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Extremist Parties and Their Euroscepticism:

A Comparison of the Differences in the Euroscepticism of the Radical Right-Wing Parties UKIP and Vox España

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ABSTRACT

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(Under the direction of Viktoriya Fedorchak)

Following the acceleration of the European integration process in the late 1990s and early 2000s, there has been a rise in political parties expressing their scepticism or outright criticism of the integration process. Using a typology presented by Sofia Vasilopoulou, this thesis investigates the differences in the Euroscepticism of two radical right-wing parties in The United Kingdom and Spain: UKIP and Vox España. The first chapter of the thesis gives a brief introduction and presents the research question. The second chapter gives an overview of the current state of art on the literature on Euroscepticism and the two parties. Following this, by thoroughly analysing party manifestos and speeches made by party representatives, the parties were analysed on four different aspects: the common cultural heritage, the principle of integration, the current practice of the EU and the future of European integration, before they were placed into one of the three categories: "rejecting", "conditional" and "compromising" Euroscepticism. The conclusion is that Euroscepticism within radical right-wing parties is very different, as UKIP was categorized as "rejecting" Eurosceptics and Vox España was categorized as "conditional" Eurosceptics. The parties were shown to have some common interests, but it becomes clear that the two parties have very different views on European integration, as UKIP wants to totally abandon the EU, while Vox España wants to reform the current practices from within. Being aware of these differences is therefore useful in explaining patterns of cooperation between these parties on a European level or investigate whether the Euroscepticism is based on ideological or strategical motivations.

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1.0 A united Europe – Not so united after all?

Never in the history of European integration has there been a more salient moment to study the much used and much-debated concept of Euroscepticism than the last 5 years. The effects of the 2008 economic crisis, deep concerns about the European security as a result of the terrorist attacks in Paris, Brussels and Manchester and the ongoing migration crisis touching on all the European countries have put the European project under great pressure (Leruth, Startin, Underwood, 2018, p. 3). In 2013, Herman van Rompuy, President of the European Council at the time had a speech about the problems the European Union should be most concerned about. He mentioned, among other things, the Euro crisis, globalization, and populism. According to Van Rompuy, populism is an outlet for anger and resentment, the promise of restored identity, the illusion that closing a fence can turn back the clock, the lie that you can survive on the global market without efforts. He also explores the question: whether Europe is just space, a zone to roam around or if it is also a place, where we can feel at home (Van Rompuy, 2013). Enrico Letta, the then Prime Minister of Italy, warned against populism in an interview with *The New York Times* in 2013, and stated that populism in Europa are mostly "anti-European", expressing his concerns that the future European elections would leave us with ´The most "anti-European" European Parliament ever´(Ortu, 2015, p. 114). The results of the last two European elections have shown us that Letta´s forecasts were correct, and the European Parliament has never consisted of more "anti-European" parties than it does today.

Two series of explanations have been used in the scientific literature to account for the rise of far-right populist, Eurosceptic parties. The first one is national problems such as the transformation of the welfare state and the threat of immigration, which has paved the way single-issue parties, where the term *populism* is used. The second explanation links the rise of the extremist parties to a broader reflection on the constitution of a multi-level European polity, where critical attitudes regarding European integration by politicians that either oppose Europeanization of national policies or reject acceding to the EU in candidate countries. This explanation is known under the term *Euroscepticism* (Dechezelles & Neumayer, 2010, pp. 229-230). I will in my thesis mainly focus on the Euroscepticism of the chosen parties, while the populist tendencies only will be mentioned when they relate to Euroscepticism. The EU is under double pressure, affected by the low trust in politics in general, and is specifically hit. For instance, Europe is blamed for what is caused by globalization, and the Europe that was all about opening, liberating, creating possibilities and empowering is today looked upon by many as being intrusive, meddling, dictating, judging, imposing and even punishing (Van Rompuy, 2013).

As anticipated by both Van Rompuy and Letta, Euroscepticism has spread across the continent like an infectious virus. Eurosceptic radical-right parties have grown all over Europe in countries such as Great Britain and Spain. Szczerbiak and Taggart (2018, pp. 14-15) note that the broad, underlying party positions on the issue of European integration (including Eurosceptic ones) are determined by, among other things, the parties ´wider ideological profile and values and the perceived interests of its supporters. This indicates that there is a need to differentiate left and right-wing Euroscepticism. Furthermore, it is evident that right-wing parties all over Europe struggle to cooperate once they are elected into the European Parliament. This indicates that Euroscepticism in itself isn't a unifier for cooperation among right-wing Eurosceptical parties and that there might exist differences among them regarding the degree of Euroscepticism (Startin &

Brack, 2016, p. 2). Considering this, **the main purpose** of this thesis is to investigate the differences between the two Eurosceptic radical right-wing parties United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) and Vox España, and my research question therefore is: What are the differences between UKIP and Vox España in their Euroscepticism?

To answer this research question, I will present the state of the art of the contemporary research on Euroscepticism and briefly touch upon relevant research found on the selected parties. Following the literature review, I will describe the methodology used in the thesis, showing how I collected my data and the methodological refinements. Further, I introduce my analytical framework which is based on Sofia Vasilopoulou (2011) typology for measuring radical right-wing parties´ Euroscepticism, before I analyse the empirical evidence based on this typology. Finally, I conclude that there does exist significant differences among the Euroscepticism of the chosen parties that might prevent cooperation on a transnational level.

2.0 Literature Review

Opposition to the EU has historically been looked at as a passing phenomenon, the inevitable "grit in the system" that always occurs in the development of political systems (Usherwood & Startin, 2013, p. 2). Key political events such as the negotiations for the Single European Act and Margaret Thatcher´s famous Bruges speech has contributed to the diffusion of Euroscepticism. However, the Maastricht treaty is generally looked at as the real turning point for the development of the whole body of literature concerning criticism towards the EU (Carlotti, 2017, p. 201). This increase in research has increased proportionally with the rise of anti-EU sentiments among European publics. Initial publications started to appear in the mid-1990s, where aspects such as Eurosceptic discourse among national parties in France and the relationship between national politics parties and the EU from a comparative aspect were subject to research. However, the first to make an attempt to define Euroscepticism was Taggart (1998), where he employed a differentiation between European integration and defined Euroscepticism as the "idea of contingent or qualified opposition, as well as incorporating outright and unqualified opposition to the process of European integration" (Vasilopoulou, 2018, p. 23). In further publications, building on this definition, Taggart and Szczerbiak (2002) saw the need to differentiate types of Euroscepticism to distinguish between those who oppose European integration in principle and those who oppose European integration due to the form it takes. They broke this down into "hard" and "soft" Euroscepticism, where hard Euroscepticism implies an outright rejection of the entire European project, in other words, they oppose the principles of European integration. Soft Euroscepticism, on the other hand, does not imply opposition to integration on principled grounds but implies that it disagrees with a certain policy or the "direction" of the current European integration (Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2002, pp. 27-28).

Kopecký and Mudde acknowledged the improvement of the original definition but found various weaknesses in the elaboration of Taggart and Szcerbiak (2002). They meant that basically all disagreements with any policy decision of the EU could be defined as soft Euroscepticism, making the two typologies too broad, something that later also was admitted by Taggart & Szczerbiak (2008b). They also put an interesting focus on the question of how ideology interacts with the strategy in the production and modification of policy positions, which had not been sufficiently explored by Taggart and Szczerbiak. Furthermore, they argued that the typologies "soft" and "hard" Euroscepticism didn't do justice to the subtle, but important distinction between the ideas of European integration,

one the one hand, and the EU as the current embodiment of these ideas, on the other hand. The definition of Taggart and Szczerbiak therefore led us to see either more or less Euroscepticism than there actually were. Kopecký and Mudde instead proposed a typology presenting four categories (Euroenthusiasts, Eurosceptics, Eurorejects and Europragmatists) that included an encompassing of both negative and positive stances on the EU (Kopecý & Mudde, 2002, pp. 300-301). However, their typology has several shortcomings, despite moving the debate on the issue forward and appearing to be much more precise than Taggart and Mudde (2002). First, regarding Europragmatists, it is highly unlikely that someone who is in opposition to the principle of European integration accepts the status quo of the EU. As a result of this, they hardly exist in the real world. Second, Eurosceptics is controversial as it fails to suggest what type of EU cooperation they desire and which part of the current integration they oppose, showing signs of weak analytical precision (Vasilopoulou, 2014, p. 4). Finally, the Europhobe/Europhile distinction is not accurate enough to recognize all the nuanced parties ´stances concerning the EU (Carlotti, 2017, p. 202).

Flood presented his view on the issue where he found it important to categorize party positions towards the EU under descriptive labels which shouldn't imply any assumptions as to the question of how those are reached in terms of ideological or strategic reasoning. He suggested a set of six categories that were supposed to work as practical aids in describing approximate locations among a continuum of attitude towards the EU. These set were *Rejectionist, Revisionist, Minimalist, Gradualist, Reformist* and *Maximalist,* and were based on the degree of support for or opposition to EU integration in general or some specified aspect(s) of it. According to Flood, this would allow a tighter specification of party positions than either of the two models previously mentioned (Flood, 2002, pp. 4-5).
   Sørensen (2004) defined popular Euroscepticism, identifying six types of attitudes towards the EU: (i) the concern about the integrity of the nation-state, (ii) the values of the EU, (iii) the transfer of new competencies to the EU, (iiii) the economic rationale of integration, (iiiii) the emotional attachment to the EU, (iiiiii) the stances toward the principles of the EU.
   Sofia Vasilopoulou aimed to improve the conceptualization of party attitudes towards the EU, but specifically looking at radical right-wing parties, ignoring the ones to the left and in the middle. She proposed a categorization of the party-positions on the issue of European integration into the rejecting, conditional and compromising patterns. Her categories deduce from the current existing literature on Euroscepticism and attentive reading of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU). This is the basis of four aspects on the debate of European integration which helps provide with the indicators based on which of the three mentioned patterns of radical right Euroscepticism are identified (Vasilopoulou, 2011, p. 229).

There is a clear pattern that the authors identified that there is a need for more categories with clearer definitions for higher analytical precision, showing the complexity of the term Euroscepticism. "Soft" and "hard" Euroscepticism was an important foundation for further research, but it is not sufficient to explain Euroscepticism in its own and lacks specific criteria for categorization, which also was admitted by Taggart & Szczerbiak in later publications. Kopecký and Mudde (2002) have similar shortcomings, although their conceptualisation appears to be more precise than Taggart and Mudde. Sofia Vasilopoulou (2011) dives into the issue based on that Euroscepticism might be different in right-wing parties, making it even more complex. This means that you might

not be able to include left and right-wing parties in the same categorizations, as the criteria for the different categories might be changing once you move to the opposite side of the political scale. She aims to improve the conceptualization of radical right attitudes towards the EU, with a more detailed explanation of all its potential facets. Once again, this shows the complexity, and the literature tends to be more and more specific for each scientific article which is published.

My analysis is based on the theoretical framework of Vasilopoulou (2011), but she does not include UKIP nor Vox España in her analysis. Vasilopoulou (2014) does, however, in an article later published, use the same framework for analysing different parties, among others UKIP. Having said that, Vasilopoulou focused on the late 2000s and therefore, her study doesn't necessarily reach the same conclusion as this thesis will. Further, Polk (2017) deemed UKIP as an extreme Eurosceptic party, which deploy anti-elite messaging in an attempt to decouple national politics from the European Union when explaining the Chapel Hill Survey for 2014. Lynch and Whitaker (2012) analyses manifestos and speeches of UKIP, giving great insight into their Euroscepticism, but for the purpose of describing national party rivalry. Carlotti (2017) presents an empirical analysis of the UKIP EU-opposition inside the European Parliament, where he identifies the objects of criticism by Eurosceptic parties as to the EU-policies, the EU-elite, the EU-regime and the EU-community. Meijers (2017) explored in his paper how radical right parties such as UKIP, named challenger-parties, influences mainstream national parties to adapt their strategies and views on European issues. Robert Gould (2019) does a comparative analysis of Vox España and Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), examining how the crisis of national identity forms these populist radical-right parties and why EU often is a common "enemy" for such parties.

As noticed above, there are many articles describing different aspects of the Euroscepticism of UKIP, but very few on Vox España. The likely reason for this is that Vox España is a relatively new party, in a less salient European country, at least EU wise. To my knowledge, there doesn't exist such a measurement of their Euroscepticism to this date. There is also a lack of articles describing in detail their Euroscepticism and position on different aspects of European integration. There are also no papers, except Vasilopoulou (2011, 2014), of my current knowledge that focuses explicitly on measuring the Euroscepticism of radical right-wing parties.

In attempting to define European integration in terms of its principle, practice and future, our understanding of the current Eurosceptic positions of right-wing parties will increase, and the four aspects of integration will provide this thesis with an analytical toolkit to explore different types of party-based Euroscepticism (Vasilopoulou, 2014, p. 6).

3.0 Methodology

The objective of this thesis is to identify differences in the Euroscepticism of two right-wing European parties and measure them through applying the typologies of Vasilopoulou (2011). By performing an analysis party manifestos and speeches by party representatives, I will be able to place the different parties within the typologies created specifically for right-wing parties. When the parties are categorized into these typologies, I will be able to explain the degree and the typical features of their Euroscepticism. It is an exploratory study, as I have chosen to do a comparative analysis of two radical right-wing parties: UKIP and VOX España. In this chapter, I will explain the reason why I have chosen a qualitative method and reason the methodological refinements.

3.1 A comparative, qualitative case study

I am performing a case study, which allows the exploration and understanding of complex issues. Yin (1984) defines the case study method as "an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context; when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; and in which multiple sources of evidence are used". It is considered a robust research method particularly when an in-depth investigation is required. This will allow the thesis to go beyond the quantitative statistical result and understand behavioural conditions trough the parties `perspectives (Zainal, 2007, p. 1). Performing a case study comes with both advantages and disadvantages. Shortly summarized, Zainal (2007, p. 4) mentions that advantages could be that the examination of the data is conducted within the context of its use, such as in our case, the manifestos for the European elections among Eurosceptic parties. Zainal (2007, p. 5) also underlines potential disadvantages, for example that the case study investigator might possess biased views, influencing the direction of the findings and conclusions.

 I have chosen to perform the analysis using the typology presented by Sofia Vasilopoulou (2011), which makes me able to measure the Euroscepticism of the chosen parties. Her typology fit well with my chosen research question, as the typology are specifically made for measuring the Euroscepticism of European right-wing parties. The patterns of the parties are identified through careful examination of party attitudes on four different aspects related to European integration and the EU. These are a common cultural definition of Europe, the principle of cooperation at a European multilateral level, the EU current policy practice and the desire to drive the European integration further. These aspects will enable me to categorize the parties within either of the three categories which are "rejecting", "conditional" and "rejecting" Eurosceptics (Vasilopoulou, 2011, p. 224). To be able to categorize the parties, I will do a document analysis of party manifestos published in my chosen period. Party manifestos communicate the values and concerns of a political party, as well as the ideas, the policies they advocate and the demands of the party (Zuñiga & Jenkins, 2018, p. 2).

These manifestos might be manifestos for national elections, such as regional elections for the Spanish autonomous communities, national elections or European elections. I will also make use of speeches made by party representatives at party gatherings or different types of meetings in their national parliaments if needed, but the manifestos are the preferred source of empirical evidence. Analysing manifestos and speeches will give me a clear understanding of their stance on the EU, as these are the main ways political parties reach out to the public in an official way.

3.2 Methodological refinements

All materials used for the analysis are gathered from the period between 2013-2019. Limiting the time-frame was necessary for several reasons**.** Primarily, party positions on different issues change. A party doesn't necessarily have the same stance on the EU in recent years that they had 20 years ago. Although research has proven that the movement of parties is restricted, they are constantly adapting their party goals (Pennings, Keman & Kleinnijenhuis, 2006, p. 208). Vox España is a good example of a "moving" party. Secondly, the European Parliament holds its election every 5 years. I have therefore decided to base my analysis on the period between the two last elections for the European Parliament, which are 2014 and 2019. As the parties campaigning process started in 2013, I found it reasonable to set the timeframe from 2013 to 2019. I chose these two "checkpoints" due to that party stances on European issues tends to be

more salient during European elections than in national elections, making it more likely that I will find not only more data but also more relevant data to analyse. Thirdly, Vox España didn't exist until recently and has changed their position radically in the Spanish political system in the last years. Comparing the two parties much earlier than 2013 would therefore not be relevant to this study, as Vox España either wouldn't be as far to the right as they currently are or, going further back, they wouldn't even exist. Comparing two different parties in different time periods could be an interesting study to do, but it does not fit into the scope of this study. To be able to categorize and compare the Euroscepticism of the parties in the best possible way, it is essential that my data collection is from a set time period.

I have chosen to only use material directly from the party, such as manifestos for national or European election or speeches made by party representatives preferably in their national sphere and preferably at their party meetings. The manifestos are great tools, as they are carefully crafted compromises which represents the parties as a whole and they are directed both externally at potential voters but also internally at the party members. Manifestos are therefore expected to give a very accurate impression on the views of the parties in question on different European issues, and I will prioritize the use of the party manifesto as long as it´s possible (Vasilopoulou, 2011, p. 236). My reasoning of wanting to use speeches made in the national sphere is that these speeches are less likely to be downplayed for the general public. This effect should be even stronger if the speeches take place in their own meetings, in front of their public. In such an environment, there should be no reason to not express the true stance of the parties on European issues.

Regarding UKIP, there are some limitations due to the fact that Brexit has already happened. Therefore, the party, which politics has been almost solely motivated by leaving the EU, it´s clear that they are establishing a greater focus on shaping their role in national politics. While their more recent manifestos and speeches do involve parts on how the British relationship with the EU should be, it shows a clear change towards national politics and discussing which type of party they want to be in the national sphere. For this reason, it was found more relevant material before Brexit than after, and the analysis might suffer a bit cause of this. However, European issues are still mentioned both in their 2019 manifesto and some speeches, but to a lesser degree. Regarding Vox España, their manifesto prior to the 2019 European elections (VOX, 2019) is extremely detailed, showcasing exactly which EU-policies they would like to remove, reform, maintain or develop further. Speeches were therefore not deemed necessary in the categorization of the party.

4.0 The Patterns of Radical Right Opposition

When defining the EU in terms of the four fundamental features mentioned above: the definition, principle, practice and future, our understanding of the different positions available for parties to take increases and we will be able to specify our analysis more thoroughly than we would with the earlier definitions and typologies on Euroscepticism. The four following aspects function as our reference in this thesis, providing us with an analytical toolkit which facilitates the process of identifying the process of the radical right party positions (Vasilopoulou, 2011, p. 232).

The first aspect of European integration is a cultural definition of Europe. This is the common identity of the European people, which is defined as the feeling of cultural, religious and historical bonds among the European nation-states. The second aspect is the "principle" of European integration. The principle of European integration indicates a party´s wish and willingness for cooperation at a higher multilateral level. This type of cooperation refers only to political cooperation within the EU framework, so for example cooperation within the European Free Trade Area does not imply support of the principle of European integration (Vasilopoulou, 2011, pp. 229-230). Vassilopoulos's third aspect is the "practice" of European integration. This indicator refers to the TEU, which says that "The union shall be served by a single institutional framework which shall ensure the consistency and the continuity of the activities carried out in order to attain its objectives while respecting and building on the acquis Communautaire". In other terms, this aspect of "practice" means that parties agree with the balance between intergovernmental and supranational governing of the EU. The last aspect is "future", which indicates member states desire to advocate for closer European cooperation within the framework of the EU with the general aim of creating an ever-closer union (Vasilopoulou, 2011, p. 231). I will now present three categories in which I will argue we can place the radical right parties. These categories are rejecting, conditional and compromising patterns.

4.1 "Rejecting" Euroscepticism

"Rejecting" Euroscepticism is a position that implies the acceptance of the common cultural, historical and religious heritage of Europe, but includes strong opposition to the three remaining aspects of European integration. This includes rejection of the principles of cooperation within the EU framework, disagreement with the European institutional and policy status quo and opposition to the future building of a European polity. This stance at the EU favours an immediate exit of the EU and that all policies are to be managed solely at the national level. The goal for the parties within this category would be to restore all sovereignty back to the institutions of the nation-state, fully denying the legitimacy of the framework of the EU and the EU institutions.

   Comparing "rejecting" Euroscepticism with the existing definitions, this would fit perfectly into the "hard" Euroscepticism of Taggart and Szczerbiak (2002), which implied a total rejection of the European project. This pattern also overlaps with the two-dimensional conceptualisation of Kopecký and Mudde (2002), where they split between diffuse and specific support for European integration. We can argue that "rejecting" Euroscepticism would fit into the "Euroreject" category, as the "Eurorejects" strongly opposes the principles of the union and the status quo practice and, therefore, naturally also the future of the EU. Furthermore, looking at Flood´s analysis, "rejecting" Euroscepticism fits into the category of "rejectionist". Rejectionist is defined as ´*positions opposed to either (i) membership of the EU or (ii) participation in some particular institution or policy*` (Flood, 2002, p. 5).

Summarizing "rejecting" Eurosceptics, they accept that Europe has a common cultural heritage, but strongly opposed the principle, practice and future of the EU. All policies should be managed at a national level, and you should withdraw from the EU at any cost. Cooperation between states should only take place through intergovernmental cooperation, without any influence from supranational institutions such as the EU.

4.2 "Conditional" Euroscepticism

"Conditional" Euroscepticism accepts the common heritage of the European people and also the principle of European cooperation, but with the current framework, they see the current policy practice as unacceptable and the shows hostility towards the future building of a European polity. Although they acknowledge the importance of nation-state cooperation at a European level, the current institutional balance, as well as the policy status-quo, is unacceptable since it compromises the sovereignty of the nation-state. Due to this, closer unification of the European polity is not an appealing option for parties within this category. Conditional Eurosceptics more or less accepts the system of the EU but shows hostility towards the policies and institutions of EU governance. This pattern aligns with a conditional wish that European cooperation does not affect state sovereignty (Vasilopoulou, 2011, p. 232). Conditional Eurosceptics strongly support intergovernmental cooperation within the EU-structures and in policies deemed beneficial to the nation-state, although there exists a great variation of which policies conditional Eurosceptics wishes to be governed intergovernmental. The dream scenario for conditional Eurosceptics would be intergovernmental cooperation without the presence or with limited power of supranational institutions, but as long as the majority of decisions in the EU is taken by supranational institutions and not by member states, conditional Eurosceptics denies its legitimacy.

This type of Euroscepticism fits into the category of "soft" Euroscepticism by Taggart and Szczerbiak (2002) as they do not oppose European integration in principle. Kopecký and Mudde (2002) would classify it as "Eurosceptics" as it combines Europhile and EU-pessimist positions. While the parties in this category believe in European integration, which is the Europhile stance, they do not believe that the current EU is the way to achieve cooperation between states, which is the EU-pessimist stance. Regarding the categories made by Flood, conditional Euroscepticism fits best into the category "revisionist". Revisionists are in favour of a return to the state of affair before some major treaty revision, either (i) in relation to the entire configuration of the EU or (ii) in relation to one or more policy area (Flood, 2002, p. 5).

Summarizing "conditional" Euroscepticism, parties within this category support the common European heritage and the principle of the EU, but they are hostile to the practice and future integration to the EU. Parties within this category would most likely prefer to return to the state of affair before a treaty revision, regaining much of the nation-state sovereignty.

4.3 "Compromising" Euroscepticism

´Compromising` Eurosceptics accepts the common cultural heritage of Europe, support the principle of the EU and the current practice of the EU, but they oppose to the future building of a European polity. Eurosceptics within this category admit that all European integration is not necessarily a good thing, but that some of its aspects are beneficial to the member states. In general, they feel that transferring decision-making powers to European institutions is unattractive, but they realize that a degree of integration is necessary for the state, especially seen from an economic point of view. They also realize that there are gains of being able to take part in the EU structure and institutions, which offers a possibility to (re)negotiate change and reform from within the EU structures in order to promote national interests. An ever-closer union is not acceptable however, as this would entail reinforcing federalism (Vasilopoulou, 2011, p. 233).

"Compromising" Euroscepticism goes well into the "soft" category of Taggart and Szczerbiak (2002), but it becomes very clear that the distinctions of Taggart and Szczerbiak become blurred. In their book opposing Europe they used the term "Euro-critics" or "Euro-contestation" to this type of negative view on the EU project, implying that this behaviour isn't necessarily Eurosceptic (Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2008b, p. 253), but in an earlier volume of the book, they write that even if someone supports the EU status quo but opposes *any* further integration, they are effectively "soft" Eurosceptics (Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2008a, p. 8). The categories of Kopecký and Mudde (2002) does not help us make this category clearer, as they didn't present any category that described support for the practice but not the future integration of the EU. "Compromising" Eurosceptics would end up somewhere in between of "Eurosceptics" and "Europragmatists". Flood´s categories are clearer, and "compromising" Eurosceptics would be categorized as "minimalists", which states that *positions accepting the status quo but resisting further integration* (Flood, 2002, p. 5). "Compromising" Eurosceptics strongly prioritizes the economic advantages and prosperity, which is deemed very beneficial to the member states. They accept that European integration, to a degree, is desirable, but they do not support much transfer of sovereignty and they will always be critical to certain aspects of the current structures of European integration (Vasilopoulou, 2011, p. 235).

Summarizing "compromising" Euroscepticism, parties within this category accepts the common cultural heritage of Europe, they support the principle and current practice of the EU, but they oppose further and deeper integration. Parties within this category realize the economic gains of the current EU structure but refuse to transfer more sovereignty to supranational institutions.

5.0 Analysis

As discussed previously, I will be using the typologies of Sofia Vasilopoulou (2011) as my analytical framework to perform this analysis. Her typology is specifically made for radical right-wing parties and aimed to improve the conceptualization of the radical right attitudes towards the EU.

Her four aspects are firstly, the common cultural heritage of Europe, which means that nations feel a common cultural, historical and religious bond between themselves. Secondly, the principle of European cooperation, which means that the different nations supports intergovernmental cooperation between states. Thirdly, the current practice of the EU. This means that the parties support EU`s current policies and are positive to the status quo. Fourth and lastly, further integration in the future. This indicates that the party supports that integration in the future will be even deeper than currently, and lead to an ever-closer union. These four aspects of integration represent the principal point of reference for this thesis. The last parts of the thesis will consist of performing the analysis, compare the two cases and discussing the results.

5.1 The common cultural heritage

The first aspect in our typology is that the parties feels a common cultural and historical bond with Europe, which Vasilopoulou (2018) implies that every party accepts. In the case of Vox España, it becomes clear very early in their manifesto prior to the European

elections in 2019 that they are very aware of the history of Europe and that Europe existed before and is much more than just the EU.

Sólo cuando los nombres de Praga, Budapest, Berlín, Roma, Paris, Viena, Copenhage, u otras grandes ciudades europeas resuenen en las mentes y los corazones de los españoles con recuerdos de la historia, de la literatura, el arte, la religion, y del mismo modo resuenen en las mentes de los ciudadanos europeos el nombre de Madrid, Barcelona, Sevilla o Toledo, podremos decir que avanzamos hacía una auténtica Europa (VOX, 2019, p. 2).[1]

This quote confirms that Vox España feels a strong bond towards the others European states. Meanwhile, UKIP has in many ways an opposite view on the matter. They appear to recognize the rest of Europe as neighbours geographically, and they are aware of the potential benefits by trading with Europe, but they seem to feel a stronger connection to especially the Commonwealth:

We also want a positive message about where Britain stands in the world. What we have got to be saying, is that to have tied ourselves so closely to our European neighbours (..) is for a country like ours, (..) quite the wrong thing to do. What UKIP will campaign for this country to do is to reembrace the rest of the world, starting with the Commonwealth (Farage, 2015)

There are several examples where the same sentiments are clearly expressed at UKIP party conferences. Farage meant that Britain had to open themselves up, especially to English speaking countries within the Commonwealth. The clearest example comes in a speech made at their party conference in London, 2013, where he states: "We should never have joined this Union in the first place, frankly because we are different. We are different. Our geography, our history, our institutions produced by that history, make us look and think differently" (Farage, 2013).

Vox España on the other hand mentions that Europe is the result of a harmonious fusion between the Greek thinking, the Roman right and the Christian spirit, and says that "Esa es la Europa en la que creemos y queremos defender *(..)*" VOX 2019, p. 2).[2]

Why there is such a difference on how the party looks at the common European cultural heritage is an interesting question. UKIP does not pay much attention to this aspect in comparison to Vox España, which dedicated a lot of space initially in their manifesto to point out the importance of the common European history, and how they must preserve the authentic feeling of being a united Europe divided in nation states. Why this is the case, is difficult to say, but obvious potential reasons might be the United Kingdom´s strong connection to the Commonwealth or the differences in their countries´ geographical locations. Another one might be that Spain is one of the southern countries in Europe, and is in general seen to have reaped the rewards economically from membership of the EU, enjoying 15 years of uninterrupted growth, among other things

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[1] Translated: Only when the names of Prague, Budapest, Berlin, Rome, Paris, Vienna, Copenhagen and other big European cities resonate in the minds and hearts of the Spaniards with memories of the history, the literature, the art, the religion, and in the same way the name of Madrid, Barcelona, Seville or Toledo resonate in the minds of European citizens, we can say that we are moving towards an authentic Europe.

[2] Translated: That is the Europe that we believe in and that we want to defend.

due to being a net recipient of EU funds, from the period of EU (EC)[3] accession until the global financial crisis in 2007 (Royo, 2009, p. 19). Meanwhile, UKIP feels that Britain has contributed too much of their taxpayers ´money as a net contributor into what they look at as a solidarity project, while they have forgotten about their own people.

What is certain, is that Vox España accepts this aspect, and aspire a Europe where the different cities are culturally and historically bonded, and that that bond must be preserved within the EU. UKIP however pays little attention to the aspect in their manifesto, but it becomes clear in speeches at their conferences that they might even feel superior to Europe: "Throughout Europe, England was known as the land of liberty, (..) here you could think freely enjoying independent minds and voices" (Farage, 2013).

5.2 The principle

The second aspect, the principle, mainly evolves around transfer of sovereignty from the nation state to the EU institutions. UKIP´s main issue with the EU is exactly this. They mean that the only way Britain can regain their self-respect is to, in Nigel Farage´s own words, divorce themselves amicably from the EU. UKIP looks at this as the only way to regain their democracy (Farage, 2015). They do not want to be under any European law that trumps their national law. Farage expresses the same sentiment with strong words at a conference in 2013:

We in UKIP are the true European. Because we want to live, work and breathe in a Europe of free, democratic sovereign states that seeks to cooperate together but are not governed by these monstrous institutions. (..) I do not only want the UK out of the EU, I want Europe out of the EU (Farage, 2013).

While UKIP strongly oppose European cooperation with any transfer of sovereignty, Vox España strongly believes in some kind of cooperation between the European states. Some sovereignty could be transferred from the nation-state to the intergovernmental institutions, but this integration has to go slow and not too far. They want a strong, coherent Europe, but the strengths of Europe should be based on the liberty of its nations and the richness of its different cultures. When something is threatening this, in other words, when European integration has gone too far and the cultural diversity of Europe and the political liberty of the member states is at risk, they are an enemy of Europe (VOX, 2019, p. 2). According to Vox España, the only political sovereignty in the EU should reside with the nation-states. The EU should be an international organization that consists of democratic states from which it receives competences to achieve common objectives that the states themselves want to achieve. Whenever the EU institutions threaten to jeopardize the unity, freedom and/or the dignity of the European nations, the nation´s themselves must have a possibility to stop potential abusive policies that might challenge the individual state´s sovereignty (VOX, 2019, p. 3).

"El poder de las instituciones comunitarias es, en todo caso, derivado y siempre fruto de la voluntad de los Estados miembros (..)" (VOX, 2019, p.3).[4]

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[3] The European Community (EC) was gradually dissolved into the European Union, officially through the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009.
[4] Translated: The power of the (EU) institutions is, in every case, derived and always the fruit of the will of the Member States.

Meanwhile, UKIP doesn't see any direct gains by being a member of the EU. In fact, they look at it as throwing money out the window. UKIP states in their 2019 manifesto that Britain will save about £8.9 billion per annum in EU budget contributions, and £2.4 billion in custom duties. They do only seek mutually beneficial bilateral free trade agreements and rejects all suggestions of multilateral trade agreements. UKIP means that outside of the EU framework and laws, the British government can reduce regulation to an appropriate level, which would aid economic growth, prosperity and employment (UKIP, 2019, p. 41). There is no doubt that UKIP stands from a complete and total withdrawal from the EU, irrespective of whatever "withdrawal agreements" that is offered. As stated early on in their 2019 manifesto, their "grand goal is to fully restore the UK´s former status as an independent, self-governing, sovereign state" (UKIP, 2019, p.3)

Identifying the reasons for the difference between the parties on the principle is difficult, but there are some factors that seems more likely than others. The biggest of them all is the consistency of the parties. As previously mentioned, Vox España is a moving party, adapting their strategies to what is likely to attract voters to help achieve their cause. They were not nearly as Eurosceptic in 2015, in fact, they were not that interested in European politics. Only after having several meetings with other radical right parties such as Front National and AfD they started to focus on the European issue, being much more salient about their view on EU politics. Meanwhile, the agenda of UKIP has been to restore the autonomy of the British Parliament as Westminster that was being impinged upon by decisions made in Brussels and Strasbourg. This agenda dates back to the aftermath of British agreement to the Maastricht treaty in the early 1990s (Jones, 2017, p. 51). This indicates that Vox España seeks electoral gains by adapting already proven successful policies from their ideology friendly parties, while UKIP´s existence is based on the fact that they want UK out of the EU. Parties that adapt such strategies might be less willing to take such drastic moves such as leaving the EU, and rather work to reform it from the inside which might be easier to achieve (Harmel & Janda, 1994, p. 282).

Summing it up, Vox España encourages cooperation between European states, including that some issues could be handled by supranational institutions, but each member state should in every case be able to protect their own sovereignty and act accordingly to their own laws. UKIP however oppose any form of transfer of sovereignty to the supranational institutions and seek cooperation with the other European states without the aid of such institutions, restoring all sovereignty back to Westminster. Their view on this aspect is therefore different, as Vox España accepts the principle of the European integration while UKIP outright rejects it.

5.3 The practice
While the two parties disagree about the principle of European integration, they both oppose the current practice of the EU where they agree that reform or abandonment is needed on several policies.

Firstly, they both think that the nation-states have transferred too much sovereignty to the European institutions. Vox España wants an unwavering respect for the sovereignty of the twenty-seven nation states that have built and are currently part of the EU. For that reason, they want to see the return of the veto, and that the requirements of unanimous decision returns are the main mechanism of integration. If a single country does not wish to implement a certain European law, they are free to do so, which in other words means that member states can be "opt-outs" on whichever policies

they like, for example the Euro or other policies (VOX, 2019, p. 7). UKIP looks at EU as an undemocratic monster, "a bureaucratic organisation writing our laws" (UKIP, 2014). They feel that the EU controls areas that they never thought were possible such as immigration, law and energy, without any chance of renegotiating back the powers that they have given away throughout the decades. As the EU project in their eyes is all about an ever-closer union, an unstoppable train that goes towards the end station which is full economic, political and military integration and the only way to regain control would be to completely abandon the EU, in other words, a hard Brexit (UKIP, 2014; Batten, 2017).

Secondly, the immigration policy of the EU receives a lot of attention in both of the parties ´manifestos. UKIP means that the rapid, uncontrolled immigration due to the EU migration policy has been extremely damaging to Britain. This immigration puts an enormous pressure on the welfare system of the UK, damaging sectors such as the National Health Service and the education sector. They also mention the Schengen-Agreement, that leads to social dumping, stealing jobs from millions of natives and depresses the wages and living standards for those at the bottom end of the economic scale (UKIP, 2019, p. 9). Vox España has a similar negative view on the current immigration policy, and their negativity is especially directed towards the Muslim immigrants. They want to review all current agreements of the EU with neighbouring countries, especially the Maghreb and the middle-east, subjecting them to a tougher pressure of active, effective and true collaboration in preventing illegal entry into the territory of the EU, and also to orderly receive the illegal immigrants who are deported to their countries of origin. Vox España also sees the need to make sure that the EU borders becomes like an impassable door for and third-national to that wants to enter. If this reform does not happen, they see no other opportunity than to suspend, temporarily or permanently, the Spanish participation in the Schengen-agreement (VOX, 2019, pp. 10,11). The desire of UKIP is to reduce net migration to below 10,000 per annum, and that a citizenship shouldn't be obtainable until the migrant has worked for 10 continuous years, fully assimilated to the country, with fluent spoken and written English (UKIP, 2019, p. 9). This indicates that UKIP problems with the current immigration policy is two-sided. They do not only oppose immigration, they oppose multiculturalism. As long as the immigrants who enter Britain has a specific skill and assimilate to their culture shown through several years of dedication, they are happy to welcome immigrants into their country, as long as they control it properly (Farage, 2013).

Thirdly, regarding the custom market, Vox España are in general in favour of this policy, but they seek to make it more efficient, since the current negotiations of trade deals take several years. Efficient, in their minds, would be that new trade deals should be negotiated by specific countries, on behalf of the EU, with close ties to the third-party countries. For example, Portugal or Spain would be natural negotiators when negotiating a trade deal with countries in South-America. Also, member-states should be able to negotiate individual, temporal trade deals in specific sectors with a third-party country while EU as a whole is in the process of negotiating a trade deal with the same third-party country (VOX, 2019, p. 19.) UKIP, on the other hand, could see an extension of the current trade agreement with the EU, but only with the possibility negotiate trade deals with all other countries in the world at the same time. If not, they have no issue in relying on the terms of the World Trade Organization and abandon the agreement completely (Batten, 2017).

Now, there isn't really anything about the current practice of the EU that UKIP supports, as they seem to have decided to not see any positives with being a member. They are relying on the fact that there exist several institutions that will secure their interests outside the EU, such as NATO regarding security and defence policies and Interpol

regarding Europol and EU´s legal institutions and instruments. Vox España, on the other hand, actually wants further integration within the European defence policy and want to contribute more to the European Defence Fund (EDF). They have actively stated that they will support every Spanish military intervention against the Muslim jihadist-threat that may be promoted or assumed by the EU, as long as they are in accordance of the interests of themselves. Therefore, it´s uncertain whether or not they actually want deeper integration or that their xenophobia against Muslims is the motivating factor, in other words, as long as the EDF targets the Muslim threat, they are supportive, if not, they might just as well not be interested after all (VOX, 2019, p. 24).

5.4 Categorizing UKIP and Vox España

UKIP wants the United Kingdom to immediately cut all ties with the EU. They have huge issues regarding the immigration and the loss of sovereignty to supranational institutions. They see the EU as a set of undemocratic institutions, led by the elite for the elite, and not for the people. They only want bilateral trade deals, and do not see the current participation in the EU as any more than a giant waste of money. Some of their statements even indicates that they feel the UK is superior to other European states, especially the southern and the eastern ones, which they mean shouldn't have entered the EU in the first place. The most awakening thing is that they don't see any of the EU policies in a positive light, even the ones where there exists a general consensus that they are positive for the general state of the nation. Summarizing UKIP, they reject the common cultural heritage, the principle, the practice and the future. They are therefore categorized as "rejecting" Eurosceptics.

Vox España strongly connects with the common cultural heritage of Europe, which they focus a lot on during their introduction to their 2019 European elections manifesto. Further, they also support the principle of the EU, as long as the political liberty and cultural diversity of the nations are maintained. However, they mean that integration has one to far, and they do not support the current practice. They are especially opposed to the transfer of sovereignty and the current migration policy and seek to reform many EU policies. They do not desire further and deeper integration of Europe, and voices in their manifesto that the EU should keep a far distance from federalism (VOX, 2019, p. 4). Therefore, as they support the common cultural heritage and the principle, Vox España is categorized as "conditional" Eurosceptics.

6.0 Conclusion

The purpose of this thesis has been to identify the differences in the Euroscepticism of UKIP and Vox España, two radical right-wing parties located in United Kingdom and Spain. By using a typology proposed by Vasilopoulou (2011), developed specifically to measure the Euroscepticism of radical right-wing parties, I have been able to compare the two parties based on four fundamental aspects through analysing manifestos and speeches made by party representatives. The analysis shows that there are significant differences between the Euroscepticism of the two parties on some of the aspects, and UKIP was categorized as "rejecting" Eurosceptics, while Vox España was categorized as "conditional" Eurosceptics.

From these results, we are able to draw some conclusions. Firstly, even though the two parties belong to the same party family, they show two different patterns of opposition to

European integration. This might indicate that radical right parties do not only want to differentiate themselves from other parties in that they adopt a Euroscepticism heavily focused around sovereignty, they also seek to differentiate themselves from parties within their party family. Secondly, UKIP concentrates its critique on the EU-community in practically all policy fields, while Vox España concentrates only on some issues such as immigration and national sovereignty. While they in many areas oppose the same EU-policy, they propose different solutions. UKIP straight-out rejects them, while Vox España leaves some room open to manoeuvre for the development of an alternative Europe, showcasing a more pragmatic critique of the EU. Thirdly, the results show that radical right-wing parties is not synonymous with being anti-European. Vox España shows that you can be a radical right party and still be positive, to a certain degree, regarding European integration and transnational cooperation.

From a general perspective the results open up for future research on many areas. Further investigation could be on how radical right-wing parties cooperate with each-other within the European Parliament, and if the party groups formed in the parliament correlate with their Eurosceptic pattern. Within the context of party ideology, it also would be interesting to investigate how the Euroscepticism of UKIP and Vox España has evolved over time and explaining the causes of the detected differences. Are these their position on the EU mainly guided by strategy, or are they influenced by the parties 'ideology? Whether the differences are due to strategy or ideology might lead to big differences in how different crises (e.g. economic crisis and immigration crisis) effect their degree of Euroscepticism. Regarding the current situation with the Corona crisis, it would be interesting to see how it will impact the Euroscepticism of the radical right, where maybe the open borders and the Schengen agreement would be the new "main-target" for these parties. While this is just speculation, the Eurosceptic parties are constantly evolving, and it will be interesting to see the developments in the Euroscepticism of these two parties, especially Vox España since the UK is leaving the EU, as we move closer to the next European Elections in 2024.

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