Master's thesis

NTNU
Norwegian University of Science and Technology

Gabriel Edward William Nichols

"Playing Chicken" with Populations

Migrant Instrumentalization and the Schengen Area

Master's thesis in European Studies
Supervisor: Anna Brigevich
May 2022

NTNU
Kunnskap for en bedre verden

Gabriel Edward William Nichols

"Playing Chicken" with Populations

Migrant Instrumentalization and the Schengen Area

Master's thesis in European Studies
Supervisor: Anna Brigevich
May 2022

Norwegian University of Science and Technology

NTNU
Kunnskap for en bedre verden

Abstract

Amidst the fall of Kabul to the Taliban in August 2021 and the scramble of international coalition partners to evacuate staff, a new instance of mass migration seemed to loom over Europe as the humanitarian situation quickly deteriorated. Spokesmen for Iran, Pakistan, and others signaled their positions on receiving new refugees, and Europe quickly responded to contain the problem, linking inducements to acquiescence. At the same time, a crisis began to brew on the borders with Belarus. Migrants, lured by the promises of easy access to the EU, found themselves stranded along the border with instructions on how to best penetrate the hastily constructed obstacles separating Belarus from its Schengen neighbors. These and other examples illustrate a different type of threat that has become common in recent decades. This threat, a form of coercive bargaining, causes several problems for a conventional understanding of power and coercion in international relations. For while conventional forms of coercion—economic sanctions, military force, etc.—favor the stronger actor, migrant instrumentalization through the use of "demographic bombs" has been shown to be a powerful tool of weaker states. While scholars might quickly point to EU externalization and securitization in regard to migration, this paper adopt a different approach. In it, I examine instances of external actors actively exploiting or manipulating these population flows to achieve political ends vis a vis the EU. This is done through the novel use of the "macro-comparative" methodology of Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) to examine instances of instrumentalized migration across cases from 2008-February 2022. The findings of this research suggest that migration that is instrumentalized by cooperative actors is a highly effective form of soft political coercion against the EU.

Sammendrag

Midt under Kabuls fall til Taliban i august 2021, fryktet mange i Europa en ny flyktningkrise i kaoset som fulgte, da internasjonale samarbeidspartnere forsøkte å evakuere av så mange av sine egne borgere som overhodet mulig ut av Afghanistan. Talspersoner for Iran og Pakistan, blant flere andre nasjoner, signaliserte tidlig sin motvilje mot å ta imot en strøm av nye flyktninger uten videre økonomiske insentiver. Europa svarte raskt på dette problemet ved å koble motivasjon til samarbeid. På samme tid så vi en begynnende krise ved grensen til Hviterussland. Flyktninger, lokket av et løfte om en enkel reise inn i EU, hopet seg opp ved grensen og ble instruert om hvordan de kunne komme seg forbi hindringene som var satt opp for å skille Hviterussland fra sine naboer i vest. Disse, og andre eksempler, illustrerer en ny type trussel som har blitt mer vanlig i løpet av de siste tiårene. Denne trusselen, i form av en slags tvangsforhandling, har skapt mange problemer for den konvensjonelle forståelsen av makt og tvangsbruk i internasjonale relasjoner. Mens konvensjonelle former for maktbruk, som økonomiske sanksjoner, militærmakt, osv., favoriserer den sterkeste aktøren, har instrumentalisering av flyktninger, gjennom bruken av «demografiske bomber» vært et nyttig virkemiddel for de svakere. Mange vil kanskje peke på at EU bruker eksternalisering og sekuritisering når det gjelder migrasjon, men jeg vil i denne oppgaven vise til en annen tilnærming. Jeg undersøker eksempler hvor eksterne aktører aktivt utnytter eller manipulerer strømmer av mennesker på flukt, for å oppnå politiske mål mot EU. Gjennom en «makrokomparativ» analyse, Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA), ser jeg nærmere på eksempler på instrumentalisert migrasjon i perioden 2008-februar 2022. Funnene her tyder på at migrasjon som er instrumentalisert av samarbeidsaktører, er et effektivt virkemiddel i å påvirke EU politisk.

Acknowledgements

A work like this is never an entirely solitary undertaking. In this respect, I have too many people to thank for getting me to this point and for contributing comments and suggestions along the way. Of the small group that I do name, I want to especially thank Ed Brown who enquired with the UNHCR for me concerning the topic of this paper and the members of the faculty at NTNU in the Department for Historical and Classical Studies. Before arriving I knew precious little about the EU and you all have amended that. In particular, I would like to thank Anna Brigevich as my thesis advisor who wisely told me to just go ahead and scratch the topic that I had spent some time preparing for (but didn't really care about). In addition to these, I thank my peers from the reading-room for being willing foils for my overly excited explanations—being allowed to think out-loud has helped hone many of my overly technical descriptions. Finally, I thank my family for supporting me in this work. You all have contributed so much—directly and indirectly—in this transition to Norway and during the writing process. Above all, I thank my wife who has so supported me in this process and who has borne the greatest brunt of additional work to allow me to write and develop arguments. She is the center-of-gravity for me and our precious little dudes.

soli Deo honor et gloria

The Stranger within my gates,
He may be evil or good,
But I cannot tell what powers control—
What reasons sway his mood;
Nor when the Gods of his far-off land
Shall repossess his blood.

Rudyard Kipling, *"The Stranger,"* Stanza 3

Table of Contents

Figures

Tables

Solutions

List of Abbreviations

CEM	Coercive Engineered Migration
EAC	Eastern African Community
ENP	European Neighborhood Policy
EUTF	Emergency Trust Fund for Arica
FRY	Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
GNA	Government of National Accord
ICC	International Criminal Court
IcSP	Instrument for contributing to Security and Peace
INSTEX	Instrument in support of Trade Extensions
IS	the Islamic State
ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
JAP	Joint Action Plan
KLA	Kosovo Liberation Army
LDCs	Less Developed Countries
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
QCA	Qualitative Comparative Analysis
csQCA	crisp-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis
mvQCA	multi-value Qualitative Comparative Analysis
UNHCR	UN High Commissioner for Refugees

1. Introduction

From 2010 to 2020, the number of forcibly displaced persons more than doubled, from slightly less than 40 million worldwide, to 82.4 million by the end of December 2020 (UNHCR, 2021.). Far from entering a more stable era, the proceeding decade witnessed an unprecedented increase in the displacement of populations, with some claiming crisis levels unequaled since WWII (Zanfrini, n.d.). Trends for 2021 and beyond are not encouraging, with unprecedented waves of refugees and asylum seekers exiting Taliban-controlled Afghanistan and war-ravaged Ukraine. Yet, even as these waves of migrants represent an immense challenge from a humanitarian perspective, they are perhaps even more so a political challenge for a collection of states that has increasingly "externalized" migration control outside the Schengen area.

Starkly illustrating this external pressure from migrants is the recent example of Belarus in the fall of 2021. Having been the target of extensive EU criticism and several rounds of sanctions on account of the sharp spike in political repression (Goldenziel, 2021.), Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko appeared to orchestrate what was advertised as a novel form of coercion. This coercion involved the import (or rather luring) of MENA migrants to Belarus with the promise of easy access to EU borders (primarily through Poland and Latvia). The EU was placed in a difficult position as Belarusian forces allegedly instructed these migrants how to penetrate the borders, providing them with wire clippers and other tools to be able to do so(Arraf & Peltier, 2021). While sanctions were not lifted, and the EU seemed to support the legally questionable actions of Poland and Latvia in expelling migrants/preventing access, this instrumental use of migrants brought to light a supposedly new tool in foreign policy. But despite comments to the contrary, this is far from the first policy evolution spurred by crisis migration, nor the first instrumental use of refugees as objects of coercion(Greenhill, 2022). In 2016, with tensions increasing between the EU and Turkey, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan threatened to allow concentrated numbers of migrants into southern Europe. While his efforts were successful in securing EU concessions and additional funding, Lukashenko has not been nearly as successful in achieving his own political ends.

This paper examines the impact of irregular migration on EU policy and strategic coherency. More specifically, it employs a "macro-comparative" approach to examine why certain instances of instrumentalized migration are successful in achieving policy objectives against the EU, while other instances are not. This is accomplished by employing Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA), which is a widely recognized comparative methodology in the social sciences (Rihoux & Ragin, 2009). This work draws heavily from the theoretical approach developed by Greenhill (2010), in her foundational work *Weapons of Mass Migration: Forced Displacement, Coercion, and Foreign Policy,* and draws several comparisons to her work in the discussion section of this research. As her work only examines cases of instrumentalized migration (Coercive Engineered Migration in her theory) through 2006, this research collects an original data set composed of all instances of instrumentalized migration used against the EU and Schengen member states from 2006 to February 2022. This study contributes to the literature by being the first macro-comparative study to examine instances of instrumentalized migration that target

specifically the EU. While this transnational entity has many features of a state, its sovereignty, bodies, and authorities are all dependent on individual member states. While this may provide a degree of resiliency from targeted coercion, it may also be a unique vulnerability. Ultimately this study will answer the question why do specific instances of instrumentalized migration successfully coerce the EU into policy concessions, while others do not?

This paper is structured as follows. First, it examines the wider literature that covers instrumentalized migration and EU bordering practices. Second, it discusses QCA as a methodology with a brief examination of the theoretical underpinnings and how it arrives at significance and necessity through a macro-comparative approach. Third, it presents the consolidated data with some comments on the most significant iterations of variables. Forth, it discusses the implications of the final data results while once again commenting on some of the most significant iterations and their wider implication in political theory. Finally, the paper concludes by addressing the wider implications of instrumentalized migration used against the EU particularly in context of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict.

2. Literature Review

2.1 Engineered Migration and Migration Diplomacy

While the instrumentalized use of immigration as a tool in negotiations is not a new phenomenon, it is nevertheless a subset of migration studies that has received relatively little attention within the pervading literature (Greenhill, 2010). Various explanations for this have been offered, with Greenhill citing the "camouflaged" nature of the phenomena against a backdrop of forced migration for other ends (2010; 14), while Teitelbaum has suggests it is rather because the phenomena resides at the intersection of disciplines of demography and political science (2015). A further explanation may be the lack of easy categorization in a broader typology of foreign policy tools. For while the traditional coercive tools within hard power are sanctions, military force, and bribes (Nye, 2004) migration as a foreign policy tool occupies an uncomfortable place between two extremes of the hard-power/soft-power continuum. For while it is the threat of mobilized population that coerces, it is the normative arguments that serve as the "effective cudgels" for inducing acquiescence (Greenhill, 2010, p. 58).

Of the scholarly literature that does address this, perhaps the best developed is in Greenhill (2010) where she defines the principle of "coercive engineered migration" (CEM) as a subset of migration types. This work is built on earlier works by Weiner (1992)and Teitelbaum (1984). But whereas Teitelbaum does address migration in the context of foreign policy, his differentiation between the natures of the sending and receiving countries does not specifically address the instrumentalization of migrant flows. Only in a brief aside does he address the use of migrant flows in the limited capacity by "private foreign policies" (Teitelbaum, 1984, p. 440) and the speculated "subtle use" of migrants on the sending side of foreign policy (p. 438). Weiner (1992), however, makes the first major examination of the coercive instrumentalization of migrants while contrasting the more general focus on immigration from a political economy perspective through a security lens. Significantly, he defined emigration [the sending side of immigration] as being exploitable by sending countries as an instrument where "one state seeks to destabilize another, force recognition, stop a neighboring state from interfering in its internal affairs, prod a neighboring state to provide aid or credit in return for stopping the flow, or extend its own political and economic interests..." (Weiner, 1992; pp. 102-103). Yet although he would make the case that the sending country possesses far more control of migration flows than had been previously understood, scholarly work in the latter half of the 1990s would primarily address the policy options of governments in respect to immigration, not necessarily the sending nation's role within the flow chain.

Characterized by a period that saw significant increases in migration flows, not to mention the gradual reconsolidating of the unified German state, relevant scholarly work in the 1990s demonstrated a preoccupation on the policy options available for states receiving large immigration flows. Jacobsen (1996) limits the field of study to specifically cover policy options of less developed countries (LDCs) especially in their role as receiving and transit

states. Arising in this work is the broader concept of externalized pressure which attempts to encapsulate the impersonal political and normative-social forces aroused by forced migration (Jacobsen, 1996). While this demonstrates a distinctive non-agency (in contrast to very intent-driven aspects of CEM) it nonetheless sheds light on both the internal pressures manipulate by outside states as well as on policy responses available to receiving nations. From this, Jacobsen goes on to claim that LDCs have a set of similar options to those of more developed nations, these being to "do nothing," "respond negatively," or "respond positively" to refugee influxes (1996; p. 657). This distinction would align with other evolving perspectives on available foreign policy options, such as with Mandel's (1997) "confrontation," "avoidance," or "discrimination" and Weiner and Munz's (1997) typology. The former of these additionally notes a wider change in immigration literature, this being a new preoccupation with the "liability" of immigration rather than as an economic asset (Mandel, 1997;p. 77). Weiner and Munz (1997) while echoing Jacobsen (1996), expands into the foreign policy dimension of migration where states can elect to develop better instruments for the containment of refugee flows, accept those flows, or take external (coercive) action against senders to prevent those flows. The last of these policy options resonates more broadly with the literature during the period, underscoring the normative mandate of intervention. This aspect is also highlighted by Keely (1996) who emphasizes the perception of threat being the primary motivator for the sending of humanitarian aid to nations experiencing large immigration influxes(rather than actual humanitarian motivations). Underscoring the identitarian threat of migrant influxes to receiving nations, it is this aspect that can justify military responses to major migration crises, where to do so is an act of "self-defense" (Keely, 1996; p. 1060).

The Kosovo conflict served as an ideal case study for the evolving of theory behind responses to engineered crisis migration. Hayden (1999) examined this case in detail, noting in particular the attempted instrumentalization of migration by Yugoslavian President Milosevic and the Kosovo Liberation Army, whose displacement of Albanians was to both internationalize the conflict, galvanize the local population, and place pressure on oppositional forces. Nevertheless, while he acknowledges that the displacement of refugees was a central aspect of the military strategy, he does not define precisely what aspect it played in a wider context (Hayden, 1999, p. 62). A more precise understanding of coercive use of migration and displacement would not arise until the formulation of subtypes within Greenhill's (2008) broader examination of the phenomena of coercive engineered migration (CEM), which she would apply to not only the Kosovo conflict, but to a larger examination of the phenomena historically.

The publication of Kelly M. Greenhill's *Weapons of Mass Migration* in 2010 marked a significant development in the understanding of the instrumentalization of migration as a subset within immigration policy. Building on her initial publication in 2008, which was particularly relevant in the discussion of how CEM impacts liberal democracies, she highlights the normative aspect engineered migrant crises (Greenhill, 2010). This normative pressure applied by a challenger leverages the conflict between espoused values, and political decision-making (Greenhill, 2010). This aspect, she terms the "hypocrisy cost," which is the "symbolic political costs that can be imposed when there exists a real or perceived disparity between a professed commitment to liberal values and norms and demonstrated actions that contravene such a commitment" (Greenhill, 2010; 4). In

accordance with this principle, she notes that democracies (including the EU) are particularly susceptible to this form of coercion because of the relative transparency of decision making processes and the codified commitment to human rights associated with migration commitments (Greenhill, 2010). While aspects of this body of theory would be applied and frequently cited in later research, the study of instrumentalized migration would remain relatively underrepresented in the literature until at least 2015 and the escalation of the Syrian migration crisis (Teitelbaum, 2015). Following that period, however, various studies would begin to examine the broader aspects of foreign policy and migration even as closer employment of her principles would be applied to current case studies (see for example Gokalp Aras, 2019).

Of the scholars that have drawn from Greenhill's framework, Tsourapas (2017) stands out as being the most distinct. Initially borrowing the term "migration diplomacy" from Thiollet (2011), Tsourapas goes to great length to differentiate migration diplomacy from CEM, although remarkable similarities remain (2017). Within this concept he defines two subtypes, these being the "cooperative" and "coercive forms," with the later defined "as the threat or act by a state, or coalition of states to affect either migration flows to/from a target state or its migrant stock as a punishment, unless the target state acquiesces to an articulated political or economic demand" (Tsourapas, 2017, pp. 2370-2371). While the "cooperative" aspect of migration diplomacy does contribute to the examination of perhaps a less aggressive instrumentalized migration, the distinction otherwise seems somewhat forced. Rather, aspects of "migration diplomacy" are already captured in the roles of transit states as defined in Greenhill's earlier work, especially those of the "opportunist" and "agent provocateurs" (2010).

Adamson and Tsourapas (2019) would go on to elaborate on this earlier development of "migration diplomacy" by applying this framework to the EU and the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP). Most significantly, it is how a nation state views the benefits of engagement—either as a zero-sum game, relative gains, or positive-sum game—that most significantly impacts how migrant instrumentalization manifests (Adamson & Tsourapas, 2019, 124). This aspect of populations as a political resource is especially reminiscent of earlier observation by Teitelbaum (1984) that populations may function as another resource to be managed. Yet once again, the resource nature of immigration is well defined in even Greenhill's earliest work, specifically the original typology behind CEM. According to this, engineered migration is first backed by dispossive, exportive, or militarized objectives (Greenhill, 2008).

While various aspects of Tsourapas and Adamson (2019) does appear to recommunicate aspects of Greenhill (2010), they do add to the understanding of instrumentalization of migration by emphasizing within "migration diplomacy" a softer form of manipulation which they refer to as "bargaining chips" (p. 120). While this is a distinction more of perspective, they do highlight the aspect of withholding populations (rather than just in the sending) being a significant feature in the diplomacy of population movements (Adamson & Tsourapas, 2019). This particular difference is a significant divergence from the main focus of Greenhill's work which emphasizes the threat of sending, rather than the threat of withholding (Greenhill, 2008, 2010).

2.2 EU Border Externalization

In context of a greater EU focus, and occurring in parallel with the development of theory surrounding the instrumentalization of migration, various scholars have observed a change in the EU approach to migration (Adamson & Tsourapas, 2019; Boswell, 2003; Panebianco, 2020). This focus on migration primarily concerns the various policy changes of the EU, especially the "externalization" of the policy and the "securitization" that results. The securitization aspect of this debate not surprisingly mirrors the general shift in focus from the political economy to the foreign/security policy of immigration, while the externalization of migration policy has the 1999 Tampere summit as its formal implementation (Geddes & Hadj-Abdou, 2018; 153) Both of these features of EU policy in regards to migration feature heavily in literature, with various case studies being applied to each aspect (Panebianco, 2020; Scipioni, 2018). Athanasopoulos (2020) charts this development as being especially impacted by the evolution of EU asylum policies. Critical to his assessment of migration is the evolution in border policing, as it relates to neofunctionalist and intergovernmental debate with the Schengen Agreement setting the stage for eventual conflict. Defining distinct phases in externalization, the Dublin Convention (1990), the Dublin II Regulation (2003) and the Dublin III Regulation would each mark a progressive "spillover" in integration which would lead to both the pursuit of contradictory policies of fortification and internal cooperation (Köpping Athanasopoulos, 2020; 81).

Using a neofunctionalist approach, he also highlights how rhetorical "framing" serves an important role in justifying externalization of migration issues, allowing for an emphasis on illegal immigrants rather than refugees (Athanasopoulos 2020). This perspective is also employed by Scipioni (2018), who emphasizes the cyclical failures of EU institutions as being drivers for greater integration while also producing a sort of cyclical crisis. Especially inherent in the EU system, and as a driver for a crisis of policy, he argues, are integral aspects of "weak monitoring, lack of policy harmonization, low solidarity, and absence of central institutions" (Scipioni 2018; p. 1358). While Scipioni (2018) defines this cyclical process of integration along migration policy lines as cyclical—a "falling forward"—in the realm of securitization, Panebianco (2019) describes the securitization of migration policy as being one of "spiraling." While she does not address the instrumentalization of the issues, which are core to this paper, she nevertheless highlights the aspects of politicizations that are critical in escalation of the securititization of policy as well as in the inter-EU contestation between institutional bodies (Panebianco 2019). The use of framing within the contestation and formation of EU migration policy is also reflected in the broader survey of EU leaders conducted by Geddes and Hadj-Abdou (2018) which observed that leaders within the institutions do typically understand the nuances of issues, but are rather limited by the political and domestic costs of selecting specific policies or pursuing reform. This is in contrast to some approaches that attribute incoherency to either the lack of expert information or the outright rejection of expert advice (Geddes & Hadj-Abdou 2018).

What is significant from this overview? The core principle to be examined in this paper is the instrumentalization of migrants to achieve coercive political objective by third party states or actors. This is most clearly reflected in Greenhill's (2008; 2010; 2016) theory of coercive engineered migration (CEM). While she is the primary scholar that specifically addresses this subset of migratation, the instrumental use of migrants is also captured in the work of

Tsourapas (2017) and Tsourapas and Adamson (2019) with the principle of migrant diplomacy. These aspects of migration are informed by general developments in EU policy, particularly its externalization and securitization in recent years, especially following the Arab Spring of 2015 time-frame. The threat to the EU after 2015 is also captured by former European Council President Donald Tusk, who remarked in 2016 that Europe had barely 2 months before the fall of the Schengen Zone and—possible—the EU itself on account to migration (as cited in Greenhill 2016). These principles are central in developing a methodology for assessing EU outcomes in respect to external instrumentalization of immigration, while considering the framing and politicization strategies of relevant actors. As both of these theoretical basis deal with the use of migrants in achieving political gains, this paper employs the simplified term "instrumentalized migration" or "instrumentalization" as it is a term easily conceptualized as it relates to migrants while also capturing the relative lack of agency, noted in various scholars such as Weiner (1992), Teitlebaum (1984), and others. While this term does not make a distinction between harder and softer forms of this phenomena—addressed above in the works of Greenhill (2010) versus that of Tsourapas (2017)—the amount of overlap between CEM and migration diplomacy would seem to permit a simplification for the sake of clarity. Regardless of whether an external state or actor uses a more coercive or diplomatic tone, ultimately the migrants caught between remain a means to a political ends.

3. Methodology

As has been previously stated, this research paper examines the interplay of factors that has resulted in the successful coercion of the EU by individual nation states through instrumentalized migration. Where this research contributes to the wider academic literature is in its focus on the EU specifically as a target for coercive exploitation through instrumentalized migration. While various scholars have addressed this topic in a general examination of EU externalization or in specific individual case studies (Boswell, 2003; Gokalp Aras, 2019; Greenhill, 2016, 2022; Üstübici & İçduygu, 2018), there is (as of this writing) no macro-level comparison of cases specific to the EU. And while Greenhill (2010) does contain a broad comparison of cases through 2006, developments in the sixteen years following that work present a wide set of highly relevant cases of which no major cross comparison has yet been attempted.

To address these cases and draw conclusions from the results, this study uses a "macro-comparative" analysis to identify factors—or combinations of these factors—that demonstrate significance and necessity in determining successful coercive attempts. This is achieved through the use of a combination of multivariable and crisp-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (mvQCA and csQCA respectively), which is a well-recognized methodology developed by Charles C. Ragin as a tool for historical political studies (Rihoux & Ragin, 2009), and which has seen a wide application in many disciplines (Roig-Tierno et al., 2017). While QCA can be used deductively (Rihoux & Ragin, 2009), in this study it is implemented in its inductive usage to identify those variables significant in the included cases. More on this methodology, case selection, and the operationalization of variables is described in the following sections.

3.1 Qualitative Comparative Analysis

As a tool in conducting comparative analysis, QCA occupies a place between quantitative and qualitative methods (Rihoux & Ragin, 2009). First developed in 1987, it "integrate[s] the best features of the case-oriented approach with the best features of the variable-oriented approach" (as cited in Rihoux & Ragin, 2009). Within this context several significant features of QCA and its subtypes are considered, before addressing the actual case selection and variable operationalization.

The first important aspect in QCA is that it employs a formal mathematical language in describing variables—even if these are in many cases qualitative variables such as the presence/absence of functioning institutions (as an example). These dichotomies are rendered into algebraic Boolean expressions which allows for comparisons across various cases. The subtypes of QCA relevant in this particular study are Crisp-Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (csQCA) and Multi-Value Qualitative Comparative Analysis (mvQCA). Whereas csQCA uses only binomials (i.e. 0,1) to describe the presence or absence of variables, mvQCA can use variables which have more than two simple values within the set. This is especially useful in the context of instrumentalized migration because sending states may demonstrate one feature among several within a limited set. A good example of this is

Greenhill's classification of cases by the size of the instrumentalized population in play (2010).

The second key aspect of QCA that requires some explanation is its fundamentally iterative nature. Unlike some qualitative methodologies that employ a formalized analysis, the researcher in QCA is forced to continuously reengage with the individual cases. This can occur for a variety of reasons, such as the need to resolve with logical contradictions or in the rejection of early posited variables (because they do not appear to provide any sufficiency). While this can be done manually, software [more on this in the next section] greatly streamlines this comparative process allowing the researcher to focus on using appropriate theory to justify variable selection and testing. While for some this may appear to be variable manipulation on the outside, this "return to the cases" is critical to the comparative testing essential to the function of QCA (Rihoux & Ragin, 2009). Any manipulation of variables is then mitigated by transparency in the process and the requisite justification of decisions throughout.

The final aspect of QCA highlighted in this section is the benefits of software. As QCA is a method that employs Boolean values to describe variables, matrix calculations facilitate the reduction of explanative factors. For the purposes of this research, I employ the readily available TOSMANA [Version 1.61] software developed by Cronquvist (2019) which was specifically designed for the use of QCA in its various types. While I do not record every iteration of QCA, I do comment on the most significant reductions and results that do occur in the data and discussion sections of this paper. This use is consistent with the practice of QCA which emphasize the reduction/summarization of data, verifying coherence across cases, hypothesis testing, conjecture testing, and in developing new theoretical arguments (Rihoux & Ragin, 2009). These aspects occur in a pseudo-sequential process as the researcher engages with the cases.

3.2 Case Selection

Per usual practices in QCA, the first part of identifying appropriate cases for comparison is in defining the observed dependent variable—in QCA terms this is labeled the "outcome" (Rihoux & Ragin, 2009) and is converted into its Boolean relationship when the variables are operationalized. For the purposes of this study, that outcome is the successful coercion of the EU [1] or the failure [0] from 2007-February 2022. After the researcher identifies the outcome, cases are then selected which are similar enough to be compared. From this point, a strategy of "Most Similar" or "Most Different" designs are used when consolidating cases (Rihoux & Ragin, 2009). I select the later of these approaches. While I will forgo an extensive discussion of these approaches, adopting the "Most Different" benefits this study as it allows for the maximum comparison across cases in order to identify more universal conclusions about the nature the phenomenon. This is accomplished by the inclusion of all cases across geographic range and challenger type with the intent of identifying what intrinsic quality to each case is significant in in determining an EU policy response.

For specific instances of instrumentalized migration, a series of steps determines which cases are selected (*Figure 1. Criteria for Case Inclusion*). This sequence is adapted from the work of Greenhill (2010) but significantly modifies several aspects to apply to this study. The primary purpose of selecting cases along these criteria is to allow for appropriate

comparison in order to identify "conjunctural causation" (Rihoux & Ragin, 2009) as it relates to instances of successful coercion by challengers.

For definitions, I use the term "challenger" to describe the actors who engage in instrumentalizing migration flows for political gains. These are typically state actors, although it may also include terrorist and other NGO entities that otherwise meet the selection criteria. The target, in this case, is always the EU itself or a Schengen-member state [this being a major controlling condition for case selection].

Two natural objections may arise to this process of case selection, with the first of these being "how can the EU be treated as a unitary actor?"[1] This criticism resonates with the wider EU literature which address EU actorness within the international environment—a fairly contentious area of scholarship which I will not extensively address here. Nevertheless, this research does treat the EU as an individual actor and solitary source of policy as many of the concessions sought by challenger states are within the economic domain—this being a generally stable domain for EU actorness. Additionally, from a diplomatic standpoint, many of these challengers consider the EU itself a relatively unitary actor with many of these appointing permanent ambassadors to the EU. Given these factors, this research maintains the EU as a unitary actor whose targeting is a suitable criteria for case selection, albeit one that can also be indirectly targeted through its individual members.

[1] This initial criticism was voiced during an early workshop in which I presented *Figure 1. Criteria for Case Selection*. The scholar noting this highlighted the frequently contentious and differentiated nature of the EU and the subsequent difficulty in truly defining the EU as a unitary actor.



Figure 1. Criteria for Case Inclusion

The second criticism that arises in the case-selection process is in the inclusion of Schengen area states as targets with these, in some cases, not actually being EU members. Why is this criteria used and why is it important in contributing to an assessment of instrumentalized migration against the EU? Exploiting the differentiated nature of EU member states, various interests seek to influence EU policy through the constituent members. This has been displayed in such venues as the competing state interests over hosting for the Galileo satellite program, in EU energy policy, and in other venues. When a state is effectively able to project its own interests upon EU policy making, "uploading" occurs, a phenomenon noted throughout EU studies literature (see for example (Batory, 2014). As this relates to immigration and instrumentalized migration, the Schengen serves as a defacto free-movement area. This means that border penetration by migrants of any one of the Schengen member states places pressure on the rest of the members and, as a result, the EU. Consequently, a challenger state can pressure the EU through the targeting of individual members. This has been displayed in many of the included cases where the predominate migrant flow placed pressure on only one member state, yet the ultimate policy objectives of the challenger state targeted the EU. The potentially cascading impacts of migrant border penetration were especially on display during the height of the

immigration crisis of 2015 where European Council President Donald Tusk predicted the collapse of the Schengen area itself if immigration concerns were not resolved (*Tusk*, 2015). For these reasons, cases where individual Schengen states are targeted are included in case selection as such instances can be framed as indirect targeting of the EU itself.

One noteworthy aspect of case selection related to this is the glaring omission of EU member states as challengers themselves. Why has this been done? While it is true that instances of instrumentalized migration have occurred via Schengen-member states[2], the exclusive venues for influence that membership allows render these instances as non-comparable to others originating from an outside challengers. For the purposes of this study, these have been excluded although an aspect of this is captured in the operationalization of variables [more on this in the following section].

With these assumptions considered, this study has identified twenty-one instances of instrumentalized migration being used against the EU by external actors from 2008-February 2022. These cases are each specifically addressed in *Annex A* of this document, although they are also summarized in *Table 1. Cases of Instrumentalized Migration*. Given the relatively limited access to documents and officials, however, this number is likely significantly lower than the actual number of occurrences due to its "often camouflaged nature" (Greenhill 2010). Adding to this is the built-on incentive of political leaders to obscure these instances of leveraged diplomatic engagements on account of the inherent shame of acquiescing to weaker political opponent, a situation Greenhill labels "hypocrisy cost" (2010). Such attempts are underscored with concrete examples—such as the rumored secret meeting of EU representatives with African counterparts in the Spring following the Valetta Conference on Migration (Plaut, 2016). As a result, while this case set has attempted to be as comprehensive as possible, future research will likely expand this selection.

[2] During the intense period where EU ministers were evaluating Greek financial reforms, Greek Defense Minister Panos Kammenos threatened the EU with unleashing a "flood" of migrants if a decision was not reached to the liking of Greece. More specifically, he stated "If Europe leaves us in the crisis, we will flood it with migrants, and even worse for Berlin if in that wave of millions of economic migrants there will be some jihadis of the Islamic State too" (Pozzebon, n.d.). While there were certainly other reasons to continue to support Greece from a financial stability perspective, the EU did not long afterward commit to mobilize an additional 35 billion euros from both the European Structural and Investment Fund and the Agricultural Funds to maintain solvency and stimulate the Greek economy (A New Start for Jobs and Growth in Greece, n.d.) While it is difficult to determine how much of this occurred on account of Schengen-threats by Greek politicians, that the EU considered these threats as significant is made evident by events during December 2015 when the EU threatened to revoke Greece's access to the Schengen zone on account of noncompliance with border security mandates (Carassava, n.d.). This internal controversy would very nearly reach crisis levels again when the EU draft report would find that Greece had "seriously neglected its obligations" ("Migrant Crisis," 2016). This occurred during a period where migrant fears had increasingly arisen both with the threat of ISIS in Libya and in the wider immigration crisis of 2015.

Timeframe	Challenger - Brief Description	Principal Target	Principal Route	Result
2007 - 2008	Libya - Italian Colonial Apology	Italy/EU	Central Mediterranean Route	Success
2011	Libya - Gaddafi's Response to EU Airstrikes	EU	Central Mediterranean Route	Failure
2013	Kenya - Closing Refugee Camps	EU	Central Mediterranean Route	Success
2015	ISIS - "Psychological Weapon"	EU	Central Mediterranean Route	Failue
2015	Russia - Norwegian Storskog Crisis	Norway/EU	Arctic Route	Failure
2016	Russia - Finnish "Arctic Route" Border Crisis	Finland/EU	Arctic Route	Success
2015 - 2016	Turkey - EU-Turkey Border Deal	Greece/EU	Eastern Mediterranean/Land Border/Black Sea Route	Success
2016	Jordan - Syrian "Boiling Point"	EU	Eastern Mediterranean Route	Success
2016	Kenya - Closing of Dadaab Refugee Camp	EU	Eastern Mediterranean/Central Mediterranean	Success
2016	Niger - 1 Billion to Tackle Migration	EU	Central Mediterranean	Success
2017	Mali - Dam Ready to Burst	EU	Central Mediterranean	Success
2019	Egypt - "Anti Smuggling Law" and Power Consolidation	EU	Eastern Mediterranean	Success
2019	Morocco - Spanish Lobbying and the Western Route	Spain/EU	Western Mediterranean	Success
2019-2020	Turkey - Erdogan's Offensive and Operation "Spring Shield"	Greece/EU	Eastern Mediterranean/Land Border/Black Sea Route	Failure
2021	Kenya - Threatens Closing of Dadaab and Kakuma Refugee Camps	EU	Central Mediterranean Route	Success
2021	Belarus - Syrians on the Land Borders	Poland, Latvia/EU	Land Borders	Failure
2021	Iran - Afghan Refugees	EU	Eastern Mediterranean/Land Border/Black Sea Route	Failure
2021	Pakistan - Afghan Refugees	EU	Eastern Mediterranean/Land Border/Black Sea Route	Success
2021	Taliban - Afghan Refugees	EU	Eastern Mediterranean/Land Border/Black Sea Route	Failure
2022	Senegal - FRONTEX Outpost	Spain/EU	Western Africa Route	Success
2021 - 2022	Morocco - Western Sahara	Spain/EU	Western Mediterranean Route	Success

Table 1. Cases of Instrumentalized Migration

Lastly, in regards to case selection, a critical assessment of those included will reveal several that would appear to be missing even without extensive research. These would be an instance of Libyan instrumentalization in the post-Gaddafi timeframe and an instance of Algerian instrumentalization in the same period following the Arab Spring. These notable absences are due to a lack of *capacity* to control migration on the part of Libyan political actors, and a lack of *intent* on the part of Algerian actors—largely due to a carefully cultivated "dogma of non-interference" (Zardo & Loschi, 2022, p. 160). These notable absences have had wide-ranging consequences for EU migration and securitization policy, and are further discussed in later sections.

3.3 Variable Operationalization

To reiterate the goals of this study, this research paper attempts to explain why specific instances of instrumentalized migration successfully coerce the EU into policy concessions, while other instances do not. As has already been explained, the main outcome binomial is successful coercion [1] or failed coercion [0] of the EU by the challenger state or entity. For the first iteration of the QCA analysis, the independent variables are limited to 4-7 variables per good methodological practices. Naming conventions for these variables follow recommended patterns under the mvQCA subtype. The initial variables to be tested are captured in *Table 2. Initial Variables*. A short explanation of these variables, their theoretical sources, and the sub-hypothesis[3] linked to the outcome follows the table. In the actual conducting of the process, more variables will be added/replace existing variables per the normal conduct of QCA. The most significant additions and iterations will be noted in the following sections.

[3] When developing individual variables to be tested as part of QCA, the researcher is encouraged to develop a hypothesis specific to the variable. Ideally, that statement should include a conclusion about the necessity and/or sufficiency of that variable (Rihoux & Ragin, 2009). For the strictly binomial variables (5/6 of the initial variables) this recommendation is adopted. For the variables that are sets of conditions [have a multi-value] these sub-hypotheses remain in statement form.

Finally, the variable type as captured in *Table 2. Initial Variables* is a simple classification of the variables into rough categories to aid in conceptualizing their nature. This does not draw from any specific theoretical background in this instance, but should be familiar as a rhetorical device when trying to distinguish between families of variables.

Variable Description	Variable (TOSMAN)	Variable Family	Sub-hypothesis	Variable Type
Sending Entity Role: Opportunist Sending Entity Role: Generator	ROLE{0} ROLE{1}	ROLE{0,1}	If the challenger is an opportunist, then they will be able to more effectively secure assistance from the EU on account of their greater ability to leverage a "victim" identity	**Attributional**
Challenger is a prior user of instrumentalized migration? [No] [Yes]	PRI{0} PRI{1}	PRI{0,1}	If the challenger has previously instrumentalized migration for coercive gains, then it is less likely to achieve its policy objectives.	
Outflow size: small Outflow size: med Outflow size: large	SIZ{0} SIZ{1} SIZ{2}	SIZ{0,1,2}	The greater the size of the migration flow the greater a challenger's ability to achieve "capacity swamping" (Greenhill 2010) hence the higher likelihood of achieving policy objectives.	**Physical**
Does the challenger share a border with a Schengen state? [No] [Yes]	BORD{0} BORD{1}	BORD{0,1}	If the challenger shares a border with a Schengen state, then the credibility of influencing a migration crisis increases along with its bargaining power.	
EU/Member State has credible responsibility for the displacement? [No] [Yes]	RES{0} RES{1}	RES{0,1}	If the target state/EU as a whole has a legitimate responsibility for the migration flow, then the "hypocrisy cost" for refusal increases as does the likelihood for acquiescence (Greenhill 2010).	**Relational**
Does the challenger have an obvious interlocutor member state within the EU? [No] [Yes]	INT{0} INT{1}	INT{0,1}	If the challenger has a Schengen-interlocutor, then its political influence increases along with the credibility of its hreats.	

Table 2. Initial Variables

ROLE{0,1}

This variables is selected for inclusion as it is a key area of differentiation noted by Greenhill (2010) in her assessment of instances of CEM. In defining these categories, I use Greenhill's own definitions where generators are "actors… who directly create or threaten to create cross-border population movements unless targets concede to their demands" (2010, p. 23). In contrast, "opportunists play no direct role in the creation of migration crises, but simply exploit for their own gain the existence of outflows generated or catalyzed by others" (Greenhill 2010, p. 30). For the purposes of this study, I have classified some cases where the challenger is acting as a host nation for a large body of refugees as a generator (e.g. Kenya), since it is the host nation that largely exercises agency over that population. Additionally, I have not included Greenhill's (2010) *agents provocateur* as a variable since no cases were observed within this time frame that would classify the challenger as such.

PRI{0,1}	Drawing from outside of strictly immigration and EU studies, this variable attempts to capture whether or not the novel use of instrumentalized migration is different from a more repeated application. In this case PRI{0} (for prior) indicates no prior use of instrumentalized migration, while PRI{1} indicates a verifiable previous use. Prior use is determined as a use of migration as a coercive tool by a specific regime. Notably, in this instance, if a major structural and regime shift has occurred, this is not considered a prior use.
SIZ{0,1,2}	This variable is another differentiating quality noted by Greenhill (2010) in her survey of cases. Given that both the strict numbers are relatively unimportant, and the difficulty in accurately determining hypothetical flows (as many of these flows are only *potential* flows) the values are a simple differentiation in terms of scale. In this case SIZ{0} (for size) is equivalent to a population flow <15,000, SIZ{1} is equivalent to a population flow 15,000 – 500,000, and SIZ{2} is equivalent to a population flow >500,000. This variable is included in the QCA assessment as the potential population flow is related to the challengers ability to effectively "capacity swamp" the target (Greenhill 2010). While Greenhill (2010) once again does not find this to have isolated causality, its conjunction alongside other variables may prove more indicative.
BORD{0,1}	Geographic proximity, although neither necessary nor sufficient as an isolated casual factor, does increase the probability of success by a challenger (Greenhill 2010). This being the case, I capture challenger proximity (BORD{1}) (for border), and lack of proximity (BORD{0}) in this binomial variable. Proximity is defined as the challenger sharing a border with a Schengen state. Not that for the purposes of this study, this proximity is not limited only land borders. Cases where states share a sea border with a Schengen state are also included as BORD{1}. This is largely due to how the chain of custody for arriving migrants would occur, and has been observed especially in the cases of Morocco and Libya.

RES{0,1}	Of the alternative explanations for predicting the success of CEM, Greenhill notes that it is the capacity of the challenger to ascribe responsibility to the target that has the greatest predictive value (2010). This relational aspect is capture in this variable, where RES{0} (for responsibility) indicates an ineffective attempt to ascribe responsibility for the migrant flow, while RES{1} indicates an effective effort to ascribe responsibility. As this is a difficult factor to assess, in assessing the classification for each in the case under this variables the type of migration flow is considered as well as relevant contextual factors and activities of present NGOs. That political actors are conscious of the value in ascribing blame in regards to immigration issues is demonstrated in various cases where ancillary rhetoric is concerned. In Greenhill's own examinations, a particularly noteworthy illustration is the example of Israeli Foreign Minister Ruth Wolf who recommended a tactic of ascribing blame to Germany in the establishment of Israel to better facilitate acceptance of Palestinian refugees (Greenhill 2010).
INT{0,1}	While most of these original variables are informed by a survey of theoretical explanations, this variable is largely included on account of an initial examination of individual cases. As has been previously addressed, policy adoption through the EU *acquis communautaire* is not one of pure "downloading," but can also be an expression of an individual member state successfully "uploading" their own policy objectives (Batory, 2014). This considered, several instances of observed successful instrumentalized migration involve an individual EU member state reinforcing the threats of challengers. These are often directly impacted by the instrumentalized migration, such as sharing a border with the challenging state. These enabling member states I label "interlocutors" for the purpose of this study. In these instances, INT{0} indicates the lack of an apparent interlocutor on behalf of the challenger, while INT{1} indicates an apparent interlocutor. As is recorded in the sub-hypothesis in *Table 2. Initial Variables*, it is predicted that the presence of an interlocutor will have a strong conjunctural causation to the success/failure of instrumentalized migration as the presence of such indicates a particularly powerful vested interest arguing on behalf of a challenger.

Variables that arise during the course of the iterations will be summarized in the data, along with any specific comments on why they arose and their applicability. This is a fundamental aspect of the iterative nature of QCA. Finally, while the intent of the study is not to theory test Greenhill's (2010) conclusions, due to the significance of her contribution to the area of study a degree of theory testing is unavoidable. Should her conclusions be correct, no single factor will be necessary or sufficient as a determinant for success. Based on her data, the variable that is likely to be correlationally significant is RES{0,1} which most closely aligns to the primary explanative factor in her research.

4. Data

In the following sub-sections to this chapter, summaries and decisions are presented in the iterating of the data. This is captured in three separate (consolidated) iterations with justifications for changes following each. The format of the consolidated iteration is derived from the TOSMANA [Version 1.61] software as are any figures included in each iteration. Any relevant notes will follow in the applicable sub section.

4.1 First Iteration [Original Variables]

Settings:
Minimizing: 1
including: C R

Truth-Table:

Challenger - Brief Description	ROLE{0,1}	PRI{0,1}	SIZ{0,1,2}	BORD{0,1}	RES{0,1}	INT{0,1}	RESULT
Russia - Norwegian Storskog Crisis	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Niger - 1 Billion to Tackle Migration	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
Senegal - FRONTEX Outpost	0	0	1	0	0	1	1
Jordan - Syrian "Boiling Point", Egypt - "Anti Smuggling Law" and Power Consolidation	0	0	1	0	1	0	1
Morocco - Spanish Lobbying and the Western Route	0	0	1	1	0	1	1
Iran - Afghan Refugees(0), Pakistan - Afghan Refugees(1)	0	0	2	0	0	0	C
Turkey - EU-Turkey Border Deal	0	0	2	1	1	1	1
Russia - Finnish "Arctic Route" Border Crisis	0	1	0	1	0	0	1
Libya - Italian Colonial Apology(1), Libya - Gaddafi's Response to EU Airstrikes(0)	0	1	1	0	0	0	C
Belarus - Syrians on the Land Borders	0	1	1	1	0	0	0
Morocco - Western Sahara	0	1	1	1	0	1	1
Turkey - Erdogan's Offensive and Operation "Spring Shield"	0	1	2	1	1	0	0
ISIS - "Psychological Weapon"(0), Mali - Dam Ready to Burst(1)	1	0	1	0	0	0	C
Taliban - Afghan Refugees	1	0	2	0	0	0	0
Kenya - Closing Refugee Camps, Kenya - Closing of Dadaab Refugee Camp, Kenya - Threatens Closing of Dadaab and Kakuma Refugee Camps	1	1	1	0	0	0	1

Result(s):

INT{0,1}{1} + (Turkey - EU-Turkey Border Deal+Morocco - Spanish Lobbying and the Western Route+Senegal - FRONTEX Outpost+Morocco - Western Sahara)

PRI{0,1}{1}SIZ{0,1,2}{0} + (Russia - Finnish "Arctic Route" Border Crisis)

SIZ{0,1,2}{1}BORD{0,1}{0} (Kenya - Closing Refugee Camps,Kenya - Closing of Dadaab Refugee Camp,Kenya - Threatens Closing of Dadaab and Kakuma Refugee Camps+Jordan - Syrian "Boiling Point",Egypt - "Anti Smuggling Law" and Power Consolidation+Niger - 1 Billion to Tackle Migration+Senegal - FRONTEX Outpost)

Solution 1. Original Variables

The above image represents the original solution where all original variables were included. These variables were reinterrogated per the normal process of QCA and the various clumping of cases examined. And while with this initial testing of cases, little useful information is apparent at first glance, several phenomena are nonetheless useful for future iterations. The decision points associated with these observations are included below.

Contradiction Results (C)

Several *logical contradictions* are apparent in the output. These are cases that have the same set of independent variables but differing results for the dependent variable (successful coercion). These can often indicate the presence of an unidentified intervening variable (Rihoux & Ragin, 2009), and have occurred with the pairings of Libya's earlier (2007-2008) and later (2011) instrumentalization under Gaddafi, and with the instrumentalization of Afghani migrants by Iran (2021) and Pakistan (2021), and with ISIS (2015) and Mali (2017). When examining the cases qualitatively two other logical contradictions that become apparent (that are not visible in the initial iteration) is Russia's instrumentalization of migrants targeting Norway (2015) and Finland (2016), and Turkey's initial instrumentalization (2015-2016), and the failure to do so during Operation "Spring Shield"

(2019-2020). These cases point to the need for an additional intervening variable that can resolve these contradictions.

PRI{0,1}

RES{0,1}

INT{0,1}

While these variables do have some influence on the reduced solution, in general when continuing to engage with the cases they seem to primarily individualize each. What does appear to be significant, however, is the type of relationship between the challenger and the target, especially if that target is also an individual member state in addition to the EU itself. This is demonstrated through the significance of the INT{0,1} variable. To better capture the element of relationship between challenger and target therefore, I am removing the PRI{0,1},RES{0,1}, and INT{0,1} variables, and am adding a variable that captures that relationship in way which reflects power structures. Drawing from Nye (2004), I am going to assume

BAD{0,1}

that the type of power dynamic in place (Hard vs. Soft power) may impact the relationship of actors. As a result, I will create a new variable which is coded as BAD{0,1} (for "bad" guy). As instrumentalized migration is a coercive tool (Greenhill, 2010), it is plausible that a pre-existing target-challenger coercive relationship may impact the effectiveness of the "demographic bombs" (Greenhill, 2010) of instrumentalized migration. The specifics of this variable are recorded below.

Is the challenger already engaged in a coercive foreign policy dynamic with the target? (defined as sanctions or an ongoing adversarial military operation) [No] [Yes]	BAD{0} BAD{1}	BAD{0,1}	If the challenger is already engaged in a coercive dynamic with the target, then the relative severity of the threat is reduced and thus less likely to result in success.	**Relational**

4.2 Second Iteration [Removed: PRI{0,1},RES{0,1},INT{0,1} Added: BAD{0,1}

Settings:

Minimizing: 1

including: C R

Truth-Table:

Challenger - Brief Description	ROLE{0,1}	BAD{0,1}	SIZ{0,1,2}	BORD{0,1}	RESULT
Libya - Italian Colonial Apology, Jordan - Syrian "Boiling Point", Niger - 1 Billion to Tackle Migration, Egypt - "Anti Smuggling Law" and Power Consolidation, Senegal - FRONTEX Outpost	0	0	1	0	1
Morocco - Spanish Lobbying and the Western Route, Morocco - Western Sahara	0	0	1	1	1
Pakistan - Afghan Refugees	0	0	2	0	1
Turkey - EU-Turkey Border Deal	0	0	2	1	1
Russia - Norwegian Storskog Crisis(0), Russia - Finnish "Arctic Route" Border Crisis(1)	0	1	0	1	C
Libya - Gaddafi's Response to EU Airstrikes	0	1	1	0	0
Belarus - Syrians on the Land Borders	0	1	1	1	0
Iran - Afghan Refugees	0	1	2	0	0
Turkey - Erdogan's Offensive and Operation "Spring Shield"	0	1	2	1	0
Kenya - Closing Refugee Camps, Kenya - Closing of Dadaab Refugee Camp, Mali - Dam Ready to Burst, Kenya - Threatens Closing of Dadaab and Kakuma Refugee Camps	1	0	1	0	1
ISIS - "Psychological Weapon"	1	1	1	0	0
Taliban - Afghan Refugees	1	1	2	0	0

Result(s):

BAD{0,1}{0}

(Libya - Italian Colonial Apology,Jordan - Syrian "Boiling Point",Niger - 1 Billion to Tackle Migration,Egypt - "Anti Smuggling Law" and Power Consolidation,Senegal - FRONTEX Outpost+Kenya - Closing Refugee Camps,Kenya - Closing of Dadaab Refugee Camp,Mali - Dam Ready to Burst,Kenya - Threatens Closing of Dadaab and Kakuma Refugee Camps+Turkey - EU-Turkey Border Deal+Morocco - Spanish Lobbying and the Western Route,Morocco - Western Sahara+Pakistan - Afghan Refugees)

Solution 2. Second Iteration Variables

As is clearly evident in the above iteration, there is a strong demonstrated correlation with the BAD{0} variable, where the BAD{0} condition would appear to be the necessary condition for the presence of a successful case of instrumentalized migration. Nevertheless, one logical contradiction occurs in the cases of Russia's instrumentalization along the Arctic Route. This set of cases and variables was re-examined in various configurations with the instance remaining as logical contradiction.

Contradiction Results (C)

The *logical contradiction or* "contradictory configurations" (Rihoux & Ragin, 2009) that appeared in the prior iteration once again return, excluding the cases of instrumentalized migration surrounding Afghanistan in 2021. This indicates the presence of an additional intervening variable that differentiates between Russia's successful coercion of Finland in 2016, and its failure to coerce Norway in 2015-2016.

SIZ{0,1,2}

Although the size of the anticipated or actual migrant stream does meaningfully differentiate between cases, as an isolated variable it is neither significant nor necessary for a successful coercive result. This is demonstrated in previous iterations and has been noted in Greenhill (2010). While her own examples do confirm this, this appears to also be relevant in the current selection. For this reason, in the next iteration I will exclude this variables, which will also allow for a better visualization of the data as all the remaining variables are simple binomials. That being said, where population is significant in instrumentalized migration is in its capacity to influence target calculations of risk. As instrumentalized migration in this fashion is fundamentally a "coercion by punishment" strategy (Greenhill 2010), the size of the migrant flow is still relevant insofar as it relates to capacity swamping. Capacity swamping, however, is more than just an aspect of incoming population size, but is also influenced by the perceived "ability of a target to accept/accommodate/assimilate a given group of migrants or refugees" (Greenhill 2010, p. 38). A key part to this, then, is access, almost more so than numerical size. For this reason, I will introduce a variable PERM{0,1} (for permeability) which captures the relative ease of access across a border along the primary migration route in a given case. This variable will primarily assess the condition at land and sea border access points, as irregular migration along air routes is largely externalized along air routes of migration, and controlled through airlines. Further specifics of this new variable are recorded below.

PERM{0,1}

In the specific case, is the primary route into the target's territory secure or able to be secured against the anticipated migrant flow? [No] [Yes]	PERM{0} PERM{1}	PERM{0,1}	If the target is unable to effectively limit access into their own territory from an irregular migrant flow then they are more likely to concede to the target states coercive objectives.	**Physical**

4.3 Third Iteration [Removed: SIZ{0,1,2} Added: PERM{0,1}]

Settings:

Minimizing: 1

including: C R

Truth-Table:

Challenger - Brief Description	ROLE{0,1}	BAD{0,1}	PERM{0,1}	BORD{0,1}	RESULT
Libya - Italian Colonial Apology, Jordan - Syrian "Boiling Point", Niger - 1 Billion to Tackle Migration, Egypt - "Anti Smuggling Law" and Power Consolidation, Senegal - FRONTEX Outpost	0	0	0	0	1
Turkey - EU-Turkey Border Deal, Morocco - Spanish Lobbying and the Western Route, Morocco - Western Sahara	0	0	0	1	1
Pakistan - Afghan Refugees	0	0	1	0	1
Libya - Gaddafi's Response to EU Airstrikes	0	1	0	0	0
Russia - Finnish "Arctic Route" Border Crisis	0	1	0	1	1
Iran - Afghan Refugees	0	1	1	0	0
Russia - Norwegian Storskog Crisis, Turkey - Erdogan's Offensive and Operation "Spring Shield", Belarus - Syrians on the Land Borders	0	1	1	1	0
Kenya - Closing Refugee Camps, Kenya - Closing of Dadaab Refugee Camp, Mali - Dam Ready to Burst, Kenya - Threatens Closing of Dadaab and Kakuma Refugee Camps	1	0	0	0	1
ISIS - "Psychological Weapon"	1	1	0	0	0
Taliban - Afghan Refugees	1	1	1	0	0

Result(s):

BAD{0,1}{0} +

(Libya - Italian Colonial Apology,Jordan - Syrian "Boiling Point",Niger - 1 Billion to Tackle Migration,Egypt - "Anti Smuggling Law" and Power Consolidation,Senegal - FRONTEX Outpost+Kenya - Closing Refugee Camps,Kenya - Closing of Dadaab Refugee Camp,Mali - Dam Ready to Burst,Kenya - Threatens Closing of Dadaab and Kakuma Refugee Camps+Turkey - EU-Turkey Border Deal,Morocco - Spanish Lobbying and the Western Route,Morocco - Western Sahara+Pakistan - Afghan Refugees)

PERM{0,1}{0}BORD{0,1}{1}

(Russia - Finnish "Arctic Route" Border Crisis+Turkey - EU-Turkey Border Deal,Morocco - Spanish Lobbying and the Western Route,Morocco - Western Sahara)

Solution 3. Third Iteration Variables (Positive Value)

Settings:

Minimizing: 0

including: C R

Truth-Table:

Challenger - Brief Description	ROLE{0,1}	BAD{0,1}	PERM{0,1}	BORD{0,1}	RESULT
Libya - Italian Colonial Apology, Jordan - Syrian "Boiling Point", Niger - 1 Billion to Tackle Migration, Egypt - "Anti Smuggling Law" and Power Consolidation, Senegal - FRONTEX Outpost	0	0	0	0	1
Turkey - EU-Turkey Border Deal, Morocco - Spanish Lobbying and the Western Route, Morocco - Western Sahara	0	0	0	1	1
Pakistan - Afghan Refugees	0	0	1	0	1
Libya - Gaddafi's Response to EU Airstrikes	0	1	0	0	0
Russia - Finnish "Arctic Route" Border Crisis	0	1	0	1	1
Iran - Afghan Refugees	0	1	1	0	0
Russia - Norwegian Storskog Crisis, Turkey - Erdogan's Offensive and Operation "Spring Shield", Belarus - Syrians on the Land Borders	0	1	1	1	0
Kenya - Closing Refugee Camps, Kenya - Closing of Dadaab Refugee Camp, Mali - Dam Ready to Burst, Kenya - Threatens Closing of Dadaab and Kakuma Refugee Camps	1	0	0	0	1
ISIS - "Psychological Weapon"	1	1	0	0	0
Taliban - Afghan Refugees	1	1	1	0	0

Result(s):

BAD{0,1}{1}PERM{0,1}{1} +

(Russia - Norwegian Storskog Crisis,Turkey - Erdogan's Offensive and Operation "Spring Shield",Belarus - Syrians on the Land Borders+Iran - Afghan Refugees+Taliban - Afghan Refugees)

BAD{0,1}{1}BORD{0,1}{0}

(Libya - Gaddafi's Response to EU Airstrikes+ISIS - "Psychological Weapon"+Iran - Afghan Refugees+Taliban - Afghan Refugees)

BAD{0,1}{1}BORD{0,1}{0} +

(Libya - Gaddafi's Response to EU Airstrikes+ISIS - "Psychological Weapon"+Iran - Afghan Refugees+Taliban - Afghan Refugees)

PERM{0,1}{1}BORD{0,1}{1}

(Russia - Norwegian Storskog Crisis,Turkey - Erdogan's Offensive and Operation "Spring Shield",Belarus - Syrians on the Land Borders)

Solution 4. Third Iteration Variables (Negative Value)

The third (consolidated) iteration of QCA with the introduction of the variable PERM{0,1} results in a solution without any contradictions and one which presents a meaningful set of qualitative factors This conclusion is considered in the discussion section below. Notice that for the final iteration, the final solution is presented for both the negative (RESULT value of 0) and the positive (RESULT value of 1).[4] Additionally, I include the visualization of the final result (*Figure 2. Visualized Solution*), noting that the solutions for both positive and negative presence are demonstrated in the green/pink placements within figure. This figure is essentially a Venn diagram of values.

[4]The previous iterations include the output for only the positive outputs (i.e. a case of successful coercion of the EU through instrumentalized immigration). In this final iteration I solve for the negative presence (the failure of coercion) in addition to the positive value. This has not changed any part of the QCA process and solving for both is a normal aspect of (especially) csQCA where observing both solutions allows for verification of the solution (Rihoux & Ragin, 2009).



Figure 2. Visualized Solution

5. Discussion

QCA is a powerful tool that is useful in comparing multiple factors across cases and in identifying potentially significant qualitative aspects of these cases. In the previous section, that process is demonstrated along while also charting various "decision points" in the process in order to present a transparent evaluation of factors. Having considered the various qualities of each case of instrumentalized migration, and having introduced several additional variables, the following minimized solutions for the [1] outcome[5] demonstrate a conjunctive correlation.



Figure 3. Consolidated Solutions

5.1 Implications of the Prime Solution

Figure 3. Consolidated Solutions displays the combination of factors that results in a successful (or unsuccessful) instrumentalization of migrants to achieve policy objectives. These minimized solutions, which follow the standard format for results within csQCA, have several important implications for EU foreign policy as it relates to instrumentalized migration. These are the relative effectiveness of this tactic when undertaken by a challenger that is not in a contesting relationship with the EU and the importance of a secured border in guarding against the coercive use of migration.

The first of these implications—the effectiveness of instrumentalized migration when used by a **non-contesting challenger**—is demonstrated in first portion of [1] result. What this indicates is that if a state that instrumentalizes migration is on friendly terms with the EU (not currently subject to sanctions or a hostile military operation), that challenger will

[5] Notice that these represents a "mirror image" of each other. Solving for the positive and negative solution is a common procedure when considering various iterations of QCA.

succeed in gaining its policy objectives, regardless of relative proximity. If, however, that challenger is already engaged in a coercive relationship with the EU, that case of instrumentalization will fail unless that challenger already shares a border with a Schengen state and the crossing cannot be effectively secured. This seems to validate the sub-hypothesis of both the BAD{0,1} and BORD{0,1} variables where the severity of the coercive use of migrants is reduced because of the already-present conflict, as is the severity of the threat on account of its relative removal from the target. Cases within the data that highlight this aspect include the difference between Pakistan, Iran, and the Taliban's attempted instrumentalization of Afghani refugees in 2021 after the fall of Kabul. While all three states attempted to instrumentalize the Afghani refugees (see their respective entries in *Annex A. Case Profiles* of this document) only Pakistan seemed able to achieve its policy objectives. While the other aspects of these cases remained essentially the same, the Taliban already had in place large sectoral sanctions and asset freezes in, while Iran remained restricted under the US sanctions regime to which the EU had reluctantly abided by and to which had also maintaining their own set of sanctions((*Iran "suspends" Cooperation with EU on Multiple Fronts after Officials Blacklisted*, 2021). Pakistan, however, had made significant efforts to foster a cooperative and helpful relationship particularly through the opportunity of assisting with the evacuation of embassy staff of various Western nations (Saeed, 2021).

Another instance of this is demonstrated in the comparison of Libya's 2007-2008 case, and the attempt in 2011. While the other factors ostensibly remained the same, the key difference was that whereas in 2008 the previous array of UN sanctions had been lifted at the time and no other coercive measures were in place, in 2011 the EU had undertaken military operations in support of the GNA forces against Gaddafi. When Gaddafi threatened to create an migration "inferno" on the island of Lampedusa ("Gaddafi Wanted to Create Immigrant 'Inferno,'" 2011), however, these threats were largely ignored and EU support persisted in facilitating the revolutionary efforts of the GNA. This occurred despite a credible attempt to carry out the threatened mass migration ("Gaddafi Wanted to Create Immigrant 'Inferno,'" 2011).

Nevertheless, there are instances where a hostile state can successfully instrumentalize migrants to achieve policy objectives. This is captured in the in the second portion of the [1] solution that observes that when a contesting state does border a Schengen area state, but that state cannot appropriately secure its territory, at that time successful instrumentalized migration will occur. This is especially demonstrated in the Russian instrumentalization of migrants in the fall of 2015 against Norway (the "Storskog" crisis) and against Finland immediately afterward. At the time of the event, both states had limited diplomatic contact with Russia on account of the relatively recent annexation of Crimea. Additionally, the EU had adopted restrictive economic sanctions in July 2014, in addition to targeted individual sanctions some months before (Council of the European Union, 2014). The big difference between these two cases, however, is in the highly localized aspect of the border crossing in Norway (and the authorities capacity to respond) versus the multiple access points entering into Finland. Indeed, rhetoric from especially the Finnish side emphasized the potential flood of migrants that would Finland would be unable to stop. Norway's solution, however, employed a relatively rapid response of border forces into Russian territory that were effectively able to prevent migrants even entering to be able

to file for asylum. Swift (and questionably legal) activities in the government additionally allowed for a freeze on asylum applications. Incidentally, these actions resulted in two strongly-worded reprimands from the UNHRC in winter 2015 (Seekers, 2019). What allowed this response to occur in Norway was the relatively small border and the capacity to deploy an appropriately large response to stem the migrant flow. This did not occur in Finland, and along the route the access remained relatively permeable for the given refugee flow with Finnish officials becoming increasingly worried about the spike in asylum seekers at especially the northern crossings. Several months of increasingly high-level meetings, culminating in the signing of two bilateral agreements restricting migrant traffic across the Finnish border finally resolved the issue and ended the migrant influx. This, however, came at the expense of EU solidarity and effectively curtailed the reduction in diplomatic engagement that had been in effect since shortly after the annexation of Crimea (Szymański et al., 2016).

Illustrating the counter point to this, while Turkey had access to a much larger arsenal of potential "demographic bombs," (Greenhill, 2010) nevertheless the attempt at instrumentalizing migration in 2019-2020 failed. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan initiated a campaign into Syria to (purportedly) to enable Syrian refugees to return. While initial strikes would occur in the fall of 2019, the campaign would expand into a wider operation during the spring under the name "Spring Shield." Yet in addition to the harsh criticism that this operation invoked globally (it was largely viewed as an opportunistic strike against specifically Kurdish forces in the region) the relationship had already soured with the EU. Coinciding with the initial strikes, the EU adopted targeted sanctions against Turkey.[6] Yet another qualitative change had occurred at the border with Greece. For while in previous years that border had largely been under Turkish control, development in Greek security practices, expansion of capabilities, and in crisis response systems rendered the border relatively impermeable to Turkish exploitation. Indeed, not only was Greece hailed as the "shield" of the EU (Rankin, 2020), but immobility at the border for refugees eventually resulted in Turkey relenting and withdrawing the mobilized population.

Other comparisons that are relevant in this discussion are depicted by the placements of cases in their respective categories, which is shown in *Figure 2. Visualized Solution.* In this context, for the purposes of a broader discussion the second part of the solution is relatively intuitive. This indicates that a proximate border that is relatively permeable yields a high degree of vulnerability for the EU to potential coercion. Such a conclusion is partly validated in Greenhill (2010) research which highlights the threat of "capacity swamping" as one of the chief threats of CEM. Yet it is perhaps the first part of this solution—the significance of the "bad actor/good actor" relationship—that has the greatest implications for EU diplomatic engagement in the area of migration and security.

[6] These sanctions were largely adopted on account of continued Turkish drilling operations in the territorial area of Cyprus, though sanctions directly on account of the military operation had been discussed especially by france (Emmott & Irish, 2019). Even so, according to the framework of this research, although routinely an ally of the EU militarily, this results in Turkey being classified as a bad-actor—a BAD{0,1}(1) value—which is captured in the data section of this paper.

5.2 Observations on Case Groupings

Grouping Name (Primary migrant group)	**Arctic** (Afghan)	**Belarussian** (Iraqi, mixed)	**Levant** (Syrian, mixed)	**Kenyan** (Somalian)	**Center-West African** (mixed African)	**Mediterranean** (mixed African)	**Afghan** (Afghan)
Case (year)	Russia (2015) Russia (2016)	Belarus (2021)	Turkey (2015-2016) Jordan (2016) Egypt (2019) Turkey (2019-2020)	Kenya (2013) Kenya (2016) Kenya (2021)	Niger (2016) Mali (2017) Senegal (2022)	Libya (2007 – 208) Libya (2011) ISIS (2015) Morocco (2019) Morocco (2021-2022)	Iran (2021) Pakistan (2021) Taliban (2021)

Table 3. Case Groupings

Although less a direct output of the research, the general distribution of cases across time also bears some discussion as these tie into the larger implications for migration and security for the EU. These cases are generally categorized according to *Table 2. Case Groupings*.[7] From a brief examination of these, several implications are apparent, made so by the presence and absence of instances of instrumentalized migration.

The distribution of cases across time first emphasizes the impact of crisis-events. In many of these cases, specific global instances creates opportunities for exploitation. It is perhaps not surprising, then, that many of the challengers are opportunist actors in this area. This is demonstrated in the Afghan cases and by the almost routine instrumentalization that occurs in the Kenyan context which is perpetuated by the hosting of vast numbers of refugees in semi-permanent camps and by the ready access to international donors through UN and in other venues.

In Turkey, too, migrants function almost as a resource to be leveraged at appropriate times. Such actions are often reflected in the response from target governments within the EU, who have remarked on the "blackmail" of such actions (Emmott & Irish, 2019). Yet, while Turkey's instrumentalization of migrants has been perhaps the loudest, similar antecedents in population type are found in Jordan and Egypt, albeit on a quieter and smaller scale.

In considering groupings of cases, however, the absence of specific instances of instrumentalized migration incidents is also significant to EU policy and diplomatic engagement. The first major absence is in any case of instrumentalization of migrants from the Mediterranean following 2011 (accepting Morocco and ISIS' grandiose threat). While Libya had been a key partner (or exploiter) of migration with the EU in the prior years, that relationship was not perpetuated in the following period. The primary reason for this is the general lawlessness and chaos that ensured in the years following. While the GNA governed in name, control of the departure areas along the coast that had been leveraged in the years to garner EU monetary assistance was contested by localized militias and families. This effectively prevented a national level of control and inter EU-Libyan engagement, although individual European states did attempt to coopt various territorial powers. Italy, especially, would attempt to stem the large flows of migrants through direct engagement

[7] I have elected to label these grouping descriptively (and not methodologically) to aid in making relevant comparisons. Note that this is done deliberately even in instances where certain contradictions may appear (e.g. Turkey and Egypt are not part of strict interpretations of the Levant region). Additionally, Senegal is emphasized on account of its slightly different relationship with the EU on account of water access to the Canary Islands, similar in some respects to the Mediterranean cases.

with the Libyan coast guard in addition to the joint elements made available through Operation Mare Nostrum and in the following years during Operation Sophia (Micallef & Reitano, 2017.) Likewise, Algeria, although ideally situated to leverage migration flows against Europe, has largely remained a non-cooperative player. While from the outside Algeria may have appeared as a cooperative player—having signed several readmission agreements with Europe, cooperation has remained minimal even though migration has remained a central concern for Algerian policy (Zardo & Loschi, 2022) As these major transit hubs could not or would not engage in instrumentalization, this has by necessity pushed the EU focus to other areas.

This limited capacity to engage with the Mediterranean-bordering states emphasizes another absence within the case groupings, that being a larger presence of African states. While Niger, Mali, Senegal, and Kenya display some attempt at instrumentalization, these are by no means the only sources of migrants or transit-points within Africa. Potentially explaining this are the wider evolutions in European migration policy. As the Joint Action Plan (JAP) signed between Turkey and the EU would effectively establish Turkey as the EU's gatekeeper, the EU undertook another major program for the securing of European borders. Taking shape following the Valetta Summit on Migration in Malta (where the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa would be established), that policy would shift into several new directions. Most relevantly, the EU would begin to prioritize migration cooperation and engagement with nations beyond the European Neighborhood and increase the use of development aid as a tool in achieving migration policy objectives (Koch et al., 2018). Given these structural shifts, a pattern would take shape in which access to development funds would be paired with an institutional structure in these frameworks, consequently lowering the threshold for access to assistance while preventing the need for more coercive (read public) leveraging of migrant flows in many cases. This is emphasized by the opaque nature of communications immediately following and the supposed secret meeting with African leaders in the months following [more on this in the case profiles].

5.3 Qualitative Validation with Greenhill's Data

While this discussion of the QCA findings has resulted in some meaningful conclusions for the EU policy in general in the post 2008 period, its wider applicability can be tested by comparing the solution to other instances of isntrumentalized migration targeting the EU. The greatest source for this data occurs in Greenhill's (2010) examination of CEM cases globally, from which several are applicable (see *Table 3. Select Greenhill Cases*).

Timeframe	Challenger - Brief Description	Result
1989-1990s	Vietnam - Comprehensive Plan of Action	Success
1991	Albania - Movement to the Adriatic Ports	Success
1991	Poland - Eliminating Polish Debt	Indeterminate
1998-1999	Federal Republic of Yugoslavia - Milosevic's Strategy	Failure
2002	Belarus - Refusal of Entry to NATO Summit	Failure
2004	Belarus - EU Investments in Security	Failure
2004	Libya - Lifting of Sanctions	Success
2006	Libya - Further Concessions	Success

Table 4. Select Greenhill Cases

In comparing select cases from Greenhill (2010) in which the EU is listed as a target[8] for CEM, several contradictory cases are apparent (these being recorded in red). Nevertheless a consideration of these cases is instructive and lends significance to—if not the minimized solution—variables within the study.

Addressing first the Belarus cases, if the assumptions from the previous iterations of QCA were applied, then these attempts at instrumentalizing migrants should not have failed. At that time, Belarus was not subject to active sanctions nor an antagonistic military operation and hence would not be a "bad actor" according to the limits of this study. Nevertheless, what is significant is that at the time, the relationship between the EU (and NATO) with Belarus had already deteriorated on account of the questionable dealings with Belarusian President Lukashenko's reelection and increasingly oppressive activities within the country. Consequently, although previously a participant in the Partnership for Peace program (PfP) within NATO, during the summit of 2002, the Czech Republic denied a visa for Lukashenko's entry. In response to increasingly hostile diplomatic overtures, his regime would threaten an influx of migrants into EU territory (Glasser, 2002), which the EU and NATO ignored. Threats made some two years later would be similarly ignored, with the EU electing to make significant investments in territorial security instead (Greenhill, 2010). What these are illustrative of is that although not technically a "bad actor" at the time, nevertheless the significantly antagonistic relationship cultivated with the EU severely hindered Belarus' capacity to instrumentalize migrants to achieve political ends. This seems to partly support the validated solution of BAD{0,1} correlating with a success/failure of instrumentalized migration *vis a vis* the EU.

Some few years earlier, instrumentalized migration would feature heavily in the strategies employed by actors within the Kosovo conflict. In the context of interethnic conflict particularly between Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) forces, and the predominately Albanian Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), President of Yugoslavia Slobodon Milosevic attempted to instrumentalize the displaced Albanian population to achieve political ends. The goals of this instrumentalization were multiple and targeted both NATO/European participants in the conflict and the territorial neighbors in order to eliminate the KLA and secure territorial control. Short of going into a detailed discussion of the event, attempts at coercion failed, even as the KLA themselves effectively manipulated refugee flows and international opinion (see Greenhill, 2010 for a broader discussion of the scenario). Relevant to this study, however, is the characterization of Milosevic's regime by NATO and the EU, whose position was undeniably hostile. This is consistent with the findings of this research on instances of instrumentalized migration which target the EU.

Even though Libya's use of instrumentalized migration in 2004 does present a contradiction to the final conclusions of this study, it still emphasizes the significance of the inter EU-challenger relationship for successful migrant instrumentalization. Having continued to maintain sanctions against Libya, finally in 2004 these were lifted after Italy experienced a

[8] Note that while in most of these cases Greenhill (2010) lists the EU as a target, the case which I have labeled *Federal Republic of Yugoslavia - Milosevic's Strategy* only lists NATO and certain EU member states as the target. This case is nevertheless included as the threatened migrant flows would primarily effect EU states and the comparison is otherwise relevant in a consideration of variables.

sharp increase in migrant arrivals in the vicinity of the island of Lampedusa. In this instance, Libya had informed the EU that it could "no longer act as Europe's coast guard" (as cited in Greenhill 2010). This contradicts the conclusions of the research as according to the predictions of the various variables, as a "bad actor" (being subject to ongoing sanctions) Libya should not be able to have successfully coerced the EU with the threat of migrants unless it also bordered the Schengen area and that border could not be secured. While I have coded sea borders as not being technically proximate to the Schengen area, this may point to the need for reassessing qualitatively how sea borders function in the instrumentalization of migration. Alternatively, the reintroduction of a formerly assessed variable INT{0,1} may be relevant. This variable, the presence/absence of an interlocutor for the challenger, does have relevance for this case in particular. Central to the removal of sanctions, Italy had lobbied the EU for months to lift sanctions, ultimately threatening to lift sanctions unilaterally if no decision was made on account of the threat of increased migration (as cited in Greenhill 2010).

While these cases from Greenhill (2010) do highlight some of the contradictions in earlier instances, nevertheless the conclusions of the QCA study remain accurate for the observed case set. If these previous examples do provide utility to this study, it is that it reinforces the importance of the state of the EU-challenger relationship. This is that in cases of prior antagonism, the effectiveness of instrumentalized migration greatly decreases unless that actor is also a proximate state. This conclusion has wider implications for EU migration policy and European security.

6. Conclusion

Global stability is not increasing, despite greater interconnectivity and interdependence across nations and continents. If anything, that greater interconnection and sharing of information has facilitated the more rapid movement of populations across borders and nations. Within this mobility, there is risk—not only for the individuals that makeup these population flows, but also for nations that attempt to relieve the associated humanitarian crisis. As the largest donor of international aide in the world, distributing over 50 billion euro yearly in development funding (European Commission, n.d.), unwanted population movements can be a profitable investment for external actors.

This study has sought to examine the wider phenomenon of instrumentalized migration specific to the EU in the period from 2008-2022. Central to this research has been the question why do specific instances of instrumentalized migration successfully coerce the EU into policy concessions, while others do not? This question is important because in conventional understandings of power-dynamics, it is the stronger state that has the upper hand particularly in instances of coercion (Greenhill, 2010). Nonetheless, in this area, the instrumentalization of migrants seems to be a coercive tool overwhelmingly employed by actors that are traditionally regarded as weaker. This question is even more important as in some of the limited research on instrumentalized migration, the composition of the EU makes it the most vulnerable of all target types.[9]

As no concrete factor outside a conceptual "hypocricy cost" (Greenhill, 2010) can explain instances of successful coercion versus failures in coercion *vis a vi* the EU, this study employed mvQCA and csQCA in an inductive manner to draw general conclusions concerning instances of instrumentalized migration. While further research is necessary, especially given the relatively limited access to internal documents related to each case study, nevertheless several conclusions can be drawn from the final minimized solution. These, in short form, are that a key differentiator in instances of instrumentalized migration are 1) is the challenger already in a state of coercive contestation with the EU (BAD{0,1}) and 2) if the challenger is Schengen-adjacent, can the primary target state effectively secure their own borders from the "demographic bomb." These two conditions drastically impact the likely success of coercion against the EU. These conclusions also have wider implications on the understanding of power and coercion in European studies and are likely to become increasingly relevant as the current conflict in Ukraine transitions to a "long war" ("Ukraine Round-Up," 2022).

Addressing the first of these contributions, and as has been demonstrated in the discussion of this research, the most striking of these is the apparent success of cooperative states in instrumentalizing migration. Examples of this are given throughout the this paper and is

[9] Greenhill (2010) defines the "soft" liberal democracy as the most vulnerable type of target in instances of CEM. According to her typology, a "soft" liberal democracy is one in which there are high levels of political and normative liberalism. While the EU is technically not a state, as its policy-making apparatus and the expression of foreign policy are fundamentally dependent on a consensual political liberalism defined by a high level of normativity, this makes the EU particularly vulnerable—even more so when individual member states can be targeted individually to influence the whole.

captured in the first part of the solution (BAD{0,1}). As a coercive tool available to the allies of the EU, this is a significant threat to European international relations as an equivocal tool does not exist in the EU's own policy arsenal. Rather, as has been seen, the alternative is to adopt one of three potential responses. These are, as Jacobsen (1996) remarked, limited to containing, accepting, or interdicting those flows. While the EU has demonstrated all three at various times, it is the continued attempts at containing migrants that has increased the utility of instrumentalization. Ironically, it is rather the accepting of those same flows that is likely to diffuse migration as political tool of coercion (Greenhill, 2022). This is likely evidenced in the present. With Europe now truly in the greatest migration crisis since WWII (*'Staggering,'* 2022), predictions that President Putin would attempt to instrumentalize migrants (Horncastle, n.d.) have (so far) not occurred. While it is difficult to predict how the concentrations of Ukrainian refugees will impact European cohesion and resilience in the face of the Russian security threat, at the time of this writing the rapid acceptance of refugees into the EU and the adoption of enabling legislation has largely curtailed a Russian strategic use of the Ukrainian population. Instead the international community witnesses Russia attempting to forcibly relocate Ukrainian populations to advertise its own humanitarian efforts (Ilyushina, 2022). Yet as time progresses and Ukrainian refugees place an increasing pressure on the economic systems of the EU member states, an opportunity may arise for actors to instrumentalize the displaced. As real bombs continue to fall, perhaps it is the "demographic bomb" that remains the real threat to European security.

7. Bibliography

Abondo, Maurice (2021). "Blaming Refugees will not divert our attention from the consistent failures of this Government. We have a Pandemic, massive Youth unemployment, & blatant theft of Public Resources but the focus 4 u is closure of Refugee Camps so as to extort Donors. @StateHouseKenya @NziokaWaita" [Tweet]. *Twitter.com.* Retrieved 24 March 2021 from https://twitter.com/maurice_abondo/status/1374627632738893827.

Adam, I., Trauner, F., Jegen, L., & Roos, C. (2020). West African interests in (EU) migration policy. Balancing domestic priorities with external incentives. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, *46*(15), 3101–3118. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2020.1750354

Adamson, F. B., & Tsourapas, G. (2019). Migration Diplomacy in World Politics. *International Studies Perspectives*, *20*(2), 113–128. https://doi.org/10.1093/isp/eky015

Afghanistan set to be world's worst humanitarian crisis, report warns | World Food Programme. (n.d.). Retrieved April 28, 2022, from https://www.wfp.org/stories/afghanistan-climate-crisis-drought-wfp-hunger-cop26-ipc-un

Arraf, J., & Peltier, E. (n.d.). *Migrants Say Belarusians Took Them to E.U. Border and Supplied Wire Cutters—The New York Times*. Retrieved March 17, 2022, from https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/13/world/middleeast/belarus-migrants-iraq-kurds.html

Augustová, K., & Hakimi, H. (2021). *Migration from Afghanistan under the Taliban*. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES) Report.

Batory, A. (2014). Uploading as political strategy: The European Parliament and the Hungarian media law debate. *East European Politics*, *30*(2), 230–245. https://doi.org/10.1080/21599165.2013.838560

Belarus: EU adopts 5th package of sanctions over continued human rights abuses and the instrumentalisation of migrants. (2021.). Retrieved May 3, 2022, from https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2021/12/02/belarus-eu-adopts-5th-package-of-sanctions-over-continued-human-rights-abuses-and-the-instrumentalisation-of-migrants/

Boswell, C. (2003). The "External Dimension" of EU Immigration and Asylum Policy. *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)*, *79*(3), 619–638.

Bouscaren, D. (2021, September 20). His Family Fled Afghanistan. In Turkey, Other Afghans Help Them Build A New Life. *NPR*. https://www.npr.org/2021/09/20/1035455391/afghanistan-refugees-flee-taliban-turkey

Council of the European Union. (2014, July 29). *Background Note*. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/22023/144159.pdf

Council of the European Union (2021). Statement on the situation in Afghanistan. Press Release. Retrieved April 26, 2022, from https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2021/08/31/statement-on-the-situation-in-afghanistan/

Cronqvist, Lasse (2019). Tosman [Version 1.61] University of Trier. https://www.tosman.net [software developed for the performance of QCA]

Dahlkamp, J., & Popp, M. (2016, May 13). EU To Work with Despot in Sudan to Keep Refugees Out. *Der Spiegel*. https://www.spiegel.de/international/world/eu-to-work-with-despot-in-sudan-to-keep-refugees-out-a-1092328.html

De Leon Cobo, B. (2020). *Spain-Senegal relations: Beyond the repatriation agreement*. Atalayar. Retrieved April 25, 2022, from https://atalayar.com/en/content/spain-senegal-relations-beyond-repatriation-agreement

Dempsey, J. (2021). *Lukashenko Uses Migrants to Exploit Europe's Vulnerability*. Carnegie Europe. Retrieved May 3, 2022, from https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/85735

Dette er forklaringen på den plutselige asylstrømmen fra Russland | Arild Moe og Lars Rowe. (n.d.). Retrieved March 15, 2022, from https://www.aftenposten.no/meninger/kronikk/i/e78AR/dette-er-forklaringen-paa-den-plutselige-asylstroemmen-fra-russland-ar

Emmott, R., & Irish, J. (2019, October 11). Furious with Turkey, EU threatens sanctions, arms embargo. *Reuters*. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-security-turkey-eu-idUSKBN1WQ1QE

Envoy Highlights Iran's Generous Support for Refugees—Politics news. (2021, October 30). Tasnim News Agency. https://www.tasnimnews.com/en/news/2021/10/30/2598379/envoy-highlights-iran-s-generous-support-for-refugees

Erdogan threatens to open borders after European Parliament vote. *DW*. 25.11.2016. DW.COM. Retrieved March 10, 2022, from https://www.dw.com/en/erdogan-threatens-to-open-borders-after-european-parliament-vote/a-36518509

EU and Republic of Kenya launch strategic dialogue. (n.d.). Retrieved May 5, 2022, from https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/news/eu-and-republic-kenya-launch-strategic-dialogue-2021-06-22_en

EU, Mali sign deal to return refugees. (2016, December 12). Www.Euractiv.Com. https://www.euractiv.com/section/justice-home-affairs/news/eu-mali-sign-deal-to-return-refugees/

EU plans big cash offer for Afghanistan's neighbors to host refugees. (2021, August 31). POLITICO. https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-plans-afghanistan-neighbors-host-refugees/

EU Sanctions Map. (n.d.). Retrieved May 10, 2022, from https://www.sanctionsmap.eu/#/main/details/49/?search=%7B%22value%22:%22%22,%22searchType%22:%7B%7D%7D

Imenkamp, Beatrix (2020). EU-Iran: The way forward. EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service - PE 652.001 . 12.

European Commission (2015). *The EU's work in Rwanda, Kenya and Uganda*. Press Release. Retrieved March 22, 2022, from https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/MEMO_15_5655

European Commission (2016). *The European Union steps up its support to Mali*. Press Release.

European Commission (2021). Afghanistan: Commission announces €1 billion Afghan support. Press Release. Retrieved April 28, 2022, from https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_21_5208

European Parliament, (2015). SUBJECT: ISIS and illegal immigration from Libya. Parliamentary Question. Retrieved March 21, 2022, from https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-8-2015-002588_EN.html

Fernández-Molina, I., & Hernando De Larramendi, M. (2022). Migration diplomacy in a de facto destination country: Morocco's new intermestic migration policy and international

socialization by/with the EU. *Mediterranean Politics*, *27*(2), 212–235. https://doi.org/10.1080/13629395.2020.1758449

Frowd, P. M. (2020). Producing the 'transit' migration state: International security intervention in Niger. *Third World Quarterly*, *41*(2), 340–358. https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2019.1660633

Gabrielius Landsbergis: We will not allow the unity of the allies to fall victim to the Taliban. (n.d.). Retrieved March 11, 2022, from https://keliauk.urm.lt/en/news/view/gabrielius-landsbergis-we-will-not-allow-the-unity-of-the-allies-to-fall-victim-to-the-taliban

Gaddafi wanted to create immigrant "inferno": Italy. (2011, August 26). *Reuters*. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-italy-libya-lampedusa-idUSTRE77P23U20110826

Gaddafi warns Europe of looming "catastrophe." (2011, July 2). France 24. https://www.france24.com/en/20110702-gaddafi-warns-europe-catastrophe-nato-air-campaign-libya

Gaffey, C. (2016, May 4). *Niger wants $1 billion to stop migration from West Africa to Europe at source*. Newsweek. https://www.newsweek.com/niger-needs-1-billion-european-funding-tackle-migration-minister-455530

Geddes, A., & Hadj-Abdou, L. (2018). Changing the path? EU migration governance after the 'Arab spring.' *Mediterranean Politics*, *23*(1), 142–160. https://doi.org/10.1080/13629395.2017.1358904

Glasser, S. B. (2002, November 16). Belarusan Barred From Summit. *Washington Post*. https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2002/11/16/belarusan-barred-from-summit/7dec0eb9-f38d-4dfe-9c13-c2fd654d2b5f/

Gluck, C. (2021). *The impact of COVID-19 on refugees and migrants on the move in North and West Africa* (p. 18) [MMC Briefing Paper]. Mixed Migration Center. https://www.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbdl486/files/covid-19_impact_briefing_paper_en.pdf

Gokalp Aras, N. E. (2019). Coercive Engineered Syrian Mass Migration in the EU -Turkey Relations: A Case Analysis for Future Reference. *International Migration*, *57*(2), 186–199. https://doi.org/10.1111/imig.12566

Goldenziel, J. (2021, November 10). *Belarus Is Weaponizing Migrants Using Putin's Playbook. Europe Must Legally Fight Back.* Forbes. https://www.forbes.com/sites/jillgoldenziel/2021/11/10/belarus-is-weaponizing-migrants-using-putins-playbook-europe-must-legally-fight-back/

Greenhill, K. M. (2008). Strategic Engineered Migration as a Weapon of War. *Civil Wars*, *10*(1), 6–21. https://doi.org/10.1080/13698240701835425

Greenhill, K. M. (2010). *Weapons of Mass Migration: Forced Displacement, Coercion, and Foreign Policy*. Cornell University Press.

Greenhill, K. M. (2016). Open Arms Behind Barred Doors: Fear, Hypocrisy and Policy Schizophrenia in the European Migration Crisis. *European Law Journal*, *22*(3), 317–332. https://doi.org/10.1111/eulj.12179

Greenhill, K. M. (2022, March 1). *When Migrants Become Weapons*. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/europe/2022-02-22/when-migrants-become-weapons

Guarascio, F., & Emmott, R. (2021, July 22). As war rages, EU weighs more funds to limit Afghans fleeing to bloc. *Reuters*. https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/war-rages-eu-weighs-more-funds-limit-afghans-fleeing-bloc-2021-07-22/

Hayden, W. (1999). The Kosovo conflict: The strategic use of displacement and the obstacles to international protection. *Civil Wars*, *2*(1), 35–68. https://doi.org/10.1080/13698249908402396

Horncastle, J. (n.d.). *Russia's invasion of Ukraine fuels a refugee crisis that could help Putin win the war*. The Conversation. Retrieved April 28, 2022, from http://theconversation.com/russias-invasion-of-ukraine-fuels-a-refugee-crisis-that-could-help-putin-win-the-war-177951

Ilyushina, M. (2022, March 30). Ukraine says Russia forcibly relocated thousands from Mariupol. Here's one dramatic account. *Washington Post*. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/03/30/ukraine-mariupol-russia-evacuation-filtration/

Imenkamp, Beatrix (2020). EU-Iran: The way forward. EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service PE 652.001 . 12.

Iran "suspends" cooperation with EU on multiple fronts after officials blacklisted. (2021, April 13). France 24. https://www.france24.com/en/middle-east/20210413-iran-halts-cooperation-with-eu-in-various-areas-following-blacklist-of-officials

Is Egypt using Syrian refugees as a bargaining chip with Europe? DW. 17.06.2019. DW.COM. Retrieved March 31, 2022, from https://www.dw.com/en/is-egypt-using-syrian-refugees-as-a-bargaining-chip-with-europe/a-49237428-0

ISIS threatens to send 500,000 migrants to Europe as a "psychological weapon" | *Daily Mail Online*. (n.d.). Retrieved March 21, 2022, from https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2958517/The-Mediterranean-sea-chaos-Gaddafi-s-chilling-prophecy-interview-ISIS-threatens-send-500-000-migrants-Europe-psychological-weapon-bombed.html

Jacobsen, K. (1996). Factors Influencing the Policy Responses of Host Governments to Mass Refugee Influxes. *The International Migration Review*, *30*(3), 655–678. https://doi.org/10.2307/2547631

Keely, C. B. (1996). How Nation-States Create and Respond to Refugee Flows. *The International Migration Review*, *30*(4), 1046–1066. https://doi.org/10.2307/2547603

Kenya: PS Karanja Kibicho explains why the government is shutting down refugee camps - Kenya. (2016). ReliefWeb. Retrieved March 22, 2022, from https://reliefweb.int/report/kenya/kenya-ps-karanja-kibicho-explains-why-government-shutting-down-refugee-camps

Kenya says Dadaab, Kakuma refugee camps to close next year. (2021, April 29). Aljazeera. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/4/29/kenya-says-dadaab-kakuma-refugee-camps-to-close-next-year

Kenya secures deal to keep duty-free access to EU market. (2016, September 29). *Reuters*. https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-kenya-eu-trade-idUKKCN11Z2D6

Kenya suspends move to close Dadaab refugee camp. (2016, November 16). *BBC News*. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-38002076

Klapper, R. (2021, August 31). *Pakistan says it doesn't have ability to offer refuge to more Afghan migrants*. Newsweek. https://www.newsweek.com/pakistan-says-it-doesnt-have-ability-offer-refuge-more-afghan-migrants-1624736

Koch, A., Weber, A., & Werenfels, I. (2018). *Profiteers of Migration? - Authoritarian States in Africa and European Migration Management*. 78.

Köpping Athanasopoulos, H. (2020). *EU Migration Management and the Social Purpose of European Integration: The Spillover of Misery*. Springer International Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-42040-6

Léonard, S., & Kaunert, C. (2021). De-centring the Securitisation of Asylum and Migration in the European Union: Securitisation, Vulnerability and the Role of Turkey. *Geopolitics*, *0*(0), 1–23. https://doi.org/10.1080/14650045.2021.1929183

Lovatt, A. L., Hugh. (2022, March 23). Endless concessions: Spain's tilt to Morocco – European Council on Foreign Relations. *ECFR*. https://ecfr.eu/article/endless-concessions-spains-tilt-to-morocco/

Mandel, R. (1997). Perceived Security Threat and the Global Refugee Crisis. *Armed Forces & Society*, *24*(1), 77–103. https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X9702400104

Maria-Margarita, M. (2021). *Evacuation of Afghan nationals to EU Member States*. EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service - PE698.776. 6.

Micallef, M., & Reitano, T. (2017). The anti-human smuggling business and Libya's political end game. *Institute for Security Studies (ISS)*. North Africa Report 2. 24.

Migrant arrivals plunge in Spain after deals with Morocco. (2019, April 26). AP NEWS. https://apnews.com/article/6e4c62e3255444c78196aef3f463fca0

Muiruri, P. (2021, April 1). Kenya issues ultimatum to UN to close camps housing almost 400,000 refugees. *The Guardian*. https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2021/apr/01/kenya-issues-ultimatum-to-un-to-close-camps-housing-almost-400000-refugees

Mutambo, A. (2022, January 29). *Kenya, EU launch talks to elevate ties 'beyond aid.'* The East African. https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/kenya-eu-launch-talks-to-elevate-ties-beyond-aid-3698584

Noraie-Kia, Neda (2021). On the border: Greece's response to Afghan asylum seekers. *Heinrich Böll Stiftung*. Retrieved April 26, 2022, from https://eu.boell.org/en/2021/08/25/border-greeces-response-afghan-asylum-seekers

Nye, J. S. (2004). *Soft power: The means to success in world politics* (1st ed). Public Affairs.

Pakistan looks to exit the "grey list", faces new test at FATF meet. (2022). WION. Retrieved April 28, 2022, from https://www.wionews.com/south-asia/pakistan-looks-to-exit-the-grey-list-faces-new-test-at-fatf-meet-455146

Panebianco, S. (2020). The EU and migration in the Mediterranean: EU borders' control by proxy. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, *0*(0), 1–19. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2020.1851468

Petesch, C. (2020, November 22). Spain's foreign minister visits Senegal to discuss migration. *NewsBreak*. https://www.newsbreak.com/news/2107454537690/spain-s-foreign-minister-visits-senegal-to-discuss-migration

Piipponen, M., & Virkkunen, J. (2020). The Remigration of Afghan Immigrants from Russia. *Nationalities Papers*, *48*(4), 644–660. https://doi.org/10.1017/nps.2019.84

Plaut, M. (2016, May 19). Europe's secret deal with Africa's dictators. *New Statesman*. https://www.newstatesman.com/world/2016/05/europe-s-secret-deal-africa-s-dictators

Polisario Front breaks off contact with Spain over U-turn on Western Sahara. (2022, April 11). France 24. https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20220411-polisario-front-breaks-off-contact-with-spain-over-u-turn-on-western-sahara

Rankin, J. (2020, March 3). Migration: EU praises Greece as "shield" after Turkey opens border. *The Guardian*. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/03/migration-eu-praises-greece-as-shield-after-turkey-opens-border

Rawlence, B. (2016, May 19). *Refugees shouldn't be bargaining chips*. https://gulfnews.com/opinion/op-eds/refugees-shouldnt-be-bargaining-chips-1.1831059

Rihoux, B., & Ragin, C. (2009). *Configurational Comparative Methods: Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) and Related Techniques*. SAGE Publications, Inc. https://doi.org/10.4135/9781452226569

Roig-Tierno, N., Gonzalez-Cruz, T. F., & Llopis-Martinez, J. (2017). An overview of qualitative comparative analysis: A bibliometric analysis. *Journal of Innovation & Knowledge*, *2*(1), 15–23. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jik.2016.12.002

Saeed, S. (2021, September 3). *Pakistan seizes chance to be Europe's best buddy in Afghan crisis*. POLITICO. https://www.politico.eu/article/afghanistan-pakistan-europe-crisis-refugees-trade/

Scipioni, M. (2018). Failing forward in EU migration policy? EU integration after the 2015 asylum and migration crisis. *Journal of European Public Policy*, *25*(9), 1357–1375. https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2017.1325920

Seeberg, P. (2022). Syrian refugees in Jordan and their integration in the labour market: Jordanian migration diplomacy and EU incentives. *Mediterranean Politics*, *27*(2), 192–211. https://doi.org/10.1080/13629395.2020.1758452

Seekers, N. A. for A. (2019, February 1). *Norway's Asylum Freeze; A report on Norway's response to increased asylum arrivals at the Storskog border crossing with Russia in 2015 and subsequent legal developments* (Norway). Https://Www.Noas.No/Wp-Content/Uploads/2019/02/Storskog-Rapport-Februar-2019.Pdf. https://www.ecoi.net/en/document/2003688.html

Soudan, F. (2017, December 17). *Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta: « Le Mali est une digue. Si elle rompt, l'Europe sera submergée » – Jeune Afrique*. JeuneAfrique.com. https://www.jeuneafrique.com/mag/498791/politique/ibrahim-boubacar-keita-le-mali-est-une-digue-si-elle-rompt-leurope-sera-submergee/

'Staggering': More than five million Ukrainians have fled war. (2022, April 20). https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/4/20/more-than-5-million-ukrainians-have-fled-since-russian-invasion

Syria conflict: Jordanians "at boiling point" over refugees. (2016, February 2). *BBC News*. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-35462698

Szymański, P., Żochowski, P., & Rodkiewicz, W. (2016, April 6). *Enforced cooperation: The Finnish-Russian migration crisis*. OSW Centre for Eastern Studies. https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2016-04-06/enforced-cooperation-finnish-russian-migration-crisis

Taliban warn US, EU of refugees if Afghan sanctions continue. (2021, October 13). *France 24.* https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20211013-taliban-warn-us-eu-of-refugees-if-afghan-sanctions-continue

Teitelbaum, M. S. (1984). Immigration, Refugees, and Foreign Policy. *International Organization*, *38*(3), 429–450.

Teitelbaum, M. S. (2015). Political demography: Powerful trends under-attended by demographic science. *Population Studies*, *69*, S87–S95.

The Jordan Compact: A New Holistic Approach between the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the International Community to deal with the Syrian Refugee Crisis - Jordan. (n.d.). ReliefWeb. Retrieved March 21, 2022, from https://reliefweb.int/report/jordan/jordan-compact-new-holistic-approach-between-hashemite-kingdom-jordan-and

Thiollet, H. (2011). Migration as Diplomacy: Labor Migrants, Refugees, and Arab Regional Politics in the Oil-Rich Countries. *International Labor and Working-Class History*, *79*, 103–121.

Thomson Reuters Foundation. (2017). *A Review of the Legal Framework Relating to the Proposed Closure of the Dadaab Refugee Camp and Repatriation of Somali Refugees*. Norwegian Refugee Council.

Tsourapas, G. (2017). Migration diplomacy in the Global South: Cooperation, coercion and issue linkage in Gaddafi's Libya. *Third World Quarterly*, *38*(10), 2367–2385. https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2017.1350102

Tusk: Schengen at risk of collapse. (2015, November 11). POLITICO. https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-asks-for-african-help-to-stem-refugee-flow-malta-summit-migration/

Ukraine round-up: US warns of long war and one man's remarkable life. (2022, May 10). *BBC News*. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-61399039

UNHCR Global Trends—Forced displacement in 2020. (2021). *UNHCR Flagship Reports*. Retrieved March 8, 2022, from https://www.unhcr.org/flagship-reports/globaltrends/

Üstübici, A., & İçduygu, A. (2018). Border closures and the externalization of immigration controls in the Mediterranean: A comparative analysis of Morocco and Turkey – RETRACTED. *New Perspectives on Turkey*, *59*, 7–31. https://doi.org/10.1017/npt.2018.21

Völkel, J. C. (2022). Fanning fears, winning praise: Egypt's smart play on Europe's apprehension of more undocumented immigration. *Mediterranean Politics*, *27*(2), 170–191. https://doi.org/10.1080/13629395.2020.1758450

Wangui, J. J. (2013, October 15). *Refworld | Proposed Closure of Kenya Refugee Camp Condemned*. Institute for War and Peace Reporting. https://www.refworld.org/docid/526115fd4.html

Weiner, M. (1992). Security, Stability, and International Migration. *International Security*, *17*(3), 91–126. https://doi.org/10.2307/2539131

Weiner, M., & Münz, R. (1997). Migrants, Refugees and Foreign Policy: Prevention and Intervention Strategies. *Third World Quarterly*, *18*(1), 25–51.

Wilhelmsen, J., & Gjerde, K. L. (2018). Norway and Russia in the Arctic: New Cold War Contamination? *Arctic Review*, *9*, 382–407. https://doi.org/10.23865/arctic.v9.1334

Wilson, N. J. (n.d.). *Kenya's threat to close Dadaab camp plays on international refugee fears*. T*he Conversation*. Retrieved March 12, 2022, from http://theconversation.com/kenyas-threat-to-close-dadaab-camp-plays-on-international-refugee-fears-59747

Zanfrini, L. (n.d.). *Europe and the Refugee Crisis: A Challenge to Our Civilization*. United Nations; United Nations. Retrieved March 8, 2022, from https://www.un.org/en/academic-impact/europe-and-refugee-crisis-challenge-our-civilization

Zardo, F., & Loschi, C. (2022). EU-Algeria (non)cooperation on migration: A tale of two fortresses. *Mediterranean Politics*, *27*(2), 148–169. https://doi.org/10.1080/13629395.2020.1758453

Annex A: Case Profiles

Key:

Challenger – General Description			
Period of Case	Specific EU Member Targeted (if any)	Role (Generator, Opportunist)	Result
Case Narrative			

Libya – Italian Colonial Apology			
2007-2008	Italy/EU	O	Success
In 2006 Libyan President Muammar Gaddafi would state during a meeting with other African Union members "we will ask Europe to pay 10 billion euros per year if it really wants to stop migration toward Europe" (as cited in Greenhill, 2010, p. 331) indicating an intentional exploitation of Libya's role as transit migration state. While this would achieve initial success in in previous attempts at the same, in 2007-2008 additional objectives would be achieved through—once again—instrumentalized migration. While irregular immigration had been reduced to approximately 19000 in 2006, it would once again rise to 37,000 in the period of 2007-2008. Added to the original objectives of securing funding for Libya, Gaddafi sought a formal apology from Italy for its colonial history along with further funding for development. Both of these he would succeed in gaining, with the Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi delivering a formal apology along with the signing of a cooperation treaty which would result in the promised Italian investment of 5 billion euros in Libyan infrastructure over 20 years. In exchange, Gaddafi's Libya agreed to allow Italian patrols in its own national waters with joint-national crews and satellite monitoring over the sea border. A reduction in irregular immigration occurred in the following two years and the EU proclaimed the joint program a success (as cited in Tsourapas, 2017).			

Libya – Gaddafi's Response to EU Airstrikes			
2011	None	O	Failure
During the height of the Libyan civil war, and with the NATO maintained no-fly-zone in place for its 100th day in the conflict, Gaddafi charged Europe to cease military strikes or else Libyans would eventually attack the nations in their homes and cities. Specifically, he would claim "we are capable of throwing ourselves on Europe like swarms of locusts or			

bees" (*Gaddafi Warns Europe of Looming "Catastrophe,"* 2011). This claim echoed earlier threats of broad immigration, especially in light of previous uses of such a tactic to elicit concessions from Europe. This plan was purportedly attempted during the conflict, with Libya's former ambassador to Italy Hafed Gaddur (who had defected to opposition forces during the civil war) claiming that this order came directly from Gaddafi while still in power with the intent of causing the Italian island Lampedusa to become as an "inferno" ("Gaddafi Wanted to Create Immigrant 'Inferno,'" 2011). Even so, these threats appeared to have been too little too late as Gaddafi was eventually captured and killed by opposition forces.

Kenya – Closing Refugee Camps			
2013	None	G	Success
After the Westgate mall terrorist attack in Nairobi, Kenyan officials proposed the closing of the Dadaab refugee camp as it had become a breeding ground for terrorist activities and presented a wider security concern for the nation (Wangui, 2013). Shortly after, the EU approved a 19 million euro support package under the Instrument for contributing to Security and Peace (IcSP) (*European Commission*, 2015.). Issues were further resolved with the signing of a joint agreement with the UNHCR and the Federal Republic of Somalia guaranteeing UN access to the camps and rights for refugees including a reaffirmation of international asylum standards. These efforts by the Kenyan legislature were widely criticized, with NGOs noting the lack of linkage between the terrorist attacks and the actual plight of refugees (Wangui, 2013). With the concessions from the international community, however, closure of the camps would be suspended and the rights of refugees guaranteed. While it is difficult to directly link a specifically coercive intent to this particular case, several factors are notable. As of 2013, large immigrant streams from sub-Saharan Africa had already dominated observed immigration from Libya through Italy, and had been targets for instrumentalization by Libyan actors in prior years. With the increase in Somali refugee numbers following famine periods in 2010 and 2011 (Thomson Reuters Foundation, 2017), these refugee streams had greatly increased the numbers held within the camps and the potential number of migrants that could seek to make the treacherous crossing through Libya and the Mediterranean. Given that the threats of closure did galvanize international support and funding, however, the case is assessed as a successful coercion of the EU (and the international community) in securing further funding and support in the area identified as the main concern for Kenya at the time—terrorism activities.			

ISIS – "Psychological Weapon"			
2015	Italy/EU	G	Failure
In early 2015, while ISIS continued to seize terrain throughout parts of Iraq, the Levant, and portions of North Africa, Italian officials claimed to have seized phone transcripts of ISIS leaders planning a mass wave of immigration against Europe and Italy (ISIS			

Threatens to Send 500,000 Migrants to Europe as a "psychological Weapon," 2015). While this vast wave of immigrants did not materialize, the threat of migration as a weapon nevertheless was considered as a significant threat by the EU with an open consultation being called (*European Parliament, 2015*) While the perceived threat may have caused some internal disruption in European states, especially when it was revealed that ISIS fighters had penetrated EU borders by posing as refugees, no significant concessions were brokered.

Russia – Norwegian Storskog Crisis			
2015	Norway/EU	O	Failure

In a similar context to the Russian-Finnish border situation (below) a large influx of migrants began attempting to enter the Norwegian border from Murmansk in the fall of 2015, with many traveling via bicycles due to the restriction on motor vehicles passing through the border area. While the causes and effects of this crisis were debated in the Norwegian media (Arild Moe & Rowe, n.d.), it has been largely attributed to Russian geostrategic aims. Some would go so far as to call it a form of hybrid-threat which Russia employed to potentially destabilize Norway in a key strategic environment. While it is initially unclear as to what Russia stood to gain from instrumentalizing migration against Norway during the period (at least without access to state ministry documents), this is consistent with the broader strategy seen in CEM where nation states attempt to destabilize targets through "capacity swamping" and/or "political agitation" (Greenhill 2010). Norwegian institutional changes during the Storskog crisis, essentially leading to a de facto suspension of all processing for asylum cases in November of 2015 (Seekers, 2019), demonstrates the significant disruption this flow caused. Such was the perceived threat in the Norwegian case that the ministry of justice amended the Immigration Act through an expedited legislative process while making a special exception to not hold a public consultation (Seekers, 2019). This violation of international asylum policies is underscored by two documents sent from the UNHCR expressing significant concern with the Norwegian institutional changes, specifically with the equivocation of language allowing what was (essentially) deportation of asylum seekers without any prevention of chain refoulment (Seekers, 2019). Nevertheless, even though some ethical compromise did occur, the likely Russian objective failed. While no statement is forthcoming from Moscow, Russia likely sought to pressure Norway to renew high-level diplomatic relations, as these had been suspended since 2014 on account of the invasion of Crimea when Norway had adopted the EU sanction regime (Wilhelmsen & Gjerde, 2018). Similar to Finland, this immigration crisis was resolved only after intense engagement with high-level leaders (but no ministers until May 2016) and a habitual request from Norwegian border guards to Russian authorities to prevent any migration without credible Norwegian visas regardless of actual individual status. What was specifically agreed following such high-level meetings is not readily apparent. Nevertheless, while Norway did potentially violate international law in its haste to expel and reclassify immigrants, it did not unilaterally reengage with Russia on diplomatic levels nor withdraw its participation in EU sanctions. As a result, this case is classified as a failure.

Russia – Finnish "Arctic Route" Border Crisis			
2015-2016	Finland/EU	O	Success
In the aftermath of the Russian annexation of Crimea and in the context of the wider immigration crisis of 2015, migrants began to gravitate toward the "Arctic Route" into the EU which involved the transit of Russia through Moscow to Saint Petersburg to Murmansk and from there to the Norwegian and Finish borders (Piipponen & Virkkunen, 2020). For the short duration from later 2015 to early 2016, a significant spike in the number of migrants occurred. During the period, both Finnish and Norwegian news media regarded the spike in immigration as a result of Russian geopolitical aims. Supporting this perspective is the sudden and uncharacteristic breakdown in Russian bordering practices that allowed transit of migrants not possessing the typical documentation (as cited in (Piipponen & Virkkunen, 2020). Coincidentally, prior to the situation in Finland, Finnish authorities had restricted diplomatic relationship with their Russian counterparts in protest over the annexation of Crimea (Szymański et al., 2016). This situation would resolve itself, however, after intense diplomatic engagement by Finland finally concluding with a meeting between Finnish President Sauli Niinistö and Vladimir Putin where the two countries would agree to a border transit restriction period of 180 days (Piipponen & Virkkunen, 2020). Given the irregularity of the situation, and the timing of various events, it seems plausible to conclude that this was a successful example of instrumentalized migration. In this context, Russia served in an opportunist role with a goal of renewing highlevel diplomatic relations with Finland, further undermining EU cohesion in condemning the Russian annexation of Crimea.			

Turkey – EU-Turkey Border Deal			
2015 - 2016	Greece/Italy	O	Success
Of all cases in this study, this is perhaps the best known. In 2015, Europe experienced a vast influx in migrants on account of the Syrian conflict. While a steady increase from Syria had arrived in Turkey from 2011, the crisis point in 2015 was predicted to mean the end of the Schengen-area if immediate measures were not put into place (*Tusk*, 2015) So significant was the anticipated migrant population that during the course of the period, many member states implemented temporary border control measures to block irregular population flows effectively suspending the free movement the Schengen-area. In this context, Turkey was ideally situated to benefit from this crisis at it was the primary transit country for these migrants, ahead of Jordan and Egypt. Although an initial framework for immigration control and cooperation had been in place as early as the Helsinki Summit in December 1999, the crisis instigated a major change in policy and would further serve as driver in the development of Turkish immigration policy throughout the period (Gokalp Aras, 2019)—albeit one that would institutionalize the ability to leverage available migrant populations. In 2015-2016, several factors enabled Turkish exploitation of the crisis, not the least of which was the lack of an effective joint response from EU nations in dealing with the influx (Gokalp Aras, 2019). With the signing of the EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan			

(JAP) in November 0f 2015, Turkey's role as the gatekeeper for "Fortress Europe" was effectively established (Gokalp Aras, 2019). Even so, various subsidiary agreements and concession would punctuate the early months of 2016 with such concessions from the EU being made to include visa liberalization, a re-initiating of the accession process, and various degrees of capacity building, aid, and investment in total amounting to 3 billion euro on top of 350 million euro that had already been dispersed for refugees (Gokalp Aras, 2019). In addition to this, the EU would cover all expenses associated with readmission of refugees back to Turkey, whose readmittance legally was contingent upon Turkey being designated a "safe third country" under international law. As a nation with an increasingly poor humanitarian record, this effectively secured a willing European denial of ethical wrongdoing as the alternative would have major ethical implications and would prevent repatriation (Gokalp Aras, 2019). Demonstrating a significant degree of foresight, as part of the JAP Turkey also initiated the construction of a modern and technologically advanced border wall complete with autonomous monitoring across the length of the land border with Greece. The wall has since served as major component of Turkey's instrumentalization strategy as it implements a defacto control over the Schengen-border and solidifies state agency over migration flows. The capacity would be exploited in the following years as on several occasions Turkish threats to "open the borders" would be underscored by a realistic capacity to do so. The first occurrence of this coincided with widespread repressive actions by the Turkish government during the fall of 2016. European condemnation of the illiberal measures, and the European Parliament's vote to recommend suspension of accession talks triggered an immediate threat from Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan who stated that "if you go any further these borders will be opened" ("Erdogan threatens to open borders," 2016)

Jordan – Syrian "Boiling" Point			
2016	None	O	Success

In a statement to the press prior to an international donor conference for migrants, King Abdullah of Jordan stated that Jordan was "at a boiling point" and that "sooner or later, I think, the dam is going to burst" ("Syria Conflict," 2016). Jordan-EU cooperation had been institutionally stable since the 2014 signing of the Mobility Partnership, and earlier as part of the wider recognition of Jordan within the ENP (Seeberg, 2022), but the rise in Syrian migration in the following years placed a considerable strain on the Jordanian institutional structures. The presence of supposed IS fighters within the refugee population further heightened the tension, with King Abdullah subtly threatening European leaders stating "if you want to take the moral high ground on this issue, we'll get them all to an airbase and we're more than happy to relocate them to your country, if what you're saying is there's only 16,000" ("Syria Conflict," 2016). In the fallout of the London Conference and in later agreements with European and international leaders, significant funds were granted to Jordan in exchange for certain concession in regards to work rights of Syrian refugees. Furthermore, the EU established the Jordan Compact directly assisting Jordan with refugee hosting. This compact targeted three areas including facilitating direct investment in the Jordanian economy (an aspect of popular

appeasement to limit the perceived negative impact of working refugees), the establishment of the Jordan Response Plan 2016-2018, and further grants within the IMF's Extended Fund Facility program (*The Jordan Compact*, n.d.). During the London Conference alone, 700 million USD were raised as part of these programs with more promised in subsequent years under the various relief programs (*The Jordan Compact*, n.d.). Based on these and other correlated results, the success of the Jordanian instrumentalization of Syrian refugees as part of a "bargaining chip" in gaining international investment and support is apparent.

Kenya – Closing of Dadaab Refugee Camp			
2016	None	G	Success

In May 2016, following demands made by Niger for an additional 1.1 billion euros in funding to prevent further transit migration to Libya and EU bordering regions, Kenya announced that it could no longer sustain the Dadaab and Kakuma refugee camp (the largest in the world at that time) (Rawlence, 2016). Principal Secretary of the Interior Karanja Kibicho, while citing security concerns associated with the Al Shabaab terrorist group, noted other reasons for closing the camp included that "we can no longer allow our people to bear the brunt of the International Community's weakening obligations to the refugees," and furthermore, that there "has also been a fall-off in the voluntary international funding for the camps in Kenya, in favour of raising budgets in the northern hemisphere to refugees headed to the West. International obligations in Africa should not be done on the cheap" (*Kenya*, 2016.) Perhaps to signal resolve, Kenya also closed the Department of Refugee Affairs in the same period while revoking the primia facie status of Somali refugees seeking asylum (Rawlence, 2016). These threats resonated with the larger migrant crisis in Syria, and underscored European fears of greater influxes of migrants through the Mediterranean and along the southern border (Wilson, n.d.). Although this decision had been said to be final, the closure of the camp was nevertheless delayed following a request from UNHCR High Commissioner Filippo Grandi ("Kenya Suspends Move to Close Dadaab Refugee Camp," 2016). As with previous attempts to close the camps, once again the Kenyan courts blocked the closure citing international law ("Kenya Suspends Move to Close Dadaab Refugee Camp," 2016). This followed a previously announced 6 month extension made in November of 2016 following initial engagement with EU leaders. The timing (and sequence) of this is significant. Occurring in close proximity to the Niger case, the original announcement closely followed a secret meeting between EU officials and other African leaders with the primary concern of security and immigration from several African states (Dahlkamp & Popp, 2016). This meeting did not appear to include Kenya at the time, although specific details remain obscure. Nevertheless, the threats of closure seemed to have achieved Kenya's ends, which were further economic and monetary concessions, one of which being the lucrative renewal of duty-free access to European markets ("Kenya Secures Deal to Keep Duty-Free Access to EU Market," 2016).

Niger – 1 Billion to Tackle Migration			
2016	Germany/France	O	Success
During the visit of French and German ministers to resolve ongoing migration issues, Niger's Foreign Minister Ibrahim Yacoubou stated to the press that Niger would require 1 billion euro to control illicit migration (Gaffey, 2016). This statement was publicly made with the French and German ministers present, even though a framework had already been established during the Valetta Summit on Migration. Made within a broader context, Niger's role in migration routes is one as a core "transit" state within the broader immigration network to Europe, a label propagated throughout the EU literature, and one reproduced locally (Frowd, 2020). Given the context and timing of this statement, it seems likely that this was calculated to increase the pressure on the European delegates as negotiations continued over disbursement of developmental and financial support.			

Mali – Dam Ready to Burst			
2015-2017	None	G	Success
In late 2015, high-level representatives for the EU member states and leaders from various African nations met to discuss the issues of irregular migration. This summit—the Valletta Summit on Migration—institutionalized several key processes for continuing to maintain dialogue. Mali in particular was identified as one of five priority nations within the Migration Partnership Framework, which would facilitate the direct investment of up to 1.8 billion Euro over the course of 2014-2018 (European Commission, 2016). A core aspect of this would be to stabilize the region and address root causes of migration. In December 2016, the EU would secure a core policy goal when, Mali would sign a bilateral agreement with the EU allowing for the repatriation of refugees that did not receive asylum status(*EU, Mali Sign Deal to Return Refugees*, 2016). But Mali was far from simply a passive observed and leveraged its key position within the region to continue to garner international support largely aimed at stabilizing the conflicting regional factions. In 2017, reiterating an aspect already central to foreign intervention, Malian President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta remarked to journalists that "Mali is a dyke. If it breaks, Europe will be submerged" (Soudan, 2017).			

Egypt – "Anti-Smuggling Law" and Power Consolidation			
2016-2019	None	O	Success
As a major player in the MENA region, Egypt has positioned itself in significant role in hosting Syrian migrants. Nevertheless, this migrant population is not recognized as refugees or asylum seekers in Egyptian law, rather remaining the responsibility of the UNHCR ("Is Egypt using Syrian refugees as a bargaining chip with Europe?" 2016) Yet even with increasing levels of human rights abuses, Egypt has used its position to access EU support and concessions.			

Following the conclusion of the EU-Turkey agreement on migration in 2016, President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi began to emphasize a new narrative in Egypt's wider relationship with the EU, likely as a measure to secure the importance of his regime. Within that narrative, the stability of the Egyptian state was critical in preventing exodus of millions of migrants into Europe. This narrative was echoed in the Egyptian parliament with speaker Ali Abdel'Al highlighting the "ten million refugees" that could flee to Europe if Egypt did not remain stable (Völkel, 2022). This strategy would become an important aspect of the relationship with Egypt and the EU. While in previous periods, ambivalence had characterized Egyptian treatment of refugees, following 2015 they would become as important hallmark of the EU and Egyptian relationship, albeit one that required the occasional reinforcement with perennial threats (Völkel, 2022).

Morocco – Spanish Lobbying and the Western Route			
2019	Spain/EU	O	Success

While migration numbers had largely decreased through the other Mediterranean routes in the period from 2016-2018, the Western route saw a sharp increase with Spain received 11,000 migrants during 2018 (*Migrant Arrivals Plunge in Spain after Deals with Morocco*, 2019). In the first months of 2019, however, that number would drop significantly through cooperation with Moroccan authorities, even as several peripheral events provide a suitable motive for the instrumentalization. While a directly coercive posture in this example is difficult to ascertain, two significant events point at a deliberate instrumentalization. The first of these is the 2018 decision by the European Court of Justice to (once again) rule against the EU including the contested Western Sahara area in EU-Morocco social and economic relationship (Fernández-Molina & Hernando De Larramendi, 2022). Statements from the Moroccan agriculture minister would reinforce this, stating "how do you [Europeans] want us to do the job of blocking African emigration if Europe does not want to work with us today?" (as cited in (Fernández-Molina & Hernando De Larramendi, 2022). That Morocco stood to gain with migrant pressure is fairly plain. In the course of resolving the migrant influx, Morocco received an additional 140 million in EU development funds during the close of 2018, with Spain itself receiving an emergency allocation of 36 million Euro from the EU for the same (*Migrant Arrivals Plunge in Spain after Deals with Morocco*, 2019). In addition to this, in February of 2019 the Spanish King Felipe VI on behalf of the Spanish government visited Morocco and signed 11 significant bilateral trade agreements one of which directly addressed terrorism and immigration. Notably, in an EU report obtained by the press concerning the incident, while increased bilateral engagement was cited as being a reason for the decrease in migrants, the report avoided defining how precisely this was done. Human rights advocates feared this was largely a result of the suspension of safe-harbor policies for humanitarian rescue ships, and the surrendering of rescue operations to the relatively inexperienced Moroccan authorities (*Migrant Arrivals Plunge in Spain after Deals with Morocco*, 2019).

Turkey – Erdogan's Offensive and Operation "Spring Shield"			
2019-2020	Greece/EU	O	Failure

In October 2019, Turkey began conducting offensive military operations against Kurdish forces in Syria that were (it claimed) linked to terrorist activities in its own state and to supposedly set conditions for the return of up-to 1 million Syrian refugees(*Erdogan Threatens to Open Europe Gates for Refugees*, 2019). Reading anti-kurdish motives in the operation, the military activities garnered widespread criticism from the international community especially from the EU, the US, and Saudi Arabia. When the EU appeared to contemplate suspending payments for refugees Turkish President Erdogan responded by once again threatening to open Turkish borders for refugees to stream into Europe. These threats were once again openly decried as blackmail, with EU officials referencing the continued support of refugees, citing prior assistance as much as 6 billion euro in (Emmott & Irish, 2019). Initially, these threats were largely disregarded as EU leaders considered various measures such as sanctions, an arms embargo, and other punitive actions. Nevertheless, these threats did not materialize. One cause of this apparent at the time was the relatively close cooperation that existed between President Erdogan and Hungarian Prime Minister Victor Orban's whose vote on the European Council first blocked a formal condemnation of the Turkish offensive, and then repeated support for Ankara's measures throughout the conflict (Emmott & Irish, 2019). But despite this lack of an additional response, the relationship with Turkey had already changed as the EU had within the same month adopted a regime of sanctions targeting turkey on account of ongoing territorial disputes with Cyprus (*EU Sanctions Map*, n.d.).

In the spring of 2020, Turkish forces undertook a new operation called "Spring Shield" which would achieve (hypothetically) similar goals from the previous limited set of operations conducted six months earlier. Nevertheless, despite the pressure from Ankara, Europe remained antagonistic to Turkish aims in Syria. Finally, following an escalation in hostilities in which fighting raged in Idlib province, which saw direct confrontation between Russian and Turkish forces, Erdogan carried through with his threats to pressure the EU for military assistance (Léonard & Kaunert, 2021) On 27 February 2020, Ankara began to divert Syrians to the border of Greece (Léonard & Kaunert, 2021). Amnesty International reported at the time that not only were these migrants actively encouraged to attempt to cross, but the Turkish government actively provided transportation, escort, fuel, and directions as to how to best penetrate the Greek border (as cited in (Léonard & Kaunert, 2021). Greece responded with an immediate reinforcement of border forces who employed tear gas and other measures to prevent entrance, while a government decree in March temporarily suspended refugees' right to file for asylum. While the measures brought widespread criticism particularly from the UNHCR with decried the (illegal) suspension of rights, the European Council declined to comment and awarded Greece an additional 700 million euro in funding toward border security and infrastructure (Léonard & Kaunert, 2021). Turkey, recognizing the failure, eventually arranged for the transport of the stuck refugees, although a meeting with Commission President Ursula von der Leyen resulted in a vague reiteration of further and financial support in the area of refugees.

Kenya – Threatens Closing Dadaab and Kakuma Refugee Camps			
2021	None	G	Success

In late March of 2021, surprising the UNHRC and other foreign leaders, Kenya once again announced the eminent closing of the Dadaab and Kakumu refugee camps which, at that time, hosted nearly 400,000 refugees of which nearly 270,000 were Somalian (Muiruri, 2021). Referring to previous incidents, Kenya stated that no further delays would be tolerated and demanded international organizations establish a roadmap for shutdown within 14 days. The UNHCR, World Bank, and the heads of the various foreign missions immediately engaged with Kenya in closed meetings in attempts to resolve the situation.

Several contextual features surrounding this case are significant. On 27 February 2021, the Eastern African Community (EAC) states finally agreed to allow for the bilateral engagement of the EU with individual members through the previously signed Eastern Partnership Agreement that had originally been concluded in 2014. These members, Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda, had not collectively ratified the agreement which prevented its earlier implementation until that time (*EU and Republic of Kenya Launch Strategic Dialogue*, n.d.) Approximately four weeks later, the closure was announced which initiated the intense renewal of dialogue with international partners. Once again, however, the Kenyan court ordered a temporary 30-day suspension of the closure, which gave the UNHCR High Representative for Refugees Filippo Grandi enough time to engage with the government, which subsequently suspended the actual closure until 30 June 2022 (*Kenya Says Dadaab, Kakuma Refugee Camps to Close next Year*, 2021). Then, in June 2021, the EU began steps to conclude a sweeping project which would address various aspects of development and stability across multiple domains (Mutambo, 2022) In January 2022 the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Joseph Borrell Frontelles visited Nairobi to finalize the expansive Joint Declaration on the Kenya-European Union Strategic Dialogue, which espoused to elevate the EU-Kenya relationship beyond a donor-recipient relationship, and would result in an investment of 361 million euro in the first four years of its implementation (Mutambo, 2022).

In addition to this, the EU and Kenya also concluded a bilateral trade pact through the previously signed EPA. While this plan had originally been established to encompass multiple African nations, objections from EU member states limited its extent to only Kenya. Signed in Nairobi, this bilateral agreement proceed the EU-AU talks by over three weeks. While some have claimed the threatening of the closure was in retaliation for Somalia's attempts to include Kenya in a dispute over maritime borders in the International Criminal Court (ICC) (Muiruri, 2021), nevertheless some popular voices point to a reoccurrence of instrumentalization. One twitter comment directed at the Kenyan Interior ministry remarks "Blaming Refugees will not divert our attention from the consistent failures of this Government. We have a Pandeic, massive Youth unemployment, & blatant theft of Public Resources but the focus 4 u is closure of Refugee Camps so as to extort Donors"(Abondo, 2021). While such a comment is not conclusive by any means, it nevertheless voices a wider social imperative.

Belarus – Syrians on the Land Borders			
2021	Poland/Latvia	AP	Failure

In June 2021, a deliberate visa liberalization and increase in flights by the state-airlines to the Middle east set the conditions for a large influx of refugees and asylum seekers to enter Belarus. With travel agencies in places such as Sulaimaniya, Iraq a "pull" force began to see large streams of Kurds, Syrians, and other asylum seekers entering Minsk in order to use the land border to eventually reach Europe (Arraf & Peltier, n.d.). But far from a benign development in visa policy, many migrants found their way to a European border accelerated when state officials provided transportation to and instruction on the how to best penetrate the borders of Latvia, Poland, and Lithuania, in some case providing migrants wire cutters (Arraf & Peltier, n.d.). The crisis that followed saw migrants stranded along the borders with Poland with vivid images of children in camps with frosted mist settling over the area across from barbed wire fences and armed security guards.

In 2020, following a widely criticized election, Lukashenko once again became the elected leader of Belarus. In the fallout of the highly questionable election and in widespread suppression and imprisonment of political prisoners, the EU imposed sanctions on the country. Beginning in June, visa liberalization and the import of refugees on tourist visas facilitated a crisis that some EU leaders decried as a "hybrid war," along various accusations of instrumentalization (Greenhill, 2022). If the response from the EU did appear to be relatively cohesive in support of Poland (who adopted increasingly restrictive and harsh measures to keep immigrants out) the fallout from the incident significantly impacted the EU's moral authority where in order to maintain control over the border 12,000 Polish were deployed while media were forbidden from operating in the vicinity of the actual crisis (Dempsey, n.d.; Greenhill, 2022). But despite this ethical blackening, Lukashenko failed to gain any concessions from Poland or the wider EU target. On the contrary, a failure to initially resolve the conflict resulted in the expansion of sanctions regimes and a joint declaration by the European Council against the coercive measures (*Europen Councils*, 2021) Restrictive measures would once again expand on December 2 with an expanded package explicitely citing human-rights violations and "the instrumentalisation of migrants" (*European Council*, 2021).

Iran – Afghani Refugees			
2021	None	O	Failure

In a statement made to the UN on 31 October 2021, the Iranian envoy (and permanent representative to the UN) Zahra Ershadi remarked "...to that end, the full and immediate removal of unilateral sanctions as well as supporting the reconstruction of this country are essential. In this context, we warn about the political instrumentalization of the international protection of refugees by certain States." While this statement did not go so far as to define who these actors were, at that time the Belarus-Polish refugee crisis was ongoing, and the EU had in the previous year been in conflict with Turkey once again over refugees. This vague reference—a reminder of instrumentalization—would occur twice in

the statement which highlighted the continued hosting of refugees in Iran from Syria and Afghanistan while also demanding the immediate removal of sanctions (*Envoy Highlights Iran's Generous Support for Refugees*, 2021). The remarks would be reinforced by additional reminders that Iran served the important role in preventing migrants from traveling to Europe but would likely be unable to host the additional 30,000 refugees coming from Afghanistan on account of the recent Taliban takeover (*Envoy Highlights Iran's Generous Support for Refugees*, 2021).

Despite the new influx of Afghani refugees, the thinly veiled threats of this nature were not a new rhetorical tool from Iran. When the EU established additional sanctions against various Iranian officials on account of crackdowns on protests in 2019, Iranian threats would once again touch on immigration and cooperation of refugees. Actively "suspending" cooperation in these areas in April of 2020 (*Iran "suspends" Cooperation with EU on Multiple Fronts after Officials Blacklisted*, 2021) such statements are often used by President Hassan Rouhani, and mirror earlier statements that coincide with statements on uranium enrichment (Augustová & Hakimi, n.d.). Yet despite EU efforts to initially alleviate sanctions and reinforce trade, as through the Instrument in Support of Trade Extensions (INSTEX) which sanctions have remained in place despite dispensations as part of the Afghanistan financial measures and other elements of cooperation. Likely this is on account of continued US opposition, in which INSTEX was criticized as circumventing the US sanctions strategy of maximum pressure [a reason cited for its significantly reduced scope following initial implementation] (Immenkamp, 2020.).

Pakistan – Afghani Refugees			
2021	None	O	Success

Observing the escalating crisis in Afghanistan, and being aware of its preeminent role in supporting those fleeing, Pakistani Foreign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi stated that Pakistan was unable to take any more Afghani refugees on account of their previous hosting of up to 3 million in the prior decades (Klapper, 2021). This statement was made while meeting with German officials in Islamabad to discuss migration issues within the unfolding crisis on 31 August 2021. It also conspicuously coincided with a wider meeting of EU officials to discuss the assistance program with Afghani refugees especially along the lines of migration and desire to prevent a "pull effect"" in the strategy for assistance (*EU Plans Big Cash Offer for Afghanistan's Neighbors to Host Refugees*, 2021). Initial amounts discussed during this EU meeting appeared to value around 600 million euro. Further discussion would continue to highlight the threat of migration and the need to preserve cohesion in the European response.

During the sudden takeover of Afghanistan by the Taliban in August 2021, many fleeing the crisis and drought followed historic migration pathways into Iran and Pakistan. These known routes have historically facilitated transient workers while also functioning as origin points for the longer journey into Europe. For this reason, the EU had previously supplied various amounts of financial aid to assist with Afghani refugees and to bolster support systems of both Pakistan and Iran—albeit to primarily keep Afghani refugees away from

the EU. In this context, the EU had originally projected a support package of around 57 million euro for refugees and support to Pakistan and Iran before the fall of Kabul (Guarascio & Emmott, 2021). In October, however, that projected number had changed with the EU further increasing the proposed 600 million euro, to a 1 billion euro package to support Afghani refugees and neighboring countries (*European Commission, 2021*). How much of this increase is directly the result of Pakistani instrumentalization of refugees is unclear, but that Pakistan sought to benefit from the crisis is clearly evident. Its partial success is evidenced by a number of factors, including the change in tone from European leaders over its human rights issues and its negotiation over its international status in areas such as money laundering and travel restrictions (Saeed, 2021). Although as of February 2022, Pakistan had not been removed from the FATF's "grey list," movement in that area was nevertheless clearly evident (*Pakistan Looks to Exit the "Grey List", Faces New Test at FATF Meet*, 2022.)

Taliban – Afghani Refugees			
021	None	G	Failure

Following the sweeping overthrow of the Western supported government in Afghanistan by the Taliban, various experts and humanitarian organizations anticipated an impending humanitarian disaster in the country. Various reasons have been attributed to this prediction, including the nature of the political shift and due to drought exacerbated by the cyclical La Niña phenomenon (*World Food Program, 2021)* . On 31 August 2021, in a joint statement following a meeting of the EU ministers of home affairs, immigration occupied the primary area of concern for the member states. While certain aspects of humanitarian support and international cooperation were emphasized, the statement goes at length to reassure citizens and fellow members that the EU would do everything to preserve the security of EU citizens and border integrity. The statement concludes "the Council… will respond to attempts to instrumentalise illegal migration for political purposes and other hybrid threats, including by developing new tools" Council of the EU, 2021). These concerns were echoed on the national level, with governments such as Lithuania highlighting the threat of immigration to EU coherency and border security (*Gabrielius Landsbergis: We Will Not Allow the Unity of the Allies to Fall Victim to the Taliban*, n.d.). Similarly, Greece, mere days following the seizure of Kabul stated that they would not become a gateway of immigration to EU in a repeat of the 2015 crisis, instead assessing how this flood of migrants would be stopped (*On the Border*, n.d.). In the context of widespread international condemnation, a contracting economy, sanctions and asset freezes, and an economic collapse in the country, the Taliban appeared to begin leveraging the threat of refugees against Western nations and the EU. In a statement given in early October 2021 while engaging with western diplomats, acting Taliban foreign minister Amir Khan Muttaqi warned of the impending danger of a mass refugee flow from Afghanistan if repressive economic actions continued (*Taliban Warn US, EU of Refugees If Afghan Sanctions Continue*, 2021). Yet despite such a clearly evident fear of a mass immigration from the EU, the Taliban largely failed in relieving sanctions and gaining access to Western resources and development funding (as of this writing). Furthermore,

the rhetoric of instrumentalized migration also ceased in the public sphere following the early attempts to threaten via migration flows. Several explanative factors appear to account for this. The first is an apparent securitization of borders, not only in Europe, but in the various transit countries through whom prior Afghani migration occurred. This includes both along the Iranian border, the Pakistani border, and in Turkey. Such changes are noted in individual accounts by the migrants that did manage to escape prior to the Taliban's own crackdown on migration (Bouscaren, 2021). The second possible explanation for the failure of instrumentalized migration is that, for the most part, European and Western nations were largely able to evacuate staff and other select nationals that could otherwise claim an attachment to each coalition nation. For the EU specifically, member states evacuated upwards of 22000 Afghanis during the period of initial Taliban takeover (Maria-Margarita, n.d.).

Senegal – FRONTEX Outpost			
2022	None	G	Success

From an early period, international actors have had a significant amount of influence over Senegal's immigration policy. Of these actors in particular, the EU (and especially France and Spain) are amongst the most significant players in shaping the domestic policies. Consequently, since the early 2000s, harsh measures have been in place against smuggling and trafficking (Adam et al., 2020). Following the "Canary Island Crisis" in 2006, in which around 30,000 migrants attempted to reach the Canary Islands by boat, Spain in particularly expended its cooperation with Senegal in the area of migration whose engagement would continue through the next 15 years in various forms, with Spain working in numerous areas to strengthen Senegalese border control and monitoring while providing various investments in development. In 2015, following the crisis immigration from Turkey, the Valetta conference was held which established the Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF) and which institutionalized an unprecedented degree of EU-African cooperation in the areas of migration. With an initial 3.2billion euro pledged to the project, Senegal was included among the benefiting countries.

In 2019, after a period of relatively little migration, the Western African Route once again experienced a massive spike in immigration, with levels of irregular migrants increasing from a mere 500 in 2019, to well over 18,000 in 2020 (a %1000 increase) (Petesch, 2020). While activists had warned of an impending increase in migration along that route, various reasons would be used to explain the change not the least of which was COVID-19. In response to this incident, the Spanish Foreign Minister Arancha González Laya flew to Senegal and met with Senegalese President Macky Sall to discuss the issue and possible solutions for the crisis on the Spanish side. Notably, Foreign Minister Laya remarked to reporters at the time that "COVID is destroying African economies, as it has also had a huge impact on European economies, we knew that one of the consequences of this pandemic was going to be an increase in migration" (Petesch, 2020). What is striking in this context is that, while economic pressures did increase some push factors in North Africa in regards to migration, in general most regions demonstrated a significant increase in the difficulty in that same migration (Gluck, 2021). Likely contributing to the

situation, while Senegal and Spain had maintained prior repatriation bilateral agreement, that had been suspended in the prior months as a consequence of COVID. This increased the relative pressure of the population movement. This was also a key policy objective for Spain and one of the key agenda items in negotiations with Senagalese officials in Dakar (De Leon Cobo, n.d.). Senegal further agreed to allow additional assistance from Spanish border control with the stationing of an additional maritime patrol vessel and observation aircraft augmenting the forces already present. (Petesch, 2020). In return, Spain agreed to address new measures for legal migration[10] while also expanding on the development aide that had already increased in the prior year—increasing from 50 million Euros from 2014-2017 to 128 million euros from 2019-2023.

Morocco – Western Sahara			
2022	Spain	O	Success
In the spring of 2021, the leader of the ethno-nationalistic Polisario Front Brahim Ghali received treatment for COVID 19 in a Spanish hospital. This action came in the context of increased conflict between Morocco and the Polisario Front, which had declared a 1991 ceasfire void as of 2020, and traditionally controls mineral rich areas with access to productive Atlantic fishing grounds (*Polisario Front Breaks off Contact with Spain over U-Turn on Western Sahara*, 2022). Shortly after, a sudden rush of over 10, 000 refugees overwhelmed the Spanish territorial area of Ceuta while Moroccan border forces ostensibly remained passive (*Polisario Front Breaks off Contact with Spain over U-Turn on Western Sahara*, 2022). Spain would attempt several measures to repair the relationship, initially removing the acting Foreign Minister at the time and then offering to sell gas when Algeria withdrew from the Maghreb-Europe Gas pipeline. These efforts to curry favor with Morocco largely failed, however, until in January the contents of a private letter from the Prime Minister of Spain to the King of Morocco was revealed to show support for the 2007 plan for the incorporation of the disputed Sahrawi territory—the primary ethnicity making up the Polisario Front—in Morocco (Lovatt, 2022) This revelation placed Spain in a compromising position, and resulted in the Spanish government officially supporting the bid by Morocco for territorial control in March 2022, which promptly resulted in the withdrawal of Algeria's ambassador to Spain in protest (Lovatt, 2022) At nearly the same time, the European Council promised an additional structural investment of up to 8.4 billion euros as part of the Link Up Africa program. Yet even with these concessions, no concrete promises on renewed immigration cooperation has originated from Morocco that seems to have prioritized actual recognition for its territorial gains, despite the European Court of Justice's ruling on prior EU efforts to include the region in economic dealings with Morocco (Lovatt, 2022).			

[10] During 2019, foreign remittance contributed to a staggering 10% of Senegalese GDP. Unsurprisingly, a chief part of the Senegalese narrative is the continued liberalization of visa regimes especially with Spain.

NTNU

Kunnskap for en bedre verden