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Violence against civilians 1900-87

A four-part analysis using a new dataset to test the relationship between the severity of democide and type of government

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Abstract

The study of violence against civilians with its over 200 million dead in the 20th century is understudied if viewed in terms of the death toll compared to the studies of inter-state and civil war. R.J. Rummel's extensive data collection of democide in the period 1900-87, has unfortunately lain dormant, mostly untouched by other researchers since its publication in 1997. This thesis has made use of this dataset, and converted it into time-series format in order to facilitate multivariate analyses. Instead of focusing on one type of violence against civilians, the thesis splits it into four different analyses on democide; one for democide performed by regimes against its own population; one for democide in a foreign state; one performed by non-state groups; and one category with the total for all of the other three. This division proves fruitful, as the three types of democides yield different results. The analyses show that autocracies are most violent when it comes to regime democide, with no difference between democracies and semi-democracies. Analyses on foreign democide, however, show that democracies are the least violent type of government, with no clear difference between autocracies and semi-democracies. Non-state democide, on the other hand, shows no clear difference between the three types of government. The role of economic development is also an interesting finding. While less-developed countries are more violent when it comes to regime democide, the exact opposite is found on foreign democide.

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Two great supervisors notwithstanding, there is an old proverb I find suiting, which goes: "you can lead a horse to water, but you cannot make it drink", and by which I mean that any errors in this thesis are of my own doing entirely.

Contents

1. Introduction

In the years between 1900 and 1987, over 169 million civilians were killed – more than four times the 38.5 million battle deaths during the same period (Rummel 1994: 3f), yet research on the subject matter has suffered from a lack of comprehensive country-year dataset. Research on violence against civilians has for the most part focused on the onset or incidence of violence, as opposed to the numbers killed, which vary considerably from event to event. In this thesis, I will present an analysis based on Rummel's (1997) dataset, with estimated democide divided into three different categories: regimes killing its civilians; non-state groups killing civilians; and regimes against a foreign state's civilians. Using this dataset, I perform four different analyses, one for each group as well as one for the sum of all democide. My main aim is to look for a possible connection between regime type and the severity of democide. By converting Rummel's data into time-series, it has become possible to perform multivariate analyses where Rummel himself only did bivariate. Furthermore, the dataset has a longer time span than most of the ones used before, a wider definition of violence against civilians which increases the number of cases, as well as estimates for the total number of deaths. These three factors make it possible to say more, and with greater certainty, about the connection between regime type and violence against civilians than what other datasets have allowed us to do before.

The thesis starts with three theory chapters. Definitions of violence against civilians are discussed in Chapter 2, before moving to previous research on the violence against civilians in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 discusses theories on the connection between violence against civilians and government. The dataset is presented in Chapter 5, leading to the research design in Chapter 6. The analyses are shown in Chapter 7, with a discussion in Chapter 8.

My main finding is that the division of democide into three categories is a valuable categorization. One cannot look at democide as just any type of killing of civilians; there are different factors at work from one type to the other that help to explain the severity. Looking at the total sum of incidents of democide, democracies are less violent than semi-democracies, which in their turn are less violent than autocracies. When the analyses are split by type of democide, autocracies are still the most violent regime type, but democracies are as violent as semi-democracies for both regime and non-state democide. The reason why democracies seemed less violent than semi-democracies in an analysis of the total numbers is found in the analyses for foreign democide, where democracies are far less violent than their semi-

democratic and autocratic counterparts. While the difference between semi-democracies and democracies depends on the type of democide, autocratic states seem to carry out the most democide no matter what category one looks at. Furthermore, my analyses show differences in the effects of ethnic distribution, where homogenous states have more violent regimes, and states where the second largest ethnic makes up a high proportion of the population will experience more severe democide perpetrated by non-state groups. Similarly, the economic development of a state acts in two different directions when analyzing regime and foreign democide separately. In the former analysis, the more economically developed a state is, the less violent its regime. On the other hand, the more economically developed a state is, the more violent it will be against foreign civilians.

2. Defining intentional killing of noncombatants

2.1 The UN definition of genocide

A multitude of definitions have been suggested to describe intentional murders of a large number of noncombatants. The first and most commonly used term has been *genocide*, created in 1944 by the Polish-Jewish jurist Raphael Lemkin (Valentino 2004: 9; Hagtvet 2008: 58). Lemkin, who in his early years read about the Huguenots in France, the pogrom in Bialystok, and acquittal of the perpetrators of the slaughter of Armenians from 1915 to 1923, felt it was wrong that a person committing murder was punished, but those responsible for killing of a million people were not. Having fled to the United States after the Nazi invasion of Poland in 1939, watching the injustice committed against those the Nazis deemed less than human, Lemkin was determined to do something about it. In a series of articles published six months prior to the Nuremberg Tribunal where leading Nazis were to be tried for their crimes against peace, crimes against humanity and war crimes, Lemkin coined the term genocide (Totten & Bartrop 2009: 3). The word combines the Greek word *genos,* which can be translated into "kin", "race", "clan" or "tribe", and the Latin word *cide*, which can be understood as "killing" (Valentino 2004: 9; Totten & Bartrop 2009: 3). He drafted a resolution where he asked the United Nations to study and consider making genocide an international crime. Then he spent many hours forming relationships with diplomats as well as educating representatives of various nations on the topic in order to make the resolution happen. The initial resolution was passed by the General Assembly on the 11th of December, 1946, and said:

Genocide is a denial of the right of existence of entire human groups, as homicide is the denial of the right to life of individual human beings; such denial of the right of existence shocks the conscience of mankind, results in great losses to humanity in the form of cultural and other contributions represented by these human groups and is contrary to moral law and to the spirit and aims of the United Nations. Many instances of such crimes of genocide have occurred when racial, religious, political and other groups have been destroyed, entirely or in part. […] The General Assembly therefore, Affirms that genocide is a crime under international law which the civilized world condemns, and for the commission of which principals and accomplices – whether private individuals, public officials or statesmen, and whether the crime is committed on religious, racial, political or any other grounds – are punishable (UN General Assembly Resolution 96).

While the initial resolution included "political or any other groups", this was removed after the Soviet Union, Poland and some other nations argued against it. The Soviet representatives held that the term political group does not have a scientific definition, while the Poles argued for the lack of distinguishing characteristics. Others again noted that political groups are voluntary, whereas racial, religious and national groups are not, and that the former should therefore be removed from the resolution. On the other side of the debate, France argued that while political groups might not have been prime targets in the past, they would become so in the future. There was also fear that the exclusion of political groups would lead perpetrators to use the political opinions of a racial or religious group as a pretext to perform genocide without being liable to sanctions (Totten & Bartrop 2009: 4).

Finally, in 1948, the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (UNGC) was approved by the United Nations, where it was defined, and still says today (UN 2011):

In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group (OHCHR 2010).

2.2 Critique of the resolution

This compromise resolution has, however, not stood unchallenged. The International Commission of Jurists recommended a revision of the definition to include political groups in 1973. In 1985 a similar recommendation was put forth by Ben Whitaker, the UN Rapporteur to Genocide (Totten & Bartrop 2009: 5). Other arguments against the standing definition have been about the rather vague phrases "intent", "in whole or in part" and "as such". Scholars disagree as to what constitutes intent of genocide, and whether it means that one has to have clear evidence such as testimony from one or more planners, documents, or a copy of a broadcast etc. In the context of genocide, intent should not be confused with a goal or motive. According to the UN definition, the only evidence prosecutors need is to therefore show that the acts were done intentionally (Gellately & Kiernan 2003:15). Because of this, international law now allows actions on the ground to be used as evidence of intent, as was done in the tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. The phrase "in whole or in part" has led to confusion about whether there is a minimum limit to the killing. "As such" refers to whether specific groups have been targeted intentionally rather than being victims of collateral damage (Totten & Bartrop 2009: 34f).

Another criticism of the UN Convention on genocide is that it protects the rights of groups, but not individuals. Individuals are assigned an additional and different quality when bound together as members of a group, which separates them from the rest of society. This is a problem because not all groups can be said to count as a "people" (Hagtvet 2008: 81). As seen above, the UN Convention's Article 2 lists nationality, ethnicity, racial or religious groups as groups that have protection under the Convention, ruling out other groups based on -social, gender, economic or political criteria. This makes it hard to punish the perpetrators of such crimes as, for example, the victims of Pol Pot's regime, or Stalin's deportations of political opponents (Hagtvet 2008: 81). On the other hand, the popularization of the expression "genocide" has diluted the meaning of the word over the years (Valentino 2006: 10). It has even been used to characterize such diverse phenomena as interracial adoption, abortion and lack of government funding for AIDS research.

2.3 Alternative conceptions of violence against civilians

Due to the shortcomings and stretching of the concept of genocide, many scholars have moved away from this term. Just as it was hard to find a consensus on an adequate definition of genocide in the UN, it has been difficult to find a single definition among researchers. This has led genocide researchers to introduce several new terms that have been used in different

research projects. While there is a discrepancy between the number of deaths between some of the definitions, others may have similar numbers. Some are even used interchangeably, depending on who is using them.

The lack of an agreed upon definition of the killing of noncombatants is a challenge for scholars in this field. For instance, it becomes hard to compare results between two research papers using datasets based on different definitions. Wayman and Tago (2010) compare different datasets and conclude that many existing controversies can be explained by the choice of datasets.

As we will see, the definitions vary a lot, and I have selected Rummel's definition of democide, since his dataset has the longest time-span, which will make the analyses less sensitive to outliers. In addition to this, the definition of democide is broader than any of the other definitions on violence against civilians, and does not discriminate as far as the total number of killed is concerned. Any murder of civilians is counted, no matter how few deaths have occurred. This wide definition strengthens the results by increasing the number of cases of violence against civilians. And lastly, Rummel's data includes estimates of the number of civilians killed, which will enable us to differentiate small and big incidents instead of treating the two as the same, as would be the case with a dummy variable, as Valentino et al. (2004) and Downes (2006) used. A detailed examination of the different datasets I considered is reviewed in Chapter 2.4.

Politicide

Politicide is defined by Harff and Gurr (1988: 360) as "the promotion and execution of policies by a state or its agents which result in the deaths of a substantial portion of a group". Genocide is a sub-category where victimized groups have been defined by their communal characteristics, such as nationality, ethnicity and religion. In politicide, on the other hand, groups are defined in terms of their political beliefs, their class or their organized opposition to the state/dominant group. Unlike genocide, victims of politicide are always engaged in some oppositional activity (Harff 2009: 72) by their hierarchichal position or political opposition to the regime and the dominant groups.

Mass killing

Valentino (2004:11ff) describes mass killing as "the intentional killing of a massive number of noncombatants". It does not matter what group the people are members of, as long as the killings are done intentionally. This means that mass killing is not limited to direct killing by

the use of arms, for example. As with Rummel's concept of democide, he includes indirect causes of death. While Valentino admits that it can be hard to determine if a killing is intentional or not, he says that they need not be the result of policies designed to kill; they will be counted as intentional if they are the result of policies trying to force civilian populations to change their behavior and if the perpetrators could foresee that such policies could result in widespread death. Although this makes the description quite similar to Rummel's democide, mass killing does not require a government to be the perpetrator. The offender can belong to any group in a society. Another difference is that the term democide includes *any* killing of civilians, no matter how few deaths.

Rummel use the terms "mass murder" or "massacre" to describe the intentional and indiscriminate murder of large numbers of people, perpetrated by government agents, for example, in the shape of shooting down unarmed demonstrators, or throwing grenades into prison cells before retreating under pressure from enemy troops (Rummel 1994: 35). Easterly, Gatti and Kurlat (2005: 132) use a similar definition for "mass killing" as Rummel does for "mass murder" but do not limit themselves to government agents.

One-sided violence

One-sided violence is a term used by Uppsala Conflict Data Programme (UCDP), and is defined as "the use of armed force by the government of a state or by a formally organized group against civilians which results in at least 25 deaths" (Kreutz & Eck 2005: 2; Eck & Hultman 2007). The collateral death of civilians (see Eckhardt 1989 for a discussion) is not included if the target of the attack was against non-civilians, and such phenomena as intentional starvation, which is included in Rummel (1995), of a people will not be counted in the dataset. The definition of one-sided violence is not limited to a state being the perpetrator, but includes cases where other agents are the executors of violence.

Democide

Democide is described by Rummel (1994: 36) as "murder by government agents acting authoritatively". Even though Rummel's definition states that democide is something that is perpetrated by the state, his statistical compendium (Rummel 1997b) still includes democide by non-state groups. Democide is any murder of a civilian by a government. The only criterion is that these deaths are the outcomes of purposive acts, processes, policies or institutions of a government. This means that unlike genocide, politicide and mass murder, democide will not only count deaths caused by arms, but also indirect deaths by acts of

government such as policies that cause starvation, diseases caused by blockades or destruction of necessities of life.

2.4 Choosing a dataset

There are several datasets to choose from when analyzing violence against civilians and they use qualitatively different definitions of this kind of violence. The four definitions with accompanying datasets discussed in Section 2.3 are those of Downes (2006), Rummel (1994), Harff (2003), Valentino, Huth and Balch-Lindsay (2004) and UCDP (2010; Eck and Hultman 2007). In addition to differences in definitions, they also cover different time periods, with Rummel covering the longest period (1900-87), and UCDP covering the shortest period of time (1989-2009).

Downes's (2006) dataset covers the longest time period, ranging from 1816-2003. The dataset has a very vague definition of violence against civilians, adding cases of "civilian victimization" in interstate wars. There does not seem to be a minimum number of deaths in order to be included in the dataset, nor does there seem to be a tally of the number of civilian deaths for the dataset, as Downes uses a dichotomous variable as an indicator for violence against civilians.

Easterly, Gatti and Kurlat (2005) covers the longest time period but for Rummel. These authors use a vague definition to what amounts as a mass killing or not, and does only state that "substantial numbers of human beings" (p. 7) have to be killed.

Harff (2003) has the narrowest definition of violence against civilians with its *geno-politicide* definition, and is, therefore, expected to show the lowest number of cases and lowest amount of victims[1]. The total dataset consists of 37 cases in the time period 1955-2001[2], with an estimated death count of 10,717,000–17,169,000. In order to be included in the dataset, the death toll has to be "in the thousands or more" (Harff & Gurr 1988:365), and has to take place in a country with a population of at least 500,000 inhabitants. This first vague criterion reduces the precision of this dataset, and it is probable that some geno-politicides have been excluded, such as Grenada's politicide of demonstrators in 1983 (which counts 100 civilian deaths in Rummel (1997b: 298), or the politicide in Uruguay between 1973 and 1984 with 300 civilian deaths (ibid: 334).

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[1] Harff does, however, have more deaths for the five cases from 1989-2001 than the UCDP, with its broader definition has as a total sum for the entire dataset.
[2] Harff & Gurr (1988) is an earlier version of the dataset, with 44 cases for the period 1945-87 – some of which were removed for the Harff (2003) dataset.

Valentino, Huth and Balch-Lindsay's (2004) dataset is a collection of *mass killings* occurring between 1945 and 2000. Unlike the other datasets, the numbers here are only gathered from violence against civilians during wars, a factor that should reduce the total figure. In addition to this, Valentino et al. have a minimum number of 50,000 killed over a period of five years in order for it to be counted as a mass killing, excluding a significant number of cases. Indeed, there are only 30 cases of mass killings found in this data – a lower number than Harff's geno-politicide numbers. In addition to this, Valentino et al. only use a dichotomous variable for mass killings, thus depriving themselves of the possibility of seeing what variables account for the intensity of the killings.

The UCDP dataset covers, with its 20 years, the shortest time period, but it may also have the most precise estimates. In order to be included in the dataset, there has to have been a *one-sided violence* count of over 25 deaths per year, making it much more sensitive to low-intensity violence than that of Valentino et al. Unlike the Downes (2006), Easterly et al. (2005) and Valentino et al. (2004), the UCDP data have been coded in time-series format. As such we can use it to show when an act of one-sided violence was most deadly, and when it was least violent. In addition to this, they have also coded every different actor with their own ID, unlike any of the other datasets. This means that one country may have several different actors performing one-sided violence in one country year (Eck & Hultman 2007: 236). One problem with this dataset, apart from the short time-span, is the case of Rwanda in 1994. Out of the total 573,000 deaths in the dataset, 500,000 occurred in Rwanda, or 87 per cent of the total number of deaths (UCDP 2011). An overview of the datasets discussed above can be seen in Table 2.1.

Rummel's wide definition and his use of a long time period yield a larger dataset, and also a much larger death count, than the other datasets. For the 1900-87 period, Rummel counted 169,198,000 victims of *democide*. More than 1,000[3] sources have been consulted in finding the numbers for all the different cases, yielding a total number of 8,200 estimates. Even though Rummel's definition of democide implies that the state has to be the actor, he has also included what he calls "rebel democide" into the dataset, but separating this from the total count of democide.

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[3] I counted 1,057 sources in Rummel (1997b), and there are probably more, as the numbers for China and Russia are not included.

Table 2.1: A comparison of the datasets

Author	Years	Definition	Data	Notes
Downes (2006)	1816-2003	Civilian victimization	52 cases	Dichotomous kill variable, only during wars
Easterly, Gatti and Kurlat (2005)	1820-1998	Mass killing	174 cases	"Substantial numbers killed"
Rummel (1994)	1900-87	Democide	560 cases[4]	No minimum number of deaths
Harff (2003)	1955-2001	Geno-Politicide	37 cases	Min 500,000 population, killed must be in "1000s"
Valentino, Huth and Balch-Lindsay (2004)	1945-2000	Mass killing	31 cases	Dichotomous kill variable, min 50,000 over 5 years
UCDP (2010)	1989-2008	One-sided violence	Time series	Min 25 per year

Based on this, the Harff and Valentino et al. datasets will not be analyzed. In comparison with Rummel's dataset, they have a shorter time span and fewer cases, making their data less precise and more vulnerable for outliers. As for Downes's data, the time span is impressive, but the definitions seem to be too loose. Because it is limited to violence against civilians in war, the dataset becomes too small for my analysis. Rummel's dataset has an edge over the UCDP dataset in the length of the coverage over time and its complexity compared with the two excluded datasets. The UCDP data has a more precise measurement of deaths as well as being coded in time-series format, which makes it very interesting. The far longer time-span and wider definition in Rummel's dataset is, however, more tempting, and converting this dataset into time series format could give new and interesting results.

I left out the dataset of Armstrong and Davenport (2008), which covers geno-politicide in the period 1946-2000 based on Rummel's (1997), Stanton's (2002) and Harff's (2003) data. The reason for not discussing it in the section is that the dataset is not publicly available, and could therefore not be considered in this thesis.

3. Type of government and violence against civilians

3.1 The two sides of the debate

As mentioned in the previous chapter, there are conflicting views on whether or not the type of government influences the likelihood of violence against civilians. On one side, authors

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[4] This is the number of cases I used in my adaptation of the dataset, and Rummel's number of cases is considerably higher. The number here represents the number of cases that give the shortest time intervals possible, which means that two or more cases that have the same time interval will be added up and counted as one case in my dataset.

like Rummel (1995), Harff (2003), and Valentino, Huth and Balch-Lindsay (2003) maintain that democracies are less violent towards civilians than non-democracies are. On the other side, authors such as Krain (1997), Mann (1999) and Downes (2006) reject this notion and claim that democracies are no better than other types of government when it comes to killing civilians.

Rummel (1995) analyses democides for all regimes during the period 1900-87, where 141 of all 432 state regimes performed democides during these 88 years. This article concludes that "power kills, and absolute power kills absolutely" (p 25). Krain (1997) uses Harff and Gurr's (1988) data for geno-politicides, and includes 35 cases of geno-politicides during the period 1945-82. Unlike Rummel, Krain does not find any correlation between the power concentration (that is the extent the power in a state is centralized in a small number of institutions) in a state and geno-politicides. He adds that he is not willing to reject Rummel's analysis, but claims that while power may be a prerequisite, it does not determine alone when genocide will occur. Harff (2003), on the other hand finds similar results to Rummel in her article covering 37 cases of geno-politicide for the period 1955-2001. While she finds democratic and quasi-democratic regimes to be less violent against civilians, she notes that when leaders form an exclusionary ideology which overrides principles or justifies efforts to persecute, restrict or kill certain categories of people, there is an increased chance of seeing geno-politicide. Examples of such exclusionary ideologies are advocates of firm variants of Marxism-Leninism, adherents of rigid anti-communist doctrines, rulers of Islamic states following Sharia laws, doctrines that claim an ethnic and ethno-nationalist superiority, and states where there is a strict secular nationalism that excludes the political participation of religious groups. Valentino et al.'s (2003) article, which tests 31 cases of mass killing during the period of 1945 to 2000, also finds a significant correlation between regime type and mass killing, showing that highly autocratic regimes have a higher chance of engaging in the mass killing of civilians during an armed conflict than highly democratic regimes.

Mann (1999: 20) challenges Rummel's claim that the few genocides that are conducted by democracies are perpetrated secretively with no democratic mandate. Among other things, he points to cases of democratic mass killings like the fire bombings of Tokyo and Dresden, the use of napalm in Vietnam, or the atomic bombs, all of which were decided through democratic constitutional processes. Mann adds that Rummel's comment on democracies' mass killings being done in secrecy was not unique to democracies, but that Hitler and Stalin also had their genocides hidden from the public. It should be noted that a large part of the democides by Hitler and Stalin, unlike their contemporary democratic

leaders, were domestic, and they therefore have a much higher incentive to hide the democides. Downes's (2006) results, on the other hand, show that liberal democracy has no effect on the occurrence of violence against civilians in wars. In addition, he finds that while democracies are no more nor less likely to kill civilians than non-democracies in normal wars, they are *more* likely than autocracies to kill civilians in wars of attrition.This effect he attributes to democracies' cost sensitivity – that is the falling popularity among the electorate should a conflict and/or its costs exceed what was first portrayed. However, these results cannot easily be compared directly to those of Krain, Rummel or Harff, as Downes's data only applies to civilian deaths in war-time in interstate conflicts.

3.2 Are democracies less violent against civilians?

3.2.1 The political norms argument

Modern democracies are open and competitive systems where politicians with conflicting views routinely clash against each other. In the democratic system, there is a constant competition between different parties, and a presence of rules, norms and guidelines that the parties have to adhere to. A democracy is only feasible when these rules are agreed upon, and followed by its politicians and citizens (Dixon 1994: 15). The competitive situation between the political parties, as well as being used to abiding by the rules, makes democratic citizens and the elites of the incumbent government and the opposition more receptive to appeals for human rights as well as international legalities on the laws of war. The implication is that democracies should be more likely to refrain from breaking international laws, even during war (Valentino, Huth & Balch-Lindsay 2004: 382). Leaders of autocratic states are socialized into a system that tolerates and may even encourage the use of force against the opposition - either by seizing power by the use of military force or by eliminating political opposition. Democratic leaders, on the other hand, have been socialized into a system which prohibits the use of violence and threats and instead encourages compromise in order to come to an agreement. The lessons political leaders learn in their way to power in their own country is then thought to be mirrored on the international scene (Rousseau et al. 1996: 513). As such, autocrats who have had success with killing civilians at home may be willing to kill another state's civilians. Democrats, on the other hand, who have not had similar experiences at home, and instead have had success with non-violent actions, may refrain from killing an enemy's civilians intentionally.

While an autocrat might be used to coercing his own subjects in order to achieve his policies, democratic leaders are more used to solving political problems through compromise and discussions (Maoz & Russett 1993: 625; Rummel 1997a: 101). This culture of compromise makes democracies more adept at solving conflicts among each other (Henderson 1991:123f). While this has been found for interstate conflicts, one can draw similar conclusion for intrastate conflicts. Although full democracies and full autocracies alike have a lower risk of experiencing civil conflict onset than hybrid regimes, the effect of conflict settlement is more in line with democratic ideals. If there is a conflict between the governing body of a state and a non-state group, there is a better chance of seeing successful negotiations if both parties are used to these kinds of politics. Indeed, democratic regimes have been found to be more successful in negotiating settlements in civil conflicts, while autocratic regimes are much less likely to do so (Valentino, Huth & Balch-Lindsay 2004: 382f). An example of the efficiency of democratic strategies through negotiation is seen in Horowitz and Sharma (2008: 769), who, in determining strategies for fighting ethnic insurgencies in India, found that democracies had a short-term positive effect by using coercive strategies (this does not involve genocide or ethnic cleansing) against insurgents. However, the short-term effect was turned into an increased local alienation which helped the insurgents militarily, as well as helping them make advances politically against local moderates. Pursuing a more cooperative approach by giving more local autonomy and economic inducements did, however, have a more lasting positive effect. The right to protection for minorities, as well as the inclusion of political opponents, is a main feature of democratic norms. Combined with competitive elections, this can act as a bulwark against the rise of exclusionary ideologies that have been found to have a higher chance of using violent means against its own population (Harff 2003: 62f).

3.2.2 The institutional structure argument

Unlike leaders in autocratic states, democratic leaders have formalized institutions that monitor abuse. These factors include the legislature, political bureaucracies, as well as key interest groups that all have to give their consent in order to go into a conflict or kill civilians. In addition to this, democratic leaders are likely to be held responsible for any wrong decisions, and might be removed from office in a future election (Maoz & Russett 1993: 626; Rummel 1997a). Sen (1990: 240) uses, as an example, the connection between freedom and famines. A higher amount of freedom will help avoid famines through, for example, the

freeing of markets and leaving room for productive opportunities connected with profit incentives, or by political pressure groups who induce governments to act if there is a shortage of food. This means that democratically elected leaders must be more careful of venturing into schemes that do not follow democratic ideals and that are unpopular among the electorate. While the incumbent political leaders in every state will always try to maintain their position, political opponents aim to thwart the leaders from maintaining the status quo when the leadership has failed to achieve their policy goals, or when they have made unpopular decisions. This shows that in democracies, the opposition has easier and nonviolent means to challenge the people in power. In turn, this should mean that democratic leaders face a higher cost of failure that forces them to ensure that their policies are likely to go through. Using military force is an example of a risky policy for the regime (Rousseau et al. 1996: 513). The citizens, who are the ones who feel the costs of war the most, will normally have a natural inclination towards peace. In a democratic regime, this public attitude has to be taken into consideration by the political leaders, for the fear of being punished in the following election (Morgan & Campbell 1991: 190).

While autocratic leaders can use the state military force quite freely, a similar occurrence is much less likely in democracies. Unlike autocratic states, democratic states are constrained in that the decision to use military force is not in the hands of a single person. It is shared between the leader of the state and other institutions, as one can see in countries like the United States where the formal authority is shared between an independent legislature and the executive (Morgan & Campbell 1991: 191). Non-democracies may also have stronger constraints on the executive; for example, in a one-party dictatorship where the leader must answer to the persons in the highest positions in the party (Morgan & Campbell 1991: 192). These factors do not necessarily mean that democracies will remain completely pacifist, as they will go to war in case of emergencies and in order to protect themselves and their interests (Maoz & Russett 1993: 626). Nevertheless, what happens when they are at war will arguably be affected by democratic structures.

Since a huge number of episodes of violence against civilians happen during civil wars, it is also interesting to look toward research on civil wars when trying to find factors explaining violence and government type. One prominent analysis is done by Hegre et al. (2001), who find that there is indeed a relationship between the regime type and the onset of civil wars. Their results show that there is not a linear relationship, but a concave one. Highly democratic and highly authoritarian states have few civil wars, and the regimes in the middle are the most conflict-prone. This result also holds when controlling for whether a regimewas

in the transition towards democracy or autocracy and when a transitional regime had stabilized as either an autocracy or a democracy. Because of the combination of somewhat open and slightly repressive and/or inefficient institutions in semi-democracies, chances of violence are higher due to the grievances caused by the repression/ineffectiveness and the openness allowing the formation of groups that eventually may take militarized action. Autocracies on the other hand will be more repressive, and will strike down such attempts to cause violence against the regime, while democracies encourage solving conflicts by means other than by using force (Hegre et al. 2001: 33f). If one were to connect this to violence against civilians, it is possible to see a situation where a semi-democratic state has instances of violence against civilians in a power struggle like an election, following Smith's retributive, ideological, utilitarian and monopolistic genocides as described in the previous chapter. This does not necessarily mean that one would see a concave curve when it comes to violence against civilians and the degree of openness, if the repressive acts done by the autocratic states are in the form of killing civilians. So the results could be similar to those of Lacina (2006), who find that democracies have less violent civil wars than other regime types, which she attributes to democratic norms, institutional adaptability and that democracies are more selective as to which conflicts they get involved in.

Indeed, as the results of Easterly, Gatti and Kurlat (2005: 136ff) show, autocracies are as violent as semi-democracies when it comes to mass killing. The authors divide the democracy scores into four quartiles, and find that the three quartiles with the lowest democracy score had similar, high frequencies of massacres, whereas the quartile with the most democratic countries had a significantly lower score.

Hypothesis 1a: Democracies are less democidal than other types of government

3.3 Are democracies just as violent as other types of government?

The democratic peace argument that democracies are constrained by institutional checks or by peaceful norms has not been universally accepted. Maoz and Russett (1993: 625) speculate that when a non-democratic and a democratic country wage war against one another, the democratic state may see itself forced to adapt to the norms of an international conflict if it believes that its democratic norms stands in the way of victory or in any way might be exploited by the non-democratic country. One may like to believe that democracies would not forego democratic principles and start killing civilians. But as will be discussed below,

guerrilla warfare is an example of a type of conflict where democracies may start targeting civilians. Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow, Siverson and Smith (1999: 804) find that democracies make an extra effort and, in general, try harder than non-democracies during a war by putting extra resources into the war effort instead of saving the money in order to pay those who backed them during wartime.

To explain why democracies might be as aggressive against civilians as non-democracies are, Downes (2006: 154) notes that a democratic state in an interstate war may target civilians in order to save lives on one's own side or simply in desperation because the war is not won quick enough and/or is too expensive. One could arguably draw a parallel between the argument of protecting one's own people and the American response to the criticism of the interrogation methods in Guantanamo Bay detention camp. Acts of desperation are, according to Downes (2006), more likely to occur in democracies, and especially in wars of attrition. Wars of attrition are also more lethal, even to the victor, giving even more incentive to find new ways to shorten the conflict, moving the cost of fighting from one's own troops over to the enemy's civilians (Valentino, Huth & Croco 2006: 348ff). This might make for a reasonable strategy for the leaders who understand that it is much easier to wage war against civilians since they do not shoot back and, therefore, do not cause the same amount of casualties against one's own troops (Downes 2007:879). The casualty factor in interstate wars is not likely to be underestimated in democracies because democratic leaders have to take into consideration something that is much less of a topic for autocratic rulers - the support of the electorate. Due to this, the democratically elected leaders are more eager to wage a short war because the public opinion would quickly turn against him if casualties rise or if the war seems unwinnable (Downes 2007: 873). Indeed, Gartner and Segura (1998:298) show that public opinion is affected by the number of casualties in the war, but they also conclude that a short, but very violent war may not be any better as far as public opinion is concerned, than a long conflict with a steady casualty rate. It could, however, be argued against Downes that the consideration of the electorate should imply that democracies are less violent against civilians instead of more violent (Bueno de Mesquita et al: 1999: 800)

Guerrilla warfare can often be seen in wars of attrition, and especially those where one of the parties is significantly weaker than the other. This kind of warfare, however, poses a great challenge to its targets, since the guerrillas often hide amongst the civilian population. This makes it hard to eradicate the threat, and therefore, makes genocide more likely (Valentino, Huth & Balch-Lindsay 2004). Guerrillas are often dependent on support from the civilian population for things like shelter, food and information, and this dependence makes

the civilian population an attractive target for government forces, thus cutting the guerrillas' line of support (Valentino, Huth & Croco 2006: 355). As far as guerrilla wars are concerned, the percentage of conflicts won by states against insurgents using guerrilla tactics has been steadily dropping since the peak during 1851-1875. In this period, ninety per cent of conflicts against insurgents were won by the state, compared to the twenty some per cent in the period 1976-2005 (Lyall & Wilson 2009: 69ff). If there is a connection between the decreasing amounts of conflicts won against insurgents and the increased chance of genocides in wars of attrition, there is a possibility that there has been an increasing amount of civilian deaths after the aforementioned peak. However, Easterly, Gatti and Kurlat (2005:135), find that massacres were more likely to happen in democratic countries in the 19th century than in the 20th century. This is attributed to the fact that most massacres were performed as a part of the colonization process. One might imagine that this is due to liberal democratic reluctance to use such force against civilian populations. But this pre-supposes that the massacres were the reason why these conflicts against insurgents using guerrilla tactics were won.

Due to the cost sensitivity seen in democratic countries, they tend to attack other countries where they believe that the war will be of short duration and inexpensive (Bueno de Mesquita et al: 1999: 799). Democracies win a disproportionate amount of the wars they enter (Reiter & Stam 1998: 387), and are also more likely to fight on battlefields that are not contiguous to their own borders, as it is easier for them to shield their own civilian population (Valentino, Huth & Croco 2010: 542).

Gartner and Regan (1996: 284f) find that it is not regime type per se that determines a state's repressiveness[5], but the type of demands or threats they face from their political opposition. Based on this they conclude that the reason why democracies experience less repression than other regime types is because democracies experience fewer extreme demands due to the different channels opposition groups can use for dissent, and have, therefore, fewer reasons to be repressive. Regan and Henderson (2002: 122) connects this with Fein's (1995: 176ff) "More Murder in the Middle" hypothesis in which she finds that semi-democracies are more repressive than their autocratic and democratic counterparts. Based on this, Regan and Henderson claim that the repression is due to the increased amount of serious threat to the regime, indirectly saying that governments in semi-democracies have less control than in other regime types. While political repression does not necessarily mean the killing of

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[5] As with violence against civilians, repression is defined in many different ways. Most relevant in this context is the definition used by Gartner and Regan (1996), who view political repression as the use of violence as a method for political control.

civilians, the threat argument is nevertheless a credible reason for murdering civilians. Combined with the cost-sensitivity discussed above, an increased threat could make a regime take pre-emptive action in order to avoid future loss.

Hypothesis 1b: Democracies are as democidal as non-democracies in wars
Hypothesis 1c: Semi-democracies are more democidal than both autocracies and democracies in war

4. Research on violence against civilians

In this section I will first present a classification of motives that some scholars believe to be useful in understanding violence against civilians. After this, I present factors that have been correlated with violence against civilians in earlier analyses, or factors that are correlated with intrastate or interstate wars, and that I suspect may be significant when it comes to violence against civilians. Since the research on violence against civilians is limited, many of the theories presented here are from research on civil wars. While I recognize that the two are not the same and one cannot draw conclusions based on another type of conflict, I believe that civil wars have several axial points with democide, and that there is possible to draw parallels between the two.

Motives/rationale behind violence against civilians

Before advancing to the structural explanations, I will first try and say something about the motives behind violence against civilians. While such motives are not readily quantifiable and suited for a statistical analysis, it may give valuable insight into understanding the topic better.

Killing civilians is seen by some as a rational decision made by leaders (Valentino 2004: 68). Trying to discover the motives as to *why* groups would go through with such a venture is a tough nut to crack. Scholars have tried to classify different types of motives and some of these explanations are similar, while others vary greatly. For instance, Chalk and Jonassohn (1990: 29) classify motives for genocide into four different categories: (1) to eliminate real or potential threats; (2) to spread terror among real or potential enemies; (3) to acquire economic wealth; (4) to implement a belief, theory or ideology. Smith (2009: 40ff) lists five different categories that he calls: (1) retributive genocide; (2) institutional genocide; (3) utilitarian genocide; (4) monopolistic genocide; (5) ideological genocide. Unlike the two former studies, Jones (2006: 262ff) maintains that one has to look to the individual in order to

understand why genocides take place, and locates four different psychological elements that are essential to understanding génocidaires: (1) narcissism; (2) greed; (3) fear; (4) humiliation. Though seemingly quite different, these three researchers have quite similar views on motives, as we can see in Table 4.1.

Table 4.1: A comparison of different explanations of motives

Cat.	Chalk and Jonassohn	Smith	Jones
1	(1) Elimination (2) Terror	(2) Institutional	(3) Fear
2		(1) Retributive	(4) Humiliation
3	(4) Belief/ideology	(5) Ideologic	
4	(3) Economy	(3) Utilitarian	(2) Greed
5		(4) Monopolistic	(1) Narcissism

Sources: Chalk and Jonassohn (1990: 29), Smith (2009: 40ff), Jones (2006: 262ff)

Smith's institutional genocide is explained as a routinization of terror against its people in order to display one's own power and hinder future retaliations, as well as devastating a city or territory instead of incorporating it into one's own system. One can see how Chalk and Jonassohn's elimination of potential threats and terror from real or potential enemies fit Smith's definition. Jones's "fear" category says that a party, in fear of being killed, might kill civilians in a pre-emptive strike. This is similar to the categories mentioned above. Under the second category, Jones' "humiliation" explanation can be explained as a situation where the perpetrator has been humiliated in the past and wants revenge to regain lost honour. This motive is fairly close to Smith's category of retributive genocide, where the perpetrators blame the victims, rationalizing that they deserve punishment for what they have done in the past or for what they are. This latter part also partly overlaps with Jones' "narcissism" explanation. The third category comprising of Chalk and Jonassohn's belief/theory/ideology and Smith's ideological genocide are both straightforward, where the focus is on the battle between ideologies as a motive for killing civilians. The fourth category includes all of the authors' focus on the quest for wealth in some form. When it comes to Smith's monopolistic genocide and Jones' narcissism category, the connection between them is perhaps less evident; the former defines his category as one where significant cleavages between religious, racial and ethnic groups create a fight for power, and the latter explains his narcissism category as one where the perpetrators see themselves as superior to other groups and deserving of special treatment. There is a possibility that this situation occurs in Smith's monopolistic genocide, but not necessarily, as the genocide might just be a struggle for power,

an "us or them" scenario. A problem with these three motivations is that they do not explain why non-state groups would perform violence against civilians as well, since it does not include such factors as the fight for political rights or equal opportunities.

The different motives presented here are just from three scholars, and many more have tried to explain the motives for killing civilians differently but still arrive at similar conclusions. Making an exhaustive list is indeed challenging, as violence against civilians often will not be explained easily by one explanation, otherwise one would expect to see more violence against civilians in other places with a similar situation. Violence against civilians happens due to a combination of different reasons and is not easily explained, but some general patterns have been found.

Development

A state's development can influence the probability of violence against civilians in the state. In the period 1946-89, over one third of all types conflicts took place in low-income, developing countries. This figure rose to 50 per cent in the period 1990-2003 (UNDP 2005: 154). These relationship is confirmed in a multivariate analysis by Fearon and Laitin (2003: 76) who interpret that a low GDP/capita as a proxy for weak state capacity. While Fearon and Laitin's results apply to civil war, Harff (2003: 69) found that a low level of development did not affect the risk of experiencing a geno-/politicide once state failure has occurred. However, Harff also includes the variable "trade openness" which may interfere with her measure for development (infant mortality rate). While Harff's results did not support it, I find it likely that a developed state is less likely to experience violence against civilians than less developed states, which leads me to the second hypothesis:

Hypothesis 2: Less developed countries commit more democide than developed countries

During wars

During a civil war where the fighting parties are fighting a symmetric war, where they have similar military capabilities, the violence against combatants and civilians usually takes place in a limited territory, such as the conflict in the final stages of the Sri Lankan civil war. Combatants in these types of conflict are usually killed in combat on the frontline. Civilians on the other hand, are isolated from the battlefields, and violence against them in this type of conflict takes the form of assassinations by armed groups entering villages or towns, due to naval or aerial bombing or massacres and executions that take place during a territorial

conquest (Balcells 2010: 296f). In an asymmetric civil conflict, one of the parties will have better military capabilities than the other[6]. Arguably, the chance of killing civilians is higher in this type of conflict. Non-state groups might follow this strategy because of problems reaching military targets due to the state's superior organization and firepower, and therefore find other - civilian - targets instead. The state actor, on the other hand, could see the killing of civilians as a solution when they have no real military targets to hit, and must attack non-state groups who live amongst civilians (Gross 2009: 321f). By killing these civilians, the state create an environment where the civilians do not want to protect the non-state groups for fear of their own lives, and would force the non-state groups to move. The same characteristics we see in symmetric and asymmetric civil wars are likely to be seen in a war between two nations, with the exception that the defending nation is less likely to kill their own civilians, but may turn to shelling enemy civilians, if they have the capacity to do so, with the same rationale as inferior non-state groups use in asymmetric civil wars.

Previous genocide

Whether or not a state has seen violence against civilians in the past can also be a reason for civilian killings in the present. A group that has been mistreated in the past may engage in a reprisal, attacking civilians of opposing groups, and blaming their victims for what they have done in the past, thus dehumanizing them in the process (Smith 2009: 40ff). A case in particular is the Hutu/Tutsi conflict in Rwanda. Past killing of civilians could also trigger future violence if the perpetrators had success with this strategy, and want to repeat the outcome with the same sort of violence (Harff 2003: 62).

Neighbours

In research on civil war several authors have found that a state's individual characteristics are not all that matters, whether or not one sees intrastate conflict. Indeed, there seems to be a contagion effect, where a conflict may spread from one country into another. Buhaug and Gleditsch (2008) find that a contagion effect does not depend on the exposure to proximate conflicts, but that ethnic linkage between groups of the two states makes a conflict more likely to spread. When it comes to democide, it seems likely that if ethnic group A performs democide on ethnic group B in one state, this might cause group B to retaliate on group A in a neighbouring state. Leaders of a state may also learn how efficient the neighbour's democide

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[6] Usually the state, and in those cases where the state is the weaker part, one will probably see a successful coup.

is in repressing opponents, and decide to build upon the neighbour's successful experiences and do the same themselves. However, it may work as a deterrent, as the leaders may recognize the atrocities done in a neighbouring state and its effect, and therefore shy away from using the same strategy. One example of the spreading of a conflict is the Tutsi army that went into Rwanda from Uganda in 1990, fuelling what would become a violent genocide four years later, and leading to the Hutu militia Interahamwe fleeing to the Democratic Republic of the Congo from where they now operate (Hintjens 1999).

Social cleavages

Social cleavage theory (Valentino 2004: 16ff) maintains that cleavages such as ethnic, cultural, religious, class divisions, political or economic exclusions or high levels of discrimination can be a powerful force behind mass killings. Such cleavages may create an "us vs. them" mindset, and dehumanizes the other party, which is perceivedas inferior to one's own. This theory is not very specific to what kind of constellation of ethnic groups that is giving the highest risk of democide and the most violent democides. Research on civil war can arguably give some parallel lessons.

Collier and Hoeffler (2004: 588) show that states with an ethnically dominant group are more likely to see civil conflict than ethnically fragmented states. Krain (1997) also find effects based on the distribution of ethnicities in a state, when he shows that, when accounting for the duration of the geno-politicide, the more homogenous[7] the population in a society is, the more severe a genocide or politicide will be. When opponents of a state or group is of a uniform ethnicity, that whole ethnic group might be seen as potential enemies, and therefore killed, even if it is clear that not every person of that ethnicity is an opponent (Downes 2007: 878). Another reason why leaders choose to kill members of the enemy's ethnicity could be that they, in fear of seeing rebellion behind their own lines, try to quell resistance before it happens. By killing most of the civilians with the same ethnicity as the enemy's, one also reduces the opposing group's interest in trying to reconquer the area and liberate their ethnic brethren (Downes 2006: 154). From this the third hypothesis is:

Hypothesis 3: Ethnically homogenous states are more democidal

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[7] Unlike Collier and Hoeffler, Krain does not use the phrase ethnic dominance , but a homogenous state will arguably have an ethnic dominant group, although an ethnic dominant group does not necessarily have to exist in a homogenous state. For example a state with six groups, where one constitutes 50 per cent of the population, and the other five 10 per cent each, there would be an ethnic dominant group, but the state is not considered homogenous.

5. Dataset

5.1 Rummel's data

Since states normally do not count the number of civilians they have murdered, the numbers will, in most cases, be estimates. Rummel's approach to finding these numbers is what he calls *reasonable approximation*, which is based on six different principles: (1) *the variation principle*, where one uses estimates from both extremes[8] while still being credible and authoritative. This avoids biased results that estimates based on one of the extremes yield; (2) *the comprehensiveness principle*, which states that one should include as many estimates as possible as long as these are independent, even if the estimated number is the same as another source; (3) *the disaggregation principle*, in which the estimates should be divided into the best sub-estimates available, for example, using the number of people killed in campaigns, deportations, massacres and camp deaths separately instead of using only total estimates. This is done to avoid exaggerations and underestimates; (4) *the error range principle*, in which one includes low and high sub-estimates for each case of democide as well as including the most probable estimate. Thus, when summing up all the low estimates for a period, it is likely that these figures are underestimated, with the opposite for the sum of the high numbers, thus creating a range of error for the medium estimate; (5) *the consolidation principle,* where one always use the lowest and highest estimates one can find, even if other sources have another low or high estimate, but where one adds the total for mid-estimates, and divides this between the number of estimates[9]. However, Rummel notes that there are situations where the consolidation differs from this; (6) *the disclosure principle*, stating that all sources, estimates and relevant comments should be disclosed, including any kind of calculations that have been undertaken to reach the final totals, making it easier for others to make additions and adjustments.

As stated above, Rummel counts a total of 169 million murders (Rummel 1994: 4), the numbers of the worst murdering states can be seen in Table 5.2.

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[8] By extremes I mean the highest and the lowest estimates given, two estimates that are likely to be different from the perpetrators and the victims.

[9] Rummel uses an example of two different medium estimates of 2,000,000 and 2,500,000, where the final mid estimate will be 2,250,000. Whereas for the low estimates he has 1,000,000 and 850,000, and uses 850,000 as the low estimate, and for the high estimate he has 4,600,000 and 3,500,000, choosing the former as his high estimate.

Table 5.2: Most deadly regimes, numbers in thousands (Rummel 1994: 4)[10]

Regimes	Total democide	Regimes	Total democide
USSR	61 911	Pakistan	1 503
China (PRC)	35 236	Mexico	1 417
Germany	20 946	Yugoslavia (Tito)	1 072
China (Kuomintang)	10 075	Russia	1 066
Japan	5 964	China (Warlords)	910
China (Mao Soviets)	3 466	Turkey (Atatürk)	878
Cambodia	2 035	United Kingdom	816
Turkey	1 883	Portugal (Dictatorship)	741
Vietnam	1 678	Indonesia	729
North Korea	1 663	*"Lesser murderers"*	*2 792*
Poland	1 585		
		World Total	**169 202**

No less than 77 per cent of all civilian deaths from democide have been conducted in, or by, three states: the Soviet Union, China (nationalist and communist) and Germany. However, in terms of democide as a share of the population, some smaller states are more violent. At the top of this list is the Cambodian Khmer Rouge's democide at an annual rate of 8.16 per cent in the years 1975-79, killing over 31 per cent of the population. The next three countries on the list that have an annual rate of over 1 per cent are Turkey in 1919-23, Yugoslavia in 1941-45 and Poland in 1945-48, with an annual democide rate of 2.64 per cent, 2.51 per cent and 1.99 per cent respectively (Rummel 1994: 7). In Rummel's data, 137.9 million of the total dead are killed by totalitarian regimes, 28.6 million by authoritarian regimes, and two million by democratic states (Rummel 1994: 15).

The data collected by Rummel have, however, not gone uncriticized. Dulic (2004a) argues that Rummel's methods for gathering data suffer from a lack of source criticism, and uses Rummel's numbers for the Yugoslav democide as an example. Dulic's main criticism is the uncritical use of secondary sources. He points to several sources Rummel has used which Dulic deems as unreliable - sources that Dulic believes exaggerate the number of people killed. Using demographic data, Dulic shows that if Rummel's numbers were to be true, Yugoslavia's annual population growth for the period 1941-48 would have to be almost 3 per cent - more than twice the population growth Rummel himself estimated for the period 1941-50. Based on the case of Yugoslavia, Dulic questions the trustworthiness of the rest of the data if Rummel has used similar sources/methods for other cases. Rummel's (2004) answer to

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[10] These numbers do not include Rummel's 38 million estimated famine death as a consequence of the Great Leap Forward.

these comments is that Dulic focuses on just a small time period for his estimate, instead of the total period the democide occurred (1944-87), and asks why Dulic has not provided any estimates of his own in comparison. Rummel also comments that the Yugoslavian democide was just one out of 218 cases, and therefore, does not say anything about his estimates or methods in general. Dulic's (2004b) reply to this is that Rummel did not try to refute Dulic's criticism and avoids the central argument about Rummel's methodological problems. Mann (1999: 20) also disagrees with Rummel's estimates, arguing that the numbers killed by napalm in Vietnam are minimized. But he does not claim that there is a systematic under- or over reporting in the dataset. In either case, one cannot claim that the data are completely accurate. It seems likely that the numbers for democide conducted in or by democracies are more precise, as democracies have more non-governmental organizations following the state's actions as well as a critical press and opposition, all with the ability to voice their opinion should such numbers be understated.

Despite Dulic's criticism, I have used Rummel's numbers for the entire dataset with the exception of the famines in 1959-63 caused by the Great Leap Forward in China. Rummel did not initially include his estimate of 27 million famine deaths caused by the great leap forward, but started including these famine deaths when he became aware that the Chinese leadership was well aware of the famine and did not try very hard to prevent it (Rummel 2005). While Rummel upped his estimate to 38 million, Dikötter (2010: 325ff) presented new and trustworthy data which exceeds Rummel's estimate, and Dikötter shows that as many as 45 million people died during that famine. Since such a big discrepancy could make a difference in the analyses, as well as the clearer numbers given by Dikötter, I have decided to use his estimate instead[11].

5.2 Restructuring Rummel's dataset

As seen above, Rummel's data is a result of consulting many different sources and then estimating the number of deaths based on these sources. Except for the numbers for Russia after 1917, China and Germany, all of the estimates are found in Rummel (1997b). For every democide case, he first writes what the democide is about or who it is against. Then he makes a list showing the death estimates of his source(s) as well as their estimated start and end years. Based on these estimates, he produces his own estimate. The number of sources he has consulted varies widely from case to case, where some of them show no sources, while others

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[11] I did analyses using Rummel's numbers instead of Dikötter's, and the results were practically identical with those used in the main analyses in Chapter 7.

may show more than 30. How much consideration he has taken of the sources also varies. Some of his estimates are the same as one or more of his sources, while other estimates show widely different numbers than all of his sources. In the latter situation he has usually extended the time period of his source, and in the process added more deaths, probably to account for killings he believes to have happened in those years. Since Rummel has not tried to build a time-series dataset, his start and end years do not need to be completely accurate. There are instances where he uses the exact same numbers as his sources, but where he may have changed start and end periods from 1963-70 to 1960-75. This does, of course, give Rummel a buffer for his numbers in case the estimates were too high and in case there was democide before and after the period of the source's estimate. The generosity in creating large intervals for democide created some problems when I tried to convert his data into a country-year format. Figure 5.1 shows that there are many cases which have a very long interval. For this reason my analysis is on the incidence and severity of democide rather than their onsets.

Figure 5.1: Number of cases per interval-year (x = interval-year, y = frequency)

The gravest examples are USA and Liberia, where the former has recorded lynchings/vigilante executions/KKK victims for the whole period of 88 years, and the latter has recorded "forced labour dead" for the same period. But fortunately, as seen in Figure 5.2, the number of deaths recorded are mostly in the earlier years.

Figure 5.2: Number of dead per interval-year (x = interval-year, y = no. dead in thousands)

Regardless of the length of the time intervals I have divided the number of deaths reported for the case, by the number of years the case was active. So a case of 10,000 dead over a period of 10 years shows up as 1,000 dead per year in my dataset. Thus, I neglect when a democide was its most intense, but Rummel's data gives no basis for judging the temporal dynamic of individual democides. The shorter the interval, the less of a problem with this strategy. Nevertheless, the long intervals are far from optimal and I have tried to change these into smaller ones. The optimal solution would, of course, be to find sources that have a single number per year, but this would be too time-consuming, and probably leave substantial inaccuracies as well. I have tried to make a cut-off at 10 years, as the maximum interval. Since I have wanted to stay true to Rummel's data, I have tried to look over every case and look at Rummel's sources to see whether they have a shorter time span than what Rummel has used. If they do have a shorter time interval, *and* if the numbers of these sources are very similar to those of Rummel, I changed Rummel's start and end years to match those of his sources. A potential problem with this strategy is that, in the case of Rummel's estimates being correct, my changing of the start and end years might make some years more intense than they really were. While I managed to lower the time period for some of the cases, I was not successful in making the cut-off I set at 10 years, as we can see from Figure 5.3, which is very similar to that of Figure 5.1.

Figure 5.3: Number of cases per interval-year after edit (x = interval-year, y = frequency)

Figure 5.4 will therefore also show approximately the same numbers as Figure 5.2 since there have not been many changes. The only visible change is the one of using Dikötter's (2010) estimates on the great famine in China.

Figure 5.4: Number of dead per interval-year after edit (x = interval-year, y = no. dead in thousands)

Rummel lists many estimates that he has left out for one reason or another. Therefore, I always had to go to his final democide estimate for the country, and work backwards to find where his numbers come from. Due to the size of his dataset, it is sometimes a maze of numbers trying to retrieve all the data I want. For example, he can have an estimate on line 250, which is a result of lines 240 and 230, and going to these lines I see that they are the result of lines 200, 195, 190 and so on.

In some of the estimates, Rummel's sources have been unclear as far as the start or end years are concerned. In these cases I chose to assume that his guesstimate is correct. There are also some places in the dataset where he has no start year, or no end year, and in these situations I have consulted his sources. Following Rummel's own coding strategy in those cases where he has no low estimate, I use the medium one if possible. If there is no medium estimate, I use the low one if possible. And if there is no high estimate, I use the medium estimate if possible.

In addition to creating a dataset with a country-year structure, I also chose to split the democide variable into three different categories: one for regime democide; one for foreign democide; and one for non-state democide. This made the whole ordeal even more time-consuming. But if I were to discover that this division does not yield any new results, it is easier to merge the data back into a single variable again than to go the other way.

5.3 Rummel's data in country-year format

After converting the dataset into time series, it becomes possible to view the development in murders over time in a more precise way. Rummel did this (1997: 466), but because he had not converted his data into country-year format, the graph becomes smoother, and it is harder to spot the peaks and drops. Figure 5.5, shows my numbers (blue) compared to the original numbers of Rummel (in red). The faint green colour in 1959-64 represents Rummel's 27

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million estimated famine deaths in his 1997 volume, whereas the orange line is his newest 38 million assessment from 2005 (Rummel 2005). The sharper lines in my data is due to the changes done in the interval years

Figure 5.5: Total number of deaths per year, numbers in thousands

Three of the major peaks are all caused by famines in Russia (1922), Russia (1934) and China (1960) respectively. The peak after World War II in 1949 can be accounted to Chinese communist democide, combined with Russian deportation and labour camp deaths. The last major peak occurs in 1971, and is largely due to Pakistan's democide in East Pakistan (currently Bangladesh).

Since I decided to code the democide count into three different categories following Rummel's own categories (although mostly overlooked in his analyses), it is useful to see the distribution of killings among the three. From Figure 5.6 we see that regime democide is by far the largest and most serious type. While foreign democide did have a significant peak during the World War II years, the number of dead due to non-state democide is miniscule compared to the other two.

Figure 5.6: The death count split into regime, foreign and non-state democide, numbers in thousands

Not surprisingly, the most violent states by far are China, Germany and Russia. Together they constitute over 88 per cent of the regime democide count of 175 million, 70 per cent of the foreign democide count of 39.5 million, and 11 per cent of the non-state democide count of 1.75 million. Removing these three states from the graph, we see the result in Figure 5.7.

Figure 5.7: Number of deaths per year after removing China, Germany and Russia, numbers in thousands

As with the total numbers, there is still a major peak during the Second World War, and Japan is a major contributor to creating this peak along with Yugoslavia. As in Figure 5.5, the spike in 1971 is the democide performed in East Pakistan. The Khmer Rouge's regime democide is the best explaining factor for the peak in the late 1970s, and the last peak around 1985 is due to Ethiopian democidal famine. Note that the scale on the vertical axis has changed considerably, reflecting the exclusion of the "megamurderers".

Just as interesting as looking at the number of killed due to democide every year is looking at the number of cases of democide per year. Even though the number of deaths in democides seems to have been declining since the 1960s, one can see from Figure 5.8 that the

number of democides did actually rise from the mid-1930s until the early 1980s, with a small drop after the Second World War, and then another drop after 1982. The numbers in this figure do not inform us of the number of nations performing democide, but are the sum of all types of democide. This means that it is possible that one nation has three cases of democide in one year (but no more than three since all cases of any type of democide is added into their respective categories). Theoretically a count of 81 cases of democide could be carried out in as few as 27 states. Even though the number of cases of democide per year rose steadily from the mid-1920s, the number of cases of democide adjusted by the number of countries dropped sharply from its peak in the early 1930s, and has slowly been decreasing since the end of the Second World War. Therefore one can assume that the rising trend of democide can be attributed to the introduction of the new nation states.

Figure 5.8: Number of cases of democide per year

When we separate the three categories, we can see that regime democide is still the most frequent type of democide, but as seen above, it has a drop after 1982. Apart from the World War II years, the number of cases of foreign and non-state democide seem to follow each other at around 5-10 cases per year, however, without the same drop in the early 1980s as we have seen in regime democide.

Figure 5.9: Number of cases of democide per year divided in three categories

This dip at the end may suggest a similar trend to the one for the number of armed conflicts, which peaked in the early 1990s, and then later dropped and plateaued around 2002 (Gleditsch et al. 2002; Harbom & Wallensteen 2010). If this were the case for democide, one would expect the number of cases of democide to continue dropping from the 1987 level of about 50 cases. Since there is no way to see if this stands with Rummel's data, I did the same test with the UCDP data which goes from 1989 onwards, leaving 1988 as a gap year. Even though these two measures are not the same, it is still interesting to see whether there has been any drop using another definition on violence against civilians. The UCDP numbers of states with one-sided violence can be seen in Figure 5.10.

Figure 5.10: Number of cases and killed of *one-sided violence* per year for the period 1989-2004, using UCDP data[12]

The peak in 1994 goes up to 501,814, which mostly consists of the 500,000 killed in Rwanda.

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[12] The number of cases has been counted in the same fashion as was done with Rummel's dataset, by counting non-state democide and regime democide as two separate cases if they were performed the same year.

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As one can see from the figure, the number of cases of one-sided violence has not decreased the same way as the number of armed conflicts, nor does the number of people killed. While I cannot find any decrease in the number of one-sided violence in the UCDP data, Anderton (2010: 463) shows a decline in genocides from 1989 and steadying from 2002 when using the Political Instability Task Force's dataset, thus supporting the theory of a similarity between violence against civilians and the number of conflicts.

6. Variables and research design

6.1 Variables

The analyses in this paper use four dependent variables and seventeen independent variables, all of which are presented in short below.

Democide

The number of democidal deaths is as mentioned earlier, based on Rummel's (1997b) estimates for the period 1900-87. This data has been divided into three different categories: regime democide; non-state democide; and foreign democide. Based on these three types of democide, I have made four dependent variables: (1) regime democide, which is all democide within a state done by the state itself; (2) non-state democide, a variable which counts democide carried out by a group that does not represent the state; (3) foreign democide, a variable which counts any democide committed outside of a country's own borders; and lastly, (4) total democide, which is the total sum of all democide (regime, non-state and foreign). Disaggregating Rummel's data into a country-year format and different forms of democide makes it possible to see whether there are different effects explaining the different types of democide and gain a better understanding of the temporal dynamics at play.

Population

The population data is mostly gathered from Maddison (2011). His data goes as far back as 1822 for a handful of countries, which is useful since the democide data goes back to 1900. Notwithstanding, there are also many gaps, especially in the early years, but the data are complete from 1950 onwards. Where applicable, I have filled some gaps with population data from Fearon and Laitin (2003). A complete list of the missing values and the instances I have used Fearon and Laitin data can be found in Appendix A.

Energy consumption per capita

As a measure of the state's economic development, I use Correlates of War Project's data on primary energy consumption instead of a normal GDP per capita. In contrast to data on GDP per capita, or infant mortality rate – the most commonly used measures of development, the energy consumption data also covers the first half of the 20th century. The primary energy consumption is data on a state's energy consumption in thousand coal-ton equivalents. The idea behind this variable is that the more energy consumption a state has, the larger potential manufacturing base of the economy and the larger the economy will be (Correlates of War 2010: 45ff).The measure is calculated per capita to account for the size of the population in the state.

Polity2

The variable for measuring type of government is retrieved from the Polity IV project. The data created in this project measures the competitiveness of political participation, the constraints on the chief executive, and the openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment (Marshall, Gurr & Jaggers 2009). Based on these measurements, one has a scale ranging from -10 to +10, with the former being strongly autocratic and the latter strongly democratic.

Democracy

Since I want to be able to test for non-linear effects on type of government, I have included a dummy variable for democracy and one for autocracy, and these will also be used in interaction terms in order to test for regime-specific effects on other variables. Using the polity2 data, I have created a dummy variable where any country with a score of +7 or more on the scale is counted as a democracy with the value 1, and any other is counted as 0. This cut-off value is the same as Harff (2003: 63) and Eck and Hultman (2007: 242) used in their articles. As I mentioned earlier, the difference in definitions of violence against civilians makes it hard to compare the results. This also goes for the variables used, and for this reason I have decided to follow Harff's definition of democracies and autocracies. I believe that a standardization of definitions will help to move the research forward.

Autocracy

Just like with the democracy variable, I have used Polity IV data as a basis for my autocracy variable. In case there are differences between autocratic countries and semi-autocratic/semi-democratic countries, the autocracy variable will test this. The dummy variable counts autocracies as those with a score of 0 or lower. Just as with the democracy dummy, this dummy uses the same cut-off points as Harff and Eck and Hultman. And combined with the democracy variable, we will be able to distinguish three groups: full democracies (+7 → +10), semi-democracies (0 → +6) with some democratic features, and full autocracies (-10 → 0).

Democide in neighbouring states

As discussed above, it is likely that there is some kind of neighbourhood effects of democides. To account for this, I created a variable for democide in neighbouring states. This is a count variable based on the democide data. For every country year, this variable counts how many of a state's neighbouring countries have performed democide. The variable checks for democide of any nature, and does not differ between types of democide. Optimally, I would want to have one for every three types, but with the lack of differential theoretical arguments on how the three forms of democide can spill into neighbouring countries, I did not prioritize testing this. The variable only checks for land-contiguous states - for example Japan's democides will not appear in any other state's neighbouring democides count.

Based on this variable, I have created two interaction terms, one with the neighbouring state's democide and whether the country of interest is a democracy, and one with the neighbourhood variable and autocracy. With these extra variables I may be able to see whether autocracies or democracies are more likely to be affected by their neighbour's actions. For instance, we could see if the spread of violence throughout the Middle East, with the exceptions of Lebanon, Israel and Turkey (all three states with a considerable element of popular participation in politics and institutional checks and balances), during the so-called Jasmine revolutions, are unique to non-democracies, or if they could have spread as easily between democracies.

Earlier democide

In order to find whether or not past democide has any effect on present democide, I have created a count variable which counts the number of years since the last democide. The variable is operationalized as a decay-variable, where the variable's value increases for every year without democide, and zeroes if there is an incidence of democide. With this variable, it

is possible to control for temporal dependence. If the results are similar to those of Harff (2003) and Smith's (2009), one can expect that a recent democide will increase the chances of a new one taking place.

Intrastate war
The Correlates of War project has a list of all intrastate wars between 1816 and 2007 (Correlates of War 2011). Based on the data here I have created a dummy variable which codes any country in an intrastate war as 1, and those not as 0. The dataset does include an estimate of number of people dead, and though it would have been interesting to see whether the intensity of intrastate war affects democide, I chose not to out of time consideration.

Two interaction terms have been created in combination with this variable: one with democracy and interstate war; and another with autocracy and interstate war. With these interaction terms I will be able to see if one is more violent than the other during intrastate wars, testing Hypothesis 1b.

Interstate war
As with intrastate war, I use the Correlates of War data, making the same coding decisions. I also create interaction terms with autocracy/democracy and interstate war in order to test whether democracies are any different from non-democracies in interstate wars as well as testing Hypothesis 1b.

Ethnic fractionalization
To measure ethnic diversity, I use the Ethno Linguistic Fractionalization (ELF) index. The ELF index calculates the likelihood of two people chosen at random being from two different ethnic groups. A country with a score of 0 on this variable will be completely homogenous, and a country with a score of 1 will be completely heterogeneous. This variable, along with the two measures below, has been copied from Fearon and Laitin (2003). A problem with this data is that it does not go further back than 1945. However, when going through Fearon and Laitin's dataset, they use the same measures from year to year for every country, even in such cases when a country has been split up, such as Pakistan in 1971, The Soviet Union in 1990, or Ethiopia in 1993, so their data are gathered for one year, and then converted into time-series format. Being aware of the reservations this implies, I have decided to use the data from 1945-87 for the earlier 45 year period as well.

Size of 2ⁿᵈ largest ethnic group

While the ELF index will get a high score if there are many small ethnic groups, I have also included a variable which checks the size of the second largest group. The reason I have added a variable like this is because the larger the second group becomes, the more power it may be expected to have. While Cunningham, Gleditsch and Salehyan (2009) find that the stronger a non-state group is, the shorter wars will be, while the opposite is true for smaller ethnic groups. It remains to be seen whether or not these results will hold for violence against civilians. The variable goes from 0, where there is no second group, and to 0.44 where one has two identically-sized sized ethnic groups.

Table 6.1 Descriptive statistics

	N	Min value	Max value	Mean	Std. Dev.
Dependent variables					
Total democide	8,164	0	11,338.18	26.72	333.49
Regime democide	8,164	0	11,338.18	21.6	313.19
Non-state democide	8,164	0	150	0.21	2.69
Foreign democide	8,164	0	3,688.01	4.9	97.62
Independent variables (continuous)					
ln(population)	6,981	4.82	13.57	8.9	1.5
ln(pec/capita)	6,150	-10.66	4.85	-1	2.42
Years since last democide	8,178	0	87	18	21.87
Polity2	7,602	-10	10	-0.88	7.22
Democide in neighbouring states	8,164	0	9	1.11	1.22
Ethnic fractionalization	7,649	0.001	0.92	0.35	0.27
Size of 2nd largest ethnic group	7,649	0	0.44	0.14	0.11
Autocracy * neighb. democide	7,602	0	9	0.82	1.23
Democracy * neighb. democide	7,602	0	5	0.2	0.6
	N	Min value	Max value	0	1
Independent variables (dummies)					
Democracy	7,602	0	1	74.11 %	25.89 %
Autocracy	7,602	0	1	39.70 %	60.30 %
Intrastate war	8,164	0	1	93.01 %	6.99 %
Interstate war	8,164	0	1	94.00 %	6.00 %
Autocracy * intrastate war	7,602	0	1	94.63 %	5.37 %
Democracy * intrastate war	7,602	0	1	98.83 %	1.17 %
Autocracy * interstate war	7,602	0	1	96.97 %	3.03 %
Democracy * interstate war	7,602	0	1	98.29 %	1.71 %

6.2 Method of analysis

The most commonly used regression model is ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. OLS is a linear regression model which estimates the value of the dependent variable based on the values of the independent variables (Ringdal 2001: 465). OLS has some assumptions that need to be met: (1) the residuals have a mean of zero; (2) the residuals have constant variance for all independent variables; and (3) there is no correlation between the residuals (Ringdal 2001: 407; Hamilton 1992: 111).

The dependent variables used in the analyses of this paper are count variables, and normal linear regression models such as OLS can be used. However, using this type of regression may result in inconsistent, inefficient and biased estimates (Long & Freese 2006: 349). So while there are situations where the results in a linear model are reasonable, it might be safer using models more suited to these kinds of variables. The most commonly used methods for estimating count models are the negative binomial and the Poisson regressions (Cameron & Trivedi 1998: 59, Harvey 1989: 358). However, count variables are often over-dispersed where the conditional variance exceeds the conditional mean (Cameron & Trivedi 1998: 60). Looking at the dependent variables in Table 6.1, we see that the variance far exceeds the mean for all four dependent variables, proving a clear over-dispersion in my data. Nevertheless, all of the models were tested using OLS. As we can see in Tables 9-12 in Appendix B the results are similar for many of the variables, but also deviate at several other variables.

While the linear regression models, as mentioned earlier, do not necessarily yield the best results in count data, the Poisson regression is the most basic model in this kind of data. This regression type determines the probability of the count by a Poisson distribution in which the mean is a function of the independent variables. However, while the Poisson regression model suggests that the conditional variance of the outcome is equal to the conditional mean, the conditional variance often exceeds the mean (Long 1997: 217f). In these events, as is the case with my data, the negative binomial regression is better suited to handling the over-dispersion (Cameron & Trivedi 1998: 71). There are also times where the simple Poisson and negative binomial regression models are not sufficient, especially when there is an excess of zeros in the dependent variable (Long 1997: 218). In such an event, the zero-inflated Poisson (ZIP) and the zero-inflated negative binomial (ZINB) regressions are better at estimating the phenomenon at hand. The zero-inflated models improve the under-prediction of zeros by increasing the conditional variance without altering the conditional mean. The model assumes that there are two groups present in the dataset, one "always zero group" and one "not always

zero group", where the former has an outcome of 0, with a probability of 1, and the latter may have a zero count, but there is a non-zero probability of seeing a positive count (Long & Freese 2006: 394).

Looking at Figures 1 through 4 in Appendix A[13], the variables do indeed have an abundance of zeros. However, tests are performed in order to determine which test of the negative binomial, Poisson, ZIP and ZINB are best suited. These tests include the Vuong test and the Bayesian information criterion (BIC) and Akaike information criterion (AIC) tests.[14] For all of the models, the ZINB regression is therefore preferred by these tests.

The ZINB regression is a two-part model, estimating the count model (number of persons killed) and also estimating a binary model (whether or not an observation is predicted to include a democide or not). While the count model is calculated on the basis of the negative binomial, the binary, or inflated model, as mentioned above, it treats the variable as a logit, where you have either zeros or non-zeros (Hilbe 2007: 174ff). However, unlike a logit model, the inflated model tries to predict the occurrence of zeros and not the probability for a case of scoring 1 on the dependent variable. As with all statistical analyses, the task of deciding which variables will help predict what groups are "always zero" has to be done from a theoretical approach. For my models, I have decided to use four variables: number of years since last democide; intrastate war; interstate war; and (for most of my models) polity2[15]. The variable measuring the number of years since last democide is chosen because most of the acts of democide happen several years in a row, giving this variable the value 0 for a lot of the democide, excluding the first year of democide as well as single year incidents[16]. The two variables for war are chosen on the basis that they have been significant in understanding both the occurrence of genocides and severity of civil wars (Krain 1997: 347). The inclusion of the polity2 measure is partly based on the earlier theory that democracies are more peaceful, but also as an extra method of testing democracies' chance of committing no democide, in addition to the severity of democide as will be done in the main analysis.

6.3 Reliability and validity

Reliability and validity are central terms in ensuring the quality of scientific analyses. While the former is about whether repeated measures with the same instrument of measurement

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[13] The figures may seem evident, but they are very efficient in showing the over-dispersion of the data.
[14] These tests were performed using the "countfit" command in STATA.
[15] Where the variable is excluded, I will state this explicitly.
[16] For example if there was a democide that lasted 10 years, the first year would get the value 1 (no previous democide), and the rest of the years would get the value 0. However, if a state experienced democide just one year, that year would get the value 1, but the following year would get the value 0.

yields the same results, the latter term is about whether what one tries to measure actually *is* what one wants to measure. A high reliability is a prerequisite for a high validity (Ringdal 2001: 166).

Reliability covers whether repeated measures with the same instrument of measurement yields the same results. Having a high reliability is a prerequisite for achieving a high validity, but is not enough in itself (Ringdal 2001: 166). Since there is almost always a measurement error in a variable, one can say that the value of the variable is created by two conditions: the true value; and measurement errors, where the errors are either systematic or random (Ringdal 2001: 167). It is very likely that there are measurement errors in the dataset used in the analyses of this paper, and these errors are probably not limited to those pointed out by Dulic (2004a) and Mann (1999) mentioned previously. The farther back in time the dataset goes, the higher chance there is of having numbers that deviate from what the true numbers would have been. For instance, the national population census of people in a country may not have been as thorough in 1900 as it was in 1988, and it is reasonable to believe that there are big differences between countries as well. In some instances, there are no estimates for some countries, creating missing values. The number of people killed in democide is probably a bigger victim of uncertainty. This is indeed the case for the number of Chinese death during the famines caused by the Great Leap Forward, where Chinese officials manipulated the numbers, which again led to an underestimate of the total deaths. Dikötter's (2010) acquisition of new and reliable data proved that there were millions of more deaths than previously believed. As with population, the numbers on democide become more uncertain the older they are. In addition to this, states are not necessarily willing to give out the numbers of civilian deaths, and so the numbers are in some cases estimates. As a way of strengthening the reliability of the democides, Rummel consulted over 10,000 sources, and while the numbers may not be completely accurate, they are the best we have, and are not likely to be biased in any direction.

Validity is about whether or not what one tries to measure actually *is* what one wants to measure. While reliability is more of an empirical issue, validity also requires a theoretical assessment (Ringdal 2001: 166). As mentioned above, a high validity is dependent on having a high reliability. When the total number of democide is over 200 million, it is not unreasonable to believe that not every one of them is an intentional murder of a civilian. This margin of error is, however, likely not so big that the validity would suffer from it and that the democide variables do not obfuscate the validity. While there are no apparent problems with the dependent variables, there could be issues concerning the validity of some of the

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independent variables. Two of these are the government dummies that measure divide countries into democracies, autocracies or semi-democracies. The cut-off points would categorize a state with a score of 6 on the polity2 scale in the same category as a state with the score of 0, even if its government is much closer to a "democracy" with a score of 7. There is no doubt that the choice of these categories will influence the results, but I accept Harff's (2003: 63) argument on the choice of categories, and recognize that this argument could be placed no matter where the cut-off point was set. Nevertheless, the usage of the polity2 variable in some of the models will alleviate this problem somewhat. The usage the democide in neighbouring countries is also somewhat problematic, as states of the same type of government seem to be spatially clustered, and it is hard to say which of the two variables are explaining the phenomenon, or if they both explain it. There could be a situation where democide happens because of contagion effects, and would have happen no matter which type of government was present. And there is also a possibility that it is the type of government that causes the contagion to take place. Using ethnicity as a variable is also a hot potato as there is no clear definition as to what an ethnicity is, and it is therefore heavily reliant on the interpretation/classification by the researchers creating the data. Since one person can belong to more than one ethnicity, it is likely that some people in the dataset are classified with an ethnicity they would not classify themselves as. However, without having a world-wide questionnaire on this classification, such errors must be accepted.

7. Results

In this chapter I test the hypotheses presented above. The analyses have been divided into four different parts: total democide; regime democide; non-state democide; and foreign democide. In all of the four parts I start off with a simple model using the linear polity2 variable, but I later replace this variable by two dummy variables for democracy and autocracy. Doing so makes it possible to see whether there is a linear or non-linear correlation between government type and democide, such as the concave relationship found for the onset of civil war (Gleditsch, Hegre & Strand 2009: 182). By analyzing the different types of democide separately, I am able to see whether the relationships between the independent variables differ, depending on the type of democide. For instance, by using the foreign democide variable I can then test Downes's (2006) results that democracies are just as violent against civilians in wars as autocracies are (Hypothesis 1b). This analysis could not have been done satisfactorily using the variable for total democide as this variable also includes the democide of its own people and might, therefore, obscure the results. For example, you could have a

situation where state A murders 10,000 civilians in another state in a given year and none within its own borders, while state B murders the same amount of its own people, but none abroad. The two nations would be treated equal in the analysis. However, since Downes measures the killing of another nation's civilians, a comparison could not have been made by using a variable for total democide.

7.1 Determinants of total democide

First, I will start off analyzing the determinants for any type of democide done by a state or a group within the state. I am aware that a wide analysis merging the three types of democide in my dataset, regime, non-state and foreign, may not yield the most precise estimates as there are differences between the three types that will not show in the analyses below. However, I want to see whether there are variables that do not give strong results for the individual analyses, but which will show up in the total democide estimate, thus making me able to generalize on a larger scale. The results are shown in Table 7.1 below.

As we can see from the results in Table 7.1, the size of the *population* is a significant factor in all nine models at a 0.01 level, where states with a higher population experience more democidal deaths. This finding is not surprising. There is a higher chance of suffering 10,000 deaths in a population of ten million than in one of one hundred thousand. *Development* does not prove to be significant in any of the models. The *number of years* since the last occurrence of democide does also seem to have a negative effect in all the models except models seven and nine where the interaction terms with neigbouring democide is included. This suggests that the longer the length of time since the last democide, the less chance there is of seeing a new one (inflated model), and that the total deaths are likely to be fewer (count model). Note that because the inflated variables predict the probability of seeing zero democide, the variables in the inflated part should have the opposite direction of those in the regression part. *Intrastate* and *interstate* wars both have a positive effect on democide at the 0.01 level for the first five models and it seems that perpetrators kill civilians who are potential enemies, or knowingly or unknowingly help enemies of the state. With the introduction of the interaction terms, the effect vanishes completely for intrastate war, but persists on interstate wars, only now the significance has dropped to 0.05 in the seventh model, and 0.1 in the tenth model.

Table 7.1 Total democide

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9
ln(Population)	0.943***	0.773***	0.979***	0.793***	0.734***	0.780***	0.767***	0.731***	0.718***
	(0.145)	(0.135)	(0.152)	(0.144)	(0.149)	(0.149)	(0.144)	(0.149)	(0.149)
ln(PEC/capita)	(0.068	-0.053	-0.079	-0.059	-0.054	-0.061	-0.053	-0.053	-0.05
	(0.077)	(0.076)	(0.078)	(0.078)	(0.079)	(0.078)	(0.077)	(0.079)	(0.078)
Democide in neighb. states		0.274***		0.284***	-0.011	0.311***	0.307***	0.194	0.131
		(0.094)		(0.095)	(0.207)	(0.096)	(0.106)	(0.263)	(0.261)
Years since last democide	(0.026***	-0.027***	-0.033***	-0.033***	-0.031***	-0.034***	-0.032***	-0.033***	-0.031***
	-0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.009)
Intrastate war	0.814***	0.892***	0.665**	0.764***	0.976***	-0.143	0.784***	-0.195	0.974***
	(0.282)	(0.286)	(0.258)	(0.248)	(0.246)	(0.688)	(0.247)	(0.892)	(0.241)
Interstate war	1.856***	2.091***	1.898***	2.144***	2.005***	2.203***	3.120***	2.036***	3.001***
	(0.374)	(0.442)	(0.414)	(0.466)	(0.47)	(0.47)	(0.928)	(0.48)	(1.044)
Autocracy			1.153***	0.850**	0.254	0.667*	1.047***	0.335	0.617
			(0.35)	(0.346)	(0.493)	(0.365)	(0.381)	(0.494)	(0.596)
Democracy			-0.788**	-0.663*	-0.687*	-0.779**	-0.39	-0.61	-0.225
			(0.388)	(0.368)	(0.408)	(0.366)	(0.379)	(0.41)	(0.452)
Autocracy*interstate war							-1.158		-1.08
							(1.145)		(1.242)
Autocracy*intrastate war						1.266*		1.194	
						(0.722)		(0.903)	
Democracy*interstate war							-1.423		-1.521
							(0.967)		(1.049)
Democracy*intrastate war						1.013		1.58	
						(0.774)		(1.049)	
Autocracy*neighb. democide					0.407*			0.202	0.275
					(0.236)			(0.285)	(0.273)
Democracy*neighb. democide					-0.06			-0.323	-0.223
					(0.203)			(0.283)	(0.225)
Polity2	-0.126***	-0.098***							
	(0.024)	(0.02)							
Constant	-7.779***	-6.635***	-8.434***	-7.038***	-6.129***	-6.872***	-7.022***	-6.188***	-6.348***
	(1.411)	(1.331)	(1.527)	(1.46)	(1.618)	(1.535)	(1.435)	(1.612)	(1.615)
Inflated variables									
Years since last democide	0.268***	0.266***	0.264***	0.264***	0.264***	0.215***	0.263***	0.264***	0.264***
	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.036)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.043)
Intrastate	-51.1***	-34.4***	-37.0***	-31.8***	-33.4***	[17]	-36.1***	-30.4***	-33.252***
	(3.636)	(3.763)	(3.576)	(3.762)	(3.762)		(3.69)	(3.789)	(3.772)
Interstate	-0.715*	-0.643*	-0.661*	-0.616*	-0.616*	-0.38	-0.586	-0.61	-0.601
	(0.377)	(0.371)	(0.378)	(0.371)	(0.371)	(0.473)	(0.373)	(0.372)	(0.376)
Observations	6,082	6,082	6,082	6,082	6,082	6,082	6,082	6,082	6,082
Country-years of democide	2,104	2,104	2,104	2,104	2,104	2,104	2,104	2,104	2,104

Standard errors shown in parentheses. Significance by asterisk: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01

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[17] Model 6 would not converge with the variable for intrastate war among the inflated variables, and was therefore removed. I tested the effect of removing this variable from the other models as well, and the absence of the variable did not have any effect on the results, and it is therefore unlikely that the removal of the removal of the intrastate war variable has any effect on model six. None of the models would converge with the Polity2 variable included.

The continued effect of interstate war is not surprising if we remember Figure 5.5, where the total number of democide during World War II was very high. And, as we can see in Tables 1-4 in Appendix B, even when World War II is excluded, interstate war still remains just as significant. The exclusion of World War II has practically no effect on the results for any of the models in all of the analyses. What happens in the neighbouring states seems to affect the state itself, suggesting that violent methods that are used abroad are more likely to be imported and used domestically.

While, in the first model, the polity2 variable is significant, I was interested in seeing if the variable capturing inclusion of the democide in neighbouring states had any effect on the polity2 significance. The reason for this is that autocratic states, as well as democratic states, are spatially clustered, and for this reason the neighbouring variable could perhaps catch whether the less violent inclination for democracies is due to some unmeasured fact in democratic clusters or, if the effect of democracy persists, a genuine effect of democracy. As we can see in Model 2, the polity2 variable remains significant at a 0.01 level which means that the government effects on democide are not affected by what is happening in neighbouring states. In Model 3, the polity2 variable is replaced by one dummy for autocracy, and one for democracy; as we can see from the results, autocratic regimes are more violent than the mixed regimes, while democracies are less deadly, with significance values of 0.01, and 0.05 respectively. Re-introducing the neighbour variable in Model 4, the significant effects of autocracy and democracy have now diminished to the 0.05 and 0.1 level. Just as in the previous model, democide in neighbouring states is positively correlated and significant at the 0.01 level. This suggests that there is an effect in democracies that reduces the risk of democide, but also that there seems to be some kind of clustering effect. In Model 5, interaction terms with type of government and democide in neighbouring states are included, and the effect for democracy, autocracy, and democide in neighbouring states is no longer significant, and only the interaction term with autocracy and neighbouring democide is positively correlated. Albeit only at a 0.1 level, it still suggests that violence against civilians is more likely to spread across borders into an autocratic regime than other types of government. In the sixth model, we see that the interaction term with autocracy and interstate war is slightly significant at the 0.1 level, hinting that autocracies are more violent than mixed regimes. For the seventh model, neither of the two new interaction terms is significant. Neither of the last two models, which include the interaction terms with neighbours and those with wars, yields any significant results. Based on these results, we can conclude that the type of government is significant in understanding democide, with democracies being less violent

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than other types of regime in accordance with Hypothesis 1a. The only disturbance to this result is the variable showing democide in neighbouring states. Whether the clustering of government types or another clustering such as economic development is the real explanation I cannot say. Nevertheless, some of the effect that can be uniquely attributed to regime type remains, thus there is a genuine effect of regime type on democide severity accounting for the spill-over effects from neighbouring countries.

Looking at the inflated variables, we do not find any unexpected results. We see, for example, that the number of years since the last occurrence of democide increases the possibility of having no democide, whereas an intrastate conflict decreases this possibility for all of the models. An interstate conflict also point in the same direction as intrastate wars, but is only significant at the 0.1 level, and only for four of the models.

7.2 Determinants of regime democide

The models used in this analysis include the same independent variables as with the total democide regression. In addition, I add two variables for ethnicity, which could not be used in the total democide analysis as it includes foreign democide, and it is unlikely (although not impossible) that a state's composition of ethnic groups is a strong determinant for democide in a foreign state. It could be discussed whether the variable for interstate war should be included or not, as this is an analysis which focuses on the democide within one country. However, there may be situations where a state uses the chaotic situation of a war to rid itself of perceived internal threats, not unlike the German persecution of Jews during the Second World War. Or – more likely – a state may focus more on their external enemy during an interstate war, and therefore kill fewer of its own enemies. The results of the regression can be seen in Table 7.2.

Like the models for total democide, *population* has a positive impact on democide, and its significance can be explained in the same fashioned as was done for total democide. As was noted in chapter four, low income countries are more often involved in civil wars (Fearon & Laitin 2003: 76; Hegre & Sambanis 2006: 524), and the results in the analyses above show that *development* has an effect on democide as well. In all the models we see a significant and negative effect of development, at a 0.05 level, implying that regime democides are more deadly in poorer countries. This result is in accordance with Poe, Tate and Keith's (1999: 306) findings that economically developed states are less likely to repress their subjects, supporting the second hypothesis, and going against Harff's (2003: 70) findings

that once internal wars and regime changes have begun, economic development makes no difference.

Table 7.2 Regime democide

	Model 10	Model 11	Model 12	Model 13	Model 14	Model 15	Model 16	Model 17	Model 18
ln(Population)	0.954***	0.628***	1.001***	0.629***	0.603***	0.616***	0.651***	0.618***	0.629***
	(0.161)	(0.139)	(0.16)	(0.135)	(0.131)	(0.141)	(0.132)	(0.14)	(0.13)
ln(PEC/capita)	-0.256**	-0.249**	-0.278**	-0.255**	-0.229**	-0.255**	-0.255**	-0.225**	-0.227**
	(0.112)	(0.112)	(0.111)	(0.108)	(0.103)	(0.106)	(0.106)	(0.105)	(0.101)
Democide in neighb. states		0.557***		0.570***	0.621**	0.592***	0.539***	0.584*	0.537*
		(0.099)		(0.099)	(0.3)	(0.101)	(0.095)	(0.341)	(0.279)
Years since last democide	-0.025***	-0.023***	-0.036***	-0.031***	-0.032***	-0.031***	-0.030***	-0.036***	-0.034***
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Intrastate war	1.076***	1.356***	0.933***	1.237***	1.438***	1.284	1.199***	1.672*	1.666***
	(0.303)	(0.289)	(0.298)	(0.253)	(0.27)	(0.816)	(0.25)	(0.919)	(0.287)
Interstate war	0.856*	0.573	0.722	0.479	0.406	0.454	-2.905***	0.448	-2.552***
	(0.489)	(0.445)	(0.457)	(0.406)	(0.402)	(0.405)	(0.922)	(0.408)	(0.938)
Autocracy			2.132***	1.960***	1.915**	1.930***	1.735***	1.864**	1.622**
			(0.533)	(0.485)	(0.764)	(0.592)	(0.453)	(0.787)	(0.73)
Democracy			-0.395	0.257	0.962	0.414	0.111	0.907	0.781
			(0.672)	(0.597)	(0.649)	(0.608)	(0.564)	(0.644)	(0.582)
Ethnic fractionalization	-0.608	-1.618**	-0.317	-1.427**	-1.398**	-1.495**	-1.457**	-1.440**	-1.509**
	(0.862)	(0.713)	(0.863)	(0.708)	(0.669)	(0.728)	(0.711)	(0.685)	(0.671)
Size of 2nd largest ethnic group	-0.753	0.793	-1.257	0.701	1.53	0.83	0.55	1.594	1.498
	(1.831)	(1.832)	(1.867)	(1.811)	(1.723)	(1.827)	(1.811)	(1.773)	(1.749)
Autocracy*interstate war							3.819***		0.129
							(1.003)		(0.294)
Autocracy*intrastate war						0.12		-0.027	
						(0.879)		(0.942)	
Democracy*interstate war							2.500*		3.450***
							(1.368)		(1.028)
Democracy*intrastate war						-0.858		0.296	
						(0.94)		(1.121)	
Autocracy*neighb. democide					0.06			0.108	1.932
					(0.315)			(0.353)	(1.278)
Democracy*neighb. democide					-0.672**			-0.705**	-0.633**
					(0.295)			(0.352)	(0.272)
Polity2	-0.174***	-0.124***							
	(0.046)	(0.041)							
Constant	-8.366***	-6.214***	-9.803***	-7.376***	-7.423***	-7.289***	-7.309***	-7.595***	-7.417***
	(1.549)	(1.317)	(1.586)	(1.395)	(1.488)	(1.507)	(1.368)	(1.605)	(1.517)
Inflated variables									
Years since last democide	0.247***	0.243***	0.238***	0.236***	0.234***	0.236***	0.239***	0.177***	0.181***
	(0.046)	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.048)	(0.049)	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.049)	(0.048)
Intrastate	-30.1***	-31.9***	-35.8***	-32.0***	-28.2***	-29.1***	-37.5***	[18]	
	(4.155)	(4.433)	(4.011)	(4.176)	(4.315)	(4.196)	(4.218)		
Polity2	0.005	0.009	0.016	0.013	0.01	0.02	0.017	-0.007	0.001
	(0.069)	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.066)	(0.066)	(0.062)	(0.084)	(0.076)
Observations	6,032	6,032	6,032	6,032	6,032	6,032	6,032	6,032	6,032
Country-years of democide	1,764	1,764	1,764	1,764	1,764	1,764	1,764	1,764	1,764

Standard errors shown in parentheses. Significance by asterisk: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01

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[18] The intrastate variable was removed among the inflated variables for models 17 and 18 because the models would not converge with them. I tested the effect of removing the variable for Model 10 through 16, and no effect could be seen, and there should not be any problems involved by excluding the variable in the two models.

Humphreys and Weinstein's (2006: 429) comment that civilians bear a significant toll in civil wars would make us expect that civil wars should also be a significant factor in explaining democides. Just like the total democide analysis, the intrastate war variable is correlated with more democide. Considering what was mentioned earlier about regime democide being, by far, the most deadly of the democides, such parallel results are not surprising since the two variables will be similar in terms of number of deaths.

As for interstate wars, its significance is only slightly positive until Model 17 and 18 where the interaction terms are included. The results of the those two models might suggest that interstate wars have a pacifying effect for democracies and mixed regimes, while autocracies are more likely to use interstate wars for "cleaning up" at home. However, recognizing that the difference between autocracies and democracies might not be so big, as the democracy interaction term is slightly significant in model sixteen. It could be that states use the guise of war to rid itself of potential or present enemies while its population is busy focusing on the external threat. One could believe that this is an effect that should be seen in mixed regimes as well, as the instability of these regimes make them more vulnerable when at war and have fewer resources to allocate towards internal threats. However, one explanation why mixed regimes are not killing their own civilians during interstate wars could be that the already limited resources forge solidarity against the foreign threat, rallying the people around the flag.

Democide in *neighbouring* states acts the same way in the analyses for regime democide as it did for total, with a positive significance at 0.01 levels for the models where it the interaction terms between government type and neighbouring democide are not included, in which it shows to be slightly significant at a 0.05 and 0.1 level. This destabilizing effect from having democide in neighbouring countries does not seem to be as strong in democracies as it does for autocracies and semi-democracies, as we can see from Model 18.

Just like for total democide, polity2 is significant at the 0.01 level for both models where it is included, suggesting that the proponents for democracies being more peaceful (Rummel 1995; Harff 2003;Valentino et. al 2003) are correct. However, when we split the polity2 variable, we find that the *autocracy* variable is significant at a 0.01 level for Models 12, 13, 15 and 16, and at a 0.1 level in Models 14, 17 and 18, and that *democracy* is only significant at a 0.1 level in the models where the interaction terms where government and neighbouring democide is included. Democracies are therefore not necessarily more peaceful,

but the difference is that autocracies are more violent than mixed and democratic regimes. This does, however, not necessarily rule out Rummel (1995), whose main argument is that unrestricted power is the main culprit.

The *interstate* variable shows a strong correlation for the models where the interaction terms with government and interstate wars are included, and then in a negative fashion. As we can see from Models 15 and 18, autocracies are more violent than semi-democracies with a significance at the 0.01 level, whereas democracies in interstate wars only show a slight tendency in Model 16, implying that interstate wars have a pacifying effect on regime democide, but less so for autocracies. The prediction of the interaction, as seen in Figure 7.1, shows that interstate wars do not seem have a pacifying effect on autocracies. Thus there is clearly a differential effect of wars conditional on regime type

Figure 7.1 Interaction term between autocracy and interstate war in Model 16

A: Interstate at 10th and Autocracy at 10th percentile; B: Interstate at 90th and Autocracy at 10th percentile;
C: Interstate at 10th and Autocracy at 90th percentile; D: Interstate at 90th and Autocracy at 90th percentile.
As both these variables are dummies, 10th percentile represents 0, and 90th percentile represents 1.

While the size of the second largest group does not have any effect on regime democide, the ethnic fragmentation yields the same results as Krain (1997) – that ethnically dominated regimes are more violent against its civilians than fragmented states. This is in accordance with the third hypothesis. One explanation could be that the leadership of an ethnically fragmented state could not easily target one ethnic group, as it might spark fear in the other ethnic groups. In a state with a dominant ethnicity, on the other hand, the leaders would not worry a significant portion of the population were it to kill civilians of a minor ethnicity. Lastly, the results from the models support Smith (2009) and Harff's (2003) results that killing civilians in the past could trigger democide in the future.

When it comes to the inflated variables, we find similar results as we did in the count model with a pacifying effect of years since last democide, and an increased risk of any democide during intrastate wars. Polity2, on the other hand, is not significant for any of the

models, which indicates that, while type of government matters for the severity of democide, it does not affect whether or not a democide happens in the first place.

7.3 Determinants of non-state democide

The analyses for non-state democide contain the same variables as the regime democide, except for the interstate variables which has been removed. Since the actor is not a state, and most likely the least powerful party in an internal dispute, one would presume that the factors deciding the extent of democide should deviate from the other analyses. And as seen from the results in Table 7.3, this holds true.

The first thing we see that is different from the previous models is that *population* is no longer a significant factor, and it seems like the explanation used for total and regime democide that the more people in a state, the more potential victims, does not hold for non-state democide. A possible explanation for this will be examined a little later.

Just like for regime democide, the level *development* has a negative effect. However, the correlation is weak, and only at the 0.1 level for all models, except Model 22, where it is at the 0.05 level. As seen in previous models, the number of years since the last democide is negatively correlated with democide, supporting Harff (2003) and Smith (2009), suggesting that groups keep the same strategies that have been successful in the past, or retaliate against actions taken against them earlier. No effect of regime could also mean that democratic states are less able to deter groups from using violence.

Intrastate war is also a significant factor in non-state democide. I shall not speculate whether it is the non-state group or the regime that starts the killing of civilians first, but it is not unreasonable to think that the significant result of intrastate war in regime and non-state democide are linked together, as actions done by one group are likely to trigger a similar retaliatory response from the other party, for instance via a spiral of insecurity as was seen in the civil wars in former Yugoslavia (Kaufman 2001: 9ff). This effect vanishes, however, with the introduction of the interaction terms.

Table 7.3 Non-state democide

	Model 19	Model 20	Model 21	Model 22	Model 23
ln(Population)	0.159	0.151	0.149	0.152	0.150
	(0.196)	(0.196)	(0.195)	(0.193)	(0.191)
ln(PEC/capita)	-0.192*	-0.195*	-0.185*	-0.198**	-0.180*
	(0.099)	(0.099)	(0.096)	(0.098)	(0.094)
Democide in neighb. states	0.187	0.190	0.798**	0.200	1.041***
	(0.200)	(0.200)	(0.319)	(0.203)	(0.323)
Years since last democide	-0.091***	-0.091***	-0.092***	-0.091***	-0.092***
	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.027)	(0.028)
Intrastate war	3.291***	3.247***	3.177***	2.810**	1.370
	(0.322)	(0.327)	(0.329)	(1.096)	(0.850)
Autocracy		0.712	2.063**	0.574	2.108**
		(0.565)	(0.984)	(0.545)	(0.926)
Democracy		0.394	0.844	0.401	1.037
		(0.587)	(1.059)	(0.591)	(1.048)
Ethnic fractionalization	-1.320	-1.216	-1.236	-1.134	-1.099
	(0.883)	(0.926)	(0.909)	(0.908)	(0.886)
Size of 2nd largest ethnic group	5.536***	5.400***	5.572***	5.293**	5.403**
	(2.022)	(2.041)	(2.135)	(2.066)	(2.114)
Autocracy*neighb. democide			-0.785**		-1.040***
			(0.362)		(0.373)
Democracy*neighb. democide			-0.179		-0.446
			(0.387)		(0.454)
Polity2	-0.016				
	(0.040)				
Autocracy*intrastate war				0.603	2.025**
				(1.106)	(0.823)
Democracy*intrastate war				-0.024	1.501
				(1.350)	(1.173)
Constant	-4.989**	-5.472***	-0.179	-5.421***	-0.446
	(2.092)	(2.044)	(0.387)	(2.022)	(0.454)
Inflated variables					
Years since last democide	0.015	0.017	0.018	0.015	0.017
	(0.019)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.017)
Intrastate	-1.911	-8.764	-5.489	-5.576	-6.642
	(4.414)	(10.349)	(15.604)	(5.531)	(4.988)
Polity2	-0.283	-0.292	-0.290	-0.213	-0.275
	(0.186)	(0.183)	(0.349)	(0.344)	(0.222)
Observations	6,032	6,032	6,032	6,032	6,032
Country-years of democide	381	381	381	381	381

Standard errors shown in parentheses. Significance by asterisk: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01

Democide in *neighbouring* states only becomes significant when the interaction terms are included. What is interesting is that the interaction term with autocracy and neighbouring

democide seems to have a significant negative effect on democide, whereas no such effect can be found for the similar interaction with democracy. However, looking at the coefficients, we see that the interaction term with autocracy and neighbouring democide is practically the same as it is with neighbouring democide, and instead strengthens the autocracy variable, making it significant. This suggests that democracies both experience negative effects from having neighbours who perform democide, while autocracies seem unaffected by the proximity to democide. However, while the autocracy and neighbouring democide interaction is fine, we see in Figure 7.2 that the interaction with democracy is dominated by the effects of neighbouring democides.

Figure 7.2 Interaction between democracy and neighbouring democide in Model 21

A: Neighbouring democide at 10th and Democracy at 10th percentile; B: Neighbouring democide at 90th and Democracy at 10th percentile; C: Neighbouring democide at 10th and Democracy at 90th percentile; D: Neighbouring democide at 90th and Democracy at 90th percentile. As the democracy variable is a dummy, the 10th percentile represents 0, and 90th percentile represents 1.

Looking at the ethnic variables, we see that the results are quite different from those seen in regime democide. While the *ethnic fractionalization* variable is insignificant for all the models, the size of the *second largest ethnic group* is positively correlated for all five of the models at a 0.01 level for the first two, and a 0.05 level for the remaining two. This is somewhat opposed to Ellingsen (2000: 242) , who found no connection between ethnic polarization and the incidence and onset of civil war. The results are more similar to Montalvo and Reynal-Querol's (2005: 812) findings that polarization is significant in explaining incidence of civil war. While these results have been on the onset and incidence of civil war, Esteban and Ray's (2008: 180) analyses might transfer better to my own analyses, as they have included the severity of conflict in addition to the occurrence. They find in their analysis that while ethnically polarized states do not experience more conflicts, the conflicts they do engage in are more severe than societies that are not ethnically polarized. One might assume that the larger the size second ethnic group, the more favorable its military capability relative to the dominant group. However, the lack of significance on this variable on regime

democide does not support this assumptionFigure 7.3 shows that the number of people killed in states where the second largest group is a significant share of the population rises exponentially with its relative size to the largest group in the state.

Figure 7.3 Estimated number of people killed on 10th, 50th and 90th percentile of the size of the second largest ethnic group in Model 23

These numbers are estimated when all other variables in the models are set at their mean. Numbers indicate estimated kill count for the different percentiles of the size of the second largest ethnic group variable. The numbers here are numbers for the count-model, that is the observations that do not have 0 on democide.

In a conflict between two parties, one could assume that the threat to the biggest group would also increase exponentially with its relative size to the opposing group, giving credence to a relative capability effect with ethnicities and democide. If this interpretation is correct, it may also help understand the lack of significance of population, since the non-state democide depends more on capacity of the non-state group than the population. It should, for example, be easier for an ethnic group of 500,000 in a state of 1,000,000 to wage war against the state, than it is for an ethnic group of 500,000 in a state of 10,000,000, since, in the latter example, the state should have better capabilities of defending itself and its population. An example of this is found in Cunningham, Gleditsch and Salehyan (2009: 592), who find that strong rebel groups are more likely to wage war effectively against the government. Thus, the population of a state and the potential victims a non-state group have, does not necessarily affect the number of people it will kill.

As we can see from the inflated variables, there are no significant factors in any of the models. This is interesting, as it would suggest that democracies and semi-democracies are just as likely to experience non-state democide as autocracies, but when it first happens, autocracies are more violent (as we could see in the count model). Intrastate wars do not seem to affect the occurrence of democide, only its severity.

7.4 Determinants of foreign democide

The dynamics of foreign democide are likely to be quite different from regime and non-state democide. For instance, the killing of another state's population is an act of war, and one would believe that a prerequisite for this type of democide is exactly that – the presence of an interstate war. Likewise, there are several variables used in the previous analyses that make little sense, including the following models, such as the variables for ethnicity. Gartzke and Gleditsch (2006) find that two states that have similar cultural ties are more prone to experience civil conflict, especially if a cultural group is politically dominant in one state, but a minority in the other. Ellingsen (2000: 242), on the other hand does not find any correlation between ethnic ties to a neighbouring state and the incidence of civil war or armed conflict. I have not examined the possibility of such a relationship when it comes to democide. While I do recognize that ethnic ties may be correlated with foreign democide, I chose not to include that variable in my dataset. Using the two ethnic variables that have been used earlier would simply not suffice, as it does not say anything about the possible cultural ties with another state. Similarly, while I do acknowledge that there may be situations where a rebel group seeks shelter and may be supported by people in a neighbouring state, I doubt that an intrastate war should be an important factor in understanding foreign democide in general. I ran some analyses with the intrastate variable included. These showed no significant correlation between intrastate wars and foreign democide. Based on this, I have chosen to exclude this variable as well. Therefore, in Table 7.4 the models for foreign democide are smaller than all of the previous models.

As we can see from Table 7.4, the *population* variable is significant as it was for regime democide, albeit at 0.1 significance in Models 24 and 26, and 0.05 in Model 25. It is not unreasonable to believe that highly populated states will fight bigger wars than lesser populated ones. If population is a measurement of power, it is more likely that the higher populated country fight within the smaller opponent's borders, thus giving them the opportunity to target the less populated state's civilians.

The *number of years* since the last democide is, unlike the 23 previous models, not significant. The lack of significance of the years since the last democide variable can be explained by the fact that foreign democide will mostly happen during interstate wars, and the occurrence of war with foreign states is not connected with when a state last performed democide, and are also quite rare.

Table 7.4 Foreign democide

	Model 24	Model 25	Model 26
ln(Population)	0.655*	0.730**	0.680*
	(0.373)	(0.353)	(0.373)
ln(PEC/capita)	0.486**	0.497**	0.526**
	(0.214)	(0.208)	(0.217)
Years since last democide	-0.006	-0.032	-0.026
	(0.045)	(0.042)	(0.044)
Interstate war	2.405***	2.426***	4.857*
	(0.697)	(0.671)	(2.897)
Autocracy		0.549	0.697
		(0.672)	(0.805)
Democracy		-1.724***	-1.461**
		(0.611)	(0.641)
Autocracy*interstate war			-0.447
			(1.212)
Democracy*interstate war			-1.353
			(1.054)
Polity2	-0.144**		
	(0.056)		
Constant	-5.622	-6.176	-5.848
	(3.822)	(3.836)	(3.998)
Inflated variables			
Years since last democide	0.232***	0.218***	0.222***
	(0.066)	(0.069)	(0.071)
Interstate	-2.932***	-2.932***	-2.863***
	(1.047)	(1.048)	(1.047)
Polity2	-0.170***	-0.161***	-0.160***
	(0.063)	(0.060)	(0.061)
Observations	6,082	6,082	6,082
Country-years of democide	491	491	491

Standard errors shown in parentheses. Significance by asterisk: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01

As in all the models for the other types of democide, we see that the *development* variable is also significant for foreign democide. However, the direction has changed, and it now seems like a well-developed state increases the number of persons killed in foreign democide. It, therefore, demonstrates the necessity of disaggregating between different forms of democide. This change of direction would help explain why the development variable was not significant in the models for total democide, as it is negative and significant for regime democide. The relative capabilities argument used on population can also be used on the positive significance for development, if we believe that economically well developed nations

have better military equipment, and are better suited for winning the wars they fight, and therefore fight outside their own borders.

Not very surprisingly, the *interstate* war variable is significant for the first two models at a 0.01 level, and at a 0.1 level for Model 26, where interaction terms with democracy/autocracy and interstate war are introduced – neither of which are significant.

Just as the *polity2* variable in Model 24, the *democracy* variable is negatively correlated with democide in the last two models. While democracies seem to perform less foreign democide than autocracies and semi-democracies, there does not seem to be a difference between them in the interaction terms, thus confirming Hypothesis 1b. It should be noted that most of the effect of the interaction terms are driven mostly by the interstate variable, as can be seen in Figure 7.4 and Figure 7.5.

Figure 7.4 Interaction between interstate wars and democracy in Model 26

A: Interstate at 10th and Democracy at 10th percentile; B: Interstate at 90th and Democracy at 10th percentile; C: Interstate at 10th and Democracy at 90th percentile; D: Interstate at 90th and Democracy at 90th percentile. As both these variables are dummies, 10th percentile represents 0, and 90th percentile represents 1.

Figure 7.5 Interaction between interstate wars and autocracy in Model 26

A: Interstate at 10th and Autocracy at 10th percentile; B: Interstate at 90th and Autocracy at 10th percentile; C: Interstate at 10th and Autocracy at 90th percentile; D: Interstate at 90th and Autocracy at 90th percentile. As both these variables are dummies, 10th percentile represents 0, and 90th percentile represents 1.

The inflated variables yield interesting results. Not surprisingly, interstate war increases the risk of any democide (negatively linked to observing no democide), but unlike the results from the intensity of democide, the number of years since the last democide is now significant. It would seem that the number of years since the last democide does not have any impact on the intensity of foreign democide in the count model. But it does have an impact on

whether foreign democide will happen in the first place, as we can see from the significance of years since last democide in the inflated models. The polity2 variable is, unlike regime and non-state democide, a significant factor, but in a negative fashion - the more democratic a state becomes, the likelihood of seeing a democide increases[19]. However, combined with what we saw above where democracies were less deadly than their semi-democratic and autocratic counterparts, it can seem as if democracies perform foreign democide more frequently, but they are less deadly when they do.

Table 7.5 below shows a summary of the results in relation to the hypotheses.

Table 7.5 Summary of results

Hypotheses	Total	Regime	Non-state	Foreign
1a: Democracies are in general less democidal than other types of government	Yes, a weak correlation	No, less democidal than autocracies, but same as mixed regimes	No	Yes
1b: Democracies are as violent as non-democracies in wars	Yes	Yes for intrastate wars, no for interstate wars	No	Yes
2: Less developed countries commit more democide than developed countries	No	Yes	Yes, a weak correlation	No, the opposite
3: Ethnically homogenous states are more democidal	N/A	Yes	No	N/A

7.5 Discussion

conomic development is not significant in the models for total democide due to the discrepancy of the results for regime and foreign democide. Thus, it is obvious that the whole should be viewed differently than just as the sum of its parts.

We cannot conclude that economically developed states kill fewer civilians than others. They do, however, kill fewer of their own citizens, and more of other nations' civilians.Tthe development variable had a negative sign in regime and non-state democide, but a positive sign in foreign democide; the latter may say something about the state's capacity in interstate wars.

As for population, governments in large countries are responsible for killing more civilians than governments in less populated countries. This is most likely because larger states are more likely to have more enemies at home, creating a larger regime democide, as well as engaging in bigger wars abroad/fighting on another state's turf. However, the severity

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[19] Since the inflate-model, as mentioned earlier, measures the likelihood of seeing a zero (that is no democide), a negative value on the polity2 variable means a higher chance of democide the more democratic a state is.

of non-state democides is not affected by a country's population. This is probably because it is more a question of the non-state group's capabilities to perform large scale democides than it is about the total population of the state. Population in itself would therefore not be the determining factor, but it is more about the opportunity to perform democide, and not only for non-state democide, but also for regime and foreign democide.

Looking at the three types of democide together, we saw that autocracies are significantly more violent than semi-democracies for regime democide, while democracies did not differ significantly from hybrid regimes. However, when we looked at foreign democide, autocracies did not prove to be much different from semi-democracies, but democracies were significantly less violent. Non-state democide, on the other hand, did not show any difference between the three forms of government. Looking at the graphs in Figure 7.6, we see the estimated deaths for each of the three types of government for each of the three forms of democide.

Figure 7.6 The effect of regime type on the number of democide deaths for model 13, 20 and 25. A = Autocracy, S-D = semi-democracy, D = Democracy[20]

There seems to be a convex relationship between type of government and regime democide, with autocracies as the most violent type. However, while democracies' democides were not significantly more violent than semi-democracies, they still seem to be more violent overall. While democracies are less violent than autocracies, the difference might not be significant. I did one analysis where I replaced semi-democracies with autocracies as the reference group with the dummies, and democracies were significantly (at a 0.05 level) less violent than autocracies. Even though non-state democide did not show any significant differences, we see that the tendency is a convex relationship also. The findings of a convex relationship between governments and *internal democide*, that is regime and non-state democide, is curious. This goes against the concave relationship seen in the onset of civil war, as well as democratic civil conflicts being less violent than semi-democratic and autocratic (Gleditsch, Hegre & Strand 2009: 181). However, as the middle graph shows, semi-democracies and autocracies are significantly more violent than democracies in terms of

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[20] These numbers are estimated when all other values in the models are set at their mean. Numbers indicate estimated kill count for the regime.

foreign democide, thus making democracies in the total model less violent than semi-democracies as well. Moreover, these are all results from the count model which means that the estimates are on how violent the democides are in states that do experience democide. The type of government did, on the other hand, not affect the chance of having a democide in the first place for regime and non-state democide, while foreign democides are more likely to happen the more democratic a state is. This is a strange finding, but while it necessarily is controversial for democratic leaders to kill civilians, it would be easier to hide democide in another state, and necessarily easier for the government to get away with democide against one's enemy than it would be with killing parts of their own electorate.

Looking at the results from the three types of democide together, it is possible that relative capabilities are important in understanding democide. As we saw for regime democide, ethnic homogenous states had more violent regimes than fragmented states, while states with a large second ethnic group were more violent, and from foreign democide we saw that a large population and a good economic development were both positively correlated with foreign democide – both factors that should be an advantage in wars. However, with this reasoning, regimes with a large ethnic second group should be less violent since the regimes' relative capabilities are worse than in homogenous societies. But it must be seen in connection with the non-state democide's increased deadliness if the second group is large and the fact that a regime will most likely perceive them as a threat, murdering their civilians, or as a response to previous killings of its own civilians. This theory of relative capability goes against Wood (2010), who tests the effects of rebel capabilities on one-sided violence and finds the opposite of what I have theorized – namely that weaker insurgents are more violent against civilians, while strong groups perform comparatively less violence, but cause the regimes to increase their violence. A problem with Wood's analyses is that he has employed the negative binomial regression where the zero-inflated negative binomial would be better suited, and yield different results[21]. Furthermore, his data only includes states that have seen one-sided violence, disregarding possible conflicts around the world where there are rebel groups, regardless of size, who do not kill civilians. This might have biased the results. Nevertheless, I cannot rule out that Wood's results may be similar in this dataset, as the usage of ethnic fractionalization and the size of the second largest group are poor estimates of rebel capability. This is, in any case, worthwhile investigating further for example by using the

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[21] I did a fit test on his models, and after finding ZINB to be the best method of analysis, I did a quick replication analysis of his models using ZINB instead of NBR. The results did not show a correlation between the rebel capability and the severity of the violence.

dataset of Cunningham, Gleditsch and Salehyan (2009) or a similar dataset that allows one to evaluate the comparative strength of non-state groups to that of the state.

In Chapter 5, we saw that China, Russia and Germany by far dominated democide with a share of over 77 per cent of the total democidal deaths in the 1900-87 period. One could therefore assume that these three states affect the results in such a way that the results would be very different without them. However, analyses done without these three states[22] are, with a few exceptions, pretty consistent with the the models that include them. The biggest difference is that the variable for ethnic fractionalization is no longer significant for regime democide. Apart from this, the differences are mostly significance values strengthening or weakening one level, such as the economic development effect on non-state democide, which is now significant at a 0.05 level instead of a 0.1 level, and the same variable going from 0.05 levels to 0.1 levels for foreign democide.

Even though I used Rummel's data, our results were slightly different. Where Rummel found a strong connection between democracies and the lack of democide, my results show a more nuanced picture, especially for regime democide where democracies are just as violent as semi-democracies. The conversion of the dataset into time-series format is one possible explanation, but the inclusion of other variables is probably a more decisive factor. On regime democide, the inclusion of a population variable seems to have a great effect on the regime variables, whereas for foreign democide the inclusion of population, development and interstate wars all have a strong effect the government variables. My results do, however, not necessarily say that Rummel was wrong when saying that "power kills, absolute power kills absolutely", only that the effects of regime type by itself are not so strong as Rummel claimed.

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[22] See Tables 5-8 in Appendix B.

8. Conclusions

In previous studies, researchers have used different definitions of violence against civilians which has led to the generation of different datasets. With the exception of Krain (1997), they all focus on the onset or incidence of violence, but not at severity. Most analyses do not use a time-series approach, thus ignoring possible changes to, for example, government, during episodes of violence against civilians, as well as temporal dependence. The data for creating a time-series dataset that is not limited by the definition of violence against civilians has, however, been available since Rummel's (1997) collection of data became accessible. With the exception of Wayman and Tago (2010) who used Rummel's data to create a time-series dataset for the onset of democide for the years 1945-2000, Rummel's data has lain dormant. Based on Rummel's data, I have presented and analyzed a time-series dataset with three different measures of democide: regime; non-state; and foreign democide, as well as an aggregate measure.

My immediate objective was to determine whether or not democracies are less violent than other types of government, as well as testing the effects of economic development and the distribution of ethnic groups within a state. While democracies are less violent than otherregime types in terms of the total amount of democide committed by a state, the largest difference is that democracies perform far less foreign democide than semi-democracies and autocracies.,However, they experience slightly more democide than semi-democracies, but this difference is not significant. Both are significantly less violent than autocracies. In terms of democide in wars, the role of democracy is not easily determined. The interaction terms showed democracies to be as violent as the other two for many of the models, and democracies were only less violent than autocracies when analyzing the effect of interstate wars on regime democide. However, the interaction terms did, in most cases, seem to be dominated by the war variables, and not showing a real interaction effect. The hypothesis focusing on the economic development of a country, specifically well-developed states being less violent, proved to be correct for regime democide, but surprisingly, the opposite was true for foreign democide. As hypothesized, the ethnic distribution in a state was significant in that ethnically homogenous states experience more regime democide than ethnically fragmented ones. While there was no such effect for non-state democide, an increased size of the second largest ethnic group increases the estimated democide as well. The results also showed that while analysing democide, one should not only look at the number of people killed, but also the context – whether it was perpetrated by a regime or a non-state groups and whether or not it was committed against foreign civilians.

If one were to build on this, I would suggest two different ways of improving the results – by developing the dataset further, and by looking at other possible factors. There are two obvious ways to improve the dataset and one not so apparent. First, the democides with very long intervals(cf. Figure 5.3) should be examined further. The interval should preferably be shortened, thus improving the precision of the results. An estimate for democides measured over forty years will miss every peak and valley, and may skew the results. Secondly, democide taking place after 1987 should be added, as there might be differences in the dynamics of democide after the end of the Cold War. Finally, as the earlier analyses have shown that distinguishing different types of democide will yield different results, one should explore the possibility of dividing the types of democide further. One possibility would be to divide democide into the types of explanations shown in Table 3.1. This would not be too different from what Harff and Gurr (1988: 368) did when they split genocides into Hegemonial and Xenophobic, and politicides into repressive, repressive/hegemonial, retributive and revolutionary. Valentino (2004: 70ff) also used motives when dividing mass killings into different categories. This division lets you see different results from ideological democide and one based on retribution However, deciding what motivates the different democide would require a lot of the person coding the data Since the motives in Table 3.1 are not mutually exclusive and can be coloured by the coder, it may not even be possible to do in a satisfactory manner.

Apart from changes in the dataset, future research could explore what mechanisms in democracies make them less likely to experience some forms of democide, whether it is public participation in elections, freedom of speech, institutional checks, or legal ways of showing dissent and opposing the government. With the current measures, we automatically assume that it is a combination of all these factors, while there may be the off chance that the main reason for the lack of democide in democracies is centered around one factor in particular. If it were to be one mechanism that is a lot more important than all the others, it is possible that the same mechanism could, explain why not all of the non-democracies are violent.

Another topic for future research is to measure the relative capabilities of the actors performing democide and their enemies. At what point (if there is one) does the threat of the opposing group become so imminent that the leaders turn to democide in order to protect their interests. If relative capability is an explanatory factor, it might help to explain why population did not have a significant effect on non-state democide.

Furthermore, the possibility of a contagion effect merits further investigation, as this was a significant factor in regime democide. For instance one could consider a division of the neighbouring democide variable, as this variable was very strong factor on regime democide. It could be that leaders see that neighbour regimes have success with democide, and decide to follow this strategy to their opposition. Or perhaps non-state democides in neighbouring states cause regimes to perform democide. For example, if rebel groups in state A are becoming a serious threat to the regime, and the leaders of state B engage in a pre-emptive strike, this will send a message about what will happen if rebel groups within its own borders attempt to copy their neighbours.

While violence against civilians may not be as common in the 21st century as it was in the 20th century, it remains an important topic for research. It is essential to understand why there is less democide today than it was fifty years ago as this information will help prevent future democide. I feel this thesis is a step in that direction, but I acknowledge that there is still a long way to go.

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Appendix A
Population addendum from Fearon and Laitin (2003)
Missing for Guyana
  Use Fearon and Laitin (F&L) for the period 1966-86
Missing for East or West Germany
  F&L 1945 and 1950-87 for West Germany
  F&L 1954-87 for East Germany
Missing Poland 1918-19 + 1941-45
  F&L Poland 1945
Hungary 1901-09 + 1911-12 + 1914-15
Czechoslovakia 1918-20
Albania 1915-23 + 1925-26 + 1928-33
Serbia 1900-20
Yugoslavia 1941-46
  F&L Yugoslavia 1945-46
Cyprus
  F&L Cyprus 1960-87
Bulgaria 1901-09 + 1911-12 + 1914-19
Romania 1901-09 + 1911-12 + 1914-19
USSR 1941-45
Russia 1900-22
Estonia 1917-40
Latvia 1920-40
Lithuania 1918-40
Liberia 1900-49
  F&L Liberia 1945-49
Ethiopia 1900-49
  F&L Ethiopia 1945-49
South Africa 1910-12 + 1914-49
  F&L South Africa 1945-49
Morocco 1900-12
Iran 1910-12 + 1914-49
  F&L Iran 1945-49
Turkey 1900-12 + 1914-22
Iraq 1920-49
  F&L Iraq 1945-49
Egypt1922-49
  F&L Egypt 1945-49
Syria 1944-49
  F&L Syria 1946-49
Lebanon 1943-49
  F&L Lebanon 1946-49
Jordan 1946-50
  F&L Jordan 1946-49
Israel 1948-49
  F&L Israel 1948-49
Saudi-Arabia 1926-49
  F&L Saudi-Arabia 1945-49

Two Yemen states
    F&L North + South Yemen
Oman 1910-12 + 1914-49
Afghanistan 1910-12 + 1914-49
    F&L Afghanistan 1945-49
Mongolia 1924-49
    F&L Mongolia 1945-49
Korea 1900-10
Korea, North 1948-49
    F&L Korea, north 1948-49
Bhutan
    F&L Bhutan 1971-87
Pakistan 1947-49
Nepal 1901-12 + 1914-22
    F&L Nepal 1945-49
Two Vietnam states
    F&L Vietnam north + Vietnam south
Papua New Guinea
    F&L Papua New Guinea
Solomon Islands
Fiji
India 1947-49
    F&L India 1947-49

Histogram of the dependent variables[23]

Figure 1. Overdispersion of the data for total democide

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
[23] The following four graphs show that over 8,000 cases have the value 0 (no democide), and the other values are not clearly discernible, proving the great overdispersion in the data.

Figure 2. Overdispersion of the data for regime democide

Figure 3. Overdispersion of the data for foreign democide

Figure 4. Overdispersion of the data for non-state democide

Table 1. Correlation matrix

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17
Ln(population) [1]	1																
Ln(PEC) [2]	0.18	1															
Years since last democide [3]	-0.19	0.06	1														
Polity2 [4]	0.07	0.27	0.27	1													
Democide in neighbouring states [5]	0.3	0.03	-0.18	-0.27	1												
Ethnic fractionalization [6]	0.01	-0.14	-0.22	-0.14	0.17	1											
Size of second largest ethnic group [7]	-0.14	-0.13	0.02	-0.15	0.11	0.49	1										
Autocracy * neighbouring democide [8]	0.18	-0.05	-0.2	-0.57	**0.8**	0.14	0.07	1									
Democracy * neighbouring democide [9]	0.21	0.17	0.07	0.47	0.21	0.02	-0.02	-0.26	1								
Democracy [10]	0.07	0.32	0.26	**0.85**	-0.23	-0.13	-0.2	-0.45	0.57	1							
Autocracy [11]	-0.06	-0.24	-0.22	**-0.92**	0.25	0.12	0.13	0.6	-0.43	-0.74	1						
Intrastate war [12]	0.19	-0.02	-0.17	-0.06	0.12	0.1	0.02	0.09	0.02	0.07	0.07	1					
Interstate war [13]	0.16	0.03	-0.06	0.04	0.03	-0.03	-0.1	0.03	-0.01	0.02	-0.05	0.09	1				
Autocracy * intrastate war [14]	0.14	-0.05	-0.14	-0.17	0.11	0.06	0.01	0.19	-0.09	-0.15	0.21	**0.81**	0.07	1			
Democracy * intrastate war [15]	0.13	0.03	-0.07	0.14	0.03	0.03	0.008	-0.08	0.26	0.18	-0.14	0.4	0.06	-0.02	1		
Autocracy * interstate war [16]	0.1	-0.02	-0.08	-0.12	0.13	-0.03	-0.06	0.18	-0.06	-0.1	0.14	0.1	0.67	0.14	-0.02	1	
Democracy * interstate war [17]	0.09	0.1	-0.01	0.19	-0.07	0.007	-0.03	-0.1	0.09	0.22	-0.16	0.02	0.57	-0.03	0.14	0.02	1

Significant values in bold

Appendix B – alternative analyses

Table 1. Total democide without the Second World War

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9
ln(Population)	0.928***	0.756***	0.962***	0.776***	0.715***	0.751***	0.757***	0.712***	0.700***
	(0.15)	(0.135)	(0.157)	(0.141)	(0.148)	(0.143)	(0.143)	(0.148)	(0.148)
ln(PEC/capita)	-0.082	-0.071	-0.091	-0.075	-0.074	-0.075	-0.075	-0.073	-0.074
	(0.076)	(0.076)	(0.077)	(0.077)	(0.077)	(0.077)	(0.077)	(0.078)	(0.077)
Democide in neighb. states		0.270**		0.276**	0.046	0.306***	0.293**	0.261	0.138
		(0.108)		(0.109)	(0.21)	(0.11)	(0.116)	(0.26)	(0.262)
Years since last democide	-0.026***	-0.027***	-0.033***	-0.032***	-0.031***	-0.033***	-0.032***	-0.033***	-0.031***
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.009)
Intrastate war	0.857***	0.910***	0.712***	0.784***	0.981***	-2.687	0.804***	-3.176	0.988***
	(0.266)	(0.267)	(0.245)	(0.23)	(0.228)	(2.031)	(0.233)	(2.486)	(0.226)
Interstate war	1.318***	1.383***	1.314***	1.417***	1.251***	1.377***	3.777	1.276***	3.945
	(0.397)	(0.407)	(0.37)	(0.408)	(0.412)	(0.399)	(2.773)	(0.417)	(3.038)
Autocracy			1.172***	0.924***	0.052	0.702**	1.030***	0.344	0.361
			(0.363)	(0.337)	(0.68)	(0.355)	(0.383)	(0.704)	(0.836)
Democracy			-0.712*	-0.55	-0.355	-0.681*	-0.4	-0.01	0.05
			(0.391)	(0.35)	(0.469)	(0.349)	(0.38)	(0.531)	(0.588)
Autocracy*interstate war							-0.81		-0.864
							(1.031)		(1.102)
Autocracy*intrastate war						1.303*		1.29	
						(0.718)		(0.827)	
Democracy*interstate war							-0.891		-1.076
							(1.023)		(1.1)
Democracy*intrastate war						1.045		1.619	
						(0.775)		(1.008)	
Autocracy*neighb. democide					0.341			0.127	0.261
					(0.245)			(0.288)	(0.282)
Democracy*neighb. democide					-0.14			-0.406	-0.246
					(0.199)			(0.275)	(0.228)
Polity2	-0.123***	-0.096***							
	(0.025)	(0.021)							
Constant	-7.699***	-6.498***	-8.365***	-6.977***	-6.113***	-6.604***	-6.934***	-6.161***	-6.215***
	(1.456)	(1.32)	(1.561)	(1.432)	(1.601)	(1.464)	(1.416)	(1.598)	(1.602)
Inflated variables									
Years since last democide	0.268***	0.266***	0.263***	0.263***	0.265***	0.263***	0.263***	0.265***	0.265***
	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.045)
Intrastate	-42.32***	-32.086***	-39.313***	-34.021***	-31.678***	-32.234***	-37.482***	-32.048***	-33.248***
	(3.761)	(3.836)	(3.707)	(3.795)	(3.845)	(3.818)	(3.79)	(3.872)	(3.847)
Interstate	-0.572	-0.568	-0.531	-0.523	-0.563	-0.536	-0.516	-0.557	-0.551
	(0.431)	(0.43)	(0.429)	(0.43)	(0.435)	(0.431)	(0.434)	(0.438)	(0.443)
Observations	5,869	5,869	5,869	5,869	5,869	5,869	5,869	5,869	5,869
Country-years of democide	2028	2028	2028	2028	2028	2028	2028	2028	2028

Standard errors shown in parentheses. Significance by asterisk: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01

Table 2. Regime democide without the Second World War [24]

	Model 10	Model 11	Model 12	Model 13	Model 14	Model 15	Model 16	Model 17	Model 18
ln(Population)	0.963***	0.655***	1.006***	0.653***		0.640***		0.627***	0.648***
	(0.16)	(0.141)	(0.16)	(0.138)		(0.144)		(0.14)	(0.133)
ln(PEC/capita)	-0.241**	-0.246**	-0.263**	-0.253**		-0.254**		-0.228**	-0.227**
	(0.108)	(0.11)	(0.107)	(0.107)		(0.105)		(0.104)	(0.101)
Democide in neighb. states		0.517***		0.533***		0.555***		0.676**	0.544*
		(0.106)		(0.107)		(0.109)		(0.311)	(0.281)
Years since last democide	-0.024***	-0.022**	-0.034***	-0.030***		-0.030***		-0.031***	-0.033***
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.008)		(0.008)		(0.009)	(0.012)
Intrastate war	1.195***	1.369***	1.056***	1.255***		2.108		0.269	1.669***
	(0.27)	(0.282)	(0.265)	(0.252)		(2.414)		(2.49)	(0.29)
Interstate war	0.903	0.601	0.776	0.495		0.464		0.419	-8.013***
	(0.587)	(0.538)	(0.539)	(0.485)		(0.486)		(0.486)	(3.087)
Autocracy			1.933***	1.885***		1.868***		1.951*	1.545
			(0.508)	(0.485)		(0.594)		(1.002)	(0.995)
Democracy			-0.467	0.2		0.361		1.727*	1.406*
			(0.678)	(0.597)		(0.61)		(0.89)	(0.787)
Ethnic fractionalization	-1.017	-1.721**	-0.76	-1.529**		-1.593**		-1.461**	-1.622**
	(0.848)	(0.726)	(0.848)	(0.726)		(0.741)		(0.705)	(0.691)
Size of 2nd largest ethnic group	-0.45	0.846	-0.93	0.719		0.85		1.45	1.528
	(1.856)	(1.835)	(1.892)	(1.82)		(1.84)		(1.801)	(1.78)
Autocracy*interstate war									3.440***
									(1.101)
Autocracy*intrastate war						0.077		0.285	
						(0.884)		(0.857)	
Democracy*interstate war									2.056
									(1.259)
Democracy*intrastate war						-0.854		0.582	
						(0.933)		(0.988)	
Autocracy*neighb. democide								-0.035	0.086
								(0.329)	(0.297)
Democracy*neighb. democide								-0.776**	-0.638**
								(0.337)	(0.274)
Polity2	-0.164***	-0.122***							
	(0.045)	(0.041)							
Constant	-8.396***	-6.379***	-9.645***	-7.454***		-7.381***		-7.561***	-7.524***
	(1.538)	(1.321)	(1.577)	(1.395)		(1.51)		(1.554)	(1.527)
Inflated variables									
Years since last democide	0.244***	0.241***	0.236***	0.235***		0.235***		0.234***	0.181***
	(0.047)	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.049)		(0.049)		(0.05)	(0.049)
Intrastate	-31.40***	-30.059***	-31.837***	-29.392***		-36.437***		-37.430***	
	(4.19)	(4.443)	(4.064)	(4.243)		(4.257)		(4.391)	
Polity2	0.015	0.015	0.027	0.02		0.026		0.017	0.012
	(0.066)	(0.063)	(0.062)	(0.063)		(0.064)		(0.064)	(0.073)
Observations	5,819	5,819	5,819	5,819		5,819		5,819	5,819
Country-years of democide	1704	1704	1704	1704		1704		1704	1704

Standard errors shown in parentheses. Significance by asterisk: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01

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[24] Model 14 and Model 16 did not converge without the years 1940-45

Table 3. Non-state democide without the Second World War

	Model 19	Model 20	Model 21	Model 22	Model 23
ln(Population)	0.109	0.096	0.085	0.104	0.094
	(0.191)	(0.188)	(0.185)	(0.186)	(0.183)
ln(PEC/capita)	-0.176*	-0.179*	-0.172*	-0.184*	-0.170*
	(0.098)	(0.098)	(0.093)	(0.096)	(0.091)
Democide in neighb. states	0.139	0.148	0.781**	0.144	1.028***
	(0.199)	(0.199)	(0.339)	(0.202)	(0.340)
Years since last democide	-0.092***	-0.091***	-0.092***	-0.092***	-0.093***
	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.030)
Intrastate war	3.338***	3.302***	3.254***	3.086	-1.672
	(0.322)	(0.330)	(0.319)	(3.497)	(2.570)
Autocracy		0.767	3.012**	0.659	3.314**
		(0.590)	(1.381)	(0.582)	(1.325)
Democracy		0.530	1.191	0.613	1.756
		(0.573)	(1.425)	(0.569)	(1.453)
Ethnic fractionalization	-1.196	-1.073	-1.113	-0.987	-0.968
	(0.897)	(0.935)	(0.908)	(0.908)	(0.883)
Size of 2nd largest ethnic group	6.007***	5.908***	6.140***	5.860**	5.990***
	(2.183)	(2.208)	(2.313)	(2.275)	(2.323)
Autocracy*neighb. democide			-0.814**		-1.079***
			(0.379)		(0.390)
Democracy*neighb. democide			-0.164		-0.468
			(0.377)		(0.444)
Polity2	-0.014				
	(0.041)				
Autocracy*intrastate war				0.433	1.967**
				(1.150)	(0.823)
Democracy*intrastate war				-0.464	1.233
				(1.443)	(1.224)
Constant	-4.602**	-5.132**	-6.174***	-5.171**	-6.346***
	(2.041)	(2.008)	(2.256)	(2.012)	(2.208)
Inflated variables					
Years since last democide	0.012	0.017	0.018	0.020	0.016
	(0.021)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.016)
Intrastate	-0.943	-6.325	-7.940	-3.743	-4.997
	(3.306)	(5.867)	(8.342)	(3.700)	(3.694)
Polity2	-0.168	-0.311	-0.299	-0.132	-0.213
	(0.248)	(0.217)	(0.377)	(0.308)	(0.291)
Observations	5819	5819	5819	5819	5819
Country-years of democide	372	372	372	372	372

Standard errors shown in parentheses. Significance by asterisk: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01

Table 4. Foreign democide without the Second World War

	Model 24	Model 25	Model 26
ln(Population)	0.574	0.666**	0.639*
	(0.366)	(0.338)	(0.356)
ln(PEC/capita)	0.430*	0.414*	0.448**
	(0.234)	(0.220)	(0.226)
Years since last democide	-0.002	-0.024	-0.022
	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.045)
Interstate war	1.882***	1.914***	3.224
	(0.702)	(0.733)	(2.779)
Autocracy		0.573	0.610
		(0.748)	(0.789)
Democracy		-1.436**	-1.313**
		(0.622)	(0.659)
Autocracy*interstate war			-0.028
			(1.290)
Democracy*interstate war			-0.955
			(1.039)
Polity2	-0.132**		
	(0.058)		
Constant	-4.988	-5.789	-5.573
	(3.798)	(3.703)	(3.828)
Inflated variables			
Years since last democide	0.235***	0.222***	0.224***
	(0.073)	(0.078)	(0.078)
Interstate	-2.656**	-2.677**	-2.575**
	(1.199)	(1.267)	(1.285)
Polity2	-0.169***	-0.158**	-0.157**
	(0.065)	(0.062)	(0.063)
Observations	5,869	5,869	5,869
Country-years of democide	452	452	452

Standard errors shown in parentheses. Significance by asterisk: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01

Table 5.Total democide without China, Russia and Germany

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9
ln(Population)	0.708***	0.650***	0.710***	0.667***	0.647***	0.670***	0.604***	0.648***	0.596***
	(0.165)	(0.158)	(0.167)	(0.165)	(0.166)	(0.171)	(0.161)	(0.167)	(0.162)
ln(PEC/capita)	-0.059	-0.051	-0.067	-0.058	-0.059	-0.059	-0.059	-0.057	-0.062
	(0.080)	(0.079)	(0.082)	(0.080)	(0.080)	(0.080)	(0.080)	(0.080)	(0.079)
Democide in neighb. states		0.169		0.170	-0.088	0.201*	0.211*	0.126	0.145
		(0.108)		(0.107)	(0.196)	(0.110)	(0.109)	(0.278)	(0.259)
Years since last democide	-0.024**	-0.026***	-0.031***	-0.031***	-0.030***	-0.033***	-0.030***	-0.032***	-0.030***
	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.009)
Intrastate war	1.131***	0.958***	0.804***	0.840***	1.019***	0.030	0.892***	-0.140	1.026***
	(0.287)	(0.285)	(0.267)	(0.251)	(0.253)	(0.722)	(0.245)	(1.017)	(0.245)
Interstate war	1.947***	2.013***	1.866***	1.994***	1.799***	2.028***	3.504***	1.833***	3.451***
	(0.440)	(0.505)	(0.442)	(0.493)	(0.465)	(0.485)	(0.883)	(0.472)	(1.007)
Autocracy			0.869**	0.712**	0.183	0.539	1.041***	0.261	0.801
			(0.373)	(0.362)	(0.472)	(0.379)	(0.396)	(0.472)	(0.583)
Democracy			-0.773**	-0.727*	-0.802*	-0.857**	-0.327	-0.732*	-0.106
			(0.376)	(0.373)	(0.411)	(0.373)	(0.395)	(0.407)	(0.449)
Autocracy*interstate war							-2.198**		-2.226**
							(0.972)		(1.072)
Autocracy*intrastate war						1.157		1.183	
						(0.748)		(1.019)	
Democracy*interstate war							-1.665*		-1.797*
							(0.931)		(1.012)
Democracy*intrastate war						0.976		1.487	
						(0.793)		(1.153)	
Autocracy*neighb. democide					0.356*			0.142	0.149
					(0.211)			(0.289)	(0.264)
Democracy*neighb. democide					0.005			-0.254	-0.234
					(0.199)			(0.297)	(0.226)
Polity2	-0.11***	-0.089***							
	(0.023)	(0.021)							
Constant	-5.702***	-5.367***	-5.844***	-5.648***	-5.141***	-5.632***	-5.450***	-5.226***	-5.304***
	(1.608)	(1.583)	(1.680)	(1.706)	(1.766)	(1.781)	(1.643)	(1.773)	(1.725)
Inflated variables									
Years since last democide	0.226***	0.268***	0.268***	0.265***	0.265***	0.216***	0.266***	0.265***	0.266***
	(0.035)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.036)	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.044)
Intrastate		-32.97***	-32.68***	-38.551***	-37.854***		-31.209***	-38.632***	-33.106***
		(3.876)	(3.677)	(3.735)	(3.767)		(3.696)	(3.792)	(3.738)
Interstate	-0.446	-0.572	-0.599	-0.543	-0.576	-0.324	-0.559	-0.568	-0.570
	(0.472)	(0.379)	(0.384)	(0.382)	(0.382)	(0.482)	(0.385)	(0.383)	(0.388)
Observations	5,958	5,958	5,958	5,958	5,958	5,958	5,958	5,958	5,958
Country-years of democide	2,016	2,016	2,016	2,016	2,016	2,016	2,016	2,016	2,016

Standard errors shown in parentheses. Significance by asterisk: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01

Table 6. Regime democide without China, Russia and Germany

	Model 10	Model 11	Model 12	Model 13	Model 14	Model 15	Model 16	Model 17	Model 18
ln(Population)	0.529**	0.531***	0.536**	0.510***	0.537***	0.508***	0.537***	0.572***	0.585***
	(0.221)	(0.189)	(0.222)	(0.189)	(0.176)	(0.192)	(0.188)	(0.184)	(0.178)
ln(PEC/capita)	-0.185*	-0.225**	-0.199*	-0.229**	-0.218**	-0.232**	-0.230**	-0.219**	-0.220**
	(0.107)	(0.111)	(0.104)	(0.107)	(0.104)	(0.107)	(0.105)	(0.106)	(0.102)
Democide in neighb. states		0.479***		0.472***	0.610**	0.496***	0.445***	0.613*	0.532*
		(0.114)		(0.112)	(0.29)	(0.117)	(0.109)	(0.333)	(0.273)
Years since last democide	-0.024**	-0.023**	-0.035***	-0.031***	-0.032***	-0.031***	-0.03***	-0.04***	-0.04***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.014)	(0.013)
Intrastate war	1.119***	1.361***	0.995***	1.228***	1.406***	1.296	1.194***	1.466*	1.659***
	(0.311)	(0.298)	(0.304)	(0.262)	(0.291)	(0.788)	(0.26)	(0.878)	(0.313)
Interstate war	0.903*	0.646	0.751	0.542	0.461	0.517	-2.611***	0.495	-2.347**
	(0.541)	(0.497)	(0.53)	(0.47)	(0.462)	(0.47)	(0.925)	(0.463)	(0.932)
Autocracy			2.122***	1.900***	1.939***	1.877***	1.697***	1.874**	1.646**
			(0.472)	(0.445)	(0.741)	(0.54)	(0.419)	(0.761)	(0.716)
Democracy			-0.187	0.158	0.868	0.289	0.042	0.813	0.699
			(0.572)	(0.558)	(0.621)	(0.561)	(0.53)	(0.615)	(0.556)
Ethnic fractionalization	-0.169	-1.358*	0.088	-1.108	-1.227	-1.197	-1.146	-1.317*	-1.395*
	(0.825)	(0.779)	(0.828)	(0.767)	(0.751)	(0.796)	(0.778)	(0.756)	(0.752)
Size of 2nd largest ethnic group	-0.182	0.792	-0.497	0.672	1.403	0.779	0.542	1.438	1.404
	(1.544)	(1.743)	(1.606)	(1.717)	(1.673)	(1.743)	(1.721)	(1.74)	(1.712)
Autocracy*interstate war							3.638***		3.343***
							(1.036)		(1.053)
Autocracy*intrastate war						0.084		0.185	
						(0.873)		(0.908)	
Democracy*interstate war							2.204*		3.343***
							(1.333)		(1.053)
Democracy*intrastate war						-0.698		0.49	
						(0.901)		(1.074)	
Autocracy*neighb. democide					-0.017			0.007	0.062
					(0.308)			(0.352)	(0.292)
Democracy*neighb. democide					-0.648**			-0.721**	-0.620**
					(0.287)			(0.347)	(0.266)
Polity2	-0.158***	-0.123***							
	(0.042)	(0.039)							
Constant	-4.613**	-5.271***	-5.758***	-6.160***	-6.738***	-6.171***	-6.154***	-7.101***	-6.963***
	(2.013)	(1.748)	(2.003)	(1.795)	(1.753)	(1.839)	(1.777)	(1.879)	(1.814)
Inflated variables									
Years since last democide	0.257***	0.244***	0.249***	0.238***	0.235***	0.238***	0.241***	0.174***	0.178***
	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.05)	(0.049)	(0.05)	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.051)	(0.049)
Intrastate	-33.5***	-30.8***	-33.258***	-32.293***	-30.538***	-28.925***	-28.614***		
	(4.718)	(4.66)	(4.192)	(4.25)	(4.36)	(4.262)	(4.301)		
Polity2	-0.011	-0.002	-0.004	0.002	0.002	0.008	0.006	-0.018	-0.009
	(0.064)	(0.065)	(0.063)	(0.066)	(0.067)	(0.067)	(0.063)	(0.086)	(0.078)
Observations	5,908	5,908	5,908	5,908	5,908	5,908	5,908	5,908	5,908
Country-years of democide	1,689	1,689	1,689	1,689	1,689	1,689	1,689	1,689	1,689

Standard errors shown in parentheses. Significance by asterisk: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01

Table 7. Non-state democide without China, Russia and Germany

	Model 19	Model 20	Model 21	Model 22	Model 23
ln(Population)	0.302*	0.29	0.281	0.290*	0.281
	(0.174)	(0.177)	(0.18)	(0.174)	(0.176)
ln(PEC/capita)	-0.220**	-0.220**	-0.210**	-0.223**	-0.206**
	(0.104)	(0.106)	(0.102)	(0.104)	(0.1)
Democide in neighb. states	0.25	0.251	0.766**	0.265	1.015***
	(0.214)	(0.214)	(0.327)	(0.215)	(0.314)
Years since last democide	-0.090***	-0.089***	-0.090***	-0.089***	-0.090***
	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.028)	(0.026)	(0.027)
Intrastate war	3.333***	3.281***	3.219***	2.659**	1.378*
	(0.319)	(0.324)	(0.327)	(1.074)	(0.83)
Autocracy		0.711	1.872*	0.52	1.899**
		(0.578)	(1.041)	(0.555)	(0.957)
Democracy		0.252	0.688	0.237	0.9
		(0.614)	(1.117)	(0.603)	(1.068)
Ethnic fractionalization	-1.548*	-1.425	-1.428	-1.317	-1.279
	(0.915)	(0.97)	(0.961)	(0.956)	(0.941)
Size of 2nd largest ethnic group	5.414***	5.222**	5.344**	5.072**	5.141**
	(2.051)	(2.07)	(2.141)	(2.073)	(2.106)
Autocracy*neighb. democide			-0.679*		-0.941**
			(0.371)		(0.369)
Democracy*neighb. democide			-0.194		-0.473
			(0.414)		(0.468)
Polity2	-0.026				
	(0.04)				
Autocracy*intrastate war				0.838	2.097***
				(1.087)	(0.813)
Democracy*intrastate war				0.103	1.455
				(1.336)	(1.144)
Constant	-6.355***	-6.737***	-7.540***	-6.638***	-7.616***
	(1.921)	(1.887)	(2.206)	(1.869)	(2.119)
Inflated variables					
Years since last democide	0.015	0.017	0.018	0.012	0.003
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.022)	(0.019)
Intrastate	-5.823	-6.218	-7.905	-5.628	1.295
	(6.163)	(9.436)	(12.085)	(5.193)	(2.088)
Polity2	-0.193	-0.248	-0.281	-0.117	-0.038
	(0.404)	(0.335)	(0.238)	(0.399)	(0.154)
Observations	5,908	5,908	5,908	5,908	5,908
Country-years of democide	381	381	381	381	381

Standard errors shown in parentheses. Significance by asterisk: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01

Table 8. Foreign democide without China, Russia and Germany

	Model 24	Model 25	Model 26
ln(Population)	0.813***	0.880***	0.814***
	(0.314)	(0.295)	(0.313)
ln(PEC/capita)	0.369	0.378*	0.385*
	(0.227)	(0.210)	(0.211)
Years since last democide	-0.005	-0.034	-0.024
	(0.046)	(0.043)	(0.049)
Interstate war	2.173***	2.049***	3.026***
	(0.719)	(0.704)	(1.054)
Autocracy		0.337	0.670
		(0.753)	(0.860)
Democracy		-1.765***	-1.390*
		(0.648)	(0.747)
Autocracy*interstate war			-1.122
			(1.326)
Democracy*interstate war			-1.280
			(1.101)
Polity2	-0.130**		
	(0.066)		
Constant	-7.238**	-7.567**	-7.221**
	(3.218)	(3.254)	(3.371)
Inflated variables			
Years since last democide	0.226***	0.210***	0.217***
	(0.065)	(0.069)	(0.072)
Interstate	-3.079***	-3.144***	-3.126***
	(0.988)	(1.038)	(1.039)
Polity2	-0.160**	-0.152**	-0.153**
	(0.069)	(0.063)	(0.063)
Observations	5,958	5,958	5,958
Country-years of democide	470	470	470

Standard errors shown in parentheses. Significance by asterisk: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01

OLS Regressions
Table 9. Total democide

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9
ln(Population)	34.604***	23.419***	34.149***	22.793***	23.256***	22.725***	23.016***	23.188***	23.482***
	(3.356)	(3.508)	(3.356)	(3.502)	(3.500)	(3.504)	(3.500)	(3.502)	(3.497)
ln(PEC/capita)	-0.034	-1.223	-0.359	-1.742	-2.459	-1.813	-1.509	-2.467	-2.228
	(1.924)	(1.912)	(1.963)	(1.950)	(1.948)	(1.953)	(1.948)	(1.950)	(1.946)
Democide in neighb		39.904***		40.947***	-5.660	41.378***	39.186***	-4.455	-7.117
		(3.955)		(3.943)	(12.852)	(3.944)	(3.959)	(12.997)	(12.901)
Years since democide	-0.008	0.077	-0.090	0.017	-0.047	-0.017	-0.009	-0.064	-0.071
	(0.203)	(0.202)	(0.202)	(0.201)	(0.200)	(0.201)	(0.201)	(0.200)	(0.200)
Intrastate war	12.170	4.012	11.295	3.803	11.076	-77.841	1.331	-38.267	8.561
	(16.850)	(16.732)	(16.876)	(16.745)	(16.673)	(140.306)	(16.734)	(141.356)	(16.662)
Interstate war	97.778***	100.71***	97.340***	100.52***	85.16***	100.61***	3.812	85.616***	-25.623
	(19.150)	(18.995)	(19.173)	(19.009)	(18.982)	(19.005)	(138.499)	(18.989)	(138.336)
Autocracy			36.135***	18.007	-129.59***	11.069	11.329	-130.0***	-135.5***
			(13.651)	(13.645)	(32.116)	(14.261)	(14.112)	(32.118)	(32.614)
Democracy			-8.547	5.318	7.612	6.428	8.680	6.947	9.892
			(15.293)	(15.219)	(34.613)	(15.795)	(15.810)	(34.625)	(35.309)
Autocracy*neighb. Dem					66.125***			64.598***	65.683***
					(13.562)			(13.714)	(13.592)
Democracy*neighb. Dem					-6.987			-6.275	-6.726
					(15.331)			(15.546)	(15.373)
Polity2	-3.402***	-1.459**							
	(0.649)	(0.672)							
Autocracy*intrastate						75.415		42.223	
						(48.754)		(49.027)	
Democracy*interstate						-38.460		-18.618	
						(58.371)		(58.901)	
Autocracy*interstate							125.424**		127.030**
							(51.786)		(51.645)
Autocracy*intrastate							-65.725		-56.917
							(54.288)		(54.197)
Constant	-297.6***	-248.5***	-308.8***	-254.8***	-207.2***	-250.5***	-250.7***	-205.6***	-203.3***
	(31.589)	(31.705)	(33.692)	(33.803)	(37.405)	(34.154)	(33.820)	(37.487)	(37.524)
Observations	6,082	6,082	6,082	6,082	6,082	6,082	6,082	6,082	6,082
R-squared	0.031	0.047	0.029	0.046	0.058	0.048	0.05	0.058	0.061

Standard errors shown in parentheses. Significance by asterisk: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01

Table 10. Regime democide

	Model 10	Model 11	Model 12	Model 13	Model 14	Model 15	Model 16	Model 17	Model 18
ln(Population)	32.954***	20.739***	32.653***	20.395***	21.901***	20.437***	20.664***	21.869***	22.124***
	(3.373)	(3.499)	(3.372)	(3.493)	(3.498)	(3.498)	(3.494)	(3.502)	(3.499)
ln(PEC/capita)	-2.564	-4.461**	-2.818	-4.856**	-5.590***	-4.914**	-4.748**	-5.595***	-5.468***
	(1.897)	(1.884)	(1.932)	(1.918)	(1.918)	(1.921)	(1.919)	(1.920)	(1.918)
Democide in neighb		44.817***		45.485***	7.269	45.777***	44.451***	8.080	5.181
		(3.870)		(3.858)	(12.460)	(3.858)	(3.882)	(12.596)	(12.518)
Years since democide	0.116	0.240	0.049	0.197	0.135	0.166	0.190	0.120	0.129
	(0.197)	(0.195)	(0.196)	(0.195)	(0.194)	(0.195)	(0.195)	(0.194)	(0.194)
Intrastate war	25.701	19.239	24.549	18.985	24.583	-34.964	17.197	-5.932	22.870
	(16.335)	(16.167)	(16.354)	(16.176)	(16.111)	(135.592)	(16.189)	(136.637)	(16.123)
Interstate war	29.796	30.635*	29.697	30.724*	18.092	31.010*	-154.390	18.553	-167.452
	(18.542)	(18.341)	(18.567)	(18.358)	(18.329)	(18.358)	(133.959)	(18.338)	(133.870)
Autocracy			34.384***	14.132	-110.73***	8.496	7.589	-111.24***	-119.50***
			(13.224)	(13.187)	(31.083)	(13.801)	(13.671)	(31.087)	(31.603)
Democracy			-7.193	5.331	24.171	7.023	2.264	23.559	17.780
			(14.944)	(14.814)	(33.524)	(15.407)	(15.454)	(33.533)	(34.290)
Ethnic fractionalization	-46.281**	-67.468***	-44.231**	-67.265***	-64.890***	-65.685***	-65.069***	-64.087***	-62.723***
	(18.294)	(18.188)	(18.302)	(18.201)	(18.109)	(18.248)	(18.223)	(18.159)	(18.131)
Size of 2nd ethnic group	-79.257*	-116.283***	-77.812*	-112.372**	-75.454*	-109.764**	-113.060**	-75.107*	-76.416*
	(44.619)	(44.249)	(45.080)	(44.668)	(44.657)	(44.768)	(44.804)	(44.759)	(44.797)
Autocracy*neighb. Dem					55.668***			54.565***	56.750***
					(13.114)			(13.260)	(13.155)
Democracy*neighb. Dem					-13.716			-12.889	-12.132
					(14.795)			(14.998)	(14.857)
Polity2	-3.080***	-1.035							
	(0.635)	(0.652)							
Autocracy*intrastate						60.545		32.583	
						(47.081)		(47.359)	
Democracy*intrastate						-40.866		-20.847	
						(56.366)		(56.874)	
Autocracy*interstate							101.178**		100.031**
							(49.974)		(49.870)
Democracy*interstate							26.728		28.284
							(52.571)		(52.510)
Constant	-262.35***	-199.20***	-275.644***	-206.358***	-184.553***	-204.807***	-203.066***	-183.738***	-179.630***
	(32.709)	(32.81)	(34.848)	(34.952)	(38.173)	(835.332)	(835.051)	(38.277)	(38.397)
Observations	6,032	6,032	6,032	6,032	6,032	6,032	6,032	6,032	6,032
R-squared	0.026	0.047	0.025	0.047	0.058	0.048	0.048	0.058	0.059

Standard errors shown in parentheses. Significance by asterisk: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01

Table 11. Non-state democide

	Model 19	Model 20	Model 21	Model 22	Model 23
ln(Population)	-0.010	-0.004	-0.002	-0.008	-0.006
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)
ln(PEC/capita)	-0.015	-0.013	-0.014	-0.012	-0.012
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Democide in neighb. states	-0.028	-0.040	0.036	-0.035	0.100
	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.081)	(0.025)	(0.081)
Years since last democide	-0.004***	-0.003***	-0.003***	-0.004***	-0.004***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Intrastate war	1.892***	1.889***	1.885***	-1.828**	-2.048**
	(0.104)	(0.104)	(0.104)	(0.869)	(0.880)
Autocracy		0.225***	0.396**	0.059	0.386*
		(0.085)	(0.201)	(0.088)	(0.200)
Democracy		0.177*	0.369*	0.116	0.363*
		(0.095)	(0.217)	(0.099)	(0.216)
Ethnic fractionalization	-0.398***	-0.412***	-0.414***	-0.359***	-0.362***
	(0.117)	(0.117)	(0.117)	(0.117)	(0.117)
Size of 2nd largest ethnic group	1.390***	1.427***	1.425***	1.405***	1.369***
	(0.284)	(0.287)	(0.288)	(0.286)	(0.288)
Autocracy*neighb. democide			-0.080		-0.155*
			(0.085)		(0.085)
Democracy*neighb. democide			-0.093		-0.119
			(0.096)		(0.097)
Polity2	0.002				
	(0.004)				
Autocracy*intrastate war				1.866***	1.948***
				(0.302)	(0.305)
Democracy*intrastate war				0.483	0.545
				(0.361)	(0.366)
Constant	0.159	-0.067	-0.171	0.070	-0.084
	(0.211)	(0.225)	(0.247)	(0.226)	(0.247)
Observations	6,032	6,032	6,032	6,032	6,032
R-squared	0.061	0.063	0.063	0.071	0.072

Standard errors shown in parentheses. Significance by asterisk: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01

Table 12. Foreign democide

	Model 24	Model 25	Model 26
ln(Population)	2.377**	2.284**	2.065**
	(0.931)	(0.930)	(0.927)
ln(PEC/capita)	1.396***	1.416**	1.515***
	(0.541)	(0.552)	(0.550)
Democide in neighb. states	-0.039	-0.052	-0.064
	(0.057)	(0.057)	(0.056)
Years since last democide	61.626***	61.222***	113.550***
	(5.380)	(5.385)	(39.103)
Autocracy		1.035	0.137
		(3.841)	(3.973)
Democracy		-7.287*	-2.517
		(4.303)	(4.454)
Autocracy*interstate war			24.894*
			(14.580)
Autocracy*intrastate war			-66.281***
			(15.357)
Polity2	-0.615***		
	(0.183)		
Constant	-18.868**	-15.898*	-14.475
	(8.839)	(9.428)	(9.416)
Observations	6,082	6,082	6,082
R-squared	0.027	0.027	0.036

Standard errors shown in parentheses. Significance by asterisk: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01

Appendix C - data

The source refers to page number/line number in Rummel 1997b. The data for China and most of Russia were retrieved from Rummel's home page (http://www.hawaii.edu/powerkills/) and refer to the table number/line number. Germany's numbers are from Rummel 1992 and refer to table/line number.

Source	Country	Start year	End year	Low estimate	Medium estimate	High estimate	Notes
216/60	Afghanistan	1978	1979	30.00	50.00	100.00	Executions, political prisoners, disappearances, massacres
216/64	Afghanistan	1979	1987	32.00	178.00	603.00	Democidal bombing/shelling/strafing/intentional starvation
216/66	Afghanistan	1978	1987	5.00			Democide by Afghan resistance
270/3	Afghanistan	1978	1987	30.00			Rebel democide
216/94	Albania	1944	1987	25.00	100.00	150.00	Albanian democide
270/16	Algeria	1962	1963	12.00	50.00	150.00	Harkis/OAS supporters killed
270/34b	Algeria	1954	1962	50.00	100.00	150.00	Rebel democide
295/1285	Algeria	1945	1945		0.10		Europeans killed by native Algerians
217/135	Angola	1978	1987	100.00	125.00	200.00	Terror/massacres
271/76	Argentina	1976	1982	15.00	20.00	40.00	Disappearances, assassinations and other killings
271/81	Argentina	1970	1979	1.00			Democide by guerrillas
272/101	Armenia	1918	1918		2.00		Azerbaijanese massacre
272/103	Armenia	1909	1909		1.85		Muslim Turks killed
272/106h	Armenia	1914	1918	64.00	75.00	300.00	Genocide
272/106i	Armenia	1920	1921	1.00			Muslim Turks killed
272/115	Armenia	1918	1920	15.00			Muslims and Tartars killed/massacred
273/163	Austria-Hungary	1914	1918	27.00	34.00	52.00	Democide of Serbians, Romanians and Russian POWs
273/175	Azerbaijan	1918	1918	4.00			Massacre of Armenians
274/204	Bangladesh	1972	1987	9.00	15.00	20.00	Bangladeshi democide - riots, collaborators, political, Chittagong Hill Tracts
274/216	Bangladesh	1974	1974			4.00	Murders/assassinations by Bangladeshi opposition groups

274/217	Bangladesh	1972	1974	6.00			Murders/assassinations by Bangladeshi opposition groups
274/228	Bolivia	1964	1987	2.00			Caracoles disappeared
266/20	Brazil	1900	1920	25.00			Democide of Brazilians by Amazon rubber companies - 10% assumed to be Brazil's government's responsibility (that is - this number)
274/240	Brazil	1945	1964	40.00	50.00	75.00	Dutra/Vargas democide
275/266	Brazil	1964	1985	53.00	79.00	105.00	Indians killed, and other democide - such as terrorism, Rio dead, Sao Paulo dead, prisoner dead
275/276	Brazil	1900	1930	50.00			Indians killed
275/300	Brazil	1930	1945	30.00	60.00	100.00	Indians killed
218/167	Bulgaria	1944	1987	25.00			Labor camp democide
218/172	Bulgaria	1944	1987	44.00			Other forced labor democide. Estimate is 0.1% of total annual foreign labourers
218/176	Bulgaria	1944	1987	3.30			Prisoner democide. Estimate is 0.5% of the minimum average of non-forced labour prisoners per year
218/186	Bulgaria	1944	1987	100.00	150.00	250.00	Other democide - executions, death sentences and killed
276/326	Bulgaria	1921	1921		0.30		Assassinations
276/328	Bulgaria	1916	1918		19.00		Greeks killed
276/345	Bulgaria	1923	1926	4.00			White terror, executions, killings
277/365	Bulgaria	1943	1943		40.00		Reprisal deaths of Greeks
277/366	Bulgaria	1942	1942	10.00			Reprisal deaths of Yugoslavs
277/389	Burma/Myanmar	1948	1955	2.00	8.00	36.00	Democide in rebellions
277/395	Burma/Myanmar	1948	1955	2.00			Rebel democide
278/426	Burma/Myanmar	1962	1987	11.00	43.00	227.00	Government's democide
278/448	Burma/Myanmar	1962	1987	5.00			Rebel democide
278/454b	Burma/Myanmar	1944	1947	3.00			Democide by the Burma Independence Army
219/240	Burundi	1971	1972	80.00	150.00	300.00	Genocide of Hutus by Tutsi army
220/245	Burundi	1972	1972	2.00	25.00	50.00	Genocide by Hutu rebels
279/464	Burundi	1965	1965	2.50	3.75	5.00	Hutus killed
58/13a	Cambodia	1968	1970	1.00			Democide by Khmer Rouge guerrilla

60/110	Cambodia	1970	1975	71.00	211.00	311.00	Khmer Rouge democide of Vietnamese, purges and other democide
66/391	Cambodia	1979	1987	68.00	230.00	383.00	Killings and democidal famines
66/395	Cambodia	1979	1987	10.00			Rebel democide
67/409	Cambodia	1970	1975	9.00	15.00	21.00	Lon Nol regime democide
67/414	Cambodia	1975	1979	600.00	2000.00	3000.00	Khmer Rouge regime domestic democide
67/415	Cambodia	1975	1979	35.00			Khmer Rouge regime foreign democide in Vietnam
67/416a	Cambodia	1979	1987	10.00			Other guerrilla democide
67/5b	Cambodia	1952	1954	1.00			Democide during Sihanouk period.
67/7a+8a	Cambodia	1967	1970	11.00			Democide during Sihanouk period. Communists killed, and Samlaut Rebellion dead.
281/585	Central African Empire	1966	1979	2.00			Disappearances, demonstrators killed, repression killed, schoolchildren massacre
280/515	Chad	1965	1987	10.00			Communal violence against muslims, and massacres
280/535b	Chad	1960	1987	20.00			Muslims killed in southern Sahara
281/567	Chile	1973	1987	2.00	10.00	30.00	Murders, disappearances, genocide, executions, genocide/politicide
220/273	China	1900	1900	32.00	100.00	250.00	Chinese killed by boxers
china.tab3.a/113	China	1927	1928	50.00	100.00	197.68	Repression, revolutionaries killed, workers killed
china.tab3.a/120	China	1923	1928	12.50	43.45	74.40	Communist massacres/atrocities
china.tab3.a/24	China	1917	1919	6.562	9.312	12.062	Warlords period formative phase - 50% of numbers (high and low, mid is average of those two) on line, as per line 64
china.tab3.a/32	China	1920	1923	10.8	15.8	20.8	Warlord period, balance of power phase - 50% of numbers (high and low, mid is average of those two) on line, as per line 64
china.tab3.a/57	China	1924	1928	21.5	94.75	168	Warlord period, ending phase - 50% of numbers (high and low, mid is average of those two) on line, as per line 64
china.tab3.a/65	China	1928	1928	194.53	198	199	Muslim rebellion dead
china.tab3.a/66	China	1926	1926	70		80	Siege of Sian dead
china.tab4.a/119	China	1929	1937	600.00	850.00	1118.00	Communist democide
china.tab4.a/65	China	1929	1937	250.00	350.00	500.00	Warlord democide

china.tab4.a/88	China	1929	1937	1130.00	1524.00	2258.00	Kuomintang democide
china.tab5.a/116	China	1937	1945	101.70	135.26	203.40	Kuomintang democide
china.tab5.a/122	China	1937	1945	100.00	250.00	500.00	Democide by communists
china.tab5.a/78	China	1937	1944	100.00	110.00	150.00	Democide by warlords
china.tab7.a/130	China	1945	1949	1125.00	2322.00	10000.00	Communist democide
china.tab7.a/84	China	1945	1949	1206.20	2645.10	5394.90	Kuomintang democide
china.tabIIa.1/156	China	1949	1953	750.00	6262.50	20225.10	Democide during totalization(sic) period
china.tabIIa.1/196	China	1954	1958	250.00	5550.00	9287.33	Democide during collectivization and "Great Leap Forward" period
china.tabIIa.1/232	China	1959	1963	3984.50	5680.00	8486.95	Democide during great famine and retrenchment period
china.tabIIa.1/291	China	1964	1968	100.00	400.00	3346.66	Executions 1964-68
china.tabIIa.1/292	China	1966	1975	280.00	1505.00	10500.00	Executions 1966-75
china.tabIIa.1/315	China	1976	1987	18.00	36.00	54.00	Suppression of demonstrations/protests, and executions/killings
china.tabIIa.1/362	China	1950	1987	75.00	375.00	900.00	Minorities, Tibetans killed
china.tabIIa.1/466	China	1954	1958	50.00	1875.00	6466.67	Forced labour
china.tabIIa.1/467	China	1949	1953	85.00	2125.00	7295.83	Forced Labour
china.tabIIa.1/496	China	1959	1963	250.00	5000.00	13350.00	Forced labour
china.tabIIa.1/511	China	1964	1975	240.00	6000.00	21600.00	Labour camp deaths based on annual death rate for cultural revolution years
china.tabIIa.1/538	China	1976	1987	12.00	720.00	4620.00	Forced labour deaths
china.tabIIa.2/551	China	1949	1987	5000.00	7500.00	10000.00	Famine deaths 1949-58 and 1964-87
Dikötter (2010: 325-334)	China	1959	1963	23000.00	45000.00	55000.00	The great famine
281/601	Colombia	1958	1962	2.1	3	6	Political domestic violence
281/610	Colombia	1963	1987	20.00	25.00	30.00	Guerrilla/drug war, using 15%, 20% and 30% of numbers on line, as per line 614
282/628	Colombia	1958	1987	3.00	4.00	5.00	Domestic democide
283/668	Colombia	1948	1958	35.00	70.00	105.00	Democide by the party in power
283/669	Colombia	1948	1958	35.00	70.00	105.00	Democide by the party out of power

283/704	Congo (Brazzaville)	1959	1968	1.00	5.00	15.00	Geno-politicide
176/248	Croatia	1941	1945	242.00	655.00	1088.00	Nazi occupation democide
284/739	Cuba	1952	1959	0.50	1.00	20.00	Domestic democide, terror
284/744	Cuba	1952	1959	0.25	0.50	1.00	Rebel democide
285/788	Cuba	1959	1987	4.00	15.00	33.00	Executions
285/800	Cuba	1959	1987	30.00	51.00	80.00	Boat people who have died trying to cross to the US, assuming 2, 3 or 4 dead for every survivor reported
286/824	Cuba	1959	1969	1.10	5.50	16.50	Prison/camp deaths. Assumed death/kill rate of 9,5%, 1% and 1,5% per year
286/838	Cuba	1970	1979	0.04	0.75	10.00	Political prisoners
286/845	Cuba	1980	1987	0.02	0.40	1.20	Political prisoners
287/867	Cyprus	1977	1987	2.00			Estimate of disappearances and otherwise killed
143/191	Czechoslovakia	1945	1950	68.00	197.00	510.00	Flight/expulsion German dead
287/892	Czechoslovakia	1948	1955	1.2	4	12	Prison/concentration/forced labour camp dead. Numbers based on a yearly death rate of 1%, 2,5% and 5% of numbers on line 891
287/892	Czechoslovakia	1956	1968	0.975	2.6	7.8	Prison/concentration/forced labour camp dead. Numbers based on a yearly death rate of 0,5%, 1% and 2% of numbers on line 891
287/912	Czechoslovakia	1948	1955	12	36	100	Concentration camp inmates/forced labourers. Numbers based on a yearly death rate of 1%, 2,5% and 5% of numbers on line 891
287/912	Czechoslovakia	1956	1968	9.75	23.4	65	Concentration camp inmates/forced labourers. Numbers based on a yearly death rate of 0,5%, 1% and 2% of numbers on line 891
335/3313	Democratic Republic of the Congo	1960	1987	4.00	6.00	10.00	Domestic democide
335/3322	Democratic Republic of the Congo	1964	1964		20.00		Assassinations by rebels

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335/3325	Democratic Republic of the Congo	1977	1977		5.20		Rebel democide
288/932	Dominican Republic	1937	1937	5.00			Haitians killed
296/1349	East Germany	1949	1987	70.00			Estimate of East German democide
288/937	Egypt	1960	1969	5.00			Democide in Yemen
290/1040	El Salvador	1931	1932	10.00	24.00	32.00	Peasant revolt/uprising, massacres
290/1044	El Salvador	1970	1979	1.00			Pre-insurrection democide
290/1071	El Salvador	1979	1984	10.00	12.00	20.00	Government democide during insurrection
291/1079	El Salvador	1979	1987	0.50			Guerrilla democide
291/1116	El Salvador	1984	1987	2.00	3.00	5.00	Domestic democide
292/1141	Equatorial Guinea	1968	1979	40.00	50.00	90.00	Democide in Equatorial Guinea
222/378	Ethiopia	1974	1978	30.00	50.00	100.00	Executions/red terror
222/402	Ethiopia	1984	1985	50.00	100.00	160.00	Killed in settlements
223/407	Ethiopia	1976	1985	50.00			Other killed: peasants massacred, bombing, children dead
223/423	Ethiopia	1974	1987	2.00			Democide by Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Army
223/427	Ethiopia	1974	1987	2.00			Democide by Eritrea
223/437	Ethiopia	1974	1975	6.00	25.00	75.00	Democidal famine
223/421	Ethiopia	1976	1977	0.30			Assassinations by Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Army
224/452	Ethiopia	1984	1985	100.00	500.00	900.00	Democidal famine
225/550	France	1914	1918		2.70		Condemned to death by military courts; posthumously rehabilitated in 1920
226/558	France	1900	1940	200.00			Forced/slave labour dead - excess deaths and killed from forced labour in French colonies
226/565	France	1900	1940	10.00			Killings of non-forced labour throughout French colonial system
227/650	France	1948	1987	10.00			Colonial forced/slave labour dead. Includes so-called contract labour that in effect turned out to be forced. Estimate of excess deaths and killed from forced labour in French colonies

228/652	France	1946	1948	2.00			Colonial forced/slave labour dead
228/655	France	1947	1948	10.00	45.00	80.00	Geno-politicide in Madagascar
228/664	France	1954	1962	100.00			Democide in Algeria
228/667	France	1958	1958		0.08		Tunisians killed
228/669	France	1946	1946	6.00	10.00	20.00	Haiphong killed
228/677	France	1961	1962	13.00			OAS democide
294/1261	France	1944	1946	0.50	1.25	28.00	Democide by government
294/1265	France	1944	1946	5.00			Forced/slave labour dead
295/1275	France	1945	1946	21.00	23.00	25.00	German POWs
293/1185	France (Vichy)	1940	1944	10.00			Democide by Vichy government
293/1189	France (Vichy)	1940	1944	22.00			Democide in colonies
293/1202	France (Vichy)	1940	1944	2.50	5.00	7.00	Democide by resistance
294/1259	France (Vichy)	1944	1946	1.50	3.75	85.00	Democide by resistance, includes private revenge and political killing by communists
283/693	Free state of Congo	1900	1910	25.00			Estimate of excess deaths and killed from forced labour
230/797	Germany	1914	1918	61.00	75.00	102.00	World War I democide
231/811	Germany	1904	1907	32.00	55.25	72.00	Herreros massacred/killed in Namibia
231/816	Germany	1904	1907	16.00	17.00	18.00	Nama and Berg Damara democides
231/832	Germany	1905	1907	50.00			Genocide in Tanganyika (Maji-Maji uprising)
231/834	Germany	1900	1905	10.00			Bushiri killed
Table A/1126	Germany	1941	1945	8678.00	12250.00	19985.00	Jews, gypsies, POWs, forced labour, famine, executions
Table A/1187	Germany	1941	1945	507.00	625.00	831.00	Jews, massacres
Table A/230	Germany	1943	1945		0.20		Jews killed in Albania
Table A/242	Germany	1938	1945	40.00	58.00	65.00	Jews killed in Austria
Table A/245	Germany	1939	1945		65.00		Gypsies killed in Austria
Table A/249	Germany	1938	1945	10.00			Other killings in Austria
Table A/313	Germany	1941	1945	221.00	235.00	324.00	Democide in the Baltics
Table A/342	Germany	1941	1945	35.00	51.00	68.00	Democide in Belgium

Table A/358	Germany	1941	1945	0.00	7.00	14.00	Democide in Bulgaria
Table A/390	Germany	1942	1942		20.00		Kozara killed
Table A/370	Germany	1941	1945	0.00	0.00	8.00	Jews killed in Croatia
Table A/387	Germany	1941	1945	0.00	1.00	2.00	Gypsies killed in Croatia
Table A/447	Germany	1939	1945	155.00	214.00	400.00	Democide in Czechoslovakia
Table A/463	Germany	1939	1945	0.05	0.50	1.50	Jews killed in Denmark
Table A/466	Germany	1940	1945	0.20			Murders in Denmark
Table A/482	Germany	1941	1945	0.00	0.06	0.11	Democide in Finland
Table A/536	Germany	1940	1945	183.00	256.00	500.00	Democide in France
Table A/557	Germany	1939	1945	123.00	160.00	195.00	Jews killed in Germany
Table A/575	Germany	1933	1937	39.15	52.0695	78.3	Repression/terror – non-Jewish, mid is 1/3 higher than low, high is twice the low
Table A/582	Germany	1934	1934	0.77	1.0241	1.54	Repression/terror – non-Jewish, mid is 1/3 higher than low, high is twice the low
Table A/583	Germany	1938	1939	126.3	167.979	252.6	Repression/terror – non-Jewish, mid is 1/3 higher than low, high is twice the low
Table A/598	Germany	1933	1945	62.00	67.00	72.00	Reprisals/law and order (non-Jewish)
Table A/598b	Germany	1933	1945	2.50	55.00	250.00	Homosexuals killed
Table A/599	Germany	1939	1945	70.00	173.00	275.00	Euthanasia
Table A/601	Germany	1945	1945	75.00	88.00	100.00	Miscellaneous dead
Table A/641	Germany	1941	1945	91.00	140.00	525.00	Democide in Greece
Table A/705	Germany	1941	1945	273.00	406.00	586.00	Democide in Hungary
Table A/737	Germany	1943	1945	50.00	64.00	90.00	Democide in Italy
Table A/741	Germany	1939	1945		0.56		Jews killed in Libya
Table A/757	Germany	1940	1945	0.70	2.00	3.00	Jews killed in Luxembourg
Table A/761	Germany	1940	1944		0.20		Gypsies killed in Luxembourg
Table A/822	Germany	1940	1945	131.00	176.00	200.00	Democide in the Netherlands
Table A/840	Germany	1940	1945	0.80	1.50	2.00	Democide in Norway
Table A/894	Germany	1939	1945	3900.00	5400.00	6371.00	Democide in Poland

Table A/956	Germany	1941	1945	54.00	70.00	170.00	Democide in Romania
Table A/963	Germany	1937	1945		21.60		Democide in Spain
Table A/973	Germany	1940	1945	68.00	87.60	107.00	Bombing of the UK and UK POWs
296/1362	Greece	1916	1916	1.00			Royalists killed
296/1364	Greece	1918	1923	15.00			Foreign democide during war with Turkey
297/1412	Greece	1944	1949	2.00			Domestic democide
297/1413	Greece	1944	1952	1.00			Domestic democide
298/1435	Greece	1944	1949	14.00	20.00	25.00	Democide by ELAS guerrillas
298/1444	Grenada	1983	1983	0.11			Demonstrators killed, executions
232/874	Guatemala	1954	1959	60.8	71.1	78.85	Govt. Democide in the 1950s. Based on government's 10-1 ratio - numbers are 80%-90%-95% of totals
232/874	Guatemala	1954	1959	4.15	7.9	15.2	Guerrilla democide in the 1950s
232/891	Guatemala	1960	1969	1.6	5.4	8.55	Govt. Democide in the 1960s. Based on government's 10-1 ratio - numbers are 80%-90%-95% of totals
232/891	Guatemala	1960	1969	0.4	0.6	0.6	Guerrilla democide in the 1960s. Numbers are totals in the line, minus govt. democide - then in reversed order (low being high)
233/912	Guatemala	1970	1979	15.2	20.7	27.55	Government Democide in the 1970s. Based on government's 10-1 ratio - numbers are 80%-90%-95% of totals
233/912	Guatemala	1970	1979	1.45	2.3	3.8	Guerrilla democide in the 1970s. Numbers are totals in the line, minus govt. Democide - then in reversed order (low being high)
233/954	Guatemala	1980	1987	24	34.2	56.05	Government Democide in the 1980s. Based on government's 10-1 ratio - numbers are 80%-90%-95% of totals
233/954	Guatemala	1980	1987	2.95	3.8	6	Guerrilla democide in the 1980s. Numbers are totals in the line minus government democide - then in reversed order (low being high), following Rummel's system
298/1458	Guinea	1969	1976	3.00			Prisoners disappeared
298/1471	Haiti	1957	1986	3.00			Haiti (Duvalier) democide - disappearances, massacres, executions, murders - estimate
299/1481	Honduras	1982	1987	0.15			Domestic democide, disappearances
176/272	Hungary	1941	1945	66.00	78.00	91.00	Hungarian democide in Yugoslavia
234/998	Hungary	1919	1929	330.00	400.00	490.00	White terror killings

235/1007	Hungary	1941	1945	30.00	37.00	43.00	Jewish forced labourers killed by Hungarians
235/1013	Hungary	1941	1944	4.00			Other Jews killed
235/1021	Hungary	1940	1940	1.00			Massacre
235/1035	Hungary	1944	1945	12.00	15.00	20.00	Democide by Arrow Cross/other groups
299/1504	Hungary	1919	1919	5.30			Red terror and Jewish pogroms
299/1517	Hungary	1945	1948	3.00	12.00	21.00	Domestic democide
300/1564	Hungary	1948	1987	26.72			Prisons/camps/dead plus executions
301/1577	Hungary	1956	1956	0.20			Rebel democide
302/1635	India	1947	1948	6.00	36.00	300.00	Indian democide post-partition
303/1712	India	1950	1987	12.00	25.00	63.00	Estimate of democide
304/1728	India	1980	1980		1.00		Bengalis massacred
237/1134	Indonesia	1965	1966	376.00	509.00	821.00	"Coup" triggered massacres
237/1142	Indonesia	1968	1971	5.00			"Other massacres"
237/1146	Indonesia	1983	1984	3.00	4.00	10.00	Anti-"crime" terror
238/1171	Indonesia	1965	1987	13.00	61.00	180.00	Political prisoners killed in Indonesia
239/1232	Indonesia	1975	1987	100.00	150.00	349.00	Population deficit, Timorese starvations, camp death, timorese killings
304/1734	Indonesia	1948	1948		1.00		Indonesian muslims
304/1765	Iran	1978	1979	3.00	4.00	5.00	Killed during protests/demonstrations
304/1770	Iran	1978	1979	3.00	4.00	5.00	Executions, killed during protests, rebellion
304/1772	Iran	1963	1963	6.00			Other killings
306/1858	Iran	1979	1987	35.00	55.00	90.00	Executions, disappearances, politicide, genocide
306/1860	Iran	1980	1987	1.00			Indiscriminate rocketing/shelling of Iraqi cities
241/1354	Iraq	1980	1987	2.00			Indiscriminate bombing/shelling of Iranian cities
241/1362	Iraq	1986	1987	50.00	100.00	200.00	Executions/killed, Disappearances, forcible deportations and additional democide. Removed big numbers from Rummel's dataset, and included only the Al-Anfal campaign. Other democide is removed
307/1916	Iraq	1958	1962	3.00	9.00	15.00	Democide of Kurds
308/1972	Israel	1950	1987	0.50			PLO foreign democide

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308/1973	Israel	1950	1987	0.70			PLO domestic democide
315/2300	Israel	1974	1987	10.00			Israeli democide in Lebanon
242/1411	Italy	1941	1943	10.00	15.00	20.00	Democide during Yugoslavian Occupation
242/1414	Italy	1943	1943		9.00		Greek reprisal
242/1515	Italy	1922	1943	209.00			Democide of Ethiopians/Libyans
243/1421	Italy	1922	1943	0.25			Executions/assassinations/killings
309/1982	Italy	1943	1946	1.00			Died in prison, killed and extrajudicial executions
309/1997	Italy	1943	1946	4.00	10.00	20.00	Fascists killed/massacred
309/2000	Italy	1943	1945	1.00			Terror by Italian fascist bands
310/2023	Japan	1923	1923	3.00	7.00	11.00	Massacre of Koreans in Japan
310/2025	Japan	1918	1920	1			Democide in Siberia
310/2026	Japan	1913			2		Democide of Chinese
310/2027	Japan	1920	1920		3.1		Chientao massacre
310/2028	Japan	1932		1.2			Democide in Manchuria
310/2029	Japan	1931	1937	5			Democide in Manchuria
310/2030	Japan	1919	1920		7.6		Democide in Korea
310/2034	Japan	1900	1900	0.13	0.63	6.25	Foreign democide in Siberia, Chientao, Manchuria and Korea
40/46	Japan	1941	1945		7.41		Australian POWs killed
40/49	Japan	1941	1945		0.27		Canadian POWs killed
40/53	Japan	1940	1945		14.00		French POWs killed
40/63	Japan	1941	1945		30.00		Europeans interned in Indochina
40/68	Japan	1941	1945			0.05	New Zealand POWs and civilians
40/71c	Japan	1941	1945	21.00	25.00	30.00	Dutch internees killed
40/73	Japan	1941	1945		27.26		Filipino POWs killed
40/83	Japan	1941	1945		10.65		US POWs killed
40/86	Japan	1941	1945		12.43		UK POWs killed
40/87	Japan	1941	1945		11.06		UK colonial POWs killed
41/105	Japan	1942	1943	30.00	60.00	100.00	Killed building the Siam railroad
41/116	Japan	1941	1945	200.00	300.00	1430.00	Indonesian forced labourers

41/123	Japan	1939	1945	270.00	378.00	810.00	Korean forced labour
41/128	Japan	1939	1945	100.00	130.00	200.00	Manchurian forced labour
43/224	Japan	1940	1945	42.00	57.00	85.00	Massacres/atrocities in occupied areas
44/250c	Japan	1941	1945	68.00	207.00	575.00	Indo-Chinese killed
45/286b	Japan	1942	1945	75.00			Democide in Indonesia
45/323	Japan	1941	1945	55.00	83.00	100.00	Malayan massacres, executions
45/330	Japan	1937	1945	7.00	16.00	25.00	Democide in Manchuria
46/343	Japan	1941	1945	90.00	119.00	180.00	Democide in the Philippines
46/362	Japan	1941	1945	150.00	200.00	300.00	Democide in Singapore
46/365	Japan	1941	1945		0.59		US civilian victims
46/378	Japan	1945	1945	250.00			Famine in Indochina
46/386	Japan	1937	1945	1578.00	3949.00	6325.00	Democide in China
310/2053	Kenya	1952	1960		1.88		Mau Mau uprising
310/2061	Kenya	1964	1987	0.50			Domestic democide
184/112	Korea, North	1950	1953	129.00			Korean War democide - atrocities/massacres of South Korean civilians
184/120	Korea, North	1950	1953	5.00	8.50	12.00	South Korean POWs killed
184/128	Korea, North	1950	1953	150.00	225.00	300.00	Democide of South Koreans Illegally impressed(sic)/conscripted
184/141	Korea, North	1950	1953	5.00	6.00	6.00	Democide of American POWs
184/146	Korea, North	1950	1953	1.00			Democide of UN military
185/158	Korea, North	1983	1987	0.10			Bombings
185/158	Korea, North	1983	1987	0.03			Bombings
185/163	Korea, North	1948	1987	10.00			Executions of purged in North Korea
185/166	Korea, North	1958	1960	10.00			Democide during open struggle campaign
185/173	Korea, North	1956	1959	25.00			Democide during collective guidance campaign
185/186	Korea, North	1948	1987	71.00	265.00	707.00	Labor concentration camps. Average number per year from 1948-1987 with a 4-year break during the Korean War period. Using an annual death rate of 0.02%, 0.05% and 0.1% on numbers on line 190
185/192	Korea, North	1948	1987	315.00	983.00	2360.00	Corvée and hard labor by those classified "hostile". Using an

							annual average times an annual death rate for 39.33 years. Using an annual death rate of 0.004%, 0.125% and 0.03% of the numbers on line 190
310/2072	Korea, South	1946	1946	0.75	1.50	2.25	Democide during country-wide rebellion
310/2073	Korea, South	1946	1946	0.25	0.50	0.75	Rebel democide
311/2083	Korea, South	1948	1949	1.50	5.00	13.20	Cheju-Do democide
311/2084	Korea, South	1946	1949	1.25	1.50	1.05	Estimate of rebel democide
312/2129	Korea, South	1948	1987	10.00			Overall estimate of domestic democide - Kwangju rebellion, student rebellion, Yosu rebellion
312/2134	Korea, South	1965	1973	3.00			Vietnamese killed
312/2135	Korea, South	1950	1953	3.00			North Koreans killed
313/2216	Laos	1975	1980	5	11.25	18.75	Re-Education/labour camp deaths. Assumed 2.5%, 5%, and 7,5% average annual excess death rate
313/2217	Laos	1981	1987	0.007	0.105	1.4	Re-Education/labour camp deaths. Assumed 1% average annual excess death rate
313/2228	Laos	1975	1980	40.00	43.00	50.00	Domestic democide
314/2253	Laos	1963	1965	18.00	18.00	20.00	Geno-politicide
314/2254	Laos	1960	1975	15.00	20.00	35.00	Executions/killed, includes Meo tribesmen
315/2328	Lebanon	1974	1987	25.00	54.00	98.00	Democide by all Lebanese groups
316/2340	Liberia	1900	1987	10.00			Forced labour dead - mainly in early years
316/2362	Libya	1969	1987	1.00			Libyans assassinated abroad
316/2371	Lithuania		1941		5.00		Jews killed by anti-Soviet partisans
316/2374	Malaysia		1951			2.55	Terror by Malayan communist guerrillas
317/2387	Malaysia	1979	1979		76.00		Boat people killed
190/35	Mexico	1900	1910	30.00			Massacres/executions pre-civil war
191/47	Mexico	1910	1920	280.00	388.00	825.00	Massacres/executions during civil war
191/57	Mexico	1900	1911	15.00	30.00	60.00	Dead or killed during deportation of Yaquis
191/79	Mexico	1900	1911	233.00	825.00	2015.00	Slavery deaths
191/87	Mexico	1900	1911	60.00	144.00	360.00	Conscription deaths
192/113	Mexico	1910	1920	388.00	420.00	550.00	Warlord democide

317/2394	Mexico	1926	1929	5.00			Cristiros killed
317/2408	Mexico	1930	1987	2.00			Massacres and killings
243/1437	Mongolia	1935	1945	2	3	3	Nomonan War/war with Japan
243/1439	Mongolia	1930	1945	10			War/rebellion dead
243/1451	Mongolia	1930	1939	35.00	100.00	200.00	Party purges, South Gobi, executions, population loss, executions
244/1513	Mozambique	1976	1987	125.00			Renamo democide
245/1533	Mozambique	1975	1987	83.00	118.00	250.00	Executions and camp deaths
317/2416	Mozambique	1964	1975	3.00			Frelimo democide
318/2452	Netherlands	1900	1914	10.00			Forced/slave labour dead in Netherlands East and West Indies
318/2454	Netherlands	1946	1946	2.00			Forced/slave labour in Netherlands East and West Indies
320/2543	Nicaragua	1979	1987	4.00	5.00	7.00	Disappearances, executions, Miskito indians and political prisoners
320/2558	Nicaragua	1980	1987	0.50			Democide by Nicaraguan Contras
246/1600	Nigeria	1966	1966	9.00	15.00	50.00	Riots, massacres, pogroms
246/1610	Nigeria	1967	1970	3.00	5.00	10.00	Massacres/atrocities/genocides during civil war
246/1614	Nigeria	1967	1970	5.00			Bombing/shelling
246/1621	Nigeria	1967	1970	250.00	375.00	500.00	Democidal famine
157/31	Pakistan	1958	1971	3.00			Democide by West Pakistan
157/32	Pakistan	1971	1971	300.00	1500.00	3003.00	East Pakistan democide
162/167	Pakistan	1971	1971	50.00	150.00	500.00	Democide by Bengalis
320/2577	Pakistan	1947	1948	6.00	36.00	300.00	Partition democide
320/2578	Pakistan	1949	1956	5.00	25.00	175.00	Additional democide
321/2608	Paraguay	1954	1987	1.50	2.00	4.00	Aché indians killed
266/21	Peru	1900	1920	25.00			Democide of Peruvians by Amazon rubber companies
322/2627	Peru	1900	1911	30.00			Estimate of excess deaths and killed from forced labor and related causes
322/2674	Peru	1980	1987	8.00	10.00	15.00	By military and paramilitary
323/2686a	Peru	1980	1987	2.00	4.00	5.00	Democide by Peruvian Shining Path rebels

324/2730	Philippines	1972	1986	10.00	15.00	25.00	Disappearances, executions, genocide/politicide
324/2739	Philippines	1972	1986	5.00			Communist (NPA) democide
324/2750	Philippines	1899	1905	3.00	13.00	49.00	Rebel democide
141/83	Poland	1945	1950	528.00	1863.00	3724.00	Flight/expulsion German dead
324/2760	Poland	1935	1937	0.08	0.10	0.12	Jews killed
324/2766	Poland	1939	1939	2.00	4.00	6.00	Ethnic Germans killed
325/2776	Poland	1941	1944	1.00			Ukrainians killed
325/2786	Poland	1948	1987	10.00	20.00	50.00	Executions/killed
248/1706	Portugal	1961	1962	20.00	30.00	40.00	Democide by Portugal in Angola
248/1706	Portugal	1961	1975	0.50	1.00	3.00	Democide by Portugal in Angola. Africans/blacks massacred
248/1718	Portugal	1956	1963	10.00			Democide in Angola
249/1733	Portugal	1959	1959	1.25			Other democide, includes East Timor and Guinea Bissau
249/1740	Portugal	1961	1962	5.00	8.00		UPA democide
249/1777	Portugal	1900	1910	200.00			Forced/slave labour dead, and other democide in all colonies
250/1779	Portugal	1906	1906		8.53		Democidal famine
250/1814	Portugal	1910	1926	125.00			Forced/slave labour dead and other democide in all colonies
251/1846	Romania	1941	1943	138.00	218.00	298.00	Jews killed by Romanians
251/1855	Romania	1941	1943	40.00	60.00	100.00	Bessarabia/Bukovina killed
251/1859	Romania	1941	1941	0.17	0.60	1.03	Bucharest killed
251/1863	Romania	1941	1941		24.00		"Elsewhere killed"
252/1878	Romania	1938	1941	1.50			Legionnaires killed
252/1880	Romania	1941	1941		144.00		Odessa murdered
252/1881	Romania	1941	1945		36.00		Gypsies killed
252/1926	Romania	1948	1987	245.00	435.00	920.00	Prisoners/inmates/forced labourers, plus executions
326/2826	Romania	1900	1938	15.00			Peasants killed, pogroms, legionnaires killed, murdered
326/2837	Romania	1941	1941		0.20		Jews massacred
196/47	Russia	1903	1906	1.61			Jewish pogroms
197/105	Russia	1914	1915	64.00	75.00	300.00	Turkish/Kurdish dead
197/55	Russia	1905	1912	0.33	0.35	1.20	"Other massacres"

197/60	Russia	1915	1917	25.00	83.00	140.00	Deportation of Volhynia Germans
197/69	Russia	1900	1917	3.00	6.50	10.50	Executions - based on 18th century executions
197/72	Russia	1903	1903	0.10			Terror campaign - Cossacs vs. Armenians
197/75	Russia	1914	1916		500.00		Turks exterminated
197/98	Russia	1914	1917	280.00	400.00	540.00	World War I POWs
198/113	Russia	1900	1917	5.00			Opposition terrorism
253/1936	Russia	1917	1917		0.40		Provisional government vs. factory-workers and soldiers
253/1938	Russia	1917	1917	14.00	40.00	81.00	World War I POWs
326/283b	Russia	1905	1905	0.10			Armenians killed
326/2842	Russia	1916	1916		9.00		Massacres
334/3247	Russia	1940	1945	70.00	95.00	120.00	Russians slaughtered by Crimean tartars
334/3253	Russia	1941	1944	90.00			Poles and Jews killed by Ukrainian partisans
Ussr.tab2a/102	Russia	1922	1922	4.00	12.00	22.00	Camp/forced labour
Ussr.tab2a/108	Russia	1918	1922	1.00	3.00	9.00	Forced labour camps
Ussr.tab2a/181	Russia	1918	1921	70.00	250.00	650.00	Rebellions
Ussr.tab2a/185	Russia	1921	1922	1000.00	5000.00	7500.00	Famine
Ussr.tab2a/80	Russia	1917	1922	250.00	500.00	3650.00	Red terror
Ussr.tab2a/85	Russia	1918	1918	0.00	1.00	3.00	Camp dead
Ussr.tab2a/88	Russia	1919	1919	0.00	1.00	3.00	Camp dead
Ussr.tab2a/92	Russia	1920	1920	1.00	4.00	7.00	Labour camp
Ussr.tab2a/94	Russia	1921	1921	4	12.00	28.00	Camp dead
Ussr.tab3a/67	Russia	1923	1928	2000.00	2200.00	3000.00	Census based estimates
Ussr.tab4a/216	Russia	1929	1935	677.00	1733.00	3592.00	Collectivization/dekulakization
Ussr.tab4a/217	Russia	1929	1935	985.00	1400.00	2863.00	Deportations
Ussr.tab4a/218	Russia	1929	1935	1566.00	3306.00	6426.00	Camp dead
Ussr.tab4a/219	Russia	1932	1933	3000.00	5000.00	10000.00	Famine
Ussr.tab5a/74	Russia	1936	1938	1508.00	3280.00	8678.00	Camp/forced labour
Ussr.tab5a/8	Russia	1936	1938	36.00	65.00	143.00	Deportations
Ussr.tab5a/93	Russia	1936	1938	500.00	1000.00	2000.00	Executions

Ussr.tab6a/114	Russia	1939	1941	113.00	146.00	349.00	Deportations
Ussr.tab6a/122	Russia	1939	1941	44.00	65.00	86.00	Terror against Poles
Ussr.tab6a/134	Russia	1940	1941	18.00	30.00	65.00	Deportation of Romanian-Bessarabians
Ussr.tab6a/148	Russia	1939	1941	27.00	65.00	172.00	Miscellaneous deportations
Ussr.tab6a/24	Russia	1940	1941	2.00	10.00	65.00	Terror of Estonians
Ussr.tab6a/15	Russia	1940	1941	5.00	8.00	14.00	Deportation of Estonians
Ussr.tab6a/210	Russia	1939	1941	111.00	251.00	480.00	Foreign camp dead
Ussr.tab6a/234	Russia	1939	1941	1000.00	1800.00	1952.00	Terror/purges
Ussr.tab6a/236	Russia	1939	1941	1307.00	2638.00	5795.00	Camp/transit dead
Ussr.tab6a/38	Russia	1940	1941	1.00	3.00	6.00	Deportation of Latvians
Ussr.tab6a/47	Russia	1940	1941	1.00	35.00	64.00	Terror of Latvians
Ussr.tab6a/61	Russia	1940	1941	3.00	6.00	14.00	Deportation of Lithuanians
Ussr.tab6a/67	Russia	1940	1941	1.00	20.00	65.00	Terror of Lithuanians
Ussr.tab6a/77	Russia	1940	1941	14.00	26.00	65.00	Deportation of Bessarabians/Bukovians
Ussr.tab6a/80	Russia	1940	1941	1.00	2.00	2.00	Terror of Bessarabians/Bukovians
Ussr.tab7a/227	Russia	1941	1945	142.00	285.00	775.00	Foreign deportations
Ussr.tab7a/337	Russia	1941	1947	1404.00	2243.00	3435.00	Foreign camp/transit dead
Ussr.tab7a/354	Russia	1941	1945	0.00	731.00	3929.00	Terror/repression
Ussr.tab7a/363	Russia	1942	1945	3.00	4.00	6.00	Deaths in the Baltics
Ussr.tab7a/368	Russia	1944	1944	200.00	266.00	400.00	Democide of Germans
Ussr.tab7a/376	Russia	1941	1944	74.00	96.00	144.00	Democide of Poles
Ussr.tab7a/387	Russia	1941	1945	120.00	160.00	240.00	Democide of other nationals, Bulgarians, Belorussians, Ukraines, Czechs, Hungarians, Koreans, Japanese, Yugoslavs
Ussr.tab7a/398	Russia	1941	1945	337.00	751.00	1134.00	Deportations
Ussr.tab7a/399	Russia	1941	1945	4735.00	8518.00	14440.00	Camp/transit dead
Ussr.tab8a/107	Russia	1944	1953	68.00	103.00	194.00	Bulgarian deportations
Ussr.tab8a/113	Russia	1945	1953	121.00	260.00	441.00	Czech deportations
Ussr.tab8a/119	Russia	1946	1953	271.00	585.00	1287.00	Pole deportations
Ussr.tab8a/124	Russia	1946	1955	18.00	35.00	86.00	Moldovian deportations

Ussr.tab8a/269	Russia	1946	1953	345.00	960.00	1652.00	Foreign camp dead
Ussr.tab8a/273	Russia	1946	1953	334.00	500.00	665.00	Terror and repression
Ussr.tab8a/274	Russia	1946	1953	113.00	228.00	538.00	Deportation of domestic people
Ussr.tab8a/275	Russia	1946	1953	3295.00	11388.00	29032.00	Camp/transit dead
Ussr.tab8a/276	Russia	1946	1953	250.00	333.00	500.00	Famine
Ussr.tab8a/280	Russia	1946	1953	826.00	876.00	926.00	Terror and repression
Ussr.tab8a/72	Russia	1944	1953	63.00	78.00	118.00	Deportation of Baltic nationals
Ussr.tab8a/83	Russia	1946	1953	51.00	65.00	68.00	German deportations
Ussr.tab8a/91	Russia	1946	1953	11.00	23.00	50.00	Hungarian deportations
Ussr.tab8a/99	Russia	1946	1953	103.00	180.00	350.00	Romanian deportations
Ussr.tab9a/16	Russia	1956	1956	4.00	8.00	18.00	Deportation of Hungarians
Ussr.tab9a/25	Russia	1953	1955	300.00	950.00	1290.00	Camp/forced labour dead
Ussr.tab9a/35	Russia	1956	1960	736.00	3083.00	4933.00	Camp/forced labour dead
Ussr.tab9a/43	Russia	1961	1970	400.00	1600.00	3920.00	Camp/forced labour dead
Ussr.tab9a/60	Russia	1970	1982	130.00	780.00	1456.00	Forced labour/prisons/camp deaths
Ussr.tab9a/69	Russia	1983	1987	25.00	200.00	350.00	Camp/forced labour dead
Ussr.tab9a/82	Russia	1979	1987	100	250	500	Terror/repression - Afghans
326/2864	Rwanda	1962	1964	10.00	15.00	20.00	Genocide of Tutsi by Hutu
221/336	Somalia	1958	1959	23.00	48.00	75.00	Democidal Tigre famine
221/347	Somalia	1973	1974	25.00	100.00	300.00	Democidal Tigre/Wollo famine
327/2896	South Africa	1934	1987	6.00			Estimated domestic democide
327/2900	South Africa	1934	1987	3.00			Foreign democide in Angola and Namibia
254/1998	Spain	1934	1934	1.50			Asturias killed
254/2009	Spain	1936	1939	25.00	100.00	300.00	Democide during civil war
254/2017	Spain	1936	1939	25.00	100.00	200.00	Democide by nationalists
256/2079b	Spain	1939	1975	210.00	275.00	300.00	Post-civil war domestic democide by nationalists -- prisons/concentration camps + executed/dead in or out of prison camps
328/2950	Sri Lanka	1983	1987	2.00	4.00	10.00	Domestic democide

328/2965a	Sri Lanka		1986	0.50	1.00	2.00	Democide by Sri Lankan Tamils
257/2140	Sudan	1956	1972	94.00	494.00	744.00	Domestic democide
257/2148	Sudan	1980	1987	22.00	133.00	250.00	Calculated democide based on democide done in 1955-72
257/2169	Sudan	1956	1987	12.00			Anya-Nya guerrilla democide - equals about 10 per week
315/2304	Syria	1974	1987	5.00			Syrian democide in Lebanon
330/3038	Syria	1980	1982	2.69	14.00	27.00	Domestic democide
330/3050	Syria	1979	1982	2.00			Prisoners killed
330/3073c	Syria	1970	1987	1.00			Estimate of Syrian terrorists
331/3087	Thailand	1976	1976	0.10			Domestic democide - demonstrators
331/3104	Thailand	1976	1987	8.20			Foreign democide of Cambodian, Laotian refugees plus boat people
331/3126	Turkey	1909	1909		1.00		Democide by Abdul Hamid's Partisans
332/3148	Turkey	1971	1983	2.00			Estimate of political prisoners dying/killed in prison and extrajudicial executions
332/3152	Turkey	1971	1983	3.00			Estimate of foreign democide in Cyprus
332/3167	Turkey	1971	1983	6.00			Turkish terrorist killing
90/71b	Turkey	1909	1914	5.00			Christian democide
92/189	Turkey	1915	1918	300.00	1404.00	2686.00	Genocide of Armenians
92/198	Turkey	1914	1918	60.00	68.00	75.00	Genocide of Greeks
92/204	Turkey	1915	1918	16.00			Greeks killed
93/208	Turkey	1914	1917	102.00			Christian democide
93/208i	Turkey	1914	1918	160.00	163.00	169.00	Democidal famine
93/228	Turkey	1918	1918	50.00	75.00	100.00	Foreign genocide of Armenians
93/229	Turkey	1915	1915	7.00	8.00	9.00	Foreign genocide of Armenians
93/239	Turkey	1915	1915	45.00			Nestorians killed
93/240	Turkey	1915	1918	1.80	2.00	2.20	Nestorians killed
93/244	Turkey	1915	1915		0.80		Azerbaijanis killed
96/420	Turkey	1920	1922	127.00	175.00	243.00	Armenian genocide
98/485b	Turkey	1919	1923	538.00	703.00	913.00	Kemal nationalist democide

259/2230	Uganda	1977	1977	1.00			Tanzanians killed
259/2240	Uganda	1971	1979	100.00	300.00	500.00	Domestic democide
260/2299	Uganda	1979	1987	80.00	255.00	505.00	Democidal famine, massacres, genocide
260/2300	Uganda	1979	1987	25.00	50.00	100.00	Rebel democide
333/3220	Uganda	1966	1971		2.00		Baganda massacres
333/3203	Ukraine	1918	1921	27.00	40.00	60.00	Executions and Jewish pogroms
263/2477	United Kingdom	1972	1972		0.13		Demonstrators killed
264/2481	United Kingdom	1900	1900		0.03		Foreign democide in China
264/2482	United Kingdom	1927	1927		0.03		Chinese killed
264/2485	United Kingdom	1914	1919	125.00	203.00	350.00	German civilians dead due to economic blockade of Germany
264/2486	United Kingdom	1914	1919	36.00	75.00	163.00	Austria-Hungarian civilians dead due to economic blockade of central powers
264/2487	United Kingdom	1914	1918	40.00	56.00	88.00	Levant civilians dead due to economic blockade of central powers
264/2495	United Kingdom	1919	1919	0.38	1.00	1.50	Amritsar massacre
264/2497	United Kingdom	1945	1945	1.00			Greeks killed
264/2499	United Kingdom	1948	1956	5.00	12.50	20.00	Geno-politicide in Malaysia
264/2501	United Kingdom	1919	1919		0.05		Arabs killed in Palestine
265/235	United Kingdom	1900	1963	5.00			Forced slave labour dead in Kenya
265/2530	United Kingdom	1901	1902	31.00	37.00	43.00	Democide during the Boer war
265/2532	United Kingdom	1940	1945	307.00	424.00	608.00	World War II European urban bombing
334/3233	Uruguay	1973	1984	0.30			Disappearances, political deaths
126/592	USA	1960	1972	0.50	1.00	5.00	Bombing/shelling by the United States
126/601	USA	1965	1970	1.00	1.50	1.50	US massacres/atrocities in Vietnam
127/607	USA	1961	1970	0.50	1.00	2.00	Defoliation, gas, herbicides
127/610	USA	1965	1972	2.00			Unestimated residual, Individual unit atrocities assumed near 25 a month
208/89	USA	1899	1905	25.00	128.00	487.00	Executions of POWs and camp deaths
209/97	USA	1900	1900	0.13	0.63	6.25	Boxer rebellion

210/148	USA	1943	1945	225.00	337.00	855.00	Indiscriminate bombing of Japan
211/216	USA	1942	1945	16.00	32.00	59.00	Indiscriminate bombing of Germany
211/222	USA	1942	1945	1.00	4.00	7.00	Indiscriminate bombing of Romanian and Hungarian cities
211/228	USA	1945	1945	3.00	3.00	3.00	German POWs
212/260	USA	1900	1987	1.00	2.00	4.00	Lynchings/vigilante executions/Ku Klux Klan victims - extrapolation based on reports from 1882 to 1951, then multiplied by 88
67/412	USA	1970	1973	3.00	60.00	200.00	US democide in Cambodia
121/275	Vietnam	1945	1947	10.00	15.00	20.00	Anti-Nationalist terror
122/329	Vietnam	1953	1956	195.00	363.00	865.00	"Land Reform" dead, Political struggle/repression, suppression of uprisings
122/336	Vietnam	1945	1956	24.00			Imprisonment/forced labour dead. Assuming 100,000 imprisoned/forced labourers with an unnatural death rate of at least 2 per year over 12 years
122/362	Vietnam	1945	1956	13.00			Foreign democide, mostly of French POWs
122/372	Vietnam	1957	1975	25.00	50.00	75.00	Democide by North Vietnam/Vietcong 1954-1975.
123/428	Vietnam	1954	1975	19.00	66.00	113.00	Officials/civilians Assassinated/executed/killed in South Vietnam by North Vietnamese - based on extrapolated figures
124/448	Vietnam	1968	1968	5	6	7	Tet/Hue democide
124/451	Vietnam	1970	1975	1			North Vietnam/Vietcong democide in Cambodia
124/454	Vietnam	1975	1975	25	50	100	Refugees killed
124/456	Vietnam	1961	1965		0.126		Saigon killed
124/459	Vietnam	?	1973			1.307	South Vietnam POWs dead
124/464	Vietnam	1954	1975	50.00			Unestimated democide assumed as at least 200 a month
124/481	Vietnam	1955	1963	9.00	24.00	50.00	Relocation/resettled dead
125/494	Vietnam	1954	1963	2.00	4.00	20.00	Arrested/detained deaths
125/515	Vietnam	1954	1963	5.00	10.00	90.00	Executed/terror
125/518	Vietnam	1954	1963	0.60	1.50	7.00	Bombing/shelling
125/540	Vietnam	1963	1975	1.00	5.00	19.00	Forced relocation deaths by South Vietnam post Diem regimes
126/556	Vietnam	1964	1975	1.00	5.00	50.00	Arrested/detained prisoner deaths by South Vietnam post-Diem

							regimes
126/563	Vietnam	1963	1975	30.00			Executions/terror
126/566	Vietnam	1963	1975	4.00	6.00	14.00	Deaths due to bombing/shelling
126/569	Vietnam	1969	1969		4.70		Other massacres
126/576	Vietnam	1970	1973	1.00			South Vietnam democide in Cambodia
128/669(673)	Vietnam	1975	1980	22.5	90	225	"Re-education" camps - assuming 2.5%, 5% and 7.5% of unnatural death rate from total camp population
128/670(673)	Vietnam	1980	1987	3.5	5.25	0.7	"Re-education" camps - assuming 1% of unnatural death rate from total camp population
128/684(687)	Vietnam	1975	1980	11.25	30	120	Forced labourers. Assuming 0.75%, 1% and 2% death rate for first 6 years
128/684(687)	Vietnam	1981	1988	8.75	17.5	35	Forced labourers. Assuming 0.5%death rate for last 7 years
128/698	Vietnam	1975	1987	50.00	100.00	250.00	Executions/killed, exclusive of those executed in "re-education" camps
129/753	Vietnam	1975	1987	33.00	250.00	934.00	Dead at sea while fleeing
129/759	Vietnam	1979	1987	80.00	87.00	100.00	Vietnamese democide in Laos
66/392	Vietnam	1979	1987	137.00	460.00	767.00	Vietnamese democide in Cambodia
334/3276	Yemen Arab Republic	1962	1987	2.50			Executions, killings, murders, disappearances
335/3297	Yemen People's Republic	1967	1987	1.00			Disappearances, executions. Estimate
172/53	Yugoslavia	1941	1944	50	100	150	Partisan democide - Russian émigrés and Slovenes erased
172/66	Yugoslavia	1944	1946	300.00	500.00	700.00	Tito government democide (after July 1944) - "anti-communists," opponents, and "collaborators" killed
172/71	Yugoslavia	1944		50	70	100	Belgrade killed
172/75	Yugoslavia	1948	1950	2			Cominformists killed
173/117	Yugoslavia	1945	1955	2.75	23.5	123.75	Forced labor camp/prison. 25%, 50% and 75% of numbers on line, as per note on line 119
173/118	Yugoslavia	1956	1965	0.75	7	30.75	Forced labor camp/prison 25%, 50% and 75% of numbers on line, as per note on line 119
173/125	Yugoslavia	1945	1948	55	75	85	German ethnics killed

173/136	Yugoslavia	1944	1945	47.2	63	76	German POWs killed. Numbers are 80%, 90% and 95% of numbers of line, as per notes on line 137
173/140	Yugoslavia	1944	1945	5			Italians killed
173/96	Yugoslavia	1945	1946	100	300	975	Croatians killed
174//174	Yugoslavia	1944	1945	300	500	750	Wartime democide in Yugoslavia
174/149	Yugoslavia	1944	1960	3.00	4.00	5.00	Muslims/Albanians killed in Yugoslavia
174/153	Yugoslavia	1944	1945	10			Chetniks killed
174/160	Yugoslavia	1945	1945	7	10	15	Trieste and Vicinity occupation killed
174/165	Yugoslavia	1944	?	2.2			Partisans/priests/nuns executed
174/185	Yugoslavia	1941	1945	50	100	500	Chetnik war-time democide
176/245	Yugoslavia	1941	1945	242	655	1088	Croatian (Ustashi) democide against Jews, Serbs, Gypsies and concentration camps
336/3335	Zanzibar	1964	1964	3.00	8.00	13.00	Massacres