Master's thesis

NTNU
Norwegian University of Science and Technology
Faculty of Social and Educational Sciences
Department of Sociology and Political Science

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When life gives you lemons, and you're out of sugar

An analysis of incumbents' post-recession vote share change in three welfare regime types

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Abstract

Since the 1980's, a considerable share of the research on vote behavior has been concerned with the *economic voting* phenomenon—the relationship between the government's ability to stimulate growth in the economy and changes in how the electorate votes from one election to another. Vote-functions and Popularity-functions, commonly known as VP-functions, are essential analytical tools in this part of the field. On the one hand, the parsimonious nature of these equations allows them to produce models with high explanatory power. On the other hand, these models are notoriously short-lived. The phenomenon *cost of ruling* is a remarkable exception from this tendency. For that reason, it is often considered a constant phenomenon in established liberal democracies by electoral behavior researchers.

In this thesis, the assumed stability of this phenomenon is tested through comparisons of incumbents' election outcomes in elections before and after the Great Recession. Based on the assumptions of the *economic safety net* hypothesis and with an ideal-typical operationalization of welfare system outcomes, or *welfare regimes*, we test if democracies behave similarly under similar macroeconomic circumstances. This political-economic contextual framework was tested on cross-national election data from 44 elections carried out surrounding the Great Recession in 22 liberal democracies. The tests were conducted using linear regression analysis and a semi-experimental comparative change design. The estimates are controlled for real GDP growth, unemployment rate change and government clarity, among other variables.

Three distinctly different patterns were found between the liberal, the conservative and the social democratic welfare regime. Though the findings indicate significant regime dependent voter behavior, they should be handled with discretion due to method and data deficiencies.

Sammendrag

Siden 1980-tallet har en betydelig del av valgforskningen blitt viet fenomenet *økonomisk stemmegivning* – forholdet mellom regjeringens evne til å stimulere til økonomisk vekst og endring i hvordan velgerne stemmer fra valg til valg. Valg-funksjoner og Popularitets-funksjoner, gjerne kalt VP-funksjoner, er helt essensielle verktøy på dette forskningsfeltet. Disse funksjonenes tankeøkonomiske beskaffenhet gir, på den ene side, forklaringsmodeller med høy forklaringskraft, og på den annen side, forklaringer med veldig kort levetid. Fenomenet *regjeringsslitasje* er i denne sammenheng et fremragende avvik fra denne tendensen. Av den grunn blir det ofte betraktet av valgforskere som et konstant fenomen i etablerte liberale demokratier.

I denne oppgaven blir det testet hvor stabilt fenomenet er gjennom å sammenligne valgutfall for sittende regjeringer i valg før og etter finanskrisen i 2008. Med utgangspunkt i hypotesen om at *økonomiske sikkerhetsnett* påvirker valgatferd og en idealtypisk operasjonalisering av velferdssystemseffekter, eller *velferdsregimer*, undersøker vi om demokratier fungerer likt under like makroøkonomiske forutsetninger. Dette politisk-økonomiske rammeverket ble testet på tverrnasjonale valgdata fra 44 valg som ble gjennomført før og etter finanskrisen i 22 liberale demokratier. Testene ble utført med lineær regresjonsanalyse i et semi-eksperimentelt design for å måle komparativ endring, og estimatene er blant annet kontrollert for realendring i BNP, endring i arbeidsledighetsraten og klarhet i regjeringens politiske profil (govenment clarity index).

Det ble funnet tre tydelig forskjellige mønstre mellom valgresultatene fra det liberale, konservative og sosialdemokratiske velferdsregimet. Funnene indikerer signifikant regimeavhengig velgeratferd, men de bør de vurderes med skjønn på grunn av metodiske og datamessige mangler.

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1. Introduction

Students of electoral behavior look for features of political actors and the societies they act in that reliably can be used to predict and understand election results. Among a myriad of measures of election outcomes, the apparent tendency that governments gradually lose favor with the voters over time is a promising indicator. The "political business cycle", "negative incumbency effect" and "cost of ruling" are all names for approximately the same phenomenon. Though the definition and specification of how to measure incumbency effects vary from study to study, three findings are fairly constant: 1) Incumbent government's vote share decreases between elections, 2) the size of the share lost increases with the duration of incumbency, and 3) the average negative effect of incumbency on government popularity has increased in OECD countries since the 1950's until today, and notably so after 1985 (Narud and Valen 2005; Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2013; Nannestad and Paldam 2003). When it comes to explaining what these findings indicate, the answers differ substantially with who you ask.

Since the 1980's, a considerable share of the research on vote behavior has been concerned with the relationship between the government's ability to stimulate growth in the economy and changes in how the electorate votes from one election to another. This is known as *economic voting*. The point of departure for this approach is a two-step causal explanation: 1) the state of the economy shapes the voters' perception of the government, 2) the voters' perception of the government determines their vote choice[1]. Vote-functions and Popularity-functions, commonly known as VP-functions, are essential analytical tools in this part of the field. VP-functions are equations used to explain or forecast election outcomes and public opinion polling in economically rational terms. They usually consist of a term for objective economic measures, e.g. GDP growth rate and unemployment rates, and a term for political institutional context, like system of governance and situations that obscure responsibility for economic and political outcomes. Both much of the academic success and theoretical challenges of economic voting theory are related to the parsimonious nature of these equations.

[1] After over 40 years of research, several amendments have been made to this initial assumption.

With this thesis, we set out to explore the potential value of an ideal-typical operationalization of contextual factors to election outcome research. A conventional VP-function does not take the effects of the welfare system or of international markets, which are both political and economic of nature, into account. When the phenomena *are* accounted for, they are most often operationalized as institutions and measured quantitatively by the size of unemployment benefit payout and the like. But though institutions can be similar in the abstract, their societal effects are subject to complex contextual interactions. The introduction of a term for welfare and market systems, in addition to the terms for economic change and political institutional context, might bring factors latent to purely economic and political measures to the surface and potentially stabilize the VP-function. *Economic systems* might just be that term.

Economic systems are defined by access to resources and the laws, norms and structures that determines flow and accumulation of these resources (Rosser and Rosser 2018). This definition contains far too much for the scope of this paper. Save access to resources, these factors are largely expressed through how a county's welfare system and labor market is organized. However, a country-to-country comparison demands a lot of detailed institutional data before it can bring new insight. To maintain the parsimoniousness of the conventional VP-function, we take a page from Esping-Andersen and use *welfare regimes* in place of economic systems. Thus, is the research question for this thesis:

RQ1: Does welfare regime type affect the stability of cost of ruling in liberal democracies?

We test the assumed stability of the cost of ruling phenomenon through comparisons of incumbents' election outcomes in elections before and after the Great Recession. Based on the assumptions of the *economic safety net* hypothesis and with an ideal-typical operationalization of welfare system outcomes, or *welfare regimes*, we test if democracies behave similarly under similar macroeconomic circumstances. This novel political-economic contextual framework is tested on cross-national election data from 44 elections carried out before and after the Great Recession in 22 liberal democracies. The tests are conducted using linear regression analysis and a semi-experimental comparative change design. The estimates are controlled for real GDP growth, unemployment rate change and government clarity, time spent in office and Eurozone membership.

1.1 Incumbency and incumbency effects

1.1.1 Definitions

In this paper, *incumbent* or *incumbent government* refers to the head of government and the cabinet in a given country, at a given time. Furthermore, it does not refer to the head of government and cabinet members in person, but to the party or parties they represent. As such, incumbency grants a political party or a coalition of political parties exclusive access to the executive power in a sovereign state. This includes holding responsibility for the governance and executing authority in said state. Thus, incumbency is desirable to any actor who aims to shape the workings of a society, to hinder others from attaining that ability or "solely in order to enjoy the income, prestige and power that go with running the governing apparatus" (Downs 1957: 137). In democracies, incumbency is held by either an elected president or by the party or coalition of parties with or closest to a parliamentary majority. However, whether incumbency is advantageous or detrimental when competing for votes, hence to attain or maintain power, is widely contested. As we will illustrate shortly the results depend on a wealth of factors. But first we will narrow down our definition of democracy to *liberal democracy*, to drastically reduce the number of entries to that list.

In *liberal democracies*, the incumbent administration is able to form a functioning government and to determine and implement the government's policies throughout the state's legal territory free of external interference[2] Access to incumbency is regularly redistributed through free and fair competition by way of a presidential or general election. If defeated, the incumbent administration accepts defeat and leaves office to its designated successor.

Incumbency effects are changes to the incumbent's vote share, relative to opposing parties or candidates, due to their office. At a governmental election, the incumbent government may experience one of three outcomes (Rose and Mackie 1983). 1) *Equilibrium:* The incumbent's popularity remains virtually unchanged. For this situation to occur the politicians need to be completely rational, effective and have complete knowledge (ibid: 117). One could argue that certain election laws and homogeneity in culture or values could lead up to a situation like this. Yet, this remains largely a theoretical scenario since politicians, like all people, are fallible and neither the voters nor the world is static. Thus, there will always be leeway to gain

[2] This does not include adherence to treaties signed and ratified by a freely elected government.

some competitive advantage in utilizing others mistakes and by acquiring knowledge. Whether that advantage is of any practical significance is an entirely different question.
2) *Exploiting office:* Positive incumbency effect—the incumbent's popularity increases. In this scenario, the incumbent government manipulates the economy and successfully exploits its position in the media spotlight to gain popularity in the electorate (ibid: 118).
3) *The pendulum effect*: Negative incumbency effect—the incumbent's popularity decreases. On the one hand, this scenario implies a strategic disadvantage of incumbency at the time of the election for that office in the shape of a relative loss in popularity. The ministers and their parties are held accountable for any errors or shortcomings made during their tenure of office. From this perspective are the parties in the opposition, free from responsibility, able to make lustrous claims about their alternative policy proposals, whereas those in office are constrained by public policy (ibid: 119-120). On the other hand, a loss of popularity does not equate a change of government. A dominating position due to electoral or party system properties, or plainly an overwhelming popularity in the electorate can render a popularity loss of several percentage points insignificant.

1.1.2 Appearance of incumbency effects

Analyses of national government election results from 17 West European countries in the period 1945 to 1999 (N=385) have shown incumbency to have a negative effect on electoral performance in all the respective countries (Narud and Valen 2005). For the whole set of governments, here as all governing parties considered as a unit for each election in each country, the mean loss was -2,6 percentage points. However, the results vary greatly between the countries. In Germany and Denmark, the governments at average have suffered losses of barely -0,8 percent, whereas Spanish governments averaged at -9,5 percent (ibid: 12). Furthermore, the voter volatility increases sharply from the 1980's and onwards with an increase in votes and elections lost for incumbent cabinets. It is worth noting that Narud admits that the addition of newer democracies like Greece, Portugal and Spain, each represented with less than 10 elections, contributes to skew these numbers (Narud and Valen 2005: 13; Narud 2002: 251).

An investigation of the incumbency effects in Norway found that the party or parties of the national incumbent suffered greater losses in local elections than in general elections (Midtbø 1999). With only a few exceptions, incumbents regained most of the lost votes by the next national election. The author interprets the difference in voter volatility with that Norwegian voters appear to use the local elections to communicate grievances to the incumbent and the National Assembly. Furthermore, Midtbø found that the negative incumbency effect was negatively correlated with voter turnout.

1.1.3 Cost of Ruling

Whereas VP- functions, in the context of social research, offer a noteworthy level explanatory power, they are also notoriously instable and short-lived (Lewis-Beck and Paldam 2000; Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2000: 375-76, 79-80). While economic parameters, and especially GDP growth, reliably show some effect on the incumbent's vote share, the validity of political parameters tend to fluctuate between elections (Wilkin, Haller, and Norpoth 1997: 307; van der Brug, van der EijK, and Franklin 2007; Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2013; Bellucci and Lewis-Beck 2011). According to VP-scholars Nannestad and Paldam (2003), a rare deviation from this fact is found in the *cost of ruling* phenomenon—negative incumbency effect—with an "unusually stable" appearance across elections and countries. Their claim is that, at average, the government in A) an **established democracy** with B) a **stable economy** should expect a yearly loss of 0,66 percentage points of the votes cast compared to the last election[3]. As such, this measure could be interpreted as an innate characteristic of stable democracies and an indicator of democratic consolidation (Keteku 2017). Nannestad and Paldam propose to include cost of ruling as a constant term in VP-functions to control for the normality of incumbent vote loss (2003: 17-18). Thus, any deviance in the measured election outcome from that term should be explained by economic or political change.

1.1.3.1 Call for "deeper parameter in human behavior"

Because the cost of ruling appears to be unusually constant, Nannestad and Paldam assume that it must be explained by something equally stabile—"a deep parameter in human behavior" (Nannestad and Paldam 2003: 28). They present three explanatory theories from the literature:

[3] For an average length tenure of 3,4 years this means a 2,25 percent loss. The standard deviation is about 4,5 percent under parliamentary systems and 9 under presidential systems.

1) The *coalition-of-minority* theory assumes that the opposition consistently over-promises policies to gain power and that a constant fraction of the electorate equal to the cost of ruling, the "sucker-fraction", is easily deceived by promises. As the government reveals its priorities over time, the sucker-fraction gradually becomes disenfranchised and turn to the opposition for a better prospect. 2) The *median-gap* theory assumes that the parties and the electorate understands the election as a one dimensional, *left-right*, competition for political power. Consequentially, there needs to be a discernable gap between the parties' policies for the competition to make sense. Whereas left-voters only need to vote left and right-voters only need to vote right, the center-voters need to change parties to, on average, achieve their preferred policy outcomes. 3) The *grievance-asymmetry* theory is the only theory of the three explanations based on empirical evidence. It holds that the impact of economic change on the incumbent's election outcome is asymmetric. Specifically, that the negative effect of negative economic change on the election outcome is stronger than the positive effect of an equivalent positive economic change.

1.1.4 Puzzle

This paper is committed to scrutinize the presumed stability of the cost of ruling phenomenon. The point of departure for our analysis is a basic political science puzzle and a system level perspective on politically enacted solutions:

It is widely agreed in the political science literature that the existence of a sovereign state is legitimized by its promise to its citizens to protect their lives from each other and from other states — the social contract. Contrarily, there is no consensus regarding *how* the state can best keep this promise.

Two things we *do* know are a) that substantial regime change is possible in both developing and established democracies and b) that political, market and civic institutions inform of human behavior and cultural evolution (Norris 2012; Inglehart 2018). Neither of these points are offered much thought in Nannestad and Paldam's methodology, nor in their discussion. As such, we think it's worth to shine some light on the assumptions behind their claim about cost of ruling, *established democracy* and *stable economy*, and how they relate to context.

Firstly, the operationalization of established democracy does not leave room for historical context. The basis of the cost of ruling measure, an average of historical elections, implicitly assumes that democracies are stable and behave similarly under similar political and economic conditions. Although established democracies, arguably, are more stable and peaceful than autocratic or intermittent regimes (Hegre 2001), adherence to liberal and democratic values, the underpinnings of western societies, might not be as deep-seated in established democracies as once though (Norris and Inglehart 2018; Mounk 2018; Fukuyama 1989). Nannestad and Paldam do account for exceptions related to very small countries, short-lived governments and newly established democracies. Never the less do they estimate cost of ruling on West European, North American and Japanese election data from 1948 through 1997, over 200 observations from 19 countries. In other words, are election data from war-torn societies in a bipolar world order and globalized post-modern welfare societies averaged together, even though they represent vastly different societies. The authors do note both that the cost of ruling increased dramatically in the late 1980's and onward, and that some vast differences in means and variation between countries are present in their data. The data is appropriately tested for homogeneity (Bartlett test and an F-test), and the tests do not reject that the means distribution is the same, but they do find that the variance is larger in the Canada, France and the Unites States than in other selected countries. Because the difference in means is insignificant, the authors argue that the cost of ruling is the same in all the 19 countries.

However, these tests were not executed with year of election in mind. When the average election outcomes for European incumbents are considered decade by decade, the marked increased vote loss looks more like a substantial shift in voter volatility than a fluke (Narud and Valen 2008). Accordingly, it's left uncertain whether the apparent stable level of cost of ruling truly is a characteristic of established democracies, thereby a constant, or if it is a product of a greater social context. The political, economic and technological state of affairs were considerably different before and after the 1980's. Many of the great debates and structural projects of the post-ware era materialized into new laws, institutions and social paradigms by 1990. The value of cost of ruling as a democratic benchmark, a constant in a VP-function or a meaningful indicator in any respect resides in the relevance of the data it is based on to the context it is supposed to explain. To this end, cost of ruling would serve as a more accurate tool for comparative analyses if a cut-off point for relevancy or a contextual sectioning of the data is made before the measure is estimated.

Secondly, the reasoning behind assumption B), that the economy needs to be stable, appears to be that "it fit the data". To find a stronger theoretical foundation for this assumption we ask two questions: which factors make economies stable and can the variance in cost of ruling between countries be traced back to those factors? Findings from welfare research indicate that countries with extensive welfare programs, such as investing in work skills and health of the population and unemployment benefits, experienced fewer negative consequences of market failure from the 2008 financial crisis (Barr 2012; Bonoli and Natali 2012; Andersen 2013). In other words, do different welfare systems afford different degrees of economic stability.

One possible answer to the second question can be found in the *economic safety net* hypothesis which postulates that some welfare schemes render economic evaluations less important to how the voters vote (Singer 2011a, 2011b; Bergh and Jenssen *forthcoming;* Park and Shin 2019). VP-research on globalization and economic interdependence present another explanation. Two main findings indicate that economic voting is affected by how the national economy fares in comparison to the global economy and by the degree the voter is exposed to market changes (Duch and Stevenson 2010; Hellwig 2001). Both lines of reasoning are applicable to the 2009 and the 2017 Norwegian general elections, which succeeded the 2008 financial crisis and the 2014 drop in oil and gas prices respectively. Despite large spikes in unemployment, the incumbent governments did not suffer extraordinary losses.

2. Theory

2.1 Theories of voter behavior and the voter volatility challenge

The academic interest in voter behavior grew with the spread of universal suffrage throughout the 20th century. By the mid-1940's, the milieu surrounding sociologist Paul F. Lazarsfeld at Columbia University had developed the *social network theory*, the first cohesive approach to voter behavior research. Several new approaches emerged the following decades, each with their own methodology and causal explanation of voter behavior. Most prominent are the *political cleavage theory,* the *Michigan model* and the *rational actor theory*, with roots in sociological, psychological and economic research respectively.

Social network models, introduced in the Columbia studies, focus on how means of communication inform opinion formation and opinion changing processes. Its causal chain, the *two-step flow of communication*, posits that one's vote choice is a result of the priorities and perspectives in one's social surroundings (Katz and Lazarsfeld 1955). Cornerstone studies to this hypothesis found that face-to-face interactions are "the most important influences stimulating opinion change" and that non-political secondary associations have a latent influence on the political positions of their members (Berelson et al. 1954; Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet 1944: xxv). The voter's vote choice is most susceptible to change by the opinions of trusted people in their own social circle, opinion leaders. Thus, actors who wish to effectively sway people's vote choice need to influence what the opinion leaders talk about—to set the agenda.

With *The American Voter* the Michigan model pioneered the attitudinal approach in electoral research (Campbell et al. 1960). Its explanation of voter behavior marks a significant theoretical and methodical shift from the sociological foundation of the Colombia approach to the discipline of psychology. A central argument for this departure is a critique of the emphasis on social groups based on demographic characteristics found in earlier explanations. The authors argue that vote choice is guided by a cluster of attitudes dubbed *party identification*. Rather than a product of her surroundings, her party identity is attained through (1) exposure to politically relevant experiences that are (2) understood through her socially defined roles (Ibid: 473-75). Party identification makes the act of voting more of an emotional response than a referendum on political issues. The degree to which the voter is exposed to such experiences before reaching the minimum voting age, or *early politicization*, is an important factor to explain the strength and persistence of her party identity (Ibid: 146-49). Thus, some segments of the electorate are mobile and susceptible to short term influences, and others are virtually unmovable. Because of this variation in the electorate, the election outcome can change between elections even though most of the voters vote for the same party at every election.

The political cleavage theory is a typological framework to understand voter behavior and the competition between political parties built on social-structural theory and a historical analytical approach. It holds that a party system is a product of political organization surrounding *political cleavages*—long-standing lines of conflict which provide a sense of identity and group affiliation— within a given society (Bartolini and Mair 2007: 215). Rokkan and Lipset's (1967) seminal studies of Western European democracies identified a four dimensional cleavage structure consisting of geographical, socioeconomic and cultural differences, as well as differences in cultural values and religiosity. Critically, these dimensions are only potential bases for cleavages. The extent to which each cleavage is developed depends on the given country's historical context. This leaves enough analytical leeway to explain and compare a great variety of political constellations.

The explanatory strengths and weaknesses of each approach can be described with its *causal distance*—the degrees of separation between the assumed causal factor and voter behavior (Jenssen 2008). In general, models with shorter causal distance offer high explanatory power and low realism, and vice versa for models with long causal distance. How to weigh explanatory power and realism has become a critical issue in the voter behavior discourse. Closeness to election result upon election result gained highly realistic and sociocultural hypotheses, like group affiliation and party identification, a strong footing in voter behavior research in the early days of the field. Staring in the late 1960's, rampant evidence of voter volatility—that voters are less committed to a single political party—challenged their theoretical assumptions like empirical curveballs. The field needed new explanations.

2.1.1 Economic voting and the VP-function

Although the rational actor theory had come into existence around the same time as its sociocultural counterparts, it only came to prominence when the others failed. The *reward-punishment* hypothesis (Key 1966), the basic causal chain for voter behavior within this line of reasoning, assumes that the voter perceives the election as a referendum on the state of the economy. The voter attributes the responsibility for the economy to the incumbent, evaluates available information about the economic conditions and votes according to her economic considerations. If the economy performs well by her evaluation, she will vote for the incumbent, if it does not, she will vote for the opposition. Because the voter decision is predicated on economic evaluations, her vote is an act of *economic voting*.

By virtue of this simple theoretical framework, it is possible to make relatively accurate predictive assessments of incumbents' popularity based on very few variables, as first demonstrated by Mueller (1970). Early empirical tests from UK (Goodhart and Bhansali 1970) and US elections (Kramer 1971; Fair 1978) indicated that aggregate support for the incumbent party might be influenced by macroeconomic fluctuations prior to the election. With further research, these claims grew more declamatory (Rose and McAllister 1986), though that is not to say without contestation. Of the debates within the economic voting literature, three incessantly abide:

One of the larger disagreements in the economic voting discourse deals with how economic evaluations should be measured with regards to level of measurement (Robinson 2009; Fiorina 1981; Kramer 1983; Kinder, Adams, and Gronke 1989; Erikson 2004; Dassonneville and Lewis-Beck 2014). Both micro- and macro-level analyses are confined by informal fallacies. On the one hand, aggregate data macro-level studies are limited to provide suggestive evidence because of the *ecological fallacy* (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2013: 369). That is, to make inference about the individual solely from information about the group. Arguably, macro-level findings need comparative micro-level analyses to be confirmed (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2007: 528). On the other hand, survey based micro-level analyses are subject to the *fallacy of composition* or *micrological fallacy*—to assume that something that is true for a part of the whole also must be true for the whole (Dassonneville and Lewis-Beck 2014). An extension of this discourse deals with whether the economic parameter should be objective or subjective.

The second question, "how is the economy evaluated?", has two axis: *target* and *time*(Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2013: 369). Target refers to whose economic situation the voter evaluates, her own (*egotropic* (Downs 1957; Sears and Funk 1991)) or that of a larger group, like the nation (*sociotropic* (Kinder and Kiewiet 1981)). Time refers to whether the voter makes her evaluation based on experiences (*retrospective* (Fiorina 1981)) or expectations (*prospective* (Mackuen, Erikson, and Stimson 1992)). Though this question isn't fully resolved, an increasing amount of empirical testing indicates that sociotropic retrospective voting is the best fitting presumption about how the evaluation is made (Sears and Funk 1991; Norpoth 1996; Anderson, Lewis-Beck, and Stegmaier 2003; Stubager et al. 2014).

The third question relates to measure reliability. Despite highly significant findings, VP-functions are notoriously unstable as the effect of different economic parameters on vote for the incumbent government can vary greatly between countries and time periods (Paldam 1989). What Paldam dubs the "stability problem" is, as such, comparable to the challenge voter volatility posed to the Michigan model and the political cleavage theory—variability between election results proves the rational actor theory theoretically deficient. It is possible to work around this by simply accepting short term effects as a democratic feature, like in *issue voting* theory (Petrocik 1996; Petrocik, Benoit, and Hansen 2003). One significant drawback with that approach is that it risks understating factors that mater in long-term societal comparisons.

Toward the end of his cornerstone essay "How Robust is the Vote Function?", Paldam (1989: 27, 29) famously asks:

> *"How deep is the instability? Is all that is required just a little trick, and then the function stabilizes? […] There is, of course, a great incentive to write the paper presenting the trick. It would surely become one of the most cited papers – so I am trying."*

In advice for further research, he suggests making better theories for the micro-foundations of economic voting, more systematic documentation of when the function works and when it doesn't, and construction of better data on political events, media coverage and other political aspects relating to economic voting.

2.1.2 Political context

One notable attempt to stabilize the VP-function is Powel and Whitten's (1993) addition of *political institutional context*. According to their *clarity of responsibility* hypothesis, the voter's ability to retrospectively assign credit or blame for the performance of the national economy depends on how defuse or defined the responsibility for policy-making was in the same period. The dynamic depends on the power relationship between the government and the legislature and within the government. If the government is a minority in the legislature, it can divert blame to the opposition. If the government is a coalition, it can blur the responsibility between the governing parties.

Powell and Whitten's initial cross-national analysis found that unsupported minority governments and coalition governments to lose fewer votes than their majority rule and single party government counterparts. Further research on elections in Western Europe (Whitten and Palmer 1999; Anderson 2000), Latin America (Roberts and Wibbels 1999; Samuels 2004), and the U.S. (Nadeau & Lewis-Beck 2001) support these findings. Coalition governments seem to diffuse responsibility and make it harder for voters to assign blame.

There are several renditions of the political context measure. Powell and Whitten's original "lack of clarity" scale consisted of five measures for institutional features[4]. This specification has since been criticized for neglecting important opposition and government characteristics (Anderson 2000), for being ambiguous in scope (Duch and Stevenson 2008) and for overestimating the importance of institutional quirks to the voter's evaluations of the government (Hobolt, Tilley, and Banducci 2013). Authors of the latter critique constructed a two-part measure to distinguish between the influence of institutional features and government features—*Institutional clarity*[5] and *Governmental clarity*[6].

'[T]he logic of clarity of responsibility is that the effect on economic voting is interactive' (Powell and Whitten 1993: 405). Such interactions between political and economic parameter are well documented (Silva and Whitten 2017). Anderson (2000) found that voter behavior is more strongly affected by economic evaluations when there is a high degree of clarity of responsibility between institutions, clarity of responsibility within the government and there are clear available alternatives to the incumbent government. A similar strong interaction has been found between subjective performance evaluation and government clarity on vote intention for incumbent (Hobolt, Tilley, and Banducci 2013). However, no significant interaction has been found between power patterns (measures similar to those in the government clarity index) and GDP growth rate on measured change of incumbent vote share,

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[4] Opposition committee chair, weak party cohesion, politically significant bicameral opposition, minority government and numbers of government parties (Powell and Whitten 1993: 403).

[5] Weak committees, unicameralism, absence of federalism, parliamentary system (Hobolt, Tilley, and Banducci 2013: 171).

[6] Dominance of one party, single-party government, absence of cohabitation, ideological cohesion of government (Hobolt, Tilley, and Banducci 2013: 171).

neither when measured individually, nor when measured as an index (Dassonneville and Lewis-Beck 2017).

This means there is an incongruence between micro-level subjective measures for voter intention and objective macro-level measures for voter behavior. Furthermore, it means that the questions of what and where the link or links are between the economy and the incumbent's electoral performance remain open.

2.1.3 Economic system: the next addition to the VP-function?

An alternative, though not competing, solution to the instability problem is to add *economic context* to the VP-function. This argument can roughly be summed up with a two-stage rationale. The first stage of the argument calls attention to effects from exogenous market factors on the national economy. In short, international economic interdependence is found to diffuse clarity of responsibility for economic outcomes between national policy and international market behavior (see chapter 3.1). The second stage of the argument is a set of endogenous policy factors. Comparative election studies indicate that there are regional differences in economic voting, especially after the Great Recession (see chapter 3.2). These findings, in conjunction with findings from welfare systems research (see chapter 3.3), point toward a plausible system-level explanation of how: *Different types of labor market organization and different non-economic welfare policy outcomes accommodate different expectations and voting rationales.*

2.2 Welfare regimes—Values, institutions and wellbeing

2.2.1 What is welfare?

Welfare is, in broad strokes, some sort of assistance offered to individuals or families. Beyond this, the definition of welfare is widely contested. How this assistance should be justified, measured and serviced are all hot button issues. To what extent the state should perform welfare services and play redistributive role in the market, or if there even should be a *welfare state*, are common themes in the welfare debate. Consequently, welfare goals and welfare systems vary greatly between countries depending on which ideological perspective has directed the welfare policy.

2.2.1.1 Principles of justice

Allyn Fives (2008: 7) highlights three *principles of justice*, with adhering policy orientations, from the debates on welfare: need, merit and equality. Both *need* and *merit* are principles of a selective and exclusionary nature. The former entails a definition of "need" and often implies means testing. As such, one's entitlement to assistance relies entirely on whether one's situation fits the definition of need for any existing welfare benefit. Welfare justified on merit, often social insurance, is granted as a right in exchange for an effort made by the recipient. Thus, access to welfare earned by merit is limited by one's ability to sustain the required effort. *Equality*, in contrast, justifies universal access to welfare as an instrument to neutralize social differences in opportunity. Although this principle is closely related to universalism, it does not imply unconditional access. For instance, access to paid parental leave might be limited to citizens of the state where the leave is granted who are parents of children under twelve months of age.

2.2.1.2 Ways of measuring welfare

In addition to the different lines of justification, *welfare goals*, and subsequently level, framework and object of measurements for goal attainment, make up the nuts and bolts of the different perspectives on welfare. (Greve 2014: 22). Specifically, welfare effects are measured either on or between the state, the market (macro) and the civil society (micro) level through objective and subjective indicators on monetary and non-monetary variables. The different perspectives weight the principles of justification and measurement methods differently with regards to value and normative considerations, especially surrounding questions about deservingness and responsibility and preferred size of the welfare state (also known as "norms for public action"). The Keynesian, the neoliberal and the social investment approach are three of several archetypical approaches on welfare (George and Wilding 1994; Morel, Palier, and Palme 2012):

The goal for the *Keynesian* approach is to secure economic stability. It values social equality, jobs for all—at least for all men—and de-commodification[7]. Keynesians encourage central

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[7] De-commodification is a process of reducing the extent to which an individual's welfare is reliant upon the market.

economic planning and welfare state development to emphasize the importance of the state to the economy. In stark contrast, the goal of the *neoliberal* approach is to best ensure full employment and economic growth. Proponents of this view argue that a dynamic market with a minimum of state interference is best able to achieve these goals. Individual responsibility is a foundational value to this perspective. Thus, are activation and any jobs preferred to benefit payments. To promote the position of market actors in society, neoliberals advocate the state to plan with austerity, remove regulation and dismantle the welfare state. Ideally, should ensuring price stability remain the only responsibility of the state in the market.

The *social investment* approach aims at increasing the options for societal development to support job creation and economic growth. Like the two former approaches, this too implies a "recipe" to optimize the wellbeing of the economy. But whereas the Keynesian and neoliberal approaches mainly consider objective macro effects on monetary variables, the social investment approach also includes objective and subjective measures on non-monetary variables. These measures are, among others, social inclusion, quality jobs and equality of opportunity. The norms for public action are widened to not only provide an economic safety net, but to play a socio-economic enabler through lifelong investment in its citizens' human capital. Instead of relying on the state or the market to exert a given type of behavior to amend unforeseen market events, this perspective favors preparation over rehabilitation. Specifically, it posits positive reciprocal effects from interaction points between state and civil society, such as education and taxation.

Political orientation and enacted ideology do undoubtedly inform political action. But neither are new to political behavior research, nor to the VP-function (Mair 2007). If a measure for welfare system is warranted, it needs a level of abstraction beyond left-right orientation and voter gaze and perspective. It might be supra-national.

2.2.2 Welfare state models

Between the burgeoning of the nation state and citizenship in the late 19th century and the establishment of the Eurozone at the close of the 20th century, a variety of European welfare state ventures came to be the fabric of advanced industrial societies. Otto von Bismarck's introduction of mandatory social insurance in Germany during the 1880's, the 1935 establishment of collective bargaining in Norway and the introduction of means tested benefits after the 1942 Beveridge report in the United Kingdom are all hallmark historical events in the development of these welfare state systems. Although Keynesian, neoliberal and social investment minded welfare policies each appear in said countries, the trajectories of their welfare systems were, arguably, set by the first perspective to reach institutionalization (Bonoli 2007).

To conceptualize realistic yet reliable welfare state models is, unsurprisingly, a central concern in comparative welfare research. Models in this field are, essentially, *real-typical* or *ideal-typical* (Aspalter 2011). Real types depict policy and institutional actualities and are well-suited to compare highly detailed technical differences and short-term changes between welfare state systems. Ideal types, on the other hand, overlook technical variance to function as yard-stick measurements of functional equivalences, *welfare regimes*, over longer periods of time.

The welfare model applied in this paper stems from Esping-Andersen's ideal-typical model (Aspalter 2011: 736; Esping-Andersen 1990; Esping-Andersen 1987: 7). The model ties different political-economic outcomes to how welfare provisions are distributed between the state, market and civil society, also known as the *welfare mix* (Esping-Andersen 1990; Greve 2014: 118). It is based on eight years of multinational data regarding how welfare policies affect people's lives and historical analyses of the processes and normative arguments behind these policies. The goals for these analyses are to measure the extent to which an individual's welfare is reliant upon the market, *de-commodification*, and how strongly the welfare system maintains social divisions in the society, *social stratification*. This operationalization considers national welfare systems with similar outcomes as one typology. Because the typologies are ideal-typically defined by performance rather than institutions, the model is less sensitive to administrative and political changes than real-typical models (Aspalter 2011: 737). That makes it well suited for multi-system comparisons across time, such as election outcome and economic voting research.

2.2.3 Welfare regime types

Esping-Andersen's original model identified three different welfare regimes: conservative, liberal and social democratic. Later research has added pro-welfare conservative and anti-welfare conservative to the list (Aspalter 2011):

Societies with the *conservative* (also known as *corporatist* or *Christian democratic*) welfare regime are characterized by a moderate degree of both de-commodification and social stratification, and are generally found to have an emphasis on merit and occupational status. This system was initially associated with occupationally specific pension schemes and NGO welfare service providers. Later, family has also been recognized as an important welfare provider (Esping-Andersen 1999). This regime type is found in continental Europe, including former Soviet states.

The *liberal* regime, found in Anglo-Saxon countries, is characterized by a low degree of de-commodification and a high degree of social stratification. Welfare policy in these systems are colored by an ethos of individual responsibility. E.g. is access to welfare benefits means-tested and healthcare services are to a large extent provided through the market.

The *social democratic* regime, associated with the Nordic countries, have a high degree of de-commodification and a low degree of social stratification. These systems emphasize equality through universal social security and welfare services that are mostly offered by public providers and funded through taxes.

Pro-welfare conservative welfare regime in East Asia are somewhat de-commodified and have a moderate degree of stratification. They typically use universal social investment strategies combined with Bismarckian social insurance.

Anti-welfare conservative welfare regimes in Latin America are somewhat de-commodified and have an extremely high degree of stratification. A typical welfare-mix in these systems are means tested social assistance and healthcare services, and Bismarckian social insurance.

3. Previous research

3.1 Economic interdependence and accountability

Several studies have found that voters take economic context into account when they vote. The literature implies that there are, at least, two ways the global economy can have a moderating effect on economic voting.

The first argument is that voters look to their national or regional neighbors to see if "the grass is greener on the other side" before voting. Voters seem more inclined to practice economic voting when variation of the national differs from that of the global economy. One cross-national study of 13 Western-European countries suggests that inflation changes different from the European average "have an impact on incumbents' vote shares" (Chapell & Vega 2000). A similar effect has been found in a series of studies by Duch and Stevenson (2005; 2008; 2010) through micro- and macro-level analyses of European election data. Their 2010 paper found that economic voting behavior is affected by the variance between national GDP change and changes in the global economy. Their micro-level results suggest that both the voters are reasonably well-informed about the macro-economy and that they appear to understand how much their economies are influenced by fluctuations in the international economy. Their macro-level analyses imply that the voters are aware of this influence when they vote. Specifically, that the voters discern to what extent unexpected shocks to the economy are related to the incumbent's competency and exogenous factors by comparing the state of the national economy to the global economy.

Economic contextual awareness has also been found on subnational elections. In a study of U.S. state elections Ebeid and Rodden (2006) found that voters would compare state economy to the national economy, and in a study of Norwegian local elections Martinussen (2004)found that differing levels of unemployment and fees in neighboring municipalities excited more economic voting behavior.

The second argument is that global market integration blurs responsibility for the economy, much like how political context can blur responsibility for policy. In a cross-national analysis of nine countries, Hellwig (2001) found that economic voting is lower when the level of exposure to the world economy is accounted for. In extension of this argument, have open economies been found to experience a lower degree of economic voting than economies less dependent on economic trade (Hellwig and Samuels 2007; 2008; Duch and Stevenson 2010). This global-market-exposure effect is, seemingly, dependent on micro-level variables. Hellwig (2001) uncovered considerable differences between unionized and nonunionized households, public and private sector workers, and workers in primary or secondary sector and tertiary sector jobs. Economic evaluations showed a sizable effect on vote for the incumbent government for both groups in all three tests, but the effect would not be dampened by trade-openness for unionized workers, public sector workers or primary or secondary sector workers, like it would for their respective counterparts. Hellwig suggests this might be a new expression of social alignment where group identity is based on one's relation to the global economy (2001: 1158).

To summarize, Duch and Stevenson's (2010) findings suggest that the voters account for international market forces before their vote choice is affected by their economic evaluations, even when the economy is under stress. Hellwig's (2001) results suggest that *some* voters incorporate the global economy into their evaluation, and that the degree to which they do depends upon whether they are unionized, have a public or private employer and which sector they work in. If both arguments are true, one should expect a country-level labor market effect on the economic vote: economies with different employer and sector makeup and different levels of union membership should respond differently to the same economic crisis.

3.2 Regional voting patterns

A growing body of research arouses the suspicion that there are regional profiles for economic voting in non-crisis elections. The economic vote is generally stronger in the United Kingdom, United States, New Zealand and Ireland than in other western democracies (Duch and Stevenson 2008: 67-69, 72-73). Likewise, does the economic vote appear to be much stronger in southern European countries than in northern European countries (Lewis-Beck and Nadeau 2012). As a case in point, did the Norwegian incumbent government lose office in both the 2001 and 2005 election despite economic growth (Aardal 2006). Do these regional differences remain during market failure?

Crudely put, the takeaway from the *post-2008-financial-crisis-elections* is this: an economic crisis makes economic issues more salient to more voters—because it affects more people, it moves more votes—and will enhance the level of economic voting (see Lewis-Beck and Lobo

2017 for an overview). A comparative study found that the financial crisis had a similar impact on the vote in Germany as it had in Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States (Clarke and Whitten 2013). Furthermore, was the appearance of economic voting extraordinarily high in Ireland (Reidy et al. 2018), Spain (Fraile and Lewis-Beck 2014) and Iceland (Indridason 2014), where unemployment was especially salient. The potent mobilizing force of bad economic outcomes, demonstrated in these findings, point toward the Grievance Asymmetry theory. This does not mean that precarious economic circumstances remove spatial or positional aspects from economic evaluation and make it purely valence driven, though many governments chose to treat it that way (LeDuc and Pammett 2013).

On the contrary, the financial crisis offer important insights to how societal factors affect voter behavior. Firstly, do policy positions remain significant during crisis elections. Although the economy was the most salient issue in the 2008 U.S. presidential election, it was not decisive to the election outcome (Hillygus and Henderson 2010; Johnston et al. 2010). Hillygus and Henderson found that most voters had decided on a presidential candidate before the financial collapse in September, and that positional economic and social issues were predictive of that decision. Secondly, deeper examinations of similar results have found that the voter's relations to the economy shape her economic and social policy preferences. Findings from the UK suggest that, though the economic vote after the financial crisis was about the same between the rich and poor, the two groups expressed different preferences on redistributive policy (Duch and Sagarzazu 2014). The electoral impact of redistributive policy preference was "twice as large for the poor as for the rich" (Ibid: 251). A comparison of two Swedish crisis elections, 1994 and 2010, with similar macroeconomic performance numbers, found evidence of more economic voting in the 2010 election. (Lindvall, Martinsson, and Oscarsson 2013). The authors note that economic differences had grown and welfare spending proportionally decreased between the two elections, and suggest that larger exposure of economically vulnerable groups to the economic crisis might partly explain the difference in voter behavior. Finally, a rich literature documents that interactions between voter relation to the economy and the welfare state inform economic and social policy positions (see chapter 3.3).

How does the welfare state system affect economic voting? Findings from the Czech Republic and Norway indicate that national economic context shapes the electorate's expectations to national economic performance. Coffey (2013) found that economic voting works the same way in the Czech Republic as it does in other established democracies, but that economic indicators only matter to the vote if they move beyond a certain threshold. She suggests that the voters' expectations to the economy is adjusted by the long-term average.

The Norwegian cases show two phenomena counterintuitive to the "reward-punishment" logic. First we have the phenomena of *rising expectations*. Despite strong economic growth, the incumbent lost both the 2001 and 2005 elections. Aardal (2006, 2007) found that the Norwegian voters were more concerned with the quality of the welfare system than with economic growth. If anything, they had come to take growth as a given. Thus, the incumbents lost due to rising expectations for how the accumulated wealth should be spent. We find the polar opposite to this in the second phenomena, the *political grace period.* Even though the export minded Norwegian economy was hit hard by the Great Recession, the incumbent government was re-elected in 2009. Not only that, the prime minister's party *grew* in popularity. Purportedly, the dramatically framed media coverage of the crisis reduced voter expectations to be lower than what the government could deliver (Jenssen and Kalstø 2012). Expectations to the incumbent were, in both cases, shaped by other factors than just real economic development.

3.3 Welfare state effects

Before we incorporate welfare regime typologies into the VP-function, we should have some expectations about how they might interact with the other components in the function—the economic and the political term.

3.3.1 Welfare state effects on economic evaluations

A common trait between the Keynesian, neo-liberal and social investment perspectives is that they in some shape or form prescribe measures to counteract unemployment. While economic growth might be an important political goal, it's attributed importance varies more between the perspectives. Given the basic premise of the reward-punishment-hypothesis, that vote choice is a product of economic evaluations, the theoretical arguments lead us to expect that the welfare state should moderate the negative impact of unemployment and unemployment related worries on economic evaluations. In turn, this means the welfare state should reduce the negative impact of unemployment on the incumbent government's election outcome. With respect to welfare state effects on economic evaluations, the empirical evidence implies that there are different regimes.

Among 15 OECD countries public policy provisions were found to affect workers' worries related to employment in three ways (Anderson and Pontusson 2007). First, job security legislation was found to have a significant impact on how secure workers felt about their employment, second, government funded active labor market programs were found to increase the ability of the unemployed to find new work, and third[8], generous unemployment compensation was found to reduce anxiety about loss of employment. Income pooling within households was, however, not found to reduce anxiety about loss of employment. Findings on the political economy of gender provide some insight to why.

An increasing number of income generating work opportunities for women and a rising acceptance of divorce has been found to propel the growing number of divorces in 18 OECD countries between 1970 and 1995 (Iversen and Rosenbluth 2003). The authors posit that the household gradually has lost its rank as a stable economic prospect, inducing female participation in the labor market as an income "insurance" strategy.

Results to that effect, though not directly related, were found in a longitudinal study on exit routes from unemployment and their effect on mental wellbeing in Sweden (Strandh 2000). To exit from unemployment to paid labor, university education or paternal leave were associated with an increase in mental wellbeing, enrollment to high school equivalent education and exit to sick leave were associated with reduced mental wellbeing, and exit to early retirement had no significant effect. Strandh suggests that the varying effect of the different exit routes is related to how well the new life situation resolves the individual's initial economic difficulties.

Income inequality has not been found to explain population health differences between rich countries (Lynch et al. 2004). It was, however, found to explain some health outcome differences within the U.S. and the UK, but not in countries like Australia, Belgium, Denmark and Spain. One cross-national multi-level study of 39 years' worth of health data found that

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[8] Not measured directly, but found trough inference from circumstantial evidence.

social democratic welfare states consistently scored better on reform sensitive, qualitative and quantitative, health indicators than countries with other regime types, even when controlled for GDP per capita (Chung and Muntaner 2007). The authors imply that the effect might be related to "universal access to healthcare, [relatively high] female employment in the labor market and [relatively high] unemployment compensation and subsidies to single mothers and divorced women".

Taken together, these results indicate that de-commodification measures, like unemployment compensation and single parent subsidies, and de-stratification measures, like high female employment, have a positive effect on well-being and a moderating on unemployment related worries. Even though labor market programs were found to improve employability, different exit routes from unemployment entail different effects on well-being. Considering the slim effects of economic considerations on vote choice in social democratic countries, mental and social wellbeing might be related to the "deeper parameter in human behavior" Nannestad and Paldam call for. To that end, maybe we should assume the vote utility function to be a product of more than evaluations of economic usefulness and political power.

3.3.2 Welfare state effects on political evaluations

If rational actor theorists include political evaluation to their models, it is conventionally limited to evaluations of political power within political institutions. Within the political cleavage school—where conflict of interest is considered the main driver for political action—there is conversely a rich literature on the ties, colloquially known as *Coleman boats*, between societal structures and political behavior. The *homogeneity thesis* (Gilens 2009) and the *culture thesis* (Graubard 1986) are some of the more popular explanations for why policy preference and , by extension, welfare states are so different among liberal industrialized countries. The nature of their claims is very similar in that they assume cross-country differences in policy preferences are products of "innate" value or attitude differences within or between populations. Like many other political cleavage theories, these too do suffer from long causal distance, over-fit models and failure to acknowledge the counterfactual. But that is not the case across the board.

According to Inglehart's *Modernization theory*, increased control over nature through science and bureaucracy advances societies acceptance of secular-rational values, and diminishes religion and tradition as sources of authority (Inglehart 2018; Inglehart and Welzel 2005). Furthermore, people who grow up taking survival for granted are more tolerant of out groups and more open to new ideas, whereas an insecure upbringing has the opposite effect. Figure 3.1 is a graphical representation of these arguments—commonly known as the *Inglehart-Welzel cultural map of the world*—which shows how different countries perform on the two axes of the modernization process. The findings below demonstrate, in line with the Modernization theory, that welfare regime outcomes, like decreased economic inequality or increased social trust, affect public support and policy preferences. In other words, that policy positions are determined by context and not composition. As such, the findings indicate that welfare regimes are self-reinforcing through macro-micro feedback effects.

Figure 3.1 Cultural map adapted from World Value Survey wave 6 (2010-2014)



We will first look at the connection between economic circumstance and policy positions. A multi-level analysis of 24 nations found that nation-level situational factors shape beliefs about deservingness and responsibility that in turn influence public attitudes toward welfare state policies (Blekesaune and Quadagno 2003). Whereas the baseline welfare attitudes were found to vary between societies, high unemployment rates were prevailingly found to make people more open to active welfare policies in general, and especially to policies meant to support the unemployed. In a follow-up study, Blekesaune (2007) found that attitudes in favor of state responsibility for economic provision were positively related with both unemployment rates and financial strain. Support for redistribution of income, however, was only positively related to unemployment rates. Similar results have also been found after the Great Recession (Finseraas 2013). Furthermore, Blekesaune found that these effects were largely contextual at the nation-level and only slightly influenced by individual-level compositional effects. This leads us to the next question. If higher unemployment has the same positive effect on support for social security and redistribution in most or all industrial societies, why does the appearance economic voting vary so much between them?

Roosma and colleagues implicitly answer this question in two cross-national studies of European welfare states. The findings in the first study indicate that the different welfare systems have different institutional effects on welfare state attitudes. Specifically, they found a divide in welfare state attitudes between Norther/Western and Southern/Eastern European citizens (Roosma, Gelissen, and van Oorschot 2013). Though people in European countries are generally very happy with their welfare state's goal (reduce income inequality) and range (level of government responsibility), citizens in the Northern and Western countries seem to have firmer set positive or negative attitudes about its effectiveness, efficiency and policy outcomes than their Southern and Eastern neighbors. Why is that? In a paper on attitudes toward social tax distribution Roosma, van Oorschot, and Gelissen (2015: 393) indicate that "people are conditional co-operators" and that attitudes toward taxation are shaped by two conditions. First, people seem to be more acceptant of their tax burden when they trust others to pay their share as well. Second, that people are more willing to contribute to the welfare state when they also get access to welfare services. This rationale effectively entails that welfare attitudes in a society are products of the predominate principle of justification for access to welfare services in that society. It effectively means that governments in societies with high social trust and widely accessible welfare services can generate a relatively high income from taxes as long as the level of social trust is maintained.

An analogous argument is made in *The Institutional Logic of Welfare Attitudes* (Larsen 2016). Larsen argues that the normative considerations expressed through the politically defined goals of and justifications for a welfare system condition the baseline welfare state attitudes in that system. One of his main findings is that individuals' perceptions of the poor are regime dependent and, in turn, that these perceptions shape welfare policy preferences. Furthermore, he has found that both the erosion of social trust in liberal welfare states and extreme levels of social trust in social democratic welfare states can be linked to "the presence or absence of a poor and culturally distinct underclass"[9] (Larsen 2007: 99). At the individual level, a strong relationship was found between perceptions of poverty as laziness and low social trust. At the aggregate level, social trust was negatively related to the perceived level of conflict between the employed and unemployed.

Cross-national studies by Li and colleagues have found that income inequality remains relatively stable within countries and across time, unaffected by economic growth and worsened by inflation(Li, Squire, and Zou 1998; Li and Zou 2002). In other words, is social redistribution of income not afforded by the market. Finseraas (2009) found that if welfare policy preferences were directly enacted, differences in redistribution between European countries would decrease over time. As such, the different welfare regimes seem to be more a product of political-institutional differences, than of public opinion. It follows that the evolution of different welfare regime types might not be directly explained by the policy preferences that are expressed in surveys, but by whether the elected government is willing and able to carry the policies through.

3.3.3 The "economic safety net" hypothesis

According to the *economic safety net* hypothesis, some aspect of the welfare state, be it accessibility or generosity, should be expected to moderate the salience of economic issues to voters. In other words, that the salience of economic issues should vary predictably between welfare state contexts. Though early testing of this hypothesis mostly showed mixed results or

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[9] Critics of Larsen have sowed doubt to his regime-dependent findings due to his unorthodox regime categorization. Because the World Bank (Narayan 2000) has found similar connections between social capital and poverty, we choose to take his findings at face value. .

null-effects (Pacek and Radcliff 1995; Palmer and Whitten 2002; van der Brug, van der EijK, and Franklin 2007), more resent findings have increased its merits.

First, a cross-national study found that though economic issues gain widespread importance when the economic climate worsens, is was less likely to gain importance among people with some sort of job security (Singer 2011b). Second, it was found that economic issues were less salient to voters in American states with generous welfare programs (Singer 2011a). Likewise, an aggregate-data cross-national study found that electoral incumbent outcomes are less affected by national economic performance in countries with generous welfare protection (Park and Shin 2019). Lastly, a multi-level cross-national study suggests that "the economic risk that an average citizen is subject to, either because of inequality or because of lacking safety nets for the unemployed, have an effect on the degree to which people engage in economic voting" (Bergh and Jenssen *forthcoming*).

That said, Berg and Jenssen stresses that the literature is yet to reach a consensus on why economic voting varies between countries. One part of the problem is that the explanations are under-theorized or, at least, that the applicable theory is underutilized in economic voting research.

3.4 Summary and hypotheses

Back to our initial question: *Does welfare regime type affect the stability of cost of ruling in liberal democracies?* With foundation in the findings above, we derive the following answer:

If access to welfare services marks the distinction that causes social trust to decrease and low social trust makes people less content with their tax burden, we should expect the principle of justification for access to welfare services to work as a feedback amplifier for the values and attitudes signaled from the electorate to the government through the vote. Accordingly, we should expect each welfare system to be—with some generational lag—well fitted to the preferences of their respective voting populations under normal economic circumstances. Given that market failure causes a sudden increase of unemployment and that unemployment is positively associated with support for an active welfare state, we assume that market failure should cause a sudden increase in demand for state issued unemployment support. We expect, under these conditions, that the discrepancy between the electorate's expectation to and experience of the welfare state's ability to counteract unemployment and unemployment related worries—*decreased wellbeing*—should explain some of the cross-national variation in vote loss in post-crisis elections.

Welfare and social security programs have historically been developed to mitigate the effect of unemployment and other causes of insufficient income for individuals or families. Given a stable economy, should neither unemployment rate nor a mitigation effect from the welfare regime matter to most voters. Only when the country suffers market failure and new voter groups face risk of unemployment, should these factors come in to play.

With basis in the welfare regime profiles presented in chapter 2.2.3 we pose the following hypotheses:

H1: Economic voting is less pronounced in social democratic welfare regimes than in conservative or liberal welfare regimes after undergoing market failure.

H2: Economic voting is more pronounced in liberal welfare regimes than in conservative or social democratic welfare regimes after undergoing market failure.

H3: VP-functions that control for welfare state regimes produce scores for cost of ruling with lower unexplained variance than VP-functions that don't.

H4: Welfare regime moderates effect of unemployment rate on vote for incumbent

4. Method

4.1 Design

We use a semi-experimental comparative change design to measure the effect of market failure on voter behavior in different welfare regimes. There are three test groups, who each represent a welfare regime typology, and a control group. The experiment is a comparison of incumbent election outcomes from the last election before and the first election after the 2008 financial crisis. The tests are conducted in two stages. First in separate pre- and post-crisis ordinary least square (OLS) models for pre- and post-treatment benchmarks and then in comparative OLS models with fixed effects for the Great recession.

We have chosen to study the elections surrounding the Great recession for two reasons. Firstly, the crisis' sharply defined onset date, September 15th, 2008, and widespread negative impact on national economies makes it well suited as a "treatment" in a VP-function experiment. Secondly, because we are looking to test the supposed stability of the cost of ruling by the method of difference, it's important that the societal circumstances vary as little as possible (Hancké 2009: 73-74). The relatively limited time frame, delimited in the previous paragraph, leaves little room for substantial institutional, ideological and cultural change within the measured societies. Although higher N, transgenerational time-series usually are preferred in aggregate data analyses of economic voting, they would require a more complex model to control for however many circumstantial caveats there would be. It is therefore easier to isolate the potential moderating effect of welfare regimes on incumbent's election outcomes with shorter time frame data.

4.2 Data

The dataset is composed of data compiled from the and the European Journal of Political Research (EJPR) Political data Year Book, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and OECD Statistics for 44 elections in 22 polities between year 2004 and 2015.

4.2.1 Data selection

Because the tests are performed *ex post facto*, selection into treatment groups is non-random. The countries are selected through a two-step process to minimize selection effects. First by availability of comparable election data and then narrowed down to only included countries are rated *free* by Freedom House in their respective pre- and post-crisis election years. The treatment group consists of countries who were negatively affected by the financial crisis (negative real GDP change or positive unemployment rate (UR) change >1,5 percentage points in 2009) and the rest is the control group. The treatment group countries are further divided by their identified welfare regime.

4.2.1.1 Liberal democracy

The Freedom House ranking system is used to measure how apparent liberal democracy is. The measure ranges from 1 to 7 in half-steps. Rankings 1 though 2,5 are *free*, 3 through 5,5 are *partly free* and 6 through 7 are *not free*. These numerical scores are based on considerations on real world developments revolving 10 political rights questions and 15 civil liberties questions in three and four subcategories respectively. Countries that score 1 in both main categories enjoy a wide range of political rights and civil liberties. In each subsequent score these rights and liberties are gradually weaker down to ratings 6, where they are very restricted, and 7, where political rights and civil liberties are virtually non-existing.

Along with this selection measure are two further specifications. First, as the name “liberal democracy” suggests, Freedom House considers political rights and civil liberties to exist independently of each other. For analytical purposes Freedom House deems countries where the electoral systems work well, but the civil liberties are more than slightly lacking, *electoral democracies*. Countries rated electoral democracies are <u>not</u> included in this study. Second, are 29 former communist countries between central-Europe and central-Asia further scrutinized in the *Nations in Transit* program, in addition to the measures in the general ranking system. These countries are rated on a scale for transition of five categories between *Consolidated Authoritarian Regime* and *Consolidated Democracy*. Countries rated Consolidated Democracy or *Semi-Consolidated Democracy* are only included in this study if they are rated free in the general Freedom House rating.

Table 4.1 Score on selection criteria for included countries in 2009 and treatment group division

Country	Freedom House Rating	Real GDP**	UR**	Welfare state regime	Group
Australia	Free	1,9	1,3	Liberal	Control
Austria	Free	-3,8	1,2	Conservative	2
Belgium	Free	-2,3	0,9	Conservative	2
Brazil	Free	-0,1	0,3	Anti-welf. conservative	Control
Canada	Free	-2,9	2,2	Liberal	1
Czech Republic	Free*	-4,8	2,3	Conservative	2
Denmark	Free	-4,9	2,5	Social democratic	3
Finland	Free	-8,3	1,9	Social democratic	3
France	Free	-2,9	1,6	Conservative	2
Germany	Free	-5,6	0,3	Conservative	2
Iceland	Free	-6,8	4,2	Social democratic	3
Ireland	Free	-5,1	5,8	Liberal	1
Israel	Free	1,3	1,7	Conservative	Control
Netherlands	Free	-3,7	0,7	Conservative	2
Norway	Free	-1,7	0,6	Social democratic	3
Poland	Free*	2,8	1,1	Conservative	Control
Portugal	Free	-3,0	1,8	Conservative	2
Slovenia	Free*	-7,8	1,5	Conservative	2
Spain	Free	-3,6	6,7	Conservative	2
Sweden	Free	-5,2	2,1	Social democratic	3
United Kingdom	Free	-4,2	1,9	Liberal	1
United States	Free	-2,5	3,5	Liberal	1

* Considered consolidated democracy

** Real GDP = Real gross domestic product growth in % points, UR = Annual unemployment rate change in % points

4.3 Variables

Table 4.2 Descriptive statistics for pre-crisis models

	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
IEpreC	22	-3.42	5.75	-17.1	8.9
GDP	22	3.58	1.73	.8	6.9
UR	22	-.36	1.08	-4.2	1.5
GCI	22	72.41	20.16	44	100
YIO	22	3.20	1.14	.907	5.115
Eurozone	22	.455	.510	0	1
Control	22	.182	.395	0	1
Welf. Reg.	22	1.68	1.04	0	3
Capita	22	4.19e+07	7.05e+07	311567	2.96e+08

Table 4.3 Descriptive statistics for post-crisis models

	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
IEpostC	22	-7.66	5.75	-29.3	10.4
GDP	22	.9	1.73	-4	5.6
UR	22	.59	1.08	-1.4	1.9
GCI	22	71.27	20.16	43	100
YIO	22	3.40	1.14	.227	5.09
Eurozone	22	.455	.510	0	1
Control	22	.182	.395	0	1
Welf. Reg.	22	1.68	1.04	0	3
Capita	22	4.31e+07	7.27e+07	318501	3.04e+08

Table 4.4 Descriptive statistics for fixed-effects models

	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
IncEf	44	-5.54	8.30	-29.3	10.4
GDP	44	2.24	2.51	-4	6.9
UR	44	.116	1.09	-4.2	1.9
GCI	44	71.84	19.95	43	100
YIO	44	3.30	1.15	.227	5.115
Eurozone	44	.455	.504	0	1
Control	44	.182	.390	0	1
Welf. Reg.	44	1.68	1.03	0	3
Capita	44	4.25e+07	7.07e+07	311567	3.04e+08

4.3.1 The dependent variable

Our aggregate measure for *incumbency effect* (IE) is operationalized as: *The change in vote share (V) between a given election (e) and the election prior (e-1) for the party or parties that make up the executive branch of government at the time of the given election (G)*, or:

$$IE = V_{Ge} - V_{Ge-1}$$

This operationalization is by no means perfect. A) Because our operationalization is meant for aggregate election results, it is unable to directly explain variation caused by re-mobilized and abstaining voters. This is unfortunate because discouraged abstaining voters play an important part in the cost of ruling puzzle: Those who elected the incumbent are, arguably, the only voters who can truly hold the incumbent accountable. We attempt to adjust for this by adding the Governmental clarity index to the equation (see chapter 4.3.2 for explanation). B) Incumbency effects on former government formations during the measured period will not show up with the current specification of the dependent variable. This means that our operationalization allows the measured government to be unduly credited or discredited for the merits of the preceding government, former coalition partners or extraordinary events. There are several ways to adjust for this. One alternative is to add a dummy for caretaker governments. A downside with this approach is that it only applies to a handful of the included polities. A different route, and our rout of choice, is to adjust for the time spent in office (see chapter 4.3.2 for explanation).

There are three iterations of the dependent variable. IEpreC, indicates the incumbency effect in pre-crisis elections, IEpostC, indicates the incumbency effect in post-crisis elections, and IncEf, indicates the incumbency effect in both pre- and post-crisis elections. We did this as a safeguard measure to prevent mix-up of the results. All three iterations are ratio scale variables based on the popular vote for the appropriate election. Information about cabinet composition and election outcomes is gathered from the EJPR Political Year Book.

The calculation of the dependent variable favors theoretical division of power over de facto division of power. All cabinets in systems where the ministry is subject to parliament confidence are measured by the election results for the lower house legislature. Likewise, all cabinets in systems where the ministry is appointed by the president are measured by the results from the presidential election. The incumbent governments are defined in table A1.1 in Appendix 1.

The distinction between theoretical and de facto division of power is largely moot point. That said, the Brazilian cases evokes its relevance to our measuring method. It is quite common in proportional and mixed voting presidential systems, like Brazil, that the president secures votes in the legislature by appointing members of other parties to ministerial positions. This usually leads the competing presidential candidates to run with formal coalitions or, at least, an outline of what their cabinets should look like as a part of their campaigns. The different prospects make it possible for the voter to split her votes with good conscience and vote for a different party in the legislature than that of her preferred presidential candidate. Thus, some parties become strong enough in the legislature to be included in the cabinet, even though they don't have viable presidential candidates. Reducing the accuracy of the data, i.e. to base the incumbency effect measure on presidential election results from systems where this scenario is applicable, raises the risk of erroneous conclusions about the voters' behavior which, at worst, can lead to a type I error: What may appear as a dramatic loss for the sitting president, might be a result of changing coalitions rather than changing minds.

Despite this consideration, we have chosen a more theoretically minded measure for two reason. First, the goal for our analysis is to test if the VP-function can be stabilized by adding welfare regime typologies to the equation. We are, in other words, looking for a general assumption or a rule of thumb for election outcome modeling. An ideal-typical representation of the election outcomes is, to our understanding, better suited for this purpose. Second, because the model aims to explain incumbency effect in several types of governmental systems, it is bound to overlook known system specific effects and measurement challenges lest it should become unwieldy to measure[10]. Most of the incumbents' election outcomes are straight forward to measure with basis in whose confidence the government is subject to.

[10] Most presidential systems have a term limit for how long a president can serve. Consequentially, some or all races for presidency will run without an accountable president competing. Parliamentary systems where government changes between scheduled elections don't require a snap election pose two merit measuring

Table 4.5 Incumbent election outcome and incumbency effect

	Pre-crisis			Post-crisis		
Country	In	Out	Inc. effect	In	Out	Inc. effect
Australia	37,6	43,4	5,8	43,4	38	-5,4
Austria	38,4	36,7	-1,7	55,3	50,9	-4,4
Belgium	54,7	45,5	-9,2	59,8	47,9	-11,9
Brazil	61,3	60,8	-0,5	60,8	56,1	-4,7
Canada	36,3	37,7	1,4	37,7	39,6	1,9
Czech Republic	44,5	39,8	-4,7	74	44,7	-29,3
Denmark	39,3	36,7	-2,6	36,7	31,6	-5,1
Finland	53,8	49,1	-4,7	57,6	46,5	-11,1
France	38,2	47,1	8,9	40,9	29,3	-11,6
Germany	47,1	42,4	-4,7	69,5	56,8	-12,7
Iceland	51,4	48,3	-3,1	41,1	51,5	10,4
Ireland	44,5	44,3	-0,2	41,6	17,4	-24,2
Israel	29,4	31	1,6	52,5	40,9	-11,6
Netherlands	41,2	24,1	-17,1	18,3	27,2	8,9
Norway	37,5	26,8	-10,7	48	47,8	-0,2
Poland	27	21,2	-5,8	50,4	47,6	-2,8
Portugal	48,9	37,1	-11,8	46,4	37,7	-8,7
Slovenia	42,2	40,1	-2,1	43	19	-24
Spain	42,6	43,9	1,3	43,9	28,7	-15,2
Sweden	39,9	35	-4,9	48,2	49,4	1,2
United Kingdom	40,7	35,2	-5,5	35,2	29	-6,2
United States	49,3	44,3	-5	44,3	42,4	-1,9

challenges: a) the measured government has spent a very limited time in office and b) the measured government consist of parties with widely different term lengths.

Table 4.6 Basis for dependent variable measures

Country	Pre-crisis election	Post-crisis election	Election type*	System of government**	Ministry subject to parl. confidence
Australia	2007	2010	LH PL	CM	Yes
Austria	2008	2013	LH PL	Parl.	Yes
Belgium	2007	2010	LH PL	CM	Yes
Brazil	2006	2010	2RP	Pres.	No
Canada	2008	2011	LH DC	CM	Yes
Czech Republic	2006	2010	LH PL	Parl.	Yes
Denmark	2007	2011	LH PL	CM	Yes
Finland	2007	2011	LH PL	Parl.	Yes
France	2007	2012	LH DC	Semi-pres.	Yes
Germany	2005	2009	LH PL	Parl.	Yes
Iceland	2007	2009	LH PL	Parl.	Yes
Ireland	2007	2011	LH DC	Parl.	Yes
Israel	2006	2009	LH PL	Parl.	Yes
Netherlands	2006	2010	LH PL	CM	Yes
Norway	2005	2009	LH PL	CM	Yes
Poland	2007	2011	LH PL	Semi-pres.	Yes
Portugal	2005	2009	LH PL	Semi-pres.	Yes
Slovenia	2008	2011	LH PL	Parl.	Yes
Spain	2008	2011	LH PL	CM	Yes
Sweden	2006	2010	LH PL	CM	Yes
United Kingdom	2005	2010	LH DC	CM	Yes
United States	2004	2008	1RP	Pres	No

* 1RP=1 Round Presidential election, 2RP=2 Round Presidential election, LH DC= Lower house election – District candidate, LH PL= Lower house election – Party list

** Pres=Presidential republic, Semi-pres.=Semi-presidential republic, CM=Constitutional monarchy, Parl.=Parliamentary republic.

4.3.2 Independent variables

Welfare regime (WR) is a nominal variable with four categories: *Control*, *Liberal*, Conservative and *Social Democratic*. The control group consists of Australia, Brazil, Israel and Poland. The liberal countries are Canada, the Republic of Ireland, the United Kingdom and the United States of America. With a total of nine countries, the Conservative category is the most diverse test group. These countries are Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovenia and Spain. Finally, the social democratic category consists of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden.

Control is a dichotomous variable that represents the control group in models without the Welfare regime variable. The control group polities are coded 1 and the polities affected by the crisis are coded 0.

Real GDP is a ratio scale variable that represents the average real GDP growth in percentage points the last 12 months before the incumbent's out election. The data is gathered from the IMF World Economic Outlook dataset.

Unemployment rate or *UR* is a ratio scale variable that represents the average unemployment rate change in percentage points the last 12 months before the incumbent's out election. The data is gathered from the IMF World Economic Outlook dataset.

Years in office is a ratio scale variable that represents the amount of time the measured cabinet has spent in office. The measure is the number of days spent in office, measured from the latest point a new party was added to the cabinet within the given election period, divided by 365. Information about cabinet composition and cabinet formation date is gathered from the EJPR Political Year Book. We included this measure because cost of ruling appears to be accumulated over time. It also allows us to control for the tendency, dubbed the "honeymoon effect", that the incumbent gains popularity during the first 100 days (approx. 0,27 years) or even the first year in office before the popularity plateaus or starts to decline (Nannestad and Paldam 2003: 26-27).

Crisis is a dichotomous variable that represents the time of election in relation to the Great Recession. The elections held after the crisis are coded 1 and those held prior to the crisis are coded 0.

Governmental clarity index or *GCI* is a ratio scale variable that represents the ideological cohesiveness of the government. As mentioned above, we have added GCI to the equation to adjust for the lack a direct account-giving measure between the voter and the incumbent. An ideologically cohesive government is, purportedly, more easily put to account than a government whose agenda is muddled by compromise (Hobolt, Tilley, and Banducci 2013). While the former is more likely to be rewarded or punished the latter is more likely to drive it's voters to abstain from the poll.

We have measured the index as defined per Hobolt and colleagues (2013). The index is an average of four indicators that each range from 0 to 1, where 0 = zero clarity and 1 = full clarity. Though the index has a theoretical range between 0 and 1, the usable range is between 0,3 and 1. Cases with GCI scores under 0,3 should be controlled for misspecification because they are indicative of politically absurd scenarios. Thus, GCI scores under 0,3 should be handled with caution, even if correctly specified. The GCI variable is coded with a range from 0 to 100 to make the estimate more intuitive.

The indicators are "Single-party government", "No cohabitation", "Ideological cohesion" and "Cabinet post share". The first two are dichotomous and the latter two are continuous. Single party government includes cabinets with independent ministers and No cohabitation includes cabinets where cohabitation is impossible. Ideological cohesion measures the proportion of ministers in each cabinet who have the same ideological leaning as the party of the head of government on a left-right scale adapted to fit with national governments. Socialist, social democratic and environmentalist parties are coded left, all other parties, including agrarian, liberalist and Christian democratic parties, are coded right. Independent ministers are assumed to hold the same ideology as the head of government's party. Cabinet post share is the head of government's party's share of cabinet posts.

Eurozone is a dichotomous variable that represents the polities that have adopted the euro as their sole legal tender. The in group is coded 1 and the out group is coded 0.

4.3.3 Weight

All models are weighted with an analytical weight, also known as an inverse sampling weight, because each observation is a mean of a sample. All assumption tests are performed unweighted. The weight *Capita* is defined as the polity population recorded for the election year. The population data is collected from OECD Statistics.

5. Results

The results for the pre- and post-crisis elections are presented in separate tables (5.1 and 5.2). The models with fixed-effects for the crisis follow in table 5.3. The models conform with the underlying linearity and constant variance assumptions of linear regression analysis. However, some, and especially the fixed-effects models, suffer from troublingly high multicollinearity.

5.1 Pre-crisis results

Real GDP growth and the governmental clarity index both have statistically significant and relatively stable effect in all models but models 2 and 6 where the GDP-GCI interaction term is included. GCI is relatively stable and statistically significant in all but one of the models, but none of the GCI interaction terms show significant effects. No independent effect is found for unemployment rate change. It appears statistically significant in one of the UR-welfare regime interaction models, but never concurrent with the interaction term.

Table 5.1 Pre-crisis incumbency effects (continues)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
	Coef.	Coef.	Coef.	Coef.
GDP	-1.92*	-0.10	-2.21*	-1.98*
UR	2.52	2.00	-4.49	2.51
GCI	0.13***	0.21	0.14**	0.14*
YIO	-20.92***	-20.53**	-21.72***	-20.73**
YIO*YIO	3.53***	3.45***	3.57***	3.51**
GDP*GCI		-0.03		
UR*GCI			0.08	
Welf. Reg.				
- Liberal				-11.08**
- Conservative				-10.49**
- Soc. Dem.				-7.86
UR by Welf. Reg.				
- Liberal				
- Conservative				
- Soc.Dem.				
Test group	-10.38***	-10.06***	-10.15***	
Constant	28.91*	22.87	31.34**	27.81*
Observations	22	22	22	22
R^2	0.77	0.78	0.81	0.78
Adj. R^2	0.680	0.676	0.711	0.647
RMSE	2.718	2.735	2.582	2.852

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Table 5.1 (continued)

	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
	Coef.	Coef.	Coef.
GDP	-2.87**	1.25	-3.53**
UR	4.21**	2.31	-7.23
GCI	0.19**	0.38*	0.16**
YIO	-27.49**	-26.22**	-31.91***
YIO*YIO	4.37**	4.20**	4.98***
GDP*GCI		-0.06	
UR*GCI			0.12
Welf. Reg.			
- *Liberal*	-16.04***	-16.03***	-14.75***
- *Conservative*	-13.91**	-12.89**	-14.70***
- *Soc. Dem.*	-14.96*	-13.43*	-13.9*
UR by Welf. Reg.			
- *Liberal*	-9.12	-12.10*	-11.57*
- *Conservative*	-2.91	-0.68	0.14
- *Soc.Dem.*	-17.74	-14.43	-15.20
Test group			
Constant	42.29***	26.76	53.34**
Observations	22	22	22
R^2	0.87	0.90	0.92
Adj. R^2	0.724	0.766	0.80
RMSE	2.524	2.320	2.137

In models 1, 2 and 3, the predicted pre-crisis election outcome is about ten points higher for control group incumbents than for test group incumbents. This consistent with model 4 where both the liberal and conservative welfare regimes show an average difference of negative ten to eleven point from the control. Incumbents election performance in the social democratic countries is not significantly different from the control when tested independently. Model 5 finds no interaction between welfare regime and unemployment rate growth, as expected, though the liberal-UR interaction is borderline significant with a p-value of 0.059.

A strong U-shaped *time in office* effect is a common finding in all the models. In fact, none of the pre-crisis models tested without the quadratic YIO term passed the F-test. All models where the Eurozone variable was included had lower explained variance than models without it, all else unchanged. We have therefore chosen to only present the pre-crisis models where the quadratic YIO term is included and none of the models where the Eurozone term is included.

Figure 5.1 Two-way plot with observed and fitted values for incumbency effect and years in office



5.2 Post-crisis results

After the crisis, neither the polynomial term, interaction terms or dummy variables show effects statistically significant at the 5% level when tested alone. Models with YIO, both with and without a quadrating term, tended to have notably lower explained variance and worse F-statistics than models without it. It is thus not included in the remaining post-crisis models. In the polynomial test, model 1, and our two dummy variable tests, models 4 and 5, have similar results in that none of the variables, including the constant, are statistically significant at the 5% level. We tested a range of models with different combinations of interaction terms and dummy terms, such as a GDP by WR interaction. All of them produced the same null results. Model 6, in stark contrast, finds a magnitude of statistically significant effects.

Table 5.2 Post-crisis incumbency effects

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
	Coef.	Coef.	Coef.	Coef.	Coef.	Coef.
GDP	0.47	0.29	-0.07	0.27	0.11	9.85*
UR	-3.00	-3.91	4.37	-3.04	-2.96	24.03*
GCI	0.13	0.15	0.19*	0.08	0.07	-0.23
YIO	9.47					
YIO*YIO	-1.27					
GCI*GDP		0.00				-0.17**
GCI*UR			-0.11			
Eurozone				-4.70		17.72*
Liberal					2.79	4.77
Conservative					-2.85	-40.43*
Soc. Dem.					5.58	-38.53**
Liberal*UR						-48.31***
Conservative*UR						-27.53**
Soc.Dem.*UR						11.07
Test group	2.31	1.56	-1.76	3.28		
Constant	-34.90	-18.51**	-18.12**	-13.05	-11.77	31.12**
Observations	22	22	22	22	22	22
R^2	0.48	0.43	0.48	0.49	0.52	0.80
Adj. R^2	0.266	0.257	0.318	0.326	0.328	0.582
RMSE	4.989	5.022	4.812	4.781	4.775	3.766

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Model 6 has got two interaction sets and one coefficient that can be interpreted independently. Contrary to the clarity of responsibility hypothesis, the model indicates a negative relationship between economic growth and electoral performance for governments with high governmental clarity and a positive relationship between economic growth and electoral performance for governments with low governmental clarity. As illustrated in figure 5.2, the convergence point is at about -1,4 points on the real GDP growth indicator and the equilibrium is at about 58 points on the governmental clarity index.

Figure 5.2 Predicted CGI and GDP interaction effect on incumbent's election outcome



Unemployment rate change is found to have a positive effect on incumbent election outcomes in the control group and a negative effect in both liberal and conservative welfare regimes. The effect is more pronounced in countries with the liberal welfare regime than in countries with the conservative one, as expected in H2 (figure 5.3). There is, however, no statistical difference in the effect of unemployment rate change in incumbent election outcomes between countries with the social democratic welfare regime and the control group in the post-crisis elections. This means that incumbents in countries with the social democratic welfare regime are predicted to perform better in post-crisis elections with positive unemployment rate change.

Figure 5.3 Predicted welfare regime and unemployment rate interaction effect on incumbent's election outcome



Figure 5.4 Observed post-crisis incumbency effect and unemployment rate by welfare regime



In line with Duch and Stevenson's findings, Eurozone membership appears to have a positive effect on the incumbent's election outcome. The model does not explain if international market integration moderates economic voting behavior.

5.3 Fixed-effects model results

The vast differences between the pre- and post-crisis results pose several specification challenges to our fixed-effects testing. For instance, the YIO terms, which are essential to the pre-crisis tests, are detrimental to the post-crisis tests. To circumvent these issues, a "Crisis" interaction term is added to every term in the model rather than to just the WR term. An unfortunate side effect from this solution is that it makes the results a lot more finicky to read.

The two models have approximately the same estimate for the constant, but Model 2 has a considerably higher explained variance. Furthermore, Model 1 offers a less substantial explanation for why incumbency effects vary than what Model 2 does. Whereas Model 1 finds the interaction between the crisis and unemployment rate change to be the main explanation, Model 2 couples the variation to the different welfare regime types. The election outcome for incumbents in polities with the liberal welfare regime type appear to be very sensitive to unemployment rate changes after undergoing market failure. A similar, though less pronounced, sensitivity is found in conservative systems post-market failure. Incumbents in social democratic type polities are not found to be significantly affected by unemployment rate changes in either of the economic scenarios.

Table 5.3 Incumbency effects with fixed effects for market failure

	Model 1 Coef.	Model 2 Coef.
Crisis	-63.82**	-8.19
GDP		
- Pre-crisis	-1.92	1.80
- Post-crisis	2.39	11.64*
UR		
- Pre-crisis	2.52	2.98
- Post-crisis	-5.52*	26.59**
GCI		
- Pre-crisis	0.13	0.40*
- Post-crisis	-0.001	-0.64**
YIO		
- Pre-crisis	-20.92**	-28.04**
- Post-crisis	30.39**	37.22**
YIO squared		
- Pre-crisis	3.53**	4.38**
- Post-crisis	-1.27	-1.71
Test group		
- Pre-crisis	-10.38**	
- Post-crisis	12.69**	
Welf.Reg. by crisis		
- Liberal, pre-crisis		-16.74***
- Liberal, post-crisis		23.58***
- Conservative, pre-crisis		-17.53*
- Conservative, post-crisis		-9.45
- Soc. Dem., pre-crisis		-12.94
- Soc.Dem., post-crisis		-22.72
UR by Welf.Reg. by crisis		
- Liberal, pre-crisis		-13.36
- Liberal, post-crisis		-50.96***
- Conservative, pre-crisis		-1.52
- Conservative, post-crisis		-38.21**
- Soc.Dem., pre-crisis		-10.05
- Soc.Dem., post-crisis		1.20
GDP by GCI		
- Pre-crisis		-0.07
- Post-Crisis		-0.21**
Eurozone by Crisis		
- In, pre-crisis		4.67
- In., post-crisis		7.09
Constant	28.92*	28.55
Observations	44	44
R^2	0.62	0.87
Adj. R^2	0.461	0.653
RMSE	4.033	3.233

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

6. Discussion

6.1 Discussion of findings

6.1.1 Welfare regime and unemployment rate effects

The post-crisis test results for welfare regime types and effects from unemployment rate change returned just about as expected. Unfortunately, the control group also returned different from test group(s) in the pre-crisis tests. Thus, an analysis of incumbency effects in different welfare regime types under "normal" economic conditions is futile.

Though the economic safety net hypothesis demands survey data to be properly tested, our aggregate data provides at least some anecdotal evidence. The scatterplots in figure 5.4 tell us three different stories about economic issue salience. Incumbents in the control group countries appear to lose about the same size vote share when the unemployment rate change is within a ±1 percentage point range. It's reasonable to assume that the salience of labor market related issues was low in these elections, as none of these countries were directly affected by the Great Recession. With some context, the observed values from the countries whose labor markets were hit the hardest, Iceland, Ireland, and Spain, tell a different tale.

Tumultuous political clashes awaited the Icelandic, Irish and Spanish incumbents in the wake of the Great Recession. The conservative Cowen government (Fianna Fáil) in Ireland and the 2nd Zapatero government (PSOE) in Spain shared many similar experiences. Between their inaugurations in the spring of 2008 and dissolutions in 2011, both governments underwent several cabinet changes due to a number of minister resignations. Faced with mounting political pressure, neither Cowen nor Zapatero ran for reelection. As figure 5.4 clearly shows, both the Irish and the Spanish incumbent parties suffered major losses in the post-crisis election.

In Iceland, the conservative/center-left coalition of the Independence Party and the Social Democratic Alliance (The Alliance)—incumbent at the onset of the crisis— was forced to resign, February 1st 2009, due to considerable public pressure. Then the Icelandic experience took something of a left turn. The Alliance, the smaller half of the resigned cabinet, formed a new government coalition with the Left-Green Movement (VG) just 83 days before the snap election called a week prior to their swearing-in. Despite economic conditions which, from a retrospective rational actor perspective, most certainly would lead to a devastating election outcome for the incumbent, The Alliance *gained* votes and emerged the largest party in the parliament.

In context of the welfare regime quadrants (figure 5.4), the election outcomes for the Icelandic and Irish incumbents appear as representations for how incumbents in their respective quadrant could perform electorally under similar extreme labor market conditions. This notion is supported by our post-crisis OLS results. As per the grievance-asymmetry theory, the electoral losses incumbents in liberal countries suffer from an increasing unemployment rate seem to be greater than the gains they enjoy from a decreasing unemployment rate. Conversely, incumbents in the social democratic countries seem to gain an electoral advantage from rising unemployment. The economic safety net hypothesis provides a less sensational explanation: The social democratic welfare systems allowed the electorates to vote by political preference by relieving the voters of the worries the recession otherwise would have entailed.

When it comes to explain the conservative regime post-crisis elections, neither the grievance-asymmetry theory nor the economic safety net hypothesis are perfectly applicable. Firstly, most all incumbents in this group performed very poorly, even with close to no change in the unemployment rate during the last 12 months before election day. Secondly, incumbents in countries with very similar change in unemployment rate, such as the Netherlands, Portugal and Slovenia, performed very differently electorally. How could this be? We offer a third explanation.

Like demonstrated in 3.3.2, market failure is positively associated with support for an active welfare state—*an increased expectation of the state to counteract unemployment and unemployment related worries*. According to the economic safety net hypothesis, some welfare states are better suited to meet this expectation than others. Given that the welfare mix in the liberal, conservative and social democratic regime types respectively have a low, moderate and high degree of de-commodifying properties, the social democratic type welfare states should be best equipped to accommodate an extraordinary demand for state issued de-commodifying measures. Then, if the increased expectation of the state is a function of unemployment rate change, the incumbents in liberal type countries should be less able than those in conservative type countries to fulfill the electorate's expectations at any unemployment rate.

However, the predicted UR effect measured by welfare regime (figure 5.3) clearly shows that incumbents in conservative type welfare states persistently perform worse than incumbents in liberal type welfare states, even though the latter are more drastically affected by unemployment rate change. This indicates that the electorates in most of the conservative welfare states share a trait that that made them react more negatively to the Great Recession as a phenomenon than to the actual outcomes of the crisis. Thus, this distinct voter behavior is presumably caused by something else than change in the unemployment rate. The way this or these phenomena appear in the conservative welfare regime type is presumably distinctly different from how they appear in the other WRs, as this systematic post-crisis vote share loss is exclusive to the conservative test group. Furthermore, as the phenomena caused a systematic change to voter behavior, they are presumably related to the act of voting.

The act of voting is, on a very basic level, an expression of thoughts and emotions. Regardless of which considerations the voter makes, her voting decision is a product of her own thought process. Because the electorates in the conservative type countries showed an almost unanimously negative response to the Great Recession, there is reason to believe that response is related to a commonality in how these electorates think and feel.

Considering the value sets attributed to the different countries in the Cultural map (figure 6.1), the welfare regime types are divided in an almost hierarchical fashion along the "Traditional vs. Secular-Rational Values" axis. The liberal type countries are the most traditional, with scores between about -0,5 and 0,5, and the social democratic type countries are the most secular-rational, with scores between about 0,5 and 1,5. On the axis for "Survival vs. Self-Expression Values", however, the conservative type countries stand out in two ways.

Figure 6.1 Cultural map w/welfare regime overlays, adapted from World Value Survey

First, whereas both liberal and social democratic type countries distinctly favor self-expression values, mostly with scores between about 1 and 2, most the conservative type countries score less than 1 on this dimension, and several score very close to 0. In other words, concerns about economic and physical security play a greater role on the general outlook on life in conservative type countries. Second, the conservative group varies a lot more along the Cultural map's X-axis than the other two test groups. Both characteristics bear similarities with the conservative group's electoral performance after the recession (figure 5.4).

Our explanation for the conservative groups' abnormal post-crisis election results employs the countries coordinates in the Cultural map to understand the respective electorates' response to the Great Recession. We consider market failure a *societal event*—an event with societal impact—and assume that most voters perceive and emphasize the importance of societal events by how they relate to the authority they rely on (traditional or secular-rational values) and the purpose they see in life (survival or self-expression).

If

i) An incumbent is held accountable by the population through election,

ii) The election outcome is an expression of the incumbent ability to satisfy popular expectations,

iii) These expectations are products of how events with societal impact are perceived, and

iv) Said perceptions are consistent with the average normative emphasis on survival or self-expression,

v) The incumbent's electoral performance should be in accordance with its ability to manage societal events relevant to that normative emphasis.

A societal event that imposes negative change to economic and physical security conditions, such as market failure, should therefore be perceived more dramatically in the more survival minded countries. This is consistent with the findings between the test groups in that the incumbents in conservative type welfare states with few exceptions perform worse than incumbents in the other test groups compared by UR change. A similar pattern appears within the conservative group, but it seems to be influenced by the countries' positions on the Y-axis. E.g., whereas both Portugal (Y≈0, X≈0) and Slovenia (Y≈1 X≈0) perform considerably worse than the Netherlands (Y≈1 X≈1), Slovenia also preforms worse than Portugal.

6.1.2 Other parameters

The predicted U-shaped YIO effect in the pre-crisis findings is comparable to the post-midterm-election-rebound effect described by Midtbø. Considering the observed YIO to IE values (figure 3.1), all governments who gained vote shares in the out election had spent more than 2,5 years in office. That said, most governments with a "normal" 3,2-year incumbency (±1,1 years) suffered a vote share loss of ≈5 percentage points or more. Contrary to Nannestad and Paldam's findings, that incumbents tend to lose popularity over time, the fan shape of the observed YIO to IE values suggests that both positive and negative incumbency effects are cumulative. One possible explanation for this is that more voters become certain in their assessments of the incumbent's performance the longer the electorate gets to familiarize with the incumbent's actual priorities.

The absence of a significant years in office effect in the post-crisis findings indicates that the electorate evaluates the incumbent differently in a crisis scenario than under regular circumstances. A comparison of model 6 (in table 3.2) to any of the pre-crisis tests adds to this supposition: None of the independent effects on the incumbent's election outcome from before the recession are replicated after the recession. Instead, the post-crisis incumbency effect largely appears to be a product of a complex set of interaction effects.

Both the pre-crisis GDP and GCI findings have opposite signs from what is posited by the reward-punishment hypothesis and the clarity of responsibility hypothesis, respectively. The sole instance where GDP and GCI appear significant in the post-crisis tests is as an interaction with indication of a similarly unexpected and inscrutable effect. The more politically unified the government is, the more positive GDP growth is found to hurt the incumbent's election outcome. Only low clarity governments seem to gain vote share from GDP growth. Similar effects have, to our knowledge, not been previously documented. Intriguing as they may be, we are unable to find a theoretically plausible explanation for why or how these phenomena could occur.

6.2 Strengths and limitations

There are several validity and reliability issues in this thesis that should be addressed. A considerable limitation of this study is that the control group registered a significantly different incumbency effect in the pre-test than the test groups. This is despite that the polities within the control group constitute different welfare regime types and have differently configured election systems, party systems and systems of government. The difference might have been caused by enforced compulsory voting. Three of the included countries, Australia, Belgium and Brazil, have enforced compulsory voting. Two of these are in the control group. Another explanation is that all the control group countries performed extraordinarily well on the economic parameters before the recession. At average the control group experienced an unemployment rate reduction about 20 times more effective than the test group, and a real GDP growth 1,48 times higher than that of the test group.

6.2.1 Design

This study is specifically designed to take on the assumption that democracies are stable and behave similarly under similar political and economic conditions. The semi-experimental comparative change design helps this effort, as the test group/control group requirements remove the influence of legacy data on the findings, thus a more accurate depiction of contemporary democracies. However, the design also has some drawbacks. Like all experimental and semi-experimental designs, it is at risk of contamination from unnatural variation in the data. The non-random mode selection poses a more serious threat because it leaves the possibility that the effect of an unmeasured cause for the measured phenomenon is confounded with the outcome. Effectively, a chance difference may appear as a significant effect. The risk for this to occur is considerable for small N studies, like the present one.

6.2.2 Data

One of the advantages of aggregate data, like election results, is that it allows for accurate assessments of how electorates behave. When it comes to explaining why, though, it can only provide an indication. That said, we chose to use aggregate data because we disputed the how.

6.3 Conclusion

In summary, the election outcomes of incumbents in liberal, conservative and social democratic type welfare systems appear to have been affected differently by the Great Recession. Incumbents in conservative type welfare states persistently performed worse than incumbents in liberal type welfare states, even though the latter were more drastically affected by unemployment rate change. Incumbents in the social democratic countries, on the other hand, appear to have gained an electoral advantage from rising unemployment. Rather than to jump to that conclusion, we argue that the welfare systems in these countries allowed the electorates to vote by political preference by relieving the voters of the worries the recession otherwise would have entailed.

Despite interesting and significant findings, we are cautious of drawing any conclusions from the current results. The risks to the findings internal validity posed by the non-random selection process, the low N and high multicollinearity make a conclusion inadvisable. That said, we are confident in the potential of a more human understanding of voter behavior to future VP-research —that there is more to the act of voting than evaluations of economic usefulness and political power.

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Appendix 1: Incumbent parties

Table A1.1 Incumbent parties

Country	Pre-crisis election	Post-crisis election
Australia	Labor	Labor
Austria	ÖVP, BZÖ	SPÖ, ÖVP
Belgium	VLD, MR, SP.a, PS	CD&V, CDh, MR, Open VLD, PS
Brazil	Workers' Party (PT)	Workers' Party (PT)
Canada	Conservative Party (CP)	Conservative Party (CP)
Czech Republic	Czech Social Democratic Party (CSSD), Christian Democratic Union - Czech People's Party (KDU-CSL), Freedom Union - Democratic Union (US-DEU)	Czech Social Democratic Party (CSSD), Civic Democratic Party (ODS), Green Party (SZ)
Denmark	Venstre, KF	Venstre, KF
Finland	Center Party (KESK), Social Democratic Party of Finland (SDP), Swedish People's Party in Finland (RKP - SFP)	Center Party (KESK), Social Democratic Party of Finland (SDP), Swedish People's Party in Finland (RKP - SFP), Green League (VIHR)
France	UMP, UDF	UMP, NC
Germany	Social Democratic Party (SPD), Alliance 90/Greens (B90/G)	Christian Democratic Union / Christian Social Union (Union), Social Democratic Party (SPD)
Iceland	Independence Party (D), Progressive Party (B)	Social Democratic Alliance (Sam), Left-Green Movement (VG)

Table A1.1 Incumbent parties continued

Country	Pre-crisis election	Post-crisis election
Ireland	Fianna Fail (FF), Progressive Democrats (PD)	Fianna Fail (FF)
Israel	Likud, Kadima	Kadima, Labor Party, Shas, Gil
Netherlands	Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA), People's Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD)	People's Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD), Green Left (GL)
Norway	Conservative Party (H), Christian People's Party (KrF), Liberal Party (V)	Labor Party (Ap), Socialist Left Party (SV), Center Party (Sp)
Poland	Law and Justice (PiS)	Civic Platform (PO), Polish Peasants' (or People's) Party (PSL)
Portugal	PSD, CDS- PP	PS
Slovenia	Social Democratic Party (SDS), Democratic Party of Pensioners (DeSUS), New Slovenia - Christian People's	Democratic Party of Pensioners (DeSUS), Social Democrats (SD), Liberal Democracy of Slovenia (LDS)
Spain	Spanish Socialist Worker’s Party (PSOE)	Spanish Socialist Worker’s Party (PSOE)
Sweden	SD	M, C, KD, L
United Kingdom	Labour	Labour
United States	Republican Party (GOP)	Republican Party (GOP)

Appendix 2: Macro data

Table A2.1 Macro data: Pre-crisis

Country	GCI	Days in office	Real GDP	UR
Australia	1	1128	4,3	-0,4
Austria	.67	626	2,1	-0,7
Belgium	.44	1429	2,9	-0,5
Brazil	.61	1369	3,8	-0,3
Canada	1	981	1,3	0,1
Czech Republic	.59	403	6,7	-0,6
Denmark	.67	998	1,4	-0,2
Finland	.49	1363	4,4	-0,7
France	.74	1867	2,4	-0,4
Germany	.59	1000	0,8	0,7
Iceland	.63	331	6,6	0,0
Ireland	.72	1833	5,2	0,2
Israel	.55	1124	4,5	-1,5
Netherlands	.64	1275	3,4	-0,8
Norway	.58	1424	3,1	0,1
Poland	.95	464	6,9	-4,2
Portugal	.45	1035	1,6	0,4
Slovenia	.61	1388	4,2	-0,7
Spain	1	1421	2,7	1,1
Sweden	1	1427	4,2	-0,4
United Kingdom	1	1428	2,6	0,2
United States	1	1382	3,7	-0,4

Table A2.2 Macro data: Post-crisis

Country	GCI	Days in office	Real GDP	UR
Australia	1	992	2,2	0,2
Austria	.45	1762	0,2	0,4
Belgium	.52	937	1,5	1,8
Brazil	.61	1371	5,6	-0,8
Canada	1	828	3,1	-0,4
Czech Republic	.53	385	-1,8	1,6
Denmark	.68	1392	1,5	0,5
Finland	.58	1459	2,9	-0,1
France	.69	1858	1,6	0,1
Germany	.43	1405	-4,0	-0,1
Iceland	.60	83	-0,9	1,9
Ireland	1	1024	2,2	1,8
Israel	.54	1013	33,3	-1,4
Netherlands	.67	1203	-1,6	0,7
Norway	.58	1427	-1,0	0,5
Poland	.89	1423	4,7	0,4
Portugal	.63	1660	-2,2	1,3
Slovenia	.66	1108	0,7	0,9
Spain	1	1315	-0,9	1,5
Sweden	.62	1413	3,2	0,7
United Kingdom	1	1827	-2,2	1,4
United States	1	1384	1,7	0,1

Appendix 3: Governmental clarity index

Table A3.1 Governmental clarity: Pre-crisis

Country	Single-party government	No cohabitation	Ideological cohesion	Cabinet post share*	Gov. clarity
Australia	1	1	1	1	1
Austria	0	1	1	.67	.67
Belgium	0	1	.47	.27	.44
Brazil[11]	0	1	1	.44	.61
Canada[12]	1	1	1	1	1
Czech Rep.[13]	0	1	.67	.67	.59
Denmark	0	1	1	.65	.67
Finland[14]	0	1	.53	.42	.49
France	0	1	1	.94	.74
Germany[15]	0	1	1	.35	.59
Iceland[16]	0	1	1	.50	.63
Ireland[17]	0	1	1	.87	.72
Israel	0	1	.72	.48	.55
Netherlands[18]	0	1	1	.56	.64
Norway[19]	0	1	1	.32	.58
Poland[20]	1	1	1	.81	.95

[11] (Hunter 2010: 166)

[12] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/28th_Canadian_Ministry retrieved 22.11.2019 14:39

[13] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jiř%C3%AD_Paroubek%27s_cabinet retrieved 22.11.19 14:46

[14] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vanhanen_I_Cabinet retrieved 22.11.19 15:11

[15] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Schröder_cabinet retrieved 22.11 15:23

[16] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First_cabinet_of_Geir_Haarde retrieved 26.11.19 15:45

[17] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Government_of_the_29th_Dáil#cite_note-2 retrieved 22.11.2019 14:33

[18] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Third_Balkenende_cabinet retrieved 26.11.19 15:57

[19] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bondevik%27s_Second_Cabinet retrieved 26.11.19 16:06

[20] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cabinet_of_Jarosław_Kaczyński retrieved 26.11.19 16:24

Portugal	0	0	1	.80	.45
Slovenia[21]	0	1	1	.44	.61
Spain	1	1	1	1	1
Sweden	1	1	1	1	1
United Kingdom	1	1	1	1	1
United States[22]	1	1	1	1	1

*Head of government's party's share of cabinet posts

[21] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/8th_Government_of_Slovenia retrieved 26.11.19 16:40

[22] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Presidency_of_George_W._Bush#Administration retrieved 26.11.19 16.56

Table A3.2 Governmental clarity: Post-crisis elections

Country	Single-party government	No cohabitation	Ideological cohesion	Cabinet post share*	Gov. clarity
Australia	1	1	1	1	1
Austria	0	1	.53	.47	.45
Belgium	0	1	.80	.27	.52
Brazil[23]	0	1	1	.44	.61
Canada	1	1	1	1	1
Czech Rep.[24]	0	1	.55	.55	.53
Denmark	0	1	1	.70	.68
Finland[25]	0	1	.90	.40	.58
France	0	1	1	.75	.69
Germany[26]	0	1	.41	.29	.43
Iceland[27]	0	1	1	.40	.60
Ireland[28]	1	1	1	1	1
Israel	0	1	.72	.45	.54
Netherlands[29]	0	1	1	.69	.67
Norway[30]	0	1	.81	.52	.58
Poland[31]	1	1	1	.55	.89
Portugal	1	0	1	.53	.63

[23] Approximation based on earlier cabinets

[2424] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jan_Fischer%27s_Cabinet retrieved 27.11.19 16:08

[25] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kiviniemi_Cabinet retrieved 27.11.19 16:09

[26] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First_Merkel_cabinet retrieved 27.11.19 15:11

[27] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First_cabinet_of_Jóhanna_Sigurðardóttir retrieved 27.11.19 15:01

[28] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Government_of_the_30th_Dáil#Changes_23_January_2011 retrieved 27.11.19 14:50

[29] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fourth_Balkenende_cabinet retrieved 27.11.19 14:44

[30] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stoltenberg%27s_Second_Cabinet retrieved 27.11.19 14:29

[31] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First_Cabinet_of_Donald_Tusk retrieved 27.11.19 14:15

Slovenia[32]	0	1	.82	.82	.66
Spain	1	1	1	1	1
Sweden	0	1	1	.48	.62
United Kingdom	1	1	1	1	1
United States	1	1	1	1	1

*Head of government's party's share of cabinet posts

[32] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Government_of_Slovenia#Pahor's_Government_(2008–2012) retrieved 27.11.19 13:51

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