

Alicia Noëllie Saes Louarn

Different Shades of Party-based Euroscepticism (A Heterogeneous Narrative): A Comparative Analysis of the 2014 European Parliament Elections in France and the United Kingdom

Master's thesis in European Studies

Supervisor: Dr. Lise Rye

May 2021

Alicia Noëllie Saes Louarn

Different Shades of Party-based Euroscepticism (A Heterogeneous Narrative): A Comparative Analysis of the 2014 European Parliament Elections in France and the United Kingdom

Master's thesis in European Studies
Supervisor: Dr. Lise Rye
May 2021

Norwegian University of Science and Technology
Faculty of Humanities
Department of Historical Studies



Norwegian University of
Science and Technology

Acknowledgements

I would firstly like to express my deepest appreciation to my thesis supervisor, Dr. Lise Rye. You have been since the very beginning a significant help to create this thesis. Your willingness to impart your knowledge, your positive approach and invaluable contribution have taught me a lot and I am very grateful for the time you spent on guiding me to do the right choice.

Also, I would like to thank all the professors at NTNU, which were part of the master's program, for all being very supportive and being great advisors when the time was needed. I have learned a great deal during this master's degree, and I am very appreciative of that. A great thank you to Dr. Carine Germond and Dr. Viktoriya Fedorchak for their great teaching and for their understanding and help for me to continue the master's program from Gjøvik instead of Trondheim. That was the best two years of studying I have experienced after eight years of graduate and post graduate studies.

Furthermore, I cannot begin to express my thanks to my boyfriend, Maciej, that has endured me studying for many years now and that have supported me along the way. This master's thesis would probably not have been possible without you. You were very patient and have often given me great feedbacks when I needed it, even if you were tired after a long day. Thank you for everything you have done for me, *bardzo dziękuję!*

And finally, I would like to thank my mother, Maryline, for helping me every time she could and have encouraged me to continue my studies and to be confident in everything I was doing. *Merci maman!*

Abstract

This master's thesis assesses the FN and UKIP's Eurosceptic claims during the 2014 European Parliament elections. This study argues that, while they are both characterized as strong Eurosceptic right-wing parties, their Eurosceptic narratives present variations. Through a qualitative content analysis of the two parties' electoral manifesto, this research seeks to fill a gap in the literature on party-based Euroscepticism by presenting that strong Euroscepticism can be much more complex. Furthermore, my research findings indicate that strong Eurosceptic narrative is multifaceted and that the degree of Euroscepticism is influenced by political, social, and economic factors. These findings provide insights into party-based Euroscepticism and its typology, as well as the shaping of parties' campaign strategy.

Keywords

Euroscepticism, Populism, European Politics, Qualitative Analysis, Word Count Analysis, UK Independence Party, Front National, 2014 European Parliament Elections.

Table of contents

1	Introduction	7
1.1	Research Question and outline of the thesis.....	8
1.2	Justification of the topic	8
1.3	Previous research on the topic	10
1.4	Structure of the thesis	11
2	Euroscepticism: Theory and Concepts	13
2.1	Introduction	13
2.2	The origin of Euroscepticism	13
2.3	What is a Populist Eurosceptic political party?	14
2.4	Conclusion	19
3	Methodology: Analyzing Party’s Electoral Program	20
3.1	Qualitative Systematic Textual Data Analysis of the Electoral Programs.....	20
3.2	Competing methods to analyze party’s electoral program.....	24
3.3	Challenges related with the chosen methodology	25
3.4	Sources	26
4	Background of the Front National and the UK Independence Party	28
4.1	Introduction	28
4.2	The Front National: “ <i>France for the French</i> ”	28
4.2.1	<i>The origin and evolution of the Front National</i>	28
4.2.2	<i>What does the FN stand for?</i>	32
4.2.3	<i>Which type of Euroscepticism for the FN?</i>	33
4.3	The UK Independence Party: “ <i>Love Britain? Vote UKIP</i> ”	34
4.3.1	<i>The origin and evolution of UKIP</i>	34
4.3.2	<i>What does UKIP stand for?</i>	36
4.3.3	<i>Which type of Euroscepticism for UKIP?</i>	37
4.4	Conclusion	38
5	Findings	39
5.1	EU salience	39
5.2	Nationalism	45
5.3	Immigration	50
6	Discussion: The FN and UKIP – a unified Eurosceptic narrative during the 2014 EP elections?	54
6.1	Similarities and patterns within the parties’ narrative	54
6.2	Diverging ideas within the parties’ narrative.....	57
7	Overall conclusion	63
	Bibliography	64

List of Figures

Figure 2.1 Flood and Usherwood's typology of Party-based Euroscepticism	18
Figure 3.2 Categorization of the coded data.....	21
Figure 3.3 Coding categories.....	21
Figure 4.1 European Parliament Results of the FN from 1984 to 2009. Source: European Parliament.....	29
Figure 4.2 Regional Elections from 1986 to 2010 - Results FN in percentage. Source: Ministère de l'Intérieur.....	30
Figure 4.3 Legislative Elections from 1997 to 2012 - Results of the FN in percentage . Source: Constitutional Council	32
Figure 4.4 Presidential elections from 1995 to 2012 - Results of the FN in percentage. Source: Constitutional Council	32
Figure 4.5 European Parliament Results of UKIP from 1999 to 2009. Source: European Parliament.....	35
Figure 4.6 General Elections UK results of UKIP from 1997 to 2010 in percentage and seats won. Source: UK Parliament.....	36
Figure 5.1 Word cloud in the category "EU salience".....	39
Figure 5.2 Average coverage EU Saliency.	40
Figure 5.3 Average coverage "EU seen as a disadvantage"	41
Figure 5.4 Word cloud in the category nationalism.....	45
Figure 5.5 Average coverage nationalism.	47
Figure 5.6 Word cloud in the category immigration	50
Figure 5.7 Average coverage immigration.....	51

List of Tables

Table 2.1 Six indicators of Party-based Euroscepticism.....	16
Table 2.2 Categorization of Euroscepticism by Kopecký and Mudde.....	17
Table 3.1 Categories and subcategories of the coding	23
Table 4.1 The FN's categorization of Euroscepticism.....	33
Table 4.2 UKIP's categorization of Euroscepticism.....	37
Table 5.1 EU salience coverage index in percentage.....	39
Table 5.2 Word count in the category "EU salience"	40
Table 5.3 Nationalism coverage index in percentage.	45
Table 5.4 Word count in the category nationalism.....	45
Table 5.5 Immigration coverage index in percentage.	50
Table 5.6 Word count in the category immigration.....	50

List of Abbreviations

AFL	Anti-Federalist League
CMP	Comparative Manifesto Project
EP	European Parliament
EU	European Union
FN	Front National
FPTP	First-Past-the-Post
PRR	Populist Radical-Right
QCA	Qualitative Content Analysis
UK	United Kingdom
UKIP	United Kingdom Independence Party
US	The United States

1 Introduction

On the 25th of May 2014, the European Parliament (EP) elections results were out. Both in France and in the United Kingdom (UK), political parties of the radical-right came out on top, the Front National (FN) and the UK Independence Party (UKIP). Startling news for most mainstream political parties in France and in the United Kingdom, these elections marked a strong turning point for the European Union (EU) political landscape. In both France and the UK, the Eurosceptic parties had gained considerable ground. In France, the FN received 24.86 per cent of the votes, as compared to 6.34 per cent in the 2009 elections. In the UK, UKIP obtained 26.77 per cent, as compared to 16.5 per cent in 2009 (European Parliament, 2014). This event pushed non-mainstream parties onto the center of attention and leading mainstream parties were put in the corner. These results were the FN's best score in its history and never before under the Fifth Republic of France, had a radical right party won so many votes (Goodliffe, 2015).

When referring to the 2014 EP elections, "Euroscepticism" was the most used term. Calculating feelings and popularity towards the EU in general is very complex. Euroscepticism is a term employed since the eighties and is described as "*encompassing a range of critical positions on European integration, as well as outright opposition.*" (Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2004). It was broadly defined, conceptualized, and refined throughout decades to justify or to provide a greater understanding of the strong opposition to the EU project whether among political parties or citizens. Today, the literature on Euroscepticism is abundant. Nonetheless, it remains a widely contested concept. Theories and definitions of Euroscepticism are often being criticized by scholars for being either too inclusive, too broad, or over-specific.

This thesis will present how one type of Euroscepticism can in fact display multiple narratives. The study will be based on the FN and UKIP's electoral manifesto for the 2014 European Parliament elections. Both the FN and UKIP are political parties classified among the strongest Eurosceptic parties in each of their respective country. Albeit can one type of Euroscepticism be in fact more complex and present strong differences in focus? Even if categorized as strong Eurosceptic, were they displaying similarities or at the contrary, is there a possible differentiation in their Eurosceptic claims? Can the same type of Euroscepticism display numerous and even significantly dissimilar nuances?

1.1 Research Question and outline of the thesis

This thesis seeks to investigate a more complex vision of strong Euroscepticism and if Eurosceptic arguments within the electoral program of the FN and of UKIP during the 2014 EP election campaign, were unified or not. In order to deeper analyze the variations of the Eurosceptic claims made by both parties, their focus, and their scope, I formulated the following research question:

Did the FN and UKIP express different nuances of Euroscepticism in their electoral programs for the 2014 European elections?

In tackling the research question, this thesis provides an empirical and methodological contribution to the political and social field. According to the knowledge of the author, this study is the first to analyze, through a qualitative content analysis and a comparative method, the different nuances of Euroscepticism within two radical-right parties during the 2014 EP elections. Analyzing further variations of one type of Euroscepticism within political parties, can enable a better comprehension and insights into the parties' focus and identify varieties in strong Eurosceptic claims. Further possible contributions of this thesis are expressed in the next subsection of this chapter.

This study does not have for purpose to find if one party's position is Eurosceptic or not in comparison to the other one, but rather to identify a different version of Euroscepticism within two strong Eurosceptic parties through their Eurosceptic claims in the electoral manifestos. By comparing the data from both documents and by performing a qualitative analysis, this thesis aims to find subtle differences in the way the FN and UKIP expressed their position towards the EU during the 2014 EP elections

This thesis argues that strong Euroscepticism is more intricate and that both parties are significantly and fundamentally different in their Eurosceptic arguments. It supposes that, while both the FN and UKIP, are categorized as strong Eurosceptic parties, they display diverging focus and objective in their Eurosceptic claims. The FN and UKIP are labelled in each academic research, as *hard* or *rejectionist* Eurosceptic parties. Now, most academics rely on well-known typologies, which aim to differentiate a general Euroscepticism into more categories encompassing different level or strength of opposition to the EU. Evidently, each strong Eurosceptic party does not present similar anti-EU arguments and that is what this study seeks to explore.

1.2 Justification of the topic

While recent EP elections of 2019 have also revealed a strong win of the Rassemblement National in France and the Brexit Party in the UK, leading the UK to officially leave the EU. I believe that, for this study, the 2014 EP elections are a more relevant focal point, as they marked a sudden change within the electorates' previous attitudes. Investigating variances of Eurosceptic claims which are all from one category¹, during a very unusual election² and demonstrate that it can indeed display considerable nuances can be relevant for further studies in the political or social field.

¹ Here this study explores the strongest Eurosceptic category. Typologies of Euroscepticism are introduced in chapter two.

² The 2014 European Elections were portrayed by the media as the "*Eurosceptic Earthquake*" (Price, 2014).

This master's thesis can be seen as an opportunity for academics to study the outcome of the 2014 EP elections in France and in the UK and examine policies or elements with future results, one has exited the EU and one still remains an EU member. This study can as well be applied to understand and apprehend new Eurosceptic trends in other countries. For example, Euroscepticism in Poland, Hungary, or Finland rose considerably the past decade (Torreblanca and Leonard, 2013; Csehi and Zgut, 2021), using this study to see what both parties focused on and how it developed post-elections in the voters' preferences can be compared and translated in other countries' development of *strong* Euroscepticism in their politics.

Moreover, there are three reasons behind the choice to center my attention on two countries, France and the UK for this thesis.

First, the UK's relationship with the EU has been quite tumultuous for several decades now. Categorized as the epicenter of Euroscepticism (Parker, 2014), the UK has experienced unstable and drastic changes in public opinions and political parties' attitude since the restructuration of the country from an imperialist state to an EU Member State in 1973. However, even if the UK displayed strong Euroscepticism for decades, Eurosceptic radical parties never reached that much power before the 2014 EP elections. *Second*, France's position as one of the main founders of the EU makes its strong level of Euroscepticism (Cautres et al., 2020) very interesting to study. As it was for the UK, French Eurosceptic political parties never won that many vote shares before the 2014 EP elections. Euroscepticism among French society is not systematic and appear to be very complex (Cautres et al., 2020). The Front National has been since 1984 the leading Populist Radical-Right party³ (PRR) in France (Ivaldi, 2016), since its restructuration in communication strategies from 2011 with the arrival of Marine Le Pen at the head of the party (Crepon et al., 2016).

Third, both countries are close geographically and have a strong common history. One might say that France and the UK (or more specifically England) are two very distinct countries, mostly politically and structurally, the UK being a Parliamentary constitutional monarchy and France a semi-presidential Republic. However, the UK and France have been historically very closely connected which makes their culture interrelated. Therefore, understanding what role had Euroscepticism in an event that impacted both countries would be of interest. I must as well, add that I have chosen these two countries as I am fluent in both French and English languages, thus, making it better to find, collect and understand relevant data and literature on the topic.

Furthermore, this thesis focused on two major radical-right political parties, the FN and UKIP. They both display similarities and differences from an ideological perspective. These two parties are fascinating as they both represent in their respective country, very successful parties in the far-right political wing. Rydgren (2018) describes the FN as the most successful party of its genre. Both used an anti-establishment strategy during their campaign "us against them" by aiming the working class. Traditional and mainstream parties are often being criticized and portrayed as untrustworthy and benefiting solely banks and the wealthier. Both parties also present similar positions towards the EU and the immigration policy. Immigration has been, for both, the FN and UKIP, one of the main issue France and the UK are facing. Anti-

³ As defined by Cas Mudde (2007), a Populist Radical-Right party has at his core, a nativist, populist, authoritarian ideology.

immigration and Islamophobic discourses have been part of both parties' discourse. Moreover, the two political parties shared a common vision and sentiment towards preventing further EU enlargement, and most notably, with the possible introduction of Turkey as a new EU member. They both present a strong opposing stance on the EU and both support the exit of their respective country's membership from the institution.

However, while Marine Le Pen often attempted to create an alliance in the EP with UKIP's members, Nigel Farage made it clear that a formal alliance with the FN would tarnish UKIP's reputation. He, nonetheless, praised Le Pen's successes and pragmatic leadership. In 2014, prior to the EP elections, Farage has called the FN "*anti-Semitic*" and a "*general prejudice*", but he expected the two parties to be on the same side of the Eurosceptic battle during the EP elections (Mason and Wintour, 2014). For Farage, the FN do not own the same values as UKIP has, whereas, for him, the FN displays more of an extremist vision and UKIP is more of a populist party. Moreover, the two parties reveal significant variation in their economic strategies that we will further see in chapter five and chapter six.

1.3 Previous research on the topic

Previous research supports my choice of following a Qualitative Content Analysis and to make a comparison of the FN and UKIP's electoral manifestos. Literature on Euroscepticism is not scarce, at the contrary, it is rather abundant. A majority of the literature focuses primarily on three topics: (a) the connection between Euroscepticism and party competition (Marks et al., 2006), (b) Euroscepticism and the social context (Ivaldi, 2014; Vasilopoulou, 2018) and (c) the salience of EU issues within parties' national campaigns (Kriesi, 2007). Regarding the 2014 EP elections, the main focus of most research lies in the "*Eurosceptic vote*", that was for many, an unusual turn that needed reasoning and explanation. However, I found limited number of studies focusing on both France and the UK 2014 EP elections and more specifically on the FN and UKIP. In general, the literature that I came across is giving an overall picture of the events in multiple EU Member States (FitzGibbon, 2014; Hobolt, 2015; Hobolt and de Vries, 2016; Schmidt, 2018). Furthermore, the research focuses mainly on the voters' attitude during the elections (Vasilopoulou, 2017b; Franklin, 2017) or on the how the EU's reaction to the financial crisis impacted voters' support to Eurosceptic parties during these elections (Hobolt and de Vries, 2016; Hobolt and Tilley, 2016; Nicoli, 2017; Bobba and Seddone, 2018). Therefore, I have yet to find literature focusing on a comparative content analysis of the nature of Euroscepticism within two strong Eurosceptic political parties.

FitzGibbon (2014) delves into the nature of Euroscepticism through a case study of France, the UK, Greece, Poland, Spain and Ireland. The author examines each country's history and social background to explain a different version of Euroscepticism during the 2014 EP elections throughout Europe. FitzGibbon finds that the overall narrative of winning Eurosceptic parties is in fact very different and presents a diverse form of opposition to the EU. He argues that these varieties of Euroscepticism emerge from the country's political priorities and current situation. The eurozone crisis and media coverage are brought to the fore to investigate a possible connection with the success of Populist Eurosceptic parties. The research does not focus on specific political parties but rather on each country as a whole and on what triggered Euroscepticism and shaped political priorities on a national level. This allows for a better understanding of

the social background that drove Eurosceptic parties to win the EP elections and the public opinion that led to the results.

Furthermore, Oliver Treib in his article "*The voter says no, but nobody listens: causes and consequences of the Eurosceptic vote in the 2014 European elections*" (2014), focuses on the drivers of the increase of support for Eurosceptic parties during the 2014 EP elections and what consequences this elections will have in the near future. This research argues, with an analysis of opinion-poll data and the elections' results, that the Eurosceptic vote of these elections is more complex and has a deeper meaning than just a vote against the government. Oliver Treib finds that there is a profound and growing dislike of European policies, institutions, and mainstream parties which will only become more evident as the years pass. This article focuses primarily on the voters' discontent and how they chose to support to Eurosceptic parties rather than on the party-based Euroscepticism.

Another research that emphasizes the strong heterogeneity within the Eurosceptic narrative of the 2014 EP elections is the one of Gilles Ivaldi (2014). Ivaldi evaluates major PRR parties in Europe that won a majority of seats within the European Parliament in 2014 and examines their impact on the European project. Ivaldi's research offers an overview or a summary of PRR parties in Europe and how these parties can represent a danger for the future of the EU. As for the research from FitzGibbon, Ivaldi does not investigate in depth parties' electoral program but focuses on rather an overall picture of the elections in several EU Member States. Thus, this research focuses primarily on the relation between the increase in popularity of Eurosceptic parties during the 2014 EP elections and how this could potentially impact the EU.

The purpose of this thesis is to fill the gap in the literature by utilizing a comparative qualitative content analysis of the nature of Euroscepticism in the narrative of the FN and UKIP during the 2014 EP elections.

1.4 Structure of the thesis

This thesis is organized into seven chapters. The second chapter introduces the reader to the existing literature on Euroscepticism as well as to how to identify a political party as Eurosceptic. This chapter provides basic knowledge about the emergence of the Eurosceptic trend, as well as of well-known typologies which help to define Euroscepticism within a party's position. The third chapter presents the chosen methodology and discusses about other competing methodologies. Chapter four focuses more on the two political parties, the FN and UKIP. It presents the bases of the two political parties, their historical development, ideologies, and what type of Euroscepticism they are defined as. This chapter is introductory to the analysis and is important to the discussion on the findings. It is utilized, in combination with chapter two, to substantiate Eurosceptic claims found in the manifestos. From chapter five starts the analysis. Chapter five presents the findings which demonstrate how both parties share different vision and focus of what would be categorized as *strong* Euroscepticism (e.g., one major indicator of Euroscepticism, which is presented in chapter two, is national identity. This indicator is perceived very differently in both parties' electoral manifesto, whereas the FN focuses more on monetary security and UKIP on competitiveness of national industries). This section is employing a word count analysis which supports the estimation of the parties' position in their electoral manifestos. It is followed by

chapter six which provides a more in-depth discussion on the findings and connects chapters two, four and five through a qualitative analysis in order to answer the research question. This analysis will bring together relevant literature on Euroscepticism and the findings by assessing it comparatively with both parties and seek to find congruency or at the contrary, diverging results. Finally, the conclusion will be drawn in chapter seven and will sum up main findings of the thesis with recommendations for further studies.

Part 1: Theory and Conceptualization

2 Euroscepticism: Theory and Concepts

2.1 Introduction

This chapter offers a conceptual and theoretical introduction to Euroscepticism and the basis on which the subsequent analysis will rest. As found in the existing literature, political parties are often studied through their policy preferences in order to place them on a left-right political spectrum. I discuss what are the drivers for Euroscepticism and what distinguishes a political party from being Eurosceptic or not. Furthermore, as both the FN and UKIP present a populist approach, which often coincide and correlates with strong Eurosceptic arguments, I provide a brief presentation of what is a populist radical-right party. This chapter is utilized further in the discussion to corroborate variations in Eurosceptic arguments for both parties.

2.2 The origin of Euroscepticism

The word Euroscepticism has floated around since the eighties. On 11 November 1985, *The Times*, a British newspaper, used the term *Euroscepticism* to describe strong opposition to European integration (Ultan and Ornek, 2015). The term became widely borrowed in the nineties. Most importantly, in the issue of 26th of December 1995, *The Economist* mentioned Euroscepticism while commenting on the change in public opinion toward European integration in Germany after the country had been requested to change its purity rules on beer to comply with internal market regulations. The term was further on used by journalists and politicians to name individuals in the EP that were reluctant or skeptical about European integration (Harmsen and Spiering, 2004).

A survey from 1973 on eight EU members, conducted by Eichenberg and Dalton, reveals that the basis of public view was dramatically changing regarding the EU. For the next twenty years, researchers linked Euroscepticism to poor economic results. However, the two authors highlighted in 1993 that, additionally to poor economic results, the expansion of the EU in certain policies is a significant driver for Euroscepticism (Eichenberg and Dalton, 1993).

Furthermore, the following arguments will be beneficial for me to confirm whether a party's electoral manifesto has or does not have Eurosceptic criteria. Understanding how Euroscepticism appeared and what are its drivers is relevant to further analyze the political parties' electoral manifesto during European elections.

The first argument is that the origin of Euroscepticism is to be found in the radical parts of the Left-Right political spectrum and most specifically, in right-wing parties (Leonard Ray, 1999). Ray confirms through an expert survey that political parties are orientating differently towards European integration. He discovered that political parties exhibit different level of Euroscepticism and that the latter is not only bound to the

opposition of the European integration. Euroscepticism is rather a broader concept that encompasses multiple factors. The results of the conducted survey illustrated that Euroscepticism mostly appears within extreme ideologies. Extreme left parties perceive the concept of European integration as a capitalist project. For extreme right parties, European integration is seen as a threat to national sovereignty. Moreover, the author emphasizes that Eurosceptic sentiments are directly linked to national interests and identity.

Another argument from Hooghe and Marks (2007) confirms the above findings of Leonard Ray. In right-wing political parties, the EU is seen as a threat to national identity and that common policies will undermine national sovereignty. While in the left-wing, political parties link the EU project with capitalism and thus, perceive it as endangering social protection. The authors stress that this trend emerges not directly from citizens' sentiment of distrust in Europe but rather as a result of how political actors, media and entrepreneurs, generate and increase the general public's feelings of identity threat, dependence and economic harm.

Additionally, McLaren (2002) identifies three main drivers for Euroscepticism: strong national identities (sociotropic factors⁴), economic losers from European integration and citizens demonstrating distrust towards EU institutions. McLaren does not confirm any correlation between these three drivers. She posits that cultural threat and economic loss are two distinct factors motivating Euroscepticism and that sociotropic factors have more impact on Euroscepticism when compared with egocentric factors.

However, Abts, Heerwegh and Swyngedouw (2009) contradict McLaren's findings. Through an empirical study, which focused on the Belgian case, the study rejected the theory of objective and subjective losers of European integration. Neither economic loss nor collective gain from becoming an EU member affect the level of Euroscepticism in the population. According to the authors, what influences citizens' feeling towards the EU is the personal gain or loss from EU membership. Moreover, the study confirms the identity theory, where the feeling of attachment to cultural communities and national identity has an impact on the level of Euroscepticism. Their study of the Belgian case suggested that, by simply better presenting the benefits that citizens would gain from being an EU Member State, utilitarian Euroscepticism would disappear. There is thus, reason to claim that egocentric factors have a stronger impact on Euroscepticism rather than sociotropic factors.

2.3 What is a Populist Eurosceptic political party?

In this sub-section I examine the factors that characterize a political party from being Populist Eurosceptic. In order to do so, I present the characteristics of a populist party and how is it concomitant to Euroscepticism. This will be needed in the discussion to comprehend the reasons behind each party's focus on certain issues. Furthermore, I present six main indicators of Euroscepticism to identify Eurosceptic claims within a political discourse. Finally, I introduce four party-based Euroscepticism typologies from well-known contributors to the literature on Euroscepticism. Through these typologies, I will be able to demonstrate in chapter four that the FN and UKIP are, as expected to be, strong Eurosceptic parties.

⁴ In the political context, sociotropy refers to how people identify themselves politically, what are their political identities, it studies the societal approach to political identification (Steenvoorden and Wright, 2019).

Populism is a very contested concept in the literature. Some academics perceive it as a tool used by political parties to gain more voting shares during elections (Mondon, 2015) and some believe that it is a flexible ideology which can be combined with other values of the party (Engesser et al., 2017). Whether it is considered as an ideology or a strategy, populism is often put hand in hand with Euroscepticism. One known feature to populist parties is to promote the idea of two distinctive camps: the people and the elite (Albertazzi and McDonnell, 2008, p.3 ; Mudde, 2004, 2007). The first one being perceived as homogeneous, "ordinary" and victim of the latter which is portrayed as corrupted and acting against the interest of the people.

"An ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, 'the pure people' versus 'the corrupt elite', and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people." (Cas Mudde, 2004, p.543)

Moreover, populist political parties in Europe display strong opposition to the EU, whether it is regarding immigration or economic issues (Gómez-Reino Cachafeiro and Plaza-Colodro, 2018; Szczerbiak and Taggart, 2003). They as well strongly politicize EU issues in order to influence public opinion regarding the elite. In this case, elite failure is highly emphasized (Pirro and Taggart, 2018; Reungoat, 2015).

Previous academic research establishes six major indicators of Euroscepticism research (Blassnig et al., 2019; Hooghe and Marks, 2004, 2005; Treib, 2020a; Treib, 2020b). These indicators (table 2.1) will be used in the methodology to examine the two electoral manifestos from the FN and UKIP: (1) National identity and regaining national sovereignty, (2) Anti-elitism and anti-establishment, (3) People-centrism, (4) Anti-immigration, (5) future enlargement of the EU and (6) Lack of democracy in the EU. Treib (2020a) define a Eurosceptic political party as a party that criticizes the current situation or environment at the EU level and that supports nation-state sovereignty over the European integration.

Table 2.1 Six indicators of Party-based Euroscepticism

National identity and regaining sovereignty	Anti-elitism and Anti-establishment sentiments	People-Centrism
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Offers priority to national citizens that shares the same values, culture and history. • Promotes national identity rather than European identity. • Supports the popular sovereignty instead of elite sovereignty. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Promotes anti-establishment messages. • Emphasizes on the betray of the elite towards the people. • Presents the elite as not acting for the interest of the citizens. • Rejects the political class in its entirety. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Creates an idea of “we” or “our”. • Exhibits proximity to the people. • Believes in acting as a “defender” of the people against the elite/ mainstream parties’ actions. • Believes in acting solely for the nation’s people.
Anti-Immigration	Future enlargement of the EU	Democracy in the EU
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Is hostile towards non-nationals • Immigration is perceived as a danger to society and a rise in poverty and crime. • Does not support the European Integration • Promotes closed and more controlled borders. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Opposes to the expansion of the EU (principally referring to Turkey and Albania). • Enlargement is seen as a threat to public services and to the national security. • Is against admitting new EU Member States in the EU as it compromises the well-being of their country (e.g., transfer of labor where the cost is lower). • Against the inclusion of countries with drastically different culture and habits. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Believes that there is a lack of democracy within the EU institutions and elections. • Brussels is usually perceived as a centralized decision-making center. • Representative institutions are perceived as a barrier to “pure democracy”.

Additionally, it is important to mention the typology of Taggart and Szczerbiak which is, arguably, the most influential contribution to the research on party-based Euroscepticism. The authors categorize party-based Euroscepticism into two distinct types: *Hard* Euroscepticism and *Soft* Euroscepticism. *Hard* Euroscepticism refers to a strong refusal of the political and economic aspect of the EU. In the *Hard* Eurosceptic approach, the EU is represented or perceived as a threat against core values. *Soft* Euroscepticism on the other hand, reflects an opposition to particular aspects of European integration but not to its core. Simple reforms that would benefit the country

in question and its citizens can be enough for the country to be positive and promotive of the European Union (Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2002).

As Taggart and Szczerbiak claim in *Theorizing party-based Euroscepticism: Problems of definition, measurement, and causality* (2003), the *Hard-Soft* model allows other researchers and scholars to better define the concept of Euroscepticism to further contribute on a larger scale in the study of political parties. The authors determine that Eurosceptic trends within parties' position and attitudes towards European integration are caused by *ideological-pragmatic* and *strategic-tactical* factors, respectively. Additionally, they offer three causes for political parties to utilize European issues in their electoral agenda (a) the parties' strategy, (b) coalition-formation and (c) the participation in governments. Finally, in *Opposing Europe?* (2008), they argue that vote-share might provide an indication of Eurosceptic parties within a party system. Nevertheless, vote-share does not allow, when aggregated, to quantify at the mass level, the significance of Euroscepticism in party-based Euroscepticism in a specific country or to utilize it as a comparison tool.

Another important contribution is the model of Petr Kopecký and Cas Mudde (2002). Even though the *Hard-Soft* model of Taggart and Szczerbiak is widely accepted among academics, Kopecký and Mudde criticized this categorization. The authors claim that it lacks clarity when it comes to the criteria that are utilized to separate or correlate the two types. This aspect limits the understanding of different types of Euroscepticism. In their two-dimensional model influenced by Taggart and Szczerbiak, two main terms appear: *Europhobe* and *Europhile*. Those terms refer to the European integration. *Europhobe* would be the equivalent of *hard* Euroscepticism and *Europhile* of *soft* Euroscepticism. Kopecký and Mudde argue that there are two major variables in defining the attitude of political parties. The first one is the fundamental support for the European integration as organized in the EU or the disapproval of the latter. The second one is the comportment towards further evolution of EU capabilities. Through their critique of the *Hard-Soft* model of Taggart and Szczerbiak, Kopecký and Mudde established a categorization of four types of political parties' position in Europe (Table 2.2).

Table 2.2 Categorization of Euroscepticism by Kopecký and Mudde

	EU-Optimist	EU-Pessimist
Europhile	<i>Euro-Enthusiast</i>	<i>Eurosceptics</i>
Europhobe	<i>Europragmatists</i>	<i>Eurorejects</i>

Furthermore, Flood (2002) and Flood and Usherwood (2005) define Euroscepticism as several points of continuum of *rejectionist*, *revisionist*, *minimalist*, *gradualist*, *reformist* and *maximalist* (Figure1). *Rejectionists* demonstrate a clear opposition to European integration and EU membership; *Revisionists* believe that the EU should have stayed in the early stages of European integration; *Minimalists* are comfortable with the current situation but are opposing to any further expansion of the European integration; *Gradualists* support slow expansion on the European integration; *Reformists* are accepting the general aspect of European integration with some concerns and discontent regarding the EU framework; And finally the *maximalists* are entirely supporting for the European integration in general with its framework and policies. *Gradualists*, *reformists* and *maximalists* are not considered Eurosceptic.

Flood and Usherwood's six points of continuum (Figure 2.1) can solely relate to the EU's structure and project or policy areas and is focused on understanding parties' position shift over time. Flood further on published a critical analysis of the *Hard-Soft* model from Taggart and Szczerbiak claiming that a binary metaphorical division of *hard* and *soft* distinction, is unprecise and unclear (Flood, 2009).




Figure 2.1 Flood and Usherwood's typology of Party-based Euroscepticism

Finally, the patterns of opposition to European integration of Sofia Vasilopoulou (2010; 2018) illustrate a conceptualization of party opposition to European integration. The opposition is divided into three categories (a) *rejectionist*, (b) *conditional* and (c) *compromising*.

Rejectionist Eurosceptics support the idea of a common culture and history within Europe (mostly the *old* Europe). However, they are in direct opposition regarding European integration, the enlargement of the EU polity and the cooperation of European countries within the EU framework. Cooperation and policies must be created and serve first and foremost the country in question. This type of Euroscepticism is against the supranational aspect of the EU and often present a pro-national discourse.

Conditional Eurosceptics recognize the common cultural and historical heritage of Europe and are in favor of countries' cooperation through the EU framework. Nonetheless, they display a certain distrust towards the future of EU's policy extension. *Conditional* Eurosceptics believe that national sovereignty is threatened by the supranational aspect of the EU's institutions. In overall, they accept EU integration, but only if reforms are implemented to ensure national interests.

Compromising Eurosceptics acknowledge the common culture and history within Europe, as well as the principle of the EU but are in opposition to some aspects of the future of the European polity. They manifest some mistrust regarding the European integration, however, admit that this integration can be beneficial to some extent to the state. A supranational entity is unappealing and securing nation state sovereignty is important. Nevertheless, a degree of this integration is necessary for the wellbeing of the economy of the state. Through EU's institutions, the state can promote and lobby for its own interests.

2.4 Conclusion

To summarize this chapter, Euroscepticism is a controversial area where scholars argue diverse theories and typologies. In the literature, I found different stance of the origin and drivers of Euroscepticism. Most academics appear to concur that Euroscepticism can be found in the extreme parts of the left-side political spectrum and that egocentric and sociotropic factors are the main drivers of Euroscepticism.

Academics express various typologies to discern different types of party-based Euroscepticism. What was found in the literature review is complementary to the methodology in this thesis. Having broader insights of the concept of Euroscepticism, how does it relate to populism and how to characterize a political party as Eurosceptic enable me to quantitatively and qualitatively analyze the FN and UKIP's electoral text. Most notably, by allowing me to distinguish Eurosceptic claims and therefore, to properly code each argument⁵ in the text, and to explore and discuss what are the reasons behind the choice of focus of each party, why are the parties sharing certain focus similar or some different.

Nonetheless, the existing literature does not address more in depth the nuances of each type of Euroscepticism. This reveals a blank within the literature which allows this study to be relevant to fill this gap.

⁵ See chapter three for more explanation on the methodology used in this study.

Part 2: Methodology and Sources

3 Methodology: Analyzing Party's Electoral Program

This chapter explains how I did proceed in order to answer the research question introduced in chapter one. The presentation is followed by a discussion on competing methodologies to provide a reasoned explanation for the chosen methodology and on identifying possible dilemmas as well as possible solutions to them. The chapter's final part presents the source material and clarifies how this material has been utilized.

3.1 Qualitative Systematic Textual Data Analysis of the Electoral Programs

To answer best the research question, I employed a Qualitative Content Analysis (QCA). Qualitative systematic textual data analysis, known as Qualitative Content Analysis or Thematic analysis, is a commonly and well-recognized qualitative method. This approach is also a well-known and reliable method to explore various topics in parties' programs (e.g., Collier and Collier, 1991; Kitschelt et al., 1999; Mainwaring and Scully, 1995). Using a qualitative method enables the creation of assumptions as well as confirming hypotheses (Mahoney, 2007). Analyzing the FN and UKIP electoral programs through this methodology allowed me to identify patterns in the text and an in-depth understanding and comparison of the two parties' Eurosceptic claims.

A QCA is performed through the creation of categories and of a category system. Kuckartz (2019) distinguishes seven types of categorization: factual; thematic; evolutive; analytical; theoretical; natural; and formal. Moreover, the author describes five phases of the QCA: reading the data, creating the coding scheme, coding the data, analyzing the coded data, and presenting the results. Additionally, the QCA can be performed in a deductive or inductive manner. In the deductive way categories and coding is set a priori according to existing literature. While in the inductive way, categories and coding are created according to the data. Elo et al (2014) determine three main phases of the analysis (a) preparation, (b) organization, (c) results.

The QCA in this thesis focused on a thematic categorization. Patterns found in the text was quantified in an unbiased, systematic and repeatable form. The text was reduced into smaller parts and then coded in order to distinguish patterns and frequency of words. After the text has been coded, I proceeded to a qualitative analysis of the data in order to establish the meaning and the purpose of the manipulated and categorized data. Interpreting the text with thematic analysis frequencies by quantifying words in the text, allows this study to describe the party's interest or the focus in its Eurosceptic claims. Moreover, this interpretation of the text permitted the analysis of relationships of words and making connections between the word frequency and the party's objectives.

Laver and Garry (2000) describe three stages of the codification: creating a coding scheme, then defining the type of text that needs to be coded and finally, coding

the text. Furthermore, categorizing the coded data helps to better examine the findings. A common categorization of the coded data is to sort it in three ways: Unipolar, bipolar and tripolar (Zúñiga and Jenkins, 2018) (Figure 3.1).





Figure 3.1 Categorization of the coded data

This thesis focused on this type of categorization to retrieve information regarding the FN and UKIP’s emphasis on an issue by studying the frequency of a word and the FN and UKIP’s position on this specific issue or category. The coding scheme can be hierarchical or equally-based. Here, all categories and sub-categories were equally structured (Figure 3.2). This coding provides richer information about the parties’ position on the EU and thus, their Eurosceptic side and focused solely on the Eurosceptic claims found in the electoral programs.

Furthermore, A computer-coding will be used for this study. Manual-coding can lack in validity, reliability and that the interpretation of the data can be biased according to the researcher’s own culture, where one word can have different meanings (Bräuninger et al., 2013). The coding was done deductively. The scope of the parties’ position and categories of the coded data were set *a priori* and were based on the theoretical part of this thesis (Laver et al., 2003; Zúñiga and Jenkins, 2018). The coding was structured under specific thematic of categories and sub-categories:



(a) Nationalism (EU as a threat to national interests and power), (b) Immigration (with EU borders and migration) and (c) EU saliency (claims regarding EU competencies, democracy and policies) (Figure 3.2) (see more in table 3.1).

Figure 3.2 Coding categories

This QCA was conducted by the use of the software NVivo. (NVivo helped this analysis by collecting, organizing, and structuring data.) This software facilitated the systematization of the qualitative research which in turn made this research more relevant and accurate. The coding of the data was performed through NVivo. While the main themes of categories were created from the literature review, sub-sections were discovered in NVivo. Such as *EU trade – economy* or *Priorities to Nationals* (see Figure 3.2).

Subcategories are described below in Table 3.1. Each argument, or EU claims are represented with a code. These categories were based on the six main indicators of Euroscepticism present in the literature review (Treib, 2020b). These indicators were used to categorize and segmentize both documents. Each sentence or paragraph of the party's document was placed in one of the main categories (Nationalism; Immigration; EU salience), the sub-categories were established according to what the party was referring to. For example, within *EU Salience*, the FN often refers to the monetary issues related to the euro, thus the sub-category *Euro-currency* was created. Same for UKIP, whereas the party focuses primarily on regaining national sovereignty, the interests of the UK in trade and British businesses must prevail above others. These categories allowed a comparison of both parties' Eurosceptic claims in their manifestos. Table 3.1 describes what kind of text that was segmentized into each category.

Table 3.1 Categories and subcategories of the coding

Nationalism	Immigration	EU salience
<p><u>Regain National Sovereignty</u></p> <p>All statements found in the documents regarding the country and the importance of a national power over the EU.</p>	<p><u>Security and Immigration</u></p> <p>Refers to statements that directly and implicitly link immigration with danger for the society. Here, immigration is regarded as a breach in security for nationals as well as an increase in illegal activities in the country.</p>	<p><u>Leaving the EU</u></p> <p>All statements regarding a clear exit of the country from the EU.</p>
<p><u>Priority made to nationals</u></p> <p>Claims made by the party concerning certain benefits that must endure first and foremost to nationals.</p>	<p><u>Misuse of National System</u></p> <p>Envelops any claims that immigrants wrongly use the healthcare system or any other public national services.</p>	<p><u>Lack of Democracy</u></p> <p>When the party describes any law or doing of the EU as undemocratic.</p> <p>The party emphasizes that the voice of the people is suppressed by the elite and the government.</p>
<p><u>Brussels as a supranational power</u></p> <p>Any declarations that Brussels is the center of EU's decision making and that the chance for the country to lobby their national interests is affected by EU's centralized decision-making.</p>	<p><u>Mass Immigration</u></p> <p>All statements regarding the bad effects of mass immigration in the country and how EU is causing it.</p>	<p><u>Euro – currency</u></p> <p>When the party refers to anything related with the euro currency. This subcategory only concerns the FN as UK does not use euro currency.</p>

<p><u>Anti-elite</u></p> <p>When the party criticizes mainstream political parties and government.</p>		<p><u>EU disadvantages</u></p> <div data-bbox="903 248 1382 434" style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px;"> <p><u>EU trade – economy:</u> Any statements that portrays the EU as disadvantageous regarding its effects on national economy.</p> </div> <div data-bbox="903 479 1382 622" style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px;"> <p><u>EU regulations:</u> Any statements that criticizes EU regulations and how it affects the country.</p> </div>
--	--	--

Finally, a comparative method was used. This comparison was based on the differences found in the retrieved and analyzed data. Using a comparative analysis for this research allowed me to find trends, patterns and analyze qualitative differences within UKIP and FN’s electoral program. This comparative analysis did not aim to establish whether one party’s position is Eurosceptic or not compared to the other one, but to identify different version of Euroscepticism within two Eurosceptic parties through their Eurosceptic claims. By comparing quantitative data and the qualitative analysis, this thesis aims to find subtle divergence in the way the FN and UKIP expressed their position towards the EU.

To summarize the methodology, first, themes of categories were drawn from the literature review in chapter two. Then with the aid of a coding software, words frequency and coverage in the text were categorized. This coding allowed me to perform the qualitative analysis in chapter five by analyzing and reviewing through each category, the parties’ electoral document. And finally, in chapter six, a discussion on the findings, and I attempted to answer the research question by finding if Eurosceptic claims present in both electoral documents are converging or diverging.

3.2 Competing methods to analyze party’s electoral program

In this section I will briefly name a few competing methods that could have been used to analyze the two parties’ electoral program and their Eurosceptic tendencies.

The first methodology that will be presented is the Discourse Analysis. This method is often used in political science research to explore the participant or text language repertoires and to investigate the relation between these repertoires and the social world (Wooffitt, 2005). The discourse analysis allows in-depth examination of the political party’s language to one or different social aspects. This methodology is not relevant for my study as I seek to compare two parties’ position on the EU and to distinguish subtle varieties of one genre of Euroscepticism. While displaying social relationships with the linguistic present in the electoral text can be worth exploring, this method does not entirely fit the purpose of the research question. This methodology focuses on finding hidden meanings in texts and connecting the language to social

contexts. With the Discourse Analysis, it would have been more interesting to examine, additionally to electoral documents, interviews with the leaders of both parties during the campaign. In our case, we are attempting to find differences in two electoral documents regarding Eurosceptic arguments.

Furthermore, Budge and Laver (1992) propose the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) method where categorization of policy dimensions allows to distinguish political parties from Left and Right with a scale analysis. This measuring of parties' position was performed by the sum of the numbers that were fixed to each dimension of the Left minus the dimensions of the Right. This methodology is used by several authors to find a party's position regarding the European Community and thus, distinguish parties' position on the political arena. This method does not correspond to this study as it is a quantitative method that requires a different focus. Additionally, the FN did not deliver a manifesto for the 2014 EP election but a document presenting their program. Therefore, this method would only have been relevant if both parties published euro manifestos for these elections.

The last methodology worth mentioning is a quantitative research method, or more specifically, a comparative quantitative method. Sofia Vasilopoulou (2017a), highlights that the most popular methodology used by scholars to study Euroscepticism is the quantitative method. By using this method, scholars perceive Euroscepticism as a dependent variable. Most research studying Euroscepticism are focusing more on a broader amount of data to discover patterns rather than on a deeper and narrowed down analysis with greater details. In this thesis, the objective is to conduct a deeper analysis of two electoral documents and thus a quantitative analysis would not be suited.

3.3 Challenges related with the chosen methodology

Firstly, the dilemmas of doing a cross-language qualitative analysis are numerous. As Nasri et al (2020) emphasize, differences found in languages can affect the meaning of the text and thus, can become a limitation to the qualitative research. A cross-language study can be performed by a monolingual or a bilingual researcher (Liamputtong, 2010). In the case of this thesis, the languages which were analyzed in this research are within my expertise area. Most notably, English for UKIP and French for the FN. Nasri et al highlight that it is necessary in a methodology to describe the researcher's level of language competency to provide trustworthiness and credibility to this study as no official translator will be used. Regarding English language, I have score 101 in a TOEFL exam, since then I have been doing this master's program in English. Moreover, French is my native language. I feel proficient in both languages, however, the lack of conceptual equivalence is a limitation to this study.

Secondly, using a Qualitative Content Analysis can come with methodological challenges. As Schreier (2012) argues, content analysis went through dramatic changes over the years from being exclusively a quantitative approach, it became more of an interpretative approach and thus, qualitative approach. This change generated new limits to content analysis, most notably by providing critical standards which justifies reliability and validity of the research (Krippendorff, 2004). This analysis relied principally on my interpretation of the text, and on my insights. One of the biggest challenge researchers

face while using a QCA is demonstrating trustworthiness. Trustworthiness has a significant place within a QCA. Credibility, dependability, conformability, transferability, and authenticity are all terms referring to trustworthiness. It must be present in all phases of the QCA, most notably, preparation, organization, and results. Trustworthiness enables all stages of the analysis to become clearer and more reliable (Elos et al., 2014). In the collection of data, it is necessary to have a strong validity and credibility. The manner of collecting the data as well as the type of data collected must be addressing the best way possible the focus of the research question (Polit and Beck, 2012; Elos et al., 2014). To enhance this thesis' trustworthiness, I collected the data and created a categorization based on previous research. Additionally, to improve the credibility of the findings, a persistent observation was done to find the most relevant issue to focus on. Concerning the dependability and the conformability of the study, I described in the most accurately possible way, each step taken in this research, from the beginning to the end.

3.4 Sources

The type of content researched to perform this analysis are electoral programs and political manifestos. This study used predominantly primary sources for the comparative analysis and secondary sources in the literature review.

The primary sources of this thesis are electoral documents for the EP elections of 2014. More precisely, it was based on UKIP's 2014 manifesto "*Create an Earthquake*" and on the FN's electoral program "*Oui à la France, Non à Bruxelles*". The FN's electoral manifesto documents the party's stance and offers arguments to why people should vote for Jean Marie Le Pen, leader of the FN at the time. UKIP's manifesto was available on manifesto.com which is archiving manifestos from different political parties in the UK. The FN's electoral manifesto was slightly more complicated to find, every link towards this document was a dead end. I therefore contacted the FN by email to ask them if they had any documents which present the electoral program for the 2014 EP elections. I also contacted the University of Mannheim which was in charge of the Euro manifestos Project Study where the FN was part of the study. However, I received no answer from either of them. After researching any printed campaign document, I finally found the FN's electoral manifesto for the *Européenne* in the FN's magazine *National* number 118 on Calaméo (a platform where magazines, online catalogs and documents are published). The hard-copy of the FN's manifesto was scanned using the ABBYY optical character recognition software. It is also important to mention that UKIP's manifesto is very brief and holds only 1266 words. While the FN's manifesto holds 2821 words.

Why to choose electoral manifestos? Political parties utilize manifestos to describe their political agenda during an election. They demonstrate which policies they will support and what and why they intend to change (Budge et al., 2001). Thus, election manifestos represent political parties' policy preferences. Moreover, parties define their political position towards one or multiple issues. Electoral programs are necessary data for this thesis' analysis. They provide this research with appropriate data source to explore the FN and UKIP's stance during the EP elections of 2014.

The secondary sources used in this thesis are books and academic articles to deliver theoretical knowledge of Euroscepticism and further on to offer an overall picture of the FN and UKIP. For the FN, I used speeches and electoral programs from previous

elections, as well as the party's statements were found on vie-publique, a political resource and database platform. Regarding UKIP, their vision and values are available on their website, statements and speeches from previous elections were retrieved from BBC or UKIP's website.

Part 3: Empirical Analysis and Comparative Content Analysis

4 Background of the Front National and the UK Independence Party

4.1 Introduction

This chapter explores (briefly) the history and development of the Front National and the UK Independence Party. It provides an overall understanding of the parties, their ideologies and their journey prior to the 2014 European Parliament elections. In order to best comprehend the nature of Euroscepticism present in the FN and UKIP's electoral program, it is necessary to have prior understanding and knowledge of both parties' ideologies and past events that influenced the party's decisions. Moreover, the knowledge gathered in this chapter can be utilized to substantiate the choice of Eurosceptic focus for each party in the discussion.

4.2 The Front National: "*France for the French*"

4.2.1 *The origin and evolution of the Front National*

The Front National is a French far-right political party created in 1972. Before its foundation, the far-right movement in France was very dispersed and unstructured. They did not have a political party that would represent them fully. In the seventies, two important political movements appeared in France, Jeune Nation and Ordre Nouveau. These movements were organizing calls for a new revolution in order to end liberal democracy through violence and strikes. The idea of establishing the FN came from Ordre Nouveau that considered this initiative as a leverage or tool from within the political arena (Shields, 2014b). The FN intended to become a "*new order*" through a political take-over based on popular support (Duprat, 1972). Academics often refer to the FN as an "*anti-system party*", a "*sartorian anti-system party*" (Shields, 2014b), an "*anti-system Eurosceptic party*" (Vercesi et al., 2017) or as an "*anti-political establishment party*" (Schedler, 1996). This anti-system party aspect was always evident, as the party's objective was to gain power and to put an end to the current political regime that was perceived as anti-national (Duprat, 1978). Hainsworth et al (2004) identify the 1984 EP elections as the party's "*breakthrough on the political stage*" with a total number of 10 seats won (Hainsworth et al., 2004; Ivaldi, 2018). The Front National emerged to be a legitimate opposition to the political elites and became the main party of the Radical-Right in the French political arena (Mudde, 2007; Ivaldi, 2018).

The FN discourse slowly evolved from its creation in 1972 and access to the EP in the eighties to prior to the 2014 EP elections. When the party originated, it was principally a pro-integrationist nationalist party. Since its accession to the EP in 1984, the FN's discourse became more clearly opposed to the EU (Reungoat, 2015). During the first European elections, European issues were not as salient as they are now (Morini, 2018). Support for the European Economic Community was important and France, being one of the founders of the community, revealed strong Euro-enthusiasm (Reungoat, 2012). According to Morini, the division over European issues in France emerged in 1992 when President François Mitterrand ratified the Maastricht Treaty. The ratification of the Maastricht Treaty created the opportunity for the FN to adopt a Eurosceptic discourse and to denounce the Treaty as being a gate for a federalist Europe and making Brussels a despotic center of Europe's decision-making. In 1999, EU issues represent 36 per cent of the FN's Euro manifestos. From 2002, the government grew very unpopular in France after the presidential elections and the election of Jacques Chirac. The 2005 referendum against the Constitutional Treaty created a long-term change in the French political culture, 55 per cent voted yes to the rejection (Morini, 2018). In the 2004 and the 2009 EP elections, there was a noticeable increase of anti-EU statements in the FN's agenda (47 per cent and 67 per cent) (Reungoat, 2012; 2015). These two elections date marked the FN's best performance in the regional elections, accessing the second round (Figure 4.2).




Figure 4.1 European Parliament Results of the FN from 1984 to 2009. Source: European Parliament.




Figure 4.2 Regional Elections from 1986 to 2010 - Results FN in percentage. Source: Ministère de l'Intérieur.

The FN put a greater emphasis on “*democratic recovery*” after the French President Nicolas Sarkozy signed the Lisbon Treaty in 2008 while the latter was rejected during a referendum in 2007. To the party, democracy is achieved through direct democracy such as popular referendums. The government is perceived as an elite that promotes submission of national laws to “*undemocratic European authorities*”, thus, destroying national interest (Quencez & Michelot, 2017).

One major event in the FN’s development was the replacement of Jean Marie Le Pen, with his daughter, Marine Le Pen, as the head of FN in 2011. Marine Le Pen imposed many strategical adjustments within the party. The radical stance of the party during Jean Marie Le Pen’s reign was softened and the discourse was transformed into a more populist approach. The discourse became more anti-liberal and protectionist to reach the working class (Quencez & Michelot, 2017; Stockemer & Mauro, 2016). Nonetheless, despite this softening, populist Eurosceptic thoughts and beliefs persisted, and most changes were made within the communication strategy (Crepon et al., 2015; Ivaldi, 2016; Ivaldi, 2018). The new strategy allowed the party to enter the selective group of mainstream “*democratic*” and “*republican*” parties (Mondon, 2014). At the heart of the FN’s new strategy, was to reach through power the presidency by converting the party into a governmental party and be less of a radical party. The values of radical identity affirmation were lightened and, in contrast to the party’s original strong opposition to the Fifth Republic, it now claims to be the only *real* defender of the Fifth Republic. As Shields (2014b) points out through Michels’ work (1915), the route and evolution of the FN display a transformation from “*a radical party on the outskirts*” to “*a conservative party on the inside*”. Marine Le Pen always denied the popular definition of the party as a “*right-wing populist movement*” and rather supported the party to be a “*patriotic movement*”, neither part of the right-wing nor the left-wing (Morini, 2018). Furthermore, a favorable environment emerged for Eurosceptic parties as the discontent feeling, and politicization of EU issues rose in France. Prior to the financial crisis in

France, which was as its worst in 2010, the FN gained 4.3 per cent of the voters in the elections of 2007. In 2011, they earned 13.6 per cent of the election (Funke et al., 2015).

Moreover, Marine Le Pen put a greater importance in utilizing the EP to access more voting shares on a national level. Reungoat (2015) emphasizes that Marine Le Pen plays a two-level game between the EU level and the national level. Since 1984, the FN strategically sought to increase its transnational collaboration through the EP in order to get recognition and respect in their domestic arena. Therefore, the work she achieves within the EP is then advertised on national level during electoral campaigns (e.g., Marine Le Pen EP speeches are used on the social media marketing strategy of the FN). Accessing leading position in a parliamentary group or creating partnership with other European parties is, since the eighties, one of the FN's main strategy within the EP.

During the 2012 presidential elections, the FN's electoral strategy was clearly based on populist components. It focused primarily on popular working classes' main concerns, low wages, low purchase power due to foreign competition and security from strong immigration. There was also a strong personification of the party's electoral program which portrayed Marine Le Pen, as the leader of the people. The strategy was almost entirely focusing on promoting the ideas of the party as Marine Le Pen's ideas and not as the FN's ideas. This was clear from the title of the program: "*Mon projet, pour la France et les français*"⁶. In doing so, the party attempted to divide and put a contrast between Jean-Marie Le Pen radical vision and the "new" populist vision of Marine Le Pen. This strategy of personification also made the program appear less political and more personal (Stockemer and Mauro, 2016). Le Pen advocated in her discourse for a recovery plan on the national French currency to boost French economy. Political and social French elites are often appearing on the Marine's discourse where their expensive lifestyle paid by the taxpayers – working class are highlighted and how this increased France's debt. She presented herself as an alternative to the current government and political system (Stockemer & Mauro, 2016; Front National, 2012). The results of the first elections under Marine Le Pen as president of the party resulted in the party's best score since 1997 during legislative elections with 13.6 per cent in the first round (Figure 4.3). Furthermore, on the first round of the 2012 presidential elections, the party achieved its best score with 17.9 per cent of votes (Figure 4.4). The FN managed to create a stable Eurosceptic platform where the party can utilize and politicize different issues to its own benefit (Crépon et al., 2015).

⁶ "*My project, for France and French people*"




Figure 4.3 Legislative Elections from 1997 to 2012 - Results of the FN in percentage . Source: Constitutional Council




Figure 4.4 Presidential elections from 1995 to 2012 - Results of the FN in percentage. Source: Constitutional Council

4.2.2 What does the FN stand for?

The FN's ideology remains at its core the same throughout the years, it primarily focuses on immigration issues, anti-establishment sentiments and the promotion of national interests and sovereignty (Benford and Snow, 2000). At the center of the party's discourse is the opposition to immigration and to foreigners. This opposition is often connected to social disadvantages such as high rates of unemployment or national

insecurity. This ethnocentric view is mostly supporting people with the same history, religion, identity and ethnicity (Hainsworth, 2008; Stockemer and Mauro, 2016). Nonetheless, even if the FN's values persisted, the party displays a strong ideological flexibility. Starting from supporting Europe and liberal practices regarding the economy until the end of the Cold War, to evolving as anti-European integration and anti-centralized decision-making in Brussels (Quencez and Michelot, 2017). Moreover, since the European debt crisis, the FN's discourse is focusing on the economic aspect of the euro currency. The eurozone crisis is then emphasized as well as the dangers of open borders within Schengen (Ivaldi, 2018).

4.2.3 Which type of Euroscepticism for the FN?

In this subsection, I will employ the four typologies of party-based Euroscepticism introduced in the second chapter in order to provide a clearer understanding of what type of Euroscepticism the FN is in its stance and political agenda (table 4.1). Even if the FN displayed a certain flexibility in its stance towards the EU, the party evolved to be openly anti-EU and strongly opposes to the overall EU project. It supports the end of the Common Monetary Union and for France to regain full national sovereignty. One main argument towards its rejection of the EU is the globalization and how it is damaging French economy and the cost of living. However, the FN defines Europe as a cultural entity where common values are shared among western countries (Vasilopoulou, 2010).

Table 4.1 The FN's categorization of Euroscepticism

Typologies	<i>Hard-Soft</i> model of Taggart and Szczerbiak (2002)	Categorization of Euroscepticism Kopecký and Mudde (2002)	The six points of continuum of the EU alignment from Flood and Usherwood (2002;2005)	The patterns of opposition to the European Integration from Vasilopoulou (2018)
Types of Euroscepticism	<i>Hard</i> Eurosceptic	Euroreject	Rejectionist	Rejectionist

4.3 The UK Independence Party: “Love Britain? Vote UKIP”

4.3.1 The origin and evolution of UKIP

UKIP was derived from the foundation in 1991 of the Anti-Federalist League (AFL), created by Professor Alan Sked. The AFL changed its name to UKIP in 1993. The party has been, since its creation, clearly opposed to the EU (Clark, 2018). UKIP supported the withdrawal of the UK from the EU and was established as a single-issue party (Usherwood, 2008; Tournier-Sol, 2020). The party’s discourse aimed to protect national sovereignty over European sovereignty and the narrative was categorized by academics as populist Eurosceptic (Hayton, 2010; Carlotti, 2018). UKIP’s ideology was often compared to the Poujadism movement ⁷ as the party’s core support are small businesses owners with a perception of betray and abandonment from the elite (Bowles, 2020).

The party has, since 1993, been categorized as a niche party. Such parties are often associated with single issues (Usherwood, 2008; Tournier-Sol, 2020; Lynch et al., 2012). Being a single-issue party entail focusing a political agenda primarily on one, all-encompassing issue that has importance to certain voters but is neglected by mainstream parties (Mudde, 2007). UKIP is therefore politicizing the EU issue and filling the gap regarding the demand within the electorate of anti-EU sentiments (Eatwell, 2003). Being a single-issue party can be advantageous for UKIP. It has allowed the party to gain voting shares by focusing on popular concerns that were left behind by mainstream parties. UKIP focused primarily on the issue of immigration in its electoral agenda. The immigration issue has experienced a strong increase in salience during elections since the end of the nineties (Lynch et al., 2012). During Pearson’s leadership, extreme Islamic issue was added to the focus of the party. Ford et al (2011) emphasize that the scope of focus in UKIP’s political agenda, encompassing anti-immigration, anti-establishment, islamophobia sentiments and popular demands, brought significant support during elections. UKIP managed to keep a more serious reputation than the BNP which allowed UKIP to win larger voting shares.

Nevertheless, despite of the clear benefits from being a single-issue party, Usherwood (2008) highlights the significant tensions that UKIP faced from being focused on one political issue. Creating objectives on one issue might generate a “*Fundi-Realo*” split. This division is appearing among members of the party when one believes that the party’s agenda must continue within this one issue only. This issue is the key to the well-functioning party. And another believes that the party’s objectives must be flexible in order to be more successful in the future. Another challenge for UKIP is to risk losing its position in the political arena by being too flexible and deviate itself from its single-issue and thus, would imply the possibility of losing a part of its electorate. If the party remains focused only on one single-issue, it must increase its representation and have broader policies.

From 1993 to 1999, the Referendum Party reached most of the radical-right voting shares during national elections, leaving UKIP in the corner. Furthermore, Alan Sked was removed as president of UKIP in 1997 due to his despotic approach (Goodwin and Dennison, 2018). Since Sked’s departure, the public and media started to

⁷ The Poujadism movement occurred in France during the fifties, protests were organized among small businesses against the political elite.

stereotype UKIP as a PRR party (Bowles, 2020). In 1999, the EP reduced its barriers for smaller parties to access elections. This allowed UKIP to participate in the 1999 elections where they gained 3 MEP's (Figure 4.5). In the following EP elections in 2004, with Robert Kilroy Silk as a leader, the party won 12 seats. A major victory for the party as it propelled them onto the central stage of the political arena. However, Kilroy Silk resigned from the party following the elections and two MEPs from UKIP were arrested for fraud (Whitaker and Lynch, 2011).

Nigel Farage became, in 2006, the leader of UKIP. He broadened UKIP's policy objectives and electoral agenda with a promise of five years freeze of immigration policies; a populist approach through a demand for lower taxes and anti-establishment sentiments (Bowles, 2020; Whitaker and Lynch, 2011). This new rebranding gave priority to the issue of immigration and transformed the party's discourse in a more populist direction (Tournier-Sol, 2020). Furthermore, the EP elections of 2009 marked a second major event in the party's history. UKIP gained 13 seats, beating the governing party, Labour Party (Figure 9). Farage removed himself as leader after the 2009 EP elections to focus plainly on the EP and in the Buckingham campaign⁸. Malcom Pearson took his place as the new leader of UKIP in November 2009. A few months later during the General Elections, Pearson was highly criticized during a BBC interview where Pearson did not appear to have read UKIP's manifesto (Hawkins, 2010). He resigned in August 2010 and Farage became leader of UKIP once more.




Figure 4.5 European Parliament Results of UKIP from 1999 to 2009. Source: European Parliament

⁸ Elections to access the UK Parliament constituency.




Figure 4.6 General Elections UK results of UKIP from 1997 to 2010 in percentage and seats won. Source: UK Parliament

UKIP performed poorly during the UK general elections. As figure 4.6 illustrates, while the percentage of votes won increased, the party has gained no seats. Hix and Marsh (2007) argue that, in European elections, parties situated on the fringes on the political arena e.g., radical positions, are performing better than in National elections. Niche parties such as UKIP must focus on a distinctive issue to perform better during elections. However, this issue must be salient, with low salience, chances for niche, single-issue parties to win elections are scarce.

4.3.2 What does UKIP stand for?

UKIP is a libertarian and a traditionalist party. Libertarian for its support for freedom of speech and democracy. Traditionalist for, what is named by the party a "*common heritage*", backing up the past cultural traditions when Britain was a "*glorious sovereign nation*" and linking it to the future (Tournier-Sol, 2015). UKIP is, since its establishment, on a quest to "*Save Britain*" by the removal of the UK from the EU. "*British people first*" is often appearing in the party's manifestos or on its website. The EU is perceived as undemocratic, privileging itself in detriment of the people. UKIP argues that democracy can only be successful if the countries involved are sharing common values, identity with the same language, historic culture and legal system. The EU, thus, destroys the legal and democratic system that Britain developed for centuries (Tournier-Sol, 2015). Moreover, the supranational aspect of the EU is often part of the party's argument regarding the dangers of the EU and how it represents a threat to Britain's national sovereignty "*We do not want or need to become a province in a European superstate*" (UKIP, 2010).

Furthermore, UKIP appears as a populist "*anti-political establishment*" party. The party represents all criteria from Adebí's terminology to distinguish such a party according to its values and ideologies (Adebí, 2004). Firstly, UKIP is a staunch opponent of immigration (strongly standing against the immigration policy, this policy issue has been a major concern in the voters' mind). UKIP also advocates for a change in the political system as well as exiting from the EU's membership. Secondly, UKIP expresses

distrust towards mainstream parties and the government in place. And thirdly, the party posits that the government and political elite are favoring themselves over the people. Within Farage’s leadership, UKIP’s Eurosceptic message became stricter. Most notably regarding the immigration policy issue and its populist anti-establishment values. The leader also reinforced UKIP’s representation in regional and parliamentary elections (Ford and Goodwin, 2014).

4.3.3 Which type of Euroscepticism for UKIP?

As performed above for the FN, this sub-section will utilize the four typologies of party-based Euroscepticism to categorize UKIP’s overall type of Euroscepticism (table 4.2). UKIP is a with a long-time supporter of the withdrawal of the UK from the EU. The party believes that being a member of the EU restrains the UK regarding international trade and the EU’s political organization is dissimilar to the British political system (Vasilopoulou, 2010). It supports national sovereignty and are against the EU enlargement, immigration policy or foreign policy. However, UKIP denies being “*Europhobe*” and considers itself as “*the real European*”, not against Europeans but against the EU framework (Farage, 2013).

Table 4.2 UKIP’s categorization of Euroscepticism

Typologies	<i>Hard-Soft</i> model of Taggart and Szczerbiak (2002)	Categorization of Euroscepticism Kopecký and Mudde (2002)	The six points of continuum of the EU alignment from Flood and Usherwood (2002;2005)	The patterns of opposition to the European Integration from Vasilopoulou (2018)
Types of Euroscepticism	<i>Hard</i> Eurosceptic	Euroreject	Rejectionist	Rejectionist

4.4 Conclusion

This chapter firstly revealed how the FN grew to be among one of the most successful PRR party in Europe. Since 1972, the FN exhibited strong anti-establishment populist ideas. The party started to take a stricter position of the EU after their first representation in the EP in 1984. However, the party demonstrated a flexibility in their ideologies according to the popular demands left aside by mainstream parties. The typologies of party-based Euroscepticism in chapter have been useful to distinguish the type of Euroscepticism present in the party's ideologies and thus, political stance. In the case of the FN, the party largely qualifies as a *hard* and *rejectionist* Eurosceptic party. Secondly, the chapter presented UKIP's development from being a marginal radical party that was being shadowed by its competitor the British National Party to a well-known party competing with mainstream parties such as the Conservatives. UKIP made its way up in the political arena, being a single-issue party, focusing on the EU issues and an anti-establishment populist party. Regarding UKIP's type of party-based Euroscepticism, drawn from four main authors and contributors to this typology; UKIP presents all criteria of a *hard* and *rejectionist* Eurosceptic party. The party's stance remained stable since UKIP's establishment in 1993 with an outright opposition to the EU and is not interested in any kind of cooperation with the EU or reforms. In the next chapter, each coding category presented in chapter three will be assessed. This section will be using a word count analysis of the coded text from both political parties during the 2014 EP elections.

5 Findings

Chapter five presents the findings originated from the coding of the FN and UKIP's 2014 EP electoral manifestos. The data is presented in word clouds, word frequency and as the coverage index.⁹

Three main coding categories were used in the word clouds analysis: *EU Saliency*, *Nationalism*, and *Immigration*. The word frequency of each category and subcategory and the coverage index allowed me to compare within both documents, priorities of certain issues over others for each party. French quotes were translated into English (see footnotes). Translations were convened by the author.

5.1 EU saliency

The first category introduced in this chapter is *EU saliency*. This category is the most complete of the chosen categories. It encompasses any arguments mentioning the EU in order to get a general outlook of both parties' intentions. Not surprisingly, both parties' text coverage refers, in a vast majority, to the EU (table 5.1). As this category includes a large amount of coded text, sub-categories are necessary in order to identify inter-party differences.

Table 5.1 EU saliency coverage index in percentage.

FN	UKIP
82.75 per cent	78.24 per cent




Figure 5.1 Word cloud in the category "EU saliency"

⁹ The number of words, in percentage, devoted to each category or sub-category according to the whole document.

Table 5.2 Word count in the category "EU salience"

FN		UKIP	
L'Union Européenne (<i>The European Union</i>)	15	EU	41
Traité (<i>Treaty</i>)	12	UK	7
Contre (<i>Against</i>)	11	Trade	5
Pays (<i>Country</i>)	11	Businesses	4
France (<i>France</i>)	10	Jobs	4
Français (<i>French</i>)	10	Million	4
Monnaie (<i>Currency</i>)	10	Rules	4
National (<i>National</i>)	8	Union	4
Transatlantique (<i>Transatlantic</i>)	8	Energy	3
L'euro (<i>the euro</i>)	7	Human	3

As demonstrated by figure 5.1 and table 5.2, the texts refer to the EU in different ways. The FN has a strong focus on monetary issues, while UKIP focuses on jobs and trade. Another noticeable feature is that while UKIP mentions the EU forty-one times, the FN mentions it only fifteen times. Considering that UKIP's text is shorter than the FN's, the EU is repeatedly stated.




Figure 5.2 Average coverage EU Salience.

The category *EU salience* is divided in five sub-categories: *the EU seen as a disadvantage* (which is also divided in two, EU trade and EU regulations), *the EU expansion*, *the lack of democracy*, *leaving the EU*, and finally, *the euro-currency* (figure 5.2).

Within the sub-category *EU seen as a disadvantage*, it is interesting to notice that, while UKIP used many times the word trade in its text, the FN focuses more on the trading and economic aspect of the EU than UKIP (38.62 per cent of the text refers to

the EU trade for the FN and 19.5 per cent for UKIP). UKIP is, however, concentrating more on the EU regulations than France (37.28 per cent for UKIP and 32 per cent for the FN) (Figure 5.3).




Figure 5.3 Average coverage "EU seen as a disadvantage".

The FN has an entire paragraph about the Transatlantic Treaty, emphasizing the dangers of creating a tax-free exchange area between the EU and the United States.

*"C'est un véritable choc de dérégulation (...) Seule la culture échappera, peut-être, à ce jeu de massacre ultra-libéral : les journalistes, les acteurs et les écrivains seraient protégés, tant mieux pour eux, quand les artisans, les agriculteurs et les ouvriers seront, eux, laissés à la merci d'une concurrence américaine avantagée à l'export par une monnaie bien plus faible que l'euro."*¹⁰

The working class is directly targeted in this paragraph. The FN presents the Transatlantic Trade Pact as an ultra-liberal massacre, that will destroy small producers in France with the American competition. Moreover, this paragraph also points out that the US dollar is much weaker than the euro currency. The euro currency is perceived as a handicap for France.

*"Notre culture, notre identité, notre agriculture, notre industrie et nos droits y sont systématiquement attaqués afin de faire place nette aux seuls intérêts du plus fort. La fusion de l'Union Européenne dans un gigantesque espace euro-atlantique dont le pôle le plus puissant se trouve à Washington, (...) est révélateur d'une Union Européenne fabriquée pour les multinationales, contre les peuples."*¹¹

¹⁰ "It is a true shock of deregulation (...) Only the culture will maybe escape this game of ultra-liberal massacre: journalists, actors, and writers will be protected, good for them, while artisans, farmers and workers will be left to the mercy of the American competition which benefits from the export with a considerably weaker currency than the euro."

¹¹ "Our culture, our identity, our agriculture, our industry and our rights are systematically attacked in order to clear the way only to the interests of the stronger. The merging of the European Union in a gigantic Euro-Atlantic space whose most powerful center is based in Washington, (...) is indicative of a European Union made for multinational companies, against the people."

UKIP on the other hand, refers to the loss the UK would suffer from staying in the EU. The EU is accused of slowing down UK trade and thus, this country's economic success. The entire part of UKIP text focusing on economic aspects stresses the need to exit the EU. By leaving the EU, the UK will strongly benefit from trading globally and will be able to negotiate deals for British interests only and not European interests.

"A lot of lies have been told about the EU. We're frequently told that we'll lose 3 million jobs if we leave – a shameless lie. No sensible commentator has ever predicted this, because the EU countries have far more to lose by interfering with our trade with them, than we do."

"On leaving the EU, the UK will keep the trade agreements we entered as an EU member prior to the Lisbon Treaty. Outside the EU, we can negotiate our own trade deals, but be in a stronger position, as we will be negotiating in the British interest."

Regarding EU regulations, UKIP is again emphasizing the need for the UK to exit the EU. The EU energy regulations are covering most of the text representing EU regulations. The EU is portrayed as being very bureaucratic and that its laws spread in many different policy areas impacting the UK. UKIP points out that when the UK entered the EU, the latter was meant to be only a trading bloc. By terminating its membership, the UK would be able to regain control of its laws and make British citizens pay less.

"Outside the EU, we can abolish EU laws that add hundreds of pounds to household energy bills."

"The 2008 Climate Change Act costs an estimated £18bn per year (...) Outside the EU, we can abolish EU laws that add hundreds of pounds to household energy bills."

"Only 5 per cent of British companies export to the EU. Why should 100 per cent of our businesses be subject to harmful EU regulation? Only outside the EU can we have more flexible regulations to create more jobs."

Interestingly, the FN does not mention the energy regulations but rather the abolishment of the EU *posted workers* directive and the defense of digital freedom. The party presents two examples against the "*posting the workers*" directives. The first one relates to the French slaughterhouses that are being destroyed by the competition from German slaughterhouses that use foreign workers seconded by Romanian companies and where workers are paid less than in France. The second example concerns the building sector, where Spanish businesses win bids on French soil and dispatch Spanish and Portuguese workers. The FN highlights that these directives, created by the EU, destroy small French producers and businesses. They also favor the growth of illegal activities such as undeclared workers or illegal dispatch of workers to France. The FN continues by denouncing mainstream parties as supporters of these directives, to increase the EU competition and lower national salaries. "*UMPS*" is the best example of anti-elite statements. The FN has since early 2000 been naming the two mainstream parties in the French political arena, the Union pour un Mouvement Populaire (center-right) and the Parti Socialiste (center-left), UMPS (Karlin & Denis, 2014). A wordplay or

neologism designing the two parties as one entity, to reflect the similar ideologies and decision they undertake. In the text, the UMPS is either being a liar or an accomplice to the EU (in a pejorative aspect).

"Complice des pires dérives de Bruxelles, l'UMPS encourage la mise en concurrence des travailleurs européens afin de faire baisser les salaires. Ces dernières années, le Front National et le Rassemblement Bleu Marine ont donc été les seuls à dénoncer les effets délétères de la directive sur le détachement des travailleurs et à proposer d'en sortir."¹²

The FN portrays itself as the only ones to go against this directive and to propose a way to get France out of it. In this paragraph, it is clearly emphasized that EU directives deeply affects French businesses and producers. Brussels is identified as being the center of these "abuses". While this paragraph attacks EU directives, it mainly criticizes mainstream parties for supporting it.

"À aucun moment il n'a été question de remettre en cause le fondement de ce texte qui autorise, pour le même poste, à payer un travailleur étranger moins cher qu'un travailleur français. Un scandale auquel les députés européens FN/RBM s'attacheront à mettre fin !"¹³

Further on, the FN put the emphasis on the EU's digital policies which endangers digital freedom. The EU policies are highly criticized for censoring and spying on people's content and activity online. This text brings attention to the link between the United States and the EU where the latter is freely letting the US systematically spy on European citizens. This part of the text is particularly interesting because it focuses on a global issue where it is not about French citizens anymore but rather about European citizens being in danger. Moreover, the PHEME project is highlighted as a tool, or an "ideal weapon" for the EU to disqualify any information or content perceived as Eurosceptic. Such disqualification would be targeting content including "opponents to the euro currency", "mass immigration", or "any opinion considered by Brussels as harmful".

Further on, UKIP's text focuses 2.67 per cent on the *EU expansion* and 6.23 per cent on *the lack of democracy* within the EU. UKIP clearly opposes itself to the further enlargements of the EU, naming Turkey, Albania, Moldova as part of the expansion plans supported by mainstream parties. The party highlights that this expansion will be jeopardizing UK citizens and national public services.

"The other parties are still committed to the EU expanding to include Turkey, Albania, Moldova and many more. Under EU rules, all their citizens would become entitled to live and work in the UK. "

The FN, however, refers to the uncontrolled and unfiltered immigration issues in the EU if enlarging its borders. The party is also emphasizing how the EU wants to make the

¹² "Complicit in supporting the worst abuses of Brussels, the UMPS encourages the use of competitive procedures for European workers in order to lower national wages. These last years, the Front National and the Rassemblement Bleu Marine were the only ones to denounce the harmful effects of these directives on posting the workers, and to propose to remove ourselves from it."

¹³ "At no time was there a call to question the fundamentals of this text that allows, for the same job, a business to pay a foreign worker less than a French worker. A scandal, that FN/RBM European deputies will commit to put an end to it."

visa process easier for third countries, here Tunisia is mentioned.

"Les élargissements successifs de cet espace aux pays d'Europe de l'Est ont achevé de transformer ces frontières en une véritable passoire, aggravant encore l'ouverture totale des frontières voulue par l'UE. La Commission Européenne veut même aller plus loin en militant en faveur d'un assouplissement des conditions d'obtention de visas pour les pays tiers comme la Tunisie."¹⁴

Regarding the lack of democracy in the EU, UKIP stresses the fact that Strasbourg and Brussels are two centralized decision-making places which endangers EU citizen's democracy by taking major decision on countries without the consent or knowledge of the people.

"Your UKIP MEPs will continue to go to Brussels and Strasbourg with a mission unlike that of any other party. (...) Some of us spend a good deal of time there, unfortunately, making sure we know what they're cooking up, creating an 'Opposition' and voting against the EU's encroachment on our democracy. "

For the FN, the threat to democracy lies in the EU institutions. The party claims that the European Parliament, governments, and the European Commission were part of an undemocratic practice by negotiating a mandate without a representative of the people and that was not rendered public. The FN points out as well the strong participation of mainstream parties. Unlike UKIP, the FN does not mention Brussels as being an undemocratic center of the EU, even though, the party does mention Brussels as a supranational entity (further developed in the category *Nationalism*).

"Le Parlement européen et les gouvernements ont confié l'année dernière à la Commission un mandat de négociation exclusif dont le contenu n'a pas été rendu public. Les négociations sont menées en secret et en l'absence de tout représentant élu des peuples. Un déni de démocratie tout à fait scandaleux dont se sont rendus complices les parlementaires européens UMPS qui ont voté en faveur du mandat."¹⁵

Finally, the last two sub-categories display one of the most important divergences when it comes to the focus of both parties. The primary objective within UKIP's text is for the UK to leave the EU. While for the FN, the focus is on exiting from the single monetary union, thus, the Euro and return to a national currency.

¹⁴ "The continuous enlargements of this space to countries from Eastern Europe transformed these borders into a complete sieve, aggravating again the total opening of border wanted by the EU. The European Commission wants even to go further by relaxing conditions to obtain visas for third countries such as Tunisia."

¹⁵ "The European Parliament and government gave last year to the Commission a mandate of exclusive negotiations which the content was not made public. Negotiations were hold in secret and without any representative that was elected by the people. A denial of democracy completely scandalous where UMPS deputies became complicit by voting in favour of this mandate."

5.2 Nationalism

After coding both parties' electoral manifesto, I found that *Nationalism* is representing 25.46 per cent of the FN's electoral program, slightly more than UKIP with 23.59 per cent (Table 5.3).

Table 5.3 Nationalism coverage index in percentage.

FN	UKIP
25.46 per cent	23.59 per cent



Figure 5.4 Word cloud in the category nationalism.

Table 5.4 Word count in the category nationalism.

FN	UKIP
Français (<i>French</i>) 11	EU 11
Monnaie (<i>Currency</i>) 5	UK 5
National (<i>National</i>) 4	Trade 3
Pays (<i>Country</i>) 4	Conservatives 2
Bruxelles (<i>Brussels</i>) 3	Health 2

For the FN, the word *Français* (French) is the most counted word (25.46 per cent), while *monnaie* (currency) and *national* come in second and third place (Table 5.4; Figure 5.4). The very first sentence from the program displays the disadvantages of being a member of the EU and of having the Euro as the national currency. The Euro is portrayed as a threat to national sovereignty and the national currency is highlighted as a pillar of national power.

"En privant la France de ce pilier majeur de la souveraineté qu'est le pouvoir de battre monnaie, l'Union Européenne a retiré au peuple français la possibilité de gérer lui-même son avenir économique." ¹⁶

While *French* is the most occurring word in this category for the FN, UKIP focuses more on the EU. UKIP mentioned eleven times the *EU*, followed by the *UK* five times and *trade* three times. In this category, the mentions of the EU concern primarily the negative effect the EU has on national businesses:

"It's our 4.8 million smaller businesses that suffer from the burden of EU laws and regulations."

The *Our* creates a distinction between businesses from the UK and businesses from outside the UK. It is counted seventeen times in the text and emphasizes a mean of an inclusion and an exclusion of a certain group. This *Us and Them* differentiation refers to the British and to the EU, or the countries outside the UK. British are portrayed as one entity that suffers from *them*, or as we may call it, *the outsiders*. *Them* is also referring to the *enemies* of the British people. The us-them dichotomy is a key element of populist discourse (Mudde, 2007). In its narrative, UKIP often presents British people as victims of the elite or of the immigration.

Concerning the FN, *notre* (*Our* in English) is counted twenty-seven times in the whole document and twelve times within the category *Nationalism*.

" Pour maintenir l'unité des Français, pour leur donner un avenir, il est urgent de mettre un terme à la logique de Schengen. Notre souveraineté en matière de politique migratoire est la clef de notre unité nationale et de notre protection économique et sociale. " ¹⁷

In the text cited above, the term *our* is noticed three times. Each time the FN refers to French attributes as *our* attributes. By doing so, the party attempts to connect the reader (the possible voter), to the issues highlighted in the text. Here again we persist in the same *Us and Them* differentiation than with UKIP, whereas *Us* is French people and *Them*, Europe or outsiders.

¹⁶ "By depriving France of this major pillar of sovereignty, which is the power to issue coins, the European Union removed to the French People, the possibility to self-manage its economic future."

¹⁷ "To maintain French unity, to give them a future, it is urgent to stop the logic of Schengen. Our sovereignty in migration policy is the key to our national unity and to our economic and social protection."




Figure 5.5 Average coverage nationalism.

The category *Nationalism* is divided by four sub-categories (figure 5.5).

Regain national sovereignty represents 5.93 per cent of the overall *Nationalism* category for the FN. It ranks as the third most occurring issue in the category with the words *French* and *Sovereignty* being the most used. In the text, the FN mentions the *French laws* and how the French law must have precedence over European law:

*"Le droit français, issu de la volonté du peuple français, doit à nouveau primer sur un droit européen qui n'a d'autre légitimité que les intérêts commerciaux qui l'ont imposé. "*¹⁸

According to the FN, only by regaining sovereignty will France be able to gain from trade. The *"Future"* of the French people is, according to the text, depending on regaining control of France's policies. Furthermore, while *Regain national sovereignty* is representing only 5.93 per cent for the FN, it is the most popular issue in UKIP's manifesto. With 10.1 per cent, the party is mostly referring to how the EU is a *"burden"* for the UK and that all EU regulations weaken the national power. In the text, UKIP often claims that by leaving the EU, the UK would recover its full control over its law-making.

"The only way to regain control is to leave the European Union."

When it comes to the *priority made to nationals*, both parties display a similar word coverage with 9.03 per cent for the FN and 8.42 per cent for UKIP (Figure 5.5). In the FN's text, the euro currency is again appearing the most. The party emphasizes that France must exit the euro currency to regain a dynamic industry. The euro is perceived as not serving the interests of the French people but international banks.

¹⁸ *"The French law, reflecting the French people's will, must again take precedence over European law which has no other form of legitimacy than commercial interests that were imposed."*

"Contre une monnaie soumise aux seuls intérêts des banques et des plus riches, choisissons une monnaie mise au service de tous les Français." ¹⁹

Additionally, the EU is accused to favor EU members' businesses on French territory through EU policies. An example is given with Spanish businesses in the building sector where for the same job, Spanish and Portuguese workers would be paid less than a French worker in France:

"Les entreprises espagnoles par exemple remportent les appels d'offre sur notre territoire puis y détachent des équipes espagnoles et portugaises (...) À aucun moment il n'a été question de remettre en cause le fondement de ce texte qui autorise, pour le même poste, à payer un travailleur étranger moins cher qu'un travailleur français." ²⁰

For UKIP, health, social housing and trade are the most important aspects when it comes to prioritizing nationals. The text illuminates a connection with this sub-category and the immigration from the EU. Medical care must be free for nationals only and non-nationals must have health insurance from their country of origin when entering the UK. In the text cited below, the first words stress the need for the health services (and most notably the National Health Services of the UK) to remain for national interests.

" A National, Not International, Health Service: It is important that everyone in the UK has access to free medical care. Visitors and migrants to the UK must show proof of health insurance as a condition of entry to the UK."

Regarding social housing, this service must be available first and foremost for nationals:

"UKIP will prioritise social housing for those with parents and grandparents born locally."

In this sentence, prioritizing people born in the UK is emphasized. UKIP portrays itself as *"the defender of the English interests"* (Hayton, 2016). At the heart of the party's ideology, patriotism and national identity are two major values which should be part of reforming Britain. As Mike Kenny (2015) points out, support for UKIP since its creation, has been representative of a *"nostalgic conservative Englishness"* part of the society.

In examining the sub-category *Brussels as a supranational entity*, we see that the FN mentions Brussels twice in the text. Brussels is perceived here as a supremacy which undermines French interest and where UMPS is an accomplice. Here farmers are the ones losing from being in the EU. The FN supports the abandonment of the Common Agricultural Policy so French agriculture is prioritized again over European agriculture. UKIP refers to Brussels as a supranational entity twice as well. The first time, Brussels is displayed as one of the EU decision-making centers with Strasbourg. The second time, Brussels is described as the supranational entity of the EU and as with the FN, mainstream parties are accomplices of Brussels.

¹⁹ *"Against a currency subjected solely to the interest of the banks and of the wealthiest, let's choose a currency that benefits all French people."*

²⁰ *"Spanish businesses for example win the bids on our territory, then deploy Spanish and Portuguese teams (...) At no time was there a call to question the fundamentals of this text that allows, for the same job, a business to pay a foreign worker less than a French worker."*

"In the meantime, your UKIP MEPs will continue to go to Brussels and Strasbourg with a mission unlike that of any other party."

"Until we leave the EU, our hands are tied by Brussels, with the support of the Conservatives, Labour and the Liberal Democrats".

Furthermore, The FN depicts strong anti-elite and anti-establishment sentiments in its program, whereas these statements refer to 9.12 per cent of the overall document (Figure 15).

" Un déni de démocratie tout à fait scandaleux dont se sont rendus complices les parlementaires européens UMPS qui ont voté en faveur du mandat." ²¹

"Affirmer que l'euro est une chance, comme n'a jamais cessé de le répéter l'UMPS, relève donc purement et simplement du mensonge et d'un déni de réalité inquiétant." ²²

As for the UKIP, anti-elite and anti-establishment sentiments refer to only 3.36 per cent of the text. Conservatives, Labour and Liberal Democrats parties are the ones being targeted. The UKIP portrays these mainstream parties as being hand in hand with Brussels and favor the European Union above the UK:

"Our hands are tied by Brussels, with the support of the Conservatives, Labour and the Liberal Democrats."

For both the FN and UKIP, mainstream parties are seen as the enemy of the nation's interests. Anti-establishment sentiments have been part of both parties' ideologies since their creation. The FN, from the leadership of Jean-Marie Le Pen, has been presenting itself as the "*anti-system*" party. Most support during elections has been generated from the party's stance regarding mainstream parties (Rydgren, 2008). Same as the FN, the UKIP as well used since its beginning, an anti-establishment strategy. UKIP's strategy, during elections, has been focused on anti-establishment values (Crines and Heppell, 2017). The party sees itself as an outsider to mainstream politics and promotes the idea that mainstream political parties are not in communion with the people's interests.

To conclude, the economic aspect is here emphasized in both texts, whereas for the FN, the focus is rather on the monetary aspect of the EU. The euro currency and how it lowers the power intake France has within its own currency. As UKIP is not part of the euro area, it makes sense that it centers its attention on a different issue. For the UKIP, the trading aspect of being in the EU, or more precisely, the competitiveness of national industries is what is being highlighted.

²¹ "A denial of democracy completely scandalous where UMPS Members of the European parliament became accomplice by voting in favor to the mandate."

²² "To claim that the Euro is a chance, as the UMPS told us again and again, is purely and simply a lie and a worrying denial of reality."

5.3 Immigration

Immigration issues are very present within Eurosceptic claims, albeit Immigration has the lowest index in both parties, with respectively 15.88 per cent of the entire text covering immigration issues for the FN and 17.61 per cent for UKIP (table 5.5). These percentages demonstrate that, for these elections, the two parties did not have a strong focus on immigration issues.

Table 5.5 Immigration coverage index in percentage.

FN	UKIP
15.88 per cent	17.61 per cent




Figure 5.6 Word cloud in the category immigration.

Table 5.6 Word count in the category immigration.

FN	UKIP
Schengen (<i>Schengen</i>) 7	EU 8
Frontière (<i>Border</i>) 5	UK 5
Pays (<i>Country</i>) 5	Immigration 4
Clandestine (<i>Clandestine</i>) 3	Borders 3
Français (<i>French</i>) 3	Population 3

When mentioning immigration issues, the FN refers to Schengen seven times. The party stresses the need for France to remove itself from the Schengen area to maintain control on its borders. Security is as well very connected to immigration and controlling the borders, whereas uncontrolled or clandestine immigration is equal to a rise in crime.

"Comme une majorité de Français, le Front National et les listes Bleu Marine sont favorables à la sortie de la France de l'espace Schengen et au rétablissement de nos frontières nationales. " ²³

²³ " As a majority of French, the Front National and Bleu Marine lists are supporting the exit of France from the Schengen area and the re-establishment of our national borders."

*" Sortir de Schengen (...) Pour maintenir l'unité des Français, pour leur donner un avenir, il est urgent de mettre un terme à la logique de Schengen. Notre souveraineté en matière de politique migratoire est la clef de notre unité nationale et de notre protection économique et sociale. "*²⁴

The FN refers to illegal immigration to stress the threat of open borders. UKIP, however, does not connect the immigration issue with the security of the country. UKIP mentions the EU eight times. Contrary to the FN, UKIP does not directly mention Schengen, however, the EU here represents the open borders within the EU community. To refer to the EU instead of Schengen when mentioning the EU's open borders reveals that UKIP correlates immigration issues with the EU as a whole and not just about the Schengen area. This reveals a very different approach to the EU and its multiple aspects.




Figure 5.7 Average coverage immigration.

In the sub-categories, the two parties focus on very different topics. The FN focuses principally on the correlation between immigration and national security while UKIP aims to demonstrate the dangers of mass and uncontrolled immigration to the UK.

UKIP argues that uncontrolled mass immigration is a threat to the country by creating over-population issues, welfare or government services overuse and public services pressure.

"Mass immigration has coincided with soaring youth unemployment and stagnant wages that have not kept pace with the cost of living."

²⁴ *"Exiting Schengen (...) To maintain the unity of French people, to give them a future, it is urgent to put a stop to the logic of Schengen. Our sovereignty regarding the migration policy is the key of our national unity and of our economic and social protection."*

UKIP names directly in the text Bulgarian and Romanian citizens as responsible for most of the uncontrolled immigration to the UK. Mass immigration from Bulgaria and Romania is considered dangerous:

"On 1st January the UK threw open its borders to unlimited numbers of Bulgarian and Romanian citizens. The Government admits it cannot control the numbers of migrants from other EU countries."

The paragraph further on refers to the dangers of the EU expansion to Turkey, Albania and Moldova and how mainstream political parties in the UK support such enlargement of the EU community. It is explicitly portrayed how such immigration would impact Britain's public services. UKIP does not assess the immigration policy itself but rather argues that such increase of migrants would be catastrophic for the country and that the government will be held accountable.

The FN mentions mass immigration once while talking about the exit of France from Schengen. It is placed as the introductory paragraph to the part referring to the immigration issue.

"100 000 naturalisations par an : c'est l'objectif fixé par Manuel Valls quand il était au ministère de l'intérieur."²⁵

Former Prime Minister of France, Manuel Valls, is being used as an example when claiming that the Government's objectives are to naturalize hundred thousand people per year. Here we can notice some similarity between both parties regarding their perception and use of government within the text. As was established in the previous chapter, the FN displays strong anti-establishment sentiment and does not approve the Government's decisions on immigration. Mass immigration is thus, perceived as a high number of naturalizations that would affect the country's economy, labor market and security.

Security and immigration are only found explicitly in the FN's text with 11.09 per cent of it represented in the category *Immigration*. The FN stresses that open borders would have a devastating impact on France.

"En supprimant les contrôles aux frontières entre une majorité de pays européens, les accords de Schengen nous laissent totalement démunis face à l'immigration clandestine, aux grands trafics internationaux et à la délinquance nomade ou aux Roms."²⁶

It has been a strong part of the FN's electoral strategies to portray uncontrolled immigration as a threat to the society and to link it with delinquency and terrorist attacks. The rise of immigration in a country is favorable to Populist Eurosceptic parties and therefore, is highly used in their strategies (Della Posta, 2013).

Finally, the last subcategory is the abuse of national systems by immigrants. This is a more present issue within UKIP's text where immigration causes problems within national systems by the abusive use of it. Most notably, immigrants that do not present

²⁵ "100 000 naturalizations per year: That is the goal set by Manuel Valls when he was part of the Ministry of the Interior."

²⁶ "By deleting border controls between most European countries, the Schengen agreements leave us completely powerless against illegal immigration, large-scale international traffic and nomadic crimes or against Roma."

any health insurance when arriving in the UK and use the National Health Services. According to the party, this practice overflows public services for nationals. Moreover, uncontrolled immigration would undermine the British peoples' opportunity to get the help they need according to the party.

"Under EU rules, anyone in the EU can come to the UK and live, claim welfare and government services they have not contributed to."

UKIP often underlines that the right for immigrants to use national systems is unfair as they did not contribute to it by paying taxes to the government. This is emphasized numerous times and it highlights that British people should have a priority in these services above immigrants.

Concerning the FN, one sentence in the text mentions the possible abuse of national systems from *certain* countries.

"Sortir de Schengen c'est, enfin, reprendre le contrôle de l'intégralité de notre système de visas afin d'éviter que les ressortissants de certains pays n'abusent des facilités qui leurs ont été attribuées."²⁷

This sentence urges the need to exit Schengen area and to regain control of the distribution of visas so that immigrants that come to France with a poor economic situation would not abuse national systems.

To conclude this category, we have seen that both parties blame the EU for any issue coming from the immigration. The FN perceives the illegal immigration as a strong security breach that puts in jeopardy the whole system and the safety of the French people. For UKIP, on the other hand, the threat lies in the mass immigration from Bulgaria and Romania. Both parties, while focusing on different immigration issues, find a common understanding: The exit of their respective country. However, this exit takes different proportion: The FN stresses that France should exit Schengen while UKIP supports the exit of the UK from the EU in general.

²⁷ *Exiting Schengen means, to finally, regain control of our visa systems in its entirety in order to avoid that nationals from designated countries would abuse services that were given to them."*

6 Discussion: The FN and UKIP — a unified Eurosceptic narrative during the 2014 EP elections?

In this chapter, I discuss nuances in the FN's and the UKIP's Eurosceptic narratives during the 2014 EP elections. The first sub-chapter presents similarities within both parties' Eurosceptic narrative, while the second sub-chapter concentrates on the differences. In both sub-chapters, I aim to identify factors that may explain the choice of focus for the two parties. The chapter traces the majority of the similarities back to the populist strategy that the two parties share. Differences in the Eurosceptic claims are visible when it comes to oppose or support certain policies and when the parties argue their ultimate electoral objective.

6.1 Similarities and patterns within the parties' narrative

Anti-establishment and anti-elite sentiments

The findings illustrate that both the FN and UKIP displayed strong anti-establishment and anti-elite attitudes. Both parties communicated explicitly the idea of a separation between the nation's people and the elite. This similarity is comprehensible, as both parties' narratives are marked by a populist approach. Furthermore, a majority of voting shares from previous national and European elections were obtained because of the parties' stance as "anti-system" parties (Crines and Heppell, 2017; Rydgren, 2008). The demands from both parties' core support can be a legitimate reason for using anti-elite arguments.

UKIP's core support lies in individuals that display strong distrust for the British political elite. These individuals feel that the two mainstream parties, the Conservative Party and Labour, do not have the people's interests in mind anymore and they feel that UKIP can fulfill their demands (Ford, Goodwin and Cutts, 2011). Here I believe that it is relevant to distinguish between core support and strategic support. By means of repeated criticism of the "*big two*"²⁸ in the text, UKIP reaches to both its core support and its strategic support. The latter will not vote for the UKIP during the UK's general elections but instead will support mainstream parties. However, it will vote for the UKIP during EP elections, to express its discontent with "*the big two's*" performance or with their stance on the EU. The core support, on the other hand, represents citizens which are very hostile towards mainstream parties or disappointed with "*the big two*" and that will support UKIP in both general elections and EP elections.

Since the 2002 presidential elections, the FN has created a strong disturbance within the French political arena and standards generated by mainstream parties have changed. By directly attacking the legitimacy of the French political elite, the FN sought to modify the dynamics during elections (Shields, 2014a). In France, the post European debt crisis allowed the FN to take more place within the central political arena. The economic hit of the crisis increased considerably the voter's discontent with the government and with mainstream parties. In its manifesto, the FN mentioned the

²⁸ The Big Two refers to the two mainstream parties in the UK, Labour and the Conservatives

economic struggle and accused the government and the *UMPS* to not having taken appropriate measures to save the French economy. The party claimed that there is a significant gap between the French people and the political elite, and that direct democracy should be prioritized over representative democracy (Cuminal et al., 1997). The FN has become more normalized since 2011, during Sarkozy's presidency (Mondon, 2014). This normalization of the FN's anti-elite rhetoric might have been triggered by the fact that Sarkozy, at the time President, was using anti-elite statements as well.

Academics describe the rise of anti-elite rhetoric in political parties as possible evidence of a populist pressure. This populist pressure appears to have contested the elite's order and to have an indirect influence on important policy areas such as immigration (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2012; Mudde, 2013). Therefore, by utilizing these statements in their strategy, the two parties can grow their soft power in the political, social, and economic area. It also allows them to portray themselves as the "real" defenders of the "true" democracy while mainstream parties represent the anti-democratic parties (Mudde, 2004).

Targeting and supporting the popular demand: The social protection

In their manifesto, the FN and UKIP exhibited strong support for small local businesses and the working-class, positioning them at the center of any EU issues. The fear of globalization, unfair competition between national and international businesses, and criticism of high taxation of local businesses were key elements in both parties' narrative. People-centrism is often acknowledged by academics as a key feature of the populist rhetoric (Rooduijn and Akkerman, 2017).

The FN concentrated on the euro currency that does not benefit French people, and trading aspect of the EU such as the failed Transatlantic Treaty and the "posted workers" directive. Findings indicated that the FN targeted not only the popular layer of the French people, but also median voters. The party did so by proposing policy changes that would benefit low-income earners and at the same time incorporate welfare-chauvinist strategies. Leonard Ray (1999) and Hooghe and Marks (2007) from the literature review claim that the perception of the EU as a threat to social protection is a feature from the radical-left wing. Since the arrival of Marine Le Pen, the FN's discourse has become more "socialist-authoritarian" (Ivaldi, 2015). Le Pen augmented the FN's attraction to voters and enlarged it by attempting to answer a demand coming from the left-wing voters. By concentrating on anti-capitalism and social welfare protectionism, the FN gained a considerable number of voting shares during the 2012 presidential elections in France. Polls found the party to have gained 12 per cent of voters previously supporting the left-wing political parties, Lutte Ouvrière and Nouveau Parti Anticapitaliste. Moreover, 32 per cent of the FN's voters were individuals which struggle to live on their earnings, a considerable higher number of shares compared to the most popular far-left wing party of Jean-Luc Melenchon (15 per cent) (Shields, 2014a; OpinionWay-Fiducial, 2012). Findings demonstrated that the FN indeed continued to shape its strategy to gain more votes from the left-wing during the 2014 EP election.

In its manifesto, UKIP targeted elderly male voters with little education (blue-collar voters) and self-employed/small businesses. This part of the British electorate was highly utilized in UKIP's strategy during previous EP elections (Ford and Goodwin, 2014). By emphasizing on unfair economic aspect of the EU, the party responds to a demand

from the working-class segment. UKIP's vote-seeking strategy during the 2014 EP elections, exploited the space created by mainstream parties. However, concentrating its strategy around blue-collar voters self-employed/small businesses is difficult. Blue-collar voters' needs tend to lean towards center-left (Labour), and self-employed/small businesses towards center-right (Conservative Party) (Ford and Goodwin, 2016). Nonetheless, UKIP was capable to combine, in its manifesto, concerns from both groups. The party linked their concerns and discontent with the economic failure of the EU, naming small businesses and the working class as part of the overall casualties of EU regulations.

Regaining national sovereignty

Regaining national sovereignty or "*Taking power back*" represented an important part of the text within the category "*nationalism*" for both parties. UKIP and the FN argued that their respective country is stronger outside the EU. Without EU's laws that profit foreign companies over national ones, their country would largely benefit from trade. The FN and UKIP depicted strong similarities in the manner they constructed their arguments regarding sovereignty. They both challenged supranational sovereignty by presenting EU institutions and EU policies as endangering and restricting national sovereignty. Furthermore, they also referred to popular sovereignty. To both parties, the nation's own people legitimate demands represent the democracy, and the latter is violated by EU's institutions and decision-making process.

For the FN, France entering the Economic and the Monetary Union was a stepstone in the shift of power to EU's institutions. This shift, made by political elites, did not consider any citizen consent or discussion over the loss of national sovereignty (Wallace, 1999). One main driver for radical-right voters is the lack of transparency from the government and political elites regarding what "*shared sovereignty*" really means (Borriello and Brack, 2019). This increased discontent and hostility towards mainstream parties and the will to return to a nation-state sovereignty again. The FN supports a Europe of sovereign nations, which reminds us of the Westphalian model. France is perceived by the FN, as the value and cultural base of the "*true*" Europe. Regaining sovereignty for the FN, does not seem to mean removing the EU but rather to come back to a Europe where countries keep their power and have close alliances with those that share the same values and culture. When delving into the Eurosceptic claims shared by both parties where national sovereignty is utilized, I notice that the FN exhibited both radical-left and radical right tendencies (Borreillo and Brack, 2019). The party's opposition to economic liberalization and its support to the economic and social protection of the French people, is often attributed to radical-left strategies. While the clear distinction between the nation's own people and the others, refers to a radical-right approach.

UKIP, however, focused on the parliamentary sovereignty that is infringed by the EU institutions. British sovereignty has always been at the center of UKIP's Eurosceptic claims. Losing traditional parliamentary sovereignty has been very hard on British citizens (Gifford, 2010; Johnston, 1977). None of the British political elite discussed in their discourse, the sovereignty conflicts created by being a member of the EU. Sovereignty issues are very salient among British citizens and the lack of interest from mainstream parties created a place in the political arena for the UKIP to use.

Insights

The FN and UKIP combined in their manifestos, resentment towards the EU with salient popular concerns such as immigration, anti-elite sentiments, and economic and social issues. Ford and Goodwin (2014) highlight that political parties do not gain enough electorate if utilizing only Eurosceptic issues in their electoral strategies. Most voters are driven by other important issues, both in France and in the UK. As is visible in the parties' manifesto, Eurosceptic claims are accompanied by other popular concerns. Both parties aimed to prove to the voters that their concerns are directly connected to the EU and thus, that they should blame the latter for their problems. Capitalizing on the public discontent with the national political system appeared to be the most opportunist strategy for the two parties during EP elections.

6.2 Diverging ideas within the parties' narrative

Exit of Schengen versus Exit of the EU

The most significant finding in this study is that the two parties opposed differently to the EU. The FN had a softer approach to opposing the EU by supporting France's withdrawal from the Schengen area. The FN always had a certain flexibility when it comes to its ideology (Quencez and Michelot, 2017). Prior to the cold war, the party was supporting the idea of the EU. Since then, it became more and more opposed to the EU concept. As other authors demonstrate, the FN agrees that the "old" Europe shares common values, history and beliefs and does not entirely despise the EU as a concept (Flood, 1997; Vasilopoulou, 2007).

UKIP strongly emphasized the need for the UK to exit the EU and renounce its membership. UK's withdrawal from the EU was clearly stated in UKIP's manifesto. The EU membership is seen as very expensive for the country and with more disadvantages than benefits. Chapter four highlighted that UKIP believes that it is on a mission to save Britain (Tournier-Sol, 2015). This rescue operation consists of exiting the EU. This is where it is worthwhile to notice that the FN as well believes that it has a mission to save France. Nevertheless, this "saving" is perceived differently by the two parties.

The party was officially named UKIP in 1993, right when the Maastricht Treaty became effective. It is not surprising that its sole and main focus was the EU. The party was concentrating on immigration from EU Member States to the UK. As the UK is an island, immigration issues are perceived slightly differently than in mainland Europe. The UK always had a special and controversial relationship with the EU (Oliver, 2015). The "us" versus "them" has been much more visible in the UK rather than in France as it did not incorporate the European culture and perceive it as an identity that was theirs. In comparison, the FN refers to Europe as a common identity "*L'Europe des patries*" and does not deny the cultural link between countries. Nonetheless, the party identifies French values and culture as the norm to follow. Gifford (2006) claims that one of the greatest arguments against the EU employed by British Eurosceptic parties is the idea of sovereignty and "*Britishness*". Gifford stresses that the political progress in the UK is "*exceptional and antithetical to the continent*" (2006, p.854).

One possible reason for the FN to focus on Schengen is that it appears to have benefits from having seats in the European Parliament. The European Parliament elections are more advantageous to small or peripheral parties (Reungoat, 2015). The

voting system is more proportional than other electoral systems in France e.g., presidential elections that consist of a two-round voting system where the two parties with the highest voting shares get access to the second round. Moreover, voters' attitudes during EP elections differ from presidential elections, as voters tend to support more non-governmental parties during EP elections (Reif and Schmitt, 1980). Hence, presidential elections are often unfavorable to marginal parties as the majority of voting shares goes to mainstreams parties. As presented in chapter four, the FN first participated in the EP elections in 1984 and managed to gain seats in the EP ever since. This indicates clear success from the FN to convert its activities with the EP into a tool. Furthermore, accessing seats on the European Parliament is a sign of political respectability and recognition (Brack and Costa, 2009). Additionally, the EP is, on top of being a symbolic resource, also is a financial source. This can be very advantageous for smaller political parties. For the FN, access to the EP was a mean to access financial resources to keep its national activities alive. Hence, the FN depends greatly on the EP, whether it is to create a better image of itself at the domestic level or regarding its development as a whole.

Concerning UKIP, EP elections appear to have created a platform for the party where it can finally have an impact. The British majoritarian First-Past-the-Post (FPTP) electoral system considerably limits the opportunities for smaller political parties which are based on the fringe of the political arena. Party competition during FPTP elections is merely benefiting mainstream parties, "*the big two*". The proportional voting from the EP elections allowed UKIP to enter the British party competition. Thus, EP elections for UKIP are very advantageous, and the party uses this opportunity to alter the balance within the British party competition and to make its own voice (Albertazzi, and McDonnell, 2008). Nonetheless, this has not changed its strategy and UKIP's stance, regarding the withdrawal of the EU, remains absolute.

Moreover, there was a noticeable change within the discourse framework of the FN. Since Marine Le Pen became the leader of the party, there has been a strong campaign to "*dediabolize*" the FN and make it seem less radical to voters while still keeping a radical stance. This was, as presented in chapter four, due to many racist allegations from Jean-Marie Le Pen. The FN's discourse had to be shaped differently to appeal to the voters that were not satisfied with mainstream parties. This implied a softening of discourse. Even if Marine Le Pen remains a fervent opponent of the EU, she displays a softer and less erratic narrative than her father, Jean-Marie. This "*dediabolization*" campaign allowed the FN to gain more votes. An interesting connection between the supply and demand metaphor from the free market and the electoral politics is made by Klandermans (2004). As it is within economy, that it is in electoral politics, a company will be successful on the market if it manages to convince consumers to buy its product. Here the more voters the party gets, the more legitimate the party becomes. The message under Marine Le Pen has seen little change from the one of her father. The message remained very populist, but she managed to transform the party into a more modern and acceptable version (Stockemer, 2015). Marine Le Pen also changed the term of the party, that was portrayed and supported by Jean-Marie Le Pen as a radical-right or extreme right party. The FN was from then advertised as a republican party by removing any reference to French extreme right figures and by replacing racist statements with an emphasis on sovereignty and laicism. This change in discourse is visible in the 2014 EP elections where the FN takes a very anti-EU stance, however, does not mention directly, as the UKIP does, the exit of the EU. This strategy from the FN, can be therefore seen as an attempt to normalize the party and to reach a

nearer place to the mainstream parties. Mondon (2016) characterized the FN's attempts as a way to reunite with mainstream parties by blurring its own ideology. This would enable the FN to not be perceived as an enemy of mainstreams but rather as a type of right-wing party (populist/republican). Advocating the exit of the EU would have been considered as very radical, even if the party supported it prior to these EP elections or in the future, the climax during these elections and the FN's situation might not have been favorable to such a statement.

The last argument is the economic, social and political environment in the parties' respective country that could have influenced their electoral strategy. In the UK, the environment was very favorable to a possible withdrawal from the EU. The British population has been very hesitant and doubting the European integration since its establishment. When asked during a survey if they would vote yes for a withdrawal during a referendum, 40 per cent answered positively. Moreover, only 25 per cent of the British exhibited trust in the EU, in comparison, the average of other EU Member States was 47 per cent (Gifford, 2010). Therefore, there was a greater chance for UKIP to gain voting shares by supporting UK's withdrawal from the EU. Contrastingly, a Eurobarometer survey from 2014 revealed that 44 per cent of the French believe that their voice in the EU is being heard, in comparison, only 27 per cent of British thought similar. In the same survey, 63 per cent of French answered that they feel as an EU citizen (Eurobarometer, 2014). France, during the 2014 EP elections was clearly not ready to vote for a party that would support France's exit from the EU. If the FN would have emphasized it, the party could have been seen radical and loose a part of the electorate.

Monetary security versus competitiveness of the industry

Another dissimilarity when comparing findings is the principal focus of both political parties. The FN focused on leaving the eurozone and the return to a national currency, while UKIP is fully centered on how the UK is losing in trade by being an EU Member State.

A first argument for the FN to rotate around the monetary security is that since France's entry in the eurozone, the FN's electoral strategy has been to stress the dangers of not having a national currency. This has been accentuated during and after the European debt crisis where the FN blamed the euro currency to be part of the economic disaster. During the 2012 presidential elections, the FN also supported the proposal for France to exit the eurozone as it did in the 2014 EP elections (Ivaldi, 2018). The FN's position against the euro currency is clear and obvious and is an important part of its electoral strategy. According to Hobolt and Tilley (2016), the eurozone crisis changed dramatically the political arena, with "*challenger parties*" gaining more support. The eurozone crisis has been very beneficial for Populist Eurosceptic parties. Electorates during crises, and more specifically financial crises, tend to support more radical anti-establishment parties. This support is triggered by their discontent with the mainstream parties' strategy to resolve the crisis. The exit of the euro currency being at the center of the FN's statement, demonstrate how the FN took advantage of highly salient European issues to gain more votes during national and European elections (Goodliffe, 2015). Moreover, as described above, the FN's discourse changed since the rise of Marine Le Pen as the leader. The party's narrative became much more focused on socio-economic problems which increased since the European debt crisis. The FN started to strongly

emphasize and address the fears and worries of the part of voters that were affected by the Eurozone crisis (Ivaldi, 2015). A part of the electorates stopped supporting mainstream parties, as they were considered to be hand in hand with the government. This gave opportunities for the FN to gain more voters.

UKIP however, focused on the lack of competitiveness for British industries within the European Common market. Mainstream political parties in the UK have amplified the EU as being very beneficial for UK's economy (Schmidt, 2006). Considering the EU mainly as an economic precursor, the UKIP stands in its discourse against the elite statements. This anti-elite stance could explain why UKIP's Eurosceptic narrative focused principally on the trading aspect of the EU. Another possible argument is that UKIP's support is, as seen above, divided into two groups, the first one represents low educated white male, mostly working manually and that display a traditional Labour preference. The second group represents the employers and small businesses which display Conservative loyalty. While UKIP attempts its best to fulfill the need of both groups, blue-collars voters symbolize the most important electorate for the party. This group display strong pessimism towards their own economic situation.

Uncontrolled immigration and security versus Mass immigration and abuse of public services

The FN and UKIP are both perceived as welfare chauvinist and both have a strong anti-immigration stance. However, when it comes to the main focus on immigration issues during the 2014 EP, the FN decided to put its attention on the aspect of security and illegal immigration while the UKIP pursued the welfare chauvinist approach where mass immigration generates more abuse of public services which in return affect national citizens.

The FN focused on national security when it comes to immigration issues. This can be related with its ethnocentric discourse which puts an emphasis on people from the same cultural and historical background, the one homogeneous pure entity (Stockemer and Mauro, 2016; Hainsworth, 2008). This approach relates to people-centrism, important characteristic of a populist discourse (Mudde, 2004; 2007). The FN stressed that illegal immigration is the most important immigration issue in France. Terroristic attacks have been very decisive regarding the choice of focus when naming immigration issues for the FN. Immigration and security became throughout the years, intertwined and highly salient during French electoral cycles, in national or EU level elections. Most notably in 2012, the Toulouse and Montauban shootings perpetrated by a self-proclaimed jihadist, increased the state of fear in France and the growth of anti-immigration feelings. It is interesting to notice that during the 2012 presidential campaign, the FN employed a similar strategy. Anti-immigration statements are portrayed as a way to be on the path for recovery of the Republic. This "*saving the Republic*" rhetoric can be identified as a way for the FN to justify anti-immigration issues.

UKIP's emphasis on mass immigration and abuse of public services can be explained as prior to 2014, the UK has seen a strong increase in the immigration ratio. In fact, David Goodhart, in his book *The British Dream: Success and Failures of Post-War immigration* (2013), argues that large-scale immigration to the UK has aggravated certain aspects of the commonwealth's economy, such as "*poverty, inequality, low productivity, lack of training and employee short-termism*". This has created a growing

discontent from the British citizens that can be seen in Eurosceptic votes which has as well increased. It is valuable to mention that politicizing European issues has been avoided by mainstream parties in the UK due to the fact that it would generate a strong division and tensions within the left-right parties whether internally or on electoral arena (Hooghe and Marks, 2009). UKIP took the opportunity and capitalized the European integration issue (Tournier-Sol, 2020). UKIP had a lot of opportunities to increase its support by focusing on these issues. Its rhetoric during the 2014 EP elections was rather exclusionary. Mass immigration and xenophobia have been very salient issues in elections in the UK, during general elections and EP elections. This large immigration to the UK was seen as a threat to the nationhood and have been a long-time driver for support of the BNP party, British radical-right wing party (Clarke et al., 2009; Voas and Ling, 2010). This would justify UKIP's choice to concentrate on these immigration issues.

Insights

One relevant insight when comparing the FN's and the UKIP's electoral program and their Eurosceptic claims was that both parties had considerably different justifications for their Euroscepticism arguments. UKIP defended the British traditional parliamentary sovereignty while the FN supported the French national Republicanism.

The FN's electoral rhetoric in its program demonstrates numerous connections with French Republicanism. Most notably, the conception of "*the will of the people*" as the basis for a true democracy, has been strongly underpinned in the FN's text. This aspect of popular sovereignty, as seen in the previous sub-chapter, insinuates a certain accountability from the establishment and the elite to the people. This accountability is reinforced by populist, anti-elite, and establishment rhetoric which in time, can generate strong political turbulences as it changes the perception of the respective role of account-givers and account-holders (Batory and Svensson, 2019; Caramani, 2017; Wood et al., 2021). As explained above, while the FN's rhetoric and strategy became smoother and more "to the norm" since Marine Le Pen, the party's ideologies remained a continuation of the one's of Jean-Marie Le Pen, based on French Republicanism. The FN describes itself as the defender of the values of the French Republic (Shields, 2013). Laborde (2008) describes the French National Republicanism as not acknowledging the existence of French racism and forces immigrants to integrate to such values. The author emphasizes that this form of republicanism, believes that focusing on ethnic issues such as discrimination, impacts the development of integration. The distinction between "*us*" and the "*others*" as well correlates with French national Republicanism, this approach is very exclusive to the "*others*". The FN relates in its text to the "*others*" as the elite or also immigrants from countries with very different culture and values than France.

Sovereignty can be perceived in many different ways. In the UK, sovereignty has a very distinct meaning from other European countries. It encompasses a great number of elements from the monarchical sovereignty and represents a centralized law-making entity. As Baker (2001, p.276) underlines, "*While governance becomes multi-level, and multi-dimensional, the elements of democratic representation, party loyalty and core political loyalty remain deeply rooted in the traditional institutions of the nation state*". The British traditional parliamentary sovereignty has been highly affected by the entrance of the UK in the European Economic Community in 1973. The latter is perceived as a menace to the British traditional parliamentary sovereignty. The European integration with the primacy of EU laws within the economic and social aspects of the

country has diminished the democratic accountability in the UK (Bellamy and Kröger 2014). The sovereignty of parliament is an important part of UK's identity and has been challenged by European integration. Findings illustrated that regaining sovereignty is one of the most popular issue in UKIP's manifesto. The withdrawal from the EU is justifiable as the UK must regain full control of its law-making. Moreover, *British exceptionalism* statements are an important part of its manifesto. These statements argue that British law or British interests must prevail above else. It is a commonly used Eurosceptic rhetoric for UKIP and justifies its stance towards the EU.

This discussion revealed three main factors affecting the parties' Eurosceptic narrative. Voting shares seem to prevail as the main factor that influences the FN and UKIP's electoral strategy and both parties' strong Eurosceptic arguments appear to be shaped according to the voters' needs. Moreover, the political, economic, and social climate in France and in the UK have as well molded the parties' narrative. One different factor is the core justification or pretext of each party's Eurosceptic claims. The FN perceives itself as the defender of the French Republic while UKIP as a defender of the British parliamentary sovereignty.

7 Overall conclusion

The fundamental aim of this master's thesis was to find if a Eurosceptic narrative categorized as strong, could present intricate variations in the corpus of the electoral manifesto. To do so, I established the research question "*did the FN and UKIP express different nuances of Euroscepticism in their electoral programs for the 2014 European elections?*". To answer the question, the qualitative textual data analysis of the two manifestos found that yes, they did display many nuances.

This thesis discovered that electoral Eurosceptic narratives are contingent on specific political and social environment. Populist Eurosceptic parties appear to shape their electoral strategies according to how opportune the environment is to gain more votes. The parties will intensify or reduce the level of their Eurosceptic statements accordingly. The FN and UKIP utilized such strategy to appeal to a greater part of the electorate during the EP elections. The two parties were found to converge in their Eurosceptic arguments encompassing populist concerns. However, they presented at their core, very distinctive justification for their Eurosceptic claims. The FN explained its Eurosceptic statements by claiming to defend the French national republicanism, while UKIP claimed to defend the British traditional parliamentary sovereignty, or the British exceptionalism. Furthermore, the FN applied softer Eurosceptic arguments compared to the UKIP by not referring to France's withdrawal from the EU but instead to the exit of the Schengen area.

The electoral manifestos' analysis outlined above, is a preliminary demonstration of how parties' manifestos can help us distinguish a more complex type of strong Euroscepticism in right-wing political parties. This framework, however, solely pertains to two political parties. This might be insufficient on its own to academically prove or disprove hypothesis. More data would be needed in this case to make the findings of this research more relevant and legitimate. Moreover, this study based itself on electoral manifestos. However, UKIP's manifesto was smaller than the FN's, which might have impacted the methodology with the coding and word count. It would be more relevant to compare manifestos of a similar size to get a better comparison when utilizing word counts analysis and coding systems.

For further recommendations, it would be relevant to use this data to examine and compare other strong Eurosceptic parties during the 2014 EP elections or to compare the FN and UKIP Eurosceptic narratives between other EP elections. This would allow to frame populism and Euroscepticism during EP elections and across Europe and to investigate if there were any changes in the parties' ideologies during the 2014 EP campaign compared to other EP elections. Another possible research can be done using this study as a base (the two parties' preferences in their Eurosceptic claims) and further analyze the outcome of the post 2014 elections, how the two parties evolved in the political sphere (at EU and national level) by utilizing their strategy during these elections and how did they use seats in the Parliament.

Bibliography

- Abts, K., & Heerwegh, D., & Swyngedouw, M. (2009). Sources of Euroscepticism: Utilitarian Interest, Social Distrust, National Identity and Institutional Distrust. *World Political Science Review*, 5. 10.2202/1935-6226.1057.
- Albertazzi, D., & McDonnell, D. (2008). Introduction: The sceptre and the spectre. In *Twenty-first century populism* (pp. 1-11). Palgrave Macmillan, London.
- Baker, D. (2001). Britain and Europe: the argument continues. *Parliamentary Affairs*, 54(2), 276-288.
- Batory, A., & Svensson, S. (2019). The use and abuse of participatory governance by populist governments. *Policy & Politics*, 47 (2), 227-244.
- Bellamy, R., & Kröger, S. (2014). Domesticating the democratic deficit? The role of national parliaments and parties in the EU's system of governance. *Parliamentary Affairs*, 67(2), 437-457.
- Benford, R D., & Snow, D. (2000) .`Framing processes and social movements: An overview and assessment'. *Annual Review of Sociology* (26): 611–639.
- Blassnig, S., & Ernst, N., & Büchel, F., & Engesser, S., & Esser, F. (2019). Populism in online election coverage: Analyzing populist statements by politicians, journalists, and readers in three countries. *Journalism Studies*, 20(8), 1110-1129.
- Bobba, G., & Seddone, A. (2018). How do Eurosceptic parties and economic crisis affect news coverage of the European Union? Evidence from the 2014 European elections in Italy. *European Politics and Society*, 19(2), 147-165.
- Borriello, A., & Brack, N .(2019). 'I want my sovereignty back!' A comparative analysis of the populist discourses of Podemos, the 5 Star Movement, the FN and UKIP during the economic and migration crises, *Journal of European Integration*, 41:7, 833-853, DOI: [10.1080/07036337.2019.1665658](https://doi.org/10.1080/07036337.2019.1665658)
- Bowles, H. (2020). Comparing the Origins and Ideology of the UK Independence Party and Alternative für Deutschland: Is it justified to include respective parties as members of the 'Extreme Right' Party Family?. *The Elphinstone Review*, 48.
- Brack, N., & Costa, O. (2009). What Role for the Eurosceptic MEPs. In Dieter Fuch, Raul MagniBerton and Antoine Roger (eds) *Euroscepticism*. Opladen: Barbara Budrich Publishers, 253–272.
- Bräuninger, T., Debus, M., & Müller, J. (2013). Estimating Policy Positions of Political Actors across Countries and Time. <http://www.mzes.unimannheim.de/publications/wp/wp-153.pdf>
- Budge, I., & Klingemann, HD., & Volkens, A, et al. (eds) (2001). *Mapping Policy Preferences: Estimates for Parties Electors, and Governments 1945-1998*. Oxford: *Oxford University Press*.
- Budge, I., & Laver, M. J. (1992). Coalition theory, government policy and party policy. *Party policy and government coalitions*, 1-14.
- Cautres, B., Chopin, T., & Riviere, E. (2020). French Public Opinion and Europe Between Distrust and Ambivalence (n.119). Institut Delors.
- Caramani, D. (2017). Will vs. Reason: The Populist and Technocratic Forms of Political Representation and Their Critique to Party Government. *American Political Science Review*, 111 (1), 54-67.
- Carlotti, B. (2018). The odd couple: Analyzing United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) and Italian Five Stars Movement's (FSM's) European Union (EU)-

- opposition in the European Parliament (EP). *Italian Political Science Review/Rivista Italiana Di Scienza Politica*, 48(2), 197-220.
Doi:10.1017/ipo.2017.24
- Clark, A. (2018). *Political Parties in the UK*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan
- Clarke, H. D., Sanders, D., Stewart, M. C., & Whiteley, P. F. (2009). *Performance politics and the British voter*. Cambridge University Press.
- Crépon S, Dézé A., & Mayer, N (eds). (2015). *Les faux-semblants du Front national*. Paris: Presses de Sciences-Po
- Crines, A., Heppell, T. (2017). Rhetorical style and issue emphasis within the conference speeches of UKIP's Nigel Farage 2010–2014. *Br Polit* **12**, 231–249.
<https://doi.org/10.1057/bp.2016.2>
- Csehi, R., & Zgut, E. (2021). 'We won't let Brussels dictate us': Eurosceptic populism in Hungary and Poland. *European Politics and Society*, 22(1), 53-68.
- Cuminal, I., Souchard, M., Wahnich, S., & Wathier, V. (1997). *Le Pen, les mots. Analyse d'un discours d'extrême-droite*. Paris: Le Monde Editions, 11.
- Della Posta, D. (2013). Competitive Threat, Intergroup Contact, or Both? Immigration and the Dynamics of *Front National* Voting in France. *Social Forces*, Volume 92, Issue 1, Pages 249–273, <https://doi.org/10.1093/sf/sot046>
- Duprat, F. (1972). *Les Mouvements d'extrême-droite en France depuis 1944*. Paris: Albatros.
- Duprat, F. (1978). Quelques définitions nécessaires. *Le Salut public* 4. Eichenberg, R., & Dalton, R. (1993). Europeans and the European community: the dynamics of public support for European integration. *International Organization* 47: 507–534
- Eatwell, R. (2003). Ten theories of the extreme right. In *Right-wing extremism in the twenty-first century* (pp. 45-70). Frank Cass.
- Elo, S., Kääriäinen, M., Kanste, O., Pölkki, T., Utriainen, K., & Kyngäs, H. (2014). Qualitative Content Analysis: A Focus on Trustworthiness. *SAGE Open*.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/2158244014522633>
- Engesser, S., Ernst, N., Esser, F., & Büchel, F. (2017). Populism and social media: How politicians spread a fragmented ideology. *Information, communication & society*, 20(8), 1109-1126.
- Eurobarometer, S. (2014). Public opinion in the European Union. *European Commission*. European Parliament. (2014). *Results of the 2014 European Parliament Elections*.
- FitzGibbon, J. (2014). Euroscepticism and the 2014 European Parliamentary Elections. *L'Europe en Formation*, 373(3), 29-44. <https://doi.org/10.3917/eufor.373.0029>
- Flood, C. (2002). Euro scepticism: A Problematic Concept. Paper presented at the UACES 32nd Annual Conference and 7th Research Conference.
- Flood, C. (2009). Dimensions of Euroscepticism. *Journal of Common Market Studies*. 47. 911- 917. 10.1111/j.1468-5965.2009.02027.x.
- Flood, C., & Usherwood, S. (2005). Positions, Dispositions, Transitions: A model of group alignment on EU integration. In *55th Annual Conference of the Political Studies Association, University of Leeds* (pp. 5-7).
- Ford, R., Goodwin, M., Cutts, D. (2011). Strategic Eurosceptics and Polite Xenophobes: Support for the UK Independence Party (UKIP) in the 2009 European Parliament Elections. *European Journal of Political Research*. Doi:[10.1111/j.1475-6765.2011.01994.x](https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-6765.2011.01994.x)
- Ford, R., & Goodwin, M. (2014). Understanding UKIP: Identity, Social Change and the Left Behind. *The Political Quarterly*, 85: 277-284. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-923X.12099>

- Ford, R., & Goodwin, M. J. (2016). Different Class? UKIP's Social Base and Political Impact: A Reply to Evans and Mellon. *Parliamentary Affairs*, 69(2), 480-491.
- Franklin M.N. (2017). EP Elections as Stepping-Stones to Eurosceptic Party Success. In: Hassing Nielsen J., Franklin M. (eds) *The Eurosceptic 2014 European Parliament Elections*. Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-58696-4_11
- Front National. (2012). *Prononcé le 14 janvier 2012 - Programme de Mme Marine Le Pen, candidate du Front national à l'élection* | *Vie publique.fr*. Vie-publique.fr. (2012). <https://www.vie-publique.fr/discours/184668-programme-de-mme-marine-le-pen-candidate-du-front-national-lelection>.
- Funke, M., & Schularick, M., & Trebesch, C. (2015). Going to Extremes: Politics After Financial Crisis, 1870-2014. *CESifo Working Paper No. 5553*.
- Gifford, C. (2006). The rise of post-imperial populism: The case of right-wing Euroscepticism in Britain. *European Journal of Political Research*, 45(5), 851-869.
- Gifford, C. (2010). The UK and the European Union: Dimensions of Sovereignty and the Problem of Eurosceptic Britishness. *Parliamentary Affairs - PARLIAMENT AFF.* 63. 321-338. 10.1093/pa/gsp031.
- Gómez-Reino Cachafeiro, M., & Plaza-Colodro, C. (2018). Populist Euroscepticism in Iberian party systems. *Politics*, 38(3), 344-360.
- Goodhart, D. (2013). *The British dream: Successes and failures of post-war immigration*. Atlantic Books Ltd.
- Goodliffe, G. (2015). Europe's salience and 'owning' Euroscepticism: Explaining the Front National's victory in the 2014 European elections in France. *French Politics*. 13. 324-345. 10.1057/fp.2015.19.
- Goodwin, M, J., & Dennison, J. (2018). The Radical Right in the United Kingdom. In J. Rydgren, *The Oxford Handbook of The Radical Right* (pp. 521-544). New York: Oxford University Press.
- Hainsworth, P., & O'Brien, C., & Mitchell, P. (2004). Defending the Nation: The Politics of Euroscepticism on the French Right. *European Studies: A Journal of European Culture, History and Politics*. 37-58.
- Hainsworth, P. (2008). *The Extreme Right in Western Europe*. Routledge, New York.
- Harmsen, R., & Spiering, M. (2004). Euroscepticism: party politics, national identity and European integration (No. 20). Rodopi.
- Hawkins, R. (2010). BBC News - Lord Pearson says UKIP needs a better politician. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/mobile/uk-politics-10997481>
- Hayton, R. (2010). Towards the mainstream? UKIP and the 2009 elections to the European Parliament. *Politics* 30(1): 26–35.
- Hix, S., & Marsh, M. (2007). Punishment or protest? Understanding European parliament elections. *The Journal of Politics*, 69(2): 495–510.
- Hobolt, S. (2015). The 2014 European Parliament Elections: Divided in Unity?. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, 53: 6– 21. doi: [10.1111/jcms.12264](https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.12264).
- Hobolt, S., & de Vries, C. (2016). Turning against the Union? The impact of the crisis on the Eurosceptic vote in the 2014 European Parliament elections. *Electoral Studies*. 44. 10.1016/j.electstud.2016.05.006.
- Hobolt, S. B., & Tilley, J. (2016). Fleeing the centre: the rise of challenger parties in the aftermath of the euro crisis. *West European Politics*, 39(5), 971-991.
- Hooghe, L., & Marks, G. (2004). Does identity or economic rationality drive public opinion on European integration?. *PS: Political science and Politics*, 37(3), 415-420.

- Hooghe, L., & Marks, G. (2005). Calculation, community and cues: Public opinion on European integration. *European Union Politics*, 6(4), 419-443.
- Hooghe, L., & Marks, G. (2007). Sources of Euroscepticism. *Acta Politica - ACTA POLIT.* 42. 119-127. 10.1057/palgrave.ap.5500192.
- Hooghe, L., & Marks, G. (2009). A postfunctionalist theory of European integration: From permissive consensus to constraining. *British journal of political science*, 1-23.
- Ivaldi, G. (2014). Euroscepticism, populisme, droites radicales : état des forces et enjeux européens. *L'Europe en Formation*, 3(3), 7-28. <https://doi.org/10.3917/eufor.373.0007>
- Ivaldi, G. (2015). Towards the median economic crisis voter? The new leftist economic agenda of the front national in France. *French Politics* 13(4): 346-369.
- Ivaldi, G. (2016). The Front National and the politics of Euroscepticism in France.
- Ivaldi, G. (2018). Contesting the EU in times of crisis: The Front National and politics of Euroscepticism in France. *Politics*, 38(3), 278-294.
Doi:10.1177/0263395718766787
- Johnston, R. J. (1977). National Sovereignty and National Power in European Institutions. *Environment and Planning A: Economy and Space*, 9(5), 569-577. <https://doi.org/10.1068/a090569>
- Karlin, É., & Denis, T. (2014). Cette France qui tombe dans les bras du FN. https://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/politique/fn/cette-france-qui-tombe-dans-les-bras-du-fn_1618575.html
- Kenny, M. (2015). The Return of "Englishness" in British Political Culture – The End of the Unions? *Journal of Common Market Studies* 53 (1): 35-51.
- Kopecký, P., & Mudde, C. (2002). The Two Sides of Euroscepticism Party Positions on European Integration in East Central Europe. *European Union Politics*, 3(3), pp.297-326.
- Kriesi, H. (2007). The role of European integration in national election campaigns', *European Union Politics* 8(1): 83-108.
- Krippendorff, K. (2004). Reliability in content analysis: Some common misconceptions and recommendations. *Human communication research*, 30(3), 411-433.
- Kuckartz, U. (2019). Qualitative Text Analysis: A Systematic Approach. In: Kaiser G., Presmeg N. (eds) *Compendium for Early Career Researchers in Mathematics Education*. ICME-13 Monographs. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-15636-7_8
- Laver, M., & Benoit, K., & Garry, J. (2003). Extracting Policy Positions from Political Texts Using Words as Data. <http://faculty.washington.edu/jwilker/tft/Laver.pdf>
- Laver, M., & Garry, J. (2000). Estimating Policy Positions from Political Texts. https://is.muni.cz/el/1423/podzim2008/SOC141/um/Laver_Garry.pdf
- Liamputtong, P. (2010). *Performing qualitative cross-cultural research*. Cambridge University Press.
- Lynch, P., & Whitaker, R., & Loomes, G. (2012). The UK Independence Party: Understanding a Niche Party's Strategy, Candidates and Supporters. *Parliamentary Affairs*, Volume 65, Issue 4, 733-757. <https://doi.org/10.1093/pa/gsr042>
- Mahoney, James. (2007). Qualitative Methodology and Comparative Politics. *Comparative Political Studies - COMP POLIT STUD.* 40. 122-144. 10.1177/0010414006296345
- Mason, R., & Wintour, P. (2014). Farage claims Ukip may have common ground with France's Front National.

- <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2014/may/21/farage-claims-ukip-may-have-common-ground-with-front-national>
- McLaren, L. (2002). Public support for the European Union: cost/benefit analysis or perceived cultural threat?. *The Journal of Politics* 64: 551–566
- Michels, R. (1915). *Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy*. New York: Hearst's International Library Co.
- Mondon, A. (2014). The Front National in the Twenty-First Century: From Pariah to Republican Democratic Contender?. *Modern & Contemporary France*, 22:3, 301-320. Doi: [10.1080/09639489.2013.872093](https://doi.org/10.1080/09639489.2013.872093)
- Mondon, A. (2015). Populism, the 'people' and the illusion of democracy—The Front National and UKIP in a comparative context. *French politics*, 13(2), 141-156.
- Morini, M. (2018). Front national and Lega Nord: two stories of the same Euroscepticism. *European Politics and Society*, 19:1, 1-19. doi: [10.1080/23745118.2017.1295569](https://doi.org/10.1080/23745118.2017.1295569)
- Mudde, C. (2004). The populist zeitgeist. *Government and opposition*, 39(4), 541-563.
- Mudde, C. (2007). *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Mudde, C. (2013). Three decades of populist radical right parties in Western Europe: So what?. *European Journal of Political Research*, 52(1), 1-19.
- Mudde, C., & Kaltwasser, C. R. (Eds.). (2012). *Populism in Europe and the Americas: Threat or corrective for democracy?*. Cambridge University Press.
- Nasri, M.N., Nasri, N., & Abd Talib, M.A. (2020). Cross-language qualitative research studies dilemmas: a research review. *Qualitative Research Journal*, Vol. 21 No. 1, pp. 15-28. <https://doi.org/10.1108/QRJ-12-2019-0093>
- Nicoli, F. (2017). Hard-line euroscepticism and the eurocrisis: Evidence from a panel study of 108 elections across Europe. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, 55(2), 312-331.
- Oliver, T. (2015). Europe's British question: the UK–EU relationship in a changing Europe and multipolar world. *Global Society*, 29(3), 409-426.
- OpinionWay-Fiducial. 2012. "Sondage jour du vote au premier tour Présidentielle 2012 – sociologie du vote." http://opinionlab.opinionway.com/dokumenty/Sondage_per_cent_20jour_per_cent_20de_per_cent_20vote-SOCIOLOGIE_per_cent_20DU_per_cent_20VOTE_per_cent_20VF_per_cent_20OLAB_5.pdf.
- Parker, G. (2014). UKIP and National Front lead populist earthquake. *Financial Times*.
- Pirro, A. L., & Taggart, P. (2018). The populist politics of Euroscepticism in times of crisis: A framework for analysis. *Politics*, 38(3), 253-262.
- Price, M. (2014). Eurosceptic 'earthquake' rocks EU elections. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-27559714>
- Quencez, M., & Michelot, M. (2017). (Rep.). German Marshall Fund of the United States. Retrieved January 7, 2021, from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep18889>
- Ray, L. (1999). Measuring Party Orientations Towards European Integration: Results from an Expert Survey. *European Journal of Political Research* 36:283
- Reif, K., & Schmitt, H. (1980). Nine Second-Order National Elections – A Conceptual Framework for the Analysis of European Election Results. *European Journal of Political Research* 8: 3-44. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-6765.1980.tb00737.x>
- Reungoat, E. (2012). Changes in Discourse and Resistance Positions Toward Europe in French Political Parties (1979–2009). In Pasquinucci, Daniele, Preda, Daniela (eds) *Consensus and European Integration*. Brussels: Peter Lang, 165–180.
- Reungoat, E. (2015). Mobilizing Europe in National Competition: The Case of the French Front National. *International Political Science Review*. 36. 296-310. Doi:10.1177/0192512114568816.

- Rooduijn, M., & Akkerman, T. (2017). Flank attacks: Populism and left-right radicalism in Western Europe. *Party Politics*, 23(3), 193–204.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/1354068815596514>
- Rydgren, J. (2018). The Radical Right. *The Oxford Handbook of the Radical Right*, 1–17. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
<http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190274559.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780190274559-e-1>
- Schedler, A. (1996). Anti-political-establishment Parties. *Party Politics* 2(3): 291–312
- Schmidt, F. (2018). Drivers of populism: A Four-country comparison of party communication in the run-up to the 2014 European Parliament Elections. *Political studies*, 66(2), 459– 479.
- Schmidt, V. A. (2006). *Democracy in Europe: The EU and national politics*. Oxford University Press.
- Schreier, M. (2012). *Qualitative content analysis in practice*. Sage publications.
- Shields, J. (2013). Marine Le Pen and the 'New'FN: A change of style or of substance?. *Parliamentary Affairs*, 66(1), 179-196.
- Shields, J. (2014a). The Front National: From Systematic Opposition to Systemic Integration?, *Modern & Contemporary France*, 22:4, 491-511. Doi: [10.1080/09639489.2014.957964](https://doi.org/10.1080/09639489.2014.957964)
- Shields, J. (2014b). The Front National since the 1970s: Electoral Impact and Party System Change. *France since the 1970s: History, Politics and Memory in an Age of Uncertainty*, 41-64.
- Steenvoorden, E., & Wright, M. (2019). Political Shades of 'we': sociotropic uncertainty and multiple political identification in Europe, *European Societies*, 21:1, 4-32. doi: [10.1080/14616696.2018.1552980](https://doi.org/10.1080/14616696.2018.1552980)
- Stockemer, D. (2015). Introduction to the special issue: Explaining the spike in electoral support for the front national in france. *French Politics*, 13(4), 319-323.
doi:<http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/fp.2015.20>
- Stockemer, D., & Barisione, M. (2016). The "new" discourse of the Front National (FN) under Marine Le Pen: A slight change with a big impact. *European Journal of Communication*. 32. Doi: [10.1177/0267323116680132](https://doi.org/10.1177/0267323116680132).
- Taggart, P., & Szczerbiak, A. (2002). Europeanisation, Euroscepticism and Party Systems: Party-based Euroscepticism in the Candidate States of Central and Eastern Europe, *Perspectives on European Politics and Society*, 3(1):23-41.
- Szczerbiak, A., & Taggart, P. (2003). Theorizing party-based Euroscepticism: Problems of definition, measurement and causality.
- Taggart, P., & Szczerbiak, A. (2004). Contemporary Euroscepticism in the party systems of the European Union candidate states of Central and Eastern Europe, *European Journal of Political Research*, 43: 1–27.
- Taggart, P., & Szczerbiak, A. (2008). Introduction: Opposing Europe? The Politics of Euroscepticism in Europe. In Szczerbiak, A. and Taggart, P. (eds.) *Opposing Europe? The Comparative Party Politics of Euroscepticism*, Volume 1: Case studies and country surveys, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Torreblanca, J. I., & Leonard, M. (2013). The continent-wide rise of Euroscepticism.
- Tournier, M. (2000). Lexicométrie. In P. Charaudeau and D. Maingueneau. *Dictionnaire d'Analyse des discours*.
- Tournier-Sol, K. (2015). Reworking the Eurosceptic and Conservative Traditions into a Populist Narrative: UKIP's Winning Formula?. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, 53(1), 140-156.

- Tournier-Sol, K. (2020). From UKIP to the Brexit party: the politicization of European integration and disruptive impact on national and European arenas, *Journal of Contemporary European Studies*, DOI: [10.1080/14782804.2020.1785849](https://doi.org/10.1080/14782804.2020.1785849)
- Treib, O. (2014). The voter says no, but nobody listens: causes and consequences of the Eurosceptic vote in the 2014 European elections. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 21:10, 1541-1554. doi: [10.1080/13501763.2014.941534](https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2014.941534)
- Treib, O. (2020a). Euroscepticism is here to stay: What cleavage theory can teach us about the 2019 European Parliament elections. *Journal of European Public Policy* (first view). <https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2020.1737881>.
- Treib, O. (2020b). Exploring mainstream Euroscepticism: Similarities and differences between Eurosceptic claims of centre-right and radical right parties. *Research & Politics*. <https://doi.org/10.1177/2053168020953301>
- Ultan, M O., & Ornek, S. (2015). EUROSCEPTICISM IN THE EUROPEAN UNION. *International Journal of Social Sciences*. IV. 49-57.
- United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP).(2010). Empowering the People. *In General Election Manifesto*.
- Usherwood, S. (2008). The dilemmas of a single-issue party – The UK Independence Party, *Representation*, 44:3, 255-264. Doi: [10.1080/00344890802237023](https://doi.org/10.1080/00344890802237023)
- Vasilopoulou, S. (2010). *Euroscepticism and the Radical Right: domestic strategies and party system dynamics* (Doctoral dissertation, The London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE)).
- Vasilopoulou, S. (2017a). Theory, concepts and research design in the study of Euroscepticism.
- Vasilopoulou S. (2017b) British Eurosceptic Voting in 2014: Anti-EU or Anti-Government?. In: Hassing Nielsen J., Franklin M. (eds) *The Eurosceptic 2014 European Parliament Elections*. Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-58696-4_4
- Vasilopoulou, S. (2018). The party politics of Euroscepticism in times of crisis: The case of Greece. *Politics*, 38(3), 311–326. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0263395718770599>
- Vercesi, Michelangelo & Salvati, Eugenio. (2017). *Anti-System Eurosceptic Parties Against Europe: Where and Why They Succeed*.
- Whitaker, R., & Lynch, P. (2011). Explaining Support for the UK Independence Party at the 2009 European Parliament Elections, *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties*, 21:3, 359-379. Doi: [10.1080/17457289.2011.588439](https://doi.org/10.1080/17457289.2011.588439)
- Voas, D., & Ling, R. (2010). *British Social Attitudes: The 26th Report*.
- Wood, M., & Matthews, F., & Schillemans, T., & Overman, S. (2021). Enacting accountability under populist pressures – theorizing the relationship between anti-elite rhetoric and public accountability. *Administration & Society*.
- Wooffitt, R. (2005). *Conversation Analysis and Discourse Analysis: A Comparative and Critical Introduction*.
- Zúñiga, N., & Jenkins, M. (2018). Methodologies for the Analysis of Political Party Programmes. *Berlin: Transparency International*. <https://knowledgehub.transparency.org/assets/uploads/helpdesk/Methodologies-analysis-party-programmes.pdf>

