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Renewable Energy Directive: A case of securitization?

A sociological approach to securitization theory

Master's thesis in Master of Arts in European Studies

Supervisor: Pieter de Wilde

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Kindest regards

Tony

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1 Introduction

The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) were as the name suggest, based upon cooperation in the field of energy. ECSC is the very start of today's European Union (EU) have undergone dramatic changes from its beginning with 28 member states (the United Kingdom is still in the European Union as of the time of writing), yet it would take decades for the ECSC to further the cooperation in on energy. Since the start of ECSC energy needs and infrastructure have changed considerably, especially with the eastern enlargement, the energy mix in the EU varied greatly. From heavy reliance on coal in Poland to wind farms in Denmark. Firstly, the eastern expansion of the EU gave the EU a new energy dilemma as the old Soviet states such as Lithuania gas infrastructure made it so that Lithuania depended on Russian export for its gas supply.

It was not before the 2007 Lisbon Treaty gave energy policies a specific legal basis in the Treaties. The policy takes aim to 'ensure the security of energy supply in the Union (Keukeleire & Delreux, 2014, p. 223). Two years after, in 2009, the 2009/28/EC, known as the Renewable energy Directive, came into force, setting mandatory targets for its member-states in energy consumption in transport, housing and in the production of that energy, with a goal of 20% increase in renewable energy sources (RES) for the EU in total, 20% increase in energy efficiency and 20% reduction of greenhouse gasses emission (EUR-Lex, 2009).

There has been a strong focus on climate change in the EU over a long period of time. The EU was one of the first international actors which acknowledge the dangers of climate changes and have been at the forefront in making reforms and legislating aimed at combating climate change and emission. In 1997, the EU and in its member-states participated in the Kyoto agreement, agreeing with the rest of the international community that something must be done regarding the environment, especially regarding GHG-emission (UNFCCC, NA). Later replaced by the Copenhagen and then the Paris agreement, all of which the EU, and in turn, the member-states have ratified. The Kyoto agreement came in a period where the EU started to focus on creating a common energy strategy to tackle the rising concern of climate change.

Nevertheless, are the other factors than climate agreements and concern that have motivated the change to renewable energy? This thesis will argue that security energy supplies through expanding the EU's RES played a large part in the creation of RED. The decline in indigenous gas production in the EU. The United Kingdom moving from a net exporter of natural gas to net importer in 2004 (Prah & Weingartner, 2016, p. 45), leaving the EU very dependent on import from third countries.

In 2018 the Commission proposed a recast of the Renewable energy directive (RED), called Renewable Energy Directive 2 (REDII). REDII set ambitious target relating to energy consumption from renewable sources in the EU and increasing energy efficiency. REDII builds upon the original RED and sets the targets of consumption higher than RED, from 20% to 32% increase in renewable energy consumption in the EU. This recast opens a question, why did RED take form at all? What was the motivation for setting these ambitious goals?

One cannot speak of energy in the EU without speaking of Russia. Russia holds over 5% of the world's oil reserves and almost 24 of the gas reserves, and in 2009 Russia provided 60% of the gas to EU member-states. In 2005, the overall share of RES in the EU-27 amounted for less than 10% of total energy, while oil and gas amounted for over 60% (European Environment Agency, 2008, p. 38). Issues of dependency trading with petroleum producing countries, as the main producers of gas in the EU, Netherlands and the UK have had a sharp drop in gas production (Eurostat, 2018).

The Russia-Ukraine gas dispute in 2006 was a turning point in energy security in the EU. The dispute came as a result of disagreement on gas prices between Gazprom and Ukraine. Gazprom demanded that from 2006, Ukraine would need to pay "European prices" for gas, up 3-4 times the current price level (Stern, 2006, p. 6). In 2006, the gas pressure from the pipeline that goes through Ukraine lessened, which were noticed notably by European costumers. Gazprom reported that it sent the usual amount of gas through the pipeline, and Ukraine denied the accusations that they were stealing gas meant for the rest of Europe (Stern, 2006, p. 8)

Did this cut in supply from Russia affect EUs institutions view on energy security in any way? Can we observe that as a result of the Ukraine-Russia gas dispute, the Commission and other EU institutions sought to capitalize and frame the dispute as a potential security threat for a secure supply of energy in Europe which can be made less severe with RES?

To further understand how renewables gained popularity and became a critical part of EU energy strategy, the research question for the thesis is: How and to what extent does securitization help us understand/explain the creation of the Renewable energy directive?

Securitization is applied in this thesis because it sheds light on how different actors in position of power might use their influence to shape one perception of what is a security threat or not, in the case of this thesis, energy security in the EU. Securitization has been used to analyze energy policies and energy security in the EU. However, RED seems to not have been the focus for analysis wit securitization at its center.

As far as I have seen in the literature, RED has not been analyzed through the scope of securitization, making it a good fit for a master thesis. The reason for using securitization approach to RED is to see if it can highlight new parts of the directive that has been overlooking by other approaches such as governance. By applying securitization to RED, I believe that it will allow for a deep dive into both the official and public discourse of energy politics in the EU and possible reveal that RED is a directive more focused on energy security than it appears at the first glance.

The study is empirical of nature, meaning it relies on observations on how political practices unfold themselves in the EU. Securitization provides a theory well suited for empirical studies. By using the theory of securitization, one ask security form whom, why this particular issues/sector, who resist the attempt to securitize and how are the audience, the ones that accept the securitizing attempt (Wæver, 2011, p. 466).

EU dependence on Russian energy and the Ukraine-Russia gas crisis in 2006 makes RED a very interesting case to analyze with a focus on security. There is a different perspective on energy security inside the EU. The "newer" eastern member states. the difference in attitude to renewables and security of energy supplies such as gas between west and east EU member-states. Western states are more focused on completing an

energy single market and climate change. The eastern member-states, such as Estonia and Poland have a much more security-focused approach to energy, fearing being too dependent on Russia (Austvik, 2016, p. 372). This is interesting as the Commission calls for a "unified" voice in energy matters, however, there is a wide gap between member-states energy interest and needs. This will be done through critical discourse analysis. Critical in that institutions and stakeholders in the EU that hold some degree of influence of power and their ability to exercise this power will be central. The European Commission, (Commission) the Council of the European Union and the parliament are the EU institutions which hold legislative power in the EU, thus, are the ones which discourse will be analyzed. Stakeholders such as business interest groups are also included in the analysis, as it will be argued that these groups have some influence over policymakers in the EU.

The thesis has 5 chapters: 1. The chapter is the introduction where with an overview of relevant academic literature will be provided. 2. Chapter provides the theoretical framework of securitization and energy securitization. 3. The chapter sets out the methodology for the thesis, 4. The chapter provides the findings and discusses whether securitization can explain why RED came into force or not. 5. The chapter is the conclusion, providing a summary of the finding and reflection of the process of writing the thesis.

1.1 Overview of the literature

Security studies have seen an increase in academic "schools" since the 1990's, mostly focused on moving away from the traditional way of looking at security, namely that security is something that belongs in the military sphere of issues. These new schools all argue that to better understand what security really is, one must look beyond military issues. There are three main schools that have gain prominence: the school of Aberystwyth, the Welsh school, Paris school and the Copenhagen School (CS).

1.1.1 "New" schools of security and governance

The Aberystwyth schools of Critical Security Studies (CSS) draws from the Frankfurt School. It is critical in its interest in power and potential power abuse from elites. CSS holds that security should not be seen through the lens of the states, rather, one should focus on how power is used, and the effects of the power use and abuse. Thus, national security should not be in focus, as it is often the state that is the source of the problem. Rather, one should seek to conceptualize security so it fits with human beings and everyday life, linking security to threats towards the people (Wæver, 2012, p. 42).

The Political Anthropological Research for International Sociology (PARIS) is focused on the individual in insecurity and normalization of insecurity through governmental practices. It draws on sociology and anthropological traditions, with Foucault as an inspiration. PARIS School focuses on empirical investigations of how agency practices compete for tasks traditionally the police and military have (Wæver, 2012, p. 44). In doing so, it seeks to highlight how these agencies create insecurity from a discourse by linking immigration to security, as Didier Bigo shows an example of in his *Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the Governmentality of Unease* from 2002. (Bigo, 2002)

RED and renewable energy schemes in the EU have seen much academic interest in recent years. Multi-governance focusses on how member states and/or other actors act at other level than the national level, such the Commission and the European Parliament

(Parliament). Governance has been the default framework for studying the security in the EU according to Sperling and Webber. The governance approach has been used to explore different aspects of renewable energy. The implication of such an approach is that the object analyzed then is the member state, and how it navigates the waters in different international institutions and forums. Hirschl claims that the development of RES has first and foremost come from the nation-states in a multi-level governance system (Hirschl, p. 4408). Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen and Jollands, and Staudt argue for RES to succeed, strong global governance is required to achieve a global shift from fossil fuels to RES (S., Jollands, & Staudt, 2012).

Inga Ydersbond found that multi-level governance is useful to explain how interest groups and stakeholders can have success lobbying energy policies at several levels in the EU, national and at the EU level (Ydersbond, 2012).

Despite the popularity of the governance approach to energy issues, this thesis focuses on the security aspect through the lens of securitization. of RED and seeks to see whether securitization could provide some insight into why RED took the shape and form it did. This next segment will give an overview of existing literature in both securitization studies and studies of energy security

1.1.2 Securitization

The concept of securitization was first coined by Ole Wæver in "securitization and desecuritization" from 1995 are generally regarded as the starting point of the securitization theory. Wæver collaboration with Barry Buzan, o and Jaap de Wilde in their book: "*security, a new framework*" set the Copenhagen school on the map. Buzan et al. lay down a framework for the usage of securitization in analyzing security politics as well as energy security as something that comes from a speech act, which originated from speech theory.

Securitization moves away from the classical tradition of security studies in that it focuses on another aspect of security outside military security and applies the concept of security to a wider range of issues (Buzan, Wæver, & Wilde, 1998). We see the same line of argument already in the introduction in Wæver 1995 he is discontent with the traditional ways of dealing with securitization and argues that security could and should be applied more broadly than to the state and military. This is the fundamentals of securitization, security covers more than the traditional usage of the word, and one should shift the focus to the spoken meaning. It is only by "*speaking security*" that one can claim that an issue has been securitized, it needs to be facilitated (Buzan et al, 1998, p. 17).

There have been several adaptations of securitization theory since the concept gained prominence amongst scholars. Balzacq identifies that there are two main directions of securitization theory. The first direction follows the 'classical tradition' of securitization, where one focuses on the act of speaking and the illocutionary act that follow, based on the speech theory. The second path is one of the critics to the reliance on speech theory (Balzacq & Guzzini, 2015, p. 97) and seeks other ways of analyzing securitization.

Some criticize the intersubjectivity of securitization, other the lack of focus on the audience. In his article: "*Three faces of securitization*" (Balzacq T., 2005) and (Balzacq T., A theory of securitization, 2011) claims that there are three basic assumptions for securitization. First, for securitization to be effective, it needs to be audience centered. Second, securitization is context driven. Matt McDonald's "*Securitization and the*

Construction of Security” builds upon the argument that securitization is too narrow by focusing on those in a position of power (McDonald, 2008, p. 564). McDonald, like Balzacq, criticizes the speech act for relying solely on language. Another interesting point is his criticism of how the speech act could leave out important bureaucratic processes that might play an important part in the security discourse (McDonald, 2008, pp. 567-568)

Michael Williams’s *Words, Images and Enemies*” argues that the speech act must be revised as new mediums such as television play a larger part of people’s access to news. What one needs to pay attention to then are the images that are broadcasted (Williams M., 2003). The point that one must adapt to the mediums the audience is using relates to the point being made by Balzacq, that the audience does play a part in the securitization scheme. Even more so today, where information flows much more freely, and the larger part of Europe are connected to the internet. Bright applies securitization to terrorism in the UK, arguing that 9/11 change both politicians and the public’s view of terrorism, something the UK was used to (Bright, 2012, p. 870) Williams also ask what is the extraordinary politics that CS securitization links to. Extraordinary politics as the intensification of popular mobilization, an extensive consensus (Williams M. C., 2015, p. 115).

Securitization has been applied to numerous security issues, ranging from climate change (Dupont, 2018), immigration (Huysmans, 2000,), terrorism (Bright; Kaurert, Léonard) and energy issues (Trombetta, 2018; Szulicki 2017, Hofmann & Steager), Cyberspace. There is also the term of Collective Securitization. Collective securitization looks at how institutions such as the EU can convince its audience, often the member states, that to tackle a certain problem, the EU is the solution to the problem (Sperling & Webber, 2018).

1.1.3 Energy security

Energy security is a contested concept, with a large variety of different definition to it. A reason for this is that energy security as a tool for policymakers, part of the explanation of the “explosion” of definitions. Every state and institution have different energy needs and issues, thus, there is no “fit all” definition for policymakers, making it hard to create a definition which satisfies everyone involved.

The view that energy security has become a buzzword is supported in the academic literature as well. Benjamin Sovacool shows that there are 45 different definitions of energy security (Sovacool, 2011, p. 3) in his handbook of energy security. Azzuni & Breye in 2018 argues that since the beginning of the 2000s, there has been a sharp rise in a number of publications that offers different versions of energy security.

One way of conceptualizing energy security is the four A’s: Availability, accessibility, affordability, and acceptability are rooted in the classic tradition and have been a major influence in energy security studies. The four A’s way of conceptualizing energy security which gained prominence for its broad applicability, covering most of the issues one would expect to find in economic-based research. It was first coined by the Asia Pacific Energy Research Centre (APEREC) (Cherp & Jewell, 2014, p. 415). Daniel Yergin’s argues that one should include the entire energy supply chain to better conceptualize energy security, taking into account other factors than those of in the economic field (Yergin, 2006).

However, these are rooted in more of an economic-oriented school of thought, focused on *securing* energy, rather the security *of* energy. What we seen then is that the energy security is restrained and fails to answer the question asked in securitization. Who is the security for, the population of a state, the industry, the military or even the entire state? Therefore, one must go beyond the 'classic' tradition (Cherp & Jewell, 2014; Szulecki K., 2018). Cherp and Jewell, as well as Szulecki, argue that energy security has natural variations, depending on who and where they are. The different energy system, infrastructure, energy poverty, and climate can be used in the energy security discourse.

Energy securitization breaks with the traditional lines of energy security studies and follows Cherp and Jewell, Szulecki quest to better define the term. Energy security for who? What are the treats? (Szulecki & Westphal, 2018) shows that Russia is using gas supply as political leverage/hostage shows that there are definite threats to the EU's energy systems. Reliance on undemocratic states for most of its power creates a weak link and restrains the EU's foreign policy work. Russia is one of the main suppliers of gas to the EU and its member states.

They also note that there is increased divergence in types of energy production in the EU, with more of a focus on renewable energy such as wind and solar power.

Szulecki et al. incorporates Balzacq's pragmatic act and supplements it with riskification. The argument is that it will better show how both security and security and risk discourse alter policymaking.

Risk-based security is oriented towards the conditions of possibility (or constitutive causes) of harm promoting long-term precautionary governance. Riskification decouples security from the idea of an existential threat to a valued referent object leading to exceptional measures against external and ungovernable threatening others. Rather, it posits risks (understood as conditions of possibility for harm) to a referent object leading to programs for permanent changes aimed at reducing vulnerability and boosting governance-capacity of the valued referent object itself. (p46)

Neither governance nor riskification will be applied in this thesis. This is because the interest of this thesis is to understand how energy security politics were conducted in the time period between 2006-2009. By adding riskification to the mix will demand a different approach, taking the focus away from threat and security politics.

2 Theoretical framework

The purpose of this section is to highlight central aspects of theories that are used in this thesis. Securitization theory on energy issues. The goal of the thesis is to see whether we can observe if central actors in the EU energy policy scene have made moves with the aim of creating an energy issue regarding energy security in the EU. Energy security theories provide a theoretical background which helps us understand just what energy security is and how it might be securitized. What are key aspects of energy security, can we extend the term beyond petroleum related energy sources in the economic field. Security has traditionally been in the realm of the state and military issues. However, this thesis is based on the assumption that security can and should be used in a broader range of issues. Security has changed from being strictly nation state-focused, to also include sociological that affect the lives of everyday inhabitant's wellbeing. By including the wellbeing of people in the security field means that one can apply security to a whole new range of issues, healthcare, welfare, and the environment is some issues which security definition could be extended to. In accepting these premises, we can study a whole new range of issues by applying security to them. I will use the theoretical framework of securitization on the energy sector in the EU, to see if energy policy has become a securitized issue.

Security, in the Oxford Dictionary, is defined as "*The state of being free from danger or threat*". Following this definition, to be secure is then to free from any danger or threat, while the absence of security would imply that one is exposed to threat and/or danger. At state level is when states impose their will on others, seeks to defend their sovereignty (Wæver, 1995, p. 47). Natural disasters such as a volcano erupting or a meteor on a collision course with earth would put one in imminent danger and relive one of their security, leave state pretty much powerless to defend and poses an existential threat to the state's sovereignty, putting the state in a position where its security is absent. One immediate question that comes to mind is who decides that something is under threat or in danger from something? Other than natural disasters, who decides that there is a "migration crisis" or a need for energy security in the EU? Is security to be understood only in issues where the use of military power is involved, the defense of the state, or can it be applied to other political issues such as migration and energy politics? If yes, one needs to understand the implication of using the word security and how it changes the issues it is latched on too.

To understand how different actors and agents can use security to change the agenda of an issue to better fit their narrative, this thesis will apply the theory of securitization. Securitization is a constructivist theory, meaning that the international systems, laws, norms, and language are created, formed and used by humans (Barnett, 2014, p. 158). Where a realist argues that the international systems consist of anarchy where it is every state for itself, a constructivist would argue that the state of anarchy is not a natural occurrence but is maintained by the will of those in charge of states to keep the international system in a state of anarchy. Constructivism gained prominence after the collapse and fragmentation of the Soviet Union, which led to a drastic change of borders in Europe and Asia. Wideners (read the constructivist such as Buzan and Wæver) argues that one needs to include more than just military issues when one speaks of security.

Security should be perceived as stabilization of conflict threatening relations, often through the mobilization of the state. Insecurity is less desirable as it creates a threat to which there are no countermeasures (Wæver, p.4). Traditionalist insists on keeping military focus in security studies, however, acknowledges that non-state actors need to be included in the analysis. There is also the issue of making security a term one can apply to anything, there have been made arguments that one runs the risk of "*destroying the intellectual coherence*", thus making it more difficult to devise solutions to security-related issues (Wæver, 1995, pp. 4-5).

The next section will go through the core of the two "branches" of securitization the speech act introduced by the CS and Balzacq's pragmatic act and tie it together to show securitization will be conceptualized and applied in the analysis of RED.

2.1 Securitization

Securitization as a theory aims to create a framework for security studies where the word "*security*" a part in creating security-related actions and policies. The CS, with Ole Wæver at the forefront, argues that one must look beyond the old militaristic way of security to better understand it. The focus should be on security for the "*people*", not the state (Wæver, 1995, p. 47). An issue presents itself and becomes securitized the CS argued that this issue is more important than other issues and should take absolute priority. The issues must be linked to an existential threat.

Wæver then defines a security problem as "*something that undercuts the political order within a state and thereby alters the premises for all other questions*" (Wæver, 1995, p. 5).

2.1.1 Copenhagen school: securitization and the speech act

Securitization is a more extreme version of politicization. Politicization meaning that the issue is part of public policy making a sphere, requiring government decision and resources allocations. More rarely, some other form of communal governance to transform into securitization; meaning the issues is presented as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying extraordinary actions outside the normal bounds of the political procedure (Buzan et al, 1998., p. 23). Securitization has been important in innovating security studies and how security is constructed (McDonald, 2008, p. 564), moving security studies beyond state and military focus of the traditionalists, providing analytical tools for understanding how security issues can be created by

One can identify a field of social interactions, with a specific set of actions and codes. Through these interactions, actions, and codes certain actors/agents set the agenda/field for security in the specific field. This approach to security it is possible to apply security to any sector. Any sector that is perceived as vulnerable to some threat, internal or external, agents can claim that one there is a security issue, thus seeks to elevate the issue to an issue of utmost importance (Wæver, 1995, p. 4)

Security then becomes something that threatens the sovereign or the sovereignty of a certain sector and alters the state of normal politics. In other words, something that threatens the sovereign/ity of a state or a referent object. Referent objects are things or objects that seemingly are existential threatened and have a legitimate claim for survival (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 36). The elite in the state/sector are the ones with the privilege of speaking of security. In the act for speaking of security, the naming itself claims special rights, thus the actors must come from some position of power for the naming of security

to resonate with the audience (Wæver, 1995, p. 6). The act then becomes Illocutionary, meaning that it has a commanding effect. An illocutionary act in the sense of security then refers to something that one should perceive as a threat (Chilton & Schäffner, 1997, p. 216) this is the steps of the speech act. The utterance of security is in itself is an act, creating a security issue based on the intersubjective perception of the issue at hand (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 26).

This then allows that securitizing actor to create a reference to it being threatened by some existential threat. Securitizing have been successful when the general public and stakeholder accept that one must enact special measures to protect the referent object from the threat presented. By accepting that security is intersubjective, it becomes clear that security is socially constructed part of a discursive and socially constituted. Whether an issue is a security issue is not something individuals decide on alone. Security is and must be understood as an intersubjective process, that security is socially constructed. To securitize, the securitizing actor must resonate with its targeted audience and must hold a position of power from where its voice and argument can reach and take hold in the targeted audience (Buzan et al., 1998, pp. 24-25). Thus, it is not for any individual or group to claim that the referent object is in imminent threat.

One must not utter the word security at every possible occasion in an attempt to securitize successfully. Firstly, one must follow the rules of the act. Creating a discourse where one constructs a narrative in which the referent object is in dire need of protection from an existential threat. Should nothing be done, there will be a point of no return, which in turn will be catastrophic as the referent object is a cornerstone of the audience way of life (Stritzel, 2012, p. 554). Secondly, the security actor should hold a position of social importance from which the act can be made. The referent object need not be threatened by tanks or a hurricane, indeed, depending on the agenda of the actor the polluted water or the possibility of lack of water could also be a legitimate reason.

Buzan et al. operate with 5 levels of analysis: 1. International systems, 2. An international subsystem, 3. Units, 4. Subunits, 5 (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 6). Individuals. Following this division, this thesis will focus on the international subsystem which in this instance is the EU. Units, in this case, the member states also will appear as it would not serve to exclude them from the analysis given the power member states have in decision making in the EU. Subunits are interest groups and stakeholders, and to see if whether these units have played a part in securitizing RED. Division of sectors serves as a means of separating the area of policy being analyzed, thus a mean of identifying certain types of interactions (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 8). The sectors under the scope here are the political and energy sector. The political sector highlights relationships between governments and political actors/agents that enjoy authority. The energy policies seem to be best put under the economic sector as the question of energy politics in the EU is mostly a question of energy supply, therefore best put in the economic sector.

This thesis will focus on how political actors and stakeholders seek to shape the discourse of energy policy in the EU. However, it is not to say that energy-related issues can or does not spill over to other sectors. In narrowing energy issues to merely the economic sphere of politics leave out the issue that without energy, hospitals and most of today's modern society would not function (Cherp & Jewell, 2014), as we will go in further detail in the conceptualizing energy security. Indeed, as Wæver argues:

With this approach, it is possible that any sector, at any given time, might be the most important focus for concerns about threats, vulnerabilities, and defense.

Historically, of course, the military sector has been most important. (Wæver, 1995, p. 50).

The Copenhagen school securitization has been accepted as a concept to understand security in. However, it is not without its critiques. Especially the reliance on the speech act has been under attack from other scholars such as Thierry Balzacq. The next section will go through his modifications of securitization, and how it will be applied in this thesis.

2.1.2 Balzacq's Pragmatic act

Balzacq offers a sociological approach to securitization, moving away from relying on the linguistic theory of the speech act. In this approach, context, power relations and practices are part of the securitizing act. The securitizing act is performative, meaning that actions are mediated by agents shaped whose behavior is shaped by their perception on the issue at hand (Balzacq, 2011, p2). Balzacq defines securitization as:

An articulated assemblage of practices whereby heuristic artefacts (metaphors, polity tools, image repertoires, analogies, stereotypes, emotions, etc.) are contextually mobilized by a securitizing actor, who works to prompt an audience to build a coherent network of implications (feelings, sensations, thoughts, and intuitions), about the critical vulnerability of a referent object, that concurs with the securitizing actor's reasons for choices and actions, by investing the referent subject with such an aura of unprecedented threatening complexion that a customized policy must be undertaken immediately to block its development (Balzacq, T., 2011, p. 3)

Balzacq offers a comprehensive definition of securitization, moving away from the reliance of the speech act, moving securitization away from the speech act and towards a sociological approach of securitization. The speech act has been heavily criticized and remains a striking point for academic critics. Through the speech act, the discursive action related to security becomes very formal, becoming to fix on itself, becoming self-referential (Balzacq, T., 2005, p. 172). In becoming self-referential, by uttering securitizing actors can create a security problem out of thin air, just by relying on the word security itself, which again will be reinforced further with more mentions of security.

Another point of critique from Balzacq is that the CS does not take the external and brute threats seriously enough. He argues that some threats are a hazard to human life, whether they have been portrayed as such by a politician or not. This is not to say that one should focus solely on brute threats. Rather, one should perceive language as a tool to help us shape our perception of reality, it does not create reality (Balzacq T., 2005, p. 181). Balzacq also criticizes CS lack of focus on the audience. In CS securitization the audience becomes a receiver of the discourse with little say in shaping it. The securitizing actor depends on both moral and formal support to succeed in the securitizing act (Balzacq T., 2005, p. 184). Others criticized CS for not including images in their theory. Williams argues that in 9/11 showing images and videos of the terrible deed on television helped to set up the general public for certain discursive path.

In an attempt to create a better framework to operationalize securitization, Balzacq shows us what he coins the strategic or pragmatic act. The pragmatic act of Balzacq moves away from the speech act and uses the 'pragmatic act' to in an attempt to make securitization a better framework from one can analyze and understand security. He

points out that by relying on the speech act, securitization becomes self-referential, meaning that the language and sentences and ideas refer to themselves.

The pragmatic act of Balzacq then consists of two overlapping levels, the agent and the act. The agent, the one making the securitizing move. What is the power position, identity and social standing of the securitizing agent? There is also the need to identify the opponents of the securitizing actor, and who the audience they struggle over is. The act is the type of action, referring to using appropriate language towards a certain kind of audience. One would have a different language towards EU ministers then in a tabloid newspaper. The act also covers the context in which the actor finds himself in, thus deciding what sort of referent objects can successfully be securitized, and what sort of securitizing moves will be allowed by the audience. Who is the targeted audience, the main opponents/alternative voices, are they individual, corporate, ad hoc or institutionalized? Which media outlet is preferred? The overarching goal is to open up the politics and methods of creating security (Balzacq, 2005, p. 178).

Securitization is successful when the securitizing agent and the audience reach a common structured perception of a threatening development. In the case of EU energy policy, the securitizing actor has traditionally been the Commission arguing that if there is no deeper integration in the energy field, the EU and its member-states will suffer a severe backlash from suppliers, potentially affecting welfare systems in member-state (Sperling & Webber, 2018, p. 228). Member-states take the role as both the opponent and the audience. The opponent because of their decision-making power as members of the council where some member-state might resist the attempt to integrate their energy policies and network. Audience because the Commission needs to convince member-states and their citizens that the threat is real for their securitizing attempt to have any credibility.

Balzacq argues that there are three ways pragmatic act improve securitization on a speech act framework: First, it adds that securitization is context-dependent. Secondly, an effective securitization is audience-centered. Third and last, securitization dynamics are power-laden. Words create their own conditions of receptiveness by modifying or building a fitting context (Balzacq T., 2005, p. 192)

This thesis will follow the sociological presented by Balzacq approach to the securitization of RED. This is to better understand the context in which are was made, the power relations between the different actors how the discursive practices were at the time. Acknowledging that the flaws of the speech act presented by Balzacq, it will pay attention to external context as well as the internal context in energy issues in the EU.

2.2 Securitization in the EU and energy security

How then can we observe if there has been a successful or failed attempt of securitizing an issue in the EU? Complex institutions such as the EU tends to react to issues or crisis by either undertaking policy initiatives or amending their institutional design. (Sperling & Webber, 2018, p. 230). A successful securitization act would then be a move towards deeper integration in the policy field in question, in this case, energy. If the ones seeking to achieve deeper integration in the energy field was successful, one should be able to observe clear examples of supranational integration of energy policies at the EU level. Harmonization of policies, with a functioning energy union as an extreme success of the securitizing actor.

The Commission is in this thesis seen as the main actor seeking to securitize energy issues, attempting to gain support for harmonization of energy policies, and in the long run, creating an energy union. By securitizing energy issues, the Commission can seek to take ownership over policy domains that are normally treated at member-state level (Hofmann & Staeger, 2018, p. 327). Energy security challenges are both internal as well as external challenges. An exporter of energy could decide to stop their supply for political reasons, putting the challenge in the foreign policy domain. Internal challenges can be met with investing in new infrastructure to lessen reliance on one supplier (Austvik, 2016, p. 376)

By referring to the Commission as a securitizing actor might lead to a negative association and/or feeling towards. However, it is worth noting that there is a link between policy entrepreneurs and securitizing actors. Policy entrepreneurs possess reputation, money and have extensive political connections, similar to the social capital resources of the securitizing actor must possess (Balzacq T., 2011, p. 68).

Energy security studies come into full force after the Arab oil embargo in 1973. In classic energy security studies, the referent objects were implicitly clear: oil importing industrial nations whose industrial and military infrastructure depended on oil to function properly (Cherp & Jewell, 2014). As mentioned, energy security is a contested concept and therefore have a broad range of definitions varying greatly. Energy security can have different meaning depending on the situation of the state and actor in question. States and their government will differ in their agenda on energy-related issues. With the EU as an example, we see that energy dependence is of major energy concern as the EU and its member states dependence on import of oil and natural gas (Yergin, 2006, p. 71). Energy security has since 1973 become something of a buzzword, meaning that there are a large variety of different definitions to be applied to an equal variety of actors.

Some definition of energy security is: "The objective of energy security is to assure adequate, reliable supplies of energy at reasonable prices in ways that do not jeopardize major national valuable objectives" and "Uninterrupted availability of energy sources at an affordable price". (Szulecki K., p. 5) both focus on the economic dimension of energy security, and affordable price and reliable supply

The Commission sets forth its own definition of energy security which fits into the economic model shown by Yergin and the IEA: "Uninterrupted physical availability of energy products on the market at an affordable price for all consumers" (Sovacool, 2011, p. 4). This links strongly into the term of "*security of supply*" which appears in quite often in the discourse in the period of 2006 early 2009. The goal of this thesis is not to contribute to the discussion on energy security. Rather, it seeks to understand how energy issues might be securitized. Therefore, it will refer to "*Security of supply*" as this is the term that was used by the EU in RED. This is done so that we can better understand how securitizing actors used the term to shape the discourse in energy-related issues.

2.2.1 Energy securitization

Securitization is historical, meaning that to properly understand how certain actors have come to their position of power. One must look back into history to better understand how actors got into their position of power, and how that position can be used to securitize an issue (Guzzini, 2011, p. 335). In the case of the energy policies in the EU, member states have been the ones in positions of power. Even though ECSC was based on coals and steel, there has been little power in the energy field for EU institutions, as

there seems as member states have preferred for that particular policy area to remain a national policy area. Energy security in the EU is diverse, as their national preferences will change the definition from member state to member state. If the goal is to secure a cheap, steady supply of energy, which sort of energy will be prioritized in the mix? In the EU there are 28 different member states, (25 in 2006) all with their own preference and energy systems. France with its nuclear energy plants, Denmark with a strong focus on wind farms or Poland with a substantial coal industry. This goes to show that there is no easy way to go about energy security the EU, because of the diverse preferences and energy mix. A part of the energy security discussion in the EU import dependency. Import dependency occurs when a country does not possess the capacity to produce its energy needs (Austvik, 2016, p. 375). In the case of the EU, import dependency has been a concern for some time, as most of the energy is provided through import from third countries such as Norway and Russia.

One must seek to see beyond energy security as a policy area rooted purely in the economic and technical sphere. To better understand what energy security is and how it comes to be, we must ask important questions such as security for whom? Security for which values and from what threat(s)? These are all questions that need to be asked, also when energy security is concerned. By asking these questions, security for whom? what values? and from what threats one opens up the possibility to investigate who speaks of energy security, what are their agenda and what are the threats they seek to shield the energy from. Vital energy systems and their vulnerabilities are not only objective phenomena, but also political constructs defined and prioritized by various social actors. (Cherp & Jewell, 2014, p. 419). As we have seen, energy security has become a buzzword which politicians and stakeholders use in very different ways. This thesis will follow Cherp and Jewell in that it will apply more of a sociological approach to energy security by applying the pragmatic act presented by Balzacq.

Challenges to energy security occur often in both the internal and external dimension, national and foreign policy authorities (Austvik, 2016, p. 376). Thus, in following Cherp and Jewell's advice of looking at the broader context of energy security one can understand how energy issues can be securitized. In doing this, one must look at the external context as well as the internal. Without the external context, one would overlook the Russia discourse that was prominent in the public sphere after the 2006 gas dispute. In RED, the EU focuses on "*Security of supply*", seemingly keeping it an economic issue at first glance. Nevertheless, in following the premises set by Cherp and Jewell that one must seek to understand secure supply for whom and what this thesis will analyze speeches, official document newspaper articles who shaped the directive, and why?

Some scholars claim that that the extra ordinary-measures in the energy sector have not led to extraordinary measures but are a part of ordinary politics (Heinrich & Szulecki, 2017b, p. 40) Indeed, Trombetta, shows that energy politics can be mundane where everyday practices and norms upheld by stakeholders and other agents. It is by upholding everyday practices, the securitizing actors can shape them into security issues to legitimize dramatic measures (Trombetta 2018, p189)

The analysis also needs to take into account the external factor that shapes the discourse on energy issues in the EU. However, as we will see in different official papers released from the EU, the security of supply has been and will continue to be a hot topic in an import-dependent energy bloc as the EU is.

3 Discourse analysis

This section will go through the methodology of this paper which is Critical discourse analysis

Qualitative data does not speak for itself; it must be interpreted/analyzed by someone. In analyzing and interpreting a text/speech one must be aware of what it means to analyze and interpret. To analyze is to split a topic of interest into smaller parts or elements. The goal is to uncover a pattern in the data that has been collected. Interpret then is to set something into a larger context. To consider the consequences that analysis and conclusion have for the research. Interpretation normal to use theory as a starting point in the area of interest and look at the finding in the light of the theory. The researcher tries to understand and explain the finding presented in the analysis. (Johanneessen, Tufte, & Christoffersen, 2016) The methodology applied in this thesis is discourse analysis. The next section will provide how it will be used in the analysis.

3.1 Why discourse?

"We may know what the language means but still not understand what is meant by its use in an articular text" (Widdiwson, 2007, p. 4).

In securitization, language is and can be used to shape people's perception of the world around them. In speaking of a security issue and relating it to a perceived threat the audience can know well but does not see as a threat (yet), one has shifted their perception of that issues to one where the audience feels threatened. To study discourse is to study the way language is used to change the audience view of certain topics. How a speech is structured, what words are used, how does the speaker relate to the audience and what are the cultural norms of language all play a part in shaping how actors construct their language seeking to influence their audience (Widdiwson, 2007, p. 5)

Discourse analysis has been accused of being relativistic, where any position or information becomes relevant, in turn becoming irrelevant (Johanneessen, Tufte, & Christoffersen, 2016, p. 224). Nevertheless, the point of discourse analysis is to show that texts are the usage of language which is produced with the intention to refer to something for some purpose (Widdiwson, 2007, p. 6). Following this logic, studying securitization is to study discourse to understand who securitizing actors create rhetoric which promotes an extraordinary measure to protect the referent object (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 25). What are the arguments that prompt this action, how are they structured becomes important questions when one seeks to apply securitization to an issue? We make assumptions about the language, on how it is conventionally meant to be understood and interpret. One does not only relate to the text in the actual situation but the abstract cultural context (Widdiwson, 2007, p. 5). Here we see the pragmatic act of Balzacq:

Politics cannot be conducted without language one must understand the language that is used in conducting energy politics. Discourse analysis is used to analyze and interpret the meaning behind the language in the text, speeches, pictures, etc. In breaking up a

text into smaller parts to better understand the linguistic message, and to interpret it in a broader context of things helps us understand the discourse better.

Discourse is in this thesis defined as "*The complex of communicative purposes as the discourse that underlies the text and motivates its production in the first place (express ideas, beliefs, explain something, etc.)*" (Widdiwson, 2007, p. 6). The term discourse refers to both what a text producer meant by a text and what a text means to the receiver, allowing for interpretation of the motives of the securitizing actors relevant to energy security. Moreover, discourse, texts, and speeches are linked, meaning that texts and speeches draw on one another. Discourses do not come from a vacuum, rather, is constructed from broader meanings and structures (Stritzel, 2012). Therefore, important to include text and speeches from different sources. The link between language and reality is important. Discourse is a linguistic system that shape the way we perceive reality (Johanneessen, Tufte, & Christoffersen, 2016, p. 223).

Language does not, however, shape reality. If someone falsely claims that there is a large meteor approaching earth, the claim is still false. The threat of the meteor does not become real just because someone claimed it to be so. What could occur is a mass hysteria/panic from the fear of imminent doom, creating an opportunity for the securitizing actor to create extraordinary measures to "prevent" this disaster, which in turn the audience will be willing to accept because of the perceived threat of imminent doom. Thus, by using the word security does not point towards an objective reality, it is the agency of the securitizing actor (Balzacq T., 2005, p. 181).

Discourse as the analysis of relationships between concrete language use and the wider social and cultural structures (Titscher et al., 1998, p. 149). Balzacq's model of a sociological approach to securitization, applying cultural norms, power relationship within the policy field of interest moves the analysis into a critical discussion of how securitizing actors can maneuver and influence energy policies by the power they hold from their official position and social standing.

CDA is critical in the sense that it calls into question ideas and assumptions that have become taken for granted as self-evidently valid on the grounds that the actually preserve a status quo which in effect sustains inequality and injustice by privileging the elite and the powerful at the expense of everybody else (Widdiwson, 2007, p. 71). Put in another way, CDA seeks to highlight power structures and the potential (miss)use of it. This thesis will not focus on the ideology of the actors involved. What it will strive to show who are the securitizing actors (if any) and, and can one can identify a particular securitization discourse and power relations in the energy field within the EU, which actors have power in the energy field? Is it the Commission with is the power to suggest laws, thus setting the agenda? The Parliament with its legislative power, or member states, represented by the Council? Did interest groups and major non-governmental stakeholders play a part in shaping the policies? Securitization fits nicely with CDA as the securitizing actor(s) must hold some degree of power to have the ability to securitize an issue. The actors highlighted above all hold some power in the EU and in shaping and creating laws that might fit their agenda better.

3.2 Critical discourse in the EU energy politics

Applying a critical approach to the EU means locating where the power lies in the field of energy in the EU. Is it the supranational institutions, the Commission and the European Parliament (Parliament), or does the power lie within the European Council (Council) and the member-states?

There was little legislative power at the EU level in the energy field before the treaty of Lisbon, leaving energy for member-states to handle. However, the Commission still had the ability to put forward a legislative suggestion, thus setting the agenda, and the Parliament has legislative power as a part of the co-decision procedures (EU Monitor, 2019).

The analysis will have a focus on documents and articles that have energy security related topics in the EY in the time period from 2006 to early 2009. Energy security must not be mentioned specifically to be useful for the research, rather, a general discussion of energy policies could well serve to highlight important aspects of how they might perceive energy policies issues in the EU. "*contextual language use by coming to the analysis of what security utterance do and what they mean*" (Balzacq T., 2005, p. 176)

The materials collected comes from various sources. Politico.eu serves as the main sources from newspapers. Politico is used because it's easy to access online archives. Official documents from the Commission and Council are used interest groups are also included in the analysis. The EU's pooled sovereignty makes policymaking much more complex. Decision makers in the EU are faced with issues ranging from trade flow in the single market to climate and energy policies issues. Regarding energy issues, their member-states have a diverse energy mix, ranging from nuclear energy to coal. It would be impossible for politicians to be experts in every field and know the situation in every member state. Thus, there is a need for experts to provide them with information and advice on how to act (Greenwood, 2011, p. 2). The complexity of energy issues makes it necessary for policymakers to seek out interest groups to provide crucial information and possible consequences the directive would have to key areas of social and economic in the EU

The timeline for the newspaper articles spans from 2006 to 2009, covering reactions to the Russia-Ukraine gas dispute and opinions of proposed legislation on energy issues. Publication on energy issues in this period were mostly focused on the eastern dimension, namely Russia and how the gas stop in 2006 were a political move by Putin's Russia.

4 Findings

With securitization and CDA as the foundation of the analysis, the thesis moves one to the data. The section is divided in 4 parts. Firstly, it explains what RED is, and how the legislative text mentions security of supply.

The next part of the is the findings, gathered from the sources mentioned above.

Leading up to RED, there were some major green papers and strategies which were ratified by both the Parliament and the Council. The first came in 2006, "*A European Strategy for sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy*" the "*Renewable energy Road map*" in 2007 and in the final paper, "*Promotion of the use of renewable energy*" in 2008. These were all steps who played a major role in creating RED, from identifying that there is a need for a common energy policy in "*A European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy*", agreeing on mandatory targets in the renewable roadmap and setting the framework for RED in the "*promotion of the use of renewable energy*".

First, there will be an overview of how RED is structured and its mentions of "*security of supply*". After the overview the thesis moves to the findings, pointing out key contributions that shaped the final product, RED. This will be presented in 3 sections of each year. For example, in 2006, there will first be a presentation of statements and documents from EU officials, secondly, newspaper and how the public react to the events/proposals. Lastly, lobby groups and other stakeholder position on the issue at hand will be presented. It was not always any major groups of interest made a position paper, and in some events, the papers were no longer available online, therefore, they will not always be included a section.

4.1 Renewable energy directive

RED is a part of the third internal market package and came into force the 25th of June 2009, and member-states were obliged to implement RED into national legislation by December 2010 (Rossegger, 2013, pp. 259-260), setting what was at the time, very ambitious goals for renewable energy consumption for its member states, 20% of the energy consumed would come from renewable sources and 10% in the transportation sector by 2020 (Cotella, Crivello, & Karatayev, 2016). Ambitious because in 2005, the combined final energy consumption from RES was 8.5% in the EU, meaning that in the 11 years from setting the targets, a combined EU would need to over double it RES (Rossegger, 2013, p. 259). To achieve the targets, RED's seeks to establish a common framework to promote the production and consumption of renewable energy in the EU, with extensive support schemes to help member-states achieve the goals. RED binds member-states to have a combined usage of power from renewable RED covers three sectors: electricity, heating transportation, setting mandatory targets for each member-states, depending on their starting point and economic situation. Each member state is responsible for setting up and action plan with details on how it will work to achieve its target. (European Commission , 2019b).

The national targets are designed so that they will provide an incentive for investment in

renewable energy sources (RES), and vary from state to state, 49% in Sweden to 12% in Malta, considering the very different starting points of the member-states. The progress on the National Progress plan was to be submitted to the Commission by December 2010 and reported to them by December 2011 (Rossegger, 2013).

RED amends 2001/77/EC on the promotion of electricity produced from renewable energy sources in the internal electricity market and 2003/30/EC promotion of the use of biofuels or other renewable fuels in the transportation sector. 2001/77/EC introduced national support schemes regarding promoting and generating electricity from renewable sources, setting up national support schemes with varied effect and provided a framework for harmonization of the energy market (Kanellakis, Martinopoulos, & Zachariadis, 2013, p. 1021).

2001/77/EC states that renewable energy sources in the EU is underused, and if these sources were to be exploited in a good manner, it will contribute to the security of supply to the community (Official Journal of the European Communities, 2001). 2003/30/EC sets to promote biofuels and other renewables in transportation. In the time of the directive, 98% of fuels in the transportation sector comes from oil, making the EU dependent on import from oil-producing countries. A shift to biofuels was to be a step-in decreasing import dependency of oil (Official Journal of the European Union, 2003).

The legislative procedure in adopting red were according to the book, following the ordinary legislative procedure, (called co-decision before the Lisbon treaty late 2009) procedure of the EU where both European Parliament and Council of Ministers must approve the directive, or make amends to it if one of the institutions see the need for a change.

4.2 Identifying energy security discourses leading up to RED

The first thing RED focuses on is both climate and energy, pointing at the need to reduce greenhouse gases as agreed upon in the 1997 Kyoto Protocol through the development of renewable energy sources and how this also will have a positive effect on the security of energy supplies. There is little doubt that environmental concerns played a large part in shaping RED. Fighting climate change and import dependency seems to be the same side of the same coin, both presented as a threat for the welfare of the Union should nothing be done. As will be shown below, the mentions of security in the RED text very much build upon earlier directives such as 2001/77 and 2003/30 and green papers adopted in the period of 2006-2009. Security of energy supply is mentioned 6 times in RED, stating that through developing a robust renewable energy sector will make the EU and its member-states less dependent on import from non-EU countries. The mentions of security of supply are so that the analysis has a "ground zero" of sorts to link the findings too. If there were any securitizing attempts to implement "extraordinary measures", meaning deeper integration in a policy field where member-states earlier have resisted these "extraordinary measures".

1:

The control of European energy consumption and the increased use of energy from renewable sources, together with energy savings and increased energy efficiency, constitute important parts of the package of measures needed to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and comply with the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, and with further Community

and international greenhouse gas emission reduction commitments beyond 2012. Those factors also have an important part to play in promoting the security of energy supply, promoting technological development and innovation and providing opportunities for employment and regional development, especially in rural and isolated areas (EUR-Lex, 2009)

Security of supply comes second here, climate change and comply with the Kyoto protocol is most important in article 1.

2:

In particular, increasing technological improvements, incentives for the use and expansion of public transport, the use of energy efficiency technologies and the use of energy from renewable sources in transport are some of the most effective tools by which the Community can reduce its dependence on imported oil in the transport sector, in which the security of energy supply problem is most acute, and influence the fuel market for transport. (EUR-Lex, 2009)

Here, the Kyoto protocol is not mentioned, however, reducing import dependence through technological is portrayed as essential for the EU to rid itself of its import dependency.

6:

It is appropriate to support the demonstration and commercialization phase of decentralized renewable energy technologies. The move towards decentralized energy production has many benefits, including the utilization of local energy sources, increased local security of energy supply, shorter transport distances, and reduced energy transmission losses. Such decentralization also fosters community development and cohesion by providing income sources and creating jobs locally. (EUR-Lex, 2009)

16:

To this end, the Commission should monitor the supply of the Community market for biofuels, and should, as appropriate, propose relevant measures to achieve a balanced approach between domestic production and imports, taking into account, inter alia, the development of multilateral and bilateral trade negotiations, environmental, social and economic considerations, and the security of energy supply (EUR-Lex, 2009).

58:

“The development of renewable energy projects, including renewable energy projects of European interest under the Trans-European Network for Energy (TEN-E) programmed should be accelerated. To that end, the Commission should also analyze how the financing of such projects can be improved. Particular attention should be paid to renewable energy projects that will contribute to a significant increase in security of energy supply in the Community and neighboring countries.” (EUR-Lex, 2009)

These articles have little supranationalism within them, giving the Commission the power to propose how to better finance RES projects and monitor the supply and production of biofuels. The plans set in the member states action plans are all set by each member state. Nevertheless, the targets are mandatory, as opposed to 2001/77/EC, where the

10% target was “guiding”. Member states must submit and report to the Commission and if a member state does not report, will be fined (as with the case of Poland in 2013)

As shown, the security of supplies red thread throughout the directive, making it a good case for studying whether it came as a result of securitization attempts made by actors with interest in a deeper EU integration of energy issues.

This next section will give insight into the public discourse, from official EU institutions as the European Council, Commission, articles and opinion pieces published in newspapers and position papers published by major stakeholders.

Together, it shows a picture of how the official debate and discourse were leading up to RED, helping to understand if RED is an example of successful securitization or not. The Green papers and strategies were milestones in setting the targets in RED, thus, to understand RED one must understand these milestones.

4.2.1 Green paper: A European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy

The green papers of 2006, “A European strategy for sustainable, competitive and secure energy” was a step for the Commission in their quest for common energy policy in the EU, and marked the beginning of a more integrated EU energy policy (Cotella, Crivello, & Karatayev, 2016, p. 22)

The green papers put forward 6 six key areas identified by the Commission for an integrated energy policy. Competitiveness and the internal market, diversification, solidarity, sustainable development, innovation and technology, and external policy. The progress in these areas was monitored through strategic reviews by the Commission The most important one here is the “*second strategic energy review: An energy EU energy security and solidarity action plan*”.

Some quotes from the text here

4.2.1.1 EU official documents

Andris Piebalgs, who was Commissioner of Energy and Transport in the form 2004 to 2009 was active in promoting a more integrated energy market, claiming during a conference that “*The EU needs an active, not laissez-fair approach to the infrastructure that serves its market*” (Piebalgs A. , 2006e). In a speech, Piebalgs stated in a speech calling for more focus on RES in 2006 “... *We have to lay the foundations today for finding a solution for when oil supply can no longer cope with demand.*” (Piebalgs A. , 2006b). Drawing a line to dependency on gas and oil, not only as a global resource but also on the EU's dependency on oil and gas from Russia. Renewables is part of the solution as it will help diversify the energy mix. However, this was the case in both 2001/77 and 2003/30, yet after the gas stop, it became evident for the Commission that there was not enough being done. The Council agreed with the Commissions point regarding the need to go seek international solutions to create more security of supply, and that renewables, like other indigenous resources such as coal, will need to play a large part in improving the situation in EU (COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, 2006)

Import dependency and the need to diversify the energy supply line and energy mix in the EU is a major concern in the green paper. The rise in global demand for energy and an increase in prices leaves member-states that depend heavily on import from perceived unstable energy suppliers, as Russia was perceived as in the time after the gas dispute. There is little mention of why oil and gas someday will no longer be able to keep up with the consumption of Europe. It can be interpreted as much as a statement of unreliable suppliers (read Russia) as that petroleum reserves would end.

After the Ukraine-Russia gas dispute, mentions of "the Russian energy weapon" appeared in newspapers. Politico came out with a headline named: "An A-Zzzzzzzzz guide to European gas wars" focuses on how Russia uses its gas resources as a weapon to conduct warfare against states that depend on gas from Russia. The article aims at informing why the gas crisis occurred and how it affects Europeans. "**D** is for diversification. If you buy your gas from just one source (e.g. Russia), you are a hostage. Go figure." Followed by: "**R** is for renewable energy. Like energy security, a nice idea with no takers at the current price" (Perera, 2005). The article stresses that Europe and the EU depend on Russia and its gas, a problem that could be somewhat relieved by investing in renewable energy, however, no one is willing to pay the price.

In the aftermath of the Ukraine-Russia gas despite there were calls for closer coordination and cooperation regarding energy policy at the EU level. These calls came from Commissioners, MEPs and the council (European Parliament, 2006). However, the perception of Russia as the "villain" in energy issue was not very clear from the EU official. No specific energy supplier was mentioned, however, dependency on energy resources from Russia and the security of supply dominates the discourse in the newspaper and in the official documents from EU institutions. There seems to have been a feeling that the EU has little control over its energy supply from third countries, especially Russia, thus, leaving the whole block vulnerable when the flow of gas stops, as it did in January 2006. Calling for a "greater EU cooperation and coordination on energy policy" came from EU citizens, as 47% of respondents in a survey preferred energy issues and challenges to be handled at the EU level (European Commission, 2006d).

4.2.1.2 Politico

Greenpeace responded with the headline: Energy Paper: A problem buried is not a problem solved. Negative that there were no imminent binding targets on RES. (Greenpeace, 2006). WWF European Policy Office calls for the EU to increase its investments into renewables, both to become less dependent on energy import, and to reach the Kyoto obligations. Published a week or so after the gas dispute (Politico, 2006).

There were claims that Russia was using gas to help or punish its trading partners. In the 2006 gas dispute with Ukraine, there are claims that Russia used its gas export to punish Ukraine for its attempts to get closer ties with NATO and the west (BBC, 2006). Furthermore, Pierre Lellouche, a French parliamentarian in 2006 drew lines from the gas dispute to the cold war, linking the Russian halt of gas to the 1973 blockade from the Arabian nations in the response of countries supporting Israel (Lellouche, 2016).

Another discourse on the EU's Russia dependency was that there was little incentive among member states to develop renewable energy, continuing to be in the grasp of Russia's "energy weapons", gas and oil. There was created a fear that the western EU member-states would prioritize cheap gas prices over fighting with Russia in the Ukraine-Russia dispute. For EU member-state that depend on Russian gas for power, this line of

thinking would leave them alone in the struggle for energy supply, where Russia is in full control (Cerulus, 2006).

Eastern member states such as Estonia and Poland imported

Piebalgs hold a firm belief that only on the global and EU level does Europe stand a chance to unite at levels above the nation-state. Estimates of import dependence to rise from 50% to 70% at 2030, together with "*the instability in some oil-producing countries*" needs to address at the EU level to have any hope to tackle these problems (Piebalgs A. , 2006d). The Commission wants to focus more on biofuels in a step to decrease the dependence of oil import, claiming that: "*The timing is right for this (...) Fears over the security of energy supply, the price of oi (...)*" (Smith, 2006).

4.2.1.3 Interest groups

This met some resistance from interest groups. The European Petroleum Industry Association stressed that biofuels would be very limited in its ability to supply fuel. They also pointed out that the biofuel would compete with the food industry for farmlands, marking a possible future conflict (European Petroleum Industry Association, 2006).

Euracoal took a much more defensive stance towards the green paper, focusing on the different need for energy in different member-states. Euracoal also stressed that coal will remain a stable energy resource in the foreseeable future in the EU, thus, should not be neglected in the quest to expand the energy mix, (read, be overshadowed by renewables) (Euracoal, 2006).

It is hard to measure if any of the interest groups mentioned influenced policymakers in energy issues or spoke to deaf ears. Nevertheless, it is interesting to see that as both the audience and a possible securitizing actor, there is a broad range of opinions.

Greenpeace disappointment in the lack of binding of renewable targets comes as a stark contrast to Euracoal wishes to keep coal as a key energy source.

The stop in gas flows from Russia through the Ukraine transits played a large part in the 2006 discourse, both in the Commission and Politico, which in turn created an opportunity for the Commission to capitalize on and set their vision of a common energy framework at the forefront of EU agenda.

The interest were spilt to the greenpaper, where not surprisingly, Euracoal argued for better utilization of the local coal resources, as renewable energy would not be able to meet the energy demand of Europe.

4.2.2 Renewable Energy Roadmap and 2007

4.2.2.1 EU official documents

The Commission continued working for common European energy policy, arguing that this is the most effective response to the challenges which the EU and its member-states face (European Commission, 2007b). Focusing on the key areas of the 2006 green paper and creating a framework to better tackle future challenges.

The roadmap was a big step in making this common framework. Coming into force in 2007, the roadmap sets a mandatory 20% of energy consumption from a renewable source by 2020.

Sees that unless there is a strengthening of current policies, the targets set in both 2001/77/EC and 2003/30/EC will not be met. To combat this, the 20% target was set as

mandatory, however, it was up to member states to set the targets (European Commission, 2007a). Development in renewable production was unevenly distributed throughout the member states, not reaching the **overall** 12% target set in 2001/77. The text in the roadmap has an economic focus, both on climate change and on the security of supply.

Moreover, developing alternative energy sources to fossil fuels will help guarantee the security of energy supply in the EU and reduce the energy bill resulting from increases in the price of fossil fuels. Consequently, if the EU meets its 20% target in 2020, it is estimated that savings will be made of over 250 million TOE (tons of oil equivalent) per year by 2020, of which 200 million TOE would otherwise be imported (European Commission, 2007a).

Here we see that if the EU were to increase its renewable energy production, money would be saved in the long run. Fossil energy sources are expensive to import, and emission quotas add to the cost, thus, it makes economic sense to diversify the of energy sources and add to the general structure of energy supply in the EU. The Renewable roadmap is more precise in setting targets, which can indicate that there has been some degree of consensus regarding the need for mandatory targets. If so, it would go a long way to indicate that in the RES bit of RED, the Commission securitizing act gave been partly successful, at least the issue is at the very forefront of the agenda. However, it is up to each individual member-state to create an action plan, meaning that the member-state decide over their own energy mix. This leaves a considerable amount of power to the member state and leaving the Commission somewhat on the sideline.

Piebalgs continued the focus on import dependency potential unstable countries:

(...) firstly, in times when Europe is more and more dependent on Russian gas and oil from the Middle East, renewable energy is an absolute must to reduce this dependency and to have our own energy resources developed (Piebalgs, 2007).

Later in 2007, Piebalgs followed up with a forceful argument for setting high targets for RES:

With oil prices at 70\$ and a carbon price of around 20 Euro, the target to supply 20% from renewable energy more or less pays for itself. Not only, therefore, is this policy a sensible measure to enable Europe to manage its security of energy supply, it also represents an enormous commercial opportunity for Europe (Piebalgs A. , 2007).

Piebalgs was followed by the Commission president Barroso also called on national governments to rally to his common energy market plans. Importantly, Barroso states that he will not purpose legislation without any backing from member-states, claiming it the legislation will be stillborn without it.

If we don't have the member states with us, we will not have a common energy policy. I believe in a partnership with the Council. The other way would be to run into the wall (Taylor, 2007a).

The quote from Barroso reveals the power structure in the EU. Within the legislative co-decision procedure, the Commission power remains limited to proposing legislations, both the Parliament and Council needs to be on board for the legislation to pass. It can be argued that the Commission holds some degree of power from its power to purpose legislation by setting the agenda for what laws in which policy area should be focused on.

The power of agenda setting can be stronger if the issue one seeks to draw attention to is easily accessible for the targeted audience (Scheufele, 2000, p. 300).

The Council responded positively, and were "*confident that substantive development of energy efficiency and of renewable energies will enhance energy security*" The council endorses the 20% share in overall Eu energy consumption by 2020 and Stressed the national starting points of member states on the basis of a "*fair starting point*". The council further stated that it:

invites the commission to work with member states to develop renewable energies, for example through an expanded Forum on renewable energies and to promote the exchange of best practice (COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, 2008a)

The response from the council makes it clear that the council intends keep decision-making regarding the energy mix to the member-state. A fair starting point will vary greatly from member state to member state, making it logical that the member states themselves deciding on their own energy mix.

4.2.2.2 Politico

Poland and the Baltic states needed reassurance that member-states would act if gas supplies were to be cut from Russia as in the Ukraine-Russia gas stop.

The solidarity act drove as fear from Russia halting or cutting energy supplies to member-states that depend on gas supply from Russia (Taylor, 2007c)

Old soviet states as the Baltic states Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania imported all of their gas from Russia, leaving them very vulnerable for supply shocks. Little coherence in EU energy policy: "We still lack a common EU energy policy. We have a range of measures on renewable ...but they don't add up to a coherent policy".

Use this to show the difference in thought and abilities, linking it to security issues in RED. (Taylor, 2007b)

In my opinion, we need to strongly promote the idea that meeting the renewables target will actually be an opportunity for the EU, not a burden and this is why it is important to all European citizens. (...). (Thomsen & Turmes, 2007)

In 2007, energy policy seemed to lead the EU what seemed a dark path regarding human rights. In its quest for stable energy supplies and diversifying its supply, fears of the EU breaking its commitments to human rights rises. As stated by Charles Esser from the International Crisis Group:

Fears of overdependence on Russian gas might be pushing the EU toward a policy that did not take account of the realities in central Asia. It is wrong-headed to say they should be given a free pass because of energy (Beatty, 2007a).

Setting human rights aside would be a blow to EU, as the EU is founded on rule of law and human rights, yet, by trading with states that deliberately ignore human rights, the EU supports these regimes, lifting sanctions that were imposed on the ground of violating human rights. MEPs will not allow for the breaking of human rights in the quest for energy supplies (Beatty, 2007b). The Commission continuous nurse its relationship with other petroleum's producing countries in the quest for diversifying energy suppliers, and again, dependency on Russian gas is portrayed as something that challenges EU's norms and values.

The framing of Russia as an “energy villain” continued in 2007, with headlines such as “*Time to break free of Putin’s grip*” emphasizes that Russia have a grip on the EU, as its dependence on supply from Russia remains.

When Vladimir Putin switched off the gas supplies to Ukraine, then doubled process for Georgia and this week halted oil supplies through Belarus, he opened our eyes to a future in which the Kremlin has, potentially, an iron grip on EU foreign policy (Hamdan & Wilkens, 2007)

The wording in the article is quite strong, painting a picture of Europe needing to obey Putin’s every whim in foreign policy issues as a result of the dependence on Russian energy. A part of the solution presented in the article is “*setting ambitious and binding targets for the share of new energy by 2020 (...)*” (Hamdan & Wilkens, 2007).

Viktor Orban, the opposition leader in Hungary had a sharp critique of the ruling party in Hungary. In this article he argues that the government lack of energy focus has made Hungary a weak state in the energy field, open for exploitation by more powerful nations such as Russia. A very clear attempt to create a security issue out with the dependency discourse. An example of the Commissions energy security discourse being used by national politicians.

We in the opposition Fidesz party welcome the legally binding target for renewable energies in the energy mix, and the decision to allow member states to decide for themselves how each will contribute to meeting the overall 20% level by 2020 (Orbán, 2007).

Orbán’s article is a good example of both the Commission and Council wishes taking root at the national level. However, there were also fears regarding the framework set forth. Member states feared that the consequence of breaking up the national energy companies in the event that the companies would be targeted by Russian investors, leaving national interest in the control of Russian (Beatty, 2007c). This is another example that member-states fear to be dependent on Russian interests,

German minister of economics and technology Michael Glos: “Energy is rightly topping the European agenda. The Eu has to move fast and in a determined way to create a coherent strategy and the German presidency will do its part to achieve this” (Glos, 2007). The focus on dependency carried over from 2006 to 2007. The renewable roadmap had a clear focus on security of supplies, making it a good example of the EU as a whole moving in the direction the Commission wished, creating a common framework in energy policies.

4.2.3 Promotion of the use of renewable energy and 2008

In 2008, the Commission put forward a proposal for a framework for promotion of the use of RES as a part of the “energy and climate package”. The proposal is an attempt to establish a common framework in accordance with the “renewable energy roadmap from 2007 (European Commission, 2008). This proposal is the “*finishing touch*” towards the RED, setting on the final bits of the legislation in place for the final directive which became RED.

4.2.3.1 EU official documents

President of the council in a presidency briefing stressing the need to speak in a unified voice to third countries. The Commission underlines that “each member-state id

responsible for its security of supply”, in accordance with the Council view (COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, 2008a)

In an impact assessment of the climate and renewable energy package, the Commission put forward what it argues is the benefits are in prioritizing and investing in renewable energy:

Overall it can be concluded that reducing greenhouse gas emissions and increasing renewable energy according to the targets agreed by the Heads of State makes the EU considerably less dependent on imports of oil and gas (Commission of the European Communities, 2008)

Together with the “*Second Strategic Energy Review*” which was agreed would occur in the Green paper of 2006, RED comes into being.

the “*Second Strategic Energy Review*” claims that the new energy policy will “*fundamentally alter the EU’s energy outlook*”. These changes will come through an increased focus on energy efficiency and renewable energy sources, where there will be set mandatory targets for each member state (COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, 2008)

2008 saw a strong move towards cooperation on energy issues in the EU. Member states located at the Baltic Sea, Denmark, Sweden, Lithuania, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Poland, and Finland agreed to integrate their gas market to better ensure stable supply of gas by diversifying the supply line (Euroepan Commission, 2009)

This is a success for the Commission, which has been at the forefront for the integration of member-states energy markets. As the securitizing actor which seeks to create an EU wide energy policy, deeper integration in the gas field in the Baltic Sea region is a step-in right direction. In the Baltic Sea region member-states that are very much dependent on Russian gas. The integration of their gas supply takes off some pressure and better energy security in the region.

4.2.3.2 Newspaper

Gazprom answered the concerns of energy supply to the EU, making it clear that Gazprom have no interest in cutting supplies to the EU. The EU is Gazprom biggest market. It would make little economic sense for Gazprom and Russia to hamper a good trading relationship with its most important trading partner. The gas dispute of 2006 was purely economic, not a political move (Medvedev, 2008)

A polish MEP: “National level had proved insufficient and inadequate and that they did not guarantee the long-term interest of the would Union” (Paparizov & Saryusz-Wolski, 2008). MEP that speaks of energy politics in Politico.eu all seem to be supporting the work for a common framework, supporting the discourse that only through speak in a unified voice will the EU be able to secure energy supplies at its own premises’ (Saryusz-Wolski, 2009).

The last observation comes from the final debate on the energy package in the Parliament. In this debate the diversity and complexity of the EU and its legislative process shows. Even as MEP has been mostly positive to a deeper integration of energy policy in the newspaper, such as the first two presented, there are other voices that did not enjoy the luxury of a voice in Politico.eu, the third MEP were heavily against the package, arguing that it would be bad for EU citizens and industry.

Fiona Hall

But on the Renewable Energy Directive, Parliament has succeeded in persuading the Member States to embrace the need for radical change in the way we source our energy (...) (European Parliament, 2008).

Umberto Guidoni

The package that this Parliament is being asked to adopt, although watered down due to the selfishness of the Member States, goes some way to providing innovative solutions to alleviate the impact of climate change. If we cannot act swiftly then this problem will weigh more heavily on the European economy, and above all on the lives of European citizens (European Parliament, 2008).

Jana Bobošíková

If we want to work in the interests of our citizens and to ensure sustainable development, then we cannot banish all industrial production from the Union, give the wind and the rain our best regards, block nuclear power and endlessly push up energy prices through useless bureaucratic measures. Therefore, we should reject the entire climate package tomorrow (European Parliament, 2008)

The Eu is a large and complex set of institutions and member states, so there is bound to be disagreements on any issue, and especially an issue as important as energy. The example above shows that in the EU have a broad range of opinions outside the "mainstream" channels which can be left out of the analysis by narrowing once material.

Next, there will be a discussion if securitization can in a reliable way explain RED and its features.

4.2.3.2.1 Interest groups

BusinessEurope falls into the category of Bobošíková, maintain that the suggest targets would come at a cost. They do acknowledge that renewable energy will be important in year to come but does not support the 20% targets that were set (BusinessEurope, 2008).

Over the 3 year the data have been collected from, one can observe a general pattern in the discourse. The Commission hold to the position of the securitizing actor, seeking to use the feeling of crisis in member state to push for a legally binding framework for energy. The reaction were mixed, from MEPs claiming it would harm member states, interest groups stressing the cost of the binging targets that were set and the Council agreeing on closer cooperation, but stressing the need for member state to decide their own energy mix.

The thesis will now see if the securitization can be used explain why RED were created.

4.3 Analysis of the findings

The finding makes it clear that there was a feeling lack of security regarding energy supplies, a sentiment that really took its place in EU agenda after the 2006 gas dispute. The Commission had a duality in the EU-Russia discourse. The Commission and Piebalgs was steadfast in the opinion that EU-Russia trading of energy supply was a relationship of mutual dependence, while at the same time using the term "security of supply".

After 2006, energy discourse was more foreign policy focused. Energy issues can have a spillover on other issues, states can choose to use their control over pipelines as a political tool, as many claimed Russia did after January 2006 (Hofmann & Staeger, 2018, p. 324). It could be argued that the relationship with Russia worsened after the gas disruption, making the EU vs Russia discourse more salient, strengthening the securitization attempt by the Commission, thus, spilling from foreign relations over to the sphere of energy policies. The Commission might fuel the fires of the dispute, emphasizing the need for a common framework to better handle such events in the future, but the Commission does not refer to security as a part in constructing a problem through speech. It includes in the discourse a broad context of energy issues, using the dependency discourse as a means to make its claims more salient. To securitize an issue, there must be related to reality (Balzacq T., 2005, p. 182). Using the pragmatic act, it can then be argued that there are grounds to assume that securitization theory provides an explanation for the creation of RED through the external dimension

The dependency discourse is not one-sided. In economic terms, it would make little sense for Gazprom and Russia to cut ties with its largest customer. President of Gazprom made attempts to show that there is a mutual dependence between the EU and Russia, where the EU needs the goods Gazprom and Russia can provide, and Russia needs a reliable trading partner for long term relationships. The need for a stable partner lies in that Russia gas export was inflexible, meaning that it was underdeveloped in terms of having pipelines to other potential customers such as China and India. Thus, the EU was not as in "Putin's grip" as portrayed in the public sphere. Indeed, it is a good example of a securitizing attempt, framing the dependency of the Russian energy as a potential threat for the EU and its members.

Technological development in the field of RES was at the time of 2006 lagging behind, expensive and required subsidy from the state and EU to function in the energy market (Marques et al., 2010, p. 6878). Thus, it would be in everyone's interest for the good trading relationship to remain stable. Gazprom takes the role as part of the opposition to the Commission attempt to securitize gas supply by claiming that there is a mutual dependence between the two parties.

This becomes important when deciding whether EU-Russia energy relations have been securitized or not. Piebalgs notes that there is an interdependence between the EU and Russia (Piebalgs P., 2006). The EU needs the energy supply provided by Russia in the foreseeable future, even with a focus on RES. Furthermore, Russia needs a stable income, which is provided by selling gas to such a stable market as the EU.

Painting the full picture is not always in the best interest of the securitizing actor(s). By "cherry picking" the information provided to officials and the public, one can better hope to push the discourse in such a way the securitizing move will be a success. Russian dependence on the EU purchasing natural gas should give the EU a strong bargaining position. However, a bilateral agreement between one member-state and a Russian company is how has been practiced, giving more power to the Russian side in the negotiations, leaving individual member-states with very different gas prices. The difference in gas prices in each member state, giving incentive for member-states to unify under an EU umbrella, and diversify their energy supplies. (Prah & Weingartner, 2016, p. 52). If member-states were to unite under the EU banner, it would shift the power in EU-Russia relations (Leonard & Popescu, 2007, p. 54). It allows for member-states to speak with one voice when trading for gas and oil, establishing better cross-

border connections, meaning better choices for consumers and so on. However, depending on once political standing on supranational cooperation in the EU, the points just raised could also be negative, and in turn, securitized by actors claiming the integration processes endangers the well-being of a particular state.

Despite the awareness of the mutual dependence between EU and Russia regarding gas trade, the Commission continued to push for more EU level cooperation. The finding shows that the discourse followed the lines of: *"Should nothing be done with the EU's internal energy production and infrastructure, the EU and its members will be in the grip of states that will use it to influence their way of life"*, as we saw in the article showing the possible withdrawal of sanctions to states break human rights and the Commission work in improving foreign relation to Turkmenistan (COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, 2008b). Following Balzacq framework, the *"breaking free of the rules"* the extraordinary measure would then be deeper integration of energy policy in the EU and achieving the goal of *"speaking with a unified"* voice (Cotella et al., 2016, p. 18). Harmonization of the legal framework, speaking with a unified voice and creating a common energy market are presented options to lessen the pressure on member-states that depend on energy import from unreliable suppliers such as Russia. In some ways, the Baltic integration of its energy markets shows that the Commission push for integration was at least partly successful. The national action plans are set up so that member-states to find their own way to reach their set targets, following article 6 logic that a decentralized energy market and local production will lead to a more stable and secure energy market in the EU.

Securitization and the pragmatic act of Balzacq can help us understand the development and final form of RED in 2 ways. Firstly, the pragmatic act puts forward a framework that helps us better understand the logic behind the need for deeper integration in the energy security to better tackle the coming hardships in securing energy supplies at EU level. The critical approach that the pragmatic act allows for sheds light on the internal power struggles in the EU policymaking between those who seek more integration vs those who prefer the nation states to handle these issues. As we have seen, the Council have been working for, and achieved its goal of member states retaining their choice of renewable sources, as long as the member state reaches its set target. Natorski & Surrallés argues that this compromise is not enough to count for an extraordinary measures, rather, they see it as economic interest coming together, not a successful securitization act (Natorski & Surrallés, 2008, p. 83). Indeed, High dependence on energy import in a member-states makes it more likely to invest in local renewable sources (Marques, Fuinhas, & Manso, 2010, p. 6883), making it likely that the increased focus on renewables would occur without the push from the Commission. However, Natorski & Surrallés article were published in 2008. In 2016, there had been an increase in production of RES by over 60%. This shows even if the directive is *"loose"*, it has had an profound effect on energy production in the EU. Securitization helps understand the process of how this change came to be by shedding light who the securitizing actor were, the context in which they worked, and the discourse used to make the wanted change.

Secondly, by including the external context of energy policies, the pragmatic act helps understand the energy dependency discourse. As with agenda setting, the power of the actors and the timing in promoting their measures to counter a threat play a large part in their proposals gaining salience. Russian use of gas as both stick and carrot seems to play a big part in this discourse. With China and India on the rise economically, the EU faces a dilemma. In their ascendance to economic prosperity, both countries will demand a bigger share of the energy supplies in the world. Fear of this leading to a rise in price,

leaving EU member states vulnerable to price shocks. If Russia expands its pipeline towards these new powers, it could diversify its potential customers, leaving Europe in the cold if there is any political dispute, thus the EU in an even weaker bargaining position as Russia no longer depends on the EU to buy its gas.

5 Conclusion

Securitization and the pragmatic act of Balzacq were very helpful in gaining insight into how energy issues occur and are tackled in the EU, providing a good explanation to the creation of RED.

The findings identify a main discourse in the EU, import dependency from third party suppliers. Among these third countries, Russia is both the largest and the one that is perceived to threaten the security of supply the most. The push for increasing RES in the EU seems to come from political pressure, seeking to lessen some of the import dependency by increasing domestic energy production through investing in RES. Thus, could be viewed as an economic issue, as stability of supply and price often are. However, disruption of energy flow can be viewed as a threat to the welfare system, like transportation, communication, hospitals and heating all depends on a stable source of energy for them to function properly (Hofmann & Staeger, 2018, p. 323).

The term "*security of supply*" used by the EU institutions leading up to RED gives the impression that there is a threat to the energy system of the EU, where the solution is clear: Diversify the energy sources and speak with one voice when dealing with third countries. The legislative text in itself indicates that it is both, shifting focus from integrating markets to ensure better supply, to the environmental gains with renewable energy. Another part of the explanation could be the work towards a new treaty the Lisbon treaty. The treaty could have made member states more compliant towards supranational cooperation at EU level, as the "new wind" from the treaty eased the push from the Commission.

Securitization and the pragmatic act provide a useful analysis of how RED took form. In this thesis, I argue that there are clear signs of securitizing moves made in creating RED, some of which were successful, while others faded into compromises. Deeper integration did occur in the time period leading up to RED, thus, we observe an instance of extraordinary measures occurring in the EU over a period of time in the EU. The Baltic Sea states integrating their gas markets. Mandatory national targets, as opposed to the 2001/77/EC and 2003/30/EC, and discussion of energy security and supply became more prominent in EU institutions and member state. Most importantly, the increase in RES across in the EU, up 60% in 2016 from the 2006 production (Eurostat, 2018). Technology or the lack of technology in the renewable sector could have been part of the reason as to why renewables did not take a larger "piece of the cake" earlier. However,

Thus, as a Securitization use extends beyond the final results of a certain issue. I argue that in applying to securitization to RED, I have gained valuable insight into who the main actors in creating the directive, how the discourse was and most importantly, who had the power to shape the directive. Securitization is better used if it is understood as a process over a period of time, not an event that occurs out of nowhere.

The extraordinary measures that the CS expects would occur with a successful securitizing act did not take place. The extraordinary measures, as we have seen above, it can be argued to be more of a compromise than a single, extraordinary action in the shape of a directive. Securitization is best understood as a process over time, where the

securitizing actor controls and shaped the discourse based on both the internal and external context.

One aspect of the data that sticks out is the focus on the EU-Russia relationship in the public sphere. Most of the opinions and articles published in Politico.eu had a overwhelmingly negative focus when it comes to the energy relationship between Russia and the EU, with mentions of EU dependence on Russia as a threat to member-states, especially the new eastern members. Besides the articles posted by the president of Gazprom, there was the little emphasis on the mutual dependence of the EU and Russia. Politico might have been overly critical to Russia on energy issues after the 2006 gas dispute. It could well be the case that other newspapers sources were to be included, I might have found a more nuanced discourse.

A danger of conducting discourse analysis comes from the researchers own perspective, meaning that the researchers do not come from outside the discourse and is not unaffected to its influence (Jäger, 2002, p. 34). It is not certain that another person using the same sources as I did would reach the same conclusion as I did. Even before starting to read and write on the thesis, I had assumptions and prejudice of what I might find in the literature and documents. However, it is my belief that in this thesis I have made a small contribution in creating a framework of securitization as a process over a period of time to use and apply to energy security studies. Depending on once ideology regarding European integration in the field of energy could either be a good or thing, shaping how the researcher read and interpret his or her sources.

There are no direct sources from member states for two reasons. The first being the language barrier, and the second is that I was interested in how EU institutions might securitize an issue. The member states were in this thesis portrayed as the audience by themselves, however, had a powerful institutional actor in the Council.

Argue that RED can in parts be explained by a securitization approach, however, environmental concerns played an in formulating it. (In the text itself there seems to more focus on the environmental concerns.

Based on the findings in this thesis, I purpose two possible avenues for future research. First, a focus on a single member-state over an extended period of time, possible all the way back to 1997. It would be interesting to see how a member state has reacted to the different proposals, did it assume as the role of a securitizing actor, supporting the Commission or did it place itself in the opposition, wanting energy policies to remain in the national domain. A potential limitation for this research is the language barrier, so this would need to be done by someone very proficient in the native language of the member state in question. The second avenue is to simply "reuse" the securitization framework provided in this thesis at the revised energy directive (2018/2001/EU). After Russia's annexation of Crimea, it would be interesting to see if the if the how the one can find the same arguments as I did, or if the discourse have evolved in a new direction.

6 Literature

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