

Master's thesis

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Ideology and Terrorist Tactics

A Case Study of Palestinian New Left and
Religious Fundamentalist Terrorism, 1987-2011

Master's thesis in Political Science

Trondheim, June 2013

NTNU, SVT-FAKULTETET

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Spring 2013

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Department of Sociology and Political Science (ISS)
Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU)

ABSTRACT

This thesis is a comparative analysis of the military tactics employed in New Left and Religious fundamentalist Palestinian nationalist-separatist terrorism from 1987 to 2011. Combining terrorism literature and military theory, it creates a framework to identify patterns in *who*, *where* and *how* the terrorists strike. It also produces a suggested model of the relationship between terrorist ideology and military tactics. The descriptive analysis on the terrorist militancy builds on data from the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Database (IPCD), a dataset created by the author and introduced in the thesis. The analysis finds that ideological adherences do influence where and how terrorists strike; in that Religious fundamentalist terrorists more frequently than its New Left counterparts attack behind enemy lines, and also have a higher usage of explosive-based weapons. No support is found for ideology having an influence on who terrorists strike, as civilian victims constitute the vast majority of targets of both New Left and Religious fundamentalist terrorists.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First and foremost, I must thank my supervisor Tanja Ellingsen for patiently putting up with me, all the while providing invaluable feedback and managing to make me doubt my own work at least a little less. All the countless hours spent collecting and classifying data over the last few years would have been for naught, if I had not been properly convinced and reassured it was worth pursuing. Thank you for pulling me back in!

Looking back at my years at Dragvoll, I would also like to express my deepest gratitude for being exposed to the likes of Torbjørn Knutsen, Jonathon Moses and Indra de Soysa – all of whom I hope not to disappoint too much with this thesis. To all my friends and fellow students who at some point have discussed my thesis or my somewhat ambitious dataset with me, you have been of more help than you could possibly know.

I must also thank my incredible family for their unflinching support and patience with me during my prolonged studies. My mother Kristin, the best mom I could wish for; my father Dag, who I can truly say I am proud to resemble; my brother John, whose artistic talents keep amazing me; and our ruler Pushild. I must also thank my uncle Jørn and Nancy, who both have inspired me to always do better.

Finally, I could not imagine how any of this would have been possible without the support from the amazing biologist I am so lucky to live with. Eline, I thank you and I love you.

Trondheim, June 2013

Andreas Hoelstad Dæhli

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1 INTRODUCTION

On May 15th 1974, three militants from the *Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine*, dressed up in Israel Defense Force uniforms, infiltrate into Israel from Lebanon around 03:00. In the village of Ma'alot, they knock on random doors, claiming to look for terrorists; before shooting to death one woman, then a family of three, before taking eighty-five school children hostage. During a rescue operation in the afternoon, they execute twenty-two of the children before being shot to death by Israeli forces.

On June 1st 2001, a *HAMAS* militant dressed up as an orthodox Jew approaches the Dolphinarium discotheque, the scene of a high school youth event. Carrying a drum filled with explosives and shrapnel shells, he positions himself alongside the admission lines. At around 20:30, he detonates the explosives, killing himself and twenty-one youngsters.

In the 'new terrorism' debate, its advocates argue that the violence conducted by today's terrorists is more ferocious and vile than that of their predecessors. Applying Rapoport's (2002) terminology to separate between generations of terrorists; these predecessors emerged in the era of the New Left; while the 'new terrorists' refer to the Religious groups that have entered the scene since 1979. Claims of this 'new terrorism', and especially its association with Islamic fundamentalism, have been met with skepticism. The two terrorist attacks listed above were conducted respectively by a New Left and a Religious terrorist organization, taking place almost exactly 27 years apart; but both represent what most would perceive as equally abhorrent acts of violence, deliberately targeting and killing a large number of minors.

This prompts the question as to what role ideology does play in the execution of terrorist violence. Are the new and religious terrorists more blood-thirsty than left-wing terrorists? As religious rhetoric may provide a powerful terminology non-religious observers will interpret as more extreme than most radical Marxist dialectics;¹ it is the belief of this author that one must ignore what they say, and rather let their actions speak for them. In other words, can we observe more vicious violence conducted by the new and religious terrorists than the violence conducted by left-wing terrorists – or are terrorists simply terrorists, regardless of ideology?

This thesis aims to explore the relationship between ideological adherence and military tactics, and does so by comparing the militancy of two ideologically diverse blocs of Palestinian nationalist-separatist terrorist organizations since 1987. Through a descriptive analysis of all fatal

¹ As noted by Field (2009:197), as the 'new' terrorists' appear to act on “a religious imperative or sacred duty, rather than a rational secular political programme [...] it has become increasingly difficult for outside observers to understand the seemingly irrational motivations of many contemporary terrorist groups”.

acts of terrorist violence conducted by the major organizations in the period, the thesis finds no connection between ideology and the targeting of civilians, but it does identify distinguishable patterns in the geographical distribution and weaponry usage unique for each of the two blocs – suggesting that ideological adherence indeed does influence where and how Palestinian terrorists strike. From this, a suggested model to explain the role of ideology in nationalist-separatist terrorist tactics is presented.

As a single case study, the main contribution of the thesis to the terrorism literature is that of a building block: In producing a suggested explanatory model, it provides a theoretical framework to be tested in other cases. As preceding models on the subject have been nonexistent, it has combined the terrorist target selection literature with military theory, 'new terrorism' and literature on terrorist sponsorship – all to which these findings may bear relevance. As a side note, the thesis also argues in favor of a terrorist classification system in which ideology is combined with territorial ambitions.

The second important contribution of the thesis is the introduction of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Database (IPCD). A 7,039 records strong 18-variables event database, the IPCD has been created by the author with the aim of containing every fatal act of politically motivated violence between and among Israelis and Palestinians since the outbreak of the First Intifadah in 1987. It is the most comprehensive dataset on Israeli-Palestinian violence, and only a small part – that of Palestinian offensive terrorist violence – has been utilized in the thesis.

In addition to this introductory chapter, the thesis is comprised by five chapters: A theory chapter; a chapter to present the actors in the case; a chapter to introduce the dataset applied in the analysis; a chapter to present the descriptive analysis; and a concluding chapter to discuss the findings and suggest directions of future research. The structuring of these chapters is as follows:

Chapter 2, presents the theoretical framework: A discussion of terrorism definitions – in which Hoffman's (2003) consensus definition stands central – leads to an approach in which terrorist violence is understood as a military tactic; and that whoever applies such tactics, will be considered a terrorist in the thesis. It goes on to review different ways of classifying terrorist organizations found in the literature, and argues that a combination of an organization's core ideology (like Rapoport 2002) and its territorial ambitions (Hegghammer 2005) provides satisfactory description.

The focus of the thesis is then narrowed down to nationalist-separatist terrorism, in which the Palestinian organizations provide the highest degree of ideological heterogeneity for comparative analysis. As described above, Rapoportian waves is applied to separate the six major organizations into two blocs; before the fundament of comparison, the identification of military

tactics, is presented in three questions: *Who* do terrorists attack – civilians or non-civilians? *Where* do terrorists attack – behind enemy lines or in their own territory? *How* do terrorists attack – what sort of weaponry is applied?

From these three questions, ten hypotheses on New Left and Religious nationalist-separatist terrorism are constructed; based on literature on terrorist target selection (Drake 1998; Goodwin 2006; Pape 2003), the 'new terrorism' debate (Asal et al. 2009; Brandt & Sandler 2010; Duyvesteyn 2004; Field 2009; Hellestveit 2005; Tucker 2001), the four levels of military theory (Diesen 2010), statistical observations on terrorism (Mccartan et al. 2008; Røislien & Røislien 2000), and terrorist sponsorships (Byman 2005). A suggested model to explain the role of ideology in terrorist tactics, building on these hypotheses, is then presented.

Chapter 3 goes on to describe the case, formally introducing the six Palestinian terrorist organizations included in the descriptive analysis. It provides the reader with the ideological roots and historical developments of the six Palestinian terrorist organizations serving as the units of analysis in the thesis. Also, the presentations explain how the period covered by the thesis came to be, and how it represents a third era in the development of the Palestinian militancy since its inception.

The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Database (IPCD), on which the descriptive analysis is based, is presented in *Chapter 4*. As the thesis focuses only on the fatal terrorist acts executed by the organizations included in the analysis, this chapter explains and operationalizes the variables relevant to the analysis. Also, a complete codebook for the IPCD has been added as Appendix 1.

The analysis is found in *Chapter 5*, starting with a more general overview of the conflict and terrorist violence in the analysis period. It goes on to testing the hypotheses through descriptive analysis, in which relevant findings are highlighted and discussed. Finally, the suggested model to explain the role of ideology in terrorist tactics from Chapter 2 is revisited and revised.

Chapter 6 contains the concluding remarks, in which the revised model to explain the role of ideology in terrorist tactics is reviewed. It also discusses the thesis' contribution to the literature, and its potential impact on the directions of future research on the field.

2 IDEOLOGY AND TERRORISM

2.1 “I Know It When I See it” – Defining Terrorism

When asked to define hard-core pornography, U.S. Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart (as quoted in Walter 2004:25) had to admit: “I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see it.” In this aspect, the concept of pornography is not too different from that of terrorism: Everyone seems to have a somewhat common idea of what it is – but few will describe it in a way that enables us to know what it is *before* we see it. In the case of terrorism, it is some sort of grisly, unjust act of violence committed by extremists against innocents for political gain. But as views differ on what 'justice', 'extremism' or 'innocence' really mean, terrorism is often thought to be in the eyes of the beholder. Or, as eloquently put by Jenkins (1980), “[t]errorism is what the bad guys do”.

Since the Tuesday morning of September 11th 2001, the public and academic attention to these “bad guys” has skyrocketed: In 2000, about three new books on terrorism were published per week – while in 2002, the figure had risen to thirty-four. Prior to the attack, *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* published on a quarterly basis – today, the journal is published on a monthly basis (Silke 2008:28ff). Studies on terrorism have been theoretical or empirical, and have been seeking to establish its proper definition, identify its root causes, its two-way relationships to societies and economies, its dynamics, its strategic logic, as well as the development of its countermeasures.²

Nevertheless, four decades of research on modern terrorism have failed to bring about any broad consensus on what terrorism really is, or who is a terrorist. This lack of definitional accord has come to characterize the research, and has also become an inescapable subject in the preliminary remarks of nearly all papers and books dealing with any aspect of it. And the approaches to the field are numerous, as terrorism studies is regarded an “academic orphan”, whose “foster parents were the schools of political science, history, psychology, sociology, anthropology, communications, criminology, law, economics, philosophy, and military science” (Ellis 2008:135).

There have been made several attempts to establish a 'consensus definition' of terrorism. Reviewing seventy-three definitions presented in fifty-five articles published from 1977 to 2000, Weinberg et al. (2004:786) describe terrorism as “a politically motivated tactic involving the threat or use of force or violence in which the pursuit of publicity plays a significant role.” And, concluding a lengthy discussion of terrorism attributes and previous definitions, Hoffman (2006:43)

² For recent surveys of terrorism literature and the field's variety, see Sandler (2011) and Young & Findley (2011).

identifies five distinguishing characteristics separating terrorism from other types of crime and irregular warfare as

“ineluctably political in aims and motives; violent – or equally important, threatens violence; designed to have far-reaching psychological repercussions beyond the immediate target; conducted either by an organization (...) or by individuals or a small collection of individuals directly influenced, motivated, or inspired by the ideological aims or example of some existent terrorist movement (...); perpetrated by a subnational group or nonstate entity.”

The consensus definition refers to subnational entities – in most instances taking on the role as the weaker side in some variety of asymmetric warfare, and commonly described as rebels, insurgents, paramilitaries, militias, guerrilleros, and/or terrorists. The ambitions of these groups are considered ideological rather than monetary, thus separating them from criminal organizations. But while guerrilleros and terrorists are both irregular combatants, terrorism is still perceived to be a more sinister and malicious type of warfare than guerrilla warfare (Hoffman 2006:21). Considering the basic rules of humanitarian law in armed conflicts, other scholars add a sixth criterion: That the targeting of non-combatants is an essential characteristic of terrorism (Byman 2005:8; Ganor 2002; Goodwin 2006:2028; Rasch 2005:10).

Ganor (2002:288) insists that the most important difference between terrorist activities and guerrilla warfare is found in “the target of their operations. The guerrillero's targets are military ones, while the terrorist deliberately targets civilians.”³ This should be considered a rule of thumb rather than a dogma, as terrorists may attack military targets as well. For example, most researchers consider the attack on the USS Cole in 2000 to be a terrorist incident (Young & Findley 2011:428). Following this line of reasoning, the rule of thumb appears to be that terrorists may attack both civilian and military targets, while guerrilleros do not attack civilian targets.⁴

Publicity plays a significant role in the efficiency of terrorism, as acts of terror are applied as tools to achieve political goals. The inherent political nature of terrorism allows us to interpret even the most gruesome attacks as 'symbolic acts', to be analyzed as a form of communication in which the terrorist is the transmitter, the target is the intended recipient, the attack is the message, and the target's reaction to the attack is the feedback (Lia 2000:12f). Note here that the victims of such a “message” may not be the actual “target”: Schmid has separated between the 'target of violence' –

³ It should also be noted that among the 109 definitions reviewed by Schmid and Jongman in 1988 (as cited in Hoffman 2006:34), only 17.5% – 19 definitions – included “civilians, noncombatants, neutrals, outsiders as victims”. However, as their survey was published 24 years ago, its current validity is questionable. Since then, developments have been made in defining terrorism, and “the definitions used in recent pieces of legislation are more precise than older approaches” (Walter 2004:33). Finally, the term “noncombatant” is also vague, as it does not necessarily exclude known members of armed entities.

⁴ Another factor may serve to separate terrorists and guerrilla fighters in their attacks on military targets, as findings by Young & Findley (2011:428) suggest that “variables that predict attacks on civilians similarly predict attacks on military who are in a noncombatant role.”

the physical victims of the act – and the 'target of attention' – the audience to, and hence the psychological victims of, the act (Asal et al. 2009:25). In this analysis, when discussing terrorist tactics, a 'target' will refer to the former.

The empirical and quantitative research on terrorism illustrates the lack of a common definition. It has not prevented the establishment of several terrorist incidents databases, working within different frameworks. The four most prominent of these are as follows: The *Global Terrorism Database* (GTD), containing more than 98,000 incidents from 1970 to 2010; the *International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events* (ITERATE), containing more than 13,000 transnational incidents from 1968 to 2010; the *Rand Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents* (RDWTI), containing more than 36,000 incidents from 1972 to 2009; and the *Worldwide Incidents Tracking System* (WITS), containing more than 84,000 incidents from 2004 to 2011. The varying definitions of terrorism applied by the producers have caused different inclusion criteria, which are reflected in the vast differences in size and detail illustrated in Table 2.1.

Table 2.1, Major Databases on Terrorist Incidents

Database	Definition of Terrorism	Incidents	Range	Incidents / Year
GTD	Acts aiming to attain political, economic, religious or social goal; intention to coerce, intimidate or convey message to audience beyond immediate victims; outside the context of legitimate warfare activities.	98,000	1970-2010	2,450
ITERATE	Use, or threat of use, of anxiety-inducing violence for political purposes by any individual or group, whether acting for or in opposition to established government authority; intended to influence an audience beyond the immediate victims, with ramifications transcending national boundaries.	13,000	1968-2010	309
RDWTI	Violence or the threat of violence; calculated to create fear and alarm; intended to coerce certain actions; politically motivated; generally directed against civilian targets; by group or an individual.	36,000	1972-2009	972
WITS	Premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents (non-combatants include military personnel who at the time of the incident are unarmed or not on duty).	84,000	2004-2011	12,000

Sources: GTD 2011; ITERATE 2010; RDWTI 2011; WITS 2011

Despite the dissension, Ganor (2002:288) claims “[a]n objective definition of terrorism is not only possible; it is also indispensable to any serious attempt to combat terrorism.” As terrorism research is inherently policy relevant, its findings and suggestions have influenced the development of counter-terrorist measures. Since Enders & Sandler (1993) demonstrated how such measures directly affect the development and employment of terrorist attacks – for example that fortification

of embassies will reduce attacks, but increase assassinations – many studies have been conducted to review various aspects of different counter-terrorist policies.⁵

The mutual relationship between the development of terrorism and the development of counter-terrorist policies points to a feature of terrorism most researchers do agree upon: Its peculiar rationality. Reviewing previous studies on terrorists' backgrounds, McCartan et al. (2008:60) find that the vast majority of those involved in terrorism are not psychologically deranged fanatics, and that “terrorist acts are not indiscriminate or random but rather demonstrate an underlying logic.” Likewise, Røislien & Røislien (2010:134) have identified a “rather unanimous assertion” among scholars that “terrorism is rational and has a clear singleness of purpose.”

In this thesis, terrorism will be understood as a military tactic – or more precisely, a distinguishable cluster of tactics. Any offensive tactic fitting the description put forth in Hoffman's consensus definition, including the sixth criterion of specifically attacking civilians, will here be considered to be an act of terrorism: By employing such tactics, one becomes a terrorist. This implies that terrorists acts, all the while being politically motivated, are still politically neutral tools; in that groups of all affiliations may commit them. This can be illustrated by the fact that Abu Mus'ab al-Suri's *Military Theory of the Global Islamic Resistance Call* (2007) and Anders Behring Breivik's *2083 – A European Declaration of Independence* (2011) both contain instructions and ideas applicable to anyone wishing to engage in terrorist tactics, not exclusively Islamists or Euro-supremacists.⁶ As pointed out by McCartan et al. (2008:61), “terrorist violence is not a goal in itself, but rather a means to an end.”

2.2 “A Terrorist is a Terrorist is a Terrorist” – Terrorist Classification

By defining terrorism as a military tactic – or an umbrella of tactics – one can identify terrorists as those who employ them. But this does not at all make terrorists a homogenous group. The Lebanese Islamists of Hizballah and the American pro-militia extremist Timothy McVeigh cannot be said to have very much in common, other than being identified as terrorists due to their politically

⁵ The most discussed countermeasure would be the Israeli – and later U.S. – policies of targeted killings, assassinating terrorist personnel in non-combatant roles. Since the controversial practice first gained attention early in during the al-Aqsa Intifadah, scholars have reviewed the legality (Ben-Naftali & Michaeli 2003; David 2003; Kretzmer 2005; Walter 2004) and the actual efficiency (Byman 2006; Hafez & Hatfield 2006).

⁶ Sharing information on how to engage in terrorist activities is nothing new: In 1885, German-American anarchist Johannes Most published a “users guide” entitled *Science of Revolutionary Warfare*, on the production of explosives. In 1971, William Powell published *The Anarchist Cookbook*, containing more instructions to engage in irregular warfare. And during its time in Afghanistan, al Qaeda also produced an eleven volume strong *Encyclopedia of Jihad*, containing instructions on “physical training, first aid, knife fighting, interrogation techniques, [and] reconnaissance”, as well as information on “the use of and manufacture of explosives, mines, and a wide variety of light and heavy weapons” (McCormick 2003:479).

motivated violent attacks on non-combatants. Terrorist entities differ in size, in striking power, in ideology, in political objectives, in domestic and foreign support bases, as well as in types of terrorist activities they engage in. Thus, any attempt to classify or categorize terrorists must choose carefully what characteristics to take into consideration.

2.2.1 Ideology

Ideology stands out as an obvious choice of a distinguishing characteristic. This might be related to how modern terrorism has developed, which, according to Rapoport (2001), has presented itself in four waves: The 'Anarchist wave' began in the 1880s, as revolutionary anarchist groups emerged in Russia and Europe. It was followed by the 'anticolonial wave' from the 1920s, when nationalist groups began seeking independence from imperialist rule. The 'New Left wave' came in the 1960s, with bands of revolutionary leftists around the world. The 'religious wave' followed the Iranian revolution of 1979, when religious fundamentalism – and in particular, Islamic fundamentalism – emerged as an important factor.

As of today, the United States Bureau of Counterterrorism's (2012) list of “Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations” consists of fifty groups – thirty Islamic fundamentalist, ten communist, seven national-separatist, and three others.⁷ The European Union (2011) identifies twenty-five “Groups and entities” – ten Islamic fundamentalist, eight communist, and seven nationalist-separatist.⁸ The ideological classification has been done by the author, and it should be noted that the classification is not mutually exclusive. Several of the groups' motivations overlap: Some Islamic fundamentalists and communists may fight a nationalist-separatist cause, but have

⁷ The following ideological classification has been undertaken by the author: *Islamic fundamentalist groups* (30): Abu Sayyaf Group, al-Shabaab, Ansar al-Islam, Asbat al-Ansar, Gama'a al-Islamiyya, HAMAS, Harakat ul-Jihad-i-Islami/Bangladesh, Harakat ul-Mujahidin, Hizballah, Islamic Jihad Union, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Jaish-e-Mohammed, Jemaah Islamiya Organization, Jemmah Anshorut Tauhid, Kata'ib Hizballah, Lashkar-e Tayyiba, Lashkar i-Jhangvi, Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group, Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, al-Qaida in Iraq, al-Qaida, al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, Harakat-ul Jihad Islami, Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan, Jundallah, Army of Islam, Indian Mujahideen. *Communist groups* (10): Communist Party of the Philippines/New People's Army, Kongra-Gel, National Liberation Army, Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, PFLP-General Command, Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, Revolutionary Organization 17 November, Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front, Revolutionary Struggle, Shining Path. *Nationalist-separatist groups* (7): Abu Nidal Organization, al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, Basque Fatherland and Liberty, Continuity Irish Republican Army, Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, Palestine Liberation Front, Real IRA. *Other groups* (3): Aum Shinrikyo (syncretic cult), Kahane Chai (Jewish fundamentalist), United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (far-right).

⁸ The following ideological classification has been undertaken by the author: *Islamic fundamentalist groups* (10): al-Aqsa e.V, al-Takfir wal-Hijra, Jemaah Islamiya, Islami Büyük Doğu Akincilar Cephesi, HAMAS, Hizbul Mujahideen, Hofstadgroep, Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Stichting al-Aqsa. *Communist groups* (8): Communist Party of the Philippines/New People's Army, Kongra-Gel, National Liberation Army, Popular Front for the liberation of Palestine, PFLP-General Command, Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front, Shining Path. *Nationalist-separatist groups* (7): Abu Nidal Organization, al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, Babbar Khalsa, International Sikh Youth Federation, Khalistan Zindabad Force, Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, Teyrbazen Azadiya Kurdistan.

here been singled out as the most common ideologies. Those described simply as national-separatists therefore adhere to other political or religious ideologies.

Hence, ideology alone fails to serve as a satisfying denominator. This can be illustrated by significant differences between two Marxist-Leninist terrorist groups: Rote Armee Fraktion (RAF) and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP). The RAF sought a German revolution, and were involved in terrorist activities primarily targeting German and U.S. officials in Germany, as well as German officials in Sweden and Italy. The DFLP sought the dismantlement of Israel and a subsequent establishment of a Palestinian state, and their terrorist activities were concentrated on Israeli civilian and non-civilian targets inside Israel or territories held by Israeli forces.⁹ Moving on to the religious fundamentalists of Rapoport's fourth wave, one can also identify considerable differences between the global Islamism of al-Qaeda and the nationalist Islamism of groups like HAMAS.¹⁰

2.2.2 Geography

Realizing ideology alone is not enough have instigated two ways to categorize terrorists by geographical terms: In what areas they operate, or in what areas they seek to exercise influence. In considering the first, Young & Findley (2011:417) have found that “(s)cholars do not typically distinguish between domestic and transnational terrorism, or they only examine transnational terrorism.” This might be due to the fact that some domestic terrorist entities, such as the Lebanese Hizballah, may occasionally participate in transnational terrorist activities.

The second geographical term identifies the territorial ambitions of the entity, or the nature of the area over which it seeks to exercise its influence. In reviewing Islamist terrorist groups, Hegghammer (2005:25) identifies three ideal types: The global jihad groups, the socio-revolutionary groups, and the nationalist-separatist groups. This can be applied to all terrorist entities: Those with international – regional, continental or global – ambitions, those who seek to overthrow their own government, and those who seek to liberate a territory.

The Hegghammer triangle, as illustrated in Figure 2.1, may serve as a more satisfying geographical denominator in terrorist classification than the domestic-transnational approach, assuming an entity's territorial ambitions are an integral characteristic not likely to change; while the areas they operate in may vary over time, depending on their military capabilities.¹¹ In other


⁹ It should be noted that since it was established in 1969, the DFLP has, according to the GTD, conducted no more than two terrorist attacks outside these areas, both of which took place in Europe (France and Germany) in August 1974, causing no fatalities nor casualties.

¹⁰ For further discussion on differences between nationalist jihad and global jihad, as well as a portrait of the enmity between the two taking place in the Gaza Strip since 2006, see Engell (2010).

¹¹ One of the best known examples of nationalist-separatist terrorism applied outside of its domestic sphere may be

words, the domestic-transnational approaches only reflect temporary strategies of a terrorist entity, while the triangle reflects a constant policy of a terrorist entity.

Figure 2.1, The Hegghammer Triangle: Territorial Ambitions of Terrorist Entities



The subject of this thesis will be Palestinian nationalist-separatist terrorism. No other territorial conflict has produced a more ideologically heterogeneous gathering of terrorists: While the Northern Irish separatist was a socialist with Catholic roots, the typical Tamil Tiger a secular socialist of Hindu background, and the typical Chechnyan rebel an Islamist; the Kalashnikov-wielding Palestinian could be a secular Ba'athist, an agnostic ethno-nationalist, an Islamist, a Marxist, a Marxist-Leninist, a Nasirist, or a socialist. This variety makes the composition of the Palestinian militants unique, as it provides observers with an on-going demonstration of how groups adhering to different ideologies seek to achieve the same objective: The establishment of an independent Palestinian state.

Combining the Rapoportian ideological wave classification and Hegghammer's triangle of territorial ambitions allows us to separate between the Palestinian New Left and the Palestinian Religious nationalist-separatist terrorist organizations. Before moving on to defining the criteria for a comparison between the waves, further elaboration on nationalist-separatist violence is required.

2.2.3 Nationalist-Separatist Violence: Terrorism or Freedom Fight?

In *Harry's Game*, a 1975 fiction book about a British undercover agent's hunt for an IRA assassin, writer Gerald Seymour introduced what would later become a well-known cliché in countless debates on terrorism: “One man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter.” This argument is particularly reverberated among supporters of armed nationalist-separatist groups, from the IRA to

Black September's 1972 Munich massacre, drawing unprecedented international attention to the Palestinian cause. Two years later, Fateh – the group from which the Black September had formed (Reeve 2011) – along with the rest of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) began opposing attacks outside of Israel, as “international terror was no longer appropriate” (Karmon 2000).

the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). However, this is rejected by scholars such as Ganor (2002) and Jenkins (1980:2), who argues that “[o]ne man's terrorist is everyone's terrorist.”

By designating all armed Palestinian, Kurdish, Tamil and Chechen groups as terrorists; Israeli, Turkish, Sri Lankan and Russian policies can be accused of attempting to undermine any legitimacy of the national movements the groups have emerged from – using the strongly pejorative term to label them vile and unjust. The groups and their supporters will traditionally reject the 'terrorist' label, and often refer to the United Nations General Assembly resolution 37/43, reaffirming the “legitimacy of the struggle of peoples for (...) liberation from colonial and foreign domination and foreign occupation by all available means, including armed struggle”.

However, armed struggle does not exclude terrorist tactics. Hence, one man's freedom fighter being another man's terrorist is not necessarily a problem, because they can both be right: A person fighting for the liberation of a territory 'by all available means', including terrorist tactics, is still a freedom fighter. A person engaging in terrorist activities, even with the aims of liberating a territory from an occupying power, is still a terrorist.¹²

A greater challenge in dealing with nationalist-separatist terrorism, is to tell it apart from nationalist-separatist guerrilla warfare. Pointing out that guerrilleros often employ the same tactics for the same purposes as terrorists, Hoffman (2006:35f) claims the latter traditionally lacks the size and control over territory and populace, but emphasizes that “none of these are pure categories and considerable overlap exists.” For example, about a third of the entities listed as foreign terrorist organizations by the United States could also be categorized as guerrillas.

Table 2.2, Types of Warfare by Target Selection

<i>Types of Warfare</i>	Target	
Military	Combatant	Non-combatant
Regular	<i>Conventional</i>	<i>State terrorism</i>
Irregular	<i>Guerrilla, insurgency</i>	<i>Terrorism</i>

Like Ganor, Goodwin (2006:2030) separates the two by the targets they select, and even goes on to identify two types of terrorism. *Guerrilla warfare* targets defense forces, security forces, paramilitaries and armed civilians. *Selective or individualized terrorism* targets politicians, state

¹² Traditionally, members of terrorist organizations will rarely describe their activities as terrorist. And even in the cases they do, such as the 1940s Jewish terrorist group *Lehi* (Lohamei Herut Yisrael; the Freedom Fighters for Israel) which “would admit to its effective use of terrorists tactics, its members never considered themselves to be terrorists” (Hoffman 2006:21). On the other hand, key al Qaeda strategist Abu Mus'ab al-Suri (2007:382f) claims terrorism is “an abstract word, and like many other abstract words, it can carry a good or bad meaning according to the context.” He goes on to separate between 'blameworthy terrorism' and 'praiseworthy terrorism'.

administrators, leaders and/or activists of competing oppositions, presumed collaborators and common criminals. *Categorical or indiscriminate terrorism* targets “anonymous members of an ethnicity, religion, nationality, social class, etc.” Again, the fundamental idea is that guerrilla warfare target combatants while terrorist warfare target non-combatants, as illustrated in Table 2.2.

Discussing findings in Engene's *Terrorism in Western Europe: Events Data* (TWEED), Lia (2001:10) notes that “ethnic-separatist groups stand out as the by far most active groups to initiate action against military targets.” This should not come as a surprise, as it is in the nature of the nationalist-separatist mission to attack the security apparatus of the perceived occupying power – especially areas under a perceived foreign military occupation. It also suggests that the vast majority of nationalist-separatist groups engage in both terrorist and guerrilla activities, and that few – if any – target exclusively non-combatants.

Only the strictest and most narrow definitions of a terrorist organization would describe an entity established and maintained with the sole purpose of conducting terrorist acts. This would drastically reduce the number of terrorist organizations worldwide, and perhaps especially among those in the nationalist-separatist corner of Hegghammer's triangle. According to Byman (2005:23), “[n]ot all terrorist groups are insurgencies, but almost every insurgent group uses terrorism.” The thesis applies perhaps the broadest definition, where all organizations engaging in terrorist activities – that is, employing terrorist tactics – are considered terrorist organizations.¹³

2.3 Terrorism as Military Tactics

2.3.1 Military Tactics

By approaching terrorism as a set of irregular, offensive military tactics – traditionally employed by an entity perceiving itself to act on behalf of the weaker side in an asymmetric conflict – the thesis aims to strip away circumstantial factors not directly related to the planning and execution of terrorist activities. To do this, further elaboration will be needed to properly describe the thesis' approach to the concepts of military tactics and strategies, as both terms originate from military theory and might carry the potential of nonchalant usage in social sciences.¹⁴

¹³ In the words of Jenkins (1980:2), from the moment a group “carries out a terrorist act, it acquires the label *terrorist* [...] and from that point on, everything this group does, whether intended to produce terror or not, is also henceforth called terrorism.” While the observation is, from a purely politico-rhetorical point of view, correct; all actions conducted by terrorist organizations will not necessarily be acts of terrorist. An organization can maintain a voluminous range of non-terrorist activities, such as providing healthcare for the poor or general political mobilization; but as long as it also engages in terrorism, the thesis will label it terrorist.

¹⁴ As of June 12th 2013, Google Scholar search engine results for the phrases “terrorism is a tactic” and “terrorism is a strategy” respectively lists 523 and 204 hits. None need to be more right or wrong than the other, as discussion later

In *On War*, Clausewitz ([1832] 2006:60) states that “tactics is the theory of the use of military forces in combat. Strategy is the theory of the use of combats for the object of war.” A paraphrasing commonly heard in military circles, says 'strategy is doing the right things, while tactics is doing the things right'. Strategy and tactics can be said to represent two different levels of military planning, leading to the framework developed by modern military theory, consisting of four, hierarchal levels:

The *grand strategy*, or national strategy, is associated with the overall national goals and interests. It seeks to create or secure peace, maintain or increase wealth, and promote political or moral values. The *military strategy* is associated with national security interests and overall objectives of warfare, and seeks to win or deter war, or reestablish a preferred political state. The *operational* level is associated with campaigns and decisive operations within a region or theater of operation, seeking to expel or force mass surrender of enemy combatants. The *tactical* level is associated with battles, skirmishes and other confrontations, seeking to defeat, stop or delay enemy combatants, or to capture or hold important areas (Diesen 2000:164).

These four levels are traditionally applied to nation-states, and are associated respectively with the top political leadership, the top military leadership, regional commands, and army corps or divisions. A reversed listing shows how the activities of each level contribute to achieve the objectives determined in the level above. According to Diesen (2000:132), operational success is achieved by “combining [achievements made on the tactical level] in a way that the results on the higher level exceeds the sum of the individual contributions.” Building on Diesen (2000:164), Table 2.3 demonstrates how the four levels can be adjusted to subnational actors, such as nationalist-separatist terrorist organizations.

Table 2.3, The Four Levels of Military Theory, Adjusted to Nationalist-separatist Terrorism

Level	Associated with	Purposes	Level of command
National strategic	Overall national and territorial demands	Formulate long-term objectives, promotion of values	Political wing leadership
Military strategic	General planning of armed struggle	Achieve long-term objectives, enemy surrender	Armed wing leadership
Operational	Campaigns	Achieve short-term objectives, enemy concessions	Regional commanders
Tactical	Attacks, skirmishes, battles	Inflict damage upon enemy morale, campaign contribution	Local cells

In the case of the nationalist-separatist organizations, the national strategy of overall national goals

on in the chapter demonstrate that it may be a question of different approaches to the subject.

and interests will relate to their territorial demands – that is, the size of the territory they seek to liberate¹⁵ – and the political nature of the state they wish to establish. The military strategy will relate to their overall objectives to achieve national liberation through different phases of warfare, depending on their relative power.¹⁶ On the operational level, the long-term objectives are converted into more specific, short-term objectives, like coordinating campaigns to achieve specific concessions. The tactical level is still related to physically engaging the enemy, contributing to on-going campaigns.¹⁷

Terrorism – a politically motivated act of violence, targeting non-combatants, aiming to achieve effects beyond the immediate target, conducted by a subnational organization – can be identified as a specific category of offensive military tactics, representing a potential choice of action to any irregular military force.¹⁸ Considering the levels of military theory, this is a bottom-up approach. On the other hand, a top-down approach can identify terrorism as a strategy on both operational and military strategic levels; as a campaign theme or as a temporary phase of warfare. The thesis seeks to analyze recorded the successful (fatal) incidents of violence caused by cell members, and use that information to identify patterns and trends; rather than to analyze statements on contemporary strategies made by military leaderships, and compare that information with the recorded incidents. The bottom-up approach is therefore deemed appropriate.

This case-study will review the ideologically different Palestinian terrorist organizations' offensive military tactics, including – but not restricted to – terrorist tactics. In search of the essence of these irregular military tactics, to describe *what* they are doing, the following three questions are asked: *Who* do they attack – civilians or non-civilians? *Where* do they attack – behind enemy lines or at home? *How* do they attack – what sort of weaponry was used?¹⁹ By including all incidents

¹⁵ Note here that these territorial *demands*, associated with national strategy among nationalist-separatist organizations; must not be confused with the territorial *ambitions*, associated with separating nationalist-separatists from nationalist-revolutionary and international terrorist organizations in Hegghammer's triangle.

¹⁶ In a zero-sum territorial conflict – as some of the Palestinian organizations perceive themselves to be in – complete national liberation cannot be achieved through irregular warfare alone, but rather through concessions allowing a gradual build-up to regular warfare.

¹⁷ Basketball, played in quarters, may provide us with a non-military analogy of the levels: Winning the game (the grand strategy) requires the team to acquire the skills and know-how to perform a number of offensive and defensive plays (or tactics, corresponding to the tactical level). They must then implement the most efficient combination of these tactics in each quarter (corresponding to the operational level). Each of these combinations must be adjusted through estimating their own relative strength and ability to the opposing team in each quarter, as the efficiency of each tactic is bound to change as the other team develops countermeasures in between the quarters (corresponding to the different phases of warfare in the military strategic level).

¹⁸ This corresponds to Drake (1998a:35), who describes terrorism as “only one of a number of methods which a group may use as part of its strategy. Depending on their capabilities, their strategy may include other violent [as well as] non-violent methods.”

¹⁹ A fourth element, '*when* do they attack' – operationalized by splitting the nychthemeron into quarters; night (midnight to 6 a.m.), morning (6 a.m. to noon), day (noon to 6 p.m.), and evening (6 p.m. to midnight) – should ideally have been included. However, not every incident in the dataset contain this information. Furthermore, '*when*' has not been considered a characteristic as crucial as the '*who*', '*where*' and '*how*' (see further discussion in Chapter

with fatal outcomes caused by the organizations, certain recognizable patterns are expected to emerge over time, rendering comparative analysis possible.

These three elements – who, where, how – will also serve as a point of departure for the existing literature on terrorist tactics. The 'who' and 'where' have traditionally been dealt with in the terrorist target selection literature. Røislien & Røislien (2010:136) specifically identify two elements of “particular significance for understanding the terrorist target selection: One is related to *where* the terrorist attack is carried out [...] the other is related to *who* is attacked.” With the exception of suicide bomb terrorism, the 'how' has been a less explored phenomenon, but is referred to in quantitative studies and terrorist organization profiling.

2.3.2 Terrorist Target Selection

Despite being a relatively narrow subfield of terrorism research, it is in the opinion of the author that the terrorist target selection literature can be separated into two blocs: *Actor-based approaches* and *target-based approaches*. The target-based approaches focus on the strategic logic of the targets selected by terrorists, are traditionally quantitative in nature, and pays little or none attention to ideological orientation.

2.3.2.1 Who Do Terrorists Attack?


In his pioneering work *Terrorist Target Selection*, Drake (1998a:175) formulated the perhaps most important argument in the actor-based approaches: “[T]he touchstone for a group's initial decisions about target selection is provided by the group's ideology.” Ideology provides terrorist groups with a set value system, shaping the mental and moral framework within which they operate. All activities must, at least in the eyes of the terrorists, be in accordance with their ideological fundament. This includes their choice of targets, as ideology, according to Nacos (as quoted in Asal et al. 2009:262), “identifies the pool of enemies from which the victims will be selected.”

Naturally, ideology alone will not explain all aspects of target choice – it will also be affected by “factors such as the resources of the group, the reaction of society to the terrorists' actions, and the security environment in which they operate” (Drake 1998b:54). The scope for action will be gradually narrowed by circumstantial factors, as illustrated in Figure 2.2.

Drake suggests that ideology influences target selection by putting the fundamental constraints on strategy and tactics development. But group dynamics, external opinion, capability, security environment, protective measures, the current conflict situation as well as the terror attack itself, may also affect the group's interpretation of ideology, as well as its development of strategies

and tactics. As rational actors, terrorist groups will have to adapt to their current security environment, capabilities and political leadership – all ephemeral factors – to constantly reinterpret the core values and principles relevant in choosing their targets.

Figure 2.2, Drake's Constraints on Terrorist Target Selection



Source: Drake 1998a:176

The role of ideology in target selection is easily connected to the debate on 'new terrorism', initiated by claims of the current-day terrorism being more blood-thirsty and fanatic than the terrorism of yesteryear. Here, Rapoport's 'religious wave' is said to be less rational, cause more mass fatalities, and also target civilians to a further extent than its three predecessors; the anarchists, the anti-colonialists, and the new leftists. Its creation of an “excessively sharp distinction between the 'traditional terrorism' of the past and the 'new terrorism' of the present” has drawn much criticism from a growing number of scholars, regarding the distinction as largely artificial and the differences as exaggerated (Field 2009:195).²⁰

Nevertheless, the debate has continued, and one explanation for 'new terrorists' alleged blood-thirst points at a religious potential of adding a new dimension to the construction of vile enemy images: Stein (2002:294) has noted how the Soviet Union, China, and Iran during the Cold

²⁰ For a critical review of the 'new terrorism' debate, see Field (2009).

War respectively branded Western leadership as 'imperialists', 'barbarians', and 'degenerates'. This is the basis for the first hypothesis:

H1: Islamist terrorists target civilians more than their Leftist counterparts.

As noted above, the claims of a 'new terrorism' more dangerous, more ferocious, less predictable, or more difficult to counter, have been met with skepticism by some scholars. According to Tucker (2001:1), “there is little that is new in the new terrorism, and what is new is not necessarily more dangerous or difficult to counter than the old.” Its advocates are also criticized for romanticizing the 'old terrorism' as – in opposition to 'new terrorism' – a rational violence, supposedly “characterized by political motivations, such as nationalism and extreme left-wing ideologies. The choice of targets reflected their ideas and was highly symbolic” (Duyvesteyn 2004:445).²¹

On the other hand, Hellestveit (2005:96ff) has shown how Islamist terrorists, within the framework of their religious interpretations, tend to redefine terms such as 'war' and 'civilians' into concepts having little in common with their namesakes in international law. According to al Qaeda strategist al-Suri (2007:387), “terrorizing the enemies [of God] is a religious duty.” But also more moderate voices, like the influential Egyptian cleric Yusuf al-Qaradawi, killing civilians can under certain circumstances be allowed. Views like these have led some writers to assume there is a higher likelihood of civilian casualties in conflicts involving Islamic fundamentalists, such as Spencer (as quoted in Asal et al. 2009:263) who claims “Islam has a propensity towards violence that other [religions] do not display.”

Quantitative analysis of domestic and international terrorism from 1998 to 2005 has found that religious and religious ethnonationalist/separatist terrorists are significantly more likely to execute attacks against soft targets than their non-religious counterparts (Asal et al. 2009:272f). And in their quantitative analysis of transnational terrorism target selection from 1968 to 2007, Brandt & Sandler (2010:221f) show that since the end of the Cold War, private parties have surpassed official, business and military parties as the most favored target. Noting that “fundamentalist terrorists' taste for bloodshed” stands out as one of the main causes for this development, they also attribute this to the improvement of security measures of official and business property since the 1980s, as well as the significant decrease in state sponsorship of terrorism after the collapse of the Soviet Union.²²

²¹ Note the striking similarities to the debates of 'new' and 'old' civil wars, which tend to romanticize the past's collective, even noble, ideologically motivated struggles against the contemporary private, predatory and even depoliticized wars (Kalyvas 2001).

²² A similar target accessibility explanation is provided by Johnson (as quoted in Asal et al. 2009:260), who argues that “[t]errorists attack innocent and undefended American targets precisely because American soldiers and sailors [...]

Among actor-based approaches not focusing entirely on ideology, a social psychological take on the process of identifying the 'pool of enemies' points to the collective insecurity expected to evolve in clandestine organizations. In conflict with a, or large parts of a, society, an 'us versus them' mentality can be accelerated by tension caused by such insecurity, causing construction of enemy images based on fundamental attribution errors (Stein 2002:294f). In some instances, the creation of dichotomies between members and non-members of terrorist organizations may allow the former to view all non-members as legitimate targets (Asal et al. 2009:262).

Using testimony from a former IRA terrorist on how the group “dehumanised the other side and branded them animals”, Drake (1998a:25) claims that ideology “transforms people or objects into representative symbols.” While this might be a point more relevant to transnational terrorism, all shades of nationalist-separatist thought, regardless of ideology, are expected to have an inherent and relatively similar 'us versus them' outlook – the occupier is the enemy. Furthermore, their enemy images will be reinforced and invigorated by all sorts of counter-terrorist measures. From this, it seems reasonable to assume that the degree of extremism in the enemy images produced within nationalist-separatist terrorist will be affected by the occupier's policies towards them.

In any case, it must be assumed that dehumanization is essential in terrorist groups' construction of enemy images, convincing its members that non-combatant targets are representative symbols of evil, injustice or oppression, rather than human beings with families and friends. From a 'new terrorism' perspective, it could be expected that Religious terrorists excel in targeting the softest among the soft targets – allowing the construction of the following hypothesis:

H₂: Islamist terrorists target children and elderly more than their Leftist counterparts.

Another target-based approach focuses on the democratic nature of societies frequently plagued with terrorism. Democratic rule is often deemed “soft” by its critics, rivals and opponents “on the ground that their publics have low thresholds of cost tolerance and high ability to affect state policy” (Pape 2003:349). This is accelerated by democratic traditions concerning freedom of press, preventing democratic regimes the option of constraining information and messages. To opponents of authoritarian regimes – where information accessible to the public is censored by the state, and civilians are unable to cause changes in policy or leadership – terrorist tactics appear to be, at least in theory,²³ counterproductive.

seems invulnerable.”

²³ Nevertheless, the figures provided by terrorist incident databases show that terrorism is far more common in semi-authoritarian regimes than in democratic regimes. A common explanation suggests that the same features of

Also, according to Wiktorowicz & Kaltner (as quoted in Asal et al. 2009:264), terrorists may “reason that democracy changes the moral status of all civilians within a democratic policy.” Returning to Goodwin's two terrorisms – 'selective' and 'categorical'; the former targeting politically involved non-combatants, the latter targeting any member of the enemy society – the justification of 'categorical terrorism' is found in a radical interpretation of representative democracy: All citizens are to be held responsible for the activities of their elected government. Through paying taxes and participating in elections bringing about government policies, representative democracies produce “complicitous civilians” (Goodwin 2006:2043).

This is also echoed by Pape (2003:349), who has pointed out that the main target of every suicide terrorism campaign²⁴ has been citizens – civilian and non-civilian – of democracies involved in a military occupation of territories claimed by terrorist organizations.²⁵ The vast majority of the attacks have been conducted by Islamic fundamentalist organizations, but it has also been applied by non-religious groups: The best known of these is the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), once the world's leader in suicide terrorism. Other non-Islamist groups responsible for suicide bombings include the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), the Arab Socialist Baath Party (ASBP) and the Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party (SSNP), both active in Lebanon in the 1980s.

Palestinian terrorist organizations have also been responsible for deploying suicide bombers, in accordance with theories on nationalist-separatist terrorism directed towards occupying powers. But GTD statistics suggest a possible difference between Islamic fundamentalist and non-religious suicide terrorism: 41.9% of all suicide attacks, of which the vast majority have been conducted by Islamic fundamentalist, have targeted police and military personnel. In comparison, uniformed security personnel were the targets in 63.7% of the attacks conducted by the non-religious LTTE, PKK, ASBP and SSNP.²⁶ The third hypothesis will therefore test for this among the Palestinian terrorist organizations:

transparency and openness that in theory make democracies the obvious targets of terrorism, simultaneously contribute to the prevention of the growth of radical attitudes needed to resort to terrorism (Rasch & Strand 2005:230ff). However, it should be noted that these figures do not separate terrorist incidents targeting civilians from those targeting non-civilians.

²⁴ When observing the trends in terrorist weaponry found in the GTD statistics, one of the most drastic changes in modern terrorism is the significant increase in the number of suicide bombings: From 139 incidents in the 20th century, to 1,682 incidents so far in the 21st century. In average, one out of every twenty terrorist attacks is now a suicide bombing.

²⁵ Pape's article from 2003 counts Lebanon (1983-1986), the Palestinian territories (1994-2003), the Tamils in Sri Lanka (1990-2003), Kurds in Turkey (1990s), Chechnya (2000-2003), Kashmir (2000-2003), and the Saudi peninsula (1996-2003). Since the article was published, the three biggest suicide bombing campaigns to date have taken place in Iraq (2003-today), Afghanistan and Pakistan (2006-today).

²⁶ Of the 2,081 suicide attacks recorded in the GTD, only 872 of these targeted military or police personnel. Of the 124 suicide attacks attributed to the four non-Islamic organizations, 79 targeted military or police personnel.

H3: Islamist suicide terrorism targets civilians more than Leftist suicide terrorism.

2.3.2.2 Where Do Terrorists Attack?

As rational actors, terrorists seek to find the cost-effective way to properly affect their target audience. It is not only a question of who or what is attacked, but also where the attack takes place.

Meltzer (2002:80) suggests Usama bin Laden must have taken this into consideration, knowing that

“[i]f 18 dead Special Forces men could trigger a retreat from Somalia, then the wider aims of removing US forces from Saudi Arabia, stopping American support for Israel and halting the bombing and sanctions against Iraq might well have been achieved by a greater operation in the USA itself.”

While bin Laden and al Qaeda represent the international corner of Hegghammer's triangle, location is also of relevance to the nationalist-separatists. Since 2008, two case-studies have been published on the strategic logic of Chechen and Palestinian terrorist target selection against Russians and Israelis - “at home”, in the occupied territories; and “beyond enemy lines”, within Russian and Israeli borders.²⁷ Both clusters of groups share the overall territorial demand of ending the civil and military occupations of the territories they claim, and both studies reach the conclusion that there is a “logical thought process guiding terrorist choice of targets” (Mccartan et al. 2008:72, Røislien & Røislien 2010:143).

Contrary to U.S. and Western military occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan, Israel and Russia are the geographic neighbors of the territories sought liberated by Chechen and Palestinian groups. It is therefore expected that the terrorists design two separate conducts of war – one applicable in the occupied territories, and another within enemy territory. The former will, due to the nature of military occupation, be a more guerrilla-like warfare, targeting military and other representatives of the enemy entity. On enemy territory, typical terrorist warfare targeting non-combatants would be expected (Mccartan et al. 2008:63f, Røislien & Røislien 2010:136f).

As expected, Mccartan et al. (2008:72f) found that “civilian targets were more likely to be bombed in Russia and that non-civilian targets were more likely to be bombed in Chechnya.” Causing military fatalities in Chechnya and civilian fatalities in Russia, they could further their cause by sending two separate messages to two target audiences: The Chechen people would witness retaliation against the soldiers thought responsible for their plight; while the Russian people would be forced to consider the costs of prolonged occupation of Chechnya. A hypothesis on nationalist-separatist terrorism disregarding ideology has been constructed to test for this:

²⁷ It should be noted that Mccartan et al. (2008) examine only Chechen bomb attacks in 1997-2003, excluding other Chechen militant activities in the period. Røislien & Røislien (2010) examine incidents on a list of 134 major Palestinian terror attacks from 2000-2004 published by the Israeli Defense Forces.

H4: Terrorist attacks behind enemy lines kill more civilians than attacks in disputed territories.

Likewise, Røislien & Røislien (2010:143ff) found that territory is “a strong indicator of both the *form* of the attacks as well as the *amount of casualties* in the attack.” In the territories, the majority of attacks resembled assassinations: Targeted shooting attacks with low fatality rates and even fewer casualties. The lack of randomness in these attacks is consolidated by the unambiguous finding that the targeted settlers were either in, or the road to, or in other ways associated with radical settlements “with Jewish national-religious overtones”.²⁸ On Israeli soil, the attacks were more spectacular, likely to include explosive devices, seeking to maximize the number of fatalities and casualties. From this, a second non-ideological hypothesis is constructed:

H5: Terrorist attacks behind enemy lines are more lethal than attacks in disputed territories.

While this technique of producing two different messages intended for two different target audiences seems to be a characteristic of nationalist-separatist terrorism, it might also be related to military capability and target accessibility. Operating behind enemy lines removes the safety net provided by a population sympathetic to the cause, decreases the logistic threshold, and increases the risk of being apprehended. Explosives – both planted devices and suicide bombs – might be the common choice on enemy soil simply because they are better suited for infiltration than firearms, and more effective than bladed weapons.

The actor-based approaches make out a large part of the 'who' literature, while the scarce 'where' literature is completely dominated by target-based approaches. The Chechen groups are commonly considered ideologically homogenous, and the IDF list of incidents examined by Røislien & Røislien does only occasionally identify the organizations responsible – thus, the patterns found in their study describe the Palestinians as one body. From this point of view, ideology is not only deemed to be irrelevant as to 'where', but also to 'who' and 'how' – as they are thought derived from the location of the attack. Still, ideology may matter to the choice of location. Returning to the 'new terrorism', in which Religious terror is considered more outrageous than that of the New Left, a third hypothesis of 'where' nationalist-separatist terrorists strike is constructed:

H6: Islamist terrorists prefer to attack behind enemy lines, while Leftist terrorists prefer to attack in

²⁸ As opposed to “large, easily accessible, non-ideological 'dormitory town' settlements” (Røislien & Røislien 2010:144). For a further introduction to the heterogenous landscape of Israeli settlers, see Røislien (2006).


disputed territories.

2.3.2.3 How Do Terrorists Attack?

Due to the nature of irregular or unconventional warfare, terrorists are, in theory, limited only by their imagination in planning attacks. This implies that professions dealing with terrorism as phenomenon – from counter-terrorist policy makers and researchers on one hand, to journalists and Hollywood writers on the other – may unwillingly fuel the terrorist imagination by discussing or presenting scenarios, occasionally building on existing weaknesses in public security. Terrorists may also gain advantages from monitoring other aspects of their target societies, such as research transparency.²⁹ According to Shapiro & Siegel (2010:96), today's policy makers “face a devilish task: balancing the general desirability of openness in a democratic polity against the duty to protect the people from terrorism.”

Nevertheless, terrorists remain almost surprisingly traditional in how they operate and what weapons they choose. According to Hoffman (1993:14), “terrorists continue to rely – as they have for more than a century – on the gun and the bomb: rarely do they deviate from an established *modus operandi*.” Also, GTD statistics on terrorist weaponry over four decades (see Figure 2.3) confirm Hoffman's claim: Firearms and explosives stand out as their obvious weapons of choice, applied in no less than 85% of all terrorist attacks since 2000. Last decade also witnessed a significant increase in the number of attacks applying some sort of explosive device, now counting for more than half of all terrorist attacks.

Figure 2.3, Terrorism by Weapon Type, 1970-2010



Source: GTD

²⁹ Open research on terrorist groups may help predict their operating patterns, but terrorists might as well use that same information to identify problems in their own organizations to decrease their operational vulnerabilities (Shapiro & Siegel 2010:71). The openness problem is not restricted to terrorism research, as illustrated by the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity request of two scientific journals not to publish details on a biomedical experiment. The experiment had created a highly transmittable form of a deadly flu virus that does not normally spread from person to person, and the advisory board feared the information could be used by terrorists to touch off what would be one of the deadliest pandemics in history (Grady & Broad 2011).

Assuming that (i) explosives have a higher potential of causing mass-casualties than other types of terrorist weaponry, and that (ii) excessive usage of explosives is a trait of the 'new terrorism'; two new hypotheses are constructed:

H7: Islamist terrorist attacks are deadlier than those by their Leftist counterparts.

H8: Islamist terrorists are more likely to use explosives than their Leftist counterparts.

Figure 2.3 also shows that, despite being a frequent theme in popular fiction,³⁰ exceptionally few terrorist organizations have applied or even attempted to apply chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) agents. One of the reasons for this might be, as pointed out by Jenkins (quoted in Lia 2000:), that “[w]hile terrorists may kill – the object of terrorism is not mass murder.” As rational actors, terrorists – portraying themselves as underdogs fighting for justice and freedom – recognize the need of a certain amount of support for their cause. This support may be risked by (literally) overkilling. Another factor may be related to capability, as both producing and successfully applying such agents are considered far more complicated than other weaponry.³¹

Another reason for the virtual absence of CBRN terrorism may be ideological restraint. As actor-based approaches to target selection identify ideology as the provider of moral core beliefs and principles, enabling them to identify targets; it can be argued that ideology will also influence their identification of legitimate and illegitimate means of struggle. This is by no means an issue restricted to terrorist groups or subnational entities, and concerns states as well. Positions on nuclear weapons found in the two main Islamic sects may serve as an example:

Iranian Grand Ayatollah Ali Khamenei (as quoted by Eisenstadt & Khalaji 2011:14) has stated that “Islam does not allow us [to produce a nuclear bomb]”, “that using nuclear weapons is against Islamic rulings”, and that “[a]ccording to our religious convictions, our religious principles, using such weapons of mass destruction is forbidden, is *haram*.” While Shia Islamic lawmakers prohibit it, Sunni Islamic rulings appear to be more liberal: Pakistan was the seventh country in the world to successfully develop and test nuclear weapons, and Saudi Arabia does not rule out the option of following their example (AP 2011). On the subnational level, al Qaeda sought to acquire

³⁰ Notable examples include: Biological and chemical terrorism: The third (2004), fifth (2006), and seventh (2008) seasons of *24*, *The Berlin Conspiracy* (1992), *Executive Decision* (1996), *Goldfinger* (1964), *Right at Your Door* (2007), *The Rock* (1996), and the first season of *Sleeper Cell* (2005). Radiological and nuclear terrorism: The second (2002), sixth (2007), and eighth (2008) seasons of *24*, *Broken Arrow* (1996), *Crimson Tide* (1995), *Next* (2007), *The Peacemaker* (1997), the second season of *Sleeper Cell* (2006), *Special Bulletin* (1983), *The Sum of All Fears* (2002), *Thunderball* (1965), *Twilight's Last Gleaming* (1977), *Under Siege* (1992), and *Unthinkable* (2010).

³¹ As experienced by the Japanese doomsday cult Aum Shinrikyo, the most CBRN active terrorist entity to date: In a number of attacks from 1990 to 1995, they applied bacteria (anthrax and botulinum), hydrogen cyanide and nerve agents (sarin and VX). The vast majority of these attacks failed to cause casualties, but nineteen people were killed in sarin gas attacks on Matsumoto in June 1994, and on the Tokyo subway in March 1995 (Cameron 1999:293ff).

nuclear weapons as early as in 1992 (Hoffman 2006:273).

Ideology may also influence the military capacities and general conduct of Palestinian terrorists through its allies: As the territories provide them with no lootable resources, their activities have been financed by outside support – from Palestinian expatriates and private donations, but more importantly from several Middle Eastern regimes. According to Byman (2005:45), ideology “is often vital in motivating a state's initial decision to support terrorism”. Of course, these ideological sympathies tend to coincide with the promotion of their own foreign policies, and the act can be interpreted as “[masking] strategic concerns in the guise of ideology.”³²

Nevertheless, the results on the ground is that the organizations receiving this support have their military capacities strengthened by such alliances, initiated by ideological connections. To test if these foreign state sponsorships influence the way terrorist organizations operate, the ninth hypothesis is presented:

H₉: Terrorist organizations sponsored by the same state or states will operate more alike.

Finally, a fourth 'how' hypothesis, based on the Rapoportian division of the terrorist organizations in the thesis, shall test if mutual ideological backgrounds also the influence weaponry usage.

H₁₀: Terrorist organizations of the same Rapoportian wave will operate more alike.

2.4 Model

2.4.1 A Suggested Model


There are different ways to ideologically compare the six major organizations – for example Marxist vs. non-Marxist, Marxist vs. non-Marxist leftist vs. Islamist, in favor of a one-state or of a two-state solution – but the author believes the separation criteria best suited and most relevant to the theory presented will be the organization's belonging to the third or the fourth Rapoportian wave: The New Left vs. Religious fundamentalists – from here on referred to as Leftists and Islamists. Fateh, the DFLP and the PFLP constitute the Leftist bloc; while HAMAS, the PIJ and the PRC constitute the Islamist bloc.³³

³² During the Cold War, both the United States and the Soviet Union contributed to the spread of international terrorism by providing financial and material support to various groups fighting their common enemy (Lia 2000:26). This suggests that state support of terrorism is not necessarily determined by sympathy (for a terrorist entity), but also antipathy (for a terrorist entity's enemy).

³³ Being the only non-Islamist organization among the advocates of the one-state solution, the PFLP holds an unique

Since an examination of the role of ideology in the choices as to *who*, *where* and *how* terrorists strike is unprecedented; there is no preexisting framework to build on.³⁴ The suggested model, presented in Figure 2.4, has sought to draw from relevant theories on 'new terrorism', basic military theory, terrorist target selection, and statistical observations on terrorism, presented earlier in this chapter. Here, ideology is thought to directly and indirectly influence the choices made on all different strategic levels. Decisions made on these different levels are thought to directly or indirectly influence each of the three choices – who, where and how – made on the tactical level.

Figure 2.4, A Suggested Model of the Role of Ideology in Terrorist Tactics



First, in accordance with the actor-based approaches to terrorist target selection, ideology is thought to directly influence the identification of legitimate targets. Civilians, government officials, and other non-combatant personnel have become the main targets of modern terrorism. But is this 'new terrorism' restricted to the “new” Islamist terrorists, or are they joined by the still active leftist terrorists? Is it a question of ideology or zeitgeist? Testing for this will connect *who* the organizations strike to their ideological orientation.

Next, ideology is thought to directly influence the 'grand strategy', determining the size of the territory they are morally obligated to liberate, as well as the political nature of a future Palestinian state. Previous case-studies on the strategic logic of nationalist-separatist terrorism have identified a 'two different messages for two different audiences' technique (Mccartan et al. 2008, Røislien & Røislien 2010). But do the Palestinian terrorists who see the West Bank settlers as

position, as its activities may suggest that the one-state vs. two-state advocacy is a better separation criteria than the Rapoportian waves.

³⁴ While Drake's model (Figure 2.2) does contain some of the same elements, its ultimate aim are the targets of terrorist action – corresponding mostly to the suggested model's *who*, and to some extent *where*. Little, if any, attention is brought to *how* attacks are conducted. The suggested model also builds on an interpretation of Diesen's classification of levels in military theory, readjusted to subnational actors; as well as an interpretation of the tactical level, in which *who*, *where* and *how* have been recognized by the author as markers to identify patterns in militancy.

occupiers of their land fight differently from the Palestinian terrorists who also see the residents of Tel Aviv and Eilat as occupiers? The one-state solutionists consider the entire state of Israel to be occupied Palestinian territory; but do their actions behind enemy lines differ from those closer to home? Testing for this will connect *where* the organizations strike to their territorial demands and political ideals.

Finally, ideology is thought to influence the level of support among both local Palestinians and foreign actors. While the former affects the security environment and ability to function as an irregular military, the latter affects the material capacities – together comprising the actual military capacity of the organization. This influences the choices made on the military strategic and operational levels, as it provides the military leadership with the options of warfare and tactics available. As the territories hold no lootable resources, foreign support is considered crucial to the amount and nature of their armament. Testing for this will connect *how* the organizations strike to the developments in their foreign sponsorships, as well as their positions in intra-Palestinian relations.

2.4.2 Summary of Hypotheses

To test the model, ten hypotheses have been constructed: Three on *who* is attacked, three on *where* attacks take place, and four on *how* the attacks are conducted.

2.4.2.1 Who: Hypotheses

The first *who* hypotheses (H₁ and H₂) aim to test theories found on the 'new terrorism', claiming that religious fundamentalists are more likely to attack civilians, and with a higher degree of brutality, than the non-religious terrorists. The third (H₃) is also associated with 'new terrorism's taste for carnage, but builds specifically on the observed differences in global suicide terrorist target selection between Islamist and non-religious groups.

H₁: Islamist terrorists target civilians more than their Leftist counterparts.

H₂: Islamist terrorists target children and elderly more than their Leftist counterparts.

H₃: Islamist suicide terrorism targets civilians more than Leftist suicide terrorism.

2.4.2.2 Where: Hypotheses

The first *where* hypotheses (H₄ and H₅) both disregard the role of ideology, and will test if this analysis supports earlier observations on the strategic logic of nationalist-separatist terrorism. The former is a *who-where* hybrid, testing to see if the target selection is influenced by location; while the latter tests for the 'two different messages for two different audiences' technique observed in the McCartan et al. (2008) and Røislien & Røislien (2010) case studies. The remaining hypothesis (H₆)

has been designed to see if the organizations' different territorial demands are also reflected in the geographical distribution of their terrorist activities.

H4: Terrorist attacks behind enemy lines kill more civilians than attacks in disputed territories.

H5: Terrorist attacks behind enemy lines are more lethal than attacks in disputed territories.

H6: Islamist terrorists prefer to attack behind enemy lines, while Leftist terrorists prefer to attack in disputed territories.

2.4.2.3 How: Hypotheses

The 'new terrorism' is considered more lethal than earlier terrorism, possibly related to GTD figures showing that the explosive device is the weapon of 21st century terrorism. The first *how* hypotheses (*H7* and *H8*) will therefore test if the Islamist bloc operate more as the 'new', 21st century terrorists, causing more fatalities and using more explosives; while the Leftist bloc remain 20th century style terrorists, with firearms and lower fatality figures. The third and fourth hypotheses (*H9* and *H10*) aim to test whether or not state sponsorships of separate organizations and shared ideological background are reflected in the weaponry applied.

H7: Islamist terrorist attacks are deadlier than those by their Leftist counterparts.

H8: Islamist terrorists are more likely to use explosives than their Leftist counterparts.

H9: Terrorist organizations sponsored by the same state or states will operate more alike.

H10: Terrorist organizations of the same Rapoportian wave will operate more alike.

2.5 Summary

To compare how the ideologically different Palestinian terrorist organizations operate, the previous chapters have identified the main components of a comparative analysis: Describing terrorism as a politically motivated act of violence; designed to have far-reaching psychological repercussions beyond an immediate, non-combatant target; perpetrated by a subnational entity. All acts fitting this description constitute a distinguishable cluster of irregular military offensive tactics, called terrorist tactics. All entities employing such tactics are identified in the thesis as terrorist organizations.

While common classifications of terrorist organization consider their ideological orientation or their territorial ambitions, the thesis argues in favor of a combination of the two – based on models presented by Rapoport and Hegghammer. Focusing on nationalist-separatist terrorism, the high level of ideological heterogeneity found among Palestinian terrorist organizations provides a rare opportunity to compare New Left and Religious terrorism on this territorial level.

The analysis will review all fatal attacks conducted by these organizations, providing insight into their choice of tactics. Three markers will be applied to identify distinguishable aspects of these

tactics: *Who* was targeted in the attack, civilians or non-civilians; *where* the attack took place, behind enemy lines or at home; and *how* the attack was conducted, meaning what type of weaponry was used. This was built on basic military theory on strategic levels, including the tactical; as well as relevant theory on, and previous studies of, the three markers: The role of ideology in terrorist tactics borrows specifically from actor-based approaches in the terrorist target selection literature.

Finally, a suggested model of the relationship between ideology and terrorist tactics is presented. The model is built on relevant theories on 'new terrorism', basic military theory, terrorist target selection, and statistical observations on terrorism, presented earlier in the chapter. Ten hypotheses have been constructed to test the model.

3 PALESTINIAN TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS

3.1 Ideological Heterogeneity

This thesis' subject of analysis is the ideologically diverse Palestinian nationalist-separatist terrorist organizations and their military tactics. The Palestinian organizations tend to be more complex than other bands of irregular combatants – such as a guerrilla army, or an international clandestine cell structured terrorist network. Militant activities, including terrorism, are usually just one out of many activities the organization will be involved in. Different branches within the organization can perform non-violent political activities and charity work, challenging the 'terrorist organization' designation within a judicial framework.³⁵ Nevertheless, the thesis does not consider political party, charitable foundation or terrorist organization necessarily to be mutually exclusive or contradictory terms – as they may all correctly describe the same entity.

The ideological diversity found among Palestinian terrorists is directly related to the timespan of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, as well as the conflict's pivotal role in shaping the modern politics of the region: For decades, Palestinian nationalist-separatists have been bombarded with influences from contemporary Middle Eastern politics. As a result, all but the first Rapoportian wave of anarchism have been reflected in the emergence of Palestinian terrorist groups over time: From the anti-colonial nationalism emerging in the interbellum, to the New Left of the Cold War, and finally to religious fundamentalism from the 1980s and on. As illustrated in Table 3.1, all prominent Palestinian terrorist organizations fit into this pattern, suggesting that the time – or era – of establishment also indicate their core political ideology.

For obvious reasons, the focus of the thesis will be on the activities of the military factions of the organizations: As long as these factions are not independent actors and remain integral parts of their mother organizations, all of their actions will be attributed to the organization as a whole. The analysis will focus on the factions adhering to the six major organizations: The first three emerged in the New Left era – *Fateh*, the *Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine*, and the *Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine*; and the other three emerged in the Religious era –

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For this reason, the United Kingdom Home Office (2011:3) does not consider HAMAS or Hizballah to be terrorist organizations, only their military wings.

HAMAS, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and the Popular Resistance Committees. All of these have employed terrorist tactics; planning, preparing and executing acts fitting Hoffman's consensus definition of terrorism, targeting civilians, and causing non-combatant fatalities.

Table 3.1, Rapoport's Waves and Notable Palestinian Nationalist-Separatist Organizations

Waves	Groups
1920s - 1950s Anti-colonialist	1930: al-Kaff al-Aswad (anti-British) 1936: Qassamiyun (anti-British)
1960s - 1970s New Left	1957: al-Fateh (left-wing) 1966: as-Saiqa (Syrian Ba'athist) 1967: Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (Communist) 1968: Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (left-wing) 1969: Arab Liberation Front (Iraqi Ba'athist) 1969: Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (Communist)
1979 – today Religious	1979: Palestinian Islamic Jihad (Islamist) 1987: HAMAS (Islamist) 2000: Popular Resistance Committees (Islamist)

This chapter is a presentation of these six organizations, focusing on their ideological roots and historical developments. Historian Yezid Sayigh (1997:675f) has identified three main determining factors in the development of the Palestinian armed struggle: The complex relationship between the Palestinian organizations and a number of Arab host societies, most prominently Syria; the development of local and exile Palestinian societies, inside and outside the territories; and the nature of the Palestinian militant leadership, both in its social and political roots and in its power play. These serve as the leading perspectives in the presentations.

For the Leftist organizations, the roots and historical presentations has been divided into two; prior to, and after, the outbreak of the First Intifadah. This has not been deemed necessary with the Islamist organizations; as these have been established no sooner than 1979. The organizations' relative size and influence in the armed struggle is also, to a certain degree, reflected in the sheer volume of their presentations.

3.2 A History of Violence: Three Eras

The six major organizations can all trace their roots back to two movements involved in the 1947-1949 Arab warfare against Israel: The founders of the Arab Nationalist Movement had been active in the Arab League-sponsored *Jaysh al-Inqadh al-Arabi*, Arab Liberation Army; while the remaining organizations have, to different degrees, been involved with *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin*, the

Since the establishment of the Israeli state in 1948, the Palestinian militancy has developed under authoritarian leaders through a series of confrontations, expulsions, and relocations; bitter internal rivalries; as well as highly conditional and swiftly changing foreign sponsorships. Wahid 'Abd al-Majid (as quoted in Frisch 2009:244) has divided the years of the Palestinian armed struggle into three separate eras:

- 1) [T]he initial years, in which Palestinians put their faith in the Arab states to redress their historical grievances and bring them back to Palestine; 2) the years 1967-82, when Palestinians in the diaspora sought to resolve their own plight by mobilizing militarily through guerrilla action; and 3) the period from the fall of Beirut through the intifada, in which the local Palestinians began to take their fate into their own hands.

This thesis' analysis focuses exclusively on these «local Palestinians», and how they have operated militarily since they «began to take their fate into their own hands». However, it considers the outbreak of the First Intifadah in December 1987 as the true initiation of Majid's third era; clearly marking the beginning of the end to the exile of Palestinian political organizations. In the presentations of the organizations, the following subchapters further describe the circumstances leading to this third and current era of the armed struggle.

The Intifadah also marks the relocation of the Israeli-Palestinian frontier: From 1949 to the Six Day War of 1967, Palestinian militancy consisted mostly of cross-border raids into Israel from the Egyptian-held Gaza Strip and the Jordanian-held West Bank. From 1967 to 1970, the militants were based in the Jordanian east bank; targeting Israeli targets in the West Bank. From 1970 to 1982, south Lebanon was the undisputed stronghold of Palestinian militancy; mostly targeting the Israeli north.³⁷ After 1982, the remaining militants in Lebanon were plagued with internal rivalries, fueled by Syrian attempts to control the Palestinian movement. Concurrently, Palestinian militancy would emerge gradually in the Gaza Strip and West Bank populations in the 1980s. Since the eruption of the Intifadah, the territories have been the focal point of Palestinian militancy.

3.3 The Leftists

3.3.1 al-Fateh

Harakat al-Tahrir al-Watani al-Filastini, the Palestinian National Liberation Movement, best

³⁶ The first Palestinian branch of the Brotherhood was established in Jerusalem in 1945, but networking began in British Palestine as early as 1935. The local branch leader was 'haj' Amin al-Husayni, the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem and preeminent political leader of the Palestinians (Abu-Amr 1993:6). In the 1947-1949 war, Brotherhood members were typically recruited into the Husayni-controlled *Jaysh al-Jihad al-Muqaddas*, the Holy War Army.

³⁷ In addition to the traditional border raids, Palestinian use of international terrorist action peaked in the early 1970s.

known by its reversed acronym Fateh, is the major Palestinian Leftist organization. In the 2006 Palestinian legislative election, the Fateh movement's list received 410,554 votes, 41.43% of the electors – making it the second biggest organization in the territories, outsized only by HAMAS (CECP 2006). Prior to this, Fateh had been the largest and most influential Palestinian organization since 1969. The al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, a militia under its aegis, is designated a terrorist organization by the European Union and the U.S. Department of State (EU 2012, USDS 2012).

3.3.1.1 Fateh: Roots and History

The two common denominators of Fateh's founding fathers were that they, with few exceptions; (i) arrived in the Gaza Strip as refugees in 1948, and (ii) were members of the Muslim Brotherhood. The Brotherhood had established two clandestine militias; *Shabab al-Tha'r*, the Revenge Youth; and *Katibat al-Haq*, the Battalion of Right; which both collapsed after the Egyptian ban on the organization in 1954. However, Khalil al-Wazir and his followers would continue operations against Israel as *Shahab al-Tha'r* until 1955. Wazir would then acquaint Muhammad 'Abd al-Ra'uf al-Qidwa al-Husayni – best known as Yasir 'Arafat. In 1957, Wazir, Arafat, and four other Palestinians met in Kuwait; formulating the founding documents of Fateh (Sayigh 1997:80ff).³⁸

Fateh launched its armed struggle against Israel in 1964, and emerged after the Six Day War as the most important faction in the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) – and Arafat as the poster-boy for the Palestinian cause – formally taking leadership in 1969. From Jordan, they made the West Bank their new battlefield.³⁹ However, when the PLO formally called for the overthrow of the Jordanian government in 1970, the Jordanian army responded with what Palestinians refer to as *Aylūl al-aswad*, 'the black September': causing the PLO flee to Lebanon (Sayigh 1997:260, 279).⁴⁰

In 1973, Fateh, along with the PDPFLP and as-Sa'iqa, formulated a new strategy of a gradual liberation of the Palestinian territory – by establishing a national authority in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The PLO's adoption of the 'national authority' slogan split the organization into Syrian and Soviet-backed «pragmatists», headed by Fateh; and Iraqi-backed «rejectionists», headed by the

³⁸ In its original constitution, Fateh ([1964] 2000) seeks a «complete liberation» of Palestine, following an equally complete eradication of Israeli «economic, political, military and cultural existence» (§12); the establishment of a progressive, non-discriminatory, democratic Palestinian state (§13 & 14); and identifies an armed public revolution as «the inevitable method to liberating Palestine» (§17). It describes itself as an anti-imperialist movement (§4), seeking to maintain relations with all parties resisting «Zionism and imperialism» (§24).

³⁹ Described by the guerrillas as the 'honeymoon', activities increased to «several hundred attacks on Israel each month by 1969» (Sayigh 1997:147). For a highly interesting, contemporary portrait of the Palestinian military activity in these years, see Albert Henrik Mohn's *Tidsbomben Midt-Østen: Nærbilde av palestinerne* (1971).

⁴⁰ From Lebanon, Fateh increased its terrorist activities – the most infamous incident being the Fateh-affiliated *Munazzamat Aylūl al-aswad*, the Black September Organization, massacre of eleven Israeli athletes in the 1972 Munich Olympics. The Israeli response – named *Za'am ha'El*, Wrath of God; assassinating PLO militants in Europe and the Middle East – would later cause the Fateh leadership to abandon international terrorism (Sayigh 1997:310f).

PFLP (Sayigh 1997:343). Fateh nevertheless condemned the normalization of Israeli-Egyptian relations; and attempted to restore credibility among its PLO rivals by drastically increasing its military efforts to conduct deadly attacks inside Israeli territory (Sayigh 1997:425f).

As a result of the civil war, Lebanon was split in three during the 1970s: Maronite militias controlled the west; Syrian troops occupied the east; while the PLO and local Muslim militias controlled the south. In response, Israel launched a large-scale military operation in 1982; causing the PLO to lose its territorial state-in-exile and most of its military infrastructure. The following year, Syrian-backed Palestinian factions sought to topple Arafat, sparking a Palestinian civil war in Lebanon. Fateh was later joined by both the PFLP and the DFLP, but the PLO was finally forced out of Lebanon by Syria in December 1983 (Sayigh 1997:562ff). Two years later, a resurgence in Fateh militancy sparked a new round of confrontation with Syria in the Camp Wars, again attracting the support of its PLO rivals.

The Fateh and mainstream PLO leadership relocated to Tunis, from where Arafat and Fateh began advocating diplomacy as a means to establish a Palestinian national authority: In 1985, a «comprehensive peace as established in UN and Security Council resolutions» was to be offered in exchange for total Israeli withdrawal from the territories (Sayigh 1997:578). Still, Jordan closed down the remaining Fateh offices and expelled Wazir.⁴¹ With Wazir weakened, Arafat attained an unprecedented control of the organization. Still, the PLO – now estranged from Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and the opposition – had been reduced to a minor actor in Arab politics by the fall of 1987.

3.3.1.2 Fateh: Since 1987

The mass uprising in the territories catapulted the Palestinian cause back on the international agenda, and the PLO directed all its efforts to assert political control over the Intifadah. In January 1988, local cadres of Fateh, the PFLP, the DFLP and the Communist Party formed *al-Qiyada al-Wataniyya al-Muwahida*, the Unified National Command (UNC) (Sayigh 1997:615). Following Jordan's termination of administrative and financial control of the West Bank, the PLO now received exclusive control over the flow of financial assistance from the Arab League – and Arafat could read a Palestinian declaration of independence in November 1988 (Sayigh 1997:623f).

By then, the concentration of Arafat's power of Fateh and the PLO was virtually absolute (Sayigh 1997:653f). But the Islamists, playing a pivotal role in the Intifadah; now challenged him as the legitimate representative of the Palestinians, demanding «a militant political programme and a 40 per cent share of the [PLO's legislative body's] seats» (Sayigh 1997:652). The 1993 Declaration

⁴¹ Under the command of Wazir in Jordan, Fateh had been active in organizing attacks on Israelis in the West Bank in the mid-1980s: 349 attacks were conducted in 1984, and the monthly average doubled during 1985 (Sayigh 1997:586).

of Principles (DoP) – where the PLO and Israel confirmed mutual recognition – led to an open conflict between Fateh and the Islamists in the territories. Nevertheless, it ensured the transfer of its state-in-exile to the territories, as well as funding from the international community.

In addition to the external struggles with the Islamist opposition, an internal leadership struggle within Fateh gradually emerged between its *old guard*, the leadership who had «returned»; and the *young guard*, the local cadres who had grown up in the territories.⁴² The old guard «feared competition from local leaders and sought to subordinate them firmly to its strategy» upon its return in the 1990s (Sayigh 1997:676). This struggle would intensify as the new guard confronted the old with its neopatrimonialist and corrupt habits.

Following the DoP, Fateh militants were merged into the security apparatus of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA).⁴³ Through-out the decade, these would refrain from violence towards Israeli targets, while policing the territories – often clashing with the Islamist opposition. Nonetheless, they played a central part in the beginning of the al-Aqsa Intifadah in September 2000.⁴⁴ Most of the Fateh militants active in the uprising could be described as semi-independent: Remaining loyal, but not subordinate, to Arafat and the old guard. Also, as noted by Hammami & Tamari (2001:13), the traditionally secular Fateh now had a «sudden emphasis on Islamic themes in the struggle over Jerusalem.» This was a result of increased influence of the young guard, whose tenancy in the territories had kept them closer to the social developments towards Islamic currents.

Fateh's military participation in the al-Aqsa Intifadah ended with Arafat's death in November 2004. Mahmoud Abbas, another old guard Fateh activist of nearly half a century, succeeded him as PA president and PLO Chairman.⁴⁵ In the 2006 legislative election, Fateh lost its long-held position as the most popular Palestinian organization to HAMAS. Tensions between the two grew as interparty talks failed include the Islamic bloc in the PLO, before turning lethal the following year: Fateh and PNA security forces clashed with HAMAS militants in fierce internecine fighting in the Gaza Strip, resulting in Islamist victory and the establishment of a rival government to the

⁴² Fateh's 'old' and 'new' guards are what Sayigh (1997:676) would describe as representatives of the *outsider* and *insider* societies. While the experienced leaderships of not only Fateh, but also PFLP and DFLP, had developed in exile over decades – starting respectively as refugees in Gaza and Egypt; and in the West Bank and Jordan – the young cadres had the advantage of better understanding the situation on the (battle)ground in the territories.

⁴³ A brilliant history of the Palestinian police and security forces has been given by Brynjar Lia (2006) in his *A Police Force Without A State*.

⁴⁴ The extent of Arafat's personal involvement in the instigation and organization of the initial clashes – where militants mingled with unarmed protesters and used firearms against Israeli security forces – is not fully known. But, according to Sayigh (2001:49), «once a few local [Fateh] activists in some cities under PA control had taken this initiative, [Arafat] needed to do nothing more than refraining from issuing internal orders to cease fire.»

⁴⁵ The position of Fateh chairman was taken by Qaddumi, an old guard hardliner who had opposed the Oslo accords and chosen to stay behind in Tunis when the rest of the leadership moved to the territories (Frisch 2009:258). Nevertheless, Qaddumi's actual influence on Fateh from Tunis is thought to be very limited.

Ramallah-based PNA (Frisch 2009:254). Since then, the Fateh-dominated PNA has maintained control of the security apparatus in the West Bank, while HAMAS has ruled the Gaza Strip.

3.3.2 The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine

al-Jabhah al-Shabiyyah li-Tahrir Filastin, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), is the second oldest of the Palestinian organizations in the analysis. In the 2006 Palestinian legislative election, the PFLP-list 'Martyr Abu Ali Mustafa' received 42,101 votes, 4.25% of the electors (CECP 2006). The PFLP is designated a terrorist organization by the European Union and the U.S. Department of State (EU 2012, USDS 2012).

3.3.2.1 The PFLP: Roots and History

In 1951, George Habash and Hani al-Hindi established the Marxist organization *Harakat al-Qawmiyyin al-Arab*, the Arab Nationalists Movement (ANM), in Beirut. Both had volunteered in 1948 for the Arab League-sponsored *Jaysh al-Inqadh al-Arabi*, Arab Salvation Army; and after the war, they partook in the formation of *Kata'ib al-Fida al-Arabi*, the Battalions of Arab Sacrifice (Sayigh 1997:71). After the dismantlement of the Battalions, the ANM took form – throwing itself into Arab politics, supporting the pan-Arabist policies of Egyptian president Nasir.

The continuing instability in Arab power politics led Habash and Hindi, along with Wadi' Haddad, to form a separate, Palestinian branch of the ANM. *Qiyadat al-'Amal al-Filastini*, the Palestinian Action Command (PAC), was established in late 1963 with support from Nasirist Egypt (Sayigh 1997:111). Following changes in the Egyptian attitudes towards the ANM, *Abtal al-'Awda*, the Heroes of Return, was formed in 1966 – now with Syrian backing (Sayigh 1997:136f). After the Six Day War, the ANM merged its own PAC and Heroes of Return with Ahmed Jibril's Palestinian Liberation Front (PLF); as well as a group of former PLA officers, headed by Ahmad Za'rur; into the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (Sayigh 1997:166f).

Added to guerrilla raids into Israel and the West Bank, the PFLP sought the attention of the international community: Its July 22nd 1968 hijacking of a Rome-Tel Aviv flight is referred to by Hoffman (2006:63) as «[t]he advent of what is considered modern, international terrorism.» Internal opposition to this strategy was among the factors to why the left-wing faction of the organization broke out to form the PDFLP the following year. Until then, the ideology had remained obscure, but the leadership saw the split «as an incentive towards [adopting] Marxism» (Sayigh 1997:232). The PFLP then actively sought a confrontation with the Jordanian monarchy, leading to the expulsion from the Jordanian east bank – severely weakening the organization.⁴⁶

⁴⁶ By the summer of 1970, the PFLP had grown confident that King Husayn did not enjoy support from his armed

In 1974, the PFLP was rejuvenated by foreign sponsorships, as it emerged as the leading PLO opposition faction to Fateh in the 'national authority' debate (Sayigh 1997:343). Accusations against the Fateh-dominated PLO leadership for seeking to please the West led to the formation of a coalition including every major Palestinian guerrilla faction except Fateh in 1978 – and the PFLP would enjoy backing from the Soviet Union and Syria.⁴⁷ After 1982, the Syrian-backed factions went into open conflict with Fateh and the mainstream PLO. The PFLP decided to «cement ties with Syria [to avoid that] the PLO would become a 'refugee revolution'», but kept lines of communication open with Fateh (Sayigh 1997:565f). To secure the independence of PLO institutions, now under intolerable Syrian pressure, it formed a joint political and military command with the DFLP, which would last three years.

When Fateh clashed with Syrian-backed militias in Lebanon again in 1985, the PFLP had to either accept Syrian action, considered «morally repugnant and politically suicidal among the wider Palestinian constituency»; or diverge from Syrian policy and give support to «the anti-Syrian stance of Arafat and, by extension, to his wider diplomatic strategy» (Sayigh 1997:596f). They would eventually reapproach the PLO as the Camp Wars split the Palestinian factions in three: The mainstream loyalists, headed by Fateh; the loyalist opposition, headed by the PFLP and the DFLP; and the Syrian-backed outsiders, consisting of as-Sa'iqa and other dissidents.

3.3.2.2 The PFLP: Since 1987

The PFLP was among the founding factions of the UNC in January 1988, thus reaffirming its PLO loyalist opposition stance.⁴⁸ A united PLO became even more important when Jordan severed its ties to the West Bank – and despite its stark opposition to the establishment of a national authority, any direct negotiation with Israel, or even the indirect recognition of Israel through endorsements of UNSCR 242 and 338; the PFLP did not withdraw from the PLO when the majority of its legislative seats defeated them in all of these battles the same year (Sayigh 1997:623f).

With the establishment of the PNA, the PFLP joined the Damascus-based, Syrian-backed Alliance of Palestinian Forces (AFP) – but the main actors of the new opposition was now the

forces, and argued that the PLO should «assault the throne directly, by splitting the army and launching a general offensive with all guerrilla and militia forces under its command» (Sayigh 1997:256). In the subsequent expulsion and a number of internal disputes, the PFLP lost its Jordanian base, «some 80 per cent of its guerrillas, a sizeable part of its student organizations, and many members in Syria and Jordan» (Sayigh 1997:304f).

⁴⁷ To secure Soviet support, the PFLP went on to support the military actions in Afghanistan and a wide range of Soviet-backed allies through-out the world. Furthermore, it declared its solidarity with Iran in the Gulf war – considering the war to be «planned by US imperialism and encouraged by [Arab] reaction [...] in order to abort the Iranian revolution» (Sayigh 1997:489). In the 1980s, the PFLP also cemented relations with Asad's Syria, which became its foremost Arab ally.

⁴⁸ As a response, the outsiders launched a military campaign against the loyalist factions in Lebanon. Due to vast Syrian backing, the outsiders won a pyrrhic victory; severely alienating the Palestinian public, while boosting public support to, as well as uniting, the PLO loyalists (Sayigh 1997:620f).

Islamists. As a minor actor, the PFLP remained willing to engage in dialogue with the PNA, but its inability to influence policy is reflected in them indirectly accepting negotiations with Israel (Sayigh 1997:649). Eventually, the pragmatic-over-dogmatic attitude led to halt in its military activities to approach the PNA, and was thus excluded from the AFP in 1999 (Strindberg 2000:64).

In 2000, Habash was succeeded as secretary-general by Abu Ali Mustafa. With the outbreak of the al-Aqsa Intifadah, the PFLP returned to arms; to which Israel responded with a targeted killing of Mustafa in August 2001. He was then succeeded by Ahmad Sa'adat, a second generation PFLP activist from Ramallah. Under Sa'adat leadership, the PFLP returned to a more radical political and military line, quickly leading to his arrest by the PNA in 2002. Sa'adat would remain imprisoned by the PNA until the 2006 legislative elections, when he Sa'adat was elected to parliament. Following a HAMAS announcement of its intentions to release him along with several other militants, an Israeli military operation was launched to capture the inmates of his prison. Since 2006, Sa'adat has been imprisoned in Israel, where he is serving a thirty-year sentence.

3.3.3 The Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine

al-Jabhah al-Dimuqratiyyah li-Tahrir Filastin, the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), emerged as a splinter group from the PFLP – initially taking the name of the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PDFLP) in 1969. In the 2006 Palestinian legislative election, its alliance⁴⁹ received 28,973 votes, 2.92% of the electors (CECP 2006). The DFLP is not considered a terrorist organization by the European Union, and was removed from the U.S. Department of State's list of foreign terrorist organizations in 1999 (USDS 2012).

3.3.3.1 The DFLP: Roots and History

Following the Six-Day War, the ANM witnessed a growing split in the organization between its 'old guard' and 'new guard' – respectively representing the right and left wings of the organization. The latter were typically young university students influenced by the contemporary European leftist rebellion, Mao Zedong writings and revolutionaries like Che Gueavara; who criticized the former of military inactivity and leadership monopoly. The internal rift grew deeper as the struggle to control the PFLP intensified, and in February 1969 the left-wing announced the formation of the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (Sayigh 1997:228ff).

The head of the new organization was by Nayef Hawatma. Under his control, the organization began to absorb smaller leftist groups, like the Maoist-leaning Popular Organization for the Liberation of Palestine (POLP). With the slogan «No power above that of the resistance

⁴⁹ The list was an electoral alliance of the DFLP, the Palestinian Democratic Union and the Palestinian People's Party,

movement», the PDFLP clearly stated its view of Arab states' attempts to control and contain the Palestinian revolutionary groups – and pushed for a confrontation with the Jordanian government (Sayigh 1997:255). Following the disastrous showdown in 1970, the PDFLP moderated itself and moved towards Fateh and the mainstream PLO factions.

The PDFLP did not conduct international terrorist attacks, and was the first PLO faction to argue in favour of a two-state solution – though only a temporary one; Hawatma (as quoted in Sayigh 1997:337) claimed that establishing an «independent national presence [in the territories] would provide a base for a protracted people's war against the Zionist entity.» As part of the PLO pragmatists in the 'national authority' debate, it sought to distinguish itself further from the rejectionist PFLP; shortening its name to DFLP in 1974, and becoming a Marxist-Leninist party.⁵⁰

Like Fateh, it briefly increased its military activities against Israel after supporting the 'national authority' slogan, often sending militants on outright suicide missions into Israel from Lebanon would often result in a high number of casualties – such as the raid on Ma'alot in May of 1974 that killed 25 Israelis, most of them schoolchildren (Sayigh 1997:340f). Eventually, the DFLP grew tired of Fateh domination of the PLO agenda, and joined the opposition in 1978. After the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, it reconnected with the PFLP in 1983. The union sided with the mainstream PLO against the Syrian-backed factions, and the DFLP was ostracized by the Syria for «refusing to take their opposition to the mainstream PLO leadership further» (Sayigh 1997:580ff). In the subsequent Camps War, it partook in the struggle against the Syrian-backed militia with the rest of the Palestinian factions – as part of the loyalist opposition.

3.3.3.2 The DFLP: Since 1987

The DFLP's efforts in the territories had had focused on social organization, rather than increasing military capacities. Despite being a part of the UNC, it did not establish strike groups in the Intifadah. Following a split,⁵¹ the DFLP joined the Damascus-based AFP in 1993 – but would formally announce an end to its opposition to the Oslo accords four years later. This allowed the DFLP to reconnect with its popular base in the territories. In 1999, it was removed from the U.S. Department's list of terrorist organizations – but refused to relinquish the right to «armed struggle for as long as the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza continues» (Strindberg 2000:65).

Militarily, the DFLP partook in what they refer to as the 'Intifada of Independence' – but not

⁵⁰ Striving to assert itself as the principal Soviet ally within the PLO, its Marxist policies included unwavering support for Soviet warfare in Afghanistan; and unequivocal condemnation of Iraq for its bloody repression of its communists, later causing the DFLP to take the side of Iran in the Gulf war in the 1980s (Sayigh 1997:488f).

⁵¹ The reluctance to violent participation in the territories, along with opposing views regarding the Oslo process, would cause a long-standing dispute between the exile leadership and local cadres. As a result, the Palestinian Democratic Union split from the DFLP as a non-violent political party in 1991 – attracting most of the organization's followers in the West Bank.

to the extent as the other five organizations in the analysis. Their efforts were directed towards reducing the rapidly growing rift between the PNA and the mostly Islamist opposition, and sought to activate national dialogue between the parties (Karim & Suleiman 2010:44f). In the post-Intifadah Fateh-HAMAS rivalry the DFLP eventually took the side of Fateh and the PNA, and refers to the HAMAS takeover of the Gaza Strip as a «bloody coup». It is still a proponent of national dialogue, as it believes the Palestinian cause is weakened by the current internal strife.

3.4 The Islamists

3.4.1 HAMAS

Harakat al-Muqawamah al-Islamiyyah, the Islamic Resistance Movement, best known by its acronym HAMAS, is the major Palestinian Islamist organization. In the 2006 Palestinian legislative election, its list 'Change and Reform' received 440,409 votes, 44.45% of the electors – the largest following among all the participating Palestinian factions (CECP 2006). Since 2007, HAMAS has also been the *de facto* rulers of the Gaza Strip. HAMAS is designated a terrorist organization by the European Union and the U.S. Department of State (EU 2012, USDS 2012).

3.4.1.1 HAMAS: Roots and History

Islamic currents in the Palestinian militancy were for the first two decades of the conflict less common – as a tradition had developed among those who preached a stricter observance of Islam to an isolation from non-Islamic societies.⁵² By some, the events of 1967 were interpreted as the definite failure of modern ideologies' ability to wipe out the Jewish state, and dozens of these devotees would join Fateh guerrilla bases in 1968-1970.⁵³

Nevertheless, the Muslim Brotherhood in the territories would firmly eschew violence until the early 1980s; when its Gaza Strip representative, Sheikh Ahmad Yasin, secretly founded a military arm of the organization. Yasin was then arrested by Israel for illegal possession of weapons, but released in a prisoner exchange in 1985. Sheikh Yasin then went on to establish *al-Majd*, the Effort, an intelligence arm entrusted to «punish informers, drug pushers and other 'deviants'» in Palestinian society (Sayigh 1997:630). In the following years, the *Majd* would conduct fire bomb,

⁵² Another factor was the strained relationship between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Egyptian and Jordanian authorities, respectively occupying the Gaza Strip and the West Bank in the period. Under the Israeli authority, a significant proliferation took place: From 1967 to 1987, the number of mosques in the West Bank rose from 400 to 750, and from 200 to 600 in the Strip (Abu-Amr 1993:8).

⁵³ Among these were 'Abdallah 'Azzam, who would become a highly influential leader of Afghan mujahideen until his assassination in 1989 (Sayigh 1997:627). 'Azzam is today perhaps best known for establishing *Maktab al-Khidamat* (MAK) with Usama bin Ladin, considered a predecessor to *al-Qaida*.

knife and acid attacks, targeting stores selling alcohol, improperly dressed women, and public baths.

At the beginning of the Intifadah, the Gaza branch of the Brotherhood swiftly decided to combine its civilian membership and military arms into a new organization. The Islamic Resistance Movement (HAMAS) was thus established on December 15th in 1987, and issued its notorious charter the following August (Sayigh 1997:631). This ostensibly separate organization allowed the Brotherhood to finance and participate in the Intifadah through its existing network, and even respond to earlier criticism from the PLO for its nonparticipation in armed struggle against Israel.⁵⁴

As a result of its relentless and violent opposition to the Oslo Accords in the early 1990s, HAMAS accumulated support among Arab sympathizers in the Gulf sheikhdoms. By condemning not only the Iraqi presence in Kuwait, but also the U.S.-led foreign presence in the Gulf during the Gulf War, HAMAS was «rewarded with continued financial assistance» from citizens of the sheikhdoms, while the PLO «suffered a total cut-off» (Sayigh 1997:650f). Nevertheless, its criticism of the sheikhdoms' relations to the West would soon cause the relationship to deteriorate. HAMAS then found a new ally in Iran. The regime would provide some HAMAS militants with military training in Iran and in Lebanon, through its Hizballah proxy (Abu-Amr 1993:16).

In 1992, an Israeli response to Islamic fundamentalist militancy inadvertently strengthened the Iranian connection, by deporting 415 Islamist leaders and activists – most of whom belonged to HAMAS – to Lebanon. Described by Hoffman (2006:148) as a «serious miscalculation» by the Israeli authorities, the deportation forged a tighter relationship between the Palestinian Islamists and Tehran.⁵⁵ Under Hizballah tutelage, the Palestinian Islamists significantly enhanced their military capabilities. According to Mishal and Sela (as quoted in Hoffman 2006:148), the deportation turned out to be «a milestone in [HAMAS'] decision to use car bombs and suicide attacks as a major operandi». A HAMAS militant conducted the first suicide bombing in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict on April 16th 1993, killing himself and a bystanding Palestinian civilian.

HAMAS, now the biggest opposition faction, enjoyed Iranian and Syrian backing through the AFP from 1993. After the establishment of the PNA, Pape (2003:359) identifies four suicide terrorist campaigns launched by HAMAS from 1994 to 1997, prompting harsh responses from the PNA security forces and Israel, often in the form of targeted killings of military and political leadership. Following a failed assassination attempt on leader Khaled Mashaal in Jordan, Sheikh Yasin – who had been imprisoned since 1989 – was released from Israeli imprisonment in 1997.

⁵⁴ According to Abu-Amr (1993:11), the Brotherhood's establishment of HAMAS was the equivalent to the PLO factions' establishment of the Unified National Command (UNC), «both serving to channel their respective bodies' resistance activities».

⁵⁵ Furthermore, instead of the collapse intended by the Israelis, the militant Islamic organizations' leadership vacuum was filled by younger and more radical activists, more prone to violence than their predecessors (Abu-Amr 1993:14, Hoffman 2006:).

While HAMAS had been a major organizing force in the First Intifadah, an uprising in which the religious character was mostly muted; it would take its militants several months to properly partake in the al-Aqsa Intifadah, where religion and Islamic symbols were overt mobilizing tools (Hammami & Tamari 2001:13). HAMAS now sent an unprecedented number of suicide bombers into Israel, prompting Israeli assassinations of several key figures, most prominently its leaders: Sheikh Yasin; and his successor, HAMAS co-founder Abd al-Aziz al-Rantisi.⁵⁶ Since then, Mashaal has headed the organization from his exile in Damascus.

Under Mashaal leadership, HAMAS sought to challenge the Fateh-dominated PNA through participation in the legislative elections of 2006, and their list won a clear majority of the seats. This sparked a conflict with Fateh over the control of the PNA, escalating into an armed conflict resulting in HAMAS ousting Fateh from the Gaza Strip in the summer of 2007. Under HAMAS control, the Strip became the radial point of Palestinian terrorism. Thousands of Palestinian missiles launched into Israel resulted in *Oferet Yetzuka*, Cast Lead, a large-scale Israeli military operation in the winter of 2008-2009. As Israel held HAMAS responsible for the Strip, the organization was hit hard. It has since increased its efforts to contain other, more radical groups in the Strip.

Since early 2011, HAMAS has perhaps become the Palestinian terrorist organization most directly affected by the regional developments dubbed the «Arab Spring», which sparked both the Egyptian revolution and the Syrian civil war: The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt has drastically increased its influence in post-Mubarak political life, suggesting the possibility of a friendly Egyptian regime; while opposition to Assad's civil war policies since the beginning of 2011 led to the relocation of its political leadership of HAMAS from Damascus to Doha, Qatar and Cairo (BBC 2012). Despite its break with Syria, HAMAS has managed to maintain its relations with Iran.

3.4.2 Palestinian Islamic Jihad

Harakat al-Jihad al-Islami fi Filastin, the Islamic Jihad Movement in Palestine, commonly referred to as the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), was the first modern militant Islamist movement in the territories. Its unique relationship with Iran has been crucial to the development of PIJ – ideologically, financially and logistically. The PIJ is designated a terrorist organization by the European Union and the U.S. Department of State (EU 2012, USDS 2012).

3.4.2.1 PIJ: Roots and History

Inspired by the Iranian revolution of 1979, militant followers of Sunni Islam, often members of the Muslim Brotherhood, emerged in the Arab world in the following years. In 1980, Dr. Ahmad Fat'hi

⁵⁶ The IPCD lists at least 110 HAMAS fatalities in targeted killings during the Intifadah, including Qassam Brigades leaders Salah Shihada (July 2002), Wa'el Nassar (May 2004) and Adnan al-Ghoul (October 2004).

al-Shiqaqi and Sheikh Abd al-Aziz al-'Awda, who had met through the Brotherhood at the Egyptian Zaqaziq University in the 1970s, established the Islamic Jihad Movement in Palestine (Barsky 2002:9f). Drawing inspiration from not only Sunni radicals, primarily Hasan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb; but also the Palestinian symbolism of Izz ad-Din al-Qassam and the teachings of the Shi'ite Ayatollah Khomeini; the PIJ criticized the Brotherhood «for choosing the 'path of belief' without jihad, and the PLO for taking the 'path of jihad' without belief» (Sayigh 1997:627).⁵⁷ Like their secular predecessors of the 1960s, Shiqaqi and Awda sought an independent Palestine through the complete eradication of the Israeli state by military force.

In 1985, following a prisoner exchange between Israel and the PF-GC, hundreds of Palestinian militants were released – many of whom had been recruited by the PIJ. Sheikh As'ad Bayyud al-Tamimi, one of the released inmates, took the role as spiritual mentor for the West Bank faction of the PIJ. This faction eventually took the name *Bayt al-Maqdis*, House of the Holy (Sayigh 1997:626).⁵⁸ Nevertheless, it was the Gaza-based Shiqaqi faction that became the first independent Islamic group to engage in military activities against Israel: A grenade attack near the Western Wall in collaboration with the previously mentioned, Fateh-affiliated Islamic Jihad Brigades (see Chapter 4.2.1.3), injured dozens of Israeli soldiers and their relatives attending an IDF ceremony in 1986.

In August 1988, the senior PIJ leadership were deported by the Israeli authorities to Lebanon, severely weakening its position (Sayigh 1997:632). With its focus on a wider ideology rather than social organization; the PIJ was never a part of neither the UNC or the HAMAS, the two major organizers of the armed resistance at the time. In Lebanon, it established its headquarters in Beirut with the assistance of Hizballah and Iran, its main benefactor (Barsky 2002:11f, Byman 2005:27). The PIJ then benefitted greatly from the Israeli deportation of 415 Islamists from the Gaza Strip to Lebanon in December 1992, forging its ties with Iran (Hoffman 2006:148). Like HAMAS, it adopted an excessive use of explosives, and the first PIJ suicide bomb attack was in December 1993. The same year, the PIJ joined the Syrian-backed AFP, moved its headquarters to Damascus, and increased its military efforts to derail the peace talks.

In 1995, Shiqaqi was shot and killed in Malta, allegedly by the Mossad. He was succeeded by Sheikh Ramadan 'Abdallah Shallah.⁵⁹ Under his leadership, the PIJ leadership would remain in

⁵⁷ As opposed to the contemporary radicalization process among other Brotherhood militants, Shiqaqi and Awda placed themselves outside the mainstream radical ideology: Bridging the traditional gap between Shi'ite and Sunni Muslims in their pro-Khomeini ideology, and diverging from the Brotherhood's pan-Islamist ideology by focusing on the Palestinian Islamist political line (Barsky 2002:9f).

⁵⁸ In 1990, the *Bayt al-Maqdis* faction officially broke off from the PIJ when it sided with Iraq against Kuwait, angering Tehran. Later, Sheikh Tamimi would personally befriend Arafat, and went on to advocate Israeli-Palestinian peace until his death in 1998 (NYT 1998). The Shiqaqi faction thus became synonymous with the PIJ.

⁵⁹ Until then, Shallah had been a Syrian political scientist and adjunct professor in the United States, who had also lived several years in northern England (Barsky 2002:17ff). Through his academic activities and the think tank

Damascus, as he sought to avoid confrontations with the PNA security forces – especially after its crack-down on Islamist terrorist cells in the mid-1990s (Strindberg 2000:72f). As a result, it would take the organization some time to properly coordinate its military efforts when the al-Aqsa Intifadah broke out in 2000. Eventually, it reemerged as the most radical of the Palestinian Islamist factions, and continued its militancy towards Israeli targets also after the end of the Intifadah.

The PIJ boycotted the 2006 Palestinian legislative elections, but Shallah claims not to reject the democratic process; explaining (in an interview with Atran & Axelrod 2010:5) that even though he would «like to live under Sharia [he] would not impose it. The people must decide.» Nonetheless, its ultimate goal is an Islamic state. The PIJ stood by as HAMAS ousted Fateh from the Gaza Strip in the following year. After a brief series of confrontations with HAMAS in October 2007, the PIJ stood out as the most influential independent militia in the Strip – sometimes an ally, sometimes a rival to the HAMAS leadership.

3.4.3 The Popular Resistance Committees

Lijan al-Muqawamah al-Sha'biyyah, the Popular Resistance Committees (PRC), is the newest of the six organizations. The PRC is based in the Gaza Strip, where it has established itself as a close ally of the HAMAS authority – with bonds to Iran and Hizballah, as well as global jihad groups in the Sinai desert.

3.4.3.1 The PRC: Roots and History

The group was founded in the Gaza Strip at the outbreak of the al-Aqsa Intifadah by Jamal Abu Samhadana, a former senior Tanzim militant. Mumtaz Dughmush, a former HAMAS militant, became his deputy (Landinfo 2008:12). A third important co-founder was sheikh Khalil Abu Yussuf al-Quqa, another former Fateh militant, who also took leadership of the armed activities of the PRC (ITIC 2006:4f). In Palestinian internal affairs, the PRC quickly placed itself in radical opposition to the Fateh 'old guard'; whom they regarded as corrupt, decadent, and even traitors to the Palestinian cause.⁶⁰ The PRC would later take the side of HAMAS in the Gazan civil war, in which Fateh was ousted from the Strip. According to the IDF (2012), the PRC «operates in coordination with Iranian authorities and the Hezbollah terrorist organization».⁶¹ It receives support, funding and training by

World Islam and Studies Enterprise (WISE), he had been touch with spiritual leaders such as PIJ Sheikh 'Awda and «the Blind Sheikh» 'Umar Abd al-Rahman, along with several other radical Islamist organizations.

⁶⁰ An attitude perhaps best illustrated in September 2005, when a large group of PRC militants conducted a raid against the home of Musa Arafat; the head of the Preventive Security Service in the Strip, a cousin of Yasir Arafat, and co-founder of the Fateh movement (BBC 2005).

⁶¹ Interestingly, the design of the PRC insignia also borrows heavily from the Hizballah insignia – again resembling that of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards: Added to a similar placing of Quranic verses, the main feature is the Arabic letter *alif* clutching an AK-47 assault rifle.

HAMAS, and is allowed to act independently in the Strip (ITIC 2006:5f).

Until the assassinations of Abu Samhadan and Quqa in 2006, the PRC had acted mostly as a loose alliance built around Islamic Fateh defectors in the Strip. Now, the organization split into three: Kamal al-Nairab took over the main faction, while Zakaria Dughmush established a splinter faction with an identical name. Both continued to be political and military allies of HAMAS (ITIC 2011:18f). The mutual name, policies and heritage have made the two unusually difficult to separate from another – and has in the time of the analysis been considered as one by the IPCD.⁶²

The third faction was led by Mumtaz Dughmush, and took the name of *Jaysh al-Islam*, the Army of Islam (JI). The JI gradually oriented itself towards global jihad, and soon found itself in opposition to HAMAS (ITIC 2011:17). Nevertheless, the mainstream PRC factions have established close ties with global jihad groups in the Sinai desert. Apparently, the PRC's activities in the Sinai can also be understood as a move to «circumvent Israel's counter-terror operations, and to avoid involving Hamas and thereby invite an Israeli response in Gaza» (Schweitzer 2012:63). PRC militants has conducted and partaken in joint attacks along the Egyptian border, targeting both Israelis and Egyptian troops.

3.5 Summary

The history of the six major Palestinian terrorist organizations is a complex mosaic of strong personalities, bitter rivalries, swiftly changing alliances and battlegrounds: Arafat, Habash and Hawatma all ruled their organizations for decades; and Islamist leadership, too, has been lifelong – but far more often cut short by Israeli missiles. The PFLP, and at times the DFLP, have struggled with Fateh for influence on PLO policymaking; while HAMAS and the PIJ have clashed fiercely with both the Fateh-dominated PNA security forces and each other. An array of states have fueled these internal rivalries through their foreign policies of sponsoring the various groups at various times. As a result, the Palestinian militants have had to relocate multiple times, and constantly adjust to their surroundings – eventually leading to their current position in the territories.

Based on the above presentations, Table 3.2 presents a general overview of the history of five most influential Middle Eastern⁶³ states' sponsorships of the six organizations in the thesis. As a

⁶² To add further to the confusion: The main faction's military wing is *al-Uyia al-Nasser Salah al-Din*, the Victorious Salah al-Din Brigades, while the Dughmush-led splinter's military wing is *Kata'ib al-Nasser Salah al-Din*, the Victorious Salah-al-Din Battalions – which, of course, can also be translated to 'Brigades'. Furthermore, their insignias are nearly indistinguishable: The Brigades have a black horse, as opposed to the Battalions' brown horse; the two Palestinian flags in the Brigades' insignia have the green stripes inwards, while the Battalions' have the black stripes inwards, et cetera (ITIC 2011:6). Until determinable, identifying differences in their policies emerge, the PRC and the PRM will be treated by the IPCD as factions under the aegis of the PRC.

⁶³ China and the Soviet Union, which, despite at times having provided vital support to Fateh, the PFLP or the DFLP, have not been included. The reason for this exclusion is to rather focus on the ideological and strategical powerplay

result of the international community funding of the PNA, and thus the mainstream factions; foreign sponsorships in the third Majidian era has focused on organization in opposition to the Oslo Accords and a two-state solution. Iran has emerged as the major benefactor, connecting with the Islamist organizations in their early stages; followed by Syria, which also has had a long and complicated relationship with the Palestinian cause in the preceding eras.

Table 3.2, Middle Eastern State Sponsorships of the Six Major Palestinian Terrorist Organizations

	Egypt	Iran	Iraq	Libya	Syria
Fateh	1968-1974 1983-1990	-	1975-1978 1983-1990	1969-1973 1978-1979	1964-1967 1973-1975
The PFLP	1968-1970	-	1969-1979 1989-1990	1973-1983	1967-1970 1979-1985 1992-present
The DFLP	-	-	1977-1979	1974-1983	1973-1983 1992-1997
HAMAS	-	1991-2012	-	-	1991-2011
The PIJ	-	1988-present	-	-	1989-present
The PRC	-	2000-present	-	-	-

Source: Byman (2005), Sayigh (1997)

Finally, a genealogical diagram of the six organizations has been included as Appendix 2. Building on a diagram originally created by Sayigh (1997:xlii), only those with direct or indirect connections to the six organizations have been included. Excluded are also several splinter organizations from, and the militias pre-dated 1987 affiliated with, the six organizations.

among the Middle Eastern states, in which association with – or control of – the Palestinian cause have been used as a tool for regional influence by regimes stretching from Nasir's Egypt in the 1960s to Khamenei's Iran of today.

4 INTRODUCING A NEW DATASET: THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT DATABASE (IPCD)

4.1 A Hypothesis-Generating Case Study

4.1.1 Another Building Block in the Wall

The aim of the thesis is to review the relationship between ideology and military tactics in Palestinian nationalist-separatist terrorism. This will be achieved through descriptive analysis of the tactics applied in fatal attacks conducted by the six major Palestinian terrorist organizations, from the outbreak of the First Intifadah on December 9th 1987 until December 31st 2011: The tactics of the three Leftist organizations, al-Fateh, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP); will be compared to those of the three Islamist organizations, HAMAS, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), and the Popular Resistance Committees (PRC).

In Chapter 2, a suggested model of the role of ideology in terrorist tactics was presented, along with ten hypotheses to test it. It is not preceded by any existing explanatory model on the subject; and was built on literature and theories on 'new terrorism', military theory, terrorist target selection, and statistical observations of terrorist violence. The thesis can therefore be considered what Lijphardt describes as a *hypothesis-generating* case study, or generalizing case study; in which «an author's familiarity with a given case [is exploited] to help generate new hypotheses or theories, which can be subsequently tested in a more rigorous design» (Moses & Knutsen 2007:136).

As the thesis focus on the nationalist-separatist corner in Hegghammer's triangle of territorial ambitions of terrorism, the outcome of the analysis may present theories and hypotheses relevant to other cases of nationalist-separatist terrorism. The analogy of case studies as 'building blocks' has been explained by Moses & Knutsen (2007:136) as follows:

The analyst studies a given case to generate a preliminary theoretical construct. Because this construct is based on a single case, it can do little more than hint a more valid general model. This model, then, is confronted with another case – which, in turn, might suggest ways of amending and improving the construct. These cases can then be assembled, like building blocks, into a stronger theoretical edifice.

The ideological heterogeneity among Palestinian terrorist organizations has been thought to make the Palestinian case specifically attractive for comparative studies, as it contains currently active organizations from both the New Left and the Religious Rapoportian waves of terrorist ideology.

Still, this rather blunt division into «Leftist» and «Islamist» does little justice to the differences and internal rivalry within the blocs.⁶⁴ Furthermore, by including only the six major organizations, a number of minor organizations have been excluded.

However, presenting a building block will necessitate a certain degree of generalization, under which the well-established Rapoportian waves should be considered acceptable. And while comparing blocwise, the analysis will still highlight important differences and similarities among the individual organizations. It is also assumed that the influence of the major organizations severely outweighs that of the excluded groups, which have been responsible for far less attacks and fatalities than the six included.⁶⁵ Ultimately, this division and selection is believed by the author to best utilize a comparative case study on the role of ideology in Palestinian terrorist tactics.

4.1.2 Supplemental Narratives and Descriptive Statistics

According to Moses & Knutsen (2007:70), descriptive statistics are commonly used to supplement narratives, and this thesis is no exception: With Chapter 3, the analysis has been preceded by a presentation of each of the ideologically diverse terrorist organizations included in the analysis. Palestinian terrorism have developed over several decades. The armed struggle against Israel has been but one of many objectives for these organizations, as they have been plagued with internal disputes – often fueled by support from Middle Eastern states using the Palestinian cause as a foreign policy tool. The analysis period also marks the relocation of the Israeli-Palestinian battleground, along with a generational shift from the old school militants of the exile to the new school militants of the territories.

Despite the mutual dependency, the narrative is nonetheless supplementing the descriptive analysis – and not the other way around. The tangible contribution of the thesis is found not in its presentation of Palestinian terrorist roots and history in its third chapter, but rather in its unique figures on Palestinian terrorism since 1987 in its fifth. Introducing and applying a dataset on Israeli-Palestinian fatal conflict violence unprecedented in scope, the relationship between terrorist ideology and offensive military tactics is explored in the descriptive statistics it has produced.

The following subchapters will focus on the construction of this dataset, discuss its reliability, before operationalizing the variables applied in the analysis. Its complete codebook has

⁶⁴ As seen in Chapter 3, Fateh and the PFLP had decade-long struggles over the control of PLO policy; while HAMAS and the PIJ have had fatal confrontations over the frequency of attacks against Israeli targets from the Gaza Strip.

⁶⁵ Of the 683 «successful» Palestinian terrorist attacks recorded by the IPCD, the six major organizations have conducted 73.9% (505); while of the 1,728 fatalities, they have caused 83.7% (1,446). Furthermore, a majority (100) of the 178 excluded attacks have no identified perpetrator – a common challenge to the uncertainty aspect of the responsible actors in terrorist databases, properly addressed in Chapter 4.2.4.2.

also been featured as an Appendix (1) to the thesis.

4.2 The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Database

4.2.1 The Dataset

All statistical data in the analysis has been collected and coded by the author, into a dataset from here on referred to as the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Database (IPCD). The descriptive analysis has been conducted in Apache OpenOffice Calc. The IPCD is an event database, seeking to record all fatality-causing acts of nationalistically motivated political violence between and among Israelis and Palestinians in Israel and the Palestinian territories.

Currently,⁶⁶ the IPCD covers the time period initiated by outbreak of the First Intifadah, on December 9th 1987; and ending on December 31st 2011. It contains 7,039 events, causing a total of 12,093 fatalities – 1,675 Israelis and 10,361 Palestinians, as well as 57 foreign citizens. The 5,734 recorded events of inter-party violence between Israelis and Palestinians have claimed 10,385 lives: 1,663 Israelis, 8,668 Palestinians, and 55 foreign citizens. The 1,304 recorded events of intra-Palestinian violence have claimed 1,706 lives: 11 Israelis, 1,693 Palestinians, and 2 foreign citizens. Finally, one recorded event of intra-Israeli violence has claimed one Israeli life – that of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin.

Each event is described by eighteen variables with a range of categories: An IPCD ID number; what conflict it took place in; what phase of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict it took place in; the Gregorian calendar date; weekday; time; the area, district, and locality, in which the event took place; classification of the scene in which the event took place; description of the incident type in which the event took place; identification of the intended target of the fatal violence; identification of the weaponry and weapon type causing the fatalities; identification of the actor responsible for causing the fatalities; and the number of civilian and non-civilian fatalities. In the raw data material, each event also identifies its fatalities by name and age.

4.2.2 Data Collection Methodology

The point of departure for the collection of data have been lists of identified fatalities. Such association with the morbid is no new phenomenon in modern statistics, and perhaps particularly not in descriptive statistics: Pioneer John Graunt thoroughly processed death records kept by the London parishes in the 17th century. In his *Natural and Political Observations made upon the Bills*

⁶⁶ The IPCD is intended to expand backwards in time, seeking to include all fatal acts of political violence dating back to pre-state era.

of *Mortality* (1665), he argued that correct interpretation of these records would provide important clues on how to combat certain diseases, and that the identification of particular causes could help save lives (Moses & Knutsen 2007:71ff).⁶⁷ The IPCD is based on Israeli and Palestinian public death records, and supplemented them with further documentation to help construct a detailed depiction of the physical violence in the conflict.

The Israeli fatalities have been registered on two government-hosted memorial sites: The Israeli National Insurance Institute's "Site to remember the civilian citizens killed by enemy/hostile activities" (*atar l'izkor ha'ezrahim khalali pe'ulot ha'eiva*, אתר לזכור האזרחים חללי פעולות האיבה) on laad.btl.gov.il, and the Israeli Ministry of Defense hosts the "We shall remember them all" (*nizkor et kolam*, נזכר את כולם) website for citizens fallen in the line of duty – both army and police – on izkor.gov.il. Here, all fatalities are identified with names, pictures, and short biographies.

On the Palestinian side, the main source of fatality lists were initially the United Nations' *Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories*. Since the outbreak of the al-Aqsa Intifadah, the Israeli and Palestinian human rights groups *B'Tselem* and the *Palestinian Human Rights Monitoring Group* have both provided lists of fatalities, often describing the circumstances of fatal incidents. Finally, no less than five of the terrorist organizations included in the thesis – Fateh, the PFLP, HAMAS, the PIJ, and the PRC – have to various extents also listed their fallen members on their own memorial websites.

These records have provided the author with points of departure for information-gathering on all recorded incidents, primarily through the contemporary news coverage. The online archives of the *Jerusalem Post*, *Haaretz* and the *New York Times*, to mention some of the major contributors, have been indispensable tools in this work. The concept of open-source intelligence (OSINT), defined by Kernan (2001:2f) as «information that has been discovered, discriminated, distilled and disseminated to a *select* audience (...) in order to address a *specific* question,» has been an important source of inspiration to this process – at least on the level of describing individual events.⁶⁸

Before coding, all data has been secured in so-called *raw data documents*. Here, each fatal event is listed with the following five information points: Date of the event; location of the event; a text describing the known circumstances in all the detail available; an identification of the actor directly responsible for causing the fatalities; identification of the victims and their status as civilian, non-civilian, or in some instances indeterminate; as well as all sources to the information listed here. The data found in the first four points provide the information used to fill out the

⁶⁷ A somewhat similar argument can be applied to this case: Increased knowledge on how terrorist entities decide to operate militarily may contribute to the development of effective countermeasures, or to a broader understanding of mechanisms crucial to terrorist campaigns.

⁶⁸ This is not the case of the IPCD as a whole, as it can be applied as a tool for, rather than a product of, OSINT.

eighteen variables on each recorded event.

4.2.3 Event Type: Act

The IPCD is an event database, seeking to record a specific type of event. Among the options available, the author decided to go for the *act* rather than the *incident*, which may be considered a more traditional choice: Event databases such as the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) or the Worldwide Incidents Tracking System (WITS) both identify the incident as the event.

While the incident solution may serve its purpose in datasets seeking to record a specific type of violence, or one-sided violence, the author has identified several short-comings when applied to a multi-party conflict with a wide range of violence. The incident solution is appropriate for tasks such as recording terrorist attacks, but most terrorist attacks – with the exception of suicide bombings and planted explosives – are also the initiating acts of violent clashes between the assailants and law enforcement agencies. In many cases, the only fatalities of terrorist attacks are the terrorists themselves. Also, law enforcement agencies may cause unintended fatalities in their attempt to take out terrorists. By defining the event as the fatal *act* – that one single action that directly caused the death of one or more persons – one can still tie it to incident types.

The different recordings of the same terrorist attack may serve as an example: On May 2nd 2004, two members of Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Popular Resistance Committees armed with automatic rifles, hid by the road near the Kissufim crossing in the Gaza Strip. When an Israeli vehicle passed by around 12:45, the gunmen opened fire, causing the vehicle to stop, before running up to the vehicle, shooting to death at point blank range the driver of the car, an eight months pregnant woman, along with her four young daughters. Israel Defense Forces (IDF) personnel quickly arrived at the scene, leading to a clash, in which both gunmen were shot to death and two troops were injured.

The GTD has recorded one event, or one incident (GTD ID 200405030004). It identifies the total number of fatalities as seven, including two «Perpetrator Fatalities». But the GTD holds no information on who or what caused the perpetrator fatalities – it could have been by their own hands, armed Israeli civilians responding to the attack, or even Palestinian National Authority security personnel. The IPCD has recorded two events, or two acts (IPCD IDs 20040502001 and 20040502002). The first event describes the shooting deaths of the five Israeli civilians by the Palestinian terrorists, while the second describes the shooting deaths of the two Palestinian terrorists by the IDF. The incident type, or situation in which the act took place, has been identified as a

«Palestinian armed assault» in both acts.⁶⁹

The act solution also has its problems. By separating the fatal acts in violent incidents, the IPCD holds no information on whether two or more acts are directly connected to one specific incident – it only identifies the incident type. For example, IPCD ID 20040502002, describing the shooting deaths of the two Palestinian militants by the IDF, could in theory – if the IDF had failed to eliminate the murderers – refer to another, unrelated attack on Israelis by another group of militants in the same area on the same day, in which two assailants were killed by gunfire.⁷⁰

4.2.4 Reliability

All works dealing with controversial subjects, as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict certainly can be described as, will have several potential sources of error. The three problems discussed here is that of source bias in a sensitive conflict; the proper identification of actors responsible for fatalities; and whether or not the dataset like this can be complete. While the discussions will focus mainly on the Palestinian terrorism found of the IPCD, which is but one of many components; the themes are still to be considered relevant for the dataset as a whole.

4.2.4.1 Source Bias

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a battle of narratives. These competing narratives differently describe the same places (Jerusalem or al-Quds, Judea and Shomron or the West Bank, haKotel haMa'aravi or Ha'it al-Buraq), the same wars (War of Liberation or The Catastrophe, Six-Day War or The Setback, Yom Kippur War or the October War), and the same incidents (the Events of 5689 or the al-Buraq Uprising, the Deir Yassin Affair or the Deir Yassin Massacre, Operation Cast Lead or the Gaza Massacre). Depending on the point of view, it is a conflict of terrorists or freedom fighters, murderers or martyrs, military battles or massacres, senseless slaughter or self-defense.

In the 1820s, historian Leopold von Ranke introduced the concept of *quellenkritik* – the critical study of sources, and the separation between primary and secondary sources. He argued that historical research should rely on the primary sources – such as eyewitness accounts, original documents, and diplomatic reports. The secondary sources, based on information provided by the primary sources, are here to be considered less trustworthy due to their distance from the actual historical event (Moses & Knutsen 2007:120f).

However, in cases like the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the competing narratives can be assumed to strongly influence the testimonies put forth by primary sources. News reports and other

⁶⁹ Alternatively, one could differ between «Palestinian armed assault» and «Israeli response to Palestinian armed assault». However, the creation of such nuance would call for every situation type to have similar response categories, and has therefore been excluded.

⁷⁰ This problem could be solved by adding an unique incident code in a future version of the dataset.

secondary sources are, not guaranteed, but at least more likely, to consider differing versions of the events presented. Interpretation of such secondary sources will therefore define how the event is described in the dataset. Ideally, there should be numerous secondary sources describing each event, considering as many narratives as possible. However, increasing the number of secondary sources will constitute no guarantee that these reports will not build on statements given by the same primary source informants, such as spokespersons for the Israel Defense Forces or Palestinian terrorist organizations, or members of politically biased organizations present at the site.⁷¹

When collecting and coding information into the IPCD system, the author has paid attention to these challenges, and noted that the vast majority of the cases and incidents lack significant inconsistencies – despite the fact that primary sources in most instances include both Israeli and Palestinian spokespersons, from soldiers and terrorists to bystanders and medical personnel. One potential weakness here is the author's dependency on English-language news coverage, as certain Arabic and Hebrew accounts may differ. However, considering the amount of attention the conflict receives, fueled also by multilingual supporters of each of the two parties, the authenticity of a narrative completely rejecting all aspects in the mainstream coverage seems less probable.

4.2.4.2 The Responsible Actor

Another problem has been the question of actual responsibility in terrorist attacks. A terrorist attack is not unlike other projects: A success will have a thousand fathers, while a failure may remain an orphan. False claims of responsibility are quite common, and there will nearly always be alternative theories and accusations of third-party involvement.⁷² While there is rarely such a thing as an absolute certainty, the information on the vast majority of cases will still provide sufficient for the purposes of gathering data.

An accusation from outside the organization leaves it with three alternatives: Confirmation, denial, or refusal to comment. While a confirmation may be truthful, it may be a lie in order to gain respect or acknowledgement from rivaling organizations and the public, create fear in the enemy population, or secure support from benefactors. While a denial may be truthful, it may be a lie in order to appear more moderate or put pressure on rivaling organizations. Refusing to comment allows the organization to sit on the fence, estimate public opinion, and make an informed decision on a confirmation or denial will be in the interest of the organization.

⁷¹ Still, some primary sources have proved helpful: News coverage and human rights organizations may fail to identify members of the Palestinian terrorist organizations. By reviewing the websites of the Palestinian terrorist organizations, the IPCD has been able to positively identify members elsewhere described as civilians.

⁷² The media coverage of the 9/11 and the 22/7 attacks have presented false claims, made respectively by anonymous spokespersons claiming to represent the DFLP and an obscure Islamist group; and certain online communities are plagued with conspiracy theories suggesting both attacks were false-flag operations, often blaming Israeli and/or American intelligence.

Without a preceding accusation, an organization may release a statement in which it claims or condemns the attack. Such claims may be truthful, but may also be lies in order to gain respect, acknowledgement, fear or support. Condemnations may be truthful, but may also be a lie in order to appear more moderate, put pressure on a rivaling organization, or simply to reject suspicion.

In other instances, a victim state may refuse to acknowledge certain terrorist or insurgent activities, in order to present the terrorist entity as dishonest and/or incapable of striking blows at them. The explosion that caused the Israel Defense Forces headquarters in Lebanon to collapse on November 11th 1982, killing eight-eight people, may serve as an example: According to the Hizballah, the explosion was caused by their Ahmad Jafaar Kassir, who drove an explosive-laden Peugeot into the building. The organization has used Kassir for several propaganda purposes, and celebrates «Martyr's Day» on the anniversary of the bombing (Hizballah 2011, Kramer 1996:231). While the GTD considers the incident to be a terrorist attack, Israeli authorities have always described the explosion as a gas leakage accident (IMFA 2000).

Finally, a victim state may accuse terrorist, insurgent, or even oppositional organizations of participation in illegal violent activities in order to cause damage to their reputation. Certain types of disasters – terrorist attacks being one of them – tend to create the confusion needed to initiate series of accusations, claims and denials, in which wild conspiracy theories thrive.

4.2.4.3 Incomplete Dataset

Does the IPCD really contain every nationalistically motivated political killing in Israel and the Palestinian territories? As of now, the data on intra-Palestinian violence is not complete: The Palestinian extrajudicial executions of suspected collaborators are rarely reported in the same detail as Israeli-Palestinian and other intra-Palestinian violence. According to the IDF spokesperson, 942 suspected Palestinian collaborators were killed from December 9th 1987 to November 30th 1993; while the Associated Press puts the number at 771 (B'Tselem 1994:1). The Palestinian Human Rights Monitoring Group (2001) states that «an estimated 1000 Palestinians were killed under suspicion of collaboration» during the First Intifadah.

In the same period, the IPCD has recorded only 357 fatalities from attacks targeting «Palestinians and Israeli Arabs accused of treason». The figure can to a certain extent be explained by the lack of detail in media reports on the incidents, which only occasionally will identify a murder victim as a suspected collaborator. However, the IPCD has recorded 447 fatalities from incidents in which the target of violence have been classified as «indeterminate», and the majority of these are thought to be collaborator killings. Nevertheless, when compared to the other figures, the IPCD's recorded total of 851 fatalities in all intra-Palestinian violence in the period suggests the

need for improvement of intra-Palestinian fatality data in the period leading up to September 2000.⁷³

The intra-Palestinian violence will not be discussed further in this thesis, as the focus will be on the Palestinian offensive tactics against Israeli targets. When it comes to recording inter-party violence between Israeli and Palestinian actors, the IPCD is still more comprehensive than the fatality lists of B'Tselem – as shown in Table 4.1.

Table 4.1, Comparison of IPCD and B'Tselem Fatality Lists

Time Frame	The IPCD	B'Tselem Fatality Lists⁷⁴
The First Intifadah 09.12.1987 - 13.09.1993	Palestinian fatalities in inter-violence: 1,349 Israeli fatalities in inter-violence: 199 Intra-Palestinian fatalities: 828	Palestinians killed by Israelis: 1,162 Israelis killed by Palestinians: 160
The Oslo Years 14.09.1993 - 28.09.2000	Palestinian fatalities in inter-violence: 472 Israeli fatalities in inter-violence: 298 Intra-Palestinian fatalities: 113 Intra-Israeli fatalities: 1	Palestinians killed by Israelis: 389 Israelis killed by Palestinians: 261
al-Aqsa Intifadah 29.09.2000 - 07.02.2005	Palestinian fatalities in inter-violence: 3,488 Israeli fatalities in inter-violence: 1,006 Intra-Palestinian fatalities: 180	Palestinians killed by Israelis: 3,281 Israelis killed by Palestinians: 968 Palestinians killed by Palestinians: 162
Post-Intifadah Years 08.02.2005 - 26.12.2008	Palestinian fatalities in inter-violence: 1,691 Israeli fatalities in inter-violence: 113 Intra-Palestinian fatalities: 508	Palestinians killed by Israelis: 1,599 Israelis killed by Palestinians: 87 Palestinians killed by Palestinians: 460
Oferet Yetzuka 27.12.2008 - 18.01.2009	Palestinian fatalities in inter-violence: 1,395 Israeli fatalities in inter-violence: 9 Intra-Palestinian fatalities: 18	Palestinians killed by Israelis: 1,397 Israelis killed by Palestinians: 9 Palestinians killed by Palestinians: 18
Post-Oferet Years 19.01.2009 - 31.12.2011	Palestinian fatalities in inter-violence: 271 Israeli fatalities in inter-violence: 38 Intra-Palestinian fatalities: 57	Palestinians killed by Israelis: 260 Israelis killed by Palestinians: 24 Palestinians killed by Palestinians: 43
Total	Palestinian fatalities in inter-violence: 8,666 Israeli fatalities in inter-violence: 1,663 Intra-Palestinian fatalities: 1,704	Palestinians killed by Israelis: 8,088 Israelis killed by Palestinians: 1,509 Palestinians killed by Palestinians: 683

The differences in inter-party violence are most likely an outcome of the IPCD applying a larger host of secondary sources than B'Tselem; as well as including certain types of Palestinian militant fatalities – such as suicide bombers and those who were killed while preparing explosive devices –

⁷³ Since the outbreak of the al-Aqsa Intifadah in September 2000, the Israeli human rights organization B'Tselem (and to a lesser extent, the Palestinian Human Rights Monitoring Group) has monitored Palestinian fatalities. These are identified by name, age, place of residence, date of death, place of death, cause of death, if he/she participated in hostilities or not, and a description of the incident that led to the fatality.

⁷⁴ These statistics builds on the organization's own investigations «into the circumstances of the death in each case», where it «gathers medical documents and photographs; and cross-checks its information with IDF Spokesperson announcements, information appearing on websites and blogs of armed Palestinian organizations, information gathered by Palestinian and international human rights organizations, and media reports» (B'Tselem 2010).

who have been excluded in the B'Tselem fatality lists.⁷⁵

Ultimately, there can never be an absolute guarantee that every single fatal act of the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians have been recorded by the IPCD. However, its strength has been to carefully gather the information provided by official spokespersons of each party in the conflict: It is not considered feasible that the Israeli government-hosted websites or the Palestinian human rights advocates would intentionally deflate their «own» figures. If anything, it would be the other way around, as high fatality figures are likely to accumulate support. Nevertheless, this does not seem to be the case – and the IPCD appears, especially when considering the amount of variables, to be the most complete dataset on the Israeli-Palestinian fatal conflict violence per today.

4.2.5 Relevance

Another question remains: What can fatality-causing violence really tell us about the conflict violence in general? Far from every act of terrorism is fatal, and organized violent attacks may fail completely or cause near-fatal injuries, but no more fatalities than a phoned-in bomb scare or a failed, spontaneous attack.

In all the recorded events of the IPCD, the deaths have been directly caused by one or more acts of physical violence performed by a hostile actor. Death is definitive and indisputable – as opposed to casualties, ranging from bruises and light injuries to severe and life-threatening injuries. An alternate system to include non-lethal acts of terrorism, not to say conflict violence in general, would therefore need to perform not only the highly controversial task of ranging the severity of injuries, but also present an immeasurable body of data to properly document every incident.

As far as sampling goes, a terrorist organization's fatal acts of violence can never be interpreted as a representative subset of all its violence.⁷⁶ Different attack types will have hugely different probabilities of causing fatalities: While a suicide bomb detonated inside a crowded coffee shop is extremely likely to kill; only a fragment of the home-made, unguided missiles fired from the Gaza Strip towards small population centers in southern Israel have claimed lives. Similarly, the outcome of gun and knife attacks will also depend on several factors, ranging from weaponry malfunctions to coincidental presence of civilian security agents at the scene of the attack.

Thus, focusing exclusively on fatal terrorism does not provide us with all the information on the organizations' military tactics, but it does reflect their military capabilities – and, at least when supplemented with more information, echo their strategies.

⁷⁵ From 1993 to 2011, the IPCD has recorded 183 suicide attacks, causing 924 fatalities – including 207 Palestinian non-civilians. These Palestinian militant fatalities have not recorded by the B'Tselem – unless it was unclear whether or not they detonated the explosives themselves, or if the explosives were detonated when fired upon and hit by Israeli gunfire. Another 59 Palestinians have been killed in 41 instances of militants' «work accidents».

⁷⁶ Likewise, the IDF cannot be interpreted from its actions recorded in the IPCD alone.

4.3 Operationalization

Due to the large scope of the IPCD, only a relatively small part of it has been utilized in this analysis: The fatal acts conducted by the six major Palestinian terrorist organizations against Israelis account for 7.2% (505 out of 7,039) of all registered events, and have caused 12.0% (1,446 out of 12,093) of all registered fatalities.⁷⁷ The following subchapters describe the operationalization process; in which the remaining 92.8% of the fatal acts are to be excluded, and categories corresponding to the hypotheses presented in Chapter 2 are established. Each variable is presented in cursive, while each category is succeeded by its proper category number in brackets (for the complete list of variable categories, see Appendix 1, pp. 10-18).

4.3.1 Conflict Type

As described, the IPCD is monitoring three *conflict types*: The Israeli-Palestinian conflict [1], and the internal conflicts among the Palestinians [2] and the Israelis [3]. In the first conflict, it has recorded 5,734 acts causing a total of 10,386 fatalities – 1,663 Israelis, 8,668 Palestinians, and 55 international citizens. It has also recorded 1,304 acts of internal violence among Palestinians, causing 1,706 fatalities. One act of Israeli internal violence – the assassination of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin on November 4th 1995 – has also been recorded.

This thesis will review the offensive military tactics of the major Palestinian terrorist organizations, and only towards Israeli targets. Thus, the tactics applied in the Palestinian internal violence are considered to be of a different nature,⁷⁸ not to be included in this analysis. The analysis will focus only on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and only the fatal acts taking place during situations instigated by Palestinian attacks.

4.3.2 Situation

The analysis will only include the fatal acts taking place during the following *situation types*: 'Palestinian armed assault' [1], 'Palestinian unarmed assault' [2], 'Palestinian lynch mob assault' [3], 'Palestinian abduction and execution' [4], 'Armed Palestinian and/or Arab infiltration from Egypt' [15], 'from the Gaza Strip' [16], 'from Jordan' [17], 'from Lebanon' [18], 'from Syria' [19], and 'from the West Bank' [20].

This brings the number down to 1,615 acts of Palestinian aggression towards Israeli and/or

⁷⁷ The remaining 6,534 fatal acts recorded in the IPCD took place during violent incidents that did not meet the inclusion criteria of the analysis: 1,110 taking place during other Palestinian attacks on Israelis, 1,241 during confrontations between Israelis and Palestinians, 2,468 during Israeli attacks on Palestinians, 1,305 during intra-party violence, and 410 during indeterminate or accidental situations.

⁷⁸ In at least 484 of the 1,304 recorded acts of fatal Palestinian internal violence, the target of violence are individuals suspected and accused of collaborating with the Israelis authorities.

Jewish targets in Israel and the Palestinian territories, causing the deaths of 3,000 people: 1,552 Israelis, 1,126 civilians and 426 non-civilians; 1,407 Palestinians, 208 civilians, 1,050 non-civilians, and 149 persons of undetermined status; and 41 foreign citizens, all civilians. A large part of these fatalities have been caused by the Israeli response to Palestinian attacks. When these have been excluded, the number has dropped to 777 fatal acts, causing 1,838 deaths: The same 1,552 Israelis and 41 foreign civilians as above, but now only 245 Palestinians, of whom 218 were non-civilians.

Finally, the analysis will also exclude the 94 attacks in which the attackers failed to kill anyone besides themselves.⁷⁹ The number of «successful» acts of Palestinian terrorist violence is therefore 683, claiming 1,728 lives: 1,552 Israelis and 41 foreign civilians, but now only 135 Palestinians, of whom 108 were non-civilians.

4.3.3 Responsible Party

The analysis will focus only on the events in which one of the six major Palestinian terrorist organizations has been identified as responsible. It will therefore exclude the 28 «successful» attacks conducted by militants from other organizations, as well as the 26 conducted by unaffiliated militants, and another 100 conducted by unidentified militants. The 24 joint attacks have also been left out, as it will search for individual traits of each organization. The analysis includes the following categories of the *responsible party* variable:

From the Leftist bloc: 'DFLP: Unspecified faction' [2], 'DFLP: Kata'ib al-Muqawama al-Wataniya' [3], 'Fateh: Unspecified faction' [4], 'Fateh: al-Fahd al-Aswad' [6], 'Fateh: al-Quwwa 17' [7], 'Fateh: al-Suqoor' [8], 'Fateh: al-Tanzim' [9], 'Fateh: Kata'ib Shuhada al-Aqsa' [11], 'PFLP: Unspecified faction' [24], 'PFLP: al-Nasr al-Ahmar' [25], and 'PFLP: Kata'ib Abu Ali Mustafa' [26]. From the Islamist bloc: 'HAMAS: Unspecified faction' [14], 'HAMAS: Kata'ib Shahid Izz ad-Din al-Qassam' [15], 'PIJ: Unspecified faction' [20], 'PIJ: Saraya al-Quds' [23], and 'PRC: al-Uyia al-Nasser Salah al-Din' [35]. These have been separated into two ideological blocs in the analysis.

In all, the «successful» attacks conducted by the six organizations claimed the lives of 1,446 people in the analysis period: 1,297 Israelis, 953 civilians and 344 non-civilians; 115 Palestinians, 12 civilians and 103 non-civilians; and 41 foreign civilians. The 103 Palestinian non-civilian fatalities are the Palestinian militants killed by their own device in the course of a «successful» suicide bombing attack, and will not be included in the fatality figures in the analysis unless stated otherwise. The number of victims of Palestinian terrorism against Israeli targets is therefore 1,343.

⁷⁹ Excluded are therefore the 80 suicide bombing attacks in which the attackers killed only themselves, and the 14 attacks where militants were killed by accidental explosions – 11 of which took place when attempting to plant unstable explosive charges, and the remaining 3 in failed missile launches.

4.3.4 Target of Violence and Fatalities

After excluding all events deemed irrelevant to the analysis, the identification of key variables will follow: The first hypotheses concerned the nature of target selection, and the analysis will utilize two variables to test them – the intended *target of violence* of the attack, and the actual *fatalities* to the violence. Applying simple dichotomy, by identifying certain of their categories as civilian (and the remainder non-civilian), it is possible to review the actual share of the different organizations' targeting and killing of civilians.

In the variable *Target of Violence*, the categories 'Israeli civilians' [1] and 'Armed Israeli civilians' [2] have been identified as civilian. *Fatalities*, being a numeral rather than a categorical variable, separates fatalities by nationality, age and combatants status. Its civilian share consists of 'Israeli civilian fatalities (0-17)', 'Israeli civilian fatalities (18-64)', 'Israeli civilian fatalities (65+)', and 'Israeli armed civilian fatalities'.

4.3.5 Location

The second part of the hypotheses concerned the geographical distribution of terrorist attacks. In the dataset, the categories of the *District/Governorate* variable allows us to create separate entities for Israel, the Gaza Strip, and the West Bank (see also Appendix 3, Figure A1).

Here, *Israel* consists of the following districts: 'Center' [1], 'Haifa' [2], 'Jerusalem' [3], 'North' [4], 'South' [5], and 'Tel Aviv' [6]. Also included is 'Jerusalem City: West Jerusalem' [8]. The *Gaza Strip* consists of five governorates: 'Deir al-Balah' [9], 'Gaza' [10], 'Khan Yunis' [11], 'North Gaza' [12], and 'Rafah' [13]. Also included is 'Gaza Strip: Indeterminate' [14]. The *West Bank* consists of eleven governorates: 'Bethlehem' [15], 'Hebron' [16], 'Jenin' [17], 'Jericho' [18], 'Nablus' [19], 'Qalqilya' [20], 'al-Quds' [21], 'Ramallah & al-Bireh' [22], 'Salfit' [23], 'Tubas' [24], and 'Tulkarm' [25]. Also included is 'Jerusalem City: East Jerusalem' [7] and 'West Bank: Indeterminate' [26]. Finally, the 'Golan Heights' [28] has been included as a separate territory.

4.3.6 Weaponry

To test for the last hypotheses, five chief categories of the *Weaponry* variable have been specifically identified: The first is 'Firearms' [8], referring to all sorts of barreled weapons – from handguns to automatic assault rifles. The second category is called «Explosives», referring to all explosive devices with the exception of the suicide bomb – meaning 'Grenades' [4], 'Planted' [5] and 'Other Explosives' [7]. The next is the 'Explosive device: Suicide bomb' [6]. 'Bladed Weapon' [3], such as knives, hatchets, axes and machetes, constitute the fourth category. The fifth and final category is the 'Missile' [10], including all sorts of rockets and mortars.

The remaining categories found in the analysis data – namely 'Beating' [2], 'Lynching' [9], 'Rocks' [12], 'Strangling' [13], 'Vehicle' [16], the combination of 'Explosive device and firearms' [19], as well as 'Indeterminate' [20] – will only be referred to as «Other» weaponry in the analysis.

4.4 Data Summary

The descriptive analysis of 505 IPCD events, all records of fatal violence conducted by Palestinian terrorists against Israelis, will explore trends and developments in the military activities of the six major Palestinian terrorist organizations from 1987 to 2011. Corresponding to the set of hypotheses presented in Chapter 2, the analysis will focus on four key variables: *Target of Violence* and *Fatalities*, concerning the targeting of civilians; *District/Governorate*, concerning the geographical distribution of attacks; and *Weaponry*, concerning the type of attack.

As the thesis seeks to explore the relationship between ideology and military tactics in terrorist organizations, the six have been divided into two blocs: The three left-wing organizations which emerged during the New Left wave of terrorism – Fateh, the PFLP and the DFLP – constitute the first; and the three Islamic fundamentalist organizations – HAMAS, the PIJ and the PRC – make up the second.


5 Palestinian Nationalist-Separatist Terrorism

5.1 Terrorism and Conflict

The military activities of the Palestinian terrorist organizations cannot be understood as isolated violent incidents, but rather as an integral part of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. As we have seen, the First Intifadah relocated the battleground 'home' – to the struggle's point of departure in the 1950s, before it had moved through Jordanian, international, Lebanese and Tunisian territories over the next three decades. This return to Israel and the territories marked a milestone in how the conflict would develop in the next two decades: From a popular uprising to a peace process, to stagnation and another uprising, to an intra-Palestinian rivalry and the current-day status quo. Prior to the descriptive analysis, a brief introduction to the general development of violence is needed.

The IPCD allows us to review the fatal incidents by the situation types in which they took place. In figure 5.1, an attempt has been made to separate between situations instigated by the various parties: *Confrontation* incidents refers to violent confrontations where the instigating party cannot be properly identified – commonly due to an uncertainty, stemming from conflicting reports made by the involved parties. *Israeli* incidents refers to all confrontations instigated by any Israeli actor – from state security personnel to armed settler militants alike. Likewise, the *Palestinian* incidents refer to those incidents instigated by all violent Palestinian actors.

Figure 5.1, Fatal Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Incidents 1987-2011, by Situation Type



The analysis period can be divided into four parts, separated by turning points in the conflict: *The First Intifadah*, from the outbreak of the uprising in December 1987 to the signing of the Oslo Accords; *the Oslo Years*, from the Declaration of Principles of September 1993 and up until the

second uprising; *the al-Aqsa Intifadah*, the uprising that began in September 2000 and ended in February 2005; and *the Post-Intifadah Years*, the current period.⁸⁰ These periods serve as tools to see how the organizations have adjusted to the major developments in the conflict.

Figure 5.1 shows how the *First Intifadah* was spearheaded by waves of deadly confrontations between Israelis and Palestinians – in most instances, between Israeli security forces and Palestinian protesters.⁸¹ These confrontations were accompanied by fatal Palestinian attacks on Israeli targets. Towards the end of the Intifadah, we can see how Palestinian terrorist groups opposing the Oslo Accords increased their attacks in an attempt to derail the peace talks. During the *Oslo Years*, the violence diminished as the Palestinian National Authority was established in the territories. The 1996 riots – when Palestinian rioters through-out the territories launched a series of violent protests against an Israeli excavation project they claimed would undermine the Temple Mount – stands out in this period.

The *al-Aqsa Intifadah* was introduced by the highest registered number of fatal confrontations between Israelis and Palestinians: 63 in October of 2000, and 69 the following month. These clashes were followed by an increase in Palestinian attacks, as well as Israeli countermeasures. The violence peaks in March of 2002, with a total of 134 fatal incidents, ranging from Palestinian suicide-bombers to Israeli large-scale military operations. As this second uprising approached its end in February 2005, most fatal incidents were results of Israeli military activities targeting Palestinian militants.

As missile attacks from the Gaza Strip literally skyrocketed in the *Post-Intifadah Years*, and particularly after Israel's 2005 unilateral disengagement plan in 2005,⁸² Israeli military operations targeting Palestinian militants went on to be the main cause of conflict fatalities into the Post-Intifadah years. It reached unprecedented numbers during the *Oferet Yetzuka*, Cast Lead, the large-scale Israeli military operation in December 2008 (74 incidents) and January 2009 (461 incidents). Following the operation, violence levels remained relatively low – as the decrease in missile attacks from the Strip provoked fewer Israeli responses, and the West Bank remained mostly quiet – and terrorist attacks inside Israeli territory became a rarity.

⁸⁰ Please note that the IPCD separates this fourth period into three: The *post-Intifadah period*; from the end of the Intifadah to the large-scale Israeli operation against militants in the Gaza Strip in 2008-2009; *Oferet Yetzuka*, the aforementioned operation; and the *post-Oferet period*, the years following the operation. For more information on this separation, see Appendix 2, p. 10.

⁸¹ During the First Intifadah, 95.7% of all registered fatal confrontations (in which the instigating party have not been determined) were between Israeli security personnel and Palestinian protesters. For the whole analysis period, this type of confrontation constitutes 72.2% of all fatal confrontations – as such confrontations between Israeli security personnel and armed Palestinian militants would become more frequent in the following years.

⁸² In 2005, 1,259 missiles were launched into Israel from the Gaza Strip. In 2006, 1,777 missile attacks were registered, followed by 2,807 in 2007, and 3,720 in 2008 (B'Tselem 2013:2).

5.2 The Terror

As explained in Chapter 4.3.3, the militias adhering to the six major organizations conducted 505 fatal acts of political violence in the analysis period, resulting in the deaths of 1,343 victims: 1,297 Israelis, 953 civilian and 344 non-civilians; 34 foreign citizens; and 12 Palestinian civilians. Before the comparative analysis, a general overview of the militias and their terrorist acts is needed.

5.2.1 Terrorist Militias in the Analysis

5.2.1.1 The Leftists

The analysis includes attacks conducted by five militias under the aegis of the Fateh organization: *Quwwa 17*, Force 17,⁸³ from the 1970s; two First Intifadah strike groups, *al-Fahd al-Aswad*, the Black Panthers,⁸⁴ and *al-Suqoor*, the Hawks;⁸⁵ and two post-Intifadah groups associated with the 'young guard', *al-Tanzim*, the Organization,⁸⁶ and *Kata'ib Shuhada al-Aqsa*, the al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades (AMB).⁸⁷ Respectively, these militias have been responsible for two, six, ten, fifty-seven, and ninety-eight fatal attacks on Israelis. Additionally, ten more fatal attacks have been attributed to Fateh, resulting in a total of 183 fatal attacks in the analysis period.⁸⁸

The PFLP had a First Intifadah strike group known as *al-Nasr al-Ahmar*, the Red Eagles; and also its military wing, *Kata'ib Abu Ali Mustafa*, the Abu Ali Mustafa Brigades. The two have been responsible for four and nine fatal attacks on Israelis. Additionally, thirteen more fatal attacks have been attributed to the PFLP, resulting in a total of 26 fatal attacks in the analysis period.

The DFLP have been responsible for five fatal attacks on Israelis in the analysis period. It

⁸³ Considered an elite unit, it was established in the early 1970s, as a «personal security force for Arafat and other PLO leaders» (Katzman 2002:4). The group also carried out terrorist attacks on Israeli targets in the 1980s. Even though it technically ceased to exist with the establishment of the PA, some security officials still identified themselves as members. The Force 17 militia was closely associated with Arafat, and has remained virtually inactive since his death in 2004.

⁸⁴ According to Cubert (cited in Chasdi 1999:101), the Panthers «appear to have been formed initially to persuade Palestinian residents through intimidation and terror not to cooperate with the Israeli authorities.» The Panthers later opposed the talks leading to the Oslo Accords, leading to a conflict with Fateh senior leadership, and was finally banned by Arafat in 1996 (START n.d.A).

⁸⁵ Like the Panthers, the Hawks targeted both Israelis and those Palestinians they considered to be traitors to their cause. A majority of the Hawks were later absorbed into the Palestinian National Security Forces – and specifically the Preventative Security Forces, a branch of the intelligence services (Lia 2006:152).

⁸⁶ Tanzim was established by Arafat in 1995, but quickly developed its own structure and leadership associated with the Fateh's 'young guard'. Headed by Barghouti, Tanzim was created as a result of a series of clashes between the PA security forces and Islamist militants in the 1990s. According to Katzman (2002:5), its hardline position towards Israel «helped siphon Palestinian support from the Islamist groups to the PA and PLO leadership.»

⁸⁷ According to Hoffman (2006:163), the AMB was established as «a specially dedicated suicide terrorist unit [within] Fateh and the irregular militias under its aegis, known as the Tanzim». The AMB stands closer to the Islamic bloc in its rhetorics and ideology than the other Fateh militias, tracing its roots back to Sarayat al-Jihad al-Islami, established by associates of Wazir in the mid-1980s.

⁸⁸ Not included in this analysis are the twenty-one attacks recorded by the IPCD which Fateh conducted in cooperation with HAMAS (9), the PIJ (6), the PRC (3), the PFLP (2) and the DFLP (1). Fateh was also involved in 192 at least fatal intra-Palestinian attacks and clashes in the period.

does still maintain an armed wing, *Kata'ib al-Muqawamah al-Wataniyah al-Filastiniyah*, the Palestinian National Resistance Brigades.

5.2.1.2 The Islamists

HAMAS established its armed wing, *Kata'ib Shahid Izz ad-Din al-Qassam*, the Martyr Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, in 1991.⁸⁹ It has since been responsible for 187 fatal attacks on Israelis. Prior to the establishment of the Brigades, fifteen more fatal attacks were attributed to HAMAS, resulting in a total of 202 fatal attacks in the analysis period.

The military wing of the PIJ was formed in the mid-1980s. Initially known as *Saraya Sayf al-Islam*, the Sword of Islam Brigades; then *Saraya al-Qassam*, the Qassam Brigades; it finally took its current name *Saraya al-Quds*, the Jerusalem Brigades, at the beginning of the 1990s – likely to avoid any confusion with the Qassam Brigades of HAMAS (START n.d.B). The Brigades conducted 81 fatal attacks on Israelis in the analysis period.

The military wings of the two PRC factions, *al-Uyia al-Nasser Salah al-Din* and *Kata'ib al-Nasser Salah al-Din*, 'the Victorious Salah al-Din Brigades' and 'Battalions', are considered as one by the IPCD during the time of analysis. These are responsible for eight fatal acts.


5.2.2 Terrorism in the Analysis

In Figure 5.2, we see how the terrorist violence is distributed through-out the period. The Islamist bloc has been the most active of the two, with 291 fatal acts of violence against the Leftists' 214. During the First Intifadah, 67.8% (59) of these were conducted by Islamists; a figure rising to 80% (64) in the Oslo years. The balance changed in the al-Aqsa Intifadah, when 56.2% (163) were attributed to the Leftist bloc. In the post-Intifadah period, the Islamists have regained their position, carrying the responsibility for 85.4% (41) of the acts.

HAMAS stands out as the most active organization with its 202 attacks, followed by Fateh, with 183. However, an important difference between the two is the distribution: HAMAS conducted 22.7% (46) of its attacks during the First Intifadah, 26.2% (53) in the Oslo years, 41.1% (83) in the al-Aqsa Intifadah, and 9.9% (20) in the post-Intifadah years. Fateh attacks have traditionally been confined to the intifadahs: 11.5% (21) during the First, and 82.0% (150) in the al-Aqsa Intifadah. With the exception of the al-Aqsa Intifadah, in which 51.9% (42) of the PIJ attacks took place, their remaining attacks are relatively evenly distributed: 16.0% (13) in the First Intifadah, 13.6% (11) in the Oslo years, and 18.5% (15) in the post-Intifadah years.

⁸⁹ According to Hoffman (2006:147f), the establishment of a proper military body had by then become an absolute necessity to regain support lost to the PIJ and the secular groups, which had proved capable of executing fatal attacks on Israelis. Initially, the Brigades systematically executed Palestinians suspected of collaboration with the Israeli authorities in the Gaza Strip, and eventually turned towards Israeli targets to derail the peace talks.

Figure 5.2, Fatal Palestinian Terrorist Attacks 1987-2011, by Bloc



The distribution of incidents and fatalities shown in Figure 5.3 compares the six organizations, suggesting the relative impact and size of each organization's militancy in the analysis period. The pie charts also reveals differences in their lethality: While the Fateh share shrinks noticeably, from the 36.2% on the Incidents pie chart to 23.2% on the Fatalities chart, HAMAS and the PIJ shares respectively grow from 40.0% to 51.5% and 16.0% to 20.5%.

Figure 5.3, Fatal Palestinian Terrorist Incidents and Fatalities 1987-2011, by Organization




Figure 5.3 also allows us to see the blocwise distribution, as the Leftists have been coded red and the Islamists green. Even though only a slight majority of the incidents (57.6%) have been caused by the Islamist violence, these have nevertheless caused nearly three quarters (73.2%) of the

fatalities: Palestinian Islamist terrorism caused 983 victim fatalities, while Palestinian Leftist terrorism caused 360. Reasons for this difference in lethality will be further discussed in the Chapter 4.5.3, where the weaponry usage of the two blocs is presented.

Overall, the firearm is still the most common weapon of the Palestinian terrorist, used in 54.1% (273 of 505) of all fatal acts in the analysis period. The gun is followed by 95 suicide bomb attacks, constituting 18.8%; and then 62 attacks with bladed weapons, or 12.3%. While firearms and bladed weapons have claimed averages of 1.6 and 1.3 fatalities per aattack, the suicide bomb stands out as the deadliest weapon of Palestinian terrorism with an average of 7.3 f/a. Through-out the period, suicide bombs claimed 690 victims, while firearms and bladed weapons respectively caused 436 and 81 deaths (for details, see Appendix 3, Table A1).

5.3 Analysis

5.3.1 Who: Testing the Hypotheses on Target Selection


The two basic approaches used here to review the blocs' preferences of civilian or non-civilian targets, are the civilian share of fatalities and the civilian share of intended targets. While the former simply reflects the percentage of civilians among the fatalities; the latter refers to the nature of the target sought by the terrorists, and is measured in number of fatal acts of violence directed towards civilian targets. The three hypotheses presented in Chapter 2.3.2.1 expected the Islamists to be more vile than the Leftists when it comes to targeting non-combatants.

Hypothesis 1: Islamist terrorists target civilians more than their leftist counterparts.

Looking first at the fatalities, the pie charts in Figure 5.4 reveal that the share of civilian fatalities from Palestinian Leftist and Islamist violence are nearly identical: 73.9% (266 of 360) of the Leftists' and 74.4% (731 of 983) of the Islamists'. To properly illustrate the proportional size relationship between the two blocs' militancy, the 360:983 fatality relationship has here been transformed to 10.7:17.7.⁹⁰


⁹⁰ Based on $A = \pi * r^2$, the fatality figures served as A, or the point of departure in the reversed equation, $\sqrt{(A / \pi)}$. Thus, $\sqrt{(360 / \pi)}=10.70$ and $\sqrt{(983 / \pi)}=17.69$. The same has been done in Figure 5.5, with fatal incidents as A: $\sqrt{(214 / \pi)}=8.25$ and $\sqrt{(291 / \pi)}=9.64$. In both cases, the «full size» constant was that of the major (Islamist) pie.

Figure 5.4, Fatalities in Palestinian Terrorist Attacks 1987-2011, by Bloc



Moving on to Figure 5.5, we find the opposite of what was expected in the hypothesis: The Palestinian Leftist bloc has a higher rate of civilian intended targets than its Islamist counterparts. The overall civilian share of targets is 77.6% (166 out of 214) in all fatal incidents instigated by the Leftist bloc, and 69.8% (203 out of 291) by the Islamists.

Figure 5.5, Intended Target Type of Palestinian Terrorist Attacks 1987-2011, by Bloc



In search of patterns to explain this, the geographical distribution of attacks was also considered: 82.8% (48 of 58) and 80.7% (109 of 135) of Leftist attacks in Israel and the West Bank targeted civilians, while only the Gaza Strip saw a slight majority of 52.6% (10 of 19) attacks on non-civilian targets. In comparison, the civilian targets of Islamist attacks account for 85.2% (115 of 135) in Israel, 64.8% (59 of 91) in the West Bank, and 44.6% (29 of 65) in the Gaza Strip (see Appendix 3, Table A2). The main difference therefore lies in the militancy in the West Bank, the only region in which the Leftist also had a higher frequency of attacks than the Islamists.

Initially, this was thought to be related to the fact that the Islamist militants, since 2006, for most parts have been geographically restricted to the Gaza Strip, *Judenfrei* since the withdrawal of all Israeli settlements on August 2005: With the exception of missile attacks, the targets available to

them have been reduced to Israeli security forces guarding the borders to the Strip. However, this is rejected by the fact that the civilian share of fatalities to Islamist has never been higher than the post-Intifadah period.⁹¹ Another explanation is that the Islamists have had limited strike capacities in the West Bank, being in opposition to both Israel and the PNA security forces.

In any instance, Hypothesis 1 is not supported by the data. Palestinian Islamist and Leftist terrorists both prefer Israeli civilian targets over security personnel targets, and have had a somewhat similar increase in targeting civilians since 1987.

Hypothesis 2: Islamist terrorists target children and elderly more than their leftist counterparts.

The IPCD categorizes the civilian fatalities by age, thus allowing us to separate the children (0-17 years) and the elderly (above 65 years) from the general adult population (18 to 64 years). These two groups, considered to be the softest of the soft targets, constitute 18.7% (184) of the Israeli victims of Islamist violence, and 15.3% (55) of Leftist violence.⁹²

Since large suicide bomb attacks have the ability to severely alter the fatality figures and statistics in smaller case-studies like these, a removal of all suicide bomb attacks from the equation was undertaken: The children and the elderly now constitute 9.9% (38) of all victims of Islamist violence, and 11.1% (30) of Leftist violence. In both blocs, the share of children and elderly among the civilian fatalities are even decreased when excluding the suicide bomb attacks: From 21.8% to 15.5% in the Islamist bloc, and from 20.7% to 16.3% in the Leftist bloc.

Hypothesis 2 is not supported by the data. The share of children and elderly victims among the fatalities has remained relatively similar for both the Leftist and the Islamist blocs: Between 1 and 2 out of 10 victim (see Appendix 3, Table A3). Specifically targeting these groups cannot be described as a specific trait of Palestinian Islamist terrorism.

Hypothesis 3: Islamic suicide terrorism targets civilians more than leftist suicide terrorism.

⁹¹ 59.0% (62 of 105) of victims of Islamist terrorism in the First Intifadah were civilians, rising to 68.6% (160 of 229) in the Oslo Years, to 77.3% (437 of 565) in the al-Aqsa Intifadah, and finally to 85.7% (72 of 84) in the post-Intifadah period. Also, the civilian share of Leftist terrorism fatalities have followed similar patterns: From 69.7% (23 of 33) in the First Intifadah to 100.0% (20 of 20) in the Oslo Years, to 72.4% (215 of 297) in the al-Aqsa Intifadah, and to 80.0% (8 of 10) in the current period.

⁹² The single attack causing the highest number of child fatalities was conducted by a HAMAS suicide bomber in Tel Aviv on June 1st 2001, killing one Ukrainian and eleven Israeli children, as well as seven adults. The attack claiming most lives among the elderly, was another HAMAS suicide bomb attack in Netanya on March 27th 2002, killing twenty-one elderly Israelis, along with seven adults and two Israeli non-civilians. Of the Leftist bloc, a Fateh suicide bomber in Jerusalem on March 3rd 2002, killing seven Israeli children and four adults. The highest number of elderly victims in Leftist attacks is two, as results of two suicide bomb attacks by the PFLP and Fateh.

When compared to Palestinian Leftist suicide terrorism, Palestinian Islamist suicide terrorism has been far more frequent, with 73 to 22 «successful» attacks; caused more fatalities, with 599 to 91; and also been twice as lethal, with a fatality rate of 8.2 f/a to 4.1 f/a (see Appendix 3, Tables A1 and A4). If one were to consider only the nature of the intended targets, the Leftists have had a slightly higher frequency of civilian targets – but civilians nevertheless make out the vast majority of targets in both blocs.⁹³

Hypothesis 3 is not supported by the analysis, as the civilian has clearly been the preferred target of suicide terrorism by both blocs. Based on the 95 suicide bombings included in this analysis, targeting civilians cannot be marked as a distinguishable characteristic of Palestinian Islamic suicide terrorism: The data rather suggests that targeting civilians is a typical trait of suicide terrorism regardless of ideological adherence. Furthermore, it echoes Pape's (2003:346) claim that the coercive logic of suicide terrorism is to cause «mounting civilian costs to overwhelm the target state's interest in the issue in dispute and so to cause it to concede the terrorists' political demands.»

5.3.2 Where: Testing the Hypotheses on the Role of Location

Chapter 2.3.2.2 presented three hypotheses concerning the relationship between terrorist tactics and geographical locations – separating between the *disputed territories* sought liberated by nationalist-separatist terrorist organizations; and territory *behind enemy lines*. In the case of the Palestinians, the former will refer to the Gaza Strip and the West Bank; and the latter to Israel. To analyze the geographical distribution of Palestinian terrorist violence, the IPCD allows us to review the developments through-out the six Israeli districts and sixteen Palestinian governorates – five in the Gaza Strip, and eleven in the West Bank (see also Appendix 3, Figure A1).

Hypothesis 4: Terrorist attacks behind enemy lines kill more civilians than attacks in disputed territories.

The majority of both blocs' terrorist activities on Israeli soil have targeted civilians: 84.5% (163 of 193) of all attacks in Israel have targeted civilians, compared to 66.5% (206 of 310) of the attacks taking place in the territories. This is also reflected in the fatality figures: 81.9% (667 of 814) of the victims killed on Israeli soil were civilian, compared to 62.7% (330 of 526) of the victims in the

⁹³ Of the 73 successful suicide attacks conducted by the Islamic bloc, 61 attacks (83.56%) targeted Israeli civilians – killing 466 Israeli civilians, 13 foreign civilians and 68 Israeli non-civilians. In comparison, the Leftist bloc conducted 22 successful attacks, of which 20 (90.90%) targeted civilians – killing 79 Israeli civilians, 2 foreign civilians, and 8 Israeli non-civilians.

territories (see Appendix 3, Table A5).⁹⁴

The analysis finds strong support for Hypothesis 4. Furthermore, there are no significant differences between the two blocs: When Palestinian militants conduct attacks behind enemy lines, civilians account for 81.5% (549 of 674) of all fatalities to Islamist terrorism, and for 84.2% (118 of 140) of those killed by Leftist terrorists (as seen in Appendix 3, Table A5).

Hypothesis 5: Terrorist attacks behind enemy lines are more lethal than attacks in disputed territories.

The relationship between the geographic location and the degree of savagery of the attack has here been measured in fatalities per attack (f/a). Figure 5.6 confirms a higher number of fatalities in the attacks taking place within Israel, for both blocs – but particularly for the Islamists. Overall, the fatal acts that took place inside Israel claimed an average of 4.2 f/a (814 in 193), while those in the territories claimed 1.7 f/a (526 in 310).⁹⁵ Figure 5.6 and the following discussions on hypotheses 5 and 6 are based on figures presented in Table A5, found in Appendix 3.


The most lethal attacks conducted by the Leftist bloc have taken place inside Israeli districts: In Tel Aviv, it claimed an average of 4.4 f/a, and Jerusalem witnessed a rate of 3.9 f/a; while Qalqilya is the only Palestinian governorate with a multiple fatality rate (2.2 f/a). Overall, its attacks inside Israel had an average fatality rate of 2.4 f/a, considerably higher than in the West Bank (1.4 f/a) and the Gaza Strip (1.3 f/a).

Here lies one of the most explicit differences between the blocs: The Islamists' attacks in the Israeli districts have been significantly more lethal than its Leftist counterparts: 8.6 f/a in Jerusalem, 7.6 f/a in Haifa, 5.3 f/a in Tel Aviv, 5.0 f/a in the Center, and 4.3 f/a in the North. The 1.8 f/a rate in the South is caused by the increase in missile attacks since the end of the al-Aqsa Intifadah: Up until February 2005, the rate had been 2.6 f/a. The Islamists also had multiple fatality rates in five Palestinian governorates; al-Quds (2.8 f/a), Tulkarm (2.8 f/a), Nablus (2.2 f/a), Hebron and Deir al-Balah (both 2.0 f/a).

⁹⁴ The overall civilian fatality rates are also three times higher in Israel than in the territories, with 3.5 f/a (667 in 193) to 1.1 f/a (330 in 310).

⁹⁵ This was the case for the entire period of analysis: Israel saw an average of 1.9 f/a in the First Intifadah, rising to 5.0 in the Oslo Years, 4.5 f/a in the al-Aqsa Intifadah, and 2.2 in the post-Intifadah period. The fatality rate in the territories peaked in the al-Aqsa Intifadah, claiming a 1.8 f/a rate.

Figure 5.6, Fatality Rate of Palestinian Terrorist Attacks 1987-2011, by Bloc and Location



Hypothesis 5 is strongly supported by the analysis, and is valid for both blocs. It should still be noted that the Islamist bloc stands out as specifically calamitous in its attacks on Israeli soil, with an average fatality rate of 5.0 fatalities per attack (674 in 135) – more than twice as many as those in the territories, with a rate of 2.0 f/a (309 in 156). In comparison, the Leftists caused a rate of 2.4 f/a (140 in 58) inside Israel and 1.4 f/a (217 in 154) in the territories.


Hypothesis 6: Islamist terrorists prefer to attack behind enemy lines, while Leftist terrorists prefer to attack in disputed territories.

Figure 5.7 shows the distribution of fatal attacks in the analysis period. Here, one can see how the al-Quds and Ramallah & al-Bireh governorates – the scenes of 22 (10.3%) and 33 (15.4%) fatal attacks, respectively – stood out as the focal points of the Leftist bloc. Their violence was also felt in the Jenin and Nablus governorates, with 16 (7.5%) and 19 (8.9%) attacks; while in Israel, the Center district was struck hardest, with 17 attacks (7.9%).

The overall distribution of fatal acts caused by the Leftist bloc shows that 63.1% (135) took

place in the West Bank, 27.1% (58) inside Israel, and 8.9% (19) in the Gaza Strip.⁹⁶ The West Bank was the only region in which Leftist terrorism occurred more frequently than Islamist terrorism, with 135 to 91 fatal incidents: In Israel, the Islamist bloc caused more than twice as many, with 135 to 58; and more than three times as many in the Gaza Strip, with 65 to 19 (see Appendix 3, Table A5).

Figure 5.7, Location of Palestinian Terrorist Attacks 1987-2011, by Bloc



The data also confirms that the Islamic bloc prefers to attack Israelis inside Israel, rather than Israelis in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank – if one considers the two latter as separate entities: 46.4% (135) of its attacks took place inside Israel, 31.3% (91) in the West Bank, and 22.3% (65) in the Gaza Strip. 32 of the attacks, a third of all registered in the West Bank, took place in the Hebron governorate, an area that has become a symbol of the clash between Jewish and Islamic religious currents. Still, the scene of most fatal Islamist terrorism in the analysis period is the Israeli South district, with 40 registered acts (13.7%).⁹⁷

⁹⁶ It should also be noted that since the al-Aqsa Intifadah, the Leftist bloc have conducted no fatal attacks on Israelis inside Israel, nor in the Gaza Strip. This could be a result of restraint, but also due to the change in circumstance – with the construction of the Israeli separation barrier between the West Bank and Israel, and Fateh being ousted from the Gaza Strip by HAMAS.

⁹⁷ It should be noted that 22 of these acts – most of which have been missile attacks from the Gaza Strip – have taken place since the end of the al-Aqsa Intifadah, as the district became the prime target for Islamist groups operating in

When isolating the city of Jerusalem from the Israeli Jerusalem district and the Palestinian al-Quds governorate, the Leftist bloc conducted 22 fatal attacks: 11 in the Western and 9 in the Eastern parts of the city, making up for 10.9% of their attacks. The Islamists executed 33 fatal attacks in Jerusalem, 20 in the Western and 13 in the Eastern parts, constituting 11.3% of their attacks. The holy city thus seems equally important to both blocs.⁹⁸

Overall, Hypothesis 6 is supported by the analysis: Palestinian Islamist terrorism has targeted Israelis in Israel almost as much as it has targeted Israelis in the territories, which is considerably more than its Leftist counterpart. The distribution of fatalities also reveal how the majority of victims of Islamist terrorism were killed inside Israel, suggesting that making their military presence felt had a higher priority here than in the territories. The majority of both targets and fatalities of Leftist terrorism in the analysis period have been Israelis in the territories, and specifically in the West Bank.

This could suggest that the geographical distribution of terrorist activities reflect each bloc's national strategy: The Islamist bloc has firmly rejected any apportion of the British Mandate of Palestine, therefore equally distributing its terrorist activities through-out the territory, while seeking to inflict most damage upon Israelis in Israel. And with the exception of the PFLP, the ultimate goal of the Leftist bloc in the analysis period has been to establish a national autonomy in the territories, thus considering the territories as its primary battlefield. Nonetheless, the data shows that the distribution of PFLP terrorism is far more similar to the Leftists than the Islamists⁹⁹ – rejecting the connection to national strategy.

5.3.3 How: Testing the Hypotheses on Weaponry

Chapter 2.3.2.3 presented four hypotheses associated with weaponry usage and military tactics. The Weaponry variable of the IPCD allows us to explore how the attacks have been conducted. The hypotheses expect the Islamists to behave as 'new terrorists', meaning more lethal and more fond of explosives than the Leftists; and that weaponry usage is influenced by sponsorships and/or the Rapoportian wave from which the organizations emerged in.

the HAMAS-ruled Strip.

⁹⁸ This is also reflected by the fact that the deadliest attacks by both blocs have taken place in the city of Jerusalem, when isolated from the district of Jerusalem and the al-Quds governorate. The 33 Islamist attacks have a fatality rate of 7.0, and when separating the Eastern and Western areas of the city, they respectively average on 3.5 and 9.3 f/a. Similarly, the 20 Leftist attacks have a fatality rate of 2.7, with a East-West distribution of 1.9 and 3.4 f/a.

⁹⁹ As seen above, the Islamist bloc has a Israel-Territories distribution percentage of 46.4 to 53.6. Without the PFLP, the Leftist bloc distribution is 27.1 to 72.9. The PFLP distribution is 26.9 to 73.1.

Hypothesis 7: Islamist terrorist attacks are deadlier than those by their leftist counterparts.

As noted in the discussion of Hypothesis 4, the attacks conducted by Islamists have been more than twice as lethal than those by the Leftists – with respective fatality rates on 3.4 (983 in 291) and 1.7 (360 in 214) per attack.¹⁰⁰

Even when excluding the suicide bomb, which has been the deadliest weapon in the conflict and most frequently applied by the Islamists; the Islamist bloc – now short of 73 attacks and 599 fatalities – still has an average of 1.8 fatalities per attack (384 in 218), while the Leftist bloc – with the exclusion of 22 attacks and 91 fatalities – averages on 1.4 f/a (269 in 192). As seen in Appendix 3, Table A5, Palestinian Islamist terrorism cause higher fatality rates than Leftist terrorism in all registered attack types: Firearms (1.9 f/a to 1.4 f/a), bladed weapons (1.4 f/a to 1.1 f/a), non-suicide explosives (2.0 f/a to 1.6 f/a), and suicide explosives (8.2 f/a to 5.2 f/a).

Hypothesis 7 finds strong support in the analysis. Palestinian Islamist terrorism has been twice as deadly as Palestinian Leftist terrorism in the analysis period, and killed more people than the Leftists regardless of the weaponry type applied.

Hypothesis 8: Islamist terrorists are more likely to use explosives than their leftist counterparts.


In Figure 5.8, the data on weaponry usage has been distributed blocwise, highlighting some significant differences (see also Appendix 3, Table A6). A clear majority, 72.9% (156 of 214), of all Palestinian Leftist terrorism in the analysis period has been conducted with firearms. Bladed weapon assaults account for 23 attacks (10.7%), while another 22 (10.3%) were suicide bombings. Leftist weaponry also seems to follow a geographical pattern: Firearms were used in 85.1% (131 of 154) of all their terrorist acts in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, but only in 39.7% (23 of 58) of those taking place inside Israel. Also, Israel suffered a much higher share of both suicide bombings (29.3%) and bladed weapon assaults (22.4%) than the territories (see Appendix 3, Table A6).

With 117 lethal attacks and a 40.2% share, guns were the most common weapon among the Islamist bloc as well – but still do not make up for half of their fatal military efforts in the analysis period: 25.1% were the 77 instances of suicide bomb attacks, while another 13.4% refer to the 39 fatal attacks by bladed weapons. Furthermore, 29 (10.0%) fatal acts were by missiles – a weaponry type so far exclusive to the Islamist bloc in the IPCD (see Appendix 3, Table A6). Geographically, a

¹⁰⁰ On Israeli soil, the Islamists are more than twice as lethal, with 5.0 to 2.4 fatalities per attack. In the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the relationships are 2.1 to 1.4 f/a, and 1.8 to 1.3 f/a. For details, see Table A5 in Appendix 3.


pattern somewhat similar to the Leftist bloc appears: While firearms have been used in 60.9% (95 of 156) attacks in the territories, it drops to only 16.3% (22 of 135) inside Israel – equal to bladed weapon assaults (16.3%), and missile attacks (21 acts, or 15.6%). Here, 58 suicide bombings constitute 43.0% of all attacks.

Figure 5.8, Weaponry in Fatal Palestinian Terrorist Attacks 1987-2011, by Bloc



The distribution of fatalities by weaponry type in Figure 5.9 truly demonstrates the importance of the differences seen in Figure 5.8: The pieces representing firearms and bladed weapons have shrunk, while the suicide bomb pieces have increased significantly. The vast majority of fatalities – 599 of 983, or 60.9% – by Islamist terrorism were victims of suicide bomb attacks, now completely dominating the graphic.

Figure 5.9, Fatalities from Palestinian Terrorism 1987-2011, by Weaponry and Bloc



Overall, Hypothesis 8 is confirmed in Figure 5.8 (see also Appendix 3, Table A6 for details), showing that attacks in which explosives, suicide bombs and missiles were applied, constitute 40.9% (119 of 291) of the Islamist terrorism in the analysis period – as opposed to only 12.6% (27

of 214) of the Leftist terrorism. Since the end of the al-Aqsa Intifadah, the missile has emerged as the primary weapon of the bloc. This can be explained in some part by the construction of the Israeli security barrier along and in the West Bank, but mostly by the obvious geographical consequences of the Fateh-HAMAS conflict.

Hypothesis 9: Terrorist groups sponsored by the same state or states will operate more alike.

To a certain degree, this hypothesis disregards the established separation of the Leftist and Islamist blocs: As previously seen in Table 3.2, state sponsorships in the analysis period have mostly concerned the opposition groups, following Fateh domination of the Palestinian National Authority since its establishment: Since the late 1980s, both Iran and Syria have supported HAMAS and the PIJ – a bond strengthened by the establishment of relations with the Lebanese Hizballah in 1992-1993. Also, the PRC received support from Iran, but to a lesser extent than the two more established Islamist organizations. As the only Leftist organization, the PFLP has received support from Ba'athist Syria since the early 1990s.

Table 5.1 reviews the composition of weaponry applied by each of the six organizations in the analysis period. When looking at the weaponry applied by the PFLP, it does not stand out from the rest of the Leftist bloc – best separated from the Islamists in having firearms as its preferred weapon. Its slightly higher percentage of bladed weapons and suicide bomb attacks can be explained by the relatively low number of fatal attacks than Fateh, and can overall not be said to resemble neither HAMAS or the PIJ, which are also backed by the Syrian regime.


Table 5.1, Weaponry in Fatal Palestinian Terrorism 1987-2011, by Organization

	Bladed weapons	Explosives	Firearms	Missiles	Suicide bomb	Other
Fateh	9.3% (17)	2.7% (5)	74.9% (137)	0.0% (0)	9.8% (18)	3.3% (6)
The PFLP	19.2% (5)	0.0% (0)	61.5% (16)	0.0% (0)	15.4% (4)	3.9% (1)
The DFLP	20.0% (1)	0.0% (0)	60.0% (3)	0.0% (0)	0.0% (0)	20.0% (1)
HAMAS	13.8% (28)	4.0% (8)	42.6% (86)	10.9% (22)	23.8% (48)	4.9% (10)
The PIJ	13.6% (11)	9.9% (8)	33.3% (27)	6.2% (5)	29.6% (24)	7.4% (6)
The PRC	0.0% (0)	12.5% (1)	50.0% (4)	25.0% (2)	12.5% (1)	0.0% (0)
Total	12.3% (62)	4.3% (22)	54.1% (273)	5.7% (29)	18.8% (95)	4.7% (24)

The Iranian-backed Islamist organizations all have a below-average usage of firearms, have been responsible for every fatal missile attack in the period, and have all applied explosives to a larger extent than the organizations not sponsored by Iran. HAMAS and the PIJ also dominate the suicide

bomb statistics. Finally, a very similar share of their attacks have also been conducted with bladed weapons, but the majority of these took place in the First Intifadah.

Figure 5.10, Palestinian Islamist Bloc's Weaponry in Fatal Terrorist Attacks, 1987-2011



PIJ senior militant Sheikh 'Abdallah al-Shami (as quoted in Barsky 2002:12) has said «[f]irst we only had knives, then we got guns, then bombs, now car bombs.» This is, as demonstrated in Figure 5.10, not a too bad assessment of the development of the weaponry used by the Palestinian Islamists Islamic bloc – though an up-to-date quote would have included missiles. During the First Intifadah, bladed weapons – knives, hatchets, axes – were used in 40.7% (24) of all attacks conducted by the Islamists. Following the expulsion of militant Islamist leadership to Lebanon, one can see an increase in the usage of firearms, as well as the introduction of suicide bombs. The graphics also show that towards the end of the al-Aqsa Intifadah and the subsequent take-over of the Gaza Strip, the missile have emerged as the primary weapon of the Islamists.

Hypothesis 9 is, at best, vaguely supported by the analysis. The three Iranian-backed organizations – the entire Palestinian Islamist bloc in this study – seem to share certain traits, such as a higher usage of explosive-based weaponry than the organizations not receiving support from Teheran. Nevertheless, state sponsorship alone cannot serve as an exclusive explanation to these shared traits: The circumstances under which their militancy has developed, at war with Israel and in (an often violent) opposition to the PNA, have also contributed to the usage of bombs and missiles rather than firearms. The Islamist organizations are also representatives a different generation of terrorism, as will be discussed below. Still, the Iranian sponsorship has undoubtedly

assisted in this progress and facilitated it.¹⁰¹

Hypothesis 10: Terrorist groups of the same Rapoportian wave will operate more alike.

As described in Chapter 2.2, the Leftist and Islamist blocs correspond to the Rapoportian 'New Left' and 'Religious' waves of terrorism – respectively emerging in the 1960s and the 1980s. Table 5.1 has already confirmed that the three organizations of each bloc have relatively similar compositions of weaponry usage: As a rule of thumb, the New Left organizations still prefer firearms; while the Religious organizations use more explosives – but not exclusively so.¹⁰²

The principle can also be said to correspond to international trends in terrorist weaponry recorded by the GTD (and illustrated in Figure 2.3), in which the usage of explosives have increased, all the while the share of firearm terrorism have decreased, since the 1980s. As the differences in Palestinian terrorist weaponry echoes this development, it suggests that this is a matter of generational differences. However, these differences might fade in the years to come, as the New Left organizations are likely to adjust to modern-era terrorism – perhaps best demonstrated by Fateh and the PFLP adopting the suicide bomb during the al-Aqsa Intifadah.

In any instance, Hypothesis 10 is supported by the analysis: The weaponry of Palestinian terrorism seems to be associated with the era from which the organization emerged.

5.4 Main Findings and Model Revision

5.4.1 Summary of Main Findings

The twelve hypotheses were designed to test the model presented in Chapter 2, in which Palestinian terrorists' ideological adherence was connected to the military tactics applied by them through three factors: *Who* the terrorists have targeted, *where* the terrorists have struck, and *how* the terrorist attacks have been executed.

Ideology was thought to directly influence the tactics through target selection. Here, civilian targets were separated from non-civilian. However, the analysis found no significant differences between the Palestinian Leftist and Islamist terrorist organizations in the period of analysis. For both ideological blocs, roughly three quarters of both the fatalities they have caused and the identified targets of their attacks have been civilian. Also, both blocs have targeted and killed a higher share of civilians in their attacks inside Israel than those in the territories.

¹⁰¹ If the hypothesis is correct, one can expect changes within the Islamist militancy in the years to come: While the PIJ has remained loyal to its Iranian benefactors, HAMAS has turned its back on Teheran's most important ally by siding with the opposition in the Syrian civil war, while taking steps towards post-Mubarak Egypt.

¹⁰² Additionally, the Religious bloc has sent thousands of missiles from the Gaza Strip since the intra-Palestinian separation of 2007; all the while not a single rocket has been fired from the Fateh-ruled West Bank.

A similar share of children and elderly among their fatalities also rejects any notion that one bloc should be more malevolent in its target selection than the other. Nevertheless, it should be noted that Palestinian Islamist terrorism has occurred more frequently than Palestinian Leftist terrorism, and that the average Islamist terrorist attack killed twice as many as the average Leftist attack, causing nearly three quarters of all the fatalities in the analysis period. This corresponds to the claims that the 'new terrorism' – Rapoport's fourth, religious wave – is in fact more blood-thirsty and fanatic than its predecessors.

Next, the model predicted that the relationship between ideology and grand strategy, in this case the overall national territorial demands, would also influence the geographical distribution of Palestinian terrorism. This initially appeared to receive some support in the analysis, as there have been significant differences in terms of where they have struck: Nearly three quarters of Leftist terrorism have occurred in the territories, while roughly half of the Islamist terrorist attacks have struck inside Israel. And while the Islamists have a relatively even distribution of attacks in the territories, the vast majority of Leftist terrorist activities have taken place in the West Bank.

Still, the connection between ideology and grand strategy is not really supported by the data, as the geographical distribution of fatal attacks conducted by the PFLP – the only Leftist organization firmly rejecting a two-state solution – are much more similar to the Leftist bloc than the Islamists. The connection between the grand strategy and the geographical distribution of terrorist activities is perhaps too weak, suggesting that the differences in the latter rather stem from generationally different views on how to implement the former. This might be a result of the long, shared history of the three New Left organizations; as well as skepticism towards assimilating with the strategies of their religious fundamentalist rivals.¹⁰³

Finally, ideology was thought to indirectly influence weaponry usage, through internal and external supporters' contributions to each organization's military capacity. The analysis has confirmed differences in how Palestinian Leftist and Islamist terrorist attacks have been executed: The Islamists have applied a more heterogeneous and explosive-based toolkit of destruction, while the Leftists have remained closest to their firearms. Regardless of what weapon used to conduct the attacks, Islamists have also been more lethal than the Leftists.

The causes for these differences are complex. Due to the covert nature of terrorism, the level of local support will determine the physical possibilities for conventional military training. And when Fateh seized control of the Palestinian National Authority and its security apparatus upon its establishment, they – and contemporary co-supporters of the Oslo Accords – gained important

¹⁰³ This was also reflected in the fact that also the PFLP weaponry usage was of a typical Leftist profile, rather than an Islamist profile, despite receiving support from the Syrian regime in the analysis period.


advantages. The Islamist-led opposition now had to steer clear of not only Israeli, but also Palestinian security personnel. A concurrent increase in foreign support from Iran through the Lebanese Hizballah introduced the explosive-based weaponry to the Islamists in 1992, and continued to contribute to widen the gap between a Fateh-dominated PNA and the HAMAS-dominated opposition through-out the analysis period (Byman 2007:4f).

5.4.2 The Revised Model

Based on the findings, a revised model is presented in Figure 5.12, with significant differences from the model presented in Chapter 2. The entire question of *who* terrorists strike has been dismissed in the revised model. No evidence suggesting any ideological differences have surfaced when it comes to civilian/non-civilian target selection in Palestinian nationalist-separatist terrorism in the analysis period.

Like the original model, ideology is still thought to influence the grand strategy – but the grand strategy is no longer believed to affect *where* Palestinian terrorists strike. Instead, the revised model suggests that ideology directly influences the geographical distribution of attacks. This is now believed to result from the generational differences between the New Left and the Religious terrorism, echoing the 'old guard' and a 'new guard' of Palestinian terrorists. The three Leftist organizations in the study have a long and entwined history of armed struggle in the territories, Jordan, Lebanon, and back; while the three Islamist organizations all have emerged from the territories.

Figure 5.11, A Suggested Model of the Role of Ideology in Terrorist Tactics (Revised)



The revised model also assumes that ideology may also indirectly influence the geographical distribution: As a result of intra-Palestinian conflicts in the analysis period, which have been fueled by foreign support; the Gaza Strip and the West Bank have become separated not only physically, but politically as well. The military capacities of the Leftist bloc are now concentrated in the West

Bank, while those of the Islamists are in the Gaza Strip.

A similar set of mechanisms are believed to influence *how* terrorists strike: Ideology's indirect influence on the terrorist organizations' *modi operandi* through support and military capacity stands out as the only survivor from the original model. Palestinian Islamist terrorism has developed under persecution from the Fateh-dominated PNA and the Israeli security apparatuses, but with a constant Iranian backing – resulting in a more varied and more explosive-based arsenal. Meanwhile, the Leftist bloc's proximity to the PNA security apparatuses has allowed for more conventional military means.

6 CONCLUSION

6.1 Contributions to the Literature and Future Research

The revised model to explain the role of ideology in terrorist tactics (Figure 5.11) reflects the outcome of the thesis. Here, ideological adherence seems to influence *where* and *how* Palestinian nationalist-separatists terrorists strike, but not their choices of civilian or non-civilian targets. These findings constitute the thesis' main contribution to the literature:

As for the geographical distribution of attacks, Islamists have a higher frequency and share of attacks executed *behind enemy lines*; while Leftist militancy has remained closer to home, mostly taking place within the Gaza Strip and the West Bank – and primarily the latter of the two. This supplements two previous case studies on how nationalist-separatist terrorist organizations choose to operate differently on these two territories (Mccartan et al. 2008, Røislien & Røislien 2010), suggesting that there is also an ideological component to it. The data also confirms the two previous studies' observations on how terrorist attacks taking place behind enemy lines are more lethal and kill a higher share of civilians than those taking place in the territories of dispute.

Weaponry-wise, Palestinian Islamists has had a higher frequency and share of attacks in which less conventional, primarily explosive-based tools of destruction have been applied; while Palestinian Leftist militancy has remained more conventional, basing itself on the use of firearms. This corresponds to the general developments in international terrorism, as recorded by the Global Terrorism Database and commented on by Hoffman (1993). It can also, to a very limited extent, supplement claims of the 'new terrorism' being more lethal than its predecessors – as explosives tend to cause more fatalities than firearms.

Equally important as the observation of some phenomena, is the lack of observation of another: The 'new terrorists' alleged taste for softer targets failed to emerge from the data, showing instead that the civilian share of fatalities remained equally high among both the New Left and Religious Palestinian terrorists. However, while the aforementioned differences in weaponry usage have been crucial in explaining how the Palestinian Islamist bloc has caused more than twice as many fatalities as the Leftist bloc; they do not explain why the Islamist terrorist attacks – regardless of weaponry – have been more lethal than Leftist terrorist attacks in the analysis period.

From this, a new theory emerges: Attack fierceness was initially – and wrongfully – expected to influence *who* was attacked, and therefore to be observed in the share of civilian fatalities. This fierceness now seems closer to *how* the attacks are conducted – as a supplement to

the choice of weaponry, to be observed in the fatality rates. From this perspective, the findings apparently confirm the 'new' terrorists organizations' preference for mass carnage – or, at least, *more* carnage, when compared to its predecessors.

Interestingly, there is little that speaks in favor of the differences found between the two ideological blocs having anything to do with distinguishable characteristics found within Marxist or Islamist ideologies. The actual role played by ideology thus seems limited: Ideological adherences have certainly facilitated the development of alliances and sponsorships, and exercised influence over rhetoric and public opinion – but the direct relationship between the essences of different ideologies and the choice of military tactics remains unclear, if at all existent: The mere age of the organization is perhaps as good a denominator as its core ideology.

The longstanding culture of perpetual and authoritarian leadership found within the Palestinian New Left organizations has also contributed to the differences. The analysis period witnessed the emergence of internal struggles within these organizations' 'old' and 'young' guards for influence on policymaking upon the latter's return to the territories. It is the 'young' guards who have been responsible for the New Left's adoption of suicide terrorism, and also the embrace of more Islamic nationalist symbols – suggesting that differences may be generational, and that the future leaderships of the New Left, sharing the basic social background in the territories with its Islamist counterparts, may also operate more alike.

Then again, this generational difference is perhaps, too, superficial. Considering the observations made by Pape (2003) on the strategic logic of suicide terrorism, the New Left's 'young' guards' adoption of suicide bombings can also be interpreted as an adaptation to modern territorial conflicts – in which suicide terrorism have successfully coerced policy changes in earlier cases. This only underscores that future studies of the relationship between ideology and terrorist tactics must carefully take into consideration the historical developments and the social backgrounds of the terrorist organizations in question.

Added to the explanatory model, the thesis also promotes a system of terrorist organization classification in which the ideology of the organization, here following the framework provided by Rapoport (2002); is to be combined with territorial ambitions, following an interpretation of Hegghammer's (2005) division of international, national-revolutionary and nationalist-separatist Islamist terrorist groups. By uniting these two characteristics, a tidier classification of terrorist organizations is achieved than by ideology or territorial ambitions alone.

This framework facilitates for comparative studies on different terrorist ideology types found on the same territorial level, like this thesis; or on the same ideology type found on different territorial levels, such as global Islamist terrorism and nationalist-revolutionary Islamist terrorism.

Comparisons do not necessarily need to be concerned with terrorists' offensive military tactics, but allows for review of other non-statistical features and characteristics – such as rhetoric, alliance-building, ideological programs, and leadership cultures.

As a final contribution to future research, the thesis also introduced the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Database (IPCD). Despite including only the successful attacks conducted by the six major Palestinian terrorist organizations' – effectively utilizing less than a tenth of the total size of the dataset – the dataset's potential for future research cannot be understated: Its recorded 7,039 fatal acts of politically motivated violence between and among Israelis and Palestinians since 1987 are described with 18 variables, allowing insights unprecedented in detail and range into the progression of conflict violence – inviting a wide range of academic approaches.

For example, the IPCD data can supplement concurrent public surveys among Israelis and/or Palestinians to test for short-term and long-term effects of the conflict violence on public opinion; or the data can be applied in time series analyses to test for Granger causality through-out various Israeli-Palestinian confrontations.¹⁰⁴ Finally, the IPCD itself is by no means set in stone, and invites criticism and suggestions for technical improvement of later, expanded versions of the dataset.

¹⁰⁴ A similar effort has been undertaken by Jaeger & Paserman (2008), examining the dynamics in Israeli-Palestinian violence from 2000-2005, finding “no evidence that the Palestinians and Israelis are engaged in a predictable 'tit-for-tat' cycle of violence”. The IPCD would allow for vast extensions of the time periods available for analysis.

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Codebook

The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Database

IPCD Variables &
Inclusion Criteria

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INTRODUCTION


This document is intended to reflect the collection and coding decisions for the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Database (IPCD). The event database seeks to record all acts of fatal political violence between and among Israelis and Palestinians, and is the only one of its kind.

The IPCD differs from other datasets on fatal political violence, such as the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) Battle-Related Deaths Dataset, in its detail and focus on a single conflict. It is also different from the traditional datasets on terrorism, such as the Global Terrorist Database (GTD), in its inclusion of non-terrorist acts and actors, as well as recording bilateral violence.

The IPCD records fatal *acts* rather than fatal *incidents*. An incident may consist of a number of fatal and non-fatal acts, actions and reactions, involving a varying number of actors causing a varying number of fatalities. To thoroughly review the development of fatal violence over time, the focus has remained on with what and by who the fatalities were caused.

The IPCD currently contains 7,039 recorded acts of fatal political violence, all from December 9th 1987 to December 31st 2011: 5,734 from Israeli-Palestinian/Palestinian-Israeli violence, 1,304 intra-Palestinian violence, and 1 (one) act of intra-Israeli violence. It contains 12,093 recorded fatalities: 10,386 from Israeli-Palestinian/Palestinian-Israeli violence, 1,706 from intra-Palestinian violence, and 1 (one) from intra-Israeli violence.

Figure 1, Fatal Acts of Violence and Fatalities by Conflict Type Recorded by the IPCD



This current period of twenty-five years, initiated by the outbreak of the First Intifadah in December of 1987, may informally be referred to as the uprising period. Future versions of the database will seek to expand backwards in time to include the initial occupation period (1967-1987), the post-independence period (1949-1967), and the colonial period (1920-1948).¹⁰⁵

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These periods represent four different stages of the conflict, all initiated by exceedingly important turning points: The introduction of British colonial rule on July 1st 1920; the General Armistice Agreements between Israel and Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria, the final of which was signed on July 20th 1949; and the cease-fire following the Six-Day War on June 11th 1967.

This codebook is divided into two parts – the first being an introduction to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Database, the second being a presentation of its eighteen categories of variables and their possible values. The introductory part will outline the inclusion criteria, discuss terminology, and present the data collection methodology.

Inclusion Criteria

For an event to be included in the IPCD, the following attributes must be present:

Location: The act took place inside Israel, or in the Palestinian territories

Outcome: The act resulted in one or more fatalities

Political: The act took place during an incident instigated by, or in another way directly involving, one or more politically motivated actors¹⁰⁶

The following events are included:

- Israelis kill Palestinians in a political setting¹⁰⁷
- Palestinians kill Israelis in a political setting
- Israelis kill Israelis in a political setting
- Palestinians kill Palestinians in a political setting
- Israelis, intending to kill Palestinians in a political setting, kill international citizens
- Palestinians, intending to kill Israelis in a political setting, kill international citizens
- Non-Israelis, acting on behalf of one or more Israeli armed political organizations, kill Palestinians
- Non-Palestinians, acting on behalf of one or more Palestinian armed political organizations, kill Israelis

The following events are excluded:

- Israelis kill Palestinians in a non-political setting
- Palestinians kill Israelis in a non-political setting
- Israelis kill Israelis in a non-political setting
- Palestinians kill Palestinians in a non-political setting
- Israelis kill Palestinians outside of Israel and the Palestinian territories
- Palestinians kill Israelis outside of Israel and the Palestinian territories
- Non-Palestinians, not acting on behalf of any Palestinian armed organization, kill Israelis in Israel or in the Palestinian territories in a political setting

All non-fatal violence is excluded. A fatality is a definite term, while a casualty may range from severe, life-threatening injuries to bruises and concussions.

Terminology

¹⁰⁶ *Politically motivated actors:* Members of the Israeli security apparatuses, members of the Palestinian Authority security apparatuses, members of Israeli and Palestinian terrorist organizations, as well as politically motivated Israeli and Palestinian militants without organizational affiliation.

¹⁰⁷ *A political setting:* All incidents instigated by one or more of the politically motivated actors described in the previous footnote, for political gains. This excludes law-enforcing activities of the Israeli and Palestinian security apparatuses not related to state security (*a non-political setting*), such as actions towards economically motivated criminals. It will still include Palestinian security apparatuses' actions towards suspected collaborators.

Act, Not Incident

The IPCD is an event database, seeking to record fatal acts rather than fatal incidents. Event databases on unilateral violence, such as terrorist incident databases, may seek to record attacks – holding the attacker responsible for all casualties and fatalities. In a conflict database, recording bilateral violence, this is not a satisfactory solution.

A hypothetical scenario may serve as an example: Members of a Palestinian terrorist group hurl grenades at a group of Israelis at a marketplace in the Palestinian territories, killing one Israeli. Israeli soldiers arrive at the scene, shooting to death one of the assailants. More troops arrive, leading to a shoot-out between the soldiers and the remaining terrorists. A Palestinian woman is killed in the cross-fire. Israeli troops blame the Palestinian terrorists, the Palestinians blame the Israeli troops. Her body is buried before an autopsy can reveal the origin of the bullets.

Is this one event (Palestinian attack), two events (Palestinian attack, Israeli response), or three events (Palestinian attack, Israeli response, Israeli-Palestinian battle)? If each event is to identify the actor responsible for the fatality, can the instigating actor – in this case, the Palestinian terrorist group – be held responsible for all fatalities suffered in clashes following their attack, including Palestinian civilians shot by Israeli troops? And how should the database separate between the grenade fatality and the two firearms fatalities?

The IPCD would interpret the hypothetical scenario as three acts of fatal violence, identifying the instigating act as the event type: A “Palestinian attack”, where one Israeli civilian was killed by a grenade hurled by a Palestinian terrorist organization in the attack; a “Palestinian attack”, where one Palestinian non-civilian was shot to death by Israeli Defense Forces during or immediately following the attack; and a “Palestinian attack”, where one Palestinian civilian was shot to death by a disputed or unknown actor (Israeli Defense Forces vs. the Palestinian terrorist organization) during or immediately following the attack.

Likewise, rather than holding the Israeli Defense Forces responsible for all fatalities during an Israeli military operation, the IPCD seeks to identify the direct cause of each fatality or group of fatalities to thoroughly examine the violence in the conflict. The incident, an Israeli military operation, is therefore only the circumstances in which the act(s) occurred.

A problem with recording fatal acts rather than fatal incidents, is that the exact number of incidents will not be revealed by the database. In the majority of the cases, there is only one fatal act in an incident – but some cases will, like in the hypothetical scenario, see several acts taking place during a single incident.

Still, identifying acts as the event type is deemed the best solution to preserve the amount of detail wanted. Despite being unable to provide the exact number of attacks, military operations, or clashes – all of which would only list the ones with fatal outcome, and not the actual toll – it will provide the exact number of fatal acts taking place, weaponry being used, fatalities being caused, and by whom, during each incident type.

Fatality Status Determination

The IPCD seeks to identify civilian and non-civilian fatalities on both sides. It is a controversial

task, as differing views on the terms exist. International humanitarian law considers civilians to be citizens who are not a member of their country's armed forces or other militia, but due to the chaotic landscape of armed civilians, determining the status of the fatalities needs some elaboration.

The IPCD identifies civilian fatalities as those who are neither of the following:

- A member of their country's armed forces or civilian law enforcement agencies
- A member of a militia or any irregular military
- Involved in armed struggle¹⁰⁸ at the time of death

Israeli fatality statuses

Separating between civilian and non-civilian Israeli fatalities builds on the two separate memorial websites hosted by the Israeli state (see “Fundamental sources on Israeli fatalities”). Here, the fallen members of one or more branches of the Israeli security apparatus (including civilian law enforcement agencies) are found on the Nizkor et kolam site – even when they were killed in non-combatant and/or off-duty situations. Building on this, the IPCD will consider all members of the national security apparatus as non-civilian fatalities.

Due to incidents involving armed civilians, security guards, or members of Israeli terrorist organizations, there has been added an “armed Israeli civilian fatalities” category. These are identified through media coverage of the incident.

Palestinian fatality statuses

Separating between civilian and non-civilian Palestinian fatalities is a greater challenge, due to the lack of publicly available official archives of the Palestinian National Authority, of complete lists of fallen members on the websites of various Palestinian terrorist organizations, and of information reported in news media.

The information provided about the incidents have at times been scarce – especially in the cases concerning internecine violence – but have, in many cases, been improved by news reports. However, due to the high number of “suspected collaborator” fatalities, a high number of Palestinian fatalities of indeterminate status remains.¹⁰⁹

Added to the news reports, other sources have been used to determine fatality statuses: B'Tselem lists whether the fatality did or did not “participate in hostilities”. The Palestinian Human Rights Monitoring Group has, somewhat sporadically, identified some fatalities as members of the different armed organizations, as well as of the Palestinian National Security Forces. Finally, some of the Palestinian terrorist organizations commemorate their fallen members on their websites.

¹⁰⁸ *Armed struggle* indicates the application of one or more lethal weapons. Lethal weapons include all firearms, all explosive devices (excluding fireworks), all missiles (excluding rocks), all bladed weapons, petrol bombs, vehicles, as well as all chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear arms. Rocks, despite causing twenty-three fatalities in twenty-one separate incidents, as well as sticks, are not considered lethal weapons by the IPCD. Perpetrators of lethal attacks without lethal weapons, without any organizational affiliation, are considered civilians.

¹⁰⁹ Nearly all “suspected collaborator” fatalities have been registered as “fatalities of indeterminate status”. First off, not all accused of collaboration were indeed collaborators – as few as 35-40 % of them had any sort of connection to the Israeli authorities (B'Tselem 1994). Many were killed not for collaboration, but for “immoral behavior” (Robinson 1997:126f). And to further complicate the civilian/non-civilian angle, some Palestinian informants, depending on their importance, had been armed by the Israeli authorities to protect themselves from attacks. As a consequence, when no further information on the incident has been made available, all male suspected collaborator fatalities have been registered as “fatalities of indeterminate status”.

Data Collection

The IPCD has identified seven Israeli, Palestinian, and third-party sources as 'fundamental sources', serving as starting points for further collection of information on, and verification of, all recorded acts of fatal violence.

Fundamental Sources on Israeli Fatalities

On the Israeli side, there are two state-hosted online memorial websites for citizens killed as a result of anti-Jewish/Zionist/Israeli violence: The Israeli National Insurance Institute hosts the "Site to remember the civilian citizens killed by enemy/hostile activities" (*atar l'izkor ha'ezrahim khalali pe'ulot ha'eiva*, אתר לזכור האזרחים חללי פעולות האיבה) on laad.btl.gov.il, and the Israeli Ministry of Defense hosts the "We shall remember them all" (*nizkor et kolam*, נזכר את כולם) website for citizens fallen in the line of duty on izkor.gov.il.

Both of these memorial websites are in Hebrew, and go back to pre-state era, including the fallen yishuvniks of the 19th and 20th century.¹¹⁰ On both sites, each fallen has his/her memorial site, with full name, a picture, date of birth and death, residence, incident location, and a short biography, usually providing some information on the fatal incident.

Fundamental Sources on Palestinian Fatalities

The pre-al-Aqsa Intifadah period (1987-2000) period builds primarily on the quarterly, chronologic listing of events in the *Middle East Journal*, as well as all reports to the UN Secretary-General from the *Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories* made in this period. Each of these reports contains a "List of Palestinians killed by Israeli troops or Israeli civilians", as well as a "List of other Palestinians killed as a result of the occupation" (the committee's term for extrajudicial killings of suspected collaborators), listing various news reports as their sources.

Since the outbreak of the al-Aqsa Intifadah, the Israeli human rights group *B'Tselem* has gathered information on every Palestinian fatality (name, age, residence, incident location, did or did not participate in hostilities during the incident, and usually a brief incident description). A similar effort has been undertaken by the *Palestinian Human Rights Monitoring Group*. And in the last decade, several of the armed organizations have also launched their own websites where they commemorate their fallen members – often very similar to the Israeli memorial sites; with names, dates of birth and death, pictures, biographies, and even videos (in the case of suicide attacks).

Verification

¹¹⁰ The first recorded civilian fatality, Abraham Shlomo Zalman Tzoref, was fatally wounded in a sword attack near the Hurva Synagogue construction site in the Old City of Jerusalem and died on September 16th 1851. The first recorded non-civilian fatality, Aharon Hershler, was shot to death on January 1st 1873 when confronting a band of thieves who had raided the Jerusalem neighborhood of Mishkenot Sha'ananim.

The information provided by these seven 'fundamental sources' have then been applied to find news coverage of the incident, primarily in the *Jerusalem Post*, *Haaretz* or *Yediot Aharonot*, but also the *BBC*, the *New York Times*, the *Washington Post*, *al-Jazeera*, and other international news media.

For every incident, at least one source will be in English. The information provided by the Hebrew and Arabic sources – the memorial sites hosted by the Israeli state and the Palestinian organizations – have, in most cases,¹¹¹ been sorted out by applying the online translating tool provided by Google (Google Translate). Due to this, any information reported in Hebrew or Arabic not confirmed by one or more English sources, have not been included.

Incident descriptions will, in the case of discrepancies, present all narratives, but put more weight on the news report(s) than on the 'fundamental source' – and especially in the cases of the memorial sites hosted by the Israeli state and the Palestinian terrorist organizations.

Raw Data Documents

Before being properly coded into the eighteen IPCD variables (see “Database variables”), all information on each event have been gathered in separate Israeli and Palestinian, annual text documents.

The five basic elements of all recorded events are 'L[ocation]', 'S[ituation]', 'A[ctor(s) responsible]', 'V[ictims]', and 'R[eferences]': 'Location' identifies the region, Israeli district or Palestinian governorate, the (approximate) city or town, and ultimately the (approximate) address on which the event took place. 'Situation' describes the circumstances of the event as accurate as possible, also taking into account differing testimonies reported in the sources. 'Actor(s) responsible' identifies the organization responsible for causing the fatality, and (where the information is available) the name of the perpetrators. 'Victims' refers to the number of fatalities, their statuses (as civilians or non-civilians), and their names. 'References' lists all sources on the event.

Example of event listed in an Israeli raw data document:

17.01.01

L: Ramallah, Ramallah & al-Bireh, West Bank
S: Female member of Fatah Youth lures 16 year old Ashkelon student out to the West Bank, where her Tanzim affiliates shoots him several times with an AK-47 rifle
A: Fatah Tanzim (Mona Jaud Awana, Hassan al-Kadi & Abdul Fatah Doleh)
V: 1 C (Ofir Rahum (body found 18.01.01))
R: Laad (Rahum, O.) -

http://laad.btl.gov.il/show_item.asp?itemId=38661&levelId=28553&itemType=10&template=3

Jerusalem Post (19.01.01): [Youth lured to death near Ramallah.](#)

BBC (25.02.01): [Woman 'confesses to internet murder'.](#)

Yediot Aharonot (13.10.11): [Names of prisoners in Shalit deal trickle through Arab media.](#)

AJC (2002): [American Jewish Year Book Vol. 102](#), p. 547.

Rubin, Barry M. & Rubin, Judith C. (2007): *Chronologies of Modern Terrorism*, p. 217. New York: M.E.

Sharpe.

Example of event listed in a Palestinian raw data document:

07.11.03

L: Maghazi RC, Deir al-Balah, Gaza Strip

¹¹¹ The author, being a Hebrew beginner class student, has done some translating by hand, as well as all name transliterations from Hebrew to Roman letters. As in the other cases, any of this information not confirmed by English sources have not been included.

S: Israeli military operation against Palestinian militants, leading to clashes, shooting to death one HAMAS militant (20)
A: IDF
V: 1 PM (Muamen 'Omar Ahmad al-Maghari [HAMAS])
R: HAMAS (al-Maghari, M.) - <http://www.alqassam.ps/arabic/sohdaa5.php?id=364>
B'Tselem: [Statistics – Fatalities \(29.09.2000-26.12.2008\)](#).
Haaretz (09.11.03): [12 Palestinians killed in weekend clashes with IDF troops](#).

The database, currently covering the period from December 9th 1987 to December 31st 2011, builds on fifty – twenty-five years of Israeli and Palestinian fatalities – raw data documents, making a total of 1,378 pages and 24,208 online references.¹¹² Note that these documents also contain certain events not to be included in this version of the database, such as killings of Israelis on Israeli soil conducted by non-Palestinian terrorist organizations.

The information found in these raw data documents have been coded into the database variables presented on the following pages. This concludes the introductory part of the codebook.

¹¹² Note that some of the references, especially on the Palestinian side, may be shared by more than one event. 24,208 is the total number of URLs listed in the documents.

DATABASE VARIABLES

I. IPCD ID

Numeric variable

Incidents in the IPCD follow an 11-digit event identification system, inspired by the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) 12-digit system.

- The 8 first digits – date recorded (see IV): “YYYYMMDD”
- The 9th digit – always a zero: “0”
- The 10th and 11th digits – event number for the given day (01, 02, 03, etc).

For example, an act of fatal political violence taking place on September 11th 2001 will be recorded as “20010911001”. Another act taking place on the same day will be recorded as “20010911002”.

II. Conflict Type

Categorical variable

The IPCD records three types of fatal political violence: Israeli-on-Palestinian/Palestinian-on-Israeli, Palestinian-on-Palestinian, and Israeli-on-Israeli. It should be noted that incidents where Arab citizens of Israel are killed by Palestinians following accusations of collaboration with the Israeli authorities, are recorded as 2 (“Intra-Palestinian”).

- 1: Israeli-Palestinian
- 2: Intra-Palestinian
- 3: Intra-Israeli

III. Period

Categorical variable

The IPCD recognizes six sub-periods. Each period is initiated by five watershed events significantly influencing the conflict's intensity level.

These five are *the shooting of Hatem Abu Sisi* in Jabalya on December 9th 1987, instigating the First Intifadah; *the signing of the Oslo Agreements* in Washington on September 13th 1993, concluding the First Intifadah; *the Temple Mount riots* in Jerusalem on September 29th 2000, instigating the al-Aqsa Intifadah; *the Sharm el-Sheikh Summit* on February 8th 2005, concluding the al-Aqsa Intifadah; and *the Oferet Yetzuka*, the massive Israeli military intervention in Gaza in the winter of 2008-2009.

The six periods are (1) *The First Intifadah*, stretching from December 9th 1987 to September 12th 1993; (2) *the Oslo Years*, from September 13th 1993 to September 28th 2000; (3) *the al-Aqsa Intifadah*, from September 29th 2000 to February 8th 2005, (4) the Post-Intifadah period, from February 9th 2005 to December 26th 2008, (5) *the Oferet Yetzuka*, from December 27th 2008 to January 18th 2009, and (6) *the Post-Oferet Years*, from January 19th 2009 to January 1st 2012.

- 1: First Intifadah
- 2: Oslo Years
- 3: al-Aqsa Intifadah
- 4: Post-Intifadah

- 5: Oferet Yetzuka
- 6: Post-Oferet

IV Date

Numeric date variable

This field contains the year, month and day on which the incident in which the act took place, occurred. If the incident took place over more than one day, the date recorded will be the first day.

YYYY-MM-DD

V Weekday

Categorical variable

This field contains on which day of the week the date (III) fell upon.

- 1: Monday
- 2: Tuesday
- 3: Wednesday
- 4: Thursday
- 5: Friday
- 6: Saturday
- 7: Sunday

VI Time

Numeric time variable

This field contains the approximate time of which the act was committed. It should be noted that of the 7,039 recorded acts, only 446 currently contain this data.

HH:MM

VII Area

Categorical variable

This field identifies the state or region where the incident in which the act took place, occurred. The city of Jerusalem has here been singled out as a separate territory (see also VI: District/Governorate). The Golan Heights, occupied from Syria in 1967 and informally annexed by Israel in 1982, are also identified as a separate region.

- 1: Israel
- 2: Jerusalem City
- 3: Gaza Strip
- 4: West Bank
- 5: Golan Heights
- 6: Indeterminate (Palestinian territories)

VIII District/Governorate

Categorical variable

This field identifies the Israeli district or Palestinian governorate where the incident in which the act took place, occurred. The Western and Eastern parts of Jerusalem City are singled out, enabling researchers to include 8 (“Jerusalem City: West”) with the rest of Israel (1-6), and 7 (“Jerusalem City: East”) with the rest of the Palestinian territories (9-27). Again, the Golan Heights has been singled out.

- 1: Center District
- 2: Haifa District
- 3: Jerusalem District
- 4: North District
- 5: South District
- 6: Tel Aviv District
- 7: Jerusalem City: East
- 8: Jerusalem City: West
- 9: Deir al-Balah Governorate
- 10: Gaza Governorate
- 11: Khan Yunis Governorate
- 12: North Gaza Governorate
- 13: Rafah Governorate
- 14: Indeterminate (Gaza Strip)
- 15: Bethlehem Governorate
- 16: Hebron Governorate
- 17: Jenin Governorate
- 18: Jericho Governorate
- 19: Nablus Governorate
- 20: Qalqilya Governorate
- 21: al-Quds Governorate
- 22: Ramallah & al-Bireh Governorate
- 23: Salfit Governorate
- 24: Tubas Governorate
- 25: Tulkarm Governorate
- 26: Indeterminate (West Bank)
- 27: Indeterminate, Palestinian Territories
- 28: Golan Heights

IX City/Town

Text variable

This field identifies the city, town, or village the incident in which the act took place, took place in. If it took place outside such a population center, the approximate city, town, or village will be recorded.

X Address

Text variable

This field identifies the address or specified location, if available.

XI Scene

Categorical variable

This field describes the circumstances in which the fatality or fatalities were in at the time of receiving the fatal injury(ies). It does not regard the circumstances in which the assailant or other actors were at the time.

For example, “*Palestinian militants fire Qassam rockets into Israel from Gaza around 20:05, striking a car near Sderot, killing one woman*” – in (VIII) “Sderot”, (VII) “5: South District” – will be recorded as a 3 (“Rural: Private transport”), where the rockets struck, rather than where they were launched from.

The rural/urban distinctions will usually consider only whether or not the incident took place in an Israeli or Palestinian city. In some cases, where detailed reporting allows such identification, large farming areas and fields within these city lines will be recorded as rural.

Israeli government property includes all buildings used by the Israeli government. Israeli military property include Israeli Defense Forces camps, vehicles, and roadblocks, as well as those vehicles and roadblocks manned by the Israeli Border Police – a gendarmery branch of the Israeli National Police.

Palestinian government property includes all buildings used by the Palestinian Authority, and all buildings, vehicles, roadblocks used by the Palestinian national security services. Religious sites include synagogues, mosques, monasteries, churches, as well as sites held sacred in Christianity, Islam, and/or Judaism.

- 1: Rural: Private property
- 2: Rural: Public space
- 3: Rural: Private transport
- 4: Rural: Public transport
- 5: Urban: Private property
- 6: Urban: Public space
- 7: Urban: Public transport
- 8: Urban: Private transport
- 9: Border area
- 10: Israeli settlement
- 11: Israeli government property
- 12: Israeli military property
- 13: Palestinian government property
- 14: Religious site
- 15: Sea
- 16: Israeli custody or imprisonment
- 17: Palestinian custody or imprisonment
- 18: Indeterminate

XII Situation

Categorical variable

This field describes the general circumstances of the fatal act of violence, seeking to identify the instigating actor. In cases where an instigating actor cannot be identified, the act is recorded as taking place during a confrontation between the actors involved.

It must be noted that the instigating actor may also be the only fatality in an incident of multiple acts of violence. For example, “*Palestinian militant opens fire at bus stop, fatally wounding two Jerusalem women*” and “*Palestinian militants open fire on gas tanker near settlement, security guard accompanying the vehicle returns fire, killing one militant*” are both

recorded as 1 (“Palestinian armed assault”). Likewise, “*Israeli military operation against Palestinian militants, leading to clash with firearms and explosives, killing one IDF soldier*” and “*Israeli military operation against Palestinian militants, leading to clashes, killing two HAMAS fighters*” are both recorded as 22 (“Israeli security apparatus operation”).

Palestinian militants are separated from the Palestinian Authority (PA) personnel and the HAMAS security apparatus (including al-Tanfithia) personnel, considering the latter two to represent governing bodies in the West Bank (the PA, since 1994) and the Gaza Strip (the PA, from 1994 to 2007; HAMAS security apparatus, since 2007). Incidents instigated by, or involving, Palestinian militants acting on their own or on behalf of one or more terrorist organizations, but who at the same time serve in the PA or HAMAS security apparatuses, are not to be attributed to the security apparatuses.

- 1: Palestinian armed assault
- 2: Palestinian unarmed assault
- 3: Palestinian lynch mob assault
- 4: Palestinian abduction and execution
- 5: Non-Palestinian Arab armed assault
- 6: PA security apparatus operation
- 7: PA law enforcement incident
- 8: PA detention
- 9: PA execution
- 10: HAMAS security apparatus operation
- 11: HAMAS security apparatus law enforcement incident
- 12: HAMAS detention
- 13: HAMAS execution
- 14: Accidents caused by Palestinian militants
- 15: Armed Palestinian and/or Arab infiltration from Egypt
- 16: Armed Palestinian and/or Arab infiltration from Gaza Strip
- 17: Armed Palestinian and/or Arab infiltration from Jordan
- 18: Armed Palestinian and/or Arab infiltration from Lebanon
- 19: Armed Palestinian and/or Arab infiltration from Syria
- 20: Armed Palestinian and/or Arab infiltration from West Bank
- 21: Unarmed Palestinian and/or Arab border infiltration
- 22: Israeli security apparatus operation
- 23: Israeli security apparatus operation: targeted killing
- 24: Israeli and/or Jewish civilian armed assault
- 25: Israeli and/or Jewish civilian unarmed assault
- 26: Israeli security personnel assault
- 27: Israeli security apparatus law enforcement incident
- 28: Israeli detention
- 29: Accident caused by Israeli security personnel
- 30: Confrontation between Israeli security personnel and Palestinian militants
- 31: Confrontation between Israeli security personnel and PA security personnel
- 32: Confrontation between Israeli security personnel and Israeli protesters
- 33: Confrontation between Israeli security personnel and Palestinian protesters
- 34: Confrontation between Israeli civilians and Palestinians
- 35: Confrontation between PA security personnel and Israelis
- 36: Confrontation between PA security personnel and Palestinians
- 37: Confrontation between HAMAS security personnel and Palestinians
- 38: Confrontation between Palestinian militants
- 39: Abandoned explosive device incident
- 40: Indeterminate

XIII Target of Violence

Categorical variable

This field refers to the intended target of the fatal violence. It must be noted that the 'Target of violence' only reflects the acts of the perpetrator (see XV: Responsible party), regardless of the instigating actor (see XI: Situation).

For example, the incidents “*Palestinian militant opens fire at bus stop, fatally wounding two Jerusalem women*” and “*Israeli military operation against Palestinian militants, leading to clash with firearms and explosives, killing one IDF soldier*” are recorded respectively as 1 (“Israeli civilians”) and 3 (“Israeli security personnel”). Likewise, “*Palestinian militants open fire on gas tanker near settlement, security guard accompanying the vehicle returns fire, killing one militant*” and “*Israeli military operation against Palestinian militants, shooting to death one bystander spotted standing on his roof, believed to be a militant*” are both recorded as 7 (“Palestinian militants”).

- 1: Israeli civilians
- 2: Armed Israeli civilians
- 3: Israeli security personnel
- 4: Israeli rioters
- 5: Israeli Jews accused of treason
- 6: Palestinian civilians
- 7: Palestinian militants
- 8: Palestinian rioters
- 9: Palestinians and Israel Arabs accused of treason
- 10: Int'l civilians
- 11: Int'l militants
- 12: Int'l military personnel
- 13: Indeterminate

XIV Weaponry

Categorical variable

This field identifies the weaponry causing the fatality.

- 1: Arson
- 2: Beating
- 3: Bladed weapon
- 4: Explosive device (grenades)
- 5: Explosive device (planted)
- 6: Explosive device (suicide bomb)
- 7: Explosive device (other)
- 8: Firearms
- 9: Lynching
- 10: Missile
- 11: Petrol bomb
- 12: Rocks
- 13: Strangling
- 14: Tank fire
- 15: Tear-gas
- 16: Vehicle
- 17: Drowning
- 18: Poisoning

- 19: Explosive device and firearms
- 20: Indeterminate

XV Weaponry Details

Text variable

Exact weapon type, if information is available.

XVI Responsible Party

Categorical variable

This field identifies the actor or actors causing the fatality.

- 001: Black 13th of September Brigades
- 002: DFLP: the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (unspecified faction)
- 003: DFLP: Kata'ib al-Muqawama al-Wataniya ("the National Resistance Brigades")
- 004: al-Fateh (Unspecified faction)
- 005: al-Fateh: The Asifa Lions
- 006: al-Fateh: al-Fahd al-Aswad ("the Black Panthers")
- 007: al-Fateh: al-Quwwa 17 ("Force 17" a.k.a. the Presidential Guard)
- 008: al-Fateh: al-Suqoor ("the Hawks" a.k.a. "Kata'ib Abu al-Rish")
- 009: al-Fateh: al-Tanzim ("the Organization")
- 010: al-Fateh: Kata'ib Shahid Sami al-Ghul ("the Martyr Sami al-Ghul Brigades")
- 011: al-Fateh: Kata'ib Shuhada al-Aqsa ("the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades")
- 012: Fatah al-Islam ("Conquest of Islam")
- 013: The Forces of Umar al-Mukhtar
- 014: HAMAS (Unspecified faction)
- 015: HAMAS: Kata'ib Shahid Izz ad-Din al-Qassam ("the al-Qassam Brigades")
- 016: HAMAS: al-Tanfithia ("the Executive" a.k.a. "Executive Force")
- 017: HAMAS Security Forces
- 018: JI: Jaysh al-Islam ("Army of Islam" a.k.a. "the Doghmush clan")
- 019: MB: Kata'ib al-Mujahedin
- 020: PIJ (Unspecified faction)
- 021: PIJ: al-Jihad al-Islami: Bayt al-Maqdas ("Islamic Jihad: The Temple")
- 022: PIJ: Munazzamat al-Jihad al-Islami: Kata'ib al-Aqsa ("the Islamic Jihad Organization: al-Aqsa Brigades")
- 023: PIJ: Saraya al-Quds ("the Jerusalem Brigades" a.k.a. "Saraya Sayf al-Islam" a.k.a. "Sayf al-Islam Brigades" a.k.a. "al-Qassam Brigades")
- 024: PFLP: the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (unspecified faction)
- 025: PFLP: al-Nasr al-Ahmar ("the Red Eagles")
- 026: PFLP: Kata'ib Abu Ali Mustafa ("the Abu Ali Mustafa Brigades")
- 027: PFLP-GC: the Palestinian Front for the Liberation of Palestine: General Command
- 028: PLF-Ta'at Yaqub:: Jabhat al-Tahrir al-Filistinia ("the Palestinian Liberation Front: Ta'alat Yaqub")
- 029: PLO: the Palestinian Liberation Organization (unspecified faction)
- 030: PLO: Revolutionary Defense Service
- 031: PLO: UNLU: al-Qiyada al-Muhwakhada ("the Unified Command" a.k.a. "the Unified National Command of the Uprising" a.k.a. "the Unified National Leadership of the Uprising")
- 032: PNLN: Harakat al-Tahrir al-Wataniya al-Filistini: "Fateh" ("Palestinian National Liberation Movement: Fateh" a.k.a. "Fatah al-Intifada" a.k.a. "the Abu Musa Faction")
- 033: PNSF: The Palestinian National Security Forces
- 034: PPSF: Jabhat al-Nidal al-Sha'biyya al-Filastini ("the Palestinian Popular Struggle Front")

035: PRC: al-Uyia al-Nasser Salah al-Din ("the Nasser Salah al-Din Brigades")
036: as-Sa'iqā ("the Thunderbolt" a.k.a. "Vanguards of Popular Liberation War: Thunderbolt Forces")
037: Unaffiliated: Abu Sneina Group
038: Unaffiliated: Awivi-Wazuz Jihad Group
039: Unaffiliated: Galilee Freedom Brigades
040: Unaffiliated: GLO: Galilee Liberation Organization
041: Unaffiliated: Mahmud al-Mabhouh Avengers
042: Global Islamist: AMJP: Jahafil al-Tawhid Wal-Jihad fi-Filastin ("The Armies of Monotheism and Jihad in Palestine")
043: Global Islamist: Kata'ib Shahid Abdullah Azzam ("Abdullah Azzam Brigades")
044: Global Islamist: Ansar al-Sunna
045: Global Islamist: al-Jahabiyya
046: Global Islamist: Jund Ansar Allah ("Army of the Supporters of Allah")
047: Palestinians accused of collaboration
048: Unaffiliated Palestinian militants
049: Unknown Palestinian militants
050: Unknown Palestinians
051: Joint (Fateh: Kata'ib Shuhada al-Aqsa, DFLP: Kata'ib al-Muqawama al-Wataniya)
052: Joint (Fateh: Kata'ib Shuhada al-Aqsa, HAMAS: Kata'ib Shahid Izz ad-Din al-Qassam)
053: Joint (Fateh: Kata'ib Shuhada al-Aqsa, HAMAS: Kata'ib Shahid Izz ad-Din al-Qassam, PIJ: Saraya al-Quds)
054: Joint (Fateh: Kata'ib Shuhada al-Aqsa, HAMAS: Kata'ib Shahid Izz ad-Din al-Qassam, PPP)
055: Joint (Fateh: Kata'ib Shuhada al-Aqsa, HAMAS: Kata'ib Shahid Izz ad-Din al-Qassam, PRC: al-Uyia al-Nasser Salah al-Din)
056: Joint (Fateh: Kata'ib Shuhada al-Aqsa, PFLP: Kata'ib Ali Abu Mustafa)
057: Joint (Fateh: Kata'ib Shuhada al-Aqsa, PFLP-GC)
058: Joint (Fateh: Kata'ib Shuhada al-Aqsa, PIJ: Saraya al-Quds)
059: Joint (Fateh: Kata'ib Shuhada al-Aqsa, PIJ: Saraya al-Quds & PRC: al-Uyia al-Nasser Salah al-Din)
060: Joint (HAMAS: Kata'ib Shahid Izz ad-Din al-Qassam, Fateh: al-Suqoor)
061: Joint (HAMAS: Kata'ib Shahid Izz ad-Din al-Qassam, Jaysh al-Islam & PRC: al-Uyia Nasser Salah al-Din)
062: Joint (HAMAS: Kata'ib Shahid Izz ad-Din al-Qassam, PFLP: Kata'ib Ali Abu Mustafa)
063: Joint (HAMAS: Kata'ib Shahid Izz ad-Din al-Qassam, PIJ: Saraya al-Quds)
064: Joint (HAMAS: Kata'ib Shahid Izz ad-Din al-Qassam, PRC: al-Uyia Nasser Salah al-Din)
065: Joint (MB: Kata'ib al-Mujahedin, PIJ: Saraya al-Quds, PRC: al-Uyia al-Nasser Salah al-Din)
066: Palestinian clash: al-Fateh vs. HAMAS
067: Palestinian clash: al-Fateh vs. PFLP
068: Palestinian clash: al-Fateh vs. PFLP & PCP
069: Palestinian clash: PNSF vs. HAMAS
070: Palestinian clash: PNSF vs. HAMAS & PIJ
071: Palestinian clash: PNSF vs. PRC
072: Palestinian clash: PNSF vs. Unknown/unaffiliated Palestinian militants
073: Palestinian clash: HAMAS vs. PIJ
074: Palestinian clash: HAMAS vs. Unknown/unaffiliated Palestinian militants
075: Palestinian militants' "work accident"
101: IDF: Ground Arm
102: IDF: IAF
103: IDF: Sea Corps
104: Israeli Police
105: Israeli Police: MAGAV ("Border Police")
106: ISA ("the Israel Security Agency" a.k.a. "Shabak" a.k.a. "Shin Bet" a.k.a. "Sherut haBitakhon haKlali" a.k.a. "GSS" a.k.a. "General Security Service")
107: Mossad: ha-Mossad l'Modi'in u'l'Tafkidim Meyuchadim ("the Institute for Intelligence and Special Operations")

108: Disputed: IDF vs Israeli civilians

109: Kahane Chai ("Kahane lives" a.k.a. "American Friends of the United Yeshiva" a.k.a. "American Friends of Yeshivat Rav Meir" a.k.a. "the Committee for the Safety of the Roads" a.k.a. "Dikuy Bogdim" a.k.a. "DOV" a.k.a. "Forefront of the Idea" a.k.a. "Friends of the Jewish Idea Yeshiva" a.k.a. "Jewish Idea Yeshiva" a.k.a. "Jewish Legion" a.k.a. "Judea Police" a.k.a. "Judean Congress" a.k.a. "Kach" a.k.a. "Kahane" a.k.a. "Kahane Chai"/"Kahane Lives" a.k.a. "Kfar Tapuah Fund" a.k.a. "Koach" a.k.a. "Meir's Youth" a.k.a. "New Kach Movement" a.k.a. "No'ar Meir" a.k.a. "Repression of Traitors" a.k.a. "the State of Judea" a.k.a. "the Sword of David" a.k.a. "the Committee Against Racism and Discrimination" a.k.a. "the Hatikva Jewish Identity Center" a.k.a. "the International Kahane Movement" a.k.a. "the Jewish Idea Yeshiva" a.k.a. "the Judean Legion" a.k.a. "the Judean Voice" a.k.a. "the Qomemiyut Movement" a.k.a. "the Rabbi Meir David Kahane Memorial Fund" a.k.a. "the Voice of Judea" a.k.a. "the Way of the Torah" a.k.a. "the Yeshiva of the Jewish Idea" a.k.a. "Yeshivat ha'Rav Meir")

110: Shalhevet-Gilad Brigades

111: Sicari'im

112: Unaffiliated Israeli and/or Jewish militants

113: Unknown Israeli and/or Jewish militants

114: Israeli civilians

201: Disputed, IDF vs. Palestinians

202: Disputed, Israeli civilians vs. Palestinians

203: Unknown

XVII No. of Responsible Actors

Numeric variable

This field identifies the number of actors of the responsible party (XVI) involved in the act.

XVIII Fatalities

Numeric variable

This field identifies the number of fatalities by status as civilians or non-civilians, as described in "Fatality status determination". Israeli and Palestinian civilians are also divided into age groups.

Israeli civilian fatalities (0-17)

Israeli civilian fatalities (18-64)

Israeli civilian fatalities (65+)

Israeli armed civilian fatalities

Israeli non-civilian fatalities

Palestinian civilian fatalities (0-17)

Palestinian civilian fatalities (18-64)

Palestinian civilian fatalities (65+)

Palestinian non-civilian fatalities

Palestinian fatalities of uncertain status

International civilians

International security personnel


International militants

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Appendix 2, Genealogical Diagram of the Six Major Palestinian Terrorist Organizations



Appendix 3, Excerpts from the IPCD Descriptive Analysis

Table A1, Fatality Rate by Weaponry Type

	Weaponry	Attacks		Fatalities		Fatalities per attack
Leftist	Firearms	156	72.9%	214	59.5%	1.4
	Explosives	5	2.3%	7	1.9%	1.4
	Suicide Bomb	22	10.3%	91	25.3%	4.1
	Bladed Weapons	23	10.8%	26	7.2%	1.1
	Other	8	3.7%	22	6.1%	2.7
	<i>Total</i>		<i>214</i>	<i>100.0%</i>	<i>360</i>	<i>100.0</i>
Islamist	Firearms	117	40.2%	222	22.6%	1.9
	Explosives	17	5.8%	34	3.5%	2.0
	Suicide Bomb	73	25.1%	599	60.9%	8.2
	Bladed Weapons	39	13.4%	55	5.5%	1.4
	Missile	29	10.0%	37	3.8%	1.3
	Other	16	5.5%	36	3.7%	2.2
<i>Total</i>		<i>291</i>	<i>100.0%</i>	<i>983</i>	<i>100.0%</i>	<i>3.4</i>
All	Firearms	273	54.1%	436	32.5%	1.6
	Explosives	22	4.4%	41	3.1%	1.9
	Suicide Bomb	95	18.8%	690	51.4%	7.3
	Bladed Weapons	62	12.3%	81	6.0%	1.3
	Missile	29	5.7%	37	2.7%	1.3
	Other	24	4.7%	58	4.3%	2.4
<i>Total</i>		<i>505</i>	<i>100.0%</i>	<i>1,343</i>	<i>100.0%</i>	<i>2.7</i>

Table A2, Intended Target Types by Location

	Intended Target	Israel		Gaza Strip		West Bank	
Leftist	Civilian	48	82.8	9	47.4	109	80.7
	Non-civilian	10	17.2	10	52.6	26	19.3
Islamist	Civilian	115	85.2	29	44.6	59	64.8
	Non-civilian	20	14.8	36	55.4	32	35.2
All	Civilian	163	84.5	38	45.2	168	74.3
	Non-civilian	30	15.5	46	54.8	58	25.7

Table A3, Children and Elderly Victims of Palestinian Terrorism, With/Without Suicide Attacks

	Suicide Attacks	Children Fatalities			Elderly Fatalities		
		Fatalities	% (civilian)	% (all)	Fatalities	% (civilian)	% (all)

Leftist	Included	35	13.2	9.7	20	7.5	5.6
	Excluded	18	9.8	6.7	12	6.5	4.5
Islamist	Included	97	11.5	9.9	87	10.3	8.8
	Excluded	27	11.0	7.0	11	4.5	2.9
All	Included	132	11.9	9.8	107	9.6	8.0
	Excluded	45	10.5	6.9	23	5.3	3.5

Table A4, Fatality Rate by Intended Target

	Intended Target Type	Attacks		Fatalities		Fatalities per Attack
Leftist	Civilian	166	77.6%	294	81.7%	1.8
	Non-civilian	48	22.4%	66	18.3%	1.4
Islamist	Civilian	203	69.8%	807	82.1%	4.0
	Non-civilian	88	30.2%	176	17.9%	2.0
All	Civilian	369	73.1%	1,101	82.0%	3.0
	Non-civilian	136	26.9%	242	18.0%	1.8

Table A5, Attacks, Fatalities and Fatality Rate, by Location

	Location	Attacks	Fatalities (civilian)	Fatalities % (region)	Fatalities % (total)	Fatalities per Attack
Leftist	Israel	58	140 (118)	100.0	38.9	2.4
	Center	17	27 (21)	19.3	7.5	1.6
	Haifa	9	18 (15)	12.9	5.0	2.0
	Jerusalem	2	2 (0)	1.4	0.5	1.0
	Jerusalem C	11	37 (34)	26.4	10.3	3.4
	North	6	14 (9)	10.0	3.9	2.3
	South	5	7 (7)	5.0	1.9	1.4
	Tel Aviv	8	35 (32)	25.0	9.7	4.4
	Gaza Strip	19	25 (9)	100.0	7.0	1.3
	Deir al-Balah	6	10 (2)	40.0	2.8	1.7
	Gaza	3	3 (2)	12.0	0.8	1.0
	Khan Yunis	4	6 (3)	24.0	1.7	1.5
	North Gaza	3	3 (0)	12.0	0.8	1.0
	Rafah	3	3 (2)	12.0	0.8	1.0
	West Bank	135	192 (139)	100.0	53.3	1.4
	Bethlehem	15	19 (10)	9.9	5.3	1.3
	Hebron	9	12 (10)	6.3	3.3	1.3
	Jericho	4	5 (3)	2.6	1.4	1.3
	Jenin	16	18 (15)	9.4	5.0	1.1
	Nablus	19	26 (19)	13.5	7.2	1.4
Qalqilya	5	11 (11)	5.7	3.0	2.2	
al-Quds	13	16 (14)	8.3	4.4	1.2	
Jerusalem C	9	17 (14)	8.9	4.7	1.9	
Ramallah & al-Bireh	33	55 (31)	28.6	15.3	1.7	

	Salfit	2	2 (2)	1.0	0.6	1.0	
	Tubas	2	2 (1)	1.0	0.6	1.0	
	Tulkarm	8	9 (9)	4.7	2.5	1.1	
	Golan Heights	2	3 (0)	100.0	0.8	1.5	
	<i>Total</i>	<i>214</i>	<i>360 (266)</i>	<i>100.0</i>	<i>100.0</i>	<i>1.7</i>	
Islamist	Israel	135	674 (549)	100.0	68.6	5.0	
	Center	22	111 (76)	16.5	11.3	5.0	
	Haifa	16	121 (95)	18.0	12.3	7.6	
	Jerusalem	4	21 (20)	3.1	2.1	5.3	
	Jerusalem C	20	185 (167)	27.4	18.8	9.3	
	North	12	52 (31)	7.7	5.3	4.3	
	South	40	73 (55)	10.8	7.4	1.8	
	Tel Aviv	21	111 (105)	16.5	11.3	5.3	
	Gaza Strip	65	119 (53)	100.0	12.1	1.8	
	Deir al-Balah	20	39 (19)	32.8	4.0	2.0	
	Gaza	10	18 (6)	15.1	1.8	1.8	
	Khan Yunis	8	15 (10)	12.6	1.5	1.9	
	North Gaza	15	29 (10)	24.4	2.9	1.9	
	Rafah	12	18 (8)	15.1	1.8	1.5	
	West Bank	91	190 (129)	100.0	19.3	2.1	
	Bethlehem	3	4 (4)	2.1	0.4	1.3	
	Hebron	32	63 (31)	33.2	6.4	2.0	
	Jericho	5	9 (6)	4.7	0.9	1.8	
	Jenin	1	1 (0)	0.5	0.1	1.0	
	Nablus	5	11 (8)	5.8	1.1	2.2	
	Qalqilya	1	1 (1)	0.5	0.1	1.0	
	al-Quds	5	6 (3)	3.2	0.6	1.2	
	Jerusalem C	13	45 (41)	23.7	4.6	3.5	
	Ramallah & al-Bireh	7	9 (7)	4.7	0.9	1.3	
	Salfit	6	10 (4)	5.3	1.0	1.7	
	Tubas	3	3 (2)	1.6	0.3	1.0	
	Tulkarm	10	28 (22)	14.7	2.8	2.8	
		<i>Total</i>	<i>291</i>	<i>983 (731)</i>	<i>100.0</i>	<i>100.0</i>	<i>3.4</i>

Table A6, Weaponry Usage by Region

	Weaponry	Israel		Gaza Strip		West Bank		Total	
		Acts	%	Acts	%	Acts	%	Acts	%
Leftist	Firearms	23	39.7	11	57.9	120	88.9	156*	72.9
	Explosives	1	1.7	2	10.5	2	1.5	5	2.3
	Suicide Bomb	17	29.3	0	0.0	5	3.7	22	10.3
	Bladed Weapons	13	22.4	4	21.1	6	4.4	23	10.8
	Other	4	6.9	2	10.5	2	1.5	8	3.7
	<i>Total</i>	<i>58</i>	<i>100.0</i>	<i>19</i>	<i>100.0</i>	<i>135</i>	<i>100.0</i>	<i>214</i>	<i>100.0</i>
Islamist	Firearms	22	16.3	29	44.6	66	72.5	117	40.2

	Explosives	6	4.4	10	15.4	1	1.1	17	5.8
	Suicide Bomb	58	43.0	7	10.8	8	8.8	73	25.1
	Bladed Weapons	22	16.3	6	9.2	11	12.1	39	13.4
	Missile	21	15.6	8	12.3	0	0.0	29	10.0
	Other	6	4.4	5	7.7	5	5.5	16	5.5
	<i>Total</i>	<i>135</i>	<i>100.0</i>	<i>65</i>	<i>100.0</i>	<i>91</i>	<i>100.0</i>	<i>291</i>	<i>100.0</i>
All	Firearms	45	23.3	40	47.6	186	82.3	273	54.1
	Explosives	7	3.6	12	14.3	3	1.3	22	4.4
	Suicide Bomb	75	38.9	7	8.3	13	5.8	95	18.8
	Bladed Weapons	35	18.1	10	11.9	17	7.5	62	12.3
	Missile	21	10.9	8	9.5	0	0.0	29	5.7
	Other	10	5.2	7	8.3	7	3.1	24	4.7
	<i>Total</i>	<i>193</i>	<i>100.0</i>	<i>84</i>	<i>100.0</i>	<i>226</i>	<i>100.0</i>	<i>505</i>	<i>100.0</i>

*-Two acts taking place in the Golan Heights have been added to the total figures

Figure A1, Map of Israeli Districts and the Palestinian Governorates

