Master's thesis

NTNU
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Department of Sociology and Political Science

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Regime Type and the Prospects of Nonviolent Mobilization

An investigation of the Correlates of Major Nonviolent Uprisings Conditioned by Regime Type

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Abstract

As nonviolent dissent has become increasingly prevalent in the last 20 years, quantitative research on the drivers and outcomes of nonviolent mobilization has increased drastically. This thesis contributes to the growing research field of nonviolent resistance by investigating if the effects of established associations between grievance and modernization theories and nonviolent campaign onset vary across regime types. In a major study on the correlates of nonviolent mobilization, Chenoweth and Ulfelder (2017) find that past operationalizations of grievance-approaches and modernization theory perform poorly in explaining the emergence of nonviolent campaigns. I investigate if this is a result of regime type as a missing conditional variable. I argue that regime-type conditions which sources of information, public or private, that are available to rational individuals, thus affecting if grievances can become shared and which sources of information are most conducive for mobilization. Using logistic regression analysis, I test how batteries of variables associated with grievances and modernization impact nonviolent campaign onset, conditioned by regime type. The results indicate that effects of grievances and modernization, as well as other important correlates, vary across regime types, thus illuminating the importance of including the political context in the study of nonviolent resistance.

Sammendrag

Kvantitativ forskning på årsaker til og konsekvenser av ikke-voldelig mobilisering har økt kraftig de siste 20 årene som et resultat av at ikke-voldelige opprør har blitt stadig mer utbredt i verden. Denne oppgaven bidrar til dette voksende forskningsfeltet gjennom å undersøke om effekter av tidligere etablerte sammenhenger mellom frustrasjoner i befolkningen («grievance-theories») og moderniseringsteori og utbrudd av ikke-voldelige opprørskampanjer varerier mellom ulike regimetyper. I en viktig studie av sammenhenger mellom tidligere operasjonaliseringer av mobiliseringsteorier og utbrudd av ikke-voldelige kampanjer, finner Chenoweth og Ulfelder (2017) at både frustrasjoner i befolkning og modernisering i liten grad kan forklare hvor og når ikke-voldelige kampanjer vil oppstå. I denne oppgaven undersøker jeg om disse funnene er et resultat av at regimetype mangler som en betingende variabel. Jeg argumenterer for at regimetype avgjør hvilke informasjonskilder, offentlige eller private, som er tilgjengelige for rasjonelle individer. Videre vil tilgang til informasjon avgjøre om frustrasjoner i befolkningen kan omsettes til mobilisering, og hvilke informasjonskilder som er viktigest for mobilisering. Jeg tester disse antagelsene ved hjelp av logistisk regresjonsanalyse, der jeg undersøker hvordan grupperinger av variabler assosiert med «grievances» og moderniseringsteori påvirker sannsynligheten for et ikke-voldelig kampanjeutbrudd i ulike regimetyper. Resultatene indikerer at effekter varierer i ulike regimer, noe som viser hvorfor det er viktig å inkludere den politiske konteksten i studier av ikke-voldelige kampanjer.

Preface

This thesis marks the end of five years of studies in the beautiful city of Trondheim. Working on this thesis has been the biggest challenge of my life so far, and I am proud to say that I made it. However, the journey has not been easy. Being a master's student during times of corona restrictions has been challenging, especially as many of the joys of student life has been banned. Still, working on this thesis has been rewarding and given me valuable social experiences, as well as plenty of new and interesting knowledge about the world.

I could not have completed this thesis without the help of a few very valuable people. Firstly, I would like to thank my supervisor Professor Charles Butcher. His help and guidance have saved me from giving up on several occasions, and he has shown me how a supervisor could and should be to help students thrive. For that, I am very grateful. I would also like to thank my friends who have tried to save me from horrendous spelling errors. All faults herein are my own.

I am also thankful for my friends at study hall 9401. Thank you for being there through both the good and the bad days, you gave me the social life needed to survive this semester. Lastly, I want to thank my fiancé Martyn for making sure that I remember that life is more than a master's thesis, and for supporting me all the way to the finish line.

Ingrid Birgitte Løvoll

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1 Introduction

"Everybody is scared to die. But life without hope is the same as dying. So, I am more scared of my future that is dark and hopeless" (NRK, 2021).

These are the words of a young woman participating in the civil resistance campaign against the military in Myanmar. She was interviewed by the Norwegian state media while she was in hiding for standing up for democracy after the military coup on the 1st of February 2021. Following a democratic general election, soldiers arrested the civilian leader Aung Suu Kyi and other top officials as military chief Min Aung Hlaing seized power (Carrol, 2021). Justified through allegations of widespread election fraud, chief Gen Hlaing claimed that the military was on the people's side and that they would work for a "true and disciplined democracy" (Cuddy, 2021). After 10 years of democracy, the actions of the military have sparked widespread resistance from the country's population. Nearly every segment of the population, be it youth, women, workers, religious leaders, or members of the security forces, have gone on strike or otherwise shown their dissatisfaction with the junta through nonviolent tactics in a fight for democracy (Stephan, 2021).

The civil uprising in Myanmar can be described as what researchers call a nonviolent resistance campaign. Such campaigns challenge the state through irregular tactics, working outside conventional and institutional channels of political participation (Schock, 2003, p. 705; Chenoweth & Cunningham, 2013, p. 271). Campaigns have maximalist goals, such as secession, removal of a foreign occupier, self-determination, or significant institutional reform and they are often described as "a series of observable, continuous, coordinated, purposive mass events in pursuit of a political objection" (Chenoweth & Ulfelder, 2017, p. 310). Campaign tactics can be both violent and nonviolent, but to qualify as nonviolent the means of resistance must primarily be non-threatening, where the physical well-being of the opponent is not at risk. Because of their ability to undermine state power (Sharp, 1999), nonviolent tactics such as protests, strikes, boycotts or demonstrations, have the power to produce change in society (Sharp, 1999, p. 568; Chenoweth & Cunningham, 2013, p. 271).

Over the last 20 years, mass nonviolent resistance campaigns have become an increasingly prevalent form of anti-government dissent (Abbs, 2020). However, nonviolent uprisings are rare phenomena (Chenoweth & Ulfelder, 2017, p. 311). The Nonviolent and Violent

Campaigns and Outcomes (NAVCO 2.0) dataset only identifies 100 nonviolent campaigns between 1945 and 2006 (Chenoweth & Lewis, 2013, p. 416) while the Major Episodes of Contention (MEC) dataset identifies 170 nonviolent campaigns between 1955 and 2013 making nonviolent campaigns as rare as civil wars (Chenoweth & Ulfelder, 2017, p. 311). The increasing prevalence of nonviolence in the last 20 years and the fact that nonviolent campaigns are more likely to achieve success than their violent counterparts (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011, p. 6-7) raises questions as to where, when, and why nonviolent campaigns evolve and succeed. In this thesis, I will tackle the first of these questions: Where, why, and when do nonviolent campaigns emerge?

A typical campaign has anywhere from 1000 participants and upwards, making nonviolent campaigns the observable outcome of mass mobilization. Even though scholars of nonviolence typically argue that agency is more important than structure, the fact that campaigns are dependent on mass mobilization across diverse segments of the population to succeed (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011) makes it likely that structural conditions might affect the prospects of mobilization. In their study of structural conditions and nonviolent action, Chenoweth and Ulfelder (2017) identify four theories of mass mobilization that provide potential explanations as to where and why nonviolent uprisings might emerge. In addition to potential explanations, these four theories – the grievance-based approach, resource mobilization theory, modernization theory, and political opportunity approaches – provide a range of potential correlates of nonviolent campaign onset.

Grievance-based approaches argue that individuals will rise against the state if subjected to shared grievances such as poverty, discrimination, or repression. Such perceived injustices serve as motivation for uprisings, thereby making uprisings more likely in states where either the whole or parts of the population is subjected to grievances (Gurr, 1970; Chenoweth & Ulfelder, 2017). Other theories argue that motivation is not enough to spur an uprising (Karakaya, 2018). According to resource mobilization theory, potential campaigns need resources such as people able and willing to mobilize, organizational capacity, or external sponsors (Chenoweth & Ulfelder, 2017). Thus, nonviolent mass mobilization should be more likely where and when there is a high mobilization potential. Modernization theory combines grievances and motivation and argues that economic development creates a new middle class that, with time, will demand greater political and civil rights, being motivated by state-created grievances and enabled by increased resources through education, industrialization, and new technology (Chenoweth & Ulfelder, 2017; Karakaya, 2018). Finally, the political opportunity

approach argues that people will rebel if the costs of mobilization are low, and the probability of success is high (Chenoweth & Ulfelder, 2017). Costs and benefits are in turn determined by the interplay between potential dissidents and the political context they operate in (Karakaya, 2018).

The main finding from Chenoweth & Ulfelder's 2017 article is that these structural theories of mass mobilization perform poorly in predicting when and where we should see a mass uprising. In this thesis, I will build on the data and the theoretical base presented by Chenoweth and Ulfelder (2017). Their article, like many others in the field, assumes that factors will have the same impact on the probability of nonviolent campaign onset across all types of regimes. However, this might not be the case as there is a widespread consensus that the choices of political actors are constrained by the context they operate in (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011, p. 64). Since nonviolent campaigns necessarily challenge the state in their pursuit of maximalist goals, the state constitutes the strategic opponent in nonviolent campaigns and shapes the conditions under which contentious politics evolves (Edwards, 2020)

Investigating effects across all four mobilization theories would be interesting, however, due to both time and space limitation, I choose to limit my main investigation to the effects of grievance- and modernization theories on nonviolent campaign onset conditioned by regime type. Chenoweth and Ulfelder (2017) find that these theories are the least useful for predicting when a mass nonviolent uprising will emerge. However, other studies find that many of the conditions used to operationalize these theories can contribute to a better understanding of nonviolent campaign onsets, making it worth investigating if the findings by Chenoweth & Ulfelder (2017) might be a result of institutions as a missing conditioning variable. Following this, the purpose of this study is to answer the following question*: Do the effects of grievance- and modernization variables vary across different regime types?*

In this thesis, I test the relationship between operationalizations of the grievance-based approach and modernization theory and the onset of nonviolent campaigns, contingent on regime type. As nonviolent campaigns are essentially major displays of individual participation, determinants of individual participation will affect if a major campaign can or cannot emerge. I argue that individual participation in nonviolent campaigns is determined by the costs and benefits of participation which are in turn influenced by both other peoples' actions and opinions, and potential state response. Following this, the availability of

information about these factors will make it more or less difficult for individuals to be mobilized, and regime type conditions which channels of information are most important and trustworthy. Furthermore, I distinguish between two sources of information: public and private. I argue that the availability of information through public sources, such as the media and political participation, is conditioned by regime type. Democratic regimes have few restrictions on public information sources, while restrictions on the public sources of information increase as regimes come more authoritarian. The availability of information from public sources also affects the importance of private information sources, defined as all the interpersonal networks individuals are a part of that.

The availability of information from public sources can affect the effects of grievances on nonviolent mobilization. As grievances emphasize the importance of shared grievances for mobilization, I argue that grievances will have bigger effects in democratic regimes than in anocracies, and finally the lowest effect in authoritarian, as regime type conditions the availability of public information and thereby individual cost-benefit assessments. Furthermore, when countries modernize, the social transformations of society generate new private channels of information where grievances and resources can be communicated, thus facilitating collective action. As regime type conditions the relative importance of private sources of regime type, I argue that modernization should be more important for mobilization in regimes that restrict public channels of information to a larger degree.

To test these arguments, I follow the general methodological approach used by Chenoweth and Ulfelder (2017), which is testing how well different batteries of variables associated with broader theoretical traditions impact nonviolent campaign onset. I use logistic regression to test the associations between grievances and modernization and nonviolent campaign onset across different subsamples of regimes, to determine whether effects differ across regimes. The results indicate that grievances have stronger effects on nonviolent campaign onset in more democratic regimes, while the effects of modernization on nonviolent campaign onset are more inconsistent. However, there is solid evidence that effects vary across regime types, suggesting that the drivers of nonviolent mobilization are not the same for all regimes.

1.1 Structure of thesis

This thesis is structured in the following way: Firstly, I briefly discuss the study of civil resistance before reviewing the most recent quantitative research on nonviolent campaign onset. Secondly, I outline my theoretical argument, where I connect the individual choice of

participation to information accessibility, before showing how regime type conditions both channels and availability of information. Following this, I argue that the effects of modernization and grievance-related variables should vary across regime type, due to how regime type affects the information environment. Thirdly, I present a chapter on research design and data, where I discuss the data used to test the hypotheses as well as the challenges associated with logistic regression on time-series-cross-sectional data. Following this, I present the results from the logistic regression models as well as additional robustness tests before I discuss the findings and how they relate to previous research. Finally, I sum up the thesis and present my conclusion.

2 Literature Review

2.1 The study of nonviolent resistance

In the introduction, I introduced the term civil resistance campaigns, referring to mass uprisings with maximalist goals using primarily nonviolent tactics (Chenoweth & Cunningham, 2013; Chenoweth & Ulfelder, 2017). In the following section, I will give a brief overview of the concept of civil resistance and how research on this phenomenon has been conducted.

The term civil resistance has been used as an "umbrella term" to cover terms such as people power, nonviolent action, and unarmed insurrections (Nepstad, 2013, p. 590). According to Adam Roberts (2009, p. 2), civil resistance "…involves a range of widespread and sustained activities that challenge a particular power, force, policy, or regime". In addition to this "a movement's goals are "civil" in the sense of being widely shared in society" (Roberts, 2009, p.2). As such, civil resistance is distinct from other forms of action, such as more discrete protests or participating in elections. It is transgressive and non-institutional and has a coordinated and purposive quality to bring about political, social, or economic change based on widely shared grievances (Chenoweth & Cunningham, 2013). Finally, all actions are nonviolent in character. However, the basis for choosing nonviolent methods and the mechanism by which nonviolence succeeds, has evolved throughout the development of civil resistance as a research field.

The study of nonviolence is heavily influenced by Mohandas Gandhi (Nepstad, 2013), who explored civil resistance after experiencing racial injustice in South Africa in the early 1900s (Schock, 2013). He viewed nonviolence as both a political strategy for change and a moral commitment (Nepstad, 2013). Following this, change was possible through nonviolent methods changing the hearts and minds of opponents, leading to a change in behavior. In the 1970s, Gene Sharp shifted the academic focus away from moral sentiments for nonviolence, towards a purely strategic view on nonviolence (Nepstad, 2013). He introduced a theory of power where the rulers depend on the consent of the population, with the consequence that the population can withdraw consent at any time and thereby produce change in society (Schock, 2013). As such, nonviolent methods do not require moral convictions, making the theoretical framework more flexible to different contexts.

Up until quite recently, nonviolent struggle has been studied in an applied, descriptive, or normative way, just recently moving on to a more empirical and analytical perspective (Chenoweth & Cunningham, 2013). Typically, scholars of civil resistance have prioritized social roots of power rather than structural conditions and political institutions, creating a primacy for agency over structure (Schock, 2013). However, agency is necessarily dependent on the structural context (Schock, 2003). Following this, drawing on social movement theories and theories of revolution can contribute to an increased understanding of civil resistance. Where civil resistance research tends to focus on why a set of strategic actions might succeed or not (Schock, 2013), literature on social movements and revolution emphasize mobilization. Schock (2013, p. 282) defines mobilization as "the process of acquiring resources, people, and support for a campaign". Studies of social movements and revolution are typically more structure-oriented, and emphasize how economic, political, and demographic conditions contribute to uprisings, how culture and ideology affect mobilization, and the interplay between mobilizing structures and political context in producing mass mobilization (Schock, 2013). In this thesis I will draw upon both structure and agency to outline an argument where individual agency is affected by structural conditions, thereby trying to bridge these theoretical directions.

2.2 Previous Research on Nonviolent Campaign Onset

The potential effects of grievances, resources, and political opportunities on nonviolent mobilization have been addressed in a number of quantitative studies over the last 10 years. Even though Chenoweth and Ulfelder (2017) find that that, in general, structural mobilization theories explain nonviolent campaign onset poorly and that only a handful of operationalizations of the mobilization theories[1] help predict where and when campaigns will emerge, research on maximalist nonviolent campaigns have established some associations between structural conditions and campaign onset, although some quite contested. In the following section, I review recent quantitative research (2010-now) on structural conditions and nonviolent campaign onset to show that many findings are conflicting and that only a few studies consider the conditioning effect of regime type. The review is structured around the four theories of mass mobilization, starting with findings related to the grievance approach. Following this, I present findings related to modernization and resource mobilization, as

[1] Specifically, operationalizations of poverty, leader's tenure, urbanization, communication technology, contagion pressure, youth bulges, social unrest, civil liberties, election year, and commitment to human rights improve predictive capability of the models.

operationalizations of these theories overlap to a certain degree, before ending with findings from the political opportunity approach.

2.2.1 Grievances

Most studies of nonviolent campaign onset include one or more indicators designed to capture the effects of grievances. Grievance-based approaches have been prevalent in research on rebellion, civil war, and contentious action, and these theories have also spilled over into research on nonviolent forms of contention. The argument is that perceived injustices such as identity-based deprivation, poverty, or unequal distribution of wealth and power motivate individuals to rebel against the incumbent regime (Gurr, 1970; Chenoweth & Ulfelder, 2017; Karakaya, 2018). In the context of nonviolence, researchers have focused especially on measures of state-led discrimination, either political or economic, often combined with an ethnic or religious component (Cunningham, 2013; Jazayeri, 2016; Thurber, 2018; Rørbæk, 2019, Abbs, 2020).

A few studies find support for a positive relationship between nonviolent action and state-led discrimination, but these studies examine a limited geographic area or maximalist goal. As such, the results cannot be generalized for a broader sample of countries and campaigns. Cunningham (2013) finds that for groups seeking self-determination, political exclusion increases the probability that groups choose violent or nonviolent tactics rather than using conventional channels. Groups that are excluded from representation and seek self-determination are likely to believe that contentious dissent would work better than conventional channels. Jazayeri (2016) find that exclusion from political representation is associated with a higher protest count in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), but for maximalist campaigns, this relationship is negative and not significant. Results from Thurber (2018) support this, as he finds a negative and significant relationship between political exclusion and the likelihood of a group initiating a nonviolent campaign. Other studies find no significant relationship between exclusion and nonviolent action (Butcher & Svensson, 2016; Abbs, 2020).

These results indicate that discrimination and exclusion against groups in society are not major drivers of nonviolent campaign onset. Rather, many studies find that exclusion encourages violent campaign onsets (Butcher & Svensson, 2016; Thurber, 2018; Rørbæk, 2019). There is also evidence that the influence of state-led discrimination is affected by the level of repression. Rørbæk (2019) finds that ethnic exclusion increases the probability of

violent campaign onset, while the relationship between ethnic exclusion and nonviolent campaign onset is not significant. In addition to this, there is a statistically significant difference between violent and nonviolent campaign onset for high levels of ethnic exclusion. However, when adding the latent level of repression as a control variable, the difference between violent and nonviolent tactics disappears, suggesting that ethnic exclusion cannot explain the choice between violent and nonviolent tactics when the latent level of repression is held constant across countries. This suggests that there might be a more complicated relationship between grievances and repression, the latter which is correlated with regime type (Chenoweth, Perkoski & Kang, 2017).

The effect of repression is also not consistent. Karakaya (2018) finds that repression, which she argues increases grievances, initially increases the probability of a nonviolent campaign onset, but that extreme repression has a negative impact, implying a curvilinear effect of repression. On the other hand, Thurber (2018) and Edwards (2020) find no significant relationship between nonviolent campaign onset and repression. The dissent-repression literature is ambiguous as to how repression affects mobilization (Chenoweth, Perkoski & Kang, 2017), and these findings to a large degree reflect that. It is also important to note that research on nonviolent action has been criticized for not distinguishing between different forms of repression, as different forms of repression might have different effects on mobilization (Chiang, 2021).

Where political exclusion creates political grievances, poverty and economic discrimination generate economic grievances. Even though economic grievances are important in the grievance literature (Gurr, 1970), few articles explicitly focus on the effects of poverty and economic discrimination. Butcher and Svensson (2016) find no significant effect of slow economic growth on nonviolent campaign onset. Similarly, Gleditsch and Rivera (2016) do not find much evidence of poverty and poor economic performance increasing the probability of nonviolent campaign onset. These results are also supported by Karakaya (2018) who find that GDP per capita and the GDP growth rate fail to reach significance across most models. However, Cunningham (2013) finds evidence that economic discrimination, that is when a group is significantly poorer than the rest of the population, increases the chance that a self-determination group would choose irregular tactics rather than conventional modes of participation.

State-led discrimination, repression, and economic grievances often affect only segments of the population, which may explain conflicting results since grievances are not necessarily shared across groups in the population. More cross-cutting grievances, on the other hand, could make nonviolent uprisings more likely. Abbs (2020) shows that cross-cutting grievances that transcend group divisions and affect a larger part of the population might increase the probability of a nonviolent campaign onset. In a study focusing on Africa, he finds that the cross-cutting nature of food price spikes increases the feasibility of nonviolent mobilization in otherwise ethnically divided communities where mobilization would be difficult. These results suggest that a joint cause, and thereby channels of distributing information about this cause, is necessary to encourage extensive mobilization.

2.2.2 Resource mobilization and modernization

The effects of networks, and the potential resources such networks can create, are important features of the resource mobilization perspective and modernization theory. The resource mobilization perspective emphasizes how mobilization is enabled through movement entrepreneurs who can assemble the human, financial, and informational resources necessary for widespread mobilization (Chenoweth & Ulfelder, 2017). Resource mobilization theories direct attention towards social transformations caused by economic development, which are argued to create a new middle class with resources from increased education, urbanization, and similar developments as well as grievances related to social and political rights in a developing society. Even though these theoretical directions differ slightly, especially regarding the importance of motivation and resources for mobilization, they both build upon the fact that networks and communication are important tools for mobilization.

Industrialization is one aspect that can facilitate the emergence of networks that link people together and in turn also create linkages between different communities (Butcher & Svensson, 2016). Industrialization refers to the process where society moves from being mostly agriculturally based to being based on the manufacturing of goods. Through this process, society becomes more interconnected, which in turn can lower collective action problems through information diffusion and group pressure (Lichbach, 1998; Gould, 1991). Both Butcher and Svensson (2016) and Karakaya (2018) find that as the level of manufacturing to GDP rises in a country, the odds of nonviolent campaign onset increase, thereby supporting this argument. As one of few studies, Butcher and Svensson (2016) test their argument across subsamples of regimes as well as a general model and find that this relationship also holds for

a sample of only authoritarian states, indicating that modernization in authoritarian states makes them more prone for uprisings.

Industrialization is closely connected to urban migration as it moves people from diverse geographical and cultural backgrounds into urban networks through factory work (Huntington, 1968, p. 33). One of the more consistent findings across many studies is that having a large urban population increases the probability of a nonviolent campaign onset (Gleditsch & Rivera, 2017; Cunningham et.al, 2017; Schaftenaar, 2017; Abbs, 2020; Dahl et.al, 2020). Other demographic factors can also contribute to increased resources in the population. Chenoweth & Ulfelder (2017) argue that having a "youth bulge", that is a relatively young population, increases the probability of nonviolent campaign onset, as young people have the resources and the freedom to participate in such activities. They find that youth bulges can help predict campaign onsets, but the effects of a young population need further investigation. Jazayeri (2016) finds, rather counterintuitively, that youth bulges reduce the count of violent and nonviolent protests, and it also decreases the probability of a nonviolent campaign. Even though this study only investigates cases in the MENA area, it shows that this factor needs to be investigated further, especially since the result conflicts with theory.

Schaftenaar (2017) finds that countries with higher levels of gender equality are more prone to nonviolent action, as allowing women participation in society creates a bigger pool of potential participants as well as a preference for nonviolent methods. This fits well with modernization theory, and the arguments put forward regarding globalization and education. Karakaya (2018) finds that globalization, which she argues influences structural conditions, grievances, resources, and the modernization process, increases the probability of a nonviolent campaign onset, as globalization creates a preference for nonviolence. She also finds that there is a positive and significant effect of education, as more educated individuals tend to have more liberal ideas. Similarly, Butcher and Svensson (2016) find a positive effect of education and campaign onset, Dahlum and Wig (2017) find a positive effect of educational level on counts of antigovernment protest, and Dahlum (2019) that protest movements that consist mainly of students and educated protestors are more likely to be nonviolent.

A preference for nonviolence can also be developed through previous or present experience for more tactical reasons. Several studies investigate the impact of campaigns in neighboring

countries, as this can increase resources through contagion or organizational learning. There is solid evidence of a global diffusion process, where campaigns in other countries increase the likelihood of a domestic nonviolent campaign (Braithwaite et.al, 2015; Butcher & Svensson, 2016; Gleditsch & Rivera, 2017; Cunningham et.al, 2017). There is also evidence that this effect might be conditioned by other factors. Braithwaite et.al (2015) find that for autocratic regimes, the effect of regional contagion is limited to countries that do not have a recent history with domestic protest, suggesting that the resources available through contagion are only relevant for countries that do not have knowledge and organizations from prior mobilization experience. Gleditsch and Rivera (2017) find evidence that the effect is limited to countries that have an internal motivation for uprisings to begin with, that is non-democracies, as democracies can handle dissatisfaction through conventional channels. Similarly, Brancati and Lucardi (2019) find that democracy protests do not diffuse, as they are motivated by internal conditions that are not transferable across countries. However, they base their analysis on daily data, thus the results are not strictly comparable to studies working with yearly data. These findings indicate that internal conditions such as regime type and societal factors do impact the effects of conditions related to campaign onsets.

2.2.3 Political opportunities

Where the previous theories emphasize more stable structural conditions, the political opportunity approach focuses to a larger extent on new developments and unanticipated events that create new opportunities for mobilization (Nepstad, 2011, p. 7). As such, the likelihood of a nonviolent campaign onset is highly dependent on the political context of a country (Karakaya, 2018), and people are expected to rebel where possibilities for success are high and costs are low (Chenoweth & Ulfelder, 2017).

Firstly, cues from the international community can affect the opportunities for mobilization. If potential dissidents expect external support, opportunities for uprisings can arise, as this can increase resources and thereby change the balance of power. Jackson, San-Acka, and Maoz (2020) argue that the anticipation of international support is essential for mobilization, as opposition groups weigh grievances against risks when deciding to oppose the government. If the balance of external support is in favor of the opposition - as it might be if the people of a non-democratic country in a democratic region attempt to mobilize - a campaign, either violent or nonviolent, is more likely. Campaign tactics, however, are dependent on the type of support the opposition groups can expect. If they expect more material resources than the government, this creates a preference for violent tactics. Support that is more political and

diplomatic on the other hand, makes groups more likely to choose nonviolence given that they get more support than the government. They find significant effects for both the anticipation of external support and the balance of support.

Another aspect that can significantly affect the opportunities for organization and mobilization is regime type. Many studies control for regime type, and most find that the more democratic a country is, the lower probability of a nonviolent uprising (Butcher & Svensson, 2016; Schaftenaar, 2017; Thurber, 2018; Karakaya, 2018; Rørbæk, 2019; Dahl et.al, 2020). This finding is further strengthened by Cunningham (2013) who find that self-determination groups in democracies are less likely to engage in a nonviolent campaign relative to conventional channels than their non-democratic counterparts. Similarly, Cunningham et.al (2017) show that if a maximalist claim has been made by the opposition, this claim is more likely to evolve into a large-scale protest campaign in autocracies and anocracies than if the same claim was made in a democratic country. Based on these findings, it is likely that regime type has an important influence on nonviolent mobilization. Existing theories mainly argue that this is due to a more open society where dissatisfaction is channeled through conventional politics. However, as I will elaborate on in the theory section, regime type might condition other factors than just the channels of participation, thus also influencing how other factors affect the probability of nonviolent campaign onset.

Where regime type frames how the opposition can act, political instability can create opportunities that can spur mobilization. Political instability signals weak governments and the possibility to affect state institutions considerably, especially as political instability signals potential elite defections which are one of the determinants of campaign success (Nepstad, 2011). However, results from studies that include a measure of political instability are diverging. Karakaya (2018) use the magnitude of change in the polity scale over the last two years to measure the effect of political instability, where an increase in the variable indicates movement towards democracy. Karakaya (2018) find that political instability significantly increases the odds of nonviolent campaign onset, as it becomes easier to challenge weaker governments. Rørbæk (2019) finds that political instability favors violent tactics, and finally Cunningham (2013) finds no evidence that political instability matters for the use of either type of irregular tactic in self-determination disputes. The effects of political instability are therefore highly contested and seem to be quite context-specific, indicating that the effect of political instability might be different across countries depending on which opportunities they create.

Another event that might cause opportunities for mobilization is elections, as elites must allow for a certain level of organization and participation (Chenoweth & Ulfelder, 2017). In addition to this, elections can serve as focal points for widespread mobilization if annulled or stolen (Braithwaite et.al, 2015; Butcher & Svensson, 2016). The effect of elections on nonviolent campaign onset is positive, and elections appear to be a trigger for nonviolent campaigns (Butcher & Svensson, 2016; Karakaya, 2018; Abbs, 2020). Karakaya (2018) find that the probability of a nonviolent campaign increases during election years. However, it might be that the effect is limited to states where elections are relatively free and fair and are not mere sham elections. Butcher and Svensson (2016) find that elections do not serve as triggers in authoritarian states, possibly because fraud or manipulation in such states are common and do not generate political grievances in the same way as in countries where elections follow more democratic norms.

Existing research on structural conditions and the onset of nonviolent campaigns shows that there is little consensus as to which conditions are the most important to explain the emergence of these movements. Despite Chenoweth and Ulfelders' (2017) conclusion that grievance- and modernization theory has low predictive powers, there is evidence that previous operationalizations of these theories have substantial effects in certain contexts and that these effects might vary across regimes. Research on grievances produces conflicting results, however the finding that repression, which is connected to regime type, conditions the effect of discrimination speak to the fact that regime type might affect other explanatory variables as well. Conditions related to modernization have more support in previous research, but more studies are needed to claim a general effect of modernization on nonviolent campaign onset. As for resource mobilization theory, there is evidence that increased resources seem to make the onset of nonviolent campaigns more likely, with regional contagion being one of the most roust findings. There is also evidence that the effect of regional contagion varies across regime types. Finally, findings related to the political opportunity approach suggest that changes in opportunity structures do matter, something which is highlighted through elections having different effects across regime types.

3 Theory

As shown in the literature review, a considerable amount of attention has been paid to the resources, opportunities, and grievances that can facilitate and encourage broad nonviolent mobilization in the population. Less attention has been paid to the role of the state, even though many studies include some measure of institutions or state capacity. In the following section, I will present my argument as to why leaving out the conditioning role of the state might cause results to be misleading or biased, especially for conditions that rely on shared information and interconnectedness throughout society such as the effects of grievances and modernization. First, I discuss a general model of individual-level mobilization that underpins most theories of nonviolent mobilization, with an emphasis on the role of information. Following this, I distinguish between public and private sources of information, before introducing the state into the equation. I argue that regime type conditions both the availability of public sources of information and the relative importance on private information sources. Concluding this section, I argue that the effects of variables related to grievances and modernization should have different effects on nonviolent campaign onset across regimes. As grievances need to be shared to generate mass mobilization, the availability of public information about these grievances affect to what extent mobilization is possible, making the prospects of mobilization dependent on regime type. Modernization, on the other hand, generates new private channels of information which should have a strong effect on mobilization where public channels of information are weak or non-existent.

3.1 Strategic nonviolent action

Nonviolent campaigns pursue maximalist goals, such as territorial secession, autonomy, or significant institutional reform (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011). Given the nature of these goals, campaigns must necessarily challenge the state, making the state a critical actor. The state constitutes the strategic opponent in nonviolent campaigns and shapes the conditions under which contentious politics evolve (Edwards, 2020). Tarrow (2011) argues that all regime change is based on changes in opportunities or threats. These changes can be caused by the state or the opposition group (Nepstad, 2011) and are an integrated part of the interaction between campaign entrepreneurs and the state. Opportunities are related to how changing factors can contribute to campaign success, thus providing cues that encourage

contentious participation. Threats refer to the risks and costs of action and inaction and can often contribute to discouraging contention through repression or the state's capacity to present a solid front (Tarrow, 2011). Following this, rational individuals and rational campaign actors must assess both opportunities and threats when deciding whether the desired outcome is possible and worth the potential risks.

The primary mechanism of nonviolent campaign success is to restrain the regime from its sources of power (Nepstad, 2011; Chenoweth, Perkoski & Kang, 2017; Chenoweth & Ulfelder, 2017). Power is typically thought of as monolithic, where rulers possess all political, economic, and social power, and citizens are left to either cooperate or fight back with violence. The nonviolent action approach, on the other hand, sees power as relational, meaning that power is derived from sources in society rather than enforced from above through the states' ability to sanction and repress (Schock, 2005, p. 37; Nepstad, 2011, p. 8; Sharp, 2005, p. 28-29). Sharp (1999, p. 569) identifies six sources of power in society, where authority, or legitimacy, is the most important one. Legitimacy refers to the belief in the regimes' right to govern and provides the basis for other important sources of power, such as human resources, material resources, and the ability to enforce sanctions. If the regime is cut off from these sources of power, it is more likely to collapse. State power, and thereby state survival, is therefore dependent on the consent of the civilian population, and this consent can be withdrawn or reassigned at any given time (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011, p. 25).

Given that nonviolent campaign success is dependent on removing the state from its pillars of support, it is necessary to ensure wide and sustained mobilization that can affect several aspects of state power (Schock, 2005, p. 167). Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) argue that mass participation is the main determinant for campaign success, and previous research has shown that conditions that link people together, either by creating a shared sense of unity (Abbs, 2020) or through generating interpersonal networks (Butcher & Svensson, 2016) contribute to an increased probability of mass mobilization. As such, there must be mechanisms within these networks that strengthen grievances and the belief that change is possible. In the following section, I argue that mass mobilization is dependent on information, as access to information can ease collective action problems and make individual participation more likely.

3.2 Collective action problems and individual participation

Nonviolent campaigns are essentially huge displays of dissatisfaction towards the state, where individuals have chosen to overcome the potential challenges related to unconventional political participation in favor of a defined goal (Kuran, 1991, p. 16). In doing so, they pursue a public good whilst endangering themselves and potentially face dire consequences. The potential benefits from participating in a campaign, that is the public good manifested in some type of regime change, will be enjoyed by everyone, regardless of participation or not (Lichbach, 1995, p. 6). The individual, on the other hand, must take on the potentially high costs of participation, as participation might involve time, money, or even the risk of death. Individuals in non-democratic regimes especially, almost certainly perceive participation as costly and high-risk, due to the threat or use of violence from the incumbent regime (Schock, 2005, p. 163). This situation, where benefits are enjoyed by all and costs placed on the individuals that participate, creates an environment where most potential rebels will never rebel since rationally, one can reap the benefits without having any costs (Lichbach, 1995). To be able to mobilize sufficiently, challengers must overcome this classic collective action problem.

When deciding whether to participate or not, individuals are faced with a cost-benefit assessment. Given that participation is only likely when potential benefits outweigh potential costs (Lohmann, 1993, p. 321; Kuran, 1991, p. 14), any potential participant must decide if the costs are worth the public good that is being pursued. To tip the cost-benefit balance in favor of participation, challengers must either increase benefits or decrease costs. As the benefit of a nonviolent campaign is in general quite fixed, the most effective way to solve this participation problem is to lower the costs of participation. However, it is quite difficult to assess how big potential costs are. As any conflict involves several parties, the actions of each party will affect how costs are perceived. As such, both the regime and the actions of every other possible participant in the campaign represent an unknown that affects the potential costs of participation. As such, the individuals' decision to participate is dependent on what everyone else does (Gould, 1993). Both the regimes' response strategy (Lichbach, 1995, p. 16) and the number of other participants will affect the threat level everyone will have to assess (Schock, 2005, p. 165), and information about these factors is not necessarily easily available.

For any type of ruler, democratic or not, the main goal is to maintain power and achieve the goals put forward by the administration (Gandhi & Przeworski, 2007, p. 1280). Campaigns

pose a huge threat to this stability, as the main goal is to destabilize the political order. As such, state repression is almost certain for movements with maximalist goals (Chenoweth, Perkoski & Kang, 2017, p. 1958). Chenoweth and Stephan (2011, p. 65) found that 88% of the campaigns included in the NAVCO 1.1 data experienced violent repression by the state, showing that campaign participation comes with high risks. However, the scope and intensity of repression are conditioned by regime type, where democratic states are far less likely to commit routine human rights abuses, or other extralegal forms of repression than authoritarian and hybrid regimes (Chenoweth, Perkoski & Kang, 2017, p. 1958). As regimes reach the highest level of democracy (7 or higher in the Polity IV scale), the effect of regime type on repression is negative (Davenport & Armstrong, 2004). Following this, I assume that the threat of repression, and thereby the perceived costs of participation, follow regime type and that individuals can assess the relative danger of participation through signals from the regime and previous experience.

The potential costs that regime response create, are also dependent on how many other individuals that one can expect to challenge the regime. With many participants and widespread resistance, the risks of participation will be distributed among a larger number of participants (Schock, 2005, p. 165), making the relative risk of participation smaller. Widespread resistance also makes it more difficult for the regime to focus repression on specific groups or activities, further lowering the danger of repression. Scholars have found that individuals are more likely to participate in protests if they expect large numbers of people to participate (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011, p. 35), which strengthens the argument that the number of participants matters. Of course, there are other costs to participation than the threat of repression, but these costs are believed to be relatively small compared to the costs of participation in violent campaigns (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011). Methods of nonviolence are available to large segments of the population, since they typically do not require physical attributes, do not often compromise moral values, and do not require the same level of commitment as violent activities (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011, p. 35ff). Given that there is an inherent motivation to oppose the government, I argue that these factors matter less than the physical risks of participation, but it is important to acknowledge that they exist. Finally, the number of participants can also affect the probability of campaign success (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011), thereby tipping the balance between cost and benefits in the favor of benefits. With a higher probability of success, individuals might accept a higher personal cost of participation.

3.3 Information and participation

The preceding arguments put individual assessments of risks and benefits as the core feature of campaign mobilization. To be able to assess the various conditions affecting the costs and benefits of participation, individuals need information both about the regime's response strategy and other peoples' intentions. In the following section, I will argue that availability and diffusion of information in society are dependent on regime type and that this, in turn, will affect how grievance- and modernization theory perform in explaining the onset of maximalist nonviolent campaigns. With information being the determining factor for participation, the channels where information can be distributed or revealed become important for explaining the emergence of mass nonviolent uprisings.

In society, citizens can gather information from both the public and the private sphere. I define the public sphere as areas where information is openly available and information diffusion is not dependent on explicit interaction with other individuals. Information revealed through the media, political competition or political participation is considered public. Chenoweth and Stephan (2011, p. 35) argue that open political participation can reveal information as to how many people are invested in the cause and thereby increase mobilization. Non-participants witnessing other people participating politically become more aware that their views are more widely shared than previously realized, and thereby action can trigger an expansion in support especially if the regime restricts the expression of political sympathies (Martin & Varney, 2003, p. 220). At the same time, the absence of visible signs of participation can be challenging from a recruitment perspective. As such, the level of open participation can be an important informational factor. Similarly, Edwards (2020) argues that nonviolent campaigns are more likely to erupt in regimes that permit open political participation, as this suggests that the state might accommodate possible demands. Another source of information is the media. Countries with media freedom have a larger flow of news and information that is not subjected to censorship (Stier, 2015). The mass media serves as an information distributor, public agenda-setter, and a watchdog keeping politicians accountable (Norris, 2006). Given the importance of news media, ruling elites could use the media to maintain their position through manipulation, propaganda, or control information streams (Stier, 2015). Equally, a diverse and unregulated press is necessary for effective political opposition, as the dissemination of information can bring groups together around common interests (de Mesquita & Downs, 2005).

In the private sphere, information is distributed through interpersonal networks such as family, kinship, or workplace relations. These informal networks are the most basic structure in the private sphere (Tarrow, 2011, p. 124), and they are central for nonviolence as they shape the ability of challengers to generate mass mobilization (Thurber, 2019). Mobilization is more likely when potential dissidents are linked through social networks than when they are not (Marwell, Oliver & Prahl, 1998). Social networks allow for framing of issues (Tarrow, 2011) creating a joint understanding of the case, coordination, and communication about nonviolent action (Martin & Varney, 2003), and create social rewards and punishments (Thurber, 2019; Gould, 1993) which in turn lowers the costs of participation. In the modern age, such networks can also be digital. Little (2016) argues that social media can alleviate coordination problems, as such platforms distribute information about the number of other possible dissidents and ease difficulties with coordination of action. However, these informal networks are not enough for sustained and resilient mobilization. Formal networks of organization are equally important to generate both horizontal and vertical mobilization. Mobilizing organizations are necessary to coordinate, direct, and support uprisings (Nepstad, 2011), and preexisting formal networks such as churches, volunteer groups, or university clubs can take on such a function to support mobilization. Other than providing resources and structures that can facilitate collective action, these organizations can also serve as spheres independent from the state, where information can be shared.

3.3.1 Regime type

The availability of information is likely to determine whether enough people are willing to take the risks of participation or not. Information is equally important to the state. The state is aware of the collective action problems potential challengers must overcome (Lichbach, 1995, p. 22), and will therefore try to maintain order by making the challenges to mobilization bigger or even demobilize citizens. As this cost-benefit approach assumes that people will respond systematically to changes in incentive structures (Lohmann, 1994, p. 90), attempts to conceal, disrupt, or prohibit information can affect mobilization. Which channels of information and communication are most assessable and important for the citizens, depend on regime type. I distinguish broadly between three regime types: Democracies, anocracies, and authoritarian regimes.

Following Dahl (1971, p. 8), democracy is defined as a regime that is highly inclusive and extensively open to public contestation. This “procedural minimum” definition includes four elements: 1) free, fair, and competitive elections, 2) full adult suffrage, 3) protection of civil

liberties, and 4) absence of nonelected groups that limit the powers to rule given to the elected (Levitsky & Way, 2010, p. 6). Authoritarian regimes are regimes that fail to elect their leaders through free and fair contestation (Gandhi, 2008; Svolik, 2012) and have repressed or suppressed political participation (Goldstone et.al, 2010). Many regimes fall between these two categories. Many hold competitive, albeit not totally free or fair elections, but suppress participation, or have open participation but fail to hold elections (Goldstone et.al, 2010). These intermediate regimes fall in the category anocracies, as they hold some democratic and some authoritarian traits. However, as this category of regimes is heterogeneous (Snyder, 2006), this categorization of regimes fails to account for the diversity of regimes that are labeled as anocracies.

The presented definitions of regime types allow for generalizations as to the relative importance of private and public sources of information across regime types. Authoritarian regimes do not allow widespread political participation or political competition (Gandhi, 2008; Goldstone et.al, 2010), thus limiting the degree of information available from public sources of information. These regimes also have bigger constraints on both traditional and social media through censorship or manipulation of information (Stier, 2015). Following this, I argue that only limited amounts of credible information can be obtained from the public sphere in these regimes, thereby making private sources of information more important for individuals. Democracies, by definition, facilitate both open competition and participation and support free and independent media outlets (Levitsky & Way, 2010). These regimes thereby allow for information to be freely distributed through public channels, decreasing the relative importance of private sources of information. Anocracies inhibit traits from both authoritarian and democratic regimes (Goldstone et.al, 2010), causing individuals to be dependent on both private and public sources of information.

These theoretical arguments are supported by empirical data from V-Dem (Coppedge et.al, 2021a; Coppedge et al, 2021b). When measuring to what extent the government respects press and media freedom, freedom to discuss political matters, and cultural and academic expression freedom, authoritarian regimes score on average 0,17 on a scale from 0-1. The score for anocracies is 0,50, while democracies score on average 0,85 (Coppedge, et.al, 2021). Similarly, authoritarian regimes are much more likely to censor print or broadcast media than anocracies and democracies. On a scale from 0-4, authoritarian regimes get an average score of 0,41, indicating that attempts to censor are routine. Democracies place at the other end of

the scale, with a score of 3,28, while anocracies score 1,59 on average, meaning that they censor some content, but not all.

3.3.2 Effects of grievances and modernization conditioned by regime type

In the previous sections, I have argued that individuals respond to costs and benefits in their decision to participate or not politically. To be able to make an informed choice about costs and benefits, individuals rely on information about both the potential costs imposed by the state and other peoples' intentions. This information can be obtained either through the private or public sphere, and which channels of information are most available for people depend on regime type. In the following section, I will connect this general argument to the grievance-based approach and modernization theory, to show how regime type might condition the relationship these theories propose between grievances and modernization and nonviolent campaign onset.

3.3.2.1 Grievances

Grievance-based approaches argue that socio-economic or political grievances motivate resistance and rebellion (Karakaya, 2018). Theoretical arguments emphasize the importance of discrimination against groups rather than individuals and the relative feeling of injustice rather than objective facts (Cederman, Weidmann & Gleditsch, 2011, Chenoweth & Ulfelder, 2017; Abbs, 2020; Jazayeri, 2016; Cunningham, 2013). These two aspects build upon the ability challengers have to use existing social structures to build group solidarity, both within groups and across diverse social categories, to generate mass mobilization. Nepstad (2011) defines the ability to unite around an "ideology of rebellion" as a necessary condition for rebellions. A similar idea is described through the creation of collective action frames (Schock, 2005) and even further by the ability to create collective identities and mobilize through emotions (Tarrow, 2011, p. 142-143). All these perspectives build upon the fact that grievances must be situated within a critique of the status quo, and that collective identities must be built around a plan of action leading up to an alternative belief system. Importance is put on the fact that individuals must be convinced that the injustices of everyday life can be challenged (Tarrow, 2011, p. 145). Schock (2005, p. 27) describes the process of linking individual interests to the activities, goals, and ideology of a potential movement "frame alignment". This process, however, is dependent on the ability to spread information through a range of different channels or what Nepstad (2011) calls "free spaces". Free spaces are autonomous places that are relatively independent of state influence. Without these spaces,

the opposition will have a difficult time trying to transform individual grievances into collective action.

The availability of the necessary free spaces depends on regime type. In democracies, dissent is tolerated and there is a relatively free flow of information in the public sphere. As such, necessary channels of communication are in place to spread awareness and build common identities. Collective action can be risky in democracies, but the risk of repression is smaller than in other regime types, thereby lowering potential costs. On the other side of the spectrum, we have authoritarian regimes. These regimes have strict control over public information (Nepstad, 2011), and there are fewer venues that are independent of state influence. Following this, it is more difficult for the opposition to create the common group identities that are necessary for mobilization, as individuals cannot be sure that their grievances are shared by a large enough number of people. As the costs of participation are high due to the states' repressive capacity, and the movement has limited access to informational channels necessary for lowering participation costs, grievances should have a smaller effect in autocratic regimes than in anocracies and democracies. Based on this I outline the following hypothesis:

H1: Grievances will have the strongest positive effects on nonviolent campaign onset in democracies compared to anocracies and authoritarian regimes.

3.3.2.2 Modernization

Where grievance-based approaches emphasize injustice as a motivating factor for collective action, modernization theory furthers this perspective by linking grievances to resources. The development of a common "ideology of rebellion" represents a form of symbolic mobilization (Schock, 2005, p. 29), but the actual mobilization depends on structures that can organize resources and people for mass participation. Modernization theory explains how this can happen. As grievance-based approaches, modernization theory argues that grievances in society, especially related to social and political rights, serve as motivation for rebellion. But where grievance theories emphasize marginalized "out-groups" in society, modernization theory relates uprisings to a resourceful emerging middle- and working-class with an increased resource base and strong interconnectedness (Dahlum et.al, 2019). Typical indicators of modernization, such as industrialization, education, and urbanization, all contribute to establishing strong networks both between individuals and between different groups in society. As previously discussed, these networks are necessary for information distribution in the private sphere, and thereby also individual participation.

Conditions related to modernization can affect the relative importance of private and public information sources in a given society. I argue that modernization will have a bigger effect on mobilization in societies where access to public information is scarce or information has low credibility. If individuals do not have access to credible information from the public sphere, information obtained through private networks is likely to be more important for mobilization. As modernization enables the expansion of these networks, and networks are important for mobilization through information diffusion, the relative importance of private versus public sources of information in society can affect how networks influence nonviolent mobilization. Assuming that the main mechanism networks serve is information transmission, I argue that modernization in authoritarian states will have a bigger effect on nonviolent campaign onset than mobilization in anocracies and lastly democracies. The more open a society is, the less important private sources of information are, as individuals can be given the necessary reassurance as to costs and benefits through publicly available information. This leads to the following hypothesis:

H2: Modernization will have stronger positive effects on nonviolent campaign onset in more authoritarian regimes.

4 Data and Research Design

In the preceding chapters, I have argued that the effect of variables related to the grievance approach and modernization theory should vary across regime types, due to how different regimes affect the proposed theoretical relationships between these factors and nonviolent campaign onset. As shown in the literature review, statistical tests of variables connected to these theories produce diverging results as to their explanatory power, and Chenoweth and Ulfelder (2017, p. 318) also find these theories to a large degree fail to predict future campaign onsets. Despite this, I have outlined theoretical reasons as to why this might not be the case, and that structural factors indeed could explain maximalist nonviolent campaigns onsets if the conditioning effect of regime type is accounted for.

In this thesis, I try to enhance the understanding of the relationships between grievances and modernization and the onset of nonviolent campaign onset, through emphasizing the conditioning role of regime type. I build on the general methodological approach used by Chenoweth and Ulfelder (2017), where I test how batteries of variables associated with grievances and modernization impact nonviolent campaign onset. However, I choose a different method. Chenoweth & Ulfelder (2017) set out to assess the predictive, there thereby explanatory, power of the four mobilization theories using forecasting techniques. They find that these theories perform badly in predicting nonviolent campaign onsets, which indicates that the models can be improved for a better understanding of causal relationships (Beck, King & Zeng, 2000). I argue that the proposed causal relationships between grievance- and modernization variables may be conditioned by regime type. Since any relationship between grievance- and modernization variables, conditioned by regime type, are yet not established or systematically explored, I will be using ordinary logistic regression to evaluate the effects of known grievance- and modernization associations on nonviolent campaign onset. This allows for an initial investigation of the potential conditioning effect of regime type, thereby enhancing understanding of the potential causal relationships. In turn, this could lead to more fruitful forecasting models.

In the results section, I will present several separate models for grievances and modernization, both for the full sample of regimes and for subsamples of regime types. I start with a base model accounting only for population size. In the next model, I add operationalizations of

either grievances or modernization and test the relationships between these variables and nonviolent campaign onset. In the third model, I add control variables to the grievance or modernization variables. These models also include cubic polynomials to account for time-dependency. Finally, in the extended controls models, I add variables accounting for time trends and geography. Each of these models will include separate calculations for democracies, anocracies, and authoritarian regimes, as well as calculations on the full sample. Through this method, I can compare directions and significance levels to be able to assess the level of support for the presented hypotheses. This section proceeds in the following way: firstly, I will describe the dependent and independent variables, before moving on to regime type as a conditional factor. Next, I present the chosen control variables. This chapter ends with a discussion of logistic regression, diagnostics, and the challenges associated with binary-time-series-cross-section data.

Unit of analysis

To test the presented hypotheses, I will be using the replication dataset provided by Chenoweth and Ulfelder (2017). This dataset contains a range of variables related to the four structural theories and provides a measure of nonviolent campaign onset from the Major Episodes of Contention dataset (Chenoweth, 2015). The independent variables are collected from a range of different sources, such as The World Bank and the Political Instability Taskforce (PITF)[2]. The replication dataset forms a panel of countries spanning from 1955-2013, with a total of 8402 country-years.

[2] More information about data sources for specific variables can be found in Chenoweth and Ulfelder (2017).

4.1 Description of variables

Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics

Continuous variables

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std.Dev.	Min	Max
Poverty	7980	-.18	.952	-2.714	1.809
Economic growth	6671	1.557	1.747	-7.879	12.246
Inflation	5999	5.981	3.376	0	34.593
Leader's tenure	7987	1.593	1.017	0	3.892
Discrimination	7972	.064	.148	0	.89
Urbanization	7964	3.692	.67	.767	4.71
Industrialization	7967	14.368	7.405	-6.513	45.666
Education	7967	52.784	34.596	-52.981	160.619
Communication technology	8127	1.081	1.713	0	5.374
Population	7650	15.906	1.59	11.689	21.029
Youth Bulge	7886	.181	.027	.082	.28
Regional contagion	8402	.297	.464	0	1.946
Organizational learning	7847	.348	.661	0	4.407

Dummy variables

Variable	Obs	0	1	%0	%1
Nonviolent campaign onset	8224	8054	170	97.93	2.07
Salient elite ethnicity	7988	4819	3169	60.33	39.67
Trade liberalization	8163	3002	5161	36.78	63.22
Ongoing domestic campaign	8402	7987	415	95.96	4.94
Commitment to human rights	8172	5638	2534	68.99	31.01
Election year	8074	6059	2015	75.04	24.96

Dependent variable

The dependent variable is a measure of maximalist nonviolent episode onset, as identified by the MEC dataset (Chenoweth, 2015). A maximalist nonviolent episode onset is defined as "a series of observable, continuous, coordinated purposive mass events in pursuit of a political objective" (Chenoweth & Ulfelder, 2017, p. 310). To qualify as an onset, each episode must involve more than one event with at least 1000 observed participants occurring within a week of another. In addition to this, the main tactic of contention must be nonviolent, and there

must be evidence of coordination across events. An episode, or onset, is registered annually and dichotomously – that is, either it happens or not – for every country worldwide with a population of at least 500,000 in 2010, from 1955 until 2013 (Chenoweth & Ulfelder 2017, p. 310-311). The dataset identifies 170 country-years between 1955 and 2013 in which an onset occurred, which amounts to 2 percent of the total observations.

The dependent variable is a dichotomous variable, where the value 1 indicates an onset and the value 0 indicates that there was no onset for each country-year. As many nonviolent tactics, such as strikes, protests, and boycotts, are designed to directly affect the regime by removing it from its sources of power (Sharp, 2005), some explanatory variables might also be affected by the onset of a maximalist nonviolent campaign. This is especially relevant for economic measures since the economy is very likely to be affected by social unrest (Sharp, 2005). The onset of nonviolent campaigns might also generate, or reveal, grievances throughout society as dissent usually triggers repression in some form (Chenoweth, Perkoski & Kang, 2017), which in turn could cause new campaigns to arise. Because some of the explanatory variables might be affected by a campaign onset, the dependent variable measures whether there was a campaign start in the next year (t+1) to avoid problems with reverse causality.

The following bar graphs show how nonviolent campaign onsets cluster in time and geography. Figure 1 shows that most campaign onsets in the dataset happened in the 1980s and the 2000s. The bar graph also shows that the number of nonviolent campaigns has been increasing over time. Figure 2 shows how nonviolent campaign onsets places across regions, with Europe and Eurasia being the region with the most onsets. However, the number of onsets is quite similar across all regions.



Figure 1 Nonviolent campaign onsets over decade



Figure 2 Nonviolent campaign onsets across geographical regions

Independent variables – grievance model

To test hypothesis 1, that grievances will have the strongest effect on nonviolent campaign onset in democracies compared to anocracies and authoritarian regimes, I will be using six of the seven indicators of grievances provided by Chenoweth and Ulfelder (2017). These indicators represent underlying factors that are believed to generate grievances in society and thereby motivate rebellion. The variables capture both political and economic grievances in society.

The first common indicator of grievances is state-led discrimination. Researchers argue that discrimination against groups in society, be it by ethnic, religious, or gender categories, can generate a sense of perceived injustice and thereby motivate participation in uprisings (Cederman, Weidmann & Gleditsch, 2011; Cunningham 2013; Jazayeri, 2016, Dahl et.al, 2020). The indicator for state-led discrimination is produced for the PITF by the Center for Systemic Peace (CSP)[3] and measures the percentage of the population experiencing state-led discrimination in a given country-year. The replication dataset also includes a categorical variable for discrimination, where any percentage of discrimination is coded as 1 and no discrimination is coded as 0. I choose to use the original variable, as theoretically one would expect that the size of the group being discriminated against would matter for the prospects of mobilization, especially for nonviolent tactics (Cunningham, 2013; Thurber, 2018).

The reasoning behind the state-led discrimination variable implies that more heterogeneous countries will have more conflict, as some groups necessarily will be better off than others, especially for countries that are ethnically diverse (Chenoweth & Ulfelder, 2017). But heterogeneity does not necessarily imply conflict. Abbs (2020) find that diverse environments are an obstacle to wide nonviolent mobilization, rather than an enabling factor, suggesting that diverse communities not necessarily are more likely to experience nonviolent conflict. This implies that heterogeneity is not conducive for nonviolent mobilization but can become a mobilizing factor if elite ethnicity is a salient political issue. Following Chenoweth & Ulfelder (2017) I, therefore, include a categorical measure of the political salience of elite ethnicity from the PITF, where countries experiencing ethnic domination by one group over others are expected to have a higher degree of grievances, thus increasing the probability of a nonviolent uprising.

[3] CSP does not post these datasets in full online, but they might be available upon request. This applies to all variables from the PITF. This was established through personal communication with Jay Ulfelder.

Where state-led discrimination and salient elite ethnicity account for social and political grievances, the next three indicators capture economic grievances. Poverty and poor economic performance are common indicators of economic grievances (Chenoweth & Ulfelder, 2017; Gleditsch & Rivera, 2017), and it is argued that the distribution of wealth could increase dissatisfaction with the status quo, especially if perceived as unfair by groups in society (Cederman, Weidmann & Gleditsch, 2011), or if a population feels they are worse off than other similar countries. Conflict can also arise if the generated grievances are widespread and affect a large part of the population (Abbs, 2020). Economic grievances are captured by measures of poverty, inflation, and economic growth. As, theoretically, one would not expect a linear impact by these variables, these variables have either been logged or square root transformed[4]. This also helps reduce the influence of outlying values.

Poverty is measured as the infant mortality rate relative to the annual global median. Even though this variable does not capture in-country differences between groups, it does reveal information about the general situation in a country relative to other countries. This variable comes from PITF and is log-transformed. Next, I include a measure of inflation to account for possible grievances arising from high prices on important goods. Abbs (2020) argues that sharp increases in domestic food prices can generate widespread grievances that impact consumers from all social groups, as affordable food is a basic need for all consumers. Inflation is captured through changes in the World Banks' consumer price index, which measures average changes in the prices of representative baskets of goods and services purchased by a typical household (World Bank, 2013). This variable is square root transformed. The last indicator of economic grievances is economic growth. Slow economic growth might cause grievances directly, as it can create fewer employment opportunities and restrict the states' ability to finance social programs (Chenoweth & Ulfelder, 2017). Economic growth is operationalized through year-to-year percentage change in gross domestic product, from the World Bank (2013) indicators. This variable is square root transformed.

The final two indicators of grievances identified by Chenoweth and Ulfelder (2017) are leader's tenure and repression. When a leader has occupied office for an abnormally long period of time, such regimes should become more and more unpopular especially as younger generations start to question regime legitimacy (Chenoweth & Ulfelder, 2017, p. 303). Leader

[4] Following Chenoweth & Ulfelder (2017).

tenure is a variable produced by CSP for the PITF and captures the length of each leaders' years in office. Since the variable has values from 1 to 49, where most cases place on the lower levels of years in office, I use a logged transformed version of the variable to reduce the impact of outlying values[5]. Finally, Chenoweth and Ulfelder (2017) use the Cingranelli-Richards physical integrity (CIRI) index to proxy for repression (Cignarelli, Richards & Clay, 2014). Even though repression certainly can cause grievances in the population, I have chosen to exclude this variable in the main models as including it causes a large drop in observations[6].

Independent variables – modernization model

Hypothesis 2 posits that the positive effect of modernization on nonviolent campaign onset will be stronger the more authoritarian the regime is. Where variables related to the grievance-based approach to a large degree explain the "why" of mobilization, i.e., motivation, modernization theory also contributes with an explanation of how. Modernization is believed to be related to uprisings through economic development, which in turn creates social transformations that affect both grievances in society and individual and group resources (Chenoweth & Ulfelder, 2017, p. 306). Economic development causes the emergence of a new middle class, increased literacy rates, value changes, as well as urbanization, and industrialization (Chenoweth & Ulfelder, 2017; Karakaya, 2018). Chenoweth & Ulfelder (2017) identify five variables that are closely associated with modernization theory: industrialization, urbanization, education, communication, and trade liberalization. The first four variables are all based on data from the World Bank (2013), while trade liberalization is coded by Chenoweth & Ulfelder (2017).

Industrialization is one of the most common variables associated with modernization theory, as it is closely tied to the emergence of urban working and middle classes (Huber, Rueschemeyer & Stephens, 1993; Chenoweth & Ulfelder, 2017). Industrialization refers to the process where an economy moves from being primarily based on agriculture towards being based on the manufacturing of goods. High levels of manufacturing allow for the creation of urban networks, links between these networks, and economic interdependence with the state (Butcher & Svensson, 2016, p. 317). Following this, industrialized countries should have a higher probability of nonviolent campaign onset, as information can diffuse

[5] Following Chenoweth & Ulfelder (2017).
[6] The global sample is reduced from 5261 to 3743, the authoritarian sample from 1232 to 811, the anocracy sample from 1359 to 987 and the democratic sample from 2383 to 1945.

through these networks, and the close interdependence with the state makes this sector an effective vessel for nonviolent tactics. Chenoweth and Ulfelder (2017) operationalize industrialization as manufacturing and services as a percentage of GDP. However, as the service- and manufacturing industries might not exhibit the same effects, and have different developments in each country, I choose to follow Butcher and Svensson (2016) and only use the World Bank's measure of value-added manufacturing as a proportion of GDP, as the relative importance of manufacturing in the economy indicates the level of industrialization.

Closely related to industrialization is urbanization. Having an urban population is important to achieve success through nonviolent methods (Dahl et.al, 2020), and equally as important to overcome collective action problems. The resources and networks available in cities make it easier to mobilize (Abbs, 2020; Chenoweth & Ulfelder, 2017; Gleditsch & Rivera, 2017), thereby making nonviolent uprisings more likely. I, therefore, include a variable that measures urban population as a percentage of the total population[7]. The third variable associated with modernization theory is education. Education spreads liberal and peaceful norms (Karakaya, 2018, p. 323), making it more likely that the population turns to nonviolent methods. Dahlum (2019) finds that movements consisting of highly educated individuals, especially students, are more likely than others to choose nonviolent methods. As an indicator of educational level in the population, I will use the rate of secondary school enrollment[8]. Enrollment in secondary school marks the completion of basic education at the primary level and lays the foundation for lifelong learning and human development through more specialized education. A more educated population is also thought to increase the probability of nonviolent campaigns because individuals have access to information about how to employ nonviolence in effective ways (Chenoweth & Ulfelder, 2017).

Access to technology can also help lower collective action problems, through distributing information both about the state of the world and coordination of actual events (Little, 2016; Chenoweth & Ulfelder, 2017). As the Internet and social media have become increasingly important for younger generations across the world, access to mobile phones can be an important instrument for communicating grievances and coordination in an anti-regime campaign. Access to technology is operationalized through mobile cellular subscriptions per 100 people. This variable is logged. Finally, Chenoweth and Ulfelder (2017, p. 307) include a self-coded categorical variable indicating if countries are a signatory to the General

[7] Values on this variable has been imputed by Chenoweth and Ulfelder (2017)
[8] Values on this variable has been imputed by Chenoweth and Ulfelder (2017)

Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (after 1994) or a member of the World Trade Organization, to proxy for a state's participation in the liberal international order. They expect international linkages to foster a preference for liberal norms, which in turn should increase opportunities for civil resistance. Furthermore, countries integrated into the international system should behave with more constraint as to use violence against unarmed civilians, thus creating possibilities for dissent.

Conditional variable – Regime type

To be able to test if different regimes moderate how grievances and modernization affect the probability of nonviolent campaign onset, it is necessary to differentiate between regime types. For this purpose, the polity2 indicator from POLITY IV will be used. This indicator assigns all countries with a score ranging from -10 (strongly autocratic) to 10 (strongly democratic) based on regulation and openness of participation and executive recruitment, and constraints on the chief executive (Marshall, Jaggers & Gurr, 2013). Following conventional coding rules, values ranging from -10 to -6 are classified as authoritarian regimes, -5 to 5 as anocracies, and 6 till 10 as democracies. There are 64 onsets in authoritarian regimes, 61 in anocracies, and 40 in democratic regimes in the period between 1955 and 2013.

These thresholds are used by researchers connected to the Center for Systemic Peace; however, this does not necessarily mean that they capture what a democracy, anocracy, or authoritarian regime is in the real world. Even though pure democracies or authoritarian states are relatively easy to identify, most countries inhibit traits from both these pure regime types, putting them in the ambiguous "anocracy" category. However, the limits of this category vary from dataset to dataset, and even from research article to research article. Comparing three different measures of regime type, that is Polity, Varieties of democracy (V-dem), and his own democracy measure, Vanhanen (2000) finds that countries with some democratic and autocratic traits can be coded as both democracies and anocracies, depending on which underlying factors the regime classification is based on. Bogaards (2012) finds at least 18 different thresholds for separating democracies from non-democracies in research based on the polity measures, clearly showing that there is no definite line. This can be problematic, as it is difficult to assess the conditioning effect of regime type on explanatory variables if the regime measure is not necessarily the best to capture these anocratic regimes. If the democratic threshold is set to low, effects that should have been amounted to the anocratic regime type will appear in democracies and opposite for too high thresholds.

To address this potential problem, I run robustness tests on all models conditioning on an alternative measure of regime type, the Regimes of the World variable from V-Dem (Coppedge et.al, 2021a). The robustness tests show that the chosen thresholds and operationalizations of regime type matter for which effects one gets and in what regime type. RoW identifies four regime types – closed autocracies, electoral autocracies, electoral democracies, and liberal democracies – based on de facto implementation of democratic institutions and processes (Lührmann, Tannenberg & Lindberg, 2018). When using this categorization, there are 60 onsets in closed autocracies, 74 onsets in electoral autocracies, 28 onsets in electoral democracies, and only 3 onsets in liberal democracies.

Control variables

In the previous sections, I have operationalized variables capturing conditions related to grievances and modernization that could affect nonviolent campaign onsets. However, there are many other possible explanations as to what drives nonviolent mobilization that may be correlated with grievances or modernization. Following this, I include control variables that might interfere with the relationship between grievance and modernization variables and nonviolent campaign onset. Chenoweth and Ulfelder (2017) find that operationalizations of both the political opportunity approach and resource mobilization theory perform better than both grievance theories and modernization theory in predicting nonviolent campaign onsets. I, therefore, include a range of different variables related to these theories, that have been found to affect the probability of nonviolent campaign onsets and thereby represent potential alternative explanations of nonviolent mass mobilization.

All models include a logged measure of population size based on data from the World Bank (2013) to control for the fact that countries with bigger populations have a bigger mobilization pool, and thereby are more likely to reach the critical threshold of 1000 participants as needed for a nonviolent campaign onset to be coded. It is also reasonable to expect that larger populations on average experience more grievances than smaller populations. Modernizing countries also experience rapid population growth, where improving conditions cause a drop in death rates while birth rates are still high. Population size has also been shown to make nonviolent campaign onsets more likely (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011)[9].

Movements towards more democratic norms and ideals can support uprisings (Karakaya, 2018; Edwards, 2020), as this creates opportunities for mobilization and lowers the risks of

[9] Dahl et. al (2020) does not find that population size affects nonviolent mobilization.

participation. A more open society allows for information to be shared publicly, thus possibly affecting both grievance- and modernization variables. To control for the new participatory possibilities arising from a more lenient attitude from the state, I include a measure of commitment to human rights from Chenoweth and Ulfelder (2017), measured as a categorical variable identifying if the country is a signatory to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights' First Optional Protocol. This gives citizens the right to petition relevant international bodies for redress in cases where civil or political rights are being threatened (Chenoweth & Ulfelder, 2017, p. 308).

Next, I control for the presence of an election. Elections have been shown to increase the probability of a nonviolent campaign onset (Butcher & Svensson, 2016; Karakaya, 2018; Abbs, 2020), as elections provide an opportunity to organize and participate politically (Braithwaite et.al, 2015). If rigged or stolen, elections can also provide the basis for resistance (Butcher & Svensson, 2016) as election fraud might generate grievances in the population. Similarly, grievances in the population might force the regime to hold elections to satisfy oppositional forces. The presence of an election is measured through a binary indicator from the National Elections Across Democracy and Autocracy dataset (NELDA), showing whether there was an executive, legislative, or constituent assembly election during the year (Hyde & Marinov, 2012).

Nonviolent campaign onsets are more likely when challengers can learn from and get inspired by ongoing campaigns in other countries (Braithwaite et.al, 2015; Butcher & Svensson, 2016; Cunningham et.al, 2017; Gleditsch & Rivera, 2017, Chenoweth & Ulfelder, 2017). Regional contagion can make individuals aware of possibilities that they were previously not aware of, such as grievances or mobilizing networks, thereby making nonviolent campaign onsets more likely. I, therefore, include a variable measuring the logged number of nonviolent campaigns that began in the same region the previous year, from the MEC dataset (Chenoweth, 2015). The variable is logged[10] due to the relative impact of changes in the number of neighboring campaigns. As the change from 0 campaigns present to 1 campaign present probably has more impact on learning and emulation than the change from 3 to 4 campaigns, using a logged measure makes theoretical sense.

Where an ongoing campaign in the region might spur mobilization, an already ongoing maximalist campaign in a country might suppress further mobilization. Since the type of

[10] Following Chenoweth & Ulfelder (2017)

protest movements investigate here exhibit maximalist goals, it is rather unlikely to have several ongoing campaigns at the same time, as these inherently must have different maximalist goals. The participation and time thresholds for nonviolent maximalist campaigns put further constraints on the possibilities for several ongoing campaigns at the same time, as campaigns must overcome a certain threshold of participants, something which is unlikely if parts of the population are otherwise engaged (Chenoweth & Ulfelder, 2017). Nevertheless, there are examples of new campaign starts during ongoing campaigns, and I, therefore, include a categorical measure from Chenoweth (2015) indicating whether there is an ongoing campaign in a given country-year.

Nonviolent campaigns are more successful when they have a large number of participants (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011). Chenoweth and Ulfelder (2017) argue that due to this, campaigns should be more likely to emerge where a large proportion of the population are youth. This argument fits well with modernization arguments, as young people are more likely to be both dissatisfied with the status quo as the world modernizes and are more likely to have the resources necessary to participate in what often is high-risk activities (Goldstone, 2011; Joffe, 2011; LaGraffe, 2012). I, therefore, include a variable based on data from the World Bank (2013), capturing the percentage of the population between the ages of 14 to 24, as a larger relative size of youth in the population should lead to a higher probability of nonviolent campaigns.

Finally, I include a variable measuring organizational learning, that is the logged sum of previous riots and protests retrieved from the Banks and Wilson (2013) data. This variable captures previous experience with social unrest, as it is plausible that previous experience, in the same way as regional contagion, provides both experience and material resources that can make the onset of a new campaign more likely (Chenoweth & Ulfelder, 2017).

In the extended controls models, I also include two variables to control for possible effects of time and geography. Firstly, I include a binary indicator to indicate the end of the Cold War period. The period after the Cold War is associated with both higher counts of mass protests and democratization (Braithwaite et.al, 2015), which suggests that the likelihood for nonviolent campaign onset might be higher in this period. I also control for unobserved effects of geography through a dummy-set indicating which region each country belongs to.

When controlling for confounding explanations as to which factors affect the dependent variable, one always walks a thin line between omitted variable biases and post-treatment

biases, either of which could influence the results (Aklin & Bayer, 2017). We wish to include "all" relevant variables that might affect both the independent and dependent variables to ensure that the main estimates do not capture the effects of unmeasured confounding factors. However, one needs sound theoretical reasoning for the causal sequence of the variables that are being included to avoid biases. If a variable mediates the relationship between the main independent variables and the dependent variables, not including this variable would cause omitted variable bias, whereas including the variable would lead to post-treatment bias, meaning that it is casually following the main independent variables. Post-treatment bias is problematic because mathematically, control variables could "soak up" the effects of the interesting independent variable (King, 2010).

Several of the included control variables could cause post-treatment biases. The most obvious one is the inclusion of organizational learning. As grievances arguably increase the probability of protests, which in turn would generate experience with these activities, organizational learning mediates the relationship between grievances and nonviolent campaign onset. Similarly, modernization theory argues that social transformation will cause social unrest in all scales, again causing organizational learning to mediate the relationship between modernization and nonviolent campaign onset. To address this issue, I run models for grievance- and modernization variables both with and without control variables.

4.2 Logistic regression

The outcome of interest in this thesis is whether we see a nonviolent campaign onset in a given country-year or not. As the dependent variable is dichotomous, the method of choice is logistic regression. The logistic regression model gives the calculated probability that the dependent variable will have the value 1 (i.e., that the desired outcome is present), given the values on the explanatory variables (Mehmetoglu & Jakobsen, 2017, p. 162). As the logit model uses maximum likelihood rather than let squares, the interpretation of the coefficients is a bit trickier, as the logit shows the change in the natural logarithm of the odds for Y=1 for one-step change in the independent variables.

When using logistic regression, four assumptions must be met to ensure unbiased estimates of the logit parameters:

1. The model must be correctly specified, that is, the logit of Y is a linear function of the X-variables.

2. No important variables must be left out and no unnecessary variables included in the model.
3. Each observation needs to be independent of the other observations.
4. None of the explanatory variables must be a linear function of the other x-variables, as this will result in multicollinearity.

(Mehmetoglu & Jakobsen, 2017, p. 167-168)

To ensure that the logit of Y is a linear function of the X-variables, one can transform the x-variables that do not have a linear relationship with the logit (Mehmetoglu & Jakobsen, 2017, p. 167). As previously discussed, many of these variables should theoretically have different effects depending on the value on the X-variable, a one-unit increase has different effects for different values, causing the relationship between the Logit and the independent variable to be non-linear. Because of this, several of the variables have been logged transformed or square root transformed (for variables with negative values). Transforming the variables can also help reduce the influence of influential cases, which can cause problems in logistic regression.

The second assumption that no important variables should be left out and no unnecessary included is probably breached throughout all models. This is a problem when the goal is to produce the best possible model for assessing the "true" relationship between X and Y, as one usually would when doing hypotheses testing. However, since I am aiming to assess the explanatory power of several variables related to different theories rather than specifying a perfect model, I do not see it as especially problematic that this assumption is breached. Identification of causal relationships is therefore not the main concern, rather I am aiming for reasonably descriptive associations across regime types.

As the data used in this thesis are time-series-cross-section data (TSCS), that is a small or moderate number of units recorded at several time points (Mehmetoglu & Jakobsen, 2017, p. 252), the assumption that observations should be independent of each other are breached. TSCS observations are likely to temporally dependent (Beck, Katz & Tucker, 1998), creating an autocorrelation problem. In addition to this, it is reasonable to assume that there can be correlations across panels (countries) (Mehmetoglu & Jakobsen, 2017, p. 255). Each country and time are unique, and we can have an issue with unobserved heterogeneity (Karakaya, 2018, p. 324).

To account for possible time dependence, I include cubic polynomials in all models that include control variables and extended control variables (Carter & Signorino, 2010). These

variables were generated through the binary-time-series-cross-section (BTSCS) software in Stata (Beck, Katz & Tucker, 1998). To relax the assumption that observations are independent of each other, it is possible to use robust standard errors (Mehmetoglu & Jakobsen, 2017, p. 235). However, the model must be correctly specified to obtain correct estimations when using robust standard errors (King & Roberts, 2015). Since most of the presented models will have omitted variables, I choose to run the models without robust standard errors to avoid incorrect estimates.

The final assumption is that none of the explanatory variables are linear functions of other X-variables. In essence, this means that one should not include several x-variables that measure the same phenomenon. This is an important assumption to test, as it is not unlikely that some of the grievance or modernization variables are quite similar, as they tap into the same theoretical dimensions. Throughout the modeling process, I have excluded variables showing signs of multicollinearity through problematic values in the variance inflation factor (VIF) or tolerance values. Generally, tolerance values under 0,2 are a cause for concern, while values under 0,1 almost certainly indicate a serious problem (Menard, 2002). Consequently, these variables have been dropped from the final models, and the final models show no evidence of serious multicollinearity problems.

5 Results

This section presents the results of my analyses. The first models I present test the relationship between grievance-based indicators and nonviolent campaign onset across different regime types. Then I proceed with the results from models testing the relationship between modernization and nonviolent campaign onset conditioned by regime type. Finally, I discuss extensions and robustness tests.

5.1 Grievances

Table 5.1: Grievances

	Base	Grievance	Authoritarian	Anocracy	Democracy
Campaign Onset					
Poverty		0.333***	0.0128	-0.273	0.714***
		(3.02)	(0.04)	(-1.59)	(3.70)
Economic growth		0.00764	-0.000595	-0.0738	0.186
		(0.13)	(-0.01)	(-0.95)	(1.07)
Inflation		0.0413	-0.0474	0.0693*	0.136**
		(1.47)	(-0.82)	(1.70)	(2.14)
Leader's tenure		0.258***	0.679***	0.156	0.0323
		(2.64)	(3.03)	(1.03)	(0.15)
Discrimination		-0.445	-1.836	-1.059	4.441**
		(-0.54)	(-0.83)	(-0.93)	(2.47)
Salient elite ethnicity		0.441**	-0.345	0.323	0.599
		(2.16)	(-0.81)	(1.07)	(1.53)
Population	0.394***	0.370***	0.525***	0.491***	0.295***
	(7.86)	(6.33)	(4.10)	(4.12)	(2.98)
Constant	-10.37***	-10.73***	-13.49***	-11.94***	-10.62***
	(-12.15)	(-10.28)	(-6.06)	(-5.65)	(-5.68)
Observations	7284	5233	1355	1358	2520

t statistics in parentheses
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 5.1 shows the results from five different logistic regression models testing the effect of population size and grievance variables on the probability of nonviolent campaign onset across a full sample of regimes (Grievances) and three subsamples of regimes (Authoritarian, Anocracy, and Democracy). Several variables show a significant relationship with nonviolent campaign onset, and effects and statistical significance differ across the different samples. Poverty significantly increases the probability of a nonviolent campaign onset in the full sample of regimes, however when looking at subsamples of regimes this effect is only significant in democratic countries. Economic growth does not significantly affect campaign onset in any of the models. Inflation has a positive and significant effect in anocracies (only 0.1) with the strongest effects in democracies. Leader's tenure significantly increases the probability of a nonviolent campaign onset in the full sample of regimes and authoritarian regimes. The relationship between discrimination and nonviolent campaign onset is only significant in democracies, where discrimination makes nonviolent campaign onsets more likely. The last grievance-variable, salient elite ethnicity, is only significant in the full sample of regimes, where elite ethnicity as a salient political issue makes campaign onset more likely. Finally, population size makes nonviolent campaign onsets more likely in all samples.

Table 5.2: Grievances including control variables

	Grievance and controls	Authoritarian	Anocracy	Democracy
Campaignstart				
Poverty	0.267*	-0.318	-0.241	0.800***
	(1.95)	(-0.88)	(-1.16)	(2.79)
Economic growth	0.0498	0.148	-0.0504	0.212
	(0.80)	(1.10)	(-0.61)	(1.22)
Inflation	0.0293	-0.115*	0.0676	0.112
	(0.91)	(-1.66)	(1.47)	(1.51)
Leader's tenure	0.317***	0.671***	0.161	-0.0200
	(3.11)	(2.85)	(1.03)	(-0.08)
Discrimination	-0.402	-0.805	-1.155	4.912***
	(-0.49)	(-0.35)	(-0.99)	(2.61)
Salient elite ethnicity	0.407**	-0.657	0.356	0.212
	(1.98)	(-1.37)	(1.14)	(0.52)
Population	0.293***	0.583***	0.454***	0.221*
	(4.28)	(3.62)	(3.45)	(1.68)
Ongoing domestic campaign	-0.501	-1.681*	-0.145	-0.503
	(-1.37)	(-1.82)	(-0.29)	(-0.69)
Commitment to human rights	0.296	1.076**	0.150	0.635
	(1.35)	(2.11)	(0.46)	(1.33)
Election year	0.444**	0.154	0.448	0.655*
	(2.25)	(0.35)	(1.50)	(1.79)
Youth Bulge	4.927	12.27	1.624	-8.029
	(0.96)	(1.20)	(0.21)	(-0.73)
Regional contagion	0.483***	0.991***	0.271	0.341
	(2.59)	(3.01)	(0.91)	(0.89)
Organizational learning	0.363***	0.435*	0.0951	0.517**
	(2.91)	(1.70)	(0.46)	(2.26)
Constant	-10.66***	-16.64***	-12.02***	-8.193**
	(-6.58)	(-4.61)	(-4.35)	(-2.54)
Observations	5217	1352	1350	2515

t statistics in parentheses
Cubic polynomials are included in estimations.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

In Table 5.2, I introduce control variables that correlate with both the grievance variables and nonviolent campaign onset. After controlling for other possible explanations, the relationships between grievances and nonviolent campaign onsets are fairly similar, with a few exceptions. Both poverty and discrimination are still positively and significantly related to nonviolent campaign onset in the full sample and the democratic sample of regimes, while the effects of economic growth have not changed. The effect of inflation has changed across regime subsamples, where inflation now significantly reduces the probability of a nonviolent

campaign onset in the authoritarian subsample. Finally, both salient elite ethnicity and leader's tenure significantly increases the probability of nonviolent campaign onset in the full sample, and for leader's tenure this effect is also present in authoritarian regimes.

Moving on to the control variables, population size is still positively and significantly related to campaign onset across all models, though the effect has become less significant in the democratic subsample. An ongoing domestic campaign significantly reduces the probability of a nonviolent campaign onset in authoritarian regimes. In the authoritarian subsample, countries that show commitment to human rights are more likely than countries that do not experience a nonviolent campaign onset. The presence of an election significantly increases the probability of a nonviolent campaign onset when not conditioning on regime type. For subsamples of regimes, this relationship only holds for democracies. Youth bulges show no significant effects on nonviolent campaign onset in any of the models. The presence of an ongoing campaign in the region makes a nonviolent campaign onset significantly more likely in the full sample of regimes and authoritarian regimes. Finally, organizational learning increases the probability of campaign onset in both the full, authoritarian, and democratic subsample, with the most significant relationship in democratic regimes.

Table 5.3: Grievances including control variables and extended control variables

	Grievance and controls	Authoritarian	Anocracy	Democracy
Campaign Onset				
Poverty	0.728***	0.204	0.0289	1.772***
	(3.67)	(0.39)	(0.09)	(4.08)
Economic growth	0.0142	0.115	-0.0644	0.151
	(0.23)	(0.82)	(-0.76)	(0.88)
Inflation	0.0728*	-0.0252	0.0990*	0.241**
	(1.67)	(-0.29)	(1.83)	(2.05)
Leader's tenure	0.358***	0.738***	0.219	0.0564
	(3.33)	(2.92)	(1.32)	(0.22)
Discrimination	-0.183	-1.232	-1.159	3.908*
	(-0.20)	(-0.49)	(-0.87)	(1.77)
Salient elite ethnicity	0.363*	-0.778	0.379	0.100
	(1.72)	(-1.43)	(1.13)	(0.24)
Population	0.239***	0.636***	0.420***	0.140
	(3.35)	(3.20)	(3.20)	(0.95)
Ongoing domestic campaign	-0.550	-1.827*	-0.259	-0.696
	(-1.49)	(-1.91)	(-0.50)	(-0.92)
Commitment to human rights	0.493**	1.278**	0.0772	1.459**
	(2.03)	(2.22)	(0.22)	(2.52)

Election year	0.449**	0.242	0.437	0.658*
	(2.26)	(0.55)	(1.45)	(1.78)
Youth Bulge	1.323	17.17	-1.259	-19.88
	(0.23)	(1.40)	(-0.14)	(-1.49)
Regional contagion	0.484**	0.794**	0.309	0.296
	(2.55)	(2.30)	(1.02)	(0.74)
Organizational learning	0.320**	0.408	0.0604	0.298
	(2.52)	(1.56)	(0.29)	(1.22)
Post-cold war	-0.509*	-0.796	-0.289	-1.619**
	(-1.66)	(-1.31)	(-0.60)	(-2.06)
Americas	-0.175	-0.788	-0.0513	-0.283
	(-0.42)	(-0.77)	(-0.07)	(-0.39)
East Asia & Pacific	0.0815	-0.772	-0.714	0.930
	(0.20)	(-0.74)	(-0.99)	(1.19)
Africa	-1.200***	-1.485	-1.033	-2.219**
	(-2.58)	(-1.34)	(-1.28)	(-2.21)
Middle East & North Africa	-0.241	-2.112*	-0.179	2.276*
	(-0.53)	(-1.91)	(-0.23)	(1.79)
South & Central Asia	-0.0634	-0.942	-0.0223	0.533
	(-0.14)	(-0.65)	(-0.03)	(0.59)
Constant	-8.763***	-17.57***	-10.49***	-4.620
	(-5.20)	(-3.85)	(-3.75)	(-1.38)
Observations	5217	1352	1350	2515

t statistics in parentheses
Cubic polynomials are included in estimations
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 5.3 adds additional control variables for time and region that capture effects of unobserved conditions specific to time periods or regions. The effect of poverty on nonviolent campaign onset is robust, showing a positive and significant relationship in both the full sample and in democratic regimes. Economic growth is still not significantly related to nonviolent campaign onset in any models, while the effects of inflation are similar to the effects found in Table 5.1, with positive and significant effects in the full, anocratic, and democratic sample, however not highly significant. The effect of leader's tenure and salient elite ethnicity is consistent with previous models, while the positive effect of discrimination in democratic regimes has lost some significance compared to the previous models.

Moving on to the control variables, population size is still significantly related to campaign onset, but the significant effect is no longer present in democratic regimes. Commitment to human rights significantly increases the probability of a nonviolent campaign onset in all samples, except for anocracies. As in Table 5.2, the presence of an election increases the probability of nonviolent campaign onset in the full sample of regimes and democratic

regimes. The effect of youth bulges is still not significant across all models, while regional contagion shows the same effects as in previous models. Finally, organizational learning makes nonviolent campaign onset significantly more likely in the full sample of regimes but has lost significance in the authoritarian subsample.

The post-cold war period is significantly less likely than the cold-war period to have a nonviolent campaign onset in the full sample of regimes and democratic countries. As for regions, Africa is significantly less likely than Europe and Eurasia to have a nonviolent campaign onset in the global sample. For the authoritarian subsample, the MENA area is significantly less likely than the comparative category to have a campaign onset, while there are no significant differences in regions in the anocratic subsample. Finally, Africa is significantly less likely than Europe and Eurasia and the MENA area significantly more likely than Europe and Eurasia to experience a nonviolent campaign onset in the democratic subsample.

5.2 Modernization

Table 5.4: Modernization

	Base	Modernization	Authoritarian	Anocracy	Democracy
Campaign Onset					
Urbanization		-0.0993	0.0870	0.188	-1.130***
		(-0.52)	(0.27)	(0.55)	(-2.91)
Industrialization		0.0107	0.00475	0.0248	0.0102
		(0.84)	(0.25)	(1.13)	(0.34)
Education		-0.00376	0.0178**	0.00411	-0.00595
		(-0.88)	(2.38)	(0.57)	(-0.67)
Communication technology		0.148**	-0.269*	0.240***	0.376***
		(2.54)	(-1.92)	(2.63)	(3.26)
Trade liberalization		0.119	0.858***	0.505	-1.403***
		(0.59)	(2.90)	(1.40)	(-2.83)
Population	0.394***	0.376***	0.424***	0.457***	0.440***
	(7.86)	(6.89)	(4.36)	(3.91)	(4.57)
Constant	-10.37***	-9.956***	-12.37***	-12.87***	-6.656***
	(-12.15)	(-9.28)	(-6.17)	(-5.68)	(-3.89)
Observations	7284	7152	2658	1649	2845

t statistics in parentheses
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 5.4 shows the output from logistic regression models measuring the effect of population and modernization variables on the probability of a nonviolent campaign onset across a full sample of regimes (Modernization) and three subsamples of regimes (Authoritarian, Anocracy, Democracy). Urbanization significantly reduces the probability of a nonviolent campaign onset in democratic regimes, while there are no significant effects in other regimes. Industrialization does not significantly affect the probability of nonviolent campaign onset in any of the samples. Education is only significantly related to nonviolent campaign onset in authoritarian regimes, where it makes nonviolent campaign onset more likely. An increase in communication technology makes nonviolent campaign onset more likely both in the global sample and in anocracies and democracies. The relationship is negative and significant for the authoritarian subsample, indicating that communication technology decreases the probability of a campaign onset in these regimes. Trade liberalization significantly increases the probability of a nonviolent campaign onset in authoritarian regimes, while the effect is significant and negative for democratic regimes. Finally, population size is significant and positive for all models.

Table 5.5: Modernization including control variables

	Modernization	Authoritarian	Anocracy	Democracy
Campaign Onset				
Urbanization	-0.132	0.0334	0.214	-1.154***
	(-0.66)	(0.10)	(0.59)	(-2.78)
Industrialization	0.00776	0.00190	0.0310	0.00980
	(0.60)	(0.10)	(1.34)	(0.30)
Education	0.00116	0.0156**	0.00201	0.00125
	(0.25)	(1.99)	(0.27)	(0.12)
Communication technology	0.122*	-0.304**	0.274***	0.341***
	(1.94)	(-2.12)	(2.68)	(2.62)
Trade liberalization	0.125	0.750**	0.522	-1.291***
	(0.61)	(2.41)	(1.45)	(-2.60)
Population	0.327***	0.421***	0.413***	0.324***
	(5.25)	(3.93)	(3.17)	(2.59)
Ongoing domestic campaign	-0.212	-1.449**	-0.162	-0.189
	(-0.65)	(-2.24)	(-0.32)	(-0.29)
Commitment to human rights	0.101	0.0950	0.146	0.959**
	(0.48)	(0.22)	(0.44)	(2.09)
Election year	0.461**	0.405	0.615**	0.644*
	(2.51)	(1.20)	(2.04)	(1.82)
Youth Bulge	13.58***	7.997	3.454	14.25*
	(3.54)	(1.16)	(0.51)	(1.73)
Regional contagion	0.532***	0.956***	0.343	0.206
	(3.12)	(3.62)	(1.17)	(0.54)
Organizational learning	0.309***	0.507**	0.0741	0.594***
	(2.78)	(2.51)	(0.37)	(2.59)
Constant	-11.99***	-13.63***	-13.49***	-8.354***
	(-7.87)	(-4.95)	(-4.71)	(-2.87)
Observations	7000	2597	1630	2773

t statistics in parentheses
Cubic polynomials are included in estimations
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 5.5 shows the results from models capturing the effects of modernization variables on nonviolent campaign onset controlling for other confounding variables. Results are fairly similar. The effects of urbanization, industrialization, and education are in line with the results from models without control variables. Similarly, the effects of communication technology are significant across all models, with positive effects in the anocratic and democratic subsample. The positive effect of communication technology in the full sample of regimes has lost some significance, while the negative effect of communication technology on campaign onset in the authoritarian sample has become more significant after controlling for other possible explanations. Finally, the effects of trade liberalization remain the same as in the first

models, but the positive effect of trade liberalization on campaign onset in the authoritarian subsample has lost some significance.

Moving on to the control variables, increases in population size makes nonviolent campaign onset more likely across all subsamples of regimes. An ongoing domestic campaign significantly reduces the probability of nonviolent campaign onset in authoritarian regimes, while commitment to human rights makes nonviolent campaign onset more likely in democratic regimes. The presence of an election makes nonviolent campaign onset more significantly more likely in the full sample and democracies, with the strongest effect in anocratic regimes. Having a large proportion of youth in the population significantly increases the probability of nonviolent campaign onset in the full sample of regimes. However, the positive effect only remains significant in democratic regimes when conditioning on regime type. An ongoing campaign abroad makes nonviolent campaign onset significantly more likely in the full sample and for authoritarian regimes. Similarly, organizational learning increases the probability of nonviolent campaign onset in the full sample of regimes and both authoritarian and democratic regimes.

Table 5.6: Modernization including control variables and extended control variables

	Modernization	Authoritarian	Anocracy	Democracy
Campaign Onset				
Urbanization	-0.160	-0.261	0.292	-0.919*
	(-0.69)	(-0.64)	(0.65)	(-1.67)
Industrialization	0.00667	-0.00194	0.0414	0.00782
	(0.48)	(-0.10)	(1.53)	(0.23)
Education	-0.00399	0.00268	-0.00899	-0.00975
	(-0.79)	(0.30)	(-1.04)	(-0.81)
Communication technology	0.192**	0.0235	0.331***	0.324**
	(2.47)	(0.14)	(2.61)	(2.24)
Trade liberalization	0.246	0.827**	0.816**	-1.226**
	(1.13)	(2.54)	(2.08)	(-2.32)
Population	0.300***	0.454***	0.328**	0.252*
	(4.47)	(3.54)	(2.44)	(1.65)
Ongoing domestic campaign	-0.218	-1.707***	-0.292	-0.158
	(-0.66)	(-2.59)	(-0.58)	(-0.24)
Commitment to human rights	0.214	0.713	0.0931	1.307**
	(0.94)	(1.55)	(0.25)	(2.39)
Election year	0.448**	0.434	0.630**	0.640*
	(2.44)	(1.26)	(2.06)	(1.79)
Youth Bulge	17.63***	19.48**	3.266	11.68

	(3.88)	(2.46)	(0.39)	(1.10)
Regional contagion	0.527***	0.777***	0.391	0.232
	(3.03)	(2.85)	(1.28)	(0.59)
Organizational learning	0.283**	0.600***	0.0486	0.481**
	(2.49)	(2.88)	(0.23)	(1.98)
Post-cold war	-0.293	-0.821	0.0284	0.261
	(-1.07)	(-1.58)	(0.06)	(0.44)
Americas	-0.499	-0.952*	-0.954	0.0446
	(-1.46)	(-1.66)	(-1.41)	(0.06)
East Asia & Pacific	-0.385	-1.517**	-1.270*	0.553
	(-1.09)	(-2.46)	(-1.75)	(0.74)
Africa	-0.956**	-2.282***	-1.328*	-0.980
	(-2.35)	(-3.19)	(-1.78)	(-0.94)
Middle East & North Africa	-0.300	-2.397***	-0.0780	1.576
	(-0.74)	(-3.41)	(-0.11)	(1.21)
South & Central Asia	-0.193	-2.677**	-0.135	0.817
	(-0.46)	(-2.30)	(-0.18)	(0.78)
Constant	-11.49***	-13.18***	-11.49***	-7.515**
	(-7.26)	(-4.16)	(-3.73)	(-2.42)
Observations	7000	2597	1630	2773

t statistics in parentheses
Cubic polynomials are included in estimations.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

For models in Table 5.6, I include two variables to capture the unobserved effects of time and geographic regions. Urbanization is still negatively associated with campaign onset in democratic regimes. Similarly, there are no significant effects of industrialization, while education has lost significance in the authoritarian subsample when controlling for time- and region effects. The positive and significant effect of communication technology in anocracies and democracies remain, while the effect of communication technology in authoritarian regimes has both changed direction and lost significance. Finally, trade liberalization significantly increases the probability of a nonviolent campaign in both the authoritarian and anocractic subsample, while the effect remains significant and negative for democracies.

Population size remains positively and significantly related to nonviolent campaign onset across all models. The effects of both an ongoing domestic campaign and commitment to human rights are the same as in the previous models, although even more significant in relevant subsamples of regimes. Elections still make nonviolent campaign onsets more likely in the full sample of regimes, anocracies and democracies. Youth bulges do no longer increase the probability of a campaign onset in democracies, while the positive effect in the

full sample remains. However, the positive effect of youths in the population has now become significant in the authoritarian subsample. Effects of regional contagion and organizational learning do not differ from previous models, other than organizational learning becoming less significant in the democratic subsample.

Moving on to time- and region effects, the post-cold war period is not significantly related to nonviolent campaign onset across all models. As for region effects, Africa is significantly less likely to experience a nonviolent campaign than Europe and Eurasia in the full sample of regimes. In the authoritarian subsamples, all regions are less likely than Europe to experience a nonviolent campaign, although with different significance levels. For anocracies, both East Asia and the Pacific and Africa are less likely than Europe and Eurasia to experience a nonviolent campaign. There are no significant effects of region in the democratic subsample.

5.3 Extensions and Robustness tests

After running the main models, I conducted several robustness tests. Firstly, I changed the operationalizations of education and trade liberalization in the modernization models. I base the new education variable on data from the Barro-Lee Educational Attainment Dataset (Barro & Lee, 2013), measuring education as average years of schooling in the population. Next, I operationalize trade liberalizations as trade as percentage of GDP with data from the World Bank (2013), as the increasing importance of trade in the economy would suggest increased interconnectedness internationally and domestically. Results from these tests can be found in the appendix (Tables A1-A6). Secondly, I include repression operationalized through the CIRI physical integrity index in the grievance models (Table A7-A9 in appendix). I also include a squared version of this variable to account for a possible curvilinear effect of repression. Results from these tests will not be discussed further due to space limitations.

As an additional test of model specifications, I include decade dummies in the extended controls models for both grievances and modernization. As the binary indicator of the post-cold war period does not capture potential time trends, I follow Dahlum (2019) in using decade dummies to account for the fact that all countries could be subjected to unobserved common developments over time. Results from these models can be found in Table A10 and A11 in the appendix, and generally show that significant effects, mainly the effects of inflation and communication technology, in both the grievance- and modernization models disappear. This suggests that these results might be a result of nonviolent campaigns increasing over time for other reasons.

Finally, I run all models with the Regimes of the World (RoW) typology from V-Dem to check how robust the findings are to changes in the categorization of regimes. As there are only three onsets of nonviolent campaigns in liberal democracies, I exclude this category from the analyses. Tables A12-A14 in the appendix report results from grievance models conditioned by RoW-regime type. The previously significant and robust effect of poverty and discrimination in democratic regimes has lost significance across all models. As in the main models, economic growth shows no significant relationship with nonviolent campaign onset, while the significant effects of inflation remain for the electoral categories. The effect of leader's tenure is no longer significant in the most autocratic regimes, however there is a positive and significant effect of leader's tenure in electoral autocracies suggesting that leader's tenure is more important in regimes that are slightly less autocratic. The results of salient elite ethnicity are fairly similar, with a positive and significant effect mainly in the full sample of regimes. Finally, the results from control variables show the same trends as results in the main models.

Results from models showing the impact of modernization variables on nonviolent campaign onset conditioned by RoW-regime type can be found in Table A15-A17 in the appendix. In these models, urbanization does not show any significant relationship with nonviolent campaign onset, meaning that the previously robust negative effect of urbanization in democratic regimes has disappeared. Industrialization shows some positive and significant effects on nonviolent campaign onset, however only in the more autocratic regime types or the full sample. As for education, effects are fairly similar to the main models, with some positive and significant effects in autocracies or electoral autocracies. As in the main models, communication technology positively and significantly affects the probability of nonviolent campaign onset in both electoral autocracies and electoral democracies. The effect in autocracies is still negative, however, it has lost significance. As for trade liberalization, the effect is still positive and significant in both autocratic regime types, however, the effect is gone for electoral democracies. Again, control variables show similar patterns as the main models.

6 Discussion

In this thesis, I have set out to investigate if Chenoweth and Ulfelder's (2017) finding that structural conditions, and especially operationalizations of grievance- and modernization theories, offer little explanatory power in relation to nonviolent campaign onset, might be due to regime type as a missing conditional variable. I have argued that the lack of emphasis on the political context that conditions related to these theories exist in, might contribute to existing null findings and contradictory findings in the research field. To address this gap in the literature, I have tested the effects of grievances and modernization on nonviolent campaign onset across subsamples of regimes, to determine whether the effects of grievances and modernization varies across regime types. In this section, I discuss the presented results of both main models and robustness tests for grievances and modernization. After this, I briefly discuss results from the control variables, before ending this section with a discussion on how these findings contradict or support previous research on the subject.

6.1 Grievances and nonviolent campaign onset

In theory, grievances serve as an important motivating factor as there is no reason to rebel if happy and content with the state of the world. However, previous research has shown that there are few if any, consensual findings as to how important grievances are in bringing about a maximalist nonviolent campaign onset. I have argued that grievances need to be shared to facilitate mobilization, and that regime type conditions to what extent people can learn about other peoples' opinions and a potential state response from the public sphere, thus affecting individual cost-benefit assessments of participation. Following this, I hypothesized that grievances should have more positive and significant effects in democratic regimes compared to anocracies and authoritarian regimes.

The presented results show some support for the proposed argument. Generally, results from the main analyses show that the effects of grievances do in fact vary across regime types, and effects appear to be both more positive and significant the more democratic a regime is. Specifically, both poverty and discrimination are only significantly related to nonviolent campaign onset in democratic regimes where they increase the probability of nonviolent campaign onset. These results are robust even when controlling for potential other correlates. As for economic grievances, economic growth seems unrelated to campaign onset, while the

results regarding inflation indicate that inflation is more conducive to nonviolent mobilization the more democratic a regime is. Based on these results, grievances do have more substantial effects on mobilization in democratic regimes compared to anocracies and authoritarian regimes, thus offering support to my argument that open and available public information is necessary to turn grievances into mobilization.

The significant and positive effect of leader's tenure in authoritarian regimes contradicts both my proposed hypothesis and the trend shown for the other grievance variables. But it is not unlikely that people in authoritarian regimes will get fed up with leaders as time passes and thereby rebel. However, it is possible that the operationalization of leader's tenure does not capture grievances, but rather some elements of political opportunity. The death of a leader is likely to cause a secession crisis in these regimes (Svolik, 2012), thus signaling regime instability. This could create opportunities for uprisings. Following this line of reasoning, this finding does not necessarily contradict my presented hypothesis.

Results from the main models generally support the argument that the effects of grievances vary across regime types. However, results are more nuanced after conducting several robustness tests. Firstly, after introducing dummies of decade to capture potential time trends, important results from the main models remain. Poverty is still significantly and positively related to campaign onset in democracies. Similarly, the effects of leader's tenure do not change. However, the significant effects of inflation and discrimination disappear, suggesting that the relationship between these variables and nonviolent campaign onset depends on other unmeasured factors. Secondly, conditioning on regime through the RoW typology reveals that how regimes are operationalized matters a lot for which effects we get, however, most significant effects are found closer to democratic regime types. Thirdly, when introducing repression as an explanatory variable, the significant effect of discrimination in democracies disappears. Even though variation across regimes remains, the robustness tests provide less support for the hypothesized relationship between grievances and nonviolent campaign onset.

As previously discussed, the regime category "anocracy" can be problematic as it is very diverse. This could explain why there are no significant findings in the anocratic subsample. This suspicion is partly confirmed when running robustness tests with the RoW typology. In general, most significant effects of grievances are now found in electoral anocracies and electoral democracies, with few significant effects in full autocracies. The lack of significant effects could also be a result of how regimes are placed into different categories. The

previously significant effect of discrimination in democracies is not present in these models, however about half of the observations from the democratic subsample are now placed in electoral democracies. Some observations are even categorized as either electoral or full autocracies, suggesting that important cases of discrimination have been spread out over regime types. Following this, the positive effect of poverty in democracies the main models might be due to how regimes are operationalized.

Lack of significant findings could also be due to not capturing the "correct" grievances that are driving uprisings in anocratic regimes. Case literature on the Arabic Spring suggests that unemployment, and especially youth unemployment (LaGraffe, 2012), is a driving factor in nonviolent campaign mobilization. As data on unemployment rates are scarce, this operationalization of grievances is not included in the models. Case literature also suggests that grievances, and especially economic grievances, could increase the latent level of dissatisfaction over time, but that an external shock is needed to turn these grievances into mobilization (Joffé, 2011). Thus, it is reasonable to expect interaction effects between grievances and other variables.

6.2 Modernization and nonviolent campaign onset

As modernization causes both new grievances and resources, emerging modern societies should experience mass uprising. Previous research has shown that several operationalizations of modernization do make nonviolent campaign onset more likely. As modernization processes tie people closer together, thus facilitating the emergence of private networks, I have argued that modernization should have bigger effects in regimes where public sources of information are limited, as this makes the private networks more important for mobilization. Following this, I hypothesized that the effects of modernization on nonviolent campaign onset should be stronger the more authoritarian a regime is.

Results from the main logistic regression models are inconsistent as to where modernization has the biggest effect on nonviolent campaign onset. There is some evidence that modernization might have bigger effects the more authoritarian the regime is. The positive effect of education varies in significance across different models; however, significant effects only appear in the authoritarian subsample. There is also a positive and significant effect of trade liberalization across all models in the authoritarian subsample, suggesting that being a member of GATT/WTO makes it more likely that a nonviolent campaign erupts in these regimes. This effect is also significant for anocracies, but only when including all control

variables. For democratic regimes, trade liberalization significantly lowers the probability of a nonviolent campaign, and the same negative effect is found for urbanization across all models in the democratic subsample. These results indicate that urbanization and trade liberalization are not important drivers of nonviolent campaign onset in democratic states as they make mass mobilization less likely.

Finally, communication technology has a significant impact on nonviolent campaign onset across almost all models, where increases in communication technology make nonviolent campaign onset more likely in both anocracies and democracies, while it makes nonviolent campaign onset less likely in authoritarian regimes. These results suggest that communication technology could serve as "liberation technology" in some regimes, where dissidents can take advantage of increased interconnectedness and communication opportunities, while the same technology could be used by the government to suppress and repress the population in other regimes (Rød & Weidmann, 2015). A study of the Chinese censorship program indicates that Chinese censorship is aimed at curtailing collective action (King, Pan & Roberts, 2013), thus exemplifying how technology can be used for demobilization in authoritarian regimes. The differing effect of communication technology across regime types also indicates that not all sources of private information have the same effects, and even more importantly it highlights the importance of having free spaces (Nepstad, 2011) to organize in the more authoritarian regimes.

Robustness tests on the modernization models show that results are dependent on both variable operationalization and model specification. The effects of education seem robust to changes in operationalization, although slightly less significant. As for trade liberalization, significant effects disappear when operationalized as trade as % of GDP. This raises questions as to if the two operationalizations capture the same theoretical concept. Chenoweth and Ulfelder (2017) argue that being a member of GATT/WTO signals opportunities for mobilization. Thus, being a member of these organizations does not necessarily facilitate the development of networks and resources necessary for nonviolent mobilization. As such, the original operationalization might not capture the modernization effects that we are trying to investigate. However, even though trade liberalization measured as trade as % of GDP would generally imply increased interconnectedness both domestically and internationally, results show no significant relationship between trade liberalization and nonviolent campaign onset.

The most striking difference between the main models and the robustness models appears when introducing time dummies to account for time trends. Using original variable operationalizations, the only significant result that remains is the positive effect of trade liberalization in authoritarian and autocratic regimes. Interestingly, the previous significant relationship between communication technology and nonviolent campaign onset disappears across all regime types. This indicates that the main models suffer from omitted variable bias and that the effects of communication technology in the main models are caused by unobserved conditions related to global developments over time.

Results from conditioning on regime type operationalized through RoW provide nuances as to the general findings from the main model. However, results are still inconsistent, but with indications of modernization having more significant effects in the more autocratic regimes. Education increases the probability of a nonviolent campaign onset in autocracies and electoral autocracies in some of the models, while results are not significant in other models. Similarly, trade liberalization significantly increases the probability of nonviolent campaign onset in autocracies and electoral autocracies in all models. Finally, industrialization has become significant in the extended control model, although only for electoral autocracies. As for communication technology, significant results are found in electoral democracies and electoral autocracies. Taken together, these results provide some support for the proposed arguments, however, sensitivity to modeling and variable operationalization makes it hard to argue that modernization has a bigger impact in authoritarian regimes.

6.3 Alternative explanation – confounding variables

The confounding variables I have chosen to include in the models are based on which variables Chenoweth and Ulfelder (2017) find to have the largest impact on the models' predictive capability. As such, the included control variables are the ones expected to have a substantial impact on the probability of nonviolent campaign onset, something which is supported by the fact that most of these variables have significant effects on nonviolent campaign onset in the full sample of regimes, both for grievance- and modernization models, as well as for different operationalizations of regime type. However, when looking at subsamples of regimes it becomes evident that these variables have different effects across regimes, thus supporting the general argument that what causes or facilitates mobilization can vary across regime type.

An ongoing domestic campaign significantly reduces the probability of nonviolent campaign onset in authoritarian regimes, and this finding is robust across grievance and modernization models and for both operationalizations of regime type. The positive and significant effect of human rights commitment is found in almost all regime types but over different models. Elections seem to have the most impact in democratic regimes and anocracies, while the positive effect of regional contagion is limited to regimes placing at the more authoritarian end of the sale. A similar relationship is found between organizational learning and nonviolent campaign onset, where most models show a significant relationship in authoritarian regimes. However, there are also significant effects in democracies in some models. Taken together, these results indicate that there is variation in effects across regime types and that these effects are sensitive to how regime type is operationalized.

6.4 Regime type, mobilization, and nonviolent campaign onset

The preceding discussion indicates that the effects of operationalizations of mobilization theories on nonviolent campaign onset do vary across regime types. Evidence of variation across regimes is strongest for the grievance-based variables, however, many of these variables show no significant relationship with nonviolent campaign onset possibly due to how grievances are operationalized or missing interaction effects. As for operationalizations of modernization theories, the results are more inconsistent and heavily dependent on both operationalizations and which variables that er included in the estimations. Finally, effects of control variables on nonviolent campaign onset vary across regimes, however with differences in significance across models. In sum, there are solid indications that the correlates of nonviolent uprisings do not have the same effects in authoritarian regimes, anocracies, and democracies. How does this conclusion correlate with previous research?

Operationalizations of the grievance-based approach have produced diverging findings in previous research. There is some evidence that state-led discrimination increases the feasibility of mobilization (Cunningham, 2013; Jazayeri, 2016), however, these studies are limited by geography or campaign goal. I find that state-led discrimination does have a positive effect on campaign onset, however only in democracies as measured by Polity. This is partly supported by Jazayeri (2016), who finds that state-led discrimination increases the count of protests in the MENA area, but the effect on campaigns is negative and not significant. As the MENA area is not dominated by democracies, this indicates that other types of regimes might not see the same positive effect of state-led discrimination. However, the clear result that state-led discrimination does not have any significant effects in more

authoritarian regimes, can explain why some studies (Butcher & Svensson, 2016; Abbs, 2020) find no significant effect of discrimination, as these studies do not look at democracies in particular. Finally, the fact that the effect of discrimination in democracies disappears when introducing repression in the robustness models, fits well with Rørbæk's (2019) finding that discrimination and repression are connected.

Economic growth shows no significant relationship with nonviolent campaign onset in any regime types, in line with previous research (Butcher & Svensson, 2016; Gleditsch & Rivera, 2016; Karakaya, 2018). Similarly, as inflation can be seen as a cross-cutting grievance, the significant impact on nonviolent campaign onset, before controlling for time trends, correlates with Abbs (2020) who finds that cross-cutting grievances increase the probability of nonviolent campaign onset. The most puzzling result is the positive and significant effect of poverty in democracies. Previous research has not found a significant effect of poverty (Gleditsch & Rivera, 2016). However, it might be that poverty the way its operationalized in this thesis captures state capacity rather than poverty, thus explaining why this result diverges so much from previous research. As such, results partly support and partly contradict previous research.

Results from the modernization models largely contradict previous research. The relationship between industrialization and nonviolent campaign onset is mostly not significant across all models, while previous research (Butcher & Svensson, 2016; Karakaya, 2018) has found significant effects of industrialization on nonviolent campaign onset. Butcher and Svensson (2016) emphasize that this effect even holds for authoritarian regimes, however, this contradicts most of the results in this thesis. Similarly, one of the most consistent findings related to modernization is the positive and significant effect of urbanization on nonviolent campaign onset (Gleditsch & Rivera, 2017; Cunningham et.al; 2017; Schaftenaar, 2017; Abbs, 2020; Dahl et.al, 2020). However, urbanization does not seem to have a positive impact on nonviolent mobilization in my models, where the only significant result is that it reduces mobilization in democratic regimes. As for education, previous research finds that increased education has a positive effect on nonviolent mobilization (Butcher & Svensson, 2016; Dahlum & Wig, 2017; Dahlum, 2019), however, my results indicate that this effect is only present in more authoritarian regimes, but generally that the relationship is not significant.

Based on previous research, it is surprising that modernization-variables have few significant effects on nonviolent campaign onset. Even when looking at the full sample of regimes, as

most other studies do, most variables do not have a significant impact on nonviolent campaign onset. These findings might be a result of how the models are specified. Butcher and Svensson (2016) find that education becomes significant when removing manufacturing from the models, suggesting that modernization variables might "steal" effects from each other. This might be the case for my models as well, thus possibly explaining some of the null findings.

Finally, relationships between control variables and nonviolent campaign onset largely align with previous research. Both effects of regional contagion and elections are consistent with previous findings, having the most significant effects in authoritarian regimes (Gleditsch & Rivera, 2017) and more democratic regimes respectively (Butcher & Svensson, 2016). As for human rights commitment and organization learning, there are no directly comparable results from previous research. Finally, Chenoweth and Ulfelder (2017) find that youth bulges can help predict the onset of a nonviolent campaign, while Jazayeri (2016) finds that youth bulges reduce the probability of a nonviolent campaign onset. Results show that there is some evidence that youth bulges increase the probability of nonviolent campaign onset in the full sample of regimes, however, results are inconsistent.

7 Conclusion

In this thesis, I have examined whether the proposed associations between grievance- and modernization variables and nonviolent campaign onset are conditioned by regime type to answer the following research question: *Do the effects of grievance- and modernization variables vary across different regime types?* I have argued that regime type conditions access to information through the public sphere, which in turn affect how individuals assess the risks and benefits of dissent participation. Regime type also affects the relative importance of public and private sources of information, thus making private information sources more important in some regime types than in others.

The results from logistic regression analyses show that in general there are differences in the effects of both grievances and modernization across regime types. However, the evidence is more compelling for grievance variables, where the results to a large degree support the presented hypothesis that the effects of grievances on nonviolent campaign onset will be more positive and significant in democratic regimes than in anocracies and authoritarian regimes. Results regarding modernization variables are more inconsistent, as the effect of modernization is highly contingent on both variable operationalization and model specification. However, the results do indicate that there are differences in effects across regime types, but the general trend is not strong enough to argue that there is support for the hypothesis that modernization should have a bigger impact on mobilization the more authoritarian a regime is. This, taken together with the fact that the effects of control variables also vary across regimes, suggests that there are different drivers of nonviolent campaign onset in different regimes.

The following limitations emphasize how dependent conclusions are on the choices that are being made throughout the process. Firstly, differences between the main models and the robustness models show that the operationalization of theoretical concepts can affect both effects and significance, as well as how results are interpreted through theory. Several variables can serve as operationalizations of different theoretical directions, thus producing results that contradict theoretical expectations. The significant impact variable operationalization can have become especially evident when comparing effects of models conditioned on regime as operationalized through Polity IV data and regime operationalized

through V-Dem data. Secondly, the analyses have shown that model specifications also affect results considerably. Especially the inclusion of time trends seems to affect the results in a significant way, suggesting that researchers should pay attention to how time trends might alter results to avoid problems with omitted variables. It is also likely that important operationalizations of grievances and modernization are missing from the models, due to missing data. Thirdly, models can suffer from post-treatment bias as well as omitted variable bias. Where the inclusion of time trends suggests that the original models suffer from omitted variable bias, inclusion of several of the control variables or even some of the grievance- and modernization variables can have made important effects non-existent. However, I have tried to limit the effect of post-treatment bias through running models with and without controls.

Both the presented results and limitations give some directions as to possible areas of focus for future research. As there are strong indications of diverging effects of the previous operationalizations of mobilization theories on nonviolent campaign onset across regime types, future research should pay closer attention to the conditional effects of regime type and institutional context. Following this, it is just as important to be mindful of how operationalizations of regime type can affect results. More research is also needed on the effects in different subcategories of anocracies, as this mixed category arguably contains regimes that differ considerably. Future research should also pay close attention to how time trends can affect potential effects, especially since both the number of nonviolent campaigns and important explanatory factors are increasing over time. Finally, the lack of significant findings suggests that both economic grievances and many aspects of modernization do not have a significant impact on nonviolent campaign onset. This should be investigated further. As for economic grievances, there could be important interaction effects that have yet not been tested, while the proposed relationship between modernization and nonviolent campaign onset might need to be nuanced, as all networks do not necessarily produce the same effects.

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9 Appendices

Appendix 1: Robustness tests on variable operationalizations

Appendix 2: Robustness tests on model specifications

Appendix 3: Conditioning on regime operationalization based on RoW from V-Dem

Appendix 4: Relevance for teaching

Appendix 1: Robustness tests on variable operationalizations

Table A1: Modernization with trade liberalization measured as trade as % of GDP

	Base	Modernization	Authoritarian	Anocracy	Democracy
Campaign Onset					
Urbanization		-0.127	0.110	0.184	-0.951**
		(-0.61)	(0.31)	(0.52)	(-2.40)
Industrialization		0.0196	0.0344*	0.0313	-0.00392
		(1.43)	(1.65)	(1.40)	(-0.12)
Education		-0.00928**	0.00815	0.00166	-0.00895
		(-2.01)	(0.94)	(0.23)	(-1.00)
Communication technology		0.139**	-0.328*	0.259***	0.256**
		(2.13)	(-1.74)	(2.60)	(2.10)
Trade liberalization		0.410**	0.174	-0.0314	0.466
		(2.09)	(0.57)	(-0.10)	(1.08)
Population	0.394***	0.431***	0.337***	0.458***	0.465***
	(7.86)	(6.00)	(2.85)	(3.22)	(3.39)
Constant	-10.37***	-12.16***	-11.16***	-12.35***	-10.13***
	(-12.15)	(-6.70)	(-3.81)	(-3.76)	(-2.68)
Observations	7284	6300	2002	1496	2802

t statistics in parentheses
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A2: Modernization with trade liberalization measured as trade as % of GDP including control variables

	Modernization	Authoritarian	Anocracy	Democracy
Campaign Onset				
Urbanization	-0.196	0.138	0.150	-1.063**
	(-0.90)	(0.35)	(0.40)	(-2.51)
Industrialization	0.0188	0.0362*	0.0377	-0.000260
	(1.35)	(1.66)	(1.60)	(-0.01)
Education	-0.00524	0.00458	-0.00102	0.000659
	(-1.07)	(0.50)	(-0.13)	(0.06)
Communication technology	0.125*	-0.303	0.287**	0.239*
	(1.79)	(-1.59)	(2.55)	(1.75)
Trade liberalization	0.325	0.0191	0.0500	0.295
	(1.58)	(0.06)	(0.15)	(0.63)
Population	0.354***	0.352***	0.421***	0.311*
	(4.50)	(2.72)	(2.75)	(1.92)
Ongoing domestic campaign	-0.328	-1.629**	-0.302	-0.141
	(-0.93)	(-1.97)	(-0.57)	(-0.22)
Commitment to human rights	0.222	0.310	0.127	0.841*

	(1.03)	(0.71)	(0.37)	(1.79)
Election year	0.487**	0.144	0.668**	0.636*
	(2.51)	(0.35)	(2.18)	(1.81)
Youth Bulge	11.88***	6.888	0.629	12.41
	(2.88)	(0.77)	(0.09)	(1.54)
Regional contagion	0.566***	0.968***	0.380	0.193
	(3.13)	(3.24)	(1.26)	(0.50)
Organizational learning	0.378***	0.479*	0.166	0.587***
	(3.11)	(1.91)	(0.79)	(2.58)
Constant	-13.10***	-12.47***	-12.78***	-9.888**
	(-6.20)	(-3.43)	(-3.30)	(-2.20)
Observations	6151	1970	1462	2719

t statistics in parentheses
Cubic polynomials are included in estimations
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A3: Modernization with trade liberalization measured as trade as % of GDP with control variables and extended control variables

	Modernization	Authoritarian	Anocracy	Democracy
Campaign Onset				
Urbanization	-0.203	-0.0348	0.205	-0.892*
	(-0.81)	(-0.07)	(0.43)	(-1.68)
Industrialization	0.0165	0.0288	0.0467*	-0.00760
	(1.08)	(1.23)	(1.71)	(-0.22)
Education	-0.0113**	-0.0117	-0.0151	-0.0122
	(-2.03)	(-1.01)	(-1.64)	(-1.03)
Communication technology	0.194**	-0.0904	0.343***	0.234
	(2.38)	(-0.42)	(2.68)	(1.62)
Trade Liberalization	0.454*	0.420	0.564	0.402
	(1.95)	(1.10)	(1.19)	(0.78)
Population	0.341***	0.431**	0.450***	0.296
	(3.78)	(2.58)	(2.60)	(1.53)
Ongoing domestic campaign	-0.324	-2.020**	-0.374	-0.0905
	(-0.92)	(-2.32)	(-0.71)	(-0.14)
Commitment to human rights	0.371	0.831*	0.0455	1.326**
	(1.55)	(1.75)	(0.12)	(2.33)
Election year	0.478**	0.230	0.680**	0.607*
	(2.46)	(0.54)	(2.19)	(1.71)
Youth Bulge	12.29**	12.63	1.025	10.91
	(2.47)	(1.26)	(0.12)	(1.02)
Regional contagion	0.580***	0.761**	0.412	0.226
	(3.12)	(2.40)	(1.32)	(0.57)
Organizational learning	0.349***	0.550**	0.148	0.445*
	(2.82)	(2.13)	(0.69)	(1.87)

Post-cold war	-0.371	-0.930	-0.236	0.0288
	(-1.26)	(-1.56)	(-0.45)	(0.05)
Americas	-0.145	-0.766	-0.869	0.0168
	(-0.37)	(-0.97)	(-1.18)	(0.02)
East Asia & Pacific	-0.0501	-1.115	-1.646*	0.447
	(-0.12)	(-1.24)	(-1.79)	(0.59)
Africa	-0.717	-2.295**	-1.409*	-1.306
	(-1.58)	(-2.47)	(-1.69)	(-1.27)
Middle East & North Africa	0.0528	-2.513***	-0.332	1.871
	(0.12)	(-2.60)	(-0.41)	(1.45)
South & Central Asia	0.250	-2.156*	-0.132	0.619
	(0.54)	(-1.66)	(-0.16)	(0.60)
Constant	-12.84***	-13.31***	-14.15***	-9.934**
	(-5.59)	(-3.02)	(-3.20)	(-2.07)
Observations	6151	1970	1462	2719

t statistics in parentheses
Cubic polynomials are included in estimations
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A4: Modernization with Barro-Lee educational attainment data

	Base	Modernization	Authoritarian	Anocracy	Democracy
Campaign Onset					
Urbanization		-0.283	-0.112	0.108	-1.279***
		(-1.51)	(-0.35)	(0.32)	(-3.17)
Industrialization		0.0176	0.0139	0.00144	0.0340
		(1.22)	(0.66)	(0.06)	(1.03)
Education		-0.0577	0.202**	0.0471	-0.0724
		(-1.16)	(2.27)	(0.55)	(-0.75)
Communication technology		0.159**	-0.383*	0.299***	0.347***
		(2.41)	(-1.96)	(2.98)	(2.72)
Trade liberalization		0.183	0.785**	0.432	-1.244**
		(0.74)	(2.19)	(1.04)	(-2.00)
Population	0.394***	0.340***	0.322***	0.538***	0.420***
	(7.86)	(5.61)	(3.06)	(3.56)	(3.77)
Constant	-10.37***	-8.668***	-10.01***	-13.51***	-6.138***
	(-12.15)	(-7.64)	(-4.89)	(-4.77)	(-2.98)
Observations	7284	5431	1741	1157	2533

t statistics in parentheses
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A5: Modernization with Barro-Lee educational attainment data including control variables

	Modernization	Authoritarian	Anocracy	Democracy
Campaign Onset				
Urbanization	-0.270	-0.182	0.0427	-1.298***

	(-1.38)	(-0.52)	(0.12)	(-2.87)
Industrialization	0.0146	0.0115	0.0141	0.0476
	(1.02)	(0.53)	(0.49)	(1.28)
Education	-0.00417	0.185*	0.0200	-0.0345
	(-0.08)	(1.83)	(0.22)	(-0.31)
Communication technology	0.116	-0.391**	0.305***	0.329**
	(1.63)	(-2.00)	(2.60)	(2.22)
Trade liberalization	0.119	0.660*	0.519	-1.094*
	(0.48)	(1.75)	(1.24)	(-1.76)
Population	0.308***	0.344***	0.571***	0.282*
	(4.49)	(2.90)	(3.33)	(1.86)
Ongoing domestic campaign	-0.455	-2.175***	-0.104	-0.509
	(-1.22)	(-2.88)	(-0.17)	(-0.71)
Commitment to human rights	0.0925	0.245	0.266	1.194**
	(0.40)	(0.48)	(0.69)	(2.21)
Election year	0.433**	0.391	0.541	0.583
	(2.12)	(1.00)	(1.62)	(1.50)
Youth Bulge	16.37***	9.636	-1.039	9.540
	(3.74)	(1.16)	(-0.13)	(1.06)
Regional contagion	0.470**	0.808***	0.159	0.216
	(2.45)	(2.69)	(0.45)	(0.52)
Organizational learning	0.271**	0.541**	-0.0243	0.695***
	(2.17)	(2.21)	(-0.10)	(2.81)
Constant	-11.52***	-11.45***	-14.54***	-6.733*
	(-6.80)	(-3.82)	(-4.24)	(-1.82)
Observations	5401	1733	1146	2522

t statistics in parentheses
Cubic polynomials are included in estimations
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A6: Modernization with Barro-Lee educational attainment data including control variables and extended control variables

	Modernization	Authoritarian	Anocracy	Democracy
Campaign Onset				
Urbanization	-0.252	-0.0254	0.0157	-0.820
	(-1.06)	(-0.05)	(0.03)	(-1.26)
Industrialization	0.0154	0.00870	0.0369	0.0434
	(1.01)	(0.39)	(1.15)	(1.09)
Education	-0.0378	-0.111	-0.0892	-0.161
	(-0.65)	(-0.84)	(-0.82)	(-1.23)
Communication technology	0.182**	0.0615	0.320**	0.374**
	(2.08)	(0.25)	(2.27)	(2.24)
Trade liberalization	0.251	0.700*	0.671	-1.016
	(0.96)	(1.75)	(1.43)	(-1.51)
Population	0.238***	0.400**	0.430**	0.0653
	(3.06)	(2.31)	(2.33)	(0.35)

Ongoing domestic campaign	-0.446	-2.348***	-0.134	-0.519
	(-1.19)	(-3.07)	(-0.22)	(-0.69)
Commitment to human rights	0.195	1.166**	0.186	1.315**
	(0.78)	(2.00)	(0.44)	(2.16)
Election year	0.416**	0.386	0.567*	0.535
	(2.03)	(0.98)	(1.67)	(1.35)
Youth Bulge	18.97***	19.21**	-0.564	1.752
	(3.70)	(2.04)	(-0.06)	(0.15)
Regional contagion	0.465**	0.638**	0.204	0.311
	(2.37)	(2.04)	(0.55)	(0.70)
Organizational learning	0.236*	0.544**	-0.0517	0.596**
	(1.83)	(2.20)	(-0.21)	(2.24)
Post-cold war	-0.308	-0.750	0.484	0.144
	(-1.01)	(-1.25)	(0.83)	(0.22)
Americas	-0.217	-1.259**	-0.751	0.535
	(-0.58)	(-2.00)	(-0.98)	(0.67)
East Asia & Pacific	0.0520	-1.222	-1.398*	1.173
	(0.13)	(-1.52)	(-1.65)	(1.31)
Africa	-0.665	-2.543***	-1.202	-1.389
	(-1.45)	(-2.96)	(-1.37)	(-0.98)
Middle East & North Africa	-0.103	-3.781***	-0.568	0
	(-0.22)	(-3.37)	(-0.63)	(.)
South & Central Asia	0.305	-2.745**	-0.264	1.559
	(0.65)	(-2.11)	(-0.32)	(1.29)
Constant	-10.65***	-11.88***	-11.62***	-3.506
	(-5.94)	(-2.91)	(-3.12)	(-0.85)
Observations	5401	1733	1146	2484

t statistics in parentheses
Cubic polynomials are included in estimations
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Appendix 2: Robustness tests on model specifications

Table A7: Grievances including repression

	Grievance	Authoritarian	Anocracy	Democracy
Campaign Onset				
Poverty	0.247*	0.0528	-0.325*	0.690***
	(1.79)	(0.14)	(-1.68)	(2.85)
Economic growth	0.00584	-0.0243	-0.0609	0.363
	(0.09)	(-0.19)	(-0.73)	(1.60)
Inflation	0.00401	-0.0964	0.0556	0.109
	(0.11)	(-1.34)	(1.12)	(1.24)
Leader's tenure	0.185*	0.681**	0.0593	-0.157
	(1.76)	(2.56)	(0.37)	(-0.61)
Discrimination	-0.894	-0.630	-1.262	2.470
	(-0.90)	(-0.30)	(-0.87)	(1.15)
Salient elite ethnicity	0.501**	-0.274	0.330	0.614
	(2.24)	(-0.55)	(1.02)	(1.42)
Repression	0.216	0.220	0.130	-0.133
	(1.27)	(0.64)	(0.48)	(-0.42)
Repression # Repression	-0.0356	-0.0140	-0.0130	-0.00312
	(-1.64)	(-0.32)	(-0.35)	(-0.08)
Population	0.292***	0.566***	0.520***	0.0407
	(3.76)	(3.47)	(3.52)	(0.26)
Constant	-9.040***	-14.33***	-12.22***	-5.649*
	(-5.82)	(-4.38)	(-4.31)	(-1.70)
Observations	3722	811	987	1924

t statistics in parentheses
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A8: Grievances including repression and control variables

	Grievance and controls	Authoritarian	Anocracy	Democracy
Campaign Onset				
Poverty	0.161	-0.304	-0.296	0.578*
	(1.02)	(-0.67)	(-1.33)	(1.74)
Economic growth	0.0419	0.0975	-0.0262	0.344
	(0.61)	(0.66)	(-0.30)	(1.50)
Inflation	0.00949	-0.109	0.0581	0.0694
	(0.24)	(-1.31)	(1.10)	(0.65)
Leader's tenure	0.249**	0.827***	0.0778	-0.242
	(2.25)	(2.71)	(0.47)	(-0.87)
Discrimination	-0.664	0.892	-1.373	2.494
	(-0.68)	(0.40)	(-0.93)	(1.14)
Salient elite ethnicity	0.458**	-0.480	0.361	0.221
	(2.03)	(-0.79)	(1.10)	(0.48)
Repression	0.228	0.105	0.125	-0.316
	(1.34)	(0.29)	(0.46)	(-0.97)

Repression # Repression	-0.0318	0.0232	-0.00918	0.0188
	(-1.47)	(0.49)	(-0.24)	(0.49)
Population	0.233***	0.744***	0.472***	-0.0742
	(2.68)	(3.58)	(3.00)	(-0.40)
Ongoing domestic campaign	-0.458	-2.020*	-0.251	-0.398
	(-1.21)	(-1.95)	(-0.48)	(-0.52)
Commitment to human rights	0.167	1.286**	0.0647	0.739
	(0.72)	(2.20)	(0.19)	(1.37)
Election year	0.379*	0.368	0.279	0.675
	(1.74)	(0.75)	(0.88)	(1.59)
Youth Bulge	8.308	18.27	1.642	6.089
	(1.41)	(1.39)	(0.19)	(0.44)
Regional contagion	0.553***	1.365***	0.219	0.523
	(2.84)	(3.47)	(0.72)	(1.29)
Organizational learning	0.402***	0.440	0.247	0.692**
	(2.87)	(1.38)	(1.09)	(2.46)
Constant	-10.28***	-21.79***	-12.28***	-5.255
	(-4.65)	(-4.12)	(-3.56)	(-1.03)
Observations	3718	809	986	1923

t statistics in parentheses
Cubic polynomials are included in estimations
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A9: Grievances including repression, control variables, and additional *controls*

	Grievance and controls	Authoritarian	Anocracy	Democracy
Campaign onset				
Poverty	0.547**	0.118	0.0389	1.151**
	(2.47)	(0.18)	(0.12)	(2.24)
Economic growth	0.0128	0.0607	-0.0161	0.279
	(0.19)	(0.40)	(-0.18)	(1.23)
Inflation	0.0590	-0.0217	0.112*	0.212
	(1.24)	(-0.22)	(1.94)	(1.41)
Leader's tenure	0.286**	0.886***	0.124	-0.124
	(2.44)	(2.86)	(0.70)	(-0.41)
Discrimination	-0.602	1.105	-1.750	2.417
	(-0.59)	(0.47)	(-1.07)	(0.94)
Salient elite ethnicity	0.420*	-0.531	0.438	0.292
	(1.82)	(-0.78)	(1.22)	(0.62)
Repression	0.223	0.106	0.0866	-0.0875
	(1.31)	(0.28)	(0.32)	(-0.25)
Repression # Repression	-0.0322	0.0250	-0.00202	0.00386
	(-1.48)	(0.52)	(-0.05)	(0.09)
Population	0.186**	0.876***	0.442***	-0.0563

	(2.12)	(3.24)	(2.85)	(-0.28)
Ongoing domestic campaign	-0.492	-2.150**	-0.433	-0.379
	(-1.29)	(-2.04)	(-0.80)	(-0.48)
Commitment to human rights	0.347	1.475**	0.0317	1.084*
	(1.38)	(2.20)	(0.09)	(1.70)
Election year	0.402*	0.476	0.290	0.629
	(1.84)	(0.93)	(0.90)	(1.45)
Youth Bulge	2.957	23.27	-6.857	1.055
	(0.44)	(1.48)	(-0.64)	(0.06)
Regional contagion	0.528***	1.204***	0.192	0.503
	(2.64)	(2.87)	(0.61)	(1.16)
Organizational learning	0.355**	0.409	0.250	0.497*
	(2.49)	(1.23)	(1.09)	(1.66)
Post-cold war	-0.638**	-0.644	-0.664	-1.320
	(-2.04)	(-0.99)	(-1.31)	(-1.52)
Americas	0.126	0.152	0.490	-0.196
	(0.26)	(0.11)	(0.60)	(-0.22)
East Asia & Pacific	0.338	-0.878	-0.505	0.566
	(0.69)	(-0.57)	(-0.62)	(0.56)
Africa	-0.724	-1.297	-0.676	-1.656
	(-1.38)	(-0.87)	(-0.80)	(-1.39)
Middle East & North Africa	0.0733	-2.090	0.205	0.887
	(0.14)	(-1.37)	(0.24)	(0.52)
South & Central Asia	0.225	-0.502	-0.0565	0.553
	(0.42)	(-0.29)	(-0.07)	(0.46)
Constant	-8.338***	-24.38***	-9.833***	-5.355
	(-3.70)	(-3.70)	(-2.78)	(-1.00)
Observations	3718	809	986	1923

t statistics in parentheses
Cubic polynomials are included in estimations
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A10: Grievances including time trends, control variables, and extended control variables

	Grievance and controls	Authoritarian	Anocracy	Democracy
Campaign Onset				
Poverty	0.541***	0.202	-0.0800	1.713***
	(2.67)	(0.37)	(-0.26)	(3.74)
Economic growth	0.0345	0.117	-0.0501	0.183
	(0.53)	(0.83)	(-0.56)	(1.01)
Inflation	-0.0711	-0.0437	-0.00116	-0.0361
	(-1.22)	(-0.45)	(-0.01)	(-0.20)
Leader's tenure	0.347***	0.728***	0.206	0.0672
	(3.19)	(2.86)	(1.22)	(0.25)
Discrimination	-0.306	-0.881	-1.181	2.765
	(-0.34)	(-0.35)	(-0.89)	(1.18)
Salient elite ethnicity	0.390*	-0.852	0.483	0.440
	(1.84)	(-1.55)	(1.41)	(1.05)
Population	0.205***	0.635***	0.361***	0.0867
	(2.87)	(3.16)	(2.70)	(0.60)
Ongoing domestic campaign	-0.628*	-1.813*	-0.289	-0.943
	(-1.71)	(-1.89)	(-0.56)	(-1.24)
Commitment to human rights	0.310	1.243**	-0.0426	1.066*
	(1.27)	(2.13)	(-0.12)	(1.82)
Election year	0.452**	0.188	0.456	0.748*
	(2.27)	(0.42)	(1.50)	(1.96)
Youth Bulge	-0.799	18.33	-2.992	-26.91*
	(-0.14)	(1.44)	(-0.32)	(-1.93)
Regional contagion	0.431**	0.863**	0.102	0.108
	(2.22)	(2.40)	(0.32)	(0.25)
Organizational learning	0.355***	0.407	0.112	0.472*
	(2.78)	(1.52)	(0.52)	(1.85)
1960s	-1.734**	0	-1.352	0
	(-2.25)	(.)	(-1.55)	(.)
1970s	-0.416	0.275	-1.233	-0.00400
	(-1.07)	(0.42)	(-1.47)	(-0.00)
1990s	-0.503	-0.0563	-0.912	-3.024**
	(-1.47)	(-0.10)	(-1.55)	(-2.37)
2000s	0.307	-1.046	-0.0123	0.221
	(0.76)	(-1.14)	(-0.02)	(0.18)
2010s	0.639	-0.467	0.442	-0.141
	(1.18)	(-0.41)	(0.55)	(-0.09)
Americas	-0.0606	-0.988	-0.110	-0.0807
	(-0.15)	(-0.93)	(-0.15)	(-0.11)
East Asia & Pacific	0.275	-1.104	-0.650	1.213
	(0.67)	(-1.03)	(-0.88)	(1.54)

Africa	-0.900**	-1.718	-0.952	-1.753*
	(-1.97)	(-1.53)	(-1.24)	(-1.78)
Middle East & North Africa	-0.0706	-2.362**	-0.177	2.077
	(-0.15)	(-2.04)	(-0.23)	(1.55)
South & Central Asia	0.179	-1.050	-0.128	0.850
	(0.39)	(-0.72)	(-0.18)	(0.98)
Constant	-7.261***	-17.57***	-8.482***	-1.411
	(-4.17)	(-3.73)	(-2.87)	(-0.41)
Observations	5217	1230	1350	2354

t statistics in parentheses
Cubic polynomials are included in estimations
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A11: Modernization including time trends, control variables, and extended control variables

	Modernization	Authoritarian	Anocracy	Democracy
Campaign Onset				
Urbanization	-0.145	-0.275	0.367	-0.577
	(-0.60)	(-0.67)	(0.80)	(-0.93)
Industrialization	0.00884	-0.00285	0.0442	0.0159
	(0.62)	(-0.14)	(1.60)	(0.44)
Education	-0.00876	-0.00185	-0.0143	-0.0190
	(-1.62)	(-0.20)	(-1.57)	(-1.36)
Communication technology	-0.0664	-0.0745	0.249	-0.158
	(-0.60)	(-0.25)	(1.29)	(-0.73)
Trade liberalization	0.247	0.793**	0.832**	-0.927
	(1.13)	(2.39)	(2.10)	(-1.64)
Population	0.267***	0.429***	0.278**	0.168
	(3.97)	(3.31)	(2.04)	(1.05)
Ongoing domestic campaign	-0.315	-1.807***	-0.348	-0.604
	(-0.96)	(-2.67)	(-0.68)	(-0.88)
Commitment to human rights	0.0813	0.596	-0.00274	1.150**
	(0.36)	(1.30)	(-0.01)	(2.09)
Election year	0.475**	0.385	0.666**	0.775**
	(2.57)	(1.12)	(2.16)	(2.08)
Youth Bulge	11.55**	17.12**	-3.029	2.516
	(2.42)	(2.11)	(-0.33)	(0.22)
Regional contagion	0.490***	0.846***	0.310	-0.0734
	(2.79)	(3.06)	(1.02)	(-0.18)
Organizational learning	0.307***	0.607***	0.0993	0.663***
	(2.69)	(2.84)	(0.47)	(2.64)
1960s	-1.966***	-2.132*	-1.577*	0
	(-3.07)	(-1.93)	(-1.75)	(.)

1970s	-0.467	-0.265	-1.329	0.00723
	(-1.43)	(-0.57)	(-1.59)	(0.01)
1990s	-0.418	-0.0572	-0.301	-1.878
	(-1.44)	(-0.13)	(-0.54)	(-1.61)
2000s	0.436	-0.724	-0.0264	2.071**
	(1.20)	(-0.80)	(-0.04)	(2.46)
2010s	0.872	0.0162	0.159	1.944*
	(1.60)	(0.01)	(0.17)	(1.72)
Americas	-0.517	-1.044*	-0.852	0.0547
	(-1.49)	(-1.78)	(-1.23)	(0.07)
East Asia & Pacific	-0.475	-1.785***	-1.302*	0.663
	(-1.31)	(-2.77)	(-1.77)	(0.87)
Africa	-1.276***	-2.683***	-1.452*	-1.291
	(-3.05)	(-3.55)	(-1.93)	(-1.15)
Middle East & North Africa	-0.345	-2.515***	0.0468	1.784
	(-0.84)	(-3.56)	(0.06)	(1.34)
South & Central Asia	-0.443	-3.075***	-0.183	0.713
	(-1.04)	(-2.61)	(-0.25)	(0.64)
Constant	-9.209***	-11.71***	-9.136***	-4.993
	(-5.54)	(-3.64)	(-2.76)	(-1.53)
Observations	7000	2597	1630	2525

t statistics in parentheses
Cubic polynomials are included in estimations
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Appendix 3: Conditioning on regime operationalization with RoW from V-Dem

Table A12: Grievances

	Base	Grievance	Autocracy	Electoral autocracy	Electoral democracy
Campaign Onset					
Poverty		0.334***	-0.632*	-0.153	0.177
		(3.09)	(-1.86)	(-0.89)	(0.61)
Economic growth		0.00363	-0.0117	-0.138*	0.348
		(0.06)	(-0.11)	(-1.89)	(1.51)
Inflation		0.0490*	-0.0443	0.0825**	0.208**
		(1.76)	(-0.77)	(2.32)	(2.31)
Leader's tenure		0.224**	0.0610	0.242*	0.0706
		(2.34)	(0.33)	(1.80)	(0.29)
Discrimination		-0.414	-1.338	-0.0207	-1.319
		(-0.51)	(-0.72)	(-0.02)	(-0.44)
Salient elite ethnicity		0.470**	-0.294	0.0870	0.756*
		(2.33)	(-0.61)	(0.33)	(1.81)
Population	0.400***	0.370***	0.507***	0.491***	0.228**
	(8.15)	(6.40)	(4.03)	(4.83)	(2.13)
Constant	-10.45***	-10.70***	-11.62***	-12.10***	-10.08***
	(-12.53)	(-10.37)	(-5.57)	(-6.77)	(-4.78)
Observations	7483	5260	1188	1701	1150

t statistics in parentheses
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A13: Grievances including control variables

	Grievance and controls	Autocracy	Electoral autocracy	Electoral democracy
Campaign Onset				
Poverty	0.268**	-0.698*	-0.149	0.360
	(1.98)	(-1.81)	(-0.72)	(1.04)
Economic growth	0.0483	0.128	-0.0975	0.383
	(0.78)	(1.01)	(-1.26)	(1.56)
Inflation	0.0361	-0.121*	0.0579	0.233**
	(1.13)	(-1.71)	(1.42)	(2.26)
Leader's tenure	0.293***	0.180	0.285**	0.0214
	(2.93)	(0.93)	(1.97)	(0.08)
Discrimination	-0.378	-1.532	-0.124	-0.759
	(-0.47)	(-0.82)	(-0.12)	(-0.24)
Salient elite ethnicity	0.428**	-0.307	0.165	0.518
	(2.11)	(-0.63)	(0.61)	(1.16)
Population	0.285***	0.519***	0.488***	0.0680
	(4.20)	(3.40)	(4.22)	(0.47)
Ongoing domestic campaign	-0.619*	-0.524	-0.973**	-0.256
	(-1.71)	(-0.69)	(-1.97)	(-0.29)
Commitment to	0.311	0.499	0.512*	0.299

human rights				
	(1.44)	(0.82)	(1.78)	(0.54)
Election year	0.405**	0.509	0.195	0.804*
	(2.06)	(1.10)	(0.71)	(1.90)
Youth Bulge	5.022	-2.496	2.614	-5.084
	(0.99)	(-0.24)	(0.37)	(-0.42)
Regional contagion	0.470**	0.775**	0.574**	-0.104
	(2.54)	(2.06)	(2.25)	(-0.23)
Organizational learning	0.406***	0.251	0.274	0.778***
	(3.34)	(0.94)	(1.55)	(2.90)
Constant	-10.46***	-11.02***	-13.00***	-7.392**
	(-6.54)	(-3.54)	(-5.37)	(-1.97)
Observations	5244	1184	1695	1144

t statistics in parentheses
Cubic polynomials are included in estimations
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A14: Grievances including control variables and extended control variables

	Grievance and controls	Autocracy	Electoral autocracy	Electoral democracy
Campaign Onset				
Poverty	0.734***	-0.245	0.259	0.552
	(3.77)	(-0.40)	(0.85)	(1.19)
Economic growth	0.0147	0.0692	-0.125	0.332
	(0.24)	(0.52)	(-1.56)	(1.41)
Inflation	0.0803*	-0.0121	0.0967*	0.290**
	(1.87)	(-0.11)	(1.88)	(1.97)
Leader's tenure	0.318***	0.329	0.377**	0.0262
	(3.03)	(1.46)	(2.41)	(0.10)
Discrimination	-0.0996	-2.910	0.338	-1.300
	(-0.11)	(-1.24)	(0.29)	(-0.38)
Salient elite ethnicity	0.379*	-0.206	0.241	0.764
	(1.83)	(-0.37)	(0.82)	(1.61)
Population	0.237***	0.521***	0.459***	-0.0651
	(3.34)	(2.91)	(3.81)	(-0.39)
Ongoing domestic campaign	-0.697*	-0.252	-1.079**	-0.209
	(-1.90)	(-0.33)	(-2.15)	(-0.23)
Commitment to human rights	0.544**	0.666	0.526*	1.189*
	(2.27)	(0.99)	(1.68)	(1.90)
Election year	0.408**	0.516	0.153	0.759*
	(2.06)	(1.09)	(0.55)	(1.75)
Youth Bulge	0.690	-8.207	1.190	-28.57
	(0.12)	(-0.67)	(0.14)	(-1.61)
Regional contagion	0.473**	0.881**	0.580**	-0.0911
	(2.52)	(2.20)	(2.28)	(-0.19)
Organizational learning	0.365***	0.0709	0.249	0.749**

	(2.96)	(0.25)	(1.40)	(2.49)
Post-cold war	-0.533*	-0.803	-0.559	-0.862
	(-1.76)	(-1.08)	(-1.30)	(-0.87)
Americas	-0.161	0.582	-0.334	0.719
	(-0.39)	(0.55)	(-0.52)	(0.70)
East Asia & Pacific	0.135	0.0378	-0.681	2.667**
	(0.33)	(0.04)	(-1.07)	(2.17)
Africa	-1.145**	-1.408	-1.347**	0.999
	(-2.49)	(-1.04)	(-2.04)	(0.78)
Middle East & North Africa	-0.00364	-0.686	-0.640	2.922**
	(-0.01)	(-0.66)	(-0.99)	(1.97)
South & Central Asia	-0.106	1.019	-0.457	2.698*
	(-0.23)	(0.83)	(-0.70)	(1.92)
Constant	-8.552***	-10.32***	-11.62***	-2.684
	(-5.16)	(-2.85)	(-4.53)	(-0.63)
Observations	5244	1184	1695	1144

t statistics in parentheses
Cubic polynomials are included in estimations
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A15: Modernization

	Base	Modernization	Autocracy	Electoral autocracy	Electoral democracy
Campaign Onset					
Urbanization		0.0316	0.00340	0.177	-0.136
		(0.40)	(0.02)	(1.52)	(-0.81)
Industrialization		5.70e-16*	6.71e-16	7.45e-16	-1.26e-15
		(1.75)	(1.29)	(1.55)	(-1.21)
Education		-0.00350	0.0212***	0.00978*	-0.00420
		(-1.07)	(3.42)	(1.82)	(-0.47)
Communication technology		0.156***	-0.190	0.188**	0.287**
		(2.80)	(-1.49)	(2.41)	(2.36)
Trade liberalization		0.109	0.946***	0.535*	0.528
		(0.55)	(2.87)	(1.88)	(0.68)
Population	0.400***	0.405***	0.503***	0.412***	0.205*
	(8.15)	(7.85)	(6.01)	(4.25)	(1.89)
Constant	-10.45***	-11.14***	-13.82***	-13.28***	-6.247***
	(-12.53)	(-9.46)	(-6.50)	(-6.70)	(-2.58)
Observations	7483	7229	2325	2231	1332

t statistics in parentheses
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A16: Modernization including control variables

	Modernization	Autocracy	Electoral autocracy	Electoral democracy
Campaign Onset				
Urbanization	0.0474	-0.0418	0.173	-0.134
	(0.61)	(-0.28)	(1.48)	(-0.79)
Industrialization	6.27e-16*	7.13e-16	7.82e-16	-1.08e-15
	(1.89)	(1.31)	(1.61)	(-1.04)
Education	0.00113	0.0164**	0.00938	-0.00560
	(0.31)	(2.43)	(1.62)	(-0.57)
Communication technology	0.132**	-0.138	0.136	0.376***
	(2.18)	(-1.04)	(1.54)	(2.66)
Trade liberalization	0.124	0.825**	0.568*	0.331
	(0.62)	(2.40)	(1.92)	(0.41)
Population	0.346***	0.457***	0.423***	0.0823
	(5.79)	(4.48)	(3.96)	(0.58)
Ongoing domestic campaign	-0.318	-1.219*	-0.534	-0.229
	(-0.98)	(-1.90)	(-1.18)	(-0.27)
Commitment to human rights	0.0766	-0.171	0.195	0.530
	(0.37)	(-0.31)	(0.68)	(0.99)
Election year	0.450**	0.629*	0.318	0.807**
	(2.49)	(1.79)	(1.19)	(2.06)
Youth Bulge	14.13***	-1.241	2.343	6.858
	(3.75)	(-0.17)	(0.36)	(0.66)
Regional contagion	0.493***	0.811***	0.535**	-0.260
	(2.92)	(2.81)	(2.13)	(-0.58)
Organizational learning	0.348***	0.395*	0.214	0.668***
	(3.21)	(1.92)	(1.27)	(2.63)
Constant	-13.36***	-11.87***	-14.46***	-6.006
	(-8.48)	(-4.17)	(-5.90)	(-1.62)
Observations	7076	2284	2180	1313

t statistics in parentheses
Cubic polynomials are included in estimations
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A17: Modernization including control variables and extended control variables

	Modernization	Autocracy	Electoral autocracy	Electoral democracy
Campaign Onset				
Urbanization	0.0435	-0.0877	0.135	-0.0288
	(0.54)	(-0.58)	(1.11)	(-0.14)
Industrialization	7.57e-16**	8.31e-16	9.78e-16**	-1.69e-15
	(2.27)	(1.51)	(1.98)	(-1.60)
Education	-0.00420	0.00396	-0.000432	0.000243
	(-0.95)	(0.49)	(-0.06)	(0.02)
Communication technology	0.210***	0.271	0.194*	0.332**

	(2.75)	(1.35)	(1.87)	(2.10)
Trade liberalization	0.288	0.888**	0.951***	0.404
	(1.34)	(2.41)	(2.91)	(0.48)
Population	0.321***	0.427***	0.374***	-0.0495
	(4.97)	(3.43)	(3.36)	(-0.31)
Ongoing domestic campaign	-0.326	-1.182*	-0.670	-0.433
	(-1.00)	(-1.91)	(-1.46)	(-0.48)
Commitment to human rights	0.233	0.560	0.221	1.222**
	(1.04)	(0.91)	(0.72)	(1.97)
Election year	0.444**	0.524	0.294	0.803**
	(2.45)	(1.46)	(1.09)	(2.00)
Youth Bulge	17.78***	4.700	4.185	-17.10
	(4.00)	(0.58)	(0.55)	(-1.12)
Regional contagion	0.486***	0.745**	0.588**	-0.178
	(2.83)	(2.47)	(2.29)	(-0.39)
Organizational learning	0.318***	0.408**	0.211	0.737***
	(2.89)	(1.98)	(1.25)	(2.59)
Post-cold war	-0.372	-1.269**	-0.118	0.0650
	(-1.36)	(-2.00)	(-0.30)	(0.09)
Americas	-0.484	-0.645	-0.681	0.729
	(-1.44)	(-1.12)	(-1.15)	(0.79)
East Asia & Pacific	-0.321	-0.805	-0.975	2.984***
	(-0.93)	(-1.31)	(-1.58)	(2.61)
Africa	-0.916**	-2.341***	-1.465**	2.106
	(-2.30)	(-2.92)	(-2.27)	(1.64)
Middle East & North Africa	-0.131	-1.424*	-0.171	3.032*
	(-0.35)	(-1.89)	(-0.30)	(1.92)
South & Central Asia	-0.0972	-0.580	-0.375	2.952**
	(-0.24)	(-0.79)	(-0.62)	(2.30)
Constant	-13.01***	-10.50***	-12.76***	-3.084
	(-8.00)	(-3.45)	(-4.96)	(-0.71)
Observations	7076	2284	2180	1313

t statistics in parentheses
Cubic polynomials are included in estimations
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Appendix 4: Relevance for teaching

As a future teacher of social and political science, working with this thesis has given me important insights into both the theories and methods within the field of political science, as well as a general understanding of how it feels like to struggle and have to work hard to reach the goals that have been set.

An important part of teaching social sciences is to help and encourage kids and youth to become active citizens who both understand and contribute to the society they live in. This requires knowledge both about how we describe the societies we live in and about how everyone can participate in this society. In the modern world, activism in all forms and sizes has become increasingly prevalent. As this master's thesis centers around collective action, nonviolent action, and what it takes for an individual to be able to participate, I have developed a more nuanced understanding of what facilitates action and how individuals can participate outside of the conventional channels of participation. At the same time, working with different regime types has given me a deeper understanding of institutions and non-democratic regimes. In a world where democracy is being challenged, knowledge about other possible institutional setups is valuable for the future leaders of the world.

Even though the methods used in this thesis will be too advanced for high school and secondary school students, the general way of thinking about cause and effect, and how causality is established will be relevant. Similarly, understanding how both definitions and data are used to capture phenomena in the real world can affect how we understand and theorize about cause and effect.

Finally, I have reached a better understanding of how it feels like to struggle, not understand, and to have other things in life take focus away from schoolwork. As a student who has always loved school, these experiences will be valuable in my future profession.



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