Pragmatism, Naturalism, and Realism: Pihlström, Price and Beyond

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1. Introduction

Pragmatist philosophers have generally been supporters of naturalism. Perhaps most fundamentally, pragmatists reject the idea of *a priori* certainty or 'first philosophy' in favour of a fallibilist, gradualist and evolving conception of our knowledge, one Quine made popular with the idea of the 'web of belief' facing 'the tribunal of experience as a corporate whole' (Quine 1953, 41).[1] Coupled with this epistemological naturalism we also tend to find pragmatists stressing a more substantive or (as it is often put) metaphysical naturalism, on which human beings are contained within the physical and biological world that science informs us about. Exactly how the latter commitment is to be understood varies. Sometimes the idea is that we are *purely* material entities like any other on earth and have to be understood accordingly. Other pragmatists see naturalism as in no way inconsistent with, indeed, as requiring, a conception of ourselves that natural science cannot capture; John McDowell's (1994) emphasis on our *second nature* is a well-known example of such a view that many pragmatists have appealed to.

Whether pragmatism cleaves to a scientific or some 'non-scientific' (cf. Knowles 2006) form of naturalism, it is clear that further questions need to be asked and answered about how exactly its epistemological and metaphysical aspects hang together. This is underlined by the acceptance by many

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[1] 'The Web of Belief' was the title of Quine's book with J. S. Ullian from 1970.

pragmatists of a further doctrine, namely *anti-realism*. Peirce's view of the truth as what we would be believe 'at the end of enquiry' is perhaps the best known version of such an anti-realist philosophy, but one also finds anti-realist strands in James and Dewey, as well as perhaps the foremost apologist for pragmatism in the contemporary era, Hilary Putnam.[2] Some will immediately protest that pragmatist thinking is not correctly viewed as *anti*-realist at all; rather, pragmatists only reject what Putnam calls 'metaphysical realism': the idea of there being a fixed totality of objects and properties existing independently of thought and language that we can nevertheless refer to and talk about in thought or language. I am sympathetic to this way of finessing pragmatism's commitments, but at a certain, coarse-grained conception of the dialectical landscape, I still think there is a good question to be raised here. Though differing in detail, many of the most sophisticated anti-realist positions in contemporary philosophy stem from the idealist tradition of Kant (and subsequent German philosophy); and isn't that a tradition that is precisely non- (or even anti-) naturalistic? For Kant there is a kind of first philosophy in the forms of intuition and the categories of understanding, however different the status these things have from *a priori* knowledge on more traditional conceptions. Moreover, Kant's underlying picture of our place in reality sees us, in some fundamental aspect of our being, as outside of nature. Nature – the scientific conception of reality – is ultimately one of the things we, as rational beings, construct on the basis of our non-natural faculties, on the basis of of influence from *Das Ding an sich*, a thoroughly unknowable quantity. This seems hard to view as a naturalistic philosophical position. But then how exactly *do*

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[2] Whether all (or most) of the main figures of pragmatism, new and old, flirt with anti-realism is no doubt somewhat a matter of who gets to count as one. Both Quine and Sellars for example are often seen as pragmatist thinkers, but also typically as realists. Rorty's generally quietist attitude to philosophy suggests he at least would at least never have wanted to be seen as an anti-realist. Having said that, perhaps all or nearly all who would call themselves pragmatists would reject metaphsycial realism (see below); the question of whether avoiding this amounts to a substantively anti-realist position is the central issue of this paper.

we commensurate anti-realism (or anti-metaphysical realism) with a naturalistic world-view for the pragmatist?

Enter Sami Pihlström. Pihlström's work has covered a large variety of topics within theoretical philosophy, ethics and the philosophy of religion, but an abiding interest has been the relationship between Kant's transcendental project and pragmatism. In his monograph from 2003 *Naturalizing the Transcendental* and several subsequent publications he attempts to show how transcendental philosophy can be freed from the procrustean bed of first philosophy, and thereby merge fruitfully with a pragmatism that respects a recognizable form of naturalism. Transcendental work is needed to reveal the presuppositions of our various discourses and conceptions of reality, but there is no one overall such conception, rather a plurality that evolve and sometimes replace one another. *A priori* understanding exists, in a structural sense of being an essential aspect of any kind of empirical understanding, but it need not be given once and for all (cf. Pihlström and Siitonen 2005, Pihlström 2012a, here drawing on ideas from thinkers like C.I. Lewis, Wittgenstein, Kuhn and Michael Friedman). The transcendental subject is seen as *emergent* from natural processes, with emphasis put on the constituting character of embodied *practices* (Pihlström 2009). Pihlström claims a form of empirical realism can be defended, such that there are thoroughly objective answers to our questions, even though the form of these answers and even our very conception of their objectivity must be seen relative to certain forms of understanding that simultaneously serve to constitute the domain in question (cf. Pihlström 2011). Finally, since there is on this picture no sense to the idea that science 'limn[s] the true and ultimate structure of reality' (Quine 1960, 221), we can also be fully paid up (local) realists about other discourses or dimensions of our understanding, including the ethical and even the religious, without reneging on anything that one might think of as a reasonable naturalism. Indeed, the ethical can be seen as constituting a broader background to our peculiar form of being-in-the world. Thus, in a nutshell, is Pihlström's answer to the question of how pragmatism combines naturalism with a form of anti-realism – as I shall continue to say. For even though it is a form that, as he would stress, also involves a

strong and recognizable empirical realism, it also remains (as far as I understand Pihlström's intention at least) a form of Kantian idealism, replete with transcendental subjects and something like the unknowable *Ding an sich* (cf. Pihlström and Siitonen *op. cit.*).

Pihlström's answer to pragmatism's challenge – that of combining its epistemology with its metaphysics – is subtle and resourceful. This paper will not be directly concerned with assessing its various merits and challenges, but with contrasting and comparing it at a more general level with the view of someone else who has recently emerged as a leading pragmatist thinker, Huw Price. Over the last years Price has developed a systematic philosophical view that he explicitly relates to various pragmatist forbears and dubs *global expressivism* (cf. especially Price 2011, 2013). What is interesting about global expressivism from the perspective of pragmatism's challenge is the seemingly very different response it offers to Pihlström's. In particular no resort (at least explicitly) is made to transcendental or Kantian philosophy; indeed, Price does not appear to make any concession to anti-realism or a non-scientific form of naturalism. And yet he does also want to be considered a fully paid up pragmatist. In this way, Price can be seen as closer to the deflationst pragmatist tradition represented by Quine and Rorty, rather than the neo-Kantian line Pihlström recommends and identifies to an extent in the work of Putnam. Now Pihlström has repeatedly made clear his dissatisfaction with the former, a dissatisfaction that has also recently been extended to Price's global expressivism (Pihlström 2012b). My question here will involve assessing the reasonableness of that dissatisfaction by asking: can Price consistently uphold his pragmatism without buying into the kind of Kantian view that Pihlström recommends?

My answer will be that it can, or at least that there is no compelling reason to think otherwise. Price rejects metaphysical realism as a consequence of his overall metasemantic position, which involves rejecting *representationalism* as incoherent. I argue that beyond this it is not at all obvious that anti-representationalism involves substantive anti-realist commitments. However, I also think awkward questions can be raised for Price about his

promotion of precisely global expressivism. In light of these, I think we might fruitfully consider a slightly different route for pragmatism that can be seen as combining elements from both Price's view and a Kantian world-view.

The rest of the paper goes as follows. The next section (section 2) outlines Price's global expressivism. Section 3 takes up the issue of whether the anti-representationalism behind this must involve a form of (neo-)Kantian metaphysics, of the kind Pihlström recommends for pragmatism. Finally section 4 considers briefly my own naturalistic and realist programme for pragmatism.

2. Global expressivism

The central idea behind Price's pragmatism is the rejection of representationalism, which he claims stands at the heart of much traditional philosophy, not least that pursued by metaphysical naturalists. The following analogy aims to bring this connection out:

> Imagine a child's puzzle book, arranged like this. The left-hand page contains a large sheet of peel-off stickers, and the right-hand page shows a line drawing of a complex scene. For each sticker – the koala, the boomerang, the Sydney Opera House, and so on – the reader needs to find the unique outline in the drawing with the corresponding shape. The aim of the game is to place all the stickers in their correct locations, in this sense.

> Now think of the right-hand page as the world, and the stickers as the collection of all the statements we take to be true of the world. For each such statement, it seems natural to ask what makes it true; what fact in the world has precisely the corresponding "shape". Within the scope of this simple but intuitive analogy, matching true statements to the world seems a lot like matching stickers to the line drawing. (Price 2011, 3)

An overarching problem for contemporary philosophy is the lack of perfect fit between the shapes on the left – what we say in everyday discourse or special sciences, and take on the whole to be true and defensible – and the shapes on the right hand side: what take to be available in the world as it is in itself to make these true. The traditional metaphysically-inclined philosopher will seek to analyse our talk to reveal

hidden correspondences – or lack thereof, thereby providing an impetus to eliminate the talk in question from the ranks of true knowledge, or perhaps to reconsider the metaphysical conception of the world as given on the right-hand side of the book. Price claims that underlying this project is the idea that language relates to the world representationalistically: there is a non-trivial specification available, in principle, of what it takes for our terms to refer to something in the world, and for the sentences composed of such terms to be true, a specification itself to be given in terms acceptable within the picture of the world given on the right hand side of the book.

With this analogy in mind, Price critiques a view he calls *object naturalism*: the idea that all truth or all knowledge is essentially of a natural scientific character (cf. Price 2004). Price claims such a naturalistic programme presupposes representationalism, in more or less the sense just outlined (as do certain other, non-naturalistic programmes). However, Price thinks representationalism is actually rather dubious, for various reasons. Part of this is the allure of semantic deflationism, which understands (*inter alia*) the truth of a statement as a non-substantial property, essentially coeval with asserting it. But without representationalsm object naturalism becomes unmotivated, possibly incoherent. This does not however mean that we should reject naturalism *tout court*. Price thinks we should remain *subject* naturalists, that is, see human talk and thought as natural phenomena to be understood as part of a natural world and studiable by science. But that does not entail seeing such talk as representing this natural world. Moral talk, for example, can be seen as having quite a different function – plausibly something along the lines urged by expressivists like Blackburn (1984) and Gibbard (1990), whereby it gives expression to and thereby aids the coordination of particular kinds of non-cognitive attitude. But since this expression is typically itself in declarative sentences, and truth is deflated, there is no question of anti-realism here. From the perspective of science, morality will not appear to latch on to anything 'real', but to use science as a standard for morality would be arbitrary, indeed to involve a use-mention fallacy (here Price draws on Carnap's distinction between external and internal questions, cf. Price 2009). In fact, semantic deflationism,

together with functional pluralism, will plausibly lead one in the direction of *global* expressivism, insofar as no discourse's function will be explained truth-theoretically (i.e. in a correspondence fashion; cf. Macarthur and Price 2007). Science may be a *kind* of Archimedian point for certain explanatory projects, including that of global expressivism, but it does not give a metaphysical picture of reality, and indeed many of its central concepts, such as time and causation, are themselves amenable to expressivist analyses. The view is also termed by Price 'global pragmatism' (Price 2013, 155), which he suggests may be the more appropriate label insofar as what is distinctive about it is the rejection of representationalist paradigms for understanding discourses, rather than its espousal of particularly expressivist ones.[3]

Price then is a fully paid up naturalist, and a scientific one at that (cf. Price 2010), who sees philosophical work as essentially a form of anthropology, understanding our different discourses by reference to their various biological functions and genealogically determined roles. Moreover, he does not subscribe to any kind of anti-realist position or Kantianism. Indeed, he thinks the norm of truth amounts to a third norm of evaluation of our statements (contra Rorty), in a way that underscores bivalence and thereby a realist interpretation of truth (Price 2003).[4]

He also aims to be a good pragmatist, however, and the question arises as to whether he can pull this combination off. *Can* he consistently co-opt the virtues of pragmatism in solving our philosophical quandaries without broaching the territory of idealism, 'non-scientific' theorizing, or indeed any substantive metaphysics or ontology? Or is Price's view really under closer analysis a kind of Kantian idealism, or best seen as such?

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[3] Truth talk for example is not plausibly expressivist in the way ethics is, but nor is it to be understood in terms of latching onto some feature of fundamental reality, but rather in terms of particular use and function for us (*ibid.*). Price's idea of certain discourses 'e-representing' the environment (Price 2013) in a way others don't also involves divergence from traditional expressivist analyses.

[4] For a slightly different response to Rorty's downgrading of truth that is nevertheless also fundamentally deflationary, see Knowles (2018a).

3. Does anti-representationalism imply a form of idealism?

Pihlström I think might well answer this last question affirmatively. In his (2012b) he rejects Price's vision of philosophy as anthropology, arguing instead that we need a different conception of what metaphysics amounts to. But he also notes the following:

> For a 'Kantian' (and Wittgensteinian) pragmatist, an interesting further question inspired by Price's work would be whether global expressivism could be understood as a pragmatist version of transcendental idealism within which (only) a pragmatic or empirical realism becomes possible. (17, note 4)

This sounds like a friendly invitation to come over the path of righteousness. But should Price accept it?

Pihlström has of course developed his own alternative conception of metaphysics in much more detail than I can present here, and I therefore cannot rule out that the benefits accruing in virtue of adopting it might be decisive. What I want to do here is to take up the general question of whether the anti-representationalist position Price espouses ('AR' in the following) must in any case accept a kind of substantively anti-realist or idealist view, as Pihlström seems to think it must, or at least should, to be plausible.[5]

To assess this we need first to return to the question of representationalism and its relation to metaphysical realism. I have so far said little by way of what Price's reasons for rejecting representationalism beyond the appeal of semantic deflationism. Though Price is not categorical here, he does offer some arguments that are reminiscent of Putnam's model-theoretic arguments against metaphysical realism (Putnam 1983). Through the latter Putnam argued that the metaphysical realist's understanding of reference is necessarily infected by a crippling indeterminacy, hence undermining the idea that we can make so much as sense of the idea of such a realism – the idea that there is a fixed,

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[5] The question of naturalism and the possibility of metaphysics will thus play a less prominent role in this paper, though what I say will also have a bearing on these issues at various points.

ready-made world, given completely independently of consciousness or conceptual activity – insofar as there will always be several ways of assigning referents to terms such that all the sentences in question remain true. Adding constraints such as causal covariation cannot help because they just represent *more theory*, itself susceptible to the indeterminacy argument. A central component in Putnam's thought is the idea that specifying how language relates to world from within the theory of the world itself looks to be incoherent. Price's arguments make a similar charge of self-referential paradox against representationalism understood as part of object naturalism. Focussing on the idea that there are substantive reference relations for the object naturalist, he points out that these too will have to be scrutable to empirical enquiry. But this leads to a threat of incoherence. If for example it turns out that there is in fact nothing in the world for 'reference' to refer to, we will land in one such an incoherence (viz '"reference" refers to nothing'; Price 2004, 193; see also the argument on pp. 194-5).

One might of course challenge these arguments, as well the connection between them and the idea of metaphysical realism. Here however I will just assume that they are at least on the right tracks and further that metaphysical realism and representationalism are mutually entailing.[6] So, in rejecting representationalism, Price is, at least as far as I understand things, also rejecting metaphysical realism. However, since the charge against the latter (and representationalism) concerns one of incoherence, this can hardly be seen as enunciating a substantive commitment to a particular metaphysical view, *a fortiori* to any kind of anti-realism. What we need to ask is if anything else follows from AR – does it exert distinctive pressure towards a substantive form of idealism?

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[6] Knowles (2014, §2) defends Price's arguments, and the idea that metaphysical presupposes representationalism. The idea behind the latter is that it is only if one can make sense of some part of our language making contact with something substantively outside of it that one can make sense of a discourse articulating 'the real' rather than merely appearing to (and hence of such a 'real' at all). I also think the opposite holds: that if one can make sense of such determinate and substantive reference, metaphysical realism follows (cf. Knowles 2018b, 304).

Insofar as AR rejects representationalism, it owes an account of meaning not based on the traditional semantic notions of truth and reference. Some form or other of use theory of meaning is typically invoked by supporters of AR here, and various different forms or outlines of this have been offered (those of Brandom, 1994, and Horwich, 1998, are perhaps the most fully worked-out versions of such theories in contemporary debate, but it is only the general idea I mean to invoke here).[7] A question then arises whether use theories of meaning entail a form of idealism. If what ultimately gives 'shape' to our truth-aimed utterances – what they say – is not a relation to something beyond utterances, but the system of utterances itself, as encoded in their use by us, will it follow that our very conception of what is real – the facts we countenance as such – must be somehow dependent on or relative to the these patterns of use?

A somewhat similar kind of thought has been discussed by various 'deflationary' metaphysicians in recent years, notably Eli Hirsch (2011) and Amie Thomasson (2015). Both these thinkers espouse a Carnapian picture of ontological commitment on which the rules of our language determine the broad contours of our ontology, such that questions about whether there exist, say, properties or endurant material objects can be largely decided by conceptual investigation. (Price of course also sees Carnap as an ally, as we have noted.) Moreover, both these thinkers staunchly repudiate the idea that their view involves a form of anti-realism, seeing the accusation as involving a use-mention fallacy. Our practices make available certain concepts and modes of thought, but the thoughts themselves do not assert language-relative truth or existence. 'There are properties' may follow from the rules of our language (along with relevant empirical input), but the claim itself makes no reference to such rules, even implicitly.

This kind of move might seem only to provide a very minimal form of realism, indeed one that hardly deserves the title at all. For example, James Miller (2016) has argued that Hirsch's claims for the realistic status of our ontological discourse entails commitment to some kind of *amorphous*

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[7] Price himself rejects Horwich's account and favours Brandom's (cf. Price 1997, 2013), but the reasons are not relevant to our concerns here.

lump (Eklund 2008) view of a more thoroughgoingly mind-independent reality. An 'amorphous lump' is of course very reminiscent of Kant's *Ding an sich* and hence we seem to arrive back at something like transcendental idealism. Hirsch's view is also a descendent of Putnam's doctrine of *conceptual relativity* (see e.g. Putnam 1987): the idea that there may be incompatible ways of conceptualising the same portion of reality that are nevertheless in some sense equally good. This might also seem to shore up under the kind of transcendental idealistic picture just sketched. Moreover, one might think AR in any case is committed to the claim that if there were no humans (or other rational beings) with concepts, there would be no truths, which sounds distinctly idealistic.

In my view however AR can resist these charges of being anti-realistic, at least in a substantive sense. That is, I think the charges, to the extent they are cogent, do not go beyond establishing that AR is not a metaphysically realist position. (And, to repeat, given that AR sees metaphysical realism as incoherent, this does not amount to a demonstration of any substantive kind of anti-realism.)

To start with, I believe AR should and need have no association with the doctrine of conceptual relativity. Putnam's writings on this issue are subtle and resourceful. For example, he convincingly argues against the idea that conceptual relativity involves a 'cookie cutter' conception of our relation to reality, whereby our concepts carve out bits of an underlying 'dough', for this either falsely gives the impression that we freely create realities, or else that in fact there are significant fault lines to be discerned in the dough after all – thereby denying the phenomenon (Putnam 1987, 33). Nevertheless, it is hard to make sense of the idea of conceptual relativity, I submit, without commitment to *some* notion of a *Ding an sich*. For if there is no real question of whether there is, say, a cup in front of me as well as the particles that make it up – if both are equally good but incompatible descriptions of what is before me – then surely, even if it must be non-structured, an underlying reality must be said exist. And yet can we really make sense of such an non-structured *Ding an sich* or the validating role it is meant

to play in relation to our structured claims about it? I myself struggle.

The *motivations* behind conceptual relativity are another issue, and deserve more discussion than I can offer here. Let me merely register a) that Putnam's own examples are of a diverse nature and all have been challenged as really implying conceptual relativity (some by Putnam himself); b) in view of the point of the previous paragraph, I take there to be genuine motivation to avoid acknowledging unreconstructed conceptual relativity.[8]

In rejecting conceptual relativity, it important to bear in mind the distinction between this and what Putnam calls conceptual *pluralism* – a distinction which maps onto Price's between *horizontal* and *vertical* pluralism (Price 1992). The point is that in rejecting conceptual relativity, AR need not accept the idea of there being 'one true theory of the world'. For we can still acknowledge different discourses with radically different functions, such as the everyday material, the scientific, the ethical and the mathematical, none of which it makes any sense to see as providing a privileged conception of 'reality' (indeed, this concept is simply jettisoned). Retaining such a clearly vertical conception of pluralism, at the same time as abjuring representationalism and metaphysical realism, is in my view key to a genuinely pragmatic but also non-compromising form of realism.

What of the final issue I mentioned, concerning the language dependence of truths? If we had never evolved from whatever existed, say, at the time of the dinosaurs, the latter would surely still have existed. No one would want to deny that – but nor would or need a supporter of AR, for such a commitment is encoded in our very concepts of the things in question (given relevant empirical input). Still, if truths are dependent on language, then if we had never existed there would be no truths, *a fortiori* not the truth

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[8] A promising way in my view to undercut at least a significant subset of Putnam's examples of conceptual relativity is to reject, with Thomasson (*op. cit.*) and others, the idea of the concept *object* as a generic, rather than some purely formal concept. This undercuts any general question as to e.g. how many objects there are in a room, which is an example of the kind of question Putnam thinks illustrates conceptual relativity.

dinosaurs exist(ed) either. Is that not to admit to idealism? I don't think it obviously is. For on the one hand, it strikes me simply as coeval with rejecting metaphysical realism; whilst, on the other hand, I don't think it's at all obvious that two counterfactual thoughts are inconsistent with one another. One might think that, on the assumption that we didn't come into existence, saying the dinosaurs would nevertheless have existed entails that it is *true* that they would have existed, which contradicts the implication of AR that under this assumption there wouldn't be any truths. But what exactly is being claimed here? A rendering in terms of possible worlds or situations would seem helpful: In the world where we don't exist, dinosaurs still do, hence 'dinosaurs exist' is true, and hence we have a truth here and get a contradiction with our second counterfactual. However we have to remember that what is being envisaged is precisely a *counterfactual* situation: it is a situation judged from our *actual* position of existing. We are judging what we would say about a situation that *in fact* does not obtain. So it does not verify that there are truths without human language. It would only do this if the possible world were interpreted realistically, in the manner of David Lewis. But this seems a thoroughly non-obligatory, unpragmatic, if not to say bizarre understanding of possible worlds talk.

Again, I don't want to suggest there isn't more to be said here. What I do think our discussions show is that it is far from clear that any direct inconsistency, incoherence or breach with an uncompromising realism is entailed by AR – beyond the rejection of metaphysical realism, which in any case is incoherent.

4. The limits of global expressivism

I have so far expressed my allegiance to AR through the endorsement of Price's views, which he sees as leading to a global expressivism. However, this does not mean I think global expressivism is itself unproblematic.

One worry is what Simon Blackburn (following Robert Kraut) has called the 'no exit' problem (Blackburn 2013, and e.g. Kraut 2016): any espousal of expressivism for a particular discourse seems to need to be grounded, ultimately, in some

kind of non-expressivistically understood vocabulary, but *ex hypothesi* no such vocabulary exists. In earlier work (Knowles 2011, 2014) I suggested this was a real challenge for Price, one that indeed might push him towards some kind of Kantian position (2011, 78 f.). Price has since himself responded to the no exit problem in his own way, making use of the idea of 'e-representation' (2103, 157 ff.). I think there is more to say about the adequacy of this reply, but I think it is at least fair to say that global expressivism – or, better, global *pragmatism* – is not obviously incoherent conceived as a thoroughgoingly realist and naturalist position.

What I do however think is problematic about Price's view is its pragmatist credentials. More specifically, given AR, plus Price's own austere form of naturalism, a rejection of object naturalism is in fact not clearly mandated; one might pursue the expressivist project, but it remains unclear why, as opposed to some kind of physicalist, reductionist one (cf. Knowles 2017, where a Quinean position is developed as an example of such an anti-representationalist object naturalism). If that is the case, then Price's overall philosophy arguably doesn't bring with it the virtues that pragmatist views generally have been hoped to do.

In my view, we need to connect AR to something other than Price's global pragmatism in order to avoid reductive physicalism; but we can I believe also do this without buying into some kind of transcendental idealism, and at the same time maintaining much of the spirit of Price's subject naturalism. There *is* arguably much to be learned, from a subject naturalistic perspective, about our different discourses in terms of different kinds of contents or thoughts they articulate. Broadly speaking I think such an account can motivate a distinction between those that ineluctably presuppose human activity and those that do not; those that delineate *our* world – a world for us: a world of agents, values, coloured, solid objects and so on – and those that delineate 'things in themselves': the posits of fundamental physics and possibly other theoretical science, that aim to abstract from the realm of sensibility – truths that would be valid for all rational beings, regardless of their particular

sensory and biological capacities.[9] Importantly for this pragmatist, 'things in themselves' is not connected to any idea of 'reality', so they would not make up *reality* as it in itself; the world for us is as real a world as we are ever going to get. Further, this distinction between the for-us and in-itself does not map onto that between e-representational and non-e-representational discourses, nor is the position's naturalism reductive insofar as it does not favour the vocabulary of natural science as our explanatory framework; in both these ways, my position is clearly distinct from Price's (cf. Knowles 2017). Indeed, something like a naturalised phenomenology, in the sense of an investigation of the lived, experienced world should also have a central place to play in this project, in my view. There will be space for explanatory cross-fertilization between our different discourses, but the idea that any one or subset of them is metaphysically fundamental, or that they variously seek to carve up 'reality' in different ways, would fall by the wayside.

This kind of view may of course smack of metaphysical theorizing itself, in some sense of the word (viz. Sellars' 'how things in the broadest sense of the word hang together in the broadest sense of the word'). I prefer to see it rather as growing out of reflection on the nature of science and what our best understanding of, in particular, the world of fundamental physics and conscious experience, respectively, amounts to. However, this is not a distinction that perhaps will bear much weight, and insofar I would not want to reject the idea of metaphysical thinking entirely. There are also of course echoes of Kant in the distinction I have drawn, albeit the specific content I attach to this is not itself one Kant would espouse (nor is it, I stress again, meant as any kind of idealism). In any case, my main aim here in concluding this paper has been to outline this further possibility, somewhere between Kantianism and global expressivism if one likes, for a pragmatist, anti-representationalist philosophy. I look

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[9] The phrase 'valid for all rational beings' I take from Danielle Macbeth (2014). The distinction also arises in the recent work of Daniel Dennett (2018), though whether Dennett would count as my kind of pragmatist is not something I would want to pronounce positively on without further consideration.

forward to future dialogue concerning the relative virtues these different pragmatic philosophies have to offer.

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