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Segregation in Oslo

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Abstract

In the first part of this study, a statistical analysis of segregation in Oslo is carried out on the basis of Massey and Denton's 1988 segregation indices. While earlier studies have made use of one of five of Massey and Denton's indices to study segregation in Norway, I perform the analysis using the complete measure and conclude that there exists a moderate degree of segregation among some immigrant groups in Oslo. Moreover, I highlight the conceptual, operational, and methodological shortcomings of prior state-sponsored research in this direction. In the second part of this study, I review sociological frameworks on "race" as a socially constructed analytic category and reiterate calls to interrogate Norwegian *colorblindness* in the context of the institutional denial of historical and contemporary Norwegian colonialism and imperialism, as well as current structural racism in Norwegian society. Finally, I offer arguments and suggestions for the development of the study of *racialization* in Norway from a statistically informed perspective.

Abstrakt

I den første delen av denne studien gjennomfører jeg en statistisk analyse av segregering i Oslo på grunnlag av Massey og Dentons segregeringsindekser fra 1988. Mens tidligere studier har benyttet seg av ett av fem av Massey og Dentons indekser for å studere segregering i Norge, utfører jeg analysen ved å bruke den fullstendige målingen og konkluderer med at det finnes en moderat grad av segregering blant noen innvandregrupper i Oslo. Videre fremhever jeg de konseptuelle, operasjonelle og metodologiske manglene ved tidligere statsstøttet forskning i denne retningen. I den andre delen av denne studien gjennomgår jeg sosiologiske rammer om "race" som en sosialt konstruert analytisk kategori og gjentar oppfordringer til å avhøre norsk *colorblindness* i sammenheng med den institusjonelle fornektelsen av historisk og moderne norsk kolonialisme og imperialism, samt nåværende strukturell rasisme i det norske samfunnet. Til slutt tilbyr jeg argumenter og forslag for utviklingen av studiet av *racialization* i Norge fra et statistisk informert perspektiv.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

The primary focus of this study is the analysis of segregation in Oslo using an established statistical model not yet implemented in the Norwegian setting. Although earlier studies have employed the use of evenness measures to explore segregation in Oslo, this document highlights some of their theoretical and methodological shortcomings.

Part one of the study is a quantitative analysis of segregation using Massey and Denton's 1988 segregation index developed to measure racial residential segregation in US metropolitan areas.¹ I use this index to measure and determine the degree of segregation of immigrants from 1) Asian countries (hereafter "Asians"), 2) African countries (hereafter "Africans"), and 3) Central and South American countries (hereafter "Americans") in Oslo.² This analysis is carried out when the majority group is defined as: 1) those with no immigration background (hereafter "Norwegians"), 2) Norwegians and immigrants from Nordic countries (hereafter "Nords"), and 3) Norwegians, Nords, and immigrants from Western European countries (hereafter "Western Europeans").

In the second part, I argue that the aforementioned theoretical shortcomings of prior research arise from inherent discursive limitations imposed by an institutional and societal post-racial ideology. The existence of "race" as a socially constructed analytic category is denied on an ontological level, hampering the reproducibility of established statistical tools and undermining the study of race and racism in Norway. I therefore present a brief overview of racial frameworks in sociology and discuss their application to the Norwegian context.

1.1 Background - Academic Divergences

The divergence between the US and European sociological discourse has led to a seemingly irreconcilable divide. While in both settings *race* as both a concept and a word have been associated with Lamarckian pseudo-scientific racism, in the US setting, *race* has been reclaimed and situated as a social fact,³ while it has maintained its exclusively pseudo-scientific connotation in the European setting and is typically avoided.

This is perhaps no more apparent than in the Norwegian context, where *rase* translates as *breed* and refers exclusively to species and subspecies of non-human animals.⁴ In cases where reference to *race* in the reclaimed context is unavoidable, the tendency has been code-switching or infrequently *folkeslag*. While I have observed the candid use of *race* in academic and/or progressive circles in US settings, the code-switched *race* is almost always accompanied with a hushed, bashful tone in the Norwegian context, as if the very notion of *race* as an appropriate discursive category were highly taboo, and subject to a cognitive dissonance: it is impossible

¹Douglas S. Massey and Nancy A. Denton, "The Dimensions of Residential Segregation," *Social Forces* 67, no. 2 (December 1988): 281-315, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2579183>; Douglas S. Massey and Nancy A. Denton, "Hypersegregation in U.S. Metropolitan Areas: Black and Hispanic Segregation Along Five Dimensions," *Demography* 26, no. 3 (August 1989): 373-391, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2061599>; Douglas S. Massey and Nancy A. Denton, *American Apartheid: Segregation and the Making of the Underclass* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1993).

²Unless otherwise stated, "immigrants" refers to first-generation immigrants and their children, subject to the limitation inherent to the SSB data set employed, as discussed later in this document.

³Michael Omi and Howard Winant, *Racial Formation in the United States: From the 1960s to the 1980s*, (New York: Routledge, 2015), 110, 115-117, 119-122.

⁴*Store Norske Leksikon*, s.v. "Rase - Historisk Bruk" by Brøgger, Anton, et al., last modified on November 19, 2018. https://snl.no/rase_-_historisk_bruk.

to talk about racism without referring to the *races* that comprise the *race system* that organizes racism, but simultaneously doing so is at odds with the “post-racial” narrative of an allegedly egalitarian society.

This phenomenon is even more widespread among non-academic progressive circles in Norway in this author’s experience, where *race* is regarded as anathema and is almost always rejected. While this represents a positive and earnest desire among progressives to challenge the racist underpinnings of *race*, I argue that it is ultimately and paradoxically harmful, as it prohibits productive anti-racist discourse. While (correctly) denying the legitimacy of pseudo-scientific *race* as a biological fact, in practice this historical revisionism also denies the legitimacy of *race* as a social fact. Actors intuitively understand that there exists a very real racial hierarchy (e.g. *racism*, and thereby a *race system*); after all, there exist very *real* material disparities between people;⁵ yet, *class* does not fully encapsulate the very real gradations of oppression among the totality of oppressed peoples (and to wit: what is then a *peoples*?). Actors intuitively understand that they are “white”, or “Black”, or “Asian”, and so on; yet, at the same time, they understand that these categorizations are not truly biological and therefore tend to argue that they could not constitute *races*, and certainly not *raser*.

On the other hand, there are indications that the issue isn’t merely limited to a US-European academic divide either. After all, critics argue that Islamophobia cannot be considered “racism” because “technically”, Islam is not a race.⁶ Nor is “Arabic”, nor “Slavic”, nor “Hispanic”, and so on. Yet Arabo-, Slavo-, and Hispano-phobia are clearly manifestations of racism, to say nothing of antiziganism, anti-Semitism, or the historical and contemporary oppression of the Sámi people by the Norwegian state, for that matter. These racisms should not be understood as racisms of a fundamentally different character, as if they were modern or ad hoc forms of discrimination that are incomparable to e.g. anti-Black racism. After all, these racisms all come replete with pseudo-scientific (and at core Lamarckian) narratives about *inherited and inheritable* characteristics, regardless of whether or not “biology” is re-termed as “culture”, because the notion of inheritable cultural traits is simply Lamarckian biological essentialism by another name.

The only distinction is the degree to which the underlying biological essentialism is explicitly acknowledged: whether it is powerfully ingrained and reinforced by more apparent physical markers (like the continued legacy of “Caucasoid”⁷), obscured when biological narratives take the backseat to linguistic markers (like “Arab” or “non-white Hispanic”), or hotly contested in an uncomfortable middle-ground (e.g. is it anti-Semitic to point out that the matrilinear Israeli definition of a “Jew” is nearly identical to antebellum *partus sequitur ventrem* slavery laws?;⁸ or that the line of critical inquiry initiated by David Ben Gurion’s 1948 comparison of involuntary

⁵Both in terms of superficial physical markers, but more importantly in terms of the inequalities that arise from the social exploitation of these physical markers.

⁶Richard Dawkins, Twitter, April 4, 2013, <https://twitter.com/richarddawkins/status/319793343150297088>.

⁷e.g. *Caucasian*.

⁸See, e.g. Kathleen M. Brown, *Good Wives, Nasty Wenches, and Anxious Patriarchs: Gender, Race, and Power in Colonial Virginia*, (Williamsburg, Virginia: University of North Carolina Press, 1996).

Ethiopian Jewish immigration to Israel to the Atlantic slave trade⁹ invites the concerning and striking resemblance of the legal inequality between *Ashkenazim*, *Sephardim*, and *Mizrahim* to slavery-era American *casta*?; who or what has agency in defining who is a “Jew”?).

A number of solutions have inconsistently and sometimes informally arisen: the humorously begrudging use of the code-switched *race* is one; *folkeslag* is another. Another less vocal (although no less influential, as I will later argue) suggestion is afforded by the Stalinist definition of *nations*.¹⁰ Interrogate as I may, this is a question I have frequently found myself ill-equipped to answer; invariably I am met with the perhaps reasonable allegation that my efforts are informed by a cultural imperialism that serves only to unwittingly impose the standards of a deeply problematic national origin on more allegedly egalitarian European settings. Is the invocation of *race* a regression, or does its denial enable colorblind racism?

An all too typical situation has manifested in the face of these questions: while academics engage (or disengage with hand-waving arguments), *innvandrere* has more or less become the colloquial replacement word for what US sociologists might call the *racialized subject*.¹¹

1.2 Background - Post-Race?

Before its eclipse in the news cycle, a national controversy began brewing in January 2020, as the far-right Progress Party (FrP) resigned from the coalition government over its decision to repatriate a 29-year-old woman with alleged ties to the Islamic State. The incident temporarily rekindled a seemingly perennial debate on the legal status of the *hijab*. While a 2018 study found that 66% of Norwegians were either positive or neutral towards the use of the *hijab* on the streets, 44% were opposed to its use in the workplace, 53% opposed its use by teachers, and fully two-thirds opposed its use by police officers.¹² In this context, the typical “leftist” rationalization that *hijab* opposition is a feminist critique is brought into question, and one may speculate as to the underlying beliefs



Figure 1.1: “If Norwegians are replaced with Africans and Asians, it stands to reason that we will have African and Asian conditions. It is not the weather, land, nor potatoes that makes Norway a good country, but that we are GOOD PEOPLE.”

⁹Joseph Massad, “Zionism’s Internal Others: Israel and the Oriental Jews,” *Journal of Palestine Studies* 25, no. 4 (Summer 1996): 53-68, <https://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2538006>.

¹⁰Joseph Stalin, “Marxism and the National Question,” *Prosveshcheniye*, no. 3-5 (March-May 1913), <https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1913/03.htm>; Omi and Winant, *Racial Formation in the United States*, 90.

¹¹Kåre Vassenden, *Innvandrere i Norge: Hvem er de, hva gjør de og hvordan lever de?*, (Statistics Norway, 1997): 235.

¹²Jan-Paul Brekke and Ferdinand A. Mohn, *Holdninger til innvandring og integrering in Norge: Integreringsbarometeret 2018*, (Oslo, Norway: Institutt for Samfunnsforskning, 2018), 79.

about the “acceptable” roles that Muslim women play in Norwegian society.¹³

A less cynical interpretation is offered by the thesis that “leftist” parties and politicians support immigration-hostile policies for purely pragmatic reasons related to labor fluidity and geopolitical interests. I find such explanations far more plausible than conspiracies about crypto-reactionary tendencies among the parliamentary “left”, but the ambiguity of covert political motivations makes “leftist” parliamentary discourse a somewhat unwieldy object of study in understanding racial attitudes among typical Norwegians. A more convincing starting point is the deconstruction of the white nationalist “Great Replacement” conspiracy theory that has permeated the paradigmatic social discourse. It is not necessary to be a neo-Nazi to subscribe to myths about “inherent” differences between peoples; it is a testament to the efficacy and danger of fascist propaganda that one may more readily do so when no reference to “race” is necessary—only “culture,” “language,” or “religion”.



Figure 1.2: This author, 6, sipping Solo in a bunad at a syttende mai tog in New York.

The degree to which proto-fascist conspiracies have been normalized must not be understated. In January 2018, *Studentersamfundet*, NTNU’s student society, invited known racist and fascist sympathizer Hans Jørgen “Lysglimt” Johansen to speak at its venue. The event was attended by nearly a thousand people; a motion to cancel the event was soundly outvoted.¹⁴ In the following months, hundreds of stickers bearing chauvinistic propaganda appeared around the city, as in Figure 1.1. Another sticker read “Europeans account for less than 10% of the world’s population. We are the minorities.” Another simply bore the slogan “This is not Africa” in English. They were commonly observed adjacent to stickers sold by the neo-Nazi website, *Frihetskamp*.

The point of this digression is as follows: while most would be repulsed by the idea of racism (going as far as to be repulsed by the very notion of *human races*), and while most are opposed to the ideology of fascist movements, it has become possible to lubricate racist ideologies by appropriating fascist Great Replacement theories substituted by a number of allegedly non-racial factors via the catchall of “immigrants”. How then, when “normal” people talk about “cultural incompatibilities” of immigrants, do they reconcile this author (pictured in Figure 1.2): a white person born and raised in the US, who speaks fluent Norwegian and was baptized at the Norwegian Seamen’s Church, but is for all intents and purposes an “*innvandrer*”? Yes, like all

¹³See Thomas Hylland Eriksen, “Immigration and national identity in Norway,” (Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2013) for an interesting, if brief, discussion on this.

¹⁴Christine Scheffe and Espen Rasmussen, “Forsøkte å stoppe debatt på Samfundet,” *Adressavisen*, January 21, 2018, <https://www.adressa.no/nyheter/trondheim/2018/01/21/Forsokte-a-stoppe-debatt-pa-Samfundet-15943887.ece>.

Norwegian citizens, I am also “*tross alt norsk*” despite my immigration status, but when “Lysglimt” talks about the problems of immigrants during his Trump endorsement at *Samfundet*, and when “normal” people speak (potentially sympathetically) about the tensions of multiculturalism borne by immigration, they clearly do not mean me!

Who benefits from the assertion of a “post-racial” society? Do we still need “race”? In lieu of an answer, I offer another question: In the desert, do we still need “thirst”?

1.3 Outline of Thesis

The first main research question I seek to answer in this thesis is “Are any minority groups segregated in Oslo?”, which I partially resolve by means of quantitative analysis. From this follows “If so, which? To what degree? How does it compare with other cases of segregation?”

The second research question is “What *is* a minority group?” or in other words “Is Norway a post-racial society; if so, how are so-called minority groups categorically distinguishable from ‘races’ in the US usage of the term?” Fundamentally, this grapples with the underlying and much thornier question of “Do we still need ‘race’?”

Chapter 2 is an overview of sociological frameworks, primarily US theories. Chapter 3 provides the technical details of the quantitative portion of the study (Section 3.2) as well the operationalization choices made and the reasoning behind them (Section 3.3). Chapter 4 is divided into four sections: Section 4.1 contains the results of the study, while Section 4.2 includes a discussion on its limitations. Section 4.3 compares the findings with that of prior research. Section 4.4 is a more exhaustive discussion regarding sociological theories on race and racism in Norway, including an argument and call for a more critical and direct treatment of racism in Norway. Finally, Chapter 5 not only summarizes the document, but also includes a non-exhaustive list of future research projects that immediately result from this one.

Chapter 2: Theory

The range of frameworks offered by US sociology is so broad that it is almost overwhelming. By contrast, Norwegian literature on the topic is somewhat sparse. I therefore offer a limited selection of what I deem the most useful frameworks in US sociology, then compare them with the present discourse in Norwegian sociology.

2.1 US Theories

Bar none, Omi and Winant's framework has become the most widely accepted standard for US sociology on race and racism, although I nonetheless claim that its significance, while representing a major advance in US sociology, has been vastly overstated, suffers serious conceptual limitations, and often serves to marginalize alternative theories on the basis of ideological preference rather than merit. Omi and Winant's most significant contribution is perhaps not their *racial formation theory*, but rather the critique of the pre-existing sociological paradigms from which it is borne, which I review following Omi and Winant here, followed immediately by critiques of racial formation theory.

According to Omi and Winant, **ethnicity theory** "is an approach to race that affords primacy to cultural variables," which laid the groundwork for establishing the notion of race as a social construct.¹ This approach to race typically conflates "ethnicity" with *culture, lifestyle, and religion* and has been criticized for its inherent bias towards legitimizing ideas as "assimilation, cultural pluralism, diversity, and multiculturalism" (one in which the "Faustian bargain" of inclusion for the sake of deracination is similar to the bankrupt racial ideology of the Norwegian state),² Ethnicity theory is a highly individualistic theory wherein group membership is determined entirely by personal lifestyle decisions. Proposals for addressing societal racism borne of this tradition typically amount to intense assimilation policies.

In terms of **economic theories**, I offer a caveat: Omi and Winant make no distinction between "class-based theories" and what I refer to in this space as "economic theories", conflating the two as "Marxism". Since I believe they offer an extremely simplified and flawed account of the Marxist position on race and racism, I separate the two and focus on what Omi and Winant refer to as the *market relations approach* and *stratification theory*. Omi and Winant adapt Stuart Hill's definition of "class theories" as those in which "social divisions which assume a distinctively racial or ethnic character can be attributed or explained principally by reference to economic structures and processes."³ For Omi and Winant, class-based theories on race span a diverse range of political and philosophical positions. This includes any and all theories that focus on economic factors without necessarily making explicit reference to class struggle. These theories tend to take a slightly idealist perspective and have been criticized by several sociologists for reducing race as an analytic category to class. Typical solutions to racism within this perspective

¹Omi and Winant, *Racial Formation*, 21.

²*Ibid.* 22-23.

³Stuart Hall, "Race, Articulation, and Societies Structured in Dominance," in Marion O'Callaghan, *Sociological Theories: Race and Colonialism* (Paris: UNESCO, 1980), 306, quoted in *Ibid.*, 53.

include reparations, legal intervention, and Black entrepreneurship.

Nation-based theories are rooted in European imperialist notions of *peoplehood*, first and foremost *white nationalism*, but later in opposition to it as well. These theories offer explanatory power in tracing the racialization and de-racialization of immigrant groups in the US in response to crises arising from immigration, US foreign policies regarding Latin America, and Pacific imperialist projects. The advantage of nation-based theories is their ability to describe diverse processes of racialization: (de-)racialization of trafficked Irish, Mexican citizenship in annexed Southwestern territories, Asian immigration in the late 19th century, etc.⁴ Omi and Winant describe a “re-appropriation” of this historically imperialist paradigm by people of color, where “the experience of collectivity and solidarity along racial lines and the sense of collective identity” served as “key dimensions of national liberation and anticolonial struggles.”⁵ In summary, these theories tend to reduce race to an essential category. They are useful in that they treat race as a dynamic process and create progressive spaces for identity-based solidarity, but ultimately replace one taken-for-granted category (“race”) for another (“peoplehood”).⁶

2.1.1 Racial Formation Theory

Racial formation is “the sociohistorical process by which racial identities are created, lived out, transformed, and destroyed,” where race is defined as “a concept that signifies and symbolizes social conflicts and interests by referring to different types of human bodies.”⁷ The main theses of this approach are:⁸

1. *Racialization*, the process by which the physical dimensions of human bodies acquire social meaning (i.e. are *socially constructed*), is “the extension of racial meaning to a previously racially unclassified relationship, social practice, or group.”
2. *Racial projects* are “interpretation[s], representation[s], or explanation[s] of racial identities and meanings [and] effort[s] to organize and distribute resources... along particular racial lines.” Racial projects are *racist* if they “create[] or reproduce[] structures of domination based on racial significations.”
3. Finally, racial rule and resistance may be categorized as:
 - *Racial despotism*, “the norm against which all U.S. politics must be measured,” (!) which has been the historically dominant framework of US policy, instrumental in establishing “American” identity as white, “rendering racial division [as] the fundamental schism in U.S. society,” and as a result “consolidat[ing] oppositional racial consciousness and organization.”
 - *Racial democracy*, where “structures and practices are rooted in significant consent from less-powerful racial groups and hegemonic control over those groups by powerful racial groups.” For Omi and Winant, the “contemporary state [is the] facilitator of racial democracy and mediator of racial conflict.”⁹

⁴Omi and Winant, *Racial Formation*, 75-80.

⁵*Ibid.* 81.

⁶*Ibid.* 95.

⁷*Ibid.* 109-110.

⁸*Ibid.* 109, 111, 125, 128, 130-131.

⁹Joe Feagin and Sean Elias, “Rethinking Racial Formation Theory: A Systemic Racism Critique,” *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 36, no. 6 (June 2013): 931-960. Note that Omi and Winant never explicitly define “racial democracy”, but rather imply that it resembles a hegemonic equilibrium attainable only through the state apparatus.

- *Racial hegemony*, a transition state between racial despotism and democracy. In 1994, Omi and Winant claim that the US has become a racial democracy but also that “without question, there has been significant progress toward racial democracy.”¹⁰ More recently, they now claim that the contemporary US racial hegemony is *colorblindness*.¹¹

While Omi and Winant initially posited that the US has experienced a “dramatic transition from a racial dictatorship to a racial democracy,”¹² they appear to have backpedaled in their third edition¹³ and now claim that the US is a racial democracy with some racial despotic features, where

refusal of slavery, resistance to colonialism, noncompliance with racial domination, fidelity to oppositional cultural traditions and alternative concepts of group and individual identity, and belief in racial solidarity [have been] central passions underlying emancipatory and democratic politics

in the past half-century.¹⁴ The presidential election of Barack Obama is cited as one of the most significant factors leading to this alleged racial democracy. The racial hegemony of “colorblindness” is “not disparaged... in every way,” as the authors “note its aspirational qualities and potential for rearticulation.”¹⁵

This document lacks the space to itemize the vast collection of empirical counter-evidence that Omi and Winant deliberately overlook, ignore, or cite while failing to truly acknowledge.¹⁶ Feagin and Elias, offering a critique of Omi and Winant’s theory, are summarily dismissed in a footnote by the latter, claiming that if

one is prepared to argue that there has been no transformation of the U.S. racial order in the past several decades... [it] risks dismissing the political agency of people of color.¹⁷

Yet, this is precisely what empirical studies of racial inequality have concluded—that there has indeed been no (systemic) transformation of the US racial order in the past several decades! I conjecture that Omi and Winant find such a perspective impermissible because their framework lacks the ability to conceive of racial progress outside the pluralist traditions of Robert Dahl and its narrow dependence on paternalistic liberal democracy. This is the bias that compels Omi and Winant to make such audacious claims as “there is nothing inherently white about racism,”¹⁸ or that people of color can advance racist projects.¹⁹ To emphasize: Omi and Winant earnestly advance the notion that there is such a thing as “reverse racism”!

¹⁰Omi and Winant, *Racial Formation*, 1994: 66, 157, quoted in Feagin and Elias, “Rethinking Racial Formation Theory”.

¹¹Omi and Winant (2015), 132.

¹²Omi and Winant, *Racial Formation*, 1994, 66 as quoted in Feagin and Elias, *ibid*.

¹³And, notably, fail to refer to the critiques of their work that led to this repositioning.

¹⁴Omi and Winant (2015), 147.

¹⁵*Ibid.* ix.

¹⁶As a starting point, I refer the reader to Michelle Alexander’s *The New Jim Crow*, Douglas Blackmon’s *Slavery by Another Name*, and various studies on the schools-to-prison pipeline. Despite citing all of these, Omi and Winant seem to deliberately ignore theories that characterize a specific mode of production under neoliberalism innately linked to its racial ideology. The connection between economic and racial ideology is a theme that the authors only appear to pay lip service to.

¹⁷*Ibid.* 130.

¹⁸Omi and Winant (1994), 72.

¹⁹Omi and Winant (2015), 130.

2.1.2 Systemic Racism and its Critique of Racial Formation Theory

This is the crux of Feagin and Elias' 2013 critique. While acknowledging the major advance that racial formation theory represents, Feagin and Elias offer *systemic racism theory* as an alternative: that *systemic racism*, the

large-scale and inescapable hierarchical system of US racial oppression... devised and maintained by whites and directed at people of colour [is] *foundational* to and deeply ingrained in US history and [is operational].²⁰

According to Feagin and Elias, this “include[s]:

1. the many exploitative and discriminatory practices perpetrated by whites;
2. the unjustly gained resources and power for whites institutionalized in the still-dominant racial hierarchy;
3. the maintenance of major material and other resource inequalities by white-controlled and well-institutionalized social reputation mechanisms; and
4. the many racial prejudices, stereotypes, images, narratives, emotions, interpretations and narratives of the dominant ‘white racial frame’ designed to rationalize and implement persisting racial oppression.”²¹

In summary, they criticize racial formation theory for “fail[ing] to provide a detailed and substantial discussion of the continuing hierarchical organization and power differences among US racial groups” and “focus[ing on] racial meanings over racial structures.”²² In contrast to Omi and Winant, Feagin and Elias offer a “more complex meaning[] of ‘whites’... [that] considers multiraciality and the struggles between *self-chosen* identity and socially *imposed* racial identity.”²³ Unlike racial formation theory, systemic racism theory maintains that racist projects are not exclusively the domain of the state, but are to a much larger degree facilitated by non-state actors, reinforced by the foundation of centuries-old structures and ideologies.

2.1.3 Marxist Theories

While I endorse systemic racism theory's critique of racial formation theory, I argue that its approach is nonetheless ahistorical. Race and racism are objectively rooted in imperialism and ultimately in class struggle;²⁴ or, as Barbara Jean Fields points out, “the chief business of slavery [wasn't] the production of white supremacy, [but] rather... the production of cotton, sugar, rice and tobacco.”²⁵

²⁰Feagin and Elias, “Rethinking Racial Formation Theory”, 936. Emphasis original.

²¹*Ibid.* 937.

²²*Ibid.* 945.

²³*Ibid.* 956. Emphasis original.

²⁴A more explicit basis for this claim has been written (but unpublished) by this author in 2016. However, a substantial amount of empirical investigations of this claim have been carried out by others. See the following footnote and/or Blackmon's *Slavery by Another Name*. Kathleen Brown's *Good Wives, Nasty Wenches, and Anxious Patriarchs*, 110-112 also contains a brief discussion on early European-African interactions.

²⁵Barbara Jean Fields, “Slavery, Race, And Ideology in the United States of America,” *New Left Review* 181 (1990): 99.

Even when its critics attempt to present it disparagingly or with a semi-ironic air, it is hard to dismiss Marxist theories on race. Many of the criticisms I have reviewed have been exceptionally emotionally charged²⁶ or have summarily dismissed it for not fitting into the authors' framework or hypotheses.²⁷ To reduce Marxist theories on race to the definition of "class-based" theories offered by Stuart Hill is to allege that *all* class-based theories posit that social divisions result from economic structures and processes. This could not be further from the truth, as Marx is clear on the fact that economic structures and processes are the result of social divisions and not vice-versa when expanding on the base-superstructure relation in his *Critique of Political Economy*.²⁸ The Marxist approach is largely absent from Omi and Winant's treatment of class-based theories (where, for the most part, only the work of liberal positivists is reviewed),²⁹ and it is not until later that it is explained that in Marxist approaches,

racism was understood as a form of "false consciousness," an ideology and practice utilized by the capitalist class to sow discontent among workers, to create artificial divisions within the working class, and prevent the emergence of unified class-consciousness and organization.³⁰

Bonilla-Silva picks up this rather shallow review:

Racism, in [the Marxists'] accounts, is an ideology that emerged with chattel slavery and other forms of class oppression to justify the exploitation of people of color and survives as a residue of the past... Marxists believe that racism developed in the sixteenth century and has been used since then by capitalists or workers to further their own class interests.³¹

Snark and all, these critiques merely orbit the Marxist position, best represented by the Black Nation Thesis, sometimes referred to more generically as the *internal colonialism* perspective. Although often unaccredited, this position is in earnest informed by Stalin's definition of the *nation*: "a historically constituted, stable community of people, formed on the basis of a common language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in a common culture."³²

2.2 Norwegian Theories

As the topic is systematically stymied in professional debates, pedagogical and sociological researchers publish report after report identifying grave shortcomings in primary and secondary

²⁶Eduardo Bonilla-Silva, "The Essential Social Fact Of Race," *American Sociological Review* 64, no.6 (1999): 905.

²⁷Omi and Winant (2015), x, 65-69, 90-91, 110, 179.

²⁸Karl Marx, *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, (1859; Moscow, USSR: Progress Publishers, 1977; Marxists.org), [marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1859/critique-pol-economy/preface.htm](https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1859/critique-pol-economy/preface.htm).

²⁹Milton Friedman, e.g. is *obviously* not a Marxist. Nor are Joseph Stiglitz, Paul Krugman, Jeffrey Sachs, or Gary Becker! It is this author's position is that referring to e.g. Michael Reich as representative of any "Marxist position" is ignorant, dishonest, or ultimately both. Omi and Winant appear to have confused "Marxist" to mean "any economist" and this is clear in the extremely discriminatory sanctioning they engage with when they determine whose work "counts" in sociology. For instance, W.E.B. Du Bois, C.L.R. James, Malcolm X, Kimberlé Crenshaw, bell hooks and Derrick Bell, or god forbid Joseph Stalin, Mao Zedong, Vladimir Lenin, Huey Newton, and Assata Shakur are never mentioned when introducing the Marxist position (or ever at all)!

³⁰Omi and Winant (2015), x.

³¹Bonilla-Silva, "Rethinking Racism."

³²Joseph Stalin, "Marxism and the National Question," *Prosveshcheniye*, nos. 3-5, (March-May 1913), <https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1913/03a.htm>.

school curricula regarding racism, replete with an alarming lack of discursive tools to discuss racism at all. These reports are published against a backlash of teachers and technocrats who have blatantly refused to take responsibility for their special civic duty to address racism in the spaces they warden and respond indignantly at the suggestion of the mere existence of racism on a societal and institutional level. A “conscious effort by numerous Norwegian academics and public intellectuals” has been made “to restrict [the meaning of race].”³³

In 2018, Osler and Lindquist concluded that “there is a near-total silence regarding concepts like race and racism,” to a point where teachers are “deprived [of] important concepts for dealing with problems of cultural and structural inequalities.”³⁴ In response and contrast to a Norwegian exceptionalism of the “because Norway has not been a colonial power, postcolonial perspectives have not been paid particular attention”³⁵ variety, the authors argue that race as a socially constructed concept can “challenge a national self-portrait of innocent colonialism and historical racism and acknowledge Norwegian participation in colonialism as well.”³⁶ The need to “create a national identity” that treats “homogeneity as ideal,” along with measures to “make the various minority groups ‘Norwegian,’” with the “education system complicit in denying and devaluing Sámi culture and language throughout the 1970s”³⁷ are, *at best*, elements of an ethnicity-based racial ideology associated with conservative racists in the contemporary US discourse. At worst, they are more akin to the pre-WWII white nationalist movements preminent to progressive insurgent nationalisms.

Students interviewed by Osler and Lindquist “lacked a language to discuss inequality in general [!] and racism and race-based injustice in particular... When asked to exemplify racism in schools, an example of discrimination on the basis of gender and sexual orientation” was given instead.³⁸ In fact, when it comes to other forms of inequality like sexual orientation, schools tend to “reinforce the traditional family structure by replacing heterosexual parents with a homosexual [sic] couple,”³⁹ underscoring a general default prerogative for assimilation to resolve tensions arising from inequality.

Osler and Lindquist’s calls to interrogate the systematic suppression of “race” and to displace the ambiguous dog-whistles of “ethnicity” and “culture” have been echoed by a multitude of Norwegian researchers.⁴⁰ That it has become difficult (some claim *near-impossible*) for

³³Sindre Bangstad, “The racism that dares not speak its name: Rethinking neonationalism and neo-racism,” *Intersections: East European Journal of Society and Politics* 1, no. 1, 49-65, quoted in Audrey Osler and Hein Lindquist, “Rase og etnisitet, to begreper vi må snakke mer om,” *Norsk Pedagogisk Tidsskrift* 102, no. 1 (2018): 26-37.

³⁴Osler and Lindquist, “Rase og etnisitet.” This author’s translation.

³⁵Jon Rogstad and Arnfinn Midtbøen, *Rasisme og diskriminering: Begreper, kontroverser og nye perspektiver*, (Oslo: Norges Forskningsråd, 2009), cited in *Ibid.* 27.

³⁶Osler and Lindquist, “Rase og etnisitet,” 27-28, this author’s translation; Stina Helena Bang Svendsen, “Learning racism in the absence of ‘race,’” *European Journal of Women’s Studies* 21, no. 1, (February 2014): 9-24, cited in *Ibid.*, 28.

³⁷*Ibid.* 27. This author’s translation.

³⁸*Ibid.*, 33-34. This author’s translation.

³⁹Åse Røthing and Stina Helena Bang Svendsen, “Homotolerance and heterosexuality as Norwegian values,” *Journal of LGBT Youth* 7, no. 2 (2010) 147-166, cited in *Ibid.* 34; Åse Røthing and Stina Helena Bang Svendsen, “Sexuality in Norwegian textbooks: constructing and controlling ethnic borders?” *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 34, no. 11 (2011), 1953-1973, cited in *Ibid.*, 34.

⁴⁰Osler and Lindquist, “Rase og etnisitet.”; Fiona Dowling, “‘Rase’ og etnisitet? Det kan ikke jeg si noe særlig om - her er det ‘Blenda-hvitt’!”, *Norsk Pedagogisk Tidsskrift* 101 no. 3 (2017), 252-265; Cora Alexa Døving, “Dolezals rase - uten en dråpe blod:

Norwegians to engage in a fruitful public debate about racism is well-documented.⁴¹ Despite the *de facto* state of the Norwegian discourse, the call to interrogate “race” and its erasure has not remained unanswered, nor is it a necessarily novel one. According to the Norwegian People’s Aid,

Many do not wish to use the word racism. They call it everyday-racism [*hverdagsrasisme*], inequality... Call it what you will, but the studies cited show that there exists discrimination on the basis of culture, ethnicity and skin color in Norway today. That is Norwegian racism [*rasisme på norsk*].⁴²

Further, it is claimed that “racism was originally a position based on the idea that people can be divided into ‘races’ of different value,” but that “today, racism [describes] ideas that ascribe traits to people based on culture and religion, i.e. not only ‘race’.”⁴³ Yet, the ascription of traits to people on the basis of culture and religion is hardly a modern variant of racism. Such discrimination is not only just as pseudo-scientific as the early Lamarckism from which it springs, but is in fact a crucial dimension of its original form! I argue that the only substantial development of racism from its earlier forms has been the (re-)emphasis of cultural and religious dimensions. More broadly speaking, *race* is and has always been a *composite* category consisting of several characteristics of which skin color is only one. As Døving puts it,

race functions as a categorical concept that is tied to experiences, historical consciousness, appearance, discrimination, privileges, cultural values, pride or inferiority—that is to say that “race” has sociological, structural, political, identitarian, cultural, and not least emotional dimensions.⁴⁴

Døving quotes anthropologist and historian Ann Stoler to underscore this point:

Biology is... only a small part of how race has been defined. We’ve assumed that early racism, the real racism, the hard racism is a biological racism and that we’ve moved to a new racism, which is cultural racism. This is a totally erroneous notion of how race has developed as a category. From the very get go... it has always been about... the cultural competencies that were displayed or not...⁴⁵

Om rase som folkelig og analytisk kategori”, *Sosiologisk Tidsskrift* 24, no.4 (2016), 327-348; Sindre Bangstad, “Rasebegreps fortid og nå”, *Norsk sosiologisk tidsskrift* 3, no. 1 (2017), 233-251; Arnfinn Midtbøen and Jon Rogstad, “Den utdannede, den etterlatte og den drepte: mot en ny forståelse av rasisme og diskriminering”, *Sosiologisk tidsskrift* 1, no. 18 (2010), 31-52. **NB, pace:** Not all of these authors necessarily endorse this call! However, wherever they do not, they indicate a need to at the very least question the foundational concept of “race” and “racialization” in Norway.

⁴¹Frode Helland, “Rasisme uten rasister i Norge”, *Agora* 14, no. 3-4 (2010), 107-143.

⁴²“Det finnes ikke rasisme i Norge”, *Fordommer.no*, accessed February 29, 2020, <http://fordommer.no/Fordommer/Mytene/Det-finnes-ikke-rasisme-i-Norge>. This author’s translation.

⁴³*Ibid.* This author’s translation.

⁴⁴Døving, “Dolezal’s Race”, 328. This author’s translation.

⁴⁵*Ibid.* 340.

Chapter 3: Data and Methods

3.1 Overview of Prior Norwegian Studies

To this author's knowledge, only two statistical studies of segregation in Norwegian urban areas have been carried out in the past two decades. The first is Blom's 2012 study of segregation in Oslo for the period 1988-2011.¹ The second is Kornstad et al.'s 2018 SSB report on residential segregation in major Norwegian population centers for the period 2005-2017.² Blom finds that "residential segregation in Oslo for persons with non-Western country backgrounds has not increased in the 2000s," but that "in an international context, segregation in Oslo is moderate."³ While Kornstad et al. find a decline in segregation when considering all immigration groups for 21 municipalities on average, persons with non-Western country backgrounds remained moderately segregated nationally.⁴ Both studies support earlier findings that segregation has tended to decline and that there exist no so-called "ghettos" in Oslo.⁵

First, both studies exclusively use a *dissimilarity* measure to support their findings.⁶ While this is certainly the most established measure used in prior studies, its exclusive use as an indicator of segregation has been criticized by Massey and Denton in a paper that both studies cite when introducing it.⁷ Second, both studies define the "majority group" as those with no immigration background, which understates segregation, as all immigrants in Norway are thereby treated as a monolith.⁸ Even with the most conservative operationalization—e.g. "culture"—one would be hard-pressed to argue that immigrants from e.g. Sweden experience comparable cultural obstacles as those from e.g. Somalia. Not only is this a departure from the established literature,⁹ but also from established SSB precedent.¹⁰

Finally, both studies collapse the finer basic statistical units available for urban centers into geographically larger, coarser units. For instance, a total of 615 statistical units are defined in Oslo as of 2020.¹¹ Kornstad et al., however, opt to use 98 coarser units for their study of Oslo, despite the availability of finer units. Moreover, the findings are obscured in two major ways. First, only the *contribution* to the *national* dissimilarity index from each *urban area* is reported, i.e. the findings reflect a "national average" of segregation over multiple major urban areas, obscuring potential segregation in individual cities. Second, only the *rate of change* of

¹Svein Blom, "Etnisk segregasjon i Oslo over to tiår," *Tidsskrift for velferdsforskning* 15, no. 4 (2012), 275-291.

²Tom Kornstad, Terje Skjærpen, and Lasse Sigbjørn Stambøl, "Utviklingen i bostedssegregering i utvalgte store og sentrale kommuner etter 2005," (Oslo: Statistics Norway, 2018).

³Blom, *ibid.*

⁴Kornstad, et al., *ibid.*

⁵Svein Blom, "Innvandrere og bokonsentrasjon i Oslo", *Statistics Norway* 32 (1995); Svein Blom, "Innvandrerens bosetningsmønster i Oslo", *Social and Economic Studies* 107, (2002).

⁶Note that this is identical to what Massey and Denton (as well as this document) refer to as the "evenness" measure.

⁷Massey and Denton, "The Dimensions of Residential Segregation".

⁸It should be noted that Blom *does not* include immigrants from Western Europe in this category, but instead defines these persons in a third category that is neither "minority" nor "majority".

⁹Massey and Denton, *ibid*; Otis Dudley Duncan and Beverly Duncan, "A Methodological Analysis of Segregation Indexes," *American Sociological Review* 20, no. 2, (April 1955): 210-217; George C. Galster, "On the Measurement of Metropolitan Decentralization of Blacks and Whites," *Urban Studies* 21 (1984): 465-470.

¹⁰See e.g. data series "12272: Children from linguistic and cultural minorities".

¹¹Since 2005, there have been some minor changes to the statistical units. Nonetheless, there have been well over 500 basic statistical units defined for Oslo for the past 2 decades.

this national dissimilarity index is reported explicitly, i.e. the authors focus only on relative segregation over time, rather than absolute realities.

As Blom points out, “the finer the overall area is divided, the higher the values [of] the dissimilarity index... because potential inequalities between the areas within smaller subordinate areas are captured with a finer division and are ‘overlooked’ with a coarser ‘sieve’.”¹² Blom also argues that the use of coarser units is justified because they more closely match the population sizes of those in Massey and Denton’s study. In terms of absolute parity, this is correct; measured in proportions, the units Blom endorses are 20 orders of magnitude greater than those used in Massey and Denton’s study.

3.2 Segregation Index

Massey and Denton offer five dimensions of geographic variation:¹³

- **Evenness (D)**: “degree to which the percentage of minority members within residential areas equals the citywide minority percentage.”
- **Exposure (P)**: “degree of... contact between minority and majority members.”
- **Clustering (SP)**: “extent to which minority areas adjoin one another in space.”
- **Centralization (CE)**: “degree to which minority members are settled in and around the center of an urban area, usually defined as the central business district.”
- **Concentration (CO)**: “relative amount of space occupied by a minority group.”

Evenness is given by

$$D = \sum_{i=1}^n \frac{t_i |p_i - P|}{2TP(1-P)}, \quad (3.1)$$

where t_i is the total population of tract i , p_i is the *proportion* of minorities in tract i relative to t_i , T is the total population of the city, P is the *proportion* of minorities in the city relative to T , and n is the number of districts.

Exposure is given by

$$P = \sum_{i=1}^n \left[\frac{x_i}{X} \right] \left[\frac{x_i}{t_i} \right], \quad (3.2)$$

where X is the total minority population of the city and t_i and x_i are the total and minority populations of district i .

Clustering is given by

$$SP = \frac{XP_{xx} + YP_{yy}}{TP_{tt}}, \quad (3.3)$$

where

$$P_{xx} = \sum_{i=1}^n \sum_{j=1}^n \frac{x_i x_j c_{ij}}{X^2} \quad (3.4)$$

is the average proximity between group X members, Y is the number of group Y members in the city, x_i and y_i are the numbers of group X and Y members in urban district i respectively, and

¹²Blom, *ibid.* This author’s translation.

¹³Douglas S. Massey and Nancy A. Denton, “Hypersegregation in U.S. Metropolitan Areas”; Massey and Denton, “The Dimensions of Residential Segregation.”

$c_{ij} = \exp(-d^{ij})$ is the distance function between districts i and j , where d^{ij} is the linear distance between the centroids of districts i and j .

Centralization is given by

$$CE = \left(\sum_{i=1}^n X_{i-1} A_i \right) - \left(\sum_{i=1}^n X_i A_{i-1} \right) \quad (3.5)$$

where the n districts are ordered by increasing distance from the central business district (CBD) and X_i and A_i are the cumulative proportions of the population of group X and the cumulative proportion of the land area of district i , respectively.

Rather than computing centroid distances directly with geospatial data, I use the estimation $d^{ij} \approx 0.6a_i \times 5$, where a_i is the area of tract i , as in Massey and Denton's original study.¹⁴ Had I used geospatial data to calculate the centroid position of the tracts, the result would reflect *all* land area within the tract, including non-residential areas (nature reserves, water areas, commercial and industrial zoning, etc.). Instead, I use the land area of *residential inhabited areas* for each tract when using a_i to estimate distances between tracts. By contrast, I compute exact linear distances to order tracts by distance to the CBD. The reason for this is that exact distances more accurately represent proximity rankings, while the estimate allows for an allowance of error arising from the inhomogeneity of overall tract populations. Note moreover that I manually define the CBD as the "Sentrum" tract (more will be said about this choice in Section 4.2).

Finally, **concentration** is given by

$$CO = \frac{\left[\sum_{i=1}^n \frac{x_i a_i}{X} / \sum_{i=1}^n \frac{y_i a_i}{Y} \right] - 1}{\left[\sum_{i=1}^{n_1} \frac{t_i a_i}{T_1} / \sum_{i=n_2}^n \frac{t_i a_i}{T_2} \right] - 1} \quad (3.6)$$

where the districts are ordered by ascending area, a_i is the area of district i , n_1 is the rank of the district where the cumulative total population of districts equals the total minority population of the city summed by ascending area, n_2 is the rank of the district where the cumulative total population of districts equals the minority population summed by descending area, T_1 is the total population of districts from $i = 1$ to $i = n_1$, T_2 is the total population of districts from $i = n_2$ to $i = n$, t_i is the total population of district i , and X is the number of group X members in the city.

Massey and Denton define a group as **hypersegregated** if it scores 60 or greater on at least 4 indices, where each index is scaled from 0 to 100.¹⁵ There is an obvious issue with this standard, best understood by a simple thought exercise. Suppose a group scores 100% on three measures, e.g. evenness, clustering, and concentration, with the other measures at 0%. This situation would be realized if every member of a minority group in the metropolitan area were confined to a single apartment building. Since each member of this group would have a neighbor from the majority

¹⁴Massey and Denton, "Hypersegregation in U.S. Metropolitan Areas."

¹⁵In their original 1989 article, Massey and Denton use a slightly more complex and stringent criteria for *hypersegregation*: a (D) index ≥ 0.600 , a (P) index ≥ 0.700 , a (SP) index ≥ 0.600 , a (CE) ≥ 0.800 , and a (CO) index ≥ 0.700 .

group and because the building were located close to the CBD, the group would be “merely” segregated, but not hypersegregated! Given this definition, Massey and Denton conclude that no other group is as segregated as Blacks in all US metropolitan areas considered.

Reproducibility is undermined when a “high” index score is defined in terms of what is considered high for one particular culturally and nationally specific group. Not even this outlines the scope of the problem. The cutoff limits do not appear to be informed by any statistical measures, and do not even seem to correspond with national averages for Blacks in the US. In principle, the most rigorous definition must be given in terms of statistical quantities, e.g. one standard deviation above the average of national averages for *all* minority groups. Another alternative is to lower the threshold for hypersegregation either in terms of scores or amounts of indices.¹⁶ At the least, taking seriously the severe implications that *any* degree of segregation has for a group¹⁷ demands a definition of *moderate* or *high* segregation in addition to *hypersegregation*.

To this end, I propose the following definitions. A group is said to be *moderately segregated* (*highly segregated*) if it scores higher than 30 (60) on at least three indices. This definition of moderate segregation has already been established by prior literature. Since a value of 60 for a *single* index would be considered high segregation by prior Norwegian literature, stipulating a score of 60 on *three* indices ought to suffice.

3.3 Operationalization

3.3.1 Demographic Operationalization

In 2019, no persons were categorized as “stateless” or “unknown” in Oslo. In 2019, “North American” immigrants comprised 1.26% of the Oslo population, while “Oceanian” immigrants comprised roughly 0.29% of the Oslo population. Given the exceptional diversity of North America, the category is too ambiguous; I conjecture that respondents are just as likely to identify with the “Western European” category than not; the data make no distinction of respondents’ racial or national backgrounds pre-immigration. Given the small size of the “Oceania” population, the data are likely to have been altered to ‘0’ or ‘3’ by SSB to preserve anonymity. Therefore, I have chosen to study the following groups: 1) Asians, 2) Africans, and 3) Americans, as defined in Table 3.1 on Page 18.

First, I use the classification system employed by SSB series 12610 to define the majority group as “Norwegians”. Next, I extend the definition of “majority group” to include “Nords” as defined by SSB series 05752.¹⁸ Finally, in a third analysis, I extend the majority group to include “Western Europeans” as defined by SSB series 05752.¹⁹ Finally, I treat the three minority

¹⁶If, for instance, hypersegregation is defined as one index scoring above 60% and two indices scoring over 80%, the number of cities in which Blacks are hypersegregated jumps from *at least* 16 to *at least* 24, while the number of metropolitan areas in which Hispanics are hypersegregated increases from 0 to *at least* 4.

¹⁷Otherwise, are we then to believe that so-called *barrios* are less underserved than so-called *ghettos*? And if earnestly so, is the claim seriously that the degree to which they are makes their study of lesser imperative?

¹⁸Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Sweden, Greenland, and Faroe Islands

¹⁹This includes universally recognized European countries with the exception of the SSB classification of the following “Eastern European” countries: Albania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Belarus, Croatia, Latvia, Poland, Romania, Lithuania, Moldova, Russia, Slovenia,

groups as a composite category and carry out the same computations for the three definitions of the “majority group”.

As alluded to earlier in this document, some shortcomings and ambiguities persist in the operationalization and definition of “minority groups”, “ethnic groups”, and the feasibility of constructing composite response categories consisting of immigrants and Norwegians born to immigrant parents across several country backgrounds. In theory, the most rigorous solution to this dilemma involves carrying out a principal component analysis across each individual group, which will be addressed later in this document.

3.3.2 Geospatial Operationalization

Initially, geodata from kart.ssb.no was used to calculate tract area. However, as can be seen in Figure 3.1 on Page 19, the tract definitions are not well-suited for this computation. In particular, roughly half the area that defines the Frogner, Gamle Oslo, and Nordstrand tracts are comprised of water areas. Three of the measures depend heavily on explicit geographic data: clustering, centralization, and concentration. While clustering is moderately affected by these anomalies, centralization and concentration, which essentially measure population densities, were suspected to be vastly understated using the geospatial classification of tracts. This is especially likely given that 25%, 12%, and 28% of all Asians, Africans, and Americans in Oslo live within these tracts, respectively. The effect of this was informally confirmed by manually halving the calculated area of the tracts, wherein both the centralization and concentration measures increased in magnitude by an order between 10 and 20. Therefore, SSB series 09594 was used to identify the *residential* land area of each tract, a variable more appropriate for this analysis.


Finally, in calculating the clustering, centralization, and concentration indices, the “Marka” tract was removed since it is discontinuous, leading to complications in calculating land area, but more importantly in calculating distances to the CBD. Given the low population of this tract, its removal is expected to be negligible.

The script used to calculate the indices is written in Python and can be found at the following link: <https://github.com/conorak/HyperSeg>.

Ukraine, Hungary, Bosnia-Herzegovina, North Macedonia, Slovakia, Czech Republic, Serbia, Montenegro, and Kosovo.

Country Grouping	Countries
Norway	Norway
EU/EEA	Denmark, Greenland, Finland, Faroe Islands, Iceland, Sweden, Belgium, Bulgaria, Andorra, Estonia, France, Gibraltar, Greece, Ireland, Croatia, Italy, Latvia, Malta, Netherlands, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Monaco, Poland, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Lithuania, Spain, United Kingdom, Switzerland, Germany, Slovenia, Hungary, Austria, Vatican City State, Slovakia, Czech Republic
European Countries outside the EU	Albania, Belarus, Moldova, Russia, Ukraine, Bosnia-Herzegovina, North Macedonia, Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo, Guernsey, Jersey, Isle of Man
Africa	Algeria, Angola, Botswana, Saint Helena, British Indian Ocean Territory, Burundi, Comoros, Benin, Equatorial Guinea, Côte d'Ivoire, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Egypt, Djibouti, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Kenya, Congo-Brazzaville, Congo, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Morocco, Western Sahara, Mauritania, Mauritius, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Mozambique, Mayotte, Réunion, Zimbabwe, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Central African Republic, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Eswatini, South Africa, Tanzania, Chad, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia, Burkina Faso
Asia with Turkey	Turkey, Afghanistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Brunei, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, United Arab Emirates, Philippines, Georgia, Taiwan, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Iran, Israel, Japan, Jordan, Cambodia, Kazakhstan, China, North Korea, South Korea, Kuwait, Cyprus, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Lebanon, Macao, Malaysia, Maldives, Mongolia, Oman, Palestine, Nepal, Pakistan, Timor-Leste, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Syria, Thailand, Vietnam, Yemen
North America	Canada, United States
South and Central America	United States Virgin Islands, Barbados, Antigua and Barbuda, Belize, Bahamas, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Grenada, Guadeloupe, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Martinique, Mexico, Montserrat, Aruba, Sint Maarten, Bonaire, Sint Eustatius and Saba, Anguilla, Curaçao, Nicaragua, Panama, El Salvador, Saint Pierre and Miquelon, Saint Kitts og Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Trinidad and Tobago, Turks and Caicos Islands, Puerto Rico, Saint Martin, Saint Barthélemy, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Guyana, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Falkland Islands, French Guiana, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay, Venezuela
Oceania	American Samoa, Australia, Solomon Islands, Christmas Island, Cocos (Keeling) Islands, Cook Islands, Fiji, Vanuatu, Tonga, French Polynesia, Kiribati, Tuvalu, Guam, Nauru, United States Minor Outlying Islands, New Zealand, Niue, Norfolk Island, Federated States of Micronesia, Papua New Guinea, Pitcairn, Tokelau, Samoa, Wallis and Futuna Islands, New Caledonia, Marshall Islands, Palau, Northern Mariana Islands
Stateless	–
Unknown	–

Table 3.1: *Categorization of country backgrounds pursuant to SSB “Country grouping Continents 2011-12 - variant of Country and citizenship in population statistics 2011-12”.*



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Figure 3.1: Urban districts statistical tracts in Oslo as defined by SSB. Of note are tracts 030101, 030105, and 030114: Gamle Oslo, Frogner, and Nordstrand, respectively, where it can be clearly seen that roughly half of the tract includes water areas.

Chapter 4: Analysis

Regardless of how the majority group is defined, Asians were found to be moderately segregated. While Africans were not found to be segregated using the definitions introduced in Section 3.2, the group consistently scored above the cutoff on clustering and centralization, while scores on evenness and concentration were arbitrarily close to the cutoff. Americans were not found to be segregated; only clustering surpassed the cutoff for this group, while the other measures remained low.

Section 4.1 provides a more detailed overview of the results of the analysis. In Section 4.2, I discuss the limitations of my findings and propose a manner in which future studies may be improved. Section 4.3 includes a comparison of my findings with prior research for minority groups in the US and Norway. Finally, Section 4.4 is a theoretical discussion of frameworks loosely based on the results of this study.

4.1 Quantitative Results

Table 4.1 provides results for each group when the majority group is strictly defined as “Norwegians”. Table 4.2 provides the measures for each group when the majority group is extended to include “Nords”. Finally, Table 4.3 gives the five measures when the majority group is extended to include “Western Europeans”. Indices scoring higher than the cutoff for moderate segregation appear in bold; an asterisk indicates the index scores higher than the cutoff for high segregation. Note that

Segregation Measures for 3 Groups					
	D	P	SP	CE	CO
Asia	0.353	0.205	0.748*	0.523	0.248
Africa	0.278	0.079	0.576	0.411	0.276
Americas	0.141	0.012	0.484	0.077	0.220

Table 4.1: Majority group defined as “Norwegians”.

Segregation Measures for 3 Groups					
	D	P	SP	CE	CO
Asia	0.353	0.205	0.767*	0.523	0.243
Africa	0.277	0.079	0.595	0.411	0.272
Americas	0.141	0.012	0.502	0.077	0.215

Table 4.2: Majority group defined as “Nords”.

only the clustering and concentration measures are functions of the “majority” group population. As the tables show, the manner in which this group is defined has a minor effect on the measures. As the “majority” group category expands to include a broader demographic, the clustering measure for each minority group tends to increase moderately while the concentration measure tends to decrease very slightly.

Segregation Measures for Three Groups in Oslo					
	D	P	SP	CE	CO
Asia	0.353	0.205	0.790*	0.523	0.240
Africa	0.278	0.079	0.618*	0.411	0.268
Americas	0.141	0.012	0.525	0.077	0.212

Table 4.3: Majority group defined as “Western Europeans”

I propose the following explanations for these observations. First: the increase in clustering suggests that operationalization limitations serve to understate the degree of segregation in Oslo. Moreover, it supports the hypothesis that segregation does not occur on the basis of dichotomous immigration status, as an increase in this measure corresponds with a greater “extent to which minority areas adjoin one another in space”. In other words: it is not the binary “immigrant/non-immigrant” category that unilaterally determines clustering, but rather the *qualification* of this status. National origin matters *at least* as much as immigration status when it comes to residential distribution.

Second: the decrease in concentration suggests that equality of areal distribution among groups is unlikely to be a significant segregation factor. This is unsurprising, given Norway’s generally sparse population. Measured in terms of residential land use, Oslo’s population density is roughly 13,207 inhabitants per km²; taking total municipal land area into consideration puts the figure closer to 1500 inhabitants per km². By contrast, Stockholm and Copenhagen are 2.8 and 3 times denser. Thus, non-scarcity of land area dampens the consequences of unequal land distribution. Finally, the magnitudes of the change in measures are of theoretical interest as well. Despite accounting for 2.7% and 5.3% of the population, including “Nords” and “Western Europeans” in the majority increases clustering by 3.2% and 7.1%, disproportionate to their size.

Segregation measures for a composite minority group					
	D	P	SP	CE	CO
“Norwegians”	0.347*	0.286	0.861	0.467*	0.286
“Nords”	0.347*	0.286	0.879	0.467*	0.281
“Western Europeans”	0.347*	0.286	0.902	0.467*	0.277

Table 4.4: Minority group defined as “non-Western Europeans”.


Given the aforementioned operationalization issues, I also carried out a final analysis that includes all three minority groups as a composite category for each definition of the majority group. While evenness and centralization appear to have been “balanced out”, exposure, clustering, and concentration increased significantly. When seen as a composite category, “non-Western Europeans” were found to be moderately segregated and where measures did not exceed the cutoff, their values were arbitrarily close to “moderate”. The results are given in Table 4.4.

4.2 Limitations

There are three types of limitations of this project: 1) those inherent in the discursive boundaries it is subject to, 2) limited access to microdata, and 3) shortcomings of my own model. The following is a review of all of the limitations I was able to identify.


4.2.1 Geospatial

Evenness and exposure are the most reliable indicators, as they depend *extensively* on geospatial data, i.e. geospatial information is contained within fixed classifications of tracts. While *reliability* is not expected to be at stake for these measures, their *validity* may be compromised by the coarseness of geospatial tracts. On the other hand, the remaining three measures are subject to more intensive geographical caveats.



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Figure 4.1: Commercial establishments as of 2017 overlaid on a map of Oslo and its urban districts. Density of establishments per 250m x 250m grid indicated by blue squares, with the darkest color indicating a local maximum density of establishments per square meter.




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Figure 4.2: Population count overlaid on a map of Oslo and its urban districts. Population per 250m x 250m grid indicated by red squares, with the darkest color indicating a local maximum density of persons per square meter.

While evenness and exposure are relatively reliable indicators (in contrast to centralization and concentration), **clustering** represents a statistical compromise between the two types of measures. Unlike evenness and exposure, clustering depends intensively on geospatial data and therefore on tract classification. To compute Eq. 3.4 on Page 14, I used GeoPandas to determine the centroids of each tract based on geospatial data from kart.ssb.no. However, as indicated in Section 3.3.2, the tracts include large non-residential areas. Therefore, the distance between the centroids of each district and the CBD are subject to considerable error. Moreover, as seen in Figure 4.1 on Page 22, the notion of a “central” business district cannot be reliably determined on the basis of statistical tracts, nor is the statistical point non-degenerate (clearly there is more than one CBD). Regardless, I claim that the errors arising from classification standards are mitigated to some extent by the dominance of population proportions in Eqs. 3.3 and 3.4. While the asymptotic behavior of the distance function c_{ij} is problematic, the deviation in distances between centroids is expected to be on the order of less than 1km.

Before the data were corrected using SSB series 09594, **centralization** and **concentration** were the least reliable of the indicators. This is because an earlier approach vastly underestimated the population density of tracts by including non-residential areas, which was particularly severe in areas with the highest populations of the minority groups relative to their total population. However, even with this mitigating factor, the coarseness of the tracts makes the results on these measures more suspect than for evenness, exposure, and even clustering. While some tracts are fairly homogeneous in the spatial distribution of residential areas, others are themselves highly clustered, as in Figure 4.2. The classification of tracts therefore significantly understates population densities.

The study can be significantly improved with access to statistical tracts, of which there are 60 in Oslo (as in Figure 4.3 on Page 25) or preferably at the basic statistical unit level, of which there are 591 in Oslo as of 2019 (as in Figure 4.4 on Page 26).



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Figure 4.3: Population count overlaid on a map of Oslo and its statistical tracts. Population per 250m x 250m grid indicated by orange/red squares, with the darkest color indicating an local maximum density of persons per square meter.

4.2.2 Demographic

While the preceding section has outlined some of the limitations resulting from the classification of statistical tracts that can almost certainly be mitigated by finer data sets (in fact, this is precisely the fineness of data used by Blom in earlier studies—although this author notes, critically, that only a conceptually equivalent measure of evenness as introduced in Eq. 3.1 was used by Blom),¹ the issue of operationalization is more severe here. Namely: by defining ‘minority group’ as immigrants and Norwegian-born to immigrant parents, the data are by no means representative of material, lived experiences.

First, in order for a person to be coded as “Norwegian-born to immigrant parents”, *both* parents must be first-generation immigrants. Second, the country background of immigrants (and therefore that of their children) is defined as the country in which they were born, taking no account of *citizenship* or self-reported *nationality*; those with parents born in different countries are coded as “Norwegian”, i.e. as having no immigration background at all. Distinctions between “Palestinians” and “Israelis”, or between “Kurds” and “Turks” are not reflected in the statistics.²

More will be said in Section 4.4, but suffice to say that data collection methods fail tremendously in outlining the very real differences between minority groups. Even when the methods “succeed” in capturing the data in question, the lived experiences of respondents are erased on a macroscopic level. Correctly enough, first-generation immigrants from South Africa are coded as “African”, yet this operationalization fails to make a distinction between a Black South African and a white South African, a distinction that is *critical* in exploring racism, discrimination, and segregation in Norway.

If one wishes to side-step the issue of defining concepts like “ethnicity”, “race”, and “minority group” (an approach I do not endorse), another possibility is to consider even finer groups of respondent categories, i.e. by studying individual *countries* rather than *country groups*. Even if one interrogates “race” in the Norwegian context and meets the issue head-on, this will still be a fruitful endeavor, as it will allow for a more rigorous understanding of the social construction of race. By carrying out a principal component analysis with this finer data, it should be possible to identify patterns of segregation and form a statistical basis for “racial” categories, especially with regards to the internal colonialism perspective. This would have several advantages:

1. It may identify groups of people who, despite diverse national origins, share a common territoriality and potentially share similar barriers to housing and integration.
2. It may provide insight into future research on the social construction of racial categories by identifying cases where the realities of segregation contradict normative narratives (e.g. do residential patterns differ between immigrants from “Israel” and immigrants from Palestine, despite both being categorized as “Asian”?).
3. Racial categorization is defined in terms of statistical realities rather than subjective (often problematic) notions of “race”, i.e. an individual becomes “racialized” on the basis of their interactions in society rather than assigned at birth.
4. Racial categorization is no longer a static and generalizing phenomenon (with fixed categories of “Black”, “Asian”, etc.) but rather results from dynamic and nuanced social processes (with categories informed by empirical data, e.g. “Middle Eastern” or “Southeast Asian”, or even more complex categories that defy labels).

¹Svein Blom, *Innvandrere og bokonsentrasjon i Oslo*.

²Vassenden, 1997. 240.

4.3 Comparison with Other Studies

Like Blom, I find that non-Western Europeans in Oslo are moderately segregated at the urban district level.³ While I find that evenness has not changed significantly since 2011, results from the remaining 4 measures show that immigrants are *at least* moderately segregated in Oslo. While the obfuscation of the data in Kornstad et al's paper makes a direct comparison difficult, I find that segregation among all immigration groups (not including Western Europe, unlike in Kornstad et al) measured at the urban district level was significantly higher than in 2017 when measured at the statistical tract level. This has several implications: 1) Western European immigrants are significantly less segregated than other immigrants, 2) Kornstad et al's use of coarser units masks segregation as Blom suggests, and/or 3) segregation has increased considerably since 2011. Cross-referencing Blom's 2012 study, where dissimilarity was reportedly roughly 16% higher in Oslo using statistical tracts than found by Kornstad et al using statistical tracts in 2011 and roughly 30% higher using basic statistical units, the first and second implications are highly likely, while the third remains plausible.

When defining the majority as "Norwegians", the mean segregation score of "Asians" in Oslo was greater than it was for Blacks in at least 7 of 60 US metropolitan areas in 1989.⁴ The mean segregation index for "Africans" was higher than for Blacks in 5 of 60 US metropolitan areas. Compared with Hispanics in US metropolitan areas in 1989, the mean segregation index for "Asians", "Africans", and "Americans" was greater than 40, 23, and 2 of 60 US metropolitan areas, respectively.

4.4 Implications for Theory

In section 4.2.2, I mentioned some of the limitations of demographic operationalization, specifically the manner in which immigrants are "deracialized". In fact, the issue is more severe than it first appears. The Kostra classification, for instance, implicitly endorses the narrative that minorities are defined exclusively by ethnolinguistics and by extension aptitude. The official position of SSB reflects this as well:

Den delen av befolkningen som til enhver tid ikke inngår i noen innvandrergrensning, blir for enkelhets skyld ofte kalt 'nordmenn' eller 'den norske befolkningen', uten at det legges noe spesielt innhold i det ordet. **Framfor alt betyr det ikke at innvandrere ikke er norske.**⁵

Thus, the very classification of "minority group" reinforces the ideology of a typical "post-racial" social democracy: nationhood is defined solely by a shared culture and language. Yet this *ideology* says nothing about the material differences between people, or about structural, institutional, or interpersonal discrimination. "All men are created equal" was, for instance, inconsequential in the red-lining policies of banks in the US. That federal statistics bureaus do not recognize physical

³Blom, "Etnisk segregasjon i Oslo over to tiår."

⁴Massey and Denton, "Hypersegregation in U.S. Metropolitan Areas."

⁵Vassenden, 1997. 235. This author's emphasis. Translation: *The portion of the population that at a given time is not placed into an immigration category are for simplicity's sake referred to as "Norwegians", without any special meaning being attributed to the word. Above all, this does not mean that immigrants are not Norwegian.*

markers as determinants of how the social fact of racism affects individuals does not mean that they do not affect people!

It is clear that in the study of discrimination, it would be senseless (not least irresponsible and unethical) to proceed as if the world were the way we wish it was rather than the way it actually is. While the hegemonic Norwegian narrative may purport that there is no difference between a Black man walking into a NAV office and a white man walking into a NAV office, the actually existing reality is that there is a shockingly fatal one because indeed society—and particularly the state—is racialized and racial. This was made abundantly clear in the death of Eugene Ejike Obiora in 2006 at the hands of Trondheim police (and, to wit, in the legal obligation to refer to a “death” rather than a “murder”).

We may wish that the lived experiences of a Black South African and a white South African in Oslo were equal, first and foremost because we do not wish for a racist society and then because post-raciality is an important aspect of social democracy’s propaganda, but in the clamor for appearing progressive, denial of social realities does little more than to enable and foster racism. In the tension between recognizing that which is ideologically uncomfortable and saving face, the latter always appears to win, as an equality sign is drawn between the experience of a Black immigrant and a white immigrant: both are equally “South African”. And of course, always: equally “Norwegian”. Therefore, operationalizing minority groups on the basis of immigration status, or on the basis of whatever variable may be used to measure “culture” and “language”, will always fall short of identifying the material effects of racism.

Additionally, it must be noted that even with the avoidance of “race” as an analytic category, immigration status as defined by SSB is still too stringent a category. We have already seen that children of immigrant parents with different national origins have been coded as non-immigrants. This means e.g. that a child born to a Sudanese father and a South Sudanese mother is coded as having no immigration background; a child born to a Norwegian with no immigration background and a first-generation Turkish immigrant is coded as having no immigration background; a child born to a Kurdish mother from Rojava (coded as “Syria”) and a Kurdish father from the autonomous region of Iraqi Kurdistan (coded as “Iraq”) is coded as neither Syrian, nor Iraqi, nor Kurdish, but rather as a Norwegian with no immigration background. Colloquially, as Vassenden points out, such individuals are “Norwegian”; to feign outrage and offense at the assertion that they are not—by virtue of their unequal treatment in practice—merely gaslights the issue.

While SSB discussions suggest that these cases are relatively rare and negligible in a macroscopic analysis, the matter of third-generation immigrants in the context of racial segregation demonstrates otherwise. A 2015 *Aftenposten* docu-series chronicles the experiences of third-generation immigrants in Norway, who consistently report difficulties not only identifying themselves as “fully” Norwegian, but also the hesitation of others to do so.⁶

Finally, an operationalization that erases “race” as an analytic category necessarily deprives researchers of the possibility to explore the internal colonialism perspective in the Norwegian context. The long-standing (and incredibly recent) national campaign of oppression towards

⁶*Aftenposten*, “#JegErNorsk: Tilhørighet” [I Am Norwegian: Belonging], May 4, 2015, <https://www.aftenposten.no/norge/i/4d1n19/video-fra-aftenposten?video=100721>.

e.g. the Sámi nation makes it clear that there is a significant demographic of the Norwegian population that has no coded immigration background that nonetheless constitutes a minority group.⁷ Interestingly enough, no SSB data on Sámi populations exist “south of Saltfjellet”, implying that such persons are for statistical purposes racialized in accordance with geographic restraints. As soon as Sámi persons indefinitely cross the nationally and historically recognized border of Sámi sovereign territory, they are no longer recognized as “Sámi”, a throwback to the so-called Faustian bargain of ethnicity theory’s “deracialization” discussed in Chapter 2.

⁷The Norwegian government recognizes 5 national minorities: Kvens, Jews, Forest Finns, Romani (*sigøynere*), and Taters. The Sámi peoples have been recognized as an *indigenous* group rather than a national minority. Needless to say, no SSB demographic data is available for these groups.

Chapter 5: Conclusion

5.1 Summary of Results

The results of this study clearly indicate a moderate level of segregation among some immigrant groups in Oslo. Despite its shortcomings, this study offers a more realistic picture of segregation in Oslo than found in the prior literature. While the results are likely to be affected by several limitations, I have demonstrated that improvements to the model will reveal higher levels of segregation on purely statistical grounds. In investigating these limitations, I have offered a number of suggestions that may improve future studies on racism in Norway. First and foremost, I have offered a proposal for a statistical approach to race as an analytic category that may be used regardless of the discursive developments of “race” as a concept. If “race” as an analytic category is rejected, this approach nonetheless allows for a more accurate understanding of discrimination; if it is kept, this approach would be instrumental in deconstructing its pseudo-scientific association and situating the concept as a fluid and dynamic social process.

I do not expect that Norwegian sociologists will see a change in this regard in the near or even distant future. I expect that confronting Norway’s past and present colonial and imperialist legacy will be a contentious and protracted struggle whose resolution I cannot comment on in any concrete terms. For instance, I do not expect, however the debate progresses, that SSB will ever develop a census that includes an item asking respondents to self-report their “race” as is done in the US census, nor do I necessarily endorse this. All I can say with certainty is that, given the abject failure of public servants to even *discuss* racism and the failure of statisticians to even *identify* it in any valid terms, *something* must be done to disrupt the normative narrative that exists today.

5.2 Future Studies

In addition to improvements to the statistical model afforded by improved access to data, there are a number of ways in which this present study may be improved. First, several groups have not been considered.¹ This is unfortunate, given that these forms of discrimination were specifically mentioned in the background section and have been particularly relevant in Norway.² Due to time and space limitations, it was not possible to carry out any other analyses, but they remain salient options for future studies.

While geospatial units at the urban district level are defined for other Norwegian cities, their coarseness makes them useless in this type of analysis.³ In principle, with 14,000 basic statistical units defined in the entirety of Norway, it would be feasible to carry out an analysis for the entire country without the arbitrary (and ideologically driven) choice of “averaging” out segregation to produce superficially optimistic reports on the state’s dime.⁴

As soon as a more reliable model can be put in place, there are almost endless opportunities to explore social phenomenon in a multidisciplinary setting. Once segregation is more reliably

¹Segregation among “Eastern Europeans” is an immediately available example, and would be particularly interesting to study in relation to geopolitics and the manner in which this category becomes defined.

²Tjen Folket Media, “Demolition of Roma Camps and Human Rights Violations”, September 20, 2019, <https://tjen-folket.no/index.php/en/2019/09/20/demolition-of-roma-camps-and-human-rights-violations/>.

³Bergen, Norway’s second most populous city, has 8 urban districts, Trondheim has 4, and Stavanger has 9.

⁴See The New York Times’ 2015 [Mapping Segregation](#) interactive map for an explicit example of proof of concept.

identified, the present study can immediately be used to explore other dimensions of geospatial discrimination. For instance, prior studies have established patterns of environmental racism by studying residential segregation and the location of environmental bads like incineration plants, hazardous waste sites, pollution flows, etc.⁵ Alternatively, it has also been possible to study the connection between residential segregation and the unequal distribution of environmental goods like parks and other green spaces.⁶ Another possible application is the geospatial study of food deserts and segregation, which may offer insights to medical researchers as well as adding to the body of literature on racism in Norway.⁷

As the present study indicates, segregation is clearly a reality in Oslo, despite the numerous attempts by bureaucratic bodies to understate it. The task is now to characterize its scope and effects in the Norwegian context.

⁵Paul Mohai, David Pellow, and J. Timmons Roberts, "Environmental Justice," *Annual Review of Environment and Resources* 34 (Nov 21, 2009): 405-430; Robert D. Bullard, "Solid Waste Sites and the Black Houston Community," *Sociological Inquiry* 53, issue 2-3 (April 1983): 273-288; Liam Downey, "Environmental Racial Inequality in Detroit," *Social Forces* 85 no. 2 (Dec 2005): 771-796.

⁶Laura Pulido, Steve Sidawi, and Robert O. Vos, "An Archaeology of Environmental Racism in Los Angeles," *Urban Geography* 17, no. 5 (1996): 419-439; Ming Wen, et. al, "Spatial Disparities in the Distribution of Parks and Green Spaces in the USA," *Annals of Behavioral Medicine* 45 (Feb 2013): S18-S27.

⁷See e.g. the [USDA's food desert atlas](#).

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