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Mapping and explaining Norwegian caveats in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2008

Master's thesis in Political Science

Trondheim, spring 2012
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Preface

I started working academically with caveats in 2006. Since then I have written several different term papers, and was to finish this final thesis in 2009. This obviously did not happen, and it took a few more years before I had enough time to finish it.

Throughout the period there were many people who have helped med and deserve to be mentioned and thanked for their support. First and foremost – Gunnar Fermann for giving very good advice targeting the weakest sides of the thesis. Steve Saideman for being an interesting partner in electronic discussions. Per Marius Frost-Nielsen has contributed much through discussions and a good perspective on the Norwegian angles. Trude Midtgård was an invaluable support at various points.

In addition – I would like to thank Ida for support and encouragement, and my classmates in class 17 for all the fun and social gatherings. Thank you for keeping my head up!

Otto Trønnes
Trondheim, 2012-07-11
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Abbreviations

ANA  Afghan National Army
ANP  Afghan National Police
AP   Arbeiderpartiet (Norwegian Labour Party)
CJSOR Combined Joint Statement of Requirements
CENTCOM  (US) Central Command in Tampa, Florida
CHoD  Chief of Defence
CIMIC Civil-Military Cooperation
CONOPS Concept of Operations
DoD   Department of Defence
DPC   Defence Planning Committee
DUUK  Den Utvidede Utenrikskomiteen (The expanded foreign policy committee)
EOD   Explosive Ordnance Disposal
FOHK  Forsvarets Operative Hovedkvarter (Norwegian Joint Operational HQ)
FrP   Fremskrittspartiet (Progress Party)
FSK   Forsvarets Spesialkommando (Norwegian Army Special Forces)
H     Høyre (Conservative Party)
IED   Improvised Explosive Device
ISAF  International Security Assistance Force.
KrF   Kristelig Folkeparti (Christian Democratic Party)
MJK   Marinejegerkommandoen (Norwegian Naval Special Forces)
MMR   Minimum Military Requirement(s)
MoD   Ministry of Defence
MoFA  Ministry of Foreign Affairs
NAC   (NATO) North Atlantic Council
NAD   Norwegian Aeromedical Detachment
NCC   National Contingent Commander
NMR   National Military Representative
NORSOF Norwegian Special Operations Force
OEF   Operation Enduring Freedom
OMLT  Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team.
OPLAN Operation Plan
NATO MC NATO Military Committee
NATO PA NATO Parliamentary Assembly
PID   Positive Identification
PRT MEY Provincial Reconstruction Team Meymanah
QRF   Quick Reaction Force
RC    Regional Command
RCH   Red Card Holder
ROE   Rules of Engagement
SACEUR Supreme Allied Commander Europe
SHAPE Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
SNR   Senior National Representative.
SP    Senterpartiet (Centre Party)
SOP   Standard Operating Procedure
SV    Sosialistisk Venstreparti (Socialist Left Party)
TOA   Transfer of Authority
V     Venstre (Liberal Party)
1. Introduction

Since the end of the Cold War NATO’s primary measurement of burden-sharing has changed from the percentage of GDP used for defence to participation and risk taking in missions “out of area”. As a part of this Norway has contributed with military forces to Afghanistan since 2001. When the situation in Afghanistan started deteriorating NATO’s focus on caveats increased. Caveats may be defined as “(...) restrictions placed on the use of national military contingents operating as part of a multinational operation” (NATO PA 2005, my emphasis). A question is then why do nations send military forces to a place like Afghanistan and then limit what they are allowed to do? The research questions follows suit and is “What were the reasons behind the variations in Norwegian caveats in Afghanistan from 2001 – 2008?” This kind of research-question invites Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) which “is the study of the process, effects, causes or outputs of foreign policy decision-making in either a comparative or case-specific manner” (FPA 2012). In its attempt to explain foreign policy (e.g. the application of caveats on the use of national military contingents in foreign theatres of war), FPA draws upon several levels of analysis – the external and internal environments of the state, as well as attributes of key decision-makers and characteristics of the governing bodies of the state (Fermann 2010: 35-43). In this thesis, I will tap into several of these levels of analysis, including relevant theories explaining various factors that are external to the country (Realism, Liberal-institutionalism), internal (Liberalism, constructivism and coalition politics) as well as the properties of the bodies that formulate and enact policy (Governmental politics, principal-agent theory, civil-military theory). In order to be able to research the questions of whether Norway had caveats, which types, and why, this thesis study almost all of Norway's units deployed in Afghanistan between 2001 and 2008.¹ The findings are that there were great variances in the level and types of caveats applied. This begs the question; why?

In general it appears that internal factors have been most important in adding caveats, whereas external factors have had some influence in reducing or removing caveats. The primary reasons behind the variation in Norwegian caveats from 2001 – 2008 was likely a political desire to keep deployed military units from causing political grievances in Norway, also linked to other policy areas – while the presence of minor political parties in the cabinets and their leverage over policies was what enabled this to happen. The lack of external threats likely increased the latitude left for domestic politics, while external pressure from allies had little effect in the short term, but more in the long term.

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¹ For a total of 38 cases.
1.1. Defining the project

One of the prime motivations for writing this thesis is that there are few studies of caveats, and even fewer that study Norwegian caveats. I have found only one other project explicitly studying caveats. It is conducted by Auerswald and Saideman (2009, 2010). They started with Canadian caveats and are expanding to also include other European nations (2012). Their findings for Canada were that the primary factor affecting Canadian caveats was the change of the Chief of Defence Staff. Political risk for Canadian politicians or actual military threat faced on the battlefield did not seem to matter. For Germany the main source was the strong role of the Bundestag, the coalition cabinets and strong restrictions in the constitution. For France the major factors were the preferences of the strong president and linkage with other trans-Atlantic issues.

Per Marius Frost-Nielsen's (2009) master's thesis studied the command and control arrangements of the Norwegian F-16s deployed as a part of Operation Enduring Freedom in 2002/2003. He found that the decision to send the planes was caused by external pressure and a wish from Norwegian politicians to strengthen Norway's influence in NATO. The restrictions put on the use of the fighter jets were established by political decision-makers in order to build and maintain a domestic political support for the Norwegian military contribution. The restrictions made it possible to portray the decision of sending the planes as less controversial, thus maintaining the support of the Parliament and avoiding criticism from the media and the public. The restrictions were also instated to make sure that the planes were not used in a way that would jeopardize Norwegian overall interests. The restrictions were also a result of the fact that the cabinet was divided over whether to actually contribute with the planes.

Looking at the available literature specifically looking at caveats it became clear that the scope of this project would become quite wide, and that a lot of new ground would have to be covered. First I needed to properly define caveats, and separate them from other concepts that might seem like caveats, and that at times are. Following this a typology would have to be made, in order to allow a detailed classification of caveats for analytical purposes. Secondly, a theoretical framework for the reasons behind the caveats would have to be found. Theory gives the ontological assumptions about political phenomena. These assumptions give the framework on how events are connected causally and which relations and factors (independent variables) are important. This makes it possible to make empirical propositions (hypotheses) about what caused the event in question. This leads us to the more specific question – What is the research question on the origin and use of caveats in Norway's contribution to a military, multi-national, out-of-area operation a case study of? The answer to this question can be suggested at different levels of generalization granted that it includes more than the particular cases covered in my specific research question. In
the most immediate sense, this project is a case-study of an important aspect of Norwegian security policy. In a more general sense my project is a case-study of Norwegian foreign policy, and ultimately of the political function of caveats on the use of military force within the wider framework of foreign policy of any state. This inductive line of reasoning implies that the theoretical framework and bodies of literature most relevant for deducing empirical propositions, and subsequently informing the empirical analysis on caveats on the use of military force, is the broad field of Foreign Policy Analysis.

Foreign Policy Analysis contains a wide variety of scholarly literature looking at various aspects of foreign policy decision-making processes, policies and actual behaviour. It covers several sub-fields of political science (international relations, international political economy, political behaviour, comparative politics, public policies and administration, organizational theory) and beyond (e.g. political psychology, international law, sociology) (Fermann 2010). In this thesis I have built on Fermann's (2010) framework. It makes a distinction between three levels of analysis, analysing how (i) external and (ii) internal environments of a state influence both the size and quality of its latitude in foreign policy issues. The third level looks at the attributes of the foreign policy decision-making apparatus of the state and the foreign policy decision-making process. I will return to this in more detail.

The third part of the project was to do the empirical mapping of Norwegian caveats from 2001 – 2008. This has not been done before, and large amounts of information was scrutinized in order to construct a complete picture of the Norwegian deployments in the period and to classify any caveats in line with the typology defined earlier. This was done at the same time as looking for the empirical information required to divine the reasons behind the caveats, as guided by the theoretical perspectives and hypotheses. The analysis was done utilizing both qualitative and more structured analysis.

1.2. The structure of the thesis
The rest of this chapter will be dedicated to the methodology used to collect and analyse data. As there are few studies of caveats chapter 2 will in great detail go in to what caveats are as well as proximate concepts, before laying out a typology for classifying caveats. Chapter 3 lays out the theoretical foundations for the thesis, which lead to the hypotheses about which factors affected the decision whether to have caveats, as well as the empirical focus for the independent variables. In chapter 4 I will give a background on Norway, Norway's political structure and NATO in ISAF in order to set the stage upon which the events take place. This leads to chapter 5 where the dependent variable – Norwegian caveats – will be described. This is tightly connected to Appendix 1 where the
38 case studies are described in detail. Chapter 6 then maps the independent variables – the factors possibly causing caveats. The analysis follows suit in chapter 7. The analysis is done using both comparative methods and interpretation of single cases/case sets, starting with bivariate analysis of each hypothesis before moving on to the comprehensive analysis controlling for the influence of third variables – while all the way combining systematic methods with a qualitative analysis going deep into the cases. The conclusion in chapter 8 sums up the research process and gives suggestions for further studies.

1.3. Methods for collecting data

At the start of the project various sources of information were considered. As official sources were barred due to classification, secondary sources would have to be used. Official statements from the military as well as general media attention to both the units in Afghanistan and the political scene in Norway was determined to possibly give enough information to be able to describe as well as to explain variations.

The empirical data on the Norwegian units and their caveats has been collected from a variety of sources. The primary source has been four of the major Norwegian newspapers. Articles from 2001 – 2009 have have been scrutinized for small pieces of information. The official military web-site has also been used extensively. In addition several studies examining more specific parts of the Norwegian deployments have been used.\(^2\)

The four newspapers used were Aftenposten, Dagbladet, Klassekampen and Verdens Gang (VG). Three of them have been selected as they are the highest selling dailies. They are big enough to have journalists independently covering the various aspects of the mission in Afghanistan, both from Afghanistan and from the political scene in Norway. Klassekampen was selected for two reasons. The first being that it is on the political left\(^3\) thus balancing out the views. The second is that they have access to sources in the leftist political parties that the other papers do not. This especially applies to Sosialistisk Venstreparti (SV), one of the 2005 – 2008 coalition government parties. Adding more newspapers would likely not have given more information. The circulation numbers are from Mediebedriftenes Landsforening (2008).


\(^3\) Klassekampen means “The class struggle”.
The official website of the Norwegian military (Forsvarsnett) was at www.mil.no during the period examined. Amongst others it contained articles describing the daily life of the Norwegian forces in Afghanistan, as well as press releases on special occasions and various other background articles.

In general Mil.no is an official organ attempting to create a positive attitude towards the armed forces, the international missions and the soldiers deployed abroad. The articles are written in a very positive way, emphasizing the positive effects of the Norwegian soldiers and the good way they conduct and solve their missions. The articles appear to be approved by high level spokespersons and do not express views that are politically problematic. They have however provided a lot of details on individual units. The site provided a lot of information on military units and their missions up to roughly 2005. After that there seemed to be a lot less information published, and what was published was much more difficult to puzzle together into a complete picture.

These factors make mil.no a somewhat problematic source to use. Statements must be “controlled” for positive bias. I do however consider it the most correct source when it comes to factual information on the Norwegian military contributions.

All quotes originally in Norwegian in speeches and news articles have been translated by me. This is not noted in each instance. As a rule of thumb all statements by Norwegians were originally in Norwegian. Some ambiguities and errors might be present in the English version because of the translation process. The faults are in these cases entirely mine. Many of the ambiguities are however because politicians are vague for political reasons or are making improvised explanations of difficult concepts. In general I have attempted to translate tone and substance rather than word for word translation.

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In 2011 this was changed to www.forsvaret.no. The articles used for this thesis were then also removed. They can be viewed through a process mentioned in the list of references.
1.3.1. The lack of interviews

I have not conducted any interviews in this thesis. The main reason was to avoid classified information and be able to make this document public domain. Time and resources was another issue. Interviewing persons with whom I have had a personal or professional relationship with could also “trick” them into giving more information than they would like or are allowed to.

Interviews would have given this thesis extra depth. Interviews with political actors could have been done in order to uncover discrepancies between political statements and results and actual political thoughts, preferences and goals. Interviews with military actors could have given a better view of their perspectives and possibly problems they have faced because of caveats. This should be done for any follow-up studies, and has been done extensively by e.g. Auerswald and Saideman (2012) and Frost-Nielsen (2009).

1.3.2. Methodological problems during data collection

The major problem in this project is that the caveats generally have a high security classification level as the information in them could be militarily harmful. Caveats are also considered politically sensitive. Requesting the actual list from the MoD has thus not been an option. Due to my previous and current employment in the armed forces great care has been taken to avoid classified material. This also includes the leaks known as “cablegate” and “wikileaks”. When they have been used as sources for articles in newspapers these newspaper articles have been used. Interviews have also been avoided because of classification issues.

In general the military perspective of the cases is only covered to a very low degree. Military officers have mostly not provided their perspective on caveats in the sources used. As the experts, the military officers, through the defence staff, feed their inputs into the caveat process before it is politically approved. Their recommendations are then approved or disapproved by the political level before the decision is made “public”. It is thus difficult to say whether their recommendations were included as their recommendations are in internal and classified documents. On the other hand, many of the caveats observed have not been about purely military issues. They are of a political or legal nature and are thus normally outside the domain of the military experts.

Using newspaper articles as sources has some problematic aspects. In general the media will attempt to portray issues as more problematic and conflicted than they originally are in order to bolster sales (Jenssen and Aalberg 2007:21). The media is also motivated by their role as watchdogs, which causes them to conduct investigative journalism. In this they depend on sources within the political system, the military and the bureaucracy. These sources often have their own
agendas that cause them to give their view to the journalist.

Noting that caveats are an expression of political disagreement regarding the deployment of a unit, and that the media prefers to present conflict, it is possible that units will appear more caveated than they really are. Spokespersons for the government do however have the opportunity to voice their standpoint, and this has been taken into account where present. In this perspective the political language used to portray a specific fact (“we have/have no caveats”) without saying it (for various domestic or foreign political reasons) has to be unravelled and interpreted. The original statements have been translated and included to make this interpretation process transparent.

In this thesis the negative effects of using media has been sought neutralized through the use of newspapers from large parts of the political spectrum. The large number of articles used has also had an effect on balancing the coverage. Without interviews and classified documents the media remains the best way to find the information that has been necessary for this thesis.

At times media will use anonymous sources. These sources range from top politicians via diplomats and bureaucrats to individual soldiers. These sources have a variety of motives. At times they are whistle blowers, other times they are leaking at the behest of some leading figure, or they disagree with an internal decision. They then leak in order to present their perspective, to force a rematch, or to make their opponents uncomfortable. In addition to this, the information the sources have access to is not necessarily complete, or they might have misunderstood the factual basis.

Another problem following the use of media is that only information represented in the media will be detected. If a unit has a strong culture of not speaking with the media,⁵ or there is little political debate about their caveats, they may be caveated without making any headlines. If there is major political debate about a unit, or their deployment or not, then it is more likely that the restrictions will be made public. This study is possibly biased because of this. The Stoltenberg II cabinet was more divided over the issue of Afghanistan. There was as such much more attention from the media and thus more information to assess the units and their caveats. It is possible that information on single cases has been over-analysed.

The lack of media attention to some units makes it hard to verify the level of caveats. Especially for some of the earlier units the assessment of their caveats has been based on only one source. This is especially true for the early PRT units, as they gathered very little attention. This has been noted for the cases where it applies. In these cases my judgement, guided by caveats on similar units in temporal proximity, has been used.

Following this there is a possible problem of over-determination for some units. Considering

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⁵ The Special Forces are a classic example of units that there is not much information about.
the many sources used and the few statements regarding caveats, any information indicating that there have been caveats is more likely to be used than a statement denying caveats. This is a common form of bias, where the researcher interprets data supporting his hypothesis more positively than those undermining it. To avoid this I have seen whether the caveats possibly found match the surrounding patterns – including earlier caveats and caveats that can possibly be applied to a unit. A thick description of the surroundings has been necessary. This is included in chapter 6, as well as in the description of each unit in appendix 1.

1.4. Methods for analysing data
The methods used should conform to current standards. In addition they should be transparent and explained. Methods serve a dual purpose. First they are used for data collection and systematisation. Secondly they are used for a proper analysis of data collected.

1.4.1. Case studies
There are varying definitions of what a case study is. Ringdal defines it as intensive surveys of a few units (2001:114). That is, the benefits of using a large number of cases are sacrificed. Either because of the benefits in being able to focus on a few units, or because a large number of units are not available. The latter is the case for this thesis. More specifically this is a case of a comparative longitudinal design, with the intent to describe the universe of Norwegian caveats, and attempt to explain the variations.

In this thesis I have chosen to use a case study methodology utilizing several smaller cases. The primary reason for this is that there are no existing data available to study using other methodologies, and the number of possible cases (38) is not enough to use statistics. With the theoretical grounds laid out in the chapter 3 it is better to make exploitative studies with the deeper and more open perspective the case study methodology offers.

To conduct a proper case study it is important to create good empirical typologies – i.e. group fairly complex case studies into groups by a set of common properties (Moses and Knutsen 2007:20). These categories must be both complete and mutually exclusive. This has been done in the next chapter, and specifically in chapter 2.6. Due to the little present literature in this field own categories were created to capture the necessary properties of the dependent variable. The study performed by Saideman and Auerswald (2012) is on a more aggregate level and does not require the same level of details in the classification of caveats as this study.

Another problem with the case study is the difficulty of assessing causality, especially multiple conjunctural causation (Moses and Knutsen 2007:20). This is when a certain outcome on
the dependent variable is not caused by one cause (independent variable), but several, or a specific combination of independent variables. For a complex political-military foreign policy decision such as caveats it is possible that different causes give the same result. The same causes can also produce different types of caveats. The task is then to try to establish factors or combinations of them that are either necessary or sufficient, or both necessary and sufficient (Moses and Knutsen 2007:27). CsQCA is utilized in order to attempt to control for this.

1.4.2. The comparative method

First over to the analytical method used. The analysis has been done using the comparative method. It was originally designed by John Stuart Mill. The comparative method is used “(...) to establish general empirical relationships between (at least) two variables, by means of control” (Moses and Knutsen 2007: 94).

The comparative method used is the indirect method of difference described by J.S. Mill. This method is applied by comparing all cases, regardless of their value on the dependent variable (caveat/no caveat). Comparing both positive and negative cases allows us to see the variable(s) that vary with the dependent variable (Moses & Knutsen 2007:103ff). The weakness of this approach is that it is not in itself enough to draw conclusions on causality. The (supposed) direction of causality must come from theory and be supported by an explanation that is consistent with real world events. The theoretical grounds have been laid out in detail in chapter 3. The grounds for causality have come through closer case studies where the necessary and sufficient factors, as well as the causality becomes more clear.

The two main problems of the comparative method are over-determination and sampling bias. Over-determination is explaining too much with too few cases or too many independent variables. This set consists of 38 cases. Since there are five main independent variables in this thesis this is sufficient to establish tentative causal relationships. Since there are variations in the dependent variable (Norwegian caveats), variables with no changes in the period are considered non-causal. To deal with the problem of over-determination problem I have conducted a series of more comprehensive mini-case studies where selected cases are examined in closer detail. This lessens the problem of over-determination, and gives added credibility to the explanations. It also enables a view of other possible factors determining the outcome (caveated or not), that are more complex.

Sampling bias is a skewed selection of cases. The most common violation of this is by selecting cases on the dependent variable (Moses and Knutsen 2007: 111), meaning that cases are selected on the basis of whether they have a certain score on the dependent variable. The period
2001 – 2008 was selected as the paper was to be completed during the spring of 2009. In this study, the entire universe of Norwegian military units in Afghanistan in the period has been included, whether caveated or not. Creation of the list has been done by the author. It is unlikely that any units have gone unnoticed. The Ministry of Defence has a short description of the units deployed from 2001 – 2012, and all units mentioned are included in this thesis (Forsvarsdepartementet 2012). The exceptions are national units (that cannot be caveated), and units lacking data. Including the units without proper data would possibly distort the analysis. The missing units are assessed to not have a large impact on the validity of the study.

1.4.3. Cross-tabulations and csQCA

The methods used for the comparative analysis are cross-tabulations for bivariate analyses and crisp-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (csQCA) for a multivariate comparative analysis. For those that are not familiar with csQCA quick introductions can be found in Rihoux & De Meur (2008), Rihoux & Lobe (2009) or Schneider & Wagemann (2010).

Cross-tabulations are a simple way to see the correlation between the dependent variable and a single independent variable. Chi-Square and Phi has been used to assess the significance (Ringdal 2001: 327). This bivariate analysis will be done for all independent variables.

The start of QCA came with Ragin (1987), and the initial method has later been known as csQCA (Schneider & Wagemann 2010). QCA is both a holistic approach as well as a set of analysis techniques. It is a comparative method “geared towards multiple-case studies, in a small- or intermediate-N research design” (Rihoux & Lobe 2009:223). This makes the method suited for this thesis as it will analyse 38 cases. This means that statistics will be problematic, while a purely qualitative analysis approach will suffer as it is difficult to keep track of the features of all cases at the same time. “(...) QCA can complement qualitative interpretive analysis, by offering a certain degree of “reduction” of rich qualitative data” (Rihoux & Lobe 2009:228). Through systematisation of data and systematic analysis it is easier to replicate the analysis for others.

An important aspect of csQCA is that “each individual case is considered as a complex

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6 These are the Norwegian Contingent Command (NCC), the National (Logistics) Support Element (NSE) (for a while called Multi-National Support Group (MNSG)), and the Norwegian Intelligence Service. Little is known about the latter, except that one of their officers was killed by a suicide bomber in 2009 (Wikipedia 2011).

7 These are a C-130 transport aircraft and movement controllers (MOVECON) at Kabul International Airport (KAIA) in 2002; an engineer unit clearing mines at Bagram and Kandahar Air Bases from January to June 2002; a Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) unit in Kabul from February 2003 – February 2004; the Norwegian Surgical Unit (NSU) in Kabul from September 2003 – Spring 2004; The Fire and Rescue team at KAIA from May to August 2006; the Norwegian Deployable Hospital in Mazar-E-Sharif from April 2006 – March 2007; and the Air Force unit in charge of running KAIA from April – October 2007. In addition, single or smaller groups of officers have been present in various multi-national staffs at all levels.

8 CS implies dichotomous variables.
entity, as a whole that needs to be comprehended and which should not be forgotten in the course of the analysis” (Rihoux & Lobe 2009:223). The causality concept in csQCA is inherently complex. A starting point is that in the social sciences an outcome is normally caused by several factors, several different combinations of factors can lead to the same outcome, and depending on context a condition might have a different impact on the outcome (Rihoux & Lobe 2009:224). The solutions that come out of QCA then do not look for the Answer that best fits the data, but rather to “determine the number and character of the different causal models that exist among comparable cases” (Ragin 1987:167). This also allows the method to discover multiple conjunctural causation. While holistic, the analysis method also identifies parsimonious solutions in which key conditions are identified within the whole context of cases. The causality does however not come from the process itself. CsQCA is primarily a deductive method, and the supposed direction of causality must come from theory. The definitions of the conditions and their effects come from a combination of theory as well as intimate knowledge of the cases.

Technically csQCA uses dichotomous variables (“conditions”) to analyse their covariation with the independent variable (“outcome”). The first result is a “truth table” listing all observed and possible combinations of conditions, and the cases and their outcome (“configurations”). This is processed through a computer program that uses Boolean algebra to reduce the long Boolean expressions “to the shortest possible expressions (…) that unveils the regularities in the data”. The researcher then returns to the cases and explains, through an intimate knowledge of the cases and relevant theory, what the results mean.

1.4.4. Reliability and validity

Reliability regards whether an observation measures what it says that it measures, and how reliable this measurement is. The reliability of this study has several problems. First, on the matter of sources, as well as the classified nature of the study objects. The information in the press does not give the full picture. Some things are left unsaid, some things are exaggerated. Thus an open source analysis of something secret will have reliability issues. Another problem with reliability is the authors connection to the armed forces and NATO. The study has however been undertaken as an ordinary civilian student. It has been done independently of the armed forces and has no approval, encouragement or connection with them.

In this study the author's knowledge about the deployment of armed forces has been considered a strength. It has given necessary background to understand military operations in

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9 Throughout the period I served as an infantry squad leader in case #7 in 2004 and #21 in 2006. I also worked as an intern at NATO HQ in Brussels in 2008. From 2009 I again worked for the armed forces.
Afghanistan, the political debate on caveats and the effects of them. The possible negative effect is that it I might have specific attitudes towards caveats and have with or without purpose skewed case selection, wordings or conclusions in order to further this perspective. Another possible issue is that a thesis presenting the armed forces or political authorities in a negative light might affect future career prospects. I do not believe that I have a bias for or against caveats, and have attempted to keep the language as neutral as possible. Any errors here should not be interpreted as taking a stand with regards to political actors or caveats as such. Analysis preceding the classification of each case has been included in appendix 1 to allow others to check whether my analysis is correct. This will allow counter-balancing and counter-argumentation against any flaws in the thesis.

Validity is the question on whether the thesis reflects the real world. Validity can be divided into two – internal and external validity. The external validity is whether the findings can be extrapolated to other cases, e.g. in different countries or Norway in a different mission or point in time. Qualitative studies are generally weaker on external validity than qualitative studies because of the specific context these studies take place in. As a qualitative study, there are specific properties of the study object (Norway, 2001 – 2008) that will not be found again. On the other hand – several of the findings will possibly be applicable to other nations, as well as for Norway in other time periods. The external validity is considered fairly low, but is augmented by the fact that other Western nations have similar military-political arrangements, and similar goals with their foreign policy. It is also possible that the findings can to some degree be used for other international organizations and regimes, but this will be less valid than for NATO. The problems NATO are facing with caveats in Afghanistan will however likely be present also for other alliances and coalitions.

The internal validity is a question of whether the thesis measures what it attempts to measure. Through using a variety of sources the internal validity is increased. It is however weakened by the lack of interviews, as well as a lack of access to classified documents. This has on the other hand been augmented by the use of other studies examining parts of the study's universe more closely, in which interviews with key actors have been conducted.
2. Defining Caveats – as concept and phenomenon

As caveats are the dependent variable in this study I will start with defining what they are. Caveats are generally difficult to nail down. In short, a caveat is any national restriction on assets under NATO control that does not permit them to be used fully in line with the politically agreed plan. In this chapter I will describe the caveats as a concept, together with similar but analytically different concepts. The creation of a Norwegian caveat will be described in chapter 4.4.1.

This chapter starts with describing how NATO mission planning ends in an Operations Plan (OPLAN). Derived from the OPLAN are the Combined Joint Statement of Requirements (CJSOR) and the Minimum Military Requirements (MMR). Rules of Engagement (ROEs) are also written with the OPLAN as a background. Red Card Holders (RCH) are sometimes used to supervise and maintain national control of a military unit. Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) are a unit's normal way of doing something, and this might at times seem like a caveat. Although this might seem somewhat cryptic at the moment these terms will be defined and explained throughout this chapter. After going through these concepts I go into further details on caveats, before creating a typology that is detailed enough to allow study and analysis of caveats at the unit level.

As discussed in chapter 3.4.2 (civil-military relations theory) there is a sphere that is military and there is a sphere that is civilian. This chapter will touch on several ways of maintaining civilian control over the military when it is deployed in a foreign country. The control of one's military forces is even more important when they take part in a multinational mission, whether it be led by an IGO (UN/NATO/EU) or as part of a coalition of the willing. This is conceptually and substantially the same for the D-Day invasion, patrolling the Mediterranean after 9/11 and a peacekeeping operation in Chad. The organization in charge will normally want to have as much control of the forces as possible. The main reason for wanting a unified strong command structure is that this increases the unity of effort, or put simpler, working towards same goal. The commanders also want to be able to use the forces in the militarily most efficient way.

Although unity of command of military forces may be desirable, it may be impractical due to political considerations. Political sensitivities about the perceived subordination of national forces to those of other states or IGOs often preclude strong command relationships; however, the agreements that establish a multinational force provide a source for determining possible authorities and command, support or other relationships (U.S. department of the army 2006:57). Nations then implement control mechanisms to ensure that their forces are not misused or put in situations that may lead to extreme political or lethal risk. Especially in NATO this is almost expected;

Other than standing headquarters that are a part of the NATO command structure, NATO does not possess any forces, save a limited aerial warning capability. From NATO's perspective, its forces are borrowed manpower (Toczek 2006).
Borrowing forces indicate that these are still controlled from home country, rather than given carte blanche to the alliance.

The processes described in this chapter concern NATO processes. Caveats in coalitions of the willing and possibly within other organizations likely follow slightly different routines. The substantial content is however expected to be fairly similar.

2.1. Planning the mission in NATO

This summary leans heavily on Royal United Services Institute (2005). When a diplomatic or other problem of a certain magnitude appears it is bound to be discussed in the North Atlantic Council (NAC) or one of its sub-committees.10

“The consultative machinery of NATO is readily available and extensively used by the members in such circumstances, in order to identify at an early stage areas where, in the interests of security and stability, coordinated action may be taken” (NATO 2006:38).

A preliminary political agreement in NAC starts the crisis management process. It “(…) is designed to facilitate political consultation and decision-making at a sufficiently early stage in an emerging crisis to give the appropriate NATO committees time to coordinate their work and submit timely advice to the Council. It also allows the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, as the Strategic Commander responsible for Allied Command Operations, to undertake preparatory planning measures in a reasonable time frame” (NATO 2006:48).

Together, these sub-committees both on the military and civilian side create the OPLAN. An OPLAN is

A plan for a single or series of connected operations to be carried out simultaneously or in succession. It is usually based upon stated assumptions and is the form of directive employed by higher authority to permit subordinate commanders to prepare supporting plans and orders (NATO Standardization Agency 2012:O-4).

The OPLAN contains enough political and military guidance that the military side can start proper planning. Based on the OPLAN, one of the NATO commands will develop a concept of operations (CONOPS). A part of the CONOPS is the Minimum Military Requirement (MMR), which states the minimum of forces needed to fulfil the mission as stated in the OPLAN. The MMR is the basis for the Combined-Joint Statement of Requirements (CJSOR), a detailed view of units and enablers needed (Craddock 2007). The MMR and CJSOR can be reviewed if the tactical situation changes.

Once approved the CJSOR is the basis for the force-generation process. Chaired by the Deputy SACEUR, a force-generation process is supposed to be straightforward: The Deputy SACEUR requests forces for each line on the CJSOR, and each nation's National Military Representative (…) responds what his nation is willing to provide. Any gaps left in the CJSOR remains as shortfalls (Toczek 2006).

The main obstacle at this time is that the National Military Representative has not got the full authority to suggest national forces, so shortfalls must be filled on an ad-hoc basis, normally as a result of political trades later. Due to the political nature of NATO, agreement to the OPLAN does not mean that nations are bound to contribute with forces.

10 Beckman (2005) gives a good overview of how the actual process of NATO taking over ISAF played out.
When a nation decides to contribute forces a force preparation message is sent to NATO. This message contains the preliminary details of the force in question, its capabilities and restrictions. These include any caveats. Upon actual deployment, the nation issues a transfer of authority (TOA) message a few days before the scheduled TOA, “stating which force requirements the units will fill, their command relationships to the gaining commander, and the limitations on their employment” (Toczek 2006). This is also a place where caveats are presented, along with other limitations.

2.1.1. Rules of Engagement

Also as a part of the planning process, the Rules of Engagement (ROE) are written. They are based on political direction and military advice. They are normally taken out of the NATO standard library of possible ROEs, and then adapted to the mission at hand. The easy way of describing Rules of Engagement (ROE) is that they contain the rules for use of force; when, what, how, how much, and against whom. “ROE are directives to military forces (including individuals) that define the circumstances, conditions, degree, and manner in which force, or actions which might be construed as provocative, may be applied” (NATO MC 2003:2). ROE can include rules concerning when civilians may be detained, specify levels of approval authority for using heavy weapons, or identify facilities that may be protected with deadly force.

“NATO ROE and the application of them, never permit use of force which violates applicable international law” (NATO MC 2003:3). In cases where international legal obligations differ between troop contributing nations, efforts will be made to make a unified compatible ROE for the entire operation. When national laws are incompatible with the ROE, national laws rank higher. The armed forces participating in an operation “are not obliged to execute tasks or operations, which would constitute a breach of their national laws. Therefore, *it is recognised that nations will issue restrictions and/or amplifying instructions in order to ensure compliance with national law*” (NATO MC 2003:3. Emphasis added). This paragraph enables caveats in NATO missions.11 It is important to note that “any such national restrictions and/or instructions must not be more permissive than the use of force authorised for the operation” (NATO MC 2003:3). This means that in the event of a restrictive ROE (in terms of use of force), no nations can have looser ROEs. As NATO ROEs are a product of consensus, they will usually be a compromise with regards to what different nations can accept. Not allowing caveats would under consensus rules will probably cause the ROE to be very restricted and full of qualifiers. One writer described the start of

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11 This only provides the authority for “legal caveats”, more on this in ch 2.6 and 2.6.4.
ISAF thus:

Agreement on Rules of Engagement (ROE), e.g., riot control, and acceptable missions, e.g., how to support counter drug efforts, were also issues. However, in true NATO fashion, the plan was written broadly enough to allow nations to opt in or out of ROE or missions in which nations did not want or could not legally allow their troops to participate (Beckman 2005:11).

Thus, in addition to being guidelines and rules for use of force ROEs are also the operation's “multinational caveats”. A mission with a restrictive ROE will cause a careful approach by all troops in theatre. This might be good in a politically sensitive area, but may also play out bad, as witnessed in Bosnia. In ISAF the lack of support for counter-narcotics operations is in effect a multinational caveat. This is a part of the OPLAN, and it has been added into the ROE (Lind, Moene & Willumsen 2009:16).

For NATO missions the process of creating the OPLAN and the ROE is fairly standardised, and the result is one ROE for the entire force. Both OPLANS and ROEs are drafted in the military side of the NATO chain of command, and then approved by the political side in either the Defence Planning Committee (DPC) or the North Atlantic Council (NAC). The OPLAN and ROE suggestions are approved through a “silence procedure”.  

As mentioned, the ROE does not limit the right to self-defence. “Self-defence is the use of such necessary and proportional force, including deadly force, by NATO/NATO-led forces and personnel to defend themselves against attack or an imminent attack” (NATO MC 2003:4). The use of force in self-defence must be necessary, proportional to the attack and the threat must be imminent. The interpretation of what legally constitutes a threat is one of the major differences between nations in ISAF, and a common cause of caveats. Self-defence, i.e. a defence against an attack is recognised. Cases where force has not yet been used are more problematic. Two more definitions are used by NATO; “hostile intent” and “hostile act”. A hostile act is “any intentional act causing serious prejudice or posing a serious danger to NATO/NATO-led forces or designated forces or personnel” (NATO MC 2003). Hostile intent is

a likely and identifiable threat recognisable on the basis on both the following conditions: a. capability and preparedness of individuals, groups of personnel or units which pose a threat to inflict damage and, b. evidence, including intelligence, which indicates an intention to attack or otherwise inflict damage (NATO MC 2003).

The difference between these terms in a practical situation is hard to define, even in an office. For soldiers in the field it is even more difficult.

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12 On Srebrenica: “The great powers secured their freedom of action by thus guaranteeing only that UNPROFOR would defend itself, with the lesser commitment of trying to deter an attack against the safe areas. The resolution, as one UN official put it, was a “masterpiece of diplomatic drafting, but largely unimplementable as an operational directive” (Honig, Jan Willem & Broth, Norbert (1996) “Srebrenica: Record of a War Crime”, quoted in Allison & Zelikow (1999:290).

13 All nations are asked to approve, any objections constitute a “break of silence”. As long as a nation does not break silence it is considered to be in favour of or at least neutral to the suggestion.
The German constitution only allows the use of force in (extended) self-defence. Der Spiegel (Koelbl & Szandar 2008) reports one incident where German special forces failed to capturing a high value target: “The dangerous terrorist escaped. It would, however, have been possible for the Germans to kill him -- but the KSK\textsuperscript{14} were not authorized to do so”. The terrorist did not pose an immediate threat to the force, and thus he was outside the German ROE. For the United States “they (soldiers or marines) may fire when they positively identify a member of a hostile force or they have clear indications of hostile intent” (U.S. department of the army 2006:350). A senior Taliban leader clearly has hostile intent, and he is a member of a hostile force, i.e. he is a viable target. This shows that the amount of Positive Identification (PID) required is another factor that is interpreted differently amongst NATO-members. Some nations include the legal details on this issue in their TOA-letters to avoid any misunderstandings. This might be seen as caveats, especially from a political perspective.

The COIN field manual claims that “ROE in COIN are dynamic. Commanders must regularly review ROE for their effectiveness in the complex COIN environment” (U.S department of the army 2006:350). This means that minor changes in ROE might be expected, but not too often. The basics of the ROE will remain. Changes will probably be swifter in areas such as detainment policy and approval for the use of heavy weapons, reflecting changes in situation on the ground. Major changes, such as in counter-narcotics policy, requires approval at political level and will normally take longer time.

\textbf{2.2. Red Card Holders}

Red Card Holders (RCH) are officers entrusted with ensuring that the political will and well-being of a nation's soldiers are taken care of. These officers have the power to refuse certain missions if they are problematic due to political, legal, military, or other considerations. For smaller nations like Norway, the National Contingent Commander (NCC) is normally the RCH, other nations have other types of Senior National Representative (SNR) that perform the same function. For units that are highly mobile and deployable, e.g. special forces or fighter jets, one or more officers are normally integrated into strategic positions in the multinational chain of command. The officers scope, placement and power is normally detailed in the TOA-letter, although those details are worked out at an earlier stage. Placing the RCH in the chain of command means that their objections can be voiced at an early stage, thus making the planning process smoother. Several officers from the same nation can be Red Card Holders in different parts of the chain of command. There is also something

\textsuperscript{14} KSK – Kommando Spezialkräfte, German special forces.
called “pin cards”. These are a more informal version of the red card. The “pin cards” are used when a red card holder or similar informs that a certain action will likely not be accepted, but he does not formally state it (e.g. in writing), and does not necessarily involve the government “back home” (Høiback 2009:23-24). Saideman & Auerswald uses the term “soft caveats” for this:

"Finally, there exist what some officers called “soft caveats,” which are self-imposed restrictions by deployed military units in anticipation of or in response to political debates back home. Deployed units refrain from certain operations or activities to avoid what they believe will be a political backlash in their own countries (Auerswald & Saideman 2009b:12). There is also a concept called Green Card Holders. These are senior national representatives that not only have the power to refuse; they have to approve all use of a national unit (Frost-Nielsen 2009). This means a much stronger level of national control over the use of forces.

Having a Red Card Holder in a coalition system does not mean that there are any caveats. The two concepts are independent of each other, also causally. An RCH can exist to access information, influence decisions, avoid misuse of a force, or enforce caveats. Caveats may exist without someone specifically placed in a chain of command to enforce them – they are then normally enforced by the national force commander in theatre or similar.

2.3. Standard Operating Procedures

Some might be puzzled by the inclusion of Standard Operating Procedures here. SOPs “are typically designed to deal with recurrent problems for which a fairly standardized response can be expected to enhance efficiency” (Bueno de Mesquita 2006:171). In essence they are the same for large businesses, bureaucracies and military units. It is normally the specific way for a military unit to do something; driving a tank from one place to another, attacking a trench or lining up for a parade. How things are done, and what things are not done, might at times seem like caveats. ROEs, guidelines for the use of force, are one of the SOPs that regulate the actions of military forces (Bueno de Mesquita:171). It is still useful to separate SOPs from ROEs for analytical purposes.

SOPs precluding the fulfilment of a certain mission may be communicated to the multinational commander (e.g. COMISAF) through the TOA-letter, and thus be listed as a caveat. One example is that the Canadian Armed Forces do not have crowd control capabilities. According to Auerswald & Saideman this is originally because the Canadian army is not to be used in Canadian domestic politics (2009a:29).

2.4. In Extremis

The concept of “in extremis” is occasionally used to modify caveats. In extremis is a Latin phrase meaning “in extreme circumstances” or “at the point of death”, generally referring to grave or
exceptional circumstances (Merriam-Webster 2009). In general it refers to a situation that is characterized by exceptional urgency, where immediate action is needed to preserve life and/or prevent the military or political situation from being undermined. Several Norwegian caveats have had modifiers that a unit might not do a certain thing, unless an in extremis situation arises.\textsuperscript{15} In extremis clauses might also have different levels of approval required. Some can be approved in theatre, some require political consent. CNN's European political editor Robin Oakley interpreted it thus after the 2006 Riga summit: “There seems to be an agreement - although they will maintain restrictions - they will agree that in extremis, in times of great peril for NATO forces, the forces may be able to assist the fighting in Helmand, in the south” (CNN 2006).

The concept of in extremis works out differently for different kinds of units. An in extremis clause for an infantry unit in ISAF can be no more than lip service. An unwilling politician might easily define support to any pre-planned operation or gradually worsening situation as “non-extremis”. In a worst case in extremis-situation, where a base is close to being overrun or similar, getting reinforcements from other parts of the country, with the appropriate political approvals, will take more time than what is most probably at hand. This is different for e.g. aircraft as they are able to move across large distances quickly. As seen in chapter 5.3.2 the in extremis clause seems to be a way around the general Norwegian prohibition against cooperating with OEF. This shows that the same concept, applied by the same government, with the same background (not wishing to partake in the “offensive American war on terrorists”), gives different results based on unit type.

In extremis also gives a caveat the needed solidarity required in the alliance. The lack of such clause spells out that “we will not help you no matter what”. This is of course politically very problematic in an alliance. NATO's article 5 is itself used for “in extremis” situations.

\textbf{2.5. Caveats}

After this detour it is time to look at actual caveats. They will first be defined, then classified. The most precise definition is

A national limitation, restriction or constraint on any national military forces or civilian elements under NATO command and control or otherwise available to NATO, that does not permit NATO commanders to deploy and employ these assets fully in line with the approved OPLAN (NATO Standardization Agency 2009:2-C-2).

For NATO-missions the process is fairly simple. The Defence Planning Committee or NAC approves the ROE. Countries report which forces they wish to contribute to the mission, and which restrictions and/or caveats they have. The forces are then approved. When NATO is given command or control over them a Transfer of Authority-letter is given from the national commander to NATO.

\textsuperscript{15} See chapters 5.3.2 and 5.4.
This TOA-letter will then detail any deviations from the OPLAN and ROE. These deviations are then sent up the NATO chain of command and entered into a central caveat matrix, which is then distributed to planners. National authorities are normally responsible for informing and training their own forces in what they can and cannot do. In NATO the definition above is correct, and seems to be implemented in national organisational routines.

Another definition came from the NATO parliamentary assembly (NATO PA); “caveats are defined as restrictions placed on the use of national military contingents operating as part of a multinational operation” (NATO PA 2005, emphasis added). The difference from the first definition is that this definition also includes deviances in ROEs, SOPs and other. The PA-definition better encompasses what might politically be considered caveats. For the researcher or journalist working with unclassified material this is also a better definition. Media and politicians will usually not be specific enough in their statements to allow the fine distinctions between ROE and caveats to be preserved. An accurate study of caveats thus requires thorough knowledge of the legal background, political situation and military capabilities of a country. I will use this definition in this thesis, as I do not have access to the official caveats, the OPLAN, the CJSOR or the Norwegian ROE.

Caveats are normally added through TOA-letters, as described in the process above. They can be added at any time, but it seems to be normal courtesy that they are added as a part of troop rotation\textsuperscript{16}, although deviations exist.\textsuperscript{17} As well as being added, caveats can also be removed at any time. Italian Prime minister Berlusconi demonstrated this in June 2008 when he removed Italian caveats in Afghanistan. In a joint press conference on June 12, 2008, US President Bush spoke about this. “I appreciate very much the fact that the government announced to the parliament, with your instructions, Mr. Prime Minister, that the caveats that had restricted your forces in Afghanistan have been removed” (Realclearpolitics 2008). This was then apparently put into force immediately.\textsuperscript{18}

The ease of adding or removing caveats means that caveats can be quite dynamic. It is then not always clear where caveats come from and what are the factors behind them. As regards Norway, its contribution to KFOR apparently had no caveats, and got honourable mentions during the 2004 riots for that. The early contributions to Afghanistan, up to roughly 2006, were basically caveat free. Since then restrictive caveats were imposed. In 2008 some of those caveats were lifted. Canada has moved in the opposite direction. They were known as caveateers in Bosnia and their Kabul-contingents were heavily caveated. But as they moved their forces to the volatile and

\textsuperscript{16} E.g. chapter 5.2.2.
\textsuperscript{17} E.g. chapter 5.4 and Appendix 1, case #21.
\textsuperscript{18} It is not known to this author whether this was actually followed up on the ground.
dangerous Kandahar province their caveats were removed (Auerswald & Saideman 2009). This shows that caveats will come and go, depending on amongst other political situation nationally, internationally and in theatre, as well as capacities of various units.

The research of Frost-Nielsen (2009) indicates that the procedure for ROE and caveats were quite different in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). His thesis is on the ROEs and national caretakers of the Norwegian F-16s that were a part of OEF. Basically, Norway offered planes, and these were accepted. Norwegian officers were sent to the American CENTCOM\(^\text{19}\) with the Norwegian ROE. There was no central or coordinated ROE for the operation. The Norwegian planes were a part of EP\AF\(^\text{20}\), and even within the EP\AF\ there was no unified ROE. This means that each nation submitted their ROEs to the Americans, and the would-be “caveats” were included in this. Apparently this caused quite a bit of uncertainty on what different nations actually could do. It is expected that in a coalition, the coalition leader will make major decisions on force composition and mission, and would-be contributing members then negotiate about participating. In this case the background for the different ROEs was that because the US had enough forces, but allowed selected allies to participate with key resources to relieve their own forces and to gain more legitimacy for the coalition of the willing. Thus the US would not let anyone interfere with their own ROE. They were not too interested in other countries ROEs, as the forces added could be left unused if there were too many caveats.

2.6. Classification of caveats

Classification of caveats is very important in order to do a proper analysis of them. As long as researchers are working with unclassified information, proper definitions make it harder to fall in the trap of over-determination. Properly defining caveats also makes it easier to search for the cause of each caveat. The classification regime is made by this author as I have not come across any works classifying caveats to the detailed level needed for this thesis.

Caveats will be classified using the following categories

1: Information to the public
2: Information to NATO
3: Severity
4: Type
5: Impact

\(^{19}\) Central Command in Tampa, Florida. Responsible for Afghanistan under OEF.

\(^{20}\) European Participating Air Forces, cooperation programme consisting of the Netherlands, Denmark and Norway. All stationed at Manas Air Base, Kirgisistan.
2.6.1. Public information

First there is the public informational status of the caveat, where it can either be public or secret. In a NATO caveat normally have a NATO secret classification. This is due to operational requirements as well as diplomatic and political considerations. However, in the case of Norway, many caveats have become public knowledge because the government has published them for political reasons. Politicians have said that these forces are under national control, and they perform certain actions. This classification has usually been quite vague, and details are not published. Whether the public knows about a caveat does not matter much to the sending organization, as national political repercussions from caveats do not concern NATO. Operationally it might be a problem that caveats are public. If the Norwegian public knows which caveats Norway are operating under, so does the enemy, and they can possibly be able to use that information in preparation for attacks.

2.6.2. Information to NATO

The NATO informational status is very important to NATO. This definition follows the NATO PA; “national caveats may be both declared and known to commanders, or undeclared and therefore unknown to commanders until they actually assign a mission to a particular unit and discover that a caveat prevents that unit from performing that mission” (2005). Caveats should normally be declared to NATO in the TOA-letter. Declaring caveats gives a good overview for the multinational commander and his staff so they might anticipate what problems might appear and how to allocate forces most efficiently. Declared caveats are listed in an official caveat matrix. However, some nations have undeclared caveats. These are often exposed when a tactical operation nears the end of planning, and nations are asked to commit forces. A national commander then informs the multinational commander that for various reasons he cannot commit his forces in the manner asked. Undeclared caveats are a major headache, as they make planning extremely difficult.

2.6.3. Caveat severity

The severity of a caveat is the most important factor for NATO. Severity is an indicator of how limiting a caveat actually is with regards to a unit’s ability to fulfil the OPLAN and the CJSOR. Put simpler; how much does the caveat make the unit unable to solve the mission the unit is sent to

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21 One might for instance say that there are rules regarding what a plane might bomb, but not go into details on classification of targets. This lack of specification might be due to reasons connected to security, or to politicians’ lack of understanding of rather technical subjects.
solve. Another factor that is important in determining severity is the level of approval required to bypass the caveat. The ease of approval and the time it takes to get that approval are the main factors. Some caveats are final. Other caveats can be bypassed with approval from a Red Card Holder in theatre, while others require approval by political authorities in the sending country. The definitions used below are those used by NATO:

Red (Severe) – The caveat does not permit the conduct of one or more of the primary or main tasks defined by the CJSOR.

Yellow (Significant) – The caveat defines major restrictions, limitations or preconditions under which main tasks defined by the CJSOR can be conducted only, or prior national permission or confirmation is required.

Blue (Limited) – The caveat defines minor restrictions, limitations or preconditions under which one or more of the primary or main tasks defined by the CJSOR can be conducted.

Green (Neutral) – Not a caveat, or caveat that does not restrict any of the tasks defined in the CJSOR.

The actual severity of a specific caveat depends on the characteristics of the mission. A refusal to do crowd control in Kosovo would be a rather serious caveat, possibly red. In Afghanistan this would be a blue caveat, as there are hardly any crowd control situations. It is important to note that assigning severity does not entail a normative judgement. If a helicopter is unable to safely fly in mountains in pitch dark this is possibly a red caveat, yet normatively this cannot be considered “bad”.

For the purpose of this thesis the distinction between what is a caveat and not is between yellow and blue. This is yet again due to lack of detailed information. For the purpose of analysis it is also more useful to distinguish between things that actually are limiting and the caveats that are closer to mere notifications.

2.6.4. Caveat types

Caveats are in this classification divided into three major types; legal, technical and political.

Legal caveats are the least controversial. They say that due to some national law or international convention soldiers cannot perform certain missions. Legal caveats must be allowed, else soldiers could be set to do tasks that would cause them to be legally persecuted in their home country. Following the chain of command, generals or politicians could be legally responsible for putting their troops in these situations. One example is quoted by Dahl; “During Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003, Australia [party to the international convention banning anti-personnel mines] was not legally able to refuel any American aircraft carrying air delivered anti-personnel mines (…)”
Technical caveats state that a military unit cannot be used for certain missions due to technical issues, lack of training or the lack of proper equipment. One example is that a nation might not fly their helicopters in extreme low-light conditions because the night vision equipment is not good enough. Another example is that an Explosive Ordnance Disposal unit (EOD) might not be allowed to remove Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) if they are not trained for it. A national caveat would then act as a safeguard from abuse (Toczek 2006). In some cases technical caveats can easily be overcome. Getting new night vision goggles is a simple case of political will and money, but it might also be that a certain type of helicopters cannot be upgraded to a certain level. Training the EOD-unit for IED-tasks takes time and money, but is doable if there is political will.

For an outside observer it is hard to analyse technical caveats. The details of the caveat must be quite clear, as must the limits of equipment and training. The person analysing must also have enough technical knowledge to be able to decide whether this is a “fair” caveat or not. It is not impossible for a person without technical knowledge to do the analysis, but the accuracy drops. However, in practical terms, the difference between a politically and a technically imposed caveat is not big, the helicopter can still not fly under certain conditions.

Political caveats take many forms. The distinguishing feature of political caveats is that they are placed for political reasons, be they domestic or foreign. During the Cold War Norway refused to have allied troops stationed there permanently. This was to avoid tensions with the Soviet Union, and was a political caveat for foreign policy reasons. Political caveats for domestic political reasons are quite common with the Norwegian ISAF participation, especially after 2005. Many of the political caveats seem to have a risk management rationale. Apparently the German Army did not operate at night in Afghanistan (Norges Forsvar 2008). This seems to stem from a desire to minimize the risk of casualties, at the expense of mission accomplishment. It can be quite difficult to unravel what is the primary rationale behind a caveat. Political caveats are highly unpopular in NATO, and they are often “disguised” as technical or legal caveats.

2.6.5. Impact of caveat

The impact of caveats describes how the caveats work; what part of normal military activity they aim to control. Geographical caveats say that a unit can only work within a designated area. Any movement outside that area is either prohibited or requires political approval. Refusing to move units from Northern to Southern Afghanistan in 2006 is one good example of this. Other forces are geographically restricted to Afghanistan; they are not allowed to enter Pakistan. This can have some impact on aircraft operating near the Pakistani border. Without a political agreement with Pakistan,
entering Pakistani airspace might cause major problems, both nationally and internationally.

Organizational caveats put limits on who the unit can cooperate with, and how closely they can cooperate. The Norwegian F-16s that operated as part of Operation Afghan Falcon\textsuperscript{22} in 2006 were not allowed to do pre-planned operations with forces from Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). Other nations have caveats that restrict the level of cooperation with the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP). The level of cooperation with external actors are not necessarily covered in the OPLAN or the ROE, but strong restrictions on them would hamper the mission, and is thus a caveat. Refusing a unit to work with other organisations such as aid organisations or the EU also falls under this category.

Action-specific caveats state that a unit cannot do or is not allowed to do certain tasks. The counter-narcotics caveats common in ISAF are one type of Action-specific caveats. Other caveats may state that a unit might not patrol on foot or do crowd control.

Support requirement caveats are a part of risk management. A unit might for instance not perform missions unless they have medical facilities available within a certain distance, or they must have Forward Air Controllers that can call in Close Air Support. Support requirements might also be added if a unit lacks important organic abilities, e.g. a Counter-IED team.

2.6.6. Classification overview

The classification of caveats is outlined in Table 2 below. Any combination of properties is possible. Note that for this thesis a severity of blue or green is considered not caveated.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Caveat</th>
<th>Public</th>
<th>NATO</th>
<th>Severity</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Impact</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public</td>
<td>Secret</td>
<td>Declared</td>
<td>Red</td>
<td>Legal</td>
<td>Organizational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public</td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>Undeclared</td>
<td>Yellow</td>
<td>Technical</td>
<td>Geographic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public</td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>Green (Blue)</td>
<td>Blue</td>
<td>Political</td>
<td>Action-specific</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Caveat classification form

As described in chapter 6.4 below, Norwegian infantry soldiers were not allowed to be sent to Southern Afghanistan in 2006. This is a case of a Public, undeclared, red, political, geographic caveat. Auerswald & Saideman's (2009) description of how Canadians cannot do crowd control seems to be a public, declared, blue/yellow, technical, action-specific caveat. While it is a technical caveat (they do not have the training nor the equipment), the final rationale behind it seems to be

\textsuperscript{22} See chapter 6.3.2.
grounded in law, albeit ultimately the reason is political – as they wish to avoid the army being used for crowd control in Canada proper.
3. Theoretical approaches explaining the use of caveats

The research question in this paper is “What were the reasons behind the variations in Norwegian caveats in Afghanistan from 2001 – 2008?” This chapter will give the theoretical basis for the research at hand. It starts off with a general description of a FPA-framework for studying foreign policy decisions in general and decisions on the application of caveats on the use of a military unit in foreign lands in particular. It then goes into further details on theories describing external factors (Realism, Neo-liberal institutionalism), internal factors (Liberalism, Constructivism and coalition governments), and properties of the governing bodies (Governmental politics model, principal-agent theory and civil-military theory). It ends with summing up the hypotheses and specifying the relevant independent variables. All empirical propositions (hypotheses) are formulated on the level of this particular project, i.e. a small state (Norway) in Afghanistan. The formulation of case-particular hypotheses is mainly done for heuristic purposes, to clarify the link between theoretical insights and empirical application, but also the hypotheses will be tested through comparative control for third variables. The strength of the comparative case-study is the context-rich material which allows for an educated and credible interpretation of facts and theoretical assumptions as these sources of insight relates to empirical propositions about relationships. These can also be structured and be analysed systematically. In addition the application of csQCA infuses an element of comparative control for third variables, which strengthens the confidence in the conclusions derived from the context-rich case study.

3.1. Analysing foreign policy – decisions within the realm of “high politics”

This sub-chapter sets out the conditions for the study of foreign policy, and further the divisions to be used for the grouping of the rest of the theory chapter. The first definition worth noting is that foreign policy is a state's way of attempting to influence the world outside the state with the aim of forwarding the states immediate or long-term interests whether they relate to security, economic gain, political values, territory, political integrity, prestige or more ambitious system-maintaining or –transforming ambitions. It does so in order to try to achieve its goals and further its interests. These include threats to national security, its political latitude, its economic interests, or the values that the society is built on (Fermann 2010:26). Following this, for the purpose of this thesis states are assumed to exist, both as physical entities and mental constructions that shape our way of seeing the world. Fermann defines foreign policy as “the territorial states external- and purposeful activity where strategies are selected and means used in light of the state's collective identity, foreign
political goals, means of power (including the state's political, military and administrative apparatus for strategic leadership) and the actual challenges the state faces” (Fermann 2007:28). As seen in this definition, both internal and external factors shape what states see as their interests and define their latitude and the means they have available. The actors influencing a state's actions are also not confined to states – individuals, corporations and organizations are at times also able to do this.

“Foreign political latitude” is a useful metaphor for the range of actions available to a state in a given situation. It can vary in “size”, from having many options to few, i.e. be large or small. It can however never be unlimited. It is useful to use this as the latitude decides which options are available to decision-makers, and it thus rules out many actions. The size of the latitude is decided by a range of factors. One major division is between small and large states, where larger states normally have larger latitude. Alliances and relationships between states also shape the latitude (Fermann 2010:32).

The latitude is also dependent on how it is interpreted by those making decisions. If a certain option is considered not doable, it is not available, disregarding whether it can actually be done. The actual amount of information available as well as the interpretation shapes this. Framing an issue in a certain way will also influence the latitude in the same way. This is true for framing issues domestically, within decision making organs or in the international realm.

Another thing influencing the latitude is the political risk a state is willing to take and the losses it is prepared to suffer. Risk sensitivity decreases the latitude as the more risky options are considered to be not available.

The foreign-political latitude can in other words be seen as a function of properties of (i) the external environment of the state, (ii) the state's internal environment and (iii) the foreign policy governing method and the decision-makers. Before the strategic leadership can release their risk propensity, interest priorities, and assessments of suitability into creative political action, the relevant, limiting and enabling factors in the external and internal environment must be mapped and understood as far as possible (Fermann 2010:36).

This is mapped out schematically in figure 1, which is my translation of Fermann (2010:37).
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Figure 1: Model explaining political latitude

The external environment (1) is the systemic constraints that the state is operating within. One important factor is the distribution of power, especially hard military power. The distribution of this amongst states and their relationships and alliances define much of the latitude, according to realists, almost all of it (see chapter 3.2.1). Liberal institutionalists on the other hand claim that organizations shape the interaction between states, making hard power less important and making norms more important (see chapter 3.2.2). Economic resources and preferences are also important in shaping the external environment. The way the external environment shapes the latitude is an external influence and the term “outside-in” will be used to describe it.

The second group of factors come from the internal, societal and domestic policy environment (2). These factors are normally relatively stable. These factors work from within and affect how a state tries to influence the outside world. This is then the inside-out perspective. A state’s identity is important in this regard – how does the population view itself and its place in the world and the region. This will be explored further in chapter 3.3. The organization of internal politics is also important, and various interest groups work within this framework in a contest to
further their preferences and goals. The election system and the ruling system is one part of this. For Norway in the period examined this has been coalition cabinets, and possible effects of this is described in chapter 3.4.

The third group concerns the actual decision-making processes in a state and the organs and individuals who performs this. First of all this concerns the organizations that actually decide, lead and execute the foreign policy. Governmental politics and the relationship between principals and agents is described in chapter 3.4. However, the perception of the first two categories are important, as well as the governing groups' ability to affect them. Risk propensity is another factor within this category. This is also an inside-out perspective. Regarding the individuals involved, they are considered to have a limited rationality. That is, they attempt to achieve their goals in a mostly rational way, but are affected by limited information (on choices and outcomes) and limited cognitive abilities (i.e. normal). As politicians spend a lot of time and resources trying to be elected they are considered to be interested in gaining a position of power, and retaining it. They still have an ideological breaking point, a point where they will rather relinquish power than make a specific decision. Some of the most important properties for the three groups in the Norwegian context are described in chapter 4.

These three perspectives together give the latitude (4) that is available to a state regarding a certain foreign policy decision. These are the alternatives available within what is considered politically possible. Within the latitude the policy-makers assess their interests and which policy will best further these. The preferences give goals, and these are ranked. Together with the means available the strategic leadership initiates a certain decision and thus give the actual foreign political response to an actual situation (5). The actual foreign policy decision is in this thesis the decision to have caveats or not on a military unit in Afghanistan. Since there were some units that had caveats, and some not, this gives us the opportunity to test hypotheses derived from the theoretical perspectives outlined below.

3.2. Outside – In: The external environment

The external environment a state finds itself in is crucial to deciding which constraints its foreign policy process operates under. In this part I will review the two main schools of thought about what shapes this environment. Realism focuses on the distribution of resources and power and how this forms both the actions of various states and the discrete room they have to formulate foreign policy. Institutional liberalism focuses on the many instances of cooperation seen in the world every day. This provides a different focus than purely on force. This does however not necessarily provide fewer or less restricting constraints on what a state can actually do.
3.2.1. Realism – gaining power and avoiding failure

Because there is nothing proportionate between the armed and the unarmed; and it is not reasonable that he who is armed should yield obedience willingly to him who is unarmed, or that the unarmed man should be secure among armed servants (Machiavelli (1515 (1908)): Chapter XIV). Political realism, henceforth realism, is not a unified theoretical entity in political science. Classic realism was defined by Hans Morgenthau in his article “Six principles of political realism” (1973). In short the principles are that politics are governed by laws that have their roots in human nature. Actors act rationally within their interests – who are determined by the pursuit of power. Moral codes exist, but when they come in conflict with power the outcome which produces more power is most important – and most right. The central tenet to realism is “How does this policy affect the power of the nation?”

Another branch is structural realism as described by Waltz (1988). It is distinguished by its focus on security rather than power. It also places strong emphasis on state's placement in the international structure, and claims that it is this placement that primarily defines the state's latitude.

The realist branch considered most applicable for this thesis is Neoclassical Realism as described by Gideon Rose (1998). While it maintains realisms focus on systemic factors, it also includes several internal factors. “(...) the scope and ambition of a country's foreign policy is driven first and foremost by its place in the international system, and specifically by its relative material power capabilities” (Rose 1998:146). Several important concepts are baked into this sentence. First, not capabilities, but relative capabilities are the defining aspect of foreign policy. These capabilities are also augmented by the ability of a state to extract its material power, i.e. the power of the state apparatus. This means that the most important factor is material, based on properties of the units, relative to other units in the international system. The driving force is nations' desire for influence in the international system. This influence is used to control and shape their external environment. Whilst maintaining the anarchy of the international system Rose distinguishes it from other branches of realism by calling it “(...) neither Hobbesian nor benign but rather murky and difficult to read” (Rose 1998:152).

The second most important factors come from within the state. They are second to systemic factors is because “(...) over the long run a state's foreign policy cannot transcend the limits and opportunities thrown up by the international environment” (Rose 1998:151). Statesmen are important because they interpret the murky international situation, based on their subjective feelings of the magnitude of their national power relative to other nations. In addition, intellectual, organizational and domestic political factors come into play. “(...) following neoclassical realism we should be aware that domestic political factors can play a role in decisions to provide military
support. Governments are motivated to stay in office so they should be sensitive to public opinion, especially when it is likely to have electoral ramifications” (Davidson 2009:4). While neoclassical realism acknowledges that factors within the state affects foreign policy it does not “open the box”. Factors are suggested, but it is left to other theories to explain them. “States will be more likely to bear the burden associated with providing military support if the target of the use of force threatens the state's national interest” (Davidson 2009:2). This means that the international system is the important shaping factor, while individual actors interpret it in different ways and weight different factors differently. This gives the latitude as described above.

As far as alliances are concerned, they are formed “in response to external threats. Such threats, in turn, are a function of relative power, geographic proximity, specific offensive capabilities and perceived intentions” (Walt 2001:12). Alliances will thus form and unravel depending on the changing relative force of states. This will not necessarily happen immediately. The alliance will become more fragile, less coherent and less devoted to mutual defence. Eventually it will lapse into irrelevance or obsolescence. A weakened alliance with no common enemy will cause nations to spend fewer resources such as money, soldiers and prestige on it.

International organizations are not important in realism. They are considered to have little effect on their own as they merely codify what states want. International organizations are not considered actors in their own right, but as instruments for dominating states. The two main problems for a state involved in international cooperation are “relative gains” and “cheating”. Relative gains imply that one nation gains more from cooperation than the other. In the long run this will relatively weaken the one state, and thus cause the cooperation to cease (Waltz 1979). Cheating is the other problem. Realists see that this can partially be helped by international organizations monitoring agreements. Interestingly enough, caveats can be seen as a form of institutionalised cheating.

Caveats are not problematic within the realist framework. Sovereign states are half expected to have caveats, and certainly will have if it is in their perceived national interest. In more tense times, caveats will only be available to the major states. They are the ones that can defend themselves, and are thus not as reliant on remaining on good footing with their allies – their latitude is bigger. Smaller nations are hostages to their scarce resources and their neighbour's intentions. “If a state values its relationship with a powerful ally, it makes sense to provide military support as in so doing the state will strengthen and even reinforce its existing relationship. Second, the state should be more likely to provide military support when it perceives its prestige to be at stake.” (Davidson 2009:2).

The desire for security can go both ways with regards to caveats. In a tense situation (e.g.
Korean border 2010) caveats can ensure that there is no over-escalation by military forces. In a major conflict on the scale of WWII nations will likely refrain from caveats, except for ensuring that their forces are not used as cannon fodder. In peacekeeping operations the use of caveats will likely vary based on alliance relations and the threat a nation is experiencing from a mission failure.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Minor nation</th>
<th>Major nation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Minor conflict</td>
<td>Some/many</td>
<td>According to natl interest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major conflict</td>
<td>None/few</td>
<td>Some/many</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: Caveats as predicted by a realist perspective

This thesis deals with Norway, a minor nation, in Afghanistan, a minor conflict. It can be termed a minor conflict as Afghanistan does not present an existential threat to the nations participating in ISAF. Thus we can expect to see some to many caveats. This table is of course based on a clean sheet – filling in the values of the world and the mission on the realist variables will give a more specific prediction. The main realist variables concern Norway's place in the world, external threats to Norway's security, the importance of the alliance that Norway is in Afghanistan with, and the importance of the Afghanistan mission to Norway.

The border with Russia is the major issue of Norwegian concern. Especially important is the fact that there were unresolved maritime border issues with Russia in the period. Although the relationship has been peaceful between the two nations, this is a ground for uncertainty. This gives Norway a reason to be seen as a solid member of NATO – its main security guarantee.

**H1**: A low level of external threat to Norway's security will allow an increase in the number of caveats

To be able to answer this hypothesis it is necessary to see the general external threats towards Norway, and changes in these over the period. These will be mapped from historic sources, before changes are then seen through events or diplomatic conflicts taking place throughout the period. An increasing concern from bureaucrats or politicians about Norway's security guarantee will also be an indicator that the external threats are considered more pressing.
3.2.2. Neo-liberal institutionalism – organisations facilitating cooperation

While realists focus on hard power, liberalists focus on other parts of the international society, seeing that these parts can shape policy as much or more. Well-designed institutions even mitigate the international anarchy and replace it with rules and cooperation.

The school known as Neo-liberal institutionalism is based on Keohane (1984), Krasner (1983) and Oye (1986). The neo-liberal institutionalism focuses on international organizations and how they influence the action of states. As such it changes focus away from the state, without putting the same emphasis on structure as structural realism. Walt (2001) points to the following institutionalist arguments for international regimes: Primarily they reduce transaction costs and they facilitate compliance within existing agreements. They also create bureaucracies that maintain themselves. These bureaucracies might have sensible uses even after their original purpose disappeared, and it might be more cost effective to keep them than to dismantle and create new ones. As such, NATO's survival is better explained in a liberal institutionalist perspective than in a realist one.

With regards to the international system, liberal institutionalists still see it as an anarchy, but it is an anarchy that can be worked around using international organisations. International organizations will gradually make their members conform to their rules and thus create a more peaceful world. The two “problems” with international cooperation; relative gains and cheating, are not an issue within liberalism. States do not care about relative gains as long as they gain more from cooperating than not, and cheating is removed by international organizations.

As such, caveats in NATO are an anomaly within liberal institutionalism. Nations should not be able to cheat within an organization that has existed for 60 years and that has excessive monitoring and cooperation measures – and certainly not if the institution is still considered important to the contributing nations. And in the case of an endeavour important to the institution, such as the ISAF mission to NATO, the allowance for cheating should be even less. This is unless the caveats are seen as an intrinsic part of an agreed burden-sharing concept. The enforcement mechanisms of institutions and alliances are normally not strong, and so we can expect to see mainly normative pressure against offenders. This is considered to be enough to cause a rectification of mistakes.

\textbf{H2: A low level of normative pressure from allies will lead to more caveats}

In this hypothesis it is assumed that NATO has a desire for nations to be caveat free. The
international normative pressure will be considered through open or hidden diplomatic pressure for fewer caveats. Open pressure will normally happen at summits, or in more general statements from foreign diplomats, bureaucrats or politicians. Hidden pressure will occasionally be leaked to the media. Other statements from Norwegian bureaucrats or politicians referencing international or NATO norms can also be indicative of external normative pressure.

3.3. Inside – Out I: The internal environment of the state

The second part of the factors defining the room which foreign policy come from factors in the internal, societal and domestic policy environment. It is logical that those making decisions themselves have preferences and values. Their choices are also influenced by the preferences of the people who elected them to office. Building on the possible actions as delineated by chapter 2.3, the internal environment of the state further describes what possible actions are.

The internationally directed systems theories have the advantage of being able to be rather abstract. As we approach the national, sub-national and individual levels the literature is quite vast. The theories selected here cover main aspects of FPA in a civil-military setting. Liberal institutionalism gives a perspective for preferences within groups of the state, constructivism further explores the formation and creation of preferences. Then the theoretical mechanisms of coalition governments are explored, describing the interaction of these groups while in a position of power.

3.3.1. Group interests in liberalism

Andrew Moravcsik presented his liberal theory of international politics in his article “taking preferences seriously” (1997). This is based on the same grounds as liberalism in international politics as described in chapter 2.3.2. However it focuses at a different level. The three core foundations of Moravcsik's theory are that i) social actors have primacy; with the primary actors in international politics are individuals and private groups promoting their interests. ii) States represent a subset of their domestic society, and their interests define state preferences. iii) “The configuration of interdependent state preferences determines state behaviour” (Moravcsik 1997:516-520).

From the first tenet it is clear that this is an inside-out theory. Furthermore, these foundations remove the assumption of a unitary state. There is no unitary state, and there are no state preferences. In pointing out the subsets of domestic society Moravcsik opens for divides within a state, even within groups. Thus it is explainable how not even political parties are a unitary actor. The ability of an individual or group to change state policy is dependent on the power of the group and the compatibility of their preferences with other groups. Especially the governing groups are
important, and state policy will most often reflect a compromise between their preferences. The preferences of any actor are not given. They will change, and this change in preferences will be reflected in state policy, relative to the power they wield. Preferences are not common for the entire state, but rather they belong to groups. Strong preferences can compensate for few resources; the state is actually willing to risk extermination, unless it succeeds. This could be seen in Afghanistan, where the Afghan mujahedeen “side” was willing to take a lot more casualties than the Soviet side.23

Having “opened the black box” and left behind the notion of the unitary state that does not have to deal with societal forces, it is time to explore further how group-interests may lead to action.

3.3.2. Constructivism – further exploration of identity

“Faced with a tough choice on whether to provide military support, a state is likely to act in ways consistent with its self-image, especially its notions about when the use of force is appropriate.” (Davidson 2009:4). Constructivism has a stronger focus on identity and how identity shapes our perceptions, options and choices. As in all walks of IR theory there are major differences within the general framework. The modern foundation of constructivism was laid down by Nicholas Onuf. The core principles of his starting point is described this way:

The key point is that speech acts, rules, and norms, which are at the heart of his approach, and at the heart of human existence as social beings, are generated from within people; that is to say, they are endogenous to real people as active, creative beings, and to their practice. They are not dictated by some outside, exogenous structure (as in Waltz or Wendt) which has taken a life and dynamism of its own. (Kubálková 1998:53 – emphasis in original).

The implications are that humans create their own practices and the sums of these practices are the social structures that surround us. The social structures also influence interpretation, and influence how we construct the world. “Countries (...) are among the social constructions, or societies, that people make through what we do.” (Onuf 1998:58). Within these structures participants and the structure reinforce each other. The group has rules, the participants internalise those and maintain them in the group. Both positive and negative feedback are used to maintain the norms.

One of the functions of these rules of the world is that they tell us which actors (agents) are actively participating in the society and what they are allowed to to. “Every society has rules telling agents which goals are the appropriate ones for them to pursue” (Onuf 1998:59-60). This is also the same for the international society. Certain groups, persons and nations are considered players. The rules regulate who is allowed to participate and how they may participate. Rules are as parts of

23 “The Afghan side” was of course complex and consisted of many groups with mostly only one common goal; expulsion of the Soviet forces, while others supported the Soviets.
structures internalised and reproduced. Feedback from other people or countries will matter.

In constructivism international organisations work on the same basis as any other society. Certain people or institutions are agents and are acknowledged as players. Certain structures (such as nations) are important, and certain norms prevail. Actors relate to the structures while they conform, reproduce and develop international rules. Some of these rules are written down, but most are informal (Onuf 1998:73).

The degree to which norms are internalised and made a part of a person or a nation's image is critical. The more internalised, the more natural it becomes to behave a certain way. At a certain internalisation-level actions become close to automatic, and doing something out of order is difficult. “(...) constructivists emphasize the importance of international norms – widely shared notions of appropriate and inappropriate behaviour – in explaining international outcomes” (Davidson 2009:4). This also applies to norms in international organisations.

Constructivism is relevant for this thesis as ideas and norms might influence caveats. In military operations where it might be hard to see a direct national interest the moral interest must be emphasised. This applies to both the voters and the politicians making the decisions. For the media it is even more important. Thus the self-image of a group or a nation is important. As is the language and symbols that are used. In Onuf's constructivism it is quite clear that language shapes interpretation. The framing of a certain issue thus becomes very important.

From these perspectives it follows that a nation's or a politician's identity shapes preferences, and thus the available choices in foreign policy and also the ranking of options. Caveats are one way of ensuring that a military unit does behave in a way not consistent with the said identity. Hypothesis 3 is then:

**H3: Units that can perform actions considered normatively unacceptable will have more caveats**

The caveats can be implemented both to restrict problematic units as such, and to keep “desirable” units from performing certain actions that will be normatively problematic. Note how this is different from actions problematic from a Realpolitik point of view. For this hypothesis one important focus will be on language used, especially when politicians or bureaucrats are using normative language in describing what a unit cannot or should not do. The public opinion on what is normatively problematic might also be found in news articles or editorials. A third item that will give information on this hypothesis is very specific caveats against issues that are not likely there to hinder misuse, threats to the force, or military issues.
3.3.3. Government by coalition

In Western European politics coalition governments have been quite common – mainly as a result of the election systems used. Regarding this thesis both Norwegian cabinets in the period examined were three-party coalitions. Juliet Kaarbo (2008) and Binnur Ozkececi-Taner (2005) have researched the merits of coalition governments. Based on theories on institutional conditions and social-psychological effects, coalition governments can be a blessing or a curse.

The start is through a parliamentary representative government. They “(...) explicitly place authority and responsibility in the hands of a group, the cabinet” (Kaarbo 2008:58). This cabinet can consist of one or many parties. A single party cabinet, even a minority cabinet, is easy enough to relate to. A bit more problematic are multi-party cabinets, where “(...) the parties are independent political actors, competitors with one another in the electoral process, and they frequently disagree on policy” (Kaarbo 2008:58). Since parties that form a coalition will normally be somewhat aligned in politics, they often compete for some of the same voters.

Parties will also have different opinions on policy issues, and different level of salience attached to certain areas. “If the policy dispute is not settled, the coalition may dissolve. Because of this, junior coalition partners, which may be fairly small political parties, can have significant influence, even thwarting the dominant party's preference at times” (Kaarbo 2008:58). The power given to junior partners is quite unique in coalition governments. Dissolving the cabinet means a loss of power for all involved, and is as such preferably avoided.

Coalition cabinets are affected by both bureaucratic politics and small group dynamics. Cabinet members represent both their various departmental ministries (for example, ministries of foreign affairs and defence) and their parties. They are also formally elected by, and accountable to, the parliament. “Yet, cabinet members meet and make decisions in the context of a small group. As leaders of their parties and their ministries, they have the authority to make government policy” (Kaarbo 2008:59-60). This means that a ministers loyalty is divided at least three ways; to their party, their ministry and the cabinet. The various parties want to realise as much as possible of their policies, ministers normally fight to increase the resources available for their sector, and the coalition wants to survive.

“Over the years, numerous studies have found that groups are more than the sum of their parts as they tend to make more extreme and more cautious choices than their individual members indicate that they prefer before engaging in group discussion” (Kaarbo 2008:60). The effects of small group dynamics might cause a cabinet to be both more war-prone or more peaceful, or even a combination of the two. This is however hard to define without falling into a tautological trap. Junior partners will thus have more power than their share of votes would normally lead to. This is
especially true if the junior party is critical to maintain the coalition (Kaarbo:64). The junior parties will normally be more extreme than the major parties. “Coalition cabinets are particularly vulnerable to persuasion by members with extreme positions. Coalitions are often (though not always) forged between a larger, more centrist senior party and one or more smaller, more ideologically extreme junior parties” (Kaarbo 2008:64). Caveats can within coalition governments be considered sweetening of a sour deal, albeit a sweetening necessary to make a deployment politically acceptable.

When a junior party is not happy with the decision process they can come with a range of threats. They may include threatening to leave the government, disrupt cabinet processes, create outside pressure on the senior party, engage in whistle-blowing, threat that this issue will make their electoral support vanish or they may make promises; a tit-for-tat on different issues (Kaarbo:66-67). Thus, coalitions are expected to make more political “noise”. They will argue internally, and this will be exposed by frustrated partners. Timed leaks will occasionally be used to allow a party to signal its dissenting views. These factors can cause caveats to be made public.

If a threat to disband a coalition is to be taken seriously it must be credible. The more important a certain issue is for the party, the more credibility they can muster. This is where issue salience enters the equation.

The concept of issue salience refers to the relative importance and significance that an actor ascribes to a given issue on the political agenda. It is a measure of the attention actors devote to the issue in question and of the issue’s overall prominence in the minds of decision-makers (Opperman 2010:3-4).

Salience then gives us a way to assess how important an issue is to an actor. Bruce Bueno De Mesquita (2009) uses two dimensions to quantify this. The first is salience, how important an issue is to an actor. The second is flexibility. Flexibility is a measure of the actors preference for reaching an agreement as opposed to maintaining his position on an issue. Put together this gives us a way to assess how likely it is that a party will leave the coalition if pushed on a certain issue. It is important to note that the effect can come from both the actor, e.g. the minister, or from the constituencies forming the actors power base (Opperman 2010). This is not only important to the politicians with their own ideas of what is important and right. “The higher the salience of foreign policy is, the more responsive voters are to information about it and the stronger the policy’s impact as a benchmark for individual voting decisions is likely to be” (Ibid.:5). This further leads to an ideological breaking point – a position a party or a minister cannot accept.

It is clear that the dynamics of coalition governments will influence caveats – joining a cabinet is indeed done to influence and create policy, and caveats might be instated to appease a disagreeing partner.
**H4: A centre-left cabinet is likely to have more caveats than a centre-right cabinet**

This differs from a more general agreement on caveats across the cabinet or in Parliament. This hypothesis has been given the same direction as the other hypotheses, with the factor theoretically leading to caveats present. This direction is in line with Auerswald and Saideman (2012: chapter 9) who find support for centre-left cabinets having more caveats. This is also connected to the specifics of Norway in Afghanistan, where the left has generally been more critical of both the USA and NATO. The mechanism which then causes caveats is described above, where junior partners can use their position in cabinet to stop a deployment or impose restrictions.

This variable will be mapped and analysed along two lines. The first being to contrast the two cabinets. The second is to discern what, if so, specifically caused the level of caveats to be different between the two cabinets. The first is primarily quantitative, whereas the second line is qualitative. The mapping focus here will primarily be on conflicts between the parties making up the two cabinets in the period. Internal or external clashes reported in the media will be a key source of information. Caveats that specifically target the concerns of one coalition partner, or that are claimed to be because of the preferences of one of the parties, or that come as a result of internal deals struck within the cabinet are items that shed more light on this hypothesis.

### 3.4. Inside – Out II: Properties of the governing bodies

Some perspectives “open the box” and show us what is going on inside the state when decisions are being made. These perspectives differ on how and what affects policy, but they are based on similar ground. Primarily they “focus the attention of the analyst on the behaviour of human “decision-makers” who are involved in the formulation and execution of foreign policy” (White 1978:141).

The first theory is Graham Allison’s Governmental politics model, describing the effect of groups and bureaucracy on decision-making. Robert D. Putnam explores the linkage of international and domestic politics in “two-level games”. Principal-Agent theory gives ideas on how decision-makers employ agents to implement their decisions. Agents must be controlled and these control measures may include caveats. The military is not like any other agent as it is entrusted with maintaining the safety of the nation and its monopoly of power. That means that it can also use this force for the wrong purposes. The civil-military relations theory developed by Huntington and further improved by Peter Feaver explores this relationship.

In the origins of the decision-making approach White identifies four significant elements.

- a) the assumption that foreign policy consists of “decisions”, made by identifiable “decision-
makers”; the making of decisions, therefore, is the behavioural activity which requires explanation.
b) the concept of the decision-makers “definition of the situation”;
c) the emphasis on the domestic or societal sources of foreign policy decisions; and
d) the clear implication that the decision-making process itself may be an important, independent
source of decisions (White 1978:144).

As opposed to realist theories states are expected to act differently, with internal factors as
important determinants of their actions. The classic exogenous factors, such as neighbours,
alliances, size and money are not removed, but merely moved one analytical step away. These
factors are not determinants of foreign policy – they do however give the latitude.

3.4.1. Governmental politics model

Based on his analysis of the Cuban missile crisis Graham Allison (1969) put forth three perspectives
on government decision making. Allison’s theory was updated in cooperation with Philip Zelikow in
their book “Essence of Decision”, and the bureaucratic politics model changed name to
“Governmental politics’(1999). The Governmental politics model says that the governmental
decision making process is not as logic as a box-chart and the Weberian optimal bureaucracy model
would imply. Actors within the state system have different preferences, and bargaining between
these shapes the outcome.

(...) the Governmental Politics Model sees no unitary actor but rather many actors as players: players
who focus not on a single strategic issue but on many diverse intranational problems as well; players
who act in terms of no consistent set of strategic objectives but rather according to various
conceptions of national, organizational, and personal goals; players who make government decisions
not by a single, rational choice but by the pulling and hauling that is politics (Allison &
Zelikow:255).

One of the participants in this process are politicians. In Norway they represent their parties; these
also have their own bureaucracy and due decision making processes. State bureaucrats and other
high ranking officials are also an important part of the mix. These are the important and visible
players. The media also plays a role, through disseminating information to the public, shaping the
debate and restricting which options are viable. Lower ranking bureaucrats, NGOs and the public
normally play a less important role, but they are still a part of the process. All of these groups have
their own internal struggles finding out what is the “correct” opinion, and this trickles up the chain
to higher echelons.

According to Allison & Zelikow the defining factor of their views on an issue is their
position. “Both by charter and in practice, most players “represent” a department or agency along
with the interests and constituencies their organization serves” (1999:256). They struggle for what
they think is right, based on their perception of the problem and their organizations responsibility,
“where you sit is where you stand”. Yet there are major differences between actors that seemingly
would share an opinion. “Where officers stand often does depend on where they sit, but soldiers sit
in different places” (Richard Betts quoted in Allison & Zelikow 1999:277). The difference between air force and army officers’ opinions might vary more than between military and civilian opinions.

When these groups compete, sometimes one group triumphs, other times the result is something that neither group would have wanted in the first place. These “games” are played by every government many times a day. Games overlap, and decisions made in one game spill over to the next. “To explain why a particular formal governmental decision was made, or why one pattern of governmental behaviour emerged, it is necessary to identify the games and players, to display the coalitions, bargains, and compromises, and to convey some feel for the confusion” (Allison & Zelikow 1999:257).

Important for these coalitions is their distribution of power, their preferences and their ability to influence others. In this mix the definition of power is that it “equals impact on outcome” (Allison & Zelikow 1999:260). Power can be tangible and positional, as well as informal. Power can also equally much be about taking part in the decision-making process, as well as being able to implement it in the way that suits one’s preferences. From this it is clear that it is possible that caveats are caused by domestic political processes through the internal competition for the achievement of preferences or goals, based on positions of power.

3.4.2. Principal-agent theory and civil-military theory

According to Principal-Agent Theory (PA-theory) any organization with at least two levels has a principal and one or more agents. The agents are hired by the principal to do work that the principal himself is unable to do. The principal has certain contract and monitoring arrangements to ensure that the agent performs as intended, in the face of the agent’s free will and own agenda.

Nowhere is the need to control the agents as strong as in civil-military relations. The wielders of the state monopoly of force need to be controlled so that they do not turn on the citizens. When they go to other countries it must be ensured that they do not embarrass or damage the sending nation. These two factors touch directly on caveats and how lack of trust can cause caveats.

Principal-Agent theory is used within political science, economics and management. “The decision maker is the principal. The principal engages additional participants – the agents – to advise or assist in making decisions or taking actions” (Allison & Zelikow 1999:272). If the agent simply did what was asked, exactly to the idea of the principal, there would be no principal-agent problem. The following core problems in the relationship between the Principal and the Agent are commonly noted:

1: There is a difference in information. The agent is usually selected on background of his superior knowledge of the matter, or achieves this superiority through spending time with the issue.
The interest of the principal and the actor differ. Due to the difference in information, the principal might not necessarily know if an actor recommends a certain course of action due to unknown factors or the agent's self-interest (Based on Allison & Zelikow 1999:272-274). In a complex decision process players may be both principals and agents, often with different interests in the two roles.

When the principal hires an agent the agent is put under a contingent delegation contract. This contract specifies what the agent should do, and under which conditions. Specific terms of delegation contracts include a list of permitted and prohibited actions, the goals of the effort, monitoring/reporting mechanism, incentives for good behaviour, disincentives for bad behaviour, and the duration of the contract” (Auerswald & Saideman 2009:10). Caveats are one type of this contract. They specify what an agent (soldier) is not allowed to do.

To ensure that the agent performs as the principal intended, monitoring arrangements may be instated. Monitoring can be done through many different mechanisms (investigations, required reports, hearings, visits, caveats). The decision of the principal to reward or sanction the agent can be based on either outcome or behaviour (Fassina 2004:438). Behaviour monitoring is originally considered a “fixed sum for doing a job”. In this case it entails a closer and reoccurring monitoring of the agent's performance. An outcome contingent contract is a contract where the actor is rewarded on the background of his performance (Auerswald and Saideman 2009:9-17).

The nature and amount of monitoring is normally decided by the importance of the agent's work to the principal. "As a policy becomes more important to the principal, less authority is delegated to the agent” (Sowers 2005:388). Since soldiers perform hazardous and highly technical missions in areas far from the home country it is clear that a certain amount of delegation is necessary. The amount of delegation is very important when addressing the question of caveats, as caveats entail a limit on the normal delegation.

Auerswald and Saideman (2009:10) claim that one of the most important sources of caveats is the PA-contract; “The more a state wants to achieve national goals, the fewer caveats they impose. In an extreme case, the ends truly justify the means from this perspective”. This means that when a nation is concerned with the outcome it chooses outcome contingent contracts. If they are more concerned with the way their troops behave they choose behaviour contingent contracts.

For the analysis the most important link is that of the proximate principal. The proximate principal is the person or organ that constructs and enforces the delegation contract with the agent. In Germany this is the lower house of the Bundestag, in Canada it is the Prime minister and in the US it is the Secretary of Defense (Auerswald & Saideman 2009:12-13). The principal agent is the Defence Minister and the cabinet in Norway.
It is common that military units in international operations have multiple principals. Normally this is at least the military and political authorities in home country and the leadership of the multinational mission. This leads to “Environments where multiple principals, possessing divergent preferences, try to influence the actions of a single agent” (Sowers 2005:390). The agent has several options when selecting how to respond to conflicting demands from several principals. He might try to satisfy both principals. Since this is quite often not possible, finding out which principal is more important and then heeding this principal’s requirements is another solution. This must then be done in every new arising situation. Given multiple principals the agent’s options increase, and as such, his opportunity to satisfy his own preferences (Sowers 2005).

**H5: Implementing agencies concerns about inappropriate use of a force will lead to more caveats**

The implementing agencies are in this hypothesis considered to be the foreign-policy bureaucracy, as well as the military bureaucracy and officers deployed in theatre. The concerns are that the unit will be misused, that is exposed to unnecessary risks, used for missions that they are not capable of, not suited for, or not mandated for, or perform missions that are not in line with Norwegian interests.

To examine this hypothesis the focus will be on three issues. First, foreign-policy or military bureaucratic language used in proposals or publicly. Secondly, anonymous statements in media can give information on concerns in the bureaucracy. These two can come from both the national level and from persons in the units deployed. Thirdly, caveats specifically targeting command and control, logistics, or other military issues can be an indicator of this hypothesis.

**3.5. Summary of Hypotheses**

Table 4 summarises the hypotheses, and also describes in short form where they come from theoretically, as well as how they are operationalized and what the empirical focus will be.
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<th>Theoretical foundation</th>
<th>Hypothesis</th>
<th>Operationalisation</th>
<th>Empirical focus</th>
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<td>External threats, decision maker fear harming security interest</td>
<td>Int’l events, diplomatic conflicts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Outside-In)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>International system level</td>
<td>Neo-liberal institutionalism</td>
<td>A low level of normative pressure from allies will lead to more caveats</td>
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<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
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Table 4: Deductive bridge - from the theoretical to the empirical universe

The operationalization of the hypotheses into variables will be covered in Chapter 7 where the independent variables are mapped.
4. Setting the stage: A background on Norway and ISAF

This chapter aims to give a background for the empirical study in the next chapter. It gives an outline of the main features of Norwegian foreign policy. Then it describes the political system and the parties involved in the two cabinets in power from 2001 – 2009. It then moves on to describe the political-military process started when NATO requests forces for a mission and how a caveat is “created” in the Norwegian system.

4.1. Background – Norway's security challenges

Norway is a small country in the outskirts of Europe. It did however have a strategic position both with regards to England and the Soviet Union. For a good historical account of Norwegian foreign policy see “Norway's foreign relations – a history” by Olav Riste (2005).

During WWII Norway was occupied by Germany to get access to the strategic coastline and Swedish iron ore. During the Cold War, the coastline and border towards the Soviet Union was an important reason for NATO to invest in Norway. From the 1970s Norway has become a major exporter of oil from offshore platforms. The oil has primarily been extracted from the Western coast. Recently both oil and gas has been found further North, as well as in the Barents-sea in the border regions between Norway and Russia in the North.

The starting point for Norwegian military planning throughout most of the 1990s was that a military invasion, especially of Northern-Norway was a genuine possibility. (...) Around the turn of the...
millennium the risk of an attack from Russia was considered as steadily less probable. In the big reports and parliamentary decisions that came in the years 2001 – 2004 the threat from Russia was seen as very small in relation to other threats and risks (Gjeset 2008:38-39).

The major challenges in Norwegian foreign policy in the decades ahead are diverse, but most are connected to the sea. First, given a global warming that opens the “Northern Sea Route”. “At least half the shipping between Asia and Europe will go along the Norwegian coast. If one adds that Russia will increase the shipments of oil and gas from their North-western areas, one starts to approach the full picture when it comes to shipping in Norwegian waters (…)” (Ørnhøy 2008:20). Furthermore “Norway alone has about the same amount of the world’s known reserves of oil and gas as the USA” (Ørnhøy 2008:20).

As a small state Norway has put primacy on a stable region and global rule of law. Due to the lack of resources, and especially hard power, it is important for Norway that the relationships between states are ruled by laws, conventions and norms (Knutsen 2010). This has led to a political focus on the building of international law and the strengthening of the UN. The Stoltenberg-II government said that its most important foreign political foundations were: “(...) a strong support for the UN and international law, the membership in NATO, the EEA, and that Norway is not a member of the EU” (Regjeringen.no 2005).

Knutsen (2010) describes three circles of cooperation that Norwegian foreign policy has been based around. The first is the Atlantic circle – primarily through the connection to England and the United States. This line can be seen from 1905 and up to today. NATO has been the primary institutional expression of this cooperation. This circle has been considered the most important to Norway, overshadowing the European circle. Domestic support for NATO has been fairly high and stable throughout and after the Cold War. Roughly 55% of the population thought that “A Norwegian NATO membership makes the country safer” in 1970. This was at roughly 70% in 2002 (Børresen, Gjeseth & Tamnes 2004:106). The European cooperation has from the Norwegian side primarily been seen as an economic endeavour. Norway is not a member of the EU following two referendums in 1972 and 1994.

The third circle is the global circle. While this can be considered Norway's first line of defence, it is less reliable when it comes to actual conflicts. It has thus been considered a pre-emptive measure. However, as the Cold War faded the global circle has been considered a much more important arena. One of the main themes in Norway has been the idea of Norway as a moral and humanitarian superpower (Knutsen 2010:176). This thesis was a part of the declarations of both governments, both the centre-right and the centre-left. This focus is likely motivated by both idealistic notions, as well as a way to further Norwegian interests in the rule of international law.

Norway has been able to maintain a good relationship with the Soviet Union and Russia.
This has been done through a focus on dialogue and cooperation. During the Cold War Norway had several caveats on NATO forces operating in Norway. There would be no permanent bases with allied soldiers, no nuclear weapons on Norwegian soil, and there were detailed rules on exercises and aircraft operating in the Northernmost regions near the border with the Soviet Union (Børresen, Gjeseth & Tamnes 2004:113-116). There has always been some unease with having a superpower at Norway's border. This unease became somewhat stronger during the mid- and late-2000s, when Russia again started spending money on its military. A problem was the lack of a complete agreement of where the border in the Barents-sea should be drawn. In 2010 an agreement was signed, and this was ratified in 2011. This does however not affect this study.

The goals of Norwegian foreign policy are as diverse as any other country's. In Skogan (2009:70ff) several factors are listed. First and foremost is the goal of controlling the national territory. Norway is reliant on NATO for this. A common goal in Norwegian politics has been to create a safer and more peaceful world. “Norwegian security policy towards the end of the 1990s had become de-territorialized. The following October 1996 statement by the foreign minister is illustrative:

Norwegian society's deep respect for humanitarian values has made the promotion of Human Rights a cornerstone of all our policy. This is of special importance to our work for peace, where it combines idealism and self-interest. The more respect for Human Rights, the safer the World will be for all of us”. (Nustad & Thune 2001:173, emphasis in original)

This is done through attempting to increase the rule of law in international politics, as well as through participation in UN peacekeeping operations. A peaceful global situation will lead to less chance of war coming to Norway. In addition, decreasing tensions and improving cooperation seems to be a very important goal in itself in Norwegian politics. “Closely connected to this is a value based foreign policy. Many Norwegians are emotionally very interested in ending violent conflicts with peaceful means. Giving humanitarian help to the needy is also a part of this” (Skogan 2009).

4.2. The political landscape

The Norwegian parliament was formed and the constitution written in 1814, as Norway sought independence from Denmark. It was instead put under Swedish rule until Norway gained its independence in 1905. The constitution was modelled on the French and American constitutions and split the power in three – executive, legislative and judiciary. Norway is a constitutional monarchy, but the Monarch's power is symbolic. Elections take place every four years for the Parliament; the Storting. It had 165 members from 1985, and from 2005 it had 169 members
The election system has proportional representation, with equalizing mandates spread out amongst parties with more than four per cent of the votes. Norway has parliamentary rule, meaning that the cabinet composition is determined by the Storting. The Parliament can not be dissolved. The Cabinet can be dissolved either by own will or by a successful vote of no confidence.

4.3. The cabinets.

There were two cabinets in the period examined in this thesis. In September 2001 the Norwegian government was led by Jens Stoltenberg of the Labour Party (AP). On September 10th there was a national election where they lost power. The new cabinet of Kjell Magne Bondevik took over on October 11th. This was the second government of Kjell Magne Bondevik, and it thus became known as the Bondevik II-cabinet. It was a minority coalition government consisting of the Conservatives (H), Christian Peoples Party (KrF) and the Liberal Party (V), with respectively 21.2%, 12.4% and 3.9% of the votes (Statistisk Sentralbyrå 2007). It reigned from 19th October 2001 to 17th October 2005 (Regjeringen.no 2007).

It was succeeded by Jens Stoltenberg’s second government, commonly known as the “Red-Green Cabinet”, or the Stoltenberg II-cabinet. It was a majority coalition government with the Labour Party (AP), the Socialist Left party (SV) and the Centre Party (SP), with respectively 32.7%, 8.8% and 6.5% of the votes (Statistisk Sentralbyrå 2007). The cabinet took over power on the 17th of October 2005. It remained in power after the 2009 elections.

4.3.1. The parties of the Bondevik II-cabinet

The Bondevik II-cabinet was based on the “Sem-proclamation” (Samarbeidsregjeringen 2001). The proclamation was agreed upon on October 8th 2001, that is, after 9/11 but before the invasion of Afghanistan. It says that “Norway’s defence and security shall also in the future be strongly anchored in NATO” (ibid. 11) and “Norway shall participate actively in international work against terrorism and other plots from outside, be that from states or other groups that do not work within the boundaries of international law and international conventions” (ibid. 12).

Høyre (H – Conservative Party)

Høyre has historically placed a big emphasis on foreign and security politics. During the Cold War they were firmly centred on a narrow security orientation, and strong proponents of close ties to the

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24 Despite having less than 50% of the votes they gained 87 of the 169 representatives.
US (Matlary & Halvorsen 2006:203). They were the largest party in this Cabinet and had both the foreign minister and the minister of defence. Their support to the US continued. Defence Minister “Krohn Devold supported USA-friendly right-field politics, and never took the initiative to, or joined in on any critique of American military policy” (Bakkeli 2007:54). Furthermore, “Foreign minister Jan Petersen will reassure the USA of Norway's full backing to the war fighting in Afghanistan when he meets with American leaders in Washington on Monday” (Aftenposten 2001c).

Kristelig Folkeparti (KrF – Christian Democratic Party)
The foreign policies of KrF have traditionally been centred on a few fields: foreign aid, Africa and political support to Israel (Matlary & Halvorsen 2006:201). Their party programme states that “within the boundaries set by the UN, NATO is the cornerstone of Norwegian security policy. Norway has a binding alliance cooperation within NATO that is of principal importance” (Kristelig Folkeparti 2005:111). During the two Bondevik-cabinets Norway participated in three wars, Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan. This is somewhat contrary to their moral founding, and it is likely that this was due to external events rather than being a policy actively pursued by KrF. In one case Erik Solheim (SV) mentioned that KrF, together with the then opposition, opposed a plan to send Norwegian special forces to Iraq, possibly in 2003 (Regjeringen.no 2006).

Venstre (V – Liberal Party)
Venstre have in general not been active in the security policy debate. They were also relatively quiet on foreign policy during their time in government. Their 2005 party programme reads: “For Venstre a UN-mandate is a clear rule for international operations. NATO must also be very restrictive with starting peacekeeping operations outside NATO's area, if there is no UN-mandate” (Venstre 2005:117). Party leader Lars Sponheim said in 2006 that he was for sending Norwegian soldiers to the South. “Our view is that the Cabinet must make a major effort into the civilian, the soft, the humanitarian part. (…) A kind of security and safety must be created in South-Afghanistan through necessary use of military means to give room for the humanitarian efforts. (Sponheim 2006). In 2009 a party meeting reiterated this stance and advocated removal of “operational restrictions” (adressa.no 2009a).
4.3.2. The parties of the Stoltenberg II-cabinet.

The basic document for the Stoltenberg II-cabinet was the Soria Moria proclamation. It says that the cabinet will:

- Not send military forces to international operation without foundation in the UN-pact and a clear mandate from the UN.
- Pull Norwegian staff- and training officers out of Iraq.
- Strengthen Norwegian participation in ISAF in Afghanistan. On this background we will not renew Norwegian participation in Operation Enduring Freedom when the mandate period of these forces expire (Regjeringen.no 2005:12).

Furthermore, "the cabinet will make sure that when agreeing to make Norwegian forces available to international operations, there will be established clear guidelines to maintain Norway's international obligations according to international conventions" (Ibid.:11).

Arbeiderpartiet (AP – Labour Party)

AP has a long tradition of supporting a stable foreign policy where trans-Atlantic ties are important and NATO membership is considered the best security guarantee. Bakkeli describes the political process before sending the first Norwegian Special Forces contingent to Afghanistan in 2001 thus:

There was always a debate on [ROE and caveats]. We emphasised dialogue with Parliament and were often in contact with the leaderships of the different parties. AP was the key – a very important partner to have on board, a centrally placed source says. There was never any opposition in AP on the contribution to Afghanistan (Bakkeli 2007:51).

AP's support to NATO has continued. There is however a left wing in AP that is more critical of NATO and wishes that more resources are put into UN-peacekeeping. Both wings are visible in AP's party programme from 2005:

Norway must contribute to strengthening international rules, norms and standards. The UN and regional organisations are our most important instruments to prevent and hinder social, economic and political tensions. AP builds our security policy on Norwegian NATO-membership. We will further develop the cooperation with NATO (Arbeiderpartiet 2005:58).

Sosialistisk Venstreparti (SV – Socialist Left Party)

SV is the only [Norwegian] party in modern time grounded in foreign policy – through their resistance against the Norwegian NATO-membership” (Matlary & Halvorsen 2006:198). In 1999 they supported Operation Allied Force (the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia), and party leader Kristin Halvorsen described this experience; “All my political instincts and reflexes are shaken when I see bombs falling, and highly decorated American generals say things that I agree with” (Børresen, Gjeseth & Tamnes 2004:222). The critical attitude towards NATO remained, as seen in the following statement from their party programme: “NATO strengthens the military and political ties to the USA, who is today the biggest threat to world peace” (Sosialistisk Venstreparti 2005). They have also been critical towards sending more troops to Afghanistan. “Aiming to have more peace
operations means that the military shall not use as many resources on offensive special forces as they are today” (Sosialistisk Venstreparti 2005). In the aftermath of 9/11 party leader Kristin Halvorsen signed a petition “against Norwegian support to American retaliatory actions that will affect innocent civilians” (Klassekampen 2001a). During the negotiations that resulted in the Soria-Moria-proclamation SV's foreign political spokesperson said the following in an interview: “If ISAF and OEF are combined or coordinated closer, or if the ISAF-forces change characteristics when they are expanding their area of responsibility southwards, the Norwegian contribution have to be re-evaluated. The conclusion might be that SV will demand a full withdrawal” (Klassekampen 2005b). As a counterpoint it should be mentioned that in a 2009 survey 86 percent of SV-voters supported the Norwegian membership in NATO (Dagbladet 2009).

Senterpartiet (SP – Centre Party)
SP is primarily based on rural interests. Their primal focus in foreign policy is to protect Norwegian self-rule and stay out of the EU. Their party programme reads: “Norway shall still base its defence- and security policy on NATO-membership, active participation in the UN and OSSE. [SP will] In military operations outside NATO's area, only allow military participation in operations with a clear UN-mandate. (SP will) turn our international military participation more towards pure UN-operations” (Senterpartiet 2005). In October 2006, during one of the controversies on whether to send special forces to Afghanistan party leader Åslaug Haga said that “We can not leave all the lousy jobs to the USA and the UK and just take the nice, humanitarian missions ourselves” (VG Nett 2006).

4.3.3. Other parties
One more party should be mentioned – Fremskrittspartiet (FrP – Progress Party). They are a populist party on the right side of the Norwegian political spectrum, strongly supportive of the US and NATO, as well as generally positive to the Armed Forces (Fremskrittspartiet 2012). In the period they have been in opposition, with 14.6% and 22.1% of the votes in 2001 and 2005 respectively (Statistisk Sentralbyrå 2009). In the first period (2001 – 2005) were able to play some role in ensuring majority when they agreed with the Centre-Right Bondevik-II cabinet, in the second period the Stoltenberg-II cabinet had a majority on their own. “Like SV, FrP is a populist party in foreign policy questions. This is defined as engaging in cases that fit the domestic agenda, normally without a sober-minded analysis of the realities and the latitude in the case” (Matlary 2008).
4.4. The political-military system of Norway

As with most western democracies the Norwegian military is firmly under civilian political control. The government has the highest executive responsibility both for the military and civilian preparations in peacetime and for the leadership of the overall defence in war. The military command authority is delegated to military commanders. The Defence Minister leads the Ministry of Defence and is constitutionally and parliamentary responsible for the operations of the armed forces (Store Norske Leksikon 2012a). In 2003 the Chief of Defence and his staff were integrated into the Ministry of Defence through “Integrated Strategic Leadership” (Store Norske Leksikon 2012b). The merger was done in order to significantly reduce the number of personnel and to achieve more effective and holistic planning and direction (Børresen, Gjeseth & Tamnes 2004:384). One of the practical outcomes is that this ensures that military decisions are in line with political sentiments. In times of war, or during international deployments the operational command is the responsibility of the Fellesoperativt Hovedkvarter (FOH - Joint Operational Headquarters) (Store Norske Leksikon 2012a).

In the period examined there were two Defence Ministers – Kristin Krohn Devold (H – Bondevik II) and Anne-Grete Strøm-Erichsen (AP – Stoltenberg II). Neither had any significant military experience – they had not been in the defence committee nor performed military service (Stortinget.no 2012a & 2012b).

In the period examined there were two chiefs of defence (CHoD), Sigurd Frisvold (30.04.1999 – 01.04.2005) and Sverre Diesen (01.04.2005 – 01.10.2009) (Wikipedia 2012b&c). I have not been able to find documentation for the the process for selecting a new CHoD. It does however seem that it starts with the out-going CHoD selects a short list of candidates. This list is given to the Defence Minister who selects the new CHoD, and announces this in a cabinet meeting (Forsvarets Forum 1999).

Both CHoDs were chosen a while before the elections - in 1998 and April 2005 respectively. Thus they are not political appointees by the cabinet they would serve under, although the process makes sure that they are politically palatable. Both the selection process and (after 2003) the close integration with the Ministry of Defence ensures that the CHoD is in line with political thinking. There seems to be a clear political sentiment that the CHoD should not stray too far. Leader of the Parliamentary Defence committee Røsjordet (from FrP) said that

With regards to [Frisvold's] utterances in Aftenposten - they are inadmissible. They raise doubt that he will implement the resolutions made by the Storting. A Chief of Defence has only one thing to do: Click his heels and execute orders (Aftenposten 2001b). Parliamentary representative Odd Roger Enoksen (Senterpartiet) also had similar sentiments. This was also been seen when CHoD Diesen wrote a fairly negative commentary on the armed forces and economy. “We would like to remind [the CHoD] that is is the Storting and the Cabinet that
decide in this country”, says State Secretary of the Ministry of Defence Espen Barth Eide” (Dagsavisen, referred in Aftenposten 2006f). This then seems to a sentiment present in all parts of the political spectrum, throughout the entire period and with regards to both Chiefs of Defence.

4.4.1. The political-military process of sending forces to a NATO-mission

This chapter builds on the terms and institutions described in the chapter defining caveats. It attempts to explain how the political process in Norway works when NATO asks for forces for a mission.

Foreign policy in Norway is considered the prerogative of the Cabinet. However, there is a strong norm that the Storting is consulted when major foreign policy, trade and defence decisions are to be made. This is normally done through “den utvidede utenrikskomiteen” (DUUK). This parliamentary committee is composed by the members of the ordinary foreign committee, the defence committee, the president of Stortinget, and the leaders of the party groups. The government normally participates with the Foreign Minister, but the Defence Minister and the Minister of Justice may also be present. The notes from the meeting are secret for 30 years and the members are not allowed to relay the discussions (Larssen 2010:202). This enables the committee to be a forum for discussion without making positions public. “The Committee is illustrative of an important feature in Norwegian foreign policy – the prominent consultative role played by the parliament. But the Committee may also be viewed as a political tool by which the government can ease political disagreement and at the same time prevent a backlash from parliament” (Nustad & Thune 2001:163). In general the DUUK is a way of retaining consensus on Norwegian foreign policy, and a way for the opposition parties to voice their opinions on current issues. It is likely that their opinions are considered advice and that the cabinet makes the final decision.

“In any case, the prerogative of the king does not undermine the legislative or financial authority of parliament to make decisions with regard to the organization of the armed forces. Despite the constitutional provisions that give the government the authority to deploy military forces outside Norway, the budgetary authority of parliament will often require legislative consent prior to deployment” (Nustad & Thune 2001:163).

The force generation process is presented visually in figure 3. The description of the Norwegian part of the process is based on Larssen (2010) and Royal United Services Institute (2005). The force generation process starts with the North Atlantic Council initiating planning for an operation. They order the Military Committee to draft an OPLAN, force level needed and ROE. This is forwarded to SACEUR and SHAPE who provide a draft. This is then approved in the Military Council and forwarded to the NAC. When NAC gains political approval of OPLAN, ROE

25 “The expanded foreign policy committee”. It was changed to the expanded foreign policy and defence committee (DUUFK) in 2009.
and CJSOR they send out an ACTWARN, a warning to start the planning process for nations. SACEUR is then tasked with starting the force generation process. Deputy SACEUR leads the force generation conferences, and generally the force generation process. Letters are sent to capitals through their National Military Representatives (NMR) at SHAPE. The NMR and the operations section of the Norwegian defence staff participate at the force generation conferences. The Norwegian defence staff drafts a proposal, with the assistance of the defence branches in question. This proposal is given to the Chief of Defence who approves and sends it to the Ministry of Defence. The ministry includes their views, including implications for security policy and perspectives from other ministries, e.g. the Finance Department. They then approve or disapprove, and forward the proposal to the Minister of Defence. She then, with the help of the MoD, drafts a cabinet note to be presented for the cabinet. The cabinet discusses the note and come to agreement. The cabinet then takes the note to the DUUK. The opposition present their views. This is included or not, and the decision is made final in the weekly Friday cabinet meeting where it is approved by the King. The MoD is then given authority to enact the decision. It is filtered down the chain, and the NMRs at SHAPE deliver the results. The results are compiled by SHAPE and filtered through the MC to the NAC. When the force generation process is complete it is approved by the NAC. If there are not enough forces made available the process starts again. When enough forces are available the NAC gives SACEUR the order to release the ACTORD, putting the OPLAN into effect. This allows national forces to be released to the joint force commander.

When an operation is on-going this process is continuous. For the Norwegian side, minor changes in force composition are normally not taken through the DUUK. The definition of what is a minor change is a matter of definition, and has occasionally been controversial.

Note that this is the model process. There have been examples of other ways of communicating the need for forces. Larssen (2010:196-197) describes how there have been at least one example of NATO's Secretary General calling the Norwegian Minister of Defence. There have also been bilateral requests from other nations for Norwegian forces.

During this process the political level is involved in many of the steps. The NAC is comprised of national representatives from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The MC consists of national military representatives. This means that the Cabinet will know what is going on and give their inputs at several stages of the process.
Figure 3: NATO and Norwegian force generation process

Seeing the process does not necessarily illuminate where the caveats come from. As mentioned previously they should be declared at two points – when reporting forces as a part of the force generation process and when the Transfer of Authority is given in theatre. Their formulation can however take place anywhere in the Norwegian chain. They are then ultimately approved by the Minister or by the cabinet. Without access to internal documents or interviews with decision makers on each level it is difficult to say where the caveats are formulated. It does however seem reasonable that different types of caveats will appear in different places. Technical caveats are likely to come from the military itself, either the branches or the defence staff, as they are the experts on the capacities and capabilities of their forces. Legal caveats are more likely to come from the defence staff or the Ministry of Defence as they possess the judicial expertise. Political caveats are more likely to come from the Ministry of Defence or the cabinet. The Ministry through discussions with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the wider foreign political effects of the use of force, and the cabinet through their political will. It is also possible that the Storting, through DUUK, will be able to influence the cabinet to include caveats if there is a sentiment against the deployment being
4.5. NATO, ISAF and OEF

The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was established after the Bonn-conference in December 2001, and was supported by UN Security Council resolution 1386. NATO assumed command of ISAF August 11th 2003. Initially ISAF was limited to Kabul. In December 2003 ISAF expanded to the north with the opening of the German led Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Kunduz (Stage 1). In the end of May 2005 ISAF took over western Afghanistan (Stage 2). 31st of June 2006 ISAF assumed command in the south (Stage 3). October 5th 2006 ISAF took command in eastern Afghanistan. “The Alliance’s mission now covers the whole of Afghanistan. Today, NATO is leading some 41,000 troops from 38 countries and 25 PRTs” (NATO 2007c). Summary is based on NATO (2007b&c).

Operation Enduring Freedom - Afghanistan (OEF-A, henceforth OEF) is the American operation launched in the aftermath of 9/11. The attacks on Afghanistan started October 7th, 2001. The primary target of OEF was to remove all terrorist infrastructure in Afghanistan and to capture al-Qaeda leaders. With the assistance of the Afghan Northern Alliance Taliban was removed from power (globalsecurity.org 2007). Following the expansion of ISAF OEF has gradually relinquished control over Afghanistan. As of October 2007 around 7000 American troops were in OEF (NATO 2007d).

The primary difference between OEF and ISAF is that the primary goals of the former are to remove terrorists and terrorist infrastructure. ISAF's primary goal is to rebuild and create a stable and peaceful Afghanistan. The difference between the missions, although methods and objectives might overlap, has been of great importance in the Norwegian public debate.
5. Mapping the dependent variable: Norwegian caveats in Afghanistan 2001 - 2008

This chapter, along with appendix 1, maps the use of caveats in the 38 cases in this study. Appendix 1 provides a comprehensive description of all the cases, with the aim of providing viable coding decisions on whether or how caveats were applied. The independent variables will be mapped in the next chapter, before the analyses follows. As stated the dependent variable is the Norwegian caveats in Afghanistan from 2001 – 2008, and the overall picture will be presented first (table 5). I will then go through three larger case-sets in closer detail in order to illuminate the process more closely. These cases have been selected on a combination of available sources and the fact that they present good views of the dynamic leading to caveats. Where possible they have been counterweighted with examples of similar forces without caveats. In addition, several of the cases in Appendix 1 have a fairly long description, making them mini-case studies, at times overlapping with the thicker case studies in this chapter. They should be read together with their relevant cases in the appendix as some information is not repeated both places.


The table below briefly describes the Norwegian units and their caveats. The cases are sorted chronologically. A more thorough description of each unit with sources and classification notes can be found in appendix 1. The table lists the case number and the name of the unit. The rest of the table is listed with a 0 meaning no/none, a 1 meaning yes/present, while a (1) means a caveat is present, but is considered to be low impact (i.e. not caveated for analytical purposes). The colour-coding is merely a visual aid, where grey is 0 and (1) and white is 1. The categories listed are in line with the typology in chapter 2 and are:

Caveated – The unit has caveats or not, number of caveats is not counted.
Technical/Legal/Political – Presence of caveats of these types.
Impact Organizational/Geographic/Action-specific/Support requirement – Notes within which area the caveats have effect.
Type of unit – Denotes whether it was a Special Forces, infantry or aircraft-based unit.
Table 5: Listing of Norwegian caveats by case

There are several interesting trends that can be seen from the table itself. First of all, 13 of 38 units had caveats. Only political caveats have been detected, except for one low impact legal caveat (#2). Secondly, the impact of the caveats was primarily geographic, but some organizational caveats were present. For the action specific caveats, these were the caveats against the PRTs doing reconstruction. The caveat was mitigated through giving more resources to MoFA representatives. There is also one support requirement caveat (#28) – where the force required medical evacuation, without having the organic asset to be able to cover this.

5.2. Special Forces – from KA-BAR to Kabul

This chapter will chronologically go through the deployments of Norwegian Special Forces. They were deployed five times in the period. In the early days (up to 2006) they had few restrictions on their missions. This changed after the 2005 elections. The operations of the Special Forces were then made more public, and caveats were exposed. Further, they were only sent after considerable political debate.
5.2.1. First to go

After 9/11 the planning for the invasion of Afghanistan quickly started. The domestic speculations about Norwegian participation also started after the invasion. In Mid-November 2001 rumours that Norwegian forces would go were refused. However, on November 16 Klassekampen reported that six officers had been sent to the US to assist in the war on terror (2001b). On December 1st the cabinet announced that it would offer to send Special Forces. All parties except SV supported this (Aftenposten 2001a). After fairly quick political debates the proposal was approved in the Storting. The first Norwegian special forces units arrived in Afghanistan in December 2001. They operated out of Bagram and Kandahar bases and performed various missions in support of OEF. According to the then Defence Minister Kristin Krohn Devold “The signal effect to the Americans from sending the force early was important. Being there before Christmas was about relevance. How many countries were there before Christmas? Not many” (Hammersmark 2010:54). Krohn Devold also describes how the attitude from the Ministry of Defence and the military leadership was that this should be done as soon as possible. The then Chief of Defence, General Frisvold, characterized Krohn Devold as an enthusiast with regards to the special forces (Hammersmark 2010:54).

In general there was little political debate surrounding both the sending of the force, as well as the missions they performed while deployed. This was also caused by a general air of secrecy surrounding the contribution. In March 2002 Dagbladet criticised the cabinet for not giving any information on what the Special Forces were doing (2002a). The reply from the spokesperson at the Norwegian High Command is a good indication of the level of secrecy; the only things we will say is that Norwegian Special Forces are in Afghanistan and that they have contributed to the on-going operation. We are as open as possible (Dagbladet 2002a).

Amongst Dagbladet’s questions were if the soldiers were operating within the Law of Armed Conflict and the land-mine agreement. The Defence Minister replied that the secrecy was necessary to protect the soldiers (Dagbladet 2002b). The Storting was later briefed through the Expanded Foreign Policy Committee. The Armed Forces High Command confirmed that no information would be given, but they guaranteed that the force was operating within Norwegian law (Aftenposten 2002). This was accepted, and there was little further political debate.

There also appeared to be a certain unity within the cabinet. In addition to a quick reaction, not having caveats was important to Krohn Devold - “[g]iving the Norwegian forces too many restrictions would make them second rate compared to those they were going to work with. If so, we might as well not have sent them” (Hammersmark 2010:58). Here she is also quite honest about

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26 See also Appendix 1, case 1.
why the forces were sent; in order to be relevant to the Americans. And in general political climate after 9/11 this was likely not very problematic politically.

A Norwegian red card holder was placed in the chain of command. “Prior to the deployment it was necessary to sort out all the details regarding the juridical status and insurances – and to maintain political control while the forces were under American command” (Bakkeli 2007:32). As noted earlier, the existence of a red card holder does not imply caveats, nor that the red card is used. The few public descriptions of the missions they carried out seem to suggest that they had fairly free reins. However, “the Norwegian ROEs were always a bit careful and well within humanitarian international law and all international conventions regulating armed conflicts” (Bakkeli 2007:47). One ROE-issue was that the Norwegian force had an absolute requirement for positive identification (PID) of enemy forces. Overall there is little evidence pointing in the direction of caveats. Even the Americans were impressed - “Commander of Task Force K-Bar (...) appreciated that the Norwegians did not have so many caveats (...) in addition to the national ROEs” (Bakkeli 2007:74). These examples combined with Bakkeli’s (2007) numerous descriptions of how the Special Forces performed extremely dangerous missions all over Afghanistan makes it fairly certain that they did not have caveats. The requirement for positive ID and generally a bit more limited ROE than US Special Forces is attributed to legal factors, and its impact is assessed as minimal.

After six months the Special Forces were sent home. They returned in March 2003 to do roughly the same job. The “same job” being dangerous long range patrols in to the Taliban dominated areas of Kandahar and Helmand. Although Bakkeli describes their missions as less “hunting terrorists and more (...) long term projects and security for the Afghan population, compared with the previous round” (2007: 263). Despite a slightly softer approach, these missions were still highly dangerous, with a great possibility of taking or inflicting casualties, both through small arms fire or by bombing. This, combined with the general freedom from political intervention and the total lack of information in the press, suggests that they had no caveats worth mentioning, i.e. beyond measures to maintain basic national control and to avoid breaking international agreements and laws.

Their original mission was only supposed to last for three months. This was expanded, and they stayed for six. According to Torunn Laugen Haaland “a possible background for this decision to also continue the Special Forces deployment was that the Norwegian F-16 contribution was terminated April 1st 2003. By using the special forces Norway would have a high profile force in Afghanistan until another contribution was in place, something that happened when a surgical unit was sent to Afghanistan in September 2003” (Bakkeli 2007:264). Another reason could be that this relieved other special forces needed for the invasion of Iraq, and thus softened the impact of the fact
that the Bondevik-II cabinet were for political reasons not able to support the American invasion directly.

5.2.2. 2005 – Back to the South

In August 2005 the Norwegian Special Forces returned to Afghanistan. The contingent was split in two, with the first part consisting of soldiers from the Army Special Forces (FSK) supporting the 2005 elections in Paktika province, and the second part with soldiers from Navy Special Forces (MJK) tasked with reconnaissance in the Southern provinces of Helmand and Kandahar.27

The decision to send them was taken in February 2005 and the force was sent out in August, before the Norwegian parliamentary election in September 2005. There was little public debate surrounding the sending of this force. “Foreign minister Jan Petersen (H) briefly accounted for the American Request in his foreign political statement in Stortinget yesterday. The case will be discussed thoroughly at a meeting in the Expanded Foreign Policy Committee on Thursday. Most probably Arbeiderpartiet, as earlier, give the government the necessary backing” (Aftenposten 2005a). Given the political landscape and distribution of mandates, this backing gave the necessary majority for the government to gain approval for the deployment.

Resembling the other Special Forces contingents, there is no information that suggests caveats. Norwegian control of the force has been maintained as earlier; “The rules are the same as last, that every operation with Norwegian participation shall be approved by Norwegian officers beforehand” (Aftenposten 2005a).

The second part of this contingent took place after the Norwegian elections. As mentioned previously the Stoltenberg II-cabinet was more critical to the USA and OEF. The contribution was however allowed to complete its term as stated in the Soria Moria agreement (Regjeringen.no 2005). Further, there are no indications that the second part of the deployment was caveated. Indeed – in the few descriptions available of their missions they appear to not be limited in the type of missions, where to go, and who to work with.

5.2.3. Kabul SOF

During spring and summer 2006 there were informal requests from NATO and the USA for Norwegian Special forces. This caused a debate within the Stoltenberg-II cabinet. The main debate was between SV who were strongly opposed to the deployment and AP who were for. The then American ambassador to Norway Benson Whitney described this in notes sent to Washington.

27 See Appendix 1, case 14 for details.
These notes were released in Norwegian newspapers following Wikileaks. VG claims that “the Norwegian Ministry of Defence and gradually the Ministry of Foreign Affairs worked hard to send the forces to Afghanistan” (VG 2010). This was done with the approval of the two ministers, both from AP. Whitney himself assessed that “We are convinced that there is a broad support for Norwegian participation within the two ministries, but because the cabinet at a high level are making efforts to satisfy SV, we are not convinced that the ministries' advice to their ministers will be followed” (VG 2010).

On 19 October 2006, after a long period of internal deliberation the cabinet announced that it would not send Special Forces to Afghanistan (VG 2010).

The discussions resurfaced again on the 5th of February 2007. Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) asked the Norwegian Chief of Defence, General Diesen, if Norway could send Special Forces, F-16 jets or transport aircraft. Initially it was reported that the cabinet would look seriously into the matter, and SV said that they would again say no (Aftenposten 2007g). On the 13th the cabinet announced that it would send Special Forces to Kabul. SV faced internal turmoil for sending the Special Forces, AP for restricting them geographically to Kabul province. A few days of debate and uncertainty about the restrictions followed. Opposition party leader Siv Jensen (FrP) said that

I think I will chose to chuckle over the fact that the Foreign Minister is now trying to place the blame on the opposition, considering how the government now has changed their standpoint on this five or six times just in the course of three days. I think everybody understands that this is not the opposition's fault (Gahr Støre 2007b).

According to Oddrun Årflot (SV), party leader Kristin Halvorsen said that

The soldiers who will be sent to Afghanistan will not operate in the southern parts of the country. She said that by sending the soldiers to Kabul we are assured that they will not be moved any other places, and especially to the South. Because, this thing about sending [the soldiers] to the South is not an option for SV (VG nett 2007).

After a few days with intense media pressure and much uncertainty Foreign Minister Jonas Gahr Støre made the following statement in Stortinget;

- Then there is the major question. If there is a crisis, an emergency, in the vicinity, where NATO should wish to use these elements, some of the soldiers, the answer is that first of all this is a hypothetical problem. But let me say that if forces are attacked and there is an acute need for a rescue action, Norway will answer the call. Norway will help people in need, if it is needed. This is something completely different than moving or re-stationing the force. We have expressed this clearly. And in both cases Norway shall be consulted. (…)

- Then I wish to respond to the MP Solberg when she says that these limitations are in conflict with the NATO-spirit, I strongly disagree with that. If that were the case, half of ISAF would be in conflict with the NATO-spirit. Other countries have placed complicated restrictions of different kinds on their participation. I think that Norway has been very clear in what we have done. We have said that there should be no limitations on the forces that have been in the North, and when it comes to the Kabul-force, it is there to solve a mission, and we say that it shall solve its mission there. If

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28 My translation from Norwegian. The original documents in English have not been released by VG.

29 See Appendix 1, case 25 for unit details.
anything else should come up, Norway must be consulted (Gahr Støre 2007b). He is a somewhat unclear here; a short summary is that there is a caveat on the special forces that will be sent to Kabul. The caveat states that they cannot be moved out of Kabul province for longer periods or on pre-planned missions. They can however be sent to other areas if a crisis should occur, an “in extremis” situation.

The decision why SV would approve the sending of Special Forces to Kabul was given one explanation in Dagbladet –

Several other countries had received the same request as Norway (...). SV leader Kristin Halvorsen feared that other NATO-allies would snatch the mission right in front of Norway’s nose, and that the government thus would have to take on a mission even less acceptable to SV (2007f). Halvorsen’s main advisor, Roger Sandum, gave a more explicit version. “We knew that sending Special Forces to the South was impossible. Sending forces to Kabul was nothing we wished for, but something we saw as acceptable” (Dagbladet 2007a). Dagbladet further quotes anonymous sources who claimed that

NATO informally asked that the Telemark Battalion to be deployed in the turbulent South-Afghanistan. The mission envisioned by NATO was to guard the border towards Pakistan (...). Such a mission would have led Norwegian soldiers straight into the war zone (2007f). Finally “the opposition in Stortinget would have hammered AP for not sending forces to the South once the decision was known. The assessment was then that the internal discontent in SV was tolerable” (Dagbladet 2007a). Janne Haaland Matlary shed further light on the debate,

The second time it was impossible to say no without damaging the Norwegian status in NATO in a permanent way. But SV wanted to have something to save face. This “something” was called “The South” and got an almost theological status (Matlary 2007). This was also stated publicly by SV itself. Foreign political spokeswoman Ågot Valle said that “It is in the South that the offensive warfare is taking place. My understanding is that what the Special Forces are going to do in Kabul primarily is a defensive task. That is the reason why we can accept the mission” (Dagbladet 2007c).

As the contribution was controversial within the cabinet the caveats were continuously monitored. The Defence Minister said that

I have visited the Special Forces several times, both before their deployment and twice in Afghanistan. I am very well oriented about their operations and activities. (...) Rules of Engagement and mandate were thoroughly debated, also in Parliament, before they were sent out by this government” (VG 2007b).

She also informed the cabinet when she felt that it was necessary. In addition to this political direct control over the force, Strøm-Erichsen also noted how the military side was involved in controlling the units. “There have not been any situations that have been in violation of the mandate or the rules of engagement they are under now in ISAF. There are many control mechanisms in the system that

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30 My translation. The speech is taken from question time in Stortinget and it is characterized by not looking like a part of a pre-written speech.
take ensure this” (VG 2007b).

After their six month period was over the force returned to Norway.

5.2.4. Return to Kabul

After the political turmoil, near splitting the cabinet, as described in the previous chapter, it was a surprise that the Special Forces were sent again. They were to be deployed in Kabul for a period of 18 months. The mission was as before – to train an Afghan Crisis Response Unit and to stop suicide bomber networks operating in and near the capital. It was again caveated geographically to Kabul.

The main difference was that there was little political debate preceding the decision to send the force. The little debate seen was sombre. Aftenposten later described how the cabinet made an agreement on 06 November 2007. In the agreement SV supported a sending of Special Forces to Kabul for 18 months. “In return, [Prime Minister] Stoltenberg accepted that the list of Norwegian contributions would be fixed until after the [Norwegian 2009 parliamentary] election” (Aftenposten 2008a). This secured internal support for the Special Forces in the cabinet. It further meant that there would not be a need to partake in new discussions if new requests came from NATO. One example of this came when US Secretary of Defence Robert Gates sent a request to the Norwegian MoD for more forces to Afghanistan in February 2008. This was refused pointing at the political agreement in the cabinet (Aftenposten 2008a). This then concluded the Norwegian special forces contingents. Although controversial and caveated geographically there did not seem to be large restraints on what they were allowed to do in their geographical Area of Responsibility throughout the period. The contribution appeared to have had a quite positive result.

The importance of the Kabul-region and the proximity to important decision-makers also contributed to getting maximum effect. The units was regularly visited by COMISAF and other important governmental persons. Continuous presence of international media and the availability of the area further contributed to the high profile of this region. That the little state Norway, with its special forces, took responsibility for this region was noticed (Hammersmark 2010:71).

A desire for military efficiency through allowing a military force to work and specialise in one area was likely not the cause of these caveats. Yet it appears to have had a good effect, and the Special Forces were allowed to focus on one single area.

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31 See Appendix 1, case 32 and 35, for more details.
5.3. Fighting planes

5.3.1. F-16s in Kyrgyzstan

In October 2002 the first Norwegian F-16 detachment left for Kyrgyzstan. A few months earlier, on June 7 2002, Klassekampen reported that “The converted Norwegian F-16s that are able to strike ground targets are now preparing to participate in the war in Afghanistan” (2002b). After the initial revelation that Norway would send planes to bomb the press calmed. The planes were to provide security through aerial show of force, bombing, and assistance to ground forces when needed (Stortinget 2003a). The main topic then became a concern about Norwegian law; as the planes would be under American command - would they carry cluster munitions (Klassekampen 2002a)? A further topic for debate was the fact that they would be stationed in Kyrgyzstan, hardly a democratic country. This press debate did not spark much political debate. And after journalists were invited to a demonstration of the planes, and the Ministry of Defence reassured that the planes would be under Norwegian command and not carry cluster bombs the controversy died.

While the planes were deployed the USA was preparing the invasion of Iraq. This created a massive global reaction, with major demonstrations in most Western capitals including Oslo. Because of this domestic pressure the Bondevik-II cabinet was not able to send forces to aid the attack on Iraq. However, “[the Americans] who are moving much of their aerial capacity to Iraq would like the Norwegians to continue flying over Afghanistan” (Aftenposten 2003). This did not happen, and the planes were redeployed as planned on April 1st 2003.

For a thorough presentation of this unit and its political control mechanisms, in Norwegian, consult Frost-Nielsen (2009). Their ROE issues are outlined in appendix 1, case #2.

5.3.2. Operation Afghan Falcon

In the summer of 2005 the Bondevik-II cabinet said that they wanted to offer three to four F-16 fighters to ISAF (Forsvarsnett 2005e). This then landed on the desk of the Stoltenberg-II cabinet after the election, as they had to approve it.

On November 4 2005 Klassekampen reported that the cabinet approved the sending of four F-16s (2005a) in what would be called “Operation Afghan Falcon”. The proposal was unanimously approved according to Klassekampen. One vital point to ensure this was the clarification that the planes were in ISAF and that they could only support OEF “in extremis”. While the case cleared cabinet fairly easy, the lower echelons of SV and others were less satisfied.

32 They did however send a “humanitarian engineer company” to aid with reconstruction after the invasion was completed.

33 See also Appendix 1, case 17.
On November 9th the organization “the peace initiative” staged a demonstration outside the Storting. Several of SV’s MPs were present at the demonstration – demonstrating against a cabinet with their own party in it. This caused media turmoil and put a heavy strain on both the cabinet and SV as a party. On the 26th Aftenposten reported that the party leadership in SV had to use “the whip” in order to make the party form ranks. As a part of this party leader Halvorsen explained that the planes were there to protect Norwegian soldiers and other soldiers in ISAF (2005b). In the words of one of the pilots; “We are helping the PRTs North and West in Afghanistan” (Forsvartsnett 2006a).

The caveats were clearly spelled out in public by the cabinet, other politicians and the military. “The Norwegians know that they may have to use weapons if it becomes necessary, or “to give ISAF ground forces fire support in critical situations” (…) In extraordinary cases they might help the American led forces of Enduring Freedom, but that is only in a case of emergency” (Aftenposten 2006a). Spelling out the caveats publicly appears to have been a strategy to make the political situation less problematic.

One point that was not lost on the opposition, and used in later debates, was the fact that a few days before the planes left for Afghanistan the Norwegian camp in Meymaneh was attacked by a large civilian crowd. Amongst the planes that came to assist were two American A-10 ground attack aircraft from Operation Enduring Freedom.

5.4. No soldiers to the “death zone”

In the summer of 2006 NATO took over the security responsibility for Southern Afghanistan. This happened after a spring and early summer that had seen a strengthened Taliban fighting against primarily American and British troops in major battles (Aftenposten 2006b). Apart from a small OEF presence the South had mainly been left alone since 2001. This had enabled Taliban and other insurgent forces to build up fighting positions, logistics networks and training camps. Deploying a large permanent force into the enemy stronghold created a violent reaction. The Taliban tried to take on NATO head-to-head in conventional fighting, in addition to their usual tactics of hit-and-run, IEDs and rocket attacks.

A few days after the change of command commentaries spoke of the fact that this would make SV supporters of sending Norwegian soldiers to the South. This would blur the image of Norwegian soldiers as only doing reconstruction (Dagbladet 2006a). “While one in the North primarily are doing state building and stabilization, in the South it is more correct to speak of peace enforcement where ISAF’s soldiers are involved in offensive operations with regular acts of war”.

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34 NATO had already taken over responsibility for the West, and the East was included later.
says lieutenant-colonel John Inge Øglænd from the armed forces joint operational headquarters” (Aftenposten 2006c).

In the summer of 2006 Norway had the following forces in Afghanistan; A PRT in Meymaneh, a Quick Reaction Force (QRF) with support elements based in Mazar-E-Sharif, and a field hospital with surgical capabilities, also in Mazar-E-Sharif. The QRF consisted of an infantry company with three platoons, and a support company with medics, snipers, mortars and combat engineers. Its primary mission was to be a quick reaction force if any of the five PRTs in Northern Afghanistan (i.e. RC North) were attacked or needed support in other ways. To perform this mission the unit was highly mobile, either by jeeps or by German helicopters, but also were able to field CV-90 infantry fighting vehicles.

“Operation Medusa, targeting Afghan Mujahedeen South-West of Kandahar, are the hardest ground fights NATO has been involved in since the organization was established” (Klassekampen 2006a), and in Norwegian media Southern Afghanistan was labelled “the death zone” (e.g. Dagbladet 2006b). The Norwegian debate largely revolved around whether the government could send 19 year old conscripts to “die in the South” (Dagbladet 2006b). NATO, through COMISAF, requested additional forces from other parts of the country. On September 1st NATO requested whether the Norwegian QRF could be sent to Kandahar to do guard duty at the airport there, thus freeing other forces to go out on fighting missions. “The Chief of FOHK… supported the NCC’s recommendation to say no to this mission” (Forsvarsnett 2006c). The rationale for saying no was that they were to keep the QRF in the North where its original mission and area of responsibility was.

The countries that contribute to the security force in Afghanistan, ISAF, have the right to veto the orders of ISAF-commanders. This was a mission that was not in concord with the one that the Norwegian soldiers was sent to Afghanistan to do, says brigadier Gunnar Gustavsen, chief of staff at Norwegian Joint Operational Headquarters (Aftenposten 2006e). Another angle was given by the spokesman of the Joint Operational Headquarters, Lieutenant Colonel Øglænd - “I can confirm that we have received a request for the Norwegian unit to go South. But this was not a sufficiently extreme case, something we think that it has to be in order to send the force. Thus Norway chose to refuse” (Dagbladet 2006b).

31st of August 2006 there were reports that NATO and Pentagon were not satisfied with the Norwegian level of participation (Aftenposten 2006d). Operation Medusa was a major ISAF offensive to restore government control of Kandahar. It started on September 2nd 2006. Three days

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35 This case is also described in appendix 1, case 21.
36 Technically they are not conscripts, as they had completed their period of conscription before going to Afghanistan. and had volunteered to go there.
37 Norwegian Joint Operational Headquarters in Jåttå, Norway.
later “an advisor to president Hamid Karzai delivered a request to a bigger and more coordinated effort from the United Stated and NATO, something which adds to the pressure NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer is already laying on NATO countries to send battle groups southwards” (Klassekampen 2006a). Klassekampen on the 12th of September reported that “Defence Minister Anne-Grete Strøm-Erichsen has admitted that Norway is under pressure to send more troops to Afghanistan” (2006b).

On September 7 a team of seven nurses and a liaison officer from the Norwegian field hospital in Mazar-E-Sharif were sent to Kandahar to assist the Canadian field hospital. According to Major Salberg who participated in the deployment said that “We will be working inside the walls of a robust military base which has a high focus on security. That makes us feel safer” (Forsvarsnett 2006d).

As the fighting continued, so did NATO’s attempts to get more forces for ISAF. SACEUR, General Jones, requested 2500 more soldiers from NATO. During the NATO summit in Portoroz, Slovenia, NATO requested Norwegian Special Forces (Adresseavisen 2006a). This request was declined by the Norwegian government on the 18th of September. NATO had the following comment on the decline: “It is a national decision. We have asked everyone to participate with what they can, and we will continue to do that” (Adresseavisen 2006b). The decisions to refuse sending forces to the South, and then refuse to send Special Forces created much debate. The responsibility for the refusal was mainly placed on SV. Allegedly the refusal came after several tough debates within the government. The debates on whether Norway should stay in the North or help its allies in the South, and if the cabinet would fall as a result of this, were quite intense. Following a several public refusals of sending forces to the South, the debate ended in late September.

In political terms Afghanistan was a very important policy area for SV, and environmental issues another. During the autumn of 2006 there was a long debate on whether to allow the construction of new gas power plants without a CO2-removal system. In the end SV mainly lost this battle and the power plants were given a green light, granted that they had CO2-removal active from 2014. This was a hard blow for SV, and a case that created internal turmoil. However, SV’s environmental spokesperson said that “If SV had chosen to leave the government [over this case] there would have been a clear majority for building these power plants without any requirements for CO2-removal” (Sørensen 2006). The debate on refusing to send the QRF South and to refuse Special Forces should be seen in conjunction with this, as well as linked to the CO2-removal case.

The caveats on the Norwegian QRF were said to be removed later that autumn. On 24 October 2006 Foreign Minister Gahr Støre said the following in the Storting: “NATO is oriented about the Norwegian standpoint. We have at the same time underlined that Norway in principle can

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contribute with forces in all of ISAF's area of responsibility. This follows from NATO's responsibility for the entire Afghanistan" (Gahr Støre 2006). This was also underlined by Defence Minister Strøm-Erichsen - “It can thus not be ruled out that the Norwegian Quick Reaction Force also can be sent to other places in Afghanistan in critical situations, as long as the missions are within the operational capacity of the force and their mission as a reaction force. Norway has already also sent some soldiers for medical duty in South-Afghanistan”. She further said that “I would like to underline that the cabinet is in principle not opposed to send Norwegian forces to South-Afghanistan” (Strøm-Erichsen 2006). In November the foreign policy editor of Aftenposten said that “We [Norway] already have a quick reaction force in North-Afghanistan. It is at the disposal of ISAF's supreme commander, the British general David Richards, without restrictions” (Dragenes 2006). Dragenes further writes that “He can use it anywhere, whenever he feels that it is militarily necessary. Norway is as such a model country, we are one of six NATO-countries that have no restrictions on where or how the forces can be used” (Ibid. Italics in original).

The removal of the caveats came before the 2006 NATO summit in Riga. It was a major event at the level of heads of state and government. It focused mainly on Afghanistan, and in the continuation of that on caveats. In its final statement on the 29th of November 2006 one passage reads “improving our ability to conduct and support multinational joint expeditionary operations far from home territory with little or no host nation support and to sustain them for extended periods. This requires forces that are fully deployable, sustainable and interoperable, and the means to deploy them” (NATO 2006). The criticism is soft, yet critical voices were quite clear before the summit (Fried 2006), and the same criticism was voiced in private talks.

On the Foreign Ministers meeting in the North-Atlantic Council in January 2007 foreign minister Jonas Gahr Støre said that “We have no formal caveats and we will adapt our presence in order to be as useful as possible” (2007a). However, when analysed closer, the practical impact of the removal of the caveat seems to mainly have been to remove it from the matrix kept in the NATO HQ in Brussels. The QRF would likely still not be sent to the South on a pre-planned mission. Any attempts to do this would be stopped by the NCC or the Join HQ acting on political directions. However, “in extremis” they could be sent. However, as discussed in chapter 4.4 an infantry unit will almost certainly never be sent on an in extremis-mission in another part of the country, mainly for reasons of practicality, logistics and the time it takes to get approval and set up chains of command. Any semi-mobile unit in the South would be at any hotspot faster than the Norwegian force. The earlier statement of Lt Col Øglænd also underlines the problem with in extremis. Thus it makes sense to say that this force was still geographically caveated. Another indication that this is the case is briefly described in appendix 1, case 24. In a TV-documentary following the life of the
QRF operating in the Spring of 2007, one of the soldiers mention that they have been asked to help in operations outside RC North several times, but this did not happen (AV-senteret 2010).

The Foreign Minister's statement is also only three weeks before the controversy surrounding the Norwegian Special Forces deployment to Kabul. They were as mentioned caveated geographically. Another interesting point surrounding the removal of the caveats is that in theory the “conscript” QRF infantry unit could be sent to the South, while the Special Forces in Kabul could not. This only makes sense if one considers the increased mobility and utility of Special Forces and their then increased likelihood of actually being used somewhere else. It is also possible that the restriction of the QRF to RC North was considered an “established fact” by planners in either the RC North or Kabul.

To sum up, the geographical caveat on the QRF was mainly there for three reasons. The first in order to safeguard them from harm, the second and third of political nature. It was important to maintain a division between the images of the reconstruction efforts of ISAF and the terrorist hunting activities of OEF. In the national debate the South was firmly connected to the latter. Thirdly this had to be publicly stated in order to keep the cabinet from disbanding.

On the other hand, NATO and allied pressure meant that it was important to be caveat free. This is clearly shown by the statements of the Foreign Minister.

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38 See chapter 5.2.3 above and Appendix 1, case 25 for the actual statements.
6. Mapping the independent variables (x1 – x5)

The description of empirical finds and coding notes are given in the remaining sub-chapters. Please note that all variables are coded so that a “1” are the values that theoretically increasing the likelihood of a unit being caveated, while “0” lessens the likelihood. This is done in line with the hypotheses eases the interpretation of the analysis. The complete coding form can be found at the end of the chapter.

6.1. Weakening the security guarantee (X1)

As discussed in chapter 3.2 a realist-perspective sees two types of caveats. The first is caveats to ensure that a unit does not jeopardize a nation's security by threatening a possible threat, the second that a nation will have caveats to protect its forces from misuse and to avoid that they are being spent by a coalition, thus lessening the national ability to defend itself or achieve its goals. These two reasons have to be weighted against the overarching goal of improving national security through joining a coalition mission and being a reliable ally.

The Norwegian relationship with Russia, the major possible threat, was quite good and basically unchanged during the period. The primary uncertainty was the unclear maritime border in the Arctic, a problem resolved after the period examined in this thesis. The NATO-Russia relation went through several phases in this period. It hit a low point in 2008 with the Kosovo declaration of independence in February and the Russo-Georgian war in August. The Norwegian relationship with Russia was also damaged by these two incidents, but not as bad. NATO and Russia ceased doing “business as usual” (Scheffer 2008), while Norway still had channels open. The difference in caveats, from a realist perspective, should come with Norway rather than NATO having a poor relationship with Russia.

The second argument is somewhat irrelevant in this case, as the number of Norwegian soldiers (~500) in Afghanistan would not have been what tipped the scales if the Russians were to invade. Thus, a realist would argue that the most important factor is that a strained relationship with Russia causes Norway to ensure NATO support by removing its caveats. It is not immediately plausible that a single unit with tighter reins would be the element that tipped NATO's scale in case of a Russian invasion of Norway. Nor was the threat of a full scale invasion present in the period either. It was more likely that small scale events and general Russian pressure would take place. One such instance is the Elektron-case in 2005 (BBC 2005; Inderberg 2007). In such less clear cut cases allies would have to support politically, rather than military. This would require them to weigh
their own political agendas towards supporting Norway. Examples of this were the periods where Russia cut the gas supplies to Ukraine\textsuperscript{39}, and the EU was unable to agree on a single stance due to diverging interests. In such cases the most important factor to get support is the overall view of Norway as a reliable ally.

There have been several references to Norway's security guarantee in the period. This has primarily been from the opposition, fearing that caveats endanger the relationship with the Americans and NATO as a whole. The Stoltenberg-II cabinet responded that they did not believe that the caveats implemented actually jeopardized Norway's position as a reliable ally.

For the coding of this variable, it is set to low threat (1) until October 2005, when the Elektron-case and gas problems meant that the external threat level was somewhat higher (0) until June 2006. It is then again low until January 2008, when the Kosovo independence and Georgian war makes it higher for the remainder of the year. It is here important to note that I have no information suggesting that Norway was in any sense on a higher alert during these periods, rather that the diplomatic problems between Norway/NATO/EU and Russia can have increased Norwegian wish to be seen as a good ally.

6.2. Normative pressure from allies (X2)

As shown there are many indications that NATO does not appreciate caveats. One good example is the Riga summit of 2006 where caveats were lifted up as one of the main topics (see chapter 6.4). The divide between nations who do a lot and nations who are considered to not do as much is also prevalent, and has given the rise to new ways of considering burden-sharing within NATO. Through official and unofficial channels various nations and NATO itself has pressured allies both to send more forces and to remove caveats.

Some instances of pressure have been shown in chapter 5. When it comes to pressure to relocate the Norwegian contribution from Kabul to the North and PRT Meymaneh Flatemo (2008:31-33) describes how this was done against military advice, in order to further political gains through taking increased responsibility. In general the messages given to all NATO nations at summits should also be considered to be political pressure. The pressure from individual nations is less reported as this is done through bi-lateral diplomatic channels. Some examples have however been reported. During the summer of 2006 when the debate on whether to send the QRF to the South raged Dagbladet reported that “While the leadership of the armed forces and the cabinet have been concerned with being seen as an important, professional and robust contributor to NATO's

\textsuperscript{39} January 2006 and January 2009.
efforts in Afghanistan, diplomatic acrobatics on a high level is currently conducted in order to avoid that the soldiers are ordered to perform dangerous crisis missions” (Dagbladet 2006b). No combat troops were sent south. Several nurses were however sent to the same camp as the infantry soldiers were not allowed to go to. This is likely an attempt to support the alliance and to take some edge off the critique.

There is also a pre-emptive effect – not having caveats is a good thing, meaning that the cabinets will attempt to not have caveats as this gives more positive political effects internationally from the contribution. When discussing the early use of Special Forces it comes forth quite clearly that Defence Minister Krohn Devold considered the contra-productive effects of sending Special Forces with caveats. The Bondevik-II government then viewed caveats as a way of undermining the positive effects of sending the force. The result was very few caveats. The outcome seemed to be a good relation with the Bush-government. “There is no doubt that the Norwegian access to decision-makers, both in NATO and with our most important allies – the US and the UK markedly improved. We climbed much higher on the meeting- and queue-list” (Devold in Hammersmark 2010:59). And in the same fashion, Jens Stoltenberg encountered problems with the same Bush-government after a diplomatic faux pas. When Bush called to congratulate Stoltenberg with the electoral victory in 2005 Stoltenberg explained that they would withdraw the forces from Iraq, but not that they would withdraw the Special Forces from Afghanistan. “A year a and a half later Norwegian diplomats can still feel that this blunder keeps the door to the White House closed for Jens Stoltenberg, while it was wide open for predecessor Kjell Magne Bondevik.” (Dagbladet 2007b).

On several occasions the Stoltenberg-II cabinet maintained its caveats despite much pressure from allies. One case in point was the refusal to send an infantry force to RC South in 2006. The official statements by Gahr Støre in 2007 and a report from Aftenposten (2006e) shows that the caveats have been removed from the list, but statements from soldiers indicated that the caveats still remained throughout spring of 2007.

For the coding – the external pressure is set to present (0) for all units following the expansion of ISAF to the South, that is from 31 July 2006, as this would decrease the Norwegian foreign-policy latitude. The statements from the Riga Summit in November are one indicator of this continuing pressure. In general caveats, as well as a desire for more troops, became more important for the alliance as the fighting became more intense. For the earlier contingents, and especially the OEF contributions, the statements especially from Krohn Devold suggest that there was no specific pressure to be caveat free, as other nations had caveats. There were however diplomatic benefits gained from not having caveats.
6.3. Normatively unacceptable behaviour (X3)

As mentioned in chapter 4 the peacekeeping infantry unit has a special significance in Norwegian politics. The idea of Norway as a humanitarian superpower is also a reoccurring theme. In general symbols and language seem to be extremely important. The first example of a normatively influenced caveat comes under the Bondevik-II government. It is the restriction that the military side of the PRT cannot do any kind of reconstruction or humanitarian aid. The caveat continued into the Stoltenberg-II PRTs. “From the Norwegian side it was decided that there would be a very clear divide between military and civilian activities in PRT MEY. The military side of PRT MEY would thus not perform any form of activity except support to building up the security sector” (Flatemo 2008: 39). It is considered a caveat as a civil-military cooperation and the ability to aid reconstruction is at the heart of both the Provincial Reconstruction Team concept and the Counter-Insurgency doctrine.

When Norway took over the leadership of PRT MEY political guidelines for how the concept should be were given. These did not appear in any public documents, but were still clearly perceived amongst the military. (…) The change of government did not cause any changes in the political guidelines for PRT MEY, and thus show that there was broad unity on these amongst the political parties in Norway (Flatemo 2008:73). This comes from the idea of the military reconstruction work as being tainted and used for the wrong ends, i.e. in an attempt to win hearts and minds rather than an altruistic approach with the aim to improve the life of those who need it most. Military humanitarian aid is also said to endanger the work of purely humanitarian organizations. There are also many instances of military reconstruction work with little or counterproductive effects due to the fact that soldiers are not trained in aid work and project leadership. In the debates that reoccur with irregular intervals the normative argument comes forth as the strongest. In practice this caveat was not removed, rather mitigated through expanding the size and funding of the civilian side of the PRT. “This examination has also shown that there has not been much disagreement between military personnel and politicians about the concept. Where there was a disagreement concept was to a large degree changed, for instance through increased civilian participation in PRT MEY and Norwegian financing of development projects in Faryab province” (Flatemo 2008:71-72). No international concern about this has been found by this author.

An argument slightly contrary to the preceding line of thought is the distinction between the peace keeper and the terrorist-hunter. Whilst there was a general political consensus for the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, this waned during the following years. The falling popularity of the Bush government and the Iraq invasion in particular were important in causing this decline. On the ground in Afghanistan there were two military organizations; ISAF and OEF. In Norwegian debate

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40 See appendix 1, Case 12 for more details
the two became symbols for two different approaches to the mission. ISAF were doing reconstruction and helping the Afghan people while OEF were hunting for Al-Qaeda and Taliban in "the South". This distinction became extremely important for SV who were negative to NATO and the US in general and OEF in particular. The normatively bad thing that a military unit could do was both hunting for terrorists and generally being associated with OEF or their hunt for terrorists. The Bondevik-II cabinet were not opposed to this, and Norwegian F-16s participated in OEF, while Special Forces were sent on several missions to assist in the South. This changed with the Stoltenberg-II cabinet. This distinction between the two missions became an issue for most units in the period 2006-2009. The QRF was not allowed to be sent to the South. Partly for military and logistical reasons, possibly partly because increased risk was not desirable, but primarily because SV could not accept Norwegian forces in the South and the following association with OEF. As party leader Kristin Halvorsen reportedly said "(...) This thing about sending [the soldiers] to the South is not an option for SV" (VG nett 2007). See also chapter 5.4 for more details on this. For Operation Afghan Falcon, the F-16s stationed in Kabul, the effect was that they were only allowed to assist OEF-units in extremis. Pre-planned missions were not allowed. This was to keep them from being used for deliberate targeting operations and generally from being associated with OEF. It also made it possible for SV to allow fighter planes to be sent to Afghanistan, something which was deeply problematic for the party. The Special Forces that were sent to Kabul were also geographically caveated in order to keep them from going to the South. This had the added benefit of allowing them to focus on their mission in Kabul and the surrounding areas. The OMLTs geographic caveats were also to keep them from going to the South (appendix 1, Case 26). There was also the case of the QRFs. As has been mentioned previously, the refusal to send them to the South was said to be grounded in military necessity. Vice Admiral Reksten stated that their mission was in the North, not in the South. In order to avoid mission creep and to make sure they are actually doing the mission they are supposed to do it makes sense to make sure that they remain in one area. This is also protection of the unit. If analysed from the RC-North level, this is correct. If one looks at theatre-level (i.e. country-level) it is most probably not. COMISAF requested these forces because he considered the situation as more grave in the South, and that the need for these forces was greater there. Further, the Norwegian QRF consisted of three separate task units (infantry platoon plus support platoon), thus sending one would mean two remaining in the North. The situation in the North at the time was relatively calm, and remained so throughout the period. Based on this it seems that the refusal to send the QRF to the South was more politically grounded than in military necessity. This matches the general unwillingness to be involved in the South.

As shown there were caveats keeping Norwegian forces from performing what was
considered normatively bad behaviour. The forms of bad behaviour were primarily anything not connected with reconstruction and peace keeping. This includes hunting for terrorists, being in “the South” and associating with OEF. On the other hand, doing actual reconstruction was also considered to be a task soldiers should not do. As for not doing reconstruction, this was a feature during both cabinets. As such it is likely a thought prevalent across larger parts of the political spectrum. It is likely that this came on the insistence of KrF in Bondevik-II, while both AP and SV would agree with it, ensuring that it would not get removed during Stoltenberg-II. And despite some military frustration it remains today.41

The main methodological problem when coding this variable is falling into a trap of circular reasoning. What is defined by various actors as normatively problematic behaviour is not constant, and can be seen as coming from two places. The first is what the public in general considers to be problematic. The second is what the parties in cabinet consider to be problematic. The first is likely fairly constant, whereas the second will vary more. The second is likely the source of actual caveats, while it can rarely allow units to behave in ways not accepted by the public over time. Both “actors” can be expected to be sensitive to the way a unit's mission and tasks are presented (“framing”).

There are in general two ways of assessing units that might behave in normatively unacceptable behaviour. The first is through empirically assigning the variable on basis of findings that indicate that the unit was feared to conduct those kinds of missions. This will then correlate highly with caveats placed against normative behaviour on the basis of the sources used, and be a possible source of over-determination. The second is to more generically assess, again on the empirical evidence above, the units that might engage in problematic behaviour. This can skew the analysis, as the same type of unit can be normatively problematic for the public or a specific party in a certain setting and time, while it is not in another.

I have chosen a mix; with most of the emphasis on option one. Units are assessed to be normatively problematic on the basis of what can be considered generally problematic. This means that most units are problematic.42 This has then been modified by my knowledge of the cases and the setting they took place in. For instance, there are no indications that the Bondevik-II cabinet considered special forces to be normatively problematic. This method will present the best actual picture of what is considered normatively problematic, but it is susceptible to circular reasoning - E.g. since there were no (detected) caveats on the Special Forces under Bondevik-II, these were not

42 All F-16s, all Special Forces, all PRTs, all OMLTs, all QRFs are considered “possibly problematic”, in total 30 of 38 cases.
normatively problematic for them. This can lead to this variable having a too high match. This also downplays interesting cases in which a normatively problematic unit is not caveated.

On the actual coding – all special forces are initially considered possibly problematic (1). This on the basis that they have a primarily offensive mission, and they are an asset that will likely be used by the coalition. As they are normally highly mobile they can be inserted into the entire theatre, while their capabilities mean that they are likely to be used. The risk to the force is also quite high as they will normally go to the most dangerous areas. Controlling for empirical finds the Bondevik-II cabinet seemed to not consider them problematic, and these are then coded (0).

The PRTs are considered problematic (1) as they can do reconstruction. This does however not apply until Norway takes over control over the PRT in June 2005. The QRFs are considered problematic as they can be deployed to the South, a major issue for the government at the time, although the public in general seemed split on the matter. For the F-16s all contingents are considered problematic. Looking at the early stages of the period there is much uncertainty in the general public and politically on what these planes would do, and concern that they would be used for bombing with the possibility of killing civilians. The concept of sending jet planes was in general problematic for the Norwegian public. Also, since the F-16s are primarily a theatre asset with extreme mobility it is likely that they will be used across the country and support operations that the various cabinets do not agree with.

The NAD-contingents are considered not problematic (0). The Kabul contingents are assessed to be not problematic as these closely resemble what Norway did in Lebanon, Bosnia and Kosovo, i.e. lightly armed peacekeeping infantry. The OMLTs are considered not problematic. They are on a mission that represents the way out of Afghanistan through helping the Afghans fend for themselves. Their relatively low combat strength means that they can normally not go out on missions on their own.

6.4. Parties leveraging foreign policy through cabinet participation (X4)

The mandate distribution in the Storting between the various political blocks of parties was roughly the same in the two periods. The main difference is that the smaller party with more radical views on NATO and ISAF, SV, was in an actual position of power in the Stoltenberg II government. Despite their 9% electoral backing, they were in the position to topple the government, and also to strongly affect government policy from inside the cabinet. Agreement was thus needed to keep the cabinet alive. There is little doubt that Høyre and Arbeiderpartiet, with 84 of the 169

43 Medical evacuation helicopters.
representatives, generally agreed on ISAF.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2005</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arbeiderpartiet</td>
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<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Høyre</td>
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<td>23</td>
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<td>Kystpartiet</td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>165</strong></td>
<td><strong>169</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 6: Mandate distribution in the Storting 2001 and 2005*

The coding of this variable is straightforward and follows the direction of the hypothesis. The Stoltenberg-II cabinet is coded as 1, while the Bondevik-II cabinet is coded as a 0.

The differences in the level and number of caveats between the two cabinets are dramatic. The Bondevik-II cabinet had one unit with caveats, while during Stoltenberg-II roughly half the units were caveated. Units were also caveated despite pressure from NATO.

It should here be noted that the level of caveats reported in this thesis relies on them somehow becoming public knowledge. The first years of the Red-Green government had a lot of media attention. The level of political conflict within the cabinet gave many interesting stories for the media to write about. This means that the caveats of the Red-Green government were much more exposed than those of the Bondevik-II cabinet. This has also caused the political nature and origin of caveats to become much more exposed.

One complicating factor was the fact that this was SV's first time in government. Since their founding they had been an opposition party critical to the powers that be, able to voice their critique without much influence and without being held accountable. After 40 days in government SV held a party congress, and while Party leader Kristin Halvorsen did not criticise her SV colleagues, “(…she admitted that the position in government had a steep learning curve)” (Aftenposten 2005b).

When the F-16s or the Special Forces were available in Norway and NATO wanted them a problem arose. The cabinet could not agree on whether to send them. “The Americans conclude that the major challenge is what they call the pacifists of SV: “The Norwegian participation in Afghanistan is already a bitter pill to swallow for SV, so supporting ISAF with Special Forces, could be a too long step for SV” (VG 2010). This was then according to VG confirmed by a top
bureaucrat at the prime minister's office “Stoltenberg set on keeping the majority cabinet together, and will thoroughly weigh the political costs before he agrees to a possible sending of Special Forces” (VG 2010).

Other major political issues of the Stoltenberg-II cabinet, and especially the interplay between AP and SV has been covered at length in the preceding chapter.

The coding is straight forward with the Bondevik-II cabinet units having (0) while the Stoltenberg-II cabinet units are coded (1).

6.5. Concerns in the military or foreign policy bureaucracy (X5)

One interesting trend in the period was the closer integration of the military bureaucracy with the political leadership through the Integrated Strategic Leadership, the merger of the Ministry of Defence and the Armed Forces Staff. This likely gave an increased political control over the armed forces.

Throughout the period the military side is fairly quiet, and does not “rebel” against the politicians when it comes to caveats. There were some examples of officers attempting to circumvent or change the PRT-policy on reconstruction. This was however on a fairly low level (Colonel, Lieutenant Colonel), and only a few isolated cases. In these cases it seems that these were actions taken in theatre as a result of challenges they faced there. There are no indications that these were ordered or backed from higher up in the military chain of command (see e.g. Solberg 2010 or case #30).

During Bondevik-II there were no reported incidents where the military or bureaucracy attempted to remove or get caveats. In the period it seemed that the military forces deployed operated with a large degree of freedom. It is thus in line with principal-actor theory that the military side would be content with that. The lack of complaints also indicates that there were appropriate mechanisms in place to avoid misuse of the forces.

During the Stoltenberg-II cabinet there were no reported incidents of high level military opposition to chosen policies with regards to caveats. The political control over the military, and the will to use it, seems strong in this period. It is likely that any military or bureaucratic attempts to change policy would have been strongly opposed in order to avoid problems in the cabinet. “All in all it seems like most of the arguments were against moving out of Kabul and up to Northern-Afghanistan from a military point of view. When Norway chose to move north this was because political priorities were more important than military recommendations” (Flatemo 2008:33).

In summing up, no military concerns were voiced publicly in the period. The two main
reasons were likely that the missions were within what the military units were able to do and that any concerns were voiced through the bureaucracy making them heard there. This is in line with Flatemo's findings with regards to the civil-military split in PRT Maimanah (2008:71-72). Thus this variable has been coded as no concerns raised throughout the period (0). This also means that the variable cannot be used for analysis, simply put because it does not vary while there is variation in the dependent variable. Further studies will be needed in order to uncover whether this was indeed due to the complete lack of concerns or whether the concerns have been ignored or not detected by the sources used in this thesis.

6.6. Summing up the coding of the independent variables
The cases are expected to be caveated before they go, and caveats are normally added, or removed, at the start of a new contingent. Thus, all changes in the independent variables are expected to affect units deployed following the date the variable took place.
<table>
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<tr>
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<th>NAME</th>
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<th>External pressure</th>
<th>Normative actions</th>
<th>Parties</th>
<th>Bureaucratic concerns</th>
<th>Period</th>
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Table 7: Coding matrix all variables
7. Empirical analyses

The analysis will go through several stages. It will start off with a basic overview, before moving on to a bivariate analysis where the dependent variable (caveats) is analysed together with each of the independent variables to see their effects in isolation. The final analysis is uses comparative control for third variables and sees all the variables together to see the interplay between the variables. Each analysis is done using both structured techniques (cross-tabulations and QCA), as well as interpretations informed by the deep understanding of the cases, contexts, and the universe as a whole.

7.1. Empirical patterns to be explained

The basic analysis covers the more immediately available explanations.

The first and most simple level of analysis is done by looking at table 5 in the previous chapter. By a glance it is possible to see that there were caveats on Norwegian forces in Afghanistan in the period. There were also units that did not have caveats. To be more specific, out of 38 cases, 13 are assessed to have had caveats, whereas 25 had no caveats or low impact caveats.

If we look at the temporal distribution of caveats we see that most of the caveated units are found late in the period. Figure 4 shows a simple coefficient made by dividing the number of caveated units with the number of units that started their deployment in each six month period.

![Figure 4: Number of caveated units over time](image)

As mentioned previously the Norwegian elections were held in September 2005. While there are caveats in both cabinets, the number is much lower (1) during the Bondevik-II cabinet. More on that in chapter 7.2.4. We also see that caveats do not start immediately after the new cabinet has
taken over, something which will be discussed in chapter 7.2.2.

Another main event is NATO taking over the responsibility for the security situation in the entire Afghanistan throughout 2006. This drastically increased the area where Norwegian forces could be sent, and the intense fighting highlighted the danger of the mission. It is likely that the Norwegian government knew about the plans for expansion already in 2005. It is likely, however, that they were as surprised by the insurgent resistance in the South and East as ISAF, NATO, and other governments. It is thus not likely that the expansion was a reason for the caveats in late 2005 and early 2006. For the later caveats it cannot be ruled out at this stage.

7.2. Bivariate analyses

7.2.1. Weakening of the security guarantee (X1)

**H1:** A low level of external threat to Norway's security will allow an increase in the number of caveats

<table>
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<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>18</td>
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<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>13</td>
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**Chi-Square** = 1,25, **P** = 0.5, **Phi** = 0.18

*Table 8: Bivariate analysis X1*

As can quickly be interpreted from the table, most of the units (72%) were deployed in periods where the external threat level was low (1). The distribution for units with caveats is roughly equal for both threat levels. For the not caveated units, a majority took place in a period where the Norwegian foreign policy latitude was theoretically larger. They could thus have caveats, but did not. Overall, based on a purely quantitative analysis, this variable does not covariate with caveats.

If we look at the temporal distribution in table 8, the Norwegian caveats went from none in a period where the relationship with Russia was good, to many when it was started to decline. Then when it hit the lowest point we see that some caveats were removed, albeit not on a large scale. This is the opposite causal direction of what was described above. This explanatory factor is however likely weakened by the fact that the participation in Afghanistan (~500 soldiers) does not affect Russian-Norwegian relations. Given the size of the forces it is likely irrelevant to the Russians how the Norwegian forces in Afghanistan are behaving. This is in contrast to the Norwegian nuclear and
basing caveats during the Cold War which directly affected the relationship with the Soviet Union.

The other realist argument, that Norway will not have caveats makes more sense, as when the relationship with Russia worsens the Norwegian relationship with NATO becomes more important. In this sense this presents a possible explanation for the insistence from the Cabinet that Norway does not have caveats. This is also one of the reoccurring arguments from the opposition regarding the caveats – what about the security guarantee and our relationship with NATO? And the cabinet, through Foreign Minister Gahr Støre (Ap) responded: “(...) When it is presented like the Cabinet's decision threatens our loyalty to NATO (...) I would like to make it very clear that for Arbeiderpartiet's part that if we thought that this decision was of this character, we would never have taken it” (2006). This shows that at least Arbeiderpartiet are concerned with the relationship with NATO and the security guarantee it provides.

The (unknown) number of hidden caveats is quite interesting when analysed in a realist perspective. By restricting (caveating) their forces a state can protect its forces from abuse or from doing things it does not want. By not informing other nations, it does not take the organizational penalties from having caveats. This is known as cheating in IR-theory. As shown there are several examples of instances where Norway insists that it does not have caveats where I assess that caveats are present. Such is also the insistence that the Special Forces in Kabul did not have caveats, when they were clearly restricted geographically. As will be shown later (chapter 7.4) a major source of the caveats was likely divisions within the cabinet. It would then be logical that the role of the Foreign Policy establishment is to lessen the impact of this on the international stage.

It appears that external factors did not play a significant role in adding caveats. The relationship with Russia did not appear to add caveats, much because Russia was not threatened by the Norwegian deployments.

On the other hand, external pressure seems to have been a vital justification in order to remove caveats, and an important factor in the argumentation to not have them. This appears to be grounded in a desire to live up to NATO standards of being caveat free. This should not be taken merely as a wish to follow institutional norms. Rather it appears that this is based on a genuine desire to maintain a working NATO. This is likely grounded in a desire to ensure that NATO, and more importantly the USA, will assist Norway should there be any trouble with Russia.

In summing up, this hypothesis seems weakened as a single explanatory factor for the variation in caveats. Despite having a benign relationship with the major threat, and as such increased latitude, this did not lead to more caveats. During the low point of the relationship with Russia there were more caveats, but this relationship is not strong enough to give a meaningful answer. It is here important to note that there were never any acute threats to Norway's security,
something which might have allowed the cabinets to put less emphasis on NATO and alliance duties, and focus more on domestic issue.

At the same time, the realist reasoning for Norway's participation in Afghanistan remains, and the questions of how caveats will affect our relationship with NATO were ever present, indicating that the external relationship of the state shapes its foreign political latitude.

7.2.2. Normative pressure from allies (X2)

H2: A low level of normative pressure from allies will lead to more caveats

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Caveated</th>
<th>X2</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>13</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>25</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>16</th>
<th>21</th>
<th>17</th>
<th>N=38</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Table 9: Bivariate analysis X2

Looking at the coefficients there is not much correlation with caveats and this variable. The results as thus interpreted with caution. The number of units are distributed fairly equally across X2, but there are few units that have caveats in the periods with low external pressure from allies (1,1). Indeed, there are more units that are caveated when the pressure has increased (1,0).

Looking at the qualitative side, the effects of pressure from allies varies. The actual effects of this pressure vary. One clear indication of adhesion to basic NATO principles is the fact that caveats were mainly added when a unit was rotated or when on new units deployed to theatre. The best example is NORSOF III (case 14) who were allowed to continue working in the East and South after the change of government. This continued until they had finished their deployment. Later Special Forces contingents were geographically caveated. There is also a pre-emptive effect – not having caveats is a good thing, meaning that the cabinets will attempt to not have caveats as this gives the most positive effects of the contribution on the political level. This regardless of whether NATO or allies have actually voiced criticism.

On the other hand, there were several instances when the Stoltenberg-II cabinet maintained its caveats despite much pressure from allies. One case in point was the refusal to send an infantry force to RC South in 2006. The official statements by Gahr Støre in 2007 and a report from Aftenposten (2006e) says that the caveats were been removed from the list, but statements from
soldiers indicate that the caveats still remained throughout spring of 2007.

Another effect of the normative pressure against having caveats are the hidden caveats. These must not be confused with caveats suddenly added after events. The insistence of Foreign Minister Gahr Støre that Norway did not have any caveats during the 2007 North Atlantic Council (Støre 2007a) is an indication of this. He is likely technically correct in stating that Norway did not have caveats at the time. This is however likely only correct for the official list of caveats maintained by NATO. In reality the units at the time were likely not allowed to relocate to the South. The noted in extremis-clauses are also a way to get around this. The units are not caveated, but bureaucratic processes will slow the deployment so much that they are for all practical purposes not an asset for ISAF to deploy freely.

There are two further ways to retain the caveats without being officially exposed. The first is through officially allowing the unit full freedom, whilst through various means ensuring that it will not do what it would have been caveated against. It is possible that this was done with the OMLT. The geographic caveat on the Brigade OMLT was removed in late 2007 (see Appendix 1, case 26). Yet in the prevailing political climate it is unlikely that a relocation to the South would have been approved. As the Afghan National Army has a rotation schedule where units are moved around, and the OMLT are supposed to follow “their” unit, this presents a possible problem. It is possible that deals were made to ensure that the mentored brigade did not move to the South, or that the OMLT would remain behind in the North given a rotation. This would be in line with Defence Minister Strøm-Eriksen's statement that “No, Norwegian officers shall not lead Afghan soldiers in the South” (Dagbladet 2007d).

The second coping mechanism is to deploy units that cannot do what has previously been caveated against. The QRF presented a problem as it was inherently mobile. Germany taking over the responsibility for the RC North QRF in mid-2008 thus presented a way out of this problem. This also allowed the Norwegian forces to focus in PRT Meymaneh, an area that had become more violent from 2007 onwards. This was a much needed boost of the capacities there, an area that Norway “owned” following the assumption of the leadership of PRT Meymaneh. It also presented a politically viable opportunity to have a force that was geographically stationary. Given that the force is tied to a geographic area it cannot be moved to a different area. It is not known whether this was a motivation for moving them there.

The international political pressure seems to have some degree of influence on caveats. First through knowing that having caveats will lessen the effect of the contribution. Secondly it is one factor contributing somewhat to the removal of caveats, or to ensure that the units sent will not be caveated. As such the institutionalist perspective presents a plausible explanation for forces
important in shaping both the options and the preference ordering of the politicians. Within the Bondevik-II cabinet it appears that this had good effect, and that they benefited from contributing. In the Stoltenberg-II cabinet the question of caveats became more problematic. The international pressure and possible gains was less heeded as internal problems in the cabinet and domestic politics became more important. There still appears to be central politicians working for the removal of caveats, not least because of the international pressure.

This hypothesis is weakened. While norms were important to ensure that units were sent, and caveated to the least degree possible, the pressure did not hinder caveats. The norms were however an important part of shaping the foreign policy room that the cabinets were working in. Both rewards and sanctions from the international community have been seen, and have had some effect on the cabinets.

There were two interconnected issues. The first is that there is likely little alliance pressure if the alliance is working well, and a particular country is providing excellent not-caveated units with the resources needed. The other issue is that as the situation in Afghanistan deteriorated from 2006 onwards, there was a need for more troops that would be inserted into more dangerous areas. This caused more alliance pressure, but also increased the risk for units that were caveat free.

7.2.3. Normatively unacceptable behaviour (X3)

H3: Units that can perform actions considered normatively unacceptable will have more caveats

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Caveated</th>
<th>X3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chi-Square 8.28, p=0.005

Table 10: Bivariate analysis X3

While there are some issues with the coding of this variable, there is a fairly strong correlation. Note especially how 77% of the caveated units were units that were able to do what was considered normatively problematic. This despite the fact that the distribution of units on X3 is roughly equal. Indeed, if units that had caveats that were below the threshold (Coded (1) in table 5) are considered to be caveated, this means that only a single unit that was normatively problematic did not have caveats. This is the case #18, which was the QRF in spring 2006 – before NATO
expanded to Southern Afghanistan. The number of units with a (0,0) score is also high, which is the distribution expected if the hypothesis is correct.

As we go more specifically into the case of Norway, one of the normatively bad things that a military unit could do was both hunting for terrorists, and generally being associated with OEF or their hunt for terrorists. The Bondevik-II cabinet were not opposed to this, and Norwegian F-16s participated in OEF, while Special Forces were sent on several missions to assist in the South. This changed with the Stoltenberg-II cabinet. This distinction between the two missions became an issue for most units in the period 2006-2009. The QRF was not allowed to be sent to the South. Partly for military and logistical reasons, possibly partly because increased risk was not desirable, but primarily because SV could not accept Norwegian forces in the South and the following association with OEF.

The Special Forces that were sent to Kabul were also geographically caveated in order to keep them from going to the South. This had the added benefit of allowing them to focus on their mission in Kabul and the surrounding areas. The OMLT's geographic caveats were also to keep them from going to the South (see appendix 1, Case 26). There was also the case of the QRFs. As has been mentioned previously, the refusal to send them to the South was said to be grounded in military necessity. Vice Admiral Reksten stated that their mission was in the North, not in the South. In order to avoid mission creep and to make sure they are actually doing the mission they are supposed to do it makes sense to make sure that they remain in one area. This is also protection of the unit. If analysed from the RC-North level, this is correct. If one looks at theatre-level (i.e. Afghanistan as a whole) it is most probably not. COMISAF requested these forces because he considered the situation to be more precarious in the South, and that the need for these forces was greater there. Based on this it seems that the refusal to send the QRF to the South was more politically grounded than in military necessity. This matches the general unwillingness to be involved in the South, again primarily on the basis of it being normatively wrong.

Another issue was the issue of soldiers doing reconstruction. Following the military support to the rebuilding of Iraq and the CIMIC-unit in Kabul, a general prohibition against military units doing reconstruction followed. This was a common feature of both cabinets.

The view of association with OEF as bad is only a feature of the Stoltenberg-II cabinet. The Bondevik-II cabinet were eager to participate with forces in OEF, in order to improve relations with the US and NATO. Parts of the explanation for this change lies in the difference in the climate in the international system between 2001 and 2006. While there was massive sympathy for the Bush government in 2001, this had changed dramatically in 2006. It is as such much more legitimate for the Stoltenberg II government to be critical to the USA and OEF.
Normative argumentation for what a unit should not do has been a feature of most of the caveated units examined. Looking at the caveat matrix (table 5) most of the caveats this caused were geographic, i.e. do not go to “the South”, with a couple having organisational caveats against working too closely with OEF, and some action-specific against reconstruction. This hypothesis is strengthened.

7.2.4. Parties leveraging foreign policy through cabinet participation (X4)

**H4:** A centre-left cabinet is likely to have more caveats than a centre-right cabinet

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Caveated</th>
<th>X4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chi-Square</td>
<td>8.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phi</td>
<td>0.47</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 11: Bivariate analysis X4

The coefficients indicate that there is a high level of correlation for this variable. The difference in the level and number of caveats between the two cabinets is dramatic. The Bondevik-II cabinet had one unit with caveats, while during Stoltenberg-II roughly half the units were caveated.

It should here be noted that the level of caveats reported in this thesis relies on them somehow becoming public knowledge. The first years of the Red-Green government had a lot of media attention. The level of political conflict within the cabinet gave many interesting stories for the media to write about. This means that the caveats of the Red-Green government were much more exposed than those of the Bondevik-II cabinet. This has also caused the political nature and origin of caveats to become much more exposed.

Minority versus majority government
The first interesting fact to analyse is that of a minority cabinet (Bondevik-II) versus a majority cabinet (Stoltenberg-II). Given, as laid out in chapter 6.4, that in the Bondevik-II cabinet there was one NATO/USA-friendly party (Høyre) and one more ambivalent with regards to military operations (KrF). The cabinet was however reliant on support from parts of the opposition in order
to be sure to gain approval for sending units. It is likely that this was granted by AP and FrP, who would ensure a majority. AP also has a long history of supporting NATO. KrF, as a junior party would have some leverage over government policies, but would still be reliant on ensuring that the opposition would accept the proposals. So, a minority government in a mostly pro-NATO Storting gives few caveats. SV’s opposition, if any, would likely have been heard, but voted down.

During Stoltenberg-II the cabinet had a majority. With AP primarily pro-NATO and SV historically opposed to the US and NATO. During this cabinet the axis of H-AP lacked one vote to get a majority, whereas the cabinet had a majority in itself.

Because the cabinet had a majority, none of the policies needed approval of the opposition. In result, a Storting that was likely positive to sending forces without caveats did not have a real influence on the policies that were worked out in cabinet. A minor cabinet-member was able to veto the rest of the Storting. This then supports a more general hypothesis as laid out by Kaarbo that a majority government will have more “extreme” policies than a minority. Extreme in this case meaning that a policy is less grounded in what the general consensus in parliament is.

It might appear that other parties did not see these caveats as a major concern either. The opposition voiced some concerns about the lack of deployment to the South, but not much more.

**Stoltenberg-II and SV**
The previous chapter on normative issues dealt with one of the primary political reasons for having caveats. The reasons for the caveats existed during Bondevik-II, but were only voiced from the side-line. During Stoltenberg-II they were voiced more strongly. This because SV in government actually had to agree with the policies that were made by the cabinet, and defend these in public. The cabinet thus needed to find a solution that would work for all parties involved. The linkage to other domestic policies was also important. A party in government can only be forced to endure a certain amount of policy losses before it decides that it is better to break out. As the Red-Green project had much prestige connected to it this was something both SV and AP wanted to avoid.

One complicating factor was the fact that this was SV’s first time in government. Since their founding they had been an opposition party critical to the powers that be, allowing them to voice their critique without much influence and without being held accountable.

The cabinet had enough MPs to make Norwegian policy, as long as they were able to agree. As noted, the reliance on the membership in NATO and a desire to keep a good relation with the US and the UK gave much of the external latitude that they operated in. The internal latitude was defined by the positions of the three parties. When the F-16s or the Special Forces were available in Norway and NATO wanted them a problem arose. The cabinet could not agree on whether to send
them. Caveats appear to have been the solution to the stalemate. Through them it was possible for
Norway to send forces and be seen as a good ally in Afghanistan. At the same time it made the units
into something SV could approve and, albeit with some difficulty, defend publicly in front of their
voters. The caveats were then the critical factor allowing the unit to be sent, while keeping them
from being used against the cabinet's will.

SV's manoeuvre to send Special Forces rather than wait for another and different request
from NATO also shows the dynamic within the cabinet. There seems to be a realization in SV that
they can only say no a certain amount of times. It is then better to lose an acceptable battle, and be
able to say no later when it really matters.

The critical factors here are the concepts of salience and ideological breaking point. With
salience as the importance of a specific policy area for an actor – NATO and the decisions on
whether to go to war are very important areas for SV. These are areas where the policy chosen
matter to the politicians themselves, as well as for the voters’ response during the next election.
NATO, the relationship with the USA and Afghanistan are important policy areas for both SV and
AP. The issue of sending jet planes and Special Forces to support the Americans in Afghanistan is
close to what can be called SV's ideological breaking point. This is where they decide that it is
better to break up the coalition and lose power rather than go along with the proposed policy. AP,
the senior partner, backed by several opposition partners, and with pressure from both NATO and
individual allies had a strong desire to make their coalition partner agree. The threat of a coalition
break-up is so credible that a middle ground has to be found. Caveats appear to be the answer to
appease all actors.

This hypothesis stands very strong in explaining both the level of caveats as well as how and
why they were implemented politically. Their form and shape were discussed in the previous
chapter.

Some of these predictions are also likely valid for other cases. In this case we have seen
something very close to what Bueno De Mesquita's calls “a winning coalition” being fairly small.
The issues important to the various parties and their saliency have also shown to be important. Still
the issue of linkage politics also factors in. This is a clear example of Putnam's two tables. The
external restrictions clearly factor into what is discussed at the national level. Despite this the
internal table seems to be the most important.

The very idea of SV approving the sending of Special Forces to Afghanistan would have
been unthinkable only a few years earlier. There are likely two reasons behind this – the first that
they are in cabinet, and thus see the value of being a cabinet member and have to give and take.
Secondly, the caveats allow them the leeway they need to be able to publicly support the
deployment. It is likely that without the caveats some of the units would not have been sent.

7.2.5. Concerns in the military or foreign policy bureaucracy (X5)

**H5:** Implementing agencies concerns about inappropriate use of a force will lead to more caveats

As no concerns from the implementing agencies were detected the quantitative analysis will not yield any results.

One interesting trend in the period was the closer integration of the military bureaucracy with the political leadership through the Integrated Strategic Leadership, the merger of the Ministry of Defence and the Armed Forces Staff. This likely gave an increased political control over the armed forces.

The two other main reasons for the lack of detected concerns were likely that the missions were within what the military units were able to do, and that any concerns were voiced through the bureaucracy making them heard there. This is in line with Flatemo's findings with regards to the civil-military split in PRT Meymaneh (2008:71-72). No interviews with persons in the two bureaucracies have been conducted as a part of this study. This might have exposed problems within that were not voiced in the media. With that caveat, this hypothesis is weakened.

7.2.6. Summing up the bivariate analyses

The interpretation of the summarized table will be done in chapter 7.4.
Table 12: Summary of bivariate analyses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of explanation</th>
<th>Theoretical foundation</th>
<th>Hypothesis</th>
<th>Operationalisation</th>
<th>Empirical focus</th>
<th>Conclusion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>International system level (Outside-in)</td>
<td>Realism</td>
<td>A low level of external threat to Norway's security will allow an increase in the number of caveats</td>
<td>External threats, decision maker fear harming security interest</td>
<td>Infl events, diplomatic conflicts</td>
<td>Weakened</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International system level (Outside-in)</td>
<td>Neo-liberal institutionalism</td>
<td>A low level of normative pressure from allies will lead to more caveats</td>
<td>External diplomatic pressure, domestic reference to infl norms</td>
<td>Statements by diplomats/external bureaucrats, summit statements, bilateral pressure</td>
<td>Weakened</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National and individual level (Inside-out)</td>
<td>Constructivism</td>
<td>Units that can perform actions considered normatively unacceptable will have more caveats</td>
<td>Normative language used, specific caveats</td>
<td>Media / parliament statements</td>
<td>Strengthened</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National level / sub-national level (Inside-out)</td>
<td>Coalition politics</td>
<td>A centre-left cabinet is likely to have more caveats than a centre-right cabinet</td>
<td>Disagreement in cabinet / parliament, deals struck</td>
<td>Media / parliament statements</td>
<td>Strengthened</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-national level</td>
<td>Bureaucratic politics, principal-agent theory</td>
<td>Implementing agencies concerns about inappropriate use of a force will lead to more caveats</td>
<td>Bureaucratic reasons for caveats, politicians describing military concerns</td>
<td>Media, anonymous bureaucratic statements, concerns in bureaucratic documents</td>
<td>Weakened</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7.3. **Technically speaking – controlling for the influence of third variables**

As mentioned previously X5 did not yield any results, and has been excluded from the comprehensive analysis. The comprehensive analysis is done utilizing csQCA for two main reasons. First – it is a method suited for medium-n studies using dichotomised variables. Secondly, it allows a comparative control for third variables, i.e. analysing if caveats are a result of one or several factors together causing caveats (or non-caveated units). It is a common assumption in FP-studies that there is more than one factor at work, or that different combinations of factors give different results. CsQCA allows us to see these patterns. Then the “mechanical” patterns must be explained through returning to the cases and utilizing the intimate knowledge of cases gained through case study methodology.

The analysis was done using the software fsQCA 2.5 (Ragin, Drass & Davey 2009) and TOSMANA 1.3.2 (Cronqvist 2011). The full truth tables and further coding notes can be found in Appendix 2. The initial coding form is the same as shown in chapter 6.6, and this was run through the software. Table 13 shows the resulting truth table.
Table 13: Truth table

The configurations with no cases (logical remainders) have not been presented. QCA truth tables are normally red along the rows, seeing cases in a holistic way. For this analysis we start by looking at the columns. First of all, all conditions are both present and absent, with both outcomes on the dependent variable. This means that none of the variables are necessary or sufficient causes on their own. The consistency is an important csQCA coefficient, ranging from 0 to 1. The configurations where the consistency is other than 0 or 1 are contradictory truth table rows, meaning that the same combination of conditions lead to both outcomes (caveated/not). There are not set rules for which consistencies are valid, but a common rule of thumb is that consistencies of less than 0.75 are not accepted (Schneider & Wagemann 2010:10). The model’s consistency as a whole is 0.54. When contradictory lines appear the cases and the coding should be examined in order to attempt to clear them out. This has been done in appendix 2, the results will be presented later in this chapter. The contradictory cases are interesting in themselves. These are primarily PRT units (VII-XI). These units had a minor caveat against reconstruction. This caveat was coded as minor as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had been resourced to do the reconstruction that the military was not allowed to do.

Another interesting case is NORDETMAN, an F-16 detachment. It was normatively problematic, and had some ROE-issues (amounting to minor caveats), but the intent of the Bondevik-II government was to send it without caveats. It thus has the same values as PRT V (1,1,1,0), whereas the PRT was caveated against doing reconstruction. The reconstruction issue thus seemed more important to the cabinet following the changes in the political situation since 2002. As the same issue was problematic for later governments, it is likely that KrF could muster support in Stortinget for having caveats on the PRT.
A first level of analysis is that the line with all conditions present (1,1,1,1) does indeed have caveats. For the opposite, there are no units that had all conditions not present. The (0,0,0,1) is however similar – strengthening the overarching hypotheses that with all conditions absent, there should not be caveats, despite the “colour” of the cabinet.

As logically required by csQCA the cases were re-examined and some were recoded as described in Appendix 2. There were some changes in the truth table, but no new configurations. Only the intermediate solutions are presented.

CsQCA solutions are read with capital letters representing a condition (variable) being present and small letters meaning not present. * is logical AND while + is logical OR. Arrow expresses the causal link between a set of conditions and the outcome (Rihoux & De Meur 2008:33). The resulting solution term is the following for caveated units:

\[ \text{NORMATIVE}\ast \text{CABINET} + \text{THREAT}\ast \text{PRESSURE}\ast \text{NORMATIVE} + \text{threat}\ast \text{PRESSURE}\ast \text{CABINET} + \text{THREAT}\ast \text{PRESSURE}\ast \text{CABINET} \rightarrow \text{CAVEAT} \]

Table 14: csQCA solution for caveated units

This means that there are four different combinations that led to caveats. Note that there is a certain amount of overlap as some solutions cover several cases. I will go through the solutions in the presented order. First there are the normatively problematic units of the Stoltenberg-II cabinet. This indicates that the external factors of the security situation and allied pressure were less important than a majority centre-left government’s problem with sending units that were considered normatively problematic by one of the parties. Given that SV had an unconventional definition of what was considered problematic, as well as the will and power to do something about it, this is in line with the thicker empirical evidence. While this covered 9 of the 12 originally caveated cases, all but one of the cases that were recoded from having a minor caveat also ended in this category.

The second category explain the two caveated units of the Bondevik-II cabinet, and one of the Stoltenberg-II cabinet. The NORDETMAN and PRT V were both normatively problematic. NORDETMAN participated early in Afghanistan, and was the first Norwegian F-16 unit that could realistically participate in ground attacks, while PRT V could do reconstruction. These also share a
benign threat level and no pressure from allies, possibly making it easier to caveat.

The two last combinations cover much common ground, where both absence and presence of threat and pressure are combined with CABINET (i.e. Centre-Left) to give caveats. There are however instances of Stoltenberg-II not having caveats, making both solutions present. The outcome is however that allied pressure or worsened security situation were in these cases not enough to keep the Stoltenberg-II cabinet from having caveats. Internal issues were more important. This also strengthens the solutions for CAVEAT, where threat and pressure were not important factors.

For not caveated units the solution is:

\[
\text{THREAT*PRESSURE*normative*cabinet + threat*pressure*normative*CABINET \rightarrow not caveat}
\]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>THREAT<em>PRESSURE</em>normative*cabinet</th>
<th>+</th>
<th>threat<em>pressure</em>normative*CABINET</th>
<th>→</th>
<th>not caveat</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NORSOF1, NORSOF2, TMIF1, TMIF2, PRT1, NORSQN, PRT2, NOR3SQN, PRT3, PRT4, TMBNMECH, NORSOF3, TMNTankSQN</td>
<td>OMLTBDE5, NAD1, NAD2, OMLTBDE6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 15: csQCA solution for not caveated units

The first solution formula covers cases from the Bondevik-II cabinet, where the latitude was not affected by external factors. Also, the units were not considered normatively problematic. These cases then represent units that the cabinet wanted to send without caveats, even though they had the latitude to do so. This is consistent with the previous quotes from Defence Minister Krohn Devold on why to not have caveats on the Special Forces, and likely indicates a will to be a good ally.

The second part covers the remaining non-caveated Stoltenberg-II units. As units who were slightly caveated were recoded in order to perform the second part of csQCA, this cabinet had few units without caveats. These units are then those that were not normatively problematic. They were also sent in periods with increased external threats and allied pressure. This likely increased the difficulty of using caveats. At the same time, for the two NAD-units, they were likely not necessary to caveat as they could only be used in or near Faryab, the Norwegian area of responsibility at the time.

7.4. **Substantial interpretation of comparative analyses**

In general it appears that internal factors (inside-out) have been most important in adding caveats, whereas external factors (outside-in) have been most vital in reducing or removing caveats. This is logical. In a mission like ISAF it is external factors that have caused Norway to contribute forces.
Internal factors are important in restricting the units, or rather defining what they are allowed to do and not.

The first hypothesis focusing on the external threat environment likely had little explanation power because the external situation was fairly calm in the period. This enabled a focus on internal politics. On the other hand, the generic threat against Norway caused Norway to send forces to Afghanistan in order to keep its security guarantee through NATO alive. It was also clear throughout the period that the cabinets gained international credibility through contributions, although it appears that the gains were at times lost, or lessened, when caveats were exposed. Throughout the period it is clear that external pressure plays a big part. Press statements where it is claimed that Norway has no caveats have been commonplace. This shows how the Norwegian government attempts to keep up the image of Norway as a reliable ally. Pressure, organizational and bilateral, from NATO has made it politically difficult to maintain caveats. While NATO allows what might be called institutionalised cheating through caveats, it is disliked and carries costs.

The normative aspects as reasons why certain units were caveated were clear. This was because politicians of certain parties, or their voters, or the public in general, opposed a certain type of units or missions. The caveats against being sent to the South, working with OEF, and the PRT doing humanitarian aid fall into this category. Political views matter, as does symbols and the framing of certain issues. The presence of parties with these perspectives in the cabinet is what allowed them to have an influence on policy, even if they had a small amount of the votes. This has been observed for both cabinets, and is a very interesting find, strongly supporting Kaarbo and Ozkececi-Taner's theories on coalition politics. It is likely that in both cabinets the major coalition partner (H / AP) were for the ISAF mission and opposed to caveats. The influence of a minor party was most strongly observed during Stoltenberg-II. This is likely due to both the issues being more problematic for one party, as well as the majority the coalition had. This made the cabinet less prone to consult other parties to gain a winning majority, and likely made them more prone to compromise in order to ensure cabinet survival. In this, linkage to other issues of domestic politics also factored in. In periods when one party “lost a battle” in one policy area, concessions had to be made in other. This went both ways. SV not being used to being in government may also account for a certain amount of this as both its politicians and voters had high expectations of what could be achieved, and were disappointed when deals had to be made. An important point to be made is that the units were indeed sent, something which few had expected from a cabinet with SV. The Red-Green cabinet also had consistently higher numbers of deployed troops than the Bondevik-II cabinet.

The influence of the military and foreign policy bureaucracy appears to have been small during the period, and clear instances of them opposing or causing caveats have not been found.
There is a problem here as the political issues have been frequently reported in the press, while the bureaucracy has been in the shadows. Such is also their normal role in Norwegian society - their role is to enact policy, not affect it. It is however my assessment that in the period examined the bureaucracy has been subordinate to the political powers that be, primarily because political issues were so important that there was little room for the bureaucracy playing in.

Table 16: Foreign policy latitude model summarized

This is a restatement of Fermann's model from chapter 3.1. As has been seen in the analysis, there was little support for the external hypotheses, and the hypothesis looking at the properties of the foreign policy apparatus. The internal policy environment did however have strong finds, and appeared to be the strongest factor in deciding the actual foreign policy latitude. The other factors are however also affecting the latitude, and may have been more important in deciding that the units would be sent in the first place, with the internal factors then coming into play.

Summing up – the reasons behind the Norwegian caveats from 2001 – 2008 were likely a political desire to keep deployed military units from causing political grievances in Norway, also linked to other policy areas – with the minor players in the cabinets and their leverage over politics enabling this to happen. The lack of external threats likely increased the latitude left for domestic politics, while external pressure from allies had little effect in the short term, but more in the long term. The variation in the level of caveats likely came from the varying policies of the different parties.
7.5. Other causes found - Events

In any study of this magnitude unexpected cases and causes appear. These do not have a hypothesis and theory backing. They will however be mentioned briefly for consideration in further studies. In the classic quote by British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan on what had been his greatest challenge as a statesman he said “Events, my dear boy, events”. In this study there it at least one caveat that was likely caused by events; the sudden appearance of a geographic caveat on the QRF in the summer of 2006 (case 21). Judging from the debates and statements made as a decision on whether to send the QRF to the South it seems lie this was not a scenario that the political side was aware of. While it had long been clear that ISAF would take control over RC South on 31 July 2006 the level of Taliban activity in the area surprised many. Since it was now ISAF that was responsible in the South, not OEF, the cabinet had a problem. In their programme, the Soria-Moria-proclamation, they even stated that they would strengthen their support for ISAF at the expense of OEF.

Judging from statements made earlier that year regarding the QRF it appears that it was not caveated. When the request for it to be sent south came it quickly became clear that this was politically not doable. The caveat then had to be added. It is not known whether later QRFs had this caveat explicitly in their caveat list, or if the commanders of RC North and ISAF simply “knew” that these units could not be sent to the South. This was then likely not an instance of a hidden caveat, rather something added impromptu by the political side.
8. Conclusion

In summing up I will first go through the ground covered by the thesis before going through the weaknesses of this study with suggestions for further studies, and finally move on to more general policy recommendations on how to handle caveats in NATO.

This thesis has examined the research question “What were the reasons behind the variations in Norwegian caveats in Afghanistan from 2001 – 2008”. This implied undertaking of four major tasks. i) The concept caveats has been studied and defined more closely, as well as separated from other terms that are similar. Further, a scientific typology allowing caveats to be studied closely has been made. ii) A basic research programme on Norwegian military units in Afghanistan from 2001 – 2008 has been conducted, with a special focus on their caveats. This gathering and systematization of data can be a stepping stone for others studying caveats, or for researchers studying other aspects of the Norwegian contribution in Afghanistan or in general. iii) A systematic multi-level FPA framework has been used, with the mix of methods allowing for a higher confidence in the results while making them easier to control for other researchers. iv) Reasons explaining the use of caveats in a specific time, place, and political system have been found. The reasons behind the variations in caveats were found to primarily be internal factors, specifically that normatively problematic units were more prone to caveats. This applied to units that were problematic for the public in general, but with even more when the units were problematic for political parties in government. The political ideology, and the give and take of a coalition cabinet, was the second important factor in the variation in caveats. Caveats were at times needed to gain internal agreement on the sending of a military unit, especially if there were other problematic domestic political issues at the same time. External factors were found to be less important in adding or removing caveats.

8.1. The limitations of this study and further research

This study has been based on secondary sources. A higher confidence could have been reached using interviews of decision makers and bureaucrats. This would possibly also have given new information and conclusions, although the public sources available have been assessed to give enough details and confidence to see the major drivers of caveats. Further studies could be done on the remaining Norwegian units (2009 – 2014?), with a deeper focus on interviewing key stakeholders, as well as going deeper into the implementing agencies, both civilian and military.

As has been seen the Norwegian caveats in Afghanistan vary much over the period. In addition there are other missions and contributions that could be examined. While Bondevik-II had few caveats in Afghanistan, the engineer company sent to Iraq to support the reconstruction was
disputed and reportedly had a number of restrictions on what they could do. Simultaneously Norway contributed with a Quick Reaction Force to KFOR in Kosovo. It had few or no restrictions and was lauded after the 2004 riots (Daltveit 2007). During Stoltenberg-II efforts were focused on Afghanistan. It is not known if the dip in caveats seen towards the end of 2008 continued further. Another interesting case is the F-16s contributed to the 2011 bombing of Libya. They were apparently under no restrictions (Aftenposten 2011). This apparently paid off - Foreign Minister Gahr Støre said that “the Norwegian and Danish aircraft are accentuated as best in class” (Aftenposten 2011). At least two authors, Per Marius Frost-Nielsen, and Stephen Saideman (2012b) are working with this case.

In addition to looking at the specifics of caveats and other types of command and control arrangements for other missions, a very interesting project would be to merge the entire process. Starting with the decision to send troops to war, exploring the arguments used to “sell” this to the public back home, and the various control mechanisms, including caveats, that are put in place once the force is sent. It is clear from this thesis that the caveats are only one part of this puzzle – the reasons for sending a force in the first place are interesting, also when contrasted with the caveats.

How much of this study and the cases shown can be applied to other countries or other missions? It is very likely that there will be caveats in every coalition or multinational mission. This study has pointed out some of the causes and effects these can have. The reasons behind the caveats will vary between countries, and the caveats are not set in stone. Nations seem to follow their political agenda, and change caveats with changing governments or based on changes in theatre or at home. It is likely that there is not a single cause that will always cause caveats. The specific time, place, mission and political situation as pointed to here will not be repeated. However, the primacy of domestic politics is something that might be found in other cases. That a NATO-critical party causes caveats in a NATO-mission is fairly easy to look for. The level of popularity of the mission and/or the coalition-leader should be factored in when looking for explanations in other cases. The considerable leverage a small party with strong preferences has on foreign policy is interesting on a general level, as are the linkages to other issues in domestic politics as well. These issues will possibly be repeated in other democratic states.

Studies of NATO are interesting because it is a close knitted military alliance. This means that findings here with regards to compliance and cheating possibly can be transferred to other international regimes and agreements, also outside the military realm. While caveats in the NATO-framework and by western countries are covered through this work and Auerswald and Saideman's book (2012), other countries have not been covered to my knowledge. The UN and its experiences with caveats is also an interesting subject as in contrast to NATO it is not a tight-knitted military
alliance with nations that have fairly standardized military equipment and standard operating procedures.

8.2. Policy recommendations – coping with caveats

This thesis has showed different types of and reasons for caveats. There is little reason to believe that caveats will go away. Norway has over the last years spent about 120 million dollars a year on its forces in Afghanistan. Its soldiers are risking their lives and using force, including lethal force, while under control of a foreign military alliance. As seen the caveats were vital to Norwegian politics in 2005/2006. Had it not been possible to put caveats on the F-16s the choice would likely have been between dissolving the cabinet and sending the aircraft. It is likely that this would have ended with not sending the planes. This is a good example showing that caveats will remain. This because they allow a government to satisfy both internal and external actors, as modelled by Putnam. Further, it is not all bad. A side effect of the caveats on the Kabul SOF was even that they were able to stay in one place and perform their mission, rather than being sent all across the country.

Following the problems regarding restrictive ROEs in ex-Yugoslavia, in Bosnia in particular, the chances are small that NATO will enter a mission with restrictive ROEs. ROEs are likely to be permissive, thus giving the troops on the ground a wide range of options when planning missions and acting in tense situations. As mentioned, loose ROEs will in themselves cause caveats.

There is some evidence of international/organizational pressure helping remove caveats, as clearly witnessed by the Berlusconi-case, and other examples in this study. This is the primary way that NATO as an organization can fight caveats. Outlawing caveats completely will cause countries to not send forces. Very many nations have different caveats; with many being merely clarifications of ambiguities and other minor items, others are required by national or international law. Defining the exact level of allowed caveats would likely be arbitrary.

One way for an alliance to cope with caveats is through “force-to-task”. This means that forces are selected for missions based on their ability to perform the mission. Heavily caveated units are then given tasks they are able to perform, freeing non-caveated forces to do others. This is difficult to do with ground units, but easier with aircraft. This will require all caveats to be in the open – and then create a two-tiered alliance – with the doers and the rations-consumers (Auerswald and Saideman 2012). This does however help the multinational commander achieve his mission in the best possible way, given the troops and caveats he has available. The ensuing naming and shaming will over time likely generally cause caveats to disappear.

For all the evil caveats are said to do, they are still necessary for NATO. No sane politician
would send his forces without retaining any form of control over them. Indeed, as Foreign Minister Gahr Støre said on the SOF in Kabul:

“If they are to be moved, Norway must be consulted. I want to challenge each party of the opposition to answer if they would have made different arrangements. Would they have said that the force can be redeployed – sent to the South, East, North or West – without Norway being consulted?” (Gahr Støre 2007b).

The institutional focus for NATO should not be to attempt to remove caveats, but rather to ensure that all caveats are declared to the force commander. NATO, and indeed any other coalition, needs to cope with caveats, rather than wish they were gone.
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Appendix 1. Classification of military units and their caveats

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Case #</th>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>Caveated</th>
<th>Technical</th>
<th>Legal</th>
<th>Political</th>
<th>Organizational</th>
<th>Geographic</th>
<th>Action-specific</th>
<th>Support req</th>
<th>Type of unit</th>
<th>Special forces</th>
<th>Infantry</th>
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Table 17: Unit matrix

Case 1: NORSOF I, Bagram/Kandahar, December 01 – June 02

NORSOF was the first Norwegian Special Forces unit that was sent to Afghanistan. The first detachment (3 months) was from Forsvarets Spezialkommando (FSK), the second from Marinejegerkommandoen (MJK). They operated under Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in a hunt for al-Qaeda and Taliban. “Prior to the deployment it was necessary to sort out all the details regarding the juridical status of the force and insurances – and to ensure national control even under American command” (Bakkeli 2007:32). “From their political leaders the Norwegian and the American forces had been given different rules on then they could and when they could not attack an enemy; Rules of Engagement. (...) The Norwegian ROEs were always a bit careful and well within humanitarian international law and all international conventions regulating armed conflicts” (Bakkeli 2007:47). Furthermore the Norwegians had an absolute requirement for positive identification of enemy forces. The American policy in this regard was apparently more relaxed.

These factors did not appear very important, as the “Commander of Task Force K-Bar (...) appreciated that the Norwegians did not have so many caveats (...) in addition to the national ROEs” (Bakkeli 2007:74).

44 Army Special Forces and Navy Special Forces.
The unit was pressed into going to Afghanistan immediately after a deployment to Macedonia. The commander of FSK at the time said that “I thought that if it was politically decided that Norway would contribute with Special Forces we would of course go, and do our very best. But I would not be the one who pushed the political and military leadership in order to ensure the deployment” (Hammersmark 2010:52). Hammersmark further describes how there was pressure from the military and political leadership in order to deploy as quickly as possible.

[Defence Minister] Krohn Devold personally reviewed all the ROEs. She wanted to give the force as few limitations as possible. In a flexible campaign such as this she did not want to pre-adjust the use of the unit and deny freedom of action for those who would do the job. Krohn Devold thought that the situation “on the ground” should be decisive for the measures to be taken in the AOO. The government had full confidence in that the force itself would take care of Norwegian interests. Because of this the commander of NORSOF TG became the so-called “Red Card Holder”. In practice this arrangement meant two things. First, the commander had the responsibility that the ROEs were followed and Norwegian interests taken care of. The Norwegian force commander was not to accept missions that did not fulfil this. Secondly it gave freedom of action to act according to operational development, without being tied down by detailed and time consuming communication back to Norway (interview with Krohn Devold in Hammersmark 2010:58).

According to Hammersmark (2010:53) most of the tasks were infiltration via helicopter, further infiltration by foot and then establishment of hidden observation posts. This was done with patrol sized units.

The requirement for positive ID and generally a bit more limited ROE than US Special Forces is attributed to legal factors. The impact of these is assessed to have been minimal. This unit is considered not caveated.

Case 2: NORDETMAN, Manas Air Force Base, Kyrgyzstan, October 02 – April 03

The Norwegian Detachment Manas (NORDETMAN) consisted of 4x F-16s plus support crew stationed at Manas Air Force Base in Kyrgyzstan. They operated as a part of OEF and was thus under American command. Norwegian officers were placed in different levels of the OEF chain of command, both at CENTCOM and Bagram Air Force Base in Afghanistan (Forsvarsnett 2002). These were red card holders with the authority to refuse Norwegian participation in missions. There were four important criteria that regulated whether force could be used. First, in pre-planned operations the planes were allowed to attack al-Qaeda, Taliban and cooperating groups. Secondly, if the planes were called upon to give close air support for ground troops under attack they could attack any target, based on the principle of self-defence. Thirdly, they had specific requirements to the information they were given, to ensure that targets were within Norwegian ROEs. Fourth, the

45 United States Central Command, responsible for US security interests between the area from the Horn of Africa and Central Asia. It is located in Tampa, Florida.

46 More specifically the information between the forward air controller and the pilot, and the pilot's ability to positively identify the target on the ground.
planes were geographically limited to Afghanistan. That is, they were not allowed to use Pakistani airspace for attacks on targets in the border areas on the Afghan side (Frost-Nielsen 2009:45-46). In addition the planes were not allowed to carry cluster munitions (Klassekampen 2002a).

This means that there were some differences in ROE between Norway and the US. There was no common ROE in OEF so differences in ROE should be expected. A few instances of refusing missions were reported, connected to the four ROE-specifications mentioned above. According to Guldhav (2004 12-14) the Americans on several occasions decided to use their own aircraft, because Norwegian ROEs made it difficult to use them in certain situations, and especially near the border with Pakistan.

After the mission the Chief of Defence Sigurd Frisvold said that “We are very happy with the mission. We have completed it the way we were supposed to, and we have shown great flexibility (...) Norway has at certain occasions refused to fly missions that were against the Armed Forces guidelines for acts of war, but this never created irritation amongst our allies” (Forsvarsnett 2003). It was also reported that in the cases that were refused it was the ChoD himself that made the call (Forsvarsnett 2003), indicating that there were good communication links back to Norway.

The F-16s were not allowed to fly into the airspace of a country Norway did not have a diplomatic agreement with. They had slightly stricter guidelines for using their weapons. Both of these corrections are considered to be of legal nature. The probable impact of these regulations is small. As laid out in chapter 4 this thesis draws the line between caveated or not between blue and yellow. The definition of yellow is “major restrictions, limitations and preconditions under which main tasks (…) can be conducted”. The instances appear to have been few and there were other aircraft available. Thus this caveat is set to blue, i.e. this unit is considered not caveated.

**Case 3: NORSOF II, Bagram, March 03 – September 03.**
The NORARSOFTG (Norwegian Army Special Operations Force Task Group) participated in OEF from March to June; MJK (Naval SOF) took over their mission for the last three months. They were stationed at Bagram Air Force Base, but participated in missions across Southern Afghanistan, mainly in the Kandahar and Helmand provinces. Bakkeli has half a chapter about this operation (2007:239-266). Their main task was long range patrols into Taliban dominated areas. Yet the focus was possibly less on “hunting terrorists and more on long term projects and security for the Afghan population, compared with the previous round” (Ibid.:263) However, these missions were highly dangerous missions with a great possibility of combat or directing bombs against enemy targets. This, combined with the general freedom from political intervention suggests that they had no caveats.
This unit is assessed to not be caveated.

**Case 4: TMTF I, Kabul, December 03 – March 04**

Telemark Task Force I (TMTF) was a mechanized infantry company from the professional Telemark Battalion. Its task was to maintain security for the “Loya Jirga” in Kabul drafting the Afghan constitution. When the Loya Jirga was finished in early January 2004 the TMTF were tasked with the responsibility for police districts 4 and 10 in Kabul (Forsvarsnett 2004a).

During both missions they were tied to their AOR in Kabul. No specifics have surfaced on any cases where they were kept from performing specific missions or working with specific nations. They were a part of ISAF, and ISAF was in this period geographically limited to Kabul. Thus it does not seem like they had any geographical caveats either. Overall they are assessed as not caveated.

**Case 5: TMTF II – February 04 – July 04**

Telemark Task Force II was in composition and mission the same as TMTF I. A mechanized infantry company with CV90 infantry fighting vehicles, supporting the Kabul Police and other security forces in the same areas as TMTF I (Forsvarsnett 2004b). Even though their AOR was PDs 4 and 10, they did support operations in other parts of Kabul. In one case, after orders from the Kabul Multinational Brigade, they supported an operation with two explosive detection dogs and handlers. The person leading the operation turned out to be Jack Idema, an American bounty-hunter hunting for Bin Laden. The case came up one year later and was immortalized by the tabloid headline “Norwegian soldiers helped wanted TORTURE RAMBO” (VG 2005). The Jack Idema-case shows that they were not kept from cooperating with OEF, or rather, what they thought was OEF.

No other indications of caveats have been found, and this unit is considered not caveated.

**Case 6: PRT I, Meymaneh, May 04 - September 04**

As ISAF expanded into the North with Provincial Reconstruction Teams, Norway sent 25 soldiers and officers to the British PRT in Meymaneh. Lt. Col. Egil Nordli was second in command. Nordli claims that they cooperated with other nations working in the North-West region. “Amongst those, Sweden, Denmark, Germany and the US. Cooperation with the Afghans was of course also important” (Forsvarsnett 2009a). The British force was a part of OEF, and so was the Norwegian

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47 An Afghan Grand Council with dignitaries from across the country.
force for the first month. They were put under ISAF-command from 01. July.

The main problem cited by Nordli was the long lines of medical evacuation. The fastest way to evacuate was through German helicopters stationed in Termez, Uzbekistan. Quite a few hours would pass before a patient would arrive at the hospitals in Kunduz or Mazar-E-Sharif. “The Lt. Col. has a simple explanation of why he operated with such high risk: “At that time the Norwegian contribution to the stabilization force in Meymaneh was not a main priority for the political and military authorities in Norway” (Ibid.).

There does not seem to be any caveats on this contingent. Due to their size (25 soldiers) they are not able to go to other parts of the country and make a difference. As Nordli mentions, they also seemed to be able to cooperate with those they needed to cooperate with. As for mission specific caveats, there are no indications of any.

This contingent is considered not caveated.

**Case 7: NorSqn, Kabul, July 04 – December 04**

The Norwegian Recce Squadron was a reinforced mechanized infantry company recruited from conscript units. It operated in Kabul with the same mission and AOR as TMTF I&II. During their period their AOR expanded with one more PD, PD 5, and the Southern valley of Musai (Forsvarsnett 2005b). They participated in a range of missions across the city and surrounding areas (Forsvarsnett 2004c).

There are no indications of any caveats.

**Case 8: PRT II, Meymaneh, September 04 – December 04**

This was the second PRT-contingent. It was still led by Britain with a Norwegian second-in-command. As for the first contingent, little is mentioned in the press. This leads towards the same conclusion as for PRT I, that they mainly are allowed to operate within their own discretion.

Two issues are of interest. The first is force protection; “A somewhat different view on force protection between the nations was one a cause of worry. The British wanted a very low force protection profile that Norwegians and Finns had problems accepting” (Forsvarsnett 2009b). The Norwegian contribution’s main activity was long range patrols lasting 3-7 days, consisting of six soldiers and an interpreter. It is difficult to perform such patrols with fewer personnel. The difference in force protection levels does not seem like a major issue. There are no indications that it caused problems for mission fulfilment.

The second issue is cooperation. “The stabilization force did not have any cooperation with other nations in this period” (Ibid.). This could point at a caveat banning cooperation with external
actors, but it seems more likely that it is a case of few other forces operating in the area in this period. This makes sense as Faryab province is one of the most remote provinces in Afghanistan.

There does not seem to be any caveats on this contingent.

**Case 9: Nor 3 Sqn, Kabul, December 04 – July 05**

This unit was based on Stormeskadron 3/Armoured Bn, a conscript unit. They operated in a fashion very similar to the three previous Kabul-contingents. They had the same mission, same area, and same kind of force. The only difference is that their area was further expanded when the district of Paghman was added (Forsvarsnett 2005a).

No indications of caveats have been found.

**Case 10: PRT III, Meymaneh, December 04 – March 05.**

PRT III and IV were the two last PRTs under British lead. The PRT had a total of 75 personnel; British, Finnish and Norwegian.

One problem noted by the Norwegian second-in-command of PRT III is that they did not have an Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) team. This meant that some projects were cancelled or took longer time (Forsvarsnett 2009c).

Another problem was that there was no capacity for CIMIC in the force. “We did not build roads, drill wells or build schools. The population that lived in more remote areas likely had some expectation that we would help them with these things” (Ibid.).

Both of these indicate a lack of enablers keeping the PRT from performing certain tasks. It can though be argued that drilling wells in an area that is fairly quiet security wise is not a military task, but should rather be left to civilians. The article further says that “In Østbø's force there was no capacity for CIMIC” (Ibid.). This indicates that neither the British nor the Finnish had similar capacities. Since the British were in charge, this would normally be their responsibility. There are no indications that a CIMIC- or EOD-unit was on purpose not deployed. As this lack of units did not hamper them in their primary task it is not considered a caveat.

This unit is considered not caveated.

**Case 11: PRT IV, Meymaneh, February 05 – June 05.**

The PRT continued the work of the previous contingents. Of the 62 soldiers in the PRT, 18 were Norwegian. The situation was fairly calm, albeit with some attacks by improvised explosive devices in Meymaneh city and some situations with local warlords. “The forces' main task was to collect information about power- and conflict structures. Presence and meetings with civilian authorities
was of great importance as this helped strengthen the position of the provincial governor” (Forsvarsnett 2009d).

“In their area of responsibility the stabilization force worked with Brits and Swedes responsible for units from the neighbouring force in the East. Sometimes they also cooperated with representatives for the Afghan and the American Army” (Forsvarsnett 2009d). Mentioning the Afghan and the American army in the same sentence suggests that this would be an American OMLT, meaning a unit under the command of OEF.

On the cooperation with IGOs and NGOs Haugdal says that “Our policy was that we did not approach these organisations or their work at our own initiative, but we shared information when they wanted to. (…) Still Haugdal describes the cooperation with the NGOs as “rendered difficult”: “It was hard to find information on Norwegian plans for Northern Afghanistan and how to support NGOs in the province”, the lieutenant colonel says” (Forsvarsnett 2009d). This could be an indication of a political wish to keep the PRT away from humanitarian aid and reconstruction. He does not however mention that he is not allowed to, rather that this has not been planned for. This also resonates with what he says the PRT's main mission was. This is in line with PRT III.

Lt. Col. Boswell, the last British commander of PRT Meymaneh, said in his farewell speech that “PRT Meymaneh has operated on the limits of what is logistically and humanly possible. The effort of the contributing nations have been far beyond what can reasonably be expected by soldiers from any nations” (Forsvarsnett 2005d). While this kind of wording is not uncommon in multinational speeches, it reinforces the impression that the forces were not politically restricted.

Because of this units low number they would probably not be sent anywhere else to fight. They are also tied to their area through their tasks. They seem to be able to cooperate with other military actors as needed, without looking to their organisational belonging. Overall there does not seem to be any caveats.

Case 12: PRT V, Meymaneh, June 05 – December 05.

This contingent started with a small Norwegian detachment under British command. On September 1st the British contingent pulled out and the Norwegian took over command. Norway reinforced with 30 more soldiers, bringing the total Norwegian force, civilians and military, up to 50. Norway had two civilians, one political advisor and one police advisor. Finland had four civilians, working with channelling Finnish funds into Faryab. These funds were earmarked for the security-sector (Flatemo 2008:40).

“At that time the threat level in Faryab was assessed to be moderate. That means calm, but unstable. Our soldiers only experienced sporadic fire fights between political parties in Faryab.
There were no direct actions against our personnel” (Forsvarsnett 2009e). When there were conflicts the force went out and established contact with the parties and initiated negotiations.

The commander, Lt. Col “Skaret explains that NGOs formally kept a distance to the force: “But in practice we cooperated about projects, and we gave them protection when they and we thought it would be necessary” (Forsvarsnett 2009e).

“The force cooperated with the UK, Finland, the Netherlands and Iceland” (Forsvarsnett 2009e). This is probably as before, the force is allowed to cooperate with actors who are operating in and near Faryab province.

The PRT lacked at least one capacity recommended by ISAF. This was a psychological operations (PSYOPS) team. This was not included immediately because the Norwegian army did not have the capacity (Flatemo 2008: 43-44). This is not considered a caveat as it was a resource not available, and it was later amended.

When Norway took over the lead of the PRT there was one major political guideline worth closer scrutiny.

There was to be a very clear divide between military and civilian activities. The military part of the PRT would thus not perform any activities except support for rebuilding the security sector. Cooperation and synergy between the civilian and the military part of the PRT would be ensured through daily dialogue and formally through a command group where both the civilian and military part of the PRT were represented (Flatemo 2008:39).

In addition there were to be no Norwegian financing of projects through the PRT and there would be no CIMIC in the organization. “According to Colonel Bjørn Solberg and Vice-admiral Jan Reksten these were political guidelines from the Bondevik-II cabinet. Especially Minister for Development Hilde Frafjord Johnsen had contributed strongly to these guidelines” (Flatemo 2008:41). The reasons were possibly a general critique of military units performing humanitarian aid and reconstruction. The cabinet had previously sent two units, a “humanitarian engineer company” to Iraq and a CIMIC unit to Kabul who were both symptomatic of this. The main points of the critique were that a mixing of roles can endanger the security of NGOs, that the military had a low cost efficiency when involved in such projects and that the military did not know enough about humanitarian aid and reconstruction, thus creating more failed projects (Flatemo 2008:41-42).

“In the concept for PRT MEY there were no money allocated from the Norwegian side for financing projects for development and reconstruction in Faryab province, neither from the MoD nor the MoFA. All Norwegian aid was given to the central government” (Flatemo 2008:40). The reason for this was to build Afghan capacity and let them decide how to distribute their funds.

This split between the military and civilian part of the PRT was continued by the Stoltenberg-II cabinet taking power in October 2005. The new Minister of Defence in November told Parliament that that “The PRT-concept consists of a military and a civilian part. The Armed
Forces contribute to the military part whose goal is to contribute to a positive development within the security sector in the provinces. It is the civilian part that takes care of aid and development. (...) At the same time it is important to clearly mark the independence in the relationship between the activities of the military forces and the humanitarian aid organizations” (Strøm-Erichsen 2005).

There is a major debate about the merits of military forces performing tasks related to humanitarian aid and reconstruction. In relation to this thesis the task of the PRTs are the deciding factor of whether this is a caveat or not. According to the PRT-handbook

As agreed by the PRT Executive Steering Committee in January 2005, the mission of PRTs is to “assist The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to extend its authority, in order to facilitate the development of a stable and secure environment in the identified area of operations, and enable Security Sector Reform (SSR) and reconstruction efforts (NATO 2010:250-251).

The exact definitions of “facilitate development” and “enable SSR and reconstruction efforts” are at the core here. In a dangerous environment there will normally be fewer NGOs doing reconstruction and the pressure for ensuring development may be felt by the PRT.

These political guidelines had several effects. First, there were no CIMIC elements in the PRT MEY organization. This despite the fact that several other countries have this capacity in their PRTs. CIMIC is also a support function in ISAF, and there are CIMIC staff elements in all headquarters. CIMIC is also a part of NATO doctrines and in the Norwegian Joint Operational doctrine (Flatemo 2008:42).

The civilian side, manned by embassy staff, would not be in the chain of command of the ISAF CIMIC (CJ9). It is not known whether the civilian side coordinated with higher echelon ISAF CIMIC.

The PRT is a dual institution, consisting of both military and civilian actors. In this thesis the focus is on the military part of it. The PRT handbook says that “the PRT itself is neither a combat nor a development institution. A PRT may perform and support such activities in the pursuit of stability, but these activities are not the primary purpose of the PRT” (NATO 2010:8). Since the civilian part of the PRT would still be able to perform reconstruction and development it is not critical that the military part are not allowed to do this. The lack of means and the shortage of personnel on the civilian side is however problematic. The commander of PRT V reported back at the end of his tour that the number of civilian personnel was not sufficient (Forsvarsnett 2009e, Flatemo 2008:61).

The complete ban on performing reconstruction and aid is most certainly a political restriction of what the military force might do. So, this unit is considered caveated. As are the following PRTs, until the time when there was sufficient civilian personnel available and resources were allocated. This was likely in place by July 2006. As will be shown it is likely that this caveat on the military forces continued in later PRTs. From July 2006 this caveat is however considered less restricting, i.e. in the blue/green categories, as the civilian side would then be able to handle
this side of the PRTs mission.

This unit is considered caveated, with a political action-specific caveat.

Case 13: Telemark Mechinf Coy, Kabul, July 05 – October 05
The mechanized company of Telemark Battalion did the same job as the previous Kabul contingents. “The company is responsible for three police districts in Kabul. The area has roughly 1.5 million inhabitants, and the Norwegian soldiers play an important part supporting Afghan authorities” (Forsvarsnett 2005c). The company was there two years earlier, and most of the officers and soldiers were the same. It was reported that “the mission has changed, and become somewhat less demanding and more a matter of routine. At the same time the AOR has increased, so the amount of work is roughly the same” (Ibid.).

No indications have come up regarding the CIMIC-debate reported in case 12 above. As Kabul has had much more reconstruction and many more NGOs it is likely that there was no need for this unit to perform those tasks. The unit also did not have a reconstruction-focus to begin with, as opposed to a Provincial Reconstruction Team. Thus there would be no need for the caveat, and if the caveat was indeed present, it would not be very limiting.

There are no indications of caveats.

Case 14: NORSOF III, Bagram, August 05 – January 06
This contingent was split in two, FSK did the first three months, then MJK took over. They were under OEF command.

Their mission appears to have been split in two as well. The FSK-contribution was in Paktika province providing situational awareness, presence, advising NGOs and training and mentoring local security forces in preparation for the 2005 elections. To do this parts of the staff were located at Bagram, while the rest of the staff and the combat units were in a Forward Operating Base. They solved their mission through reconnaissance patrols and meetings with local leaders. In parallel the organic medical assets occasionally treated local civilians. Local security forces were trained in shooting and other tactical skills (Hammersmark 2010:62).

According to Hammersmark the MJK had a different mission. Bakkeli describes how their mission was mainly reconnaissance in the mountains North of the Southern provinces of Helmand and Kandahar. They also treated local civilians and gave out medicines. Over a period of several weeks they treated between 500 and 600 Afghans. (Bakkeli 2007:266-283).

The decision to send the force was made in February 2005, and it was sent out before the 2005 Norwegian parliamentary elections. Resembling the other Special Forces contingents, there is
no information that suggests caveats. Norwegian control of the force has been maintained as earlier; “The rules are the same as last, that every operation with Norwegian participation shall be approved by Norwegian officers beforehand” (Aftenposten 2005a).

On 07.09.2007 it became public that a navy Special Forces soldier was recommended for the Military Cross.48 The background for the recommendation is two operations the Norwegian Special Forces – NORSOF – carried out in the Taliban-infected Helmand province in Southern-Afghanistan in 2005. The area is amongst the most dangerous in the world, and the Norwegian Special Forces were under command of the US-led Operation Enduring Freedom (VG 2007a).49 This suggests that there were few limits on what missions they could do. They operated under OEF, and in Helmand. Thus there are probably not any organizational or geographical caveats. Neither of the units were apparently kept from performing aid to civilians. The requirement that every operation shall be approved by Norwegian officers resemble that which has been discussed in case #1 (NORSOF I) and #2 (NORDETMAN). It highly likely indicates the presence of Norwegian Red Card Holders in the chain of command, but not that the forces are restricted in the types of missions that they could perform. It is not known whether any missions were refused.

No other indications of caveats have been seen and this unit is considered not caveated.

Case 15: TankSqn TMBN – October 05 – January 06.
The Tank Squadron of Telemark Battalion was for the occasion reconfigured as a mechanized infantry company. As for the other Kabul-contingents, there is no evidence of caveats.

Case 16: PRT VI, Meymaneh, January 06 – June 06.
The main thing that happened during this contingent was a violent demonstration as a result of a minor Norwegian newspaper reprinting the Danish Mohammed-cartoons. 200-300 people attacked the camp with stones, Kalashnikovs and RPGs. Several soldiers were wounded, and 4-5 civilian protesters were killed. This caused a change in the approach to the mission and “The time when we could walk around in the city two and two is probably gone”, Lieutenant Asle Strand said” (Forsvarsnett 2009f).

During this contingent, partly caused by the demonstration, an agreement was signed between the Norwegian and Afghan authorities on a permanent stationing of the Afghan Army in Faryab. The PRT base was also reinforced by a Latvian force protection unit, and it was decided to move the camp from down town Meymaneh to the airport a few kilometres away.

48 Norway’s highest ranking combat medal.
49 The officer in question was Trond André Bolle, who was killed by an IED in Faryab province in June 2010 (VG Nett 2010). He was awarded the medal posthumously on 21 January 2011.
As discussed in the PRT V-case this unit is considered caveated due to the military side not being allowed to perform any sort of reconstruction and development work and the civilian side not yet having the means to do so. This was instated for political reasons. There are no indications of other caveats.

Case 17: Operation Afghan Falcon – February 06 – June 06
Close to the 2005 election the Bondevik II-cabinet suggested to send 3-4 F-16s to support ISAF. After a massive internal debate in the Stoltenberg II-cabinet this was approved in November 2005. See chapter 6.3.2 for more details on this controversy.

Operation Afghan Falcon was a detachment of four F-16 jet fighters plus support personnel. They were stationed at Kabul Airport (KAIA), and were a part of ISAF. There was a lot of publicity about the mission, and their caveats were spelled out in the media. In the words of one of the pilots; “We are helping the PRTs North and West in Afghanistan” (Forsvarsnett 2006a). Furthermore; “The Norwegians know that they may have to use weapons if it becomes necessary, or “to give ISAF ground forces fire support in critical situations” (...). In extraordinary cases they might help the American led forces of Enduring Freedom, but that is only in a case of emergency” (Aftenposten 2006a). Compared with earlier fighter detachments that were a part of OEF, the planes of Afghan Falcon were not allowed to help OEF with pre-planned missions. If a so-called “in extremis-situation” (a critical situation) erupts they might help OEF forces.50

The Minister of Defence also spelled this out:

Planes under ISAF’s command will in emergency situations possibly be asked to assist OEF-personnel on the ground. This can be the case in very special cases where personnel from OEF are attacked or in other ways are in a crisis situation (...). From the Norwegian side we will constantly assure that the operation is executed in line with ISAF’s mandate and Norwegian obligations to international humanitarian law (Strøm-Erichsen 2005).

There were Norwegian officers posted in the chain of command, functioning as red card holders, making sure these caveats were followed. It is not known if any missions were refused, but pre-planned support to OEF did likely not happen.

Afghan Falcon had caveats, both geographic and organizational. These were for political reasons.

Case 18: QRF I - TMBN, Mazar-E-Sharif, March 06 – July 06.
The professional Telemark Battalion took over the responsibility for the Quick Reaction Force stationed in Mazar-E-Sharif from the British. They sent a mechanized infantry company plus a

50 Review chapter 4.4 for more on in extremis.
combat support company and other support personnel. This was an ISAF mission that provided a mobile and quickly deployable force in support of the five PRTs in Northern Afghanistan. They could deploy by German helicopters, Jeeps or CV-90 IFVs.

According to Forsvarsnett “The Telemark Battalion is to be able to move quickly to the entire Northern region of Afghanistan” (2006b). This is in line with their task of reinforcing the PRTs in RC North.

No information indicating that this unit was caveated has been found. Regarding the controversy surrounding the unit that followed them, there are no indications that this unit was caveated in the same way. However, this is likely because the situation had not yet arisen. It is likely that they would have been denied used in the South if they had been asked. This was not an option at the time as RC West was “far off” and RCs South and East were still the responsibility of Operation Enduring Freedom. With the information available it is not possible to determine whether they were actually geographically caveated or not. They are thus considered not geographically caveated.

In general there was very little press focus on this QRF unit. No organizational caveats have been mentioned and it is unknown whether they could support OEF with pre-planned operations within RC North.

This unit is considered not caveated.

**Case 19: PRT VII, Meymaneh, June 06 – December 06.**

This PRT was similar to the previous. Due to expansions after the demonstration in February 2006 it now consisted of roughly 100 Norwegians, 30 Finns and 25 Latvians. “In this period the soldiers were in three fire fights. They were all at long distances, and no Norwegian lives were lost” (Forsvarsnett 2009g). This indicates that the situation was still calm in the province.

American units mentoring the Afghan National Army (ANA) were present in the province. The Americans were at that time a part of Operation Enduring Freedom. It is likely that there was some cooperation between the PRT and the US units, but the level is not known.

A Norwegian civilian advisor provided a link to the Norwegian embassy and Norwegian authorities, thus enabling the PRT to provide information influencing the use of Norwegian aid. A common problem was the lack of a comprehensive plan with a longer perspective. In July 2006 it was decided that a certain percentage of the Norwegian aid to Afghanistan would be earmarked for projects in Faryab. This started to materialize as development projects from this point (Flatemo 2008:87, UD 2010). Between 10 and 20 NGOs were in Faryab in this period. According to the PRT commander Lt. Col. Sommerseth
Coordination between the NGOs was close to non-existent, and the PRT took responsibility for coordinating information, and partially effort, until an UNAMA representative arrived. We initiated meeting places where we could gather to discuss development, and especially information about security. This was received well by the civilian organizations locally, and information passed freely both ways (Forsvarsnett 2009g). The civilian side of the PRT was gradually strengthened during 2006. This, in combination with the arrival of earmarked funds alleviated the caveat placed upon the military side. Judging from the statements of Lt. Col Sommerseth the PRT was able to perform some civilian assistance. It is not known whether this regards the civilian or the military side.

This unit is considered to have a low impact political, action specific caveat, regarding reconstruction and development. There are no indications of caveats keeping them from cooperating with Operation Enduring Freedom in the province, nor any other caveats.

**Case 20: OMLT Brigade I, Mazar-E-Sharif, June 06 - November 06.**

Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams help the Afghan army by letting experienced officers work with their Afghan counterparts to guide, mentor and support them. The American Task Force Phoenix had the responsibility for this when ISAF started supporting in the summer of 2006. The first Norwegians working in an OMLT deployed around June.\(^{51}\) They were deployed to Mazar-E-Sharif where they participated in mentoring the Afghan National Army 1\(^{st}\) brigade / 209. Corps. The unit consisted of 10 high-ranking officers supporting and mentoring the ANA at brigade- and corps-level.

Mentoring does not necessarily stop at the office door. “The mission entails participation in planning and executing Afghan army operations all over Afghanistan” (Forsvarsnett 2008a). Since they were mentoring at brigade- and corps level there was little chance of the Norwegian officers ending up in combat. The official statement from the military is that “The 209. Corps has also been sent to other parts of the country, also there have the Norwegian mentors followed their “pupils” - from office into battle” (Forsvarsnett 2008a). This does not say where they have been deployed, but it is outside RC North. This speaks against a general geographic caveat restricting them to work only in RC North. Yet, as described more thoroughly in Case 26 below (OMLT Brigade III), for all practical purposes they likely had a caveat saying they could not be stationed in the South, and that sending them would only happen after high level political approval.

The American Task Force Phoenix had for many years been training the ANA. “ISAF started OMLT summer 2006, and the team works in close cooperation with the American Task Force Phoenix”. (Forsvarsnett 2008a) Interestingly enough, Task Force Phoenix started as a part of

\(^{51}\) The details are unclear.
Operation Enduring Freedom under the Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan (CSTC-A), and still was as of January 2009 (Task Force Phoenix 200952, Wikipedia 2010a). Since this was noted at the Norwegian Defence website, it is fair to say that they did not have an organizational caveat against working with OEF. This is only a few months after Afghan Falcon was refused to do pre-planned missions for OEF.

This unit is assessed to have a geographical caveat for political reasons, but there is no evidence of other caveats.

Case 21: QRF II – Esk 1, Mazar-E-Sharif, July 06 – January 07.
The 1st Squadron of 2nd Battalion assumed the QRF in Mazar-E-Sharif after Telemark Battalion. They had the same mission and had the same set-up. It was the free tactical reserve of Commander RC-North, and as such the only mobile reserve in the North, and one of the few in all of Afghanistan. The soldiers were mainly conscripts who volunteered for Afghanistan after their conscript period was over.

During the summer of 2006 ISAF expanded its Area of Operations to include the southern areas of Afghanistan. Heavy fighting erupted and NATO requested additional forces from other places in Afghanistan53. September 1st NATO inquired whether the QRF could be sent to Kandahar to be a part of base security there. “The chief of FOHK54, Vice Admiral Reksten (...) supported the NCC’s recommendation to say no to this mission” (Forsvarsnett 2006c). They said that this was done to keep the QRF in the North where its area of operations was. Several requests followed during the autumn, but were refused. “The countries that contribute to the security force in Afghanistan, ISAF, have the right to lay down a veto against the orders of ISAF-commanders. This was a mission that was not in concord with the one that the Norwegian soldiers was sent to Afghanistan to solve, says brigadier Gunnar Gustavsen, chief of staff at Norwegian Joint Operational Headquarters (…)” (Aftenposten 2006e).

However, on September 7th a team of eight nurses were sent to Kandahar to assist the Canadian field hospital there. They were a part of the Norwegian Deployable Hospital, also stationed in Mazar-E-Sharif. According to Forsvarsnett (2006d) Major Salberg said that “We will be working inside the walls of a robust military base which has high focus on security. That makes us feel safer”.

In November the foreign editor of Aftenposten said in an editorial that “We already have a

52 This website has since expired.
53 This case is explored in greater detail in chapter 6.4
54 Norwegian Joint Operational Headquarters in Jåttå, Norway.
quick reaction force in North-Afghanistan. It is at the disposal of ISAF’s supreme commander, the British general David Richards, without limitations. He can use it anywhere, whenever he feels that it is a military necessity. Norway is as such a model country, we are one of six NATO-countries that have no restrictions on where or how the forces can be used” (Dragnes 2006). This, discussed further in chapter 6.4, suggests that the caveat was removed. As this happened close to the Riga-summit, the practical impact of this was primarily that the caveat was removed from the list at NATO HQ in Brussels. The main crisis in RC South that had taken ISAF by surprise was over and the Taliban had temporarily been beaten. The QRF would still not be sent to the South on a pre-planned mission. Any attempts to do this would most likely be stopped by the NCC or FOHK acting on political directions. The QRF could be sent South on «in extremis»-missions. In practice this was at best unlikely, as there were mobile forces in the South that could get to any crisis far faster than the Norwegian force. It is thus likely that this force was still geographically caveated.

There were likely four reasons for this caveat. The first is the logistical problems involved with moving and resupplying a unit far from its normal structures. The second is that their primary mission was in the North. The third is to keep them out of harm’s way. The fourth that the “South” was a politically problematic area in Norway. It had strong connections to OEF and their hunt for terrorists. It is likely that the QRF was not allowed to help OEF with preplanned missions, even in the North. This in line with the caveats on Operation Afghan Falcon.

This unit is considered caveated, for political reasons, both both geographically and organizationally.

Case 22: OMLT Brigade II, Mazar-E-Sharif, November 06 - April 07.
This unit continued the mentoring work at brigade and corps level. As discussed in case 26, OMLT Brigade III, this unit is considered geographically caveated.

There are no indications of action-specific or organizational caveats.

Case 23: PRT VIII, Meymaneh, December 06 – June 07.
The PRT continued the work of previous PRTs. The force had by now increased to 165, from Norway, Finland and Latvia, plus some civilians and police from Norway and Finland.

The commander, Lt. Col. Opperud had many resources at his disposal as the head of the PRT in Meymaneh. “We were a multinational civil-military unit with resources within diplomacy, media and information as well as military and economic means. Orchestrating all of this in order to get

55 See chapter 4.4 for more on “in extremis”-clauses.
progress within security, governance and development was very demanding” (Forsvarsnett 2009h).
The PRT’s development advisor had a close dialogue with the local UN representative and international organization. There was no direct cooperation with NGOs. “(...) We forwarded a wish for development projects through our embassy in Kabul back to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Oslo. (...) Then inquiries were sent out to the organizations asking whether they could deliver what was asked for” (Ibid.).

In one incident an IED exploded inside Meymaneh city and one Finnish soldier was killed. The rest of the contingent had only minor skirmishes (Forsvarsnett 2009h).

It is likely that this PRT had the same caveat restricting the military side from performing development. This is, however, mitigated by the civilian side. This PRT is considered to have a minor action-specific caveat of political origin.

**Case 24: QRF III – Stormeskadron 4, Mazar-E-Sharif, January 07 – July 07.**
Assault squadron 4 of the Armoured battalion took over the QRF. They were quite identical to their predecessors in both composition and mission. Officially their geographic caveats were removed, as opposed to the previous QRF56. In practice, however, they were most probably restricted to Northern Afghanistan. According to Forsvarsnett (2007) they were used for 37 pre-planned operations and two alarms. A TV-documentary called “Storm 423” was made. It followed one of the infantry squads throughout the contingent. One of the soldiers interviewed claimed that there had been several requests for their use outside the North, yet this did not happen (AV-senteret 2010).

Most likely they were caveated in the same way as their predecessors. A geographic caveat against going to the South instated for political reasons.

**Case 25: NORSOF (FSK) I, Kabul, March 07 – September 07.**
Following several NATO requests, the Red-Green cabinet decided to send Special Forces to Kabul. The force had two main tasks, mentoring an Afghan police unit and collecting and acting against insurgent networks operating in the city (Hammersmark 2010:65).

SV strongly disliked this. In an attempt to close ranks Oddrun Árflot of SV claimed that the party leader, Kristin Halvorsen, said that “the soldiers who will be sent to Afghanistan will not operate in the southern parts of the country. She (Halvorsen) said that by sending the soldiers to Kabul we can have insurances that they will not be moved any other places, and especially to the South. Because, this thing about sending (the soldiers) to the South is not an option for SV” (VG

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56 See chapter 6.4 for a closer look at the political debate on the QRFs.
Nett 2007). After a few days of intense media pressure and much uncertainty Foreign Minister Jonas Gahr Støre made the following statement in Stortinget:

- Then there is the major question. If there is a crisis, an emergency, in the vicinity, where NATO should wish to use these elements, some of the soldiers, the answer is that first of all this is a hypothetical problem. But allow me to underline that if forces are attacked and there is an acute need for a rescue mission, Norway will answer the call. Norway will help people in need, if it is needed. This is something completely different from moving or re-stationing the force. We have expressed this clearly. And in both cases Norway shall be consulted. (...) - Then I wish to respond to the MP Solberg [Høyre]; when she says that these limitations are in conflict with the NATO-spirit, I strongly disagree with that. If that were the case, half of ISAF would be in conflict with the NATO-spirit. Other countries have placed complicated constraints of different kinds on their participation. I think that Norway has been very clear in what we have done. We have said that there should be no limitations on the forces that have been in the North, and when it comes to the Kabul-force, it is there to solve a mission, and we say that it shall solve its mission there. If anything else should come up, Norway must be consulted (Gahr Støre 2007b).

Summarised, there is a caveat on the Special Forces. They will not be moved out of Kabul province and the surrounding areas for longer periods (re-stationed) or on pre-planned missions. They can however be sent to other areas if a crisis should occur, “in extremis”, only to be sent back to Kabul when the crisis is resolved. Later in the same speech Gahr Støre specifies that sending the Special Forces outside their Area of Operations will require government approval. “To the press Defence Minister Strøm-Erichsen said that the flexibility was good enough in her view. (…) “There is only one Special Forces unit in the Kabul-region, and it is Norwegian. There is plenty of work for them to do here”, the minister said, refusing to comment further on their activities”. (Aftenposten 2007a)

On June 23rd one of the SOF-officers was killed in a fire-fight in Lowgar province. The head of the Joint Operational HQ “emphasized that the skirmish happened within the AOO of the Norwegian force and within the mandate given by the government” (Aftenposten 2007b). When the force started operating they discovered that the networks they were targeting often had contacts outside the capital. The definition of what “Kabul” meant resulted in political discussions. “After consultations it was clarified that they were allowed to operate in the adjoining provinces so that possible negative effects of the discussions were minimal on the ground” (Hammersmark 2010:67-68). In a rare interview after the deployment the commander of the Norwegian Army Special Forces said that

“The mission in the Kabul-area was to localize and stop cells that prepared suicide attacks and placement of IEDs. We discovered that many of these people operated from the outside, thus we had to leave Kabul. It would be pointless to stop at the borders of Kabul. We have to use operational judgement. (…) In these cases I get permission from Norway, directly from Chief of Defence Sverre Diesen, or from the HQ in Stavanger” (Aftenposten 2007c).

As for other caveats, colonel Petter Lindquist stated that “There are no limitations to what

57 My translation. The speech is taken from question time in Parliament and does not look like a part of a pre-written speech.
the soldiers may do” (Dagbladet 2007c). He is likely then referring to types of missions and leaving the geographical caveats out. The Defence Minister was kept abreast of the operations of the Special Forces, and occasionally she would inform the rest of the government of their actions. “I am very well oriented about their operations and activities. I have no reason to believe that I am not oriented enough about what they are doing. Rules of engagement and mandate was thoroughly debated, also in Parliament, before the force was deployed by this government” (VG 2007b).

Overall, there does not appear to be any restrictions on what kind of missions these soldiers might participate in, or whom they may cooperate with. However, they were geographically limited to Kabul and the surrounding provinces. Surrounding provinces after local approval; anywhere else after government approval. As discussed, this was for political reasons.

**Case 26: OMLT Brigade III, Mazar-E-Sharif, April 07 – October 07.**
As noted in the previous contingent, these were allowed to follow their Afghan counterparts all over Afghanistan. They worked together with TFP, a derivative of OEF, so there are no indications of organizational caveats.

In early June Dagbladet ran a story about one of the officers being sent to Kandahar:

- I was in Kandahar in May to reconnoitre the situation for a brigade of Afghan soldiers who were going down there”. (…) He is supposedly the first officer in Afghanistan who has been given clearance to go to the South on duty. All missions in the South are politically sensitive in Norway, and they have to be cleared at the highest levels of the armed forces. Norway has no formal caveats on where the soldiers can go, but has got a political understanding that none of them shall serve in Southern Afghanistan. The head of all Norwegian forces in Afghanistan [NCC] (…) clears all of these missions with Joint Operational HQ in Norway. (Dagbladet 2007d. My emphasis).

The political understanding referred to here means that they have an undeclared geographic caveat, a caveat probably not mentioned in the TOA-letter. Although this caveat seems to be known by at least their local NATO-superiors.

On the more general policy Defence Minister Strøm-Erichsen claims that

“There are no lines in the sand. The QRF in Mazar-E-Sharif can also be sent South in emergencies”. (…) She was not informed about Olsbø's reconnoitre in the South. And she did not need to be. “It was not like he was taking part in operations in the South. He was guiding and reconnoitring before a troop movement, and he worked from inside the base in Kandahar”, she says. Is it so that Norwegian officers can go to Southern Afghanistan with Afghan soldiers, but not with Norwegian? “No, Norwegian officers shall not lead Afghan soldiers in the South. This was a case of mentoring in connection with Afghan soldiers stationed in the North being moved South, says Defence Minister Anne-Grethe Strøm-Erichsen. (Ibid.).

This means that the OMLT had an undeclared geographic caveat saying that they should not normally be deployed to the South. Politically it could be acceptable if the person deployed went on a brief mission that had no chance of involvement in combat. This is also expected to be the same for the previous contingents.

Ten days later, on the 17th of June, the cabinet removed this caveat.
“There are no geographical limitations on them”, says Espen Barth Eide (Ap) parliamentary secretary to the Minister of Defence. SV has accepted that the new officers will have full freedom of movement, also in the volatile Southern Afghanistan where Norway has refused to send soldiers so far. In return SV can celebrate that the Special Forces are being withdrawn from Afghanistan when their 6 month long mandate is finished this Autumn (VG 2007c).

As this change came over half-way into their contingent they are considered geographically caveated for political reasons. There are no indications of other caveats.

Case 27: PRT IX, Meymaneh, June 07 – December 07

PRT IX was led by Lt. Col. Jørn Erik Berntsen. He had about 200 soldiers under his command. The commander said that the security situation was difficult and that they regularly were in combat. “We went into Ghormach with a wish to change the activities that influenced security. This lead to confrontations, but we managed to create room for a positive development” (Forsvarsnett 2009i).

Operation Harekate Yolo II put the spotlight on the Ghormach-district. Ghormach district is a part of Badghis province, and thus in RC West. RC West was however not able to influence the situation there, and insurgents in Ghormach were creating problems in Faryab province. Crossing into RC West had to be approved by RC North on a case-by-case basis. This sometimes precluded Norwegian units from helping American and Afghan units who came into contact with insurgents. This problem lasted until January 1st 2009 when Ghormach permanently became a part of Faryab province and thus also RC North. It is not a specific Norwegian caveat, but rather a chain of command focus on Area of Responsibility. It is apparent that the PRT worked hard to remove this problem.

One thing that might be considered a caveat is the requirement that there must be sufficient medical support available.

In 63 of the 73 weeks since the surgical team arrived in Meymaneh, an anaesthetist or a surgeon has been in camp. For a total of ten weeks this medical capacity has been lacking. Strøm-Erichsen confirmed that missions have been cancelled because of lack of doctors. (…) She denied that these restrictions on the operations of Norwegian forces have had any consequences for other allies (VG 2007f).

A year later Aftenposten reported that since December 2007 the PRT has always had doctors in camp (Aftenposten 2008e). From December 2008 and onwards Macedonian doctors were present.

In this case the PRT has the same support requirement restriction as the QRF in case #28 below. Some missions have been cancelled. Yet the total of 10 weeks in a year and a half is not frightening. It means that some 3 weeks of this 6 month contingent have had some restrictions in missions they could perform. Since this is a result of unforeseen events, and has a rather small impact, it will not be considered a caveat. This requirement will not be mentioned again for the PRT, as there were always doctors in place after this.

During their six months the PRT had one or two meetings with each of the NGOs present in
the province. The PRT had a continuous dialogue with the development advisor from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The commander claimed that “the civilian organizations did not want too close ties to us, even though they emphasised that the military and the civilian effort is closely linked” (Forsvarsnett 2009i).

There are no indications of other caveats. The PRT is considered not caveated with regards to medical evacuation. They are considered to have a mission-specific caveat of little importance regarding the caveat against performing reconstruction and development.

Case 28: QRF IV - 2 bn, Mazar-E-Sharif, July 07 – January 08

This unit had the same mission and composition as previous QRFs. There were two major changes in the situation. First, more Taliban were conducting activities in the North. Secondly the new commander of RC North was more inclined to use the force. (...)[Commander RC North, Dieter] Warnecke has kept the QRF busy almost constantly since their deployment. Time after time they have been sent to help ISAF forces strained by the increasingly dramatic situation in the North. The young Norwegians supported a German PRT East in Northern-Afghanistan, have been involved in operations on the Pakistani border, have supported Hungarian soldiers and have been involved in security operations far North (Aftenposten 2007d). In November 2007 the QRF conducted “Operation Harekate Yolo II”. This operation was an offensive operation aimed to dislodge Taliban forces setting up in the Ghormach-district near Faryab. Ghormach is in Badghis province, a part of RC West. The area was temporarily transferred to RC North for the duration of the operation, so the forces did not “leave” RC North. The operation included 200 Norwegian soldiers from the QRF and the PRT, and between 1000 and 1500 Afghan and other ISAF soldiers. Between 50 and 100 insurgents were reported killed (VG 2007d). This was the first time “conscript”58 soldiers had been involved in large battles, and the first example of large scale offensive operations conducted by Norwegians.

In the aftermath of Operation Harekate Yolo II one PRT soldier was wounded and one killed by an IED. The one that was wounded was saved by a German surgeon stationed in PRT Meymaneh for the duration of the operation. Norway did not have their own surgeons there. This led to a major debate about the level of medical care available. The commanding officer of the QRF, Lt. Col Rune Solberg said that

“I have to stand cap in hand and ask the German general if he can lend me a doctor. This is embarrassing for Norway. (... ) The force is divided into three units, Task Units (TUs), who rotate being on standby. A unit that deploys is supposed to have a medical trauma unit, where a doctor always will be present” (VG 2007e).

Solberg moves on to explain how there is a lack of doctors; they usually have some, and are

58 They were recruited for international duty during their conscript period, and left for Afghanistan after the conscript period was finished. Occasionally they would be called conscripts in the media.
able to lend some from the Germans.

We never go out on a mission without doctors. Luckily the German contingent provides vehicles, medic teams and doctors. But there is also pressure on the German forces, they cannot guarantee anything and our requests are on a day-to-day basis. In addition to having a medical team with doctors along with the forces, there is also a requirement that there shall never be more than two hours transport to the nearest surgical facility. (...) This problem is solved by Germany supplying helicopters for medevac. Although that also has its limitations. The medevac helicopters cannot fly when it is completely dark, Solberg says (ibid.).

A Norwegian cavalry officer taking part in Harakate Yolo II was quoted saying “This is hopeless! We attacked the bad guys, but around 3-4 o'clock in the afternoon the [German] helicopters pulled out. (...) We should have had Norwegian helicopters. They can at least fly at night” (Aftenposten 2007e). Since the force required availability of helicopter medevac they had to return to their Forward Operating Base (FOB) without completing their mission when the helicopters left. The reason why the helicopters pulled out was stated to be a combination of number of flying hours allowed per day, work-time-regulations and that “German national regulations say that the MH 53-helicopters are not allowed to fly in the dark” (Ibid.). This was later rebutted by German mission command in Potsdam who said that German helicopters were regularly flying at night (Spiegel.de 2007). The possible German caveats are not the issue here, rather the effect the lack of helicopters had on the Norwegian force. This may be a case of a support requirement caveat. There is currently an ISAF 90 minute MEDEVAC standard, but this was to my knowledge not issued in regulation-form until March 2009, and the standard was applied from 1 July 2009 (NATO ACO 2010).

As mentioned earlier the PRT in Meymaneh does not appear to have the same caveat. Its Military Observer Teams (MOT) had been operating for years in the same area without helicopters on standby. The requirement for medevac seems like a (reasonable) national regulation, that was probably shared with most of the nations in theatre. The problem is not the requirement itself, but the fact that support needed is not organic to the force. The lack of doctors is one problem, the caveated German helicopters another. This highlights the support requirement. The bottom line is that national regulations cause missions to be cancelled or not completed. Earlier QRFs have possibly also had the same requirement, but as the problem has not come up, this has not been reported.

There does not seem to be any restrictions on doing offensive missions, or other types of missions. They cooperated with other nations and Afghans, so there are probably no organizational caveats. Based on Defence Minister Strøm-Erichsens statement “There are no lines in the sand. The QRF in Mazar-E-Sharif can also be sent South in emergencies” (Dagbladet 2007d), this unit is

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59 Originally reported by the UK paper “The Sunday Times” under the headline “For us ze war is over by tea time, ja” on 18.11.2007.
considered caveated geographically. This because they could likely only be moved to the South “in extremis”, in line with the other QRFs. It also has the mentioned support requirement caveat.

**Case 29: OMLT Brigade IV, Mazar-E-Sharif, October 07 – March 08.**

With a force of roughly 10 high level officers, the OMLT continued the work of the previous contingent. Referring to the changes made during autumn 07 (case 26), and no reports of reversals, there are no known caveats on this force.

It is considered not caveated.

**Case 30: PRT X, Meymaneh, December 2007 – June 2008**

Lt. Col. Espen Arntzen was the commander of the tenth PRT in Meymaneh. It consisted of 250 soldiers, of which 150 were Norwegian. This increased as the Norwegian Aeromedical Detachment (NAD) arrived as they brought 50-60 personnel with them (Forsvarsnett 2009j).

They continued the work of the other contingents. Ghormach continued to be a problematic area, and there were several missions there. The force cooperated with Afghan forces, the German led RC, Swedes, Finns, Americans and Latvians (Ibid.).

One reported incident is worth mentioning.

It was the coldest winter for 30 years in Northern Afghanistan, and Lt. Col Espen Arntzen wanted to contribute so Afghans would not starve to death. He gave 10,000 dollars from the military unit he is leading, PRT Meymaneh, to food distribution under the direction of a group led by the local governor. This was not well received by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (…) “This is a mix of civilian and military roles, and it is a problem” (…), said MoFA political secretary Raymond Johansen. (…)

“When we see people suffer we want to do something. But we do not wish that we as soldiers should walk around and be the kindest kid in class. It is better that the [Norwegian] MoFA takes care of this, and that we help build their legitimacy”, says Arntzen (VG 2008a).

Minister of Defence Anne-Grete Strøm-Erichsen had full understanding for Arntzen’s actions, but was supportive of the MoFA. On the other hand, Arntzen was supported by his military superiors. Major General Morten Haga Lunde, deputy secretary of the MoD said that

Arntzen was not reprimanded from the military, because we think that it is OK to contribute to life saving activities. When it is minus 15 degrees and people are walking without shoes, it feels right to be able to distribute blankets and flour (VG 2008a).

This shows that there is a divide, even within the MoD, of the interpretation of what the military side is allowed to do. This also shows that the caveat keeping the military from performing reconstruction, development and humanitarian aid remains.

There does not appear to be any caveats on missions or geographic areas. The force seems to be able to cooperate with any force in its AOO. This unit is considered to have a low impact political caveat against performing reconstruction, development and humanitarian aid.
Case 31: QRF V & VI - TMBN, Mazar-E-Sharif, January 08 – July 08
There were no visible changes in the modus operandi of the QRF. This time it was provided by the Telemark Battalion. In the spring they conducted Operation Karez, going into Ghormach to remove Taliban insurgents operating in the area. There is no information suggesting that any missions were refused on the grounds of mission type.

Although it has not been reported this contingent most probably has the same medical support requirement caveat as the previous QRF. However this lack of doctors was amended after December 2007, and is not expected to have affected this unit.

I find no evidence that the caveat forbidding them to go to Southern Afghanistan has removed. This would have been a major event and would likely have been publicised. So, they are considered caveated geographically for political reasons.

Case 32: NORSOF (FSK), Kabul, March 08 – June 08?
The return of NORSOF to Kabul was shrouded in secrecy. The political debate surrounding their deployment was public, but much more low key than previous debates. The force's primary mission would, as in the previous round, be to avert threats against the Afghan capital. They would stay for three months, before MJK would take over for six months, and then FSK would return for nine months. They would act against insurgent networks and train an Afghan police unit; the Crisis Response Unit (Hammersmark 2010:65). They would work in Kabul province, as well as the surrounding provinces. This as was politically cleared in their previous rotation, described in case #25. “From the North the threat is mainly from conventional guerrilla forces, while the Logar province in the South is a staging area for suicide bombers” (Dagbladet 2007e).

An editorial in Aftenposten described the political problem like this;

A Special Forces unit of 150 soldiers will be stationed in the Kabul-area. These soldiers will be deployed to where ever NATO may need them the most, but this will require government approval first. Herein lies a potential for tough discussions (Haugen 2007).

However, the cabinet dealt with these discussions beforehand. “From what VG understands SV have accepted the new Norwegian contributions based on the precondition that the special forces will not be sent to battles in Southern-Afghanistan” (VG 2007g). Although there is some leniency;

The cabinet emphasizes that it still must approve any NATO requests to use Norwegian Special Forces in pre-planned operations outside the Kabul-area. At the same time the chief of the Special Forces is granted authority to use the force in acute crises outside the capital. The Minister of Defence must then be oriented immediately (VG 2007h).

There is no evidence of the force being restricted in any operational sense. Newspapers report that they have made offensive actions, arresting Taliban leaders, and “taking out” Taliban
leaders. However, as they are restricted to Kabul and adjoining provinces they are considered geographically caveated for political reasons.

**Case 33: OMLT Brigade V, Mazar-E-Sharif, March 08 – October 08**
The unit is the same size and has the same mission as the previous brigade OMLTs. There does not seem to be any differences in how they operate.

They are thus considered not caveated.

**Case 34: NAD I, Meymaneh, April 08 – Summer 08**
The Norwegian Aeromedical Detachment consisted of roughly 60 soldiers and officers, and was based in PRT Meymaneh. Their main asset was three Bell 412SP helicopters meant for medical evacuation (MEDEVAC). These helicopters were on rotation so that two would always be ready. One helicopter would be outfitted for medical evacuation, with the other as a support helicopter fitted with two M134 “mini-guns”. The mini-gun is in 7.62mm calibre and fires with a rate of 3,000 rounds per minute (Dillon Aero 2010). The helicopters were lightly armoured. No details have been given, but it is likely that they are armoured in vulnerable places, with enough thickness to withstand small-arms fire. They do not have the Greek red cross painted on the side. This is probably to be able to rotate the helicopters, as the support helicopter with the two mini-guns would then possibly have been in breach of the Geneva Convention.

It was stated quite a few times that these helicopters are only for medical evacuation purposes. “The 339-squadron with medics will be on 24 hours state of readiness to support the Norwegian PRT Meymaneh” (Forsvarsnett 2008b). This may seem like a caveat. The fact that there are three helicopters, with one in reserve, means that they are interchangeable. Thus two helicopters could be outfitted with mini-guns and used as gunships. While this might be possible, it does not seem to be a political restriction, rather a technical limitation. While the mini-guns have a massive rate of fire, their range and accuracy is limited. In addition, “in no sense are his Bell 412s gunships, but under the unstable conditions prevailing one cannot trust that the opponents respect the job of the ambulances” Aftenposten 2008b). Attempting to use the helicopters as gunships would make them vulnerable to small-arms and machine-gun fire. Additionally the pilots (and gunners) are not trained for a combat role, as this is the first time Norwegian helicopters have had weapons mounted since the Cold War (Forsvarsnett 2008b). In addition this would have led to the forces being without the required MEDEVAC assets.

Many technical problems were foreseen before the helicopters left. “The maximum flying time of these helicopters are 1 hour 30 minutes” (Aftenposten 2007f).
According to sources in the Armed Forces the helicopters have restrictions saying they can fly no more than 30-50 hours per month. In addition to the big problems of flying to the hospital in the heat, the helicopters have problems flying in darkness, and can thus only fly one in two nights. The Norwegian pilots are given so little time flying that they have to be sent home after six weeks in Afghanistan – to fly helicopters so they can maintain their licenses (VG 2008b).

In a letter Chief of the Air Force Staff Erik Gustavson writes “Summarized (...) low light conditions, poor weather, high temperatures and/or high altitude may cause operations to be cancelled or operational range to be reduced” (Aftenposten 2008c).

After the first contingent was finished they had only recorded one instance of not being able to fly a mission, when they suddenly flew into a sandstorm (Forsvarsnett 2008c). The technical limits of the equipment thus far exceeded the expectations. There is a question whether this should be counted as technical caveats. The helicopters have technical limits, but seem to be flying whenever it is possible. The whole discussion suggests that they are not technically caveated for political reasons; these are limits inherent in the equipment. Politicians seemed eager to send the helicopters to Meymaneh. Canada operates roughly the same helicopter in Helmand and faces some of the same restraints, but have also been able to use the helicopters for good effect (CBC News 2009).

What might seem like a geographical caveat is that they are limited to the area surrounding Meymaneh. As these helicopters have a rather short range (1hr 30min) at this altitude and temperature it is not possible for them to serve other provinces. Helicopters require much maintenance. This must be done by national personnel, utilising national spares. Operating them out of anywhere but Meymaneh would be logistically very difficult.

As for organisational caveats, i.e. who will they rescue; there are no indications of caveats. Before they arrived it was promised that “The helicopters will also support our allies if necessary, both ISAF forces and Afghan security forces” (ISAF Public Affairs 2008:20). In their first 6 months they evacuated 17 people. “We have evacuated soldiers and policemen from five nations: Norwegians, Swedes, Americans, Latvians and Afghans” (Aftenposten 2008f). This should mean that they do not distinguish between who they evacuate.

Summarised, I find no evidence of caveats on the helicopters, when controlling for the special operational requirements of helicopters.

**Case 35: NORSOF (MJK) III, Kabul, June 08 – November 08?**

There has been very little reporting on these. They took over the mission from FSK and would stay for six months. There is little reason to believe that the Navy Special Forces operated under other restrictions than FSK. The Norwegian Special forces were to be deployed for 18 months, of which the MJK were responsible for six months in the autumn of 2008.
They are considered to have one caveat; the political caveat restricting them to Kabul and adjoining provinces.

**Case 36: PRT XI, Meymaneh, June 08 – December 2008.**

The commander of PRT XI was Lt. Col. Morten Jensen. The PRT now consisted of roughly 400 soldiers, including 110 Latvians and one Icelander. During an IED attack in the centre of Meymaneh one Latvian soldier was killed and one was wounded. Two Norwegian soldiers were wounded in an ambush in Ghormach district (Forsvarsnett 2009k). The PRT's mission was primarily building capacity of the army, police, border police and government. “Thereafter it was important to reduce the influence Taliban and criminals had on the security situation in Faryab. Through improved security we would facilitate development and economic growth”, explains Jensen” (Ibid.).

Jensen also explains the Norwegian model of peace keeping. “It is based on the three pillars of security, economic and social development, and good governance based on justice and human rights. In the Norwegian solution advisers from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs implement projects in their area with Norwegian development aid through the Norwegian embassy in Kabul” (Ibid.).

The area of Ghormach still had insurgent presence.

Tactical units from Telemark Battalion in the Norwegian stabilization force in Meymaneh are lauded for their actions when Afghan forces with their American mentors were ambushed by the Taliban. This happened when they were on their way to apprehend a known insurgent leader in a village near the village of Ghormach last week. (…) VG has learned that the Norwegian soldiers entered the battle zone and pushed the Taliban attackers back using sniper fire and other firearms. Allied planes bombed the insurgents' positions and made it possible for the ambushed units to escape (VG 2008d).

The German commander of RC North is not left with much honour in VG's description. They claimed that he “tried to prevent the Norwegian forces from assisting their colleagues for as long as possible” (VG 2008d). The reason for this was claimed to be Germany's wish to stay out of the troubled area of Ghormach.

Today the commander of RC North must approve that any Norwegian or other forces in Faryab cross the border to the neighbouring province of Badghis, and the rules say that this can only be done when allies are in grave danger. Ambush absolutely qualifies for support, the Norwegian forces think. (…) Chief of Defence Diesen does not make a secret of the Army's wish to enter Ghormach on a regular basis (VG 2008d)

This is an example of a German caveat affecting Norwegian soldiers and other allies operating in the area. The Germans are not allowed to deploy outside RC North. Thus, if an allied unit is ambushed in Ghormach, and a Norwegian unit on their way to help is ambushed as well, the German QRF from Mazar-E-Sharif might have to deploy there. As a result of this and many similar cases, after strong international pressure, the Ghormach-district was formally made a part of RC North in mid-December 2008 (Klassekampen 2008). This means that the one thing that might be considered a geographical caveat in the PRT was removed.
Regarding cooperation and organisational caveat, there is one report that an American liaison officer moved into the PRT camp in Meymaneh. The reason is according to Dagbladet that Norway will cooperate closer with the American as the Norwegian OMLT-Kandak\textsuperscript{60} deploys (Dagbladet 2008). The liaison officer would then be from Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan or Task Force Phoenix and thus a part of Operation Enduring Freedom. The liaison officer could also be a liaison to “other” American forces.

The decision to have the liaison officer move into the Norwegian camp appears to have been taken by military authorities. “The political leadership in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs” have not been informed. - I have not heard anything about this, political secretary Raymond Johansen (Ap) said to Dagbladet” (2008). Either way, the liaison officer most likely belonged to Operation Enduring Freedom. However, the press did not report anything further on this case, and it is not known how long the officer(s) stayed.

There are no other indications of caveats on the PRT. This unit is considered to have no caveats, except the standard low-impact caveat on aid and reconstruction.

Case 37: NAD II, Meymaneh, Autumn 08.
There does not seem to be any changes in the way the NAD operated. They had certain technical restrictions (heat, sand, darkness). These seem inherent in the equipment of the unit and seem hard to bypass, and do not seem like they are generated politically. As winter approaches the heat and sand disappears and is replaces with rain and snow. This makes the technical problems remain somewhat the same.

In October 2008 a fire-fight between Taliban and ANA with American mentors ended with several civilians and a Taliban fighter left wounded on the battlefield. “The heavily injured Taliban-soldier is on the operating table with a torn off foot and a massive blood loss. He can thank Norwegian soldiers and Norwegian military medics that he is still alive” (VG 2008c). Since they even transport the enemy there is little reason to expect that they have any organisational caveats against evacuating allied personnel.

This unit is considered not caveated.

Case 38: OMLT Brigade VI, Mazar-E-Sharif, October 2008 – March 2009
This unit continued their work with the 1\textsuperscript{st} brigade of ANA’s 209\textsuperscript{th} corps. They were the same size as the previous contingents (Forsvarsnett 2009l). In December 2008 Aftenposten said that Defense

\textsuperscript{60} A 50 man strong OMLT mentoring one Afghan Kandak (i.e. battalion). Deployed in January 2009.
Minister Anne-Grete Strøm-Erichsen had reiterated that “the Norwegian instructors in Afghan army units will follow their units, North or South, East or West, wherever and whenever they might be sent to combat” (Aftenposten 2008d)

There are no indications that this unit has any caveats.
Appendix 2. CsQCA tables

The coding form is given in chapter 6.6. The analysis is run with all variables except X5. All variables are assessed to contribute to the outcome caveats (1) when present (1).

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Table 18: Full truth table

For logical reminders the outcome is coded as 1 when two or more conditions have (1). Interesting here is that the perfect match (1,1,1,1) has only one case, whereas no cases have all conditions lacking. This means that for the rest, several of the conditions are present, including for the 65% of cases that did not have caveats. As we can see in the original truth table there are several contradictory rows (with consistency values of other than 0 or 1), meaning that the same combination of conditions result in different outcomes. These contradictions amount to a total of 19 cases, i.e. 50%. Normal QCA procedure require that the cases are examined more closely in order to resolve the contradictions before the Boolean minimization takes place (Rihoux & De Meur:47). Contradictions are logically impossible, but possible in real life. One strategy is then to add conditions, as the difference in outcome might be caused by a condition currently not included. A different strategy is to review definition and coding of conditions and outcome as discrepancies here can cause the contradiction (Rihoux & De Meur:48-49).

After a more thorough examination I decided to set all the units that had low level caveats (1) to caveated. This was NORDETMAN and PRTVII – XI, a total of 6 units. While they are below the threshold I have set for what is a caveat, there were some minor caveats on them. Recoding
them is thus not very problematic, and removes most of the contradictions. The two remaining problematic cases - QRF I – TMBN and OMLT BDE IV were more difficult to handle. The QRF would possibly have been caveated if the request from ISAF that came in QRF II had come earlier, and was set to caveated. As I was unable to resolve OMLT BDE IV in a proper way, it was deleted.

The operations made on the cases did not change the actual number of configurations, but did redistribute the cases. It also increased the number of caveated units by 7, a 58% increase.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome (caveat)</th>
<th>External security</th>
<th>Allied pressure</th>
<th>Normatively problematic</th>
<th>Cabinet</th>
<th>Unit name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>NORSOF1, NORSOF2, TMTF1, TMTF2, PRT1, NORSQN, PRT2, NORSQN, PRT3, PRT4, TMBNMECH, NORSOF3, TMBNTankSQN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>NORDETTMAN, PRT5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>PRT5, OpAfghFalcon, TMBNQRF1, PRT7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>OMLTBDE1</td>
</tr>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>QRF25K1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>OMLTBDE2, OMLTBDE3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>PRT10, Stormesa, QRF3, NORSOFSS1, PRT9, QRF4m2, PRT11</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>TMBNQRF56, NORSOFSS2, NORSOFJK3, PRT11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>OMLTBDE5, NAD1, NAD2, OMLTBDE6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 19: Modified truth table

The solution for caveated units using the modified coding was

NORMATIVE*CABINET + THREAT*PRESSURE*NORMATIVE +
threat*PRESSURE*CABINET + THREAT*pressure*CABINET → CAVEAT
Table 20: Modified solution for caveated units

For not caveated units the solution is

**THREAT**\***PRESSURE**\*normative\*cabinet + threat\*pressure\*normative\*CABINET

Table 21: Modified solution for not caveated units