

# 'Real Toryism' or Christian democracy? The political thought of Douglas Jerrold and Charles Petrie at the *New English Review*, 1945–50\*

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## Abstract

This article uses the periodical press, memoirs and archival sources to examine the Conservative thought of Douglas Jerrold and Charles Petrie at the *New English Review* between 1945 and 1950. It seeks to argue that while there was more continuity than rupture in their political thought, they were able to make a transition from interwar authoritarianism and 'fascism' to postwar anti-communism and democracy. There were similarities between their political Catholicism and Christian democracy, but ultimately their 'real Toryism' and continued sympathy for Franco prevented them from fully aligning themselves with British and west European Christian democrats.

It is widely known that the Anglo-Catholic conservative writer T. S. Eliot was particularly active in intellectual and religious circles between the late 1930s and the end of the Second World War.<sup>1</sup> His interaction with influential thinkers like the sociologist Karl Mannheim contributed a great deal to the development of his ideas, some of which he published in essay form before he included them in his more influential books on society and culture.<sup>2</sup> In one of his most famous essays, published in the Conservative-leaning periodical the *New English Review*, Eliot addressed Mannheim's *Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction* (1940). In doing so, he outlined his own view of the relationship between classes and elites in the making of cultures:

I have suggested elsewhere that a growing weakness of our culture has been the increasing isolation of *élites* from each other, so that the political, the philosophical, the artistic, the scientific, are separated, to the loss of each of them, not merely through the arrest of any general circulation of ideas, but through the lack of those contacts and mutual influences at a less conscious level, which are perhaps even more important than ideas. The problem of the formation, preservation, and development of the *élites* is therefore also the problem of the formation, preservation, and development of the *élite* ...<sup>3</sup>

\* I would like to thank Peter Mandler, Philip Morgan, Christian Egander Skov, Richard Toye and the two anonymous reviewers for reading and commenting on earlier versions of this article.

<sup>1</sup> See R. Kojecky, *T.S. Eliot's Social Criticism* (New York, 1971); M. Grimley, 'Civil society and the clerisy: Christian elites and national culture, c.1930–1950', in *Civil Society in British History: Ideas, Identities, Institutions*, ed. J. Harris (Oxford, 2003), pp. 231–48; J. Harris, "'A struggle for European civilization": T.S. Eliot and British conceptions of Europe during and after the Second World War', in *Europeanization in the Twentieth Century: Historical Approaches*, ed. M. Conway and K. K. Patel (Basingstoke, 2010), pp. 44–63; J. C. Wood, *This is Your Hour: Christian Intellectuals in Britain and the Crisis of Europe, 1937–49* (Manchester, 2019).

<sup>2</sup> See T. S. Eliot, *The Idea of a Christian Society* (London, 1939); T. S. Eliot, *Notes Towards the Definition of Culture* (London, 1948).

<sup>3</sup> T. S. Eliot, 'The class and the elite', *New English Review*, xi (Oct., 1945), 499–509, at p. 501. An updated version of the essay was published in Eliot, *Notes Towards the Definition of Culture*, pp. 35–49.

As José Harris has argued, Eliot theorized cultures ‘as a “frame” within which elites and masses, educated and demotic speech, and civic and rural life all needed constantly to interact with each other in order to stay alive’.<sup>4</sup> Nevertheless, one of Eliot’s chief concerns was the maintenance of *the elite* in a graded or class-based society and, like other influential thinkers on the right, he was keen to find new meeting points for philosophical elites like himself and political elites, particularly those within the Conservative party, to discuss the future of British society and European civilization.

This article offers a case study of an important but mostly forgotten example of one of these intellectual and social meeting points. This is the *New English Review*, a monthly periodical that was reconstituted by its pre-war radical-right and Catholic Tory editors Douglas Jerrold and Charles Petrie with direct support from the Conservative party in 1945. Religious and philosophical groups like the Moot, which included figures like Eliot, Mannheim and Christopher Dawson, and the Catholic Sword of the Spirit movement, which was partly conceived by Dawson as editor of the *Dublin Review*, as well as Conservative political groups like the Tory Reform Committee (T.R.C.) and the Progress Trust, have received significant historical attention in recent years for their wartime ideas about postwar British society.<sup>5</sup> But, as Harris has argued, ‘wartime thinking among British writers and intellectuals about the past and future of “European civilization” deserves much wider and more detailed examination ... as do the ideas on this subject of T. S. Eliot himself’.<sup>6</sup> This article suggests that Eliot was part of the same broader intellectual and political network on the right as Jerrold and Petrie, which consisted of a significant number of writers, publicists and politicians who wanted to rethink Conservatism and the party’s policies during the Second World War.

The members of this network often met each other at gentlemen’s clubs in London, at political and literary luncheons, and in the editorial offices of publishing houses where monthly periodicals were put together. These were some of the most important social spaces where issues like the future of British Conservatism, Conservative ideas about the nature of postwar British society and Conservative attitudes towards European integration were discussed in this period. This article argues that the *New English Review* was one of the most important links between the aforementioned religious and literary ‘thought worlds’ and the Conservative party itself between 1945 and 1950.<sup>7</sup>

Although the existence of the *New English Review* has rarely been acknowledged by historians, there is an extensive secondary literature on Jerrold’s and Petrie’s editorship of its predecessor the *English Review* between 1931 and 1935.<sup>8</sup> This is because historians have been and continue to be fascinated by their radical Conservatism and sympathy for authoritarian regimes in interwar Europe. Richard Griffiths was the first to mine its pages for British

<sup>4</sup> Harris, “A struggle for European civilization”, p. 56.

<sup>5</sup> See *The Moot Papers: Faith, Freedom and Society 1938–1944*, ed. K. Clements (London, 2009); Grimley, ‘Civil society and the clerisy’; A. Hastings, *A History of English Christianity 1920–2000* (London, 2001); Wood, *This is Your Hour*; G. Love, ‘Making a “new Conservatism”: the Tory Reform Committee and Design for Freedom, 1942–49’, *English Historical Review*, forthcoming (2020); R. Ritchie, *Without Hindsight: a History of the Progress Trust 1943–2005* (London, 2018).

<sup>6</sup> Harris, “A struggle for European civilization”, p. 58.

<sup>7</sup> It builds on an approach to researching Conservatism through the periodical press; see G. Love, ‘The periodical press and the intellectual culture of Conservatism in interwar Britain’, *Historical Journal*, lvii (2014), 1027–56.

<sup>8</sup> For clarification, the *English Review* ceased publication in July 1937 and was incorporated into its rival the *National Review*, which then adopted the full title the *National Review. Incorporating The English Review*. The *New English Review* was a new periodical (May 1945–Aug. 1948), which later changed its name to the *New English Review Magazine* (Sept. 1948–Aug. 1949) and finally the *English Review Magazine* (Sept. 1949–May 1950).

enthusiasts for Italian Fascism and German Nazism, and both Jay P. Corrin and Tom Villis explored the influence of the Catholic ‘Chesterbelloc’ and distributism political traditions on Jerrold and Petrie, who, as editors, promoted Italian Fascism, the French far right and the Franco regime in Spain.<sup>9</sup> These historians might be forgiven for assuming that the review ceased publication permanently when it was incorporated into the *National Review* in 1937, or that Jerrold’s and Petrie’s association with Fascist thought and appeasement would have prevented them from influencing Conservative politics in the 1940s. In fact, the only historian to mention Jerrold’s and Petrie’s running of the *New English Review* is Bernhard Dietz, but he does so only in passing because his recent work on Britain’s ‘neo-Tories’ is limited to the history of the 1930s.<sup>10</sup> As this article will show, Jerrold and Petrie quickly re-emerged as important players in the wider intellectual culture of Conservatism during the Second World War. The article explores why their radical views from the 1930s had little impact on their ability to be key facilitators of Conservative debate in the 1940s, and, in order to answer that question, it pays significant attention to their continued influence as publishers, clubmen and Conservative party activists.

This article analyses the degree of continuity and rupture in Jerrold’s and Petrie’s thought between the 1930s and the 1940s. It considers how far they abandoned their interwar political sympathies and asks to what degree they adapted their Conservatism to respond to postwar realities. It seeks to argue that Jerrold and Petrie made a transition from interwar authoritarianism and ‘fascism’ to postwar anti-communism and democracy. But the question of what type of democracy they embraced requires rigorous examination. The article draws upon Martin Conway’s and Volker Depkat’s work to contextualize their arguments in view of the competing interpretations of democracy that existed in Europe in the years after the Second World War.<sup>11</sup> Following Harris’s argument, the article also reflects on the nature of their commitment to democracy in view of their greater and continued concern for the defence of Christian civilization against the threat of communism in Europe. As a result, it compares the complex nature of Jerrold’s and Petrie’s postwar views, which did much to shape the parameters of Conservative debate in the *New English Review*, to the formative phase of Christian democracy in postwar Europe. In doing so, it uses the *New English Review* and its associated network to think more broadly about the question of why a home-grown explicitly Christian democratic movement failed to emerge as an influential force in British politics after 1945.

Finally, the article makes an important contribution to our understanding of those intellectual forces within the wider Conservative movement that helped to define the limits of the possible for the Conservative party in terms of the development of its domestic policy in the 1940s. It builds on a recent body of work that has started to rethink mid twentieth-century Conservatism in terms of its ‘futurology’.<sup>12</sup> The debates

<sup>9</sup> See R. Griffiths, *Fellow Travellers of the Right: British Enthusiasts for Nazi Germany 1933–39* (Oxford, 1983), pp. 21–49, 237–9; J. P. Corrin, *Catholic Intellectuals and the Challenge of Democracy* (Notre Dame, Ind., 2002), pp. 233–4, 321–6, 344–54; T. Villis, *British Catholics and Fascism: Religious Identity and Political Extremism between the Wars* (Basingstoke, 2013), pp. 136–74.

<sup>10</sup> See B. Dietz, *Neo-Tories: the Revolt of British Conservatives against Democracy and Political Modernity, 1929–1939* (London, 2018), pp. 6, 207.

<sup>11</sup> M. Conway and V. Depkat, ‘Towards a European history of the discourse of democracy: discussing democracy in western Europe, 1945–60’, in *Europeanization in the Twentieth Century: Historical Approaches*, ed. M. Conway and K. Klaus Patel (Basingstoke, 2010), pp. 132–56.

<sup>12</sup> R. Crowcroft, ‘Peering into the future: British Conservative leaders and the problem of national renewal, 1942–5’, *Historical Research*, xc (2017), 788–809; K. Kowol, ‘The Conservative movement and dreams of Britain’s post-war future’, *Historical Journal*, lxxii (2019), 473–93. See also D. Edgerton, *The Rise and Fall of the British Nation: a Twentieth Century History* (London, 2018), pp. 174–6.

in the *New English Review* were focused on critiquing or refining different interpretations of a ‘middle-way’ Conservatism that could be used to restore the party to government. In this sense, they help us to understand the party leadership’s own intellectual and strategic choices in the run-up to both the 1950 and 1951 general elections.<sup>13</sup> As will be shown, there was more continuity than rupture in Jerrold’s and Petrie’s thought between the interwar years and the postwar period. But arguably they have been neglected in the historiography for the years after 1935, because they have been discarded as authoritarians who became irrelevant once appeasement collapsed. One important exception is James Lothian’s work on the English Catholic intellectual community. Lothian has argued that ‘minor’ writers and thinkers like Jerrold could often be more influential in British Catholic circles than high-profile literary figures like Graham Greene and Evelyn Waugh, who continue to attract significant historical attention.<sup>14</sup> This article adopts Lothian’s approach to widening the ‘canon’ of Catholic writers in this period, but it does not neglect their roles in party politics. It seeks to argue that both Jerrold and Petrie made an important contribution to one possible future for Toryism, which was in some ways closer to the politics of west European Christian democrats after the Second World War.<sup>15</sup>

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In order to discuss the nature of Jerrold’s and Petrie’s Conservatism in the *New English Review*, we need to briefly examine their interwar record and relate the founding of the periodical to the political, religious and publishing networks that they were part of during the Second World War. Jerrold’s and Petrie’s endorsement of ‘strong government’ and their willingness to promote authoritarian regimes abroad meant that they had turned the *English Review* into a prominent forum for Conservative debate and criticism of Stanley Baldwin’s liberal Conservatism in the 1930s.<sup>16</sup> Dietz has shown that Jerrold, Petrie and other members of the English Review Group had seen themselves ‘as part of a Europe-wide counter-revolution against a modernization process that had dominated since the Enlightenment and the French Revolution’.<sup>17</sup> Although Jerrold and Petrie had not been fascists, they had shown considerable interest in Italian Fascism and its idea of the corporate state. Petrie had visited Mussolini on several occasions; he had published a biography of him in 1931; he had been on the board of directors of C.I.N.E.F. – a ‘think tank’ that studied Italian Fascism, which was in reality a propaganda vehicle for the Italian Fascist regime – and he had been one of the best-connected Italophiles in London.<sup>18</sup> As Tom Villis has explained, ‘their Catholic faith gave them a less positive view of British exceptionalism, which to them smacked of Protestant insularity’. This had shaped their view of Latin Europe, which had derived ‘many of its features from the French radical right, particularly the *Action Française*’. Charles Maurras’s vision for France was based on

<sup>13</sup> On Conservatism in this period, see P. Addison, *The Road to 1945: British Politics and the Second World War* (London, 1975); H. Jones, ‘The Conservative party and social policy, 1942–55’ (unpublished University of London Ph.D. thesis, 1992); H. Kopsch, ‘The approach of the Conservative party to social policy during World War II’ (unpublished University of London Ph.D. thesis, 1970); J. Ramsden, *The Age of Churchill and Eden, 1940–1957* (London, 1995).

<sup>14</sup> J. L. Lothian, *The Making and Unmaking of the English Catholic Intellectual Community, 1910–1950* (Notre Dame, Ind., 2009), p. xiii.

<sup>15</sup> Petrie has also been left out of accounts of Conservative intellectuals; see M. Bentley’s review of R. N. Soffer’s book *History, Historians, and Conservatism in Britain and America: from the Great War to Thatcher and Reagan* (Oxford, 2009), in *English Historical Review*, cxxv (2010), 784–5.

<sup>16</sup> Villis, *British Catholics*, p. 140.

<sup>17</sup> Dietz, *Neo-Tories*, p. 7.

<sup>18</sup> Dietz, *Neo-Tories*, pp. 115–22. C.I.N.E.F. was the abbreviation for Centre International d’Études sur la Fascisme (International Centre of Fascist Studies).

‘the great traditions of classical Europe – discipline, authority and unity – which had been maintained by the monarchy and the Catholic Church’. Villis argued that ‘Petrie [had] acted as a political ambassador for the French extreme right as much as Italian Fascism’ during the 1930s.<sup>19</sup> Jerrold had also played an important role in providing General Franco with a pilot and an aeroplane so that he could fly from the Canary Islands to Morocco before the start of the Spanish Civil War and, along with Petrie, he had been instrumental in forming the Friends of Nationalist Spain, which was ‘the most important pro-Franco organization in Britain’.<sup>20</sup> Both men had shown limited interest in Oswald Mosley’s British Union of Fascists and they had been sceptical of the Nazi regime in Germany, but they had published a wealth of articles by writers that were known associates of the Nazi and Fascist regimes, and other far-right movements in Europe.<sup>21</sup>

Jerrold and Petrie had advocated a temporary dictatorship or an absolute monarchy, a corporate state and distributism during the 1930s.<sup>22</sup> In addition to French and Italian influences, their political thought had been heavily shaped by the British Edwardian and post-First World War ideas of Hilaire Belloc and G. K. Chesterton, which George Bernard Shaw famously labelled the ‘Chesterbelloc’.<sup>23</sup> Jerrold’s and Petrie’s interwar thinking had embraced the anti-establishment ideas in Belloc’s and Chesterton’s book *The Party System* (1911) and Belloc’s *The Servile State* (1912). The first of these works outlined a ‘plutocratic conspiracy’ that was reducing parliamentary government to a ‘sham fight’ between Conservatives and Liberals. The second work predicted that the attempted implementation of socialism would result in a compromise with capitalism, which would lead to the enslavement of the potentially revolutionary worker by capitalists and state bureaucrats.<sup>24</sup> Belloc’s and Chesterton’s remedy was distributism, but their political vision is difficult to define because it was never written down in a single document. As Corrin has argued, distributism as envisaged by Belloc and Chesterton was meant to be an alternative to ‘the inequities of monopoly capitalism and statist collectivism’. But crucially, it was much more than an economic theory, because it drew upon ‘classical economic theory as well as Scholasticism’; in other words, it viewed ‘economics as a subdivision of moral philosophy’. Key features of distributism included the wider distribution of private property, ‘a restoration of worker control in commerce, agriculture, and industry along the lines of medieval guilds’, a mixed economy, and the decentralization of political power.<sup>25</sup> Jerrold and Petrie had been ‘new distributists’ because they had promoted and adapted Belloc’s and Chesterton’s ideas in the interwar period. Jerrold had imagined an ‘Ethical State’ consisting of a measure of ‘self-government’, meaning devolved decision-making powers in particular trades and professions, with an established monarch sitting above capital and labour.<sup>26</sup> Jerrold’s and Petrie’s ideas had been anti-socialist and anti-capitalist. They had wanted the Conservative party to adopt a ‘real Toryism’ that was uncorrupted by liberal democracy and industrial capitalism.<sup>27</sup> In the 1930s their ideas had gravitated towards authoritarianism, but the closest they had ever come to challenging

<sup>19</sup> Villis, *British Catholics*, pp. 146–8.

<sup>20</sup> Corrin, *Catholic Intellectuals*, pp. 323–4.

<sup>21</sup> See Griffiths, *Fellow Travellers of the Right*, pp. 21–4, 40–5, 237–9; Villis, *British Catholics*, pp. 136–74.

<sup>22</sup> Dietz, *Neo-Tories*, pp. 111–12.

<sup>23</sup> T. Villis, *Reaction and the Avant-Garde: the Revolt Against Liberal Democracy in Early Twentieth-Century Britain* (London, 2006), pp. 12–15.

<sup>24</sup> Corrin, *Catholic Intellectuals*, pp. 121–2.

<sup>25</sup> Corrin, *Catholic Intellectuals*, pp. 155–60.

<sup>26</sup> Corrin, *Catholic Intellectuals*, pp. 176–81.

<sup>27</sup> C. Petrie, *Chapters of Life: Intimate Recollections and Reflections on Life, Literature, Politics and Diplomacy* (London, 1950), p. 129.

Baldwin's liberal Conservatism was a failed attempt to push Lord Lloyd as an alternative leader in 1934.<sup>28</sup>

Jerrold and Petrie had also been strong supporters of Neville Chamberlain and appeasement in the 1930s.<sup>29</sup> Petrie had abandoned appeasement and his support for Fascist Italy only when Mussolini invaded Albania in April 1939.<sup>30</sup> Jerrold, meanwhile, had continued to hold on to the idea of achieving a negotiated peace with Germany early in the war and thought that Britain might 'tack on' to a Latin Catholic bloc after the war.<sup>31</sup> One might have expected their own reputations to follow them into the postwar years, but as Petrie later recalled in his memoirs, 'when war came Fascism was felt to be unpatriotic, and that sealed its fate'.<sup>32</sup> Both men came to accept the need to reposition themselves during wartime, which was essential if they were to play a significant role in the future of the party. Petrie was also well connected inside the party; he was a regular attendee of the Carlton Club and he would go on to write its history.<sup>33</sup> He quickly adapted his outlook from being a staunch defender of Chamberlain to being an avid supporter of Churchill and the war.<sup>34</sup> Jerrold made similar moves; not only was he a member of the Carlton Club, but he joined the party's new subcommittee on constitutional reform in 1941, serving under its chairman Cuthbert Headlam and R. A. Butler (chairman of the Conservative party's Post-War Problems Central Committee).<sup>35</sup> Jerrold's notoriously difficult personality seems to have led to his failure to be adopted as a Conservative candidate on multiple occasions, but his and Petrie's political views were mostly overlooked during the war.<sup>36</sup> As we shall see, one of the most important reasons for this was Jerrold's standing as a publisher and both men's roles as leading right-wing figures in a number of influential gentlemen's clubs in London. Under Jerrold's and Petrie's editorship, 'the old "English Review"' had also 'won for itself a unique place as an independent exponent of Conservative thought', which meant both men were seen as proven facilitators of Conservative debate.<sup>37</sup>

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Keeping Jerrold's and Petrie's backgrounds in mind, there was a renewed desire for wider intellectual discussion and co-operation in Conservative circles from 1943. One important but neglected sign of this was the establishment of the Burke Club, a monthly luncheon club founded by the Conservative M.P. Piers Loftus.<sup>38</sup> Loftus's aim was to use the club as an intellectual space for around twelve Conservative M.P.s and twelve conservative writers to meet each month to exchange ideas.<sup>39</sup> Loftus told the Conservative M.P. and

<sup>28</sup> Dietz, *Neo-Tories*, pp. 143–53.

<sup>29</sup> Petrie's biography of the Chamberlain family was published by the Right Book Club (see C. Petrie, *The Chamberlain Tradition* (London, 1938)).

<sup>30</sup> Dietz, *Neo-Tories*, p. 201.

<sup>31</sup> Lothian, *Making and Unmaking*, p. 373.

<sup>32</sup> Petrie, *Chapters of Life*, pp. 168–9.

<sup>33</sup> C. Petrie, *The Carlton Club* (London, 1955). The Carlton Club is the gentlemen's club affiliated with the party.

<sup>34</sup> A. Roberts, *Eminent Churchillians* (London, 1995), p. 203.

<sup>35</sup> *Parliament and Politics in the Age of Churchill and Attlee: the Headlam Diaries 1935–1951*, ed. S. Ball (Cambridge, 1999), p. 267.

<sup>36</sup> On Jerrold's ambitions, see Petrie, *Chapters of Life*, pp. 144–5; R. Speaight, *The Property Basket: Recollections of a Divided Life* (London, 1970), p. 155.

<sup>37</sup> See Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge, papers of Lord Hailsham (hereafter C.A.C.), HLSM 2/9/188, *New English Review* flyer signed by Petrie, n.d.

<sup>38</sup> Loftus was known as the author of *Conservatism and the Future: a Programme for Tory Democracy* (London, 1912) and *The Creed of a Tory* (London, 1926).

<sup>39</sup> C.A.C., HLSM 2/7/9, Piers Loftus to Quintin Hogg, 17 Oct. 1943.

prominent member of the T.R.C. Quintin Hogg that his idea was ‘to get Conservative writers and M.P.s representing all sections of opinions to meet together and better realise each others points of view, thus helping unity combined with diversity’. Loftus added,

For instance men like T.S. Eliot, [H. J.] Massingham, [Christopher] Hollis and Arthur Bryant are in favour of very drastic reconstruction ideas (though not necessarily 100% adherence to Beveridge) and they hold the same kind of views I do as regards our present financial system. On the other hand men like Collin Brooks regard these views, which we hold, with horror. So you will see that I want the Club to be thoroughly comprehensive.<sup>40</sup>

The Burke Club’s membership included writers and publicists like Jerrold, Petrie and Eliot, but also Arthur Bryant (editor of the *Ashridge Journal*), Collin Brooks (editor of *Truth*), F. A. Voigt (editor of *The Nineteenth Century and After*), Christopher Dawson (editor of the *Dublin Review*) and Douglas Woodruff (editor of *The Tablet*), and M.P.s like Quintin Hogg, A. P. Herbert, Christopher Hollis, Piers Loftus and Kenneth Pickthorn. Other notables who were being proposed at this time included Viscount Hinchinbrooke, David Eccles, Richard Law, Edward Grigg, Victor Raikes, Hamilton Kerr and Somerset de Chair.<sup>41</sup> Eliot described the Burke Club as ‘serious’ and stated that all of its members were of ‘a Tory cast of mind’.<sup>42</sup> But more importantly, the club’s aims signalled that for many Conservative M.P.s and intellectuals, there was a vacuum in Conservative ideas and a flexibility about what ideas might turn out to be the way forward.

Jerrold, Petrie and Eliot, then, were influential members of a wider Conservative political network, which made use of important meeting points like the Burke Club. But the religious dimensions of this network were also important. In order to map Jerrold’s, Petrie’s and Eliot’s positions in this broader network, we need to briefly consider two important groups that were thinking about the nature of postwar British society: the Moot, a discussion group led by the Anglican missionary but ecumenical J. H. Oldham, and the Sword of the Spirit, a democratic Catholic initiative founded by Cardinal Hinsley and Christopher Dawson, which was meant to reach out to non-Catholics and help to counter a continued Catholic interest in Mussolini’s and Franco’s politics and a newer interest in Marshal Pétain’s Vichy regime because of his pledge to honour traditional Catholic values.<sup>43</sup>

The Moot’s Christian members were mostly Protestant; Anglicans formed the largest group, followed by Presbyterians and a small number of Roman Catholics like Christopher Dawson and Michael Polanyi. However, Polanyi was Jewish originally, and the same was true of other members like the sociologists Karl Mannheim and Adolf Löwe.<sup>44</sup> In John Carter Wood’s words, the Oldham group was ‘part of a resurgence of Christian “civil society” ideals, such as Maritain’s personalist democracy’, but it also ‘resisted *anti*-planning arguments, Christian or not. It distinctively combined religious principles *and* secular sociology as well as personalism *and* planning: it represented, in a sense, a meeting of Maritain *and* Mannheim’.<sup>45</sup> The Moot was a philosophical group

<sup>40</sup> C.A.C., HLSM 2/7/9, Piers Loftus to Quintin Hogg, 22 Nov. 1943. Loftus was referring to the Beveridge Report of 1942.

<sup>41</sup> See the correspondence and memoranda from Piers Loftus sent to Quintin Hogg, C.A.C., HLSM 2/7/9, dated between 25 May and 22 Nov. 1943.

<sup>42</sup> Kojecky, *T.S. Eliot’s Social Criticism*, p. 151. The Burke Club was still in existence in 1950; see C. Brooks, *Tavern Talk* (London, 1950), p. 106.

<sup>43</sup> Hastings, *A History of English Christianity*, p. 393. Although Hinsley still kept a signed photograph of Franco on his desk during the war (see T. Buchanan, ‘Great Britain’, in *Political Catholicism in Europe, 1918–1965*, ed. T. Buchanan and M. Conway (Oxford, 1996), pp. 248–74, at p. 269).

<sup>44</sup> Wood, *This is Your Hour*, pp. 34–6 (original emphasis).

<sup>45</sup> Wood, *This is Your Hour*, p. 122 (original emphasis).

that failed to put its ideals into practice, and one of the reasons for this was that its members were never in full agreement about what postwar British society should look like. Dawson and Eliot came to operate on the margins of the group partly because they were sceptical about ‘planning’ and rejected the idea of increasing the power of the state; instead they preferred to emphasize the ‘pluralist–medieval perspective’ of society.<sup>46</sup> It was also Dawson as editor of the *Dublin Review* who outlined the agenda of the Sword of the Spirit. Dawson rejected totalitarianism and argued that ‘Catholics could and should, on a basis of recognition of natural law, co-operate with Christians of other churches and democratic society generally’.<sup>47</sup> Although the project failed because its president, Cardinal Hinsley, was ‘reproved by his fellow bishops (though not by Rome) for praying with heretics’, resulting in non-Catholics being excluded from membership, it was pitched as a Catholic-led equivalent of groups like the Moot.<sup>48</sup>

Jerrold and Petrie would have had no truck with the Moot, not only because of its ecumenical agenda but also because of its interest in planning and increasing state power, its early interest in Christian ‘personalism’, the lack of attention paid to property ownership and distributism, and the fact that it was not focused on directly influencing Conservative politics. In the case of the Sword of the Spirit, it was Dawson’s democratic Catholicism and his willingness to endorse writers who had turned against Franco in the 1930s that drew their criticism. Jerrold was also in a position to challenge Dawson’s authority as editor of the *Dublin Review* because he was managing director of Eyre & Spottiswoode publishers, which had rescued the firm Burns & Oates, the publisher of the *Dublin Review*, in 1939.<sup>49</sup> As Robert Speaight, himself part of the same Roman Catholic network, recounted in his memoirs, under Dawson the *Dublin Review* ‘was not the review that Douglas Jerrold – in whose gift the editorship lay – intended it to be’. Jerrold expected Dawson ‘to echo the sentiments of the Catholic Right’ because he ‘was still fighting the Spanish Civil War, which for him was the “last crusade”’. Although both Dawson and Hinsley had supported Franco in the 1930s, they now advocated a shift towards a democratic Catholicism, which led Dawson to publish articles by the French intellectuals Jacques Maritain and Georges Bernanos, both of whom had turned against Franco in the 1930s. As a result (but only after Hinsley’s death in 1943), Jerrold ousted Dawson from the editorial chair of the *Dublin Review*.<sup>50</sup>

Jerrold was known to be a devout Roman Catholic and right-wing Conservative, but what is not widely known is that he remained at the heart of a specific but nonetheless influential publishing, literary and political network in the 1940s. Eyre & Spottiswoode was owned by the Catholic Crosthwaite–Eyre family.<sup>51</sup> Oliver Crosthwaite–Eyre, who took over the firm during the war, was elected as the Conservative M.P. for New Forest and Christchurch in 1945. By the end of the war, Jerrold, Petrie and the Catholic author Graham Greene were among the named managing directors of Eyre & Spottiswoode. There was also an active social life surrounding the firm that centred on Oliver Crosthwaite–Eyre’s circle, and both the Authors’ Club and the Lamb and Flag pub in London. Jerrold and Petrie were the key figures in a network of prominent authors and publicists, which also included Hugh Kingsmill, Malcolm Muggeridge and Anthony

<sup>46</sup> Wood, *This is Your Hour*, p. 138; Grimley, ‘Civil society and the clerisy’, p. 243.

<sup>47</sup> Hastings, *A History of English Christianity*, pp. 392–4.

<sup>48</sup> Hastings, *A History of English Christianity*, pp. 395–7.

<sup>49</sup> T. Burns, *The Use of Memory: Publishing and Further Pursuits* (London, 1993), p. 126.

<sup>50</sup> Speaight, *The Property Basket*, p. 220.

<sup>51</sup> The Crosthwaite–Eyre family also owned the *Financial Times*; see D. Kynaston, *The Financial Times: a Centenary History* (London, 1988), p. 161.



Powell.<sup>52</sup> Within this circle Jerrold wielded substantial power and influence, as the leading managing director of the firm and as the chairman of the Authors' Club, and some authors, like Powell, did not take kindly to his personality and his determination to hold authors to their contracts.<sup>53</sup> Still, Catholic conservative writers benefitted from Jerrold's patronage, and none more so than the Conservative M.P. Christopher Hollis. According to Tom Burns, Jerrold established a subsidiary publishing arm called 'Hollis & Carter for no other reason than the chance of having Chris Hollis ... for a nominal Chairman'.<sup>54</sup> Significantly, Jerrold, Petrie, Eliot, Kingsmill, Hollis, Green, Powell, Crosthwaite-Eyre and members of the Burke Club would go on to publish in the *New English Review* (Dawson was promised, but he never actually appeared). Jerrold, Petrie and Crosthwaite-Eyre also made themselves managing directors of the new periodical.<sup>55</sup> The *New English Review* was launched with the support of this network, and it was meant to play an important role in bridging these religious, literary and political 'thought worlds'.

According to Petrie, the review was still a 'venture of faith' because 'paper was strictly rationed and it was forbidden to publish any new periodical' during the war. Fortunately for them, they managed to persuade the Conservative party chairman Ralph Assheton to hand them its paper ration for its defunct publication *Home and Empire*; Lord Woolton, Assheton's successor, also supported the review's publication after the war.<sup>56</sup> Continued support owed something to Jerrold's and Petrie's decision to drop any public interest in applying authoritarian methods of government in Britain and their desire to promote the Conservative party ahead of the 1945 general election. Petrie's involvement in Conservative politics also increased after the war. He became chairman of the 1900 Club in 1946, and his wife became the representative for South Kensington on the London County Council. Petrie later claimed that at the 1950 general election, 'no less than fifty-four' of the 1900 Club's '318 members (of whom 38 were peers and so ineligible for the House of Commons) stood as Conservative candidates, and of these 44 were elected'.<sup>57</sup> More important, however, was Jerrold's role as managing director of Eyre & Spottiswoode, which meant he was able to finance and publish the review in addition to doing all of the editorial work. With Crosthwaite-Eyre's support and that of other notable Conservative M.P.s and writers behind him, it is not difficult to see why both he and Petrie were trusted by the party organization to run such a periodical.

Petrie recalled that they had decided to revive the *English Review* of the 1930s because it was 'the only satisfactory medium for propagating the views which a number of us held on the outstanding topics of the day'.<sup>58</sup> Jerrold and Petrie established the *New English Review* partly to give public expression to the ideals of the Burke Club, which meant trying to unify the views of a significant number of Conservatives but also to channel Conservative views along lines that they could accept. Equally, it was an attempt to moderate the 'socialist' views of the T.R.C., which had made a splash during the Beveridge debate, as well as the right-wing views of Conservatives like Collin Brooks,

<sup>52</sup> W. J. West, *The Quest for Graham Greene: a Biography* (London, 1997), pp. 112–21.

<sup>53</sup> C. J. Schüler, *A History of the Authors' Club of London, 1891–2016* (London, 2016), p. 103; A. Powell, *To Keep the Ball Rolling: the Memoirs of Anthony Powell* (Chicago, Ill., 1983), pp. 312–13.

<sup>54</sup> Burns, *The Use of Memory*, p. 127. Hollis & Carter published some of Petrie's books.

<sup>55</sup> London School of Economics Library, papers of Donald McIntosh Johnson (hereafter L.S.E.), Johnson 5/1, C. Petrie to D. M. Johnson, 5 Nov. 1946.

<sup>56</sup> Petrie, *Chapters of Life*, pp. 306–7.

<sup>57</sup> C. Petrie, *A Historian Looks at His World* (London, 1972), pp. 185–9.

<sup>58</sup> Petrie, *Chapters of Life*, pp. 306–7.

who professed their loyalty to an outdated mode of *laissez-faire*.<sup>59</sup> But if Jerrold and Petrie wanted to distance themselves from socialist ideas like nationalization and ‘bureaucratic controls’, they also shifted their thinking away from authoritarianism. They started to lean more heavily on their Catholicism and their earlier interest in distributism, which meant they argued for a ‘middle-way’ Conservatism that emphasized both individual freedom and social responsibility within a new west European moral order.

Indeed, Jerrold wrote to Quintin Hogg, then a leading member of the T.R.C., to ask him to contribute an article on an ‘aspect of Conservative policy on which there is very general agreement’, rather than on one of the T.R.C.’s more divisive policies.<sup>60</sup> In reply Hogg questioned Jerrold’s objectivity, explaining that if Jerrold was determined to avoid controversy, the review would be of no ‘value to the public or to the Party or offer the smallest inducement to Conservative writers to express themselves freely or originally’.<sup>61</sup> Jerrold reassured Hogg that T.R.C. views would be published because if they were not, ‘the *New English Review* would be regarded, not as a broadly based organ of intellectual Conservatism, but as a sort of Right Wing group’. Jerrold thought that this ‘would be highly disadvantageous both to the paper and to the Party’. He explained to Hogg that both his and Petrie’s views were ‘closer to yours than to those of some of our friends at the Carlton Club’.<sup>62</sup> As we shall see, Jerrold’s and Petrie’s ‘middle-way’ ideas were closer to some of the T.R.C.’s ideas. But Hogg was right to sense that the editors wanted to tame the T.R.C.’s ideas about state interventionism in the economy. Nevertheless, he took Jerrold at his word and he added his weight to Assheton’s official stamp of approval on a letter that was sent out to all the names on the Conservative Central Office list who were asked to subscribe.<sup>63</sup> He wrote, ‘I hope the *New English Review* will be at once progressive and aggressive urging the laggards in the Party to keep up with the times and smacking the Leftists in the face for trying to go back to the jungle’.<sup>64</sup>

Unfortunately, no circulation or sales figures survive for the *New English Review*. It is not listed in the U.K. Audit Bureau of Circulations (A.B.C.) reports for 1948–50; periodicals had to become members of the A.B.C. to have their circulations audited, and in the 1940s the coverage was far from comprehensive for periodicals. Although the review is listed in both Mitchell’s *Newspaper Press Directory* and *Willings Press Guide* for 1945–50, no circulation figures are given. Furthermore, when the Royal Commission on the Press decided at the last minute to include some discussion of periodicals, the evidence was limited to a small selection of companies that happened to own political periodicals. The study was not comprehensive and focused mostly on the six leading political weeklies (*The Economist*, *New Statesman*, *The Spectator*, *Time and Tide*, *Tribune* and *Truth*), which then had circulations ranging from approximately 35,000 to 76,000 copies a week.<sup>65</sup> But in terms of general monthly periodicals, circulation and sales figures are much harder to come by for this period. We know that *Horizon* sold between 9,000 and 10,000 copies a month during the late 1940s and *Encounter* achieved figures of 30,000 in 1962.<sup>66</sup> But the *New English Review* was a much more modest publication in terms of

<sup>59</sup> Brooks had been an associate of Lord Rothermere and a number of radical-right groups in the 1930s. See *Fleet Street, Press Barons and Politics: the Journals of Collin Brooks, 1932–1940*, ed. N. J. Crowson (Cambridge, 1998), pp. 14–17.

<sup>60</sup> C.A.C., HLSM 2/9/124, Douglas Jerrold to Quintin Hogg, 10 Jan. 1945.

<sup>61</sup> C.A.C., HLSM 2/9/124, Quintin Hogg to Douglas Jerrold, 11 Jan. 1945.

<sup>62</sup> C.A.C., HLSM 2/9/124, Douglas Jerrold to Quintin Hogg, 23 Jan. 1945.

<sup>63</sup> C.A.C., HLSM 2/9/188, Charles Petrie to Quintin Hogg, 19 Jan. 1945.

<sup>64</sup> C.A.C., HLSM 2/9/188, Quintin Hogg to Charles Petrie, 26 Jan. 1945.

<sup>65</sup> Viscount Camrose, *British Newspapers and their Controllers* (London, 1947), pp. 145–51.

<sup>66</sup> S. Collini, *Common Reading: Critics, Historians, Publics* (Oxford, 2008), p. 227.

its cultural ‘throw’ and literary ambitions because despite being a general periodical, it looked far more like a political monthly. If we keep in mind the circulation numbers for similar right-wing periodicals in the 1930s, it is likely that as a new general monthly it had a circulation of several thousand after the war.<sup>67</sup> But it is possible that its strong party connections resulted in more copies being sold, and there is some anecdotal evidence to suggest that individual politicians requested the reprinting of particular articles for circulation in their local Conservative Associations.<sup>68</sup>

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In view of the literary and party political connections of the *New English Review*’s editors, it did not take long for the review to make an impact on Britain’s intellectual elite. In October 1945 George Orwell published his influential essay ‘Notes on Nationalism’ in the journal *Polemic*, in which he identified a brand of nationalism called ‘neo-Toryism’. Orwell argued that ‘neo-Toryism’ was exemplified by the publications of the T.R.C. and Conservative-leaning periodicals like the *New English Review* and *The Nineteenth Century and After*. Orwell also singled out Hugh Kingsmill, along with F. A. Voigt, Malcolm Muggeridge, Evelyn Waugh, T. S. Eliot and Wyndham Lewis, as an Anglophobe writer who had suddenly become ‘violently pro-British’.<sup>69</sup> Like Jerrold and Petrie, Kingsmill had rekindled his role as literary editor of the old *English Review*. But when he responded to Orwell in print, he explained somewhat disingenuously that he barely knew the other ‘neo-Tories’. He made light of his own role in a potential ‘Neo-Tory conspiracy to aggrandise Britain at the expense of Russia and America’ and claimed that he had never been a member of a political party, even if he did not wish to pretend that he was ‘editing a literary supplement in a Tory review by pure chance’.<sup>70</sup>

The intellectual development of the ‘neo-Tories’ who were associated with editing both the *English Review* and the *New English Review* straddled the 1930s and the 1940s. It was catalysed by the war and the party’s defeat in 1945. Orwell rightly recognized a subtle shift in their writing away from some of their long-held continental sympathies towards the promotion of British values and the war effort, which meant they were able to make the transition from pre-war authoritarianism and ‘fascism’ to postwar anti-communism and democracy while scarcely missing a beat. But as we shall see, they understood that Britain’s postwar recovery was heavily dependent on American aid, and they thought this was crucial because they wanted Britain to play a leading role in the rebuilding of Europe and the defence of western Christian civilization.

The launch of the *New English Review* meant that both Jerrold and Petrie had to confront the challenge of how best to reconcile their pre-war views on European affairs with the political developments that were now taking place in postwar Europe. Jerrold made a conscious effort to counter what he believed was the European left’s attempt to use the experience of the war to demand left-wing or socialist governments because he was concerned that constitutional or rightist governments in exile, whether monarchical or republican, would be seen as reactionary, and that members of leftist groups, especially those who had served in the resistance, would stage political coups. This enabled him to

<sup>67</sup> Love, ‘The periodical press’, p. 1032.

<sup>68</sup> E.g., Lord Londonderry requested 150 copies of Donald McIntosh Johnson’s article ‘The liberal and the liberal minded’. See L.S.E., Johnson 5/1, C. Petrie to D. M. Johnson, 5 Nov. 1946; D. M. Johnson to C. Petrie, 16 Dec. 1946; Petrie to Johnson, 17 Dec. 1946; Johnson to Marquis of Londonderry, 7 Feb. 1947.

<sup>69</sup> G. Orwell, ‘Notes on nationalism’, *Polemic*, i (Oct. 1945), reprinted in G. Orwell, *Essays* (London, 2000), pp. 300–17, at p. 310.

<sup>70</sup> H. Kingsmill, ‘Literary notes. What are politics?’, *New English Review*, xi (Dec. 1945), 752–5.

place the totalitarian challenge within a broader narrative, which explained the decline of western Europe:

The world order set up in 1918 was the creation of the European liberal and progressive movement. This world order, inspired by high ideals, collapsed not before a fierce aristocratic and ecclesiastical reaction, but before the newest ideology of all, the revolutionary technocratic totalitarian State.

Jerrold continued to believe in the same reading of history that he had propagated in the 1930s, but now totalitarian movements and regimes, some of which he had praised before the war, were seen as yet another example or stage of the undermining of ‘real Tory’ and Catholic values, which he associated with ‘the basic institutions of society, the free family, the self-governing community, the independent Church, and the independent State’.<sup>71</sup>

Fascism was a recurring theme in Jerrold’s and Petrie’s editorials throughout 1945–7. Both argued that it was Tories like themselves who were now under attack and being unfairly victimized for speaking the truth about the Labour government and its leftist counterparts in Europe. They wrote continuously about the left’s portrayal of all those on the right, whether at home or in Europe, as ‘fascists’, ‘neo-fascists’, or ‘crypto-fascists’, which they claimed was not only wrong but an example of just the sort of totalitarianism that the country had been fighting against during the war.<sup>72</sup> They now accepted that both Mussolini and Hitler had been the chief architects of the war and that they had carried out ‘gangster revolutions’, but they tried to neutralize fascism’s toxicity, and thereby their own relationship with it, by questioning its very meaning, and by arguing that the ideological aspects of current politics needed to be set aside in order to achieve peace and stability in Europe.

Their initial concern was the fear of reprisals from the left against the right in countries like France, Italy and Yugoslavia. Highlighting the reported murder of Catholic priests in Yugoslavia who were accused of being sympathetic to fascism, Jerrold wrote,

The term ‘Fascism’ is used to cover at one and the same time the perpetration by the German Gestapo of mass murder ... and the passive acquiescence of the mayor of some out-of-the-way French village in the rule of Marshal Pétain. When we hear, therefore, that only Fascists are being denied the fundamental rights of man we really do need to know in which sense this word is being used. Were the priests in Yugoslavia merely rendering to the Cæsar of the hour the things that are Cæsar’s, or were they committing crimes justly punishable by death? The same questions must be asked as we hear about the thousands who fill the Italian gaols.<sup>73</sup>

Jerrold believed that it was only a matter of time before the churches would be denounced ‘as agents of Fascism’.<sup>74</sup> Similarly, Petrie wrote about issues involving collaboration when the verdicts were delivered on the Nazi leadership at Nuremburg. Although he agreed with the executions of the Nazi leaders, what concerned him was that Nuremburg was not going to ‘mark finality’. In his words, the ‘heresy-hunting’ would continue throughout Europe. He thought this should be ended immediately, even if some ‘so-called collaborators’ would go unpunished.<sup>75</sup>

Petrie could also not resist the political opportunity to compare what was happening in Nuremburg to the actions of the Labour government in Britain. He wrote, ‘If, in the outpourings of Mr. Shinwell and Mr. Bevan the word “Jews” be substituted for “Tories” and “capitalists”, the parallel between the Socialist outlook and that of Nazi Germany

<sup>71</sup> D. Jerrold, ‘Commentary’, *New English Review*, xi (May 1945), 3–12.

<sup>72</sup> D. Jerrold, ‘Commentary’, *New English Review*, xi (July 1945), 195–203, at pp. 196–7.

<sup>73</sup> Jerrold, ‘Commentary’, (July 1945), p. 200.

<sup>74</sup> D. Jerrold, ‘Commentary’, *New English Review*, xii (March 1946), 195–203, at pp. 197–8.

<sup>75</sup> C. Petrie, ‘Commentary’, *New English Review*, xiii (Nov. 1946), 451–8, at p. 453.

is complete'. He even compared the Labour government's respect for constitutional government to that of the defendants of Nuremberg. 'Their bodies may swing on a gallows in Central Europe', he argued, 'but their ideas are dominant in Whitehall'.<sup>76</sup> Likewise, Jerrold explained that Britain had fought the war to challenge the idea that an elected majority government like that of Hitler's Nazi regime could deprive minorities of their natural rights as human beings. He implied that left-wing governments could now do the same in the postwar period.<sup>77</sup> As Richard Toye has shown, accusing your political opponents of Nazism was not uncommon on both sides of the political spectrum in this period.<sup>78</sup> But by equating it with the politics of the Labour government, and prospective socialist and communist governments throughout Europe, it left only conservative, liberal, constitutional and Catholic parties as the natural rulers of European nation states, and as the defenders of peace, security and Christian civilization on the continent.

Petrie was pessimistic about the right's chances in postwar elections, and he wrote about the decline of European conservatism. He argued that it was 'dead save in Spain and Portugal' because it had mostly committed suicide after 1918. Instead of campaigning for the restoration of 'Throne and Altar', it had 'followed the strange gods of dictatorship and Big Business', which meant that the ordinary man in the street now identified it with 'collaboration of the worst type'. He recognized that social democrats would probably be the victors in the immediate political climate, but reasoned that a break between communists and socialists would occur on the European left. This would force socialists to look further to the right for support, especially in France and Italy.<sup>79</sup> The implications of Petrie's comments were that all moderate parties and groups should be tolerated, and perhaps they would have to work together, regardless of their past and what type of politics they stood for, if peace and stability were to be achieved and political extremism was to be avoided.

Jerrold went on to make similar comments in his editorials about the forthcoming elections in European nation states. He warned his readers, 'We must support, and insist on the Government supporting, liberal policies and institutions abroad, not because we think we shall like the kind of government which will be elected, but because of the need for peace and stability'. He also wrote that he was willing to accept either the restoration or the abdication of European monarchies in order to secure it. His fear of the hard left in the Labour party and the prospect of the spread of communist totalitarianism in Europe drove these conciliatory thoughts, but at the same time he proclaimed, perhaps more in hope, that free elections would result in 'an overwhelming popular majority' for the return of the 'monarchical principle'.<sup>80</sup> France was an important exception because of the strength of its socialist and communist parties, which is why he could only put his faith in the news that Clemenceau's son had become associated with a new Catholic radical party.<sup>81</sup> He argued that this was 'an indication that the true spirit of France, at once democratic (in the true sense) and Christian, may at last be finding worthy political expression'. With a Labour government in power, the other difficult case was Spain. Jerrold was willing to criticize the uglier aspects of Franco's regime, but he continued

<sup>76</sup> Petrie, 'Commentary', (Nov. 1946), pp. 454–5.

<sup>77</sup> Jerrold, 'Commentary', (March 1946), p. 197.

<sup>78</sup> R. Toye, 'Winston Churchill's "crazy broadcast": party, nation, and the 1945 Gestapo speech', *Journal of British Studies*, xlix (2010), 655–80.

<sup>79</sup> C. Petrie, 'Commentary', *New English Review*, xi (Nov. 1945), 579–87. at pp. 582–3.

<sup>80</sup> D. Jerrold, 'Commentary', *New English Review*, xii (May 1946), 387–91, at p. 391.

<sup>81</sup> This was the Parti Républicain de la Liberté (P.R.L.). Richard Vinen has described the P.R.L. as the 'dorsal fin of French conservatism' in this period (R. Vinen, *Bourgeois Politics in France, 1945–1951* (Cambridge, 1995), p. 115).

to support it on the grounds that a left-wing republican government would have to be imposed on the Spanish people.<sup>82</sup>

There were elements of continuity and rupture in Jerrold's and Petrie's thought. They did not abandon many of their pre-war sympathies, but they did pledge themselves to upholding parliamentary democracy in Britain. After all, the embracing of some form of democracy was crucial to any Conservative attempt to undermine the British left and the influence of the Soviet Union in Cold War Europe. But as Martin Conway and Volker Depkat have argued, 'democracy' in the immediate postwar years was a hotly contested term in Europe. Certainly, 'the events of the Second World War had brought about a fundamental realignment of Catholic political attitudes away from the interwar infatuation with authoritarian and corporatist political models in favour of the acceptance of democracy', which allowed Christian democrat leaders 'to emphasize the distinctly Catholic inspiration that underlay their actions'. But Catholic and Christian democratic interpretations of 'true democracy' could take on a number of different forms and crucially, 'it was based on a vision of channelling the will of the people through a number of intermediate institutions ... to blunt the impact of majoritarian will'.<sup>83</sup> There were certainly some similarities and differences here between Jerrold's view of democracy and that of Christian democrats in postwar Europe. As we shall see, both Jerrold and Petrie wanted to introduce constitutional reform or further checks and balances to 'stabilise' British democracy; not only were they meant to filter out the majoritarian will of the people when needed, but they were meant to constrain the ability of politicians to introduce what they termed 'irreversible legislation'. But Jerrold and Petrie never shifted their Catholic thinking far enough to fully embrace the new Catholic language of 'personalism' and 'dignity' that figures like Maritain and Pope Pius XII helped to infuse into the politics of postwar west European Christian democracy.<sup>84</sup>

The outcome of the war shaped their view of the relative urgency of what was needed in Britain and other western European states to provide stability. Although Jerrold wanted to make British democracy more secure in the long run, he comforted himself with the belief that there were some elements of the British experience that were exceptional, which meant it was unlikely that the country would fall victim to a socialist revolution in the short term. For example, he cited the 'Anglo-Saxon political genius' and the unique nature of Britain's two-party system. But, as he explained, the two-party system did 'not exist east of the English channel'. He believed that 'the destruction of the old governing classes, the general weakening of the social fabric and the decay of public, if not of private, morality has gone much further on the continent than among the English-speaking peoples'. For Jerrold, religious and moral values had to be re-established in western Europe before 'the viability of free institutions' could be guaranteed.<sup>85</sup> What also separated British Catholic Tories like Jerrold and Petrie from many postwar west European Christian democrats was their continued belief in corporatism, their reluctant acceptance of Britain's welfare state as it stood in the late 1940s (they would not have endorsed further expansion), their refusal to abandon their interwar 'crusade' in support of General Franco and their nostalgia for the political ideas of interwar movements like the Action Française. But they wanted a stable Britain to take the lead in a volatile Europe after 1945.

<sup>82</sup> D. Jerrold, 'Commentary', *New English Review*, xiii (June 1946), 499–507, at p. 502.

<sup>83</sup> Conway and Depkat, 'Towards a European history of the discourse of democracy', p. 139.

<sup>84</sup> On how Catholicism influenced postwar Christian democrats, European constitutions and human rights legislation, see S. Moyn, *Christian Human Rights* (Philadelphia, Pa., 2015), esp. pp. 1–100.

<sup>85</sup> D. Jerrold, 'British defence policy: the political background', *New English Review*, xvii (July 1948), 3–10, at pp. 6–7.

Jerrold and Petrie also continued to prioritize their anti-communism in the *New English Review*, but their attitude towards the Soviet Union evolved slowly until the American government announced a shift of policy known as the Truman Doctrine in March 1947. Up until that point their chief concern was to make a case for a strong ‘Anglo-Saxon conception of political and economic freedom’ and the maintenance of the ‘resolution and military power of the English-speaking peoples’, because they argued that this was the only way of guaranteeing ‘Russian tolerance’ of western Europe or maintaining a ‘grand alliance’.<sup>86</sup> Jerrold and Petrie were keen to highlight features of the totalitarian system in the Soviet Union, but they focused most of their attention on the argument that because there was no longer a balance of power in Europe, the only way to stop the Soviet Union would be to restore western Europe ‘politically, economically, and morally as soon as possible’.<sup>87</sup> Jerrold’s and Petrie’s criticisms of the Soviet Union were expressed more openly from 1947. For example, Jerrold argued strongly that Russian concerns should not be taken into account when ‘working for European co-operation’.<sup>88</sup> But more importantly, both Jerrold and Petrie started to merge their fears about the spread of international communism with their criticisms of the Labour government. Petrie called out Conservatives for labelling Labour ministers as cowardly and incompetent on the platform when they were also continuing to claim that they were ‘cold-blooded scoundrels whose one idea is to establish a Communist regime’. He wanted Conservatives to be consistent and to stick to the latter argument because he reasoned that Britain under Labour was becoming a ‘Slave State’.<sup>89</sup> Jerrold also argued that the end of American isolationism was ‘by far the most important single event in world history since 1940’.<sup>90</sup> He recognized that it would be years before western Europe could fully support itself and be prepared to face Russia in the last resort, but he argued that this should be ‘the ultimate objective’.<sup>91</sup> Therefore, both Jerrold and Petrie channelled their anti-communism into arguments for a strong and independent western Europe as a bulwark against the Soviet Union after 1945. But at home they argued that the ‘only real bulwark against Communism in this country is a property-owning democracy’.<sup>92</sup>

In foreign affairs Jerrold insisted that Britain should continue to take its ‘moral and political responsibilities’ seriously rather than delegate those responsibilities to an international organization like the League of Nations, which had failed to keep the peace during the 1930s. Significantly, he argued that Britain needed to ‘retain not only the means but the right under international law to discharge such responsibilities’.<sup>93</sup> Jerrold feared that the next war would be a ‘revolution from within’, and he highlighted the threat of totalitarianism from the left both at home and abroad. He was sceptical about the newly formed United Nations and its plans for human rights legislation because he did not see a military commitment on behalf of its members to defend its ideals; he thought it would protect continental revolutionaries and give them equal status to western European democrats. In other words, he was concerned that membership of

<sup>86</sup> Jerrold, ‘Commentary’, (May 1945), p. 8; D. Jerrold, ‘Commentary’, *New English Review*, xi (Oct. 1945), 483–91, at p. 489.

<sup>87</sup> Jerrold, ‘Commentary’, (July 1945), p. 200; Jerrold, ‘Commentary’, (Oct. 1945), p. 489; Petrie, ‘Commentary’, (Nov. 1945), p. 580; D. Jerrold, ‘Commentary’, (Jan. 1946), 3–12, at p. 12.

<sup>88</sup> D. Jerrold, ‘An unauthorized programme: comments and reflections’, *New English Review*, xv (Aug. 1947), 99–106, at p. 101.

<sup>89</sup> C. Petrie, ‘Commentary’, *New English Review*, xv (Nov. 1947), 387–94, at pp. 389–90.

<sup>90</sup> D. Jerrold, ‘Commentary’, *New English Review*, xv (Dec. 1947), 483–90, at pp. 483–4.

<sup>91</sup> Jerrold, ‘British defence policy: the political background’, (July 1948), p. 3.

<sup>92</sup> C. Petrie, ‘Commentary’, *New English Review*, xvii (Aug. 1948), 99–106, at pp. 101–2.

<sup>93</sup> Jerrold, ‘Commentary’, (May 1945), pp. 8–9.

the United Nations was not limited to ‘true democracies’ because he wanted Britain and its allies to be able to intervene in the affairs of other nations if they were not protecting the ‘natural rights of man’.<sup>94</sup>

However, Jerrold accepted that the ‘days of the independent, self-sufficient nation-state’ were ‘truly over’.<sup>95</sup> This is why both he and Petrie supported important elements of European integration, viewing this as a more reliable solution to the defence of western Christian civilization.<sup>96</sup> Jerrold argued that ‘a true re-integration of Europe is the only possible bulwark against this new barbarism from the East’.<sup>97</sup> He praised the newly founded Council of Europe because its membership was limited to countries belonging to the western Christian tradition, but he was disappointed when it did not immediately adopt means for economic and defence co-operation. He wanted to create (or recreate) ‘the discipline of a closed moral order’, which had little to do with respecting the rights of ‘political majorities’.<sup>98</sup> Petrie did praise David Maxwell Fyfe’s work in Strasbourg on human rights and Churchill’s argument that West Germany should be welcomed into the Council as soon as possible, but again he was troubled by the fact that Spain and Portugal were not invited to Strasbourg because he saw the meeting as an ‘anti-Communist gathering’.<sup>99</sup> Above all, both Jerrold and Petrie prioritized their anti-communism, even if they wanted to see Christian democracy succeed in western Europe.

Marco Duranti has shown that leading British Conservatives like Churchill, Duncan Sandys and Maxwell Fyfe shared Jerrold’s and Petrie’s anti-communism and pro-Europeanism after the war. They were at the heart of the European Movement, which was determined to defend western Christian civilization. They also wanted to defend it through a new Western Union of like-minded Christian democratic nations, which became the Council of Europe, and to protect it against socialist and communist legislation through the adoption of a new legal framework, which became the European Convention on Human Rights. According to Duranti, ‘human rights and European integration provided conservatives with a new moral and technical vocabulary with which to express minority viewpoints and resist the socialist tide of the post-war era’.<sup>100</sup> In this sense, the editorial line of the *New English Review* was very much in tune with the party leadership’s views during the early Cold War. But crucially, Jerrold and Petrie were willing to pool more of Britain’s sovereignty in Europe, particularly in areas of economic and defence co-operation, because they believed this was the surest way of entrenching Conservative and Christian democratic values in Britain and Europe during the Cold War.<sup>101</sup>

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The review’s editorials and articles between 1945 and 1950 were meant to contribute to the making of a distinctive ‘middle-way’ Conservatism. In the months before the 1945

<sup>94</sup> Jerrold, ‘Commentary’, (July 1945), pp. 200–1.

<sup>95</sup> Jerrold, ‘Commentary’, (Oct. 1945), pp. 488–9.

<sup>96</sup> On the wider shift within political Catholicism, see M. Conway, ‘Catholic politics or Christian democracy? The evolution of inter-war political Catholicism’, in *Political Catholicism in Europe 1918–45*, i, ed. W. Kaiser and H. Wohnout (London, 2004), 235–51, at p. 237.

<sup>97</sup> D. Jerrold, ‘Commentary’, *New English Review*, xvi (June 1948), 483–8, at pp. 487–8.

<sup>98</sup> D. Jerrold, ‘Commentary’, *New English Review Magazine*, ii (June 1949), 355–61, at pp. 355–60.

<sup>99</sup> C. Petrie, ‘Commentary’, *New English Review Magazine*, iii (Oct. 1949), 221–5, at pp. 221–2.

<sup>100</sup> M. Duranti, *The Conservative Human Rights Revolution: European Identity, Transnational Politics, and the Origins of the European Convention* (New York, 2017), p. 219.

<sup>101</sup> E.g., Jerrold, ‘Commentary’, (Oct. 1945), pp. 488–9; Jerrold, ‘British defence policy: the political background’, (July 1948), p. 10; D. Jerrold, ‘Commentary’, *English Review Magazine*, iii (Sept. 1949), 149–54.



general election, the most notable writers who discussed Conservative thought were Jerrold, Hollis, Hogg and other members of the T.R.C. like Hugh Molson.<sup>102</sup> The first two were Catholics and influenced by the theories of the ‘Chesterbelloc’, particularly Belloc’s fears about a ‘servile state’ and Chesterton’s support for distributism. The second two were some of the most active members of the T.R.C., who had been accused by some members of the party of swallowing socialism whole during the war. Both groups pitched their Conservatism against state socialism and laissez-faire liberalism.<sup>103</sup> The general political tone of the review in terms of domestic politics was founded on this intellectual dialogue between these two competing ‘middle-way’ Conservatisms, and there were notably no articles published by prominent Conservative advocates of laissez-faire or members of the Society of Individualists (Friedrich Hayek was advertised as a forthcoming author but he also never appeared). Nor did the journal focus much attention on the views of right-wing Conservatives, who were interested mostly in the future of the British empire. It is within this discursive context that we must measure Jerrold’s and Petrie’s views, but also in relation to what the Labour government and the Conservative party leadership were offering or not offering at the time.

Jerrold outlined his political ideas in response to the new political expectations that had emerged out of the war. He accepted the need for postwar reconstruction and argued that he did not want to see a return to the deflationary policies of the 1920s. Instead he wanted a policy of economic expansion, capital investment in industry and a viable social programme that could preserve freedom.<sup>104</sup> This meant he only grudgingly accepted some elements of the Beveridge Report, arguing that ‘the State cannot accept unlimited responsibilities with limited resources’. Jerrold prioritized increasing the national wealth because he argued that he was interested in ‘the abolition, not the relief, of poverty’, but he thought the implementation of Beveridge by Labour would result in a bureaucratic ‘servile state’ that would only redistribute a relatively small amount of wealth. Still, he acknowledged that ‘the Conservative attitude to social reform’ was too negative. For Jerrold, the right balance between stability and reform had to be negotiated by Conservatives if they were to raise the standard of living and preserve British freedom and morality.<sup>105</sup>

Jerrold blamed the complacency of the Conservatives on home affairs. He argued, ‘To be blunt, they were not credited with a constructive long-term policy for the simple reason that they had not got one’. In his mind, the party had shifted from one extreme to another on economic and social policy since 1918. He asked his readers, ‘Have we given the electorate a fair chance? Is it really surprising that they should think, as they do, that they have been repeatedly deceived?’ He thought the party had a great opportunity ‘to develop and preach a dynamic conception of social progress in terms which are their own, which are fixed, and which are consistent with the fundamental Conservative faith in freedom’.<sup>106</sup> Jerrold disagreed with party policy (or the lack of a clearly defined one), and the general scope and tone of the T.R.C.’s arguments. He was signalling that there was a subtly different route to a new conservatism.

<sup>102</sup> In addition to the articles cited by Jerrold, see C. Hollis, ‘The Conservative opportunity’, *New English Review*, xi (June 1945), 109–16; Q. Hogg, ‘British industry after the war’, *New English Review*, xi (May 1945), 50–4; H. Molson, ‘The Tory Reform Committee’, *New English Review*, xi (July 1945), 245–52.

<sup>103</sup> The T.R.C.’s wartime ideas proposed significant levels of state intervention, but the group’s unity fell apart after the war. Some of its members, like Peter Thorneycroft, then created the non-party Design for Freedom movement to try to attract Liberals (see Love, ‘Making a “new Conservatism”’).

<sup>104</sup> Jerrold, ‘Commentary’, (May 1945), pp. 10–11.

<sup>105</sup> D. Jerrold, ‘Commentary’, *New English Review*, xi (June 1945), 99–108.

<sup>106</sup> D. Jerrold, ‘Commentary’, *New English Review*, xi (Sept. 1945), 387–95, at pp. 389–91.

However, it was only after the party published *The Industrial Charter* in May 1947 that Jerrold and Petrie began to formulate a more comprehensive Conservative approach. According to John Ramsden, the charter ‘sought to weld together the Liberal tradition of free enterprise with the equally-traditional Tory concept of interventionism. Its rhetoric concentrated mostly on the former ... while its substantive promises veered rather more to the latter’.<sup>107</sup> Jerrold’s response to the charter was mixed because he was unhappy with its tone, describing it as ‘the politest document in the history of political propaganda’. He wanted a more vigorous attack on the Labour government and he questioned its ‘exclusively forward look’. Jerrold highlighted the charter’s promise to tackle ‘controls’ and ‘a swollen Civil Service’ as its most important contribution, but he was not enthusiastic about its promise to underwrite a policy of ‘full employment’. He argued that this should be limited to ‘industries working ... a standard working week’, because ‘full employment is a consequence of full production and cannot be ensured by any other means’. Jerrold welcomed the party’s shift from prioritizing exports to prioritizing the renewal of the nation’s capital equipment in areas like energy, housing and transport, but he thought it was strange to promise to stabilize the value of the pound at a time when ‘a measure of re-flation based on ... an expansion in the output of goods’ was needed.<sup>108</sup>

Jerrold saw the charter as a promising start, which is why he then published the *New English Review*’s ‘Unauthorized Programme’ (a reference to Joseph Chamberlain’s radical programme of the 1880s). He wanted to influence Conservative thinking in the run-up to the party’s conference in October. At the heart of the programme was Jerrold’s argument that there could be no domestic recovery without the reconstruction of the western European economy, which depended on ‘a persistent and continuing British initiative’. Only the Conservatives could build on ‘the common Christian tradition of the free society’, which would unite western Europe and develop economic co-operation. Britain was also to develop the agriculture and commerce of the empire because this would lead to ‘the restoration of a healthy and prosperous system of multilateral trading’, which would prevent Britain’s and Europe’s subservience to the U.S.A.<sup>109</sup>

These comments were being made at the same time as the Labour government’s short-lived attempt to make sterling convertible with the U.S. dollar. Convertibility was one of the prices that the British had been expected to pay in exchange for the American loan agreement of 1945. When convertibility failed in July and August 1947, the American government allowed the British government to continue ‘to discriminate against American goods in favour of non-dollar suppliers’.<sup>110</sup> In the months ahead the British and American governments also met to discuss multilateral trade ‘aimed both at the eventual creation of an International Trade Organization (ITO), and at securing substantial reductions in barriers to world trade’.<sup>111</sup> Certainly, Conservatives like Jerrold and Petrie had reason to fear the Labour government’s attitude in these areas because, as Richard Toye has argued, most Labour ministers in the wartime coalition government had supported the case for establishing a system of multilateral trade after the war, and

<sup>107</sup> For a full discussion of the Industrial Charter, see J. Ramsden, *The Making of Conservative Party Policy: the Conservative Research Department since 1929* (London, 1980), pp. 108–14.

<sup>108</sup> D. Jerrold, ‘Commentary’, *New English Review*, xiv (June 1947), 531–8.

<sup>109</sup> D. Jerrold, ‘An unauthorized programme’, *New English Review*, xv (July 1947), 3–10.

<sup>110</sup> R. Toye, ‘The Labour party’s external economic policy in the 1940s’, *Historical Journal*, xliii (2000), 189–215, at p. 212.

<sup>111</sup> R. Toye, ‘The Attlee government, the imperial preference system and the creation of the GATT’, *English Historical Review*, cxviii (2003), 912–39, at p. 912.

the Attlee government's answer to the question of the degree to which Britain should 'accept restrictions on her own freedoms as the price of achieving a more satisfactory international economic environment' was not yet clear.<sup>112</sup> But, as Toye has also explained, the Labour government did not give in to these American demands when it came to the future of convertibility, multilateral trading or Marshall Aid.<sup>113</sup> Considering Jerrold's and Petrie's pro-Europeanism, their initial anxieties were understandable, but their fears soon passed because one year later Jerrold was arguing in the review that there could be no recovery of Britain's world role without hard work and American aid.<sup>114</sup>

Jerrold accepted that the state must play a central role if Christian traditions were to be upheld in postwar Britain, but his main goal was to establish 'a society of men and women economically free and politically independent'. He argued that Britain needed to find ways to encourage workers to work harder for longer hours, which could be achieved only if a series of economic and social incentives were introduced. A 'constructive programme of social reform' had to look towards 'the permanent requirements of social justice for all'. This meant the creation of a society based on 'equality of opportunity' whereby 'new leaders in the arts and sciences, in government and public administration, in finance and industry' could be recruited 'perpetually ... from below'. This blueprint was to be promoted as an alternative to Labour's 'vicious feudalism'; the Conservatives would be the 'suppliants', not the 'masters', of the people.<sup>115</sup>

Housing was also crucial to Jerrold's Conservatism because he saw it as a key component of social security. Everyone in regular employment would have the right to buy; the state would guarantee a supply of cheap money, enforce rent restrictions and introduce a system of varying subsidies to facilitate a 'property-owning democracy', but also to stop the exploitation of the housing crisis by private and municipal interests.<sup>116</sup> The unemployment insurance fund would pay the interest on mortgages when workers suffered unemployment because this would help secure low interest rates for new working-class buyers and existing home owners. Jerrold also advocated private 'pensions for all' because these would act as economic incentives and provide more social security.<sup>117</sup> Structuring the economy and the tax system so that workers would be encouraged to save rather than spend money on consumer goods was also an important goal. The tax system would reward hard work based on tax-free incentives: overtime hours, bonuses and commissions would be tax-free and qualify as pensionable income. Life insurance policies would be encouraged by allowing tax-free income to pay for them. Unearned income would not enjoy comparable benefits.<sup>118</sup>

This was the essence of Jerrold's and Petrie's programme, but just two years later Jerrold sent a private memorandum to leading Conservatives. The memorandum was critical of the party's position, especially its failure to account for 'the change in the mentality of the electorate as the result of the vast extension of the social services'. He argued that it was the social services that mattered, even if 'these things are not what we talk about in our clubs'. He demanded an 'immediate change' in the party's 'psychological approach'; it had failed to 'enunciate' its 'social dynamic', leading to 'widespread feeling' that the

<sup>112</sup> Toye, 'The Attlee government', pp. 915–16.

<sup>113</sup> Toye, 'The Labour party's external economic policy', pp. 211–15.

<sup>114</sup> D. Jerrold, 'Commentary', *New English Review Magazine*, i (Sept. 1948), 7–13.

<sup>115</sup> Jerrold, 'An unauthorized programme', (July 1947), pp. 3–10.

<sup>116</sup> Jerrold, 'An unauthorized programme', (July 1947), pp. 3–10; Jerrold, 'An unauthorized programme: comments and reflections', (Aug. 1947), pp. 99–106.

<sup>117</sup> Jerrold, 'An unauthorized programme', (July 1947), pp. 3–10.

<sup>118</sup> Jerrold, 'Commentary', (June 1947), pp. 531–8.

party had no policy. Conservatives said so little about social policy, he argued, that ‘no one believes us’. In addition, people were right to identify two dominant Conservatisms among the party’s rank and file: ‘one section which swallows almost whole the Socialist policy ... and the other section which secretly regrets the social services ... and hopes vaguely for a return to the conditions of the middle twenties’. Jerrold disliked the former because it encouraged ‘regimentation and the destruction of personal initiative and responsibility’, and the latter because it was focused on ‘reducing taxation and reversing the present trend towards the equalization of incomes’.<sup>119</sup>

Jerrold’s and Petrie’s ‘real Toryism’ was a ‘middle way’ that existed somewhere between the realities of the party’s Industrial Charter and its ‘freedom rhetoric’.<sup>120</sup> A careful balance had to be struck between these competing versions of a ‘middle-way’ Conservatism, and the party’s emphasis on one or the other would be likely to determine its future electoral success. But they preferred a form of capitalism that could be made to incorporate distributism, corporatism and a minimal welfare state. Britain’s postwar social services were to be closely watched, and they were to be financed on the back of what a private enterprise-dominated economy could afford. The key difference here was that they wanted to use the central state and other forms of decentralized power, like corporations, to channel the forces of individualism into the creation of a more Christian and Tory society. They believed this combination would be effective if the party promoted it in an unapologetic and vigorous way, but they were convinced that the party had swung too far away from the social dimensions of their political thought. The party leadership saw some value in Jerrold’s and Petrie’s questioning of the party’s strategy. Jerrold, on the request of Maxwell Fyfe (with whom Petrie sometimes holidayed), forwarded the memorandum to Churchill, who asked Reginald Maudling of the Conservative Research Department to comment on it.<sup>121</sup> Maudling told Churchill that it contained ‘some extremely shrewd remarks’. He wrote,

The main view is that instead of allowing ourselves to appear as grudging supporters and further explain to the electorate not only how they [the social services] can be provided at less expense to the taxpayer, but also that we intend to see how they can be provided without the threat to individual freedom and responsibility contained in many of the features introduced by the Socialists.

He also revealed that it was Maxwell Fyfe who instructed the party’s Advisory Committee on Policy, which was chaired by Butler, to include a substantial passage on the social services in its ‘Re-Statement of Policy’, which was being prepared ahead of the next general election.<sup>122</sup> The arguments that Jerrold and Petrie had developed in the pages of the *New English Review*, and which culminated in the sending out of the memorandum, helped at the very least to reinforce Maxwell Fyfe’s own views on the importance of a positive approach to the social services. But Maudling told Churchill that it was difficult to translate general principles into detailed policy recommendations. Therefore, he invited Churchill to write to Jerrold to inform him that specific ideas

<sup>119</sup> C.A.C., CHUR 2/84 A, Douglas Jerrold to Winston S. Churchill, 14 March 1949. See also C.A.C., HLSM 4/2/7, Charles Petrie to Quintin Hogg, 4 Apr. 1949.

<sup>120</sup> J. Freeman, ‘Reconsidering “Set the People Free”: neoliberalism and freedom rhetoric in Churchill’s Conservative party’, *Twentieth Century British History*, xxix (2017), 1–25.

<sup>121</sup> Freeman, ‘Reconsidering “Set the People Free”’, pp. 24–5; C.A.C., CHUR 2/84 A, Douglas Jerrold to Winston S. Churchill, 14 March 1949; CHUR 2/84 A, Elizabeth Gilliatt to Reginald Maudling, 5 Apr. 1949; Petrie, *A Historian Looks at His World*, p. 193.

<sup>122</sup> C.A.C., CHUR 2/84 A, Reginald Maudling to Elizabeth Gilliatt, 14 Apr. 1949.

would be ‘most welcome’ at the Conservative Research Department, and that a copy of the memorandum should be forwarded to Butler himself.<sup>123</sup>

Jerrold and Petrie were concerned that the Conservatives had abandoned a positive approach to the social services as they sought to distinguish themselves from the Labour government and respond to the public’s frustration with postwar rationing and controls.<sup>124</sup> However, this seems to have no longer been their chief concern after the party only narrowly lost the 1950 general election. Perhaps they had finally come to realize that the party’s stronger emphasis on ‘freedom’ was appealing to the electorate and especially to Liberal voters, which is probably why they published a series of articles by the Conservative advocate of laissez-faire Collin Brooks ahead of the 1951 general election.<sup>125</sup> Jerrold’s and Petrie’s views were now sufficiently aligned with those of the party leadership. The party’s emphasis on private enterprise and its embrace of the politics of the ‘property-owning democracy’ largely satisfied their interest in freedom and distributism, even if these ideas were not couched in Christian or Catholic tones. Therefore, Jerrold’s decision to wind up the *English Review Magazine*, as it was now known, in May 1950 and merge it with Lord Altrincham’s *National Review* was probably a direct response to his realization that the party was now promising to deliver a type of Conservatism that was closer to what he and some of the other contributors to the *New English Review* had been arguing for since 1945.

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This does not mean that Jerrold and Petrie were entirely satisfied with the state of postwar British Conservatism, politics and democracy. Both men published books in 1950 that clarified their Conservatism in view of what had occurred in Britain and Europe since 1945. Although the two were broadly united, some important differences emerged. Jerrold recognized the Conservative party for safeguarding ‘the economic independence of the family’ through its commitment to a ‘property-owning democracy’, but he conceded that ‘much remains to be done’. He called for major constitutional reform to protect ‘the rights of democracy’ against ‘irreversible legislation’ and the potential development of a ‘socialized state’, a return to ‘a proper conception of Christian education’, and the transfer of various responsibilities from the state to ‘corporations’ in British society. Constitutionally, he accepted the need to democratize the house of lords, but only at the expense of a written constitution that would include protection ‘in the manner of a constitutional amendment in the United States or Australia’. Other checks and balances included the advocacy of the public referendum; a two-thirds majority would be required if ‘irreversible legislation’ was proposed that could bind future parliaments. He also sought sanctuary in the idea of devolved government, meaning the establishment of English, Scottish, Welsh and Northern Irish parliaments, because ‘a further check would automatically be imposed’. Acts of ‘irreversible legislation’ included ‘the confiscation or compulsory purchase of capital assets’ and ‘a measure of nationalization or a capital levy’. These were radical suggestions for a Conservative in 1950, particularly the idea of relying on the public referendum to limit the implementation of socialism. But he accepted that

<sup>123</sup> C.A.C., CHUR 2/84 A, Reginald Maudling to Elizabeth Gilliat, 14 Apr. 1949.

<sup>124</sup> On rationing and controls, see I. Zweiniger-Bargielowska, *Austerity in Britain: Rationing, Controls, and Consumption 1939–1955* (Oxford, 2000).

<sup>125</sup> See C. Brooks, ‘Socialism and the fiscal machine’, *English Review Magazine*, iv (Apr. 1950), 276–9, pp. 276–8; C. Brooks, ‘The position of Liberal thought’, *English Review Magazine*, iv (May 1950), 306–11.

if these constitutional checks were overcome by the required majority and the people voted for ‘revolution’ they would have it.<sup>126</sup>

Jerrold wanted the Conservative party to shift the state’s responsibility for society onto the individual and the corporation; the latter could be ‘a profession, a limited liability company, a co-operative association, an industry, or a craft’. Although he repeated his claim that he did not want to reduce taxation or alter the range of social services that had been introduced since the war, he argued that ‘insurances, pensions, and allowances must become the responsibility of industry, agriculture, and the professions, so that all men have to look to the corporation in which they are responsible partners, and never elsewhere, for the just and full rewards of their service’. For Jerrold, this would help to re-establish ‘morals’. This form of corporatism was not only meant to encourage collaboration between employers and employees, but it was meant to remove potentially corrupt and wasteful politicians from an important area of managing the economy and society.<sup>127</sup>

Petrie’s views were more traditionally Tory and it is unlikely that he would have accepted all of Jerrold’s suggestions, even if he shared his fears about a future socialized state. He admitted that he would reinforce the constitution to safeguard Britain’s parliamentary system, but he wanted ‘a strong monarchy, where the Sovereign not only reigns but governs’, to restore the powers of the house of lords so that they would be ‘equal’ to those of the house of commons and to restrict the franchise based upon ‘the attainment of a certain educational standard’.<sup>128</sup> Petrie’s abiding interest in monarchy and the Jacobite cause was well known because of the books that he had published and continued to publish on this subject.<sup>129</sup> He certainly used his own prerogative as an editor of the *New English Review* to publish a large number of articles on his historical research on the Jacobite movement, but he never used this work to address questions about the Windsors.<sup>130</sup> Although he dreamt of a more active role for the monarch in the British constitution, he never actively campaigned for it in the review because he understood that his views were not widely shared in the Conservative party. But his new historical research would have appealed to Catholic Conservative readers and his articles would have helped to promote his books on the subject in advance of their publication.

Petrie looked back upon fifty years of British politics without ‘much sympathy’.<sup>131</sup> In some ways, his Toryism mirrored his continued admiration for the hierarchical and corporatist ideas of the Action Française, which he still believed offered a scheme for ‘the salvation of France’.<sup>132</sup> The Action Française’s programme still appealed to Petrie above all others, even after 1945, but again he was realistic enough to know that such a programme would never appeal to the majority of British Conservatives. Despite his outdated Tory beliefs, Petrie supported Britain’s parliamentary democracy out of necessity after 1945. Furthermore, the extent of his and Jerrold’s ideas for constitutional

<sup>126</sup> D. Jerrold, *England: Past Present and Future* (London, 1950), pp. 316–23.

<sup>127</sup> Jerrold, *England: Past Present and Future*, pp. 320–1.

<sup>128</sup> Petrie, *Chapters of Life*, p. 147.

<sup>129</sup> See C. Petrie, *The Jacobite Movement* (London, 1932); *Monarchy* (London, 1933); *The Letters, Speeches and Proclamations of King Charles I* (London, 1935); *The Stuarts* (London, 1937); *Louis XIV* (London, 1938); *The Jacobite Movement: the First Phase 1688–1716* (London, 1948); *The Jacobite Movement: the Last Phase 1716–1807* (London, 1950); *Monarchy in the Twentieth Century* (London, 1952).

<sup>130</sup> E.g., see C. Petrie, ‘The forty-five’, *New English Review*, xi (June 1945), 141–7; ‘The Elibank plot, 1752–3’, *New English Review*, xii (Feb. 1946), 166–74; ‘The Jacobite war in Ireland, 1688–1691’, *New English Review*, xv (July 1947), 43–53; ‘The Jacobite twilight’, *New English Review*, xvi (March 1948), 213–22.

<sup>131</sup> Petrie, *Chapters of Life*, p. 147.

<sup>132</sup> Petrie, *Chapters of Life*, pp. 189–90.

reform was never made clear in the *New English Review*. While they occasionally tackled technical questions relating to the reform of cabinet government and the house of lords, they never went into the additional areas that they explored in their books. This shows that they were determined to use the periodical to try to influence a wider pool of Conservative M.P.s, because they knew that the party considered constitutional reform to be a divisive and electorally redundant issue.<sup>133</sup>

It is worth considering what drove Jerrold's and Petrie's renewed interest in constitutional reform during the late 1940s and early 1950s. As Miles Taylor has argued, in the Labour manifesto of 1945, entitled *Let Us Face the Future*, the party had warned that it would 'not tolerate obstruction of the people's will by the House of Lords', which had prompted a 'co-operative response' from the Conservative-dominated upper house in the form of the Salisbury-Addison Convention of 1945.<sup>134</sup> This meant that 'the Lords guaranteed to accept any bills for which the government had a clear mandate, namely manifesto promises, reserving to itself only the right to amend them'.<sup>135</sup> Although this agreement held during the early years of the Attlee government, Labour ministers became increasingly concerned about the potential blocking of Labour's programme from 1947. This led to Attlee's intervention to introduce a new Parliament Bill, which reduced the powers of the Lords to delaying legislation by one year when it was passed into statute in December 1949.<sup>136</sup> Considering Jerrold's and Petrie's fears of Labour's plans to nationalize more industries and their greater anxiety about the government's willingness to create a 'socialised state', these constitutional changes framed their view that Labour could now introduce 'irreversible legislation'. This is why they urgently wanted the Conservatives to restore the powers of the house of lords.

When Petrie published a revised memoir in 1972, the party was experiencing a transitional moment in British politics because the terms of the postwar settlement were being questioned. In that context Petrie also reaffirmed the principles of his Toryism, rejecting simplistic Conservative views of British politics that divided up the political landscape between the true believers in nationalization and private enterprise. Petrie argued that he could see 'little or no difference between them'. He was resigned to the fact that 'there was a time when the Tories stood for the small man, and looked after his interests; but that is a thing of the past'.<sup>137</sup> Both Jerrold and Petrie remained committed to their particular brands of 'real Toryism', which meant there was a significant amount of continuity in their political thought between the interwar and the postwar years. But the war had provided an important rupture in British politics that had affected their political thought. Parliamentary democracy was the price worth paying for preventing the spread of communism in postwar Europe and for trying to re-establish western Europe as a unified 'Christendom'.

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This article has shown that Jerrold's and Petrie's 'real Toryism' in the 1940s was strongly based on their interwar thinking. Despite the fact that many Conservative M.P.s and

<sup>133</sup> E.g., see D. Jerrold, 'Commentary', *English Review Magazine*, iv (Apr. 1950), 221–6, at pp. 222–5.

<sup>134</sup> M. Taylor, 'Labour and the constitution', in *Labour's First Century*, ed. D. Tanner, P. Thane and N. Tiratsoo (Cambridge, 2000), 151–90, at p. 164. On the Labour manifesto and its relationship to the Salisbury-Addison Convention, see D. Thackeray and R. Toye, 'An age of promises: British election manifestoes and addresses 1900–97', *Twentieth Century British History*, xxxiii (2019), 1–26.

<sup>135</sup> K. Manton, 'Labour and the 1949 Parliament Act', *Contemporary British History*, xxvi (2012), 149–72, at p. 152.

<sup>136</sup> Taylor, 'Labour and the constitution', pp. 164–5.

<sup>137</sup> Petrie, *A Historian Looks at His World*, p. 235.

intellectuals considered them to be radical-right Tories because of their support for Italian Fascism, the French far right and Franco during the 1930s, they remained influential Conservative publicists and activists after 1945. This was partly because the Second World War and the party's general election defeat in 1945 had the effect of turning some of their 'minority' views into 'mainstream' ones. Conservative fears about the newly elected Labour government's potential creation of a bureaucratic state made their interwar support for the 'Chesterbelloc' relevant again, and their interest in distributism fit the postwar party's promotion of a 'property-owning democracy'. Their anti-capitalist and anti-socialist 'middle way' incorporated support for higher employment, a fairer capitalism and the social services, but they continued to support the party's emphasis on freedom and private enterprise. The political circumstances enabled Jerrold and Petrie to make a quick and relatively painless transition from pre-war authoritarianism and 'fascism' to postwar anti-communism and democracy. This development was common on the right in Europe during the immediate postwar years, and their outlook was similar to some western European Christian democrats.<sup>138</sup>

The extent of continuity and rupture in Jerrold's and Petrie's thought, and the religious, political and literary networks that they operated in during the 1940s, might also tell us something about why a home-grown version of Christian democracy had little chance of success in postwar Britain. Of course, the political and religious conditions were not ripe for a Catholic-led Christian democratic politics. There were simply not enough Catholics living in Britain compared to France, Italy, Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands.<sup>139</sup> Most Catholics who were living in Britain were also happy with their existing political options, and 'Christian Democratic ideas were not unique enough, at least in their policy implications, for them to gain much attention from other sections of the thinking public' in this period. While a strand of British Catholic thought had explicitly advocated Christian democratic ideas in Britain during the 1930s and, with the help of influential Christian democrats in exile like Luigi Sturzo, had contributed to keeping the flame alive for Christian democracy in Europe during the war, they were never particularly influential in British politics.<sup>140</sup> The same was true of the Sword of the Spirit movement, which had only briefly marginalized some of the pro-authoritarian Catholic Conservatives of the 1930s like Jerrold and Petrie and given some of the more progressive 'Christian democrats' of that decade a platform.<sup>141</sup> But, arguably, if a more influential form of home-grown Christian democratic politics was to have emerged either during or after the war in Britain, it would have had to be grounded in Anglican, Anglo-Catholic and Roman Catholic networks, and it would have had to include some intellectuals and politicians on the right. Certainly, British Christians and Conservatives would not have united around Jerrold's and Petrie's version of Christian democracy. Jerrold and Petrie had distanced themselves from influential democratic Catholics like Dawson and Maritain; they had been unwilling to abandon Franco and Salazar; and they never shifted their Catholic thinking from emphasizing the importance (or dignity) of groups (like corporations) to individual persons, which is what really inspired the politics of postwar Christian democrats in Europe.

<sup>138</sup> P. Pombeni, 'Christian democracy', in *The Oxford Handbook of Political Ideologies*, ed. M. Freeden, L. T. Sargent and M. Stears (Oxford, 2013), pp. 312–28, at p. 312.

<sup>139</sup> The Catholic population of Great Britain stood at 3.49 million in 1950 (C. Brown, *Religion and Society in Twentieth-Century Britain* (Harlow, 2006), p. 25). On the electoral strength of Christian democrats in western Europe, see W. Kaiser, *Christian Democracy and the Origins of European Union* (Cambridge, 2007), esp. ch. 5.

<sup>140</sup> J. Keating, 'Looking to Europe: Roman Catholics and Christian democracy in 1930s Britain', *European History Quarterly*, xxvi (1996), 57–79, at p. 73. See also Buchanan, 'Great Britain', pp. 248–74.

<sup>141</sup> Buchanan, 'Great Britain', p. 270.



But Jerrold's and Petrie's views did have something in common with Christian democracy, at least during its formative phase after the Second World War. They wanted to use the state, constitutional checks and balances, different forms of decentralized power, and a private enterprise-dominated economy to channel the forces of individualism into the re-establishment of a more Christian or Tory society in which the individual would take responsibility for his or herself and the common good. Their Catholic Toryism supported the broader 'conservative human rights revolution' in Europe after the Second World War. They backed Churchill's and the European Movement's role in the forming of the Council of Europe, and they backed the work of other leading Conservatives like Maxwell Fyfe who helped design the European Convention on Human Rights. Furthermore, they were willing to move further and faster than most British Conservatives in terms of pooling national sovereignty in order to lock in or constitutionalize Conservative and Christian democratic views of what they considered to be 'true democracy'.

Nevertheless, Jerrold's and Petrie's views on the role of the state and decentralized forms of power, particularly the inclusion of corporatism, were vague, and they offered no detailed plan of how these institutions would function together in postwar Britain. Whether Jerrold and Petrie had truly abandoned their interest in interwar fascist corporatism, which would have privileged the state and employers over workers, in favour of an alternative Christian democratic interpretation of Catholic social thought and political organization is unclear. Likewise, their reluctant acceptance of the postwar settlement in Britain would not have lasted. Their concerns about public expenditure, which were always linked to national economic performance, would have meant they would not have accepted the future growth of Britain's welfare state in the late 1950s and the 1960s. These crucial differences would have also determined whether they would have adapted to Christian democracy as it emerged in postwar Europe. Jerrold and Petrie claimed that they wanted more meritocracy, promoted a mix of individual freedom and corporatism, and embraced Catholic social ideas, but we should not forget that they remained right-wing Tories with hierarchical ideas about educational standards, tradition and cultural inheritance. Any similarities between Jerrold's and Petrie's politics and those of Christian democrats in postwar Europe would have eroded over time. As Paolo Pombeni has argued, Christian democratic parties went on to embrace an 'inter-class' Catholicism that aimed to 'merge the classes into a single cultural and social entity'. Over time this helped to reduce 'ecclesial membership to a pure form of endorsement of average cultural values shared by society as a whole', which dissolved the 'militancy that had initially galvanized "Christian Democracy"' in Europe.<sup>142</sup> Jerrold and Petrie would have agreed with Eliot's view of the importance of an 'intercommunicating elite' operating at the top of a graded or traditional class-based society.<sup>143</sup> After all, as editors they had published Eliot's famous essay on the matter in the *New English Review*.<sup>144</sup> Christian democratic politics would evolve in ways they would have surely objected to, because by the early 1960s European Christian democratic parties had become largely secularized and had helped to integrate Christians into 'a political system forged by modern constitutionalism'.<sup>145</sup>

<sup>142</sup> P. Pombeni, 'The ideology of Christian democracy', *Journal of Political Ideologies*, v (2000), 289–300, at pp. 298–9.

<sup>143</sup> Kojecky, *T.S. Eliot's Social Criticism*, p. 196; Eliot, *Notes Towards the Definition of Culture*, pp. 35–49.

<sup>144</sup> Eliot, 'The class and the elite'.

<sup>145</sup> Pombeni, 'Christian democracy', pp. 325–6. Martin Conway has argued that Christian democracy only fully abandoned its links to interwar political Catholicism's undemocratic mentalities in the 1960s (M. Conway, 'Catholic politics or Christian democracy?', p. 248).

Jerrold's and Petrie's radical views on constitutional reform and European integration had a limited appeal in the Conservative party, but they were persuaded that the party was moving in the right direction. This was partly because they needed the party to be in power to fight socialism at home and stem the spread of communism in Europe. It is unlikely that their views influenced party leaders in any significant way, but their views were being championed in the *New English Review* and its associated networks at the same time as the party leadership and a large number of Conservatives were undergoing their own intellectual transformations in the late 1940s. Ultimately, Jerrold and Petrie offered a road that was not taken by the party – it was an alternative Conservative future driven by a political Catholicism that had more in common with Christian democratic politics on the continent. But at the same time, it was their 'real Toryism' that prevented a fuller embrace of postwar Christian democracy.

Finally, the *New English Review* helped to fill an important intellectual gap for the party between 1945 and 1950. Some of the party's more enlightened figures like Hogg later reflected on the party's redevelopment in the 1940s. He claimed that the transformation into a more intellectual party had been so successful that it was able to attract famous writers and literary stars to publish under its own name. When the American Republican Neil MacNeil, an aide to the former American president Herbert Hoover, wrote to Hogg to get information about the party's postwar recovery, he praised the party's clever 'use' of star intellectuals like Eliot. But Hogg did not see it that way:

I think it is putting slightly the wrong emphasis to say that we were able to 'use' people like T.S. Eliot. What happened was that we created an intellectual ambience around the Conservative Party which made it possible to invite people of the intellectual eminence of T.S. Eliot, G.M. Young, Bertrand de Jouvenel, etc. etc. to lecture or write under our auspices.<sup>146</sup>

Hogg's comments illustrate the importance of a wider intellectual culture of Conservatism to the party, which was more fully embraced when the party was in opposition during the 1940s. The *New English Review* is a forgotten but nonetheless important part of the development of that 'intellectual ambience', which the party was able to exploit between the 1940s and the 1960s before it started to embrace a more 'scientific' and technocratic view of British politics.<sup>147</sup>

<sup>146</sup> Oxford, Bodleian Library, Conservative Party Archive, CCO 4/8/102, Lord Hailsham (Quintin Hogg) to Neil MacNeil, 11 Feb. 1959.

<sup>147</sup> C. Lockwood, "'Action not words": the Conservative party, public opinion and "scientific" politics, c.1945–70', *Twentieth Century British History*, advance articles, doi.org/10.1093/tcbh/hwz014 (2019).