



**Party affiliation and support for Muslim newcomers: Masked opposition in the Norwegian context**

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3 Immigration plays an important role in a changing European socio-political landscape. In  
4 particular, the issue of immigration has undergirded political and social change, including  
5 populist right-wing political parties in a number of European contexts (Stockemer 2017). In  
6 this study, we focus on differences between overt and covert support for Muslim newcomers  
7 to Norway. Using a list experiment embedded in the Norwegian Citizen Panel (NCP), we  
8 manipulate the level of anonymity provided respondents. This approach allows us to  
9 consider differences in the extent to which support for Muslim newcomers is selectively  
10 expressed. Specifically, we are interested in the expectations that govern the overt expression  
11 anti-immigrant discourse, focusing on distinct types of Muslim newcomers.  
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26 Excellent work on attitudes toward immigrants – overall and Muslim newcomers in  
27 particular – has emerged in recent years (for summaries of the literature see Hainmueller and  
28 Hopkins 2014; Ceobanu and Escandell 2010). On the issue of Muslim newcomers, some have  
29 noted that Islam plays a unique role in shaping attitudes toward immigration in the Netherlands  
30 (Azrout and Wojcieszak 2017<sup>i</sup>; Erisen and Kentmen-Cin 2017; Savelkoul et al. 2011),  
31 Germany (Erisen and Kentmen-Cin 2017), the US (Creighton and Jamal 2015; Kalkan et al.  
32 2009) and multi-country comparative work (Strabac et al. 2013; Strabac and Listhaug 2008).  
33 Characteristics of members of some contexts of reception, such as religiosity, has shown a  
34 significant and substantive link to anti-immigrant sentiment in Europe (Davidov et al. 2008;  
35 Sides and Citrin 2007). When considering characteristics of Muslim immigrants, findings vary.  
36 Some (e.g., Helbling 2014) find a link with general antipathy toward immigrants, but not a  
37 clear link with specific phenotypical symbols. Strabac et al. (2016), who consider the specific  
38 case of Norway, find that some expressions of religiosity among Muslim immigrants, namely  
39 the wearing of the veil, elicit targeted negative reactions that are distinct from general anti-  
40 immigrant sentiment. Recent work (Coenders et al. 2017) has considered distinct types of  
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3 Muslim immigration (e.g., immigrants vs. refugees) and finds that the flow of asylum  
4 application, rather than general antipathy, is relevant.  
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10 To be clear, the approach used in this work is different than that intent on explaining general  
11 variation in attitudes toward Muslim immigration (i.e., the levels of opposition). Instead, the  
12 contribution and innovation of this work is a focus on how support/opposition to Muslim  
13 newcomers is selectively expressed. This insight is not wholly unrelated to observational  
14 approaches, but unique patterns can emerge. For example, work in the US has shown  
15 identical levels of opposition to Muslim and Christian immigrants is found only when  
16 respondents are able to mask their responses (Creighton and Jamal 2015). Rather than  
17 considering distinct religious groups, we reveal systematic differences in over-reporting of  
18 positive attitudes by type of Muslim newcomer and political affiliation of the respondent.  
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33 To these ends, Norway offers the opportunity to explore the overlap between political  
34 affiliation and attitudes toward Muslim newcomers as it sustains two large  
35 traditional/conventional parties on either side of the left-right divided – the Labour Party and  
36 the Conservative Party – and, moreover, a non-traditional, large and established party – the  
37 Progress Party. Importantly, the Progress Party is strongly focused on issue of immigration.  
38 This political landscape provides the key ingredients to explore distinct understandings of  
39 what is acceptable to express in terms of attitudes toward Muslim newcomers.  
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51 When comparing overt and covert expression of support for Muslim newcomers, our results  
52 reveal somewhat unexpected pattern with clear social and political consequences.  
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54 Specifically, supporters of the centre-right Conservative Party exhibit substantive and  
55 significant masking of intolerance with relatively large gaps between what is overtly and  
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3 covertly expressed, which reveals an interesting tendency: Conservative Party supporters are  
4 notably closer to Labour Party supporters on the issue of Muslim immigration in terms of  
5 their *overt* expression of support, regardless of the how the newcomers are framed. However,  
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10 once anonymity is provided, a less tolerant position emerges placing Conservative Party  
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13 supporters closer to the more restrictive stance of the Progress Party.  
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### 17 **Attitudes toward immigration and social stigma**

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19 To better understand how context and political orientation shape the expression of attitudes  
20 toward Muslim newcomers in Norway, we consider the role of social desirability in  
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To better understand how context and political orientation shape the expression of attitudes toward Muslim newcomers in Norway, we consider the role of social desirability in stigmatising certain expressed attitudes and, moreover, how this might change under conditions of anonymity. Specifically, via the anticipation and avoidance of social stigma, group members (e.g., supporters of a political party) conform to situationally-specific role expectations based on the constellation of identities/roles/affiliations they embody. In a given interaction, participants make an effort to present a consistent self, pursuing a logic of situational conformity<sup>1</sup> (Blumer 1969; Goffman 1959; Kuhn 1964; Stryker 1980). However, this is not always possible and masking of identities anticipated to elicit greater stigma results. Succinctly put, “[r]ole conflict exists when there are contradictory expectations that attach to some position in a social relationship, [which] ... may call for incompatible performances... (Stryker (1980; 73).” In other words, masking emerges as a strategy if (1) the potentially stigmatizing attribute is discreditable<sup>ii</sup> and (2) the associated stigma is able to be anticipated.

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<sup>1</sup> Some have suggested a more permanent, less situationally defined theoretical mechanism rooted in motivated reasoning (Bloemraad et al. 2016). This perspective links the formation of attitudes toward immigrants/immigration to stable identities formed earlier in the life course (e.g., political orientation, party affiliation).

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3 Empirical evidence has emerged of significant and substantive masking in a variety of social  
4 situations (Phillips and Clancey 1972; Presser and Stinson 1998; Arnold and Feldman 1981;  
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6 Kuklinski et al. 1997a; Kuklinski et al. 1997b; Davis and Silver 2003; Kuran and McCaffery  
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8 2008; Heerwegh 2009). At the core of this work are findings that controversial attitudes,  
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10 such as targeted opposition to specific immigrant groups, are often expressed *only* under  
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12 conditions of absolute and permanent anonymity in a variety of contexts (Janus, 2010;  
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14 Creighton and Jamal 2015; Creighton, Jamal and Malancu 2015; Knoll, 2013a; Knoll, 2013b;  
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16 Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007).

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24 Of note, masking emerges even when the mode of data collection avoids direct interaction  
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26 (e.g., phone, in-person interviews). For example, work in the US (Janus 2010; Creighton and  
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28 Jamal 2015; Creighton et al. 2015) and the Netherlands (Creighton et al. 2018) finds  
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30 significant masking using online surveys. D’Ancona (2014) assesses the link between the  
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32 mode of collection and the expression of xenophobia, finding that less direct interactions  
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34 reduce, but do not eliminate, social desirability bias. In summary, the mode of data collection  
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36 is relevant and indirect approaches do result in a greater expression of controversial opinions  
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38 such as intolerance toward immigrants. However, participation in a survey – whether online  
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40 or not – results in some hesitancy to express some attitudes and approaches that provide  
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42 anonymity in a permanent and absolute manner have demonstrable advantages if the goal is  
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44 to capture covert sentiment.  
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51 We suggest that situational conformity, which is manifested in strategic masking of  
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53 intolerance, offers a plausible theoretical frame by which intentional masking of antipathy  
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55 toward newcomers can be anticipated. Specifically, we contend that the pursuit of a masking  
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57 strategy, rooted in a sensitivity to conventional norms (i.e., what is and is not acceptable to  
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3 overtly express) shaped by the anticipation of stigma, is an important feature of Norwegian  
4 politics. In practical terms, this should manifest itself in significant differences in stated  
5 attitudes by supporters of conventional parties (e.g., Conservative and Labour), depending on  
6 whether social stigma was present. In other words, we expect that supporters of the  
7 conventional parties will make a significantly greater effort to be consistent in their  
8 presentation of self, but a variation could emerge depending on the context/situation of a  
9 given interaction, particularly when anonymity is provided. In general, the logic of stigma  
10 predicts that supporters of unconventional/populist political parties being less concerns with  
11 complying with social norms about the expression of anti-immigrant sentiment.  
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### 26 **Attitudes toward immigration and political orientation**

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28 Empirically, political orientation has been linked to antipathy/support for immigration in a  
29 variety of context (Sniderman 2000; Betts 1988; Espenshade and Hempstead 1996). In  
30 general, research suggests that parties and their constituent supporters on the left and centre-  
31 left express less opposition to immigrants and immigration relative to their equivalents on the  
32 right and centre-right. A primary explanation is that that the underlying political ideology  
33 delineating the right and left, albeit consisting of substantial variation across contexts, does  
34 broadly reflect sincere differences in moral framing of the issue of immigration. On the left,  
35 progressive notions of inclusivity and a somewhat recent affinity with internationalism  
36 embraces and/or encourages followers who see immigration and immigrants as being  
37 encapsulated by broader tenants of inclusivity. In contrast, on the right, conservative notions  
38 of national and sociocultural continuity result in a scepticism of the compatibility of  
39 newcomers with national identity, national economies and sociocultural attributes (e.g.,  
40 religion, ethnicity, race) (Isernia and Smets 2014; Sniderman 2000).  
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3 Supporters of unconventional political movements, whether they be characterized as populist,  
4 radical, new right (Seippel and Strandbu 2017), populist radical right (PRR) (Muis and  
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6 Immerszeel 2017; Golder 2016; Greven 2016; Mudde 2013) or populist radical right parties  
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8 (PRRP) (Röth et al. 2018), are theoretically unmoved by situational norms governing role  
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10 consistency on the right or the left. The term “populist”, as applied to these parties (Mudde  
11  
12 2007), reflects notably inconsistent positions in relation to other conventional left-right norms  
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14 such as economic and social policy. That said, these same parties demonstrate notable  
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16 consistency in terms of opposition to immigration (Van der Brug et al. 2000), offering one of  
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18 the few unifying policy positions (van de Brug et al. 2005; Arzheimer 2009; Hainsworth  
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20 2008; Hutter and Kiersi 2013). Some suggest that the coupling of right-wing identification  
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22 with strong anti-immigrant positioning defines alternatives to conventional political  
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24 orientations (Van Spanje 2011). That said, variation does exist. Cases in point are contexts  
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26 where anti-immigrant parties differ on support for redistributive welfare regimes (Finseraas  
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28 2012) and some Eastern European/post-Communist states (Van Spanje 2011).  
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[insert Table 1 here]

### **The case of Norway and the unconventional politics of immigration**

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45 As in other Western societies, political party affiliations in Norway correlate with anti-  
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47 Muslim and anti-immigrant attitudes. At the moment of writing, there are nine political  
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49 parties represented in Norwegian Parliament, with the three largest consisting of the Labour  
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51 Party (“Det norske arbeiderpartiet”; *AP*), the Conservative Party (“Høyre”; *H*) and the Party  
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53 of Progress (“Fremskrittspartiet”; *FrP*)<sup>iii</sup>. These three parties have consistently captured  
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55 two-thirds of total vote in each election over the past 40 years (see Table 1). *AP* is a centre-  
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57 left party that has dominated Norwegian politics for decades and remains the largest party  
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3 despite being out of power since 2013. *H* is a conventional centre-right party that has  
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5 traditionally been one of the largest parties in Norwegian politics and is currently the largest  
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7 member in the governing coalition, determining the Prime Minister.  
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12 *FrP* is a relatively more recent entrant in Norwegian politics. The party emerged from an  
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14 anti-tax party in 1973 with the rather long title “Anders Lange’s Party for a Strong Reduction  
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16 in Taxes, Duties and Public Intervention” - shortened to the Progress Party (*FrP*) in 1977. *H*  
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18 formed a governmental coalition with *FrP* after the 2013 parliamentary elections, building  
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20 upon earlier experience of working together in local councils (Jupskås 2013). With support  
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22 from smaller, centre-right parties, the two parties have governed uninterrupted since 2013,  
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24 repeating their electoral success in the 2017 elections (see Heinze 2018 for an overview).  
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26 *FrP* is currently the third-largest party in the Norwegian parliament, receiving 15.2 percent of  
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28 the votes in 2017 parliament elections (see Table 1).  
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36 Regarding attitudes toward immigrants and immigration, there have historically been clear  
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38 differences between the *AP*, *H* and *FrP* - reflected in party platforms, public discourse and  
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40 attitudes of their constituencies (Simonnes, 2013). *FrP* is the most stridently anti-immigrant of  
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42 the three, promoting its position on this issue as core to its identity (Kestila and Söderlund,  
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44 2007). *FrP* has actively sought an anti-immigrant constituency for decades and, within a  
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46 broader anti-immigrant posture, has consistently expressed targeted opposition toward  
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48 Muslim immigrant population in particular (Strabac and Valenta, 2012). The party has been  
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50 strongly focused on immigration since the 1980’s and was among the first to politicise the  
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52 issue of immigration in Norway. (Kestila and Söderlund, 2007). That said, the electoral  
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54 success of *FrP* is not based solely on the issue of immigration as the party embraces a  
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56 broader range of policies constituting a “... rather erratic mixture of neo-liberalism,  
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3 conservatism and populism” (Hagelund, 2003: 47). Nevertheless, the defining issue of the  
4 party is immigration. Despite being relatively more moderate, both *H* and *AP* recently  
5 advocated stricter immigration policies, due, at least in part, to the perceived electoral success  
6 of *FrP* on this issue (Simmones, 2013; see van Spanje, 2010 for broader European analysis of  
7 immigration and non-traditional party success).  
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### 18 **Hypotheses:**

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20 We offer a number of testable hypotheses. Regarding the openly expressed opposition, we  
21 expect it will be significantly and substantively higher among supporters of *FrP*. In addition,  
22 we expect that supporters of centre-right *H* will express less support for Muslim newcomers  
23 than the supporters of centre-left *AP*. The difference between these two parties is expected to  
24 be smaller, compared to *FrP*. In other words, we expect voters of *FrP* to stand out as  
25 exhibiting particularly little support.  
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34 Both these expectations are largely based on findings from previous work.

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39 *H1a: Muslim refugees, people and immigrants confront significantly less acceptance*  
40 *among the Progress Party relative to the two conventional centre-left (Labour Party)*  
41 *and centre-right parties (Conservative Party) when sentiment is overtly expressed.*

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46 *H1b: Muslim refugees, people and immigrants confront a somewhat lower level of*  
47 *acceptance among supporters of Conservative Party, compared with supporters of*  
48 *Labour Party, when sentiment is overtly expressed.*  
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55 When the threat of stigmatisation is minimised by the offer of absolute anonymity, significant  
56 change should emerge in expressed levels of support f only among members of conventional  
57 political parties – *H* and *AP*. We consider three categories of Muslim newcomers - Muslim  
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3 refugees (MR), Muslim people (MP) or Muslim immigrants (MI). We expect masking to be  
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5 basically non-existent among party supports of *FrP*, which is the clear marker that this party  
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7 deviates from normative pressure and the situational conformity shaping the conventional  
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9 Norwegian political parties such as *H* and *AP*. This expectation can be articulated in two,  
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11 related hypotheses.

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17 H2a: *Muslim newcomers encounter significantly less tolerance among supporters of*  
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19 *Labour and Conservative parties when sentiment is expressed with the guarantee of*  
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21 *absolute and permanent anonymity than when the same sentiment is overtly*  
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23 *expressed.*

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26 H2b: *Overt and covert expressions of tolerance for Muslim newcomers among*  
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28 *supporters of the Progress Party do not differ.*

### 32 33 **Method: The intuition of the item-count technique (ICT)**

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35 The item-count technique ICT, adapted for the substantive focus of this work (i.e., attitudes  
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37 toward Muslim newcomers), works by manipulating the extent to which respondents are  
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39 guaranteed absolute and permanent anonymity. **First**, a control group is presented a list of  
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41 items unrelated to concerns about immigration about which they list the number with which  
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43 they agree. **Second**, an independent treatment groups are presented with the same list, but  
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45 with additional *focal* items, defining support for Muslim immigrants, refugees and people  
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47 (i.e., newcomers). The difference between the mean response to the control list (first step)  
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49 and the mean response to the treatment list (second step) offers a group-level measure of  
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51 agreement with the focal item under conditions of absolute and permanent anonymity, termed  
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53 covert sentiment. **Third**, the control sample is further sorted into randomized subsamples to  
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55 which a direct question is presented that is directly comparable to one of the focal items.  
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3 This step allows for the measurement of overtly expressed opposition, which is comparable to  
4 a standard public opinion poll.  
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10 [insert Figure 1 near here]  
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#### 14 **Method: Formal design and implementation of the item-count technique (ICT)**

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16 Figure 1 illustrates the specific ICT used in this work. The initial, representative sample is  
17 first sorted into two experimental groups – treatment and control. All respondents in each  
18 group is presented with a standard survey questionnaire, which measures sociodemographic  
19 characteristics as well as party identification. In addition to these core measures, the control  
20 group is presented with a 3-item list question as follows:  
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30 [control list] *Of the following three statements, HOW MANY of them do you AGREE with? We*  
31 *don't want to know which statements, just HOW MANY.*<sup>iv</sup>  
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34 *Norway should increase in assistance to the poor*  
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36 *Norway should decrease the tax on petrol and diesel*  
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38 *Norway should allow large corporations to pollute the environment*  
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44 The treatment group is sorted further into three independent experimental subgroups. Each of  
45 these groups is presented with a similar list question as that received by the control group, but  
46 with an additional focal item added to the list. Each treatment subgroup, to offer sufficient  
47 statistical power, is roughly equivalent in size to the total control group. In total, three focal  
48 items are used – one per treatment subgroup – which constitute 4-items lists and are worded  
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3 [treatment list frame 1] *Norway should allow people from Muslim countries to come and live*  
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5 *here*

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7 [treatment list frame 2] *Norway should allow immigrants from Muslim countries to come and*  
8  
9 *live here*

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11 [treatment list frame 3] *Norway should allow refugees from Muslim countries to come and*  
12  
13 *live here*

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19 All control respondents are confronted with the 3-item list, but the control group is further  
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21 divided into three independent experiment subgroups. Each of these subgroups is presented  
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23 with a **direct** question that is directly comparable to one of the focal items placed in a  
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25 treatment subgroup. This provides the overt measure of attitudes toward each of the three  
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27 Muslim newcomer frames – immigrant, refugee and person. The wording of the overt  
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29 questions is as follows:  
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35 [control direct frame 1] *Should Norway allow people from Muslim countries to come and live*  
36  
37 *here?*

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39 [control direct frame 2] *Should Norway allow immigrants from Muslim countries to come and*  
40  
41 *live here?*<sup>v</sup>

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43 [control direct frame 3] *Should Norway allow refugees from Muslim countries to come and*  
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45 *live here?*<sup>vi</sup>

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51 In sum, the design used offers four distinct manipulations and related comparisons. The **first**  
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53 is the difference between the treatment and control list, which reveals attitudes covertly  
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55 expressed. A formal test of this difference is a one-sided test of means as the mean response  
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57 to the 4-item treatment group, which includes the additional focal item, is expected to be  
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3 equivalent or greater than the mean response to the 3-item control list. The **second** is the  
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5 difference between each covert measure, which is calculable for Muslim newcomers  
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7 characterized by three distinct frames – immigrant, refugee and person. There are two  
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9 options to ascertain difference between each of the treatment frames. Either a two-sided test  
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11 of proportions or a direct test of means between the mean response to the 4-item list. The  
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14 **third** is the comparison between each overt measure of attitudes toward the same three  
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16 frames. This is determined by a two-sided test of proportions. The **fourth** is the comparison  
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18 between each overt frame and the equivalent covert frame (e.g., overt attitudes toward  
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20 Muslim refugees vs. covert attitudes toward Muslim refugees). This is determined by a two-  
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22 sided test of proportions.  
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### 29 **Data and sample**

30 The experiment described above was embedded in the Norwegian Citizen Panel (NCP)<sup>vii</sup>,  
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32 which is an ongoing representative panel survey of the Norwegian population jointly  
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34 administered by Faculty of Social Sciences at the University of Bergen and Uni Research  
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36 Rokkan Centre. The recruitment of panel members and the collection itself was completed in  
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38 partnership with ideas2evidence<sup>viii</sup>, a private data collection company, based on a sample  
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40 drawn by Evry<sup>ix</sup>, a private company that co-manages the National Registry of Norway with  
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42 the Norwegian Tax Administration. The collection of 7<sup>th</sup> wave resulted in a total sample of  
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44 4,689 completed surveys, resulting in a cumulative response rate of 72 percent (Skjervheim  
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46 and Høgestøl 2016). Of these 4,689 sampled individuals, a random subsample (n=3,005)  
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48 were included in the survey experiment used in this work with only respondents who  
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50 identified with one of the three largest political parties – *AP* (n=952), *H* (n=692) or *FrP*  
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52 (n=281) - being retained in the analysis. The final analytic sample consists of **1,929**  
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54 respondents and Figure 1 shows the process of randomly assigning these sampled  
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respondents into the treatment and control groups. See Appendix 2 for a detailed overview of the NCP, analytic sample characteristics and mode of data collection.

### **Limitations and assumptions of the list experiment**

The list experiment offers high levels of anonymity, which underpins its ability to mitigate the stigma associated with certain responses to survey questions. The maintenance of anonymity requires a number of assumptions. First, a response to a list question should not be zero. This is referred to as a floor effect and it would reveal a respondent's preference for any item in the list (Blair and Imai 2012). Second, a response to a list question should not equal the total number of items. This is referred to as a ceiling effect and, like a floor effect, reveals the respondent's preference for any given item – including the focal item (Blair and Imai 2012). Third, the difference in the number of items in the control list and the treatments list (control list + a focal item) should not affect the response pattern independent of a respondent's response to the additional focal item. This last concern is a design effect (Blair and Imai 2012)<sup>2</sup>.

Tables A1, A2, A3 and A4 of Appendix 3 report the distribution of responses to the treatment and control list questions overall and by political party affiliation. The proportion and counts for responses, which range from zero to the total number of items (three in the case of the control and four in the case of the treatment), offer some indication of the extent to which there are respondents responding in a way that would violate the assumption that anonymity is provided by simply requiring a count response to a list rather than to individual items.

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<sup>2</sup> Assuming that there is limited substantive overlap of list items (i.e., multiple items that query a similar opinion), Blair and Imai (2012) suggest a test for design effects. This tests the null hypothesis of no design effect. At an alpha of 0.05, the null hypothesis was not rejected for each treatment list – Muslim people, Muslim immigrants and Muslim refugees.

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3 Two patterns emerge. First, there is little evidence of a ceiling effect in the sample overall  
4 (appendix Table A1) and for any political party (appendix Tables A2, A3 and A4). No more than  
5 seven respondents respond agree with four items regardless of the whether the overall sample or a  
6 specific political party are being considered. The pattern of ceiling effects varies little with 1 to 2  
7 percent of respondents agreeing with all four items regardless of party affiliation. To be clear, this  
8 pattern is only suggestive as the possibility remains that a respondent could chose to mask their  
9 true response to avoid hitting the ceiling, which would show up in the data as a response less than  
10 four.  
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23 Second, between 7 and 21 percent of respondents to the treatment lists report a response of zero,  
24 indicating a non-trivial number of responses that reveal no agreement with any list item (i.e., floor  
25 effect). Moreover, within samples – for the total sample and political-party subsamples – the  
26 percentage responding zero to the treatment question are notably consistent, varying by no more  
27 than two percentage points.  
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36 The implications for the interpretation of the results for the *H* and *FrP* is twofold. First, both parties  
37 are overtly more restrictionist and, therefore, their supporters are less likely to agree with the  
38 additional focal item. Given the way in which the question is asked (i.e., agreement indicates  
39 greater support for Muslim newcomers), fewer zero responses due to residual social desirability  
40 bias not mitigated by the list question could result in an overestimate of the level of support. In  
41 other words, rather than report a zero, which reveals the response to any given item, respondents  
42 could suggest support that would not be the case if support could be withheld and anonymity  
43 maintained. From this perspective, the estimated lack of covert support for Muslim newcomers  
44 among those who identify with the *FrP* and *H*, described in detail below, should be interpreted as  
45 a conservative estimate.  
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3 Blair and Imai (2010; 2012) offer a way to assess the extent to which floor and ceiling effects could  
4 alter responses. The approach estimates the percentage of the sample/population that is likely to  
5 report a response other than that which would have emerged if anonymity were maintained –  
6 termed “liars”. Table A1 reports these estimates for each Muslim newcomer frame (i.e., people,  
7 immigrants and refugees) and for a combined sample of all respondents who received a treatment  
8 list question regardless of frame. The results suggest that the percentage remains below 1%, which  
9 suggests that there is little direct evidence that the floor effects generate bias in the reported.

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21 [insert Table 2 near here]  
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## 25 **Results**

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27 Table 2 reports the n, mean and standard deviation of support for Muslim newcomers by  
28 frame (i.e., people, immigrants, people) and political party (i.e., *FrP*, *H* and *AP*). The  
29 estimated means/proportions or, in the case of covert support, the difference in means are  
30 formally tested. In addition, social desirability bias (SDB), which is the difference between  
31 the overt and covert estimates for each frame and political party, is reported and tested for  
32 significance.  
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### 44 *Overt Sentiment*

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46 Column d of Table 2 reports the overt support (rows e, g and i) for each frame for the entire  
47 sample, generalizable to the Norwegian population. A clear pattern emerges in that support is  
48 high when overtly expressed (Table 2; rows e, g and i), with more than half the population  
49 agreeing that Norway *should* allow Muslim newcomers, regardless of the frame, to come and  
50 reside. However, support overall in Norway is distinct from within-part support. *AP*  
51 supporters (Table 2; column b; rows e, g and i) and *H* supporters (Table 2; column c; rows e,  
52 g and i) are broadly similar to the overall population in terms of their overt attitudes toward  
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3 Muslim newcomers, although *AP* supporters consistently articulate slightly higher support than  
4 those identifying with *H*.  
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10 Supporters of *FrP* (column a) deviate from the general pattern observed for *AP* and *H*, with  
11 overt support being notably lower. No overt estimate of support for Muslim newcomer  
12 among *FrP* supporters significantly differs from zero (Table 2; column a; rows e, g and i), but  
13 this is to a large degree a result of small number of respondents in these cells. Looking at the  
14 mean values of overt support, they are low, but not extremely so: The support varies from  
15 10% for “Muslim immigrants” to 26% for “Muslim refugees”.  
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26 In terms of the first set of hypotheses, we find support for both. Results show that, indeed,  
27 Muslim refugees, people and immigrants confront significantly less acceptance among *FrP*  
28 supporters relative to *H* and *AP* when sentiment is overtly expressed (H1a). In addition,  
29 Muslim refugees, people and immigrants confront a lower level of acceptance among  
30 supporters of *H*, compared with supporters of *AP*, when sentiment is expressed openly (H1b).  
31 In other words, in terms of overt support, we find it to be highest among *AP* supporter,  
32 followed closely by supporters of *H*. Those with an affinity for *FrP* are, as expected, a  
33 distant third.  
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#### 47 *Covert sentiment and social desirability bias (SDB)*

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49 When considering covert sentiment and SDB, the pattern deviates notably. Once permanent  
50 anonymity is provided by the ICT, covert support of *H* voters drops strongly (Table 2;  
51 column c; rows f, h and j). The levels of support are more than halved, and the decreases are  
52 statistically significant for all three wordings of the question. Regarding *AP* supporters, the  
53 results are somewhat more mixed. Also here, the general trend is decrease of support once the  
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3 anonymity is provided, but the sizes of the decreases and their statistical significance are to  
4 some degree dependent on wording of the question. For the “Muslim people” wording, the  
5 support drops by 20 percentage points, and the decrease is statistically significant. For  
6  
7 “Muslim immigrants” wording, the drop is about 16 percentage points, and with our sample  
8 sizes the decrease in support is not significant at the conventional 0.05 level (although it is  
9 significant at the 0.1 level). Finally, for the “Muslim refugees” wording, the drop in support  
10 is about 10 percentage points and is not statistically significant. The results for supporters of  
11 *FrP* (column a), which need to be considered as suggestive due to the available sample size,  
12 reveal a complex pattern. For “Muslim people” wording, the results are in line with our  
13 expectations – there is essentially no difference in support expressed openly and under  
14 anonymity condition. The “Muslim immigrants” wording results in drop in support of about  
15 nine percentage points; a relatively modest, although non-negligible drop that is not  
16 statistically significant at our sample sizes. Finally, with regard to “Muslim refugees”  
17 wording, the estimated drop in support is about 25 percentage points. That is definitely not a  
18 small decrease, although it is not statistically significant at the conventional 0.05 level due to  
19 low number of observations in cell (i) of the row (a)<sup>3</sup>.  
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42 Thus, our hypothesis H2a (“Muslim newcomers encounter significantly less tolerance among  
43 supporters of Labour (AP) and Conservative (H) parties when sentiment is expressed with the  
44 guarantee of absolute and permanent anonymity than when the same sentiment is overtly  
45 expressed”) receives mixed support. H supporters indeed show much less support in  
46 anonymity condition, while the results for AP supporters are mixed and the decrease in  
47 support in anonymity condition is generally less dramatic. Regarding the hypothesis H2b  
48 (“Overt and covert expressions of tolerance for Muslim newcomers among supporters of the  
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60 <sup>3</sup> The decrease is significant at the 0.1 level

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3 Progress Party (FrP) do not differ”), we cannot claim to have found any support for it, based  
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5 on our dataset. Our results paint a pretty complex picture, where wording of the question  
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7 seem to be of importance. This, combined with the low sample sizes in some of the table  
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9 cells, prevent us from drawing any clear conclusions.  
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17 [insert Table 3 near here]  
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### 19 *Differences between political parties*

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21 Table 3 reports the formal tests between *AP*, *FrP* and *H* supporters. Overall, *H*, *FrP* and *AP*  
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23 supporters report significantly different levels of overt and covert support for Muslim  
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25 Newcomers – framed as people (MP) and refugees (MI). In addition, the extent to which  
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27 sentiment is masked (i.e., SDB) is notably different between distinct party affiliations.  
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29 However, two exceptions are observed.  
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35 First, *AP* and *H* supports are notably similar in their overtly stated support for Muslim  
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37 refugees (MR), but a large and significant gap emerges when anonymity is provided. In other  
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39 words, what appears to be similarities between the two mainstream parties (*AP* and *H*) is  
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41 limited to overtly expressed sentiment. Covert expression suggests a wider, covertly  
42  
43 expressed difference between the two parties. Second, *AP* and *FrP* supporters do not mask  
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45 much antipathy toward Muslim immigrants. This does not mean that they express similar  
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47 levels of overt and covert support, which is not the case. Instead, the difference between the  
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49 relatively positive overt and covert estimates for *AP* is similar to the difference between the  
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51 relatively negative overt and covert estimates for *FrP*. In other words, *AP* supporters do not  
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53 mask their support while *FrP* supporters do not mask their antipathy.  
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3 Of note, when comparing *H* and *FrP* supporters, the difference between support for Muslim  
4 newcomers across all frames narrows when sentiment is expressed covertly. An example is  
5 the decline from 0.474 to 0.176 in the case of support for Muslim immigrants (MI). This is  
6 not the case when results for *AP* supporters are compared to the *FrP* where a difference of  
7 0.592 reduces to 0.515 for the same frame. In other words, *H* and *FrP* supporters appear  
8 distinct particularly when overt sentiment is assessed, but the provision of anonymity  
9 suggests the gap to be less substantive.  
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## 24 **Conclusion**

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26 Our empirical results based on *direct* questions (i.e., overt) are very much in accordance with  
27 previous studies of attitudes toward new minorities and newcomers in Norway and, more  
28 broadly, Europe. Succinctly put, the levels of intolerance are notably higher among  
29 supporters of *FrP* than among supporters of centre-left (*AP*) and centre-right (*H*). As  
30 expected, some difference is also observed among conventional centre-right and centre-left  
31 party supporters with *H* expressing less support for newcomers than *AP*. That said, the two  
32 conventional parties are much closer to each other than to supporters of *FrP* in terms of overt  
33 attitudes.  
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45 These empirical results reinforce previous work that links overtly intolerant parts of  
46 population with support for populist-right parties and politicians. It is important to note that  
47 the sizable fraction of the electorate supporting overtly anti-immigrant parties in Norway (and  
48 Western Europe more broadly) do not comprise the majority of the population. Most of the  
49 electorate expressed relatively tolerant attitudes, which suggests that the growth of parties  
50 like the *FrP* based on the issue of immigration, in the absence of disruptive events (e.g.,  
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3 return to recession or dramatic shift in labour/refugee immigration), could be nearing its  
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5 limits.  
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8 In contrast to the overt pattern, supporters of the *H* express significantly less support for  
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10 Muslim newcomers when provided absolute and permanent anonymity. This pattern confirms  
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12 the theoretical importance of situational conformity in that we interpret this pattern as  
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14 emerging from the anticipation of the stigma. The proportion of the centre-right  
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16 Conservative party's supporters exhibiting support for Muslim newcomers, whether they be  
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18 identified as immigrants, refugees or people, is more than halved when anonymity is  
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20 provided; from about 60 to less than 30 percent. This effectively places *H* supporters, in  
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22 terms of covert attitudes, closer to the supporters of the *FrP* than to the *AP*. Simply put, the  
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24 attitudes of supporters of the centre-right party (i.e., *H*) might be less liberal than standard  
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26 public opinion polls would suggest.  
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32 Regarding the supporters of the centre-left *AP*, our results are mixed and more dependent on  
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34 wording of the question when it comes to decrease in support in conditions of anonymity.  
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36 Particularly when asked about acceptance of "Muslim Refugees", the *AP*-supporters tend to  
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38 give similar answers, with difference between overt and covert condition being less than 10  
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40 percentage points and not statistically significant. Interestingly, quite the opposite is the case  
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42 for *FrP*-supporters in "Muslim Refugees" wording condition. For them the overt support  
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44 increases, compared with "People" and "Immigrants" wordings, while the support under  
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46 condition of anonymity drops to basically zero. This results in a fairly large difference  
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48 between overt and covert condition (SDB) of about 25 percentage points. Though, due to the  
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50 problems with low sample size, this difference is only significant at the 0.1 level of  
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52 significance and the result should be interpreted with caution.  
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3 It is worth noting that anonymously held opinions are plausibly more predictive of  
4 anonymous acts (e.g., voting). Therefore, the notably more similar perspective shared by *FrP*  
5 and the *H* on the issue of immigration, when sentiment is covertly expressed, might have  
6 quite important political and social implications. This would be particularly important to take  
7 into account when preferences are anonymously expressed (e.g., elections, referenda). The *H*  
8 and *FrP* have been in a stable government that has collaboratively pursued more restrictive  
9 immigration policies. If the preferences of large parts of supporters of *H*, albeit only  
10 expressed covertly, are in-line with a more restrictive posture toward Muslim newcomers –  
11 refugee or otherwise, the result is a divergence of attitudes that is limited to the public sphere  
12 (i.e., overt expression) and the underlying acceptance of seemingly divergent policy positions  
13 should be expected. In addition, future work should have a clear prediction in other,  
14 neighbouring contexts (e.g., Denmark) where a similar pattern of cooperation between  
15 overtly incompatible political parties can be better understood if covert sentiment is taken  
16 into account.  
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


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Figure 1: Research design and sample distribution by experiment groups



Source: Wave 7, Norwegian Citizen Panel (NCP7), 2016

Table 1: Percentage of the vote and number of seats by party in Norway: 1989-2017

|                                      | 1989 | 1993 | 1997 | 2001 | 2005 | 2009 | 2013 | 2017 |
|--------------------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| <b>Progress Party (<i>FrP</i>)</b>   |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |
| % of vote                            | 13.0 | 6.3  | 15.3 | 14.6 | 22.1 | 22.9 | 16.3 | 15.2 |
| # of seats                           | 22   | 10   | 25   | 25   | 38   | 41   | 29   | 27   |
| <b>Labour Party (<i>AP</i>)</b>      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |
| % of vote                            | 34.4 | 36.9 | 35.1 | 24.3 | 32.7 | 35.4 | 30.8 | 27.4 |
| # of seats                           | 63   | 67   | 65   | 43   | 61   | 64   | 55   | 49   |
| <b>Conservative Party (<i>H</i>)</b> |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |
| % of vote                            | 22.1 | 17.0 | 14.3 | 21.2 | 14.1 | 17.2 | 26.8 | 25.0 |
| # of seats                           | 37   | 28   | 23   | 38   | 23   | 30   | 48   | 45   |

Nordsieck 2017 (<http://www.parties-and-elections.eu/norway.html>); Valgdirektoratet 2018 (<http://www.valgresultat.no>)

Table 2: Overt, covert and social desirability bias (SDB) estimates by party affiliation and overall

|                        |           | Progress Party ( <i>FrP</i> ) |                   | Labour Party ( <i>AP</i> ) |                |     | Conservative Party ( <i>H</i> ) |                |   | Overall |                |   |
|------------------------|-----------|-------------------------------|-------------------|----------------------------|----------------|-----|---------------------------------|----------------|---|---------|----------------|---|
|                        |           | n                             | (mean; std. err.) |                            |                |     |                                 |                |   |         |                |   |
|                        |           | (a)                           |                   | (b)                        |                | (c) |                                 | (d)            |   |         |                |   |
| Muslim People (MP)     |           |                               |                   |                            |                |     |                                 |                |   |         |                |   |
| Overt                  | (e)       | 22                            | (0.136; 0.075)    | 70                         | (0.786; 0.049) | *   | 59                              | (0.627; 0.064) | * | 151     | (0.629; 0.039) | * |
| Covert                 | (f)       | 137                           | (0.119; 0.123)    | 468                        | (0.588; 0.356) | *   | 347                             | (0.244; 0.818) | * | 952     | (0.403; 0.482) | * |
| SDB                    | (e) - (f) | 159                           | (0.018; 0.156)    | 538                        | (0.197; 0.941) | *   | 406                             | (0.383; 0.102) | * | 1,103   | (0.227; 0.064) | * |
| Muslim Immigrants (MI) |           |                               |                   |                            |                |     |                                 |                |   |         |                |   |
| Overt                  | (g)       | 20                            | (0.100; 0.069)    | 66                         | (0.692; 0.057) | *   | 68                              | (0.574; 0.060) | * | 153     | (0.562; 0.040) | * |
| Covert                 | (h)       | 139                           | (0.013; 0.108)    | 459                        | (0.528; 0.067) | *   | 362                             | (0.189; 0.077) | * | 960     | (0.327; 0.047) | * |
| SDB                    | (g) - (h) | 159                           | (0.087; 0.145)    | 524                        | (0.164; 0.097) | †   | 430                             | (0.385; 0.094) | * | 1,113   | (0.235; 0.062) | * |
| Muslim Refugees (MR)   |           |                               |                   |                            |                |     |                                 |                |   |         |                |   |
| Overt                  | (i)       | 27                            | (0.260; 0.086)    | 95                         | (0.737; 0.045) | *   | 57                              | (0.667; 0.063) | * | 179     | (0.642; 0.036) | * |
| Covert                 | (j)       | 143                           | (0.009; 0.107)    | 485                        | (0.644; 0.062) | *   | 355                             | (0.270; 0.084) | * | 983     | (0.424; 0.047) | * |
| SDB                    | (i) - (j) | 170                           | (0.251; 0.129)    | † 580                      | (0.093; 0.080) |     | 412                             | (0.396; 0.108) | * | 1162    | (0.218; 0.059) | * |

Source: Wave 7, Norwegian Citizen Panel (NCP7), 2016

†p<0.10; \*p<0.05

Note: The significance of covert sentiment is determined by a one-sided t-test as the expected value should be greater or equal to one. Differences between the initial analytic sample (n=1,942) and the overall n (e.g., n=2274) in the calculations used in Table 1 results from the use of a control direct and a control list for the calculation of SDB (see Figure 1), which includes responses to the control list question and responses to the relevant direct question.

Interpretation: In Table 2, to reference specific differences (e.g., “(f) - (e)”) letters are used that correspond to rows and refer to simple differences based on lettered columns. To offer an example, the estimate of social desirability bias (SDB) for the Progress Party (*FrP*) on the topic of Muslim Refugees (MR) is “(i) – (j)”, which corresponds to “0.260 – 0.009” (i.e., 0.251).

Table 3: Comparison of political affiliation by overt, covert and social desirability bias (SDB)

| Table 2 Columns →             | Comparison                           |             |                                   |         |                                      |         |
|-------------------------------|--------------------------------------|-------------|-----------------------------------|---------|--------------------------------------|---------|
|                               | Conservative Party ( <i>H</i> )      |             | Conservative Party ( <i>H</i> )   |         | Labour Party ( <i>AP</i> )           |         |
|                               | vs.<br>Progress Party ( <i>FrP</i> ) |             | vs.<br>Labour Party ( <i>AP</i> ) |         | vs.<br>Progress Party ( <i>FrP</i> ) |         |
|                               | (c) - (a)                            | (std. err.) | (c) - (b)                         |         | (b) - (a)                            |         |
| <b>Muslim People (MP)</b>     |                                      |             |                                   |         |                                      |         |
| Overt                         | 0.491 *                              | (0.114)     | -0.159 *                          | (0.079) | 0.650 *                              | (0.098) |
| Covert                        | 0.125 *                              | (0.075)     | -0.345 *                          | (0.054) | 0.470 *                              | (0.074) |
| SDB                           | 0.366 *                              | (0.068)     | 0.186 *                           | (0.049) | 0.180 *                              | (0.065) |
| <b>Muslim Immigrants (MI)</b> |                                      |             |                                   |         |                                      |         |
| Overt                         | 0.474 *                              | (0.118)     | -0.118 †                          | (0.083) | 0.592 *                              | (0.111) |
| Covert                        | 0.176 *                              | (0.071)     | -0.339 *                          | (0.053) | 0.515 *                              | (0.071) |
| SDB                           | 0.298 *                              | (0.064)     | 0.221 *                           | (0.047) | 0.077                                | (0.064) |
| <b>Muslim Refugees (MR)</b>   |                                      |             |                                   |         |                                      |         |
| Overt                         | 0.407 *                              | (0.109)     | -0.070                            | (0.076) | 0.477 *                              | (0.097) |
| Covert                        | 0.262 *                              | (0.075)     | -0.373 *                          | (0.054) | 0.635 *                              | (0.070) |
| SDB                           | 0.146 *                              | (0.066)     | 0.303 *                           | (0.048) | -0.157 *                             | (0.061) |

Source: Wave 7, Norwegian Citizen Panel (NCP7), 2016

† $p < 0.10$ ; \* $p < 0.05$

Note: The significance of a comparison of any two political parties or immigrant groups is determined by a two-sided t-test as the expected difference could be positive or negative.

Interpretation: In Table 3, to reference specific differences (e.g., “(c) - (a)”) letters are used that correspond to lettered columns in Table 2. To offer an example, the estimate of differences in covert support between the Labour Party (*AP*) and the Progress Party (*FrP*) on the topic of Muslim Immigrants (MI) is “(b) - (a)”, which corresponds to “0.528 - 0.013” (i.e., 0.515).

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<sup>i</sup> Azrout and Wojcieszak (2017) focus on the unlikely, but salient ascension of Turkey in the EU. As attitudes toward Polish immigrants are contrasted to those directed at Muslim immigrants, the key insight is that having a negative view of Muslim immigrants is significantly associated only with the potential inclusion of Turkey in the EU. In other words, outgroup characteristics determine distinct preferences.

<sup>ii</sup> Discreditable refers to the type of attribute than could result in stigma but is able to be masked in a given interaction (e.g., an opinion expressed via a list experiment). This terminology was introduced by Goffman (1959) who used it to delineate attributes that could be hidden (i.e., discreditable) from those that could not be managed in a given interaction (i.e., discredited).

<sup>iii</sup> Each Political party will be referred to by their respective acronym from this point forward in the text.

<sup>iv</sup> *Hvor mange av de tre følgende påstandene er du enig i? Vi ønsker ikke å vite hvilke påstander, bare hvor mange.*

<sup>v</sup> *Synes du Norge bør la immigranter fra muslimske land komme for å bosette seg her?*

<sup>vi</sup> *Synes du Norge bør la flyktninger fra muslimske land komme for å bosette seg her?*

<sup>vii</sup> <https://www.uib.no/en/citizen>


<sup>viii</sup> <https://www.ideas2evidence.com/>

<sup>ix</sup> <https://www.evry.com/>



Appendix 1: Figures depicting difference in overt, covert and social desirability bias by frame and party affiliation


Plot A1: Muslim people



Source: Wave 7, Norwegian Citizen Panel (NCP7), 2016

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
Plot A2: Muslim immigrants



Source: Wave 7, Norwegian Citizen Panel (NCP7), 2016

Review Only

Plot A3: Muslim Refugees



Source: Wave 7, Norwegian Citizen Panel (NCP7), 2016

## Appendix 2: Norwegian Citizen Panel (NCP), general data collection and panel characteristics

Panel members in the 7<sup>th</sup> wave (NCP7; 2016) of the NCP were initially recruited in the 1<sup>st</sup> (NCP1; 2013) and 3<sup>rd</sup> (NCP3; 2014) waves via a random sample drawn from the National Registry of Norway, which includes all individuals born in Norway. The recruitment sample for the 1<sup>st</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> waves each consisted of 25,000 aged 18 years or more. After receipt of the initial sample, all respondents over the age of 95 were excluded from the data collection step. The initial contact involved a mix of postal recruitment and text messages (i.e., SMS) followed by telephone reminders to all sampled individuals with viable/identifiable phone numbers, resulting in a total recruitment rate of 20 (NCP1) and 23 (NCP3) percent and a total panel of 10,130 members.

The survey component of the 7<sup>th</sup> wave of the NCP entered the field on 1<sup>st</sup> of November 2016, administered via an email to all 10,130 panel members. Although all panel members received an initial email, participants who do not respond to three consecutive requests for participation are considered “inactive” and are excluded from the calculation of the non-response rate. Specifically, of the 4,651 initial recruits in NCP1, 1,741 are considered inactive. From the NCP3 recruitment of 5,479, 1,885 are now considered inactive. This results in an effective panel of 6,504 members (from which the cumulative response rate is derived) that is representative of the Norwegian population. After initial contact (1,939 completions), a second email contact was attempted (3<sup>rd</sup> of November; 1,473 completions) with a third attempt via a text message (11<sup>th</sup> of November; 593 responses). Text messages were only used if the panel member registered a contact number. For those who did not register a number, email (11<sup>th</sup> of November; 69 responses) was used again for the 3<sup>rd</sup> follow-up.

## Appendix 3: Distribution of responses to control and treatment lists

Table A1: Counts and percentages for each item response – Full sample

|   | Control list<br>3 items |       | Treatment list<br>(MP)<br>4 items |       | Treatment list<br>(MI)<br>4 items |      | Treatment list<br>(MR)<br>4 items |       | Treatment list<br>(Overall)<br>4 items |       |
|---|-------------------------|-------|-----------------------------------|-------|-----------------------------------|------|-----------------------------------|-------|--|-------|
|   | n                       | (%)   |                                   |       |                                   |      |                                   |       |  |       |
| Number of Items                                 |                         |       |                                   |       |                                   |      |                                   |       |  |       |
| 0   | 95                      | (20)  | 61                                | (13)  | 71                                | (15) | 69                                | (14)  | 201                                    | (14)  |
| 1   | 305                     | (63)  | 207                               | (44)  | 216                               | (45) | 190                               | (38)  | 613                                    | (42)  |
| 2   | 78                      | (16)  | 164                               | (35)  | 163                               | (34) | 215                               | (43)  | 542                                    | (37)  |
| 3   | 5                       | (1)   | 32                                | (7)   | 24                                | (5)  | 19                                | (4)   | 75                                     | (5)   |
| 4   | n/a                     |       | 5                                 | (1)   | 3                                 | (1)  | 7                                 | (1)   | 15                                     | (1)   |
| Total   | 483                     | (100) | 469                               | (100) | 477                               | (99) | 500                               | (100) | 1446                                   | (100) |
| Maximum-likelihood estimate of % floor liars    |                         |       | 0.017                             |       | 0.017                             |      | 0.006                             |       | 0.018                                  |       |
| Quasi-bayesian approximation of % floor liars   |                         |       | 0.000                             |       | 0.000                             |      | 0.001                             |       | 0.000                                  |       |
| Maximum-likelihood estimate of % ceiling liars  |                         |       | 0.003                             |       | 0.003                             |      | 0.003                             |       | 0.003                                  |       |
| Quasi-bayesian approximation of % ceiling liars |                         |       | 0.002                             |       | 0.002                             |      | 0.002                             |       | 0.000                                  |       |

Source: Wave 7, Norwegian Citizen Panel (NCP) 2016

Table A2: Counts and percentages for each item response – Labour Party (AP)

|                    | Control list<br>3 items<br>n (%) | Treatment list<br>(MP)<br>4 items | Treatment list<br>(MI)<br>4 items | Treatment list<br>(MR)<br>4 items |
|--------------------|----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| Number of<br>Items |                                  |                                   |                                   |                                   |
| 0                  | 41 (18)                          | 17 (7)                            | 20 (9)                            | 18 (7)                            |
| 1                  | 152 (66)                         | 91 (38)                           | 91 (40)                           | 75 (29)                           |
| 2                  | 34 (15)                          | 107 (45)                          | 98 (43)                           | 147 (58)                          |
| 3                  | 3 (1)                            | 20 (8)                            | 18 (8)                            | 11 (4)                            |
| 4                  | n/a                              | 3 (1)                             | 2 (1)                             | 4 (2)                             |
| Total              | 230 (100)                        | 238 (100)                         | 229 (99)                          | 255 (100)                         |

Source: Wave 7, Norwegian Citizen Panel (NCP) 2016

Table A3: Counts and percentages for each item response – Conservative Party (H)

|                    | Control list<br>3 items<br>n (%) | Treatment list<br>(MP)<br>4 items | Treatment list<br>(MI)<br>4 items | Treatment list<br>(MR)<br>4 items |
|--------------------|----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| Number of<br>Items |                                  |                                   |                                   |                                   |
| 0                  | 46 (25)                          | 30 (18)                           | 37 (21)                           | 36 (21)                           |
| 1                  | 105 (57)                         | 85 (52)                           | 88 (49)                           | 76 (44)                           |
| 2                  | 31 (17)                          | 37 (23)                           | 47 (26)                           | 49 (29)                           |
| 3                  | 2 (1)                            | 10 (6)                            | 5 (3)                             | 7 (4)                             |
| 4                  | n/a                              | 1 (1)                             | 1 (1)                             | 3 (2)                             |
| Total              | 184 (100)                        | 163 (100)                         | 178 (99)                          | 171 (100)                         |

Source: Wave 7, Norwegian Citizen Panel (NCP) 2016

Table A4: Counts and percentages for each item response – Progress Party (FrP)

|                    | Control list<br>3 items |       | Treatment list<br>(MP)<br>4 items | Treatment list<br>(MI)<br>4 items | Treatment list<br>(MR)<br>4 items |
|--------------------|-------------------------|-------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
|                    | n                       | (%)   |                                   |                                   |                                   |
| Number of<br>Items |                         |       |                                   |                                   |                                   |
| 0                  | 8                       | (12)  | 14 (21)                           | 14 (20)                           | 15 (20)                           |
| 1                  | 48                      | (70)  | 31 (46)                           | 37 (53)                           | 39 (53)                           |
| 2                  | 13                      | (19)  | 20 (29)                           | 18 (26)                           | 19 (26)                           |
| 3                  | 0                       | (0)   | 2 (3)                             | 1 (1)                             | 1 (1)                             |
| 4                  | n/a                     |       | 1 (1)                             | 0 (0)                             | 0 (0)                             |
| Total              | 69                      | (100) | 68 (100)                          | 70 (100)                          | 74 (100)                          |

Source: Wave 7, Norwegian Citizen Panel (NCP) 2016