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Political transnationalism of Turkish refugees toward the Turkish state

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*For the Jews [the cause of dispersal was] Babylon, for the Africans – slavery,
for the Irish feminine, for the Armenians – genocide,
for the Palestinians – the formation of the state of Israel
(Cohen, 1996,p. 513).*

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DEDICATION

To my father. I love and miss you.

Rest in peace...

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Abbreviations

AKP: Justice and Development Party

AST: Advocates of Silenced Turkey

DITIB: Turkish-Islamic Union of Religious Affairs

DNF: Den Nordiske Friheten

ECC: European Economic Community

FT: From Turkey

IfF: Initiative für Flüchtlinge

TIKA: Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency

KOMKAR: The Association for Kurdish Workers for Kurdistan

PKK: Kurdistan Workers' Party

Summary

This thesis focuses on various factors affecting the political transnational participation of Turkish refugees who have migrated since 2016 to the Western countries. The level of political transnationalism of Turkish refugees is analyzed at different levels. At micro level, the agency characteristics and motivations of the Turkish refugees have been analyzed. Furthermore, the establishment of social movement organizations and their transnational networks have been explained at institutional level. Finally, the receptive and home countries' policies, which might provide or constrain the political transnational mobilization of Turkish refugees are analyzed at country level. The respective host countries, Germany, Norway, and the United States have been selected with aim to compare political transnational participation of Turkish refugees in these countries.

The empirical part of the thesis builds on semi-structured interviews with the Turkish refugees and the analysis of web pages of various social movement organizations. The related news and state reports are included in the analysis. The interviews are analyzed qualitatively, and web pages are scrutinized through content analysis. The respondents of the study have shared their experiences, motivations, opinions regarding their political transnational participation.

I argue that the transnational network exchange theory and conceptual framework of transnationalism are direct and appropriate theoretical and conceptual frameworks for analysis of transnational political activities of refugees in my study. These theoretical frames help me with the explanation of what, why and how political refugees participate in political transnational participation toward their country. It has been argued that the political transnationalism of the refugees in the study is influenced by their capacities, motivations, and various opportunities and restrictions in the host countries. Furthermore, extra-territorial authoritarian practices of Turkish state deter refugees and affect the level of their political transnational participation.

My findings also indicate that there is small portion of Turkish refugees who participate actively in political transnational participation. Indeed, there is a small portion of those who participate in political transnational participation in form of high-risk activism. Turkish political refugees participate in institutional social movement organizations as the anti-regime advocates. The official members of social movement organizations participate in high-risk and high-level political transnational participation while most of the Turkish refugees participate

in political remittances and low-risk and guarded advocacy through digital participation. First and foremost, there is small portion of Turkish refugees who participate actively in political transnational participation.

My findings also show that refugees' political transnationalism has been experienced in different contexts of reception in Germany, Norway, and the United States. It is maintained that refugees in these respective countries experience different obstacles. The respondents in Germany and Norway indicated that they have language obstacles when they are participating in transnational activities while in the United States the refugees identified their overloaded job hours as the major obstacle to participation in the transnational political activities. A settlement program is indicated as also one of the crucial factors in transnational participation of the Turkish refugees who convey that, on the one hand, resettlement to remote places makes it financially complicated to commute between places that are offering the transnational activities. On the other hand, living in big cities might similarly diminish their participation. In cities, there are larger numbers of Turkish diaspora groups, resulting in exposure to possible surveillance and intimidation by the groups supportive of the Turkish state.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Currently, over five million of Turkish citizens reside abroad mostly in Western countries (Kanik, 2015). The Turkish state is the emigration and immigration country, which interacts with a complex and multi-sited migration system. It represents a multi-sited research field where several relevant structural dimensions intervene. Here, the migration policies and Syrian refugees intervene with EU-Turkey relations and Turkey's internal political developments. Furthermore, refugees' incorporation and integration in host countries intervenes with transnational practices of Turkish diaspora, and with Turkish state's engagement in Turkish diaspora (Ostergaard-Nielsen, 2003, pp. 3-4). This thesis will focus mainly on Turkish refugees, specifically members of Gulen movement, who migrated after the failed coup attempt that was happened on 15 July 2016. It explores their political transnational practices and activities toward the Turkish state.

Turkish refugees who have resided in the host countries since 2016 have established NGOs and identified themselves as activists who fight against the Turkish government's human rights violations such as detention of journalists, imprisonment of women with babies, suspension of judges, academicians, teachers, and doctors from their positions, closure of human rights organizations, universities, and private schools (Aydin & Avincan, 2020; Caman, 2019). Justification of this research is based on the lack in the transnational scholarship on current position of Turkey surrounded by different events related to migration and transnationalism.

The related researches on EU-Turkey agreement and Syrian refugees, pro-active foreign policies of Turkish state, integration of Turkish and Kurdish migrants in host countries, Turkish state's diaspora engagement, Kurdish migrants direct confrontation against Turkish state, and Turkish migrants' lobbying for political interests of Turkish state have been scrutinized and studied (Baser, 2013; Ostergaard-Nielsen, 2003; Öztürk & Taş, 2020; Sirkeci, 2017). The fifth migration flow and Turkish refugees' indirect political transnationalism has to be taken under study to obtain a holistic picture of the phenomenon.

This thesis relates refugees' political transnationalism to (i) developments in the sending state; (ii) migrant's individual motivations and concerns; and (iii) the contexts of the reception in the host states. Therefore, main research questions of this thesis are:

- ◆ What kind of politically transnational activities do Turkish refugees participate in and what are their motivations?
- ◆ How do refugees experience the context of reception, and how these different settings in host countries influence their political transnationalism of Turkish refugees?
- ◆ How does the Turkish state violation of human rights at home and its actions against dissidents abroad affect the transnational practices of the Turkish refugees?

The methodology of this master thesis was the semi-structured interviews with Turkish refugees, specifically Gulen movement members, inter alia, the leaders of these NGOs: *From Turkey* and *Den Nordiske Friheten* in Norway, *Initiative für Flüchtlinge* in Germany, and *Advocates for Silenced Turkey* in the United States. Interviews included five Turkish refugees in each country; Norway, Germany and the United States. The interview was conducted through Skype and recorded for further data information. Alternative resources such as news, content analysis of the web pages of NGOs, the pamphlets and social media were similarly analyzed and used in this master thesis.

The master thesis is divided in eight chapters. The first chapter shortly introduces the questions and objectives of the thesis. The second chapter takes the historical perspective on the emigration process of migrant workers, Kurdish and Turkish refugees, who fled Turkey and migrated to the Western countries. The third chapter includes relevant theories and previously done works to obtain the whole picture of transnational studies with the critical points and lacking gaps in scholarship, thus going beyond this broad proposition and focusing on specific issue. Moreover, this chapter also focuses on Turkish state emigration policy and the reasons of this policy. The methodological chapter divides methodological process into parts and goes step by step, showing how the process of data-gathering will be proceeded. The fifth chapter examines various politically transnational practices of Turkish refugees, exploring their

motivations for political transnational participation and engagement. The sixth chapter explores and compares how host countries immigration policies have effects on the Turkish refugees in the process of transnational practices. The seventh chapter provides insights into the connections between Turkish state diaspora policies and transnationalism of refugees. The final chapter provides conclusions and answers on the asked research questions, and makes recommendations for further research.

CHAPTER TWO

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AROUND TURKISH EMIGRATION

2.1. Introduction

This part discusses emigration from Turkey to the Western countries at different periods. It is maintained that every migration flow has been different based on the political and economic situations both in Turkey and in the Western countries. This part is relevant for my project as it conceptualizes the Turkish diaspora construction. Moreover, it helps us to understand how the new diaspora group, people who have migrated since 2016, is related to the broader Turkish diaspora context.

2.2. History of Emigration Between 1960-2000 and the Turkish State

The agricultural industrialization led to rural-urban migration increasing the unemployment rates in urban cities of Turkey, the one-party government was reformed into multi-party coalition government, and the military coup in 1960s in Turkey had caused the socio-political and economic transformation (Kanik, 2015; Manco, 2000). Since Turkey did not participate in World War II and the high birth rate, causing Turkey have high demographic rates and not enough employment capacity (Kanik, 2015). The Turkish state started to search for “alternative economic methods” to export labor force and have ‘less mouths to feed’ while expecting capital inflow from remittances and social remittances as the “hope for the industrial development of their lands” (Agocuk, Kanlı, & Kasap, 2017, p. 505; De Haas, 2010b, p. 232). The disequilibrium between the core and periphery could be turned into “win-win” and “demand-need” North-South relation (Ay, 2015, p. 27; Bozdağ & Atan, 2009; Kanik, 2015, p. 144). The European countries struggled with labor force deficit at the times, as Osterhammel and Petersson (2009) call the “Western European miracle of 1950-73”, on the other hand Turkey had surplus population and economic downturn.

After the military coup in 1960s, the Turkish government introduced new legislation in 1961-constitution, adding developmentalist plans with the Article 18 about freedom of movement (Ay, 2015, p. 37). Initially, the First-Five-Year Development Plan (1962-1967) then the Second-Five-Year Development Plan (1968-1972) had been implemented in order to decrease unemployment and let capital inflow to Turkey (Ay, 2015, p. 28). The first Turkish emigrants

had been sent to Germany, as Ravenstein (1885) in his theory of the *Laws of Migration* suggests that migration frequency depends on distance proximity. He argues that migrants likely migrate to countries that are close to the county of origin. The development plan had targeted unskilled workers and tried to keep skilled workers in Turkey for the domestic development. Turkey implemented these plans with belief that emigrant workers would return with skills gained in the western countries, as it was emphasized mainly in the second developmentalist plan (DPT, 1968, p. 19).

Ankara agreement (1963) signed between Turkey and EEC and allowed Turkish workers movement in EEC member states, established customs union, and lifted previous restrictions (Mayer, 2009, p. 4). Additionally, the Turkish state signed bilateral agreement with UK in 1959, Germany (1961), Austria, Belgium, Holland (1964), France (1965), Sweden (1967), Norway (1967), Australia (1968), Switzerland (1969), and Denmark (1970) for recruitment of Turkish workers (Ay, 2015; Kanik, 2015; Manco, 2000; Soytürk, 2012; Tören, 2014). The agreements with EEC countries had been supported by the US due to geopolitical position of Turkey and Soviet threat (Mayer, 2009).

The legalization of worker importation eased the recruitment of Turkish guest workers through European agencies that had been coordinated with the Turkish employment office (İş ve İşçi Bulma Kurumu) (Tören, 2014). The Turkish Rural Development Cooperatives (Köy Kalkınma Kooperatifleri) got 15 % of quota for the employment of workers living in rural areas of Turkey (Ay, 2015, p. 39). The Turkish state responded very positively to exportation of Turkish unskilled workers, consequently the number of cooperatives and emigrated workers had increased in the years between 1961 and 1975 (Ay, 2015; Kanik, 2015). The emigration policy of the Turkish state as the part of the developmentalist project was evaluated positively. The economic deficit in Turkey was covered by the remittances sent by Turkish workers, it was revealed that merely in 1975 Turkey received 1.3 billion dollars from abroad (Erdoğan, 2015, p. 125). The year 1973 was associated with the Oil Crisis and when the receiving countries stopped the immigration of migrants workers from abroad (Muratoğlu & Muratoğlu, 2016).

Once the receiving countries implemented *Anwerbestop*, the migrants workers applied for family reunification that caused the second wave of emigration from Turkey (Muratoğlu & Muratoğlu, 2016).

Bringing the migrants' families to the countries where Turkish migrants had worked was a signal for the receiving countries about shifting condition of migrants who had been defined as temporary workers changed to permanent (Çoştu & Ceyhan, 2015). With the realization of Turkish migrants' new status as being permanent migrants, the receiving countries incorporated migrants into integration process. The military coup of 1980s and armed conflicts in 1990s led to the mass exodus of political refugees (Ostergaard-Nielsen, 2003). Thus, the Turkish state has experienced concrete five-waves of emigration: 1) labor migration since 1960s, 2) family reunification or "social migration" after 1973, 3) "political migration" due to military coup in 1980s and, 4) refugee flow migration between 1990s and 2002 of Kurdish minority groups due to military-PKK conflicts in the South-eastern part of Turkey (Adıgüzel, 2007, p. 4).

2.3. The Fifth Wave of Emigration From Turkey

As 1960s could be defined the turning point in the Turkish Republic politics, likewise the year 2002 would signify the coming socio-political transformation in domestic and foreign affairs of Turkey that thereafter would change its stance from secular to religiously conservative orientation. The AKP government came to power, initially promoting democratization with full packages of reforms bypassing them after 2010 referendum when AKP government could overweight the power in the civil-military balance (Kalaycıoğlu, 2012).

Over two terms of AKP government, the emigration had been fallen steadily due to economic stability and minority group openings (Muratoğlu & Muratoğlu, 2016). Politically strengthened AKP laid all reforms and democratization process aside, thus rolling back to authoritarianism and causing the increase of unemployment and political instabilities (Özer & Topal, 2017). The coming events: mass *Gezi* protests in 2013, elections in 2015 that caused attacks on the peace rally, and finally the failed coup attempt in 2016 were the signs of coming political instabilities (Esen & Gumuscu, 2017; Göle, 2013; O'Connor & Baser, 2018). Right after the coup, the president Tayyip Erdogan blamed Gulen movement¹ for plotting the coup and administered the governmental purge against all dissidents. The number of detained, regarding the coup, constituted 39 378 out of 96 000 suspects, while the number of suspended was 115 000 people, 2600 non-governmental organizations were closed down, and 15 universities and hundreds

¹ Gulen movement- "faith-inspired education movement" (Yavuz & Esposito, 2003, p. 19).

private schools were shut down (Sirkeci, 2017, p. 26). Additionally, the constitutional referendum in 2017 was held on the presidential system, replacing the parliamentary system and leading Turkey to one-man-rule (Esen & Gümüşçü, 2017).

Sirkeci (2017) defines the current migration from Turkey as brain drain due to emigration of highly educated people. The number of asylum seekers from Turkey in the Western countries had increased from 5 161 in 2016 to 253 000² in 2017 (Sirkeci, 2017, p. 32). Moreover, Turkish state cancelled many passports and started witch-hunt against governmental oppositions and dissidents group, thus most of the refugees originated from Turkey fled the country through the illegal routes (Ekim, 2018).

2.4. Turkey – not safe country for refugees

The case of Turkish state in migration studies can be analyzed at various levels since Turkey today is a country that receives Syrian refugees and produces Turkish refugees at the same time, a country that signed agreements with EU to hold refugee flows from entering the Schengen zone and currently opens the borders to Europe as the manipulating and punishing approaches³ (Haferlach & Kurban, 2017; Sirkeci, 2017). Turkish state's behavior regarding Syrian refugees has been changed due to the "lack of solidarity with his [Erdogan] military operations in Syria" and insufficient financial aid for Syrian refugees in Turkey⁴.

Prior to EU-Turkey agreement, EU evaluated Turkey as a safe country although the anti-democratic governmental policies and terroristic attacks have been occurred since 2013. The Turkish state should have been identified as a country with "deficit in 3 D": development deficit, democracy deficit and a county with high demography and high unemployment (Sirkeci, 2017, p. 24). Thus, Turkey after 2016 has swung between "security and insecurity" for EU, whereas Turkey's temporary position is insecure not only because of the governmental purges and detentions without any legal charges of Turkish citizens but also because of Syrian refugees being under political threat and manipulations of Turkey (Sirkeci, 2017; Zanotti, 2016). Moreover, the Amnesty International and the Human Rights Watch have criticized the

² <http://www.agos.com.tr/tr/yazi/21398/turkiye-den-gidenler-ve-donmeyi-dusunmeyenler>

³ <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/09/turkey-erdogan-holds-talks-with-eu-leaders-over-border-opening>

⁴ <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/09/turkey-erdogan-holds-talks-with-eu-leaders-over-border-opening>

Turkish state for violation of the Geneva Convention, as it was revealed that Syrian refugees were shot by the Turkish soldiers at the Syrian-Turkish borders and due to the forced repatriation of some Syrian refugees back to Syria (Niemann & Zaun, 2018, p. 9).

2.5. Summary

The historical perspective on the emigration from Turkey demonstrates several waves of emigration due to different pushing factors. Unemployment in 1960s, family reunification in 1970s, the military coup in 1980s, minority rights violations in 1990s and finally political instabilities, governmental crackdown and anti-democratic policies of Turkish state have been the pushing forces of emigration process (Adıgüzel, 2007; Sirkeci, 2017). Presently, it has been constituted over five million migrants originated from Turkey, thus the Turkish state engages in diaspora policies to keep its expats loyal to Turkish state, promoting national identity whereas punishing the dissidents abroad (Kanik, 2015; Ostergaard-Nielsen, 2003).

The chapter also demonstrates the foreign position of Turkey, which is a valve country and immigration country for Syrian refugees (Tudoroiu, 2017). Turkey's domestic and foreign political instabilities makes it as unsafe county for Syrian and other refugees. The paradox of Turkey's position, being at one stance a country that receives refugees and at the other side purge the dissidents, thus causing mass exodus from Turkey (Sirkeci, 2017).

CHAPTER THREE

THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES, CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND RELATED RESEARCHES

3.1. Introduction

This chapter introduces theoretical and conceptual frameworks. It focuses on theories and researches that may be relevant in explorations on home-oriented transnational political participation of refugees. These contributions provide perspectives on constraints and opportunities the sending and host countries create to support or deter the transnational mobilization of refugees. The theories of migration studies and conceptual framework of transnationalism are explained at the initial part of the literature review. Then, transnational network mechanisms are explained in the second part. Here, the focus is on specific theoretical framework that explains how transnational networks mechanisms are constructed by the agents, sending and host countries that shape the way political transnationalism work.

3.2. Theories of Migration

Migration, as the movement of people from origin to destination, has been transformed into a global phenomenon (Brinkerhoff, 2008; Freeman, 2005). The pushing factors of the migration have been manifolded, between 1940s and 1970s can be defined as the “win-win” relation between the North that recruited guest-workers and the South that allowed emigration as the economic strategy of “shoveling out the unwanted” (Ay, 2015; Lee, 1966; Massey & Liang, 1989; Ragazzi, 2009; Zolberg, 1983). Alongside the economic reason as the pushing factor for migration, there is similarly important factor causing migration of citizens who among the “exit, voice and loyalty” options decide to exit from the country that can be defined as democracy deficit, development deficit and high demography (Hirschman, 1978; Sirkeci, 2017). Consequently, voluntarily and forced migration have become as the main concern of the researchers of the migration studies who have tried to shed light on the relationship between development and migration (Castles, De Haas, & Miller, 2013; Cornelius & Rosenblum, 2005). The theories of migration forefront different reasons that generate migration, neoclassical

theorists refer to “wage differential” between the North and the South and “wage-maximizing behavior” of citizens who due to economic reasons migrate to mainly high-wage countries (J. Fitzgerald, Leblang, & Teets, 2014, p. 408).

On the other hand, historical structuralist and neo-Marxists blame global capitalism for “asymmetric growth” and dependency of the South on the North (De Haas, 2010b, p. 234). Similarly, Wallerstein theory tells that world-system, in which periphery depends on the core causes migration (De Haas, 2010b). Apart from these theories, other theorists have opted for scrutinizing the migrants-level for better understand of migration, arguing that macro factors are not only determinants of migration. Consequently, the new economics of labor migration (NEML) argues that livelihood strategy of household is the reason for migration, while Mabogunje (1970) asserts that established migrant network and feedback mechanism are the determinants of the further migration of migrants. Alongside these classical migration theories, Lee (1966) suggests push/pull factors while Hirschman (1986) brings options forward as the explanation of migration dynamics. The Turkish case shows that Turkish workers migrated during the “Western European miracle of 1950-73” to the Western countries due to unemployment, agricultural industrialization, and military coup of 1960s (Findlay & O'rourke, 2009; Kanik, 2015; Manco, 2000).

3.3. Defining the Transnationalism

The global capitalism and deeper interconnectedness in the digital and globalized world, where transnationalism has been fundamentally changed, thus intensifying and deepening the ties across the borders (Levitt, 2001; Portes, Guarnizo, & Landolt, 1999; Schiller, Basch, & Blanc, 1995). Portes (2000) resembles transnationalism to a process of globalization, which leads to what Vertovec (2004) calls a “death of distance”. Basch, Schiller, and Blanc (2005) explains how transnationalism process links migrants’ sending and receiving states, while Vertovec (1999, p. 447) states that “long-distance” network of migrants is transnationalism. Some of the scholars criticize that concept of transnationalism being “misused or overused” while other scholars criticize the “methodological nationalist” tendency of the transnational perspective that has been defined through the lens of the nation-states (D. Fitzgerald, 2004; Guarnizo & Smith, 1998).

Transnationalism has been searched in the context of the nation-state, bringing the question on whether transnational practices of migrants threatens the principles of nation-states. Koser (2007, p. 233) disagrees with the scholars who state that transnationalism challenges the state power and state cohesion, he on the other hand believes that transnationalism “reinforces states” rather than empowers migrants. Moreover, D. Fitzgerald (2004) suggests that migrants who are active in transnational practices might have dual nationalism toward their state of origin and the receiving countries, implying to the process in which migrants have long-distance nationalism and assimilation into the receiving country society. Some scholars measures transnational practices of migrants into “core and extended” and “narrow and broad” transnationalism (Itzigsohn, Cabral, Medina, & Vazquez, 1999; Levitt, 2001).

Based on these conceptualizations and perspectives, migrants originated from Turkey can be categorized into “core” and “narrow” transnational practices, although there are huge diversities within Turkish diaspora community (Levitt, 2001). Additionally, transnational practices are practiced at different levels: *transnationalism from above*, *meso-level transnational network*, and *transnationalism from below* (Koser, 2007). The transnationalism from above is sending state-initiated diaspora management policies that tend to deter the mobilization of transnational practices. The meso-level transnational network is a network between the transnational institutions which are engaged in information flows between each other, illustrating how refugee established institutions operate at meso level. Transnationalism from below is how agency characteristics and motivations shape grass-root transnational mobilization. Based on the above-mentioned research, I tend to explore different transnational strategies of Turkish refugees. In line with the theories, I will relate these practices to different motivations, settings, forces and structures in the sending and receiving countries.

3.4. Transnationalism from Above

3.4.1. Transnationalization of Nation-Building

State-initiated diaspora engagement policies are “oriented toward governing domestic population abroad” aiming at reaching emigrants through various policies, methods, institutions, and discourses due to political, economic, and social reasons (Gamlen, 2006; Ragazzi, 2009, p. 379). Not all nation-states apply for diaspora management, per se the governments with the “nation-building project abroad” to keep loyalty of expatriates to the home countries (Basch et al., 2005). Thus, the nation-building project consists three “modality

of government” – encouraging migrants’ return, prevention of dissidents abroad, and promotion of “official national identity” (Ragazzi, 2009, pp. 384-386). These nation-states not only promote ideal type of national identity while oppressing dissidents domestically but also construct a clear cut between “friendly and enemy emigrants” abroad (Bauböck, 2003; Ragazzi, 2009).

In Turkish case, it can be argued that “official national identity” or “acceptable citizens” at home and abroad has been changed according to the different regimes and ideologies in the history of Turkish state (Yilmaz, 2015). The nature of Turkish diaspora is heterogenous; consisting various ethnic, religious and ideological groups while the stance of Turkish state has been “paternalistic” toward Turkish emigrants (Çitak, 2010, p. 621). The 1980-ideology of nation-building promoted “Turk-Islam Synthesis” as the part of “long-distance Kemalism” that defined secular Turkish-Ataturkists⁵ emigrants as a model expatriates while other diaspora groups that were out of the official national-identity as the dissident groups (Çitak, 2010; Şenay, 2012, p. 1616). The Kemalist regime of Turkish state reinforced to “Turkify and secularize its nationals in the diaspora” (Şenay, 2012, p. 1616). The similar paternalistic behavior has been observed in current Islamist AKP government of Turkish state that promotes new identity of ‘New Turkey’ based on neo-Ottomanism, prioritizing Sunni-Muslim identity (Arkilic, 2016, p. 106; Mencutek & Baser, 2018, p. 98; Öztürk & Sözeri, 2018).

Based on these notions, in the empirical part of the thesis I intend to explore the links between religious affiliation and the reactions of the Turkish state. It may be of relevance to distinguish between different categories of dissidents and their transnational practices. For example, it may be pertinent to analyze how Turkish-Sunni Muslims respondents experience being defined as ‘dissidents’ and ‘enemies’ of the Turkish state.

3.4.2. State-initiated Diaspora Management Policies

Sending states reach their expats through a series of diaspora policies such as consulate services, religion-related services, education programs, and healthcare and pension programs (Ragazzi, 2009). Moreover, Ragazzi (2009, p. 390) characterizes the state-initiated diaspora

⁵ Ataturkism refers to Kemalism, a person who affiliated himself/herself with socio-political vision of Kemalist ideology (see (Yilmaz, 2013))

policies as “long-distance practices of labor management, cultural inculcation and political policing”. Along these diaspora policies, Bauböck (2003) suggests that some sending-states increase the transnational practices through voting rights of expats. There are various types of voting; “remote voting, absentee voting, extraterritorial or out-of-country voting”, which consolidate the patronage relationship between sending-countries with their emigrants (Baubock, 2006, p. 2395).

Turkish state introduced voting rights back to 1995, nevertheless, de facto voting happened in 2014 presidential election, in which expatriates were allowed to the external voting in the countries where they resided (Arkilic, 2016). The external voting rights had been aimed for “potential benefit” that was expected by Erdogan regime for stronger support from abroad, thus external votes for Erdogan in presidential elections constituted of 65.52 % compared to in-country 51 % supporting votes (Şahin-Mencütek & Erdoğan, 2016, p. 176).

Other Turkish state-initiated diaspora management policies have been “curtailed duration of military service”, new legislation that allowed dual citizenship, Pink Cards for non-citizens who could have inheritance in Turkey, offers for “favorable interest rate”, allowing investments, offering citizenship for new born Turkish expats without voting rights, pension rights and Turkish language classes abroad (Arkilic, 2016, pp. 67-68; Şenay, 2012).

The above-mentioned positive diaspora policies are initiated by the Turkish state for only ‘loyalist’ and ‘acceptable’ Turkish expats (Yanasmayan & Kaşlı, 2019). However, for this project, it will be pertinent to explore how such diaspora policies respond to parts of the diaspora that is perceived by the state as disloyal.

3.4.3. Transnational Diaspora Political Rhetoric

Gamlen (2006) argues that political discourses about nation-building are instrumentalized by the politicians of the sending states as one of the methods of the diaspora management that strengthens the state-diaspora relation. Politicians’ diaspora rhetoric and discourses are the important aspects the “imagined communities” construction about sacred nation to which migrants would one day return (Anderson, 2006). Diaspora communities are likely to watch diaspora media through which political rhetoric of sending-states can be proliferated. The transnational discourses about emigrants and how they define them have been changed. At the

beginning of the labor migration, Turkish state defined emigrants as “low-skilled villagers, then in 1970s Turkish emigrants were defined by the Turkish state as “Turkish citizens abroad” (Arkilic, 2016, p. 63). In 1980s, the definition changed to “expatriates” and in 1990s Turkish state called Turkish emigrants as “goodwill ambassadors” who have mobilized through these symbolic discourses (Arkilic, 2016, pp. 63-64). Ibrahim Kalin, presidential spokesperson, emphasized the changing attitude of Turkish state to its emigrants,

Turks’ perceptions of Turkey have changed in parallel to Turkey’s transformation. Today, Turkish citizens no longer see themselves as a problematic and small footnote in the Euro-centric historical narrative and they desire to see Turkey as an active agent creating its own history (Arkilic, 2016, p. 83).

Turkish state political discourses have been considered as the political strategies for mobilization of Turkish expats for political interests of Turkey. Abdullah Gul, then president of Turkey, during his visit to Sweden addressed his speech to Turkish emigrants.

You [Turkish emigrants] should act like ambassadors of your motherland, Turkey, which you should represent here in the best way. You should protect and defend Turkey’s image, as there could be anti-Turkish propaganda (Mencutek & Baser, 2018, p. 99).

Thus, as the political strategy, Turkish state instrumentalizes diaspora discourses to mobilize them abroad, asking them to lobby for the interests of the Turkish state. It seems that the positive branding of the Turkish expats has been instrumentalized for their mobilization while the negative branding of the dissidents has been used by the Turkish state as the discursive policies to discredit and deter their political transnational participation. In line with these perspectives, I will explore which specific tools the Turkish state used and which consequences it has on the political transnationalism of the refugees in my study.

3.5. Meso-level of transnational networks

3.5.1. Breaking the principles of Westphalian conception of nation-states

The growing size of the international migration has been perceived by nation-states as threatening. The Westphalian conception defines a nation-state as sovereign and power-exercising within its territory and non-interventional to its domestic politics based on the Vattelien conception (Ragazzi, 2009). Some scholars assert that sending states with their state-

initiated diaspora policies ignore these principles by applying the policies targeting “legitimate inhabitants” of the host states (Ragazzi, 2009, p. 380).

According to Agnew (2015, p. 46) “territorial trap” is unavoidable under the age of postmodern globalization. The transformation of the nation-states into global states, thus breaking physical territorial boundaries and creating new ones, has led to transnationalization of governmentality and “deterritorialized nation states” (Basch et al., 2005; Foucault, 2004, p. 6; Gamlen, 2006). Smith (2003) disagrees with “deterritorialization” of the nation-states, mentioning Weberian conception of the modern state that “holds monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory”, arguing that modern states can be defined without their territories (Weber, 2009, p. 78).

Faist (2001) believes that multiple ties of migrants unavoidable due to complexity of the globalization and emerging of new social facts. Moreover, Ragazzi (2009, p. 388) argues that classical notion of nation-states has been transformed into global-states with “liberal governmentality” and “derogation of territorial model”, focusing more on power exercising in more than one territorial space. Thus, some scholars obtain a holistic picture of nation-state as “sociological imagination” and “myth of sovereignty” that creates the distinct line between inside and outside of territory (Bigo, 2002, p. 67). The speech of then Foreign Minister of Turkey, Ahmet Davutoglu, might be an appropriate example of a global state with *transnationalizing sovereignty* and power exercising at different localities where Turkish emigrants reside.

Protecting the rights of citizens abroad is the dignity of the Turkish Republic. If a state is not able to protect the rights of citizens abroad, its sovereignty claims within borders will be weakened. Sovereignty means protecting and helping citizens abroad. The Turkish Republic has the power to protect her citizens, wherever they live (Davutoglu 2013).

After 2010 referendum, Turkish Republic has launched a new domestic and foreign policy about ‘New Turkey’ that would wake Ottoman Renaissance by becoming a regional leader, which enlarges its power to neighbor countries, promoting new identity construction that is based on Sunni Islamic identity and Muslim Ummah, and acting as the regional mediator with public diplomacy and soft power (Mencutek & Baser, 2018, p. 98; Öktem, 2012, p. 33; Öztürk & Sözeri, 2018, p. 4). Consequently, the Turkish government instrumentalizes ‘New Diaspora

Policies' for the preferred policies by mobilizing diaspora abroad. Adamson (2019) gives Turkey as an example of global-nation due to her diaspora policies and pro-active foreign policies. The engineering of nation-identity of "non-resident Turks" can be regarded as the geopolitical stance for the extended power-exercising (Adamson, 2019, p. 229; Arkilic, 2016, p. 73).

Based on these perspectives, it is expected that with the instrumentalization of loyalist groups within diaspora, Turkish state would deploy members of Turkish diaspora for surveillance and monitoring the dissident groups. Therefore, one of the aims of this study is to explore how these processes have affected the political transnational participation of the Turkish refugees.

3.5.2. "Migrant Membership as an Instituted Process" (Smith, 2003)

Scholars of transnational studies underline the importance of reconceptualization of "sovereignty, citizenship and membership" since they are no more concretely fitted to classical conception of nation-state (Levitt & De la Dehesa, 2003, p. 561). Bauböck (1994) refers "transnational citizenship" to migrants who actively taking roles in politics of both sending and host states, thus enjoying "overlapping membership, rights and practices" of both sides. For Gamlen (2006, p. 5), transnational process can be materialized through sending states' transnational and diaspora institutions as the vehicles for the extension of "rights and [extraction of] obligations". Schiller (2009) describes 'institutionalized social relations' as networks with social fields to which migrants are connected. The migrants' membership as the "extra-territorial conduct" leads to the formation of 'transnational public spheres' (Smith, 2003, p. 297). Migrant membership practices that are "instituted process" through which migrants can gain extra economic and social rights beyond the borders (Brubaker, 1989; Smith, 2003, p. 298). Migrant membership or diasporic engagement practices are less formal than citizenship practices, nevertheless, they are functional and effective for the changes in home country (Smith, 2003). Thus, migrants can be governable by their sending states through transnational diaspora institutions while migrants membership can be similarly practiced though "instituted process" of transnational institution (Gamlen, 2006; Smith, 2003). Moreover, "instituted process" of migrants' transnationalism might be constrained or supported by the host countries' political opportunity structures (POS) (Brees, 2010; Østergaard-Nielsen, 2001). It is both sending and receiving countries policies that shape the political transnationalism of migrants and refugees (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2001). It can be seen

in both cases of instituted process of institutionalized transnational participation of Turkish migrants, who mainly are lobbyists of Turkish political foreign interests, and Turkish refugees institutional participation, who are participated in anti-regime mobilizations (Ostergaard-Nielsen, 2003).

The Turkish state is an emigration country with governmental policies that holds their emigrants abroad tightly close to homeland (Mencutek & Baser, 2018). The great variety of institutions organized to proliferate national identity into diaspora community, keep diaspora belonged to national building of Turkey, and Turkish state perception on host states' integration policies that have been considered by Turkey as assimilationist (Boz & Bouma, 2012; Inglis, Akgonul, & De Tapia, 2009).

The ministerial bodies: the Office of Prime Minister, the Ministry of Labor and Social Security, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, are the institutions responsible for Turks abroad (Arkilic, 2016, p. 65). The transnational state-established institutions that are operated under these ministries function as the network channels between Turkish state and emigrants (Sunier, van der Linden, & van de Bovenkamp, 2016, p. 408). The networked infrastructure of institutions established and operated by the Turkish state shapes the political transnational participation of both 'loyalist' and 'dissident' groups by including or excluding them from the diaspora management policies.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has two sub-units; the Directorate for Consular Affairs and the Turkish Cultural Centers such as Yunus Emre Foundations, which operating in all Western countries. If first institution works in helping adaptation of emigrants in host countries then later promotes Turkish culture abroad (Arkilic, 2016, p. 66). The Directorate General for Issues Related to Workers Abroad was established as a unit under the Ministry of Labor and Social Security that advocates the working rights of emigrants abroad (Tören, 2014). Finally, the Office of Prime Minister has three sub-units; the Promotion Fund, the Advisory Board for Turkish Citizens Abroad, and the Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyamet), related to the issues of emigrants abroad (İçduygu, 2009; Tören, 2014). The Presidency of Religious Affairs (Diyamet) has been the most instrumentalized at home and abroad throughout the Turkish history under different regimes.

The religious institutions, which operate transnationally, are network mechanisms at different levels of “organizational hierarchy” (Levitt, 2001, p. 210). Radicalization and assimilation of emigrants have been perceived by the Turkish state as the main concerns, which have tackled by these institutions. Thus, Diyanet abroad was a tool through which Turkey could transnationalize nation-building, prevent from assimilation, and suppress the radicalization of Turkish expats (Çitak, 2010; Sunier et al., 2016). Along these institutions, Turkish state founded the Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency (TIKA), the Yunus Emre Foundation, and Presidency for Turks Abroad and Relative Communities, as the soft power of pro-active foreign affairs not only to transnationalize the national identity to diaspora communities but also to present the neo-Ottomanism, thus extending the influence regionally (Arkilic, 2016). All these institutions and policies work for the sake of new nation-building, which not only characterized as Sunni-Muslim or neo-Ottomanist but a nation that is loyal to the ruling elites’ ideologies. The member of Gulen movement might fit into some categories but not in all, thus making them have been categorized into ‘dissident’ group. In line with these perspectives I will explore how policies of new nation-building affect the political transnational participation of Turkish refugees.

3.6. Transnationalism From Bellow

3.6.1. Transnationality in a “narrow” and “broad” sense

The scholars of transnational studies have focused either on immigrant incorporation in host countries for improvement of their condition or their “grass-root transnationalism” for development of the sending-states political, economic and social spheres (Landolt, Autler, & Baires, 1999, p. 305). Itzigsohn et al. (1999, p. 336) argue that political activities and remittances of migrants are “initial engines” of transnationalism. The level of participation in transnational practices of migrants varies, from meso-level to individual participation, which Itzigsohn et al. (1999, p. 323) define as “transnationality in a narrow” and “transnationality in a broad” sense. The degree of transnationality depends on institutional practices, frequency of migrants’ involvement in the transnational social fields, and frequency of migrants’ movement in the transnational space (Itzigsohn et al., 1999, p. 317). The transnational space is constructed not only by participation of political transnational practices but also economic, social and cultural transnational activities. The strengthening of the transnational space is due to globalization and digital communication that diminish importance of states’ borders.

The financial remittances are the migrants' earnings that are sent to the sending country and seen as the obligation by some "collective cultures" (Brees, 2010, p. 286). The economic migrants mostly are engaged in transnational practices through remittances sent to their non-migrants families, while political refugees participate in transnational activities through direct or indirect political mobilizations (Brees, 2010, p. 291). The migrants originated from Turkey have engaged in "narrow", economic transnational practices. The amount of investment was 10.8 billion euros and remittances constituted 40 billion euros just from Germany in 2006 (Tören, 2014, p. 23; Yaprak, 2013). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared that investments have been increasing by the migrants originated from Turkey while 70 billion dollars of capital inflowed to Turkey in 2015 (Arkilic, 2016, p. 101).

Based on these perspectives I will explore remitting practices of Turkish refugees in my study, and how this is a part of the political transnational participation. It is assumed that major part of remittances is apolitical, sent to families back home to improve their life circumstances.

3.6.2. "Core" and "Extended" Transnationalism

Levitt (2001, p. 198) categorizes migrants into "core" transnationality those migrants whose transnational activities and practices become an integral part of their everyday life. Those migrants who engaged in transnational activities only occasionally are in category of "extended" transnationalism. These types of transnationality resemble to what Itzigsohn et al. (1999) define as "narrow" and "broad" transnationalism. This operationalization of transnational practices helps to understand the variety of transnational levels.

Moreover, the migrants' capacities and desires to participate in transnational activities are the determinants of the formation of transnational social spheres and transnational level (Koser, 2007, p. 243). There are variety of transnational practice levels, some migrants might be engage in core transnationalism politically while in extended transnationalism economically, or they might be intensively engaged at one period and less engaged in another period (Levitt, 2001). For instance, refugees might be actively engaged in "post-conflict reconstruction" in the sending states from overseas at definite period, while become less active under the better conditions in the sending states (Koser, 2007, p. 238).

Refugees can be directly and indirectly politically active. In the case of economic dependence of migrants' family on remittances, migrants can influence the non-migrant family's decision in election (Levitt, 2001). Additionally, indirect political transnationalism of migrants can be occurred through political activities of migrants in host country institutions, thus bringing the domestic issues and drawing their (host country institutions) attention to the issues of their sending states (Brees, 2010). The direct political engagement can be materialized through the support of "rebel movements" in the sending states or by voting from abroad (Brees, 2010).

The Kurdish group within Turkish diaspora is most politically mobilized abroad (Baser, 2013). The Kurdish refugees started to migrate in 1980s after the military coup in Turkey and in 1990s due to military conflicts in the southeastern part of Turkey. The number of asylum seekers from Turkey constituted 340 000 in 1990s and 116 399 in 2002 in European countries, mostly of them were Kurds (Yenilmez, 2017). The "Kurdish Question" have brought into host states by Kurdish mobilization in almost all European countries (Baser, 2013). By bringing the Kurdish Question to European countries, a "one of Turkey's internal problems" became the domestic security problem of host states because of "conventional and unconventional" methods used by the Kurdish migrants (Baser, 2013, p. 2).

The Kurdish movements such as KOMKAR and PKK in Europe have not only mobilized the Kurdish migrants but also participated in separatist movement activities. The "transnationalization of homeland conflicts" became the concern of the sending states, then Interior Minister of Germany, Otto Schilly, stated that Kurdish Question "does not belong to Germany" (Baser, 2013, p. 11). So, the political transnational mobilization of Turkish refugees could be also perceived as the security concern by the host states.

In the line with these perspectives, I will explore how Turkish refugees engage in political transnational participation. The focus will be on whether they are participated in violent or non-violent political transnationalism and how the host states have perceived and responded on their transnational mobilization.

3.6.3. "Bottom-up" Transnationalism

The social sphere of transnationalism is equally important as economic and political transnational practices of migrants. The transnational ties between home and migrants are kept

tightly through migrants participation in cultural and religious activities. The engagement in cultural and social transnational activities lead to the construction of migrants' identities, which are the representatives of the collective and shared believes and common myths (Stryker, 2000). The new identity construction of migrants is constituted by both old and new identities, thus leading to "hybrid identities" (Jaspal & Cinnirella, 2012). Consequently, the migrants originated from Turkey have been practicing their religious and cultural transnational practices, thus leading to social transnational sphere. The social and cultural transnational practices of Turkish diaspora includes ethnic marriage, establishment of hometown associations, celebration of religious and national days (Şahin Kütük, 2017).

Nikielska-Sekuła (2016) conducted her research on the migrants originated from Turkey in Norwegian context. She visited Norwegian-Turkish clubs in city of Drammen, where she observed how Turkish migrants designed interior of these clubs. The Turkish interior design, Turkish tea in traditional cups and Turkish flag hanged on the walls are the transnationalization of Turkish culture into host society where Turkish migrants can feel themselves at home (Nikielska-Sekuła, 2016, p. 333). Inspired by these studies I will explore how Turkish refugees participate in social, economic and political transnational activities, and which of these prevail.

3.7. Network Transnationalism and Diaspora construction

3.7.1. Migrant and non-Migrant Network

De Haas (2010a) describes how migrants' network works in migration system process, which defines the further migration. The "feedback mechanism" between migrants and non-migrants plays as a channel through which capital flow and information flow are transmitted (De Haas, 2010a). Transnational ties between migrants and non-migrants are occurred at micro and meso level based on their kinship community or friendship relations (Brown & Tilly, 1967; Castles et al., 2013). Thus, the transnational network occurs not only between the sending state and emigrants but also between migrants and non-migrants of the sending states. Migrants become either "bridgeheads" or "gatekeepers" based on their ties with non-migrants and host states' economic conditions (Böcker, 1994). Consequently, the transnational impact generates both sides, from the sending states to host states and vice versa. As migrants are influenced by the diaspora policies of the sending states, non-migrants of the sending states are similarly affected by the information and economic flows coming from migrants, sometimes it might cause the democratization of the authoritarian sending states. Based on these perspectives, I will explore

whether Turkish refugees have transnational networks with those who remained in Turkey and how they create these transnational channels.

3.7.2. Transnationalization of Group Conflicts into Diaspora

Levitt (2001, pp. 200-202) suggests process of four transnational community formations: 1) “rural-to-urban transnational” community for example Kurdish people from Konya village in urban country of Germany, 2) “urban-to-urban” transnational community might be Turkish migrants from Istanbul in Oslo, 3) “normative” transnational community is a community formed based on the shared “identities, values, occupation and norms”, and 4) diaspora community constitutes a group of migrants who have been exiled to other nation states and have same belonging and loyalty to country of origin. Initially, diaspora connotated to Jewish dispersion while currently all international migrant groups have been defined as diaspora communities (Cohen, 1996; Tölölyan, 1991). The conceptualization of diaspora term, for some scholars, “universalized” while for others, “undertheorized” (Anthias, 1998; Brubaker, 2005).

Bruneau (2010) and C. King and Melvin (2000) define diaspora as an ethnic community group in host country, while Ragazzi (2009) argues that diaspora is a continuation of sending state’s foreign policy and Portes (2000, p. 257) resembles diaspora to “international corporations” in the way they operate as international global network. Rose (1996) and Anderson (2006) call diaspora as “virtual community” or “imagined community”, emphasizing the invisible bond between migrants and their home countries. What can be built upon the various definitions is that diaspora is a community of once migrated group of people that has collective memory, close ties with home country, engaged in transnational activities for bettering the conditions of home state, myth of return and feeling of belonging to the place of origin (Brubaker, 2005, 2017; Féron, 2017).

Diaspora becomes a concern for host countries when sending states transmit homeland conflicts to diaspora community. The diaspora community mobilizes for the political interests of the sending states through funds, political supports, and even weapon procurement, thus becoming a “conflict-generated” diaspora (Feron & Beauzamy, 2009). The ethnic and religious group conflicts at home can be “re-create[d]” in diaspora community through sending states rhetoric and policies and diaspora media (Osman, 2015). The same process of conflict transnationalization from home states to host states can be observed in Turkish diaspora case. For a

long period “intra-diasporic” rivalry between nationalist Turks and Kurds has been seen in the host countries (Adamson, 2019, p. 228).

The diaspora community originated from Turkey has multiple ethnic and religious groups thus forming “diasporas within diaspora” and each group lobbies in the host countries for their “own identity-based interests” (2019, p. 229). Minorities of a nation-state have been considered as a problem due to “national narratives of social cohesion” and unity (Appadurai, 2006, p. 1). The domestic tensions between ethnic and religious groups of the sending states can be reproduced at host countries and defined by Feron (2013) as “autonomization” of diasporic behavior (Baser, 2013, p. 4). Even though, the Turkish state argues about “inclusive diaspora” policy engagement, it is evident that “diffusion of homeland conflicts to the diasporic space” is definitely materialized by the hand of the Turkish state (Baser, 2013, p. 3). As then Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu in his speech in 2011 told that “every individual who originated from Anatolia belongs to the Turkish diaspora...regardless of religion and ethnicity” while on the other hand the Turkish state excludes and stigmatizes “dissident groups” and rewards conservative nationalist Sunni Turks (Adamson, 2019, p. 225; Arkilic, 2016; Çitak, 2010).

3.7.3. Network Exchange Theory

The sociologists of the network theory focus on the “micro and macrostructures” between people, groups and societies at variety different social settings (Wellman 1983). Granovetter (1973) contributes to the network studies by analyzing the strong and weak ties of the network, arguing strong ties of the network isolate the group of the network from the rest of the society while weak ties might play a role as the bridging between different groups. Moreover, the similar feelings of the group members make them structurally equivalent, meaning construct their group identities within the network (Mizruchi 1990, 25).

On the other hand, the theorists of the exchange theory position the actors of the network according to their exchange abilities where they can exercise their power. Thus, Emerson’s (1972) idea of “positively and negatively linked exchange” explains how the power within the networks is distributed and exercised. The actors of the network are the maximizers of self-interest (Ritzer and Stepnisky 2018). The network theory has been sophisticated when Markovsky (2005) combined it with the exchange theory into network exchange theory (NET) in which he explains the strong and weak power networks. Giving different possible

alternatives of networks, he argues that the type of the network can be measured by checking “whether the actors can be excluded from exchange” or not (2018, 420). Thus, in the strong power networks some low power actors can be excluded while the high-power actors cannot be excluded.

In the weak power networks, there are several high-power actors who have similar chances to be excluded thus the low-power actors might have alternative exchanges with these high power actors. The theory tells that high power actor as the self/interest maximizer would get maximum resources from the exchange in the strong power network (2018, 420). Additionally, Leak (1992, 316) explains “strategic manipulation of network linkages” emphasizing the low power actors changing the network to seek better sources while high power actors “prefer to isolate those dependent on them”.

I believe that the network exchange theory can be applied to the Turkish state political transnationalism, arguing that network generates between the Turkish state and Turkish diaspora can be identified as strong power networks. The Turkish state in this exchange network is the high-power actor that cannot be excluded from the network while other low-power actors such as Kurds or Alevis can be excluded very easily by the high-power actor. The Turkish state as the high-power actor uses strategic manipulations to make the low-power actors (Sunni Turks) be dependent on it. What state gets from this exchange is all resources (preferred diaspora policies, remittances, information about other dissident groups, etc.) it prefers from this network. All these key concepts are very useful in understanding of how Turkish state might have position in the network with its expatriates, some of whom are more preferred and dependent than others.

3.7.4. Application of the Migration Network to Political transnationalism and Top-down Emigration Policies of Home Countries (Transnational Network Mechanism)

Miller, Castles, and de Haas in their book, *The Age of Migration*, tell why it becomes that we live in the age of migration, how it becomes that migration works as the “self/perpetuating” process and how migration becomes the problem that should be solved in the First World states eyes. The most prominent theory that explains how migration as the mechanism or system works has been explained by the migrant network (de Haas 2010, 1588). Some countries have applied for emigration policies as the “hope for the industrial development of their lands (de

Haas 2010, 232). While some countries remain very neutral to their expatriates, some prefer only remittances as the developmentalist project, while the Turkish state has exercised all its power crossing the territorial sovereignty of other nation states (Mencutek & Baser, 2018).

This study focuses on the migrant network and how they interact with the Turkish state that plays very important role on identity construction of the groups originated from Turkey. The migrant network theory will give access to broader picture of how the Turkish state make it possible to keep the loyalties and belongings of Turkish diaspora while some groups within the diaspora tend to be excluded from the network.

Firstly, the migrant network theory has been studied by Mabogunje (1970) who explains the *feedback mechanism* of the network. He argues that information flows pass through the migrants networks. According to this perspective, we should identify the position of migrants towards the non-migrants in terms of information flow that comes from migrants to non/migrants making the cost and risk reduction. It is assumed in this study that transnational network of Turkish diaspora, the information flows go in both directions. It is not only migrants who provide non-migrants with the needed information, but also the Turkish state that diffuses some political information flows into its diaspora. Furthermore, it is assumed that in the Turkish diaspora case, the ties and bonds of the actors in the transnational network are based on ethnical, ideological and religious features. However, this study will not only focus on interactions between these segments of the migrant networks. It will also explore interactions between the above-mentioned segments of the networks and the representatives of the state such as consulates bodies, the director of religious affairs (Diyanet), and the cultural associations established by the state.

3.7.5. Transnational Mechanism or System / State-monitored Transnational Network

Gurak and Fe Caces (2010, 151) define networks as “mechanisms” that serve as the connection between both sides through which the data, information and other sources are transmitted. In this study, they are conceptualized as a transnational system that operates as the exchange of goods, people, information, resources and data (Massey et al, 1993). The migration system engages continuously in the process of change due to its network members and political and economic conditions (Massey et al., 1993, p. 454). Thus, migration system uncovers “diverse

linkages” and interconnected nature of it when “one part is sensitive to change in other parts” (Fawcett, 673).

Castles et al (2014, 43) defines the migration system as the process that “link people, families, communities [and states] over space”. Bakewell (2013, 310) describes the whole mechanism of the migration system, arguing that various flows such as flows of capital, information, goods, people, discourses, actor strategies are the interacting elements between both the sending and receiving states. Moreover, de Haas (2010) adds to this system the “contextual feedback mechanism” according to which the migration process shapes. This contextual feedback mechanism through the migrants networks facilitates or undermines the migration.

In this study however, the similar system and network analysis can be integrated. Thus, it might be conceptualized as the transnational system or transnational network, in which contextual feedback mechanism takes place as well. In this model, it is assumed that the Turkish state that decides on the context of the information that will be transmitted through the transnational network between the state and its emigrants. The definite context of Turkish state diaspora policies would influence the identities, belongings and loyalties of the network members. Here, Gurak and Caces (1992) work on the impact of the network on the sending and the receiving states would be of relevance. These researches argue that some networks operate in the way to isolate migrants from the society at the destination and keep the bonds to the home states. Transnational networks are “serving as channels for information” (Gurak & Caces, 1992, p. 153).

The argument made by Gurak and Caces is that some transnational networks may prevent the migrants from the integration in the destination states while strengthen their ties to their country of origins (1992, p. 154). The researchers add that ideology, distance, technology, political and economic factors may shape the network and how it would operate. However, they believe that migrant network is also shaped by the characteristics of the both home and host countries and the characteristics of the migrants (2010, 159). Feld (1981, 1015) conceptualizes these factors and mechanisms as the “organizing foci” while Lomnitz (1976) perceives them as “network’s organizing variables” referring to the “basis that organizes individuals and collectivities into networks” (Gurak and Caces 2010, 163). Inspired by these studies, I will explore in this thesis how the transnational Turkish refugees network is influenced by several aforementioned mechanisms and factors, such as the Turkish state initiated diaspora policies, the political and

ideological factors, instrumentalization of the transnational networks and religious organizing foci.

3.8. Summary

Transnationalism is a “dynamic process” that is “multi-dimensional and inter-linked” (Al-Ali, Black, & Koser, 2001, p. 615; Landolt et al., 1999, p. 292). Globalization process generates transnationalism, eases communication and transportation of “transmigrants” towards their home states (Guarnizo, 1997). Transnationalism can be practiced at macro, meso and micro level, while on the other hand these transnational levels are interconnected. All three levels of analyses are included in the master thesis since transnational diaspora policies of Turkey and integration policies of the respective countries, transnational network between institutions and agency grass-root transnational participation are key factors in shaping the political transnational participation of Turkish refugees. Scholars of transnational studies focus on different aspects of transnational practices; while some of them research sending states transnational stance toward emigrants, others conduct their research on grass-root level and some scholars draw their attention to transnational institutions. Some scholars find out the outcome of transnational practices of migrants on their identity construction, others make some remarks on how state-initiated transnational practices might cause the mobilization or resistance of migrants (Baser, 2013; Østergaard-Nielsen, 2001).

The theories of networked transnational mechanisms are in direct relevance to the target question of the master thesis. The theory that explains how refugees create networks at individual, institutional, and country levels. It may also help us to understand how their home-oriented political transnational activities are positioned at networked transnational spaces. The figure 1 illustrates the main conceptual and theoretical frameworks, which relate directly to the major research questions of the master thesis. Conceptual framework of different levels of transnationalism defines how various transnationalism is constructed either by sending and host countries policies, or networked relationships between institutions, or through the diaspora group mobilization. Transnational mechanism between sending state and diaspora directly related to the question of how sending state’s diaspora policies affect refugees’ level of political transnational participation (Gurak and Fe Caces 2010). Theories on institutionalized transnationalism and meso-level transnational network between institutions answer the question of how host countries political opportunity structures shape the political transnationalism (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2001). Transnationalism from below and feedback

mechanism of network between migrants and non-migrants are theories directly relevant to the question of how refugees' capacities and motivations affect the level of political transnationalism (Levitt, 2001; Mabogunje, 1970).




Figure 1: Theoretical and conceptual frameworks

CHAPTER FOUR

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

4.1. Research Method Step by Step

Babbie (1989) structures the research design step by step, suggesting the brainstorming on the interest, idea and related theory as the first step of the methodology. Figuring out and rising the questions of interests requires the next step that is a selection of the method of inquiry. The methodology used has been a “procedures for scientific investigation” that should be supported empirically (Babbie, 1989, p. 7). There is “two pillars of the science” that are logic and observation, consequently the scientific research has to “make sense” and “correspond to what we observe” (1989, p. 8). Buckley, Buckley, and Chiang (1976) resemble a researcher to an architectural designer who defines strategy for exploration of problems and their solutions. That is why it is so crucial to decide on an appropriate method for collection of empirical data that would illustrate the full picture of the research.

The research method of this thesis has been a qualitative research method for “deeper and fuller understanding” of the phenomenon (Babbie, 1989, p. 324). According to John Lofland (2006) the appropriate research method for analyzing of social setting is qualitative research method, thus it has to be doable for the research on the political transnational practices of Turkish refugees in host countries. Moreover, the qualitative research method includes variety of different approaches, nevertheless, none of them numerical and focuses on intensive and deep amount of information while having a small number of cases (G. King, Keohane, & Verba, 1994).

The thesis research has been conducted through the semi-constructed in-depth interviews with the Turkish refugees who are active in transnational practices and activities. The unit of analysis was individuals, the Turkish refugees in Norway, Germany, and the United States. The countries chosen were on behalf of their similarities and differences in immigration policies of the countries, the interstate relations, and different numbers of Turkish migrants and refugees in these respective countries. The increasing and decreasing numbers of Turkish refugees who have migrated since 2016 to the respective countries can be observed in Figure2.




Figure 2: The number of Turkish refugees in the respective countries

I used a semi-structured interviews with open-ended questions to make respondents focused on specific issues while at the same time they were given free space to freely and widely speak about the topic without losing the track of it (Jamshed, 2014).

The qualitative research gave possibility not only to record the data, but also “achieve, challenge and reinforce” it (Oakley, 1998). During the interviews I tried to give more space for interviewees, who wanted to share their stories, opinions and experiences. Whenever they distracted from the question asked, I redirected them to the focus of the question. Mostly, I was passive and interviewees were active, merely in some cases I became active. For instance, when respondents did not understand or misunderstood the questions. Through the semi-structured interviews approach I got the information about Turkish refugees’ political transnational participation.

4.2. Sampling Respondents and Selecting Informants

The sampling of the respondents has been based on strategic sampling, which has been done through snowball sampling technique. The snowball sampling is one of the techniques and used when the research contains a specific group, which is not easy to locate. The researcher starts with few members of the group, thus creating network with them and asking for further contacts of members. “Snowball” associates with the “accumulation” since first respondents provide the network for other respondents (1989, p. 129). The sample size according to Sandelowski (1995, p. 179) has to be adequate and not reductionist based on the “judgement

and experience in evaluating the quality of the information collected”, having a large size of sample in qualitative research method is not necessary or sufficient, it is crucial to have the size of sample through which the data would give the answers to the research questions. On the other hand, the informants have been selected with the purpose of snowball selection of respondents and for deeper information about phenomenon. The informants are not respondents in terms of information they can provide (Babbie, 1989, p. 131).

The informants of the research have been the leaders of the non-governmental organizations that are established by Turkish refugees with the goals for transnational practices, which has political dimension and with the motivations for liberation of detained people and for stopping human rights violations in Turkey. The informants of the research have given more information about phenomenon and have provided network as the snowball technique. From each country five active members of social movement organizations have been interviewed. All respondents were political refugees who migrated to these respective countries after 2016. Most of the respondents were between 30 and 50 years old. All respondents had high level of education, they were academicians, journalists, teachers, public officials and doctors. The sampling criteria of the research was to find active political refugees who could provide me with information of how political transnationalism works and what kind of experiences have been faced in respective countries. I could get the information about political transnational participation of Turkish political refugees through this sampling. The only challenge was to find appropriate respondents according to sampling criteria because, for example, in Germany I could not find a social movement organization that was established by Turkish refugees. Therefore, I found respondents from Germany who either were voluntarily members of another country’s social movement organization or were members of NGO that was found by Turkish migrants with integration trajectories and they were active in political transnational practices on individual level.

4.3. Data Processing and Analysis: Qualitative Interviews, Categories, and Conceptualizations

This study is based on a face-to-face semi-structured interviews with Turkish refugees through Skype, because scope of the research includes three countries, which are Norway, Germany and the United States. At the beginning the contact with the informants of the transnational NGOs have been done. The interviewed informants have been providers of the network with

other Turkish refugees who are actively engaged in the transnational activities that have political dimensions. For each country five Turkish refugees have been interviewed through Skype that has recording facility. Jamshed (2014) advises researchers to record qualitative interviews due to enormous information that impossible to noted and for further analysis. The recorded interviews have provided researcher with the “verbal prompts” and enabled to generate “verbatim transcript” that afterwards have been analyzed (2014, p. 87). The data processing is not interpretable, therefore a researcher applies for data analysis of the collected data. Thus, the collected data has been analyzed and interpreted for the “purpose of drawing conclusions that reflect the interests, ideas, and theories” (Babbie, 1989, p. 116).

Additionally, the researcher has to be sure that his/her data-collected is being valid and reliable. Validity of the data is whether measurement of the data “actually measure what they supposed to measure” while reliability means that repeated measurement would give the same result (Babbie, 1989, p. 353). Thus, having the recorded interview would give the researcher chance to measure the given responses any time is needed and allow data to be remeasured and reanalyzed. The researcher has to take each case very carefully and avoid ecological fallacy, thus drawing the incorrect conclusions of analysis of individuals by observing the groups. I analyzed respondents on the individual level and tried to figure out the differences and similarities among them. The interviews with the Turkish refugees went very well. As I mentioned before the only challenge was with Turkish refugees in Germany. It was challenging to make a sample from respondents from Germany because if in two other cases I could communicate with informants who provided me contacts with other members of the social movement organization, then in Germany case there was not any social movement organization. I found one active respondent from Germany through social movement organization in the US. Afterwards, the respondent I found in Germany helped me with network of the rest respondents.

The active members of the social movement organizations told about their web sites, from where I could get more data. To the question about the political transnational practices done, the respondents redirected me to the web sites of social movement organizations, indicated the profile of the organizations, their various activities and values. I tried to analyze how each social movement organization have defined themselves and how they have defined their activities. Moreover, I have compared the political transnational activities the social movement

organizations posted in web sites, trying to figure out what they have in common and what they have in difference.

I have included *Advocates of Silenced Turkey* from the US, *From Turkey* and *Den Nordiske Friheten* from Norway. I initially included the web site of *Iniative für Flüchtlinge*, because as respondents from Germany told that some of the political transnational activities have been organized in *Iniative für Flüchtlinge*. However, later in the process I decided to exclude *Iniative für Flüchtlinge*, as it was not explicitly social movement organization and therefore did not entirely fit the sampling criteria. Furthermore, this social movement organization did not have a web site. Thus, the perspectives on the refugees' political transnationalism in Germany are entirely based on the interview material. Here, I asked questions to respondents in Germany about their political transnational participation; explored how they engaged in transnational activities; and how they have organized compared to other three social movement organizations.

The qualitative method includes questions that are formed by words and specific concepts, which is “tricky business” and has to lead the data collection in right way (Babbie, 1989, p. 348). The conceptualization is a process in which agreement on what terms mean made, thus the result of the conceptualization ends up with concepts (1989, p. 166). The concern in social science research is with conceptualization process because not always scholars have agreement on the meaning of the concept. Moreover, concepts are identified as “theoretical creation” of “constructs” (1989, p. 168). Thus, the main concepts of the research thesis are: (i) political transnationalism, (ii) political transnational practices, (iii) indirect and direct mobilization. Consequently, the right way to conceptualize concepts is by specifying the indicators and dimensions of the concepts. For instance, Turkish refugees' engagement in political transnational practices have been indicated via codes such as: establishing the political non-governmental organizations, attending NGOs for human rights, mobilization and demonstration against human rights violations in Turkey.

Regarding the political transnational practices of Turkish refugees, I could distinguish between informants who have been “active” of “passive” in transnational activities. These categories are related to various categories on micro, meso and macro levels such as migrant profile (occupation, motivations for transnationalism, and priorities), host country characteristics (inclusive/exclusive immigration policies), and the extra-territorial purge of the dissidents

abroad by the Turkish state. For example, Turkish state governmental oppression and mass detention of dissidents at home at certain period of time might increase the level of activeness of Turkish refugees in political transnational practices.

Finally, coming from conceptualization to measurement of the political transnational practices that can be measured by number of petitions, establishment of NGOs, organizing seminars, conferences and workshops, contacting with local and international human rights organizations, posting stories and news about human rights violations in Turkey in social media, fundraising for the families of detained. As Babbie (1989, p. 164) suggests that concepts is not the same as “rocks”, which exist in nature, whereas concepts are the constructions of meanings people give them. Therefore, it is crucial to measure the concepts otherwise they would be invalid and unreliable.

4.5. Positionality of the Researcher

Carling, Erdal, and Ezzati (2014, p. 36) offer the “dynamic approach” to positionality of the researcher. They suggest that researcher with migrant background who conducts research on migration studies becomes as insider due to his/her background while researcher who is a member of majority population of the receiving country is perceived by migrants as outsider. They suggest that researcher is obliged to have “strategic and reflexive management” of positionality in the ethical consideration of the research (2014, p. 36). Positionality might have positive sides and negative as well, what is for sure, is that positionality of the researcher affects the research process. The insider position of the researcher who has linguistic skills and migrant background might have access to definite diaspora communities, whereas a researcher with outsider position might have troubles with access to migrants who might see the researcher as the “threat” to migrants (2014, p. 42).

John Lofland (2006) offers to use “selective competence” such as skills and knowledge of the researcher as the positionality that bridges researcher with respondents. Moreover, the “third position” can be used as positionality, that means being neither insider nor outsider (Carling et al., 2014, p. 49). The suggestion of scholars to researchers of migration studies is to find similarities and differences between them and migrant respondents, since every research might find out some similarities with migrants such as gender or class, calling this as “intersectionality” between researchers and respondents (Carling et al., 2014, p. 38). Thus, my

intersectionality with Turkish respondents is migrant background that has positioned me as insider but being different ethnically reaffirmed my position as a researcher. Similarly, Babbie (1989, p. 328) expresses his concern about various roles of the researcher who might face the “problem of reactivity” when respondents are aware of being under study that might modify their responses and behaviors. Consequently, the researcher has to interview the respondents by avoiding the “problem of reactivity”, mainly it is possibly by allowing and providing more free space for respondents to express and explain their opinions, experiences, and thoughts.

4.6. Ethical Consideration and Limitations of the Research

Respondents of a research and a researcher have to be sure that they are under security, thus the researcher is obliged to guarantee that his/her respondents do not get harmed by participating in the research. Therefore, any kind of research method requires anonymity and confidentiality of participants (Babbie, 1989). As a student at the program of Globalization and Sustainable Development and doing my master thesis under the department of Social Work at NTNU, I was informed by my supervisor, professor Marko Valenta, and administrative coordinators of Geography Department about the compulsory assessment of the project by NSD, *Norsk Senter for Forskningsdata*. Consequently, I prepared my thesis proposal and interview questions and applied to NSD for project assessment. The methodological part of the master thesis that was built on the semi-structured interviews with Turkish refugees, who have been informed about their rights as the respondents in the study. They have rights of having confidentiality and anonymity, right to withdraw from the research any time they want, the data collected would be dismissed at the end of the research, the data has been used only in master thesis, their identity information have been encrypted in private computer with the access only of researcher, the respondents have rights for feedback of the research and they would be provided with final work of the master thesis. Finally, the assessment of the master thesis proposal by NSD was positive and approved.

The limitation of this master thesis lies in budgetary and time management. My preference for research method is to conduct face-to-face interviews with Turkish migrants and make a field research by participating as the participant observer. The first part of my preference for methodology is doable, whereas the second is costly and time-consuming because I have interviewed the Turkish refugees who are right now residing in Norway, Germany and the United States. Therefore, I have only interviewed my respondents through Skype and have

worked on digging the information by analyzing and interpreting the data that gave deeper and wide picture of the phenomenon I have worked on.

CHAPTER FIVE

FACETS OF POLITICAL TRANSNATIONALISM OF GULEN MOVEMENT: ACTORS AND MOTIVATIONS

The critical juncture - the failed coup in Turkey on 15 of July 2016, has caused the change in political climate in Turkey and separation and formation of new diaspora group within the Turkish diaspora (Koinova, 2018). The transformative events, the violation of human rights and governmental purge at home and abroad, have led to anti-regime transnational advocacy by the Gulen movement that included new movement trajectories (Koinova, 2018). The Turkish diaspora's "complex interplay" between different ethnic, religious and ideological groups that have different means and interests for diaspora mobilization and which mainly replicate the interplay between these groups in Turkey (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2001, p. 266). These heterogeneous groups of the Turkish diaspora have employed different ways of mobilizations, for example, working Turkish migrants of 1960s have been mobilized mainly in indirect and institutional participation lobbying and mobilizing for the foreign interest of the Turkish state. The Kurdish refugee groups of 1980s have mobilized in direct and indirect confrontational transnational mobilizations as the separatist diaspora group (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2001). Thus, the critical and transformative events in Turkey have caused the separation of Gulen movement from the wider Turkish diaspora and they have engaged in new transnational trajectories for the social and political change in Turkey.

In this chapter I have explored how motivations and characteristics of the political refugees play crucial role in political transnational participation. Moreover, this chapter has deepened in how political refugees have established social movement organizations. Additionally, I have ranged various limitations, motivations, and factors affecting their level of activeness in political transnational participation.

5.1. The characteristics of the transnational political participation of the Gulen movement's diaspora group

Turkish political refugees have engaged in an *indirect institutional transnational participation*. The Turkish refugees who have affiliation to the Gulen movement in the respective countries have formed the *social movement organizations* as the institutionalized transnational political

action (TRA) (Chaudhary & Moss, 2019; Østergaard-Nielsen, 2001). The indirect influence of the social movement organizations have contributions through seminars, workshops, panel discussions, lobbying with local and international organizations, awareness campaigns, “providing information and keeping the issue on the international agenda”, large scale petitions, silent march and protests (Brees, 2010; Østergaard-Nielsen, 2001). Local institutionalization of social movement organizations that are “homeland-oriented” and “activism-oriented” key players who have human rights approach and “claim-making” through “legal means” (Chaudhary & Moss, 2019; Cheran, 2006, p. 3; Orjuela, 2018; Wahlbeck, 2002, p. 228).

The overall analysis of the responses of the respondents has shown the similar and different transnational action tendencies. In all three countries, the social movement organizations have participated in large scale petitions for the release of women prisoners with children, journalists, and political prisoners who are under Covid19 danger. The silent march and protests have been organized in these countries for the protesting the violation of human rights in Turkey, specifically marching with placards to stop the imprisonment of women with small children. The social movement organizations have made contacts with local NGOs such as Amnesty and Red Cross and with international such as United Nations and International Human Rights organizations. On 8 March Women Day, these organizations have organized seminars with photo gallery on the topic of women prisoners in Turkey and marching in the centers of towns by staging the scene of small children with their mothers in prisons. All respondents stated that they have periodically sent money to the victim families, which members of family are in prisons or suspended from jobs, thus participating in economic transnational action. Although the social movements transnational participation have parallel approaches they still have own appropriate ways of establishment and mobilizations.

*FromTurkey*⁶ is a social movement organization based in Norway and have focus to advocate for all groups and people in Turkey who have been faced violation of human rights, thus having inclusive approach. The head of the social movement organization distinguish the concepts of victimhood and human rights violation, arguing that victimhood mainly associates with the human rights violations faced by Gulen movement members while their aim is to become

⁶ <https://www.fromturkey.no/>

voices of all groups of people of Turkey. The advocacy has been materialized through cooperation with the local and international NGOs, trying to reach all possible channels such as NGOs, media outlets, bureaucrats, and politicians. A member of this social movement organization has project with a Swedish academician who have translated Ahmet Altan's, a Turkish journalist, books. One of the respondents has started to draw the human rights violations through drawings after his wife detainment, thus he has continued to draw paintings here in Norway. The respondent told that he with other activists have been drawing pictures of human rights violation and posted them in, *Zulundan Yansiyenler*⁷, under *Magduriyetler* web page. These paintings have been exhibited in different cities of Norway mainly in libraries. Moreover, the stories of human rights violations have been collected into a book, *Huznun Dip Ugultusu*⁸, and the cover of the book was drawn by the respondent from Norway.

Den Nordiske Friheten is a social movement organization established by the political refugees and based in Norway. Their advocacy could be categorized into more digital advocacy since they have participated in cyberspace, all videos with interviews of victims or about human rights violations in general they have posted in the social media, such as Twitter⁹, Youtube¹⁰, and Instagram¹¹. A member of the social movement organization told that the duties have been divided into news gathering, statement writing, the theme identification, interviewing, data such as video, information collection. Thus, the case of human right violation is searched, assessed, prepared and posted in social media.

Initiative für Flüchtlinge is based in Germany and established by the Turkish migrants who have migrated before the Turkish refugee influxes. The focus of the organization is to help migrants and refugees with the integration process, arranging different social activities for better adaptation. The respondents shared that they do not have an organization aimed to the political transnational advocacy, therefore one of the respondents told that she is a volunteer member of the Advocates of Silenced Turkey. The transnational political advocacy in Germany has been

⁷ <http://magduriyetler.com/category/zulumlerden-cizimler/>

⁸ <https://www.scribd.com/book/452427549/Huznun-Dip-U%C4%9Fultusu>

⁹ <https://twitter.com/dnfriheten?lang=tr>

¹⁰ <https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCskMeWrLIY6BHqi6yJAGIyg>

¹¹ <https://www.instagram.com/dnfriheten/>

done mainly personally while some activities such as seminars or conferences about the human rights violations in Turkey have been organized in Initiative für Flüchtlinge.

*Advocates of Silenced Turkey*¹² is based in the United States and has participated nationally and internationally, having volunteer members in different countries and partners in different regions. They include all reports prepared by national and international human rights organizations such as Journalists and Writers Foundation, Amnesty International, Stockholm Center for Freedom, Committee to Protect Journalists, Freedom House, State Department Report in Turkey, European Union, International Court of Justice, United Nations, Alliance for Shared Values, Academics at Risks, Court decisions and Resolutions. They provide people who faced human rights violation with samples and instructions of how to apply for UN Arbitrary Detention Commission. They have organized worldwide campaigns of calls for investigation and release of journalists and political prisoners. Alongside the exhibitions, seminars, workshops, and forums, the Advocates of Silenced Turkey has organized short film festivals¹³ and song contest¹⁴ with the title of human rights violation in Turkey. A member of AST described how the social movement organization has been organized,

We have prepared the human rights violation reports with the consultancy of advocates and journalists. The journalists have expertise in accessing the information. For instance, the report about abduction we prepared before was done through the direct connection between our journalists with the families of the abducted. The document that has been prepared by journalists go to advocates who edited the document according to laws and regulations. If we are going to publish a call letter, then advocates provide us with the international documents which support our arguments. If we are going to publish a statement the related team members such as advocates, journalists and academicians work on that statement.

The institutionalization of the social movement organization by the Turkish refugees has shown different patterns of institution establishments. The social movement organizations in Norway collaborate mainly with local non-governmental institutions or they advocate through social media channels. The case with Germany illustrates the social movement organization that has

¹² <https://silencedturkey.org/>

¹³ <https://silencedturkey.org/testhome/short-film-competition>

¹⁴ <https://silencedturkey.org/testhome/song-contest>

different focus, which is integration of newcomers rather than advocacy of human rights. Finally, the institutionalization of Turkish refugees in the United States demonstrates the professional characteristic of the organization, which has a professional team of advocates, journalists, and academicians. There are many reasons of why these similar social movement organizations have organized in different ways. In coming chapters, these reasons are explained in detail.

5.2. Low-risk and High-risk Activism and Guarded Advocacy

The relevant researches on the diaspora studies mainly criticize diasporas for their participation in financing and supporting wars, extremism and radical political views (Baser & Swain, 2008). Nevertheless, diaspora activists and advocates might be substantial key actors in home country change and development as a part of transitional justice (TJ) (Orjuela, 2018). Thus, diaspora members are not only “war-mongers” but they can be “peace-makers” and “peace builders” while engaging in the transnational political fields (Koinova, 2018; Van Hear & Cohen, 2017, p. 172). The Turkish refugees who have been engaged in the indirect institutional transnational participation through established social movement organizations can be categorized into ‘*peace-makers*’ and ‘*justice-advocates*’ groups. Moreover, diaspora activists might have influential positive effects on “peacemaking through human rights advocacy, raising consciousness among the host land public and decision-makers” (Baser & Swain, 2008, p. 15). For instance, the Advocates of Silenced Turkey have defined themselves and their activities as,

We are a group of lawyers, judges, academicians, journalists, and hundreds of activists who cherish democratic ideals and universal human rights. We, the Advocates, have made it our mission to champion the rights of silenced Turkey until universal human rights and democratic governance are established and sustained as the utmost priorities of the Republic of Turkey¹⁵.

The members of the social movement organizations can be also categorized into active, passive and silent members. The *active* members are usually the founders and spokespersons of the organizations, and they participate actively. The *passive* members are those who mobilize when the “active leadership calls upon them” (Shain & Barth, 2003, p. 452). The *silent* members are mainly unengaged in transnational political activities except the times of crises (Shain & Barth, 2003). The Turkish refugees indicated that they have been very active economically, they have

¹⁵ <https://silencedturkey.org/about-us>

engaged transnationally through helping victims financially. One founder and spokesperson of these social movement organizations are active members due to their positions and organizing duties. There are just little portion of those who are active in political transnational activities and the rest are passive and silent members who either participate on the occasions or in the times of campaigns or as the participants.

The political transnational advocacy can be also categorized into *high-risk activism* and *low-risk activism* (Moss, 2016, p. 493). The activism becomes highly risky when the authoritarian countries employ the repressive extra-territorial purge against the activists abroad. Therefore, the activists have participated in “*guarded advocacy*”, anonymously or mainly through *net-activism* (Dalmaso et al., 2017; Moss, 2016). The leaders and members of the committee of the social movement organizations are not allowed to be members anonymously due to the transparency required in the liberal democratic states, thus the official members of the movement organizations engage in high-risk activism. The general impression is that the most of the Turkish refugees engage in political transnational activities anonymously. During the march they wear masks and while attending the conferences they tend to avoid cameras. Furthermore, they mainly engage in net-activism where they can hide their identities.

The interconnected world and digital communication technologies enable the “increase civic involvement and autonomy of the civil society”, leading to the democratization and fighting against the dictatorships (Castells, 2015; Moss, 2016, p. 106). Political refugees through digital advocacy form the transnational cyberspace where refugees can be transnationally active with less risks of advocacy (Adamson, 2016). For example, the members of the *Den Nordiske Friheten* engage totally in digital advocacy and net-activism, thus participating in low-risk activism and transnational political activities.

Consequently, the political transnational participation of the most of Turkish political refugees in my study can be categorized as institutionalized low-risk participation. Here, the only ones who are active members are the leading members. They engage in high-risk activism because they do not conceal their identities. The majority of the new refugee community participates passive and in low-risk activism through digital advocacy.

5.3. The Driving Motivations

The motivations are the drivers for the transnational participation and there are various motivations at varying degrees (Shain & Barth, 2003). Some of the respondents told that their motivations for their political transnational advocacy is to improve a situation in Turkey where they can return lately. Others connected their own experiences of helplessness in Turkey and motivation to help those that remained. One of the respondents from Germany described her experience,

You do not have any law or NGO in your right, left, back, and front sides, which can protect you. Our voices were silenced so much, when we could flee the country the first thing was opening Twitter and use my voice there. Tell the world what has happened, there, in Turkey. Now there a lot of people in Turkey who cannot use their voices. I know how it is to be helpless therefore I decided to become a voice of those who are silenced (Respondent # 5, Germany).

Baser and Swain (2008, p. 14) argue that a motive of diaspora engagement in home country oriented transnational activism is due to “emotional attachments of solidarity and kinship”. A respondent from the US told his direct attachment to victims who are under governmental purge,

I have acquaintances and friends who have been tortured and their human rights have been violated. There are a lot of people among the Turkish refugees whose relatives, families or friends are under danger. Thus it becomes your motivation. I have many friends for whom I try to do something (Respondent #1, US).

Some of the Turkish refugees told about their feeling of responsibility, obligation and duty of loyalty that motivate them to engage in activities on behalf of transnational justice and global awareness, which is line with other studies that identify common motivations of the political transnational participation (Brees, 2010; Van Hear & Cohen, 2017). A refugee respondent from Germany described her motivation in the political transnational mobilization,

I did not come here for joy, I was forced to flee the country. I do not migrate because of euros, the high living standards, or for my children’s future. I could raise them very good in Turkey as well. Now my motivation in learning German and integration is to make the silenced people voices be heard. I wish I can speak German I can write a song in German language that would tell about the victimhood happened in Turkey. I am 37 years old and I am going to guitar

courses. At this age why would I learn guitar. My motivation is only to bring awareness and help those who are in Turkey. We have songs of 70s and 80s and when we listen them we understand these periods. We should have songs telling these days. I think the music will be my dialogue with people here. The only reason of my motivation is to tell and tell to the world about victims in Turkey. I want to become their [victims] channel (Respondent # 5, Germany).

As we can see from this quotation, the motivation of political refugees for the political transnational participation might be their willingness to bring awareness of what has been happening in Turkey. This is at certain degree of what Michaelsen (2018, p. 248) calls for diaspora activists who engage as “intermediaries” thus “channeling information” and bring the issue at the global scale. Some respondents from the US also conveyed that this was part of their motivation. As the quotation below shows, for the informant below it should not be only a global awareness but also “external pressure”, which is also in line with Michaelsen’s study (2018, pp. 249)¹⁶.

Does not matter to what extent today we speak about the dictatorship, at the end of day, Turkey— is a country that at many levels have to move together with other states. At that point there is a need to bring awareness globally and with this power of public opinion these human rights violations have to be stopped by the pressure or regulations from the countries. The global power, which will apply sanctions on Turkey as the regulation mechanism. For instance, there are the European Human Rights Agreement or United Nation that bring up the norms, which the countries have to follow. These all can be mechanisms to diminish the violations or in long-term wipe all off them. Therefore, it has to be out duty to bring this issue at the global stage (Respondent # 1, US).

From this quotation it can be also argued that political refugees’ motivations might not only range from awareness to regulations but also show their knowledge of different mechanisms such as international human rights agreements that would function to stop or decrease the authoritarian practices of Turkish state toward its citizens at home and abroad.

¹⁶ Michaelsen (2018) found in his study that diaspora activists mobilized to create an external pressure which they hoped would stop the authoritarian practices of the sending states.

5.3. Transnational Network Between Social Movement Organizations

Migrant networks or refugee networks are social networks through which the various flows go back and forth thus creating the transnational space (Faist, 2000). The social movement organizations that are located at different places can cooperate with each other thus bringing local to the global space (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2001). They are cooperating with similar social movement organizations or global institutions, leading to networked advocacy by which the local “claims” can be shifted into “global framing” (Tarrow, 2005, p. 30). The networked social movements are ideally engaged in networked transnational practices by the “new non-national” transnational space, which is -cyberspace (Adamson, 2016; Castells, 2015). My respondents described how their transnational network with other similar social movement organizations have cooperated in information flows or joint campaigns, for instance, an exhibition about the human rights violation done in Belgium was replicated in Sweden. A respondent from Norway also shared with their networked cooperation with other similar organizations,

As the team we have contacted with friends from Germany. We get information from them and we give the information we have. We follow all activities they have done, we also try to help them. So this makes idea exchanges. Sometimes we have organized something they have done. Sometimes they ask permission to materialize something we have succeeded. We have several networks with other organizations from other countries. Thus, we have the interaction with other our friends (Respondent #3, Norway).

This informant indicated that similar social movement organizations at different localities can cooperate for similar motivations and interests. Transnational bonds do not only link people in the sending and receiving countries. Respondents from Norway and the US told that social movement organizations cooperate and exchange ideas, creating the transnational network between organizations in various receiving countries. One refugee respondents from the US described how they collaborate with their partners from different countries,

We organize the common activities with partners, for example, one is the short film contest about the human rights violation in Turkey. We have partners from Germany, Australia, the South Africa, France, and Norway, these organizations have been established by political refugees from Turkey and they have organized through the consultative help of the local institutes and civil rights organizations. For example, one coordinated common event was on Human Rights Day when we here in front of United Nation and our partners in front of European Court of Human Rights in France, issuing a press statement in front of these

institutions. Thus, by collaborating with partners we make a global movement (Respondent # 3, US).

From a quotation of a member of Advocates of Silenced Turkey, we can understand how social movement organizations cooperate and organize common events. On Human Rights Day, they organized similar events at different localities, thus connecting local to transnational events. However, a different perspective was stated by a member of FromTurkey based in Norway who thought that common or networked activities are unnecessary, except the ideas flows that can be useful and seminal,

Every county should collaborate with local civil organizations. It is better to contact with Amnesty Norge than an civil organization in Germany. The similar social movement organizations can make networks for idea exchanges. Sometimes, I have contacted with different organizations in order to get some good ideas about succeeded events (Respondent #2, Norway).

Thus, there have been different responses to transnational networks between organizations. Some organizations cooperate with each others, some prefer to collaborate with local, there are also few respondents who believe that global platform will be ideal space and motivator for refugee activist. All respondents agreed that idea exchange is necessary transnational network, while common platforms and events have to be organized with local institutions.

5.4. Transnational Contacts Between Political Refugees and Victims in Turkey

The new technologies not only enable similar social movement organizations to construct networks but also connect those who migrated and those who remained in Turkey. The voice after exit is only option in digital interconnected world, those who could not exit can use their voices through internet connection with migrants or refugees who can easily get information directly from victims (Glasius, 2018). The migrants contact with victims and “debate inside their country of origin”, networking people at different locations and creating transnational space (Glasius, 2018, p. 194). All respondents argued that they contact with their friends or relatives who are under governmental purge. They have organized global cyberspace meetings through Zoom where refugees at different locations and victims in Turkey can come together, where victims have shared their experiences and challenges, and where they can transmit their voices. One of the respondents from Germany told,

I am very impressed when I contact with my friends who are still in Turkey. I can immediately bring my memories of those days of challenges. I contact with them to help them and to not forget. Some of my friends have psychological problems, therefore they need us. Several times I have arranged an appointments for psychology consultation online, thus helping my friends (Respondent #5, Germany).

Some of the active members of social movement organizations told that they have direct contact with victims in Turkey for preparation of case that could be posted on social media or in reports that would be shared with international human rights organizations.

The political transnational participation that is networked between organizations and between refugees and victims through the transnational cyberspace where voices can be exercised and motivations strengthened, thus contributing for “network of networks” (Levitt & Schiller, 2004). Based on the responses of the respondents, it has been revealed that Turkish refugees have engaged in networked transnational communication with those who remained for helping and assisting them, for data and materials about victimhood, and to keep the memory.

5.5. New Identity Construction, Belonging, and Memory Collection

The transnational identification of the different groups within a diaspora toward home might be nonlinear while the collective identity of a community might be culminated by strong ties with each other due to the common experiences and shared memory (Adamson, 2016; Østergaard-Nielsen, 2001). As an example, the Turkishness of the guest workers is completely different from Kurdish identity construction and new formation of new diaspora within diaspora can be referred to new refugee group, Gulen movement- as a new group within wider Turkish diaspora. The new identification by the political refugees has been defined as not “victim diaspora” but as “advocate diaspora”, not the one that merely tells the victimhood but the one that fights for justice at home. A respondent from Norway shared his understanding of new identity of Turkish refugees,

It is not that you want to burden someone with your problems, it is better when you through your education, capacities, and future perspectives on what you can contribute in Norway, can touch the mechanisms. When you organize the Turkish evenings with food and you speak to audience and tell your victimhood. People will cry but after one or two days they will forget,

and all you have told will be remained there. As one of the writer wrote, “You have to endure your pains courageously, you should not give them to others”. The effective mechanisms here are NGOs rather than state, so we actively have to cooperate with NGOs on what can be done to stop the human rights violation in Turkey (Respondent #4, Norway).

As we can see from this quotation, this informant told that new identity construction of the political refugees should not be the identity of the victim. He suggested that political refugees had to be active advocates who could touch the effective mechanisms such as non-governmental organizations to stop authoritarian practices in Turkey. The collective identity of any group is constituted around the shared memory that also has contributed to the formation of transnational space (Cheran, 2006; Orjuela, 2018). The stories of state purges, prosecutions, displacement are illustrated by the refugees in a way they connect to these traumatic events to broader “collective story...belonging and identification” (Cohen, 1996; Orjuela, 2018, p. 3). Respondents shared that their memory collection has been formed by the drawings, films and short videos, books with stories, songs, and theaters in which the violation of human rights are the theme and through which, as one of the respondent from Norway told, “memory that we should not forget” (Respondent #5, Norway). The memory is not only something the respondents connect to their experiences of past but also the transnational memory, which is based on the transnational political activities and which brings awareness at the global scale. A respondent from the US described how transnational participation of refugees would create a memory as the fact of history,

All we have done so far, every activity will be a part of memory that will include other small activities. All these activities are collected in one place and one day someone will tell you “yes, I have heard about this or I am aware of these human right violations in Turkey”. All these responses will come out of the collected memory of what have been done so far (Respondent #1, US).

The groups of diaspora are “multifaceted, fluid, and exhibit multiple belongings and multiple homes” therefore members of diaspora have different level of belongings to home country and due to fluidity of their identities at different times and places their belongings might change (Baser & Swain, 2008; Cheran, 2006, p. 4). Mavroudi (2018, p. 12) argues that strong belonging to home country does not mean that these members of diaspora would mobilize automatically, as it has been assumed. Thus, there are many factors that are drivers of the

mobilization and only strong belonging is not sufficient. The Turkish refugees who are residing in different countries have responded very differently to question of belonging to the country of origin. Some of them told that their level of belonging to Turkey has been diminished while others have been increased belonging, the only belonging they have is to the county and the nation but not to the government. Some of the respondents told that their belonging and identity have been shifted from nationalist to global. A respondent from Norway illustrated this as,

Before I had identified myself as the nationalist. When I was young I was a member of nationalist movements. Nevertheless, now I define myself as the human of the world. What I had seen as sacrificed are not any more, it was something we made a meaning of. If before I categorized myself and others according to ethnicity or ideological stance then now I see myself as merely a person. We have a German neighbor who is 86 years old and he has to sit at home because of Covid19 but he is active in helping refugees. I feel myself belong to these people, just people without any categorizations (Respondent #1, Norway).

From this quotation, we can see how attitudes and belonging of the respondent shifted from nationalistic to global because state purge might change perception about home state and symbolic meanings of national belongings. Consequently, based on the responses it might be argued that Turkish refugees identities, belongings, and memories have been changed or shifted beyond the Turkishness. The mobilization and transnational participation of refugees have been determined not only by their motivations but also their identities, “experiences, norms and values” (Orjuela, 2018, p. 5).

There are also other, individual reasons that affected the level of transnational political activity of Turkish refugees in my study. Lacroix and Fiddian-Qasmiyeh (2013) mention a need to focus on individual level of members of diaspora rather than have the research on community level because as one of the respondent told that “there are as many reasons for mobilization as the number of members in diaspora” (Respondent #1, US). The various factors affecting the political transnational participation of members of diaspora might be their capacity and desire to engage in anti-regime activities (Al-Ali et al., 2001). Capacity constitutes security, income, freedom of expression, network with NGOs and CSOs, and organizational expertise, while desire is mainly motivations of the activists (Van Hear & Cohen, 2016). My respondents mentioned several of these reasons, amongst others adaptation and integration that take time, traumas and fatigue, extra-territorial oppression of the Turkish state and economic reasons that

have impact on their level of political transnational activeness. Mavroudi (2018, p. 3) in her research also finds out that political refugees with traumas have feelings of “diaspora fatigue” because of which they tend to not participate or involve in political transnational activities. Moreover, the legal status of the refugees might cause the decline in their transnational participations due to their new duties and obligations such as learning language or searching for job (Brees, 2010).

5.6. Summary

In this chapter, I identified the major transnational political actors of social movement organizations affiliated to Gulen movement. Furthermore, I explored similarities and differences in the activities and motivations of various organizations and members. It is maintained that the refugees who have experienced high level of victimhood in Turkey are more likely to be active in political transnational advocacies while at the same time if they have deep traumas they might also be unwilling to engage. The strong belonging might affect the level of participation while at the same time it might be not a guarantee that strong belonging would cause participation. For instance, the spokesperson of the Advocates of Silenced Turkey shared that her belonging to Turkey has been diminished but her level of participation is high. The level of activeness in political transnational participation of the social movement organizations established by the Turkish refugees I discussed in this chapter is summarized in this table.

	Level of Activism	Level of Risk Activism	Motivations	Transnational networks
AST	high	high	create global external pressure	global partners
FT	medium	high	create awareness	local partners
DNF	medium	low	create awareness	similar NGOs
IfF	low	low	create awareness	similar NGOs

Table 1: Characteristics of social movement organizations

In this chapter I asserted that political transnational participation is multi-sited, multi-leveled and multi-faceted process that includes various factors, creating the transnational space in which not only networks of people but also organizations and networks of information are driving forces. Based on analyses of the responses and web sites of the social movement organizations, it can be argued that some of the social movement organizations have participated at high-level advocacy due to their networking and lobbying on a global scale and due to their organizational network and capacity that connect volunteers at different regions, others can be categorized into middle-level advocacy due to their transnational activeness at national level, and finally the lack of the definite social movement organization established by the refugees and mobilizations merely on occasions cause the low-level of advocacy.

CHAPTER SIX

POLITICAL TRANSNATIONALISM AND THE CONTEXT OF RECEPTION IN THE HOST COUNTRIES

In this chapter I explore refugees' perceptions of the host countries policies. In first part, I analyze their perceptions of protection policies of host countries. Thereafter, I scrutinize their views of countries' integration and resettlement policies, and their relation to Turkish regime. In third part, I explore how host countries' political opportunity structures and constraints affect the level of political transnationalism of Turkish refugees.

6.1. Refugees' Perception of Host Countries

The flexibilities and level of political transnational participation of the Gulen movement members are based on the residing countries regime type and the international relation of these countries with Turkey (Öztürk & Taş, 2020). The public diplomacy and foreign soft power of the Turkish state have impacts on many regions, except the countries of Global North (Ozturk, 2020; Öztürk & Taş, 2020). The countries of the Western countries get clear on their disallowance of the Turkish state political campaigns in their countries, illustrating their discomfort of Turkish intensive diaspora management policies and public diplomacy. The president of Turkey, Tayyip Erdogan responded to this, calling these countries "Nazis [who will] pay for this", thus deteriorating relation with these countries (Koinova & Tsourapas, 2018, p. 312). The clear stance of the Global North countries towards the domestic-foreign unlawful practices and politization of diaspora policies of the Turkish state, has formed the perception of safety in the minds of the political refugees of Gulen movement who mentioned in their interviews their trust to these countries. A refugee from Germany told,

The human rights in Germany is one of the top protected, for instance the Balkan countries do not have the same protection of huma rights. Refugees who are residing there are not safe and they do not have possibilities to be active in the activities which will bring awareness of unlawful practices in Turkey. On the other hand, Germany is safe country, in which we can easily organize different activities (Respondent #1, Germany).

Another Turkish refugee from Norway described his perception about different countries, which she described as unsafe to reside,

In Makedonia, Bosnia, and Albania, the word democracy exists as the word. Perhaps they do have it better than Turkey in terms of democracy understanding, nevertheless, it is unsafe for our friends (the Gulen movement members) to live there. If Turkish state would give money to these countries they [members of Gulen movement] would be extradited back to Turkey. People in these countries have been abducted, there is no possible ways to mobilize in these countries at all (Respondent #3, Norway).

The respondents shared their high level of trust to the countries where they are residing, mentioning their decision-making of destination where they would be totally safe from the direct extra-territorial authoritarian practices by the Turkish state. Even though the countries of the Global North have been regarded as safe, these countries have been faced “by demands” coming from refugees on behalf of their interests toward their home states, whereas home states might also demand the host states to ban mobilization of the dissidents of the sending states (Ostergaard-Nielsen, 2003, p. 2). The political refugees might demand states’ support in their advocacies and activist participation toward the injustices happening in their home countries. One of the refugees from Germany argued in his interview about his demand from the Western countries, he stated.

The Third World countries have enough problems, but the developed countries such as, Europe, Scandinavian countries, and the United States, which have substructures and possibilities, these countries could deal with the world problems. I think there is hypocrisy in terms of politics of these countries’ governments not as the states. I do not believe in sincerity of these countries. They would say about human rights, animal rights, the global warming, democracy and modernity, but most of the parts of the world are under the oppression and they [the Western countries] are just watching these. The world is aware of this. I want these countries to be aware of what are happening in Turkey. They cannot say that it is not their business, because what had been ignored yesterday, Erdogan has made big impacts on Europe today [the refugee issue]. Today world has become a global village, that is why no one can say it does not bother me. The trash of your neighbor makes the smell in front of your door today. When you say states, it does not mean just governments but media outlets and ruling elites, who are ruling the country. The German people could know what is happening abroad if the media would provide with the information. What has happened in Turkey has to be told by the media but it has not, because on the political level the countries have their political interests and gains. Today, a lot of people

unlawfully have imprisoned in Turkey and because of the Syrian refugee deal with Erdogan, the states prefer not to talk (Respondent #2, Germany).

Consequently, these demands can be directed by the refugees to the host countries while the host countries might also be pressured by the sending states as well. For instance, the Berlin's refusal of extradition of Turkish political refugees has deteriorated the Turkish-German relations (Paul & Schmidt, 2017). Thus, the host states might be less open to the transnational mobilization of the political refugees. Nevertheless, none of the respondents have told about any constraints have made by these countries because of interstate relationship between the countries.

6.1. The Models of Integration Process in Respective Countries

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) defines integration as a multi-dimensional and two-way process in which all actors involved (UNHCR, 2005). It can be argued that Norway is a favorite destination for migrants and refugees due to its “egalitarian income structure”, “social insurance system” and “generous refugee integration policies” (Brochmann, 2008, p. 529; Valenta & Bunar, 2010, p. 464). The refugees are secured by controlled resettlement and integration through language courses and “employment assistance” (Valenta & Bunar, 2010, p. 464). In 1990s, Norway had applied for progressive immigration policies focusing on “economic integration and anti-discrimination” in the way to multicultural Norway (Valenta & Bunar, 2010, p. 469).

For better integration, refugees are supposed to have access to language and integration courses (Engler, 2016). Thus, Germany as a receiver country of refugees has full package of integration policies which includes integration courses for learning of official language, access to education, employment and healthcare (Gurer, 2019, p. 53). On the other hand, unsimilar from Scandinavian and European integration process models, the United States has a resettlement program with limited financial assistance for several month, during which refugees are expected to be integrated into labor market (Capps et al., 2015, p. 346).

What makes the United States' integration program different from Germany and Norway is that United States prioritizes “work first”, while Germany and Norway have “train first” rather than “work first” approach (Capps et al., 2015, p. 346). The introduction program or integration courses in both Norway and Germany lasts in two or three years. During these intensive

language learning program refugees are unemployed but financially assisted for their participation in the introduction program (Capps et al., 2015, p. 347). Dissimilarly, the United States' Reception and Placement Program provides refugees with reception and accommodation just for the first 30 days after arrival, afterwards they are expected to either apply for "mainstream social benefit system" or find a job (2015, p. 348).

There are factors, formed by the distinctiveness of the respective countries system models, that distinguish the transnational participation of the Turkish refugees in Germany, Norway, and the United States. English is a universal language thus, migrants and refugees have been exposed before, whereas Norwegian or German languages are more difficult to learn (2015, p. 342). The Turkish respondents of both Germany and Norway told that language is the most prominent obstacle in the transnational political participation. When they contact with the local NGOs or political representatives, they do not have common language to communicate, thus they stand back from anti-regime advocacy. A respondent from Germany explained his level participation in transnational participation,

My priority is to integrate into this society. I do not have that position to change something in Turkey. I want to develop myself and I do not want to be a burden for the state. If I will integrate, I can help people in Turkey. Our integration will change the perception of German people as well. If we could learn language very fast, we can tell people what has been happened in Turkey (Respondent #1, Germany).

The Turkish refugees from Germany shared their concerns related to the perception of the German citizens about the Turkish citizen who came in 1960s and have not integrated since then into the German society. They have a feeling of double burden as they have duties to integrate and change the bad image of Turks in Germany. Another Turkish refugee from Germany told the reason he could not participate in different activities organized by the Turkish refugees,

We have to learn German. We have to find a job. I do not feel myself comfortable. In order to participate, in the programs where we can tell people about the violation of human rights, we need time, which I do not have because first of all I need to learn language and be independent from any financial supports (Respondent #4, Germany).

The Turkish political refugees, who are mainly have high educational level and who had good labor positions in Turkey, prioritize the integration process because they want to be independent financially and because they believe they can help people in Turkey who are under the governmental purge after their integration. Many of the respondents mention that integration and political transnational participation are not clashing practices, contrary integration and transnational participation can flourish each other. Even though they do not think that two practices are challenging each other, they argued that integration is a key for transnational participation because without language it is impossible to have communication with local people. A Turkish refugee from Norway shared her experience,

From my own experience I can tell that if we want to bring awareness about the victims in Turkey we need to speak the language, which will connect us with people. Without language we cannot explain, without good knowledge of language it will be insufficient. What we could tell with insufficient language will be half-told story that will look like a fairy tale (Respondent #3, Norway).

The lack of language skill is an obstacle to the political transnational participation in German and Norway cases. The refugees from these countries do not have financial concerns at least the first two or three years. Unlikely, the Turkish refugees in the United States who do not have language skill problems. All of the respondents are fluent in English language, nevertheless, they are obliged to find a job as soon as possible. The respondents from America told that they might be less active in the political transnational practices due to their being overloaded with job duties, thus having problem with time. One of the respondents from the United States told,

If I will not work one month this financial gap will grow each day and everything will be halted. Thanks to state that gives you permission to work. When a person the whole day tries to sell books online and searching for another job at the same time, that person would never have time to different activities. That means that person will be less active. Nevertheless, there are those Turkish people who came earlier who are integrated and have good job, they can be easily active in these activities (Respondent #2, US).

Some scholars of transnational studies find out that integrated migrants and refugees are those who less participated in the transnational mobilization for a country of origin and more engaged in the political participation of a country of settlement (Miller, 1981). On the contrary, there

are other US-based studies done in transnational political participations of migrants and refugees and which demonstrate that more integrated migrants and refugees tend to participate actively in home country related transnational mobilization (Shain, 1999; Sheffer, 1986). The integrated communities are not only those who have language skills and who are integrated into labor market, both are not sufficient. Some of the respondents mention that they have problems of understanding the cultural codes. They believe that if they would know the cultural codes they might be more effective in transnational political participation activities. For instance one respondent from Germany told,

It is crucial to understand the cultural reflexes of the country of settlement. Once I told one woman how my friend gave a birth at home because she could not go to hospital and if she would go to hospital she would be detained. Another time when we met, she started to range the advantages of giving birth at home. If I would know that she would understand this in this way I would tell another case of human right violation in Turkey. Since she did not perceive this as the violation but connected this to something different. This example of mine did not create any effect. I do not know the cultural reflexes of the country. I wish I told how my children could not go to school because we were hiding from the prosecution and how their rights to go to school were taken from them. If I would tell this she would better understand what has happened in Turkey. I have learnt the cultural codes by experiencing them. For example, in Germany during the Covid19, the right of education has not taken from children. The schools in Germany were open even in very critical periods (Respondent #5, Germany).

As we can see in this quotation, this political refugee faced some cultural obstacles while giving examples of human rights violations in Turkey. She realized that knowing cultural codes might be crucial in political transnational advocacy because most of what have been done as the political transnational participation has been through narration. Also other political refugee perceived the lack of knowledge about cultural reflexes and codes as one of the obstacles to their political activities.

6.2. Political Transnationalism and the Settlement Programs in the Host Countries

The Turkish diaspora is composed of different ethnic, religious and ideological groups within the Turkish diaspora makes it complicated. Different groups have been mobilized for different political interests and means. The conflicts between these groups in Turkey have been exported into the host countries. The “different dynamics of transnational political mobilization” within

the Turkish diaspora creates the insecurities not only for diaspora groups but it also might be perceived as national security concern for the host countries (Ostergaard-Nielsen, 2003, p. 4).

The Turkish political refugees in Germany and Norway have been settled under the settlement programs. Those who are settled in the neighborhood of the wider Turkish diaspora might feel uncomfortable and unsafe living in that neighborhood and be active in transnational political activities due to the oppositional ideological stances (Wahlbeck, 2002). However, Turkish dissidents in Western European countries may experience the threat, especially those living in the Turkish neighborhood. In Germany, such threat may come from the gang, the Osmanian Germania, which is instrumentalized by the Turkish state (Öztürk & Taş, 2020, p. 63). On the other hand, those refugees who are settled far from the Turkish diaspora neighborhoods are living in remote areas and they mentioned that being in remote areas also causes obstacles to their transnational activities. One of the Turkish refugee from Germany told,

I have participated in at least six or seven activities in Hamburg and would like to participate more. Nevertheless, we live far from Hamburg and it takes time and money to commute between the places (Respondent #2, Germany).

The refugees who have been similarly settled by the settlement program in Norway have been scattered in different parts of Norway. The refugees in Norway also shared another factor that affects their level of activeness in transnational mobilization. One of them told,

Germany and Amerika seem to be very active and I guess it is because there are some members of Gulen movement who migrated there before us. We are few in Norway, thus the number of activities is also less when I compare with these countries (Respondent #5, Norway).

The participants from the United States have not mentioned anything about relation between their level of activeness with their settlement or the number of refugees there. The resettlement program in the United States is different from Germany and Norway. The Turkish refugees are more flexible regarding where they will be settled in the United States compared to two other respective countries.

6.3. Political Opportunity Structure and Social Context of the Receiving Countries for Transnational Political Activities

The Turkish refugee respondents have mentioned social context and political opportunity structures of the respective states that have shaped their political transnational participation. The host countries might be inclusive or exclusive in providing migrants and refugees with resources and access to the institutions that either support or constrain the political mobilizations of the migrants and refugees in their home-oriented transnational practices. The social and political structures of these respective countries are explained in details below.

6.3.1. Exclusionary Social Structures and the Political Transnationalism

The grass-root transnationalism that takes place in a new environment of a receiving country might be facilitated or constrained by the social structure that might take different forms such as discrimination, racism and exclusion (Wahlbeck, 2002). Østergaard-Nielsen (2001) argues that studies in Western Europe come up with the conclusions that social exclusion and less receptive approach of the receiving countries cause the stronger identification of the refugees or migrants with their home countries, on the other hand she finds out some studies done in multicultural political structures the same tendency of active transnational practices of migrants and refugees who have been provided with the tools for better mobilization. The unwillingness of the receiving countries to give a larger space for transnational mobilization of refugees and migrants might be due to the perception of possible threat that might come because of transnational activities of refugees and migrants (Koser, 2007). Moreover, the “key assumption” of the receiving states is that transnational activities of refugees and migrants will make the ties between migrants and their home countries stronger, thus affecting their integration in the country of settlement in a negative way (Cheran, 2006, p. 4). The importation of the domestic issues to the receiving countries might be considered unappropriated. Thus, the receiving countries immigration policies and the social exclusionary structures tend to be determinants of the political transnational activeness of the migrants and refugees (Cheran, 2006).

None of the respondents who reside in Germany, Norway, and the United States did not tell anything about unwillingness or constrained systems of the receiving countries. The respondents have feeling of being welcomed in the receiving countries. One of the respondents

from Norway told that his decision-making of migration country was done according to the receptive policies and indiscriminatory social structure of the receiving country.

When we fled Turkey and were in Greece, we were making our research on which country to migrate. We were thinking about our children future, so it had to be a country where they would not be discriminated because of their identities. We found out that some countries are very discriminatory because of the religious and ethnical background of the migrants. Norway is a country with less discriminatory practices (Respondent #1, Norway).

The Turkish refugees who have been residing in Germany shared their experiences of being initially prejudiced by the German society that does not have good impressions about Turks in Germany. Therefore, they felt having a double burden in Germany because of negative image the previous Turks have created due to their segregation and unwillingness to integrate. The first duty they feel they are obliged to do is to integrate into society and only then they can be active in political transnational activities. One of the respondent told,

The last year [2019] we had demonstration in Stuttgart for the release of the journalist who have been detained in prisons in Turkey. There was an area that was prohibited to stay. The policemen and officials opened that area for us and allowed us to demonstrate there. We were reading statement and were provided with all opportunities there. In Turkey when you are against Erdogan you will be marginalized from society because of your criticism, here in Germany it is opposite. First impression of German people when they have seen us they thought that we were the AKP supporters because of our headscarves but afterwards when we have told them that we fled Turkey because of the regime, their [German people] manner toward us immediately changed. They have become more supportive (Respondent #5, Germany).

The respondent from the United States compared his residing country with the Western European countries and told that United States is ‘multicultural’ while Western countries are ‘homogenic’ countries (Respondent #1, US). Thus, arguing that the Turkish refugees transnational participation is ‘usual’ activity that can be observed among different diaspora groups in the United States. Although, Germany and Norway might be categorized as “exclusionary” in terms of political and societal structures compared to the United States, all respondents defined the systems of the respective countries as ‘inclusive’ and ‘supportive’.

6.3.2. Political Opportunity Structures

The political systems and the level of development both of the sending and receiving states are determinants of the level of refugee transnational participation (Brees, 2010). The refugees in the liberal democratic countries confront “fewer restrictions on their political” and transnational activities than refugees who might lack the right and access to civil society organizations that might be prohibited in the authoritative host countries (Adamson, 2020, p. 153; Shain & Barth, 2003). Thus, the political opportunity structure (POS) of the host countries which are mainly the liberal democracies provide the migrants and refugees with certain “resources for and models of” transnational organization (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2001, p. 264). Opposite, the lack of political opportunity structures of the host countries might constrain the transnational political activities of the migrants and refugees (Chaudhary & Moss, 2019).

The political opportunities in the United States are given to the different minority groups and their rights for mobilization are protected and welcomed. One of the respondent from the United States described the American system by saying,

America has a system that embedded channels of freedom of expression and opportunities. You can witness dozens of mobilizations for instance in New York where different minority groups have their demonstrations, holding different placards. This, you might not see in different corners of the world, only in the countries where democracy becomes the social culture of society. Therefore, the county system and its possibilities are very important for refugees’ activities. In the countries that lack these opportunities refugees might be less motivated (Respondent #1, US).

From this quotation, we can understand that political opportunity structures of host states are motivators and providers of means and opportunities for political transnational participation of refugees toward their home countries. However, a respondent from Norway mentioned that level of transnational participation is based much more on agency of refugees rather than a country system,

This country [Norway] is open for these kinds of activities. Even in our small village there are few nongovernmental organizations for women. There are a lot of opportunities and possibilities in Norway. For instance, I could have my own exhibition of my drawings about the violation of human rights in Turkey. It is something actually they want you to do. The society in Norway is little bit closed that is why the government supports different activities.

All these you can organize through the contacts you have made with locals. I am very upset to see how the Turkish refugees are passive, everyone deals with own problems (Respondent #4, Norway).

Another respondent from Norway mentioned one possible reason Turkish refugees might be passive in transnational activities, despite the fact Norway is full of opportunities and possibilities,

When you establish a civil society organization in Norway you do not have possibilities to be an anonymous member of CSO. Norway is a transparent country and wants all NGOs and CSOs be transparent. Until today, I have tried to participate in transnational advocacies anonymously because I have concerns about my family in Turkey. Nevertheless, today we have established an official CSO with all members names revealed. On the one hand I have concerns because of this but on the other hand I just understand that I need to do something for people in Turkey (Respondent #2, Norway).

The Turkish political refugees tend to avoid from official membership in grass-root organizations because these organizations are required by liberal democratic states to be transparent. The official membership in these organizations might cause danger to their families back to home.

The respondents from Germany similarly to Norwegians assume that agency of refugees is determinant of transnational advocacy rather than political opportunity structures of countries since mainly political refugees are residing in liberal democratic countries where they have access to local and international nongovernmental and civil society organizations. In the Germany case, it can be also argued that previously established nongovernmental organization, which affiliated with Gulen movement, has different motivations such as to integrate newly migrated Turkish refugees into society. Germany is the most favorite destination of the Turkish refugees, thus there are many refugees who need assistance and support from these organizations. One of the respondents argued,

I am active in activities that have been organized by the NGO that was established earlier. I have organized different activities for refugee children who were traumatized and I help them to adopt new life. The NGO engages in different activities that have a focus to help the newly came with integration (Respondent #4, Germany).

Consequently, it can be concluded that all respondents agree that the respective countries provide with opportunities and access to local and international civil society organizations. Some of them even mentioned that the receiving countries demand the activeness in their transnational advocacy participation. The obstacles might be transparency that might constrained refugees from mobilization and overloaded number of refugees and their priorities in example with Germany. Additionally, Brees (2010) and Chaudhary and Moss (2019) address a possible reason that might constrain the transnational political action of the members of a diaspora – that is – interstate relations between home and host countries. The countries that have geopolitical relations might be unlikely to provide refugees with political opportunity resources, which might affect the bilateral relations of the states. Nevertheless, the respondents mention nothing related constraints that might be caused due to the geopolitical and interstate relations between Turkey and these respective countries.

6.4. Summary

In this chapter, I explored how the Turkish refugees who migrated from the authoritarian state to the liberal democratic countries might find political opportunities for advocacy and fight against the violations of human rights in Turkey (Moss, 2016). The refugees might find the new environment as a “space of freedom” where they can establish the grass-root organizations that have to be responding to the “particular institutional environment” of the host countries (Adamson, 2020, p. 151; Østergaard-Nielsen, 2001, p. 264). The political opportunity structure of the respective countries might be available for refugees and migrants, nevertheless, mainly political institutions “constrain rather than facilitate” transnational practices because the receiving countries’ focus is more on integration of the migrants and refugees rather than their political transnational advocacy (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003; Østergaard-Nielsen, 2001, p. 274). For instance, the confrontational mobilization of the Kurdish refugees who migrated in 1980s have been defined by the respective states as security concerns that have to be stopped and several demonstrations by the Kurdish groups have been banned in Germany (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003).

Based on the responses of the respondents, it has been revealed that social context and political opportunity structures are inclusive in the three countries and that host country authorities did not curtail their political transnationalism. The respective countries might be inclusive of the diaspora groups I explored because their political transnational engagements have so far been

peaceful. Since they are engaging in institutional transnational political mobilizations through the peaceful and legal means and they are not seen as security concern by the local authorities of the host states.

CHAPTER SEVEN

THE TOOLS OF TURKISH STATE'S EXTRA-TERRITORIAL DETERRENCE

In this chapter, I outline how Turkish state has instrumentalized different tools and methods to control the transnational political participation of Turkish refugees. Furthermore, I explore various extra-territorial authoritarian practices of Turkish state, affecting the level of participation of Turkish refugees in anti-regime advocacy. So, this chapter indicates how Turkish state diaspora dissident policies influence the transnational political participation of the political refugees.

7.1. Abduction and Extradition as Deterrence Mechanism

The roll-back from democratic stance of the Turkish state to a “new-authoritarianism”, especially after the failed coup attempt in 2016, illustrates a regime shift and an instrumentalization of new modes of extra-territorial governance of transnational space control by “legitimation, co-option and repression” of the citizens abroad for the sake of the regime stabilization (Gerschewski, 2013; Glasius, 2018, p. 186; Ozturk, 2020, p. 6). The political transnational participation of the “anti-regime advocates”, who are perceived as the key actors in challenging the stabilization of regime and potential threat for the authoritarian state, have been purged and repressed by the authoritarian practices of the country of origin (Adamson, 2020; Dalmasso et al., 2017; Moss, 2016, p. 481).

The Turkish state's extra-territorial and transnational repression of the Kurds, liberals, Alevi diaspora groups have been for a long time in the Turkish history, while new target of the authoritarian Turkish state has become a Gulen Movement, which is defined as the most repressed group among the others domestically and internationally (Öztürk & Taş, 2020, p. 60). The global purge by the Turkish state against the Gulen movement has been materialized through direct and indirect authoritarian practices and transnational repressions, using different methods and tools with only aim to prevent dissidents from mobilization. The transnational space is “re-territorialized” by the Turkish state to control those who reside outside of the border of the Turkish state and Weber's definition of coercive force exercising by the state is extended transnationally through “networked infrastructures” (Collyer & King, 2015; Moss,

2016, p. 482). Thus, those who could exit from the territories of the Turkish state and migrate to Global North have faced the extraterritorial repression that becomes a deterrence mechanism of the Turkish state to keep oppositional rivals incapable of mobilization. Therefore, it is “only minority engaged” in anti-regime advocacy and transnational mobilization for the hope of the change and development (Moss, 2016, p. 493).

Several studies identified that the global purge of the Gulen movement by the Turkish state consists of abduction and extradition, targeting them internationally, confiscating institutions abroad, controlling exit, instrumentalizing state-initiated institutions, co-option of diaspora and negative branding, threatening families at home, threatening publicly and surveillance of activists (Adamson, 2020; Öztürk & Sözeri, 2018; Öztürk & Taş, 2020; Tsourapas, 2018).

The Turkish state expands rights and budgets of the National Intelligence Organization (MIT) for operations abroad such as abduction and extradition of the members of Gulen Movement (Öztürk & Taş, 2020). The direct transnational repression by the Turkish state has been mainly operated in the third world and the Eastern European countries, moreover the operations have been targeted “a tiny number of dissidents” to spread the fear among the Gulen movement and demonstrate the possible threat for those who mobilize and advocate against the regime (Moss, 2016, p. 482). One of the respondents explained the reasons of their decision to continue their journey of migration from Greece to Germany,

When we fled Turkey and came to Greece through illegal ways, we found out that we could not live here as well, even though we liked the country. Nevertheless, it was hard to concentrate for learning a language or for integration because whenever my husband came late from language courses I was nervous and had a lot of concerns such as safety. Every day we had heard that agents of the Turkish intelligence were gathering the square and making their surveillance of Gulen movement members. So, even Greece became a prison for us, a place with no safety and we realized that we needed a place where we would feel ourselves safe. Therefore, from Greece we moved to Germany, a country which explicitly shows their views and criticism on human rights violations in Turkey and a country of liberal democracies where humans rights are protected (Respondent #5, Germany).

As we can see from this account, the motivation for secondary movement of this informant were, among other factors, her safety. She told that the reason for her decision to move to Germany from Greece were security problems she faced in Greece.

Thus, the migration of the members of Gulen movement has been directed to the Global North where they feel themselves safer than in other countries where they could be attacked directly by the Turkish state. One of the example of Turkish state illegal interference and abduction of six Turkish citizens in Kosovo and bringing them by the private plane to Turkey, illustrated the “breach of the national laws and procedures” of the country, after which the security chief and interior minister of Kosovo were suspended from their duties (Öztürk & Taş, 2020). The direct targeting of Gulen movement members has caused low participation in transnational mobilization and anti-regime movement participation due to high risks of possible abductions and extraditions. MIT has employed “800 operatives and 6000 informants in Western Europe alone” thus remaining no safe place for those who fled the governmental purge at home (Öztürk & Taş, 2020, p. 62). A respondent from Norway told the reason why the Turkish refugees unwilling to speak out,

The abduction of Gulen movement members have been done mainly in third world countries. Nevertheless, it was revealed that there has been two cases of abduction attempts in Denmark and Switzerland. Both of them were failed. The MIT agents attempted to abduct, Hasan Cucuk, who was a journalist in Turkey and who is residing right now in Denmark (Respondent #2, Norway).

Thus, attempts or direct abductions by the Turkish state have caused the fear of insecurity in the residing states, even in democratically highly protected states and these abductions have worked as the mechanism of deterrence.

Moreover, the international purge of Gulen movement by the Turkish state has been in many ways, for instance by confiscating schools and institutions and giving them to Maarif Foundations that was established by the Turkish state in 2016 (Ozturk, 2020; Öztürk & Taş, 2020). Moreover, some of the respondents told that due to the diplomatic pressures done by the Turkish state to the countries where they resided to ban organizations and extradite the members of the Gulen movement, who mainly were teachers in the residing countries, they have been faced not only purge of the Turkish state but also the states of the residence

(Adamson, 2020). Turkey abused “Interpol’s red notice system” by giving 60 000 names and trying to block the movement of those who were in the system (Öztürk & Taş, 2020; Tsourapas, 2018). Being purged by home country and country of residence, having risks of being in the Interpol system, have made Gulen movement members vulnerable at different levels.

7.2. Instrumentalization of Turkish State-Initiated Institutions as the Tools of Repression

The nexus of institutions, such as the Turkish consulates and embassies, the Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities, and the Turkish-Islamic Union for Religious Affairs (DITIB) are the state apparatuses that have been used for extraterritorial repression of the Gulen movement members (Baser & Ozturk, 2020). The Turkish consulates and embassies, as the hand of the Turkish state, have intimidated and even attacked the dissidents (Tsourapas, 2020). Yavuz Koca, a teacher in Gulen-affiliated schools was beaten by the Turkish consulates in Germany in 2017 (Öztürk & Taş, 2020). One of the respondents from Norway shared the similar incident happened with him in the Turkish consulate building in Norway.

I came to the Turkish consulate for passport renewal and was attacked by the officials who tried to get my passport forcibly. The only thing I could do was to run out of the building and throw my passport to my wife who waited me outside. I screamed very loudly and asked for help. They could not do anything to me, thanks I could get out of the building (Respondent #4, Norway).

The most politicized institution after Turkish consulate is the Turkish-Islamic Union for Religious Affairs (DITIB), which became known by the news about espionage activities and discrimination of Gulen movement members who visited mosques. In Germany, DITIB was investigated and it was revealed that Turkish imams were “gathering intelligence and profiling their congregation” (Öztürk & Taş, 2020, p. 63). The same spying allegations have been revealed in Belgium, Netherlands, and other Western European and Scandinavian countries. One of the respondents from Germany told that members of the Gulen movement tried to visit all other mosques, except the Turkish mosques where some of them have been told to not come.

Once I went to the Turkish mosque for Friday prayer. You enter to the house of God and you are publicly threaten there by imam who speaks about politics. You have to listen all these. Then I have decided to not to go to the Turkish mosques (Respondent #1, Germany).

Thus, respondents told that they do not have any level of trust to the Turkish-state initiated institutions and that they have been marginalized and excluded from the institutions while they have been refused of any services by these institutions. For example, the majority of the refugees in the Western Europe came through illegal ways due to passport cancelation or being on the “blacklist” system that has prevented people from exit. Securitization of emigration by the controlling exit appears as one of the constraints the Turkish refugees have faced (Tsourapas, 2018). The issue with the Turkish passports has not been only due to their cancellation but also refusal of the Turkish embassies of the renewal passports and families with new born babies could not get passports for their children, thus letting dissidents be stuck and immobile in the countries where they have resided. The “passport harassment” has been one of the mechanism to crack down the movement, stopping them from migration to the Global North where they possibly could find the possibilities for mobilization (Adamson, 2020, p. 156).

7.3. Non-State Actors, Diaspora Management by the Turkish state

There are different ideological, ethnical, and religious lines within the wider Turkish diaspora, the domestic conflicts have been exported into the diaspora(Hirt & Saleh Mohammad, 2018). Turkey for a long time has been engaging in diaspora management in which the diaspora groups are selectively included into diaspora policies while those who are excluded have been defined by the state as the ‘traitors’ or ‘terrorists’ for negative branding and discretization in the eyes of the countries they are residing (Tziarras, 2019; Yanasmayan & Kaşlı, 2019). The Turkey’s Foreign Minister, Mevlut Cavusoglu, officially defined the Gulen movement as terror organization and announced the global purge against it (Öztürk & Taş, 2020).

Several previous studies indicate that the Turkish state has deployed non-state actors within of the Turkish diaspora, those loyalists of the Turkish government who through the patronage and clientelist relationship, acting on behalf on the Turkish state that represses dissidents within the diaspora by surveillance, harassment, and threatening (Adamson, 2020; Chaudhary & Moss, 2019, p. 11). Polarizing the whole diaspora into “patriots” and “traitors” of the state, those patriots of the state tends to instrumentalize the same authoritarian practices as the state thus leading to “weaponizing the diaspora” (Dalmasso et al., 2017; Glasius, 2018; Öztürk & Taş, 2020, p. 60). Researchers assert that transnational repression within diaspora is the one of the most effective tool in the hands of the Turkish government since diaspora is “outside” the

territorial boundaries of Turkey but “inside” of people, thus making it more easier for surveillance, monitoring, threatening, isolating dissidents from the rest of the diaspora (Koinova & Tsourapas, 2018, p. 314; Öztürk & Taş, 2020). The members of Gulen movement has been isolated from the wider Turkish diaspora either because the loyalist of the regime tend to support the regime’s views or fear that they will be similarly purged by the state in the case of their relationships with the movement (Öztürk & Taş, 2020, p. 66).

Findings from my study are in line with the above-mentioned research. Most of my respondents have faced different harassment, threatening, surveillance and discrimination by the loyalists of the Turkish state. An episode of an attack was shared by the respondent from Norway who told,

At the documentary premiere of *En Gave Fra Gud*, I was attacked by the group of Turkish people who are known as those who have close affiliations with the Turkish consulates. There was a security officials otherwise most probably it would be more complicated. While leaving they threatened me, saying “We are leaving now, but we will meet with you soon”. There are lots of Turks living in Europe and who cooperate with the Turkish agents and the Turkish consulate, thus they [non-state actors] harass, threaten, and even attack the members of Gulen movement (Respondent #1, Norway).

Another respondent from Germany told about his concerns of being captured by the fear of possible intimidation by either MIT agents or diaspora members,

When we had been settled, one day a policeman came to our home telling that MIT agents have had different operations in Germany. He asked to change our telephones, which we brought with us from Turkey. He asked us to be very careful and call to the number he gave to us in any suspicious case. This made us feel ourselves in safe, but sometimes it happens when you are outside and you buy doner, one from the Turkish diaspora starts to ask questions such as, “When you came here? Are you a member of FETO¹⁷?” It is even hard to answer because they can attack you anytime. There is very high psychological pressure (Respondent #3, Germany).

As we can see from this quotation, a respondent from Germany was warned by German authorities about possible threat might come from the Turkish state. This quotation indicates that more likely this kind of warning experiences from the host countries make an issue more

¹⁷ FETO: the Fetullah Terrorist Organization, the derogatory definition given to the Gulen movement by the Turkish state

serious and affect the transnational political participation of political refugees. Moreover, the Turkish refugees tend to conceal their identities from the wider Turkish diaspora, they do not attend Turkish mosques and prefer to be settled down in non-Turkish neighborhoods.

7.4. Proxy deterrence: Families Used as ‘Hostages’ of the Turkish State

The Turkish government has threatened the well-being of families of activists who remained in Turkey (Chaudhary & Moss, 2019; Dalmasso et al., 2017; Tsourapas, 2020). By threatening to harass, detain, and torture them, the families of Turkish activists become a “proxy punishment” by which the Turkish government aims to control and punish those who are engaging in the transnational political activities that might threaten the regime stability (Moss, 2016, p. 486). As an example with Enes Kanter, a NBA player’s family was raided, his father and dentist were detained as the “proxy punishment” or holding them as hostages due to unreachability of Kanter by the Turkish state (Öztürk & Taş, 2020, p. 65).

Turkish refugees have shared their concerns about their families and beloved ones back home. They told that their parents were raided by police and they were threatened. In that regard, one of the refugees in my study conveyed,

We do not participate in the activities if our photographs or identification information will be shared because we have concerns about our families who are still in Turkey” (Respondent 32, Germany).

Most of the Turkish activists or advocates, those who actively participate or even organize the activities, campaigns, demonstrations, conferences, seminars and exhibitions related to the violation of human rights in Turkey, they do it anonymously, without giving any identification information. Thus, for the protection of their families in Turkey they engage in “guarded advocacy” (Moss, 2016, p. 494). The analysis of the interviews has showed the four different categories of participations in the political transnational activities. Among the refugees in my study are mainly those who are engaged in guarded advocacy, some of them participate with their identifications revealed because their families back in Turkey are supporters of the government, and just few who are obliged to participate with identifications because of their being CEO of the organizations. For instance, the spokesperson of the Advocates of Silenced Turkey told,

Of course, my family in Turkey is under the risk. If they would come and not find us or if they would investigate our being active here in transnational activities, our families would be under the danger. The police raided the house of our parents, but thanks God they did not detain them. Every day, we wake up with the concerns about our families, when they call us we are restless of fear to hear something negative. Even though there are risks for our families, I do not stop my activities. Nevertheless, there are many of those who do not participate because of their family concerns (Respondent #3, US).

The fourth group has decided to participate with identities revealed because they believe that it is more doable and effective even though they have concerns about their families in Turkey. An activist from Norway describes other Turkish refugees concerns in activist participation,

I know some Turkish refugees who had been detained or tortured in prisons before they fled the country. I have invite them for interviews to bring awareness about what have happened in Turkey. Unfortunately, they have rejected to participate because they do not want to give their identity information. We have asked them permission to use their photographs at least but they do not want to because they are afraid. They might be in safe but their families in Turkey are under the danger. Therefore, they do not want to speak out about what they have experienced in prisons. I participate with my identity revealed because I do not want to live with fear anymore. It seems I have burnt all bridges. I have heard about some people have been abducted in the Eastern Europe or some of them are threatened, and I do understand their concerns but I think we should not live as if nothing has happened. If we will think that our safety right now is enough and just close our eyes for those who are still in prisons, these violation of human rights will never be ended. What we have been through in Turkey was because of our silence. Perhaps, there will be no big changes in Turkey because of our advocacy but bringing awareness here in Europe is important. I feel myself responsible for those who are still in prisons and danger in Turkey. At least it is our duty of loyalty to become a voice of those who are silenced in Turkey (Respondent 3, Norway).

Consequently, one of the reasons for unwillingness of Turkish refugees to participate in anti-regime advocacy is their concerns about their families who might be under the surveillance. They were also anxious that their families in Turkey would risk harassment, detainment and torture as the “proxy punishment” by the Turkish state. However, these concerns are opposed to eagerness to challenge the prosecution in the home country as the above-presented account

reveals. However, it seems that most of the activists balance these concerns by engaging in guarded advocacy.

7.5. Surveillance, Monitoring, Psychological Repression and Fear

The repertoire of repressive authoritarian practices of the Turkish government includes “extensive surveillance and informant networks” that cause a “disposition of silence” of Turkish political refugees who have fear even in the liberal democratic countries (Moss, 2016, p. 482; Öztürk & Taş, 2020). Moreover, the communication technologies enable authoritarian states to surveil and expand their threatening through social media (Dalmasso et al., 2017). It has been revealed that numerous Alevi, leftist and Kurdish activists have been arrested at Turkish airports when they travelled to Turkey due to their critical messages in social media (Baser & Ozturk, 2020, p. 12). The digital surveillance and monitoring and threatening in social media create the widespread fear and feeling of continuously being watched (Öztürk & Taş, 2020).

The Turkish political refugees have shared their experience of surveillance in the residing countries. One from Germany told that agents of the Turkish intelligence came to Germany and stayed in the refugee camps as the refugees while making their surveillance and leaking the names of those in the refugee camps. The similar case was told by a political refugee who is residing in the Unites States, he implied:

The Turkish government has sent families who have applied for the refugee seeking here. They are fake refugees because their only purpose is to collect data on those who are here. There was one refugee family who had stayed here for six months. It was later revealed that they gave the names of Turkish refugees and their families in Turkey were raided by police. It understood just after they immediately returned to Turkey (Respondent #4, US).

Öztürk and Taş (2020, p. 13) maintain that possibility of being under surveillance “creates the feeling of insecurity and mistrust despite the distance”. These feelings created the sense of insecurity among refugees in my study. One activist from Norway told that whenever he has seen the black transporters with black windows, he has been set aback because he associated it with abduction happened in Turkey. Respondents told that they believed that they were surveilled in different ways, such as by agents, diaspora supporters of the regime, in the Turkish mosques, being taken a picture, and being surveilled in digital space. One of the advocates told

how the motivation for speaking out was diminished because of the extra-territorial repressions and threatening of Gulen movement members,

The possible risk coming from the Turkish state decreases the motivation to speak out. Especially in Europe, but in America it is little bit better. The physical authoritarian practices by the Turkish agents or diaspora is almost impossible in America, nevertheless, the surveillance, stigmatization, threat to families in Turkey, or discrimination they might face have made them silenced. Ibrahim Kalin, the spokesperson of president Tayyip Erdogan, two years ago came to a meeting in the United Nation General Assembly where he publicly threatened us by saying, “Even if you came here, FETO members, we will track you”. They could not abduct or attack us here in America, but even these threats were enough to make members of the Gulen movement to disquiet. Therefore, the major parts of the Turkish political refugees are inactive and silenced (Respondent #3, US).

Some of my informants in Germany claimed that they already as the newcomers in Germany were tracked and asked questions by people connected to the Turkish state. According to the respondents from Germany, it is really very easy for the Turkish diaspora to figure out who is new. Therefore, some of them asked to be settled far from the wider diaspora and they concealed their identities. Indeed, their stories concurs with the findings from other studies which show that the Turkish state’s different surveillance techniques and different informant channels have led to the creation of the “internment of the psyche” and “relational disincentive to speak out” (Adamson, 2020; Baser & Ozturk, 2020; Chaudhary & Moss, 2019; Moss, 2016, pp. 482, 493).

7.6. Summary

In this chapter I studied the tools and methods of deterrence have been instrumentalized by the Turkish state toward their diaspora groups and how these mechanisms affect the political transnational practices of Turkish refugees. The anti-regime advocacy is important due to its potential for change or at least bringing awareness about the violation of human rights and abuses of victims (Moss, 2016). When it comes that political refugees engage in the political transnational activities for the political change, the authoritarian states have instrumentalized their diaspora management policies and expanded the budgets for intensive and widespread extra-territorial authoritarian repressive practices (Öztürk & Taş, 2020). Thus, “the state is not a unitary actor” because by recruiting non-state actors and informants from the wider diaspora, plus state-initiated institutions with multiplications of instruments and methods have made

possible the extra-territorial exercising of coercive power by the authoritarian state (Koinova & Tsourapas, 2018, p. 314; Öztürk & Taş, 2020, p. 62).

Accounts from my informants suggest that the Turkish state in order to deter the transnational advocacy of the Gulen movement refugees utilizes direct and indirect extra-territorial repression practices through institutions, diaspora, and policies, which work in advancing and protecting the stabilization of the regime. To summarize: accounts of my informants and various previous studies indicate that the Turkish state uses multifunctional and multi-tiered methods and tools of repression such as abduction, public threatening, surveillance and monitoring, digital threatening, and holding relatives as the hostages. As several previous studies conclude, all these extended human rights violations create a feeling that “there is no safe harbor” and Turkish refugees who could flee the country would not fully exit the authoritarian Turkish state (Moss, 2016, pp. 481-482). The “full autonomy” according to some scholars is to break all connection with homeland, which by the responses of the respondents seem impossible (Dalmasso et al., 2017, p. 2).

CHAPTER EIGHT

CONCLUDING REMARKS

In this study, I explored various factors affecting the political transnational participation of Turkish refugees affiliated to the Gulen Movement. These three research questions were explored: (i) What kind of politically transnational activities do Turkish refugees participate in and what are their motivations?, (ii) How do refugees experience the context of reception, and how these different settings in host countries influence political transnationalism of Turkish refugees? (iii) How does the Turkish state violation of human rights at home and its actions against dissidents abroad affect the transnational practices of the Turkish refugees? In this chapter, I present concluding remarks on these research questions.

The human rights violations have started with the AKP government's democratization shift to authoritarian stance during the Gezi Protests in 2013 (Göle, 2013). On 15 July 2016, the Turkish Republic faced the coup attempt that ended with failure and as the critical juncture caused the regime change and mass exodus due to the mass imprisonments, suspensions, prosecutions and marginalization. Respondents of this research have defined 'new Turkey's' policies as "psychological and physical genocide", construction of a nation-building as "monotype", the governance that "for own sustainability applies for different methods of dictatorship" and rule of law that is "between the lips of one man". Consequently, the Turkish citizens who could flee the country legally and illegally have found their places of settlement mainly in Global North. One of the aims of my study was to explore what influenced different levels of engagement in political transnationalism of Turkish refugees. I analyzed why some political refugees have decided to be active in political transnational participation while others remained passive and silenced. My research has taken a combination of agency-oriented, host country-oriented and home country-oriented approaches to figure out various opportunities and constraints the Turkish political refugees are facing in their anti-regime advocacy and home-oriented political transnational participation.

The agency-oriented approach includes two interrelated dimensions. The first dimension was associated with, the agency of the social movement organizations. Second dimension was associated with driving factors and motivations that have impacted the level of activeness of individual members in political transnational mobilization. The scope of this research is a newly established community of Gulen movement within broader Turkish diaspora. The

members of the Gulen movement in respective countries have established social movement organizations, which are ‘home-oriented’ with human rights approach. They have participated in grass-root political transnational activities through institutional participation thus influencing home country indirectly and fighting for what Adamson calls the “diffusion of liberal and democratic norms” at home (Adamson, 2020, p. 152). The accounts of refugees in my study suggest that their social movement organizations can be categorized as “non-violent”. Their methods and tools of transnational mobilization are first and foremost collaboration with local and international human rights organizations. These activities are combined with the organization of exhibitions and galleries dedicated to the victims of Turkey. My study has also shown that they are participating actively in net-advocacy or cyberspace-advocacy, and they are organizing large scale petition campaigns and silent marches and other related activities (Brees, 2010, p. 296; Cheran, 2006).

My findings show that members of these social movement organizations might be active, passive, and silenced while their level of activeness might also change at different times and occasions. Most of the Turkish refugees in my study are active in political remittances, thus supporting financially victim families in Turkey. They are also active in low-risk advocacy through the mobilization in social media and guarded advocacy, while the committee members and leaders of the social movement organizations are only those who are active in high-risk transnational activism due to their position within organization.

The interconnected world and communication technologies allow the social movement organizations participate in networked transnational activities thus exercising their voice horizontally and vertically between social movement organizations at different locations and between refugees in the respective countries and non-migrant victims in Turkey (Glasius, 2018). Alongside of processes, practices, actors, and networks there are various factors such as motivations, capacities and desires of refugees, new identities and level of belongings to home country, traumas and memories that have affected the level of activeness in the political transnational participation of Turkish migrants (Baser & Swain, 2008; Cheran, 2006).

The host country-oriented approach includes the models of integration processes and political opportunity structures that shape the trajectories of political transnational participation of Turkish refugees. The political refugees have made their decision of destinations to the Global North due to the extra-territorial governmental purge by the Turkish state. Among the Turkish

refugees who migrated directly from Turkey and those who had residence permits in other countries where they did not feel safe.

In this thesis, I explored and compared how refugees' political transnationalism was experienced in different contexts of reception in Germany, Norway, and the United States. It is maintained that refugees in these respective countries experience different obstacles. The respondents in Germany and Norway indicated that they have language obstacles when they are participating in transnational activities while in the United States the refugees cannot find time for participation due to their overloaded job hours. A settlement program was also mentioned as one of the crucial factors in transnational participation of the Turkish refugees who convey that, on the one hand, resettlement to remote places makes it financially complicated to commute between places that are offering the transnational activities. On the other hand, living in big cities might similarly diminish their participation. In cities, there are larger numbers of Turkish diaspora groups, resulting in exposure to possible surveillance and intimidation by the groups supportive of the Turkish state.

Some studies suggest that the political refugees might be faced with constraints and obstacles placed by the host countries, which might perceive the transnational political mobilization as the threat to the national cohesion of the state. Moreover, the receiving countries might be more focused on the integration of the newcomers rather their home-oriented mobilization. Finally, their geopolitical and interstate relations with the home country of the refugees might cause a constraint for refugees political transnational mobilization (Chaudhary & Moss, 2019; Koser, 2007; Mavroudi, 2018).

My respondents expressed their concerns related to the interstate relationship between their host countries and Turkey, which is a NATO member. Yet, they did not feel being constrained due to the geopolitical relationship between their home and host countries. Refugees' accounts suggest that their transnational political engagement was not curtailed by the authorities in the host countries. They instead indicated that the major obstacle to their political transnational activities are the factors imposed by the different modes of resettlement and integration related challenges.

The sending state-oriented approach explains how some sending states apply for "governmentality" of refugees by the authoritarian practices to deter their mobilizations

(Foucault, 2004). The extra-territorial governance of transnational space by the Turkish state has been materialized and exercised through direct and indirect authoritarian practices such as; abduction and extradition, cancellation of passports, rejection of services by the state-initiated institutions, espionage and surveillance by the Diyanet, Turkish consulates, and members of diaspora, threatening families of the refugees, psychological repression and fear¹⁸. Refugees in my study have described their concerns relating to the extra-territorial repressive practices by the Turkish state, emphasizing the connection between transnational authoritarian practices of the Turkish state and their unwillingness of participation in the political transnational activities where their identities can be revealed or surveilled by the other groups within Turkish diaspora.

To summarize: It is maintained that the political opportunity structures of the receiving states are channels and drivers for mobilization of the Turkish refugees. Nevertheless, refugees do not automatically mobilize even in democratic states. Indeed, there is a small portion of those who participate in political transnational participation in form of high-risk activism. The extra-territorial tools of deterrence diminish the level of activeness of political transnational participation by the Turkish refugees. Therefore, the Turkish refugees are more likely to participate in political remittances and in digital advocacy that guarantee safety for the refugees and their families. The main factors that affect the level of political transnational participation of the Turkish refugees can be seen in the figure.

¹⁸ See among others, Chaudhary & Moss, 2019; Öztürk & Taş, 2020.




Figure 3: Factors effecting the level of political transnational participation

The scholars of transnational studies agree on the fact that some gaps in the scholarship of transnationalism exist and should be taken into consideration in further studies. Levitt (2001, p. 211) points out that very little attention paid to transnational practices of community groups and their institutional transnational processes, moreover he suggests that further research is needed for analysis of variations across transnational institutional practices. Similarly, Itzigsohn et al. (1999) address the issue of limitedness of transnational studies in which some key issues have been researched while the others is ignored. They argue that the scholars of the receiving countries are focused more on the studies of migrants integration and incorporation and less interested in their transnational practices in host countries (1999, p. 317). Consequently, the gab in transnational studies of Turkish case can be also evidently seen how on one side Ostergaard-Nielsen (2003) and Baser (2013) conducted a research on Turkish migrants and Kurdish refugees originated from Turkey and being active in transnational activities in Germany for different political interests, on the other hand Mencutek and Baser (2018), Öztürk and Sözeri (2018) researched Turkish state-initiated diaspora engagement policies to reach their citizens abroad and mobilize them for their foreign political interests, moreover Arkilic (2016) worked at meso-level of transnational institutions established by both

the Turkish state and migrants from Turkey who live abroad. Thus, in order to clearly understand how transnationalism process functions it is crucial to have a research, which would focus on both sides (Levitt, 2001). Senay (2012, p. 16) call this “triadic relationship” suggesting to bring sending and receiving states and migrants under investigation for better understanding of “transnational political space”. Hence, this research provides a picture of transnationalism, in which Turkish state’s current targeting diaspora policies, the receiving countries responses and providing possibilities for political mobilization, and Turkish refugees, who migrated after 2016, politically transnational practices have been framed.

In this study, the political transnational participation of political refugees has been scrutinized in the liberal western democracies. However, large numbers of Turkish political refugees do not live in the West. Therefore, there is also a need to study modes of political transnationalism of political refugees who are in exile in Third World countries. It is assumed that Turkish political refugees who currently reside in various autocracies in Turkey’s neighborhood are even more deterred by the Turkish state than refugees in my study. Therefore, it will be pertinent to explore their realities, and possible constraints and limitations they might face and how they deal with them.

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