An Illuminating Tale of the impact of the EEA Grants

A study of project performance levels as good governance illuminators in the 2009-2014 Gender Mainstreaming Programme in Spain

Master’s thesis in European Studies
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<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>BEPG</td>
<td>Broad Economic Policy Guidelines</td>
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<td>CAV</td>
<td>Companies Against Violence</td>
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<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil Society Organization</td>
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<td>CSR</td>
<td>Corporate Social Responsibility</td>
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<td>CPPP</td>
<td>CSO-Public-Private Partnership</td>
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<td>CEOE</td>
<td>Corporations of Spanish Business Organizations</td>
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<td>EEA</td>
<td>European Economic Area</td>
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<td>EES</td>
<td>European Employment Strategy</td>
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<td>EFTA</td>
<td>European Free Trade Area</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>FMO</td>
<td>Financial Mechanism Office</td>
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<td>GAD</td>
<td>Gender and Development</td>
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<td>GNI</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Income</td>
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<td>LDO</td>
<td>The Norwegian Equality and Anti-Discrimination Ombud</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Nongovernmental Organization</td>
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<td>NAV</td>
<td>The Norwegian Labour and Welfare Administration</td>
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<td>NRP</td>
<td>National Reform Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>PP</td>
<td>The Spanish People’s Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>Public-Private Partnership</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSOE</td>
<td>The Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>WID</td>
<td>Women in Development</td>
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<td>WAD</td>
<td>Women and Development</td>
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1. Introduction

The contribution of the EEA Grants to reduce inequality in Spain cannot be measured in numbers. The importance of the chosen areas during the 20 years and the more than 400 projects financed and successfully concluded are proof of how the grants have boosted the economic and social development of the country (Quoted in Puig Syversen & Blas Miranda 2016, p. 11).

Twenty years of the European Economic Area (EEA) grants to Spain from 1994-2014 has knowingly been a success story. Looking back, the former Ambassador of Norway to Spain, Johan Cristopher Vibe, expressed that one crucial aspect it has produced is the exchange of best practices and the forging of a tight relationship between Norway and Spain (Puig Syversen & Blas Miranda 2016, p.7). On the other hand, Pilar Soler Oroz, the Director of the EEA Grants’ Spanish Focal Point, chose to highlight the convincing results of the 2009-2014 programme period\(^4\) even in times of profound economic difficulties: “(...) none of this would have been possible without the contributions from the three donors and the dedication of all those involved in the Grants in Spain. We are very proud of all the successes” (EEA Grants 2016a).

From these statements, which looks beyond stipulated and unambiguous numbers, one may find it legitimate to ask what employee attitudes and efforts were behind these great accomplishments. However, how organisational representatives worked nationally and bilaterally and why certain outputs or results were brought about remain in the dark. Albeit what is credible is that a high degree of good governance was achieved in the EEA grants to Spain from 2009-2014 (Puig Syversen & Blas Miranda 2016 p. 11). The aim of this thesis is to substantiate how and why a high degree of good governance was achieved in the EEA grants to Spain from 2009-2014. The reason for the existence of good governance is the establishment and preservation of sustainable value for organisations and partners (Too & Weaver 2014, p. 1385). Good governance and anti-corruption has been a prioritized area of Norwegian foreign aid since 2000 (Riksrevisjonen 2015, p.7). Within the EEA grants scheme, Norway (95,8%), Iceland (3%) and Liechtenstein (1,2%) give financial support that contributes indirectly to development progress in Eastern and Southern European EU member states\(^2\) (EEA and Norway grants n.d-b). It is a parallel scheme to the Norway Grants. Continental equalization and strengthened bilateral cooperation are the overarching goals of the grant schemes (EEA and Norway Grants n.d-c).

Due to considerations of delimitations in depth and scope, this study will investigate the Promociona and companies against violence (CAV)\(^3\)-project which belonged to the Gender Mainstreaming and Work-Life Balance programme. They were established by the EEA Grants in the middle of 2013 and are still operational (EEA grants 2014, p. 136). Promociona encourages the recruitment of more female Spanish business employees to senior executive boards and the boardroom based on the problem that women have a lesser tendency to being promoted in high corporate positions (Nordic Consulting Group

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\(^1\) 2009-2014 marks the intended time scope of the fourth funding/programme period. In reality it officially ended in the middle of 2017. I decided to use the timespan 2009-2014 in line with the accessible literature.

\(^2\) Ireland and Northern Ireland also received EEA grants from 1994-2003 (EEA and Norway Grants n.d-a).

\(^3\) Named CAV for the sake of simplicity. A project description of this project is unavailable on the EEA Grants Project Portal. See Puig Syversen & Blas Miranda 2016 p. 85.
Promociona received €800.000 over 30 months from 2013-2015. CAV aims to counter gender-based violence through providing work for victims. The two phases of the project were exchanges of Best Practices and social awareness-building to optimize a coordinated response between municipalities in collaboration with public and private organisations. CAV received €120.000 from 2013-2016 (Syversen & Blas Miranda 2016, p. 85-89). Awareness of the very wide-ranging nature of good governance and performance does that employee experiences of the project undertakings and factors that are interpreted as being most important for its performance in their respective contexts will be focused upon (Doornbos 2001; Noordegraaf 2015, p. 70).

There are also limitations to this study. I aim to look into two out of 71 projects in the Gender Mainstreaming and Work-Life Balance programme conducted in Spain where hundreds of employees are expected to have worked (Nordic Consulting Group 2016, p. 69). I have done semi-structured interviews via Skype with three of the employees. Respondent 1 worked closely with the Promociona project, respondent 2 worked closely with the Gender Mainstreaming and Work-Life Balance programme and respondent 3 worked closely with the CAV-project during the 2009-2014 funding period. Importantly, the programme was additionally realized in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Poland, Portugal, Romania and Slovenia (Nordic Consulting Group 2016, p.4). More than 400 projects were funded in six different areas in Spain during the fourth period (Puig Syversen & Blas Miranda 2016, p. 61). Therefore, I cannot generalize my findings.

Without excluding the possibility that a high degree of good governance was attained in prior funding periods; a stronger certainty of the assumption persist in the fourth funding period as a results-based management system was introduced for all the involved organisations where the amount of performance indicators were decreased and their quality increased. Notwithstanding, the good governance guidelines of the grants scheme does not concretize nor fully distinguish its significance from governance and arguably ends up giving management a larger reach than it should get (EEA and Norway Grants 2015a, p. 77-80). I will instead propose to use management and governance in a complementary fashion by adding a process-based governance mindset because both make up a substantial explanatory power on project success (Joslin & Müller 2015; Thomson & Perry 2006, p. 22). Governance can be understood as what an organisation does and what it ought to be in the future. Management is how organisations will achieve those goals and ambitions (ResearchGate 2013). Even though the monitoring functions are hard to split from each other they must be treated separately (Too & Weaver 2014, p. 1387).

These activities and responsibilities were transferred and materialized by financial contributions from the grants that incentivized organisational representatives to embark on social initiatives that bit by bit reduced inequities in Spain through the interorganisational partnerships that unfolded between the wide variety of organizations that formed and entered the management structure of the EEA grants scheme⁴. See country information in appendix I. Since I will uncover the inner workings of the projects inside the Gender Mainstreaming and Work-Life Balance programme, I will concentrate on interactions and other actions between the programme operator and the donor programme partner at the programme level, and especially the project promoters and donor partners at the project level (EEA and Norway Grants 2015a, p. 78-79). I test the

⁴ See a supplementary description of the management structure of the EEA grants in appendix II.
analytical framework by applying a step-by-step approach to first look inside and then uncovering the performance black box for the analysis of the Promociona and CAV-project with the assistance of publicly available results. In doing so I rely on the thought to illustrate the throughput phase between inputs of aid flows and development outputs as a black box in a causal chain (Bourguignon & Sundberg 2007; Arndt, Jones & Tarp 2011). Good governance impacts positively on results (Bourguignon & Sundberg 2007, p. 318).

A necessary starting task is to define concepts that works as scaffolds to address good governance convincingly for qualitative EEA grants research. Although the concepts that will guide this study have not been applied together, EU performance studies associated to the EU objective of supporting good governance flourish. These kinds of studies originated in the business management literature (Oberthür, Jørgensen & Shahin 2012, p. 2, 40). Nonetheless transferable, sizable research engagements in the EEA grants studies field are missing. A black box can be seen as a situation where the middle stage of a system inadequately explains neither the coherence nor the exerted activities between the starting and ending stage (Bunge 1963; Cauer, Mathis & Pauli 2000). Inside the black box, management and governance arguably regulate employee behaviours in a workplace context and performance denotes to its worth from monitoring (Ul Haq, Liang, Gu, Du & Zhao 2018, p. 277-278). Management can be comprehended as resource consumption of managers to fulfil public or private necessities (Noordegraaf 2015, p.5). Governance can be interpreted as the skillset of employees working in organisational partnerships to boost accomplishments and maximize proficiencies from resource consumption (Brinkerhoff & Brinkerhoff 2011, p. 4-5). Performance can be defined as the motivation and wiggle-room of an individual or group to act in a given context depending on necessities and capabilities (Stannack 1996, p. 38-39).

Many wonders about the performance of the EEA Grants as good governance aid. A positive sign is that it creates multiple public-private partnerships5 (PPPs) across the beneficiary and recipient countries that take shape around different programme fields and targets (EEA and Norway Grants n.d-d). PPPs are required to find solutions to societal problems and are tools to promote good governance. A permanent issue is how much public and company profits that PPPs generate (Brinkerhoff & Brinkerhoff 2011, p.2).To start off a project, the National Focal Point offices allocate financial contributions received by recipient governments to non-governmental organisations (NGOs). NGOs from a beneficiary country then frequently choose to appoint NGOs from a recipient country to initiate projects (Brekke 2017). The appointed NGOs can then invite private organisations to administer projects together. Donor partners from a beneficiary country support in overcoming hurdles that might put PPPs on hold in any phase of the project processes. National Focal Point offices keep an eye on how the money is spent (EEA and Norway Grants 2015a, p. 78-79).

The Promociona and CAV-project were arguably products of PPP cooperation. In the former, the Norwegian Equality and Anti-Discrimination Ombud (LDO) first cooperated with the Section of Equal opportunities who was replaced by the Spanish Institute for Women. Subsequently the Spanish Institute for Women asked the Corporation of Spanish Business Organisations (CEOE) to participate. In the latter, the LDO invited South Odal

5 The EEA Grants can also facilitate the creation of Civil Society Organization (CSO) – public/private partnerships (Szábo 2013, p. 59-64).
municipality to learn from the Spanish State Secretary of Equality and Social Services. South-Odal municipality for example reinforces its cooperation with Maarud which a Norwegian manufacturer of snack foods (Puig Syversen & Blas Miranda 2016, p. 85). In other words, the CEOE and Maarud decided to use parts of their corporate social responsibility (CSR) quota on the projects. CSR engagement are actions that go broader than financial aims and are mandatory by law (Harajoto & Jo 2011, p. 45).

At the end of the 2009-2014 period, questions were raised on the back of negative media portrayals about what effects the EEA grants actually had. Possible misuse was put a biased focus on rather than use. This viewpoint originated when Norwegian journalists caught the attention of signs on churches, castles, kindergartens and monuments around Eastern Europe that said that they were financed by the EEA (and Norway) grants. It led them to unknowingly ask what the grants were. Basic information about the “Norwegian voluntary membership fee” as part of the EEA agreement and the fact that it has amounted for 38 billion euros worth of Norwegian taxpayer money, made them critically dig into projects of the scheme to know with more certainty how the money was utilized (Thorenfeldt 2018, p. 3-4). Nonetheless, the road to gain access to information was tough especially into irregularity cases. Information were kept secret as the FMO abides to European Free Trade Area (EFTA) legislation for inspection of documents and not the Norwegian freedom of information act (Venli & Thorenfeldt 2017). By and large, several recipient countries showed more openness than the EFTA countries (Thorenfeldt & Christiansen 2017).

Broadly speaking, the EEA grants scheme originated as a lending and surplus arrangement with the ratification of the EEA Agreement in 1994 and became a pure financial arrangement named the EEA and Norway Grants from 2004. Only EEA grants were given to Spain (NOU 2012:2, p. 75). Over the course of 25 years, Norway has somewhat reluctantly been more frequently denoted as an informal EU member on the notion that national bureaucrats manoeuvre themselves gradually less outside and more inside its structures. The development is caused by a steady transfer of EU laws into Norwegian legislation. A continuous question surrounds to what degree the EU is a danger to Norway´s distinctiveness and sovereignty. Grants giving without formal EU membership has until further ado thus provided Norway with consent to conduct trade on identical premises as member states in the European Single Market (Eriksen 2015, p. 87-89).

Spain, as all beneficiary countries, was eligible for EEA Grants because its gross national income (GNI) was under 90% of the EU average (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2015; The World Bank Group n.d-a) In 2014, the pooling of EEA Grants to Spain was finished because of a rapid national economic growth from 2013 on that exceeds the EU average (Regjeringen 2016;The World Bank Group n.d-b). Spain received €45.85 million in the 2009-2014 period and about €375 million in total (Regjeringen 2016). Remarkably, Spain has under the similar eligibility criteria almost received €200.000 million from EU cohesion funds since 1989 (European Commission 2016). The grants scheme has been renegotiated periodically every fifth year (Regjeringen n.d) and has partly by Spanish interest mobilization encompassed an enormous rise in allocation of resources. Spain was granted a special transitional arrangement from the 1st of May 2009 to the 31st of December 2013 because the EUs cohesion funds was phased out simultaneously (Utenriksdepartementet 2010, p. 2,4). Spain was the country that received by far the most grants to the Gender Mainstreaming and Work-Life Balance programme with an amount of €10.191.250. Seventy-five percent of 71 projects had
positive effects that were likely to continue beyond the funding period (EEA and Norway Grants n.d-e).

This study present considerable evidence to support the claim that a high degree of good governance was achieved in the EEA grants to Spain from 2009-2014 because of a professional PPP collaboration around CSR activities and Best Practices that displayed themselves in an overload of positive performance experiences from management and governance conducts. Common success factors backs these findings.

The present thesis consists of nine chapters. Chapter two offers a justification, proposing for the sake of research to detach oneself from an accentuated results-based approach which manages for results and rather use it alongside a process-based approach which governs for results to understand the black box better. Chapter three discusses the incentives of Norway and Spain to engage in gender-based violence and work-life balance projects. Chapter four assesses the existing research, arguing that this study has a high academic and societal relevance in terms of its new perspective on the EEA grants including Spain as focal point. The fifth chapter presents insights from casual input, throughput and output theories. The input subsection, shows to what extent good governance is a “good” concept, evaluates strategies using earmarked grants and conditions for successful socialization. The throughput subsection describes process performance, project management and project governance. The subsection on outputs considers critical success factors and value originating from collaborative project processes. Chapter six explain the methodological considerations. Chapter seven debates how 20 years of gender mainstreaming advancements in the EU, Spain and Norway has affected the EEA Grants scheme. Chapter eight analyses the findings on employee perceptions of the performance in the Promociona and CAV project. The ninth chapter argues that a high degree of good governance was achieved in the EEA grants to Spain from 2009-2014 as a high performance coincides with good results.
2. Justification and Innovation of the Study

This thesis is justified on two grounds. The first idea is to introduce the phenomenon of a black box into EEA Grants research. The second idea is to tone down the already established framework strategy of managing for results and rather highlight governing for results to better understand EEA-funded project processes.

2.1 Integrating Black Box Thinking into the EEA Grants Result-Based Management Framework

One of three figures that will guide this thesis is that of a black box (see Figure 1 on the next page). The purpose of a black box can be to illustrate situations where the inner processes of a system are unknown and ignored. Then the inner process naturally occurs in between inputs and outputs. The inner process is exclusively concerned with the human behaviours inside the system (Bunge 1963; Cauer, Mathis & Pauli 2000). Humans are incomprehensive decision-makers and inconsistently rigorous about finding optimal solutions because of cognitive biases and ineptitude. Human behaviour thus unpredictably increases and decreases performances (Björk 2018, p. 49). Management and governance seemingly regulate human behaviours in a workplace context, while performance pinpoint the quality (Ul Haq, Liang, Gu, Du & Zhao 2018, p. 277-278).

National aid and grants schemes are arguably one of many reasonable examples where one may encounter fragmented, classified and even technical information that makes it impossible or difficult to comprehend the work that has been put in to forge results. When financial institutions claim to be successful, they regularly point out that involved organisations meet public growth needs and rarely portray first-hand experiences of employees (Arndt, Jones & Tarp 2011, p. 8). Although not entirely unknown, it allows the possibility for a systematic exploration of what is known based on the fact that national grants schemes constitute knowledge gaps for the general public but those who for instance actively worked in the Promoción and CAV project knows the internal project processes well (Bourguignon & Sundberg 2007, p. 317-319). I will pursue to understand the black box of these projects along links in a casual result chain by interviewing employees who were engaged in them and thereby trace experiences that happens at and between the micro and meso level. The reasons for concentrating on project processes and quality to explain project successes is defended in the next sub-section.
2.2 Defending the Applicability of a Process-Based Governance Framework

An appropriate performance assessment system is arguably not established in the EEA grants scheme besides compiling a guidance document for core input and output indicators in the current funding period (EEA and Norway Grants 2018). The FMO emphasizes that all organisations within the donor and recipient countries in the 2009-2014 programme period focused on managing for results (EEA and Norway Grants n.d-f). Notably, in this thesis, I argue that managing for results is an insufficient procedure to viably use any adjective describing the EEA Grants domain without governing for results. Logically backing this argument requires a clarification of what it signifies to manage for results. An evidence-based approach is taken to know what measures that works well and what could be done better to reach stipulated goals. Evaluation is the preferred tool to inspect achievements of results (EEA and Norway Grants 2017, p. 41). The result-based management chain is illustrated in Figure 2.

![Black Box model for the analysis of the Promociona and CAV project](image)

**Figure 1: Black Box model for the analysis of the Promociona and CAV project**


![EEA Grants Results Chain](image)

**Figure 2: EEA Grants Results Chain**

The results chain demonstrates the predicted causal relation between facets over time (EEA and Norway Grants n.d-g). It is constructed by tracing macro indicators and data to comprehend in what ways the grants can make a difference and by hypothesising that the grants contribute indirectly to national development progress. The results chain consists of five mutually dependent facets. Those marked in red are resources, while those marked in blue are results. “Inputs” are funds, personnel, expertise and knowledge. "Activities" are noted just as being necessary action to achieve outputs, not as the vital employee effort that is a binding glue to keeping the cycle together since the facet is affected by inputs and affects results. “Outputs” are deliveries produced from programme interventions, Outcomes are short- and medium-term objectives “Objective” is long-term objectives. To know what the results are, the development effectiveness is measured to retrieve short-, medium- and long-term results. The effectiveness is measured by tracking the evolution of programmes towards results. Additional efforts are done to safeguard the operationality of the framework. To demystify how the funds are spent, an unremitting update is done on what the strategic focus of the grants are. The focus of the grants is delineated to concern civil society and gender mainstreaming spin-offs (EEA and Norway Grants n.d-f).

Even though prevailing policy wordings correctly presents good governance as a cross-cutting issue, it is treated as a dependent variable of management next to resources (EEA and Norway Grants 2005, p. 3, 8-10)⁶. Managing means to apply knowledge, skills, tools and techniques to activities in line with set requirements (Rowlings n.d). This is a mainstream organisational approach not exclusively in a grants-giving context, where inputs and results are strongly accentuated. The approach is built on internal and external pressures to prevent corruption, monitor risks, offer training and capacity-building seminars and ultimately deliver results (EEA and Norway Grants 2017, p. 42; Noordegraaf 2015, p. 18). Consequently, good governance is explained as a vague top-down meso-level term anchored in performance principles (EEA and Norway Grants 2005, p.3). It corresponds to a focus on mechanisms at the organisational level where performance indicators imposed on employees are designed to translate complicated challenges into quantifiable and measurable data (Van der Waldt 2012, p. 90-91). This composition could be said to have commonalities to the trend which failed to work out as planned in the post-cold war era, namely posing political conditionalities as a bargaining chip to induce good governance in donor and recipient aid partnerships (Doornbos 2001, p. 107).

### 2.3 Applying a Process-Based Governance Framework

On the contrary, it is proposed to see governance as a dependent variable of good governance thereby interpreting it as a bottom-up micro-level term anchored in performance practices⁷(Van der Waldt 2012, p. 91). Governing means elevating the success rate of activities and optimizing return on investment (Rowlings n.d). This is an innovative research approach alongside managing in performance assessment, because

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⁶ Result-based Management (Y)=Good Governance (X1) and Resources (X2)
⁷ Process-based Governance (Y)= Performance (X1) and Results (X2) (Rotberg 2014).

Practices are deliberate actions that an individual or group can conduct on the basis of habitual patterns and skills improvements (Cambridge Dictionary n.d).
they constitute intersections between sociology, organizational psychology and political science (Lewis 2015).

By integrating a governance logic, I discharge hidden knowledge on how and why the money was translated into societal value based on qualitative data. Organisational employees determines whether money is used for its intended purpose or not through their practices. Good governance is chosen to be released from its political conditionalities and broken down to objectively analyse the internally alleged project successes of Promociona and CAV (Doornbos 2001, p. 107). Good governance can be defined as an elastic policy ideal that the world community strives towards in order to ensure sustainable development even though it is difficult to achieve in its totality (UNESCAP 2009, p.3). At the macro level, it depends on national governments ability to integrate international Best Practices. At the meso level, it depends on organisational and institutional ability to integrate organisational Best Practices. Meanwhile, at the micro level it depends on employees’ abilities to integrate Best Practices. Best Practices are procedures that are accepted as being most correct or effective. A common denominator is that performers manage and govern with links to optimality. Best Practices can therefore be judged as decisive means to achieve good governance in PPPs. Any level of good governance is earned not given (Van der Waldt 2012, p.88-89). Figure 3 offers an overview of the three levels.

![Figure 3: The Levels of Good Governance](source: Adapted from Van der Waldt 2012, p. 88.)

Mechanisms at the micro level, on which this study focuses, do that performance is built through employee socialization directed at managing and governing that are visible from qualitative and measurable data (Van der Waldt 2012 p. 91-94). Which performance that outplay themselves inside collaborative project processes varies. Regardless, they are expected to surround best practices (Van der Waldt 2012 p. 91-94). In other words, positive memories are expected to be triggered on the basis of professional practices. (Van der Waldt 2012, p.88). However, the performance perceptions must be supplemented by quantitative data to make any holistic sense out of project cycles. Combining the static nature of management and the dynamic nature of governance can constitute a creative platform to gather existing quantifiable proof to underline qualitative explanatory factors (Thompson & Perry 2006 p. 24). They are separate, but management...
can be understood as the necessary base that bring about governance action (Too & Weaver 2014, p. 1387).

Since thorough projects descriptions are reasonably accessible if one puts in the exertion, it is a task that the FMO, the Norwegian Embassy in Spain or the involved companies themselves can explain better. They have arguably not published this due to a large workload and priority evaluations (Noordegraaf 2015, p. 81). Measuring is an unnecessary and too vast task for this thesis. It would mean to disclaim convincing evidence-based results achieved by the workforce involved in the EEA grants scheme. Embarking on such a demanding measuring quest of good governance would encompass digging into databases, read models properly, constructing aggregate indicators and interpret levels, changes and trends (Besançon 2003). Then there is a risk that the retrieved data has a low explanatory power with what I want to know (Doornbos 2001, p 95-97). By confirming a high degree of good governance from a high project performance, on the other hand, demands me to trace employee impressions of the level of performance in the projects. I will then have a high certainty of revealing answers with a high explanatory power with what I want to know (Landy, Barnes & Murphy 1978; London, Mone & Scott 2004). A process-based governance framework (see Figure 4) is suggested that sheds light on the value for money of performance practices to reinforce this perspective further.

![Figure 4: Process-based Governance Framework](source)

By relying on these considerations, empirical data will be provided that later may evolve into a theoretical framework for characteristics of (successful) EEA Grants-funded projects. Replication studies could be done to test if this ambition holds true or not.

In this justifying section, I built a process-based governance framework to supplement and thereby unlock explanatory power to the existing results-based management framework about proclaimed project successes recurring from the experiences of organisational employees. I will confirm that a high performance was achieved in the Promociona and CAV projects.
3. Reasons for Giving and Receiving EEA Grants within the Gender Mainstreaming and Work-Life Balance Programme

In the Gender Mainstreaming and Work-Life Balance programme the LDO were the donor programme partner, the State Secretariat for Social Services and Equality was the programme operator. The significance of the international environment during the 2009-2014 is evaluated. Furthermore, the complementary nature of interests is highlighted and traditions of utilizing aid as a foreign policy tool is compared by drawing parallels to the UN grants scheme targeting gender equality and violence against women. Recurring from aid and grants schemes are persistent value for money dilemmas.

Norway seemingly gives EEA grants as a strategy to lessen the Norwegian EU membership question in the public sphere. Spain received grants to strengthen its ability to combat constant social challenges. In the 2009-2014 funding period an additional reason to reduce the amount of social damages caused by the global economic recession emerged (Puig Syversen & Blas Miranda 2016, p. 8-11). General mutual needs were reflected in common needs to improve gender mainstreaming and work-life balance conditions as gender equality advance economic growth (European Institute of Gender Equality 2017). Even if Spain is presumably at the forefront of countries in improving gender equality in Europe and is a principal priority by the current Spanish government, it was treated as of secondary importance during the global economic crisis when austerity measures were adopted (Fajardo 2014, p. 262). This degrading triggered an unfortunate situation in which the social policy concern was left aside to supposedly more urgent policy themes. Notably, the reprioritization continued after the economic downturn since Spain was among the worst struck by the crisis (Lombardo & León 2014). Therefore, Spanish gender policies are vulnerable and haves an uncertain future ahead (Salazar Benítez 2016).

This troubling situation is confirmed by the Global Gender Gap Index which shows a decreased gender equality ratio in Spain during the global financial crisis. In 2011 the index was 0,758 and in 2013 it was 0.7266, while a stable ratio of around 0.74 has followed in the years up until today (World Economic Forum 2011, p.8; World Economic Forum 2013, p. 8; World Economic Forum 2016, p. 10; World Economic Forum 2018, p. 10). Constant country-specific variables worth knowing are said to be machismo and corruption. One may for instance argue that the problems outplayed themselves under Franco’s dictatorship and still characterize Spain as having one of the most “macho” cultures and corrupt societies in Europe (LeVere 2016, p. 39-41; Transparency International 2008-2014; Transparency International 2015a; Transparency International 2016-2018).

Norway is, together with the Nordic states, a forerunner on gender equality. The global economic crisis had minimal impact on levels of gender equality. A main reason is the existence of the Nordic welfare state model since the 1950s. A core premise for Norway’s good performance is a steady flow of oil incomes and capital exports to deficit countries (Gustavsson 2011). This trend is affirmed by the Global Gender Gap Index which shows

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8 The scale in the Global Gender Gap Index goes from 0-1, i.e. total gender inequality to total gender equality.
an approximately unchanged gender equality ratio in the last decade of about 0.84. Markedly, Norway thus struggle to improve the condition of women significantly the last nine years (Transparency International 2008-2014; Transparency International 2015a; Transparency International 2016-2018).

A high mutual need of financial cooperation, mutual learning and experience sharing was therefore present between Norway and Spain (EEA and Norway Grants n.d-h). Economic recessions are temporary incidents that arguably hit women harder than men (Bristøl 2009). This discrepancy is for instance evident in regard to achieving and maintaining top positions and chances of experiencing domestic violence increases if women are unemployed or are at risk of losing their job even though women are at a disadvantage from the outset (Schneider, Harknett & McLanahan 2016; Anderberg, Rainer, Wadsworth & Wilson 2015). The percentage of women in top positions in Norway increased from 34.1% to 37.9% from 2009-2016 while it decreased from 33.2% to 31.2% in Spain (FN-Sambandet n.d). Spanish women are overrepresented in blue-collar jobs and underrepresented in white-collar jobs. Accordingly, Spain wanted to emulate Norway´s quota law for women in corporate boards. Norway´s quota law passed through Parliament in November 2003 and stipulated that all large-scale companies had to form corporate boards with a 40% female representation. By the end of 2007, all large-scale companies managed to reach the target. Additional mainstreaming efforts of the law have gone faster in Norway than in Spain (Hoel 2008, p. 84-86).

Gender mainstreaming means to adopt a gender perspective into all policy areas. The public policy concept is an essentially contested concept since it is constructed by two contrasting positions, namely "gender equality" and "mainstream". Therefore, there exist a disagreement on its definition, including the extent to which the concept can describe the interplay between gender equality and mainstream agendas. In theory, it is a strategy of revising key concepts to comprehend a gendered world, while in practice it is a tool to promote gender equality (Walby 2005, p. 321-322). At the programme level in Spain, 3760 vulnerable women took part in employment advancement activities, 87 companies signed an initiative to get more women in companies and 38 awareness raising initiatives were reinforced on the gender pay gap (EEA Grants 2016b).

In the Promocion-a-project, the CEOE accepted to pioneer and facilitate the entry of women into corporate boards of Spanish business organizations on a proposal from the Spanish Institute for Women which wanted to extend an initiative from the Norwegian project called “Female Future” as it delivered favourable results (Puig Syversen & Blas Miranda 2016, p. 88-89). Short-term effects were awareness-raising and institutional campaigns, personal and professional empowering and transformation into a platform for constructive forum sessions. Medium-term effects are multiplier effects and more women accessing top positions in corporate boards. The long-term objective is to improve gender balance on company boards throughout Spain (Nordic Consulting Group 2016, p. 68). As of November 2016, 25% of the participants were promoted (EEA and Norway Grants 2014, p. 74).

Gender-based violence is a big Norwegian health problem (Amnesty International 2012). About 5.4% of Norwegian women annually report that they experience sexual, physical or psychological violence although the real amount is estimated to be much bigger (Kleiven 2011, p.25). Norwegian representatives wished to emulate Spain´s progressive

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9 The UN indicators for Sustainable Development goal number 5 is measured from 0% to 100%, i.e. no females in top leading positions to equal share of females and males in top leading positions.
legislation on gender-based violence (EEA and Norway Grants n.d-c). The Organic Law 1/2004 on Integrated Protection Measures against Gender Violence encompasses awareness raising, rights protection of victims of domestic violence, improvements of institutional framework and new criminal and legal procedures (Agencia Estatal Boletín Oficial del Estado 2004). In practice it provides an integrated support system for victims of gender-based violence in the labour market, which Norway lacked (Puig Syversen & Blas Miranda 2016, p. 85). The UN has formerly criticised Norway for lacking concrete measures against gender-based violence directed at women and demanded improvements (Amnesty International 2012). A research report by the Norwegian Ministry of Children and Equality found that 29% of Norwegian women and 15% of Norwegian men have been victims to psychological, psychical, sexual or digital violence (Bufdir 2018). That is higher than the EU average for women of 27,5% (European Institute of Gender Equality 2017, p. 31).

In Spain at least 917 women have been killed due to violence-related crimes since 2003 (Público 2017). However, Spain´s total level is beneath the EU average, namely 25,2% (European Institute of Gender Equality 2017, p.31). Remarkably, it is by far the EU country where most women have seen or heard of campaigns against violence against women (European Union Agency of Fundamental Rights 2015, p. 161-162). In the CAV-project, the short-term effect was that representants from the Municipality of South-Odal created a model after experience-sharing in Spain that assures decent local security webs for women10. The medium-term effect was that the model was integrated in Spanish municipalities and in the Municipality of South-Odal. 45 organisations have promised to incorporate victims of gender-based violence in their workforce. Meanwhile, the long-term objective is to distribute the model to other Norwegian municipalities (Puig Syversen & Blas Miranda 2016, p. 85). For instance, it has been distributed to the Municipality of Bodø11.

A profound challenge in creating value for money for foreign grants and aid schemes is the ability to refer to documented transformations, such as on gender equality, in receiving societies. Wide-ranging evidence are requested of quantitative information, but to guarantee that placed measures are preventive thorough qualitative information must complement quantifiable findings. Foreign grants and aids systems are very dissimilar; reporting is done distinctively; and results are interpreted in different ways which makes facts ungeneralizable. Research commitments are encouraged to present insightful perspectives that may close this knowledge gap (Lindstad 2018).

Norwegian governments in the post war era optimized financial aid as a foreign policy tool by matching or surpassing all Western nations on per capita contributions and thereby gained recognition as good global citizens (Apodaca 2017, p.8). Spanish governments were slow to give aid to other than ex-colonies before the millennial shift when devotion to the EU ordinary development assistance and the UN Grants scheme programme targeting gender equality and violence against women among others suddenly escalated. One can hold that Spain reacted swiftly because it realized the diplomatic gains of promoting aid as a foreign policy tool. One general reason for the implementation of a global aid and grants schemes at distinct points in time may be due to Norway´s status as small power and Spain´s status as a middle power (Donor Tracker n.d; European ODA 2012). Norway have financial means to put it into action and may

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10 See the South-Odal model in appendix III
11 See the Salten model in appendix IV
have a greater awareness that foreign aid can bring soft power (Aaser & De Soysa 2016, p. 10).

As of 2005, both states responded to security mechanisms within the aforementioned UN Grants scheme (UN Women 2015). This investment incites another challenge to produce value for money. Whether the Norwegian government in 2011 managed to obtain the quality assurance it demanded in comparison to the size of its annual UN grants scheme is highly doubtful. The Foreign Minister stressed that the UN would be held accountable for the uncovered inconsistencies in quality and control of the measures and ordered zero tolerance for bad governance and poor resource usage (Lindstad 2011). Nonetheless, similar discrepancies, have manifested themselves between good governance guidelines and realities of EEA Grants operations (Hågensen 2013; Thorenfeldt & Christiansen 2017). How then are employees working together to prevent these scenarios and optimize profits?

As has been shown, Norway gives the grants to keep the EEA agreement unchanged. Spain received the grants to establish benign social balance measures that impacts on economic growth creation which eventually reached a distinguished level in 2013. In the 2009-2014 funding period, an additional reason arose due to the detrimental effects the global financial crisis had on Spain. LDO participated in the programme on a need to help overcome a halt in significant overall progress on gender mainstreaming, learn how to prevent gender-based violence and increase work-life balance. The State Secretariat for Social Services and Equality participated in the programme on a need to improve and safeguard gender mainstreaming, spread knowledge on how to prevent gender-based violence and increase work-life balance. Norway’s foreign policy is rooted in using development support as foreign policy tool while Spain’s foreign policy integrated the strategy around the millennium shift. Lastly, the persistent value for money dilemmas are national capacity to refer to documented changes in recipient countries and trust in monitoring mechanisms.
4. Research

There are two clusters of research that characterizes the field, namely internal donor debates and operational performance and results and coexistence with EU Structural Funds in Eastern European recipient countries. I defy the rules of a literature review in this section by intermeshing academic, non-academic and scholarly research. The purpose is to provide a first intent to gather all the research on the EEA and Norway grants and mark gaps that future research endeavours can close. Furthermore, the recapitulation is an illuminating walkthrough for those with and without prior knowledge of the grant schemes. The existing research on the EEA and Norway Grants establishes a connection between operational performance, expressed through factors and results in a sample of Eastern European EU member states.

The first sub-section reviews the current literature research on internal donor debates and operational performance, arguing that it is in the Norwegian political interest to maintain the EEA agreement and that further investments into the EEA grants might be the optimal instrument to gather added values of operating as an apparently integrated European nation. One should nonetheless have in mind that these features are comparable to Norway’s global supportive actions. The second sub-section reviews the existing literature on results and cohabitation with EU Structural Funds in Eastern European recipient countries, arguing that the EEA Grants is a significant fundament to trigger promising changes in Eastern European societies through appropriate use intended at maximizing value for money. However, there are no signs that Eastern European countries who also get EU Structural Funds evaluate the financial arrangements differently. All sections clarify that discourse analysis is habitually used in the study of the EEA and Norway grants. Few studies relate to project performance. No scholarly research focuses solely on the EEA grants, the 2009-2014 funding period, improving gender mainstreaming and work-life balance initiatives or use Spain as focal point.

4.1 Internal Donor Debates and Operational Performance

The EEA and Norway grants have been and still are to a very small extent an academic research interest, but it is also to a larger extent a field where expert groups get hired to provide more knowledge. Approximately 25 years’ experience of supplying the grants to development projects in Eastern and Southern European regions have shown the schemes capabilities but also challenges articulated by the involved donor and recipient countries. This evolution is chiefly tracked by primary documents and newspaper articles (EEA and Norway Grants n.d.-i; Thorenfeldt 2018).

In an institutionalist discourse analysis of the political portrayal of the financial arrangements under the EEA Agreement between 1992-2014, Skogheim (2015) found that considerable increases in the Norwegian financial contributions to European equalization sparked clear changes in the political rhetoric. The discursive changes could be seen as intents by the Norwegian government to justify the increases in financial contributions, because the solidarity-based portrayal of the financial arrangements was the least effective and marks a contrast from the strong idealist Norwegian foreign policy tradition. The Norwegian payments to the 2009-14 financial arrangement of the EEA
Grants were a strategic interest-based instrument to strengthen bilateral relations. This manifested itself in government statements. The possibilities that the programmes provided to Norwegian actors were stressed.

Meanwhile, the Foreign and Defence Committee focused on aspects of the practical completion. Corruption risks was one amongst them. Therefore, the Committee highlighted the importance of openness, transparency and sufficient control in the processes associated to the EEA Grants, in addition to the Norwegian right to suspend contributions and demand return payments of Grants if inconsistencies or corruption were to be uncovered in the funded projects. Norway applied this right to end its transfers to Hungary in May of 2014 (Skogheim 2015).

Nevertheless, the political argumentation contains a wish to uphold the solidarity principle. Even though Norway is not legally obliged to give grants after 2009, the transfers have continued due to an elitist decision that it is in the Norwegian interest to contribute in decreasing socioeconomical disparities within European states that are suffering gravely from economic recessions, and that the scheme is a prerequisite to maintain access to the European Single Market. However, politicians cannot decide if a permanent financial arrangement is in line with Norwegian interests. Norwegian newspapers devoted most attention to the EEA and Norway grants in 2008, leading up to the 2009-2014 funding period (Skogheim 2015).

A common Norwegian EEA debate is about the continuity and the size of the grants. Even though Norway dares to both object and adapt to EUs demands, the EEA grants have increased almost exponentially. The recipient countries, spearheaded by Spain, managed to convince the EU in the autumn of 1998 that the financial arrangement was to be extended five more years, after initial disagreements between the EFTA countries on whether it was worth extending. Knowingly, the reinvigorated support amounted for 119,6 million euros and was given to Portugal, Greece, the Irish Republic, Northern Ireland and Spain strictly directed at subsidies. Overall, this instance provides just a taste of the asymmetrical relationship between Norway and the EU that marked the 2004-2009 negotiations which arguably caused the tenfold rise in Norwegian contributions. The EU could define the conditions for further cooperation, because Norway had a need to extend the EEA Agreement. There existed a political will to financially support the Eastern enlargement. Norway did not seem to have a proper vision of the EUs desires and were ultimately surprised about the emphasis on money (Gjessing Værnes 2006).

The funding strategies of the donor countries changed considerably from 1999-2009 as the EEA negotiations unfolded. The lending arrangement was ended in 1999 and from 2004-2009 the Grants targeted comparatively fewer project with more financial support than what was done since 2009 on the grounds of strengthening bilateral relations, bolster risk management and maximize added values (Riksrevisjonen 2013). A risk management report for the EEA and Norway Grants in the 2009-2014 funding period finds that its risk management level was satisfactory at an established maturity level, but under the recommended advanced level. The function of the framework corresponds to a medium potential to produce values and prevent risks. Regulations for risk management are operative. A risk management team is formed. Strategies and objectives are integrated. The risk competence is adequate. A verifiability structure is operative through letter of allotment including necessity reporting. The reporting has an insufficient emphasis on risks and measures. Templates for risk evaluations are integrated.
Dissimilar risk scales and standards are utilized in the grant schemes. Explanations of scales and standards for risk evaluations are unclear. A system to certify risk evaluations is operational, but the description is unsubtle. A "lesson learned culture" is implemented (Ernst & Young 2011). Public desires of openness on the EEA Grants were met more than ever before, under and after the fourth funding period, as evaluation reports were published by appointed consultant firms to assess the programme quality, decide whether the grants provide the desired results and to secure transparency and accountability (EEA and Norway Grants n.d-i).

Correspondingly, a qualitative survey study on the status of bilateral relations in the EEA and Norway grants, Kruse & Kaya (2013) shows that 67% of the respondents who worked for a Donor Programme Partner consider the bilateral objective to be very important. Following an assessment of the power of Norwegian financial contributions, Johnsen & Rieker (2015) state that although the grants give Norway a considerable degree of soft power when negotiating with recipient states, there exist a lack of empirical evidence of soft power outcome in addition to a lack of interest and a strategic approach among national politicians to the grants. A report on the participation and values of EU programmes in the Norwegian municipality sector highlights that approximately twenty-eight municipalities and 7 regional municipalities participated in giving EEA Grants during the 2009-14 funding period. Slovakia is the most common partner country for Norwegian municipalities in this program. There are approximately twenty-five municipalities that participates in interregional and EU-projects, while there are five municipalities who also participate in the sectoral programs. All the projects have elements of sustainability, which comes into effect in the shape of technical solutions, relationship-building including individual and group-specific learning (Schou & Indset 2015).

Seventy-three percent of respondents strongly agreed that awareness, attitudes and trust had increased through the EEA and Norway grants. Stakeholders increased their knowledge and mutual understanding of the partners’ culture and institutions (Lienkiewicz, Kakteniece, Nemec, Kusk & Irimia 2016). One mid-term evaluation maintains that Norway’s support of about 3.2 billion euros per 2014 encourages the legitimacy of the state membership of the European Single Market. Nevertheless, the EEA grants make up roughly 0.7% of the EU Cohesion Funds and 0.01-0.05% of the Gross Domestic Product of recipient states. The EU Cohesion Funds contributions was 2.1-4.9% (PriceWaterhouseCoopers 2008). Another mid-term report holds that NGO Funds are viewed positively and have addressed funding gaps including local challenges of the beneficiary states (Falconer et al. 2014). There was a lack of consistency in the monitoring and evaluation frameworks, which translates into a lack of consistency in the information sharing across the beneficiary countries. A reason for this gap is the confusion with the EU Structural Funds (Kitchener, Wrona & Watt 2016). Rampton et. al (2016) concluded that there was significant delay in the distribution and payment of funds during the fourth funding period. Only 68% of the funds had been transferred by May 2016 and were slowest in Hungary and Malta due to national governance issues.

Numerous projects aimed at improving the treatment of gender-based violence were realized in Spain under the Gender Mainstreaming and Work-Life Balance programmes. Besides the progress, Spain had still much strategic work to do to reach set targets. An

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assessment of the EEA and Norway grants support the Gender Mainstreaming and Work-Life Balance programmes highlight that the overall funding for gender equality is low in Portugal, Poland and Slovakia, but the programmes have responded to beneficiary needs. Effectiveness levels are often decided by how project interventions are combined (Nordic Consulting Group 2016). The EEA grants-funded culture programmes are popular and visible, beneficiary country demands have been high, many projects include a social dimension and there has been a high increase in the magnitude of bilateral cooperation in projects in comparison to the 2004-2009 funding period. It has helped to build capacity and increase international ties between cultural actors in the donor and beneficiary countries (Rampton & Carlberg et al. 2015).

4.2 Results and Coexistence with EU Structural Funds in Eastern European Recipient Countries

A research emphasis has been put on the effects of the grants in Hungary and Poland. The results of the EEA and Norway grants support to Roma inclusion and empowerment in Romania and Bulgaria demonstrate that around 50,000 Roma people from more than 360 Roma communities benefited from these initiatives. Interventions that worked particularly well were efforts at the local or community level, where Roma people live because they contained a strong empowerment objective (Milosheva-Krushe et. al 2013). A follow-up report found that the Roma NGOs applying and receiving grants will be higher than in the 2004-2009 funding period mainly due to mainstreaming efforts (PITIJA 2015). An overall assessment of the research programmes in the two final funding periods in Estonia, Poland and Romania claims that grant recipients and donor project partners are very satisfied with the collaborations supported through the EEA and Norway grants. There appears to be a high success rate among project teams supported by the EEA and Norway grants (Wroma, O’Carroll, Kitchener, Hoffmann & Dretcanu 2017).

Evidence from a comparison between the EEA grants pooled to environmental causes and the EU´s environmental financing scheme in the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary during 1994-99 holds that most applications of EEA grants were done within areas that are already covered by EU Structural Funds. As the EEA grants cover smaller projects than the EU Structural Funds, these funds have become popular amongst local municipalities. Even so popular that there were applications for ten times as many grants than what was announced. The EEA Grants has arguably become complementary to the EU Structural Funds (Cockbain 2006).

Nyvoll & Steinnes (2018) investigated what the role and effects of the Norway grants to the Latvian probation and prison service are in the Correctional Services programme. Through a qualitative discourse analysis and a constructivist approach to policy transfer, she uncovered empirical proof that trust, good structure of cooperation, informality and willingness to learn characterises the bilateral cooperation in the Norway grants. The projects on alternatives to imprisonment and establishment of a new prison block in Olaine prison, including construction and training of staff, were successful because the vast majority of indicators were reached in the programme process. The positive feedback from the media, the society and international correctional services and the lack of negative feedback explain the political success. Furthermore, the process success was a fact due to the changes of norms and values, the increased understanding of the
Norwegian correctional service mindset and that learning outcomes of the projects will be extended. Latvia has changed norms or perceptions during the cooperation with Norway because socialization took place and led to internationalization of norms and values.

The relationship between the EEA and Norway grants and Hungarian environmental NGOs was examined by Szabó (2013) during the 2004-2009 funding period. She specifically looked into how two CSOs, named Rakoshegy Airspace Association and Energiaklub, contributed to democratic processes with financial backing from the EEA and Norway Grants which enabled green organizations to pursue their policy agendas. Her findings suggest that the grants play a vital role, because it increased the negotiating capacities of the CSOs and makes them able to punch above their weight. Energiaklub used the Grants to achieve maximum effects through prompting a debate about the course energy policies should take, while Rakoshegy Airspace Association utilized it to finance activities such as publishing documents of public concerns, oversee legislative processes and noise impact levels. Rakoshegy Airspace Association fulfil the functions as a watchdog on how monitory democracy comes about. Energiaklub gave more leverage to the watchdog, because the organization started a rational-critical discourse on sustainable energy solutions.

A master’s dissertation examined what role the EEA and Norway grants have in terms of democratizing the Hungarian civil society by focusing on the 2004-2009 funding period. The author found that the civil society has enjoyed transfers from international donors and especially American donors up until the time before the regime change. Almost all the projects had activities that coincided with one or more functions in the framework where public communication was accentuated. The NGO-fund seems to have handled the given grants well, as they went to a range of organisations with different resource fundaments that were anchored in their local society or within their thematic field. The challenges the EEA and Norway grants for the pro-democratic functions to the organizations which receive it is that realistic expectations trump normative approaches when giving grants to civil societies. Links between civil society and democratization are complex. Contexts and institutional frames contribute in what kind of activities the civil society embark on. One needs to view civil society as a common sphere that collaboratively executes its activities. Notably, the Hungarian approach is the exact opposite. That might explain why the performance of EEA and Norway grants in the civil society was average in comparison to the amount of allocated funds (Lønsethagen 2013).

The two clusters of research establishes a connection between the EEA and Norway grants, operational performance and Eastern European EU member states. Norway consider it for the time being as an advantage to stay outside of the EU with the EEA Grants scheme intact. The costs are outweighed by the benefits of giving grants, even with the coexistence with the EU Structural Funds. However, the question of how and why throughput performance aligns textual and numbered results and provides explanatory power to a level of good governance is not stressed. It will be the main aim of this study to contribute in filling this research gap.
In the ensuing chapter I will take a look inside the black box by including presumed explanatory power from inputs, throughputs and outputs. The fundamental theoretical claim in this study is that good governance, which is practically impossible to achieve in its totality, is composed by performance and results. To solve the puzzle and interweave data on management and governance to uncover the black box of the two projects underlying theoretical considerations must be presented. First, what is meant with project success and how to delineate good governance as an omnipresent working principle is clarified. Then the input factors are put forward by problematizing earmarked grants in domestic and foreign spheres and criteria for successful socialization are presented. Next, throughput factors are unleashed by elaborating on process performance. Furthermore, output factors are demonstrated, and it is given a taste of a setting where money has produced high value.

5.1 The Meaning of Project Success

Even though academic research on the factors that relating to projects success stretches back to the 1960s, results are still not convincing. Academics differentiate between project success, project management success and project investment success. Project success is measured against overarching goals, while project management success has been measured against the widespread and traditional measures of performance against cost, time and quality (Cooke-Davies 2002, p. 185). This triple constraint is arguably outdated, due to a new shift from product creation to value creation. Project management success is instead an estimate of the performance of organisational employees in reaching the project plan as arbitrated by the project administrators. Project investment success is a measure of the real value created by the project investment as assessed by the project funder (ul Musawir, Serra, Zwikael & Ali 2017, p. 1661). A distinction is also made between success criteria and success factors. Success criteria are measures by which success or failure of a project will be judged. Success factors are inputs to the management system that directly or indirectly correlates to the success of a project (Cooke-Davies 2002, p. 185). Importantly, it seems to be the experience of applying comprehensive measures, criteria and factors and modify them to a given context of the organizational environment that counts for project success, not the use itself (Joslin & Müller 2015, p. 1388). The more compact stories that are repeated and the more experiences are shared from different contexts, the stronger one can argue for a programme success (Cooke-Davies 2002, p. 188).

5.2 Inputs

Employees carry sets of experiences and values that shape and are shaped by socialization. To what extent these are weighed in fulfilling own and common goals, and produce value of money, is determined by their practices.
5.2.1 The Goodness of Governance

Gerring (1999) envisages eight peculiarities that he thinks makes a concept good within social sciences. They are familiarity, resonance, parsimony, coherence, external differentiation, depth, theoretical utility and field utility. Good governance is a familiar term to organisations and positively fits into a broad range of research fields. In contrast to governance which defines the traditional sphere of political decision-making processes, good governance is a modern toolkit that is exchanged to counter bad governance (UNESCAP 2009, p.1). It has a profound depth in terms of levels of analysis and features it can relate to. It is, furthermore, a very catchy manner to describe diversified institutions and results (Buller & Gamble 2002, p. 7-8). Nonetheless, good governance arguably lacks parsimony, coherence, external differentiation and theoretical utility. The concept lacks parsimony because it is an essentially contested concept, it lacks coherence because features such as respect for human rights and banking regulations are not directly related, it lacks external differentiation because states who are well-governed can all sound like functional liberal democracies. Furthermore, the concept lacks theoretical utility because it is elastic, and researchers can twist it to coincide with their data (Gisselquist 2002). That is why I justified that investigating performance on results will bring forth the level of good governance in section 2.3. At the micro level, employees are incoherently aware that they execute Best Practices and whether projects are Best Practices in themselves. Adopting good enough governance guides organisations to pick a few feasible tasks in an otherwise extensive policy agenda (Grindle 2011, p. 217-218).

5.2.2 Earmarked Grants in Domestic and Foreign Spheres

The EEA grants are earmarked grants. Earmarked grants are given to achieve specific purposes. Essentially the EEA grants are both grants for actions and operating grants, as they form part of an external aid programme and finances the operational costs of the FMO that pursues European equalization (European Commission n.d). National foreign aid can be defined as resource transfers from a developed country to a developing country. National foreign aid can be grants, lending arrangement or a mix (Gaibulloev & Younas 2018, p. 13). A recurring question is whether they are effective. Although Norway´s financial contributions have increased substantially, they have seemingly become very effective in the last ten years to keep up with overarching goals (Szabó 2013, p. 32-34).

From a Norwegian standpoint, earmarked grants might be efficient if a service targets specific areas or people, if the coverage in a specific sector is low and if the central government pays for specific services provided in the municipalities. This is because earmarked grants make it inexpensive to produce a service and the municipalities request the grant. Another scenario that arguably makes grants ineffective is the power struggle between politicians to pursue priorities through grants. Some politicians may use the grants to fulfil local and sectoral priorities while others who predict high administrative costs and uncertainties surrounding the budget process want to secure long-term efficiency and have macroeconomic control of the budgets (Borge & Lilleschulstad 2010, p. 215-216).
Earmarked grants are ineffective when they are used in a wide variety of areas. General block grants arguably give municipalities and counties better leverage to accommodate welfare services to local desires. Although earmarked grants and general block grants are balanced in Norway, earmarked grants are a preferred way to pool financial support abroad (Borge & Lilleschulstad 2010, p. 215-216). In relation to the EEA Grants, one aspect of this decision might be that the local transfer system of Spain suffers from weaknesses. It has a lack of equalization capacity; project transfers do not have a certain impact on coordination problems in the local sector as they interfere with local autonomy and projects somewhat diverge from citizens interests. Co-partisans enjoy a large share of transfers due to a biased selection procedure of projects (Solé-Ollé 2009, p. 390-391).

Western countries utilize divergent donor strategies to improve good governance towards fellow developed countries than against developing countries. One can therefore imagine that Norway, Liechtenstein and Iceland follow a capacity-building strategy towards the EU recipient countries through the EEA grants scheme. The capacity-building strategy is that donors pool aid into projects who are grounded on the aim to build up good governance capacity contingent that a goodwill is present (Neumayer 2003, p.11-12). Social issues like sustainable development and gender equality, but also tighter bilateral relations legitimize the strategic choices to help decrease capacity gaps (EEA and Norway Grants 2005, p.8). Goodwill and capacity are for instance crucial for the quality of management and governance (Neumayer 2003, p.12). Poland and Hungary risked losing 1 billion euros in Norway and EEA grants after a phase of disagreement of whether to permit the pooling of grants trough state-run organisations (Eriksson 2017).

Donor assistance to developing countries should optimally speaking add a selectivity strategy. It involves giving more aid to states that have a proven record of good governance with the incentive that these states will withhold their good governance level in the future and that other recipient nations with worse governance will view it as necessary to elevate their level to receive higher aid flows (Neumayer 2003, p.14). However, within the EEA grants domain, the EU decides on subjects concerning the financial distributions. Remarkably, Poland, which is the recipient country with the largest degree of reported money-related irregularities is by far the one who receive most grants (EEA and Norway Grants 2015b; EEA and Norway Grants 2019). In other words, Norway gives on EU conclusions more EEA grants to the state that is least likely to transform money into societal values. Similar case marks itself for the EU with the Structural Funds (Moe & Klovstad Langberg 2018). Poland, and to a lesser extent Bulgaria and Hungary have fewer incentives to improve their good governance levels besides mediocre impositions of infringements by the European Commission (Šelih, Bond & Dolan 2017, p. 2, 6-8) and punishments imposed by the FMO (EEA and Norway Grants 2018). The allocation of funds in the fifth funding period, shows that they may have bigger incentives to do the exact opposite (Regjeringen 2017).

Spain is the most populous country that received least EEA Grants (EEA and Norway Grants 2017, p.36). Although the money generally translated into societal values, 8 money-related irregularity cases and nineteen minor suspicions of irregularities were corrected in Spain during the 2009-2014 funding period (EEA and Norway Grants 2015b; EEA and Norway Grants 2019). Moreover, areas of high risks were pointed out in the end phase of the fourth funding period. There was supposedly a high corruption risk at the country-level due to a mild interrelation of functions between the Programme Promoter institutions, namely the Spanish Focal Point, the Certifying Authority, and the Audit.
Authority as all belong to the same ministry and since they had not implemented the required complaint mechanism. At the programme-level, the gender equality and work-life balance were deemed most vulnerable on the grounds that the big grant size elevated the risk of corruption in the allocation stage, an inconvenient connection between the Programme Promoter institutions and the State Secretariat for Social Services and Equality which was the programme operator institution and irregularities associated with corruption issues including contracting and procurement practices. Mitigation measures were integrated rapidly by the Spanish Focal Point office (Transparency International 2015b, p. 150-165).

5.2.3 Criteria for Successful Socialization

John Dewey’s thought patterns on growth touches upon how education affects socialization. Regarding the input indicators (see Figure 2), the personnel are educators as bearers of knowledge and expertise. When the personnel talk to each other they become spreaders and receivers of knowledge and expertise. The quality and value of knowledge and expertise depends on the customs and goals of groups, because all knowledge and expertise provided by whatever group favour to socialize its members bilaterally. The problem is to retrieve desirable style attributes of negotiated interest formation which actually endures and to utilize them to scrutinize unwanted features and offer improvement. As discovered priorities easily repeat themselves, therefore one can hold that what is needed is a measure of worth of any given form of collaboration modelled on real interest coordination of employee behaviour. Two benchmarks can be utilized to identify collaborations designed in a way that allows possibilities for growth of its participants to be maximized: How plentiful and diverse are the interests which are consciously shared? How complete and autonomous is the interaction with other forms of association? (Popp 2015, p. 47).

The first criteria proposed is to evaluate the extent interest formations are acknowledged and chased by for example various employees of a project. Acceptance and pursuit of consciously shared interests does not call for a mutual disturbance or responsibility for those who share those interests. A central body can redirect interests and warn those responsible. The more plentiful and varied the interests are the better. The second criteria focus on the mobilization level of interest formations among employees in interorganisational relationships. If the employees accept specific norms and if they can partake in several other organizational dialogues, the mobilization level is high. In circumstances where employees talk to others about similar issues, maturity is important to secure an effective foundation for future progresses (Popp 2015, p. 48).

5.3 Throughput

In the following sub-section, mainstream performance factors are mentioned when explaining process performance, project management and project governance as some may prove to have an impact on the project performance of Promociona and CAV.
5.3.1 Process Performance

Employees knowledge and capabilities constitutes the real means of production. They unconsciously and consciously choose how and where to utilize it. The organisational ability to effectively implement strategies is presumably a major determinant to workforce performance which transmits onto collaborative project processes. Notably, neither employees nor citizens usually have a high interest in performance information until real performance diverts further away from optimal performance (Niven 2006, p. 5). Schmidt (2013) agrees with this statement because she found that the throughput is often most prominent when negative and has consequences for the input and output. An optimal strategy execution fulfils vision, people, management and resource considerations. Vision entails that every employee comprehends the strategy. People entails that employees have motivations connected to the strategy. Management entails that teams spend one hour per month discussing strategy. Resource entails that organisations connect budgets to strategy. Nonetheless, ground-breaking research of 200 organisations shows that 10% execute their strategy. On average 5% of the workforce comprehends the strategy, 25% have motivations connected to the strategy, 85% of teams use less than one hour each month to discuss strategy and 60% of organisations do not connect budgets to strategy. Effectively implementing strategies are arguably more demanding when organisations collaborate across national borders. Differential loyalties in working cultures might trump embracement of new impulses. Nowadays performance systems must be able to identify, explain, monitor and fully bind value creation from immaterial resources behind organisational success. Intents have been made to develop performance management systems that monitors correctly (Niven 2006, p. 5-12).

5.3.2 Project Management

A degree of competence recurs from employee socialization. Competence is required for project management to take place. Project management is the traditional perspective on project success (and failure). Performance-based management has a large explanatory power for project success. What supposedly leads to high performance is managing communication, managing risk and cathetic roles (Turner & Müller 2003, p. 6). Managing communication relies on internal and external transfers of information. How well communication is managed depends on which approach employees selects when encountered with problems, what type of communication mechanism employees prefer and decision-making practices. Their options when encountered with problems are either problem-solving or problem-blaming. Employees can choose a huge variety of ways to communicate with their co-workers. Decision-making practices lead to maximization of interests, compromises or giving in to competing interests (McDonough, Kahn & Griffin 1999, p. 375, 378, 383).

Managing risks is a strategy to discover, classify, interrogate and mitigate risks that threatens a project. The threats can be of a social, political and cultural kind (Majeed 2018). The EEA grants got a risk mitigation framework in the 2009–2014 funding period and the FMO, Focal Point offices and Finance Ministries are responsible of minimizing
risks. Risk management is an added cost (EEA and Norway Grants n.d.-]). Cathetic roles signifies that project participants have to be motivated to perform, develop faith in and commit to a broad ethical purpose. Organizational deliberations should assure that employees maintain cathetic roles to safeguard a level of performance. Programme operators and eventual donor partners should decide on whether they should change its activity as one large project or programme, or whether it should break it into a myriad of small projects. Another judgement is whether a group of projects should be managed together to cover common targets and pool resources between organisations. The management tasks that creates optimal value conform to pre-existing rules and guidelines. Professional monitoring conducts lay the base to extract value out of the grants through governance (Turner & Müller 2003, p. 5-6).

5.3.3 Project Governance

Project governance can be interpreted as a modern oversight function that is aligned with governance models of organizations and that encompasses the project lifecycle and provides a dependable method of controlling the project and ensuring its success by defining and documenting and communicating reliable, repeatable project practices. Project governance is a subdivision of qualitative corporate governance and its main focus is on the governance of a single project. It has a small explanatory power on project success. Successful project governance is explained best by its future potential (Joslin & Müller 2015, p. 614-615, 619, 631). Good project governance is about accomplishing optimal balance between portfolio management, project sponsorship, a project management office and projects and program support within each organization. Portfolio management is focused on selecting the right projects and programs to support the organization’s strategy and ending ones that no longer contribute to the success of the organization. Project sponsorship is to provide a direct link between the executive and the project or program manager, focused on the whole project lifecycle. A project management office provide oversight and strategic reporting capabilities. Projects and program support concern the effective support and management of projects and programs are the measures of an effective governance system (Too & Weaver 2013, p. 1382-1394).

5.4 Outputs

Pinto & Slevin (1988) think that ten controllable features and four uncontrollable features results in project success. The ten predictable features are mission, top management support, project plan, client consultation, personnel, technical assistance, client acceptance, monitoring and feedback, communication and troubleshooting. Mission means how goals and directions are defined. Top management support depends on the desire of top managers to provide the compulsory resources and power for project success. Whether a project plan is made and how it encompasses stepwise actions affects project success. Client consultation signifies how impacted parties are communicating. The amount of personnel recruited affects project undertakings. Technical assistance means how available the required technology and expertise to realise technical steps in a project plan are. Client acceptance depends on the ability to sell the final project to its intended users. How and in what size control information is reported also affects project success. Troubleshooting is the skill of handling
unanticipated crisis and deviations from plan. The four unpredictable features are characteristics of the project team leader, power and politics, environmental events and urgency. What features that are most vital dependents of the stage of the project cycle that is being dealt with (Pinto & Slevin 1988, p. 174-175).

If employees who work in a project are capable of delivering value for money the involved organisations face a dual benefit, namely that citizens feel that societal problems are improved and strengthen trust in the performance function of its initiator. For the EEA Grants scheme project success would then one by one indirectly heighten the chance that EU citizens consider societies as more equal, feel that bilateral relations are tighter and increase trust in the EEA grants performance functions (Noordegraaf 2015, p. 77).

In the theory chapter, I discussed perspectives on input, throughput and output indicators with the middle stage as the centre of attention for project success. Countless factors impact on project success and far from all are yet to be found. Project success signifies the experience of applying and working under measures, factors and criteria and modify them in given contexts. Good governance is an averagely good concept overall but lacks theoretical utility. Performance, on the other hand, comes in handy to trace value creations inside throughput stages in causal chains. Much explanatory power for project performance resides in management and governance. Management practices have a large explanatory power and governance practices have a small explanatory power. What features that most strongly correlate to performance depends on the stage that is under investigation in project cycles. A setting where EEA funded projects produces high value might make EU citizens feel progress in reaching societal equalization and strengthen bilateral relations. This may increase trust in the performance functions of the EEA grants.
6. Methodology

This dissertation consists of an insightful data material retrieved from three semi-structured in-depth interviews via Skype with organisational employees who worked with the Promociona and CAV project when they were funded by the EEA grants.

The interviews were conducted in Norwegian and Spanish. The interview with the Spanish respondent was transcribed from Spanish to English. A direct qualitative content analysis is utilized to make sense of the data material. An alternative analysis method that could have been utilized instead is a process-tracing approach. A process-tracing approach trace entire processes chronologically based on hypotheses. Although it is often considered as the best ways of studying causal mechanisms and is commonly knit to black box thinking, it reveals evidence of a process undertaking at particular points in time from start to end. Hence, process-tracing requires much more empirical data than this thesis has to offer as it interrogates events in detail. Risks of over-analysing is also erased, because some facets might be irrelevant to reveal (Trampusch & Palier 2016, p. 440-449). Nevertheless, this approach should be put to the test in EEA grants research in the near future.

6.1 Semi-structured Interviews via Skype

Semi-structured interviews via Skype is employed as the preferred data gathering method. Room to prepare questions on beforehand and have unpredictably thorough conversations on predefined themes that effectively narrows down based on the answers of informants as the interviews moves along constitutes its main strengths. An overly strong dependence on interview guides, interrogation of the knowledge of respondents, need for cultural understanding and video transmission constitutes its main weaknesses.

Semi-structured interviews were considered as the most optimal method to use grounded on the interest of having informal conversations with respondents of around one hours each about aspects that allegedly characterises collaborative success in the throughput phase, allowing them to reflect upon own experiences of the performance between donor partners and project operators from open questions without any prior restrictions (Tjora 2017, p. 113-114). The predefined themes were warm-up questions, antecedents, negotiation, commitment, implementation and assessment. Follow-up questions of a more closed kind were asked when answers were unclear or were considered as of high importance for the research aim. They answered the questions confidently, with little hesitation and gave supplementary answers on own working experiences (Tjora 2017, p. 155-159).

Since the answers concerns completed projects and in case bad monitoring practices were to be mentioned, it was determined that anonymization was necessary to protect the identity of the respondents. Anonymization was one of the ethical rules that were overheld in accordance with guidelines from the Norwegian Centre for Research Data. Moreover, the conversations were audio-recorded on a laptop and by phone. This was done to ensure that everything that was being said was saved, while at the same time allowing for logical follow-up questions to be asked. Oral consent from the respondents...
was given at the beginning of the interviews and they accepted that their interviews were to be recorded (see Appendix VI). This point was succeeded by how the recordings were to be used and when they were to be deleted, including a reminder that participation was voluntary. The respondents did not seem to be affected by knowing that their voices were recorded (Tjora 2017, p. 130, 166-169, 175-178).

A dissimilar interview guide\textsuperscript{13} was made for all the informants to have a goal-oriented academic conversation and avoid nonrelevant digressions during the interviews. I managed to detach myself from the interview guide. My own words replaced instances where an overly academized language was or were to be communicated. As the respondents talked rapidly and were very engaged in the conversations it challenged me to track responses on the spot that I wanted further elaborations on. Nonetheless, the scarce number of interviews did not allow me to get properly used to the interview guide. Luckily, the brief intervals between consultations of the interview guide and raising questions served as natural breaks in the conversations (Tjora 2017, p. 155-159).

The sample of respondents were strategically selected based on their first-hand knowledge about the project undertakings through working with or for either the donor partner or the project operator. Recruiting informants was a hard task and establishing contact by email was my only option as their phone numbers are not publicly available online. One of the interviews had to be planned via an office secretary. In cases where I was in doubt whether potential respondent had deep insights into the projects, I decided to have telephone conversations with them. In opposition to what was expected, the respondents had knowledge of both the Promociona and CAV project independent of where they worked and knew individuals and external partners involved in the programme (Tjora 2017, p. 130-132).

Cross-cultural communication can cause hurdles in interviews. By choosing a Norwegian, a Norwegian-speaking and a Spanish respondent, it provided a dual view on a cultural dialogue between Norway and Spain that habitually united the EEA Grants for two decades. In addition, two of the interviews were conducted in the mother tongue of the respondents. That arguably made them able to bring about an optimal meaning of what they were saying. I was capable of maintaining uninterrupted conversations as Norwegian is my mother tongue and I have an advanced language proficiency in Spanish. These notions coincide with those of Andrews (1995) and Tsang (1998) who argue that interviewers always should use the native language of respondents during interviews as long as the interviewers inhibit sufficient language skills. Nevertheless, Briggs (1986) argues that linguistic competence is not more important than familiarity with the communicative norms of society. My personal and educational background makes me able to grasp the communicative norms in the language areas.

Conducting interviews via Skype defies suggestions of not using video for interviews as they decrease authenticity. However, the downsides of using Skype were outweighed by the upsides. Skype is known as the second-best way to conduct semi-structured interviews after real face to face interactions (Sullivan 2012, p. 54-56). One may lose some impressions of the atmosphere surrounding the interview setting as none meet at a neutral location, but at different locations where both usually find themselves. Some respondents could in effect be unusually talkative and bring more authenticity into interviews when staying at their own chosen place. A risk by using Skype as a research medium is that a slow internet connection may create lags and can in worse cases be lost

\textsuperscript{13} See appendix V for an example of an interview guide. See also Appendix VII for the list of informants.
or cause disturbances. Besides experiencing a couple of short lags, my interviews went smoothly (Lo Iacono, Symonds & Brown 2016, p. 8-10). No convincing proof exists that Skype interviews reduces a degree of interpersonal trust, nor the relationship between the interviewer and respondents as a whole. Recording devices and interview guides can be hidden from the screen (Lo Iacono, Symonds & Brown 2016, p. 9, 14). Furthermore, Skype gives the possibility to contact busy people efficiently and free of charge across the globe. Hannah (2012) decided to use Skype to induce sustainability into the research process and limit the pollution caused by means of transportation in his study on sustainable tourism. Finally, since the respondent and interviewer habitually use Skype, it created a natural feel, just like in any other conversation.

6.2 Direct Content Analysis

A direct content analysis is used in the study of deficient facts and experiences that is a topic of current theory and research. Theory is taken as point of departure; codes are delineated before and during data analysis and codes are acquired from theory or compatible research findings with the aim of confirming theoretical assumptions or provide additional evidence to a robust theory. Categories are applied deductively, thereby helping to sort out peculiar variables from a broad range of variables or linkages among variables that ease the selection of a suitable coding scheme. In a structural way, the researcher then gain a richer comprehension that goes deeper than what theories suggests (Hsieh & Shannon 2005, p. 1281, 1286).

To begin with, researchers should identify core factors as coding categories. As examined, perceptions on what performance factors that knowingly leads to project success differs. Antagonistic factors presumably leads to project failures. I unravel which factors that describe employee experiences of performance in the Promociona and CAV project. Even though my research is how and why was a high degree of good governance achieved in the EEA grants to Spain from 2009-2014, good governance does not have theoretical utility, but performance does. Therefore, it is tested how many positive experiences related to project success or negative performance experiences related to project failure the respondents mentions (Hsieh & Shannon 2005, p. 1281). If positive factors outweigh the negative ones, one can substantiate that a high performance is levelled with the pre-existing good results which are portrayed in Chapter 3.

The next step is to make operational definitions for each from the justification. Operational definitions according to the throughput theories are management and governance. How respondents describe the factors will give an idea of employee priorities. Then all highlighted instances impacting on the process performance are coded. New codes are given to any explanation that fall outside of the categorization of the coding scheme (Hsieh & Shannon 2005, p. 1281). As the interview findings contained few pathways to elaborate on the difference between management and governance in practice, it is briefly indicated.

A direct content analysis has strengths and weaknesses researchers must adjust to. Present theory can be verified and broadened, thereby proving to be suitable elsewhere. As researchers take prior findings as vantage point, they become increasingly aware of where studies give most profit for further falsification intents. However, the probability is high that researchers find evidence that supports rather than undermine a theory.
Researchers could in turn be tempted to answer in a determined way or comply with established assumptions to please academics. In addition, an overemphasis on the theory can blind researchers from contextual aspects of experiences (Hsieh & Shannon 2005, p. 1283).

In this chapter, I have clarified the methodological approaches which guides the upcoming analysis. Altogether, the semi-structured interviews via Skype and the direct content analysis have a high reliability and high validity. Quantitative results pre-exist prior to the qualitative analysis. Challenges in terms of time are mentioned, respondents were interviewed in natural settings and the importance of keeping a distance to the research material is recognized to interpret employee experiences objectively (Carr 1994, p. 719). Considerations of linguistic and ethical kind is taken, respondents are chosen strategically, and interviews are recorded with oral consent. A direct content analysis is a well-suited analytical method to the investigation of performance inside a black box. Future research endeavours building on a grand empirical data material should try to apply a process-tracing approach to shed new light on EEA grants research.
7. Twenty years of EEA Grants to Spain in Gender Equality

Below, coincidental traits on gender equality in the EU, Spain and Norway from 1994-2014 are described to answer under what premises the EEA grants have come to prioritize such harmonising policies and how they may have facilitated societal value creation.

Besides a Norwegian resistance to full membership, the EU has left juridical traces in Norwegian legislation. A decisive argument against EU membership in 1994 was that it would weaken Norwegian welfare policies because a reliable prioritisation of welfare schemes in the Nordic gender equality model was perceived as better than what the EU could offer. The EEA Agreement now encompasses many EU directives on gender equality and anti-discrimination. Meanwhile, Norway has also approved directives on own initiatives. Although a Europeanisation of Norwegian gender policies is a reality it must not be exaggerated. The Norwegian social democratic approach to gender equality is largely incompatible with the individualised and conformable approach to gender equality of the EU. An illustration of this is an unresolved disagreement that endures between the parties about the Norwegian tradition of utilizing positive discrimination and quota allocation as measures to improve gender equality (Sørum 2019). On the contrary, Spain welcomed directives on gender equality when it became a member of the European project in 1986. The Europeanisation process on the field has thus been restricted by unclear answers from the European level about the necessity of Spanish women regarding socio-economic goods and an institutional inability to implement gender policies nationally. Two main reasons are arguably an accentuated marked-orientation and no supervision of national efforts to implement gender equality policies on behalf of the EU (Lombardo 2003, p. 77-78).

7.1 Global Inclusion of Gender Mainstreaming

Global inclusion of gender mainstreaming marks the period from 1994-1997 and the EU was a driving force to stimulate this development. Jacques Delors, who was President of the Commission from 1985-1995, was preoccupied about how market liberalisation would create an increasingly competitive environment for workers and regions alike. Consequently, he was devoted to including a social dimension into the Single Market programme (Bratt 2011, p.18-19). His job creation initiative manifested itself in a 1993 White Paper on growth, competitiveness and employment which stipulated the path for 21st century social policy actions. The 1994 Essen Strategy was the first substantial step to counter unemployment through conformity with future interests of European citizens. Five propositions were highlighted. Those were resource enforcement through language training, advancement of advantageous investment through balanced wage policies, upgrade of the efficiency of labour market bodies, recognition of new sources of jobs through local programmes and elevation of access to the labour market for young people, long-term unemployed and women. The member states were obliged to hand in annual progress reports that altogether became annual Commission progress reports. Suggestions from the Commission were given to each member subsequently after
evaluating them. Both the EU and its member states were imposed a shared responsibility for employment in the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty, with the refined European Employment Strategy (EES) that aimed at making the Essen propositions feasible. Gender mainstreaming was already mentioned in the Third Action programme on Equal Opportunities effectuated by the Commission in 1991 but got international recognition with the Platform for Action presented at the 1995 Fourth World Conference. Of twelve critical areas, eradication of violence against women was stresses as one case in point to observe actual gender equality (Bratt 2011, p.19, 25-26).

Spain and the EEA nations were no exceptions in abiding to the UN resolution. State feminism became a reality in Spain approximately 10 years after Western countries such as Norway (Bustelo 2016, p.110). On the back of an obscure feminist movement during the 19th century and under Franco´s authoritarian regime, the Spanish Institute for Women became an institution of equal operability as the Western ones in 1994 and took charge in diffusing gender mainstreaming on a national scale (Valiente 1995, p. 221). When the Spanish conservative party, the People’s Party (PP) held office from 1996-2004, the initial progressive steps at the European and global scale made the new cabinet support women´s agencies and gender policies (Bustelo 2016, p. 110). On the other hand, a dual Norwegian trajectory of gender mainstreaming and gender specific action originated around the end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s (Gender in Norway n.d). Norway and Scandinavia made state feminism a reality in the early 1980s. It grew out of state interference into the private sphere (Lucas 1990, p. 48, 51).

By 1994, the Norwegian Prime Minister for the Norwegian Labour Party, Gro Harlem Brundtland, was well into her third government term. As a cause of her decision to appoint 40% of female minister´s in her centre-coalition government in 1986, she challenged succeeding governments to remedy the almost total absence of women holding power positions in corporations throughout the 1990s (Hoel 2008, p. 79-80). A seven decades long continual Norwegian political consensus exists on the use of aid as a foreign policy tool. Interestingly enough, there are discrepancies between national foreign policies and European policies. Norway deems it as important to signal to the world community that it contributes in the UN and the North Atlantic Treaty Association but think it is important to hide the transfers of EEA grants from the national public sphere (Haugevik & Sending 2018, p. 372, 380).

By the time gender mainstreaming was announced, Norway had raised Women in Development (WID) issues and given earmarked WID funds since the early 1970s inside the governing bodies of UN organisations (Geisler, Keller & Norman 1999, p.1).WID was first replaced by the Women and Development (WAD) paradigm and then by the Gender and Development (GAD) paradigm in academic circles but is kept in many current development projects. WID thinking assumes that integrating women into an industrial society from an agrarian one solves the underlying structural problem of widespread economic inequalities. Based on the recognition that women actually are losers in development it was replaced in development research in the late 1970s by the Women and Development (WAD) paradigm. WAD rather assumes that women have always played an important part in economic development but was replaced by the Gender and Development (GAD) approach in the 1980s because WAD neglect women´s reproductive labour. GAD offers a holistic approach by focusing on women´s productive and reproductive labour, women as active agents of change and legal reform to improve the status of women. Enhancing women´s participation in economic development led to gender mainstreaming (Cornwall 2003, p. 1326-1329). Even though gender policies were
left outside the realm of the EEA in the three first funding periods, gender dis-aggregate indicators are, in the two last funding periods, monitored by the FMO to keep track on the contributions of the Grants to gender equality (EEA and Norway Grants n.d-a).

7.2 General Weakening of Gender Mainstreaming

A general weakening of gender mainstreaming marks the period from 1997 to 2005. The Commission and the Council bolstered the equal opportunity perspective on economic-based efficiency arguments rather than rights-based equality arguments. The former involves using gender equality as a cynical tool to facilitate improved competitiveness, and a sturdier growth in occupation quantity and productivity. The latter involves using gender equality as an inclusive tool to emphasise the heavy strain that women and men encounter at work that clashes with basic human rights. Equal opportunities was an integral pillar of the EES from the very start together with employability, adaptability and entrepreneurship. Equal opportunities were understood to eradicate the gender employment gap. This shows that gender equality made up the core of the equal opportunities pillar and that breaking down barriers to it was prioritized (Bratt 2011, p. 37-40).

Two interrelated initiatives put gender equality solidly on the agenda, since the initial encouraging employee guidelines led to a targeted gender mainstreaming guideline. This positive spark made that most member states succeeded in integrating all three gender equality guidelines corresponding to a moderate spectrum of mainstreaming mechanisms independent of performance levels. Meanwhile, the pioneer states utilized the momentum to pressure laggard states towards reducing unequal opportunities within the EES. During the Lisbon Summit quantitative objectives were set for women and men in employment and heightened attention on childcare. A renewed vision and targets were presented in 2002 in Barcelona, when realizing the tight coherence between societal objectives and universal provision of social services. However, the pillar structure of the EES disappeared unintentionally with the 2003 reform because the EES was synchronized with the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines (BEPG) constituting ten guidelines under three focus areas where the equal opportunities pillar filled just one guideline. A dual strategy, less visibility and results-orientation meant that equal opportunities fell drastically on the employment agenda and were deprioritized by member states (Bratt 2011, p. 37-47).

Spain suffered a setback by being incapable of developing a moderate spectrum of work-related mainstreaming mechanisms before 2001 in contrast to most other member states. On the positive side, complaints against expansion of childcare provisions created a constructive debate and the Organic Law of 2004 was a result of an apparently overlooked international agenda on fighting gender-based violence. Spain arguably fell short on mainstreaming efforts on the back of the heightened relevance of the Autonomous Communities and in turn a lowered relevance of the state. In addition, recurring from this trend are fundamental power differences among the Autonomous Communities in the preparation and application of equality policies (Alonso & Verge 2014). Some Spaniards feared that the expansion of leave was inconsistent with a less gender unequal society as it only targeted women and would mean a stronger status for women and a lower status for men as carers. This opposing argument was logical since childcare provisions targeting both genders are only likely to lead to real gender equality.
Evidently, the role of fathers were prompted in childcare and work-time arrangements were moderated to harmonize family and work (Bratt 2011, p. 44).

Recommendation number 19 of the 1998 UN Committee of the Elimination of Discrimination against Women clarifies that the definition of discrimination written in the 1st article of the Convention encompasses gender-based violence and that the concept committed states and citizens to act (UN 1998). Spain and the EEA-EFTA states have disseminated the Daphne programmes that began in January 2000 (EFTA 2010, p.25-26). They are one of the foremost strategies of the Commission in preventing and combating violence against children, young people and women. Gender equality was a chief concern on the agenda from 2004-2010 set by the newly imposed Centrum-left government ruled by the Spanish Socialist Party (PSOE). For instance, the Organic Law of 2004 was the first of its kind in Europe as it established a Special Government Delegation against Violence against Women within the General Secretariat of Equality Policies responsible for formulating government public policies to address the problem of gender violence. Furthermore, parity governments were formed, and the 2005 implementation of the same-sex marriage law received surprisingly little public opposition making Spain the third country to accept it (European Parliament 2016, p. 6-7, 25). The Norwegian Christian Conservative Party amended the “Work conditions law” in 2004 by giving it a new chapter on equal treatment at work. Between 2000-2005 there was a minimal growth of women in top positions in Spain, increasing from 31,5% to 32%, while a big growth from 25% to 30,4% happened in the same time phase in Norway (FN-sambandet n.d).

7.3 General Exclusion of Gender Mainstreaming

A general exclusion of gender mainstreaming marks the period from 2005-2014. During this nine-year span, the EU gave up pressure on member states to decrease gender inequality and continued to undermine its importance for greater economic gains. Achievement of quantitative objectives eventually overshadowed how goals were to be achieved. In the 2005 reform of the Lisbon Strategy, the EES and the BEPG framework were merged to better handle minor and large fluctuations in the European labour market in light of an unpredictable international environment. As a cause of this policy change, EU states got solely one set of labour market guidelines. It drew on inspiration from the 2004 Kok-report, which argued that better results would be obtained if the EES and the BEPG framework were to be merged and make it more comprehensible for member states to connect employment and economic growth. Favourable economic results were probably produced, but none in relation to stimulating more gender equality. Knowingly, simply a third of the Employment Guidelines were incorporated into the Integrated Guidelines for Growth and Jobs and had no guideline targeting gender equality. A disregard of gender equality aspects was also reflected in the National Reform Programme (NRP) delivered to the Commission from 2005-2010. A social investment perspective took precedence over equal opportunities and member states could decide themselves on what facets of the guidelines they wished to carry out. Gender-disaggregated data, specific action and gender equality measures were rarely presented in the 2005-2008 NRPs. Spain had hardly any references to gender mainstreaming and outlined vague gender policies. Even worse, gender perspectives were practically abandoned in the following NRPs. Spain excluded gender mainstreaming from all
employment plans, failed to present specific data on a struggle to explain gendered differences in employment and provisioned abstract gender-specific policies founded on scarce evidence of its real profits for assuring equalized opportunities (Bratt 2011, p. 49-60).

Correspondingly, progressive steps made before the global recession were re-evaluated by the PP during the global recession once reinstated as the ruling party in 2011. The parity rate inside the government dropped to 31% and the status of the Spanish Institute for Women was downgraded. In addition, the PP seemed to be on standby to pick apart various policies passed by the PSOE in the preceding term (Bustelo 2014, p.110). Even though the gender policies of the PSOE were sustained, austerity policies combined with the conservative agenda resulted in that these modern policies got a lower priority at the state level. Meanwhile, demands on labour and salary conditions were lowered at the regional level in order to maintain competitiveness (Alonso & Verge 2014). The gender gap in wages was approximately 20% in 2010, close to its value in 1994 (Guner, Kaya & Sánchez-Marcos 2014, p. 61). Spain subsequently fell 19 places on the gender gap index between 2010-2014 (Valera 2014).

On the other hand, while the status of women improved steadily, the laws on equal pay and gender-based violence haunts Norway. Besides not ever having a parity government, no country is closer than Norway in reaching parity in political party representation (Heidar 2005, p. 814). LDO was created in 2005 with a legislative amendment of the Equality law of 1978 during the end of the Christian Conservative government term (NOU 2004). LDO takes charge in stressing gender issues to Norwegian authorities (LDO n.d, p. 6). Norway incorporated legislation on gender-based discrimination in 1978 (Sørum 2019) but responds somewhat inconsistently to international legislation on the field (LDO n.d, p. 6-7). Surprisingly, the Stoltenberg II government copied the Spanish same-sex marriage law in 2008. A delegation consisting of representants from the Children and Equality Ministry and the National Association for Lesbians, Gays, Bisexuals and Transgender people went on a study excursion to Spain during the spring of 2006 to learn how the law was enforced by a representant of the PSOE and the Marriage Act was amended approximately a year later (NOU 2008, p.6).

Gender equality promotion and gender-based violence measures were dealt with in the EEA and Norway grants mainstreaming gender equality and work-life balance programme during the 2009-2014 funding period. Arguably it was a response to the adoption of a new Convention by the Council of Europe that obliges EU states to make stricter legislations against such societal problems. 50 million euros was proportioned to the Czech Republic, Estonia, Portugal, Romania, Spain and Slovenia (EEA and Norway Grants n.d-k). The program challenges persistent gender gaps on predicted results that builds on the Norwegian quota law and the Spanish Organic law. Supposedly, this programme was very giving for all the involved partners especially because a grand majority of projects still are operational in the respective countries (EEA and Norway Grants n.d-h). Key results during 2014-2015 in Spain shows that 150 women from vulnerable groups took part in job skills training, the gender balance improved in 69 company boards and six schools integrated equality plans (EEA and Norway Grants 2015, p. 73).

In this chapter I have discussed coincidental traits on gender equality in the EU, Spain and Norway. The main premise transferred from the EU level to the EEA area is that gender equality policies are removed from the political discourse when it is not perceived to advance economic growth. The EES became a counterproductive attempt to reduce
the gender gap through employment because standards differ tremendously between member states. The main premise transferred from Spain to the EEA area is that gender equality policies were mainstreamed incoherently and briefly due to conflicting ideological visions which led to insufficient estimates of its holistic significance in economic contexts, regions and local societies. Pioneering policies such as on gender-based violence have widespread resonance, also outside its borders. Gaps remain in the private sphere and in the labour market. The main premise transferred from Norway to beneficiary countries is pioneering gender mainstreaming and gender specific action practices within for example work-life balance. Gaps remain in gender-based violence and in the labour market. Gender policies inside the EEA grants scheme partly evolved out of these supplementary premises. In contrast to many development projects, the EEA Grants scheme thoroughly interrogates societal value creation by applying gender sensitive data to keep a hold on how policies pursues gender equality.
8. Uncovering the Performance Black Box

In this chapter I will uncover the black box of the Promociona and CAV project inside the Gender Mainstreaming and Work-life Balance programme. First, factors that sticks to performance experiences in the PPPs will be found. Then these will be categorized into positive and negative experiences, and it will be suggested how to view them separately.

Through this thesis, reasonings has been put forward that enables an analysis of the good governance level in the Promociona and CAV project. PPPs were first highlighted as tools to achieve good governance. Then it was clarified that the EEA grants scheme bases its proclaimed high degree of good governance on managing for results and not governing for results. An over-emphasis on results were brought together with an under-emphasis on the process undertaking to extract more explanatory power. As good governance is an elastic concept which is impossible to achieve in its totality and lacks theoretical utility, the level is determined by the project performance. Best Practices are means to achieve good governance. Such practices correlates with positive performance experiences which are found from performance factors. If positive experiences outweigh negative experiences as expected, it gives grounds to verify how and why a high degree of good governance was achieved in the EEA grants to Spain from 2009-2014.

8.1 The Gender Mainstreaming and Work-Life Balance Programme

The Gender Mainstreaming and Work-Life Balance programme seems to have unfolded constructively. Respondent 2 stated that: "One often enter... development projects assuming that we from Norway are specialists in...gender equality”. When Norwegian representatives came to Spain, they quickly realized that the Spanish representatives were competent, skilled, engaged and operational. Norwegian representatives thus also had a lot to learn (Interview 2, 7th of May). This quick realization is arguably a key for success. An overconfidence in Norwegian gender policy and practice in development projects can lead to realizing the assets of counterparts in hindsight and be a symptom of failure as noticed by Lexow & Skjønsberg (1989) in three mediocre bilateral development projects conducted in Africa that were considered “good for women”. The projects concerned a WID-issue of safeguarding that women at grassroot levels receive funds. Little experience-sharing was obtained since the purpose was to learn from own good experiences and identify measures and utilized methods. The learning potential was consequently largely decreased (Lexow & Skjønsberg 1989, p. 7-9, 87). However, this defect is apparently part of bigger problems which persists in Norwegian good governance aid. Over 300 million Norwegian crowns were earmarked to women and gender equality from 2004-2013, but poor planification, follow-up and evaluation in line with set goals gave little learning (Riksrevisjonen 2015, p. 8, 54).

Nevertheless, respondent 2 “...experienced Norway as very flexible in terms of financing”. She claims that she came easier in touch with people who work on the field through the EEA grants scheme than in the EU Cohesion Fund and the Daphne programme due to lower administrative costs (Interview 2, 7th of May). This can also mean that the EEA
grants give more added values than predicted (Riksrevisjonen 2013, p. 57). The Norwegian government has to a certain extent mastered to exert soft power and acts as a norm entrepreneur against the EU through the EEA grants. Nonetheless, chances are small for improving due to little political attention, a limited strategic approach, a vague bilateral relations goal, political sensitivity, the fragmented nature of the contributions and repeated negotiation with the EU (Johnsen & Rieker 2015, p. 428-429). A capacity-building strategy was arguably adopted by Norway towards Spain because a goodwill and capacity to improve good governance was deemed sufficient and important (Neumayer 2003, p. 11). She added that “…the former leader of the Norwegian Foreign Ministry for the EEA grants...was very devoted to the programme in Spain...very engaged in gender equality...and very interested when... proposed to include gender-based violence…” (Interview 2, 7th of May). An incentive which possibly led to cooperation is that Norway prioritises gender equality very differently than the EU (Sørum 2019). Notably, “Norway and Spain top the ranking of health and social services in Europe” (Interview 3, 14th of May).

The Programme operator, the donor partner and the Norwegian Embassy in Spain which constitute the top positions of the management structure had a great communication even when confronted with challenges. From the very beginning, the LDO had frequent meetings with the Norwegian Embassy and the Program Operator in Madrid. The LDO could contact the leader of the EEA grants at the Norwegian Foreign Ministry at any time. Furthermore, the director of the Spanish Institute for Women skilfully broke down the abstract nature of gender mainstreaming into concrete projects. Interestingly, the donor partner and the programme operator created a project which analysed gender mainstreaming in all the operational programmes by investing in academia (Interview 2, 7th of May). An “interpersonal relationship-communication-success” variable stood out to explain the success of international development projects in sub-Saharan Africa (Diallo & Thuillier 2005, p. 249). It knowingly allowed to discover and mitigate risks. When the person in-charge from the LDO discovered that the National Focal Point office were not talking about work-related subjects with the Section for Equal Opportunities in the initiating phase she saw that it was about to put the programme process on a halt because of a heavy Spanish bureaucratic leadership from the National Focal Point office. For instance, it caused troubles for the Spanish Institute for Women in the Promociona-project. She swiftly called in to a crisis meeting in Brussels with support from the leader of the EEA grants in the Norwegian Foreign Ministry. Within a few days the risk was solved as an agreement was met, and a program note was written (Interview 2, 7th of May).

Governmental shifts obstructed the collaboration process. Markedly, the Norwegian Embassy backed the Programme operator when it had difficulties to act through its own government by promoting projects. During the Spanish political deadlock, the use of grants were prohibited. This did that there was money left to spend. Even though the Spanish partners had to discard two bilateral meetings that were planned in Norway, they invited the Norwegian partners to Spain instead. A governmental shift in 2015 resulted in that the CAV-project temporarily lost momentum and was transferred to Bodø (Interview 2, 7th of May).

The performance factors that are found are a quick realization, learning potential, a great communication, effective risk prevention and governmental shifts. Those who are portrayed positively are a quick realization, learning potential and a great communication. Governmental shifts are portrayed negatively. A great communication
and governmental shifts fall under the management realm, while a quick realization and learning potential fall under the governance realm.

8.2 Case Studies: Promociona and CAV

8.2.1 Promociona

In the Promociona project, experiences of employees surrounding positive performance experiences dominates in comparison to perceptions of negative experiences. Respondent 1 highlights that among the input indicators of the EEA Grants the financial support was essential, while knowledge and expertise was rarely taken into consideration by the involved parties.

The project [Promociona] would not have started if it were not for the grants (...) because there were not a prior situation to receiving funds. (...) It allowed us to have additional funding that were not from the Spanish state...which was fundamentally one of the problems of putting it into action ... in a moment when we were in the middle of an economic crisis. (...) It emerged thanks to these funds. (...) I did not notice any [transfers of norms, expertise or principles]. I will set its importance to zero. (...) There were not much collaboration in other than financial matters (Interview 1, 25th of March).

Respondent 1 chose to look past the external collaboration and focus on the positive performance environment that were brought about because of the grants, in the PPP between the Spanish Institute for Women and the Spanish Confederation of Business Organizations (CEOE). Promociona is first and foremost implemented as a good governance practice in itself by Spanish companies who are members of the CEOE.

The companies that participate in Promociona reports it as an activity of good corporate governance. (...) It exists codes of good governance for companies (...) and one of the good governance articles state that there need to be a participation which aims for equality between women and men. Therefore, the Promociona project also collaborates in meeting the codes of good governance of the companies (Interview 1, 25th of March).

Good governance is crucial to attract private sector participation in public sector delivery (Li, Akintoye, Edwards & Hardcastle 2005, p. 465). CSR activities namely increases working performance and firm value. Notwithstanding, companies have to make sure that the CSR activities are benign as activities can in worst cases forge a negative public image of them. Companies may await a decision, but public organisations can reassure that bad exposure is out of question (Harajoto & Jo 2011, p. 45-46).

Notably, the Spanish Institute for Women had a comprehensive strategic vision:

The CEOE is an employer's corporation, we are a public administration. (...) The Institute for Women elected CEOE as program promoter because it was the easiest way to reach the companies (...) because for the companies it is very potent that it is the national association which agglutinate them and say: 'It is important that you work with this theme and we are going to set in action a program that the CEOE, the Workers Commission, guarantee for them... to try increment the number of women [in top corporate positions].(Interview 1, 25th of March).

Nonetheless, the Spanish Institute for Women had to convince the CEOE that Promociona was the right project for them to participate in. Even though this process was demanding it generated many positive attributes for the organisations. At first, when it was a pilot project, the Spanish Institute for Women had to refer to results in order to attract the
CEOE into the project. This made the CEOE learn to take advantage of benefits of PPPs, and in turn the Spanish Institute for Women to learn how to reinforce PPPs. Respondent 1 asserts that it was hard to reach a collaborative agreement because when the Spanish Institute for Women first came in contact with the CEOE, the corporation thought that they were an unapt entity to participate in the project. Gender equality was not a worry at that point (Interview 1, 25th of March).

Nevertheless, the interest changed completely following the success that the companies were having. Even though the Institute for Women did not have much habits of reaching the business field they learned how to reach companies and how to convince the CEOE to buy their project idea. One have to find strategies that are linked what they can contribute with to the benefit of businesses apart from mobilising around a fundamental right. One got to utilize another elocution, facilitate transparency and visibility to win the companies over. In reality, Promociona constituted a small cost for the CEOE which saw the benefits of jumping on the bandwagon of good corporate practices, social responsibility and a good corporate image. The hardship has also helped the NGO to have contacts in the companies that currently are essential to Promociona and other projects. Currently companies participate in other projects that the NGO did not know how to involve before, is one of the star projects and has the CEOE with it in all fields (Interview 1, 25th of March).

Promociona also gives a highly positive public visibility to the organisations involved because it provoked a durable change around a relevant gender equality topic, namely female representation in top positions of corporate boards. Respondent 1 confirms this in asserting that the CEOE presents itself to the society with a more modern image around a “clean” theme for company personnel and less based on traditional business themes of the national association such as syndicate problems, salary themes and collective negotiation (Interview 1, 25th of March). It is very visible in the corporate field because it is present on social media and networking sites. Promociona has integrated female representation in top positions of corporate boards as a topic of public debate. Respondent 1 assures that in many companies’ female representation in top corporate positions of corporate boards was ignored at a high level or it was not talked about. It was a theme that only women talked about (Interview 1, 25th of March). Promociona has incorporated this theme into the public debate. The CEOE has been able to transmit an image of a modern business confederation that cares because it has female participation in its corporate bodies, while the companies have noticed that they have much talent that they do not exploit and are much more aware that it is not lost. Each time they are more sensible to the necessity of managing personnel in a different manner internally to make use of the talent of women and facilitate their professional promotion (Interview 1, 25th of March).

The board that manages Promociona on a daily basis is small, competent and dedicated. Three persons manage the project. It has a director, one technical support. The director has an accredited training in equality and is an expert in formative projects. She also has coordinated the project for five years. She and her team have a very high dedication towards achieving the project goal of a 40% female representation in top positions of corporate boards. Compromises are manifested in a document and the grand majority of the cooperation clauses were fulfilled. A high percentage of commitments were made face to face (Interview 1, 25th of March).
Furthermore, the cornerstones of the project is made up of transparency, in addition to trust and passion among employees (or mentors) and the participants. Respondent 1 holds that the project has been transparent. Pieces of good governance were implemented in a broad sense in all the phases of the project. All the funding that was invested in the project was justified adequately. No type of obscurantism has been noticed this far. A high trust level is grounded in that Promociona works well. Cathetic roles are embraced by the participants towards gender equality in top leadership positions of companies. Respondent 1 has never heard anyone of the more than three or nearly four hundred women that have been through Promociona talk badly about it (Interview 1, 25th of March). This is because the project itself transcends a stronger personal self-trust among the participants. Passion is interpreted as the main success factor and attitudinal driver. Respondent 1 thinks that Promociona worked out amazingly well thanks to that they had a lot of passion (Interview 1, 25th of March). Moreover, they have passion to continue withholding it to improve it each time, to increment the number of companies and of female participants. Respondent 1 express that it is very giving to be involved, as the women who participate are very happy to be a part of Promociona. Some project participants who got promoted have given brief testimonies about the project, where one claimed that the management is excellent (EEA and Norway Grants 2015c).

Promociona has what it takes to blossom in the future. The PPP has a continuity and repeats itself each year. Company participation increment towards the goal. Each time it has more prestige and the participating women talk to each other about some companies to other companies. Once the grants were finished it continues to evolve, and the companies continue to participate nearly more than before to be consolidated. The project continues to receive funding from the general Spanish state budget. The companies assess if they participate or not every year. Perhaps they participate one year and the next and not the year after, but then again later. At least two initiatives have arose out of Promociona. Chile has copied the Promociona project and is off to its second edition. LDO tries to extend the Promociona-project in Portugal. Business schools have been established which every year selects the most competitive company and school (Interview 1, 25th of March).

Notably, respondent 1 declares that the biggest negative aspects stressed by workers confederations is that Promociona is a bit elitist. It is directed at women who have professional experience, are highly educated and have noteworthy positions inside companies. Consequently, women who lacks professional experience, have low education and low positions inside companies do not know much about the project. Diversity considerations are also absent. Therefore, it receives critique for not helping women who needs it the most (Interview 1, 25th of March). Respondent 2 emphasizes that Promociona got a foothold in Spain, but not in Norway because work-life balance is to a large extent seen as an issue of the past and has become a norm (Interview 2, 7th of May).

Recurring from the analysis of Promociona are many positive performance factors. Those are CSR, a strategic vision, mutual learning, a high visibility, a high relevance, a competent management team, a high transparency, cathetic roles and continuity. Elitism is the only negative performance factor. A strategic vision and a competent management team falls under the management realm, while the rest belong to the governance realm.
8.2.2 Companies Against Violence

The CAV project was one of the ten projects that gave best results in the fourth funding period. A high relevance was emphasised at several occasions. LDO and South-Odal municipality coincidentally had interests in developing measures against violence in near relations simultaneously. The initiative from South-Odal became the fundament of the CAV-project which was inspired by a project that already had begun in Spain. Through the programme, LDO put in action a bilateral project where the programme operator gathered firms in Spain together in an expert group. It was difficult to do the same in Norway. Luckily LDO discovered South-Odal’s initiative that was going to look at violence in near relations (Interview 2, 7th of May). LDO and South-Odal municipality came in touch in June of 2013 and became part of the CAV-project during the autumn (Interview 3, 14th of May).

South-Odal municipality had established a coordinated team who worked at the public health centre especially directed against children, child protection services, the crisis centre, the Norwegian Labour and Welfare Administration (NAV) and the social welfare office. It was a response to a case about a closure of a regional crisis centre where a necessity to connect violence-hit women to the business life arose. Initially, the initiative met resistance in professional circles because they think that it is not the task of crisis centres to get a job for women. This though was new in Norway at the time (Interview 3, 14th of May).

Norway handles victims of violence in near relations very well when it comes to offering crisis centre treatment and actual protection “per se” but falls short of providing them with a proper job that will help them break out of a violence cycle and become unique societal contributors. People of all ages who experience violence in acute situations or over a short and long term receive healthcare and social assistance in accordance to the Norwegian crisis centre law (Interview 3, 14th of May). An analysis of the system established around female violence victims in Stavanger municipality supports that the preparedness that handles violence against women in near relations is majorly driven by reactive aspects and neglect proactive aspects of the phenomenon. Consequently, violence against women in near relations seems to be handled as one individual crisis at a time and not as an ongoing crisis (Lea 2010, p. 84-85).

The social services and crisis centres looks at work as essential for victims of violence, but NAV has a sort of monopoly on such cases. NAV finds deprecatory diagnoses to provide disability benefits to women. One should not stigmatize women who are victims of violence, categorize them nor feel sorry for them (Interview 3, 14th of May). Fortunately, NAV is knowingly getting better at perceiving violence problems (Lea 2010, p. 64). Victims of violence are particularly disposed to suffering a huge drop in self-esteem. Victims might lose control of themselves and think that they do not have abilities. Instead of sending victims around from place to place, it should be possible to sit down and talk with relevant persons that may get them into the working life. Through work they will get empowered and their consciousness will shift towards making money which would help them elevate their own personal growth. Collaboration with private enterprises is a possible strategy to implement this measure (Interview 3, 14th of May).

Even if work is important to boost personal growth, research show that women who are vulnerable to violence and active workers have a poorer quality of life than women who are not active workers. Women in the last group in turn experience troubles in mastering
the working life. With the right assistance work can still be a way to get out of a violence cycle (Alsaker, Moen & Baste 2009, p. 60-63).

Spain arguably have a stronger tradition in accommodating organisational partnerships than Norway. Spain has succeeded in formalizing the involvement of the private sector and the ideal sector in cooperation with the public sector to produce good solutions next to a cross-sectoral cooperation at the authority level despite handling a grave economic recession. Norway should learn from Spain who have put those in action (Interview 2, 7th of May; Interview 3, 14th of May). CSO-public-private partnerships (CPPP) are an up and coming way of effectively maximizing benefits for companies and citizens in modern development (Essia 2015, p.1). Spain runs national strategies through the Ministry of Health, Consumer Affairs and Social Welfare and has many clear campaigns about preventing violence against women. Spain works very closely with large voluntary organisations such as the Red Cross throughout the country (Interview 3, 14th of May).

Social awareness in Norway is totally different than in Spain (Interview 3, 14th of May). Public enterprises hesitate to get in touch with private enterprises because they are not used to cooperate, although it has proven to work well in Bodø municipality. This also holds true in working with women who are victims of violence as a defined group. Non-state actors need external financing to participate in projects because of small budgets. Another disadvantage is that labour expenses are a lot higher in Norway. That may be the reason why it is difficult to establish a similar expert group of firms in Norway (Interview 2, 7th of May). Nonetheless, Maarud, were among the companies that wanted to join the project immediately because of ambitions to give back to South-Odal municipality where its local firm is located and due to their international working patterns. Maarud thus contribute whenever they are consulted by the municipality. Norwegian enterprises generally have a lot to learn. Now it has become a subject of public discussion that the development of an individual plan aiming at a job should assist women who are victims of violence (Interview 3, 14th of May).

South-Odal municipality learned about the Organic law and representants from the State Secretary for Equality and Social Services learned how South-Odal municipality worked with coordinated response in collaboration with the business life. The exiting aspect for South-Odal was on juridical strategic work to promote gender equality. It taught them to think change in shape of that one wants to empower exposed groups another way and how legislation might translate into good results in times of economic crisis. The Norwegian mechanisms for instance inadequately capture what happens to women prior to incidents (Interview 3, 14th of May).

Spain has accomplished to empower women who are victims of gender-based violence that have slightly dissimilar rights in the countries even though Norway has not experienced similar economic challenges. In return, Spain learned about the Norwegian child law which they do not apply distinctly. There it makes up a part of the family law related to the rights of women. This contrast could successively be a topic of discussion. Spanish workers specifically showed interest in child protection as a way to discover domestic violence and the empirical benefits of finding work for women who receive acute support. By working crosswise one can see things differently and gain acceptance for cultural differences. An achievement was the development of the instruction model (Interview 3, 14th of May).

Respondent 3 clarified that South-Odal had more to learn when the project was concluded. They could have worked more with experience-sharing between Spanish
companies who have a long experience of getting women who have traumas into the working life and Norwegian companies. A downside is that the project issue has a small chance of maintaining its focus in the future because an estimated two thirds of those who worked in 2014-2015 has gotten a new job since then (Interview 3, 14th of May).

All the employees had well defined roles and the money was used wisely. Both parties met at meetings and even worked in-between meetings. They had great respect of fulfilling their mandates and the objective of the project. An equal engagement and dedication gave an actual utility value. The earmarking of the EEA grants went to meeting facilities, travel expenses, accommodation and daily allowances. A very high value for money was secured as the cheapest alternatives were picked with a creativity to it. Respondent 3 remember that she never have travelled that much on “milk routes” as she did then. The organizers were very skilled to get companies to arrange meeting points and cover food expenses. Spanish workers had learned from their national history and was preoccupied with retracting learning out of every crown. That gave the parties nice experiences at the meeting points (Interview 3, 14th of May).

A considerable media attention was given to the CAV project. It gained recognition in the local newspaper in South-Odal (Glåmdalen 2015), but also in Spain. Respondent 3 has had lectures about the project. Reasons for this might be to continue sharing best practices and keep attention to the issue. She has presented the project for Norwegian local politicians, the Spanish Department of Justice and State Secretaries, in Eastern European countries (Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia) and at the UN Commission of the Status of Women in 2015. The latter presentation attracted interest from women from all over the world, because in comparison to the traditional themes such as violence, female genital mutilation, HIV/AIDS, suppression, sale of women and prostitution, work as a way out of violence was unheard of. Grants from the Department of Justice and Preparedness and the new crime-preventive measure still keeps the projects operational in South-Odal. Recently, respondent 3 held a lecture for an optimist club where one of the company directors who attended is engaged in the issue and works closely with the local crisis centre. She has also been contacted by municipalities in Portugal. The project has provided a useful tool for the target group in the whole programme (Interview 3, 14th of May).

In the CAV-project, experiences are in line with positive performance factors. They are relevance, mutual learning, sharing of best practices, visibility and continuity. A negative performance aspect is that more learning could have been obtained. Sharing of best practices belongs to the management domain, while the rest falls under the governance domain.

Overall discoveries from the analysis confirms that a high throughput performance was achieved in the Gender Mainstreaming and Work-Life balance Programme and in the Promociona and CAV project. National and organisational interests coincided with each other and the interest mobilization level was high. Maturity was anchored in a high mutual trust and on an admittance of societal challenges. An overload of performance success factors does that one can argue for project successes and a successful programme. The management of the grants and the projects were solid, and they have strong future potentials. Surprisingly, most positive performance experiences belong to the governance domain. Controllable factors in the output phase are well-defined missions, a satisfactory amount of personnel, a programme plan, a proficient client consultation and an attentive troubleshooting. Uncontrollable factors are power politics
voiced through governmental shifts majorly due to diverging egalitarian priorities and a small sense of urgency to operationalize the programme and the projects caused by a delayed initiating phase. Enough empirical data to approve an optimal balance between portfolio management, project sponsorship, a project management office and projects and program support was not accessible. Neither was it enough to indicate more than that a strong strategic vision existed in Promociona project amongst considerations to fulfil an optimal strategy execution.

The findings are although sufficient to substantiate the existence of a high degree of good governance in the EEA grants to Spain from 2009-2014 from the results presented in Chapter 3. PPPs were established and working conducts surrounded CSR activities and Best Practices. A high performance thus coincides with good results and means that a high degree of good governance was achieved.
9. Conclusion

The purpose of the current thesis has been to substantiate how and why a high degree of good governance was achieved in the EEA grants to Spain from 2009-2014. This was done by evaluating known external elements and revealed internal throughput components to confirm that the performance level of the Promociona and CAV-project within the Gender Mainstreaming and Work-Life Balance programme was high. Aspects that suggests how a high degree of good governance was achieved are benign PPP formations while reasons why are CSR activities and conducts surrounding Best Practices. PPPs are tools to promote good governance. CSR activities increases working performance and Best Practices are micro-level practices of good governance.

Representants from the LDO, the Spanish Institute for Women, South-Odal municipality, the CEOE, the Spanish State Secretary of Equality and Social Services formed successful partnerships. A solid management structure by the EEA grants scheme and skilled management operations at the programme and project level eased organisational collaborations. Professional financial earmarking, socialization and working methods led to good results and strong future project potentials.

Gender mainstreaming, gender-based violence and work-life balance were actualized to fill societal gender gaps in Norway and Spain. It seems like the projects worked as intended. Mutual learning and experience-sharing were produced. The Gender Mainstreaming and Work-Life Balance programme in Spain got €10.191.250 in EEA grants. A quick realization, learning potential, a great communication and an effective risk prevention were positive performance factors, while the negative performance factor was governmental shifts. 3760 vulnerable women took part in employment advancement activities, 87 companies signed an initiative to get more women in companies and 38 awareness raising initiatives were reinforced on the gender pay gap. Promociona received €800.000 in EEA grants and improves the possibility of women to achieve top positions in corporate boards. Positive performance factors were CSR, a strategic vision, mutual learning, a high visibility, a high relevance, a competent management team, a high transparency, cathetic roles and continuity. The negative performance factor was a soft elitism. A result from Promociona show that 25% of the participants were promoted by November of 2017. CAV received €120.000 to exchange Best Practices and build social awareness to optimize a coordinated response between municipalities in collaboration with public and private organisations. Positive performance factors were relevance, mutual learning, sharing of best practices, visibility and continuity. A negative performance facet was that more learning could have been obtained. A result from CAV show that 45 organisations have promised to incorporate victims of gender-based violence in their workforce. Known success factors backs these findings.

The conclusions drawn from contextual discussions and interviews with three organisational employees overlap with the thoughts of leading figures who they may have encountered between aid and development during the fourth funding period. At the closing event of the Gender Mainstreaming and Work-Life Balance programme, the former Norwegian Ambassador to Spain, Johan Cristopher Vibe, declared that Spain and Norway became partners in gender equality under common goals despite societal differences. Meanwhile, the General Director of the Institute for Women and Equal Opportunities, Rosa Urbón Izquierdo, accentuated that the policies advanced will endure in Spain (EEA Grants 2016b).
Future research can go in different directions. One possible avenue could be to test the generalizability of the Promociona and CAV project by including more projects and respondents. The shown programme performance can also be added to the study. Another avenue could be to dig deeper into employees’ experiences with the EEA grants against the EU Cohesion Funds. As called upon, one can also trace whole project processes if one has the time and resources. They should be from the fifth funding period as the projects likelier are still fresh in the minds of the respondents. Projects from all the programmes should be investigated, but certain projects are protected from third parties.
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11. Appendixes

Appendix I

### SPAIN

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<th>Country Facts</th>
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<td>Youth unemployment rate (%)</td>
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Source: Eurostat 2019/Transparency International

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</table>

Source: EEA and Norway Grants 2017 p. 36.
The Financial Mechanism Committee is the decision-making body of the EEA Grants. It formulates policies and guidelines, agrees upon every programme funding and certifies monitoring, control and evaluation. The Financial Mechanism Office (FMO) reports to the Foreign Ministries of the EEA countries and works as a fixed point for recipient countries. Every recipient country has a National Focal Point office. They are responsible for reaching the overarching goals and broad management of programmes. National Focal Point offices are located inside organs who also manages EU funds. Programme operators are often public institutions who are inclined to give money to projects in line with set criteria and monitoring project integration. Donor programme partners usually cooperate with programme operators by providing expertise and strategic advice on programme planning and implementation in addition to facilitating networking and help project promoters find project partners in donor countries. Embassies participate in the dialogue between the involved countries and takes part in communicating results. The collaboration evolves at various levels. At the programme level, donor countries engage in above 50% of the programmes with partners from receiving countries. At the project level, programmes tend to support separate projects where organisations from Norway, Iceland or Liechtenstein cooperate with partners in receiving countries (EEA and Norway Grants 2014, p. 78-79). Approximately 6% was set aside to reach the second overarching goal to strengthen bilateral relations between donor and recipient countries. Around 7% was set aside to cover management costs at the programme level. Donor operators could utilize a maximum of 10% for management costs at the project level (EEA and Norway Grants n.d.-l).

Appendix III

The South-Odal model places the woman in the centre when a need for aid and follow-up from public institutions arises after being exposed to violence in near relations. The goal is to get women out of violence and into the working life (Krisesenteret i Salten 2018, p. 9-10).

Source: Krisesenteret i Salten 2018, p. 10.

Translations

Inner circle: Kvinne utsatt for vold i nære relasjoner - Woman victim of violence in near relations

Outer circles:

Helsesøster - Public health nurse
Krikesenter – Crisis Centre
Politi – Police
NAV - The Norwegian Labour and Welfare Administration
Barnevern – Child protection
Næringsliv – Business life
Appendix IV

The Salten model is an adaptation of the knowledge-based Individual Placement and Support (IPS) model to a crisis centre context (Krisesenteret i Salten 2018, p.11). The IPS model is a systematic follow-up method with a standardization and methodology based on a manual. Individual job support focus on helping people to gain ordinary paid work rather than having a longer clarification and skill acquisition status, in for instance shielded measures, before entering the working life. The model facilitates a formalized and integrated cooperation between municipalities, the Specialized Health Services and the Norwegian Labour and Welfare Administration (NAV 2013).

The Salten model takes the wishes and need of the woman (kvinnens behov/ønsker) to get a job as vantage point for all job-related support. This wish is communicated from the primary contact (primærkontakt) to the job coordinator (jobkoordinator) via a referral scheme. Then the job coordinator contacts the woman concerned and the woman receives the mapping manual from the job coordinator that she can start to work with. When the women thinks that she has completed the mapping manual as well as she can, she and the job coordinator shall begin making concrete plans and goals in addition to delegate the responsibility and arrange the upcoming job support meetings. Before every meeting, targets are agreed upon for the next meeting. Not every Norwegian municipality has an IPS-team, but it is possible to map the help apparatus (hjelpeapparatet) in these Municipalities to look if there exist a similar team of specialists within the job support. A tight collaboration with the Norwegian Labour and Welfare Administration (NAV) is a very important safeguarding instrument (Krisesenteret i Salten 2018, p. 3,11-13).

Source: Krisesenteret i Salten 2018, p. 12.
Appendix V

*Example of an interview guide*

**Interview Guide**

- **Opening questions**

  In what year and month were the project established?
  How many employees do you estimate to work in the project?
  Were there done anything differently in the project at the time when it received funding from the grants?
  Why do you think that the project was established?

- **Antecedents**

  How would you estimate the interdependency level between the involved actors and companies?
  What kinds of the resources that the EEA Grants has to offer were considered as the most important for the project?
  What relation does the project have with the concept “good governance”?

- **Negotiation**

  Would you say that the negotiation led to a common vision?
  What was, in your opinion, the most important factor in the decision taken in the concluding phase of the negotiations to reach an agreement?

- **Commitment**

  To what degree were compromises made face-to-face?
  Were there formed compromises for future collaboration?

- **Implementation**

  What would you say is the general mission or idea of the project?
  Based on your knowledge, to what degree were the team members dedicated to the general mission?
  How would you describe the professional competencies of the team members?
  What do you think of the resource base of the project?
  What importance would you give to the EEA Grants when there existed alternative funding schemes?
  To what extent is the project publicly visible?
Based on your knowledge, are you in favour of the following affirmation; All partners or actors engaged in the project could review the status of the project, make suggestions through formal feedback channels or evaluative meetings.

Does there exist feasible concrete goal and a good communication?
Were mutual benefits obtained between the involved organisations?
Based on your knowledge, what level of trust existed between the involved parties?

- **Assessment**

To what level would you estimate that the EEA grants impacted on the performance of the project?

To what degree was attitudes about good governance implemented throughout the execution of the project?

Did you notice any learning from this process?

Does there exist feasible concrete goal and a good communication?
Were mutual benefits obtained between the involved organisations?
Based on your knowledge, what level of trust existed between the involved parties?

To what level would you estimate that the EEA grants impacted on the performance of the project?

To what degree was attitudes about good governance implemented throughout the execution of the project?

Did you notice learning from this process?

How would you describe the diversity of the employees who work in the project?

From what you can recon, do you enjoy working in the project now in comparison to the period it received EEA Grants?

What value would you give the EEA Grants on the achievement of the project?

In conclusion, would you agree that a high degree of good governance was achieved in the project?
Appendix VI

Trondheim, våren 2019. Ansvarlig institusjon; NTNU: Campus Dragvoll.

Ref. Intervju 7/5, 14/5 Student: dmyklan@gmail.com
Veileder: carine.germond@ntnu.no

ORAL CONSENT GIVEN DURING THE INTERVIEWS

Bekreftelse på deltakelse i et masteroppgaveprosjekt
Suksessen til EØS-midlene i Spania (2009-2014)
«En kvalitativ analyse av samarbeidsprossessene i prosjektet Promociona og prosjektet Companies against violence»

Bakgrunn og hensikt
Bakgrunnen for masteroppgaven er å teste den implisitte hypotesen til the Financial Mechanism Office/ EØS kontoret om at et høyt nivå å godt styresett ble oppnådd i EØS-midlene til Spania i den fjerde finansieringsperioden. Jeg søker å begrunne påstanden ved å avdekke erfaringer til utvalgte ansatte om samarbeidsprossessene som omgir beste praksis i de to prosjektene som tilhører underprogrammet ”Mainstreaming gender equality and promoting work-life balance” innenfor programmet ”Human and Social Development”.

Hensikten er å tilføre ytterligere kunnskap om yteevnene til ansatte og hvorfor den er slik i de delfinansierede EØS-prosjektene. Denne tilnærmingen tar avstand fra fokuset de involverte organisasjonene har på å oppnå resultater. Lignende studier har blitt gjort om Østeuropeiske land, men ingen har blitt gjort om Spania.

Informantene har blitt valgt ut basert på deres kunnskaper og personlige erfaringen med å jobbe i relasjon til prosjektene. Deltakelsen er frivillig og informantene har rett til å klage til Datatilsynet dersom informasjon misbrukes; https://www.datatilsynet.no/. Personvernombud for NTNU; thomas.helgesen@ntnu.no

Hva innebærer deltakelsen?

Norsk senter for forskningsdata (NSD) har godkjent bruken av intervjuer til masteroppgaven min.
Confirmación de participación en una tesis de maestría

El éxito de los EEA Grants para España (2009-2014)

"Un análisis cualitativo sobre el proceso de colaboración en el proyecto Promociona y en el proyecto Empresas contra la violencia"

Motivo y Propósito

El motivo de la tesis es probar el hipótesis implícito de la Oficina de Mechanismo Financiera/ la Oficina de los EEA and Norway Grants que se obtuvo un alto nivel de buen gobierno en los EEA Grants para España en el cuarto período de financiación. Busco explicar este hecho en revelar la experiencia de empleados involucrados sobre los procesos de colaboración que rodean a prácticas optimas en los dos proyectos que pertenecen al subprograma “Mainstreaming gender equality and promoting work-life balance” dentro del programa “Human and Social Development”.

El propósito es dar conocimiento sobre lo que pasa en el rendimiento total y porque en el centro de los ciclos de proyectos financiadas por los EEA Grants. Esta aproximación se despeje a la dedicación de las organizaciones involucradas a producir resultados. Estudios comparables se han realizado a países en Europa del Este, pero ningunos se han enfocado en España.

Los informantes se han elegido por sus conocimientos y experiencia personal de trabajar en relación con los proyectos. La participación es voluntaria. Los informantes tienen derecho a contactar la autoridad de protección de datos si información se abusa; https://www.datatilsynet.no/en. El defensor de privacidad en NTNU; thomas.helgesen@ntnu.no

¿Qué significa la participación?

La participación se trata de entrevistas individuales, semiestructuradas y anónimas que duran aproximadamente una hora. El audio de las entrevistas se graba y el diálogo se transcribe. El audio se borrará el 15 de mayo (cambiado al inicio de agosto) cuando se entregue la tesis. Solo informantes que aceptan las condiciones se entrevistan. Las condiciones se mencionan brevemente en las entrevistas.

El Centro Noruego de Datos de Investigación (NSD) ha aceptado el uso de entrevistas para mi estudio.
Appendix VII

List of the informants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Workplace</th>
<th>Date and place</th>
<th>Recording/language</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>RESPONDENT 1:</strong> The Spanish Institute for Women</td>
<td>Skype, Trondheim-Madrid 25.03.2019</td>
<td>Recorded. Language: Spanish.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>RESPONDENT 2:</strong> The Norwegian Equality and Anti-Discrimination Ombud</td>
<td>Skype, Trondheim-Oslo 07.05.2019</td>
<td>Recorded. Language: Norwegian.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>RESPONDENT 3:</strong> The Municipality of South-Odal</td>
<td>Skype, Trondheim-Oslo 14.05.2019</td>
<td>Recorded. Language: Norwegian.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

14 Workplace during the 2009-2014 funding period. The positions and affiliations of the informants are excluded to sustain the anonymity of the respondents.