

Balder Haarklou Jensen

A Vision for Europe

The Approach to European Security and Defense
by the Macron Administration

Bachelor's thesis in European Studies specializing in Political
Science

Supervisor: Viktoriya Fedorchak

May 2022

Balder Haarklou Jensen

A Vision for Europe

The Approach to European Security and Defense by
the Macron Administration

Bachelor's thesis in European Studies specializing in Political Science
Supervisor: Viktoriya Fedorchak
May 2022

Norwegian University of Science and Technology
Faculty of Humanities
Department of Historical and Classical Studies

Abstract

France has for a long time been champions of a more powerful Europe in the areas of security and defense. During the first presidential administration of Emmanuel Macron from 2017-2022 such a focus has again been paramount. What has been the approach of the Macron administration to European security and defense? This thesis seeks to understand the actions of the administration both inside and outside the EU as well as in NATO. Furthermore, it seeks to compare those actions to that of previous administrations and to discuss its findings in a neorealist fashion. The findings suggest that while President Macron has operated in a manner which is close to that of previous administrations there are some telling differences which suggests a new and more pragmatic strategy under the leadership of President Macron.

Sammendrag

Frankrike har lenge vært et ledende land i å jobbe for et sterkere Europa innenfor områdene sikkerhet og forsvar. Et slikt fokus har igjen vært stort under den første presidentperioden til Emmanuel Macron fra 2017-2022. Med dette i bakhodet, hva har vært tilnærmingen til Europeisk sikkerhet og forsvar under Macron sin administrasjon? Denne oppgaven ønsker å forstå tilnærmingen både på innsiden og utsiden av EU og i NATO. Videre ønsker den å sammenligne tilnærmingen med den til tidligere administrasjoner samt å diskutere funnene i ny-realistisk forstand. Funnene tilsier at President Macron har fulgt tidligere administrasjoner sine tilnærminger men med noen klare forskjeller som vitner om en ny og mer pragmatisk strategi under Macron sin ledelse.

Table of contents

Abstract	v
Table of contents	vii
List of abbreviations	viii
1 Introduction:	1
1.2 Literature review	2
1.3 Method	3
2 Clarifications	4
2.1 Concept clarification	4
2.2 Theory clarification – neorealism	4
3 Empirical research - The French approach	6
3.1 Actualization of the situation Macron took over	6
3.2 France and European cooperation	8
3.3 Macron and European cooperation	9
3.4 France and NATO	11
3.5 Macron and NATO	12
4 Discussion.....	13
5 Conclusion	15
6 Bibliography	17

List of abbreviations

- **CARD** - *Coordinated Annual Review on Defense*
- **CSDP** - *Common Security and Defense Policy*
- **DFVSR** - *Deutsch-Französischer Verteidigungs- und Sicherheitsrat/Franco-German Defense and Security Council*
- **EC** - *European Commission*
- **EDC** - *European Defense Community*
- **EDF** - *European Defense Fund*
- **EI2** - *European Intervention Initiative*
- **ESDI** - *European Security and Defense Identity*
- **ESDP** - *European Security and Defense Policy*
- **EU** - *European Union*
- **ISIS** - *Islamic State of Iraq and Syria*
- **JHA** - *Justice and Home Affairs*
- **NATO** - *North Atlantic Treaty Organization*
- **PESCO** - *Permanent Structured Cooperation*
- **SSR** - *Security Sector Reform*
- **UK** - *United Kingdom*
- **US** - *United States*
- **USSR** - *The United Socialist Soviet Republic/Soviet Union*
- **WWII** - *Second World War*
- **YPG** - *Yekîneyên Parastina Ge*

1 Introduction:

“It is up to us, to you, to map out the route which ensures our future, the one I wish to talk to you about today. The route of rebuilding a sovereign, united and democratic Europe. Let us together have the audacity to create this route. The Quest for European Sovereignty. As I have done at every point in front of the French people, I would today like to say with resolute conviction: the Europe of today is too weak, too slow, too inefficient, but Europe alone can enable us to take action in the world, in the face of the big contemporary challenges”.

Emmanuel Macron, as stated in (Élysée, 2017).

On September the 26th, 2017, the President of France, Emmanuel Macron, laid out his wishes for Europe in a speech at the Sorbonne University in Paris. Parts of his speech detailed a wish for a more autonomous Europe in the fields of security and defense after relying on security guarantees by the United States (US) since the end of the Second World War (WWII) (Élysée, 2017).

In this thesis it is sought to explain the approach of President Macron to European security and defense during his first tenure as president from 2017 until 2022 as well as to compare it to that of previous administrations and to discuss his approach using the defensive neorealist tradition. To do this, the thesis will start with a short clarification of two important concepts, that of defense and that of security, in a common European context. Furthermore, the thesis will highlight the main points of the neorealist tradition. The thesis will in its following chapter give a historical overview towards French approaches to European security and defense. After this the approach of the Macron administration towards defense and security in a European context as well as in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) respectively will be explained, thus forming the empirical base for the following discussion.

The thesis seeks to explain the Macron administration's approach to European security and defense, both inside and outside the confines of the EU, as well as NATO. Does the approach of the Macron administration differ from earlier administrations? How can neorealism explain such an approach?

A tragic backdrop to this thesis is the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine (Deutsche Welle, 2022). As this situation is ongoing, the thesis will not highlight any changes that have happened over the last months, rather, it seeks to analyze the French approach before the invasion. President Macron won his reelection on April the 24th, 2022, and has during the period of the invasion been amongst the most prominent European leader in talking to Russia (France 24A, 2022; France 24B, 2022; Leali, 2022). What the French approach results in during his second tenure as President with the invasion as a backdrop will indeed be interesting to see.

1.2 Literature review

Hyde-Price (2006) in his work *Normative power Europe: a realist critique*, offers a neorealist analysis of European security cooperation while critiquing the general liberal-idealist vision of a "normative" European Union (EU). Its main argument is that of neorealism being able to shed a new light on the development of EU foreign and security policy and the cooperation which has resulted from this, looking at the systemic determinants regarding such cooperation and EU foreign and security policy in itself as well as arguing that EU cooperation is nothing more than an instrument that states use for their interests. Building on this, Simón (2017), considers the idea that the relative decline of Europe will eventually lead to cooperation by examining intra-European considerations relating to how relative gains affect the ways in which cooperation is likely between the greater powers in Europe in the security field. Posen (2004) considers the future of transatlantic relations in the realist tradition by assessing the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) and its possibilities ahead. Irondelle (2008) asks the question of French commitment to the CSDP, arguing that while France is committed to a strong European security and defense policy, such a policy may not be inside the EU. Treacher (2001) analyzes and explains the French approach to Europe as a power multiplier and its reasoning for why it seeks to do this from the presidency of Charles de Gaulle at the start of the Fifth Republic in 1958 until 2001. Tardy (2018) analyzes the defense component of the CSDP and explains its underwhelming development that, since 2016, has started to accelerate somewhat as well as explaining the different strategic cultures between the greater powers. When explaining the approach of the Macron administration the thesis builds on a report from 2021 by the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP - Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik) which highlights traditional French approaches as well as shedding light on what the Macron administration has done both towards NATO and in Europe. Furthermore, this report builds on several primary and secondary sources, some of whom have also been used in the thesis together with other primary and secondary sources. The theory of neorealism and its arguments builds on *Theory of International Politics* by Kenneth Waltz (1979), *Realism and International Relations* by Jack Donnely (2000) as well as the chapter by Mearsheimer on neorealism in the work *International Relations Theories* (2010) thus seeking to give a view to both the offensive and defensive arguments of the theory.

While Treacher (2001), Posen (2004), Hyde Price (2006), Irondelle (2008) and Simón (2017) all shine a useful light on France, European cooperation and the uses of realism in such a context some of the literatures are rather outdated. Much has happened since these works and while several arguments are useful for this thesis there is a lack of newer literature analyzing France and its approach to European security and defense cooperation in the world we now find ourselves in. Several of the works for example focus on the role of the United Kingdom (UK) inside the EU security architecture as an important partner of France while Brexit now has changed whatever approach would amount from such a partnership. Posen (2004) does not talk on the possibility of a changing world order and the role of Europe, rather focusing on the world order as unipolar. Tardy (2018) is quite alone in his focus on the defense cooperation inside the EU and explains clearly why such a cooperation has been problematic. Still, it is a focus more on the EU and less on states such

as France and their attitudes. About Macron there is not much literature analyzing his approach which is not surprising given that these are new events. The report from SWP (2021) as well as primary sources such as official documents and news articles form the basis for this explanation. As such, this dissertation then seems to fit in with trying to explain a newer administration's approach in an era where it is argued more than ever that the unipolar world order is ending.

1.3 Method

This thesis is built upon the qualitative method, using comparative analysis, a case study and document analysis in its work. When separating qualitative and quantitative methods, quality refers to questions such as how, when, what and why, it refers to the essence of something, for example what its meaning, characteristics and descriptions are (Berg & Lune, 2017, p. 12). Quantitative on the other hand measures a thing, for example its size, its distribution and its likeness. Qualitative methods are therefore more in line when one seeks to explain what the approach of presidential administrations has been (Berg & Lune, 2017, p. 12).

A benefit of the comparative analysis is that it analyzes the question in its natural context without trying to control the cases as would happen in experimental studies. John Stuart Mill highlighted four methods of comparative analysis, one of them being that of the method of difference which is the form of comparative analysis used in this thesis, comparing the similarities of different administrations while also searching for what has been done differently (Knutsen & Moses, 2019, p. 98-101).

Building on such a comparative analysis, the case study helps to shed more proper light on the chosen main focus, the Macron administration and their approach. The close link between case studies and more historiographical methods gives it a benefit in showing what has happened after its happening, such as analyzing the approach of an administration after its first five years in charge (Berg & Lune, 2017, p. 170-180).

Given the reliance on both primary and secondary sources for this thesis, document analysis will also help to give a clearer picture. To understand what the actions of administrations have been one has to analyze what is written. The benefits of document analysis are many, it is for example efficient and easily available. That being said, and as shown in the literature review, one relies on documents which do not necessarily contain all the detail that is needed (Frey, 2018).

A combination of these methods is believed to give weight in explaining the approach not just of the Macron administration but also of administrations before him. By using these approaches the thesis can understand whether some parts of the Macron administration's approach are rooted in traditional French approaches as well as see what the differences are. The cons with using such an approach is that it will have to shorten the part of the theoretical discussion in the thesis in favor of a more solid empirical background

2 Clarifications

2.1 Concept clarification

Defense as a concept has been rather ill defined by the EU but in general one might look at the concept of defense for the EU as implying protection of what the EU grants important, covering areas such as citizens, territories or vital interests. This protection of course would be through the threat of military force or by using said military force against attacks (Tardy, 2018, p. 120).

Contrastingly, security for the EU covers a much broader range of areas, referring as it does not to protecting oneself militarily but rather to have policy responses towards various threats in the social, political, judicial, and economic sphere to name some examples (Tardy, 2018, p. 120).

2.2 Theory clarification – neorealism

The two main approaches of realism are classical realism and neorealism. A main thing separating them are their perceptions of power. Classical realists believe that power is the end goal of everyone in the international system, a consequence of the human nature, which often is selfish and greedy (Donnelly, 2000, p. 9-11; Mearsheimer, 2010, p. 72).

Neorealists on the other hand believe that the search for power is grounded in structural concerns with power as the means to the end, the end goal being survival (Donnelly, 2000, p. 18; Mearsheimer, 2010, p. 72; Waltz, 1979, p. 91).

Perhaps the most prominent neorealist has been Kenneth Waltz who argues that the realm of international politics is made up firstly by an "ordering principle". This ordering principle is whether political actors are arranged in hierarchical relations or in anarchic (non-hierarchical) relations and the international order is, to neorealism, anarchic. What is meant by this is that there is no centralized authority to create order, all states must fend for themselves in a self-help system (Waltz, 1979, p. 88-99).

"During the time men live without a common Power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called Warre; and such a warre, as is of every man, against every man"

(Hobbes, 1965, p. 96)

States are the main actors in the system and they are formally equal. Furthermore, every state possesses some form of military capability to inflict harm on others. The main difference between states is whether they are happy with the current situation, so-called status quo states, or not, so-called revisionist states (Mearsheimer, 2010, p. 73). As is pointed out by Mearsheimer (2010, p. 73) "intentions cannot be empirically verified" and as such, states have no other option than to believe the worst about others. As mentioned, the main goal is survival. While states also pursue other goals like economic growth, all other objectives that are not survival will share second place (Mearsheimer, 2010, p. 74). After

all, if there is no survival there can be nothing else, as Hobbes (1965, p. 97) himself states "no Arts; no Letters; no Society". Finally, states are rational actors in that they always seek to develop the best strategies for maximum survival. That being said, neorealism also believes that states from time to time miscalculate (Mearsheimer, 2010, p. 74).

While neorealism believes that every state is formally equal, distribution of capabilities renders some states more powerful, so-called great powers. These great powers are then the most important part of the system because they are the ones with the most influence to shape the world order (Mearsheimer, 2010, p. 72). Historically there have been two different "patterns" of world order, multipolarity and bipolarity. Multipolarity being that of three or more great powers, examples being Europe, most of the time, from the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 until WWII and bipolarity being that of two competing superpowers, such as the Cold War competition between the US and the Soviet Union (USSR) (Donnelly, 2000, p. 17; Mearsheimer, 2010, p. 78-79). Following the end of the Cold War, the world saw a new world order, that of unipolarity, with the US taking its place as the only great power, a world order many now believe is on its way to an end (Mearsheimer, 2010, p. 80, Simón, 2017, p. 186).

This question of power leads us to the discussion of how much power a state should seek. Here one needs to separate offensive- and defensive neorealism. Offensive neorealists believe that states should seek to maximize power as much as possible, this being the best way to guarantee survival. Defensive neorealists on the other hand, while sympathetic to the opinion that the international system creates incentives for power maximization, believes that such action would lead to so-called overexpansion (Mearsheimer, 2010, p. 75). Rather, states should seek to maintain an "appropriate amount of power", so-called relative power (Waltz, 1979, p. 40).

The power of others is always a threat. Consequently, cooperation in areas of high politics, such as security and defense, are viewed as difficult because, while one may gain from such cooperation, so can the other participants, and gains relative to the other parties are what determines further cooperation. This is known as relative gains (Donnelly, 2000, p. 58; Simón, 2017, p. 192-197). Cooperation then, is viewed as a competition between achieving greater relative gains than others. As such, cooperation inside institutions are not looked at as actual cooperation, rather as a power politics competition between the greater powers seeking to achieve their interests. High politics, that being areas such as security and defense, are especially challenging areas for cooperation in the eyes of neorealism (Collard-Wexler, 2006, p. 402-403).

Bandwagoning, buck-passing and balancing are the three main ways of action for powers in the system. Less powerful states are believed likely to bandwagon the greater powers. Waltz (1979, p. 126) believes that in hierarchical orders, actors tend to bandwagon the strongest actor because "losing does not place their security in jeopardy". In an anarchical order however, jumping on the bandwagon is a mistake because one sets itself up to become a prey of this power later on. As such, Donnelly and Waltz (2000, p. 18; 1979, p. 126) point out that a state always has to be concerned with the amount of relative power it possesses to that of another power. In periods where the security situation is less intense, stronger powers could rely on others to do the heavy lifting, so-called buck-passing

(Mearsheimer, 2010, p. 76; Posen, 2003, p. 6-7). Mostly though, neorealism believes that balancing will inevitably occur between the greater powers. Balancing could be to get a greater influence or to make the hegemon feel less secure but it could also be to bring down the hegemon, as was the case with powers such as Napoleonic France and Nazi Germany (Posen, 2003, p. 6-7; Waltz, 1979, p. 126).

“All the behaviors are observed, but unless the ultimate failure of all aspiring hegemon on the Eurasian landmass in modern times is to be attributed to chance or the intervention of Providence, it must be concluded that balancing ultimately happens and is backed with enough force to bring down the greatest powers”.

(Posen, 2004, p. 7).

3 Empirical research - The French approach

3.1 Actualization of the situation Macron took over

“We face a very clear choice: we must emerge from the withdrawal in which we have lived for too long, or be swept out of our own history.”

Jean-Yves Le Drian, as stated in (France Diplomacy, 2020).

The debate in France between 1952 and 1954 on the European Defense Community (EDC) saw a divide on the course of action between those that felt that such an approach would guarantee French security as well as ensuring German cooperation and those that felt that such an approach would reduce French national capabilities (Boniface, 2000, p. 41). The side against won and France scrapped the project they themselves proposed to Europe in 1952 (Boniface, 2000, p. 41). We do not know what would have happened had France gone along with the project, but we do know that France have worked for something similar later. Since the start of the Fifth Republic in 1958, under the presidency of Charles de Gaulle, France has developed different strategies working towards the idea of an autonomous Europe in the fields of security and defense (Treacher, 2001, p. 22). The idea of European security and defense policy have existed on the basis of three principles, those of sovereignty, independence and a global role, principles which coincidentally are at the cornerstone of the Gaullist legacy (Irondele, 2008, p. 155). Fearing to live under a US hegemon, France has sought to push European leaders into assuming objectives that France no longer has the capability to attain alone but which are important for France on the basis of grandeur and the image of France as a real great power (Bouemar, 2021; Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, 2014, p. 86; Treacher, 2001, p. 22-23). Europe then, with the transferal of French ambitions to this level, have been looked at as a possible power multiplier for France, a so-called *Europe puissance*, which is supposed to be a “European Europe”, free from dominance (Irondele, 2008, p. 155; Treacher, 2001, p. 22-23). As Jacques Chirac labeled it in 1996, it is a Europe “capable of defending European interests worldwide with the whole spectrum of power” (Irondele, 2008, p. 155).

So far, one can argue that there have been three distinct strategic periods of French policies towards this goal. Firstly, France sought to promote an autonomous European security and defense identity (ESDI) which would be under, in large part, French leadership. Seeing the lack of success around this, France tried to shift its policy to pursue ESDI inside the confines of the Atlantic Alliance. Thirdly, perhaps best exemplified with the French-British Saint-Malo summit of 1998, France tried to relocate ESDI to the EU, this time under a more common European leadership (Treacher, 2001, p. 22-23).

The period before the presidency of Emmanuel Macron saw some important shifts relating to the world order. In 2009, during the presidency of Nicolas Sarkozy, the Obama administration of the US announced the US pivot to Asia, marking the era of Sino-US rivalry and sowing doubts about the US commitment to Europe (Myre, 2021; SWP, 2021, p. 11). 2014 saw the Russian annexation of the Crimean Peninsula and larger aggression in Europe (Béraud-Sudreau & Pannier, 2021, p. 297; Sweeney & Winn, 2020, p. 226). 2015 saw several terrorist attacks on France which also led to a somewhat deepening divide in threat understandings between France, who focused on terrorism and the southern neighborhood, and Northern- and Central European countries that saw its largest threat in Russia (SWP, 2021, p. 36). 2016 saw the Brexit referendum, leading the UK, the traditionally strongest European security and defense partner to France, to start its process of leaving the EU (Charillon, 2018, p. 7-8, Sweeney & Winn, 2020, p. 225-226). Following Brexit, this period also saw heightened Euroscepticism in several countries, The Netherlands being one example, and not least France, where the main opposition for Macron was the Eurosceptic Marine Le Pen (BBC, 2013; France, 24, 2017; Walt, 2022). Over the Atlantic, another shift occurred with the election of Donald Trump as US president, marking a more isolationist US policy line (Charillon, 2018, p. 7-8; Shreer, 2019, p. 10). Furthermore, it is not only China and Russia that has seen rising growth but also powers such as Brazil and India, leading some scholars to speak of a "rise of the rest" instead of that of the west (Simón, 2017, p. 155-156). How solid foundations these powers have is still something time will tell, but a world characterized by such a multiplication of power centers and continental-sized great powers is a world which is argued to underscore the relative decline of importance for Europe (Simón, 2017, p. 155-156).

The French perspective then, when President Macron took office, was of a Europe where the entire framework and conditions of its security and defense policy had changed. A Europe where the liberal world order marked by the end of the Cold War and the unipolar moment was no more. The election of Donald Trump, Brexit, Euroscepticism and Chinese and Russian aggression were not accidents but the new normal, they were glaring examples of a structural transformation to which France and Europe had to respond (SWP, 2021, p. 11). In understanding this, France also understood its own position towards having an important say in shaping this new world order as quite limited. Not only was there a fear that this Sino-US rivalry could lead to less American security guarantees in Europe, perhaps an even bigger fear was that if Europe did not take its security and defense seriously it would not have a real say in the order of the world (Simón, 2017, p. 156; SWP, 2021, p. 11-12). Europe could be on the menu but not at the actual table. To counteract against such a possibility, the European level once again stood out to Paris as the only level in which there could be a large enough capacity to act while still having France in the driver's seat (SWP,

2021, p. 11). There were French concerns regarding other European powers lack of interest in acknowledging their points of weakness in the new, largely power based, world order that they saw coming. As such, an outspoken target from the Macron administration was, in line with policies going back to Charles de Gaulle, that France would be willing to act disruptively and alone to inspire action among other European states (SWP, 2021, p. 11-12). From there, President Macron made his Sorbonne speech, where he detailed his plans for Europe (Élysée, 2017).

3.2 France and European cooperation

Perhaps the first real breakthrough for France in the area of a common European security and defense policy would be the Saint-Malo agreement of 1998 between France and Britain. The resulting European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), which was renamed the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) in the Lisbon Treaty, was meant to be, first and foremost, an area of military activity (Tardy, 2018, p. 121). In the 1998 Saint-Malo Joint Declaration the target of the ESDP was to anchor it in "progressive framing of a common defense policy" (Franco-British Summit, 1998). Furthermore, its target for the EU as a whole was to "have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them and a readiness to do so" (Franco-British Summit, 1998). In the years to come, the ambition from the Saint-Malo declaration seemed to be followed up. The 1999 Helsinki Headline Goal also had a strong military focus, calling, as it did, on member states to "deploy rapidly and then sustain forces capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks as set out in the Amsterdam Treaty, including the most demanding, in operations up to corps level (up to 15 brigades or 50,000-60,000 persons)" (Council of the EU, 1999).

It seemed that the goal that France was pushing for, to rebrand the EU away from a status as a civilian and normative power, looked likely to happen, in line with the chosen strategy from France at that time of ESDI inside the EU (Tardy, 2018, p. 121; Treacher, 2001, p. 22-23). When Macron took office, however, the picture was somewhat different. The EU had failed vis a vis the US to narrow any gap in military power and experience (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, 2014, p. 83). One could point out that the EU in fact had run 12 military operations, some of which were rather robust (Tardy, 2018, p. 121). Still, as a whole, the defense dimension of the EU when President Macron took over was underdeveloped and the EU was by many labeled as a civilian power, perhaps a civilian power with some offensive capabilities at best (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, 2014, p. 83; Piechowicz & Szpak, 2022, p. 64; Sweeney & Winn, 2020, p. 226-227; Tardy, 2018, p. 121). First of all, civilian CSDP operations have always been a key feature of the CSDP and had, in fact, outnumbered the amount of military operations (Tardy, 2018, p. 121). As for the CSDP missions which had been militarily focused, many of these had not been about defense. Rather they had been about coercion of opponents outside the borders of the EU and focused more on international peacekeeping (Tardy, 2018, p. 121-122). Furthermore, the development of the CSDP happened in parallel to EU developments and investments in fields such as security sector reform (SSR), border management, cyber security and civilian policing to name a few. These developments also stretch further than the CSDP, being done through

institutions such as the European Commission (EC) and several Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) agencies (Tardy, 2018, 122). All these developments through different EU programs and institutions had, in other words, become part of a wider EU security policy approach and attested to the EU and its development as more an ambition of security than one of both security and defense (Tardy, 2018, p. 122).

3.3 Macron and European cooperation

With that being said, the later years have seen some development on the part of defense. The EU, like France, took notice of geopolitical events in the period up to 2016 and the likely approach of a new, more aggressive and power based world order. Thus, the EU started measures to respond accordingly (Sweeney & Winn, 2020, p. 226; Tardy, 2018, p. 122-125). The EU Global Strategy released in 2016 was a landmark in its calling for a Europe with autonomous capabilities, a rhetoric playing right into French hearts (High Representative, 2016, p. 4; Sweeney & Winn, 2020, p. 224-225; Tardy, 2018, p. 122-125). From this, there have been several examples of action. Some examples include breathing new life into the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO). Furthermore, there is the Coordinated Annual Review on Defense (CARD) which has sought to institutionalize the exchanging of information amongst states regarding their defense planning. Not least, the European Defense Fund (EDF) set out on a mission to enable closer pan-European cooperation on capabilities, in line with the hope for larger autonomy in the industrial sector, a feat Europe has managed before, Airbus being a leading example (Biermann & Weiss, 2021, p. 2; Drent, 2018, p. 1; Irondelle, 2008, p. 158; Sweeney & Winn, 2020, p. 224-225; SWP, 2021, p. 21; Tardy, 2018, p. 126-127).

France has been a leading contributor, normally together with Germany, in such implementations (Tardy, 2018, p. 124). As the two most powerful European states that also have vastly different strategic cultures, further European integration in the fields of security and defense is often a question of Franco-German cooperation (Kunz, 2019, p. 1-2; Piechowicz & Szpak, 2022, p. 68; SWP, 2021, p. 13; Tardy, 2018, p. 124). When President Macron took office in 2017, he did not take long in calling for a rejuvenated Franco-German cooperation, both inside and outside the EU (Billon-Galland & Quencez, 2017; Kunz, 2021, p. 4; SWP, 2021, p. 21). The Franco-German Defense and Security Council (DFVSR) stated on the 13th of July 2017 that the EU needed to become "a truly global actor in security and defense" (SWP, 2021, p. 21). France and Germany wanted to spearhead a campaign to boost the European defense process with a large procurement of capabilities and especially through the work of PESCO. PESCO was meant to offer the EU member states "the political framework for improving their solidarity and cooperation as well as their respective military instruments and defense capabilities through coordinated initiatives and specific projects" (SWP, 2021, p. 21). Such an optimism around cooperation did however not last long. While Germany campaigned for an inclusive PESCO, France took issue with this, citing the wording from the Lisbon Treaty, which stated that PESCO should be open to all member states "whose military capabilities fulfill higher criteria, and which have made more binding commitments to one another in this area with a view to the most demanding missions"

(European Union, 2007). France lost out to the broader interpretation championed by Germany. Twenty-five out of twenty-eight EU member states announced their intent to take part in PESCO. Paris responded with scaling back their participation significantly, only partaking in eight of the seventeen PESCO projects that were adopted on the 6th of March 2018 (SWP, 2021, p. 22).

Paris reacted to these developments by increasingly seeking out European defense cooperation outside the confines of EU institutions and policy programs. In his aforementioned Sorbonne speech, President Macron initiated the European Intervention Initiative (EI2) with a target towards developing a more pan-European strategic culture among willing countries (Élysée, 2017; France Diplomacy A, 2022; Kruijver & Zandee, 2019, p. 2; Sweeney & Winn, 2020, p. 227; SWP, 2021, p. 22). Macron acknowledged that defense cooperation inside the EU had seen "progress of historic levels" (Élysée, 2017). Still, he argued that it was not enough. The participation in EI2 of European countries not in the EU, such as Norway, points to a French approach to European defense that does not have to be inside the EU, just an approach that will meet the French targets (Kruijver & Zandee, 2019, p. 4; Remý-Bel, 2019; Sweeney & Winn, 2020, p. 227).

French frustration with European cooperation inside the EU can be found in many more examples. The participation of third countries in both PESCO and EDF projects met continuing resistance in Paris. This especially accounts for fear of US involvement that could oppose efforts from Paris to reduce dependence on American industry (Koenig, 2020, p. 4; SWP, 2021, p. 23). This was not made better by the fact that Germany, as well as other European states, resonated quite a bit with arguments made by the Trump administration that such measures were protectionist and would harm existing NATO structures (Koenig, 2020, p. 4). In October 2018 a compromise was drawn up, setting independent rules as a guarantee for each PESCO project (SWP, 2021, p. 23). Such conflicts between France, Germany and the German influenced states are more the norm than the exception and creates a difficult climate for France. As a consequence, measures such as EI2 are created outside of institutional structures and the 2017 French strategic review supported growing French unilateralist cooperation inside Europe but outside the EU, relying on Europe as a whole and demonstrating a pragmatism and a shift in policy focus that separates the Macron administration from earlier administrations (SWP, 2021, p. 47; Treacher, 2001, p. 22-23).

3.4 France and NATO

“Amie, alliée, mais pas alignée”, which means “friend, ally, but not aligned”, possibly best sums up the traditional French approach to NATO (SWP, 2021, p. 35). The relationship between the two has historically been complicated, one example being the period from 1966 until 2009 where France did not participate in the integrated military structures of the alliance (France Diplomacy B, 2022; SWP, 2021, p. 35). NATO has simply, in the French mind, been one of many possible formats for France to achieve its defense and security targets. Building on this, France has been very clear during its membership that one needs to separate NATO from politics. In other words, Paris has made a habit of distinguishing NATO as a military defense organization while at the same time downplaying NATO as a political union. NATO, in the traditional French perspective, should keep its focus where its values lie, this first and foremost being the collective defense of Europe (SWP, 2021, p. 35).

Traditionally one can point to four factors that mainly explain the French position vis a vis NATO. Firstly, there has been a sincere and longstanding doubt in Paris that the pledges from the US regarding European defense are reliable over a longer term, a view that did not weaken with the election of Donald Trump (Schreer, 2019, p. 10-17; SWP, 2021, p. 36). Examples of behavior and actions that concerned France was the US withdrawal from Syria in 2019 which was not coordinated with European leaders. Furthermore, there were strong French reactions towards the rhetoric of the Trump administration, naming Europe a foe, as well as the US withdrawal from parts of the international order (BBC, 2018; Schreer, 2019, p. 10-17; SWP, 2021, p. 36). However, it is not the Trump administration that in itself has been the deciding factor regarding the European security guarantee. As stated, this is a traditional view and stems mostly from French structural concerns. The increasing US focus on its competition with China as well as the tendencies towards a new world order of bipolarity is what, in the eyes of Paris, highlights the difficulty in trusting such a guarantee (SWP, 2021, p. 36).

NATO has also, from the French perspective, become increasingly weakened (SWP, 2021, p. 36). The biggest challenges here are member states that disregard NATO rules and instead pursue their own interests. Turkey is a main issue for France, especially Turkish involvement in various theaters around the world where it acts or has acted against NATO decisions, with a particularly shining example being the violation of the arms embargo in Libya (Jabbour, 2021, p. 4-6; SWP, 2021, p. 36). Moreover, Paris claims that the Turkish fighting against the Kurdish Yekîneyên Parastina Gel (YPG) forces, trained and equipped in large part by France, is directly harming the interests of member states (Jabbour, 2021, p. 6; SWP, 2021, p. 36). Furthermore, Paris is under the impression that European security has been harmed because of Turkish conduct, hereby meaning that the risks of terrorist attacks in Europe, and France especially, has increased in no small way because of the actions made in Ankara (SWP, 2021 p. 36).

Building on this, the traditional French view has been that NATO has been a bit one-sided in its focus on Russia while at the same time not taking seriously the French perspective of the key threat coming from terrorism (SWP, 2021, p. 36-37). Lastly, Paris believes that too

strong a focus on the transatlantic link and NATO will damage the French hope of European sovereignty. (Sweeney & Winn, 2020, p. 229-230; SWP, 2021, p. 23 & 37).

That being said, Paris acknowledges that NATO is of fundamental importance (France Diplomacy B, 2022). The view in Paris is just that strengthening European security and defense does not harm NATO, rather the two will mutually strengthen each other. Paris, furthermore, does not look at cooperation with the US on European security as only being done under the NATO umbrella. NATO is rather, albeit an important one, just one of several formats for French-US cooperation, as can be exemplified with the French-US operations in the Sahel and the coalition against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). While these operations take place far outside European borders, with the French focus on terrorism, they are looked at as a direct action to strengthen European security (SWP, 2021, p. 35-37). Furthermore, seeing the lukewarm approval from European allies on their wish for a more autonomous Europe, the policies of the two administrations before Macron, those of Sarkozy and Hollande, were altered, both turning towards the US more (Pannier, 2017).

3.5 Macron and NATO

During his presidency, Macron has largely followed the French strategy towards NATO of the former years but there have been some changes which are worthy of notice. In the military area, France has, more than earlier, been committed to visible contribution in areas that for France have not been the most important areas of defense, trying to show a larger solidarity with European allies. As such, there have been substantial contributions by France towards the NATO deterrence missions in the Baltic states following the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014. Contributions include participation in the Baltic Air Policing operations and being a part of NATO's enhanced Forward Presence with 300 soldiers as well as with capabilities such as the French Leclerc battle tanks (France Diplomacy B, 2022; SWP, 2021, p. 37).

Perhaps most substantial is however the upgraded importance emphasized towards the political part of NATO. As mentioned, the traditional French line has been to disregard, for the most part, NATO as a political actor. President Macron, on the other hand, has made changes to this. The harsh criticism towards the alliance made by Macron during an interview with *The Economist* in 2019 where he labeled NATO as braindead marked a new era of French focus on the political arm of the alliance (SWP, 2021, p. 38; *The Economist*, 2019). While Macron acknowledged that NATO, for the most part, functioned well militarily, he criticized the political room for action, pointing to Turkey, the problems with the Trump administration as well as lack of European unity (*The Economist*, 2019). This is a good example of the outspoken French line of disruption when it sees the need for it (SWP, 2021, p. 38). While his statements irritated many allies, it did lead to a German proposal to set up an expert commission not long after, and ended with the alliance tasking the NATO administration with making proposals to strengthen the political dimension of the alliance during the NATO meeting in London in 2019 (Kunz, 2020; NATO, 2019; SWP, 2021, p. 38). The resulting report, published in December 2020, contained 130 proposals, a report that

Paris was mostly satisfied with and which it claimed responsibility for (Élysée, 2020; NATO, 2020; SWP, 2021, p. 39).

However, it is no secret that France often has a difficult relationship with allies, in large part because of their sometimes disruptive tone. Informally, it could be that most of the allies agree with what France is stating as well as valuing what France brings militarily and security wise to the alliance. At the same time, many states are of the opinion that France ruins more than it builds with its disruptiveness, and France has, as a consequence, gotten the reputation of being a difficult ally. So is also the case under President Macron (SWP, 2021, p. 40).

4 Discussion

A more autonomous Europe has been the goal of the varied French approaches, as have also been the case during the Macron administration. One thing that separates the Macron administration from previous administrations is the fact that the world order now seems to be changing. The unipolar moment of US hegemony seems to shift towards a bipolar, Sino-US rivalry. At the same time there has been a relative decline in Europe and what scholars have deemed the "rise of the rest". Such a relative decline of Europe, and thereby France, has led to the ambitions of the Macron administration to strengthen Europe, viewing Europe as the only possibility to be able to take action in the face of contemporary challenges. Europe then, is seen as a power multiplier. In a neorealist fashion, this can be explained by France being a rational actor, eager to maintain its power and thereby chances of survival in this shifting world order and seeing Europe as the rationally best strategy.

Such a quest for power leads us to the question of whether France seems to operate under an offensive or defensive approach. If operating under an offensive approach, then France would seek to maximize its power and indeed the power of Europe, seeing this as the best way to guarantee survival. While France does seek for Europe to be autonomous in its action, it still is a close ally of the US. As such, one could argue that it is more likely that France favors a defensive approach, that of gaining relative power towards the power of other third parties. Such an argument could then be linked to the question of balancing, bandwagoning and buck-passing and what France seeks for itself and Europe to do.

There are little signs of bandwagoning efforts from Paris. Firstly, Paris works to disentangle the US from the European security architecture and the Macron administration has, as an example, been vocally against US efforts to partake in PESCO and EDF projects, fearing from this a larger chance of continuous European bandwagoning in the industrial sector. Furthermore, the Macron administration has been vocal in its dissatisfaction with NATO and pushing for changes, thereby trying to take somewhat of a leadership role and not bowing altogether to US leadership. The French project towards European autonomy, both inside and outside of the EU, does instead point towards French balancing efforts. Balancing, as realism points out, can take several different directions. France is a close partner of the US, and as such, there is little evidence to point to a French effort of balancing the US with the end goal of removing the US as a world power in favor of Europe, which would be more in

line with a maximizing offensive neorealist approach. If one looks at the French concerns regarding the shifting world order and US priorities, it is more probable that French balancing efforts through Europe are designed towards granting France and Europe a more influential position and therefore also a larger amount of relative power. Balancing efforts then, point towards a quest towards greater influence, seeking to have a voice in discussions with the US and other third parties, to have the ability to defend itself without US support and thereby also to not be dismissed or not at the table but be a force to be reckoned with. Such is more in line with a defensive neorealist approach. A statement that perhaps captures the French reasoning was stated by former British official Sir Rodric Braithwaite:

"A junior partner who is taken for granted is a junior partner with no influence. In dealing with the Americans we need to follow the basic principle of negotiation: you must always make it clear that you will, if necessary, walk away from the table."

As cited in (Posen, 2004, p. 14).

That being said, the French approach could be argued to also point towards buck-passing. While France indeed has maintained a separate industry and capabilities, as well as historically working towards autonomy, they have, like the rest of Europe, relied on US support after WWII. France has accepted that there are operations and tasks which they are not capable of managing by themselves and the country has, as such, while working towards autonomy, still turned to the US for assistance. A good example is the operations in the Sahel, which France believes is a key part of European security, where Paris has worked with the US and relied on US support. This then could, using neorealism, be argued to be an example of French buck-passing.

However, the shift from Paris to locate some of its defense and security goals outside of the EU, as exemplified with the E12, could point towards the larger issue concerning the French wish for European cooperation, that of cooperation itself. As neorealism is quick to point out, cooperation in the areas of high politics, such as those of security and defense, are, by nature, difficult. While the relative decline of Europe suggests that Europe must cooperate and balance third parties, such as the US, this idea fails to take into account that of the position of a given European country inside of a multipolar Europe. A country must not just focus on its relative power position towards a third actor without at the same time also focusing on its relative power position inside the power multiplier that is Europe. As such, and in line with the idea of relative gains, it should be the duty of every country to make sure that European cooperation takes place according to one's own ideas, strategies and advantages. While, depending on circumstances, it could be okay for a state to accept a relative loss to another European country for the sake of a gain that is greater from a third party such as the US, this is not always the case. The actions of the Macron administration concerning its multifaceted approach to cooperation both inside and outside the confines of the EU and NATO could then be explained by the wish from France to shape cooperation where they believe it is best for France to do so. While France could be happy with the CSDP as well as different EU institutions being best suited towards various security cooperation measures, it could believe that defense integration and strategic integration is best suited outside the EU. At the same time, NATO, for France, has an important role in furthering

European commitments towards common defense while France also believes that collaboration with the US on European security is not limited to NATO and thus seeks unilateral cooperation with the US in areas such as the Sahel as well. What follows from this could be seen to be a wish for greater relative gains where they are best suited. Inside the mechanisms of the EU for example, French cooperation could highlight itself in gains towards its relationship with Germany, which, as mentioned, it continually stresses as its most important ally. Building on this, France could see its participation in NATO operations in the Baltics as a gain in showing commitments to European countries who normally are of a more atlanticist mentality. At the same time French efforts outside of the EU could gain France in shaping a more common strategic culture and threat assessment that cooperation inside the EU has proven to be an obstacle to.

Furthermore, the reaction of the Macron administration towards institutional cooperation and its stated wish for more cooperation outside of institutions could be explained in neorealism with the general skepticism coming from cooperation in high politics. As institutional cooperation is viewed as the arena of power politics and competition it is no wonder that the Macron administration faces a side, often led by Germany, with a different view that they try to push. Such is, by all accounts, the nature of institutional cooperation, and especially so in high politics. Relocating some cooperation it deems important outside such institutional structures then, could give the Élysée more freedom in shaping it how it wants it.

5 Conclusion

To conclude it is clear that President Macron during his tenure has approached European security in much the same way that earlier administrations have done. Since Charles de Gaulle took charge of the Fifth French Republic in 1958, France has worked towards a less reliant and more autonomous Europe. Such work has also been supported by President Macron, who from the start of his Presidency held a speech at the Sorbonne which outlined his ambitions. During his Presidency, Macron has supported several initiatives inside the confines of the EU and have been a vocal supporter of a coherent Franco-German leadership. That being said, the Macron administration has been more active in working towards such a European policy. While his two predecessors, President Sarkozy and President Hollande scaled back French ambitions in light of lacking European support, Macron has scaled this ambition back up, even in a time when he has had to face Euroscepticism in many countries as well as his own. Furthermore, the Macron administration has shifted some of its focus from inside the EU to outside of it with initiatives such as EII and with a stated focus on more unilateral cooperation. This is a change from previous administrations and highlights a new and more pragmatic approach towards reaching the French goals.

Regarding NATO, while Paris has been rather consistent, the Macron administration has taken a keener interest and vocal role in the political arm of NATO than what has been the approach before. Cooperation with the US regarding European security has, during the

Macron presidency, as with earlier administrations, taken place both inside and outside the confines of NATO, but the Macron administration has partaken more in NATO operations with the French efforts in the Baltic states being a leading example. In conclusion, the Macron administration has cooperated closely with NATO and the US while also developing cooperation inside and outside the EU. The three different strategies previous administrations have used have focused mostly on one area while the pragmatic multifaceted approach of the Macron administration could be seen as the new fourth strategy.

Explaining the French approach using neorealism means firstly that one has to understand it as a quest for power and survival. The Macron administration's push for a more autonomous Europe with greater capabilities suggests a French strategy towards a Europe that can fend for itself in the new world order that is approaching, corresponding closely with the idea of a rational actor developing strategies for survival. The idea of balancing also needs to be pointed out. While France does not push to unseat the US as a global power, it seeks through a more powerful Europe to gain a more important seat at the table, thus also gaining influence over the actions in the world, operating more in a defensive manner than in an offensive manner. While this is happening, France still acknowledges that neither France nor Europe is at the wanted level yet. As such, there are tendencies that point towards some French buck-passing with the US as well while the balancing work for autonomy develops. Finally, neorealism and its skepticism towards institutional cooperation is mirrored in France. Consequently, there are clear signs of a France that wishes to split up cooperation both inside and outside institutions, giving France the possibility to act, alone or with others, where it is preferred in terms of relative gains and where it can operate on its own terms. While France seeks a powerful Europe, one first, as with all other states in the self-help system, has to prioritize its own power and survival.

6 Bibliography

- BBC. (2013). Geert Wilders on bringing down EU. *BBC*. Viewed: 06.05.22.
<https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-europe-25356773>
- BBC. (2018). Donald Trump: European Union is a foe on trade. *BBC*. Viewed: 06.05.22.
<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-44837311>
- Béraud-Sudreau, L & Pannier, A. (2021). An “improbable Paris-Berlin-Commission triangle”: usages of Europe and the revival of EU defense cooperation after 2016. *Journal of European Integration*, 43(3), 295-310. Viewed: 05.01.22.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/07036337.2020.1740215>
- Berg, B, L & Lune, H. (2017). *Qualitative Research Methods for the Social Sciences* (Ninth Edition.). Essex: Pearson Education Limited.
- Biermann, F., Weiss, M. (2021). Networked politics and the supply of European defense integration. *Journal of European Public Policy*, N/A, 1-22. Viewed: 12.03.22.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2021.1916057>
- Billon-Galland, A & Quencez, M. (2017, October 6th). Can France and Germany make PESCO work as a process toward EU defense? *German Marshall Fund*. Viewed: 02.01.22.
<https://www.gmfus.org/news/can-france-and-germany-make-pesco-work-process-toward-eu-defense>
- Boniface, P. (1998). *Is France still a great power?* Paris: Presses de Sciences Po.
- Bouemar, V. (2021, September 29th). EU Collective Defense: What Does France Want? *Clingendael Spectator*. Viewed: 20.03.22.
<https://spectator.clingendael.org/en/publication/eu-collective-defence-what-does-france-want>
- Charillon, F. (2018). Macron’s France in the World: Strategic Challenges and a Narrow Path. *Norwegian Atlantic Committee, Security Policy Library*. Viewed, 20.03.22.
<https://www.atlanterhavskomiteen.no/en/library>
- Collard-Wexler, S. (2006). *Integration Under Anarchy: Neorealism and the European*

- Union. *European Journal of International Relations*, 12(3), 397-432. Viewed: 10.01.22.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066106067349>
- Council of the EU. (1999). Presidency Conclusions: Helsinki European Council. Viewed: 04.05.22.
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/acfa4c.htm
- Deutsche Welle. (2022, May 7th). Russia's invasion of Ukraine. *Deutsche Welle*. Viewed: 07.05.22.
<https://www.dw.com/en/russias-invasion-of-ukraine/t-60931789>
- Donnelly, J. (2000). *Realism and International Relations* (First edition.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Drent, M. (2018). European strategic autonomy: Going it alone? *Netherlands Institute of International Relations*. Viewed: 03.01.22.
https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/2018-08/PB_European_Strategic_Autonomy.pdf
- Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, M. (2014). Europe's Defense Dilemma. *The International Spectator*, 49(2). 83-116. Viewed: 13.04.22.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/03932729.2014.910728>
- Élysée. (2017, September 26th). *President Macron gives speech on new initiative for Europe*. Viewed: 10.12.21.
<https://www.elysee.fr/en/emmanuel-macron/2017/09/26/president-macron-gives-speech-on-new-initiative-for-europe>
- Élysée. (2020, December 2nd). *Entretien téléphonique du Président de la République avec le Secrétaire Général de l'OTAN, M. Jens Stoltenberg*. Viewed: 02.05.22.
<https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2020/12/02/entretien-telephonique-du-president-de-la-republique-avec-le-secretaire-general-de-lotan-m-jens-stoltenberg>
- European Union. (2007, December 13th). *Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Community, 2007/C 306/01*. Viewed: 02.05.22.
<https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A12007L%2FTXT>

- France 24. (2017, N/A). French Presidential Elections, first round and second round results. *France 24*. Viewed: 06.05.22.
<https://graphics.france24.com/results-first-round-french-presidential-election-2017/>
- France 24 A. (2022, March 7th). Macron bucks Western trend by keeping dialogue open with Putin. *France 24*. Viewed: 07.05.22.
<https://www.france24.com/en/europe/20220307-macron-bucks-western-trend-by-keeping-dialogue-open-with-putin>
- France 24 B. (2022, N/A). France 2022 - Presidential Election, first round and second round results. *France 24*. Viewed: 07.05.22.
<https://www.france24.com/en/france-2022-presidential-election-second-round-results>
- France Diplomacy. (2020). *Speech by Jean-Yves Le Drian in Bratislava*. Viewed: 05.05.2020.
<https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/our-ministers/jean-yves-le-drian/speeches/article/speech-by-jean-yves-le-drian-in-bratislava-globsec-2020-bratislava-forum-08-oct>
- France Diplomacy A. (2022). *European Defense*. Viewed: 08.04.22.
<https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/french-foreign-policy/europe/european-defence/>
- France Diplomacy B. (2022). *France and NATO*. Viewed: 08.04.22.
<https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/french-foreign-policy/security-disarmament-and-non-proliferation/our-alliances-and-cooperations/france-and-nato/>
- Franco-British Summit. (1998). *Joint Declaration on European Defense*. Viewed: 05.05.22.
https://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/2008/3/31/f3cd16fb-fc37-4d52-936f-c8e9bc80f24f/publishable_en.pdf
- Frey, B. (2018). *The SAGE encyclopedia of educational research, measurement, and evaluation* (Vols. 1-4). Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications, Inc. Viewed: 05.05.22.
<https://dx.doi.org/10.4135/9781506326139.n209>
- High Representative. (2016). Shared vision, common action: a stronger Europe. A global strategy for the EU's Foreign and Security Policy. Viewed: 10.04.22.
https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/top_stories/pdf/eugs_review_web.pdf
- Hobbes, T, 1588-1679. (1965, reprinted from the edition of 1651). *Leviathan* (Eight

- Edition). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Hyde-Price, A. (2006) "Normative" power Europe: a realist critique. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 13(2), 217-234. Viewed: 18.01.22.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/13501760500451634>
- Irondelle, B. (2008). European Foreign Policy: the End of French Europe? *European Integration*, 30(1). 153-168. Viewed: 12.03.22.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/07036330801959556>
- Jabbour, J. (2021). France vs Turkey in the EastMed. *Ifri & Center for Applied Turkey Studies*. Viewed: 10.04.22.
https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/jabbour_france_vs_turkey_eastmed_2021.pdf
- Knutsen, T, L & Moses, J, W. (2019). *Ways of Knowing: Competing Methodologies in Social and Political Research* (Third Edition). London: Red Globe Press.
- Koenig, N. (2020). Time to go beyond the meta-debate on EU strategic autonomy in defense. *Hertie School, Policy Brief*. Viewed: 02.05.22.
https://hertieschool-f4e6.kxcdn.com/fileadmin/2_Research/1_About_our_research/2_Research_centres/6_Jacques_Delors_Centre/Publications/20201203_defence_Koenig.pdf
- Kruijver, K & Zandee, D. (2019). The European Intervention Initiative: Developing a shared strategic culture for European defense. *Netherlands Institute of International Relations*. Viewed: 20.04.22.
https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/2019-09/The_European_Intervention_2019.pdf
- Kunz, B. (2019). Why Franco-German leadership on European defense is not in sight. *NUPI Policy Brief*. Viewed: 20.03.22.
https://nupi.brage.unit.no/nupi-xmlui/bitstream/handle/11250/2599512/NUPI_Policy_Brief_10_2019_Kunz-2.pdf?sequence=2&isAllowed=y
- Kunz, B. (2020, March 4th). Europe's Defense Debate Is All About America. *War on the Rocks*. Viewed: 02.04.22.
<https://warontherocks.com/2020/03/europes-defense-debate-is-all-about-america/>
- Kunz, B. (2021). Paris and Berlin: still no strategic convergence while the big

- questions return. *The Norwegian Atlantic Committee, Security Policy Library*.
Viewed: 20.03.22.
<https://www.atlanterhavskomiteen.no/en/library>
- Leali, G. (2022, May 3rd). Macron, Putin resume phone contact but remain far apart on Ukraine war. *Politico*. Viewed: 07.05.22.
<https://www.politico.eu/article/macron-putin-resume-phone-contact-but-remain-far-apart-on-ukraine-war/>
- Mearsheimer, J, J. (2010). Structural Realism, I T. Dunne, M. Kurki & S. Smith (eds.), *International Relations Theories* (pp. 77-94). Oxford University Press: New York.
- Myre, G. (2021, October 6th). Long promised and often delayed, the “pivot to Asia” takes shape under Biden. *NPR*. Viewed: 05.05.22.
<https://www.npr.org/2021/10/06/1043329242/long-promised-and-often-delayed-the-pivot-to-asia-takes-shape-under-biden>
- NATO. (2019, December 4th). *London Declaration*. Viewed: 02.05.22.
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_171584.htm
- NATO. (2020, November 25th). *NATO 2030: United for a New Era*. Viewed: 02.05.22.
https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2020/12/pdf/201201-Reflection-Group-Final-Report-Uni.pdf
- Pannier, A. (2017). Between Autonomy and Cooperation: The Role of Allies in France’s new defense strategy. Viewed: 20.03.22.
<https://warontherocks.com/2017/11/between-autonomy-and-cooperation-the-role-of-allies-in-frances-new-defense-strategy/>
- Piechowicz, M & Agnieszka, S. (2022). Evolution of the CSDP in the setting of European integration and international relations theory. *Comparative Strategy*, 41(1), 60-77. Viewed: 05.02.22.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/01495933.2021.2017746>
- Posen, B. (2003). ESDP and the structure of world power. *The International Spectator*, 39(1), 5-17. Viewed: 05.01.22.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/03932720408457057>
- Remý-Bel, O. (2019, October 2nd). Can Macron’s European Intervention Initiative Make the Europeans Battle-Ready? *War on the Rocks*. Viewed: 05.05.22.

<https://warontherocks.com/2019/10/can-macrons-european-intervention-initiative-make-the-europeans-battle-ready/>

Schreer, B. (2019) Trump, NATO and the Future of Europe's Defense. *The RUSI Journal*, 164(1), 10-17. Viewed: 25.03.22.

<https://doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2019.1605011>

Simón, L. (2017) Neorealism, Security Cooperation, and Europe's Relative Gains Dilemma, *Security Studies*, 26(2), 185-212. Viewed: 12.03.22.

<https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2017.1280297>

Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik/German Institute for International and Security Affairs. (2021). *France's Foreign and Security Policy under President Macron*. Viewed: 12.03.22.

https://www.swpberlin.org/publications/products/research_papers/2021RP04_Policy_UnderMacron_DASEP.pdf

Sweeney, S & Winn, N. (2020). EU security and defense cooperation in times of Dissent: Analyzing PESCO, the European Defense Fund and the European Intervention Initiative (EI2) in the shadow of Brexit. *Defense Studies*, 20(3), 224-249. Viewed: 20.03.22.

<https://doi.org/10.1080/14702436.2020.1778472>

Tardy, T. (2018) Does European defense really matter? Fortunes and misfortunes of the Common Security and Defense Policy. *European Security*, 27(2), 119-137. Viewed: 12.03.22.

<https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2018.1454434>

The Economist. (2019, November 7th). Emmanuel Macron warns Europe: NATO is becoming brain-dead. *The Economist*. Viewed: 02.05.22.

<https://www.economist.com/europe/2019/11/07/emmanuel-macron-warns-europe-nato-is-becoming-brain-dead>

Treacher, A. (2001). Europe as a power multiplier for French security policy: Strategic consistency, tactical adaptation. *European Security*, 10(1). 22-44. Viewed: 12.03.22.

<https://doi.org/10.1080/09662830108407481>

Walt, V. (2022, April 12th). Marine Le Pen doesn't oppose France leaving European

Union. *Time Magazine*. Viewed: 06.05.22.

<https://time.com/6166144/marine-le-pen-france-european-union/>

Waltz, K, N. (1979). *Theory of International Politics* (First Edition.). Massachusetts:
Addison-Wesley Publishing Company.

