

## **Abstract**

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the Berlin Wall in the late 1980's gave rise to a new wave of democracy around the world, including Africa. Many sub-Saharan African countries embraced this wave after several failed attempts after independence in the 1960's. The European Community, through the Lome Convention, Maastricht Treaty and Cotonou Conventions situated democracy promotion in Africa as foreign policy priority. Promoting democracy and human right was thus identified as an essential element of development cooperation. This thesis assesses the EU's role in the democratization process in Africa, using Ghana as a case study. This thesis relies on journal articles, newspaper articles, EU reports and reports from development programmes for its analysis. It adopts Merkel's (2008) four level consolidation framework for its analysis. The elements of the framework include institutional consolidation, representative consolidation, behavioural consolidation, and the consolidation of civic and political culture. The argument of this thesis is that except for electoral support, and support for the consolidation of civic culture through civil society organizations, the EU has done little to support democracy consolidation efforts in Ghana, and by extension Africa. Most of the EU support in Africa is in areas such as peace and security, agriculture and rural development, transportation, and infrastructure. Evidence from the allocations by the European Development Fund to sectors such as agriculture and rural development are used to illustrate this point. The rise of China, and the perception of the EU in Africa are discussed as part of the challenges the EU faces in its democracy promotion efforts. The thesis concludes with recommendations to improve EU support for democracy promotion in Africa. The recommendations include clarity on EU priority foreign policy areas as well as increase in EDF allocation for governance projects.

## **Acknowledgement**

I would first like to thank God for His wisdom, guidance, strength, and grace throughout the whole thesis. I also want to thank Him for the fortitude he gave me to successfully complete my two-year master's degree program.

I would like to express my heartfelt appreciation and gratitude to those who helped in many ways and without whose contribution this thesis would not have become a reality. My deepest thanks go out to my supervisor, Anna Brigeovich (Associate Professor of European Studies) for the commitment, enthusiasm, and interest she showed from the beginning to the end of this work. Anna's interest, knowledge and research works on Africa contributed immensely to the success of this thesis. Words alone cannot touch the depth of my appreciation for the quality and long hours we spent together working on this thesis. I am particularly indebted to Dr. Viktoria Fedorchak, for her continuous support and encouragement throughout the period I lost my beloved father. I say thank you very much for being there for me and for your encouragement when times were difficult.

It is also an honour for me to thank my family for their warmth and care throughout my life; to my late father, Professor Annor Serekye, the cornerstone of all aspects of my life, I say thank you very much. Rest well daddy. To my girlfriend, Gloria Dinkyini Marfo and beautiful daughter, Myrtle Owusuaa Agyapong Kingslove, who was born in my absence and to whom I dedicate this thesis, I say a big thank you for enduring my long absence. Finally, I would like to thank my lovely mother, Mad. Comfort Nkrumah and my siblings, Agyapong Richard, Agyapong Juliana, Agyapong Nicholas, and Della Bernard for their prayers, love, and words of encouragement throughout the entire project as well as throughout my two-year master's degree programme.

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## List of Abbreviations

ACP	Africa Caribbean and the Pacific
APF	Africa Peace Facility
AFRC	Armed Forces Revolutionary Country
CHRAJ	Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice
CPP	Convention People's Party
CSOs	Civil Society Organizations
CSP	Country Strategic Paper
DANIDA	Danish International Development Agency
DFID	Department for International Development
EC	European Commission
EDF	European Development Fund
EU	European Union
EIB	European Investment Bank
GACC	Ghana Anti-corruption Coalition
GBA	Ghana Bar Association
IDEG	Institute for Democratic Governance
NACAP	National Anti-corruption Coalition
NCCE	National Commission on Civic Education
NDC	National Democratic Congress
NIP	National Indicative Programme
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
NLC	National Liberation Council
NPP	New Patriotic Party
NRC	National Redemption Council
NUGS	National Union of Ghana Students
PNDC	Provisional National Defense Council
SAP	Structural Adjustment Policy
SMC	Supreme Military Council

UGCC	United Gold Coast Convention
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WASU	West African Students Union

## **Chapter One**

### **Introduction and Problem Analysis**

#### **1.1 Introduction**

The dawn of political independence in the late 1950'-s and 1960'-s for European colonies in Africa heralded hope for the colonies at the time (Decalo, 1992). Hope not just for self-government, but also hope in rapidly attaining sustainable social and economic development that accrued benefits for a wide cross-section of society. As colonialism waned, the exiting colonial authorities handed over power to democratically elected leaders in most colonies (Mozaffar, 1997). The main task for the new leaders was to develop and consolidate a durable system of governance with political and economic institutions that would facilitate the inclusion of all in the development process. Leaders like Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya, Felix Houphouet-Boigny of Cote D'Ivoire were among those leading the charge in establishing this system of governance.

Despite the high hopes and good intentions, many newly independent African countries did not see their hopes fulfilled nor democracies consolidated in the three decades following independence (Meredith, 2006). Instead, the history of governance and economic development for most sub-Saharan African countries was that of political instability, authoritarianism, political repression, corruption, economic mismanagement and misallocation, unemployment, and high inflation (Lynch and Crawford, 2011; Meredith, 2006). Military coups were widespread, and so were one party constitutional states. Besides Botswana and Mauritius, most other sub-Saharan African countries experienced some form of disruption to their fledgling democracies. Ghana, Burkina Faso, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Nigeria, Madagascar, and Sudan all experienced at least one overthrow of a democratically elected regime by 1980 (Mozaffar, 1997). Mozaffar (1997: 7) notes that in countries like Kenya, Senegal, Malawi and Zambia, nascent democracies morphed into one party states with "tightly-controlled candidate nominations, and electoral competition among aspiring local candidates served as important mechanisms for pork-barrel serving of local communities with valuable national resources, for recruiting new leaders with strong local ties, and for legitimizing authoritarian governments." Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana for example relied on his parliamentary majority to turn Ghana into a one-party state in 1964. With him as the leader of the CPP, he would be president for life. Mobutu Sese Seko was president of Zaire for 32 years (1965 - 1997), under a very repressive regime. The economies of many countries struggled due to mismanagement and corruption (Meredith, 2005). There was widespread shortage of basic goods, unemployment was high, inflation was also high, and currencies continued to depreciate (Ibid).

In the first three decades post-independence, democratic consolidation and economic development thus faltered in sub-Saharan Africa.

By 1989 however, as the Soviet Union and Berlin Wall collapsed together with communism, a new wave of democracy swept across the world, particularly in Eastern Europe and Africa. One-party states, autocratic and military regimes slowly transitioned to democracies

through multiparty elections (Huntington, 1991). Between 1990 to 1995 alone, about 34 African countries conducted elections to elect representatives for their legislatures (Akin and Ade, 2018). Many countries introduced democratic constitutions that established governance institutions and secured liberties for all, consequently raising optimism about democratic consolidation within the continent. Huntington (1991: 13), notes that this “third-wave of democracy” as he termed it, was propelled by several factors including wide global acceptance of democratic values and deepening legitimacy crisis of authoritarian regimes, as well as the emergence of democracy promotion as a foreign policy objective of the European Union or European Community (as it was known at the time) and United States. This research project focuses more on the second factor, specifically the role of the European Union in promoting democratization in Africa.

According to Bradley (2009), Europe and Africa have had a long-complicated relationship shaped by watersheds including the slave trade, scramble for Africa, colonialism, independence, and the cold war. These engagements have mostly been either through bilateral relations between individual European and African countries or through the European Community. Africa was colonized largely by European countries, and most independent countries still have strong ties with the colonizing countries. France for example is has strong ties with its former colonies on the continent. Britain has also maintained ties with its former colonies through the commonwealth framework. The commonwealth however does include countries outside Africa such as India. Relations between Europe and Africa thus have long roots in history. As a matter of fact, relations between the European Union and Africa predates the formal existence of the EU as an organization. The Yaounde Convention, which came into force in 1963, set the framework for engagements between the European Economic Community (EEC) and newly independent African countries at the time. This framework mainly covered trade and development assistance. Politics and governance were not captured by the Yaounde Convention.

In 1975, the Lome Convention replaced the Yaounde Convention, expanding the scope of the agreement for aid and trade, and the number of African countries it covered. The Caribbean and Pacific countries were also captured in the Lome Convention. Politics did feature in the Lome Convention until fourth revision of the convention Lome IV. It was at this point that the EU began to emphasize on democracy promotion as a foreign policy priority. The Maastricht Treaty in 1993 formally established the European Union, and in 2000, the Cotonou Agreement came to replace the Lome Agreement (Crawford, 2005).

Crawford (2005: 574) observes that the historical roots of the EU’s democracy promotion policy dates to a Council of Minister’s Resolution in 1991 and the Maastricht Treaty. Though the Lome IV Convention in 1989 introduced human rights promotion as an element of the agreement, it was not until the Council of Minister’s Resolution in November 1991 that “the promotion of human rights and democracy” were both made “an objective and a condition of development cooperation” (ibid). Building on the Council of Minister’s Resolution, the Maastricht Treaty captured democracy consolidation as a critical element of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). With these institutional frameworks in place, the EU has over the past decades impressed on African countries through development aid conditionalities to adopt democracy as a system of governance, improve electoral practices, enhance transparency and accountability, and uphold the rule of law. Thus, even though the

initial agreements focused mainly on aid and trade, the EU, gradually introduced issues of human rights and democracy as part of the political dimensions of these engagements.

## **1.2 Problem Statement**

Despite the EU's institutional commitment to democracy and human rights promotion in Africa, budgetary allocations, and aid conditionalities, the process of democratic consolidation continues to falter in many African countries. Lynch and Crawford (2011: 277) observe that between 1990 and 2001 alone, "there were 50 attempted coups in sub-Saharan Africa, of which 13 were successful." Guinea Bissau experienced coups in 1999 and 2001, and Central Africa Republic in 2003 (Meredith, 2006). In 2008, there were coups in both Mauritania and Guinea, and Madagascar experienced a military takeover in 2009. Mali experienced a military coup in 2012 and more recently in 2020. Countries like Uganda, Chad, Rwanda, Cameroon, and Republic of the Congo among others remain under the grip of authoritarian governments, and in countries such as Ghana and Kenya with relatively more established democracies, issues such as grand corruption, vote buying and ethnic voting persists, with electoral violence featuring strongly in Kenya's 2007 election (Khorram-Manesh, 2013). On rule of law, the 2019 Ibrahim Index on African Governance indicates that safety and rule of law has declined on average in Africa between 2008 and 2017 (IIAG, 2019). Evidently, the democracy consolidation process in Africa is far from complete.

While all the issues articulated above can be seen as internal problems of the continent, they have nonetheless occurred in periods where EU support for the promotion of democracy and human rights on the continent have been more pronounced (Olsen, 2002). Since the 1990s, the European community, through the European Development Fund (EDF) and individual country aid agencies like the Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA), and the United Kingdom (UK) Department for International Development (DFID) has provided support for electoral administration and monitoring, the building of governance institution, and assistance to civil society groups and non-governmental organizations in order to further democratization in Africa (Rakner, Menocal and Fritz, 2007).

Scholars such as Olsen (1998) hold that the EU's foreign policy on democracy promotion in Africa has been inconsistent and more rhetoric than action, with priority placed on national security and self-interest of EU member states. In his assessment of the EU's democracy promotion efforts in Africa, Crawford (2005: 571) concurs that "the EU's political activities in Africa are driven more by its self-interest than by the norms and principles of democratic governance." Yet, there are others like Bradley (2009) who maintain that the EU is a real partner in advancing democratization in Africa through support for institutional infrastructure and capacity building. This inconclusive debate not only raises questions about the motives of EU support, but also the nature of the support, its effect in the consolidation process as well as what could be done differently.

The argument of this thesis is that with exception of assistance for electoral administration and observation, the European Community or European Union has done little to support the democratic consolidation process in Ghana.

### **1.3 Research Aims and Objectives**

Given this background, this study sets out to assess the process of democratic consolidation in Africa, with specific reference to the role of the EU in the process. This research adopts Ghana as its case study in uncovering questions such as how is Ghana undertaking its democratization process in the Fourth Republic? What role has the EU played in supporting Ghana's democratic consolidation process? And finally, what challenges has the EU faced in its attempts to support Ghana's democratic consolidation process and how can these challenges be addressed?

In finding answers to these questions, the thesis seeks to:

- Understand Ghana's democratization process in the fourth republic.
- Assesses the role the EU has played in supporting Sub Saharan Africa's democratic transition and consolidation process by using Ghana as a case study.
- Appreciate the challenges the EU has faced in its attempts to support Sub Saharan Africa's democratic consolidation process by using Ghana as a case study and advance recommendations as to how these challenges can be addressed.

### **1.4 Methodology**

This study adopts a qualitative research design as its main approach. This is because the qualitative approach is well suited for the type of inquiry this study undertakes. Due to limitations of time, the study employed secondary data sources and document analysis for assessments. The main sources of data were academic publications, conference papers, case studies, dissertations on related topics, EU reports and policy documents, and grey literature such as online media articles, reports from non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and civil society organizations (CSOs) among others. Specifically, this includes academic journal publications on 'democracy', 'democratization in Africa', 'democratic transition', 'democratic consolidation', 'EU foreign policy', and 'EU support for democracy' among others. Reports that were reviewed include reports on the Yaounde, Lome, and Cotonou Conventions as well as reports on Ghana's transition and democratization process. Emerging issues from the review were then indexed to generate analytically useful categories to guide theoretical analysis and interpretation. The document analysis is useful because it helps to understand the scope of the relevant laws and policies, the extent of their application, democratization processes and as Bowen (2009: 27) puts it, "elicit meaning, gain understanding and develop empirical knowledge" on Ghana's democratic transition and consolidation process.

The main limitation of this methodology is that adopting a qualitative approach that relies solely on secondary data sources limits the potential for any generalization and prevents the study from accessing insights directly from political actors and EU diplomats. Nonetheless, EU reports on EDF and development cooperation were also assessed for the purpose of this thesis.

## **1.5 The Scope**

Ghana presents the ideal case for this study due to several factors. First, Ghana is widely considered as one of Africa's most stable democracies, so if EU aid for democracy promotion is likely to be effective, then Ghana is the country for such an assessment (Crawford, 2005). Since military rule ended in 1992, Ghana has conducted eight presidential and parliamentary elections, with three peaceful transfers of power from one president and political party to another. The country boasts a good human rights record, a vibrant free press and active civil society (Abdulai and Hickey, 2014). Yet, despite these strides, the country faces significant challenges to the consolidation of its democracy including high levels of corruption and patronage, excessive power of the executive branch, weak institutions, and a less than optimal civil service among others (Akin and Ade, 2018). Its current trajectory thus provides fertile grounds for understanding democratic consolidation processes and the EU's contribution to the process. The reasoning is that, under Ghana's circumstances, if the EU's support has impacts on the consolidation of Ghana's democracy, then it is likely to have impact in other countries as well.

## **1.6 Rational for the Study**

Since independence, and especially following the cold war, African countries have received a lot of aid from across the world to support economic development, governance, and institutional development, among others. While the literature is replete with studies assessing the impact of aid on economic development, few qualitative inquiries have explored the impact of aid on governance and democracy consolidation. The studies in this area have focused more on United States foreign policy and aid than on that of the EU. The few studies on the EU focus also focus the inconclusive debate on the motivation for aid, with little attention to its impact or efficacy on democratization.

This study makes a significant contribution to the literature on democracy consolidation by assessing the process in Ghana, highlighting the EU's contributions, its challenges, and advances lessons for improvement. The democracy consolidation process in Africa is far from complete, and insights from this study will be useful to other countries in the region, as well as development partners seeking to support democratic consolidation processes on the continent.

## **1.7 Outline of Chapters**

This thesis will have six chapters including the introduction and conclusion. The second chapter presents discussions on democracy, democratic transition, and democratic consolidation. It begins with competing definitions for the concepts before proceeding to discuss theories on transition and consolidation. Based on the theoretical discussions, it presents a framework that will guide the assessment of Ghana's democratic consolidation process. Merkel's (2008) multilevel framework of democratic consolidation which include constitutional consolidation, representative consolidation, behavioural consolidation, and the consolidation of civil culture is used to assess the democratic consolidation process in Ghana.

The third chapter unpacks the process of democracy consolidation in Ghana, adopting the framework developed in chapter two analysis. It highlights the EU's commitment and contribution to the democratization process, both in policy and practice. Using the Merkel's multilevel framework, the chapter reveals that the EU provided supports which include capacity building of state institutions and consolidation of civic culture in Ghana. However, specifically to Ghana's democratic consolidation process, the EU only supported electoral administration and observation. The European Development Fund allocations also show that the EU prioritizes other areas over democracy promotion. Hence, the chapter unveils that the EU has contributed little in Ghana's democratic consolidation process.

Chapter four, building on chapter three, discusses the challenges to Ghana's democracy consolidation process as well as challenges faced by the EU in its attempts to support the process. The chapter also discusses theories of aid motivation and elaborates on the disconnect between the EU's stated policy objectives and the reality in practice. Perceptions of the EU's efforts at promoting democracy and how that has resulted in resistance from African leaders is explained. China's growing dominance and its potential impact on the EU's democracy promotion efforts is also discussed.

The fifth chapter outlines recommendations for the countries consolidating their democracies as well as development partners supporting such processes.

The final chapter (6) summarizes and concludes the study.

## **Chapter Two**

### **Democracy and Democratic Consolidation; concepts and theoretical underpinnings**

#### **2.1 Introduction**

Since the end of the cold war, democracy has remained the dominant form of government across the world. The ideological triumph of the United States and its European allies was accompanied by the widespread adoption of liberal democratic institutions across the world, and especially so in the developing world. This was partly because of external pressure from the US and its institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and partly because of internal calls for democracy in developing countries. With its roots well established in the United States and Western Europe, other countries in Eastern Europe and Africa sort to establish and consolidate their own democracies in the 1990's.

This chapter assess democratic consolidation as a concept both in theory and in practice. It outlines different theories and measurement indicators of democratization before presenting an overview of the transition and consolidation process in Africa after 1989. Before engaging these discussions, the next section begins with conceptual definitions for democracy, democratic transition, and consolidation.

#### **2.2 Democracy**

The concept of democracy has been defined in different ways by different scholars. This lack of consensus stems from the perspective from which one views democracy. In spite of these variations in definitions, its core underpinning principles such as popular representation, rule of law, and competitive multiparty elections, remains the same. A few definitions shall be discussed here for the purposes of this dissertation.

In the publication "The Meaning of Democracy", Charles Merriam (1941: 309) defines democracy as "a form of political association in which the general control and direction of the commonwealth is habitually determined by the bulk of the community in accordance with understandings and procedures providing for popular participation and consent." Merriam's conceptualization captures the essence of widely accepted procedures, specifically elections, in facilitating popular participation and inclusion in determining a society's leadership and governance directly. By stating that "the general control and direction of the commonwealth is habitually determined by the bulk of the community" the definition underscores the principles of popular representation and the rule of law.

Another definition that also emphasizes elections and popular representation is that articulated by Huntington. Huntington (1991: 7-8) contends that a state is democratic "to the extent that its most powerful collective decision makers are selected through fair, honest and periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes, and in which virtually all the adult population is eligible to vote." The emphasis on elections comes out strongly here. While these definitions place primacy on electoral processes, there are others who hold a more expansive view of democracy.

Larry Diamond (2004, cited in Nwogu, 2015: 131) for example views democracy as a system of government that entails four key elements: a free and fair electoral system for choosing governments; active participation of the people as citizens in politics and civic life; the protection of human rights of all citizens; and a rule of law in which the laws and procedures apply equally to all citizens." Larry's conception provides a more complex view of democracy that recognizes election as a necessary but insufficient condition for the establishment of democracy. Issues of human rights protection, fundamental application of the rule of law and the active participation of citizens in political and civic life among others also need to be established through gradual institutional arrangements.

The definitions discussed situate democracy along a continuum. At one far end is the simple definition of democracy as relating to elections and popular representation. Definitions like that provided by Huntington fits within this far end. At the other far end is the much more complex conception of democracy to capture not only elections, but also the rule of law, respect for civil liberties, and the entrenchment of democratic institutions. The definition provided by Diamond fits within this end of the continuum. Along the continuum are different levels of democratic establishments.

In the democracy literature, there is consensus on the fact that the process of democratization involves two main processes: democratic transition and democratic consolidation (Huntington, 1991; Faulenbach, 2007). The transition occurs when a society shifts from an authoritarian regime to a democracy through elections. The elections are mostly preceded by the drafting of a constitution which creates the legal framework for the elections and the transfer of power to the winners thereof.

Consolidation, which is the process of ensuring that the democracy endures through institutions, follows the transition. Here, governance institutions are established, democratic procedures are put in place and adhered to, and democratic norms are entrenched in society. Transition and consolidation can overlap, but the transition must occur before the democracy can be consolidated (Beetham, 1994). The following sub-section discusses transition and consolidation in detail.

### **2.3 Democratic Transition**

Democratic transition is simply the process through which societies with authoritarian forms of government transform into democracies through general elections (Mozaffar, 1997). In the 1950's and 1960's the dominant thinking on democratic transition was that certain preconditions were required before democracy could emerge in a particular society. Such conditions included a well-functioning state, socio-economic development, historical legacies, and cultural norms that resonated with democratic values (Khorram-Manesh, 2013). The successful establishment of a democracy was thus more likely in societies where these arrangements were already in place. In line with this 'structuralist' thinking, newly independent countries in the 50's and 60's were unlikely to successfully transition to democracies. The myriad of coups, and authoritarian governments that took over these newly independent countries between the 60's and the 80's reinforced this thinking.

However, the structuralist view of democratic transitions began to falter at the onset of the third wave of democratic transitions in the late 80's and 90's as most of the states experiencing the transitions had low levels of socio-economic development as well as historical legacies and cultural values that did not necessarily facilitate democracy (Huntington, 1991). According to Rakner, Menocal and Fritz (2007: 9) this led to the emergence of the 'agency' or 'universalist' approach in the literature that "emphasized the importance of decisions, ideas and the interaction among strategic political actors in bringing about transitions in 'unlikely places. As democracies continued to emerge across the world during this third wave, there was also a growing consensus among scholars that transition alone was not enough, there was a need to establish and entrench governance institutions that will lead to the endurance of democracy and avoid the reversals that occurred after the first and second waves of democratic transitions (Huntington 1991). This process of stabilizing democracies for the purpose of endurance is what is referred to as democratic consolidation.

#### **2.4 Democratic Consolidation**

The literature on democratization is replete with competing definitions of democratic consolidation. According to Przeworski (1991:26) a democracy is consolidated "when under given political and economic conditions, a particular system of institutions becomes the only game in town, when no one can imagine acting outside the democratic institutions, when all the losers want to do is try again within the same institutions under which they have just lost." Similarly, Gunther, Diamandourus and Duhle (1995:7) view a democracy as consolidated "when all politically significant groups regard its key political institutions as the only legitimate framework for political contestation and adhere to democratic rules of the game." In both conceptions, emphasis is placed on the wide acceptance of democratic institutions as legitimate, and how these institutions confine the behaviours and attitudes of political actors and the citizens.

For all its apparent simplicity, consolidation is widely agreed to be the lengthiest and most difficult aspect of the democratization process (Beetham, 1994). In fact, Rakner, Menocal and Fritz (2007: 11) observe that only "a limited number of countries that have undergone transitions to democracy have in fact succeeded in establishing consolidated and functioning democratic regimes. Instead, most of these countries in transition have come to occupy a precarious middle ground between outright authoritarianism and fully-fledged democracies." This suggests clearly that not all countries with democratic systems have achieved consolidation, irrespective of the longevity of the regime. This begs the question, if the persistence of a democracy is not synonymous with consolidation, then what constitutes a consolidated democracy? Przeworski's definition discussed above leads us to understand that consolidation occurs when democracy is the "only game in town" and political actors and the public have accepted that their interests are best pursued under this rubric. But how exactly can such a situation be measured?

Different scholars propose several criteria for assessing the consolidation process in each society. Huntington in his seminal book "The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century", advances that after the process of transition, a democracy is consolidated when it achieves the 'Two-Turnover Test' – thus two consecutive peaceful

transfers of political power between different political parties (Huntington, 1991: 266-67). This indicator as suggested by Huntington places emphasis mainly electoral success and views the peaceful transfers of power between parties as indicative of the acceptance of democracy and thus indicative of its potential endurance in the future. While this test provides a minimum level for assessing aspects of consolidation, a common criticism is that it reduces the consolidation process to electoral success and ignores critical aspects such as the formal and informal acceptance of democratic institutions that facilitate rule of law and inclusion in the development process (Beetham, 1994). Considering such criticisms of procedural or electoral indicators, others have proposed indicators that focus more on the legitimization of democratic institutions.

Linz and Stepan (1996: 5) contend that before a democracy can be consolidated, there are three main dimensions along which consolidation must occur – behavioural dimension, attitudinal dimension, and constitutional dimension. The behaviour dimension, according to them, is concerned with the conformity of the overt actions of political actors and citizens with democratic rules of the game. If the power and interest seeking behaviours of political actors' fits stipulated democratic procedures, then democracy is consolidated at the behavioural level. The second level has to do with the attitudes or more broadly perceptions and preferences of political actors and citizens. If democratic institutions can be gleaned as widely preferred by actors in a society, then democracy has been consolidated at the attitudinal level. The third level, which is the constitutional level, is consolidated when governance institutions established through a constitution are widely accepted.


Merkel (2008) also proposes multilevel framework like that of Linz and Stepan, but broader in its scope for assessment. According to Merkel, there are four analytical levels along which democratic consolidation occurs chronologically with impact across all levels. The levels of consolidation are constitutional consolidation, representative consolidation, behavioural consolidation, and the consolidation of civic culture.

The first is macro level constitutional consolidation. Merkel (2008: 14) notes that this level is concerned with the establishment of democratic governance institutions such as "the executive, legislature, and judicial branches of government, and the electoral system" through a constitution. This first level of consolidation ordinarily occurs first and has impacts on all the other levels of consolidation "through components or norms and penalties that facilitate or constrict action and thereby shape structures" (ibid).

The second level of consolidation is representative consolidation. This has to do with the representation of geographic and interest groups and political parties at decision making levels. Here "the actor constellations and what those actors do help determine both how the norms and structures established at levels 1 are consolidated, and whether the joint configuration of levels one (1) and two (2) positively or negatively affect the behaviour of the actors at level three (3) in terms of democratic consolidation" (Merkel, 2008: 14). Behavioural consolidation is the third level of consolidation. This is where the behaviour of informal political actors such as business owners, radical groups, the armed forces, and other groups with the potential to reverse democratic consolidation gains act and pursue their interest within the rubric of democratic institutions. Success in this third level of consolidation is dependent on successful consolidation at the first and second levels, and in turn has consequences on the fourth level of consolidation.

The fourth level is the consolidation of civic and political culture. This is where democratic norms and values become entrenched in the civic and political cultures of a particular society. This is the concluding and lengthiest part of the consolidation process which can take decades to achieve. According to Merkel, it is when consolidation occurs chronologically on all four levels that democratic consolidation occurs. It is worthy of note that securing consolidation at all levels does not necessarily mean that a collapse of the democracy or its institutions is impossible, but rather indicative of a “relatively stable equilibrium of a democratic system’s defining components” (Merkel, 2008: 15). Figure 1 presents the diagram with the four levels of analysis and their chronological impact.

**Figure 1 Merkel's Four Levels of Democratic Consolidation**



**Source: Merkel 2008**

This study adopts Merkel’s multilevel model of democratic consolidation as a framework to assess the democratic consolidation process in Ghana. This is because despite its similarity with the framework of Linz and Stepan in emphasizing behaviour and institutions, Merkel’s approach allows for more comprehensive assessment of different aspects of the consolidation process and the impacts of the levels on one another. Such an approach allows for the kind of analysis that this study aims to undertake.

Through Merkel’s four levels of democratic consolidation, this dissertation will make the argument that with the exception of electoral support, the EC has done little to support the democratic transition and consolidation.

## **2.5 Chapter Conclusion**

This chapter discussed in detail the concepts of democracy, democratic transition, and democratic consolidation. Democracy, despite its widespread adoption across the world, has been conceptualized in different ways due to the different perspectives from which people view the concept. As discussed in this chapter, the conceptions of democracy exist on a continuum, with the presence of elections alone on one far end, and the other far end including elements of rule of law, respect for human rights, and the entrenchment of democratic institutions and norms. Between these two polar ends are different configurations of democracy both in theory and in practice. The discussions in this chapter also distinguished between democratic transition and consolidation and captured definitions for both. The discussions not only focused on competing definitions of the concepts, but also theoretical frameworks for the assessment of transition and consolidation. Merkel's (2008) multilevel model of democratic consolidation was presented as the framework suitable for analysis this study will undertake. Merkel presents four levels of democratic consolidation, and they include institutional/constitutional consolidation, representative consolidation, behavioural consolidation, and the consolidation of civil culture. Consolidation according to Merkel, occurs in the same order in which the four levels are presented. This study adopts Merkel's framework in discussing Ghana's democratic consolidation process, and in assessing the role of the European community. In the next chapter, the process of democratic transition and consolidation in Ghana are discussed.

## **Chapter Three**

### **Democratization in Ghana's Fourth Republic**

#### **3.1 Introduction**

The first two chapters presented the background to this study, discussing the problem, aims and objectives as well as an overview of the theoretical framework that will guide the analysis. In this chapter, this dissertation employs Merkel's theoretical framework outlined in Chapter Two to discuss Ghana's democratization process in the Fourth Republic and the European Community's support in the process. Here support from the EU as well as direct bilateral support from specific European countries will be considered and assessed. The chapter begins with a historical overview of the first three republics in Ghana before discussing the transition and consolidation process in the Fourth Republic.

#### **3.2 Independence and the first three republics**

As the first sub-Saharan African country to gain independence in 1957, Ghana inherited the British parliamentary system of government and a liberal democratic constitution that provided for a parliament, an independent judiciary, and guaranteed multi-party elections (Gyeke-Jandoh, 2017). In April 1960, after a nationwide referendum, the country adopted a new constitution that provided for a presidential system of government (Ibid). This ushered in Ghana's First Republic with Kwame Nkrumah as the first president.

Kwame Nkrumah is one of Ghana's most controversial figures in history. During the early days of independence, he was loved by many, and similarly disliked by many. Though educated in the United States of America and the United Kingdom, Nkrumah was ideologically a socialist (Handley and Mills, 2001). This was mainly because of the impact of colonialism, Western imperialism, and the chasm in the global political environment created by the cold war. While studying in London, he was a member of the West African Students Union (WASU), a group of west African students in the United Kingdom popular for their activism against colonialism and western imperialism. Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya and George Padmore were also members of WASU. Following the end of the second World War, Nkrumah along with other WASU members were all keen to return to their various African countries to contribute to the fight for independence (Ibid).

In Ghana, Nkrumah first joined the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC) as their secretary. The UGCC was a political party composed of Ghanaian elites at the time who were fighting for a place in the colonial administration and subsequently independence. After a brief period with the UGCC, Nkrumah left to form his own party, due to differences in ideology and the timing of independence. Nkrumah wanted independence now, and not in the shortest possible time like the UGCC. Nkrumah's party was the Convention Peoples Party (CPP) and it was the party of the masses. His socialist ideologies, his views on colonialism, independence and the economy made him and the CPP very appealing to the ordinary Ghanaians. As a result, Nkrumah and his CPP won the first general election by a landslide, taking 34 out of the 38 parliamentary seats in 1951. Nkrumah became prime

minister then and continued to win in successive elections until in 1960 when the introduction of the republican constitution made him president.

Nkrumah's presidency was marked by widespread socialist economic and nationalistic policies. Nkrumah was very weary of post-colonial imperialism by western powers. As such, the task at independence was to ensure that Ghana will be economically independent to reduce its reliance on the west. This economic independence was to be achieved through rapid industrialization, thus the establishment of import substitution industries (ISIs) to produce the goods Ghanaians needed to avoid their importation from western countries (Meredith, 2005). In 1959, Nkrumah tasked the parliament to pass the Statutory Corporations Act (1959) that gave the legal framework for the establishment of state enterprises. About 600 national factories were to be setup under this initiative to produce a wide range of goods that Ghana was importing. The Nkrumah government in 1961 built the Akosombo hydroelectric power dam to generate electricity for industrial and domestic use. This was to ensure that Ghana was self-reliant in energy production. Interestingly, despite his ideological leanings, Nkrumah received support from the World Bank and the United States in setting up the hydropower dam (Handley and Mills, 2001). He also built the Tema Port to facilitate the export of the goods that were to be produced by the local industries and expanded the road and railway infrastructure across the country to facilitate the movement of people and goods for trade (Ibid).

On the international scene, Nkrumah was one of the active African leaders along with Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, among others. Nkrumah's driving objective at the continental level was the complete independence of all African countries, as well as the political, economic, and military union of the African continent. This unity he believed will make Africa a formidable global force able to withstand the West and their imperialist tendencies (Meredith, 2005). This led Nkrumah to use the Ghana's resources in pursuit of this objective.

Due to Nkrumah's pan-African leadership on the continent, Ghana became the centre of knowledge production on Pan-Africanism and African independence. Nkrumah established the Kwame Nkrumah Ideological Institute, now University of Education Winneba, as an institution for the promotion of socialism, pan Africanism and decolonisation (Handley and Mills, 2001). Many from across the continent including Robert Mugabe from Zimbabwe trained at this institute, and it also served as centre for the training of Ghana's civil servants. In 1958, a year after Ghana gained independence, Nkrumah hosted the first Conference Independent States in Accra. Later the same year, he hosted the All-African People's Conference in Accra with representation from over 60 nationalist organizations and Freedom fighters across the African continent (Quaidoo, 2010). In 1960, he joined forces with newly independent Mali and Guinea to form the Union of African States as one of the first steps towards Africa's political unification. In 1963, Nkrumah was instrumental in the establishment of the Organization of African Unity, and he hoped that the OAU would serve as a foundation for a United States of Africa. In addition to the movements for independence, he also became very involved in the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa. All these endeavours on the African continent were resource intensive, and Nkrumah continued to deplete Ghana's resources in advancing them (Handley and Mills, 2001).

While working to ensure the complete independence of Africa and its political unification, Nkrumah was entrenching his political power and control at home through constitutional means. In 1964, Nkrumah used the parliamentary majority of the CPP to pass a law that made Ghana a one-party state, with the CPP as the only political party (Quaidoo, 2010). Thus, Nkrumah was to serve as president for life. Through the same parliamentary majority, he saw to the enactment of the Preventive Detention Act (1958). This Act allowed Nkrumah to order for the arrest and imprisonment of any person for up to five years without trial for the purpose of national security. Though the Act was inspired by attempted assassinations on the life of the president, it was in practice used to silence members of the opposition. UGCC member Jake Obetsebi Lamptey was one of those who were imprisoned because of the Act.

The economy of Ghana soon began to suffer under Nkrumah's one party CPP government. Corruption and mismanagement led to the collapse of the state industries. Scarcity of necessities became the everyday reality since import of basic items were banned to facilitate that growth of the state industries that were failing. Nkrumah's appeal declined among some sections of the population and the dissatisfaction only grew (Meredith, 2005). The bipolar international world created by the cold war also eventually turned Nkrumah into an enemy in the eyes of the West.

The military decided to take matters into their own hands as they also identified with the struggles of the masses. On February 24<sup>th</sup>, 1966, the National Liberation Council (NLC), led by top military officers in Ghana, General Afrifa and E. K. Kotoka overthrew the Nkrumah government and the constitution while Nkrumah was in China on his way to Vietnam (Frosini, 2011). Nkrumah was on his way to Vietnam on a peace mission due to his strong alliance with the communist block at the time. Upon learning of the coup, Nkrumah did not return to Ghana but proceeded to Guinea where he was happily received by Guinea's president at the time, Sekou Toure (Meredith, 2005).

The NLC was in power for less than three years, during which time there were drastic changes to the socialist economic policies and foreign policy of Nkrumah. After the Nkrumah government was dissolved, members of the military took over the reins of power and reversed many of Nkrumah's policies. The military team that took overpower capitalist in ideology and received support from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of the United States of America in overthrowing Nkrumah (Ibid). In line with recommendations from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, the NLC instituted structural adjustment policies, privatised most of the state enterprises, and opened the economy for foreign investment. Ghana's relationship with the communist world also came to a halt, and the United Kingdom as well as the United States became stronger allies (Frosini, 2011).

After only a few years in office, the NLC put in place measures for a new constitution to transition the country into the Second Republic. In August 1969, the NLC handed over the reins of power to the Progress Party (PP) led by Kofi Abrefa Busia after relatively stable elections in August 1969 (Gyimah-Boadi, 1994). Busia and the Progress and Party were pro-capitalist in ideology, and thus continued with the liberalisation efforts of the NLC. Privatization continued, subsidies were removed from many sectors of the economy and import of foreign goods were allowed. The government also devalued the cedi by 44% in

1971. Not too long after, the Busia government also fell out with the Ghanaian people due to economic hardship and discontent grew as a result.

Again, just like the First Republic, the government of the Second Republic did not serve their full term in office. Lt-Col I.K. Acheampong and his National Redemption Council (NRC) overthrew Busia's PP government in a coup on 13<sup>th</sup> January 1972, marking the end of the second republic (Meredith, 2005). This occurred while Busia was away in Britain for medical purposes. Just like Nkrumah, Busia never returned to Ghana after the coup, but remained in Britain until his death. After the NRC took overpower, the constitution was suspended, and all political parties were banned. The NRC was pro-Nkrumah.

The NRC changed its name to the Supreme Military Council (SMC I) in 1975, and in July 1978, Lt-Col I.K. Acheampong was ousted in a palace coup and the SMC I was replaced by the SMC II under the leadership of Lt-Gen F.W.K. Akuffo. On June 4<sup>th</sup>, 1979, the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) led by the young Flt-Lt JJ Rawlings displaced the SMC II in a coup, stayed in power for three months, and handed over power to the Peoples National Party (PNP) led by Dr. Hilla Limann after a successful election was conducted under a new constitution in September 1979. This marked the beginning of Ghana's Third Republic (Gyeke-Jandoh, 2017).

On 31<sup>st</sup> December 1981, history repeated itself when Flt-Lt JJ Rawlings led a coup that overthrew the Limann administration and the Third Republic, ushering in authoritarian rule, under the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) that persisted until 1992. The first three republics of the country had all been short-lived and no democratically elected president in the first three republics saw the end of their constitutional term in office. Thus, for the first three decades after independence, Ghana's political history was mainly one of political instability.

Coups were not uncommon in the early days of independence, and many African countries experienced this. Different reasons may have accounted for this widespread occurrence. In Ghana, every military government that took overpower through a coup cited corruption and mismanagement, and hardship among the ordinary citizens as reasons for the takeover of power (Gyeke-Jandoh, 2017). The rationale of the military in intervening in governance was that the military identified with the struggles of the masses, and as a result, had a moral obligation to intervene to rectify the governance and economic struggles of the country. This quote from Lt-General AK Ocran is instructive.

"The preservation of order and good government seems to have become a national task to which the military have dedicated themselves. It seems to have become acceptable therefore that if the government is not doing right by, for example, if it becomes a dictatorship or fails to function effectively.... The military feel that they could intervene. In Ghana, the military have intervened not because their officers are Sandhurst or West Point trained or are trained locally, but chiefly because they have identified themselves with the national interest and are today more critical and inquisitive." (Handley and Mills, 2001: 9)

Yet interestingly, each military government was overthrown for the same reasons for which they took overpower. Many of the military leaders that took overpower had little to no experience in governance and this led to a lot of corruption and mismanagement in most of

the military regimes. While the intentions of the military when taking over power may have been genuine, that is not to justify the means, the economic mismanagement and quest to stay in power for long questions this motive. This is because, as soon as most military leaders were in power, the objective was no longer building the economy, but staying in power. Power thus corrupted the military leaders. Colonel Ignatius Acheampong is once recorded in (Handley and Mills, 2001: 9) to have said, "Once you have touched the magic wand of power, never dream that you can go back to your village, the barracks or wherever you were before." Acheampong led National Redemption Council in Ghana's second coup and such a statement from him is from a position of experience and provides evidence to strengthen the hypothesis that power corrupts, and control of political power is the primary reason why coups were widespread. The proposition that the military intervene to salvage the economy is not supported by the evidence.

### **3.3 Transition to the Fourth Republic**

By 1990, when the third wave of democracy began sweeping across the globe, pressure was already building internally for a return of the country to constitutional democratic rule. Pro-democracy activists like Adu Boahen and his Movement for Freedom and Justice mounted pressure on the PNDC to put together a new constitution that established a democracy and to organize fresh elections. According to Gyimah-Boadi (1994; 78), these internal pressures "combined with official desires to conform with global and regional trends and thus pre-empt the application of 'political conditionalities' by international donors, led a reluctant PNDC to plan the return of constitutional rule." On 10<sup>th</sup> May 1991, the PNDC government released a white paper for the establishment of a committee of experts to make proposals for a new constitution. The report of the committee was submitted to a Consultative Assembly who subsequently drew up a new constitution for the fourth republic. The new constitution was put to a referendum on April 28<sup>th</sup>, 1992 and 92% of those who voted approved the new constitution (Gyekye-Jandoh, 2017).

After the approval of the constitution, the eleven-year ban on political parties was lifted in May 1992 and a presidential election was held in November the same year with multiple political parties participating in the elections. The PNDC morphed into the National Democratic Congress (NDC) with Rawlings as its flagbearer, and Adu Boahen formed the National Patriotic Party (NPP) and stood as its flagbearer (Gyimah-Boadi, 1994). Other parties that contested the elections included Limann's Peoples National Convention (PNC), the National Independence Party, the Egle Party, Peoples Heritage Party and Convention Peoples Party. Rawlings and the NDC won the election with 58.3% of the votes and Adu Boahen's NPP followed with 30% of the votes.

Parliamentary elections followed shortly after in December 1992, but the NPP boycotted the elections and raised concerns about the credibility of the presidential elections. The NDC again emerged victorious in the parliamentary elections, winning 189 out of the 200 seats in Parliament (Frosini, 2011). With the presidential and parliamentary elections complete, a new democratic government under the fourth republic was ushered in in January 1993. The transition to electoral democracy was thus complete, the next step was to consolidate the democracy.

### **3.4 Consolidating Democracy in the Fourth Republic**

The transition to the fourth republic despite its challenges was a relative success (Gyimah-Boadi, 1994). The 1992 elections saw to the election of democratic leaders and the institutions of democratic governance had their foundations laid out in the transition process. The more difficult task is the consolidation process, which requires more resources and is achieved over a longer period (Przeworski, 1991). It involves entrenching the norms and procedural rules of democracy within society. It also involves the widespread acceptance and legitimization of democratic institutions and principles within the population. When consolidation has largely occurred, democracy will thus be the only game in town (Ibid).

This thesis employs Merkel's framework for consolidation in assessing the EU's contribution to democracy consolidation in Ghana as discussed in chapter two. Under this framework, consolidation will be considered on four main levels: institutional or constitutional consolidation, representative consolidation, behavioural consolidation, and the consolidation of civic culture. The assessment follows in the same order, beginning with institutional/constitutional consolidation.

#### **3.4.1 Institutional/ Constitutional Consolidation**

The first level of consolidation according to Merkel (2008) is institutional or constitutional consolidation. This has to do with the establishment of democratic governance institutions such as "the executive, legislature, and judicial branches of government, and the electoral system." These are the macrolevel structures that need to be consolidated first before any other level of consolidation can occur.

Constitutional consolidation began for Ghana's fourth republic with the processes to put together a new constitution that established the three main arms of government and the foundations for democratic governance. This process was not a smooth process free of tensions. According to Gyimah-Boadi (1991), there was little clarity on the modalities of the transition, and the committee of experts and the constituent assembly in charge of drafting the new constitution were unevenly constituted by pro-government forces, raising fears that the outcome will only reflect the interests of the PNDC. Moreover, given the country's history with reluctant military rulers, there was also widespread fear that the Rawlings administration was not fully committed to return the country to democracy, and this was reinforced by the government's refusal to allow an interim government to oversee the transition process. Such fears and reservations led groups like the Ghana Bar Association (GBA) and National Union of Ghana Students (NUGS) to raise strong objections to the process (Boafo-Arthur, 1991).

Given these widespread concerns, the constituent assembly, in putting together the draft constitution, made efforts to consult citizens in all ten regions of the country, thus ensuring that the outcome reflected the interests, aspirations and needs of the citizens.

Unsurprisingly when the new constitution was put before the people in a referendum, 92% approved of it (Gyimah-Boadi, 1994). Regarding its contents, the new constitution made provisions for an independent judiciary, a unicameral legislature, and an executive with the president as its head. It further secured freedoms and liberties for citizens including the

freedom of association and speech as well as freedom of the press. Despite its shortcomings, the 1992 constitution of Ghana provided a good foundation for establishing a democratic government (Gyimah-Boadi, 1994).

A review of the literature suggests that though the European Community did not play an active role in the transition process, it has been a key player supporting election administration and observation (Gyekye-Jandoh, 2017; Crawford, 2005). In her assessment of the role of the international community in Ghana's democratic transition in the fourth republic, Gyekye-Jandoh (2017) observed that the main international actors directly involved in the transition were USAID, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The active role of the World Bank and IMF was mainly because, owing to a dire economic situation, the Rawlings government had signed on to the World Bank's Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) in 1983, which required the government to institute economic liberalization reforms (Boafo-Arthur, 1991). With economic reforms well underway, the Washington institutions gradually followed with calls for democracy and good governance in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Gyekye-Jandoh maintains that these external pressures were successful partly because they coincided with internal pressures and partly because Ghana was highly dependent on the World Bank and IMF at the time.

The conspicuous absence of EC support from Ghana's transition process in the fourth republic may be explained by the fact that the Maastricht Treaty, the agreement that established the EU and served as the bedrock for EC global democracy promotion, was not in place until 1993, a year after Ghana had instituted a new constitution and transitioned to democracy. Moreover, the Cotonou Agreement, which entrenched democracy and human rights promotion as a condition for development cooperation was not also in place until 2000. Thus, the lack of a framework for political engagement may serve as a plausible explanation for the lack of EU support for Ghana's transition in 1992.

Despite the above, the most visible support of the European Community towards institutional consolidation in Ghana has been in election administration and observation. This support for elections did not however begin in Ghana and the rest of sub-Saharan Africa until 1994, when the Maastricht Treaty was already in place (Motsamai, 2010). According to Crawford (2005), the EC, in furthering the Cotonou Agreement (2000) signed a Country Strategy Paper and National Indicative Programme with the Ghana government. This included an allocation of 311million euros from the European Development Fund (EDF) to support rural development, road transport and the macroeconomy. Crawford (2005: 580) notes that, even though contributions were made to support the general elections in 2000 and 2004, these only represent 'a tiny proportion of EC funds.' Besides the support for election administration, the EU has also consistently sent observers to observe all general elections in Ghana and other African countries since 2000. This has also been to further institutional consolidation in the electoral process of Ghana.

The European Development Fund is the financial means through which development cooperation is facilitated between Africa, the Caribbean, and Pacific countries (ACP). The administration of the fund has been guided by the political and legal frameworks for cooperation, previously the Lome Convention, and now the Cotonou Agreement (EC, 2018). The main aim is to provide development aid and technical assistance in promoting economic, social, and environmental development in the ACP countries. The EDF is not

funded by the main EU budget but is the outcome of ad hoc contributions by member states. The responsibility for the financial implementation of the fund rests with the European Commission, and the European Investment Bank (EIB) manages the investment facility. The EDF is composed of different accounts, and each account, with its own financial regulations, operates for approximately five years. Accordingly, representatives of member states meet every five years at an intergovernmental meeting to decide on new contributions to the fund, specific allocations, as well as how to monitor the implementation of the fund. The most recent is the 11<sup>th</sup> European Development Fund (2014 - 2020) which is guided by the Cotonou Agreement. Before that was the 10<sup>th</sup> EDF facility for the period 2008 – 2013. The 12<sup>th</sup> EDF is for the period 2021 to 2027 (Ibid).

It can be gleaned from the preceding analysis that the main support of the EC in the institutional consolidation process has been through electoral support, and even this has been very limited and began only after 1994. While specific allocations for electoral support are not clearly captured in the literature, what is clear is that funds allocated for development cooperation under the EDF did not capture democratic assistance as a core area. Rather, the main areas for assistance were rural development, transportation, and the economy (Crawford, 2005). Support for governance did not receive priority in the allocation of EDF for development in Ghana. Even in electoral support, support for observer missions has been more pronounced than support for electoral administration.

### **3.4.2 Representative Consolidation**

After constitutional/institutional consolidation, the next step in the democratic consolidation process is representative consolidation. Representative consolidation, as articulated by Merkel (2008: 14), is concerned with the “territorial and functional representation of interests.” At this meso-level, collective actors such as parties and interest groups contribute and participate in consolidating the established constitutional and institutional structures.

Participation and representation are key pillars of democracy. Political parties and interest groups serve as the vehicles for such participation and representation, at national and local levels, in decision making for development. According to Essuman-Johnson (1994: 196), it “is the parties that help the people to choose a government to run the affairs of the state and also to choose a parliament where the representatives of the people will debate and discuss national issues and act on behalf of the people in authorizing policies and making decisions.” The parties further facilitate the easy participation of citizens in periodic elections by presenting candidates that identify with specific interest and ideological groups (Ibid).

Arguably, the process of representative consolidation began with the lifting of the ban on political parties in May 1992. Before the ban was lifted, interest groups already existed in the form of clubs such as the Eagle Club, Heritage Club, and the Danquah-Busia Club among others. After the ban was lifted, most of these groups altered their structures and registered as political parties (Boafo-Arthur, 1991). Among the parties that emerged after the ban was lifted were the National Patriotic Party (NPP), Peoples Heritage Party (PNP), National Democratic Congress (NDC) and the National Convention Party (NCP) among

others. Party activities followed soon after and a legislation was enacted to regulate the activities of the political parties (Ibid).

A thorough assessment of the process of representative consolidation in Ghana reveals that there has been little direct support from the European Community in this process. Though the successive Country Strategy Papers (CSP) and National Indicative Programmes (NIP) guiding EU development assistance to Ghana capture governance as thematic area for support, no specific reference was made to supporting political parties or interest groups in their mobilization processes. The closest attempt at supporting participation and representation is the EU's support for local governance and decentralization. According to Champagne (2016), between 2012 and 2014, the EU provided EUR 5 million to support the Ghana Decentralization Support Programme. Though this was meant mainly to improve sanitation, water supply and infrastructure in rural areas, part of this money was also directed to the Inter-Ministerial Coordinating Committee to assist the local officials and representatives through the Local Government Service Secretariate (Ibid).

A plausible explanation for this may be that direct support from the EU to specific interest groups or political parties may give the appearance that the EU is meddling in Ghana's internal politics or buying influence through support for political parties or specific interest groups. While this may be the case or not, the fact remains clear, that so far as representative consolidation is concerned, support from the European Community has been palpably absent.

### **3.4.3 Behavioural Consolidation**

At this level of consolidation, potential political actors including the armed forces, business capital and major landowners, and radical groups act and pursue their interests within the democratic norms and institutions (Merkel, 2008). This level of consolidation is an ongoing process and the situation in Ghana is far from complete. The process as well as any role played by the EU will be discussed.

Since the onset of the fourth republic, most actors within the political landscape of the country have in most cases pursued their interest through the accepted democratic procedures. The military has remained effectively under the control of the executive arm of government, and there has been no coup or attempted coup since 1992. While there have been instances of radical group activities reported in the media, these remain isolated activities, with no real ability to subvert Ghana's democracy (Ziaba, 2020).

Though the political polarization between the two main political parties, the National Democratic Congress (NDC) and the New Patriotic Party (NPP), has grown over the years, both actors remain constitutional in pursuit of political power and their interests. The disputes arising out of the 2012 and 2020 presidential and parliamentary elections are instructive in this regard. After the 2012 presidential elections, the NPP disputed the results of the elections and refused to recognize the NDC and president-elect John Dramani Mahama as legitimate winners of the elections. In line with the constitution of Ghana, they filed an election petition case in the Supreme Court. The case was decided in favour of the NDC, upholding the declared election results (BBC, 2013). The NPP and its followers respected the decision of the court and the declared election results without resorting to any

violent or other undemocratic means of pursuing political power. Similarly, in the just ended 2020 elections, the NPP emerged victorious, and the NDC, refusing to accept the election results filed an election petition in the supreme court. The case was eventually decided in favour of the NPP (The Africa Report, 2021). The NDC and its followers respected the decision of the court and the declared election results. The actions of the two main political parties in seeking legal redress for their electoral grievances reflects a growing understanding among the political elite in Ghana to work within stipulated democratic procedures to pursue power and other interests.

Regarding the EU, support in behavioural consolidation has been geared more towards strengthening practices within governance institutions, and promoting transparency and accountability (Champagne, 2016). This is mainly to ensure that the political elite and government employees act according to the dictates of the law. Here, the EU has provided significant funding for the National Anti-corruption Action Plan (NACAP) to strengthen the capacity of state institutions to prevent and respond to corruption (Champagne, 2016). The main objective of NACAP according to Ghana Anti-Corruption Coalition (2019: 3-4) is to “mobilize the efforts and resources of stakeholders, state and non-state actors, to prevent and fight corruption through ethics, integrity and the stringent application” of anti-corruption laws. The initiative started in 2011 when the government instructed the Commission for Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ) to lead a technical working group of key stakeholders to put together an action plan to tackle corruption in the country. The draft action plan by the technical working group was presented to parliament on in 2013, and in 2014 NACAP was adopted. This raised optimism within the anti-corruption community in Ghana about the fight against corruption.

However, a 2019 evaluation report on the status of NACAP revealed that implementation process has been fraught with challenges. According to GACC (2019), the implementation process has been slow due to challenges with funding, poor monitoring, and supervision as well as lack of political will. The funding challenge seeks to suggest that the financial support provided by the EU remains insufficient for the extent of the task of NACAP. The sensitization components of its action plan require widespread awareness creation across the country, and this is capital intensive (Ibid). The regularly stakeholder engagements, as well as efforts to ensure complete prosecution of corrupt public workers all requires resources to accomplish and the funding from the EU has not been sufficient to undertake these tasks.

In addition to NACAP, the EC has also provided support for the Strengthening Transparency, Accountability and Responsiveness (STAR) Ghana programme which aims to improve good governance, accountability, and responsiveness. They operated as a multi-donor fund and the first phase of the programme was funded by the UL aid or Department for International Development (DFID), Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA), the European Union and USAID. The total amount of money for the first phase (2010 - 2015) was USD 38 million (STAR-Ghana Foundation 2020). This went to support grant partners including civil society organizations (CSOs) at the local and national level in undertaking projects to promote good governance, as well as demand accountability and responsiveness from elected officials. It was also used to support processes to ensure a peaceful election in 2012 (Champagne, 2016). The second phase of the STAR Ghana programme was also for the

period between 2015 and 2020. UK Aid, DANIDA and the EU were the main funders of this phase and they contributed a total of £22 million for the programme (Christian Aid, 2018). Through this programme, grants and technical support were used to finance projects and initiatives that promoted inclusive governance, transparency, and accountability, as well as peaceful elections in 2020.

While these efforts have contributed to encouraging democratic behaviours among political actors and government officials, this remains meagre in comparison to the scale of support required or even the total amount of EU development assistance (Crawford, 2005). As already discussed above, the implementation of NACAP is struggling, and funding is one of the main challenges. Funding for the STAR-Ghana programme also ended in 2020, and in anticipation of this, the programme morphed into an independent non-profit Ghanaian organization working to promote and support good governance (STAR-Ghana Foundation 2020). The EU only committed to fund the initial stages of implementing the NACAP project to get it started. Regarding the STAR Ghana programme, the EU and other partners committed to fund the project for ten years (five year the first phase and another five years for phase two). The fact that the STAR Ghana Foundation has persisted as an organization despite the end of funding indicates that there is still a lot to do to support and promote governance in the country. Resources, specifically financial resource are required in this regard, but the funding provided by the EU in support of these remains inadequate despite the modest milestones chalked as a result.

#### **3.4.4 Consolidation of Political and Civic Culture**

This level of consolidation takes decades and according to Merkel (2008: 14) involves the emergence of a "citizenship culture as the sociocultural substructure of democracy." For such a citizenship culture to emerge, the ethos of democracy needs to be accepted and instilled among a wide cross section of the society. The democratic ethos, according to Essuman-Johnson (1994: 194), consists of all those essential traits of democracy: i.e., the characteristic spirit, moral values, ideals or beliefs of democracy." Such values and ideals are instilled through education, public sensitization, and continuous practice. As Merkel rightly admits, this fourth level of consolidation is a continuous progressive process that requires patience to achieve.


In Ghana, the process of cultivating a political and civic culture has been a steady evolving process since the beginning of the 4<sup>th</sup> republic. This has been partly through the acceptance of constitutional provisions such as freedom of speech and association, as well as partly through efforts of state agencies like the National Commission on Civic Education (NCCE) as well as civil society organizations in educating citizens on issues of democracy, their rights and how these could be safeguarded. Education and sensitization activities undertaken by political parties and pro-democracy groups are all contribute to the emergence of a civic culture among the citizens.

In its contribution to the consolidation of a civic culture, the EU has provided significant support for civil society organization since 2005 (Champagne, 2016). This has been to improve political dialogue between the private sector and civil society on one hand, and the government on the other. This support from the EU has also been to promote civic

education on development issues and to help the public understand better, issues of governance and how to hold elected officials accountable. Civil society organizations and thinktanks in Ghana such as the Institute for Democratic Governance (IDEG), Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA), Centre for Democratic Development (CDD), and IMANI have all received some form of funding from the EU or specific European countries to undertake research on development issues, advocate for governance reforms and human rights (Crawford, 2005). In May 2015 for example, the EU ambassador to Ghana met with civil society organizations in the country to discuss the state of governance in the country before meeting with the Ghana government in June the same year (Champagne, 2016).

From the preceding analysis, when it comes to EU support for democracy consolidation, more effort has been put into electoral support than on any other aspect of democracy promotion. Admittedly, some efforts have been put in place to support local governance, institutional capacity building, and anti-corruption reforms, but these only constitute a small portion of the EU support. As a matter of fact, among the main thematic areas that benefit from EU support, support for governance and human rights has received the lowest budgetary allocation of just about 7.89% between 1980 and 2013 as depicted in Figure 2. The highest allocations of EU assistance to Ghana are in macroeconomic support, and support for agricultural and rural development. The low allocation for governance is indicative that despite the high political rhetoric of the EU and its members on democracy, it remains a low priority in actual development assistance.

**Figure 2 Allocation of EU Assistance to Ghana by Sector**



**Source: Ghana-EU Brochure 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition**

The 11<sup>th</sup> European Development Fund covers the period 2014 – 2020. Ghana is one of the countries benefitting from this fund. Under this framework, the EDF made an allocation of EUR 323 million to cover the entire period. The focal areas for the 11<sup>th</sup> EDF in Ghana are the following three: Governance, public sector management and accountability; productive investment in agriculture in the Savannah Ecological Zone; and Employment and social protection. The focal area on governance is concerned with improving accountability and efficiency within the public sector and improving the quality-of-service delivery by public

agencies at the national and local levels. It also includes the effective mobilization and management of national revenue from national resources as well as ensuring accountability in the process. Promoting respect for the rule of law and the fight against corruption, as well as support for state institutions and civil society are all components of the first focal point. Out of the total EDF allocation of EUR 323 million to Ghana, 23%, that is EUR 75 million, was allocated for governance as a focal area. The support provided for NACAP, the STAR-Ghana programme, local governance initiatives and electoral monitoring all came from this allocation.

The second focal area focuses on productive investment in the agriculture within the Savannah Ecological areas. The purpose is to help reduce poverty, increase food security and good nutrition in the area. The Savannah zone constitutes one of the poorest regions in the country and agriculture is the main stay of most of the inhabitants there. Supporting agriculture through investments in technology, fertilizer, improved seeds, and farming methods would help increase crop production in the region. Thus, ensuring that farmers have more to sell to increase and their income and to guarantee good food supply. The EDF budget for this second focal sector is EUR 160 million, that is 50% of the entire EDF allocation to Ghana. The third focal sector employment and social protection is aimed at improving the employment in the country. Much of the focus here is on the informal sector, the sector where majority of Ghanaians earn their livelihoods. It is also concerned with improving the protection systems available to vulnerable and potentially marginalized groups in the country that rely on the state for their basic sustenance. The EDF budget allocated EUR 75 million for this purpose as well, thus also representing 23% of the total EDF allocation to Ghana.

First, it is noteworthy that the EU captured governance as a focal area for support under the 11<sup>th</sup> EDF. This does suggest that there is some level of commitment from the EU in furthering democracy in Ghana. Yet, the differential allocation across the three focal areas does also suggest that even though the EU may be concerned about democracy, it is nonetheless not a high priority area. The high priority area is investment in agriculture ostensibly to reduce poverty and promote food security among the poor in the Savannah region. While this objective is laudable, it is also important to note, that the EU is Ghana's largest trade partner. In 2012 alone, 42% of Ghana's total exports went to the EU, and most of the products consisted of agricultural products. With the EU importing a large quantity of agricultural products from Ghana, it is in the interest of the EU to support the development of agriculture in the country. It is therefore unsurprising that under the 11<sup>th</sup> EDF, the EU budget for agricultural development (EUR 160 million) is twice the amount allocated to the other two focal areas governance (EUR 75 million) and employment and social protection (EUR 75 million).

While the point made above is not to suggest that the EU is not motivated by poverty reduction and food security, it is to illustrate the fact that the EU may have more reasons than altruistic motivations. In that case, it is therefore not surprising that despite the high rhetoric on democracy and human rights promotion, actual financial allocation for this purpose remains low. EUR 75 million may be considered a high amount until one considers the fact that the 11<sup>th</sup> EDF allocation is for the period between 2014 to 2020, and this means using the allocated amount over a six-year period to support public sector reforms, civil

society support and other initiatives. To put this into more perspective, the STAR-Ghana budget alone was GBP 22 million, which is equivalent to EUR 25 million, and even this amount was considered insufficient, given the fact that the fund in 2018 had to be turned into a private organization to raise external source of funding to support its activities (STAR-Ghana Foundation 2020). Under the governance focal sector, multiple grants such as that given to STAR-Ghana are also awarded to other civil society organizations working to improve public sector transparency, accountability, and service delivery. It also must cover direct engagement activities with state institutions, among others. The point to be made here is straight forward, promoting democracy may be an area of foreign policy importance for the EU, but in practise other areas that reflect EU domestic interest such as trade appear to be more salient. The difference in financial allocation to the focal sectors emphasizes this point very clearly.

### **3.5 Chapter Conclusion**

This chapter presented a discussion on Ghana's democratization process in the fourth republic and the support of the European community in the process. It began with a historical overview of Ghana's political and governance landscape from independence in 1957 to the end of the third republic in 1981. This was followed by a brief overview of the transition process in the fourth republic. The remaining parts of the chapter assessed the EU's support for Ghana's democratic consolidation process using Merkel's framework as the prism of analysis. The main argument of the chapter, and by extension this study, is that, except for support for electoral administration and observation, the EU has done little to support the democratic consolidation process in Ghana. Though other areas of support include capacity building for state institutions and support for civil society in consolidating a civic culture, this support is meagre in comparison to the scope of the assistance required and even as a proportion of general EU development assistance. Evidence from the European Development Fund allocations suggest that the EU has other priority areas than democracy promotion. In the next chapter, this study considers reasons accounting for the EU's low level of support for democracy consolidation in Ghana and Africa, and some challenges the EU may be facing.

## **Chapter Four**

### **Gaps in EU Policy and Practice**

#### **4.1 Introduction**

Democracy and human rights promotion have been touted strongly by the EU as one of their main foreign policy priorities in Africa. This has been well articulated in the Maastricht Treaty, and finds strong expression in the Cotonou Agreement. Yet, as the analysis in the preceding chapter demonstrates, this foreign policy commitment is more on paper than in practice. This far, this study has argued that, apart from support for electoral administration and observation, the EU has done little to support democratic consolidation processes in Ghana, and by extension Africa. Though there has been some support from the EU and its members for decentralization, institutional capacity building, policy advocacy and civil society activities, these only constitute a small proportion of EU support, and its effectiveness remains questionable. What reasons account for this disconnection in rhetoric and practice by the EU? What are the main challenges hindering the EU's efforts in promoting democracy on the African continent? This chapter shall attempt to address these questions. It will discuss among others, the actual priorities of the EU, motivations for aid, perceptions of Africans about EU support, and growing influence of China in Africa.

#### **4.2 Motivation for Aid - Good**

Narratives around aid fit within three main schools of thought. Dependency theory, with its Marxist approach, views foreign aid as a tool by which developed countries and former colonial powers keep developing countries dependent on the former for financial and other resources ostensibly for development (Cox, 2016). From this point of view, dependency and exploitation are the motivations that underpin development aid efforts. In such situations power asymmetries are tilted in the favour of the more developed high-income societies.

The liberal school, according to Hattori (2001, p.634), views it as "a set of programmatic measures designed to enhance the socio-economic and political development of recipient countries." Here, the motivation for aid is more benign, and high-income societies providing assistance are more concerned about poverty reduction and improving the quality of life in the countries to which they aid. Though this school of thought remains widespread, its fundamental assumptions have been questioned by the realist school. From a realist perspective, the primary motivation for aid is political, and based on the personal interests of the countries involved. It is a foreign policy tool for furthering the diplomatic and general political interests and agenda of the donor country (Liska, 1960; Morgenthau, 1962). The premise here is that countries, just like humans, are more self-centred than altruistic. Their activities and actions on the international scene are motivated by what they can get or how they can benefit. The Cold War era of a bipolar international environment at the time strengthened this thinking as countries were concerned more about their own interests and how they could benefit from engaging with others. The realist approach holds more explanatory value for this study. This situates the motivation for EU development cooperation and assistance within the thinking that the EU is self-interested and focuses

mainly on the interests of the EU as a region and how it can further the interest of its member states, to whom the EU has primary responsibility.

According to Olsen (1998), one of the main reasons why the European community has not in practice delivered well on its democracy promotion policy is because the motivation for aid is primarily based on self-interest and not some lofty moral ideals on democracy. Though the EU ostensibly captures democracy and human rights promotion as a foreign policy priority, its actions reveal its interests are more towards other areas. As Olsen (1998: 345) puts it, "European motives for promoting democracy and respect for human rights in Africa were so-called 'donor interests'. When implementing the policy, the 'non-declared' interests of the donor countries themselves were decisive and not the official ones found in treaties and public statements." Donor interests are the interests that have broad appeal within the international community, while non declared interests are the real interests the donor or development agency (Ibid). Since the 1960's, development assistance has been a salient donor theme because of the newly independent African countries that were pushing for their development. After the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s, democracy and human rights promotion also gained salience due to the ideological triumph of the United States and its western allies in Europe. As a result, it is therefore not surprising that the EU captures democracy and human rights promotion as a foreign policy priority, when the facts say otherwise. In this case then, what are the real non-declared interests of the EU?

According to Crawford (2005), the primary interest of the EU has been in securing peace at home and abroad to facilitate international trade and cooperation. It has also been to secure peace among its neighbours especially in North Africa to control the immigration of refugees seeking asylum in Europe (Ibid). Unsurprisingly, most of the EU's efforts on the African continent has been more towards promoting peace and security than in promoting democratic consolidation (Olsen, 2002).

In line with its security interests, the EU has provided substantial financial support for the African Peace Facility (APF) through the European Development Fund (EDF), as an avenue to promote peace and stability on the continent (Fioramonti, 2009).

The African Peace Facility was established in 2004 to help facilitate the promotion of peace and security in Africa. As a component of the European Union – Africa partnership, the APC emerged because of a call made by African leaders during the 2003 summit in Maputo (AU, 2014). The facilitate has three main strands of operation: peace support operations, capacity building and early response. The peace support operations strand focuses on support for peace keeping missions in African countries that are prone to conflict. In Somalia for example, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) was established under the APF to promote peace and ensure a smooth transition. The mission was also to help facilitate the peaceful reconciliation and reconstruction processes. The African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) was also established under the APF to improve the peace and security in Sudan, ensure the safe arrival of humanitarian aid as well as the return of refugees who departed because of the war. The mission is also to help monitor compliance with ceasefire arrangements in the region. The Central Africa Republic and Comoros Island are also among countries that have benefitted through the peace support strand of the Africa Peace Facility (Ibid).

The capacity building strand of the APF is focused on building the capacities of peace keeping missions and security forces, to get them ready for the missions. This involves equipping the peace keeping missions, composed of security personnel from across African countries, with the needed resources and logistics to carry out their assigned duties. It also involves training on peace keeping and how to operate within civilian populations. The final strand of the APF is the early response strand. This is concerned with making financial resources readily available for the early resolution of conflicts or disputes through mediation and other alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. This to prevent the situation from escalating to more violent levels that make it difficult to control.

The APF is funded mainly through the EDF, and according to the African Union, (2014: 1) a "total of €740 million have already been earmarked by the EU to carry out these actions." The amount of money allocated to the facility alone is instructive that peace and security are high priority areas for the EU than democracy and human rights promotion. The amount of money allocated from the EDF to support the APF is more than twice the of the EDF allocation to Ghana (€ 323 million) for the period 2014 to 2020 (EU, 2014). A counter argument to this may be that the APF facility covers the continental level, and thus will require more resources. While this may be true to a certain extent, this APF facility only covers specific post-war societies such as Sudan, Central African Republic, and Somalia, who also have independent EDF allocations for internal development cooperation.

Though the EU may view peace and security as integral to development, Bradley (2009: 59) observes that many on the continent view the EU "as focusing excessively on conflict management in Africa to attain quick, highly visible but short-term successes, but not focusing on sustainable conflict prevention and its long-term advantages in relation to democracy building and sustainable development." As a matter of fact, the converse can be argued that good governance brings about peace and security. In most of the conflict prone areas in Africa such as Sudan and Somalia, poor governance can be cited as one of the major causes of the conflict. Suffering, widespread discrimination and marginalization within specific groups and repression can lead to the formation of dissident or rebel groups fighting for independence. In Sudan for example, the marginalization and discrimination of southern Sudanese contributed to the conflict in the country and the subsequent secession of South Sudan.

Given the EU's dominant security and conflict prevention interest, democracy promotion as a normative concern has received little priority in practise, and conditionalities based on democracy promotion have been difficult to enforce. For example, 'despite the numerous democratic shortcomings of the Ugandan "no-party system," donors (including the EU) have been prepared to put up with Museveni and his government, mainly because the donors' value "immensely his ability to build stability in the country' Olsen (2002: 316). The situation is similar with other stable autocratic regimes in Africa and beyond.

Though Ghana did not benefit directly from any peace building efforts, the dissonance between the EU's policy declarations and reality is also clear in the case of Ghana. In his assessment, Crawford (2005) concluded that the European community had done little to support democracy consolidation in Ghana, and that most of the support from the EU went

towards other areas such rural development and macro-economic support. In fact, the EU in its 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition Brochure with Ghana acknowledges that between 1980 and 2013, cumulatively, thematic areas receiving the most support were Transportation (28.86%), Macro-economic and budgetary support (27.13%), and Agriculture and Rural Development (23.7%). Governance support was only 7.89% during the period as indicated in Figure Two in the previous chapter. This is clearly instructive that the EUs priority in practice was not governance or democracy promotion. Thus, from a realist perspective, the practical focus of the EU clearly shows its priorities than its articulated interests in policy.

### **4.3 Perceptions of the EU**

The way the EU is perceived in Africa by political actors and citizens alike, is a factor that may frustrate EU democracy promotion efforts, even if merely normative. Regarding the EU's position on democracy promotion, many in Africa view it as bordering on interference and undermining African leaders. According to Fioramonti (2009), the EU is viewed as trying to impose western values on African countries. This is reminiscent of the Structural Adjustment Policies (SAP) imposed on many African countries by the World Bank and IMF in the 1980s and the colossal disasters that followed afterwards (Meredith, 2005).

The issue here is that democracy is not a static concept. Its meaning and application vary depending on the society. The type of democracy practiced in Washington is markedly different from that practised in Britain or Switzerland. The commonalities are however the existence of multiparty elections, guaranteed freedoms under the law, rule of law, and inclusive participation in governance through transparency and accountability mechanisms. Similarly in Africa, the democracy practised in different countries diverge and so do the needs of the populations. In an Afrobarometer Policy Paper detailing the results of surveys in thirty-four African countries, Mattes (2019) found that even though most Africans preferred democratic governance and abhorred authoritarian regimes and dictatorships, their views on democracy and the form of democracy under which they lived differed from their point of view. As such, promoting a particular form of western liberal democracy to facilitate ideological dominance may create a counterintuitive effect.

As Bradley (2009: 58) put it, through "its actions, including the application of conditionality based on Eurocentric human rights and democracy perspectives, the EU is perceived as promoting its own agenda without taking into consideration the development needs of Africa." This agenda, Crawford (2005: 596) maintains, is in promoting the 'political dimension of neo-liberalism' to ensure the 'maintenance of the neo-liberal hegemony' of the west. This has led to a situation where many African leaders resist attempts at EU interference even through conditionalities. The case of Robert Mugabe in the 2007 Lisbon EU-Africa summit is instructive.

Before the EU-Africa Summit in Lisbon in 2007, the EU had placed a travel ban on Robert Mugabe, the then president of Zimbabwe, owing to human rights issues and political crisis in the country. This meant that he was automatically excluded from the summit (Bradley, 2009). The African leaders protested, viewing the move as a blatant attempt to interfere in the governance of African countries. EU member countries including the UK at the time resisted the move by the African leaders, creating divisions even among the EU members.

In the end, the African leaders prevailed, and the ban was lifted, allowing Mugabe to attend the Summit (Ibid). This endeavor by the African leaders to resist the sanction demonstrates how their perceptions of EU interference influences their resistance towards such efforts. As Fioramonti (2009: 6) puts it, 'the summit revealed the limited capacity of EU member states to exert credible pressure on African states to find common solutions to the political and social crises ravaging the continent.'

The main challenge here is that conditionality and sanctions are avenues through which the EU and other international actors promoting democracy can ensure compliance. At the same time, conditionality and sanctions are themselves contested issues due to their implication for national sovereignty and autonomy of the states on which these conditions and sanctions are being imposed. Admittedly, even in situations where there is wide agreement on the objectives of the conditionality, the idea of employing such a tool smacks of neo-imperialist and neo-colonialist sentiments. It is therefore not surprising the level of resistance that African countries show towards such attempts by western powers to impose conditionalities or sanctions.

Despite these reservations, Fioramonti (2009) notes that the EU is viewed favorable by many African leaders as strong development partner. In her 2015 assessment of public opinion of the European Union in Africa, Keuleers (2015) observed that many across the continent were aware of the EU's presence and had knowledge of its development related activities. There also viewed the EU making positive contributions to the development of their countries. According to a Pew Research Centre Survey conducted in 33 countries across the world, most adults in the world (58%) have a positive view of the EU (Devlin, 2019). Three countries were included in that study with regards to Africa. These were Kenya, Nigeria, and South Africa. In Nigeria, 53% of the adult population had a favorable view of the EU and its role in their country. In South Africa, 42% had a favorable view of the EU while in Kenya, 52% of adults viewed the EU favorably (Devlin, 2019). The fact that the EU is viewed favorable by most adults in these African countries, is telling that many Africans are aware and appreciate the role of the EU in supporting development on the continent. Though much of the collaborations and EU support are in areas other than democracy consolidation, the current frameworks for engagement may serve as a starting point for deeper engagement and support in democracy and human rights promotion in Africa. More on this the next chapter.

#### **4.4 The Case of China**

Since the late 1990'-s and early 2000'-s, China's presence in the international community has grown considerably (Cox, 2016). In Asia, China has overtaken the US and EU to become largest trade and economic partner of almost all countries in the region, and its influence continues to grow. Africa is one of the continents experiencing a rapid increase in Chinese presence and importance. The relationship between many African countries and China is growing, especially in the areas of trade, investment, aid, and support for infrastructure development.

Given its ideological departure from the west (the EU inclusive), the Chinese government, in its relations with Africa, situates itself as an alternative development partner with more to offer the continent. The Chinese government eschews economic and political conditionalities as part of its terms of trade, or in loans and grants given to countries on the continent. This deliberate avoidance of conditionalities makes cooperation with China more favourable for African leaders who view conditionalities as forms of interference or neo-colonial impositions. As Sino-Africa<sup>1</sup> development cooperation continues to increase, the relevance of the EU as a development partner may grow weak, in addition to its ability to impose political conditionalities on the continent. As Fioramonti, (2009: 13) put it, a “new framework for trade relations, in which China has been making significant ground in recent years, will inevitably erode the primacy of EU trade in Africa, thereby reducing the effectiveness of the EU’s political conditionality.” The reality is that, given the different approach adopted by China, “Chinese trade competition will be increasingly exploited by certain African leaders to secure less stringent trade deals with the EU, in which human rights clauses and governance conditions will be relegated to a minor component”, and there lies the challenge.

Though a study by Hackenesch (2015) on the impact of China on EU and US democracy promotion efforts in Angola and Ethiopia has shown that China’s growing presence has not significantly eroded EU and US influence in both countries, the reality remains that China adopts a more favorable trade approach than the west and in the long run may weaken their current influence. Moreover, Hackenesch’s study focused less on the dissonance between declared policy objectives and practical interests, so other potential explanations such as regional security are also potential reasons why the west may maintain its sway in both countries. Nonetheless, the reality remains, that with China’s increasing trade in Africa coupled with its emphasis on no conditionalities, more African countries will gravitate towards Chinese support, increasingly impacting the ability of the EU to promote democracy on the continent, especially through conditionalities.

#### **4.5 Chapter Conclusion**

The argument of this thesis has been that apart from support for electoral administration and observation, the EU/EC has done little to support democratic consolidation in Africa. Though other areas of political support include decentralization and institutional capacity building, the effort here is meagre at best. Chapter three used Merkel’s framework to present and discuss the argument in the context of Ghana. This chapter building on chapter three, discussed reasons accounting for this low level of support for democracy promotion by the EU, and some challenges faced by the EU. It presented theories of aid motivation and from a realist perspective, explained the disconnect between the EU’s stated policy objectives, and the reality in practice. It also discussed perceptions of the EU’s efforts at promoting democracy and how this influences resistance from African leaders. It also discussed China’s growing presence on the continent and the potential impact of this on the EU’s democracy promotion efforts. In the next chapter, this concludes with a summary

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<sup>1</sup> Sino-Africa refers to Chinese Africa relations.

of the entire study and some recommendations to bulwark the EU's democracy promotion efforts.

## **Chapter Five**

### **Recommendations**

#### **5.1 Introduction**

This chapter presents some recommendations for improving the EU's efforts at democracy promotion in Africa. In the previous chapter, the study discussed reasons accounting for the low EU support for democracy promotion in Africa and the challenges of the EU. It outlined the different theoretical approaches to understanding aid motivation including the liberal school, the dependency school, and the realist approach. Situating the discussion within the realist theory of aid motivation, it outlined the EU's motives in practise and the dissonance with policy objectives. It also presented perceptions of the EU on the continent and how this influenced the action of leaders towards the EU. The emerging role of China was also highlighted, together with its possible impacts on the EUs influence and activities on the continent. How can the EU improve its democracy promotion efforts in Africa and surmount its existing challenges? This chapter addresses this question.

#### **5.2 Recommendations**

##### *Clarity on foreign policy objectives*

The first and most important recommendation is that the EU should be candid and clear about its foreign policy objectives in Africa, the issues of top priority to them, as well as its investments for these. The current situation where the EU emphasizes democracy and human rights as a policy priority raises expectations within the continent about the support in this area. The disconnect between policy and practise has as a result been disappointing for many on the continent (Fioramonti, 2009). The case of Ghana discussed illustrated the fact that even though the EU captured governance as a key focal area along with productive investment in agriculture, and employment and social protection, its priority was more towards investments in agriculture than anywhere else. Agriculture as a priority area for the EU in Ghana is clear because of the 11<sup>th</sup> EDF allocation for that focal area (EUR 160 million), twice the amount allocated for governance (EUR 75 million) and employment and social security (EUR 75 million). This difference in priority is understandable because that EU is one of Ghana's largest trade partners, and Ghana exports most of its cash crops and other agricultural produce to the EU. As such, it only makes sense that the EU may wish to ensure the protection of its interests in that area.

Clarity and transparency on what the EU are interested in and how it aims to achieve these will be useful for African states in understanding how to engage the EU on such issues. Moreover, there needs to be clear coordination and communication between EU agencies and member states on support efforts in Africa, to ensure policy harmony and consistency (Bradley, 2009). This is primarily important because, even though EU member countries make individual contributions to the EDF, the also have their own bilateral development cooperation arrangement to facilitate their own specific interests. This may create a situation where a possible misalignment between the common interest and focal areas of

the EU on one hand, and that of a member state in another. It is because of such situations that Bradley calls for proper coordination between EU member countries in other that they can harmonize the pursuit of their common interests in the region. As a matter of fact, the regulations guiding the implementation of the EDF insist on coordinated efforts in Africa to avoid conflict and ensure maximum impact. This will help prevent the duplication of efforts among EU member states and ensure the policy coordination needed to attain optimal impact.

*Democracy for Africans – a stronger inclusive partnership*

The African continent is unique for its cultural and ethnic diversity. Even within each one of its over 50 countries, multiple ethnic and cultural groups exist with different social and governance structures. Given this diversity, conceptualizing, and understanding democracy should be an inclusive process specific to each country, and not based on broad western conceptions of democracy (Champagne, 2016). The EU's approach to democracy promotion on the continent has over the years been based on western conceptions of liberal democracy that the EU attempts to impose through conditionalities and sanctions. Crawford (2005) has remarked that this approach of the EU in promoting its versions of liberal democracy is aimed at maintaining its neoliberal ideological dominance. This argument makes more sense when the increasing presence of China in the Africa and other parts of the world is taking into consideration. This threat to the ideological dominance of the United States and European allies creates a situation where development cooperation is used as to tool to ensure compliance with their ideological position. As discussed in the last chapter, this has not worked partly because of the western conceptions of democracy and partly due to the conditionalities and sanctions involved.

A research policy paper based on data from the Afrobarometer survey of 34 African countries found that even though many Africans preferred to live under a democracy than any other form of government, their conceptions of democracy differed as well as the type of democracy they wished to live in (Mattes, 2019). Issues of multiparty elections, existence of a vocal opposition, press freedom and the guarantee of universal human rights are the basics that are common to those interested in a democracy. The points of departure are about the type of institutions to be established, the extent of the powers of each institution, how delegation at the local levels should occur, as well as the power of security forces-, among others (Ibid). When it comes to these issues, even democracy in the west takes on different forms depending on the country in which a person finds themselves. The democracy in the United States where the executive branch and the presidency are equipped with a lot of executive power is markedly different from the parliamentary system in England where the Prime-minister and leader of government business also doubles as an elected member of parliament. In Switzerland as well, the form of democracy practised is different from that in the US and in England. In all these three countries however, there exists multiparty elections, press freedom, and universal rights are guaranteed for citizens as well.

This only goes to indicate the divergence in conceptions of democracy, despite the commonalities. The same case of difference in conception holds true for Africa. To address this, the EU needs to adopt a more inclusive approach to democracy promotion that does

not include conditionalities, but rather involves Africans in conceptualizing democracy for Africans.

Such an approach will involve close and strong partnerships with African states on how to address challenges of democracy building within specific countries, and to strengthen the pillars of democracy. State institutions, civil society groups, professional groups such as Bar associations and student groups, as well as interest groups such as trade unions should all be included in such a process. This will mean the EU will have to go beyond electoral assistance to include more direct support for specific aspects of the democracy consolidation process, addressing concerns of representative and civic consolidation. This can include providing or supporting platforms that facilitate engagement between citizens in the state for purposes of contributing to the decisions that affect them or to exert accountability on elected officials. At the national level, this involves forums or direct engagement between interest groups and ministers of state or other members of the executive arm of government. It can also include engagements between interest groups and parliamentarians or law makers, in making contributions to the legal drafting or amendment process as well as key decisions on specific national issues. At the local level, this can also involve facilitating dialogues between respective members of parliament and their constituents, as well as engagements with District and Municipal and Metropolitan Chief Executives (MMDCEs). Facilitating such platforms can make the government more responsive to the needs of the public and work towards addressing these.

Given that the consolidation process itself is a continuous long-term process, this inclusive approach will require patience and an enduring partnership with the state and interest groups outlined above to achieve. As Bradley (2009: 61) rightly contends, the "EU must continue to engage with Africa to build and strengthen the partnership, which should be mutually beneficial, based on reciprocity, predictability and consistency, and founded on mutual respect." Inclusivity and ownership are the lynchpins of such an approach, and to quote Bradley again, "home grown initiatives should be allowed to shape democracy building, and assistance programmes must be designed that respect jointly agreed benchmarks for democracy derived from internationally accepted indicators."

In place of conditionalities, these new partnerships should involve engagements to agree on specific, measurable democracy promotion objectives and benchmarks for government, civil society, and interest groups. This will ensure ownership of the process and partly ensure compliance. Compliance monitoring should not exclusively be the responsibility of the EU but should include vertical and horizontal social accountability approaches that include the media and a broad cross section of the society. Under such a process, the EU will play more of a facilitating background role than a leading role to assuage concerns of neo-colonialism or neo-imperialism. The EU can also collaborate with the African Peer Review Mechanism on a continental level to support the monitoring process within specific African countries as well. Serving as the external monitoring body, the inclusion of the APRM will also help strengthen the relationship of the EU and the AU at a continental level.

*Increase support for governance in EDF budget.*

Adopting the kind of engagements proposed above will require a lot of resources to accomplish, specifically financial resources. The EU needs to expand its budget for governance under the EDF to support democracy consolidation efforts on the continent (Olsen, 2002; Crawford, 2005). As the discussions in the previous chapters highlighted, the EDF allocation for governance has over the years been insufficient in pushing the agenda of democratic consolidation. The implementation of the National Anti-corruption Action Plan for example has been fraught because of low level of funding, among others. Similarly, the STAR Ghana programme also ended to 2020 due funding, but the programme has been turned into a private organization because the issues it was established to tackle, transparency and accountability in governance, are still pressing and will need to be addressed. The STAR-Ghana programme has indeed been instrumental in increasing participation in governance at the local level and improving responsiveness of state actors at the national level through grants and technical support for projects in these areas (STAR-Ghana Foundation 2020). An increase in the EDF allocation will ensure that there are more funds to continually support such initiatives.

Increasing the EDF allocation will include funds to facilitate engagements at the continental, regional, national, and sub-national levels, as well as advocacy and monitoring activities. It will also include more funding for participatory processes that include interest groups, the diaspora and local level governance structures. Evidently, the EUR 75 million allocation for governance under the 11<sup>th</sup> EDF was insufficient in supporting all the initiatives at the level of the state and civil society in promoting democracy and good governance. While this study hesitates to make recommendations for specific percentage increases, it however maintains that increasing the EDF allocation for governance will communicate that the EU means business. And more importantly will expand the scope of what is possible under democracy consolidation.

## **Chapter Six**

### **Summary and Conclusion**

#### **6.1 Introduction**

The European community has been a strong advocate for democracy and human rights promotion around the world. Particularly during and after the cold war, the EC and its member countries have together with the United States pushed for countries all over the world to either transition to democratic governance, or if there were already practising democracy, strengthen their institutions. As colonialism waned in the aftermath of the Second World War, the exiting colonial authorities in most countries, especially in Africa, ensured that elections were conducted for power to be handed over to a democratic regime (Mozaffar, 1997). That first experiment in democratic transition was a colossal failure in many African countries. Military coups, corruption, and economic mismanagement, as well as political repression became widespread in most African countries (Ibid). In many parts of Africa, from the 1960s to 1980s, the military was in control, and the civilian leaders were their own autocrats. Countries Burkina Faso, Ghana, Liberia, Nigeria, and Sudan among others all experienced coups during this period. Senegal, Kenya, Malawi, and Zambia also turned into one-party states at some point. The bipolar international world that existed during the Cold War also complicated the situation as most of the new African leaders sought alternative development partners in communist societies where authoritarian rule was common. As leaders like Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana and Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya looked to the Soviet Union for support, the likelihood for the emergence of democracy subsided. Global development in the late 1980s however heralded hope.

The end of the cold war and the collapse of the Berlin wall marked a significant watershed not just in international relations, but also in the internal governance of many countries. The ideological triumph of the United States over the Soviet Union signalled the emergence of a unipolar international system. It also birthed what Huntington refers to as the third wave of democratization. Many countries in the world at the time partly due to internal activism by citizens and partly due to external pressure, began transitions to democracy. The United States and its allies in Western Europe were very instrumental in driving this wave. Development cooperation was to serve as the main instrument of democracy promotion across the world. The focus of this dissertation was on the role of the EU/EC in supporting democratization processes in Africa.

Through the Maastricht Treaty and Cotonou Agreement the EU/EC adopted a political framework for engagement with Africa that captured democracy promotion and human right as an integral element of development assistance. The Cotonou Agreement succeeded the earlier Lome Convention that provided a framework mainly for trade. The political dimensions of the engagement with Africa only began to feature strongly in the Cotonou Agreement.

## **6.2 Summary**

This thesis set out with the objective to assess the process of democracy consolidation in Africa, with specific reference to the role of the EU, and adopted Ghana as its case study. Specifically, it sought to understand Ghana's democratization process in the fourth republic; assess the role the EU has played in supporting Ghana's democratic transition and consolidation process; and to appreciate the challenges the EU has faced in its attempts, as well as advance recommendations as to how these challenges can be addressed. The study obtained information mainly through secondary sources and adopted Merkel's four level framework of democracy consolidation to assess Ghana's consolidation process.

The first chapter presented the background to this study, providing a historical overview of independence and democratic transitions across Africa in the 1960s. It further discussed the problem of this thesis, considering different positions on the work of the EU in promoting democracy and development across Africa. Though scholars such as Olsen (1998) maintain that the EU has never considered democracy promotion a priority interest area in Africa, some like Bradley (2009) maintained that the EU is a strong development partner in Africa in the promotion of democracy and human rights. In fact, there exist evidence of the EU support for efforts in promoting democracy through the European Development Fund. The challenge remains, that despite these efforts, democracy in Africa is at best fragile. Mali experienced a coup as recently as 2020, and the 2019 Ibrahim Index on African Governance shows that rule of law has declined considerably over the years. Following from this background, the objectives of this study were threefold; to understand Ghana's democratization process in the fourth republic; to assess the role the EU has played in supporting Sub Saharan Africa's democratic transition and consolidation process by using Ghana as a case study and; to highlight the challenges the EU has faced in its attempts to support Sub Saharan Africa's democratic consolidation process, and to advance recommendations as to how these challenges could be addressed.

The second chapter of the study discussed the concepts, and theoretical framework for this study. It presented competing definitions on democracy and democratization and proceeded to highlight the distinction between democratic transition and consolidation. While transition involves the move to democratic governance through a liberal constitution and the conduction of free and fair elections, the consolidation process involves entrenching the democratic institutions, practices, and norms within the country. Different theoretical propositions on consolidation were considered before the study adopted Merkel's (2008) framework to guide the discussions in this thesis. Merkel's framework presents four levels of democratic consolidation: institutional consolidation, representative consolidation, behavioural consolidation, and the consolidation of civic culture. Institutional or constitutional consolidation is about the establishment of governance institutions and an electoral system. Aspects of this overlap with the process of transition. The second level of consolidation, representative consolidation, is about effective representation and giving a voice to different interest groups such as political parties and trade unions. The third level of consolidation, behavioural consolidation, is the level where political actors and other powerful individuals and groups in society are consistently compliance with democratic rules and procedures in the pursuit of their interests. At the final level of consolidation, which is the consolidation of civic and political culture, democratic norms become entrenched as part of the structure of society and part of the lives of the people. These four levels of

consolidation were used in assessing Ghana's democratic consolidation process in the fourth republic. The focus was on Ghana's fourth republic because the first three republics were short-lived, with none of the elected leaders under these republics completing their term in office. The fourth republic has however endured from 1992 and witnessed successive changes of power between different political parties. This case of electoral success and relative stability made Ghana's fourth republic the ideal case for this dissertation's assessment.

The contention of this thesis has been that apart from assistance for institutional consolidation through electoral support, and support in consolidating the civic culture through programme assistance, the European Community or European Union has done little to support the democratic consolidation process in Ghana and by extension Africa.

On institutional consolidation, which focuses on the establishment of macro-level governance structures and the electoral system, the study showed that since 1994 the EU has played an active role in supporting electoral administration and observation. Even in the recent 2020 elections, the EU sent an observer mission, and was involving pre-dialogues and preparations as well. Beyond this however, there is no evidence of other areas of support in institutional consolidation (Gyekye-Jandoh, 2017). Beside the EU, the only other international actor that directly supported the institutional construction process in Ghana's fourth republic is the United States (Ibid).

Regarding representative consolidation, which focuses on the representation of interest groups, there is no evidence of EU support to any such groups as well. As discussed in chapter three, a plausible explanation for this is that the EU may not one to be associated with influence peddling or supporting particular interest groups against others. If this reason holds true, then the EU's decision to limit support in this area is directly in line with democratic principles.

On the level of behavioural consolidation, the EU has focused its support mainly on state institutions to secure compliance with democratic norms at the level of state actors (Champagne, 2016). Though Ghana has been relatively successful in this level of consolidation due to the compliance of political parties, the army, and other potentially violent groups with democracy norms, none of this is as a direct result of EU support. A thorough review of the EDF reports, particularly after the signing of the Cotonou agreement in 2001, suggests that there has been no allocation or support for activities in this area on consolidation.

Beyond electoral support, the only other area of significant support has been to civil society organizations to facilitate learning and sensitization initiatives as well as advocacy (Crawford, 2005). This goes directly to support efforts in consolidating a civic/political culture in Ghana. Support to the STAR-Ghana Programme, the National Anti-Corruption Action Plan (NACAP), as well as direct financial support to civil society organizations like IMANI Africa, the Institute of Economic Affairs among others all form part of this assistance. In addition to direct support from the EU through the EDF for these projects and programmes, individual European countries, especially Denmark, Germany and the United Kingdom have also supported civil society activities directly through their respective international development agencies.

These levels of support from the EU and member countries for elections and civil society organizations in Ghana has been instrumental in furthering the consolidation of Ghana's democracy, but this remains insufficient. As discussed in chapter three, funding for most of these programmes such as NACAP and STAR-Ghana, have come to an end, yet the problems of corruption, lack of transparency and accountability remain. More efforts are still required in consolidating the initial gains, and furthering the consolidation, otherwise, the risk of reversal is not farfetched.

Chapter four outlined reasons accounting for this low level of EU support as well as the challenges facing the EU in its attempt to further democratic consolidation in Africa. The discussions captured include the motivation for aid, perceptions of EU in Africa, and the rise of China as an alternative development partner for Africa. Three main schools of thought on aid were considered: the liberal school, the dependency school, and the realist perspective. This study adopted the realist perspective and the argument that democracy promotion was not part of the EU's top priority despite stating so in policy. This argument is not new and has been advanced by Olsen (1998) and Crawford (2005) among others. Building on the works of these scholars, this thesis employed EU EDF reports on financial allocation to different focal sectors to highlight this point. In the case of Ghana, even though the EU captured governance as one of the key focal areas for the 11<sup>th</sup> EDF, the allocation for governance (EUR 75 million) was barely a third of the total allocation (EUR 323 million). Investment in agriculture received the most allocation (EUR 160 million), about half the entire EDF allocation to Ghana. This was not surprising, given the fact that the EU at the time received the largest share of Ghana's agricultural exports including cocoa, and shea butter, among others. This clearly shows that interest matters in foreign policy, and the stated interest policy documents may not be the actual interests in practise.

On the issue of the emergence of China as an alternative development partner, the studies showed that even though China's approach of no conditions or sanctions was more preferable for African leaders, the increasing presence of China has not significantly impacted the democracy promotion efforts of the EU yet. The discussions in chapter four also captured the fact that even though perceptions of Africans on the EU diverge, many see the EU as a development partner that has supported different aspects of development in many African countries. This is although the support for and impact on democratic consolidation has been low.

Among the recommendations advanced in chapter five to improve the EU's democracy promotion efforts, were clarity and transparency on EU foreign policy objectives, a stronger inclusive partnership with Africans playing a bigger role in conceptualizing what democracy means for them, as well as an increase in the EDF budgetary allocation for democracy promotion. Clarity will help Africa leaders know what exactly to expect and an increase in the EDF allocation will ensure that programmes aimed at promoting democratic consolidation will continue to secure the current progress and work towards fuller consolidation.

### **6.3 Conclusion**

In conclusion, this thesis has established through the case of Ghana that the EU has made some contributions to the consolidation of democracy in Africa, but more needs to be done. The level of support from the EU has not been in proportion to its foreign policy objectives that captures democracy as a main priority area. The EU has the interest of member states as its primary focus, and the evidence captures this clearly. As an international actor, the role of the EU may be limited, but its support is nonetheless instrumental in advancing Ghana's efforts in consolidating its fledgeling democracy.

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