

Torbjørn Kveberg

'New Terrorism' - Fact or Fiction?

A Descriptive and Quantitative Analysis of
Religious Terrorism Since 1985

Master's thesis in Political Science

Trondheim, June 2012



Acknowledgements

I'd like to thank Associate Professor Tanja Ellingsen for all her help and council throughout this research period. I also thank fellow political scientist Ådne Naper for assisting me with my work on classifying the terrorist groups. I thank all the members of the 'Violence, Instability and Peace' group at NTNU for allowing me to present my thesis at one of the workshops, and for constructive criticism. Three fellow students of political science have also been important throughout this last year. Cecilie Stubberud Næss has been invaluable in keeping my spirits up throughout these last two semesters, and for that I am very grateful. I greatly appreciate the help from my brother, Audun Kveberg, as well as Jørund Hjeltnes Langdal for helping me with spelling, grammar, and general helpful comments.

Table of Contents

Introduction	1
The Definitions and Types of Terrorism	3
Defining Terrorism.....	3
Types of Terrorism.....	8
The Theories of a New Terrorism	9
The Many Terms and Beginnings of New Terrorism	9
Rapoport's Wave Concept	10
The Fourth Wave and the New Terrorism	13
The Definition of 'Religious' in the Context of New Terrorism	13
The Goals of New Terrorists	15
The Target Selection of New Terrorists	20
The New Terrorists Weapons of Choice	25
The Organization and Resources of New Terrorism.....	30
Method for Data Collection and Analysis	33
Selecting a Data Source.....	33
The Global Terrorism Database (GTD)	35
Compilation.....	35
Evaluation of the GTD	36
Indicator for Ideology.....	41
The Terrorism Knowledge Base (TKB).....	43
My Own Data Gathering	44
Variable Operationalization and Descriptive Statistics.....	46
Separation of Transnational and Domestic Incidents.....	46
Ideological Indicators	47
Lethality	52
Suicide Attacks.....	53
Other variables	54
Descriptive Statistics	55
Analysis Design: Graphs and Regression Models	56
Figures	56
Statistical Models Used.....	56
Interpretations of Regression Models Used in this Thesis	60
Checking the Assumptions of Multilevel Models.....	62
Model Specifications.....	62
Results and Discussion.....	65
Hypothesis 1: The Numerical Increase of Religious Terrorist Incidents	65
Hypothesis 2: The Proportional Increase of Religious Incidents	66
Hypothesis 3: H1 & H2 is True for Domestic and Transnational Incidents	68
Hypothesis 4: The Decrease of Leftist Incidents	72
Hypothesis 5: Increased Lethality	73
Hypothesis 6: All Terrorist Incidents Have Become More Lethal.....	76
Hypothesis 7: Religious Suicide Attacks	78
Hypothesis 8: More Religious Incidents are Transnational	83
Summary of Main Findings.....	84
Potential Points of Criticism	86
Concluding Remarks	91
The Findings in Relation to 'New Terrorism'	91
Policy Implications.....	92
Future Research.....	93

Litterature	95
Appendix	
Tables	i
Figures	vi
Codebook	
Terrorism Knowledge Base (TKB)	i
Mismatches between the GTD and TKB	iii
Own Research Using Dow Jones Factiva	vi
Constructed Variables	viii
Three sets of broader ideological profiles	viii

List of Figures

Figure 1. Distribution of Transnational, Domestic and Uncertain Incidents	47
Figure 2. Comparing the Coverage TKB and My Own Coding	50
Figure 3. The Ideological Distribution of Groups	51
Figure 4. Ideological Coverage Across Time.....	51
Figure 5. Yearly Number of Incidents for each Ideology	65
Figure 6. Percentages of All Yearly Incidents	67
Figures 7 & 8. Yearly Number of Domestic and Transnational Incidents.....	69
Figures 9 & 10. Yearly Percentages of Domestic and Transnational Incidents.....	69
Figures 11 & 12. Yearly Counts and Percentages of Leftist Terrorism.....	72
Figure 13. Average Incident Lethality	77
Figures 14 & 15. The Number of Killed by each Ideology.....	78
Figures 16 and 17. Suicide Terrorism	80
Figure 18. The Domestic Percentage of Incidents With Five-Year Intervals	83
Figure 19. Transnational and Domestic Separately	85
Figures 20 and 21. Number of New Groups & Average Group Activity	87
Figure 22. Ideological Coverage With Unknown Incidents.....	vi
Figures 23 & 24. Percentages and Counts of All Ideologies	vi
Figures 25 & 26. Suicide Terrorism With, and Without Iraq and Afghanistan	vii
Figures 27 & 28. Percentages and Counts Without Iraq and Afghanistan.....	viii
Figures 29 & 30. Percentages of Yearly Killed for Domestic and Transnational Incidents.	ix
Figure 31. Stacked Bars of Yearly Ideological Percentages	x
Figures 1 & 2. Percent of yearly incidents with ideological profiles.....	viii

List of Tables

Table I. Summary of Ideological Coverage	42
Table II. Filter Variables for Lethality	53
Table III. Summary Statistics of Variables Used.....	55
Table IV. Poisson Regression of Religious Terrorism.....	66
Table V. Logistic Regression Models 1-6 for Hypotheses 1 & 3	68
Table VI. Poisson Regression Domestic and Transnational Religious Terrorism.....	70
Table VII. Logistic Regression Domestic and Transnational Incidents.....	71
Table VIII. Descriptive Statistics of the Number Killed.....	73
Table IX. Negative Binominal Regression of Lethality.....	74
Table X. Average Lethality over Time	76
Table XI. Number of Suicide Terrorism Incidents	79
Table XII. Logistic Regression of Suicide Terrorism	82
Table XIII. Descriptives of Domestic, Transnational and Uncertain Incidents.....	83
Table XIV. Logistic Regression of Transnational Incidents.....	84
Table XV. Support for Hypotheses	86
Table XVI. Database Information from the GTD	i
Table XVII. Summary Information About the GTD 2010.....	ii
Table XVIII. Poisson Risk Regression of Leftist Decline	ii
Table XIX. Domestic and Transnational Incidents for Remaining Incidents	iii
Table XX. Descriptive Statistics of the Number Killed.....	iii
Table XXI. Mass Casualty Attacks By Ideology and Five Year Periods	iv
Table XXII. Number of Suicide Attacks by Country and Ideology.....	v
Table I. Documentation of Problems	iii
Table II. Coding of Ideological Sets	x

List of Most Important Abbreviations

GTD	: Global Terrorism Database
ITERATE	: International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events
IRR	: Incidence Rate Ratio
MIPT	: Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism
NBRM	: Negative Binominal Regression Model
OLS	: Ordinary Least Squares
OR	: Oddsratio
PGIS	: Pinkerton Global Intelligence Services
RAND	: Research and Development (referring to the RAND Corporation)
RDWTI	: Rand Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents
START	: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism
TKB	: Terrorism Knowledge Base
TOP	: Terrorist Organization Profile

Introduction

In the mid-1990s several academics published papers on a significant change within terrorism; religion was replacing the traditional political ideologies in terrorist groups.¹ Walter Laqueur (1996:36) referred to Aum Shinrikyo's sarin gas attack on the Tokyo Subway, noting that the apocalyptic groups of the future are 'beyond terrorism as we have known it. New definitions and new terms may have to be developed for new realities, and intelligence services and policymakers must learn to discern the significant differences among terrorists motivations, approaches and aims.' The new terrorism will 'emerge in all kinds of new guises that are inconsistent with traditional experience' (Laqueur, 1998:178). RAND's Bruce Hoffman opened his 1996(:79) article 'Holy Terror: An Act of Divide Duty' with examples of religious terrorist incidents which 'all arguably point to the beginning of a new era of international terrorism – more lethal and severe than any other'. Raufur (1999:30) agreed that terrorism no longer was a 'marginal and localized problem' but now 'all-invasive' and that it had changed 'dramatically' from 'its past form'. That same year, the RAND Corporation summed up the state of 'new terrorism' in a report for the United States Airforce;

"The old image of a professional terrorist motivated by ideology or the desire for "national liberation," operating according to a specific political agenda, armed with guns and bombs, and backed by overt state sponsors, has not quite disappeared. It has been augmented – some would say overtaken – by other forms of terrorism. This new terrorism has different motives, different actors, different sponsors, and, '...' greater lethality'... 'Terrorists are organizing themselves in new, less hierarchical structures and using "amateurs" to a far greater extent than in the past. All of this renders much previous analysis of terrorism based on established groups obsolete, and complicates the task of intelligence-gathering and counterterrorism'. (Lesser, 1999:1-2).

The new terrorism is; religious, more lethal, transnational, differently organised. The new terrorists cannot be negotiated with, have extreme world views and are significantly more likely to use suicide attacks and weapons of mass destruction. The perception of a new paradigm within terrorism spread to journalists, policy makers, experts and politicians alike – especially after 9/11 (Crenshaw, 2008:117). The academic debate on the validity of the new terrorism is still on-going, nearly two decades later. Are there, in fact, so many more religiously motivated terrorist incidents in recent years? Are, in fact, most terrorist incidents today religiously motivated? Are religious terrorist incidents more lethal than other terrorist

¹ See for example Ciluffo & Tomarchio, 1998; Hoffman, 1996, 1999, 2001; Jürgensmeyer, 1997; Laqueur, 1996, 1998; Raufur, 1999

incidents? Is suicide terrorism inextricably linked to religious terrorism? Are religious terrorist incidents more likely to cross border, and become transnational? These are all questions that are directly relevant not only to the debate of new terrorism, but to anyone who has to relate to terrorism. Knowing what is going on inside terrorism is a prerequisite for effective counter-terrorism policies.

In academia, the concepts and questions of new terrorism has been addressed by many researchers (See for example Pape, 2005; Moghadam, 2006; Hoffman, 2006; Piazza, 2009; Enders & Sandler, 1999, 2002, Field, 2009; Tucker, 2001; Brandt, 2010). The qualitative debate appears to be at a stalemate, limited to discussing a relatively small sample of terrorist groups which supposedly embody the traits of new terrorism. The quantitative research effort has, up until this thesis, been limited to either transnational terrorist incidents over a long period of time – or transnational and domestic incidents over a relatively short period of time (see Piazza, 2009; Rasler & Thompson, 2009; Enders & Sandler 1999, 2002; Bellany, 2007). As far as I know, no tests have been carried out with domestic incidents over a time period sufficient to capture the rise of religious terrorism – yet domestic incidents are thought to outnumber transnational incidents by as much as seven to one (LaFree, 2010:25). This means that we have been looking at religious terrorism through a pinhole because the data needed hasn't been available. In this thesis I significantly broaden the scope in terms of time, as well as the number of groups and incidents covered to, address these problems and revisit the central tenants of new terrorism.

I use the relatively new Global Terrorism Database (GTD) to investigate the questions asked earlier. Worldwide records of domestic and transnational incidents from 1985–2010 are used for the first time to investigate the development of religious terrorism for the last 26 years. I have coded an ideological indicator for 1,140 terrorist groups, responsible for 35,860 terrorist incidents to capture the trends and traits of religious terrorism.

The findings provide mixed support for the central tenants of new terrorism. The evidence is supportive of a beginning, and subsequent increase, of religious terrorism. This is especially evident from 2002 and on. There is, however, little support for the notion that religious terrorism is very different from other forms of terrorism. Religious terrorism appears to cause many casualties due to an increase in activity, rather than a higher lethality rate for each incident. Although religious groups are currently perpetrating most of the suicide attacks, they are not especially likely to use the tactic. Religious incidents are also not particularly more likely to cross state borders than other forms of terrorism.

I will begin by discussing the definitions of terrorism. From then on, the thesis follows the traditional structure of presenting the relevant theory, introducing the methods and data sources used and then presenting and discussing the results. The final section offers concluding remarks regarding the findings, policy implications and future research.

The Definitions and Types of Terrorism

This section discusses some example definitions of terrorism and detail the definition used for this thesis. Following this, terrorism is further divided into commonly used typologies necessary for this thesis.

Defining Terrorism

For such a common word as terrorism the number of definitions and their range of variation are staggering. Despite decades of academic effort we have yet to properly nail down this nuance of human violent activity. The most widely used definition of terrorism will be presented first. Since this is a U.S. definition a recent Chinese definition will be presented for perspective, followed by a far more complex academic definition. Finally, since this thesis is bound to the definition that sets the inclusion criteria for the GTD dataset this definition will be presented in detail and discussed in relation to the other definitions putting this research into proper context. State terrorism is not part of this thesis and will not be part of the discussion.

One place to start our discussion is in the United States. The 1986 US Department of State's *Patterns of Global Terrorism* holds what Lia (2005:11) argues is the most widely used definition for statistical and analytical purposes since 1983. According to that definition terrorism is ...

...premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups of clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience. (Lia, 2005:11).

This definition can be broken down into principal components, such as intent, motivation, violence, definitions of both actor and victim and finally communication. These are very common components of a definition of terrorism. The consequences of one of these being left out can be quite dire. The following definition was offered by the U.S. Vice President's task force in 1986;

... the unlawful use or threat of violence against persons or property to further political or social objectives. It is generally intended to intimidate or coerce a government, individuals or groups to modify their behavior or policies. (Merari, 2007:14).

Here the violence component is put into the framework of U.S. law and the threat of violence is also specified and both political and social goals are considered. The differences are subtle apart from the fact that the perpetrators aren't specified at all. Hence, by this definition the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki was an act of terrorism. Both of these definitions are presented by the United States. We can find something completely different in a Chinese definition from 2011;

Activities that severely endanger society that have the goal of creating terror in society, endangering public security, or threatening state organs and international organizations and which, by the use of violence, sabotage, intimidation, and other methods, cause or are intended to cause human casualties, great loss to property, damage to public infrastructure, and chaos in the social order, as well as activities that incite, finance, or assist the implementation of the above activities through any other means.

(The Law Library of Congress 2011)

'Society' has a prominent role in this definition, both as victim and almost as a method of attack causing 'chaos in the social order'. It is also, in contrast to all previously presented definitions, specific in labelling any collaborators terrorists as well. Though it is longer than the other definitions and might appear specific it is not so, and very open to interpretation. What constitutes for example 'creating terror in society', 'and other methods' and 'chaos in the social order'? If you were to change a tire on the freeway and cause a traffic jam, would this be chaos in the social order? Is openly criticizing the government one of the 'other methods' of causing 'chaos in the social order'?

Evidently the problem here is that states, both democratic and autocratic, use the term 'terrorist' as a political tool rather than as a universal phenomenon. Lia (2005:9) notes that labelling someone as terrorists is a way of delegitimizing them, which is why 'terrorists usually avoid the terms to describe their activities, preferring other more positively-laden labels such as revolutionary cells, urban guerrillas, Islamic fighters or mujahidin'. States also use different labels for different groups. In President Ronald Reagan's seventh State of the Union Address in January 1988 famously stated 'In Afghanistan, the freedom fighters are key to peace. We support the Mujahadeen...'. (Reagan, 1988). This was during the end of the Soviet war in Afghanistan where they had supported the Marxist-regime against the

Mujahadeen. The difference between states was illustrated with a quote from Secretary-General of the U.N. Kofi Annan in 2005. After several terrorist bombings had occurred he said ‘...gives us one more reason to press ahead and get a good definition *that we can all live with*’ (Emphasis added) (United Nations, 2005). A consensus definition does not yet exist, and terrorism remains in the eye of the beholder for as long as this is the case. Thackrah (2004:75) write;

Terrorism is also a moral problem, and attempts at a definition are based on the assumption that some classes of political violence are justifiable whereas others are not. For instance, students of terrorism find some difficulty in labelling an event as terrorist without making a moral judgment about the act. Governments and lawyers and politicians find themselves unable to take such a detached view.

Academia has struggled with this problem for well over 40 years now (Badey, 1998:90) and has produced numerous definitions of the phenomenon. So many in fact, that Dutch researchers Alex Schmid & Alberg Jongman in 1983 collected 109 of them and analysed their components instead of attempting to create one from scratch. This results in an analysis of what is commonly perceived as terrorism. 83.5 percent of these included a component of violence, 65 percent included political goals, 51 percent emphasized spreading fear and terror, and as Merari (2007:14) sums up; ‘Only 21 percent of the definitions mentioned arbitrariness and indiscriminate targeting, and only 17.5 percent included the victimization of civilians, non-combatants, neutrals, or outsiders. In their work 22 different components were identified and 16 of these composed into yet another definition. This definition represents ‘probably the most rigorous effort there has been to define terrorism’ (Guelke, 1998:18). It reads...

Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi)clandestine individual, group, or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal, or political reasons, whereby – in contrast to assassination – the direct targets of violence are not the main targets. The immediate human victims of violence are generally chosen randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from a target population, and serve as message generators. Threat- and violence-based communication processes between terrorist (organization), (imperilled) victims, and main targets are used to manipulate the main target (audience(s)), turning it into a target of terror, a target of demands, or a target of attention, depending on whether intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is primarily sought.

(from Guelke, 1998:18)

This definition has been criticized for being contradictory as a result of over-specification and is also unlikely to be used by any governments (Badey, 1998:91). Merari (2007:14) also notes that this definition is by large the product of the western view and its consensus over the essence of terrorism and that it is ‘probably not shared by the majority of people on earth’. Several points can be seen as problematic here, first of all terrorism is contrasted to assassination. Many terrorist incidents are assassinations, and an incident can involve direct- and indirect targeting at the same time. An exponent for a terrorist group’s enemy can be assassinated both to get rid of that person and to communicate their overall message to the audience. Furthermore, the paragraph goes beyond the call of a definition and proceeds into the domain of a further description of the phenomenon.

In an attempt at a similar definition, Weinberg, Pedahzur & Hirsch-Hoefler (2010:780) examined all articles from the journals *Terrorism*, *Terrorism and Political Violence* and *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* and found seventy-three definitions in fifty-five articles. Their consensus definition is abstract and general as well as similar to that used by states. The authors concluded that ‘unless we are willing to label terrorism as a very wide range of violent activities, we may be better off finding another governing concept or looking elsewhere for a definition’. Their definition read; ‘Terrorism is a politically motivated tactic involving the threat or use of force or violence in which the pursuit of publicity plays a significant role’. (Weinberg, Pedahzur & Hirsch-Hoefler, 2010:787). These five different definitions illustrate some of the problems with defining terrorism and of reaching a consensus on what the phenomenon really is.

The principal components of these definitions are easily recognizable in the GTD inclusion criteria. The GTD inclusion criteria consist of two main parts. In the first part there are three criteria which must all be satisfied for an incident to be included in the dataset. In the second part, only two out of three are necessary.²

Part one reads...

- ‘**The incident must be intentional** – the result of a conscious calculation on the part of the perpetrator.’
- ‘**The incident must entail some level of violence or threat* of violence** – including property violence as well as violence against people.’

² It is, however, possible to drop all incidents which do not satisfy all criteria in the second part. However, this option is only available for incidents which took place in 1997 and onwards. This is discussed further in the method chapter.

- **‘The perpetrators of the incident must be sub-national actors.** This database does not include acts of state terrorism.’³

(START, 2011:5)

* ‘Threat’ here ‘refers to an indication of imminent danger and does not include verbal or written claims of violence or intent that do not coincide with kinetic action toward harm for which the perpetrator is physically present’ (START, 2011:5).

The three main components; intent, use or threat of violence, and specification of actors are represented here. They are clearly defined, yet not over specified and are as such quite similar to the two U.S. definitions presented above.

The second part reads....

- **‘The act must be aimed at attaining political, economic, religious, or social goal.** In terms of economic goals, the exclusive pursuit of profit does not satisfy this criterion. It must involve the pursuit of more profound, systemic economic change.’
- **‘There must be evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or convey some other message to a larger audience (or audiences) than the immediate victims.** It is the act taken as a totality that is considered, irrespective if every individual involved in carrying out the act was aware of this intention. As long as any of the planners or decision-makers behind the attack intended to coerce, intimidate or publicize, the intentionality criterion is met.’
- **‘The action must be outside the context of legitimate warfare activities.** That is, the act must be outside the parameters permitted by international humanitarian law (particularly the prohibition against deliberately targeting civilians or non-combatants).’

(START, 2011:5)

Motivation, communication and target selection are the three main components of this part. Note that only two out of three need be present for an incident to be labelled terrorism and included in the GTD. The logic of splitting the criteria into two parts seem to reflect the fact that the criteria in part two are harder to define and are perhaps harder to measure. Point one clarifies motivation only to the point that it cannot be the sole pursuit of profit. Point two specifies that some form of communication is present to a third party not directly involved in the incident. The third point ties target selection to international humanitarian law, which is a good thing in the sense that it gives the definition an international moral anchoring point. It does mean, however, that the point is subject to changes in international humanitarian law (because no particular text or version of that text is specified). This means that the point may not be timeless such as all other points of the definition could be. It does, however, specify

³ The codebook actually says “...must be sub-national actors” but I presume this is a typo.

that the deliberate targeting of civilians or non-combatants is of particular importance and shows overall that the GTD is aware of the fluidity of the international humanitarian law. Overall this definition seems both effective in its operation and representative of the commonly accepted components of terrorism.

Types of Terrorism

Given any of the above definitions of the phenomenon itself, terrorism can be categorized even further. Terrorism is usually subdivided into three types; domestic, international and transnational. International terrorism is terrorism that ‘involves citizenry or territory of more than one country’ while domestic terrorism does not (Guelke, 1998:143). Badey (1998:92) defines international terrorism as ‘the repeated use of politically motivated violence with coercive intent, by non-state actors, that affects more than one state’. ‘Transnational terrorism’ is international terrorism that does not involve the state as an actor, while international terrorism does (Guelke, 1998:143; Lia, 2005:11). These terms are sometimes used interchangeably and some relate international terrorism directly to state sponsorship (Lia, 2005:11). However, Badey (1998:90) does not think the distinction between international and transnational is necessary as it has ‘no popular resonance’ and ‘have meaning only to an anointed few’. The research field is not entirely clear on the distinction between transnational and international. This thesis really has no need for the distinction because the data I use does not distinguish between incidents where the state was involved (in any way) and not. The inconsistencies may be present in the theory presented and is hard to control for.⁴ The only thing to keep in mind is that transnational and international terrorism involves two or more states (purely in terms of geography) while domestic does not. From the method section and out I’ll use the transnational term for any incident which involves two or more states because international implies the state has a role as an actor and we have no information to prove this. This also seems consistent with Enders, Sandler & Gaibullov (2011) who devised the method used for separating domestic and transnational attacks in the GTD dataset.⁵

⁴ Ultimately, this is of little consequence. A central point of the theory of new terrorism hinges on the demise of state-sponsorship and that sponsoring state’s restrictions on violence put on the terrorist group. One could argue, and rightfully so, that some states may indeed have little restraints they wish to put on a terrorist group as well. Nevertheless, state-sponsorship is part of the theory and state sponsored groups are in the GTD data. Validity-wise, the decision of using the term ‘transnational’ is arbitrary and based on the fact that it is impossible to distinguish transnational from international events in GTD at present.

⁵ In fact, the ITERATE dataset (which is widely used in previous research in the field) holds a quite lengthy definition of both transnational and international terrorism. In short, there international terrorism is an act of terrorism which is “carried out by individuals or groups controlled by a sovereign state, whereas transnational

Furthermore, terrorist groups can be subdivided into ideological categories to reflect the theoretical worldview they are promoting in their activities, out of which religion is only one of several. Mengel (1977) separated between social-revolutionary, nationalist-separatist, religious-fundamentalist, new religious extremists (close cults), right-wing and single-issue extremists. Piazza (2009) distinguishes between Islamist, leftist, rightist, national-separatist, and universal/abstract groups. In this thesis 9 basic categories, and any combination of them, serve as the starting point for the analysis; anarchist, anti-globalization, communist / socialist, environmental, leftist, nationalist / separatist, racist, religious and right wing. These reflect the general ideas the group is promoting through their activities and is further discussed in the method chapter. All such terrorist categories will be referred to as ‘ideologies’ in this thesis.⁶

The Theories of a New Terrorism

This chapter will present the theory of new terrorism in three main sections; first, an introduction to the many nick-names and supposed start-dates for new terrorism; second, Rapoport’s wave concept is introduced along with the three first waves of international terrorism; third, Rapoport’s fourth wave and the general new terrorism literature is presented in greater detail. This third section is further divided into subsections dealing with the meaning of the word ‘religious’ in this context, the goals, target selection, weapons of choice, and the organizational structure of new terrorists.

The Many Terms and Beginnings of New Terrorism

One thing must be made abundantly clear; there is no unified or clearly defined theory called the theory of new terrorism. New Terrorism is more accurately a term referring to a series of theories on how terrorism has, or even will change substantially. The theories are highly similar and the core concept is the same but the authors seldom use the term ‘new terrorism’ to describe their new terrorism. This is effectively illustrated by giving the different names given to new terrorists. Here are some examples I’ve seen in my review of the literature; ‘second generation terrorists’ and ‘neo-terrorists’ (Cilluffo & Tomarchio, 1998:441) and ‘megaterrorism’, ‘superterrorism’ or ‘postmodern terrorism’ (Laqueur, 2004, 1996) and ‘Catastrophic Terrorism’ (Carter, Deutch & Zelikow, 1998), and referencing the specific threat of WMDs to the rest of society in our ‘third wave of vulnerability’ (post 1995) (Gurr &

terrorism is carried out by basically autonomous non-state actors, whether or not they enjoy some degree of support from sympathetic states.’. (Mickolous, Sandler, Murdock & Flemming 2003:2).

⁶ This is simply a matter of workflow. The word ‘ideology’ itself stems from French enlightenment philosopher Destutt de Tracy and means the science of ideas (Østerud, Goldmann & Pedersen 2004:91). The word has since become closely tied to political ideologies.

Cole, 2002), ‘super terrorism’ & ‘hyper terrorism’ (Zimmermann, 2004:9), ‘holy terror’ or ‘fourth wave of modern terrorism’ (Rapoport, 1988, 2004). There are probably more, especially if we broaden our horizons outside academia. Equally varying are the proclaimed advents of new terrorism, Rapoport’s (2004) so-called fourth wave of modern terrorism starts with the fall of the Shah of Iran in 1979, other cite Aum Shinrikyo’s sarin gas attack in Tokyo 1995, the World Trade Center bombing in 1993 or the assassination of Meir Kahane in 1990 (Crenshaw, 2009:119; Spencer, 2006:9). A rough generalization of the literature would be to say that there is a transitional period between the traditional and new terrorism, beginning somewhere in the early 1980s, and it becomes prominent in the 1990s.

A new form of terrorism was heralded as early as the early twentieth century, referring to nationalist political violence, and several other times since then (Walter Laqueur, in: Duyvesteyn, 2010). For the purposes of this thesis, new terrorism will refer to the literature that was written in the early 1990s and onwards. I will use the collective term, new terrorism, and treat them as one theory because they are very similar and the field is used to this. Rapoport’s wave concept will sometimes be referred to separately as ‘fourth wave terrorists’. This will be more obvious once the concept is explained, because no other theory of new terrorism offers such an elaborate explanation for the ideological trends of terrorism. The wave concept is quite simply qualitatively different from the rest of the new terrorism literature.

Rapoport’s Wave Concept

David C. Rapoport (2004) has a far more elaborate theory than any other authors in the field of new terrorism beginning his historical analysis in the late 1880s. He argues that a longer perspective of time will remedy ‘unduly focus on contemporary events’ within terrorism research, probably referring to the bulk of the new terrorism literature as well. He argues that the period of time from the late 1880s and up until the present can be divided into four distinct sections, termed waves. A wave is described by Rapoport (2004:47) as follows;

It is a cycle of activity in a given time period – a cycle characterized by expansion and contraction phases. A crucial feature is its international character; similar activities occur in several countries driven by a common predominant energy that shapes the participating group’s characteristics and mutual relationships. As their names – “Anarchist”, “anticolonial”, “New Left,” and “Religious” – suggest, a different energy drives each.

Each wave's name reflects its dominant but not its only feature. Nationalist organizations in various numbers appear in all waves, for example, and each wave shaped its national elements differently.

From these paragraphs we see that a wave is international in its nature, thus early Ku Klux Klan activities pre-dating the anarchist wave are not part of a wave because it had 'no contemporary parallels or emulators.' (Rapoport, 2004:47). A sole organization does not make for a wave. He is not suggesting that each and every terrorist organization existing within a wave must be anarchist, anticolonial, new left or religious but holds that this is the dominant group ideology of each wave. In the same manner, an argument could be made that not all wars from 1945–1990 were signified by the ideological showdown between communism and western democracies, however the distinctive feature of the conflicts of the era are indeed ideological. The wave-pattern also tells us that most terrorist organizations are both created and succumb during the course of one wave. If an organization survives the transitional period between two waves it will inevitably be influenced by the new wave coming in, and adopt its ideas in order to survive in the new environment. This is, in other words, a global feature that influences many groups. Simply put, organizations are likely to reflect the zeitgeist of the generation. The term wave also describe the process of ebb and flow between waves meaning that there is a transitional period where the two coexist, one wave fading out and another coming in. Though organizations seldom survive this transition the major goal of each wave is revolution in some form (Rapoport, 2004:47-48).

The first wave was the Anarchist wave which originated from Russia, and lasted from the late 1880s up until the new colonial wave took over in the 1920s. The critical elements producing this wave was a 'transformation in communication and transportation patterns', along with the publication of the first significant works on the tactic of terrorism itself (Rapoport, 2004:48-49).⁷ The anarchists had grievances against 'the conventions of society devised to muffle and diffuse antagonisms generated by guilt' and against the channels provided 'for settling grievances and securing personal amenities.' (Rapoport, 2004:50). The highpoint of this wave is sometimes called 'the "Golden Age of Assassination"', reflecting the dominant strategy employed at the time against leaders around the world. The international seriousness of this wave was noted by President Theodore Roosevelt and actually spurred the first international counter-terrorism effort (Rapoport, 2004:52).

⁷ Unlike the organizations themselves the technical works on the "science" of terror' are inherited and drawn upon in varying degree by each consecutive wave (Rapoport 2004:49).

The anticolonial wave began to assert itself after the Versailles treaty, which radically transformed the world by invoking the principle of national self-determination to break up the defeated states. States outside Europe were not treated with the same logic, ‘and terrorist groups developed in all empires except for the Soviet Union’...’ after World War II’ (Rapoport, 2004:53). This wave was, unlike the other waves, highly successful and ‘terrorist activity was crucial in establishing the new states of Ireland, Israel, Cyprus, and Algeria’. This meant resolving the grievances - thus the second wave receded (Rapoport, 2004:53). Instead of using the word ‘Terrorist’ proudly, as the first wave had done, the second wave terrorist required terms that didn’t evoke the ‘negative connotations’ connected with the Anarchists. Interestingly, this led to a confounding of the term terrorist itself where terrorists began using ‘freedom fighters’ to describe themselves, while governments labelled all rebel activity as ‘terrorist’. Trying to escape obvious bias in their reports, the media resorted to calling the ‘same individuals terrorists, guerrillas and soldiers in the same account.’ (Rapoport, 2004:54).

The third wave of international terrorism is dubbed the ‘New Left’ wave. Rapoport (2004:55) holds the ‘major political event stimulating’ ...this wave... ‘was the agonizing Vietnam War.’, and the Viet Cong (and later PLO) served as the main inspirational sources. Terrorist groups developed both in Third World countries and in the Western states where several ‘saw themselves as vanguards for the Third World masses.’ (Rapoport, 2004:55). Though several of the groups were fighting for self-determination the colonial empires had already crumbled thus the legitimacy found in the second wave’s struggle was not present in the third wave – and the opportunity for success was not present (Rapoport, 2004:55).

The ideology, so to speak, of each wave was not the only thing that changed. The weapons of choice and target selection changed between waves. Assassination was popular among the first wave terrorists, the Anarchists. The tactic had, however, proved counterproductive thus (with the exception of the Balkans) assassination was not much used by anticolonial terrorists. Where Anarchists had chosen high profile leaders and proponents of the system they opposed, the second wave focused on eliminating the police by targeting their officers and/or their families and on guerrilla strikes on troops⁸ (Rapoport, 2004:54-55). The third wave found airports vulnerable and instigated seven hundred hijackings over 30 years and later increasingly turned to another characteristic of the third wave; hostage taking. Assassination was also revived, now used as punishments for actions against the organizations interests instead of the more selective exponent targeting of the first wave. The

⁸ Often without warning the civilian population prior to the incident, and using both concealed weapons and no identifying insignia. (Rapoport, 2004:55)

U.S. and their citizens also emerged as a prime target, particularly in South America (Rapoport, 2004:56-58). Diaspora communities and sympathetic states started contributing to terrorist organizations in their homeland during the second wave. Both the League of Nations and the U.N. also played a role in legitimizing some terrorist efforts during this wave. State-sponsorship became prominent during the third wave, which is also when many organizations lost the diaspora support (Rapoport, 2004:55-59).

The third wave began to ebb in the 1980s, while the fourth (and current) religious wave of terrorism began with the fall of the Shah of Iran in 1979 (Rapoport 2004:60-61). For all intents and purposes Rapoport's fourth wave of modern terrorism is the new terrorism, and the fourth wave is therefore presented alongside the new terrorism literature in general. No other new terrorism proponents present such a detailed picture of ideological trends in terrorism for the past 130 years, although Laqueur (2004:54) notes that 'fanaticism doesn't easily transfer from one generation to the next', and expects the religious fanaticism to be replaced with something else entirely.

The Fourth Wave and the New Terrorism

In short, the fourth wave and new terrorists are religious. The term 'religious' has a different meaning in the context of new terrorism and requires a definition before I proceed.

The Definition of 'Religious' in the Context of New Terrorism

There is one major difference between old and new terrorist organizations from which all other differences can be derived, and on which all new terrorism authors agree: Gone are the days of secular and politically motivated terrorism. There are somewhat different takes on what it has been replaced with, but new terrorists are generally said to be religiously motivated. Some authors, however, apply significantly broader definitions of 'religious' than others seem to do. In his earliest papers on postmodern terrorism Laqueur (1996, 1998) focuses on sectarian fanaticism and millenarian movements poised on giving history a helping hand in bringing about an apocalyptic end-of-days scenario. Hoffman (1996) wrote that none of the active terrorists groups in 1968⁹ could be classified as religious and that in the 1990s this had changed radically. In 1994 a sixteen out of forty nine international terrorist groups were religious, in 1995 nearly half of the groups were religious (Hoffman, 2006:86). Rapoport (2004:61) holds the goals of fourth wave terrorists are inextricably bound to religion, and

⁹ Hoffman (2006:63) holds the advent of modern international terrorism is 22nd of July 1968 when The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) hijacked an Israeli El Al commercial flight from Rome to Tel Aviv with the goal of trading the passengers for Palestinian terrorists held captive by Israel.

Islam is at the heart of the wave. Simon & Benjamin (2000:59) focus most their attention on Islam, writing ‘although the new terrorism stems from a welter of causes, and cannot be considered the invention of any one individual, the face of this phenomenon belongs to Osama bin Laden.’. Kurtulus (2011: 478) claims new terrorism is all about ‘...religious or mystical motivation.’. Jürgensmeyer (2003) devotes his book *Terror in the Mind of God* to the relationship between many religions and terrorism. Ciluffo & Tomarchio (1998:440-441) wrote ‘the terrorist brew has been fortified by single-issue extremists, cults, religious fanatics, and insurgent reactionaries.’.

Although Islam in particular has received a lot of attention the scope of new terrorism is significantly broader. Laqueur (1998) and Jürgensmeyer (2003) both add other religions to the list, such as Christianity, Judaism, Hinduism, Sikhism and Buddhism. Morgan (2004:32) notes that even though much of the research and many of the incidents are attributed to religious groups, and to Islam, ‘Islamic radicalism is not the only form of apocalyptic, catastrophic terrorism’. Along with al-Qaida, Aum Shinrikyo is often cited as such a new terrorist group. Aum Shinrikyo’s former leader, Shoko Asahara, taught ‘a unique amalgam of Buddhism, Hinduism, Christianity, and New Age thought, with some elements also taken from Nostradamus’ prophecies and even science fiction.’ (TKB, 2008). Laqueur (1998:175) even holds that ‘In the case of certain militant Christian sects and the Japanese Aum [Shinrikyo], it can be shown that science fiction has provided *as much inspiration as sacred religious texts.*’ (Emphasis added). Thus, religious in the context of new terrorism refers to the relationship between terrorism and a spiritual world view. Whether the religion is age old, such as the major religions of the world, or newly invented such as New Age-philosophies or the Church of Scientology, whether they are small cults or large organizations – they all fall under the term ‘religious’ in the context of this thesis. The meaning of the term religious is thus wider than what is commonly associated with the word ‘religion’ – it spans a broader realm of fiction.

The reason defining religion is important is that distinguishing between ideology and religion is very hard, yet it is essential to the difference between new and traditional terrorists. Both religion and ideology can be used as guides for how a society should be structured and as such they supply similar functions to the believer. However, religion (in all its breadth described above) touches people on a more fundamental level than ideology does. Religion is an integral part of an individual’s identity on a more basic level than ideology. In his well-known paper on the Clash of Civilizations, Samuel S. Huntington (1993:25) divided the world into 7(8) distinct civilizations he considered ‘history, language, culture, tradition and, most

important, religion.’ as the differentiating factors. These factors are the ‘product of centuries’ and ‘far more fundamental than differences among political ideologies and political regimes.’ (Huntington, 1993:25). You are your ethnicity and your religion, but you are convinced of an ideology. Furthermore, religion creates a black and white divide between us and them and – you cannot follow two religions at the same time (Huntington, 1993:27). Evidence suggests that many civil wars are related to ethnic and religious identities, either directly or as an instrument of agitator(s)¹⁰ (see Buhaug & Gates, 2002, Fox & Sandler, 2006, 2006a). A terrorist group is not religious solely on the grounds that some, if not all, of their members have a spiritual life. The true change in the new terrorists falls from the fact that religion now plays an *active* role in many, if not all, aspects of a group’s activities. This means that unlike a political group, identity has now become part of terrorist group’s agenda. This leads us on to how the goals of new terrorists differ from those of traditional terrorists.

The Goals of New Terrorists

An excellent presentation of new terrorism is given by Martha Crenshaw (2009). On the subject of goals, she is very specific; The ‘goals of ‘new’ terrorists are derived exclusively from religious doctrines that emphasize transformational and apocalyptical beliefs.’ (Crenshaw 2009, 144). This is the key point that separates new terrorists from old terrorists. Even though traditional terrorist groups also had religious members, they differ from new terrorists because their goals were often secular, such as the creation of a secular state. This means, in essence, that a group comprised only of Catholics is not a new terrorism group if their goals are the creation of a secular state. The new terrorists are engaging in terrorist activities because it is according to their beliefs. They are not terrorists who happen to be religious as well – they are terrorists because they are religious. For new terrorists, religion defines the goals. In the fourth wave the religious component is ‘supplying justifications and organizing principles for a state’, and this is new (Rapoport, 2004:61). Religion has the dominant role in new terrorist organizations, and their goals are derived from that doctrine. Where a traditional group would attempt to further support for communism by striking at capitalist figures, or seek secession from the state in a nationalist separatist struggle religious groups find their goals in their sacred texts. New terrorists ‘seek the restoration of a golden age of religious belief and practices, whose passing left the community vulnerable to the depredations of the enemy. The essentially religious goal of moral restoration becomes the

¹⁰ There is an ongoing debate on the role of identity in conflict eruption and perpetuation. ‘Primordialists’ argue that state institutions keep identities in check, thus avoiding conflict, while ‘Instrumentalists’ argue that there is need for agitator(s) using identities strategically to create conflict. (see for example Pearce, 2006:41)

basis of a political response in the form of a confrontation with the enemy within and without.’ (Simon & Benjamin, 2000:66). Furthermore, Simon & Benjamin (2000) holds that the ‘jihadists’ seek the restoration of ‘the early seventh-eight century Caliphate when, in their understanding of Islamic history, a righteous leader ruled over an undivided *umma* (community of believers), achieving a perfect unity of religious and political authority over the lands of Islam’ (Simon & Benjamin, 2000:67).

Al-Qaida, probably the prime example of such a group, seek the creation of an Islamic state under the laws of sharia (Rapoport, 2004:64). Of course different groups have different takes on religion, and different religions produce different goals. Aum Shinrikyo, now ‘Aleph’, had bases of operations in Australia, Germany, Indonesia, Japan, Russia, Taiwan and the United States and believed in a coming apocalyptic war between Japan and the United States. One of their goals was to bring about this war (TKB, 2008). The ‘Christian Identity’ movement in the United States employed racist interpretations of the Bible and longed for the Second Coming of Christ and ‘the great racial war’ (Rapoport, 2004:61). According to Crenshaw (1999:122) this types of grand goals are assumed to exist in all monotheistic religions by the new terrorism literature.

The goals can have direct consequences. According to Rapoport (2004:65) fourth wave terrorist groups are inherently anti-democratic because democracy is ‘inconceivable without a significant measure of secularism’. All political issues are seen and interpreted in light of belief and actions undertaken to fulfil their goals are sanctioned by God. This also has consequences for how we can relate to these new terrorists. Cilluffo & Tomarchio (1998:441) said that new terrorists are motivated by ‘vengeance, rage, racial or religious hatred, intense anti-government feelings or extreme nationalism. Their agendas differ markedly from their classical terrorist counterparts in that they are not seeking a seat at the negotiating table. They want to blow up the table altogether and build a new one in its place’¹¹. Crenshaw (2009:122) writes ‘...the *ends* of the ‘new’ terrorism are presumed to be both unlimited and non-negotiable. These aims are also considered largely incomprehensible and amorphous.’.

From this we can also see that distinguishing between transnational and domestic groups can be very difficult. Their goals do not directly relate to the existing state structure and is therefore hard to position within that framework. The new terrorists defy ‘ready classification as solely foreign or domestic’ (Carter, Deutch & Zelikow, 1998:82). New terrorism groups can work towards global goals on the transnational level but just as well

¹¹ The authors are actually paraphrasing former CIA Chief R. James Woolsey, who said; “Today’s terrorists don’t want a seat at the table, they want to destroy the table and everyone sitting at it” (Lia, 2005:14).

exist as a cult-phenomenon on the domestic level or perhaps even sub-national level. There is no telling what shape an organization based on fictional beliefs will take.

The most comprehensive test of the ideological trends across time is found in Rasler & Thompson (2000). They use the ITERATE dataset to test 8 hypotheses indicative of Rapoport's (2004) wave-concept. They find support for seven of the hypotheses, beginning their analysis in 1968. There is nearly no anarchism, little nationalist, and they observe the ebb and flow of leftism as well as the increase of religious terrorism. They find that the evidence is 'highly supportive of the wave approach to conceptualizing terrorism'.¹² However, the ITERATE dataset holds only transnational incidents. Can the same be said to be true for domestic incidents, which after all make up the better part of all terrorist incidents? There are good reasons to revisit these questions, using the domestic and transnational data which is available now.

If there has been a rise in the number of religious terrorist groups engaging in terrorism activity since the early 1980s, and this form of terrorism hasn't been seen before, then there should be a significant increase in the number of religious terrorist incidents within the same timeframe. This fact has to be true if the theory of new terrorism is to justify new conceptions and definitions of terrorism in the modern counter terrorism policies.

H₁ The numbers of religiously motivated terrorist incident has risen significantly since 1979.

In fact, an increase in religious terrorism over time produces two hypotheses. First of all, the number of religious terrorist incidents has to rise in proportion to the number of other terrorist incidents. This is to account for shifts in the number of incidents each year over time. The number of incidents can go up and down each year in a cyclical pattern (cycles are observed by Enders, Sandler & Gaibullov (2011)), thus an observed rise in religious terrorism may in fact not be a proportional change but simply a change in the total number of incidents.

H₂ The proportion of all terrorist incidents that are religiously motivated has risen significantly over time since 1979.

¹² Also worth noting, Enders & Sandler (1999) argue that we may perceive an increase of terrorist activity because there are cycles of activity within terrorism. These cycles are also further investigated in their 2002 paper, where terrorist activity is set into context across time with counter-measures – such as metal detectors on airports – to see how new security measures impact terrorist activity. Their findings show that terrorists adapt to the new regimes, and find alternate ways of attacking instead.

If the analysis shows that the proportion of religiously motivated incidents have gone up and the number of incident analysis shows that the overall risk remains unchanged – then the overall conclusion must be that other forms of motivations are phased out while religious terrorism remain at a constant level. If no significant changes in proportion are found, and no significant change in risk is found, then the phenomenon as a whole remains unchanged across time. If no significant change in proportions is found but an increased risk is found then the overall number of terrorist incidents have increased. Therefore, both the proportion and risk of a religiously motivated terrorist incident should become significantly higher over time to substantiate the claims of the new terrorism literature.

Finally, new terrorism should be spread across the regions of the world. The wave concept holds that a wave has international features where similar actors pop up across the globe and engage in transnational activities. This means that these patterns should be more pronounced among the transnational incidents than the domestic incidents of terrorism. Nevertheless, it should be present in both if this is the kind of group the current zeitgeist produces. Additionally, new terrorism should exist across the globe and not be confined to smaller regions of the world although it may very well vary in frequency between regions.

H₃ Hypotheses 1 and 2 hold for both transnational and domestic terrorist incidents.

The criticism of new terrorism focuses on the resurgence of religious motivations and goals are levied by expanding the time frame of the analysis. To a western analyst born after the cold war began, religious violence may indeed seem foreign, but historical perspective paints a different picture. Copeland notes that ‘most authoritarian and totalitarian governments in the twentieth century were ruthless in their persecution of religion, forcing it underground although not eliminating it successfully’ (Copeland, 2001:9). Thus, the recent rise of religious violence may seem new to western analysts but is in fact a reassertion of age old motivations subdued by the Cold War. In fact, Copeland (2001:9) also notes that the Marxist designations of many cold war terrorist groups were generally superficial, thus simply masking ‘their true underlying ethno-nationalist or religious motivations’. A perceived rise in religious motivations may, in this light, simply be the downfall of Marxism as an ideological cover for religiously motivated terrorism.¹³

Examples of ancient religious terrorism, also with transnational traits, are also given by opponents of the new paradigm, such as the Jewish Zealots, the Sicarii Assassins and the

¹³ The ideological indicator coded for this thesis does not track changes in ideological alignment for the groups throughout the time period. Therefore, I am unable to test whether groups drop their leftist ideological cover.

Thugs. It is pointed out that the traditional terrorists also operated transnationally and that this fact also stretches back to antiquity (Copeland, 2001, Duyvesteyn, 2011:444). Religion is also shown to have played a role for the members of recent groups that are considered traditional. Duyvesteyn (2011:445-447) holds that the IRA ‘...had almost exclusive Catholic membership.’ and believed that their cause had a religious quality. In short, the division between the motivations and goals of a new and old terrorist becomes artificial where politics and religion overlap for both types of groups (Duyvesteyn, 2011:447). There are several similar examples to be found throughout history.¹⁴ The proponents of new terrorism clearly state, that the relationship between violence and religion is not a new one. Rapoport (2004:61) holds that religious and ethnic identities ‘often overlap’ and that religious terrorism precedes the fourth wave in this regard. 16 years earlier he also noted that ‘”Holy Terror” seems new to us, but prior to the French Revolution it was the dominant, perhaps only form of terror.’ (Rapoport, 1988:195). Hoffman also goes into detail on religious terrorists far pre-dating the ones we are witnessing now, noting ‘two thousand years ago the first acts of what we now describe as “terrorism” were perpetrated by religious fanatics’ (Hoffman, 2006:83). Therefore, it is hard to pin down just what blend of religious terrorism the new terrorism proponents are speaking of and what blend they are not. If religious terrorism is not new, then Rapoport (2004:65) is the author who most clearly distinguish what exactly is new; ‘unlike crime or poverty, international terrorism is a recent phenomenon.’.

The fact that groups and not individuals are the units of analysis is also seen as problematic. Some stress the fact that the motivations of an individual in a terrorist group may be different from the terrorist group’s motivations. The fact that not all religious terrorists seem to be willing to die in the act for their God, or sect-leader, also indicate that their motivations may not be as true as the new terrorism postulates (Duyvesteyn, 2011:445-446). It is also noted that the large, seemingly unobtainable goals of new terrorists are also found in traditional groups such as the anarchist movement or the Rote Armee Fraktion and that the recreating the Caliphate can be seen as political (Duyvesteyn, 2011:446-447).

Finally, the ebb of the third wave should show up clearly throughout the 1980s. Thus, leftist ideologies would be expected to decline sharply after the cold war and religious terrorism would present an incline.

¹⁴ At times the debate has gotten side-tracked into arguments starting with definitions of the word ‘new’, and attempting to define some arbitrary measure of change which has to occur in order to call a phenomenon new. I have already given examples of alternate names, and such arguments could be circumvented altogether by using one of these names instead. The meaning of the new terrorism literature would not change if it was called Postmodern Terrorism instead. Kurtulus (2011) offers a summary of the valid and invalid points of the critique against new terrorism which addresses this problem.

H₄ The number of incidents motivated by a leftist ideology have declined significantly after the Cold War.

The Target Selection of New Terrorists

According to Drake (1998) the role of ideology in target selection and is highly relevant to understanding of new terrorists. First of all, there is no ‘single cause which can adequately explain terrorist’ target selection’ (Drake, 1998:54). A group has to target according to the resources at their disposal, the reactions from society in general. The security environment they exist within is also an important factor (Drake, 1998; Mareš, 2011). However ideology plays a vital role because it is the ‘prism through which [terrorists] view events and the actions of other people’, and legitimate targets are those who transgress upon that ideology’s tenants. Ideology provides a ‘measure against which to assess the ‘innocence’ or ‘guilt’ of people and institutions.’ (Drake, 1998:53-58). Ideology helps de-humanize persons and persons within institutions which are portrayed as the ideological arch-enemy. This means that ‘Just being who, what, or where one is may be enough’ (Drake, 1998:60). Finally, ideology also displaces the blame from the perpetrator to the victims or even to the audience, or what Drake (1998:61) calls the ‘psychological target’.

So what kind of target selection follows from the new terrorists with their religious ideology? There are a number of prisms available, since there are many religions (and other ideologies) as well as many doctrines (and interpretations of other ideologies). While the target selection of the Anarchists, as I’ve previously shown, could be highly discriminate, the new terrorists use far more indiscriminate targeting. This can be seen as a logical step because the operating ideology determines who are the transgressors and are legitimate targets. In the extreme, a cult with 10 members could see the rest of the world as transgressors. Morgan (2004:32) puts it this way; ‘Secular terrorists seek to defend or promote some disenfranchised population and to appeal to sympathizers or prospective sympathizers. Religious terrorists are often their own constituency, having no external audience for their acts of destruction’. Religious terrorists have declared war ‘on entire societies, cultures and political status quos, not just on individual governments as is the cause with secular terrorist groups.’ (Piazza, 2009:64). Simply put, the size of the out-group, derived from a religious doctrine can be immense. If new terrorist groups have long term objectives derived from an ideology that divides the world into such a black and white picture then then the palette of tactical options is widened radically. Islam has received a large portion of the attention and al-Qaeda is an oft cited new terrorist group. Having declared war on the United States in 1996, Osama bin

Laden sought to create a unified Islamic state under the laws of Sharia. The Salafi Jihad doctrine offers an interpretation of the Quran where all human laws are rejected in favour of the laws of Allah. Through their prism all non-Muslims ('infidels') and 'nominally Muslim "traitors"' or 'apostates' are legitimate targets (Moghadam, 2009:60-62). Put to a point, using this logic billions of people are legitimate targets in contrast to the leader figures the Anarchists sought to eliminate. This is one of the reasons why new terrorists are said to cause far higher lethality rates than secular groups. Furthermore, the groups are said to care less in general about civilian casualties. Simon & Benjamin (2000:65) write that traditional groups target selection were discriminate "and proportionate in scope and intensity to the practical political objectives being pursued". The traditional groups did not want to alienate the public or other actors in society because they would rely on their support further down the road. The new terrorist groups have no need to this because they do not promote 'clearly defined political demands' but rather seek the 'destruction of society and the elimination of large sections of the population' (Walter Laqueur, in Spencer, 2006:9).

Another reason for higher casualties is that new terrorists have a different system of morale derived from the interpretations of religious texts. The religious component of new terrorism has produced 'radically different value systems, mechanisms of legitimization and justification, concepts of morality and, world view.' (Hoffman, 2006:88). They see themselves as 'outsiders from the society they both abhor and reject, and this sense of alienation enables them to contemplate – and undertake – far more destructive and much bloodier types of terrorist operations than their secular counterparts.' (Hoffman, 1996:80). This in itself may not be too different from a communist group, viewing acts of violence as an ideological demand in a society they reject. Secular groups will not, however, go to the same lengths as religious groups in their attacks because they rely on the support of the public. Secular groups will refrain from large scale killings because they are politically counterproductive; their long term goal is to reform the system and society – not shatter it altogether. (Morgan, 2004:32). Their actions are anchored in this fact, while religious groups are not. They substitute it with a religious set of morale in which large scale killings are not only allowed for but encouraged. So the religious ideology provides target selection and a system of morale in which such attacks can be justified. The final component to this discussion is how this will play out on the individual level.

There is also an attraction between extreme acts of violence and religion which Rapoport (1988:210) sums up, already in 1988, concluding; '... and I cannot emphasize the point enough, terror is attractive in itself to messianists just *because* it is outside the normal

range of violence and for this reason represents a break with the past, epitomizing the antinomianism or complete liberation which is the essence of the messianic expectation'. Acts of violence, even far outside the 'norm', can be the truest sign of a complete devotee and as such something to strive for. Faith, in short, frees the believer from other moral constraints. Hoffman (2006:88) echoes this when he iterates that violence, for a religious terrorist, 'is first and foremost a sacramental act or divine duty executed in direct response to some theological demand or imperative. Terrorism thus assumes a transcendental dimension, and its perpetrators therefore often disregard political, moral, or practical constraints that may affect other terrorists.'. Cults, in particular, can be very dangerous in this sense because they are personality driven with a constituency devoted to one leader. '... if that leader is emotionally or mentally unstable, the ramifications can be catastrophic' (Morgan, 2004:32-33). Once these groups adopt goals that include the fate of the outside world, and not just the in-group, they become a particularly dangerous breed of terrorists (Morgan, 2004:33-34). In short, where secular groups may rationalize and justify violence as a necessity, as a means to an end, religious groups glorify and encourage violence, and view it as an ends in itself. Simon & Benjamin (2000:59) also add that the change in morale, and subsequent increase in lethality, is also due to lack of state sponsorship. New terrorists neither rely 'on the support of sovereign states nor is constrained by the limits on violence that state sponsors have observed themselves or place on their proxies'.¹⁵ Hoffman (1996:81) also mentions that the methods to inflict mass casualties are more readily available to anyone with a grievance in 'bookshops, from mail order publishers or even over the internet'.¹⁶

To recap; new terrorists want high casualties. They have a different set of morale and beliefs which encourage and reward taking as many lives as possible whenever possible. They have no use for public support and have no political demands behind their killings; mass-murder is not a necessary means to provoke interest in their long term goal - it is their long term goal. New terrorist groups should hence not only be the current dominant form of terrorism, as per the first batch of hypotheses, but also kill more people in their attacks than other ideologies do.

¹⁵ State sponsorship may also relate to training and equipment given to the organization effectively transforming them into 'entities more akin to elite commando units than stereotypical Molotov-cocktail wielding or crude pipe-bomb manufacturing anarchist or radical leftist' (Hoffman 1999:14).

¹⁶ Later, Hoffman (2006: Chapter 7) wrote extensively on the role of the new media opportunities in terrorism also describing how the internet has spread within terrorist groups and is now used as an important tool of the trade.

H₅ Religiously motivated terrorist incidents cause significantly higher casualties than incidents motivated by any other ideology.

However, this also has to be considered in relation to the argument of public support. What if a group were to combine one or more secular ideologies with a religious ideology? Would this group be interested in seeking public support, and thus be less likely to engage in high casualty attacks? It is hard to specify a direction of this hypothesis. The perpetrator group could be seeking public support and the perpetrator group could be their own constituency and not care about public support. The perpetrator group could also have varying mixes of religious and secular ideologies. The hypothesis is therefore as much exploratory as it is confirmatory. The important part is that there are, according to theory, reasons to suspect this type of incident to be different from purely religiously motivated groups. The theory demands that both be investigated separately before they can be put into the same category.

The hypothesis of increased lethality is the one that has shown the most promise from the literature. Duyvesteyn (2010:448) notes in a critique of new terrorism that ‘It cannot be denied that there is a statistical link between Islamic groups and a high number of fatalities in their terrorist attacks.’ However, Field (2009:203) for example notes that secular groups have also shown little regard for civilian casualties and that even though there are signs of increased lethality in recent history, the picture is ‘far from clear’. Spencer (2006:15) holds that ‘indiscriminate mass-casualty attacks have long been a characteristic of terrorism.’ and cite examples of this.¹⁷ He also shows that the number of fatalities per incidents has been on the rise since the 1980s, which does not fit ‘new terrorism’ because it’s too early in history, and that attacks by religious groups indeed does have consequences for the public support for the Islamic state they seek to establish (Spencer. 2006:15-17). In short, there is definitely doubt as to the causal connection between new terrorist groups and the entire increase in lethality. Duyvesteyn (2010:448) holds that the new terrorism theories of target selection cannot explain this because their targets are still highly symbolic (such as the World Trade Center), nor can technological progress automatically account for increased lethality. Lack of state sponsorship (and restraints laid upon groups by their sponsors) is presented as an alternate explanation, as well as technological innovations (Kurtulus, 2011:480) along with increased competition for wanted space in the media (see Wilkinson 1997). Piazza (2009:72-

¹⁷ ‘...the simultaneous truck bombings of US and French barracks in Lebanon 1983, which took the life of 270, and the bombing of an Air India Flight in 1985 by Sikh Terrorists with 329 fatalities’ (Spencer, 2006:15).

73) find Islamist groups are more deadly than other groups in his empirical analysis, but when controlling for al-Qaeda affiliation this relationship is no longer present.

If the increase in lethality is due to universal factors which apply to all terrorist groups (such as technological innovations, competition in the media, and lack of state sponsorship) then religious groups should not stand out significantly as more lethal than other terrorist groups over time. The argument on the increased lethality of religious groups also hinge on the moral argument, stating that it is the non-secular moral of religious groups that cause the increased lethality. If this is true, then religious terrorist incidents should be more lethal than all other types of incidents throughout the time period – and remain at very much the same levels. It could be a combination of the two, resulting in religious terrorism being on average more lethal than all other forms of terrorism throughout the time period, and increasing somewhat over time in the same way as other incidents do. Nevertheless, the moral argument should be a timeless one. Also, if the religious ideology is a late arrival in the terrorist scene then their average lethality rate may be higher simply because they arrived at a later stage where the universal factors had already heightened the lethality. In essence, for example leftists could have perpetrated many incidents in the past when the universal factors did not drive the lethality rates up to the same extent as they do today. This would drag the average incident lethality of leftists down, unless time is considered. There are many good reasons for not drawing conclusions based on average incident lethality alone, but including a time factor. This hypothesis could take the shape of both the new terrorism argument and the universal factor argument - I chose to use the universal factor argument to provide an alternative hypothesis on lethality.

There are several quantitative works on increased lethality, not all directly related to religious terrorism in particular. Bellany (2007) for example finds that the number of international incidents that lead to fatalities has gone up. However, the average lethality of the incidents that do lead to fatalities hasn't changed.¹⁸ These analyses were carried out with the RAND-MIPT data stretching from 1968–2006. Enders & Sandler (2000, 2002) hold that there has been a decline of incidents but that the incidents are far more likely to result in death or injury. These authors have written extensively on terrorism, using the ITERATE dataset. Piazza (2009) shows that incidents perpetrated by Islamic groups are more likely to cause high casualties, however this effect is no longer present once al-Qaeda affiliation is controlled

¹⁸ There could be several reasons for this; i) terrorists could have gotten better at killing and carry out more successful incidents, ii) terrorists need fatalities to compete for media attention, iii) terrorists care less about whether they have fatalities or not, and iii) terrorists want fatalities.

for with a dummy-variable. Thus, the general trend seems not to be increased lethality in religious groups. Masters (2008), (like Bellany, 2007 & Enders & Sandler, 2000) remove non-fatal incidents from the pool and specifies mass casualty incidents as those with more than 32 dead. This leaves 1 308 incidents with fatalities, and 165 with mass casualties. His findings indicate that ethno-nationalist groups are responsible for most incidents with casualties, and once combined with religious groups this category is responsible for the highest average casualty rate and the highest mass casualty rate. Additionally, these increase over time. Thus, the evidence points in several directions depending on the data used.

In this section we have seen that the new terrorists employ indiscriminate targeting for non-political goals and employ gratuitous violence while doing so.¹⁹ This has, however, not been tested in relation to religious terrorism in the domestic domain. This is in itself a good reason to revisit the hypothesis with both domestic and transnational incidents in the analysis. Also, if other groups are considered contingent on public support and employ a morale thereafter, while the religious groups do not, then transnational incidents may be more lethal all over. Attacking the people around you may hamper public support in a larger degree than attacking people further away, as transnational incidents do.

H₆ All ideological strains of terrorism have become more lethal with time.

The New Terrorists Weapons of Choice

The new terrorist's religious goals, target selections and system of moral also have consequences for their weapons of choice. Cilluffo & Tomarchio (1998:440-441) wrote 'a new breed of terrorists seeking out and using weapons of greater lethality that can affect scores of victims over large areas'. This seems logical in the paradigm described so far with grand universal goals, a large population of legitimate targets, no need for public support and a system of morale which allows for significantly more lethal attacks. Two types of weapons have been devoted attention in particular; the tactic of suicide bombing and the potential use

¹⁹ A highly similar notion swept the field of civil war studies during the 1990s where a concept of old and new civil wars developed. The line of reasoning within new civil wars is strikingly similar to that of new terrorism. According to Kalyvas (2001:99) the civil wars of the 1990s were said to be 'distinguished as criminal, rather than political, phenomena'. The old civil wars had been caused and motivated by, collective grievances, enjoyed broad public support and employed a controlled form of violence – which is very similar to the lines of reasoning on traditional terrorism. The new civil wars, on the other hand, are caused and motivated by; private loot, lack public support, and employ gratuitous violence (Kalyvas, 2001:102). The old civil wars were considered 'ideological, political, and even noble' while the new civil wars are 'characteristically criminal, depolitical, private, and predatory' (Kalyvas, 2001:111). The perception that violence had become depoliticized, indiscriminate and in essence more brutal is not limited to the field of terrorism research.

of WMDs.²⁰ This tactic has, since the Iraq war in particular, become an associated trait of religious fundamentalism and therefore fit the modus operandi of the new terrorism.

Suicide Terrorism

The true advent of modern suicide bombing was the bombing of the Iraqi embassy in Lebanon in December 1981 (Moghadam, 2008:48). Rapoport (2004:62) notes that suicide bombings are the most deadly tactical innovation of the fourth wave terrorists. However, the secular Tamil Tigers of Sri Lanka used it, often with women as the perpetrators, more than all Islamic groups combined from 1983–2000. Rapoport (2004:63) views this as ‘a very unusual event in the fourth wave’, also noting that it is ‘reminiscent of anarchist bomb-throwing efforts’. Religion is not the only ideology capable of provoking the will to sacrifice one-self. Laqueur (1996:26) notes that ‘The bomber willing and indeed eager to blow himself up has appeared in all eras and cultural traditions, espousing politics ranging from the leftism of the Baader-Meinhof Gang in the 1970s Germany to rightist extremism’. Suicidal attacks or ‘self-sacrifice/homicide’, is indeed a feature of human history, but modern explosives solved a technical problem with the strategy; it guarantees you die in the process. Before easy access to explosives the terrorist risked getting ‘wounded, tortured, manipulated, exchanged, or turned.’ by the enemy after the attack (Géré, 2007:365). However, it also figures heavily in the new terrorism. Bruce Hoffman (2005:131) wrote ‘In no area of contemporary terrorism has religion had a greater impact than propelling the vast increase of suicide attacks that have occurred since 9/11’. 78 percent of all suicide attacks perpetrated between 1968 and 2005 took place between 2001 and 2005, and 31 out of the 35 groups responsible were Islamic.²¹

So far, the role of religion as an ideology supplying targets and justifying attacks on the target population has been discussed. Attempting to explain the motivations behind a suicidal act can be difficult, so why should this be ‘popular’ with religious groups in particular? One link between religion and motivation can be found in the word ‘martyrdom’.²²

²⁰ I will rely heavily on Assaf Moghadam (2006) for this discussion. Robert A Pape (2005) a highly regarded source on suicide terrorism, but he not as relevant to the theory of new terrorism. The main reason for this is the fact that Moghadam (2006) is published after the major eruption of suicide terrorism in Iraq and is written as a critique of Pape (2005). His critique is not directly linked to new terrorism, but the information is highly relevant.

²¹ Another interesting point is that this may in fact be changing today. According to Ashour (2011) there is yet another global transformation going on within current jihadist movements where political violence, especially terrorism, is delegitimized. If true we could be witnessing not only the peak of this tactic, but the peak of Rapoport’s fourth wave and new terrorism (given that the theory holds).

²² This is not the first time systematic suicide has been put in connection with martyrdom. Géré (2007:375) links modern suicide and martyrdom to Islam from 1979 when Iran started using 15 year old volunteers, called *bassidje*, for suicide in both regular warfare and more isolated operations in Lebanon and Palestine. They were suicide volunteers for operations of ‘extreme military peril’. Though this may have been a starting-point for the

Before joining al-Qaida now al-Qaida leader Ayman al-Zawahiri stated that the martyrs represented a ‘generation of mujahideen that has decided to sacrifice itself and its property in the cause of God. That is because the way of death and martyrdom is a weapon that tyrants and their helpers, who worship their salaries instead of God, do not have.’ (Moghadam, 2008:60).²³ From 2004–2008 more suicide bombings took place in Iraq than the rest of the world combined the preceding 25 years. These attacks were predominantly carried out by Salafi-Jihadist groups (Moghadam, 2008:46). The number of suicide attacks has increased by a staggering amount in the 2000s. In his study of suicide attacks from 1981–2007 the number of yearly attacks rarely approaches 25, and doesn’t cross 50 before 2001, at which point it rises steadily to over 100 in 2004 before skyrocketing to 350 in in 2005 and over 500 in 2007 (Moghadam, 2008:49).

Furthermore, Moghadam (2006:720) argues that there must be made a distinction between localized and globalized terrorist attacks. Localized attacks are planned and executed by sub-national actors, ‘such as Hizballah, the LTTE, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), or the PKK’, and are geographically concentrated in a clearly definable conflict area (Moghadam, 2006:720). Globalized attacks on the other hand are ‘transnational in nature’. The ‘globalized martyrs’ can sacrifice themselves outside what is traditionally seen as the conflict area, such as the 9/11 attacks, thus the act is transnational. An estimated 90 percent of suicide attacks in Iraq were conducted by non-Iraqis (Moghadam, 2006:721). Indeed the internet seems to work as an educational institution and recruitment facility for such globalized suicide terrorists (Moghadam, 2006:722). In a later paper Moghadam (2008) goes on to describe the proliferation of suicide attacks in the world, or the ‘globalization of martyrdom’ as a function of al-Qaida’s evolution into a global actor and the growing appeal of the Salafi jihad ideology. The presence of the Salafi-jihad ideology is tested empirically by Moghadam (2008:64) and shows that this ideological strain carried out 37.7 percent of all suicide attacks from December 1981 to March 2008. In the end, the picture painted by Moghadam’s articles is very much the same as that the theory of new terrorism predicts; the attacks are religiously motivated, and the suicide attack is definitely a recognizable feature of

trend the Lebanese Hezbollah does indeed seem to be the group first associated with using the tactic successfully to force Israeli withdrawal, and was an inspiration for other groups (Géré, 2007:375-379).

²³ This is not a unique quote. Sheikh Ibrahim Madhi said the following in the Gaza City Mosque in 2001; ‘Anyone who does not attain martyrdom in these days’ ... should wake in the middle of the night and say: “My God, why have you deprived me of martyrdom for your sake? For the martyr lives next to Allah” followed by a call to Allah to ‘accept our martyrs in the highest heavens ... show the Jews a black day ... annihilate the Jews and their supporters ... [and] raise the flag of Jihad across the land.’ (Hoffman, 2006:158).

religious terrorism and Islam in particular. Finally, the will to commit suicide can also be seen as an expression of antinomianism as mentioned earlier.

The connection between religion, and Islam in particular, and suicide terrorism has been criticized. Pape's (2005) book on the strategic logic of suicide terrorism explores the tactical usefulness of suicide terrorism, arguing that it is used for ousting foreign occupants rather than directly linked to Islam. This book represents a substantial data collection and analysis effort and presents strong evidence for the case of suicide terrorism as an anti-occupation tactic. However, Moghaddam's articles presented above also score valid points criticising some of the measures and methods employed by Robert Pape (2005). The main reason to distrust any particular causal link between religious groups and suicide terrorism is that the main wave of suicide terrorism in Iraq had not yet happened at the time of Pape's (2005) book. Hoffman (2006:132) support both views, acknowledging the strategic worth of suicide terrorism while also noting the importance of religious and theological justification in ensuring a steady flow of new recruits for suicide attacks. Finally, we cannot overlook a third explanation; some suicide attackers may indeed be suicidal (see Lankford, 2011). Laqueur (1998:170) notes that as far back as in 1904 to 1907 a high percentage of Russian terrorists had in fact already attempted to commit suicide, and that more examples of this can easily be provided. Thus, the link between religion and suicide terrorism is plausible, and in part substantiated, but likely highly localized - and the tactic has also shown strategic worth as the 'ultimate smart bomb' (Hoffman, 2006:132).

H₇ A terrorist incident perpetrated by a religious group is significantly more likely to employ suicide terrorism.

Weapons of Mass Destruction

Finally, new terrorist groups are considered more likely to use WMDs. Laqueur (1996, 1998, 2004) predicts an even more lethal form of terrorism, especially in the earlier writings. Laqueur's new terrorists will only be satisfied with the complete annihilation of their enemies and the moral revolution mentioned earlier means that these groups are far more likely to use WMDs. He indicates that Aum Shinrikyo's sarin gas attack was just a step on the way, and that we (as per 2004) have yet to see the true advent of this form of megaterrorism. He is definitely not alone in the assertion that new terrorist groups are more likely to use WMDs. Cilluffo & Tomarchio's (1998) 'Responding to New Terrorist Threats' start out with a fictional worst-case-scenario in which a mid-sized American city of just over 200 000 people

are attacked with computer viruses as well as biological and chemical weapons. The city is decimated while ‘America is exposed as defenceless. It cannot even retaliate.’ (Cilluffo & Tomarchio, 1998:439-440). Mayhem of this scale is considered a successful attack by new terrorists. Carter, Deutch & Zelikow (1998:81) go as far as to say ‘the danger of weapons of mass destruction being used against America and its allies is greater now than at any time since the Cuban missile crisis of 1962’, and propose policy measures to respond to this new type of terrorist threat. Simon & Benjamin (2000:71) write, ‘these terrorists want a lot of people watching *and* a lot of people dead.’ and therefore WMD attacks are the ‘next natural step’. Gurr & Cole (2002) devote an entire book to terrorists and WMDs, titled *The New Face of Terrorism. Threats from Weapons of Mass Destruction*. In their book they hold that the currently ‘embryonic regime is forming’ to hinder the proliferation of WMDs in relation to terrorism (Gurr & Cole, 2002:247) and that better policies are needed. They deal not only with religious terrorists, but all types of groups. Still, they hold that religious groups are more likely to use WMDs because of their ‘all-encompassing objectives’ and who’s rhetoric at times can be described as ‘genocidal’ (Gurr & Cole, 2002:251). One restraint these groups are concerned with is simply the contamination of areas WMD attacks cause, with the exception of ‘religious cults, which if they do not decide to lash out violently against society operate under no political or ideological constraints.’ (Gurr & Cole, 2002:252).

Enders & Sandler (1999) find that little changed within terrorist tactics in the post-cold war years, save a small increase in hostage incidents. Still, the eerie absence of an increase in WMD attacks since the Tokyo Subway gas attack has spawned both critique and some moderation on part of new terrorism proponents. Hoffman (2001:417) observes that the new terrorists have ‘remained remarkably conservative operationally’ and that future use of chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons ‘...may be far less certain than is now commonly assumed...’. Laqueur (2004:63) simply postpone the inevitable WMD use. Experts also seem to agree, although their predictions have yet to come true. In 2008 the Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism predicted ‘it is more likely than not that a weapon of mass destruction will be used in a terrorist attack somewhere in the world by the end of 2013’, and it is not unique in its assessment (Koblentz, 2011:501). The aspect of WMD use is not investigated further in this thesis because the data available is not suited for such an analysis.

The Organization and Resources of New Terrorism

The last major difference between new and old organizations are said to be their different organizational structure. Crenshaw (2009:132) writes ‘The ‘new’ terrorists are said to be decentralized, with a ‘flat’ networked apparatus rather than a hierarchical or cellular structure’. Simon & Benjamin (2000:69) hold that ‘the *jihad* camp’ can, in organizational terms, be called ‘non-group groups’, meaning that there is little hierarchy and people know each other personally only from the training camps. Al-Qaida is mentioned specifically to communicate not only between cell and leadership, but also between cells without leadership involved at all. They ‘...combine elements of a ‘hub and spoke’ structure (where nodes communicate with the centre) and with a ‘wheel’ structure (where nodes in the network communicate with each other without reference to the center)’ (Simon & Benjamin, 2000:70). This means they are also more likely to employ amateur part-time terrorists (Copeland 2001:7). This makes the networks, in contrast to traditional groups, hard to identify, infiltrate and disrupt.

Hoffman (2001:418) claims the ‘new generation of terrorists evidence several important organizational changes that in turn have affected their operations, decision making, and targeting.’. The new organizations are comprised of loosely linked individuals ranging from amateurs to professionals. Hoffman (2001) also supports the notion that the typical hierarchical structure is gone and replaced by ‘far more amorphous, indistinct, and broader movements’. He echoes Simon & Benjamin’s (2000) assessment from the year before, and adds that this ‘particular trend in terrorism may represent a very different and potentially far more lethal one than that posed by more familiar, traditional, terrorist adversaries.’ (Hoffman, 2001:418). A combination of this loose cell structure and a vague ideology also means that these new groups are less likely to claim responsibility for an attack against civilians (Hoffman, 2001:418).

In Rapoport’s fourth wave the number of groups have declined dramatically, and their size grown. He sees this as related to the shift from local to international groups, from a national audience to an audience of an entire religion (Rapoport, 2004:63). Rapoport also goes into al-Qaida specifics when he writes on how the disruption of their training grounds with the invasion of Afghanistan changed their organizational structure. Al-Qaida’s pre-war structure was one of sleeper cells, where a cell would await orders to strike from the leadership – which is an ‘unusual pattern in terrorist history’ (Rapoport, 2004:65). Because of the disruption the cells will have to increase their own autonomy, acting when they see fit and are able to. This would, according to Rapoport (2004:65) result in a shift in targets to ‘softer,

largely unprotected civilian targets'. However, the organization seems to continue displaying their 'trademark by maximizing casualties'. (Rapoport, 2004:65).

Helfstein, Scorr & Dominic Wright (2011) is the best example I have found of an attempt at mapping the structure of new terrorists. However, the links between cells and organizations cannot be tested in this thesis because the data doesn't hold any relevant information. However, there is one potential aspect of the organizational structure which can be tested. Carter, Deutch and Zelikow (1998:82) also note how this new international organizational structure makes state sanctions harder and the danger greater. '... the threat falls into one of the crevasses in government's overlapping jurisdictions, such as the divide between 'foreign' and 'domestic' terrorism or 'law enforcement' versus 'national security'. Simon & Benjamin (2000; Simon, 2003) also focus on how the United States have, and should, changed their counter terrorism policies in order to cope with this new jurisdictional complexity, especially during the Clinton administrations. The data available does not allow for placing each incident in an overall organizational structure. However, the inherent transnational feature of new terrorism is part of the new organizational structure. Thus, a limited portion of the organizational structure of new terrorists can be addressed with a hypothesis on the transnational nature of their organizations and incidents;

H₈ Transnational incidents are significantly more likely to be motivated by a religious ideology than any other ideology.

Method for Data Collection and Analysis

This chapter will present the reasons for using the Global Terrorism Database, out of all the other databases available, and evaluate it thoroughly. The hypotheses require a measure of the perpetrator group's ideology for testing. I will detail how this indicator coded into the GTD to enable testing of the hypotheses. I regard these two as separate datasets used for this thesis. Therefore both are presented, and further variable operationalization of the two datasets is treated separately. Following this I will present descriptive statistics, and an introduction into the graphs and statistical models used for the analysis. The final section provide regression model specifications for my 8 hypotheses.

Selecting a Data Source

Most statistical information on terrorism is found in event-history datasets listing terrorist incidents chronologically. These databases are typically based on information available in the news media, or 'Open Source Databases', and began to appear in the early 1970s numbering over a dozen by the late 1990s (LaFree, 2010:24). He defends this type of data collection method by contrasting terrorism to traditional criminology databases registering incidents of burglary or car theft. The relationship between terrorism and the media is active (this is of course also relevant to the definitions discussed previously), whereas the relationship between crime and the media is not. Terrorists require the media to spread the word of the deeds, 'Thus, while no serious researcher would suggest that we track burglary or car theft rates by relying solely on media sources such a strategy is much more defensible in the case of terrorist attacks.' (LaFree, 2010:24).

Before reviewing the alternatives within open source datasets it is necessary to discuss about the overall reliability issues following such a data collection methodology. The main issues, and also some of the perks, stem from the fact that the media dominate as a source. The perk is that terrorist groups seek publicity to communicate their agenda and therefore compete for attention in the media (see Wilkinson, 1997). The problem is that the media can be inaccurate, wrong, and potentially outright lie. Government control and censorship can also be a source of both disinformation and bias in reports (LaFree, 2010:24). A news article is influenced at several pit stops on the road from the incident itself to published news article. The journalist may or may not have been witness to the incident (more likely not) and thus rely on accounts from other people which may not be accurate. A press wire or an article is then written by that journalist, possibly reflecting (however inadvertently) both inaccuracies and bias. The news item could travel through additional news agencies before it is finally

bought, framed and reformulated by the publisher before it is finally printed, reported in a news cast or published electronically. The final leg on this journey is of course the reader him or herself and their individual preconceptions about the world (see Strömbeck, 2004).²⁴ LaFree et.al. (2006:24) note that the available information will be biased on the side of what is deemed news-worthy by the media actors themselves. This also spins into the fact that terrorist attacks are not always successful or are averted by other actors – and some of these will never reach the media at all. Both these factors are selection biases over which I have little control. Of the incidents reported, some may have unknown perpetrators (as do 40 872 in the GTD (START, 2011a)) (LaFree et.al., 2006:24). This means that there could be uncertainty as to whether the act was indeed terrorism at all. Of course the information of interest to researchers are limited to the simpler facts, such as how many were killed, weapons used, name of the group responsible and so on. The point is that there need not be a motivation for misrepresentation of the facts for there to be some. There can be no doubt that several sources for errors exist in open source material. Nevertheless, the open source incident databases available commonly used and are the best available option to investigate terrorism quantitatively.

There are several large, open source datasets containing information on terrorist incidents over extended periods of time.²⁵ The World Incident Tracking System (WITS) covers events after 2004 and is ill suited for the task at hand. Terrorism in Western Europe: Events Data (TWEED) covers domestic terrorism from 1950–2004, and the database is limited to 18 countries in Western Europe. It is also based on one source alone. (Konstantinos, 2011:150). A similar set is the Domestic Terrorism Victims (DTV) set, which details fatalities in domestic terrorism in Western Europe from 1965-2005 (see Calle & Sánchez-Cuenca, 2011). Edward Mickolus, Todd Sandler, Jean Murdock and Peter Flemming developed the widely used ITERATE set covering the entire world from 1968 to 2008, however these are exclusively transnational and international incidents (Konstantinos, 2011:150). Since this analysis requires both worldwide incident coverage and ideally both domestic and transnational incidents there are two major contenders left; the Rand Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents (RDWTI) and newcomer, the Global Terrorism Database (GTD). ‘With over 36 000 incidents of terrorism coded and detailed, the quality and completeness of the RDWTI is unparalleled’ (RAND, 2012). This dataset is a merge between the RAND

²⁴ This is a crude summary of quite complex, and well documented processes. See Strömbeck (2004) for an introduction to these processes in the media of a democracy.

²⁵ A quick introduction to available resources on terrorism is found on Assistant Professor of Political Science Barak Mendelsohn’s online space at Haverford College. (<http://people.haverford.edu/bmendels/>)

Terrorism Chronology and the RAND-MIPT Terrorism Incident Database. It holds worldwide event accounts from 1972–2008 is freely available for download to researchers. According to RAND this dataset is ‘widely regarded as the gold standard for comprehensive information on international and domestic terrorism’ (RAND, 2012). However, the dataset contains domestic incidents only after 1998 (RAND, 2012). Although both RAND and ITERATE could be used to investigate the hypotheses put forth in the new terrorism literature, most of the terrorist incidents that occur in the world are domestic (START, 2011a). Only the GTD has domestic and transnational incident coverage stretching back well beyond the 1990s. In relation to the definition presented earlier it is also important to note that the GTD is not only the sole dataset which supplies both domestic and transnational incidents for a prolonged period of time – but is also the only one applying a wide enough definition to include ‘political, as well as religious, economic, and social acts’ throughout that period (Lafree et.al., 2006:7). As such, it is uniquely suited to answer the questions raised in this thesis.

The Global Terrorism Database (GTD)

Compilation

The current GTD (START, 2011a) dataset contains information on 92 112 terrorist incidents from 1970-2010, and is updated yearly. It was created at the University of Maryland in 2001 after researchers received a PGIS database of terrorist incidents from 1970–1997, coded primarily by retired Air Force personnel. START took over management of this database in 2006 and at present it is a compilation of several databases (START, 2012a, 2012b).

The work on extending GTD past PGIS’ 1997 end-date has been a joint effort between START and the Center for Terrorism and Intelligence Studies (CETIS). This effort has also been supplemented by the Institute for the Study of Violent Groups (ISVG), working for START registering incidents in the period from April 2008 and onwards (START, 2012b). 25 to 35 data collectors fluent in six language groups²⁶ have worked using Lexis-Nexis and Opensource.gov in their research, typically finding 10,000 potential incidents each day. (LaFree 2010:26). Due to this history, the GTD data is a Frankenstein-monster compiled from 21 different databases²⁷. The three main contributors are PGIS (65.1 percent), CETIS (16.5 percent), and ISVG (13.5 percent), accounting for 95.1 percent of the incidents in total. CAIN and Hewitt are the only two other sources accounting for more than one percent of the total

²⁶ English, French, Spanish, Russian, Arabic and Mandarin (Lafree, 2010:26)

²⁷ A complete list of sources and their respective number of added incidents can be found in the appendix.

(START, 2011a). The GTD is growing in popularity among researchers, but according to Enders, Sandler & Gaibulloev (2011:32) researchers have yet to address the reliability of the data in depth.

Evaluation of the GTD

The GTD Codebook (START, 2011c), along with additional documentation on data collection methodology (START, 2012a) are freely available on the START websites themselves along with the dataset. The data collection methodology page (START, 2012a) reveals that the original PGIS data were compiled into a dataset titled GTD1 while the continued effort of cataloguing incidents from 1998 and onwards were compiled in a dataset titled GTD2. GTD1 and GTD2 were synthesized into what is now known as GTD in 2008. The reason the two sets were kept apart until 2008 was that some incidents in GTD1 (the PGIS years) did not meet the inclusion criteria in GTD2 (the post-PGIS years) - for example, incidents ‘better described as guerrilla warfare’. GTD1 also contained 44 variables while GTD2 contained an additional 84 variables (making the total count 128). The GTD1 set was supplemented with information on the additional variables ‘where possible’ according to START (2012a). The GTD is also the only dataset that currently offers text-citations from the sources used to code the incident (Sheehan, 2012:33).

The fact that the GTD1 set did not meet the inclusion criteria of GTD2 means the definition of terrorism was narrower in GTD2 than in GTD1. The GTD1 definition was of course that used by PGIS, which is; ‘the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation.’ (START, 2012a). The GTD2 definition adds that the use or threat of use of violence had to be intended as well as the three additional criteria in the second part of the GTD definition.²⁸ The three new criteria from the GTD2 years are registered as three dummy variables, *crit1*, *crit2*, and *crit3* and these are the three points seen in part two of the definition introduced in the beginning of this thesis. Thus, researchers are able to narrow the definition further by demanding all three inclusion criteria in the second part of the definition to be satisfied. Additionally, a variable indicating if there was ‘doubt as to whether the incident was truly a terrorist act’ was introduced, called *doubtterr*. These four variables are only available for the GTD2 data. (START, 2011c, 2012a).

Enders, Sandler & Gaibulloev (2011) note that a broader definition was indeed used during the PGIS years, and that there is no documentation on how this definition was broader.

²⁸ See the previous chapter on the GTD definition.

However, Enders, Sandler & Gaibullov (2011) used the first synthesized version of GTD while this thesis uses the second version. As far as I can see, these problems are now remedied or perhaps clarified, as this information is only available on the START websites. Thus the consequences of the synthesis of GTD1 and GTD2 are not so dire. The GTD staff appear to have reviewed the GTD1 incidents and made sure these satisfy the inclusion criteria of GTD2 (START, 2012a). The fact that we lack the variables *crit1*, *crit2* and *crit3* for these incidents only has consequences only if a researcher applies a more narrow definition using these variables, thus narrowing the post-1997 definition in relation to the pre-1997 years. Seventeen coders were trained for this process which took place from April 2008 until December 2008. ‘Incidents that failed to meet two of the three criteria developed for GTD2 were removed from the new synthesized GTD’ (START, 2012a). Thus, to be absolutely clear; in its original, unaltered form the 2010 GTD version now appears to apply the same definition for *all* incidents. Only when the researcher demands all three additional criteria to be satisfied will the GTD present serious issues on using data from both before and after 1997 *simultaneously*. The fact that the PGIS definition was wider is in fact positive because this means only a selection of the PGIS population were included in the synthesized version of GTD. If the transition was from a narrow definition towards a wider one there would be significantly more reason to worry about systematic inconsistencies between the two main periods of data collection.

The GTD has a complete data loss for the year 1993. “... be aware that prior to the transfer of the original GTD data from Pinkerton Global Intelligence Services (PGIS) to START, all records of terrorist attacks during 1993 were lost.”²⁹ (START, 2011b). Based on country level statistics from PGIS indicating the total number of incidents in each country that year a total of fifteen percent have been recovered by the GTD team. (START, 2011b)³⁰. These are available for download as a separate file together with the main GTD data file, and were appended to the file used for analysis in this thesis using STATA 11.2.

Finally, users are cautioned about data inconsistency. ‘Even though efforts have been made to assure the continuity of the data from 1970 to the present, users should keep in mind that the collection was done in real time for cases between 1970 and 1997, was retrospective between 1998 and 2007, and is again in real time after 2007.’ (START, 2012a). This temporary change from real time to retrospective can ‘at least partially’ explain the

²⁹ Apparently, the box of data fell off a truck during transit (Enders, Sandler & Gaibullov, 2011:322).

³⁰ These country statistics are also available in the GTD Codebook (START 2011).

differences in levels of attack ‘after January 1, 1998 and before and after April 1, 2008’ (START, 2012a).

These are the main points of criticism that are found after consulting the documentation available from START as well as Enders, Sandler & Gaibullov (2011). However, the process of converting the original PGIS data to the GTD1 dataset form is thoroughly documented in a 205 page report to the U.S. Department of Justice, received in May 2006.³¹ The report is filed by Professor, and current director of START, Gary LaFree as well as three other key personnel at the GTD, and opens the black box of the pre-1998 years in the GTD. It is of crucial importance to any researcher using the GTD because it is responsible for over half its contents. First of all, it is clear that the PGIS project ‘aimed to record every major known terrorist event across nations and over time.’ Furthermore, the information was collected with the purpose of performing risk analyses for U.S. businesses and seems well planned. Seven of the nine different event types (for example hijacking, assault or assassination) were defined before their data gathering began - and the collection and coding scheme, planned out in beforehand, remained similar for 28 years. (LaFree et.al., 2006:6-7). The following paragraph is of vital importance...

PGIS trained their employees to identify and code all terrorism incidents they could identify from a variety of multi-lingual sources, including: wire services, such as Reuters and the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, U.S. State Department reports, other U.S. and foreign government reporting, U.S. and foreign newspapers, information provided by PGIS offices throughout the world, occasional inputs from such special interests as organized political opposition groups, and data furnished by PGIS clients and other individuals in both official and private capacities. Although about two dozen persons were responsible for collecting information over the years the data were recorded, only two individuals were in charge of supervising data collection and the same basic coding structure was used throughout the entire data collection period. The most recent project manager of the PGIS database was retained as a consultant on the NIJ project and assisted with development of the database interface and codebook and served as a consultant on data entry questions as they arose.

LaFree et.al., 2006:8

Several pieces of good news are presented in this paragraph. First of all, consistency in coding over time; second, trained personnel; third, a multitude of sources; and fourth, the presence of the project manager from PGIS to answer questions when the database was converted to its current format. The PGIS terrorism project saw only 2 supervisors over the 27 years of data collection which contributes to the reliability and consistency of the data

³¹ The report was filed because the team received federal funding for the project. The report is not publicised by the U.S. Department of Justice but has been made available on their website ‘to provide better customer service’. (Lafee et.al. 2006). A printed version is also available, which is published by the U.S. Department of Justice that same year, ASIN: B005IIAC0W. This printed version was not acquired for this thesis, however the report numbers are the same (214260).

(LaFree et.al., 2006:20). The conversion process from PGIS to GTD itself was carried out by more than 70 trained undergraduate students over six months, using an interface especially designed for the job and with good opportunities for supervision. Pre-tests of both the codebook and interface were carried out before coding commenced, using two batches of randomly sampled incidents from the PGIS database cards (LaFree et.al., 2006:2-11). All in all, the digitization process appears both well documented and of high quality.

This process produced what is now known as the GTD1 which is then compared to ITERATE and RDWTI, the two other major, publicly available contenders on incident level terrorism statistics at the time. As already discussed, this comparison is of limited use because no other database has a comprehensive list of domestic terrorism. At the time, the authors of the report did not have the means to separate domestic incidents from transnational incidents thus making a quantitative comparison impossible. Their comparison is left out of this discussion in favour of Enders, Sandler and Gaibullov (2011) who separate transnational and domestic incidents in GTD and compare this to the ITERATE dataset. However, note that these authors use the 2008 version of GTD (the first synthesized version) and level criticisms against definition and information shortcomings which seem rectified in the current 2010 version.

Comparing quarterly numbers of transnational incidents in GTD and ITERATE from 1970 until the second quarter of 1977 shows ITERATE consistently holds more incidents than the GTD. The mean number of incidents are 94,67 in ITERATE and 45,93 IN GTD (Enders, Sandler & Gaibullov, 2011:324). This is a substantial difference, with the number of ITERATE incidents at twice the rate of the GTD. The two sets are quite similar from then on until the second quarter of 1991 when the GTD greatly exceeds those of ITERATE. This pattern holds until the first quarter of 1998 when there is a sharp decline in the GTD, due to the new inclusion criteria already discussed. From there on the two sets actually seem to 'track one another quite nicely' up until the fourth quarter of 2004 when the GTD starts reporting more transnational incidents than ITERATE (Enders, Sandler & Gaibullov, 2011:324).³² Several reasons are suggested for these developments; first of all, Enders, Sandler & Gaibullov (2011:324) note that neither dataset is perfect and that the differences in estimation from 2004 and onwards are largely a result of incidents in Afghanistan and Iraq where ITERATE excludes attacks on combatants. GTD includes these attacks, both pre- and post-PGIS. Enders, Sandler & Gaibullov (2011:322) also suggest that the rapid increase in

³² A recommend reading their article because their analysis is thorough, and shows patterns in much greater detail-

registered incidents in the GTD during the 1980s ‘may be due to PGIS acquiring a larger coding staff as the project ensued’ or that they worked retrospectively. Like Enders, Sandler & Gaibullov (2011) I haven’t found any information to either prove or disprove this. Lafree (2010:45) notes that the number of sources used by PGIS increased over time, as did their registering of a source for their incidents. The fact remains, the dataset underestimates the number of transnational incidents (and likely domestic) in the better part of the 1970s.³³

An alternate explanation for the decline of incidents after 1998 is that the incidents in this period are registered retrospectively. This data collection method entails that some media sources may have become unavailable thus leading incidents to go unregistered (GTD, 2011c). This explanation may indeed have value because the GTD now employs the same inclusion criteria for all incidents. The results could therefore very well be different if the comparison was run using the 2010 version of GTD against ITERATE. The presented comparison should be treated with some care because the two datasets are not identical in method and definitions which should lead to different estimates.³⁴

There are 41 236 incidents with an ‘Unknown’ perpetrator group in the GTD, or 41.7 percent of the total number of incidents. Some people may be put off by the large amount of ‘Unknown’ perpetrator groups. However, this is *definitely not* an uncommon feature for terrorism datasets at all. The ITERATE dataset has 39.5 percent ‘Unknown’ incidents from 1968 until 1991, and 36.4 percent from 1991–2010. It, like the GTD, has a higher percentage of ‘Unknown’ incidents in the 2000s (41.1 percent unknown from 2001–2010 in ITERATE) (Stohl, 2012:40). 26 190 out of the 40 129 registered incidents in the RDWTI have unknown perpetrators (or 65 percent). All in all, the GTD offers unique opportunities at much the same costs as any other terrorism database, especially in relation to research questions depending on perpetrator names such as this.

In conclusion, the GTD represents the most comprehensive database of terrorism available today. The data is collected from the same sources as other terrorism databases, but using two distinct and different definitions. It is built from several parts and it would appear

³³ Enders, Sandler & Gaibullov (2011) also go on to suggest methods for compensating the discrepancy in number of incidents in the GTD as compared to ITERATE. This approach is not applicable to this thesis as we are dealing with specifics related to each incident and not an overall incident count. It also presumes that the PGIS crew under / overestimated both transnational and domestic incidents evenly.

³⁴ Sheehan (2012) concludes the presentation of current terrorism databases stating; ‘Finally, the near canonical reputation of datasets such as ITERATE needs to be reevaluated in light of the valuable contributions of newcomers to the field. Over the years ITERATE data has been used so often in academic publications that it has come to be seen by some as the only authoritative database on terrorism. But ITERATE is confined to international and transnational events and it is becoming much more obvious that the distinctions between international and domestic terrorist events are not as clear-cut as previously thought. Moreover, ITERATE data is only available to subscribing universities and is not otherwise accessible on the web.’

the 2010 version represents a significant raise in overall quality, especially in relation to the new uniformity of the inclusion criteria. The database is definitely not a complete list of all domestic and transnational terrorist incidents from 1970 until 2010, but it is as close to one as anyone has been able to get. This is also substantiated by its use in several publicized works in journals such as the *Journal of Peace Research* and *Terrorism and Political Violence*. (See for example Enders, Sandler & Gaibullov 2011; Lafree & Dugan, 2007)³⁵ The GTD no doubt lack (at least transnational) coverage from 1970–1977 – for whatever reason. Though the inclusion criteria between ITERATE and PGIS may have been different at the time the difference in levels from the 70s to the 80s in the GTD compared to the levels of ITERATE definitely speaks to this point. The period of decline in the number of incidents after 1998 likely stems from the research methodology, but it is also interesting to note that this is the period which most corresponds to the ITERATE dataset. This has to be considered in relation to the hypotheses tested using the data when representing time in the regression model and when interpreting the results. The dataset, with the 1993 data appended, is considered a reliable representation of domestic and transnational terrorism from 1970 until 2010 as defined in its inclusion criteria.³⁶

Indicator for Ideology

Neither the GTD nor any other dataset discussed have an indicator of the perpetrator group's ideology. Therefore, this indicator had to be researched and coded for every incident in the GTD dataset for the purposes of this analysis. Searching for, and classifying, the ideology for every group in the GTD took me roughly 7 months, starting in September of 2011 and finishing in late March 2012. A total of 6 variables indicate the perpetrator group name in the GTD, most of the time there is only one name listed and it is found in the first variable (*gname*). Due to time constraints, secondary and tertiary group names have yet to be researched along with most group names from before 1985. Furthermore, a lot of incidents have an 'unknown' perpetrator which means that there is a difference between the total number of incidents listed and the number of incidents that are possible to give an ideological profile. I will get back to these points later on. The Terrorism Knowledge Base (TKB) and Open Source information from Dow Jones Factiva search engine was used to acquire the

³⁵ There are several other journals and many articles. START lists several of these on their own websites. <http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/using-gtd/GTDinResearch.aspx>

³⁶ LaFree et.al. (2006) contains much more information that can be of interest to researchers evaluating the PGIS years, such as pictures of coding cards as well as the descriptions of what acts constitutes assassinations, assault and so on. See also Lafree (2010) for the most recent look at the GTD. Sheehan (2012) offers an excellent introduction into the current major terrorism databases.

information for each group’s ideological profile. The coding I have done is further detailed in the codebook located at the very end of this thesis.

Table I. Summary of Ideological Coverage

	GTD Statistics		Ideological Coverage				
	<i>Complete GTD</i>	<i>Known Groups</i>	<i>TKB Coded</i>	<i>My Own Coding</i>	<i>Total Coded</i>	<i>Known Group, No Ideology</i>	<i>Percent of Known</i>
Groups	2,871	2,870	490	738	1 228	1,642	43 %
Incidents	98,848	57,612	39,399	8,206	47,607	10,369	83 %

Table I summarizes how many terrorist groups have been assigned an ideological profile, and how many incidents these groups are responsible for. The complete GTD column show how many groups and incidents there are originally in the GTD. This number is created by dropping the duplicate names form the GTD, one of these names are ‘Unknown’ and therefore the number of known groups are 2,870. This number may in fact be a little lower, because group names such as “U/I Gunmen” and “Terrorists” are also counted as unique group names. After researching all the group names of the GTD I have no doubt that a terrorist group could call themselves “The Terrorists” and the like, therefore I have not removed such suspect names from the total list at all. The number of incidents with known perpetrator groups is significantly lower than the total number (from 98,848 to 57,612), as indicated by the known groups column. The TKB column show the number of groups and incidents that were assigned an ideological profile using information from the TKB, while the ‘my own coding’-column show the number I have coded myself. The total-column shows the total number of groups and incidents that have been assigned an ideological profile, and the ‘known group, no ideology’ column show the number of known groups and incidents that are missing an ideological profile, but could potentially be assigned one in the future. This term will be used several times in this thesis. The percent of known column show how many percent of the *known* groups and incidents that have been assigned an ideological profile. As such, it is the truest representation of what I have achieved of ideological coverage out of what is possible.

The Terrorism Knowledge Base (TKB)

The TKB database itself was found to be unavailable and had ceased operations on the 31st of March 2008 (START, 2011c).³⁷ The remains are available in the form of Terrorist Organization Profiles (TOPs) on the START websites (START, 2012c).

The TKB was developed and sponsored by the Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT) based in Oklahoma. The project ran from an unknown date in 2004 until the final update on 1st of March 2008 before the project shut down on the 31st of March 2008. MIPT was provided support for both the creation and maintenance of the TKB by the U.S. Department of Justice and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. MIPT was also partnered with another company called Detica on this project.³⁸ The TKB data are also widely used and accepted in terrorism research.³⁹ The main objective of the project was to collect information on ‘terrorist groups and key leaders of terrorist groups’ (START, 2011c). The resulting Terrorist Organization Profiles (TOPs) include information such as mother tongue name, aliases, bases of operation, date formed, strength, ideology (referred to as ‘classifications’), financial sources, founding philosophy and current goals in text format. These TOPs profiles are currently hosted by START and contain information on 856 different terrorist organizations. Not all fields of information are available on all groups, and not all groups are covered as extensively as the next.

No original project documentation was available to the me on the TKB. However, former MIPT employee James O. Ellis describe state the TKB was in essence a combination of their databases, library materials, and other resources putting ‘the facts concerning global terrorism at the fingertips of policymakers, professionals, and the public’ (Ellis, 2008). As mentioned previously, the MIPT data were merged with the RAND data and is as such considered a reliable source of information.

³⁷ Former Director of Research at MIPT, Brian K. Houghton, actually wrote a eulogy for the TKB underlining the magnitude of the loss this is to the terrorism research community. (<http://terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/43/html>)

³⁸ Detica was founded by Bruce Smith and started out as Smith Associates in the 1970s working on research and development projects for the UK defence industry. The company was renamed Detica in 2001 when national security had taken over as ‘the growth engine of the firm’. (See <http://www.baesystemsdetica.com/about-us/our-history/>)

³⁹ MIPT defined terrorism as; ‘...terrorism is defined by the nature of the act, not by the identity of the perpetrators. Terrorism is violence calculated to create an atmosphere of fear and alarm to coerce others into actions they would not otherwise undertake, or refrain from actions they desired to take. Acts of terrorism are generally directed against civilian targets. The motives of all terrorists are political, and terrorist actions are generally carried out in a way that will achieve maximum publicity . . . International terrorism includes incidents in which the perpetrators go abroad to strike their targets, select domestic targets associated with a foreign state, or create an international incident by attacking airline passengers or equipment.’ Goldman (2010:36).

Over the course of 3 months, the 2,870 known perpetrator group names in GTD were searched for in these profiles on the START website. The ‘Classification’ field, indicating the group ideology, was coded into the GTD as a numerical variable. A total of 490 groups, responsible for 39 399 incidents, received a value indicating the ideology fronted by the group. The following 11 base ideological categories, used by the TKB, were encountered during this process; ‘Anarchist’, ‘Anti-Globalization’, ‘Communist/Socialist’, ‘Environmental’, ‘Leftist’, ‘Nationalist/Separatist’, ‘Racist’, ‘Religious’, ‘Right Wing Conservative’, ‘Right Wing Reactionary’, and ‘Other’. Many groups combine ideologies, for example ‘Nationalist / Separatist *and* Religious’. In the end, a total of 27 distinct combinations were encountered in addition to the base categories. (See the codebook for more information on these).

My Own Data Gathering

After gathering data on the ideological profiles from the remains of the TKB, I searched for a further 1,272 group names on Dow Jones Factiva, which resulted in 738 new ideological group profiles, responsible for 8,206 incidents in the GTD. Roughly 3000 news articles and press wires were downloaded to provide information on the groups so that ideological profiles could be coded for each of them.⁴⁰ The categories available for classification are the same as those used in the TKB with the exception of ‘Right Wing Reactionary’ and ‘Right Wing Conservative’. These were combined into one ‘Right Wing’ category. This decision was made with the knowledge that these base categories would be combined into broader categories at a later time anyway. Also, achieving a reliable and valid distinction between the two was found unrealistic at an early stage of the research. This is especially true when considering the classifications have to match the TKB data as best as possible. Nevertheless, I kept as many as possible of the original categories to ensure a similar framework for my own and the TKB profiles.

There are essentially two possible approaches to classifying a group within the categories given by the TKB. One alternative would be to define each and every category, gather all possible information on the group’s activities and make an academic judgment of where the group belongs. This method calls for an in-depth study of each group, looking for manifestos, writings and speeches of any kind. This is a practical impossibility for this one-year study conducted by me alone. It also opens up the possibility of classifying a group differently than the group’s own sense of ideological affiliation, simply because the academic

⁴⁰ This process is further detailed in the codebook.

and group definition of each ideology may differ. In addition, such a method would judge a group not only by their representation in the media but by their actions as a whole – leading to the same potential difference in classification. This approach was discarded in favour of a simpler approach; a group is classified by the words used about them in the media – meaning if the media write ‘Marxist’ group, that group will be a ‘communist / socialist’ group. This gives us the truest representation of the ideology the group itself holds they are fronting, regardless of what the pure academic definition would be. At no point did I consider mapping ideological changes across time. The TKB does not do this, and the amount of research which it would require is far beyond the scope of a master thesis. Thus, all groups are judged on face value based on the most readily available information about them.

The premise for the entire endeavour is; that all terrorist organizations equally seek to communicate their ideological alignment to the world, are able to use the proper terms when communicating that ideology, and finally that the media are present and able to report on the incident. The problems associated with relying on media sources has already been discussed and naturally apply to this process as well. The fact that the research is based on information from the GTD shows that the ability to present the media with information is present. Factiva does not hold the complete media content (published and unpublished) in the time period 1970 to 2010. Although the search engine ensures that the research relies on several sources, this is the effort of one researcher using one research tool. It is pioneering work which, ideally, should be expanded on with other sources in the future.

Finally, this work is not yet completed. Due to time constraints most of the groups before 1985 are not yet looked for in Factiva, and have no ideological profiles coded by me. Therefore, the scope in terms of time is narrowed from 1970–2010 to 1985–2010.⁴¹ This means that I have 26 years of domestic and transnational incidents available for analysis, instead of 41. The scope is still much wider than any similar study using both domestic and transnational incidents, and the cost of this data loss is that I miss the beginnings of Rapoport’s fourth wave. This decision turned out not to significantly hamper the analysis, although a wider time frame would be preferred. With the exception of figure 1, all information from this point on is based only on the 1985–2010 period of the GTD.

⁴¹ This reduces the number of incidents available for analysis from 98 848 to 74 818. Since the data loss is confined to the pre 1985 years, this only has consequences for the time horizon and is not discussed further.

Variable Operationalization and Descriptive Statistics

This section describes how the variables available from the GTD and my own coding is readied for analysis. Before I can describe the operationalization of the ideological variable, I have to describe the process of separating transnational from domestic incidents in the GTD. Once this is done, and the ideological indicators are operationalized, I can evaluate the total ideological coverage for both domestic and transnational incidents across the entire time period. I also have hypotheses which require an indicator of lethality and suicide attacks. Following this, time, regions and countries are briefly discussed. Several variables are used as both dependent variables and independent variables, therefore the operationalization is not structured after dependent and independent variables at all.


Separation of Transnational and Domestic Incidents

The GTD includes both transnational and domestic terrorist incidents, but no variable distinguish between the two. Enders, Sandler & Gaibulloev (2011) describe a method for separating the two types of terrorism in the GTD to rectify this problem for researchers. I have replicated their method using the GTD 2010 version with the 1993 data appended. In short, five filters are applied to identify the transnational incidents in the data; Firstly, the nationality of the victims are compared to the country in which the incident took place; Second, intentional attacks against clearly transnational objects (such as diplomat's, NGO's and tourists); Third, targets against U.S. entities abroad and international entities are identified; Fourth, If there are U.S. victims in an incident outside the U.S. the incident is deemed transnational; and finally, information on the countries where kidnappings and hijackings are compared to the country in which the incident took place. In short, using these four filters the incidents that can be proven to involve targets and or victims from two countries are identified and coded as transnational. The same procedure of confirmation is performed for domestic incidents, and the incidents which cannot be confirmed as either transnational or domestic are labelled uncertain.

Figure 1 is a bar graph showing the yearly numbers of domestic, transnational and uncertain incidents following the separation procedure detailed above. The towering amount of domestic terrorism is the most striking feature of this graph, illustrating the relatively small portion of all terrorism that is transnational. There are few uncertain incidents, located in the mid-80s, mid-90s and some spread in the late 2000s. Another interesting feature is the fact that transnational incidents appear to hold a more steady level than domestic terrorism, and appear not to follow the recent upswing in domestic terrorism. It would also appear we are

currently at an historical high of domestic terrorism, surpassing the previous peak located in 1992.⁴² The data-loss of 1993 is evident in this graph, and it would appear that a larger portion of the domestic incidents are missing than the transnational.

Figure 1. Distribution of Transnational, Domestic and Uncertain Incidents



This is not an ideal method for separating the two. First of all, there could be other factors which make an incident transnational. For example, a perpetrator could arrive from another country to carry out an attack – and all the variables used to describe the incident in the GTD would point to a domestic incident using the

method described above. This would, to a certain extent, also be a problem for other open source databases should the news articles not mention this fact. Nevertheless, the problem has to be considered to be under less control in the GTD than for example ITERATE. The number of transnational incidents is, potentially, underestimated because of this. Also, separating the incidents in this manner means that it is the terrorist incident, and not group, that is considered transnational. An alternative would be to consider all incidents perpetrated by one group as transnational if even one of them is – this would yield a group level indicator of whether more exclusively religious groups have stepped into the transnational domain than for example leftist groups. This option is not explored further in this thesis. The method used is sub-optimal, but it is the only one available to me at the moment.

Ideological Indicators

There are 53 unique ideological categories in the original ideology variable I have created and this number has to be reduced. Some examples of how this has been done are found in Masters (2008), Rasler & Thompson (2009) and Piazza (2009).

⁴² In descending order, the five countries that have experienced the most domestic terrorism are Iraq (5,680), India (5,498), Colombia (5,310), Peru (4,056) and Pakistan (3878). The top five countries for transnational terrorism are Corsica (977), the West Bank and Gaza Strip (824), Iraq (604), Lebanon (569) and Northern Ireland (423). 57 countries have experienced more than 100 domestic incidents while 23 have experienced more than 100 transnational incidents. These numbers are calculated using the original GTD countries, which are also the basis for the quantitative analyses of this thesis. These are different from other well-known country codes, such as the UCDP codes from Uppsala, the World Bank codes or the Correlates of War (COW) codes.

The main objective of this thesis is to investigate religious terrorism, thus it is of prime interest so separate the religious as clearly as possible from the rest of the ideologies. Many incidents are *exclusively religious*, meaning that ‘religious’ is the *only* ideology assigned to the perpetrator group of that incident. These clearly fall into the category ‘religious’ in any analysis. The exclusively religious category also has to be considered the valid measurement of the new terrorist because the groups are solely religious. There are *combination religious* groups where religion is mixed with one or more other ideologies. Although there are many such combinations, 97.9 percent of these incidents are nationalist-separatist in combination with religious. The problem is that there is no way of knowing which, if any, is the dominant ideology. This becomes a problem in particular in relation to lethality. Should I expect a combination religious group to be tethered or untethered to secular morale? The combination religious incidents do not fit comfortably within either the exclusively religious category or a nationalist-separatist category. The indicator has to be a valid representation of the theory, and only exclusively religious groups are a valid representation of this. Once another ideology is involved, the validity is questionable in relation to the theory. The best solution to this validity problem is to use two definitions of a religious group; one *exclusively* religious and one *combination* religious category. That way, all non-secular new terrorists are separated from all the secular traditional terrorists.

The other categories used are leftist, rightist and nationalist separatists. To make sure that these are the truest representations of the political left, right and of nationalist-separatists the categories which do not clearly fit in any of these, are put in a final ‘other’ category. Incidents with unknown perpetrators are also treated separately as an ideology. Unlike the religious variables, these variables are not mutually exclusive. A terrorist group with a ‘Nationalist Separatist & Rightist’ ideology cannot comfortably be put in either category alone, and is therefore put in both. This is a conscious decision of deliberately biasing the analysis against the theory of new terrorism because I have no way of determining which ideology is dominant. Piazza (2009) also does this, and a figure indicating when the other categories are overestimates because if this can be found in the appendix. The problem is not at all large. Overall, I argue this is the best solution to achieve valid indicators to test new terrorism.

The incidents with an unknown perpetrator are given their own dummyvariable for easy separation. Incidents with a known group name, but no ideological profile are also given their own dummy variable, called ‘Known Group, No Ideology’.

This effectively reduces the 53 ideological categories to a dummy set of 8 ideological variables. The category reductions are as follows;⁴³

The '**leftist**' variable is given the value 1 if the original ideological variable lists; Anti-Globalization, Communist-Socialist, Leftist, Anarchist & Communist-Socialist, Anarchist & Leftist, Anti-Globalization & Communist-Socialist, Anti-Globalization & Leftist, Communist-Socialist & Leftist, Communist-Socialist & Nationalist-Separatist, Communist-Socialist & Right Wing, Environmental & Leftist, Leftist & Nationalist-Separatist, Anti-Globalization & Communist Socialist & Nationalist-Separatist, Communist-Socialist & Nationalist Separatist & Leftist, Communist-Socialist & Nationalist Separatist & Racist, Communist-Socialist & Nationalist Separatist & Right Wing, Communist-Socialist & Other, Leftist & Other, Communist-Socialist & Leftist & Other and finally Communist-Socialist & Nationalist Separatist & Other.

The '**rightist**' variable is given the value 1 if the original ideological variable lists; Right Wing, Anarchist & Right Wing, Anti-Globalization & Right Wing, Communist-Socialist & Right Wing, Nationalist-Separatist & Right Wing, Racist & Right Wing, Anti-Globalization & Racist & Right Wing, Communist-Socialist & Nationalist-Separatist & Right Wing, Nationalist-Separatist & Racist & Right Wing and finally Right Wing & Other.

The '**nationalist-separatist**' variable is given the value 1 if the original ideological variable lists; Nationalist-Separatist, Anti-Globalization & Nationalist-Separatist, Communist-Socialist & Nationalist-Separatist, Environmental & Nationalist-Separatist, Leftist & Nationalist-Separatist, Nationalist-Separatist & Racist, Anti-Globalization & Communist-Socialist & Nationalist-Separatist, Communist-Socialist & Nationalist-Separatist & Leftist, Communist-Socialist & Nationalist-Separatist & Racist, Communist-Socialist & Nationalist-Separatist & Right Wing, Nationalist-Separatist & Racist & Right Wing, Nationalist-Separatist & Other and finally Communist-Socialist, Nationalist-Separatist & Other.

The '**exclusively religious**' variable is given the value 1 if the original ideological variable lists; Religious.

The '**combination religious**' variable is given the value 1 if the original ideological variable lists; Communist-Socialist & Religious, Leftist & Religious, Nationalist-Separatist & Religious, Religious & Right Wing, Leftist & Nationalist-Separatist & Religious, Nationalist-Separatist & Racist & Religious, Nationalist-Separatist & Religious & Right Wing, Racist & Religious & Right Wing, Religious & Other and finally Nationalist-Separatist & Racist & Religious & Right Wing.

The '**other**' variable is given the value 1 if the original ideological variable lists; Anarchist, Environmental, Racist, Other, Anarchist & Anti-Globalization, Anarchist & Environmental, Anti-Globalization & Environmental, and finally Environmental & Other.

The '**known group, no ideology**' variable is given the value 1 for all incidents where the group name is not listed as 'Unknown' and is not captured in any of the above variables. Thus, there are real group names in this category as well as categories such as "Palestinians", "Hutus" or "U/I Gunmen".

The '**unknown**' variable is given the value 1 if the perpetrator group name for the incident is 'Unknown'.

Once the ideological categories are defined, I have to evaluate these. My own coding needs to be compared against the TKB coding, and the ideological coverage across time has to be evaluated in both the domestic and transnational domains. One way to evaluate the success of the coding process is to compare with previous studies. As mentioned previously Rasler & Thompson (2009) look for Rapoport's waves in the ITERATE dataset. They do so by introducing an indicator for ideology using several different sources and their own research, just like this thesis. They identify 763 of 1,483 groups (circa 51 percent), and find that these groups are responsible for 44 percent of the incidents in the ITERATE dataset. They also perform a correlation test between the total yearly terrorist activity and the covered terrorist activity, with a Pearson's R-value of .938 (Rasler & Thompson, 2009:33). There are 2,031 unique group names carrying out terrorist attacks in the GTD from 1985–2010 and

⁴³ There is more information on this in the attached codebook I have written for the thesis.

1,141 of these have an ideological profile (or 56.2 percent). The correlation tests were carried out for the yearly covered versus total activity for all incidents ($r=.8181$), domestic incidents ($r=.8203$) and transnational incidents ($r=.9161$).⁴⁴ The correlation tests for the transnational incidents are on par with those Rasler & Thompson (2009) present for ITERATE, which also hold transnational incidents. The domestic correlation test is lower but still strong. I have better coverage in terms of the number of groups covered out of the total, and I have more groups. 35,860 out of 74,818 incidents (or 47.9 percent) have an ideological profile. However, many of the 74,818 incidents have an unknown perpetrator and are impossible to assign an ideological profile. 41,889 incidents have a known perpetrator group, which means that 85.6 percent of the incidents with a known perpetrator group has an ideological profile. Overall, the coverage is a significant improvement on previous research and is deemed sufficient for analysis.

Figure 2. Comparing the Coverage TKB and My Own Coding




Figure 2 shows the percentage of the total number of groups that were coded as each ideology. For example, a little over 10 percent of my own coded groups were leftists, while almost 25 percent of the TKB sourced groups were coded as leftist. This comparison shows that the proportion of groups coded nationalist-separatist and exclusively religious are highly similar. I

have put proportionately more groups in the other and rightist categories, while less in the combination religious and leftist categories. This is the closest I will get to comparing how my own coding scheme has worked compared to that of the TKB. If I had coded no groups in any category, I would have been worried. Also, if the relationships between the bars were highly dissimilar from the TKB to my own coding, it would be cause for worry. Overall, it would appear that both the coding and the reduction of categories have gone well. This comparison should be treated lightly, because the two sets are *not* directly comparable when I have coded the smaller groups while the TKB have coded the larger groups. Differences may

⁴⁴ I am uncertain as to how Rauffer & Thompson (2009) carried out their tests, but I counted yearly occurrences and collapsed the dataset to one observation per year. I also performed a test for all incidents in the entire time-period from 1970-2010 ($r= .9044$). I'm uncertain why the results are so different using the entire time-period, however it looks like the unknown patterns change radically during the 1990s. This fact may also change the pearsons r test in the ITERATE data if all pre-1985 incidents were removed in that data set.

simply reflect the fact that there are more small-time rightist and other groups that were not captured by the TKB project. This is more likely, since the TKB profiles cover most of the incidents, yet far fewer of the groups.

Figure 3. The Ideological Distribution of Groups




Figure 3 shows how many out of the total number of groups are placed within each ideology. There most groups are found in the nationalist-separatist category, while the second-most are found in the other category. Exclusively religious groups make up for the second-smallest portion of the total number of coded groups, the number of rightist groups being the only ideology with fewer groups coded.

Figure 4. Ideological Coverage Across Time




Figure 4 shows the percent of the total incidents each year with a known perpetrator that have been assigned an ideological profile. This means that all the incidents with an unknown perpetrator are taken out of the calculations. There are a large number of unknown incidents, and a short discussion on this can be found in the appendix. This thesis

has to deal with terrorism with known perpetrators because I am mapping the ideologies of the perpetrator groups.⁴⁵

There is one line for the total coverage, one for the domestic (dom.) coverage and one for the transnational (tra.) coverage for my own coding and for the TKB coding respectively. There is also one line showing the total coverage using both ideology-sources and all incidents. The figure shows that the coverage is pretty even across time, which is very important for these analyses. It also illustrates the contribution of my own coding, especially for transnational terrorist incidents in 1996 and 1997 where the TKB coverage drops below 40 percent. Overall, my own coding appears to smooth out the variation from the TKB coding. The total line in the high-70s or above throughout the graph meaning most of the incidents

⁴⁵ A figure where the unknown incidents are part of the calculations can be found in the appendix.

with a known perpetrator throughout the time period has been assigned an ideological profile. The total coverage is at its lowest from 1991–1999.

To summarize the ideological indicators; the indicators are considered a valid representation of the theory, the joining of my coding and the TKB coding appears to have gone well and finally the coverage is good and correlated with the total number of incidents each year throughout the time period. All in all, the ideological indicators are deemed fit for use in the analyses.

Lethality

The GTD variable for the number of killed ‘...stores the number of total confirmed fatalities for the incidents. The number includes all victims *and* attackers who died as a direct result of the incident. Where there is evidence of fatalities, but the number is not reported, “-99” or “Unknown” is the value given in this field’ (START, 2011c)⁴⁶ It is necessary to control for extremely lethal incidents in the analyses on lethality. Piazza (2009) controls for both al-Qaida affiliation and 9/11 using dummy-variables in his regression analyses. This tactic doesn’t work well for the GTD data because 9/11 are not the only events in the near-thousand-range. I found it difficult to be the judge of when ‘extremely lethal’ incidents begin and ‘normal incidents’ stop, and I chose a different approach altogether. In the time-period 1985–2010, only 6 terrorist incidents have led to more than 400 fatalities, the twin towers of 9/11 being two of these. Furthermore, only 32 incidents (or .04 percent) have led to equal to, or more than 200 dead. Finally, 102 incidents (or .14 percent) left equal to, or more than, 100 dead. I created two filter variables for these incidents, one filter for equal to, or more than 200 dead (200+), and the same for 100 dead (<100 Killed). Only the <100 Killed filter is used, nevertheless I produce some statistics for the 200+ filter as well to illustrate the data loss caused by the <100 Killed filter. The 200+ filter removes .04 percent and the <100 Killed filter removes .14 percent of the total number of incidents respectively, meaning that 99.86 percent of the incidents are kept in an analysis using the strictest <100 Killed filter.⁴⁷ The data

⁴⁶ There are indications that the methods of follow up for each incident could be different in the pre- and post-PGIS research paradigm. Or at least that they may have had a different practice on how the number is reported. Continuous numbers, such as 14.5, are noted when the coders come across multiple different accounts, and a point in between is chosen. It is unlikely that the estimates are off in the tens and hundreds, and even more unlikely that these deviations are systematic. The sheer number of incidents itself also weigh up for a lot of the uncertainty regarding this. The regression method used to analyse this variable requires discrete (whole) numbers, therefore all continuous (.5, .8 etc.) registrations are rounded using the ‘round’ command in Stata 11.2.

⁴⁷ The practical data loss due to these filters may in fact be smaller because not all of the removed incidents have ideological profiles available for analysis, and would have been left out anyway. Also note that out of the 74 818 incidents from 1985-2010, 39 400 have zero fatalities.

loss is minimal and the distribution of the removed incidents among the ideologies are presented in table II.

Table II. Filter Variables for Lethality

Ideology	<100 Killed	<200 Killed	
Leftist	8	4	Three of the four exclusively religious incidents that are removed with the 200+ filter are perpetrated by al-Qaida, and are the 1998 Nairobi car-bomb and the two twin towers of 9/11. Other well-known groups in the 200+ filter are the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) with 3 incidents, one of which is the fourth most lethal of all. The Communist Party of Nepal – Maoist (CPN-
Rightist	2	0	
Nationalist-Separatist	21	4	
Exclusively Religious	15	4	
Combination Religious	10	2	
Other	6	3	
Known Group, No Ideology	21	8	
Unknown	19	7	
Total	102	32	
Number of Killed	21,152	12,426	

M), the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC), the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Party, Armed Islamic Group (GIA), the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), the Mozambique National Resistance Movement (MNR) and finally the Riyadus-Salikhin Reconnaissance and Sabotage Battalion of Chechen Martyrs. If any-one ideology stands out from the rest in terms of incidents lost, it is the Nationalist-Separatists, followed by the two religious categories. All in all, the filters removes miniscule number of incidents which claimed an extraordinary 21,152 deaths, or 11.9 percent of the total 177,459 fatalities from terrorism in the time period. These are indeed extremely lethal incidents, and the filters should serve to undercut most arguments regarding how such incidents influence the results of an analysis on lethality. If the religious incidents are more lethal, they will have to be so without the 15 most deadly incidents, out of several thousands. The same goes for any other ideology.

The lethality variable itself is considered a valid indicator, and a reliable source of information.⁴⁸

Suicide Attacks

The indicator of suicide terrorism is a dummy variable in the GTD, and the codebook states ‘This variable is coded “Yes” in those cases where there is evidence that the perpetrator did not intent to escape from the attack alive.’ (START, 2011c:21). This is not a valid representation of a *suicide bombing*, but it captures the will and intent to sacrifice one’s own

⁴⁸ An alternate solution would be to attempt other operationalization’s by combining the variable listing the number of killed with that listing the number of wounded. Digging this deep is beyond the scope of this thesis.

life in a terrorist incident, and is as such a valid measure of how religion supposedly inspires such acts.

Other variables

Time is represented as a dummy set of five-year period dummy variables, for example 1985–1989 is one dummy-variable.⁴⁹ There are several benefits with this operationalization; first of all, treating time in five-year intervals make the measurements more robust against yearly swings and ‘non-normal’ years; second, the dummy variables allow a direct peak into the development across time without predicting values with the models; and third, there is reason to suspect not all relationships are curve-linear and it may well be that the curve has more than one bend. Squared-functions of time, which capture curve-linearity, are unable to model more than one bend. Many regression models are presented, and it is important to have as similar models as possible to ease the transition from one to the next.

In addition to listing countries the GTD divides the world into thirteen larger regions (START, 2011c:16-17).⁵⁰ These are North America, Central America & The Caribbean, South America, East Asia, Southeast Asia, South Asia, Central Asia, Western Europe, Eastern Europe, Middle East & North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, Russia and the Newly Independent States (NIS), and Australasia & Oceania. These regional divisions are kept as is. Alternately, the variable could be divided into the five continents of the world although such a division holds little more validity than the current 13 regions. Alternate country-codes are not used in this thesis either, although there are several alternatives which are frequently used in conflict research, such as the UCDP country codes or the World Bank codes. Since country-level indicators are not merged into the data, the original country codes are kept. These can be viewed in the GTD codebook (START, 2011c).

⁴⁹ A linear ‘age’ version of yearly time, 0,1...41 years since 1970, was tested against a curvilinear representation and the five-year dummy set representation of time. Both curvilinear time and the five-year dummies proved a significant improvement on linear time, but neither curvilinear time nor five-year dummies proved an improvement on each other. Therefore, the choice between them is a matter of practicality.

⁵⁰ Although Huntington’s civilizational lines are not tested in this thesis cross-civilizational incidents could indeed be identified employing a similar technique to that of Enders, Sandler & Gaibullov (2011) to separate transnational from domestic incidents. This could be done by duplicating every variable used in their analysis where country names are listed and replacing these with the civilization to which they belong. Alternately, a dichotomous variable could be created indicating that the country in question lies at the border between two civilizations as a measure of fault line activity thus avoiding many of the ‘uncertain’ incidents the first one would result in.

Descriptive Statistics

Table III shows the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the analyses. The first column lists the total number of observations (incidents) in the dataset, this column is followed by the number and percentages of incidents that have the value 0 and 1 on the dummy-variables. These are the usual descriptive statistics used in most research. However, these numbers and percentages include both incidents without a known perpetrator and incidents with a known perpetrator, but no ideological profile. Therefore, it is an incorrect representation of the data used. The final column on the right shows how many percent has the value 1 *out of the known perpetrators*.

Table III. Summary Statistics of Variables Used

Discrete Variables	Tot. N	N 0	N 1	% 0	% 1	%1 (of Known Perpetrators)
<i>With Ideology</i>						
Leftist	74,818	58,777	16,041	78.56	21.44	38.29
Rightist	74,818	73,729	1,089	98.54	1.46	2.60
Nationalist-Separatist	74,818	65,724	9,094	87.85	12.15	21.71
Exclusively Religious	74,818	74,384	4,340	94.2	5.8	10.36
Combination Religious	74,818	71,674	3,144	95.8	4.2	7.51
Other	74,818	72,666	2,152	97.12	2.88	5.14
<i>No Ideology</i>						
Known	74,818	68,789	6,029	91.94	8.06	14.39
Unknown	74,818	41,889	32,929	55.99	44.01	-
Total	74,818	35,860	38,958	47.93	52.07	-
<i>Type of Incident</i>						
Transnational Incident	74,818	64,596	10,222	86.34	13.66	13.23
Domestic Incident	74,818	12,475	62,343	16.67	83.33	84.35
Uncertain Incident	74,818	72,565	2,253	96.59	3.41	2.43
Suicide Attack	74,818	72,957	1,861	97.51	2.49	2.01
Continuous Variables						
	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	-
Killed	72,679	2.442	12.842	0	1,382	-
<i>Country-Year Counts</i>						
Exclusively Religious	5,174	0.839	9.739	0	304	-
Transnational	5,174	0.106	1.260	0	43	-
Domestic	5,174	0.715	8.514	0	274	-
Combination Religious	5,174	0.608	5.272	0	140	-
Transnational	5,174	0.106	1.062	0	31	-
Domestic	5,174	0.484	4.800	0	139	-

For example, the 16,041 leftist incidents account for 21.44 percent of the total number of incidents in the data, but 44.73 percent of the incidents with a known perpetrator group.

This column shows that, of all the incidents with a known perpetrator, most are leftist, nationalist-separatist or exclusively religious.

Analysis Design: Graphs and Regression Models

In this section I outline how I will approach the analysis of the hypotheses. Some of the statistical methods used are quite complex, and the important thing to remember is that the approach is chosen in essence to get more reliable standard errors for the variables of interest. The interpretation of the models is not complicated by the methods used.

Figures

The primary method of analysis will be descriptive statistics, using line plots of the developments of religious terrorism across time. This is a valid approach because the dataset used is assumed to be closer to a list of the population than a random sample of terrorist incidents. Rasler & Thompson (2009), which is the most directly comparable to this thesis, use descriptive statistics from the ITERATE dataset. The main objective of the analysis is to illustrate development across the entire time-period of 1985–2010. Most of the figures will plot yearly counts of incidents for each ideology, and the percentage of the yearly total incidents one ideology is responsible for. This should provide a picture not only of the increase in terms of numbers, but whether an ideology becomes responsible for the majority of incidents at different points in time. Such graphs, and summary statistics, are produced for all my hypotheses. 16 graphs and 4 descriptive tables are presented in total.

Statistical Models Used

This section will briefly introduce the concept of multilevel longitudinal modelling used for the regression analyses of the data. Understanding the concept is not very important to the interpretation of the results, however understanding the reasons why I have chosen this approach is. I will define the base models mathematically as the concepts are introduced, however the model specifications for each hypothesis is laid out in text in the next section.

Most researchers are familiar with the logistic and Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression methods. Both of these methods are unsuitable for dealing with some of the hypotheses because of the nature of the dataset used. Time-series data, such as this, means that the observations of terrorism are dependent across time, within the countries and likely the regions in which they happen - thus violating the assumptions of these regression methods (Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal 2008, Field 2009). A multilevel model not only allow the observations of the dataset themselves have an effect on the dependent variable but also a

second level variable, such as regions, have an effect. There are several techniques available to accommodate for clustered data; the fixed effects estimator deal with factors that are the same for all units of the analysis at all times, such as time. All incidents that occurred in 1985 occurred in 1985 – there is no escaping this fact. The catch is that the fixed effects estimator is unable to model that which does not vary with time, such as for example gender. Conversely there are also random effects which are effects that are not the same for all units of analysis but fixed across time, such as gender or regions. (Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal 2008). Thus, the fixed effects estimator has to be used to model time in our models while the random effects estimator must be used to model the regions. This results in a mixed-effects model, including both fixed and random effects.

There are also two random effects estimates available to us; random coefficients and random intercepts. If regions are introduced as a second level random effect then a random coefficient would supply each region with its own regression slope. If regions are introduced as a second level random intercept then each region is given its own intercept, but not slope. The reason for this is that the random effects are estimated as variance from the population mean, meaning that a random coefficient would start at the population intercept and diverge from it at the rate of the random coefficient. Conversely, the random intercept would have the same slope as the population average but deviate from that average by the value of the random intercept – effectively shifting the regression line for one region away from the population average regression line (Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal, 2008). These two different solutions hold different types of information; a random coefficient would provide information on the direction of development in each region while the random intercept would provide a measure of difference between regions. In this thesis the single regional development is not the main interest, the fixed development across time is. The random-intercept approach is chosen and essentially functions as a control-variable – making sure that the clustering of the data is accounted for when estimating the fixed effects.

Having already given away the fact that time is represented as a fixed effect (meaning it will be treated as an independent variable) it is prudent to point out that other alternatives for representing time is not suitable for these analyses. The most common other solution to representing time, or longitudinal modelling, is to introduce time as a lagged effect. This means, for example, that a model with country GDP as an independent variable can introduce a lagged version of GDP and to see if changes in the GDP *cause* changes in the dependent variable after for example two years of lag. (Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal 2008) This solution is unsuitable because we have no causal independent variables *per se*, the causal relationship

between time and new terrorism is known to be spurious. Simply put; the lagged relationship between time and new terrorist traits are both meaningless and uninteresting in the context of this thesis.

To sum up, we require a longitudinal model treating time as a fixed effect and clustering the incidents around regions or countries as a random effect. The math of such a model is, at its base, a standard regression model with the random intercepts added as an error term at the end of the equation to indicate the random intercept's distance from the population regression line.

$$y_{ij} = \beta_1 + \beta_2 x_{2ij} + \dots + \beta_x x_{xij} + \zeta_j + \epsilon_{ij} \quad (1)$$

Where y_{ij} is the dependent variable of the model for occasion, i , and region, j . On the estimation side of the equation, β_1 denotes the population average intercept for the model while $\beta_2 x_{2ij} + \dots + \beta_x x_{xij}$ are independent variables as we know them from other regression equations. ζ_j is the j^{th} region's random intercept variance from the population average, or the level two residual. In other words, it denotes the j^{th} regions intercept deviation from the population average intercept β_1 . Finally; ϵ_{ij} is the level one residual. (Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal 2009:192).

The longitudinal random intercept model above assumes that both the level 1 and level 2 error terms are normally distributed around the population average with a mean of zero. The error terms are also assumed to be independent, which has different implications for the two terms; the level 1 error term contains both occasions of measurement and regional variance and has to be independent across both, while the level 2 error term has to be independent across the level 2 units (regions). (Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal 2009:192). The above is, in a sense, an alternative to including all the regions of the world as independent dummy variables however such a model would assume that the residual between regions is the same as that within regions, which is unreasonable. Also, it would add 13 dummy variables to the existing equation containing time dummy variables making for a highly complex model (Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal 2009).

Several of the hypotheses of this thesis have to be tested with a dichotomous dependent variable. The more familiar logistic model can be specified as a longitudinal model with random intercepts without any changes on the right side of the equation, simply substituting the outcome with...

$$\text{logit}\{\text{Pr}(y_{ij} = 1|x_{ij}, \zeta_j)\} = \beta_1 + \beta_2 x_{2ij} + \dots + \beta_x x_{xij} + \zeta_j + \epsilon_{ij} \quad (2)$$

The assumptions of *this* logistic regression model remain largely the same. The level two error term remains normally distributed with a mean of zero while the level one error term follows the logistic distribution of continuous probabilities. The assumptions of independence for both error terms remain the same (Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal 2009). This method can be modelled using *xtnlogit* in Stata 11.2.

We require one more regression model because some dependent variables are discrete count variables, such as the number of killed, which are ill suited for an OLS regression. This is primarily because the observations are neither independent across time nor across the units of analysis (see Field 2009:133). They cluster in a non-random manner around specific points in time and regions, and there is cause to assume there is interplay between these across time. Hox (2010:115) recommends the Poisson distribution and regression model is more suitable for these types of analyses. The Poisson regression model often has a problem with what is called *overdispersion*⁵¹. Overdispersion means, essentially, that the model (using the Poisson distribution instead of the normal distribution) underfits the amount of dispersion present in the data. In short, there is more variation in the data than the Poisson-distribution assumes, leading to a distribution of the error terms that expands well past the Poisson distribution (Hox, 2010:118). A sign of this is when the standard deviation of the dependent variable is larger than the average value. This means that the standard error estimates are biased downward, increasing the risk of wrongfully rejecting a null hypothesis and concluding that there is a significant relationship between the independent and dependent variable (or what is called a Type I error) (Long & Freese, 2006:372). An alternative to this model would have been the Negative Binomial Regression (NBRM) (as used by Piazza (2009)), however this leads to problems once the random intercept is introduced because it, and the level-1 overdispersion factor (introduced to solve the problem of overdispersion in NBRMs), are estimated from the same parameter. As a consequence, the regions cannot vary without overdispersion at level-1. Therefore, the NBRM is not recommended if we want to introduce a region specific intercept to the model (Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal 2008:394). Instead, Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal (2008:395) recommend using a random intercept Poisson model and re-estimate the standard errors only using the sandwich estimator, which can be obtained by using the *gllamm* model in STATA 11.2. By doing so we effectively avoid the problems introduced by a NBRM and reduce the risk of a Type I error caused by overdispersion. (See Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal, 2008:395; Rabe-Hesketh & Everitt 2000:95). Once again, the

⁵¹ Also known as ‘Extra-binomial variation’ or ‘extra-Poisson variability’.

random intercept is once again introduced to model unobserved heterogeneity between regions. The mixed effects Poisson regression model can be expressed as...

$$\mu_{ij} = \exp(\beta_1 + \beta_2 x_{2i} + \dots + \beta_x x_{xij} + \zeta_{1j}) \quad (3)$$

The level-two error term is assumed to be normally distributed with a mean of zero. It is also independent across the second level units of analysis, like the previous models introduced. However, the number of incidents for a region at two occasions are treated as conditionally dependent (Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal, 2009:381). This model can be estimated using *xtmepoisson* in Stata 11.2.

The main contribution of the random intercepts are more accurate level-1 standard errors, which is exactly what I am after. This should make the results more robust against variation between regions and countries, allowing me to more accurately observed the global phenomenon instead. The random intercept need not be interpreted in order to contribute to a regression model, it is used more as a control-variable in this case. This is the reason why I use random intercepts in the models that treat time.

Interpretations of Regression Models Used in this Thesis

Since the Poisson regression model is not interpreted in the same way as the more commonly used OLS or Logistic regression models, I will briefly outline how they can be interpreted. The interpretations used in this thesis are rather superficial since the models are used as a complementary tool to confirm the trends seen in the figures. The logistic models have a dependent variable which can either have the value 0 or 1. For example, if exclusively religious incidents are the dependent variable, this dependent variable will have the value 1 if the incident was perpetrated by an exclusively religious group and 0 if it was not. The point of the logistic regression model is to tell us what the probability of the value 1 is, or what is the probability of an exclusively religious incident. The logistic regression coefficients are given in natural logarithms, or ‘logged numbers’, which say little by themselves save the direction the probability will go; either more or less probable. You can obtain what is called a logit by solving the regression equation, and that logit can be turned into a probability.⁵² Such detailed information is not devoted time in this thesis because there is no room for it nor is it of prime interest. I therefore use the third option, which is the oddsratio interpretation. By exponentiating the logistic regression coefficients I obtain the oddsratio (OR), which is the ratio between two odds. If the oddsratio is above 1, then the odds are increased and if it is below 1 then the odds are decreased.

⁵² Once you have the logit, or L, you solve the following equation; $P = 1/(1-e^{-L})$

Interpretation of the oddsratio is best given by examples. Let's say that the dependent variable has the value 1 if the incident was exclusively religious. As independent variables, we have a dummy set of five-year time periods using the years 1985–1989 as a reference category. If the oddsratio of the time period 1990–1994 is 1.8 I immediately know that the odds of an incident being exclusively religious is higher from 1990–1994 than it is for the reference category of 1985–1989. Furthermore, this can be changed into a percentage by subtracting 1 and multiplying by 100. Thus, an oddsratio of 1.8 means that the odds of an exclusively religious incident is 80 percent higher in 1990–1994 than in 1985–1989. Since the analyses of this thesis are complemented by descriptive statistics from what I assume is a close approximation of the population of terrorist incidents, the oddsratio interpretation is deemed sufficient to substantiate the trends seen in the graphs. All independent variables in this thesis are dummy variables, so keep in mind that there is always a reference category.

The poisson regression models have dependent variables that are counts, meaning that they can go anywhere from 0 to infinity. Probabilities won't make sense when dealing with such discrete counts, but the interpretation of the poisson model is very similar to that of the logistic regression. I require no deeper interpretation in the poisson models than I do for the logistic models, therefore I will skip directly to the oddsratio equivalent of the poisson regression model; the Incidence Rate Ratio (IRR).

Let's say the dependent variable is the number of exclusively religious incidents, and the independent variable is the time period 1990–1994 with an IRR of 1,5 – and the reference category is still 1985–1989. The interpretation of that IRR would be, just like oddsratios, that there are more exclusively religious incidents in the time period 1990–1994 than in the time period 1985–1989. In fact, this model would expect to observe 1.5 times as many exclusively religious incidents in 1990–1994 as in 1985–1989. Thus, the IRR can also be converted to a measure of increase in percentages by subtracting 1 from the IRR, and multiplying it by 100. An IRR of 1,5 yields a 50 percent increase in the expected number of incidents produced on the dependent variable. The NBRM also provide an IRR, which is interpreted in the exact same manner.

I mentioned previously that the random intercept is introduced as a control, to help the model fit the data structure I have. Therefore, the intercept receives practically no weight in terms of interpretation other than to say that there is variation going on between countries or regions of the world. Also, the random intercept makes little sense for direct interpretation since the only figure provided is the standard deviation of all the regions or countries from the population average regression line. Therefore, the random intercept's true explanatory value

only comes to show if values are predicted for each country or region alone and then plotted in a graph. Such a graph would show the developments for each country across the time period, and such an interpretation is beyond the scope of this thesis. There also is no room for it.

Finally, the most important thing about all the logistic models of this thesis is to remember what the population I am generalizing to is. The dataset is a list of terrorist incidents, and as such the logistic models tell nothing about the likelihood of an exclusively religious incident taking place at all. The logistic models show what the likelihood of a terrorist incident being exclusively religious is, *once the incident has happened*. The incident is already a fact for the logistic models and they only provide information on that incident once it has already happened.

Checking the Assumptions of Multilevel Models

The assumed normal distribution of the second-level residuals are not checked because the model is not used for predicting values on the second level, the population is already registered in the data, and they are not used to draw major conclusions, and in some cases there are very few second level units. There is a debate regarding the quality of second-level interpretations models, especially for the cases where the number of second level units is low, as is the case with the 13 regions of the logistic models in this thesis. In the end, if the random intercept is of high interest, then the number of second level units needs to be high enough not to run out of degrees of freedom. If the random intercept is not of principal interest, such as in this thesis, the number can be much lower, and this becomes less of a problem. For more information on the discussion of second-level units, see Hox (2010:46-47). The models should not have multicollinearity, autocorrelation and discrimination (Eikemo & Clausen, 2007:113). Multicollinearity is was tested for, but since most of the dependent variables are more or less mutually exclusive dummy variables this doesn't present a problem, autocorrelation is what I control for with the random intercept and discrimination is not a problem with the variables used.⁵³

Model Specifications

The rest of this section is devoted to the regression models alone, which by larger are meant to support the conclusions drawn from the figures.

⁵³ Rightist have carried out no suicide attacks, and is the only discrimination problem to speak of. However, STATA automatically omits a variable if this is the case and so this is not a problem.

H₁ asks whether the number of religious incidents has increased with time. Since the GTD is a list of terrorist incidents, the dataset is collapsed into country-year observations of counts of religious terrorism incidents for the regression analysis. All gaps are filled in, meaning that all countries have 21 observations (one for each year), even if that observation is a count of 0 incidents. This results in a highly balanced⁵⁴ time dataset with a dependent count variable, which can be analysed using the Poisson regression model. The number of religious incidents is the dependent variable, while five-year time dummies are the independent variables. This model also uses a random intercept to account for the dependence between the observations within a country from one observation to the next. The random intercept fitted for these models are the countries of the GTD.

H₂ asks whether the religious proportion of all terrorist incidents has increased with time. This will be tested with a logistic regression model where the dependent variable has the value 1 if the terrorist incident was religious and five-year time dummies are the independent variables. The dataset is kept in its original form for this analysis, meaning one where the terrorist incidents are the observations. This model also uses a random intercept to account for the dependence between the observations within each region from year to year. The 13 regions of the GTD are fitted as a random intercept.⁵⁵

H₃ specifies that H₁ and H₂ are true for both domestic and transnational incidents. This requires the two models from H₁ and H₂ to be re-run for domestic and transnational incidents separately.

H₄ holds that there is a leftist decline through the time-period. This hypothesis is a slight sidestep from the real purpose of the thesis, and the trends seen in the graphs are very clear. This hypothesis is not tested with a regression model at all.

H₅ deals with the higher lethality of religious incidents. Once again, the dependent variable is a count variable of the number of killed in each incident. Due to problems with overdispersion, this dependent variable is analysed with the Negative Binomial Regression Model (NBRM), which is really a special case of the Poisson regression model suited for dealing with overdispersion. The dependent variable for this analysis is the number of killed in each incident, and the ideologies are the independent variables. In essence, this is a replication of Piazza (2009).

⁵⁴ Meaning that all countries have an equal amount of observations carried out at the same points in time. One observation, for each country, for every year.

⁵⁵ I was unable to fit the models with countries as random intercepts. In essence, the maximum likelihood estimation process was unable to find the direction to go to produce more likely coefficients ('not concave' error in Stata 11.2). I argue that regional random intercepts are still better than no random intercepts at all.

H₆ states that all strains of terrorism have become lethal over time. This hypothesis is not tested with a regression model.

H₇ states that a religious terrorist incident is more likely to be a suicide attack. This hypothesis is tested using a logistic regression model where the dependent variable has the value 1 if the incident was a suicide attack, and the different ideologies are the independent variables.

H₈ states that a religious incident is more likely to be transnational than an incident using any other ideology. This is tested with a logistic regression model where the dependent variable has the value 1 if the incident was transnational, and the ideologies are the independent variables.

In essence, I have specified five different regression models; one for the increase in the number of religious incidents, one for the proportional increase, or increased likelihood, of religious incidents, one for the increased lethality, one for suicide attacks, and finally one for transnational incidents. However, I use two different definitions of religious; one for combination religious incidents and one for exclusively religious incidents. There are also models which need to treat domestic and transnational incidents as separately. Thus, the *number* of regressions run quickly multiplies. A total of 20 regression models are presented, but there is only *one* regression table for each hypothesis, with the exception of hypothesis 3 which has two. Keep in mind that they are all, in essence, slight variations of the same model – exchanging the dependent variable with another definition or separating between domestic and transnational incidents. The relevant dependent variable is always listed when results are presented, along with information on when domestic and transnational incidents are included.

Results and Discussion

I have structured this section after the eight hypotheses put forth earlier. Relevant results are presented and discussed before moving on to the next hypothesis. This type of structure was necessary simply because there is too much information to take in all at once. I attempted to graph as much information as possible in each graph, but nearly all figures in this chapter exclude unknown incidents or incidents by a known perpetrator, but without an ideological profile. This does *not* mean that these have been left out of the analyses; Unknown and Known Group, No Ideology are part of *all* the calculations – they are just not plotted. If you note discrepancies between the trends from one graph to another, the cause of this discrepancy is found in the number of unknown incidents. Keep in mind that these graphs essentially show the counts and percentages of incidents with known perpetrators. If you're interested in full plots, some can be found in the appendix along with a short discussion on the implications of unknown incidents.

Hypothesis 1: The Numerical Increase of Religious Terrorist Incidents

H₁ The number of religiously motivated terrorist incident has risen significantly since 1979.

Figure 5. Yearly Number of Incidents for each Ideology




Figure 5 display the number of incidents for each year for the different ideologies. For example, roughly 1500 incidents were carried out by leftist groups in 1985. The data-loss of 1993 is also apparent as a sharp decline to very low levels – this real value for this year is likely somewhere between 1992 and 1994. This is true for all graphs dealing with counts.

The most apparent feature of the staggering number of leftist incidents from 1985–1991, and the rapid decline from 1991 to 1992 and finally 1994 (not counting 1993). The resurgence of leftism is also apparent at the end of the time period. There is some exclusively religious activity throughout the time period, but the first substantial activity is found from 1992–1996. From 2001 and on, the number of exclusively religious incidents is on a steady rise each year up until 2010. This graph is therefore supportive of a significant increase of religious terrorism, and the steady growth begins in 2001–2002. No other ideology is showing such a clear incline over time.

Table IV. Poisson Regression of Religious Terrorism

Dependents <i>Model</i>	All Incidents	
	Exclus. <i>1</i>	Comb. <i>2</i>
	IRR (S.E.)	IRR (S.E.)
1990–1994	9.198*** (.658)	1.206 (.248)
1995–1999	8.398*** (.645)	.477 (.652)
2000–2004	11.905*** (.681)	1.126 (.608)
2005–2010	40.326*** (.714)	1.305 (.636)
Constant	-8.346	.266
Country Std.Dev.	3.650 (.307)	3.800 (.357)
Country-Years (N)	5,174	5,174
LR χ^2	2557.54***	232.26***
LR vs. Poisson	26073.35 ***	18608.44 ***
Second Level N	199	199

* $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$

Table IV show two poisson regression models of country-year counts of Exclusively Religious (Exclus.) and Combination Religious (Comb.) incidents. The Incidence Rate Ratios are reported, along with robust standard errors. The models show no significant changes within combination religious incidents, and highly significant increases within exclusively religious incidents. The random intercept is given as a standard deviation from the regression line, ‘Country Std. Dev’, as noted previously I will not read more into this control than to say that there is significant variation between the countries. The significance-test of the multi-level model against a normal poisson model is given by LR vs. Poisson, and is highly significant indicating that a multilevel model

is indeed required for the data.⁵⁶ The LR χ^2 line show the model significance tests for the five-year time dummies. All such significance tests in this thesis are highly significant, and are not discussed further.

The lack of significant values in the combination religious models are supportive of the trend seen in the graph; that combination religious incidents appear to by a highly varying, yet constant feature throughout the time period. The same is not true for exclusively religious incidents, which increases significantly with every time period. Exclusively religious terrorists have indeed become more active in the 1990s and 2000s, clearly perpetrating more terrorist incidents. All in all, the evidence so far is highly supportive of H₁.

Hypothesis 2: The Proportional Increase of Religious Incidents

H₂ The proportion of all terrorist incidents that are religiously motivated has risen significantly over time since 1979.

⁵⁶ I you want to predict values using the random intercept, it has to be made part of the logit and turned into a probability. However, there are 199 countries and predicting only one makes little sense. Prediction of multilevel models is best done using statistical software.

Figure 6. Percentages of All Yearly Incidents




Figure 6 shows the percentages of the yearly total number of incidents that were perpetrated by each ideology. For example; leftists perpetrated nearly 50 percent of all the incidents in 1985. Most of the incidents up until 1992 are perpetrated by leftists, however the nationalist-separatist incidents catch up with the leftist line in 1993, and these two track each other throughout the

rest of the 1990s. It is not until 2002 that the exclusively religious incidents make up the largest single-ideology percentage of yearly incidents, and can in a sense be said to be ‘dominant’ throughout much of the 2000s. The recent resurgence of leftism is also evident in this graph, following 2007 and on. As per 2009–2010, leftists are once again responsible for a higher percentage of the yearly number of incidents than the exclusively religious ideology is. Both nationalist-separatists and combination religious experience a downward trend following 2002. The rightist and other-category are clustered at the bottom, and appear to be less active throughout most of the time period. Although there is exclusively religious activity throughout the 1990s, the real increase is located in 2002. There is a notable increase of combination religious activity from around 1998 to 2005, but the combination religious incidents never quite reach the same levels as those seen in the leftist, nationalist-separatist and exclusively religious lines. The combination religious activity is not sustained at high levels for many years either.

Table V shows a logistic regression model for exclusively religious and combination religious incidents. All time periods are associated with clearly increased oddsratios for exclusively religious terrorism, meaning in essence that the likelihood of a terrorist incident being exclusively religious is higher throughout the entire time period, compared to the reference category of 1985–1989. Although there are significant changes in the oddsratios for combination religious incidents as well, only the period from 2000–2004 has an oddsratio of over 1, inevitably meaning an increase in the likelihood of a terrorist incident being combination religious.

Table V. Logistic Regression Models 1-6 for Hypotheses 1 & 3

Dependents <i>Model</i>	All Incidents	
	Exclus. 3	Comb. 4
	OR (S.E.)	OR (S.E.)
1990–1994	6,54*** (0.143)	.783*** (0.060)
1995–1999	8,101*** (0.144)	.39*** (0.076)
2000–2004	20,635*** (0.142)	1,452*** (0.062)
2005–2010	17,939*** (0.138)	.399*** (0.056)
Constant	-7,401	-4,901
Region	2.420	2.503
Std. Dev.	(.583)	(.581)
Incidents (N)	74,818	74,818
LR χ^2	976.17***	723.97***
LR vs. Logistic	2374.01***	3622.43***
Second Level N	13	13

* $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$

The oddsratios for the exclusively religious model appear to be incredibly high, while the combination religious increase of the early 2000s is relatively low. The reason for this is that there are 55 exclusively religious incidents in the reference category of 1985–1989. Therefore, the odds of a terrorist incident being exclusively religious in 2005–2010 are 1693.9 percent higher than in 1985–1989. The random intercepts for this model are the regions because I was unable to fit country-intercepts.⁵⁷ The significance tests for a multilevel model are still significant, and there is variation between the regions as well.

The evidence is highly supportive of H₂, and the marked increased probability of an exclusively religious incident. Exclusively religious terrorism has grown to unprecedented levels in the 2000s, and are at times responsible for the largest single percentage of yearly incidents worldwide.

Hypothesis 3: H1 & H2 is True for Domestic and Transnational Incidents

H₃ Hypotheses 1 and 2 hold for both transnational and domestic terrorist incidents.


Hypothesis 3 requires all the figures and models seen so far to be re-run for domestic and transnational incidents separately.

Figures 7 and 8 separate the counts of domestic and transnational incidents throughout the time period. First of all, the number of domestic incidents far outnumbers the domestic incidents, which is why the transnational curves appear more erratic than the domestic curves.

Both graphs show the same general trends seen already. The leftist decline is evident in both graphs – but the recent resurgence appears to primarily locate in the domestic domain.


⁵⁷ The Maximum Likelihood estimation process had trouble finding the direction to go in order to produce more likely coefficients. I was unable to resolve the problem, and fitted regional intercepts instead. I believe this may be second-level discrimination problem.

Figures 7 & 8. Yearly Number of Domestic and Transnational Incidents



The number of exclusively religious incidents grows steadily from at least 2004 and on, while the number of exclusively religious transnational incidents grows markedly from 2002 to 2003. After this, the transnational incidents maintain similar levels until another peak in 2007. Note that both the number of domestic and transnational incidents rise, and are sustained at unprecedented levels throughout much of the 2000s. Nationalist-separatists appear to have produced the largest number of transnational incidents in a year ever in 1994. This level drops dramatically in the late 1990s. No other ideology shows such clear signs of steady growth and high levels as exclusively religious incidents, with the exception of the recent domestic leftist upswing. In terms of numbers, there is a much clearer exclusively religious presence in the domestic domain than in the transnational domain before 2002.

Figures 9 & 10. Yearly Percentages of Domestic and Transnational Incidents



Figures 9 & 10 show the percentages of yearly incidents separated between the domestic and transnational incidents. All in all, the trends are the same. The transnational graph is clearly influenced by the fact that there are few transnational incidents, and that an increase of relatively few incidents cause large spikes in terms of percentages. Exclusively religious incidents make up the largest single ideological portion of domestic terrorism

throughout much of the 2000s, and the same can be said for transnational incidents for slightly less years.

Notably, the exclusively religious domestic incidents remain at a slow decline throughout the 2000s, and arrive at this level from 2001 to 2002. The exclusively religious entrance into the transnational domain is even more marked, jumping from a sub-5 percentage to nearly 20 over the course of two years from 2002 to 2003. After a slight decrease, the levels increase yet again to a little over 20 percent. It would appear that exclusively religious incidents are present in significant numbers much earlier in the domestic domain, than in the transnational domain. They move into transnational incidents dramatically from 2001 to 2002.

The poisson regression model for counts, and the logistic regression model for proportions are run again with exclusively religious and combination religious as the dependent variable. This time, they are run for domestic and transnational separately, leading to 8 regressions that are practically identical. The poisson count models are presented first.

Table VI. Poisson Regression Domestic and Transnational Religious Terrorism

Dependents <i>Model</i>	Domestic		Transnational	
	Exclus. 5	Comb. 6	Exclus. 7	Comb. 8
	IRR (S.E.)	IRR (S.E.)	IRR (S.E.)	IRR (S.E.)
1990–1994	11.001*** (.723)	1.137 (.219)	4.076*** (.712)	2.266 (.479)
1995–1999	10.496*** (.727)	.391 (.719)	2.462*** (.597)	1.235 (.245)
2000–2004	13.303*** (.794)	1.051 (.688)	8.998*** (.65)	2.282 (.735)
2005–2010	47.229*** (.786)	1.339 (.716)	21.349*** (.759)	1.484 (.696)
Constant	-9.074	-11.163	-8.524	-8.187
Country Std.Dev.	3.749 (.321)	5.904 (1.247)	3.046 (.324)	3.519 (.498)
Country-Years (N)	5,174	5,174	5,174	5,174
LR χ^2	2137.73***	234.37***	341.91***	52.62***
LR vs. Poisson	22603.26***	15572.50***	2868.07***	3249.17***
Second Level N	199	199	199	199

* $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$

All model significance tests are highly significant, and the country-standard deviation is unequal to zero, meaning there is significant difference between the countries of the world.

Note that all the time periods of the exclusively religious models are significantly different from the reference category of 1985–1989, while none of the combination religious models are. This is caused by the fact that combination religious incidents have a constant presence throughout the time period, and despite yearly variation the overall levels remain much the same. The growth of exclusively religious terrorism, however, is apparent. All time periods are associated with a higher number of exclusively religious incidents, and the growth is especially high from 2005–2010. The growth is also more dramatic in the domestic domain than in the transnational domain, although the IRRs aren't directly comparable because the same incidents are not found in the reference category of domestic and transnational incidents.

Table VII. Logistic Regression Domestic and Transnational Incidents

Dependents <i>Model</i>	Domestic		Transnational	
	Exclus. 9	Comb. 10	Exclus 11	Comb. 12
	<i>OR (S.E.)</i>	<i>OR (S.E.)</i>	<i>OR (S.E.)</i>	<i>OR (S.E.)</i>
1990–1994	7,523*** (0.166)	.776 *** (0.067)	2,954 (0.315)***	1,234 (.159)
1995–1999	10,288*** (0.167)	.326*** (0.089)	3,193*** (0.336)	1,528 ** (0.181)
2000–2004	23,689*** (0.166)	1,401*** (0.069)	11,554*** (0.300)	2,382*** (0.162)
2005–2010	19,011 *** (0.161)	.386*** (0.062)	13,846*** (0.289)	1,241 (.167)
Constant	-7,74	-4,823	-6,378	-5,132
Region	2.852	2.475	1.762	2.084
Std. Dev.	(.778)	(.582)	(.500)	(.565)
Incidents (N)	62,343	62,343	10,222	10,222
<i>LR</i> χ^2	719.38***	618.62***	194.58***	41.77***
LR vs. Logistic	2036.90***	2874.31***	436.81***	812.98***
Second Level N	13	13	13	13

* $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$

The logistic models show significant values for both exclusively religious and combination religious incidents in all models. Only the transnational combination religious incidents of the early 1990s and late 2000s are not significantly different from the reference category of 1985–1989. It would appear that the oddsratio of an exclusively religious domestic incident was at its highest from 2000-2004, while the transnational incidents peak a little later in 2005–2010. This is in line with what has been shown in the graphs so far. All time periods are


associated with increased odds ratios of exclusively religious terrorism, both in the domestic and transnational domain. This is not true for combination religious incidents, which are lower in all time periods but 2000-2004 in the domestic domain, and significantly higher in the transnational domain from 1995–2004.

All in all the regression models confirm the patterns seen in the graphs, and are highly supportive of H₃. The increase in both numbers and proportions hold for both domestic and transnational incidents. Also, combination religious incidents appear to be a constant feature throughout the time period, unlike the exclusively religious incidents. Although the combination religious incidents peak in terms of proportion, their number is not significantly higher in any of the time periods. This means that there is a change in the counts of the other ideologies which lead to an increased likelihood of a combination religious incident, without significant changes in their overall number of terrorist incidents.

Hypothesis 4: The Decrease of Leftist Incidents

H₄ The number of incidents motivated by a leftist ideology have declined significantly after the Cold War.

Figures 11 & 12. Yearly Counts and Percentages of Leftist Terrorism



Figures 11 & 12 show the yearly numbers and proportions of all terrorist attacks that were leftist. They also separate between transnational and domestic leftist terrorism since evidence has been put forth so far that support a domestic leftist resurgence in the latter years. In relation to H₄, these graphs tell a pretty clear story; after 1992(or maybe 1993) there is a drastic decline in both the yearly number and percentages of leftist terrorism. Leftist terrorist incidents drop from near 2000 in 1991 to just over 500 in 1994. The trend continues in a general downward direction up until 2007 when leftist terrorism rises once again to levels not seen since 1994 and earlier. Although the number of transnational leftist incidents is low compared to domestic incidents, they were responsible for roughly 20 to 30 percent of the

yearly transnational incidents up until at least 1992. There is strong support for H₄ up until 2007, and the recent resurgence is not in line with new terrorism. It would appear that leftist terrorists do not need the Cold War to remain active, but a large fraction of their activities may have depended on it.

Hypothesis 5: Increased Lethality

H₅ Religiously motivated terrorist incidents cause significantly higher casualties than incidents motivated by any other ideology.

During the variable operationalization in the method chapter I introduced two filters for the number of killed. For this thesis I have settled on using the <100 Killed filter, meaning the 102 incidents which caused 100 or more casualties are removed from the analysis. Unless specified with ‘Without <100 Killed filter’, all the figures and tables on this hypothesis use the <100 Killed filter.

Table VIII. Descriptive Statistics of the Number Killed

Ideologies	<i>Without <100 Killed Filter</i>			<i><100 Killed Filter</i>		
	Mean	Std. Dev	Freq	Mean	Std. Dev	Freq
Leftist	1,911	7,753	15,366	1,800	5,253	15,358
Rightist	4,043	10,656	874	3,783	9,174	872
Nationalist-Separatist	3,227	14,315	8,953	2,812	7,269	8,932
Exclusively Religious	4,364	31,675	4,273	3,334	7,776	4,258
Combination Religious	3,944	13,428	3,027	3,366	7,545	3,017
Other	2,964	13,678	2,088	2,415	7,174	2,082
Known Group, No Ideology	3,530	20,863	5,877	2,709	7,485	5,856
Unknown	1,805	6,334	32,221	1,708	4,823	32,202
Total	2,442	12,842	72 679	2,154	5,996	72 577

Table VIII presents more in depth descriptive statistics so that the means and standard deviations can be observed when the <100 Killed filter is applied to the lethality variable. For example, the mean number of killed in a leftist incident is 1,9 without the filter, and 1,8 with the filter. The total-row at the bottom show the descriptive numbers for the whole GTD, so the mean number of killed in a terrorist incident in the GTD is 2,442 without the filter - and 2,154 with the filter on. The exclusively religious incidents are clearly the hardest hit by the <100 Killed filter, dropping the mean lethality rate by 1,03. The standard deviation of the exclusively religious category also drops drastically by 23,899, many times that of nationalist-separatist, and combination religious incidents. This clearly shows how removing the 102 most lethal incidents from the GTD impact the mean lethality rates. Using the <100 Killed filter, the exclusively religious incidents have the second-highest mean lethality rate of all,

second only to rightist incidents. Also note that the mean values are low all over, and that none were above 5 even before the filter was applied. Most ideologies are above the total-mean of the GTD because there are so many unknown and leftist incidents – and on average, these appear to be the least lethal of all. Rightist incidents followed by combination and exclusively religious are the most lethal incidents, and the standard deviations indicate that the rightist incidents vary more than the other two categories. This is because there are relatively few incidents in the rightist category. Although exclusively religious incidents are in the most lethal section, they do not separate themselves from the rest of the ideologies in the way I would expect. These numbers are not very supportive of H₄.

Table IX. Negative Binominal Regression of Lethality

<i>Model Number</i>	Without <100 Killed Filter			<100 Killed Filter		
	All	Dom.	Tran.	All	Dom.	Tran.
	<i>13</i>	<i>14</i>	<i>15</i>	<i>16</i>	<i>17</i>	<i>18</i>
	IRR	IRR	IRR	IRR	IRR	IRR
	(S.E.)	(S.E.)	(S.E.)	(S.E.)	(S.E.)	(S.E.)
Rightist	2.168*** (.071)	2.171*** (.072)	2.305*** (.324)	2.1*** (.069)	2.147*** (.070)	.598 (.343)
Nationalist-Separatist	1.68*** (.028)	1.835*** (.030)	1.408*** (.100)	1.556*** (.027)	1.758*** (.029)	1.116 (.096)
Exclusively Religious	2.286*** (.036)	2.123*** (.038)	5.254*** (.136)	1.852*** (.035)	1.701*** (.037)	4.998*** (.128)
Combination Religious	2.067*** (.042)	2.054*** (.045)	3.225*** (.138)	1.87*** (.041)	1.917*** (.043)	2.63*** (.131)
Other	1.553*** (.049)	1.647*** (.051)	.735 (.198)	1.342*** (.048)	1.401*** (.050)	.909 (.186)
Known Group	1.85***	1.958***	1.662***	1.505***	1.57***	1.551***
No Ideology	(.032)	.035	(.112)	(.032)	(.034)	(.107)
Unknown	.946*** (.021)	.993 (.022)	.837** (.090)	.949** (.020)	.986 (.021)	1.007 .086
Constant	.646	.683	.094	.588	.63	-.12
Inalpha	1.422	1.354	1.831	1.335	1.27	1.665
Incidents (N)	72,679	60,510	9,964	72,577	60,426	9,949
LR χ^2	1769.62 ***	1493.75 ***	459.86 ***	1192.12 ***	1088.51 ***	375.31 ***
LR-test of Alpha = 0	460 000 ***	380 000 ***	55 000 ***	310 000 ***	260 000 ***	28 000 ***

* $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$

The IRR's of the negative binominal regression are interpreted the same way as in the poisson regression models. Models 13-15 show all, domestic and transnational incidents respectively, including all incidents – or no filter. Models 16-19 show the same, only with the <100 Killed filter. Rightist incidents appear to be the most lethal in comparison to leftist groups. Without

the filter they are marginally more deadly in the transnational domain than in the domestic domain, however once the filter is applied the domestic incidents are revealed as the most deadly while the transnational rightist incidents are not significantly different from transnational leftist incidents. Nationalist-separatist incidents are also more lethal than leftist incidents, but this also appears only to be true for domestic incidents once the filter is applied. Exclusively religious incidents are more lethal than leftist incidents, and although the IRRs are somewhat reduced once the filter is applied this finding is robust and evident across all models. Model 17 shows that exclusively religious domestic incidents are about as lethal as nationalist-separatist incidents in comparison to leftist incidents, and that the most lethal domestic forms of terrorism are rightists and combination religious groups. Model 18 shows that exclusively religious terrorism which produces less than 100 casualties, still produces 399% more casualties than transnational leftist incidents. Exclusively religious transnational terrorism is the most lethal form of all compared to leftist terrorism. Also note that exclusively religious, along with combination religious and the remaining known groups with no ideology are the only three which appear significantly different from leftists in the transnational domain.

The effects of the filter are both in line, and contrary, to the theory of new terrorism. First of all, exclusively religious domestic terrorism is brought down to the same level as nationalist-separatist incidents once the filter is applied. The opposite effect is observed in the transnational domain, where nationalist-separatist groups are no longer any different from leftist groups. The filter drops all IRRs down, which is to be expected since high lethality incidents are removed, however all ideologies appear to be effected by this and the differences are in general found in the transnational domain. All in all, there is partial support for H₄; exclusively religious *transnational* terrorism is markedly more deadly than leftist terrorism – and is along with combination religious incidents the only ones that separate themselves significantly from leftist incidents. In the domestic domain, the exclusively religious incidents are not only on par with the rest of the ideologies, but much less lethal. There are, of course, many more incidents in the domestic domain and the results from the transnational analyses may be more heavily impacted by a few highly lethal incidents. This is controlled for quite harshly using the <100 Killed filter, and further investigations into this are not carried out for this thesis.

Hypothesis 6: All Terrorist Incidents Have Become More Lethal

H₆ All ideological strains of terrorism have become more lethal with time.

A potential counter-argument to the findings from hypothesis 5 would be that the average incident lethality changes with time, and is influenced by factors such as technological development or competition for media space. The surprising lethality of rightist incidents also stems from relatively few incidents, and pin-pointing their location in time should also reveal whether rightists can be expected to be the most lethal throughout the time period. To investigate this I divided all incidents between those that were exclusively religious and all other ideologies. This means that the incidents without an ideological indicator are treated separately as well, so that I have control over what I am comparing the religious incidents to. This will give some measure of whether religious terrorism has become more deadly with time, than all other ideologies.

Table X. Average Lethality over Time

Time	Exclusively Religious			All Other Ideologies		
	Mean	Std. Dev.	Freq.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Freq.
1985–1990	2,291	7,169	55	2,217	6,052	10,547
1990–1994	1,653	3,382	502	2,279	6,415	9,098
1995–1999	4,209	10,315	455	2,745	7,527	3,487
2000–2004	4,902	9,215	635	2,908	6,407	2,427
2005–2010	3,146	7,409	2,611	2,233	6,522	4,702
N			4,258			30,261
Total N						

Table X shows the mean lethality rate per incident for exclusively religious incidents, all other incidents with an ideological value, and finally all the incidents without an ideological profile. This means that the values for the all other ideologies-category stem from leftist, rightist, nationalist-separatist and other incidents as per the variable operationalization of this thesis. Note that the standard deviation of the exclusively religious incidents is consistently larger than all other groups with an unknown profile. Exclusively religious terrorist incidents appear to be more deadly than the other incidents from 1995 and onwards. All other ideologies are also more lethal from 1995–2004, but return to pre-1995 levels from 2005 and on. Exclusively religious terrorism does not return to pre-1995 levels. It would appear that terrorism was, for at least a decade, more lethal than usual – and that the average was markedly higher for exclusively religious incidents. However, collapsing all other ideologies into one may only show part of the picture. I have already shown that the average lethality rate varies greatly between the ideologies and that the least lethal of them all were leftists,

who are responsible for the most incidents. This fact may be dragging the average values down for the all other category, undermining the comparison done in table X. This problem can be addressed by treating each ideology separately throughout the time period, and these results are best presented in a bar graph.

Figure 13. Average Incident Lethality





Figure 13 shows the average incident lethality for each ideology in the five-year time periods. The horizontal lines are drawn at 2, 4 and 6 killed, on average per incident. First of all, until 1995–1999 no one ideology crosses the middle reference line which indicates an average of 4 killed per incident. From 1995–2004 rightist and exclusively religious incidents have an average of above

4 killed per incident, and are the only two ideologies to ever cross this line until combination religious incidents follow suit in 2005–2010. Leftist and unknown incidents rarely cross an average of two dead, and remain the least lethal ideologies in most time periods. All in all, exclusively religious terrorism wasn't always as lethal, but was on average at its most lethal from 1995–2005. The highest spikes are found with 1995–1999 and from 2000–2004. The main contributor to the rightist spikes is the Peasant Self-Defense Group (ACCU) from 1995–1999 and the United Self-Defense Units of Columbia (AUC) from 2000–2004 – both from Colombia. In terms of incidents, these are very few with 76 incidents in 1995–1999 and 28 from 2000–2004. The exclusively religious Armed Islamic Group (GIA), the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), al-Gma'at al-Islamiyya (IG) appear to have been responsible for the most lethal incidents in 1995–1999 while al-Qaeda, Abu Hafs al-Masri Brigades, Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) and once again the LRA appears to have been most active in high lethality incidents from 2000–2004. The exclusively religious incidents from the two periods are 460 and 648 respectively.

So far, it would appear that most ideologies have varying average lethality rates, most peaking from 1995–2005. Exclusively religious incidents are on average highly lethal in this time period, but are surpassed by rightist incidents. If religious terrorism is perceived as more lethal, it could be that they are simply more active in this time period. Although the average incident may not kill many more people, the total number of killed could be higher due to

their increased activity. The final piece to this puzzle is to see how many are killed by incidents from each ideology across time.

Figures 14 & 15. The Number of Killed by each Ideology



These are stacked bars, meaning they are put on top of one another, and the point of this is to illustrate proportional growth across time. Figure 14 shows the number of incidents within each time-period, while figure 15 shows the percentage of all incidents within each time-period.

Both figures show that more people are killed by exclusively religious incidents as time progress, and that this is true in terms of both hard numbers and percentages of yearly totals. This distinction is crucial. This means that exclusively religious terrorism not only kills more people than before, but that the other ideologies kill less people. In terms of hard numbers, the number of killed in terrorist incidents for each five-year period has a downward trend after the first half of the 1990s. Leftists markedly decline until the second half of the 2000s when there is a slight increase to pre 2000-levels. Nationalist-Separatist groups clearly increase in the first half of the 1990s, and decline from then on until the second half of the 2000s. Exclusively religious is the only category that grows with each five-year period, and apparently becomes much more lethal in the second half of the 2000s than any previous time period. Combination religious groups appear to have one high-point along with nationalist separatist groups in the early 1990s, before declining and peaking once again in the early 2000s. In terms of percentages, exclusively religious incidents are clearly responsible for the majority of casualties at the very least in the late 2000s.

Hypothesis 7: Religious Suicide Attacks

H7 A terrorist incident perpetrated by a religious group is significantly more likely to employ suicide terrorism.

Table XI shows how many incidents within each ideology that were not suicide-attacks, and how many that were. The ‘Percent Suicide Terrorism’-column show the percentage of all the incidents by each ideology that are suicide attacks. For example, 2.4 percent of all the nationalist-separatist incidents were suicide attacks.

Table XI. Number of Suicide Terrorism Incidents

Ideology	Not Suicide Terrorism	Suicide Terrorism	Percent Suicide Terrorism
Leftist	16,030	11	.069
Rightist	1,089	0	0
Nationalist-Separatist	8,879	215	2.364
Exclusively Religious	4,046	294	6.774
Combination Religious	2,897	247	7.856
Other	2,148	4	.186
Known Group, No Ideology	5,959	70	1.161
Unknown	31,909	1,020	3.098
Total	72,957	1,861	2,487

7.9 percent of all registered combination religious incidents are suicide attacks, 6.8 percent of all exclusively religious terrorist incidents are suicide attacks and 2.4 percent of all nationalist separatist incidents are suicide attacks. Notably, more than half of all suicide terrorism incidents have an unknown perpetrator. The table clearly shows that suicide attacks are predominantly found in the nationalist-separatist, exclusively religious and combination religious incidents. Although they are similar in terms of number, and clearly separated from the rest of the ideologies, they are dissimilar in terms of how often they use suicide attacks as a method. 2.4 percent of all nationalist-separatist incidents are suicide attacks, compared to the 6.8 percent for exclusively religious, and 7.9 percent for combination religious. Keep in mind that 97.9 percent of the nationalist-separatist incidents are religious in combination with nationalist-separatist. This indicates that once the religious component is introduced into the nationalist-separatist ideology, the suicide attack is more oftenly used. Exclusively religious incidents are clearly the most likely single-ideology to use suicide attacks, but they are surpassed by over 1 percent by the combination religious category. There are no incidents of rightist suicide terrorism in the data, and the Other category along with leftists have a very small number both in total and in relation to their overall activity. 2.5 percent of all incidents are suicide attacks, but the leftist, rightist and other ideologies are far less likely to use this tactic.


Suicide attacks are a highly localized phenomenon in terms of geography. Iraq (757), Afghanistan (292), Pakistan (198), Israel (116) and Sri Lanka (112) are the five countries that

have experienced more than 55 suicide attacks in the GTD. A total of 53 countries have experienced suicide attacks, 21 of these have only one registered incident, 17 have experienced between 2 and 10, and 10 have experienced between 10 and 55 incidents. Additionally, the ideologies are concentrated within specific countries as well. Nationalist-Separatist suicide attacks are mainly clustered in Sri-Lanka (108), Russia (31), Israel (17) and Turkey (11). Combination Religious Incidents are mainly clustered in Iraq (75), Israel (68), Pakistan (32) and the West Bank and Gaza Strip (25). Exclusively Religious Terrorism is mainly clustered in Afghanistan (155), Pakistan (21), Iraq (21), Algeria (20) and Yemen (12). Removing any of these substantially alters the analysis and hampers any reliability there is in such an analysis.

There is also something to be said for the spread of nationalist-separatist, combination religious and exclusively religious suicide terrorism. There are registered incidents of nationalist-separatist suicide attacks in 10 countries, 15 countries for combination religious groups and finally 26 countries for exclusively religious suicide attacks. Only 7 countries have experienced any mix of the three, and outside of the West Bank and Gaza Strip and Iraq this is a *very rare* occurrence. Exclusively religious suicide terrorism has spread to the most countries, while nationalist-separatist has the least spread.⁵⁸

Since suicide attacks are so highly localized, and relatively few in numbers compared to the total number of incidents, removing any one of these countries from the analysis will substantially alter the analysis. The attacks are also highly clustered in time, especially from 2000 and on.

Figures 16 and 17. Suicide Terrorism



⁵⁸ A table showing the distribution of suicide attacks between the countries of the GTD can be found in the appendix.

Figures 16 & 17 show the number of suicide terrorism incidents perpetrated each year by each ideology. These are the only two graphs which display the number of unknown, and known groups with no ideology coded. Note that the exclusively religious ideology produces the most incidents every year from 2006 and on. Exclusively Religious incidents are the only ones that approach 50 in one year (2007 and 2008), these are unprecedented heights for any ideology. Nationalist-Separatist groups have never reached similar yearly levels, and appear to have increased their activity towards the end of the 1990s and reduced in once again in the first half of the 2000s. Combination Religious groups appear to start using suicide terrorism more actively from 2000 and on, peaking in 2005 and declining dramatically in 2006. All in all, the evidence is supportive of the fact that exclusively religious terrorists are more likely to employ suicide terrorism – at the very least since 2005 and onwards. Suicide attacks did not start out exclusively religious, but appears to have become much more so. Overall, suicide terrorism appears to become a terrorist tactic in the early 1990s, continually rising throughout the time period and reaching peak levels in 2007.

These numbers are dwarfed by the number of unknown suicide attacks. The unknown incidents are particularly important in this case, because so many of them are found in Iraq and Afghanistan.⁵⁹ Moghaddam (2006) holds that most of the unknown incidents in Iraq are in fact perpetrated by religious groups – meaning that any plot of suicide attacks is biased in disfavour of either combination or exclusively religious suicide attacks. The impact of the unknown, and likely incidents, are exemplified by removing all unknown incidents from either Iraq or Afghanistan from the graph altogether. This is what you see in figure 17, and the reduction of incidents listed is dramatic. There are still a large number of unknown incidents from 2006–2010, many of which stem from Pakistan.⁶⁰ The exclusively religious ideology is already heavily represented, but there is reason to believe that the number of exclusively religious terrorist attacks, and potentially combination religious, is much higher in reality. Since few incidents have a radical impact on the graph, this is a real problem.

1 020 suicide attacks have an unknown perpetrator, 10 of which occurred from 1985–1989, 2 from 1990–1994, 21 from 1995–1999, 117 from 2000–2004 and a staggering 869 from 2005–2010. 621 of these unknown incidents of these took place in Iraq – 551 from 2005–2010 alone. This means that the unknown, but potentially religious, suicide attacks in Iraq make up 60 percent of the total number of suicide attacks by an unknown perpetrator.

⁵⁹ Unknown incidents are also discussed at more length in the appendix.

⁶⁰ 48 in 2007, 27 in 2008, 28 in 2009 and 13 from 2010.

Also, Moghaddam (2006:719) holds that 500 suicide attacks took place in Iraq from 2003–2005 and the GTD only lists 247 for the same time period.⁶¹

Table XII. Logistic Regression of Suicide Terrorism

Dependent Model.	Suicide Attack = 1 19 OR (S.E.)
Leftist	.071 (.184)***
Exclusively Religious	2.651 (.095)***
Combination Religious	3.108 (.099)***
Other	.068 (.506)***
Known Group, No Ideology	.428 (.141)***
Unknown	1.165 (.080)*
Constant	-3.597
Incidents (N)	73,698
LR χ^2	1 300.82***

p<0.1; ** *p*<0.05; *** *p*<0.01

Table XII shows a logistic regression using a dependent variable with the value 1 if the incident was a suicide attack. I have used nationalist-separatist incidents as a reference category because it is the only category which holds a large number of suicide attack and is easily distinguishable from exclusively religious. Since 97.9 percent of the combination-religious incidents are nationalist-

separatist combined with religious, the combination religious category has traits of the two other main exponents of suicide terrorism; nationalist-separatists and exclusively religious incidents.

Interestingly, combination religious incidents are significantly more likely to be suicide terrorism than nationalist-separatist incidents. The same goes for exclusively religious groups, albeit with a somewhat smaller oddsratio. All other ideologies, save unknown, appear significantly less likely to use the suicide terrorism tactic. The large number of suicide attacks in Iraq with an unknown perpetrator is likely the reason why unknown groups appear more likely than nationalist-separatists to use suicide terrorism. I have already noted that many of these likely belong in either of the two religious categories. Only 193 of the suicide attacks were coded as transnational. Given the problems above, an analysis of transnational and domestic suicide attacks will not yield reliable results at all and is not presented in this thesis.

⁶¹ This discrepancy could at least in part be due to a difference in definitions – nevertheless the discrepancy is very high.

Hypothesis 8: More Religious Incidents are Transnational


H₈ Transnational incidents are significantly more likely to be motivated by a religious ideology than any other ideology.

Table XIII. Descriptives of Domestic, Transnational and Uncertain Incidents

	Nationalist- Exclusively Combination					
	Leftist	Rightist	Separatist	Religious	Religious	Other
Number						
Domestic	14,734	1,028	6,894	3,698	2,505	1,874
Transnational	1,099	55	1,904	548	548	232
Uncertain	208	6	296	94	91	46
Total N	16 041	1 089	9 094	4 340	3 144	2 152
Percent						
Domestic	91.85	94.4	75.81	85.21	79.68	87.08
Transnational	6.85	5.05	20.94	12.63	17.43	10.78
Uncertain	1.3	0.55	3.25	2.17	2.89	2.14
Total %	100	100	100	100	100	100

Table XIII shows how many percent of the ideology’s incidents are coded as domestic, transnational and uncertain. For example, 20.94 percent of nationalist-separatist incidents are transnational. The nationalist-separatist category is followed by the combination religious and exclusively religious categories respectively. Exclusively religious incidents appear to be predominantly domestic – with only 12.63 percent transnational incidents.

Figure 18. The Domestic Percentage of Incidents With Five-Year Intervals



A potential point of criticism here is that these relationships could have changed with time. Figure 18 plots the domestic percentage of incidents for each ideology in the five-year time periods.⁶² In general, it appears that there is in fact more activity in the domestic domain in recent years than in previous years. It also appears to be more even amongst the ideologies in the last five-

year period. The nationalist-separatist incidents of the late 1980s appear to have the lowest percentage of domestic incidents of any ideology from any time period. Exclusively religious terrorism doesn’t appear to be very different from any of the other ideologies throughout the

⁶² I attempted to make a stacked bars diagram which showed both the domestic, transnational and uncertain percentage for each ideology in each time period. Such a figure holds too much information in too many colours.

time period. If anything, the domestic proportion of exclusively religious terrorism is higher in all the time periods following the late 80s.

The final test for this hypothesis is a logistic regression model where the dependent variable has the value 1 if the incident was transnational.

Table XIV. Logistic Regression of Transnational Incidents

Independent Model	Transnational = 1 20 OR (S.E.)
Rightist	.791 (.131)*
Nationalist-Separatist	3.618 (.040)***
Exclusively Religious	1.974 (.055)***
Combination Religious	2.883 (.056)***
Other	1.65 (.076)***
Known Group, No Ideology	3.235 (.045)***
Unknown	2.264 (.035)***
Constant	-2,614
Incidents (N)	74,818
<i>LR</i> χ^2	1 400.43

* $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$

This regression analysis uses the leftists as the reference category.⁶³ All oddsratios, except the rightist oddsratio, are above 1 meaning they are associated with an increased likelihood of a transnational incident, compared to the leftist reference category. The biggest increase in oddsratio is found in the nationalist-separatist category. The second largest oddsratio increase is found in combination religious groups which are often also nationalist-separatist. The exclusively religious incidents are also significantly more likely to be transnational than leftist incidents, and this category is closely followed by the final other category. There appears to be a substantial amount of transnational incidents left to code, as indicated by the known groups with no ideology. Also, a large amount of transnational incidents are found in the unknown category.⁶⁴ All in all, an exclusively religious incident is more likely to be transnational than a leftist incident, but exclusively religious incidents are not the most likely ideological category.

Summary of Main Findings

Figure 19 shows a partial summary of the most important findings for hypotheses 1-4.⁶⁵ The findings are highly supportive of H₁, H₂, H₃ and H₄. There is an increase in both the number of exclusively religious incidents, and the proportion of all terrorism that is exclusively


⁶³ Leftists have perpetrated 1 099 transnational incidents, second only to nationalist-separatist groups with 1 904. Since the leftist category are the clearest representation of traditional, political, third wave terrorists they are the preferred choice for the reference category.

⁶⁴ This is probably in large a product of the separation method. For example, the perpetrator group name may be unknown – but the incident may be coded as transnational because a foreigner was killed in the incident.

⁶⁵ It also shows the number of Unknown incidents across time for both the domestic and transnational domain. A further investigation into the unknown incidents is not an important part of this thesis, and is a constant feature in any terrorism database. A short discussion on the unknown incidents can be found in the appendix as well.

religious. The clearest and most robust pattern for exclusively religious terrorist incidents is found in the domestic domain.

Figure 19. Transnational and Domestic Separately



The leftist decline following the cold war is also evident, and the 1990s appear if anything to be a transitional period where leftist incidents decline and exclusively religious incidents begin to show up in greater numbers. Combination religious incidents appear to be a constant feature throughout the time period, not varying

significantly.

The results from both hypotheses on lethality gave mixed results. First of all, it appears that exclusively religious transnational terrorism is more lethal— even when controlling for extreme incidents. Domestic exclusively religious incidents are significantly more deadly than leftist incidents, but do not separate themselves from the rest of the ideologies in this regard. In the domestic domain, rightist incidents appear to be the most lethal.

The average lethality-rate of exclusively religious incidents varies across time, like all ideologies. If the exclusively religious groups are untethered from secular morale, and care less about high casualties then the average lethality rate of their incidents should be consistently high throughout the time period. This is definitely not the case. Exclusively religious groups are more lethal in the transnational domain, but not markedly so in general across time. Further investigations revealed that exclusively religious incidents claim more lives because of the rise in numbers of exclusively religious incidents. In other words, the increase in number of dead is predominantly due to an increase in activity – and not significantly higher average lethality rates.⁶⁶

Exclusively religious incidents are far more likely to be suicide attacks than nationalist-separatist incidents, but the likelihood is even higher for combination religious groups. It is plausible that the religious component of the combination religious incidents is

⁶⁶ I also carried out a descriptive analysis of mass casualty attacks similar to Masters (2008) design. This analysis can be found in the appendix. The main findings are that mass-casualty attacks is a feature of all five time periods, and that mass casualties is more associated with leftist and nationalist separatists than with exclusively religious. Also, exclusively religious groups perpetrate most of their high-casualty incidents from 2005-2010. The trends in mass casualty attacks appear to be reflections of the overall activity level within each ideology at different points in time, rather than a distinguishing feature of exclusively religious incidents.

promoting suicide attacks because combination religious incidents are clearly significantly different from nationalist-separatist incidents. As such, combination religious incidents appear a deadly mix of the other two ideologies that use suicide attacks frequently. Suicide attacks are highly localized in time, space and within ideologies – and this fact makes generalization problematic because countries are very different. Exclusively religious suicide attacks have taken place in more countries than any other, and this also partly supports the notion that religion plays an important part in choosing suicide attacks as a tactic. In recent years, most suicide attacks are indeed exclusively religious and this is supportive of the hypothesis. However, the analyses are likely biased in disfavour of the religious categories and it is hard to say anything concrete about whether the combination religious or exclusively religious would receive the numerous unknown suicide attacks from Iraq if they were coded. In the end, the results have questionable reliability and provide mixed support. The religious component appears to be important, but exactly how is hard to say.

Exclusively religious incidents do not separate themselves from the rest of the ideologies as much more likely to be transnational. The analysis rather served to show that with the exception of rightist incidents, leftist incidents are by far the least likely to be transnational. The remaining ideologies vary, but the nationalist-separatist and combination religious incidents are by far the most likely to be transnational.

Table XV. Support for Hypotheses

Hypothesis Number & Topic	Findings of this Thesis
H ₁ : Increase in Number	Highly Supportive
H ₂ : Increase in Proportion	Highly Supportive
H ₃ : For both Domestic and Transnational	Highly Supportive
H ₄ : Leftist Decline	Highly Supportive
H ₅ : Higher Incident Lethality	Partial Support
H ₆ : Incident Lethality Across Time	Not Supportive
H ₇ : Suicide Attacks	Mixed Support, questionable reliability
H ₈ : Transnational	Not Supportive

Potential Points of Criticism

The results from the analyses provide a lot of support for hypotheses 1-4, but there are some potential problems with how this analysis is conducted that could help produce these results. I mentioned in the introduction that new terrorism became especially popular outside the academic arena following the events of 9/11. Much of the information used to code ideological profiles used in this thesis are news articles and press wires published after 9/11. The TKB also coded their profiles after 9/11. This raises the question of whether there is indeed an increase of religious terrorism, or if it is our perceptions of terrorism that has

changed. Do we label more organizations ‘religious’ today because of our perceptions, or would the label be the same of 9/11 and the war on terror never happened? I have attempted to control for this throughout the analysis by clearly separating the organizations that were labelled exclusively religious from those that received a combination of religious and another ideology. This distinction made sense in terms of the theory of new terrorism because exclusively religious incidents should be the ultimate example of new terrorism. However, it should also be harder to label an organization as exclusively religious, than simply adding religious to another ideology because of recent perceptions of religious terrorism. This is definitely not a perfect solution to the problem, and ideally I would have had followed each organizations ideological preferences throughout the time period they have existed.

This problem can, in part, be addressed by looking at when the different group are created. For example, if there are almost no exclusively religious groups founded in the pre 9/11 years, and a high amount in the post 9/11 years – then there is less support for the assumption that the perceptions of exclusively religious terrorism haven’t changed radically since 9/11. If almost all exclusively religious groups are formed after 9/11, then there is strong support for the argument that we perceive more groups as religious following 9/11.

I do not have any data on when the groups in the GTD were founded, but I am able to locate their first registered terrorist incident. A group could have been formed years prior to their first attack, their first attack could have been missed by the GTD coders and a group could have lain dormant from before 1985 and only become active at a much later point in time. Treating the first terrorist attack by each group as their ‘formation date’ is not an ideal solution, but should at least shed some more light on the matter.

Figures 20 and 21. Number of New Groups & Average Group Activity




Figure 20 was created by locating the first attack of every terrorist group in the GTD, and counting that incident as a group formation within each ideology. For example, if an

exclusively religious terrorist group carries out their first attack somewhere between 1985 and 1989 –the bar in figure 20 receives a registration of one more exclusively religious group. All subsequent observations of that group is dropped, therefore there are no double registrations of the same group and the graph shows how many groups first become active throughout the time period for each ideology. The graph clearly shows that the highest number of exclusively religious groups is formed in 1990–1994 and that the 1985–1989 levels are the lowest. Overall, the level of new groups appears similar throughout the five time-periods and the cause for worry about our perceptions is lessened. Figure 21 shows the average number of incidents that are carried out by a terrorist group within each ideology for the five-year periods. For example, a leftist terrorist group carried out 75 incidents on average for the time period 1985–1989.⁶⁷ Combined, these two graphs provide the final answer to the patterns seen in the previous analyses; there are not many more exclusively religious groups formed in recent years than in previous years. The lethality rate hasn't increased on average, but the exclusively religious groups have become far more active. They perpetrate more incidents, and this development is striking for the period 2005–2010.⁶⁸

Another point of potential criticism is regarding the analysis on the likelihood of an exclusively religious incident being transnational. The analyses showed that the nationalist-separatist element was important, and it can be argued that the reason for this pattern lies in the method the domestic and transnational incidents are separated in this thesis. Nationalist separatist struggles sometimes involve a group seeking separation from two states and not just one. Some of the major nationalist separatist struggles lie in border regions (for example the ETA or PKK). The transnational incidents are identified by indicators, such as the nationality of the victim compared to the country where the incident took place, and border regions can provide these conditions in plenty without there every having been an 'intentional' transnational incident. This is not to say that the attack doesn't involve two states, however they may be coded transnational more often due to the nature of the separatist struggle. Put to a point, 9/11 is an intentional transnational event, while nationalist-separatist incidents may be coded as transnational by 'accident'. This is a plausible explanation for part of the nationalist-

⁶⁷ These numbers are *not* controlled for extremely active groups which carry out incidents in the thousands.

⁶⁸ Some of the leftist groups who became active in the period from 2005-2010 are for example; the Communist Party of India – Maoist (CPI-M) (1 036 incidents), the Conspiracy Cells of Fire (43 incidents), and the Kangleipak Communist Party (KCP) (24 incidents). Some more obscure groups may be the Terai Janatantrik Madhes Party in Nepal, the Greek 'Solidarity with Imprisoned Members of Action Directe (AD)'. Some exclusively religious group are Al-Shabaab (156 incidents), Al-Qa`ida in the Lands of Islamic Maghreb (AQLIM) (127 incidents) and Boko Haram (26 incidents).

separatist dominance in the transnational analysis. One potential solution would be to identify the incidents which involve states not directly adjacent to one another, but this solution would not be perfect either. Many unknown incidents are also coded transnational because of the separation method used. I have no method ready for addressing this potential weakness of the analysis at the moment.

Concluding Remarks

This section will address the consequences of the findings in relation to the theory of new terrorism, present some potential policy implications and finally discuss future research.

The Findings in Relation to ‘New Terrorism’

The findings of this thesis support the emergence and growth of an exclusively religious terrorism. Exclusively religious terrorism grows practically from the bottom of every graph, and appears to be distinct from combination religious incidents which are a more constant feature throughout the time period. Therefore, the observation of something ‘new’ and exclusively religious appears to make sense. The timing of this growth is not entirely in line any of the proposed beginnings of new terrorism. Although it is clearly present in the 1990s, the real growth happens from 2002. The timing therefore seems to be off by about a decade for the authors who pinpointed it to the early 1990s. In relation to Rapoport’s wave concept, the timing of the leftist decline is also off by about a decade. The third leftist wave appears to ebb quickly in the early 1990s, and there is a transitional period of mixed development before the religious growth begins predominantly in 2002. From this point on, the exclusively religious presence is sustained, and for all intents and purposes it can be labelled a religious wave. Finally, the leftist resurgence from 2007 and on is not in accordance with the wave concept – unless the religious wave was exceptionally short and we are heading into yet another leftist wave. The leftist resurgence does not fit well with the remaining new terrorism literature either. If the days of the traditional, political terrorist are over – then there should not be growth in political terrorism. Not only is there growth, but leftist terrorist incidents are now dominant in the domestic domain.

Apart from exclusively religious transnational terrorism, the new terrorists do not appear to be extraordinarily lethal. The new terrorism theory cannot survive on the lethality of exclusively religious transnational terrorism alone. The exclusively religious incident lethality varies across time, which is contrary to the notion that they are untethered from secular morale. The analysis rather show that leftist groups aren’t very lethal, which could also contribute to the perception that the current dominant form of terrorism must be more lethal. However, exclusively religious terrorist incidents are far from alone in being more lethal than the leftist groups and this is not explained by the theory of new terrorism.

There is suggestive evidence that the religious component may be important in promoting suicide attacks, and that exclusively religious groups have perpetrated the most

suicide attacks. Nevertheless, exclusively religious terrorists are not the most likely or frequent user of suicide attacks. Nor are they the most likely to be transnational.

The total weight of evidence does not provide clear support for the theory of new terrorism, but there is definitely support for the growth of religious terrorism. This is a partial problem for the theory of new terrorism, because the new terrorists are here – but appear not to be so different from other terrorists as prescribed by the theory. If anything, it would appear that leftists is the category which more often distinguish itself from the other ideologies. The grand ideological trends nevertheless support the notion of a change within terrorism, and also the wave concept. The timing, however, seems to be off by about a decade.

Policy Implications

There are clearly identifiable ideological trends in terrorism. This means that there are different causes for different ideological strains of terrorism. Governments should support research into the causes of terrorism which attempts different explanatory variables for different ideological strains of terrorism. Since terrorism is predominantly a domestic phenomenon, information on the causes for particular ideological strains of terrorism could provide invaluable information to governments seeking a more effective counter-terrorism policy. Keeping track of the ideological trends of domestic terrorism is key to an effective counter terrorism policy at an early stage to minimize casualties.

Although religious terrorism has had a strong presence throughout the 2000s, the religious terrorism does not appear to be so different from other types of terrorism. If the new conceptions are not needed, then the old remedies may still work and should not be discarded. It is also worth noting that religious terrorism, nor any other ideology for that matter, has reached the levels seen in leftist terrorism during the late 1980s and early 1990s. The number of terrorist incidents with a known perpetrator was at a low point up until 2004, which is well after religious terrorism became a primary concern of the international community. The number of terrorist incidents is now at levels not seen since 1994, and a significant portion of this is religious and found in the domestic domain. There has been a consistent rising trend since 2004 which show no signs of flattening out in the last year of 2010.

Although exclusively religious transnational incidents are indeed highly lethal, the lethality of religious terrorism is a consequence of increased activity and not higher lethality per incident. The fact that both average incident lethality, and activity, varies throughout the time periods means that the key to reducing casualties lie in identifying the causes of increased activity. Morale and world view may be to blame with certain extreme groups, but

overall this is not the root cause of the current high lethality due to terrorist activity. Domestic terrorism is by far the biggest killer. The number of domestic incidents outnumbers the number of transnational incidents several times over, and rightist incidents have the potential of being highly lethal. These groups are not produced often, and are not highly active in relation to the other ideologies – but when they do attack the casualties are likely to be high. If there is an increase in rightist activity policy advisors should be aware that this is a potentially very lethal form of terrorism. Incidents that are motivated by both religion and nationalist-separatist agendas also appear to be lethal, both in their domestic and transnational incidents. These groups also appear more likely to perpetrate suicide attacks.

The recent leftist resurgence is also cause for concern. It climbs rapidly from 2007, and now outnumbers the total number of exclusively religious terrorism. Although a lot of these incidents are caused by the Communist Party of India – Maoist (CPI-M), there is ample evidence for a broader rise of leftist terrorism as well. The rise is predominantly found in the domestic domain, which should be a cause for concern with any government. Since the cold war ended leftist terrorism has maintained relatively low levels, and the cause of its continued presence and recent upsurge should be a cause for concern. This is especially true for the governments who are aware of leftist terrorist groups existing in their country. There are also indications that the cause is not primarily the formation of new groups, but increased activity in the leftist groups. This also indicates that there is renewed potential for recruitment which could be met with counter-policies at an early stage.

Future Research

This thesis has shown that domestic incidents should receive more attention by researchers in the future. Most terrorism incidents are domestic, and although the ideological trends of domestic and transnational terrorism track each other well, they are not identical. I have presented a thorough review of the GTD, and recommend researchers to begin using this database actively in their research because it offers unique opportunities within terrorism studies.

The causes of terrorism should also be researched in relation to each ideological subdivision and not terrorism in general (See Crenshaw 2007) The fact that there are ideological trends speak to the point that there are different causes for different ideologies. The best models to model the causes of terrorism are therefore found when the incidents are separated between the ideologies. The timing of some of the trends in this thesis are highly suggestive, and could provide a place to begin this research. First of all, the rise of exclusively

religious incidents arrives only after 9/11, and appears not to be highly influenced by the Iraq invasion in 2003. It is possible that the war on terror has provoked a response and ironically caused the trend it set out to subdue. This evidence is circumstantial at best, yet it is a valid question to ask why the rise of religious terrorism arrives 10 years later than expected. Secondly, the resurgence of leftism is suggestive of a connection with the current financial crisis. Economic causal variables may have more explanatory power after the ideological Cold War ended.

The dataset is the result of 7 months of work and provide ideological profiles for more terrorist groups than previous similar studies. For example, Piazza (2009) identified 473 groups, Rasler & Thompson (2009) identified 763 groups, the TKB held 856 (START 2012c). In the future, the dataset can shed new light on the ideological aspects of domestic and transnational terrorism. I have classified an unprecedented amount of groups and incidents, but there is much work to be done still. Completing the ideological coverage should be the first undertaking of researchers. The TKB has been used by most researchers up until now, but the smaller groups are not at all well covered by the TKB. These groups should be equally important to any analysis. Additionally, they could be compared to the major organizations to see why some organizations carry on with a sustained effort and other collapse. What type of group is more likely to splinter? What type of group is likely to last longer? These are also questions which have real world applications in counter-terrorism policy.

Any future research into suicide terrorism should at least cover at least the entire 2000s. This decade is clearly the decade with the most suicide attacks, and since this is such a localized phenomenon analyses are heavily impacted by a reduced time horizon.

Litterature

- Ashour, Omar (2011) Post-Jihadism: Libya and the Global Transformations of Armed Islamist Movements. *Terrorism and Political Violence* 23(3): 377–397.
- Badey, Thomas J (1998) Defining International Terrorism: A Pragmatic Approach. *Terrorism and Political Violence* 10(1): 90–107.
- Bellany, Ian (2007) Terrorism: Facts from Figures. *Defence and Peace Economics* 18(2):101–112.
- Brandt, Patrick T & Todd Sandler (2010) What Do Transnational Terrorists Target? Has it Changed? Are We Safer?. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 54(2): 214–236.
- Buhaug, Halvard & Scott Gates (2002) The Geography of Civil War. *Journal of Peace Research* 39(4):417–433.
- Calle, Luis de la & Ignacio Sánchez-Cuenca (2011) The Quantity and Quality of Terrorism: The DTV Dataset. *Journal of Peace Research* 48(1): 49–58
- Carter, Aston; John Deutch & Philip Zelikow (1998) Catastrophic Terrorism: Tackling the New Danger. *Foreign Affairs* 77(6): 80–94.
- Cilluffo, Frank J & Jack Thomas Tomarchio (1998) Responding to New Terrorist Threats. *Orbis* 42(3): n.pag.
- Copeland, Thomas (2001) Is the ‘New Terrorism’ Really New?: An Analysis of the New Paradigm for Terrorism. *Journal of Conflict Studies* 21(2): n.pag.
- Crenshaw, Martha (2007) Terrorism and Global Security. In: Chester A Crocker; Fen Osler Hampson & Pamela Aal (eds) *Leashing the Dogs of War*. Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 67–82.
- Crenshaw, Martha (2009) The Debate over ‘New’ vs. ‘Old’ Terrorism. In: Ibrahim A Karawan; Wayne McCormack & Stephen E Reynolds (eds) *Values and Violence*. Netherlands: Springer, 117–136. From: Chatterjee K Deen (book series ed.) *Studies in Global Justice*, Volume 4.
- Drake, C J M (1998) The Role of Ideology in Terrorists’ Target Selection’. *Terrorism and Political Violence* 10(2): 53–85.
- Duyvesteyn, Isabelle (2010) How New is the New Terrorism?. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 27(5): 439–454.
- Eikemo, Terje Andreas & Tommy Høyvarde Clausen (2007) *Kvantitativ Analyse med SPSS. En praktisk innføring i kvantitative analyseteknikker*. (Quantitative Analysis using SPSS. A Practical Introduction in Quantitative Analysis Techniques). Trondheim: Tapir Akademisk Forlag.
- Ellis, James O (2008) Countering Terrorism with Knowledge. In: Hsinchun Chen; Edna Reid; Joshua Sinai; Andrew Silke; Boaz Ganor (eds) *Terrorism Informatics*. U.S.:Springer, 141–155.
- Enders, Walter & Todd Sandler (1999) Transnational Terrorism in the Post-Cold War Era. *International Studies Quarterly* 43(1): 145–167.
- Enders, Walter & Todd Sandler (2000) Is Transnational Terrorism Becoming More Threatening? A Time-Series Investigation. *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 44(3): 307–332.

- Enders, Walter; Todd Sandler and Khusrav Gaibulloev (2011) Domestic Versus Transnational Terrorism: Data, Decomposition, and Dynamics' *Journal of Peace Research* 48(3): 319–337.
- Field, Andy (2009) *Discovering Statistics Using SPSS. Third Edition*. London: Sage Publications.
- Field, Anthony (2009) The 'New Terrorism': Revolution or Evolution?. *Political Studies Review* 7(2): 195–207.
- Fox, Jonathan & Shmuel Sandler (eds) (2006) *Religion in World Conflict* New York: Routledge.
- Fox, Jonathan & Shmuel Sandler (2006a) The Question of Religion and World Politics. In: Jonathan Fox & Shmuel Sandler (eds) *Religion in World Conflict*. London and New York: Routledge, 1–11.
- Géré, François (2007) Suicide Operations: Between War and Terrorism. In: Gérard Chailand & Arnaud Blin (eds) *The History of Terrorism. From Antiquity to Al-Qaeda*. Los Angeles: California University Press, 363–397.
- Goldman, Ogen (2010) The Globalization of Terror Attacks. *Terrorism and Political Violence* 23(1): 31–59.
- Guelke, Adrian (1998) *The Age of Terrorism and the International Political System*. London: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd.
- Gurr, Nadine & Benjamin Cole (2002) *The New Face of Terrorism: Threats from Weapons of Mass Destruction*. London: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd.
- Helfstein, Scorr & Dominic Wright (2011) Success, Lethality, and Cell Structure Across the Dimensions of Al-Qaida. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 34(5): 367–382.
- Hoffman, Bruce (1996) Holy Terror. An Act of Divine Duty. *The World Today* 52(3): 79–81.
- Hoffman, Bruce (1999) Terrorism Trends and Prospects. In: Ian Lesser; Bruce Hoffman; John Arquillar; David Ronfeldt & Michele Zannini (1999) *Countering the New Terrorism*. Washington: RAND, 7–32.
- Hoffman, Bruce (2001) Change and Continuity in Terrorism. *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 24(5): 417–428.
- Hoffman, Bruce (2006). *Inside Terrorism*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Huntington, Samuel P (1993) The Clash of Civilizations?. *Foreign Affairs* 72(3): 22–49.
- Hox, Joop (2010) *Multilevel Analysis. Techniques and Applications. Second Edition*. New York: Routledge.
- Jürgensmeyer, Mark (1997) Terror mandated by god. *Terrorism and Political Violence* 9(2): 16–23.
- Jürgensmeyer, Mark (2003) *Terror in the Mind of God. The Global Rise of Religious Violence*. Berkley / Los Angeles / London: University of California Press.
- Kalyvas, Stathis N. (2001) 'New' and 'Old' Civil Wars: A Valid Distinction?. *World Politics* 54(1): 99–118.
- Koblenz, Gregory D (2011) Predicting Peril or the Peril of Prediction? Assessing the Risk of CBRN Terrorism. *Terrorism and Political Violence* 23(4): 501–520.

- Konstantinos, Drakos (2011) Security Economics: A Guide for Data Availability and Needs. *Defence and Peace Economics* 22(2): 147–159.
- Kurtulus, Ersun (2011) The New Terrorism and its Critics. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 34(6): 476–500.
- LaFree, Gary (2010) The Global Terrorism Database (GTD): Accomplishments and Challenges. *Perspectives on Terrorism* 4(1): 24–46.
- Lafree, Gary & Laura Dugan (2007) Introducing the Global Terrorism Database. *Terrorism and Political Violence* 19(2): 181–204.
- LaFree, Gary; Laure Dugan; Heather V Fogg & Jeffrey Scott (2006) *Building a Global Terrorism Database*. National Crime Justice Reference Service (NCJRS), Administered by the Office of Justice programs, U.S. Department of Justice. (<https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/214260.pdf>)
- Lankford, Adam (2011) Could Suicide Terrorists Actually be Suicidal? *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 34(4): 337–366.
- Laqueur, Walter (1996) Postmodern Terrorism. *Foreign Affairs* 75(5): 24–36.
- Laqueur, Walter (1998) The New Face of Terrorism. *The Washington Quarterly* 21(4): 167–178.
- Laqueur, Walter (2004) The Terrorism to Come. *Policy Review* Aug & Sep 2004(126) 49–64.
- Lesser, Ian O (1999) Introduction. In: Ian O Lesser; Bruce Hoffman; John Arquilla; David Ronfeldt & Michelle Zanini. *Countering the New Terrorism* Washington: RAND, 1–3.
- Lia, Brynjar (2005) *Globalisation and the Future of Terrorism. Patterns and Predictions*. New York: Routledge.
- Long, Scott J & Jeremy Freese (2006) *Regression Models for Categorical Dependent Variables Using Stata. Second Edition*. Texas: Stata Press.
- Mareš, Miroslav (2011) Terrorism-Free Zone in East Central Europe? Strategic Environment, Risk Tendencies, and Causes of Limited Terrorist Activities in the Visegrad Group Countries. *Terrorism and Political Violence* 23(2) 233–253.
- Masters, Daniel (2008) The Origin of Terrorist Threats: Religious, Separatist, or Something Else? *Terrorism and Political Violence* 23(3): 396–414.
- Mengel, William R (1977) Terrorism and New technologies of Destruction: An Overview of the Potential Risk. In: *Disorders and Terrorism: Report of the Task Force on Disorders and Terrorism* Compiled by the US National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 497–506.
- Merari, Ariel (2007) Terrorism as a Strategy of Insurgency. In: Gérard Chailand & Arnaud Blin (eds) *The History of Terrorism. From Antiquity to Al-Qaeda*. Los Angeles: California University Press, 12–54.
- Mickolus, Edward F; Todd Sandler; Jean M Murdock; Peter A Flemming (eds) (2003) *International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events*. (ITERATE Data Codebook.) Michigan: Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research.
- Moghadam, Assaf (2008) Motives for Martyrdom. Al-Qaida, Salafi Jihad, and the Spread of Suicide Attacks. *International Security* 33(3): 46–78.

- Moghadam, Assaf (2006) Suicide Terrorism, Occupation, and the Globalization of Martyrdom: A Critique of Dying to Win. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 29(8): 707–729.
- Morgan, Matthew J (2004) The Origins of the New Terrorism. *Parameters* Spring 2004: 29–43
- Pape, Robert A (2005) *Dying to Win. The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism*. New York: Random House .
- Pearce, Susanna (2006) Religious Rage: A Quantitative Analysis of the Intensity of Religious Conflicts. In: Jonathan Fox & Shmuel Sandler (eds) *Religion in World Conflict*. London and New York: Routledge, 39–58.
- Piazza, James A (2009) Is Islamist Terrorism More Dangerous?: An Empirical Study of Group Ideology, Organization, and Goal Structure. *Terrorism and Political Violence* 21(1): 62–88.
- Rasler, Karen & William R Thompson (2009) Looking for Waves of Terrorism. *Terrorism and Political Violence* 21(1):28–41.
- Reagan, Ronald (1988) Address Before a Joint Session of Congress on the State of the Union. Speech held January 25th, 1988. *The American Presidency Project*. (<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=36035#axzz1t9jffuI>)
- Rapoport, David C (1988) Messianic Sanctions for Terror. *Comparative Politics* 20(2): 195–213.
- Rapoport, David C (2004) The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism. In: Audrey Kurth Cronin & James M. Ludes (eds) *Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy*. Washington: Georgetown University Press.
- Rabe-Hesketh, Sophia & Anders Skrondal (2008) *Multilevel and Longitudinal Modeling Using Stata*. Texas: Stata Press.
- Rabe-Hesketh, Sophia & Brian Everitt (2000) *A Handbook of Statistical Analyses Using Stata. Second Edition*. Florida: Chapman & Hall/CRC.
- Raufer, Xavier (1999) New World Disorder, New Terrorisms: New Threats for Europe and the Western World. *Terrorism and Political Violence* 11(4):30–51.
- Sheehan, Ivan Sascha (2012) Assessing and Comparing Data Sources for Terrorism Research. In: Lum, Cynthia & Leslie W. Kennedy (eds) *Evidence-Based Counterterrorism Policy*. London: Springer: 13–41.
- Simon, Steven (2003) The New Terrorism. Securing the Nation Against a Messianic Foe. *The Brookings Review* 21(1): 18–24.
- Simon, Steven & Daniel Benjamin (2000) America and the New Terrorism. *Survival* 42(1): 59–75.
- Spencer, Alexander (2006) Questioning the Concept of New Terrorism. *Peace, Conflict & Development* Issue 8.
- Strömbäck, Jesper (2004) *Den Medialiserade Demokratin*. (The Medialized Democracy). Stockholm: SNS Förlag.
- Stohl, Michael (2012) Don't Confuse me With the Facts: Knowledge Claims and Terrorism. *Critical Studies on Terrorism* 5(1): 39–49.

- National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). (2011a). Global Terrorism Database [Data file]. Retrieved from <http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd>
- National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) (2011b) *Global Terrorism Database. Distribution Letter*. Dated June 2011, last visited 01.05.2012 on (<http://www.start.umd.edu/>) (Available only through download of the entire GTD 2010 dataset).
- National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) (2011c) *Global Terrorism Database. GTD Variables & Inclusion Criteria*. Dated June 2011, last visited 01.05.2012 on (<http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/downloads/Codebook.pdf>).
- National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) (2012a) *Data Collection Methodology*. (<http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/using-gtd/>)
- National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) (2012b) *History of the GTD*. (<http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/about/History.aspx>)
- National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) (2012c) *Terrorist Organization Profiles*. (http://www.start.umd.edu/start/data_collections/tops/)
- Terrorism Knowledge Base (TKB) (2008). *Terrorist Organization Profile of Aum Shinrikyo / Aleph*. Currently hosted by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) (http://www.start.umd.edu/start/data_collections/tops/).
- Thackrah, John Richard (2004) *Dictionary of Terrorism*. London & New York: Routledge.
- The Law Library of Congress (2011) China: Legal Definition of Terrorist Activities Clarified. *The Law Library of Congress* October 29. (http://www.loc.gov/lawweb/servlet/lloc_news?disp3_1205402874_text)
- The RAND Corporation (RAND) (2012) *Rand Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents*. (<http://www.rand.org/nsrd/projects/terrorism-incidents.html>)
- Tucker, David (2001) What's New About the New Terrorism and How Dangerous is it?. *Terrorism and Political Violence* 13(3): 1–14
- United Nations (2005) Annan hopes London terror bombings will not lead to racial profiling. *U.N. New Centre* 25th of July. (<http://www.un.org/apps/news/storyAr.asp?NewsID=15137&Cr=terror&Cr1=>).
- Weinberg, Leanoard; Ami Pedahzur & Sivan Hirsch-Hoeffler (2004) The Challenges of Conceptualizing Terrorism. *Terrorism and Political Violence* 16(4): 777–794
- Wilkinson, Paul (1997) The Media and Terrorism: A reassessment. *Terrorism and Political Violence* 9(2): 51–64.
- Zimmermann, Doron (2004) Terrorism Transformed: The 'New Terrorism,' Impact Scalability, and the Dynamic of Reciprocal Threat Perception. *The Quarterly Journal* 3(1): 19–39.
- Østerud, Øyvind; Kjell Goldmann; Mogens N Pedersen (2004) *Statsvitenskapelig Leksikon* [Lexicon of Political Science]. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget.

Appendix

I have referred to figures and table in the appendix at several points throughout this thesis. A larger number of tables and graphs were produced, and not all were deemed relevant. A selection of the most interesting and important graphs that did not fit the thesis are presented here in the appendix. I will not comment extensively on most of these.

Tables

Table XVI. Database Information from the GTD

Data Source	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
Anti-Abortion Project 2010	186	0.19	0.19
Armenian Website	40	0.04	0.23
CAIN	1,589	1.62	1.85
CBRN Global Chronology	49	0.05	1.9
CETIS	16,205	16.52	18.42
Disorders and Terrorism Chronology	5	0.01	18.42
Eco Project 2010	135	0.14	18.56
HSI	99	0.1	18.66
Hewitt Project	1,013	1.03	19.69
Hijacking DB	54	0.06	19.75
Hyland	74	0.08	19.82
ISVG	13,213	13.47	33.29
PGIS	63,882	65.11	98.4
Sageman	3	0	98.4
State Department 1997 Document	27	0.03	98.43
UMD Algeria 2010	645	0.66	99.09
UMD Assassinations Project	19	0.02	99.11
UMD Black Widows 2011	7	0.01	99.12
UMD Miscellaneous	12	0.01	99.13
UMD South Africa	449	0.46	99.59
UMD Sri Lanka 2011	406	0.41	100
Total	98 112	100	-

Table XVI is a tabulation of the different sources used by the GTD. It shows the number of incidents coded with information from each source, how many percent that source makes up of the total number of incidents and the cumulative percent.

Table XVII. Summary Information About the GTD 2010

<i>Information</i>	<i>GTD 1970 – 2010</i>	<i>GTD 1985 – 2010</i>
Incident Level		
Total Number of Incidents	98,848	74,818
Incidents with Ideology	47,447	35,860
Incidents with TKB Profile	39,401	28,790
Incidents with Own Profile	8,046	7,070
Unknown Incidents	40,872	32,929
Known Group, No Ideology	10,529	6,029
Group Level		
Total Number of Groups	2,871	2,031
Groups with Ideology	1,227	1,140
Groups with TKB Profile	491	405
Groups with Own Profile	736	735
Known Group, No Ideology	1,644	891

Table XVII shows some descriptive statistics of the number of incidents for the complete time series GTD, and the time-period used for this thesis (1985–2010).

Table XVIII. Poisson Risk Regression of Leftist Decline

<i>Dependent</i>	<i>Leftist</i>
Independents	OR (S.E.)
1990–1994	.736 (.2)
1995–1999	0,204*** (.432)
2000–2004	.114*** (.476)
2005–2010	.256** (.669)
Constant	-3,852
Country Intercept	4.037 (.324)
N	5,174
LR χ^2	8132.46***
LR Test Vs. Logistic	98515.12***
Second Level N	199

* $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$

Table XVIII is a Poisson regression model of the leftist decline. Because the graph showed such a clear trend, and the hypothesis is somewhat on the side of the main objective with the thesis, the regression is not presented in the thesis. The dependent variable is a country-year count of leftist incidents.

Table XIX. Domestic and Transnational Incidents for Remaining Incidents

	Known Group, No Ideology	Unknown
Dom. N	4,599	27 011
Trans. N	1,155	4 681
Unc. N	275	1 237
Total N	6,029	32 929
Dom. %	76.28	82.03
Trans. %	19.16	14.22
Unc. %	4.56	3.76
Total %	100	100

Table XIX is the missing piece of table XIII, and holds the number and percentages of incidents that are domestic and transnational for the known group, no ideology and unknown categories. A relatively large percentage of these incidents are transnational, but no interpretation of these numbers can be made as I have no information on the ideology of the perpetrator group.

Table XX. Descriptive Statistics of the Number Killed

Filter	Observations	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
None	72,679	2.442	12.842	0	1382
<100 Killed	72,577	2.154	5.996	0	97
200+	72,647	2.272	7.138	0	189
*1-99 dead	33,177	4.711	8.161	1	97

*1-99 dead is an additional category where only incidents which led to between 1 and 99 dead are listed.

Table XX show the impact of the <100 Killed and 200+ lethality filters. The 200+ lethality filter was not used at all, nevertheless the descriptive statistics for it provides some information on the incidents lost using the <100 Killed filter. The last line of the table removes the incidents which caused zero fatalities, and show descriptive statistics using the <100 Killed filter, as noted by the range of the variable from 1-97. Obviously, the number of incidents with zero killed pulls the mean down significantly – however; I have no way of distinguishing the incidents which were meant not to lead to fatalities from those who were meant to lead to fatalities, but failed to do so. Thus, removing all the zero-counts from the data material skews any analysis on lethality.

The investigations into lethality indicated some highly lethal rightist incidents, but overall the average incident lethality was relatively low and similar. Masters (2008) defined high-casualty incidents by stating that they were incidents that were .5 standard deviations more lethal than the sample incident average. However, Masters (2008) had removed the non-fatal incidents from the data material – which has an effect on the average value. I do not remove non-fatal incidents as they are attempts at terrorism regardless of the degree of success. It may also be an intentional non-fatal incident, as such it is an important part of the lethality of each ideology. Therefore, I define a high casualty incident as one that is more than two standard deviations higher than the average incident casualty rate. 95 percent of the data exists within two standard deviations of the mean, thus if we disregard the portion below the

mean and turn our attention to the portion above the mean – this definition will yield a definition of high casualty incidents as the 2,5 percent most lethal. The calculations are still done after applying the <100 Killed filter. Using the total numbers, with the <100 Killed filter, high casualties can be defined as; incident average + (2*standard deviation) = 2,154 + (2*5,996) = 14.146 = 14. If I count all the incidents the yielded equal to, or more than, 14 deaths within each ideology throughout the five-time periods I get a measure of the development of mass-casualty incidents. The table below shows the number of high casualty attacks committed by the different ideologies throughout the time period, as per the definition of high casualties above. Also, note that even two standard deviations out – my mass-casualty definition is still under half of that set my Masters (2008). This is likely not only caused by the inclusion of non-fatal incidents, but also by the fact that I use the <100 Killed lethality filter.

Table XXI. Mass Casualty Attacks By Ideology and Five Year Periods

	1985– 1989	1990– 1994	1995– 1999	2000– 2004	2005– 2010	Ideo. Total
Leftist	206	106	35	25	26	398
Rightist	51	2	7	3	0	63
Nationalist-Separatist	68	148	98	41	43	398
Exclusively Religious	3	4	31	47	105	190
Combination Religious	15	20	5	38	75	153
Other	25	35	13	1	15	89
Known Group, No Ideology	62	57	101	15	55	290
Unknown	45	48	120	71	365	649
Time-Period Total	475	420	410	241	684	-

The totals on the far right show that all ideologies have engaged in high casualty incidents, and that nationalist-separatist and leftist groups have caused the most of these incidents. Exclusively Religious and Combination religious are a distant third and fourth respectively. Also, note that there is high amount of high-casualty incidents with an unknown perpetrator, especially from 2005-2010. 290 high casualty incidents have also yet to receive an ideological profile. Nonetheless, the numbers show that high casualty incidents have been present throughout the time period, and in great numbers within each five-year period.

Table XXI show the number of suicide attacks within each country for the three ideologies that turned out to be the main exponents of suicide attacks. The list is sorted after the number of exclusively religious suicide attacks.

Table XXII. Number of Suicide Attacks by Country and Ideology

Country	Exclusively Religious	Combination Religious	Nationalist-Separatist
Afghanistan	155	-	-
Pakistan	21	32	8
Iraq	21	75	-
Algeria	20	-	-
Yemen	12	-	-
Saudi Arabia	9	-	-
Indonesia	8	1	-
Bangladesh	6	-	-
Morocco	6	-	-
Somalia	6	1	-
United States	5	-	-
Great Britain	5	-	-
Iran	4	-	-
Turkey	2	-	11
Egypt	2	-	-
Mauritania	2	-	-
Kenya	1	-	-
Tunisia	1	-	-
Qatar	1	-	-
Panama	1	-	-
China	1	-	-
India	1	12	5
Sweden	1	-	-
Croatia	1	-	-
Israel	1	68	27
France	1	-	-
West Bank and Gaza Strip	-	25	17
Russia	-	8	31
Lebanon	-	6	6
Philippines	-	5	-
Palestine	-	4	1
Uzbekistan	-	4	-
Jordan	-	3	-
Argentina	-	2	-
Tajikistan	-	1	-
Sri Lanka	-	-	108
Sudan	-	-	1
Total Number	294	247	215
Total All Three Ideologies			756

Figures

Figure 22. Ideological Coverage With Unknown Incidents





Figure 22 shows the ideological coverage with the unknown incidents included in the calculation. This version was not presented in the thesis because the incidents without a known perpetrator are impossible to classify within an ideology. The reason the coverage gets worse as time progresses is that more and more incidents have an unknown perpetrator. I do not see this as a particularly serious problem with the analysis, however I will dedicate some time to explain why now.

Figures 23 & 24. Percentages and Counts of All Ideologies




Figures 23 & 24 show the percentages and counts seen from earlier graphs for all ideologies. These graphs were discarded because they are messy, and the huge number of unknown incidents make the rest of the ideologies entangle in the bottom of the graph. Keep in mind, that in terms of percentages the GTD has far less unknown incidents than the RDWTI for example. It has marginally more than the ITERATE. Nevertheless, the number is very high and this may put of researchers. However, what are unknown incidents? They are acts that fall within the definition of terrorism given by the dataset (GTD in this case), but without a known perpetrator group. This could be anything. Does the huge number of unknown incidents invalidate the research done here? The number of unknown does not appear to be a function of systematic errors on part of the database developers, and it appears to be a constant feature throughout terrorism history. If this fact invalidates this research, then it invalidates any quantitative study based on a terrorism event history database. The consequences of unknown incidents are really in relation to what population you are generalizing to. Any researcher

which depends on having access to a perpetrator group name will have to discard these incidents. The consequences of the number of unknown incidents could really be summed up in an additional point in the definition section, if it were necessary; A terrorist incident must have a known perpetrator. This may not be unreasonable, however it should not be done without any research into the geographic clustering of these unknown incidents. There are places in the world in which the conflict is practically self-evident, in which a perpetrator group name is not needed to communicate the terrorist agenda to the audience. In such an instance, it would likely not be in the interest of a terrorist organization to call unneeded attention upon itself by signing its name on the incident. Some terrorists may be in it for the fame, but terrorism is a form of communication – and if it can be anonymous it is easy to see how this would be preferred. The number of unknown incidents are not a problem. Why there are so many of them, that is an interesting question.

The number of unknown incidents only posed a problem in the analyses on suicide terrorism. This analysis made me a little uncomfortable because Moghadam (2008) gave good reasons to suspect that most of the unknown incidents in Iraq were indeed exclusively religious. This isn't a problem until I deal with a phenomenon that is highly localized in both time and space – and where the occurrences of the phenomenon in relation to the total list of incidents is incredibly low.

Figures 25 & 26. Suicide Terrorism With, and Without Iraq and Afghanistan




Figures 25 and 26 shows the impact of removing Iraq and Afghanistan from the analysis on suicide terrorism. Since I have good reason to believe that most of the unknown incidents in Iraq are indeed exclusively religious suicide attacks, there is reason the believe the figures presented in the thesis are as biased because of the huge number of unknown incidents. Figure


26 illustrates how this type of bias will play out with such a rare, and highly localized phenomenon.

To illustrate how this does not appear to impact the other large N analyses, I present the percentages and counts used to test hypotheses 1-2 without any registrations from Iraq and Afghanistan whatsoever. These can be seen in figures 27 & 28. The reason I choose these two countries is that these are the two major battlegrounds of the war on terror which followed 9/11. Although slightly subdued, which is to be expected, the trends are overall the same. Naturally, the removal of Iraq and Afghanistan changes the picture of which ideology is dominant when, but not the overall trends. There is significant exclusively religious activity outside of Iraq and Afghanistan.

Figures 27 & 28. Percentages and Counts Without Iraq and Afghanistan



Figures 29 & 30. Percentages of Yearly Killed for Domestic and Transnational Incidents.



Figures 29 & 30 show the percentages of the yearly number of killed by terrorist incidents that are attributable to the exclusively religious, combination religious and all other ideologies. Note that Known Group, No Ideology and Unknown incidents are not plotted in the graphs, but are part of the calculations. These figures show that exclusively religious groups have become responsible for a larger percentage of the number of yearly killed from the early 1990s and on. This trend is markedly different from 2002 within both the transnational and domestic domain. In the transnational plot, exclusively religious groups appear to be responsible for almost all the fatalities with known perpetrators. This is a significant development, and is clearly unprecedented before the last five-year period. With these graphs, it is important to remember that domestic terrorism kills far more people than transnational terrorism because it outnumbers transnational terrorist incidents many times over. As such, although the development in the transnational graph may appear more dramatic – the major amount of casualties are expected to be in the domestic domain. The relatively low number of incidents in the transnational domain is the reason why the lines are more erratic, showing that relatively few incidents will have an impact on the graphs. As with all graphs on lethality, the <100 Killed filter is used for the calculations.

Figure 31. Stacked Bars of Yearly Ideological Percentages




Figure 31 shows the yearly percentage of the total number of incidents that can be ascribed to the different ideologies. This has commonly been presented in line-graphs in the thesis. These stacked bars illustrate at which points in time the leftist, rightist and nationalist-separatist categories are overestimated because these ideological

categories are not mutually exclusive. This problem appears to peak in the early 1990s, but is generally not a large problem throughout the time period.

Codebook

This codebook outlines how an ideological indicator was introduced for the perpetrator groups in the GTD 2010 dataset. This work was carried out by graduate student in political science Torbjørn Kveberg with the assistance of Ådne Naper, Master in Science in Political Science (2011), NTNU. The work was carried out in two stages from September 2011 until February 2012 during which 47 447 incidents, out of the total 57 976 incidents, in the 2010 edition with known perpetrators, received an ideological profile in the form of a numerical value.

The STATA do-file containing this work carries out all the coding automatically into a mint version of the GTD 2010. If you want to append the 1993 data, this should be done prior to running the do-file to ensure that groups in 1993 are coded properly as well.

Terrorism Knowledge Base (TKB)

During the years 2004-2008 the Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT) at the University of Maryland developed the Terrorism Knowledge Base (TKB). The TKB was unavailable at the time of coding, but the TOPs from the TKB was hosted by START on their websites. The work started with coding these profiles into the GTD dataset.

Every group name was searched for in the TOPs profiles available on the START website. If you choose to do this over again keep in mind that the search tool need not return the group name you searched for at all, and that a great many groups have to be browsed for alphabetically instead. Also, searching with Google may be helpful as groups often use many different names or aliases and several different spellings of that name. The GTD and TKB names often do not match exactly. This process was finished on the 17th of November 2011 at which point a total of 491 groups had been coded using TKB information, responsible for a total of 39 401 incidents.

Variable list and description

The following variables are *only* available for the groups which received an ideological profile from the TKB;

- *tkb_ideology*
- *tkb_strength*
- *tkb_bo*
- *tkb_starty*

Ideology

tkb_ideology - Ideology listed in the 'Classification' field in the TKB.

This variable is coded differently from all other ideology indicators in the dataset. It's values are;

- 1 Anarchist
- 2 Anti-Globalization
- 3 Communist / Socialist
- 4 Environmental
- 5 Leftist
- 6 Nationalist / Separatist
- 7 Racist
- 8 Religious
- 9 Right Wing Conservative
- 10 Right Wing Reactionary
- 11 Nationalist / Separatist + Religious

- 12 Nationalist / Separatist + Other
- 13 Anarchist + Communist / Socialist
- 14 Other + Religious
- 15 Leftist + Nationalist / Separatist
- 16 Anti-Globalization + Communist / Socialist
- 17 Religious + Right Wing Reactionary
- 18 Communist / Socialist + Leftist
- 19 Communist / Socialist + Leftist + other
- 20 Racist, right wing reactionary
- 21 Racist, right wing conservative
- 22 Environmental + other
- 23 Racist, religious, right-wing reactionary
- 24 Communist/Socialist + Nationalist/Separatist
- 25 Nationalist / Separatist + Racist
- 26 Anti-Globalization + Nationalist / separatist
- 27 Leftist, Nationalist / Separatist, Religious
- 28 Anti-Globalization + Leftist
- 29 Nationalist / Separatist + Racist + Religious
- 30 Communist / Socialist + Nationalist / Separatist + Other
- 31 Communist / Socialist + Other
- 32 Anti-Globalization + Communist / Socialist + Nationalist / Separatist
- 33 Leftist + Other
- 34 Nationalist / Separatist + Right Wing Conservative
- 35 Nationalist / Separatist + Right Wing Reactionary
- 36 Anarchist + Anti-Globalization
- 37 Anti-Globalization + Nationalist / Separatist
- 66 Other
- . No profile available for incident, missing.

Group Strength

tkb_strength - Member-size of group listed in the ‘Strength’ field in the TKB.

Values; 0 = Inactive group (as per the TKB, 2004-2008). 3 = Unknown number of members.

All other values = number of members in group at some point between 2004-2008.

Bases of Operation

tkb_bo - Countries listed in the ‘Bases of Operation’ field in the TKB.

Foundation Year

tkb_starty - Reflects the earliest year of known activity for the group. This variable is not always based on the TKB data. If the TKB has a specific year listed for the formation of the group, then this year is coded without further consideration. The TKB data does not always give a precise year, therefore the following coding rules were established;

- No dates are coded.
- If “mid-1990s”; 1995.
- If “early 1990s”; 1992.
- If “early to mid 1990s”; 1992, unless first attack listed in the GTD precedes 1992 in which case earliest attack is coded.
- If “late 1990s”; 1998.
- If “1990s”; 1990.
- If none is specified, earliest attack will be coded as “starty”. At least this gives us a point in time when the group first became violent.

- If “late 1960s to early 1970s” then 1970 (being the natural quasi-interpolation midpoint between 1968 and 1972. Unless first attack precedes that year of course
- If “mid to late 1990s” then 1997.

Mismatches between the GTD and TKB

This table lists the group names that were problematic when matching the GTD name to the TKB name. GTD name is listed first, then the TKB name and finally the resolution to the problem.

*CFA is short for “Coded by first attack”. This refers to the variable *tkb_starty* in the cases where a group was given a formation year that reflected their earliest attack. For example, the TKB lists ‘mid-1990s’, the rules for the *tkb_starty* variable stipulate that the year 1995 should be used however the group has carried out an attack in 1994 in the GTD. In such cases, 1994 was used as the formation year for the group – meaning they were coded by first attack (CFA).

Table I. Documentation of Problems

GTD gname	TKB / Problem	Problem and resolution
Breton Liberation Front (FLB)	Breton Revolutionary ARmy (ARB)	ARB is listed as gsubname in the GTD dataset. TKB information used.
Brother Julian	Brother Julian	Possibly just a disgrunteled individual with a stick of dynamite. Little is known of this attack according to TKB. Not likely more information will surface. No information from TKB to code.
Brunswijk Jungle Commando	National Liberation Union, a.k.a. Bushnegro Jungle Commandos led by Ronnie Brunswijk.	Concluded that this is indeed the same group by comparing the TKB information to GTD information.
Canary Islands Independence Movement		CFA.
Comite de Liberation et de Detournements d'Ordinateurs (Committee for the liberation and hijacking of computers)	Committee for Liquidation of Computers (CLODO)	Concluded these two are the same.
Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party	Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Army	The army is the militant wing of the party according to TKB. I have coded this group according to the TKB data on the army itself. “starty” was coded as 1972 when the party was formed.
Fatah Uprising	Al-Fatah Uprising	Concluded these two groups are one and the same.
Hector Rio De Brigade	Hector Riobe Brigade	Concluded that these two groups were the same.
Hizballah	Hezbollah	One and the same.
Jund al-Sham for Tawhid and Jihad	Jund al-Sham	Jund al-Sham seems to be a type of religious organization according to TKB. Research this before coding.
Karbi Longri National Liberation Front (KLNLF). Also listed below, Karbi Longri North Cachar Liberation Front (KLNLF).	Karbi Longri North Cachar Liberation Front (KLNLF)	North Cachar coded, the other is not.

Contras		CFA
Dev Genc		
Dev Yol		
Evan Mecham Eco-Terrorist International Conspiracy (EMETIC)		CFA
Front for the Liberation of Cabinda / Cabinda Armed Forces (FLEC-FAC)	FLEC exists in TKB. FAC does not.	Given same code as FLEC (Nationalist / Separatist).
Greek Anti-Dictatorial Youth (EAN)		CFA
Islamic Army in Iraq (al-Jaish al-Islami fi al-Iraq)		CFA
Islamic Defenders' Front (FPI)		Starty interpolated
Islamic Jihad Group (IJG) and, separate in GTD, Islamic Jihad Union	Groups are listed as one and the same in TKB.	Both groups received the same coding from TKB.
Islamic Liberation Organization	Presumed formed after the six day war in 1967.	Starty: 1967
Jagrata Towhidi Janeta (Rising Faithfuls)	Potential GTD typo.	Not corrected.
Khristos Kasimis	Khristos Kasimis Revolutionary Group for International Solidarity	Concluded this group is one and the same. CFA.
Kurdish Independence Group (name unk)	Example of unknown names being listed as something other than "unknown"	Revision of remaining group names during my own classification process.
Lashkar-e-Omar		CFA
Laskhar-e-Taiba (LeT)	TKB says the organization has been funded since 1994.	1994 set as starty
Lebanese Socialist Revolutionary Organization	No known "Bases of Operation". Text indicates Lebanon.	Origin set to Lebanon.
Mahaz-e-Inquilab	Islami Inqulabi Mahaz	Concluded this group is one and the same. Dehli bombings of 2005 fit.
Mujahedeen Shura Council		CFA
Mujahedin-e-Khalq(MeK)	Mujahideen-I-Khalq(MK)	Concluded these are one and the same.
Muslims Against Global Oppression (MAGO)		CFA
Muttahida Qami Movement (MQM)		CFA
National Liberation Union		CFA
National Youth Resistance Organization		CFA
Nihilists Faction		CFA
November 17 Revolutionary Organization (N17RO)	Revolutionary Organization 17 November (RO-N17)	Concluded groups are one and the same.
Nuclei Communist Combatants	Lacks TOP	CFA, no resolution as of yet. (No way of knowing if they are communist or are combating communists either)
Orly Organization		CFA
Oromo Liberation Front	TKB says inactive. GTD has attacks listed in 2010.	No resolution as of yet.
Pan-Turkish Organization		CFA
Patriotic Resistance Army (ERP)		CFA
Paupa New Guinea Troops	GTD typo.	-
People's Liberation Forces (FPL)	No origin	No resolution yet.
People's Revolutionary Army	No origin.	No resolution yet

(ERP)		
People's Revolutionary Militias		CFA
(MRP)		
People's Revolutionary Organization		CFA
People's Revolutionary Home Army		CFA
Popular Resistance Committees	TKB; Late 2000.	Intepreted as late in the year 2000 and coded as such.
Popular Revolutionary Action	"Approximately 1 members"	CFA
Purbo Banglar Communist Party		CFA
Raul Sendic International Brigade		CFA
Recontras		CFA
Red Brigades	Missing origin. Text says they are concentrated in Italy.	No value given for origin.
Revolutionary Action Party	Missing TOP. According to TKB the detonated bombs to protest American support for the apartheid regime in South Africa.	Coded as 'Other'.
Revolutionary Autonomous Group		CFA
Revolutionary Leninist Brigades		CFA
Revolutionary Nuclei		CFA
Revolutionary Perspective		CFA
Revolutionary Proletarian Initiative Nuclei (NIPR)		CFA
Revolutionary United Front Movement		CFA
Riyadus-Salikhin Reconnaissance and Sabotage Battalion of Chechen Martyrs		CFA
Roque Dalton Commando		CFA
Runda Kumpulan Kecil (RKK)		CFA
Salafia Jihadia		Starty interpolated to 1997.
Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) are listed separately from the Sandinistas.	TKB treats these two as one and the same.	Treated these two as one and the same
Save Kashmir Movement		CFA
Secret Organization Zero		CFA
Seikijuku		CFA
Shahin (Falcon)		CFA
Socialist-Nationalist Front (SNF)		CFA
Sons of the South		CFA
Support of Ocalan-The Hawks of Thrace	Hawks of Thrace	Concluded these are one and the same.
Sword of Islam		CFA
Tawid and Jihad		Starty interpolated to 1998
Terra Lliure		Starty interpolated to 1972
The Front for the Liberation of the Cabinda Enclave – Renewed (FLEC)		Starty interpolated to 1968
The Inevitables		CFA
Tigray Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF)		CFA
Turkish Communist Party/Marxist (TKP-ML)	No listing of this organization. TIKKO (the militant wing of TKP-ML) is listed. Some, but not all, of the attacks have gsubname in GTD with TIKKO listed.	Coded as Communist / Socialist and Leftist

Ummah Liberation Army		CFA
United Arab Revolution		CFA
United Kiku Liberation Front (UKLF) – India		Starty interpolated to 1998.
United Popular Liberation Army of America		Starty interpolated to 1965
Usbat al-Ansar (League of Partisans)		Starty interpolated to 1990
West Nile Bank Front (WNBFB)		Starty interpolated to 1992
World Punishment Organization		CFA
Young Liberators of Pattani		CFA
Zapatista National Liberation Army	EZLN	Concluded these are one and the same.
Zimbabwe African Nationalist Union (ZANU)		CFA
Al-Intiqami al-Pakistani	Missing origin.	Origin set to “Pakistan” as both GTD and TKB list the 2002 attacks as the only ones and those were in Pakistan.
Red Line		CFA

Own Research Using Dow Jones Factiva

Variable name; *author_ideology*

* NOTE; This variable utilizes a different, more efficient coding scheme than the *tkb_ideology*.

Values

- 1 Anarchist
- 2 Anti-Globalization
- 3 Communist / Socialist
- 4 Environmental
- 5 Leftist
- 6 Nationalist / Separatist
- 7 Racist
- 8 Religious
- 9 Right Wing
- 99 Other
- . Missing

Combinations are allowed; meaning a value of 78 indicates a Racist (7) and Religious (8) group. The bulk of incidents were covered by relatively few groups coded using the TKB. It is reasonable to assume the remaining groups are the more obscure groups, perhaps only responsible for one incident ever. Thus, complete coverage may be hard to achieve.

First, all duplicates of group names were dropped from the dataset. Second, all groups with profiles from TKB were dropped from the dataset. This produced a rough list of 2381 organizations without TOPs out of a total number of unique group names of 2871. 1272 of these were searched for by me using Dow Jones Factiva search engine. This leaves 738 organizations still not researched for the future and yielded a further coverage of 8186 incidents, bringing the total coverage up to 47 605.

An estimated 3000⁶⁹ plus press wires and news articles were deemed relevant and downloaded to serve as sources for the classifications of the groups ideologies. Thousands more were reviewed and deemed irrelevant. Through a process of trial and error the following served as rough rules of searching; first, attempt to search for the entire group name within a relevant timeframe to the incident listed; second, attempt the same search using a segment of the group name eliminating any special characters that may confuse the search engine; finally attempt a broader search throughout the entire period of time covered by Factiva. If the above fails, attempt to find the incident itself by searching for location and mode of attack, for example 'Bomb' and 'Rome' on or after the date of the incident listed. If all above fails, move on to the next group.


This process was time consuming and highly repetitive. The most effective way of proceeding was to quickly review the articles, see if they held relevant information, and download the article if it did, before continuing with the next article on the same group. The goal was to find 2-3 unique articles per group, however sometimes there were many more and sometimes there was one or none. The main point of getting more articles was to get multiple accounts from different journalists. The information was then sent to fellow political scientist Ådne Naper to be classified in an Excel-document. Naper reviewed the articles and used the categories supplied by the TKB to classify the group going after the specific words used by journalists, such as 'marxist' or 'Islamic fundamentalist'. Once a group was classified, the sources were referenced together with the numerical codes for the ideology in an document for future review by other researchers. Naper was paid by the hour and if he should feel uncertain about a classification told to leave the group un-coded or contact me. He also had a field available in the Excel document in which he could write notes should he deem the decision needed further substantiation than the articles referenced. The process began in late November 2011 and ended in late February 2012. It involves a high degree of subjective qualitative decisions on part of both of us. By large, the research process was one of learning by doing, however we proceeded carefully and thoughtfully rather than with the focus on getting done in time. The coding process was cut short due to time constraints, meaning that no groups prior to 1985 are covered in my own coding's. This also illustrate the fact that we were in no hurry, and rather stopped at a certain point in time than attempting to rush through the entire list of group names.

Researchers must be aware of these problems when using these data. I recommend dropping all incidents prior to 1985, waiting for me to finish the work or finishing the work yourself.

Figures 1 show the ideological coverage achieved so far. There are many unknown group names which are impossible to code. Therefore, the coverage of the incidents with known perpetrator groups are plotted in figure 1, while figure 2 show the total yearly coverage including unknown incidents.

⁶⁹ Estimating the exact number downloaded and used is difficult because several files are created when an article is stored on the computer, and not always the same amount for every article. The estimate is based on a guesstimated average number of files per article by browsing a few random folders and counting the number of files, then counting the total number of files and dividing that number with the guesstimation.

Figures 1 & 2. Percent of yearly incidents with ideological profiles.



Constructed Variables

tkb_new_format
ideology

The *tkb_new_format* contains the TKB profiles in the *author_ideology* coding scheme, meaning *tkb_ideology* categories 9 and 10 are joined into one single 9: Right Wing category. The *ideology* variable contains both *author_ideology* and *tkb_new_format* bringing the ideological coverage up to a maximum. This variable has the same categories as the *author_ideology* and *tkb_new_format* variables do.

Three sets of broader ideological profiles

The *ideology* variable has 53 unique categories and is ill suited for analysis. The dataset was constructed for the purpose of investigating religiously motivated groups. Three sets of broader ideological profiles were created with the goal of investigating the differences between religious groups and all other types of groups. All variables are dichotomous variables where the value 1 indicates the group holds the ideological trait described.

Variable Sets Created:

- | Set1: Exclusively Religious | Set2: Religious + any combination | Set2: Exclusively Religious and religious + any combination |
|------------------------------------|--|--|
| • <i>leftist_1</i> | • <i>leftist_2</i> | • <i>leftist_3</i> |
| • <i>rightist_1</i> | • <i>rightist_2</i> | • <i>rightist_3</i> |
| • <i>natsep_1</i> | • <i>natsep_2</i> | • <i>natsep_3</i> |
| • <i>rel_1</i> | • <i>rel_2</i> | • <i>rel_exclus_3</i> |
| • <i>other_1</i> | • <i>other_2</i> | • <i>rel_comb_3</i> |
| | | • <i>other_3</i> |

The difference between the sets lie in the religious variable, *rel_1*, *rel_2* and *rel_exclus3* & *rel_comb3*. In set one, a group has to be exclusively religious to be counted in the religious categories. In set two, a group may combine a religious ideology with any other ideology to be in the religious category. This means that if the group is ‘Right Wing and Religious’ it is only counted in the *rel_2* variable and **not** in the *rightist_2* variable. The third sets creates a separate variable for exclusively religious groups and groups that employ religious and any

other combination. Once again, if a group falls within the *rel_comb_3* variable, meaning combining a religious ideology with another ideology, it will no longer be counted among the other ideologies.

I emphasize that these sets are created with the goal of separating religious groups in particular from all other. Thus, a group may combine both a 'Right Wing' and 'Left Wing' ideology, should it wish to do so, and be counted in both variables. The same will not be true for any group with a religious ideology.

Further elaboration on this will only lead to confusion, as there are 53 categories in the original variable. In essence, only groups that can for certain be put in leftist, rightist, nationalist / separatist or religious are put there. If a group is exclusively 'Environmentalist' there are no grounds for calling them 'Leftist', so the group will end up in the 'Other' category. Thus, the variables attempt to isolate groups on as clear terms as possible, maximizing the validity of the measures.

Variables compatible with all three sets;

The following three variables are created to represent the incidents without an ideological profile and are thus compatible with all the above sets of variables. Two versions are available; One where all groups without profile are treated the same, and one where known groups without profiles are separated from unknown groups.

Ideo_unkn - Known groups without ideological profiles, i.e. MISSING, are given the value 1.

Ideomiss - Unknown Groups are given the value 1




Unknown - Both known groups without ideological profiles and unknown groups are given the value 1.

Table II displays the coding in practice. On the far right there are two religious variables; Exclusively religious (*rel_1* & *rel_exclus3*) and Combination Religious (*rel_comb3*). If you are using set number 3, meaning the Combination Religious variable, then the 'X' from either the 'Leftist', 'Rightist', 'Nationalist-Separatist' or 'Other' categories are to be interpreted as *moved* into the Combination Religious variable. If you wish to create the *rel_2* variable, then you combine the *rel_exclus3* and *rel_comb3* variables to create an all-encompassing religious category.

Table II. Coding of Ideological Sets

<i>Val.</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>Description</i>	Old Values		New Variables			
			<i>Leftist</i>	<i>Rightist</i>	<i>Nat-Sep</i>	<i>Other</i>	<i>Excl. Rel.</i>	<i>Comb. Rel</i>
1	64	Anarchist					X	
2	8	Anti Globalization	X					
3	18,175	Communist – Socialist	X					
4	209	Environmental					X	
5	2,112	Leftist	X					
6	10,12	Nationalist – Separatist			X			
7	62	Racist					X	
8	4,608	Religious						X
9	1,336	Right Wing		X				
99	2,308	Other					X	
12	1	Anarchist, Anti Globalization					X	
13	48	Anarchist, Communist – Socialist	X					
14	1	Anarchist, Environmental					X	
15	83	Anarchist, Leftist	X					
19	8	Anarchist, Right Wing		X				
23	131	Anti Globalization, Communist – Socialist	X					
24	7	Anti Globalization, Environmental					X	
25	2	Anti Globalization, Leftist	X					
26	48	Anti Globalization, Nationalist – Separatist			X			
29	2	Anti Globalization, Right Wing		X				
35	126	Communist – Socialist, Leftist	X					
36	1,975	Communist – Socialist, Nationalist – Separatist	X		X			
38	5	Communist – Socialist , Religious	X					X
39	7	Communist – Socialist, Right Wing	X	X				
45	1	Environmental, Leftist	X					
46	1	Environmental, Nationalist – Separatist			X			

56	13	Leftist, Nationalist – Separatist	X		X	
58	1	Leftist, Religious	X			X
67	5	Nationalist – Separatist, Racist			X	
68	3,363	Nationalist – Separatist , Religious			X	X
69	96	Nationalist – Separatist, Right Wing		X		
79	42	Racist, Right Wing		X		
89	13	Religious, Right Wing		X		X
236	136	Anti Globalization, Communist–Socialist, Nationalist–Separatist	X		X	
279	1	Anti Globalization, Racist, Right Wing		X		
356	1	Communist – Socialist, Nationalist – Separatist Leftist	X		X	
367	5	Communist – Socialist, Nationalist – Separatist, Racist	X		X	
369	10	Communist – Socialist, Nationalist – Separatist, Right Wing	X	X	X	
399	31	Communist – Socialist, Other	X			
499	8	Environmental, Other				X
568	32	Leftist, Nationalist – Separatist, Religious	X		X	X
599	9	Leftist, Other	X			
678	4	Nationalist – Separatist, Racist, Religious			X	X
679	22	Nationalist – Separatist, Racist, Right Wing		X	X	
689	5	Nationalist – Separatist , Religious, Right Wing				X
699	33	Nationalist – Separatist, Other			X	
789	5	Racist , Religious, Right Wing		X		X
899	2	Religious, Other				X
999	4	Right Wing, Other		X		
3599	2,203	Communist – Socialist, Leftist, Other	X			
3699	24	Communist – Socialist, Nationalist – Separatist, Other	X		X	
6789	5	Nationalist – Separatist, Racist, Religious, Right Wing		X	X	X



NTNU – Trondheim
Norwegian University of
Science and Technology