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"Us" versus "them", people´s identity in Europe

Bachelor's thesis in European studies
Supervisor: Anna Brigevich
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NTNU
Kunnskap for en bedre verden

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Abstract

There has been an increase in nationalist and populist sentiments in Europe during the last two decades. Some believed that globalization would lead to the eradication of national identity, that it would be replaced by a cosmopolitan European identity. This prediction has not come to pass. In fact, it seems that globalization has actually increased the appeal of national identity and has led to increased nationalism. This thesis will explain what identity factors that influence people`s national identity and that of being European, the most. This thesis will use Henri Tajfel's *social identity theory* to explain how the notion of "us" versus "them" is strong, concerning how nationalism, and by extension populism, has manifested itself in the narrative of "winners" and "losers" of globalization. It is argued in this paper that certain variables such as age, education and geographical location of people (of European citizens) are often in focus of a discussion regarding people`s national identity and European identity, presenting that there are other elements such as religion, economy and political affiliation that have a stronger impact on people's identity. This is done by looking at data from the Eurobarometer 508 report where roughly 27000 respondents from the EU member states answered survey questions about how strongly they identified themselves with different identity factors.

Sammendrag

Nasjonalisme og populistisk tankegang har hatt en økende tilslutning i Europa i løpet av de siste to tiårene. Flere var av den mening at globalisering ville lede til at den nasjonalistisk identiteten ville utviskes, og deretter bli erstattet med en kosmopolitisk europeisk identitet. Dette har ikke skjedd. Istedenfor virker det som om globalisering har bidratt til å øke folks nasjonale identitet, og også ført til en økende nasjonalisme. Denne besvarelsen vil søke å forklare hvilke identitetsfaktorer som påvirker folks nasjonale identitet og folks europeiske identitet sterkest. Med grunnlag i Henri Tajfel´s *social identity theory,* viser denne oppgaven hvordan effekten av "oss" versus "dem" er sterk når det gjelder nasjonalisme, og dermed også populisme, og har manifestert seg i narrativet "vinnere" og "tapere" av globaliseringen. Denne besvarelsen viser at det er visse faktorer som alder, utdanning og folks (europeeres) geografiske bosted som ofte er i fokus når nasjonal og europeisk identitet debatteres. Samtidig viser besvarelsen også andre elementer som har sterkere innvirkning på folks identitet; religion, økonomi og politisk tilhørighet. Data fra *Eurobarometer 508 report*, en rapport som viser data basert på ca.27000 EU-borgeres svar på spørsmål om hvor sterkt de identifiserer seg med ulike identitetsfaktorer, er benyttet for å forklare dette.

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1 Introduction

We know from social identity theory that group identity can simultaneously unite and divide people. The social psychologist Henri Tajfel's *social identity theory* implies that human beings tend to identify themselves with other people who are like them, based on positive emotions, first and foremost. Social identity theory discusses that some individuals have negative responses to people who are not like them, referring to "us" versus "them", based on certain identity factors that people will identify themselves with. The "us" versus "them"-sentiment exists not only between individuals, but also on a larger scale, both regionally and internationally. Nowadays, people in Europe tend to be categorized as either nationalistic or cosmopolitan, they will either have strong attachments to their nationality or that of being European. The same "us" versus "them"-sentiment also exists regarding globalization, where there have been "winners" and "losers". During the last two decades there has been a rise of *populism* as a reaction against the promise that globalization would mean gains for all. As a result, some people are now prone to feel more attached to populist sentiment and ideology. This paper will make use of Tajfel's theory in order to explain what kinds of people gravitate more to nationalism, and by extension populism, and what kinds of people gravitate more to cosmopolitanism. This paper contains an empirical analysis that will highlight different identity factors that have an impact on both national and European identity, with data chosen from a collection of public opinion surveys, the Eurobarometer 508 (European union, 2021).

2 Social identity theory

Psychology research over the years has dealt with different issues regarding a human being`s perception of itself, its *individual identity,* and its relations with other people, its *social identity.* People's political belief/belonging, which is a topic that has gained importance in the last decade, is people's *national identity*. The term "national identity" refers both to the subjective feeling an individual shares with a group about their national belonging as well as the merging of nations' sovereignty into one unit (i. e. the European Union). Back in the 1980s and 1990s, many believed that with the pooling of sovereignty from nations into (what we now know as) the EU - which represents the strongest image of the process of globalization - this process would, eventually, lead to the eradication of national identity. In fact, people presumed that national identity would be replaced by a *cosmopolitan European identity*, but this has proven not to be the case. While someone`s national identity deals with the individual perception of an identity, does the term *nationalism* refer to a political ideology, a belief, whereas *populism* refers to a political strategy used to appeal to the people. But, both nationalism and populism are rooted in the idea of popular sovereignty, they both gravitate towards the right (on the political scale), and the target group they speak to and for is equivalent with the ethnic and racial majority of a nation. Both terms focus on an ideology which revolves around an "in- and out-group" classification (and the differences between them), which mainly can be summarized into the following groups; "us/the people/the nation" versus "them/the elite".

In the different fields of research, there are different definitions of an identity. Theories about psychology show that human beings have the ability to both be self-conscious and to self-reflect, and discuss that both self-consciousness and self-reflection are important elements belonging to a human being´s identity. While theories on *social identity,* on the other hand, refer to the knowledge an individual has about oneself and its perception of belonging to certain social groups, in addition to what personal values and emotions that matter for the individual when it relates itself to other individuals or groups of people. In the 1970s, the social psychologist Henri Tajfel initially developed a theory known as *the social identity theory* (SIT). Tajfel`s theory deals with the categorizing an individual does when relating oneself to other people, as well as what categorizing that will happen in the relation between groups of people, especially regarding the dynamics of prejudice, stereotyping and discrimination. The social identity theory implies that human beings identify themselves with others, with a strong focus on *positive social categories*, referring to *social groups*` reflections on who they are, as well as the perception of belonging to these groups which makes them feel good about themselves. Tajfel's social identity theory may therefore be used to showcase the concept of one's social identity in order to explain intergroup behavior. The social identity theory implies that people have the perception of belonging to certain groups of people, based on categories of certain social dynamics, that people are either part of an "in-group" or not, and that there, by default, has to be an "out-group". There is an "us" versus "them"-sentiment; if an individual categorizes itself into the "in-group", that individual will then categorize

everyone else into the "out-group". What identity factors do then represent a significant impact on people's social identity and political belief?

In order to understand how people are drawn into ideologies and theories such as nationalism and populism, it is important to look at social identity theory in general, but also, more specifically, take a closer look on how one's identity is and how it can be shaped. Social identity is classically defined by Henri Tajfel as an "individual's knowledge that he belongs to certain social groups together with some emotional and value significance to him of this group membership" (Tajfel, 1972, as cited in Hogg, 2016, p. 6). Social groups, in varied sizes, share a common identity on specific or more explicit components that will make up a person's socially constructed identity. The most important aspect of a shared social identity is not that it "… prescribes and evaluates who they are, what they should believe and how they should behave…", but rather "how the in-group is distinct from relevant out-groups in a particular social context" (Hogg, 2016, p. 6). The theory attaches a natural inclination that people have to categorize and/or stereotype themselves and others, and implies that there is a social construct which fosters conflict due to the interplay of identity and access to resources. The sentiment of "in-group" and "out-group" is created from the concept that identity both integrates and divides people. When an individual has a sense of mutual obligation, attachment and loyalty, as well as perceiving something similar of the others' identity in one´s "in-group", there will be sharp boundaries drawn around, and negative sentiments will remain attached to the "out-groups", with the persistent belief that they are not "us", but "them". Social identity will therefore both integrate and divide people simultaneously. As previously stated, both nationalism and populism are rooted in the idea of popular sovereignty and that both focus on the "in-and out-group"-classification, mainly with the basis in the "us" versus "them''. The representation of "the people'' as the underdog and those left behind, when indicating/stating that they are the losers of globalization, is constructed as a subset of the whole.

Society is a term rooted in history and tradition. A "new" society is constructed by imagined communities, and it is now under threat by the new cosmopolitan way of life; both the populist and the nationalistic rhetoric seek to find those who are "oppressed" by new developments in a community. In political science, a cleavage has been made use of to determine social and/or cultural differences between people and citizens within a society, both on a regional and international scale. These social and/or cultural differences will divide the society into groups with different political interests, which then will give premise for political conflicts. This structural cleavage is referred to in the works of Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan´s (1967), in their theories about West European politics. Based on the two political sociologists` observations, there are four main cleavages in Europe that have persisted over time. As a result, party systems have become "frozen" around these four cleavages. These four cleavages are; 1. owner vs worker, 2. church vs state, 3. urban vs rural and 4. center vs periphery. Even though Lipset and Rokkan`s theory does have some success in explaining party systems, there are however new parties that have gained support. These new parties are not based on the historical cleavages, but rather new ones, and there are new conflict lines that have emerged. Some of these new cleavages have emerged with the rise of globalization, and, as a result, the new conflicts that have emerged are not enabled to be "part of" the old

cleavages. Examples of these new conflicts are integration, multiculturalism, as well as environmental issues (such as climate change). New cleavages may also emerge from identity factors like age, education, geography (both national and international) and religion. There is a need for an additional and supplemental explanation, one which deals with new social and political issues in modern times, issues that have emerged due to globalization.

3 National and European identities

Social identity theory can further explain the new narrative that has become dominant in politics, that is the "winners" and the "losers" of globalization, and how the term "losers" refers to people who are more prone to vote for populist parties that have gained traction in the European political arena. There is a divide between those with a more a nationalistic and exclusive identity versus those with a more cosmopolitan and inclusive identity. This diversity in identity is of utmost importance, because globalization as well as the establishment of the EU are both processes that are considered to have been definite reasons for an increase in the cosmopolitan appeal - but there is also evidence of the opposite. As globalization has increased, and the group of "losers" has grown, populist parties, especially those on the radical right, have capitalized on this issue and have attempted to attract people to vote for them in protection of the nation and against the EU. Norris and Inglehart (2016) point out a specific development concerning populism with a nativist rhetoric and nationalistic appeal; "… the wave of populist leaders whose support has been swelling in many Western democracies" (p.6). There seems to be a certain type of people who will be more prone/more likely to be convinced by the ideologies and rhetoric's of populist parties, people who will carry a stronger attachment to certain specific values, beliefs and attitudes that represent their identity. What (specific) identity factors have such an impact on people? The data used for this paper will show a correlation between certain identity factors and people`s national identity and that of their European identity, of being citizens of Europe and the EU, and, hence, explain who gravitates more to nationalism, and by extension populism, and who gravitates more to cosmopolitanism.

When viewing identity as a whole, identity is not a singular entity, as there are different issues of separation; there are multiple identities that are at play, and, together, they all summon up to the individual's role and place as a person in different social and cultural contexts. These separate identities have three main ways of interaction. These interactions can either be; 1. separate and not interact at all with each other, 2. cross-cutting (compound) where they can overlap at times, or 3. nested, where they are layered on each other and the identities get more specific as you go. There is also the cross-categorization; "where people acquire a more textured and less identity-threatening representation of in-group-out-group relations; the groups are categorically distinct and separate but share identity on other dimensions" (Hogg, 2016, p.8). There have been attempts made in Europe and the EU in order to create a new social identity - *the European identity* - but such attempts to superordinate re-categorization "can be viewed as an identity threat that is resisted, often fiercely" (Hogg, 2016, p.8). There will be a disconnection between people and groups based on this, but the extent is not clear. Scholars have questioned how a European and/or globalized identity then has taken hold, given that both the separation of groups is so sharp and one's national and cultural identity is being "challenged" by opposing groups arriving in the EU, but, there is not a simple or single reason to this issue. One should rather focus on who is more prone to cosmopolitan or nationalist(ic) values.

Social identity theory can explain how people will categorize themselves in groups based on some mutual recognition, based on specific factors or more extensive and abstract ones, but social identity theory will also explain how people will integrate themselves. How is this then important to Europe in general and the EU specifically? Considering the recent development in the world and the impact that the EU has had, especially on the rise of globalization, there is a clear difference between what types of people who will fall into the categories of being more prone to carry a more globalized and cosmopolitan identity, versus those who have a more nationalist identity. Social identity theory deals with why and how people are drawn to the populist parties, as "...groups and members go to great lengths to protect or promote their belief that 'we´ are better than ´them´"(Hogg, 2016, p.9). The concept of "us" versus "them" presents a strong rhetoric being used by populist parties. It is, here, important to look closer at what populism is, and how it is connected to globalization.

In political debates, whether in Europe or in the EU, Euroscepticism is often brought up. This issue is often viewed as an "only" right-wing opposition issue, but it is then not the important distinctions between left- and right-wing Euroscepticism that comes into play (of what the focus is on). While the left-wing will mobilize opposition on economical and anti-austerity, the right-wing "rally opposition by highlighting national identity considerations and feelings of cultural threats" (Hobolt & de Vries, 2016, p.422). People can have weaker and stronger attachments to different parts of their identity, but for people who carry a strong national and cultural identity, is the EU a threat. The EU, which represents globalization and the four freedoms of the EU (the free movement of goods, person, services and capital), includes all EU members and potential new members, but this merge of millions of individuals' identities also implies many different attitudes towards European integration.

The many perspectives on European integration are not just about the economical aspect that comes with countries joining and gaining access to the single market, which can be said to be one of the largest benefits of joining, but people's identity is in correspondence to the power they hold, so when a nation loses its national power, its national identity is threatened. The threat comes from the pooling of sovereignty in the EU as that "potentially erodes national self-determination and blurs boundaries between distinct national communities'' (Hobolt & de Vries, 2016, p.420). The distinct lines between the in- and out-groups then become blurred, and the concept of homogenisation is once again fueled. This loss of sovereignty, of a nation's own determination, and the blurring of distinctions relate with what has been previously stated about identity and that of nationalism and people who are drawn to populist parties. Subsequently, people who have a stronger national identity will be less supportive of European integration, due to how important certain identity factors are for them.

4 Globalization and new political parties

It is common to describe globalization as a complex process of interaction and integration that has developed throughout decades, one which involves all international trade, flows of capital and investment, the movement of people and the constant information-flow from the internet. Globalization has come with rapid industrial and technological development in the last decades in addition to a growing interdependence of the world's economies, cultures and populations (Block, 2004, p. 14-15). Transnationalism and internationalism are two terms which are often associated with globalization. While globalization merely refers to the process of the world becoming interconnected mainly through trade, does transnationalism deal with the process of social, political and economic activity which has gone beyond sovereign jurisdiction boundaries of national states. These activities and boundaries are governed by non-state actors and/or international organizations - the EU. Internationalism is the principle which is associated with the advocating of greater cooperation between states and nations with politics and economy - it deals more with the political ideology. The terms globalization, transnationalism and internationalism often overlap, but they all refer to the increase of international cooperation, trade in goods, service and technology, in addition to the flow of investment, people and information.

To understand how globalization has become an overarching theme for most issues and concerns in the present time, especially concerning the EU and European countries, we need to take a retrospect on the postwar world of internationalism first. World War II ravaged through the many states involved, causing an immense worth of damages, with a staggering number of casualties, leaving behind ruined infrastructures and fragmented economies. As a direct consequence, a more united Europe was considered an antidote for the countries that later decided to become members of the European Union (EU), an antidote to extreme nationalism. Some of the main reasons for how integrated and globalized the world economy and politics have become, in addition to cultural and social aspects, must be seen in relation to the EU and the growing European single market. One must here also take into consideration the result of the enormous growth that the internet has undergone since the mid-1990s.

The Internet in general and social media especially, have both played important roles in modern times, especially concerning the immense possibilities to communicate between people all over the world. This matters in the political arena, because it has made political parties more able to reach their audience than ever before, enabling them to mobilize "new", and, perhaps, also (still) uninfluenced voters. Social media is a productive tool, especially for smaller "unknown" parties, like the new radical right parties, that otherwise would have had limited available resources to make themselves more visible for their voters. Social media also enables these smaller parties to participate in political debates, and has completely changed the way political groups and individual politicians manage their campaigns, keeping them in instant touch with voters - while also enabling them to ally with parties from other regions or even other nations.

The Internet has had an incredible impact on the growth and spread of globalization, largely due to its two major functions, as; "it allows the publication and dissemination of data on the World Wide Web without direct contact; it allows interaction among users on a person to person basis through email and chatrooms" (Block, 2004, p.19) - with an easy and accessible communication for all as a direct result.

There is no question about how important globalization is to businesses and politics on an economic scale, especially concerning import and export, but also with the development of international policies and polity in general, for instance regarding the EU. The support and opposition to the EU has varied around the different political aspects from the mere beginning, but, with globalization, most of the EU support deals with what the gains and losses represent in an increased social and cultural organization where nations entrust their sovereignty to a supranational, intergovernmental and transnational institution. Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks (2018) argue that; "The promise of transnationalism has been gains for all, but the experience of the past two decades is that it hurts many. Hence, opposition to transnationalism is for many a populist reaction against the élites who have little sympathy for national borders" (p.114-115) - much of this due to the EU and the European Single Market and the four freedoms for EU citizens (free movement of goods, capital, service and people). Globalization has created both winners and losers, but who are they? The relevance of this issue becomes clear when we look at the rise of both nationalist and populist sentiments, and the ideology of political parties in the EU (and in a globalized world as a whole).

5 Populism

People who are drawn to vote for the populist parties and their leaders, are influenced by the philosophy of populism, which, according to Cas Mudde (cited in Norris & Inglehart, 2016, p.6), is a loose set of ideas that share three core features: 1. anti-establishment sentiment, 2. authoritarianism and 3. nativism. Two terms that are often associated with populism are nationalism/nationalists and nativism/nativists. Nationalists strongly identify with their own nation and will support their nation's own interests first, to the exclusion of other nations. Nativism, on the other hand, is somewhat similar, but still different; it will promote the interest of the native population over the interest of immigrants. Even though nationalism and nativism do have some differences between them, they are still based on parts of the same ideology - and it is still "us" before "them". Populism mainly represents the stance of "we" (the workers) against "them" (the elite). The term is often used for other "in- and out-groups" of society. The three core features are wide, and they may include varied meanings, but "... populist discourse typically emphasizes nativism or xenophobic nationalism, which assumes that the 'people' are a uniform whole, and that states should exclude people from other countries and cultures." (Norris & Inglehart, 2016, p.7). Populism will also favor mono-culturalism, national self-interest, closed borders, as well as traditionalism - all of which are in opposition to what they believed replacement that globalization would bring.

New issues tend to both emerge and change more frequently in modern times, but they do also represent a natural part of the continuous development in society. Traditional mainstream political parties, on the other hand, may not have undergone the same (rapid) changes. A large part of mainstream parties in the EU are in favor of integration and globalization, historically seen. Newer/modern parties, on the other hand, here represented in the radical right and populist ones, may present a possibility to fulfill a "wish come true" for voters, especially those who do not identify themselves with what the mainstream parties stand for and represent. Newer modern parties can therefore turn out to be the identifiable part of one's identity, and will hence gain support from such kinds of voters, from people who are deemed as losers, the ones who experience themselves as being left behind. It is more about the ideology of these parties than the parties themselves. Norris and Inglehart (2016) state that there has been a clear rise of populism; "(D)uring the last two decades, in many countries, parties led by populist authoritarian leaders have grown in popularity, gaining legislative seats, reaching ministerial office, and holding the balance of power" (p.6).

6 Cosmopolitan values compared to populist sentiment

Cosmopolitan liberal values represent an opposite to populist values. Some of the most important elements/issues concerning the thesis of this paper are some of the values that are often emphasized as opposites; the cosmopolitan and liberal values of open borders and societies, protection of minority rights, diversity on all accounts, global governance, international cooperation and secularity (Norris & Inglehart, 2016, p. 7-8). These values will matter concerning certain core features which set people apart on the political spectrum - to the extent that they might have a significant impact on one's identity. The three features of a populist philosophy, as mentioned earlier, will appeal to those who oppose the cosmopolitan liberalism views and values.

As previously stated, populists idealize values surrounding anti-establishment, authoritarian and nativist sentiments, and these values will therefore, more likely, be appealing for people who hold a more *exclusive identity*, like the nationalists, than those who hold a *compound/nested identity*, who tend to be more *inclusive* of other people. Hooghe and Marks (as cited in Hobolt & de Vries, 2016, p.421) argue that Euroscepticism is more likely the more exclusive one's identity is, than that of those who have multiple nested identities. This also corresponds with the theory of who is more likely to be a nationalist and/or who is more likely to be a cosmopolitan. Those who have an exclusive nationalist identity tend to be less supportive of European integration, and they are also "deeply concerned with policing the boundaries of their community against a variety of outsiders and are more likely to exhibit xenophobic and racist attitudes" (Brigevich, 2016, p.480). Those who are inclusive nationalists and/or cosmopolitan, on the other hand, are more likely to support European integration and less likely to exhibit xenophobic and racist attitudes. Then, why and how has populism gained so much traction during the last two decades? What kinds of people are the ones to vote for populist parties, given that anti-establishment, authoritarian and nativism, the features of populism, have such wide definitions? The development through the late 20th and early 21st century, especially regarding an increased globalized world and a transnationalism that both have persisted in all societies (although in multiple social areas and of varying degrees), has led to a rising emphasis on the winners and losers of globalization. It is here that we can see some relation with who/what kinds of people who tend to categorize themselves with which side of the political spectrum.

7 Hypotheses

Who are these people that are deemed as "losers" in the promise of transnationalism, and, by default, also globalization? There are two aspects that fuel the sense of being "left behind" here. The aspect of a strong perception of "us" versus "them" in addition to a sense of resistance, because their identity is under threat, both belong to how a large part of nationalism and populism does not only belong to a regional level, but also a national and international one. The EU and Brussels, being both the center for a majority of its organizations and where decisions are made, are being accused of acting on their own and not standing out as the voice of the whole union; it is the nation against the Brussels` bureaucracy, and the threat narrative that is often emphasized, is the loss of sovereignty. The EU has too much power, while each nation state does not. From the mere beginning of the EU, when it was still known as the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), there was a distinct need for a more "United Europe" after WW2. The narrative of a united Europe with a single European culture and society has also been lingering, especially in debates regarding the solidarity to the EU and European countries. The "mix" of cultures and societies will also be viewed as a threat to people's identity, the stronger it is and the more exclusive it becomes. Those who carry a more inclusive and weaker national and/or cultural identity, on the other hand, may embrace the collected European identity more.

There are some main identity indicators, like ethnicity, race, religion, area/region and nationality, that people will identify themselves with, and, the stronger an individual identifies itself with some of these specific factors, the less tolerable he/she will be towards others. People who are younger and more educated, and those with higher levels of income and human capital, are prone to be more globalists (Citrin and Sides, 2004, p.172). With this in mind, other research also showcases some of the same factors involving one's identity that have a significant impact on people's attitude towards different types of social, cultural and political issues, here concerning Europe and the EU. Citrin and Sides` (2004) early studies show that education has a positive relation with support and identification with being European and the EU. Their studies also show that people in the age group 15-24 are least likely to hold an exclusive national identity (p.172). Their research here corresponds with the concept of being a globalist and transnationalist. At the same time, young people will benefit more from being part of the EU, and, hence, also be more supportive of the EU (Hobolt & Varies, 2016, p.420). Higher education is here linked to both market and work mobility, and with the free flow of workforce that has come from the European single market, this all represents the benefit of being mobile as being of utmost importance, all of which does indicate a unique effect of globalization.

People who have strong attachments to their groups and memberships that create their social identity, will have the tendencies to be nationalists and populists, which puts them on the right on a political scale. Populist parties are often referred to in political matters where they either support or oppose radical and extreme right-wing parties (often used

interchangeably). These political matters typically include opposition to globalization and to the EU, as well as opposition/criticism to immigration and the increase of multiculturalism (as an effect). These parties heavily define themselves as protectors of traditional family structure, gender roles and religion.

8 Data and method

I have chosen to use the collection of public opinion surveys in the EU called "Values and Identities of EU citizens, Special Eurobarometer 508" (European Union, 2021), which contains data that showcases the values and identities of EU citizens. This collection of data gives information about the chosen (independent) variables for this paper; the respondents` age, education level, financial situation, social class, urbanisation, political leaning, and religion. This specific collection of surveys had some 27000 respondents. The survey was conducted "between the 22 October and the 20 November 2020" (European Union, 2021, p.4), and 27 member states were included, aged 15 years and over (p.130). The number of respondents were roughly equal across the countries, with approximately 1000 respondents per member state (p.133). The respondents were recruited "in a probabilistic random manner", and some "were recruited by telephone via a dual frame RDD sample design" (p.133).

The survey was conducted with interviews face-to-face in people's homes or on their doorstep, with CAPI (Computer Assisted Personal Interviewing), or online with Computer Assisted Web Interviewing (CAWI) technique (p.132-133). In some countries "an online survey was offered…through interviews via CAPI and CAWI modes" (p.132-133). In other countries, the interviews were conducted only online. The data is not representative of the EU citizenry as a whole, because it does not include a majority of the EU population, but it does give a preliminary starting point for a larger scale. By looking at the data from the specific Eurobarometer 508, one may find indications of the relation between what identity factors and what groups of people who carry nationalist/nativist and/or cosmopolitan views and beliefs.

The hypothesis is that there are some factors that will have an impact on people's identity which will show both who gravitate more towards nationalism (and by extension populism) and who gravitate more to cosmopolitanism. Citrin and Sides (2004, p.172) state that there are factors that will make people more prone to a globalist and cosmopolitan stance; young of age, with higher education, high levels of income and human capital. The Eurobarometer 508 showcases data that relate to these specific factors, and some other identity factors. The survey questions that I have examined represent merely a small percentage of the whole data, but they do represent the most important data for this paper, and they will help emphasize the thesis of this paper. The survey question is "In general, how much do you identify yourself with each of the following?" (European Union, 2021, p.73), both regarding "your nationality" (p.73) and regarding "being European" (p.76). I have chosen only to focus on the number of respondents who strongly identify with their national identity and those who strongly identify with being European.

The data is measured in percentages, and the statements show how much the respondents identify themselves with their nationality (p.73) and being European (p.76) on a scale from 0 (not at all) to 10 (a lot).

Table 1 - Respondent´s age

Independent variable (measured in percentages) The respondents` age	Your nationality (measured in percentages)	Being European (measured in percentages)
15-24	42	28
25-39	41	29
40-54	46	29
55+	54	32

Data from the tables QC 4.9 and 4.10 (European Union, 2021, p.73 & 76) show that the number of respondents who strongly identify with their nationality are higher among those who are 55+ and 40-54 than those who are aged 15-24 (students and first time voters) and 25-39. The corresponding data for being European shows that the number of respondents who strongly identify with being European, are slightly less likely among the youngest, aged 15-39, than among the oldest, 40+. The respondents' age does have a higher impact on their nationality than of being European.

Table 2 - Education (end of)

Independent variable (measured in percentages) education (end of)	Your nationality (measured in percentages)	Being European (measured in percentages)
15-	58	27
16-19	51	31
20+	42	31
still studying	41	30

The tables QC 4.9 and 4.10 (European Union, 2021, p.73 & 76) show that the number of respondents who strongly identify with their nationality, are higher among those who ended their education at a younger age than those who completed their education at 20+ or who are still studying. The corresponding data for being European shows that the number of respondents who strongly identify with being European, represent a slightly higher percentage for those still studying than those who completed their education at 15 or younger. The respondents` education level does have a higher impact on the respondents 'nationality than of identifying themselves as being European. The number of respondents who strongly identify with their nationality and also who completed their education when 15 or younger, is significantly high; 58%.

Table 3 - Difficulties paying bills

Independent variable (measured in percentages) difficulties paying bills	Your nationality (measured in percentages)	Being European (measured in percentages)
most of the time	49	25
from time to time	46	27
almost never/never	47	32

Tables QC 4.9 and 4.10 (European Union, 2021, p.73 & 76) show data where the respondents´ answers to whether they categorize themselves as having difficulties paying bills, are divided in three groups; 1. most of the time, 2. from time to time, and 3. almost never/never. The difference between the three groups of respondents is not significant between those who strongly identify with their nationality, while the difference between those who identify with their nationality and those who identify themselves as being European, is. The respondents` difficulties paying bills does also have a higher impact on the respondents' nationality than that of being European.

Table 4 - Social class belonging

Independent variable (measured in percentages) consider belonging to	Your nationality (measured in percentages)	Being European (measured in percentages)
The working class	58	30
The lower middle class	45	26
The middle class	46	32

The upper middle class	36	29
The upper class	53	42

The tables QC 4.9 and 4.10 (European Union, 2021, p.73 & 76) show the data of respondents divided in five social categories; 1. the working class, 2.the lower middle class, 3. the middle class, 4. the upper middle class and 5. the upper class. The difference between the five social classes is significant between those who categorize themselves as belonging to the working class and upper class compared to the middle classes, and although the working class and the upper class do strongest identify with their nationality, does the upper class represent the largest percentage for identifying themselves with being European.

Table 5 - Subjective urbanisation

Independent variable (measured in percentages) subjective urbanisation	Your nationality (measured in percentages)	Being European (measured in percentages)
rural village	51	29
small/mid-size town	48	30
large town	43	32

The tables QC 4.9 and 4.10 (European Union, 2021, p.73 & 76) also show the respondents` answers to "subjective urbanisation", here divided in three categories; 1. rural village, 2. small/mid-size town and 3. large town. The difference between those who identify with their nationality versus those who identify with being European, is significant for the following two groups; 1. rural village, 51% (your nationality) versus 29% (being European) and 2. small/mid-size town, 48% (your nationality) versus 30% (being European).

Table 6 - political scale

Independent variable (measured in percentages) left-right political scale	Your nationality (measured in percentages)	Being European (measured in percentages)
left	42	31

center	48	30
right	55	32

The respondents' answers to where they consider themselves on a left-right political scale are also presented in the tables QC 4.9 and 4.10 (European Union, 2021, p.73 & 76), and are divided in three categories; 1. left, 2. center and 3. right. The respondents in general identify themselves more with their nationality than being European; whatever political category, are the numbers for "being European" merely of the same percentage. While the difference between identifying with "your nationality" versus "being European", is more significant for those who categorize themselves on the political right than the other two political categories (55% versus 32%). Political affiliation has a stronger influence on the respondents` national identity than of being European.

Table 7 - Importance of religion

Independent variable (measured in percentages) importance of religion	Your nationality (measured in percentages)	Being European (measured in percentages)
important	56	34
neither important nor not important	48	28
not important	39	27

The two tables QC 4.9 and 4.10 (European Union, 2021, p.73 & 76) also show the respondents' answers regarding how important religion is to them. The data indicates that religion has a significant influence on what people identify themselves with, whether based on their national identity or with being European; those who identify strongest with their nationality will view religion as more important than those who identify themselves as being European. The data also shows that religion is very important for the respondents, whether they identify themselves with their nationality or with being European.

The Eurobarometer 508 presents the identity factors that have the strongest influence on people's national identity ("your nationality"); education, age, subjective urbanisation, political scale, religion. This collection of surveys also shows which identity factors that impact the respondents` identification of themselves as "being European" the most; difficulties paying bills, social class belonging and religion. The difference between "your nationality" and "being European" differentiates significantly regarding these identity

factors; class (working and lower middle class), subjective urbanisation (rural village), political scale (right-wing) and religion (important).

The data I have chosen from the Eurobarometer 508 indicates that the identity factors age, education, social class, do all have an impact on the respondents` identity and their values concerning their identity, both on a domestic/regional level and internationally. But, the data also indicates that other identity factors, like subjective urbanisation, political scale, economic status and religion have a significant impact on people's identity and belonging. The identity factors do, all together, have a strong impact on the respondents` national identity and that of being European, but this does not necessarily mean that those with a strong national identity will be less prone to feel European. What the data shows is that the numbers were low whatever identity factor, regarding "being European". It also shows that those numbers were not as significantly different as with the numbers regarding "your nationality". To summarize; the data indicates that EU-citizens have a stronger attachment to their nationality than the European identity. "Being European" can indicate cosmopolitan values, but the data is not representative here, because "your nationality" and "being European" still represent two separate identification categories, and can therefore merely give a small indication to what kinds of people who are more prone towards this "newer identity".

The people who do not share an identity with others on other dimensions than those that are easily categorically distinct, will be more prone to be influenced by the rhetoric of populist and nationalist parties. It is important to note that these people are often categorized as right leaning in politics, or even far/radical/extremist-right, even though populist parties in the US, Easter Europe and Asia favor economic left-wing policies (Norris & Inglehart, 2016, p. 8). The Eurobarometer 508 showcases that the respondents' statements correspond with some specific identity factors, and that there are people who are prone to be more globalists, people who will not carry a strong national identity. People who are older, less educated, less geographically mobile, more attached to their locality/region, will have a stronger national identity and perhaps identify themselves less with being European. With the data from the Eurobarometer 508, I was able to test whether nationalists are more right-wing. As such, the data does indicate that people who are more traditional in their values are more religious, and people who are more traditional in values, tend to categorize themselves on the right of the political scale.

9 Summary

Henri Tajfel's social identity theory implies that people's social identity is based on them identifying themselves with other people who categorize themselves similarly, based on certain identity factors. Tajfel's theory further explains that people`s group identity can both unite and divide them with other groups. The "us vs them"-idea that is being carried out through both populist parties and nationalist parties, is equivalent with the perspective of the social identity theory, especially with the aspect of where a conflict is due to the interplay of identity and the access to resources concerning globalization issues (such as the migrant crisis, especially, but also the flow of goods, service, people and capital, in general). The identity factors that are most frequently brought up in official debates, are age, education and where people live, but, interestingly enough are social class, religion and political affiliation the identity factors that have the strongest impact on people`s national identity and a European and/or cosmopolitan identity.

This paper has made use of Tajfel's social identity theory in order to explain what kinds of people gravitate more to nationalism, and by extension populism, and what kinds of people who gravitate more to cosmopolitanism. My empirical analysis has highlighted certain identity factors that have an impact on both national and European identity, with the data from the Eurobarometer 508 (European union, 2021), a collection of public opinion surveys.

The Eurobarometer 508 had some 27000 respondents, and, as such, the survey does not present sufficient enough data, but it does have enough respondents (approximately 1000 per state) from roughly equal across the EU to give some indications. The data from the statistics of the Eurobarometer 508 can give an indication on what identity factors that do represent an impact on people's identity, but it is, here, also important to remember that identity is like a fluid, itis not "set in stone", meaning it will be subject to change both with time and because of social changes. On the other hand, the stronger one's identity is, the harder it is to subject people's identity to change. Other research, for instance future (Eurobarometer) surveys, will help show/emphasize if people`s identity has changed, whether they are still more nationalistic or have become more cosmopolitan/European.

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