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Elections, regime types, and social disorder in the developing world.

A quantitative study, 1960-2012.

Master's thesis in political science
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Kunnskap for en bedre verden

Abstrakt

Hvorfor er er noen valg gang på gang preget av vold og demonstrasjoner, mens andre går helt fredelig for seg? Denne oppgaven tar for seg forholdet mellom valg og sosial uro, og hvordan dette forholdet påvirkes av styresett eller regimetype. Selv om nasjonale valg ideelt sett skal fungere som en substitutt for voldelig opprør, argumenterer jeg for at konkurransen valg legger opp til gir grunn til mobilisering og polarisering, som fort kan skli ut til uro.

Til å utforske denne sammenhengen bruker jeg paneldata som dekker 86 land mellom 1960 og 2012. Gjennom tidsserieanalyse finner beskriver jeg forholdene som legger til rette for at valg kan lede til uro.

Resultatene viser at valg øker risikoen for sosial uro, men at effekten ikke konstant over regimetyper. Valg i hybridregimer, stater som blander demokratiske og autokratiske trekk, har spesielt høy risiko for uro. Det samme gjelder valg i mer tradisjonelle autoritære styrer. Jeg utforsker også forskjellene på dødelig og ikke-dødelig uro, og finner at ikke-dødelig uro er vanligst i samme måned som valget, mens dødelig uro er vanligst i månedene før og etter. Funnene støtter ideen om at valg kan fungere som en katalysator for mobilisering, og at stater med svake institusjoner ikke klarer å holde kontroll på uroen.

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The act of writing a thesis is a lonely endeavour. Luckily, there is a lot more to a thesis than just writing, and some people deserve honourable mentions.

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That being said, all remaining errors are my own.

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1 Introduction

Elections are meant to serve as an alternate for battling it out with violence, providing a peaceful way to settle disputes, replacing the bullet for the ballot (Goldsmith, 2014; Przeworski, 1991). Yet, Kenya seems to not be able to hold an election without riots resulting in deaths; post-election violence in Nigeria in 2011 left over 800 dead; and Mexico is now experiencing an unprecedented wave of assassinations in the run up to their election in July. Why do some elections spark mass protest, attacks, and social disorder?

In recent years, there has been a marked increase in the interest for the "lower levels" of violence and disorder, that while not having the long-lastingness and deadliness of full civil wars, still can have dire consequences. This thesis slots into the growing literature on this field.

Why study elections and electoral disorder specifically? While violence is a concern it itself, it can in addition risk stalling democratisation, instil mistrust in political processes and institutions, or slide states into civil war (Salehyan & Linebarger, 2014). In addition, the insights of Harish and Little (2017), that elections increase the levels of violence in the election period, but reduce the overall levels, indicate elections being important.

As the "third wave of democracy" (Huntington, 1993) that spread across the world between 1974 and the 90's has come to a stop, some would find the results disappointing. Instead of flourishing democracies, these waves have several places resulted in various forms of hybrid regimes, blending elections and democratic institutions with traits more commonly associated with autocracies. With the rise this new, remarkably stable form of government, where, despite not being democratic, elections play a crucial role in managing legitimacy and the transfer of power; understanding the relationship between elections, regimes, and social violence, especially in these hybrid regimes becomes more important than ever.

This leads us to this thesis' research question:

Under what conditions do national elections increase the risk of social disorder, and what separates non-fatal from fatal election violence?

To clarify, I do not ask whether elections increase or decrease the overall levels of social disorder, but whether election periods have a higher risk of election compared to a national baseline.

Similar questions have of course been asked before. Höglund (2009) highlights the challenges of holding elections in conflict environment, Fjelde and Höglund (2014) finds that majoritarian electoral systems makes violence more likely, Daxecker (2012) finds that international monitors can increase the risk of post-election violence by giving credibility to allegations of fraud; and Taylor, Pevehouse, and Straus (2017) find that elections where the incumbent is running are at risk of violence. Looking at the structural determinates for election related violence Salehyan and Linebarger (2014) find that illiberal elections and elections in weak states are especially conflict prone.

The scope of these studies remains limited. Most have focused on Africa, or have had a limited temporal scope. While there are good reasons to be interested in post-Cold war Africa as a case of its own, little work has been done on global trends in election related disorder. Therefore, I seek to explore the structural determinates for election violence, and see if the trends and mechanisms uncovered for Africa also hold true for regimes across the developing world.

In addition, most studies have neglected the variety in democratic, semi-democratic and non-democratic regime types. Especially with the trend towards most countries holding elections, but many still holding on to their autocratic institutions. By moving beyond dichotomous measures of democracy or autocracy, I seek to see if the mix of traits hybrid regimes exhibit has a further effect on disorder than only whether or not a country is democratic. I argue that elections held in settings with weak, or not fully developed democratic institutions, institutions that lack respect for civil liberties and fails to provide some from of credible judicial oversight, increase the risk of disorder (Salehyan & Linebarger, 2014; Collier, 2009;

Przeworski, 2011). Due to the high stakes of electoral competition, actors gain incentives to both mobilise into rallies, demonstrations, and other mass actions; or even harassment, or targeted killings.

In many ways, I build upon (Salehyan & Linebarger, 2014), and their study of electoral violence in sub-Saharan Africa. By using a similar design, but expanding the temporal and spacial scope, the results are easier to compare and discuss, making it easier to compare the patterns of electoral violence in Africa to global trends.

For my analysis I use cross-national panel data for 86 countries; a sample that covers large parts of the developing world. I find that while elections increase the risk of disorder, it does not do so consistently over regime types. These findings are consistent with the results from Africa, giving some support for the idea of consistent logics of electoral violence across the globe.

The thesis is structured as follows: Section 2 presents the theoretical framework for the thesis. It first clarifies and conceptualises the central concepts of this thesis, before showing first how elections are potentially destabilising on their own. This simple relationship is then shown to be confounded by various regime types. Testable hypotheses are derived from the expectations given by the framework. Section 3 deals with the datasets, and presents and discusses the choice of variables and codings. Finally the trend lines of the data are presented. The last section presents the findings, and discusses them up against the theory and earlier findings on the relationship between elections and social disorder.

2 Theory

This section will first conceptualise and discuss various forms of civil conflict in the context of elections. Then I will using a simplifying approach, show the theoretical arguemnt for how elections viewed by themselves can induce social disorder. Finally discuss how this effect can vary across regime types.

2.1 Concepts and definitions

This thesis is concerned with elections on the national level, both executive and legislative elections, and elections for constituent assemblies. Referenda, while important, are a due to their focus on a cause rather than a position of power, combined with a non-regularity, an entirely different beast from "normal" national elections, and are therefore outside the interest of this thesis.

While there is a rich research tradition on the relationship between elections and various forms of civil disorder, the concept of civil unrest has not been consistently defined (Straus & Taylor, 2012). Civil violence, or social disorder exists as a spectrum, ranging from non-violent mobilisation to full scale civil war. Earlier studies have focused on the upper end of the spectrum, concentrating war (Cederman, Gleditsch, & Hug, 2012; Cheibub & Hays, 2015) and other serious forms of election-related violence (Butcher & Goldsmith, 2016; Goldsmith, 2015; Carey, 2007).

I choose to use a conceptualisation similar to that of and Salehyan and Linebarger (2014), who focus on general political unrest in a wide sense. Forms of unrest includes but is not limited to protests, riots, and less militarised forms of civil conflict; capturing the whole spectrum of disorder or disorder rather than the most extreme forms of civil disorder (Gurr, 1970). In addition I make a distinction between lethal/violent unrest, which is unrest with at least one death, and non-lethal/non-violent unrest, unrest with no deaths. This distinction is interesting, as there is here a lack of theory. Some expectations are possible using the

logics presented later in the chapter. Throughout this thesis, the words unrest and disorder will be used interchangeably to refer to the whole spectrum of civil disorder, that is both violent and non-violent instances. Violence will mostly refer to violent or lethal forms of unrest.

In the context of election periods, a common assumption is that unrest before or during an election frequently is an attempt to influence said election, and unrest after an election often is a response to the results (Höglund, 2009; Daxecker, 2012, 2014). Due to the salience of elections, this assumption is not an entirely unreasonable, but it does needs stating, as it forms an implicit basis for a several of the mechanisms described.

This form of conceptualisation stands in a mild contrast to the main concept put forward in the fairly recent literature on electoral violence specifically, where the objective, or motive behind the violence or disorder is central in distinguishing it from other forms of political violence [1]. These forms of conceptualisation look at electoral violence as something exclusively endogenous to the electoral process.

While basic concept of civil disorder can be sufficient, expanding on it can be useful to clarify other aspects. Of particular interest are the actors and timing associated with the disorder, or the who, when, and what and where of civil unrest (Höglund, 2009). In addition I include the spacial element, to discuss where the unrest takes place.

Staniland (2014) identifies in his typology on types of electoral violence four different kinds of relevant actors: State, non-state allies, opposition, and unaligned actors. Höglund (2009), identifies a handful of different kinds of actors, including state actors, political parties, militia, and rebel groups. She further distinguishes electoral violence on whether the actor behind it is a governmental or oppositional actor. However, elite are key actors in organising and rallying the masses to their cause, and are therefore the most relevant actor, at least theoretically (Höglund, 2009). Parties and party leaders, then become the most important,

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[1] For example, Fischer defines electoral violence "... as any random or organized act that seeks to determine, delay, or otherwise influence an electoral process ..." (Fischer, 2002, p. 8); and Laakso (2007) defines it as "an activity motivated by an attempt to affect the results of the elections – either by manipulating the electoral procedures and participation or by contesting the legitimacy of the results" (Laakso, 2007, p.28).

in the theoretical sense, as they are behind the both the decision to mobilise and the strategic choice of deciding what form of civil disorder to purse. Even spontaneous, disorganised forms of disorder usually need some form of prior mobilisation, done by elites, in order to succeed.

One of the main characteristics that distinguishes electoral disorder from other kinds of political violence is that electoral disorder takes place in the temporal vicinity of an election. It can happen in all parts of the electoral process; before the election, on election day, and after the results have been announced (Höglund, 2009). While both the phases of an election period and the middle phase of election day are easy to identify, the length of the pre-election period and the post-election period are vaguer terms that require specification. While election periods vary in length from country to country, mobilisation needs to happen close to the election in order to be efficient (Goldsmith, 2015). I will here define an election period as the month during, before, and after an election.

There is a strain of research that also focuses on the particularities urban unrest, as opposed to general country-wide unrest. While this thesis does not attempt to theoretically explain urban disorder as a concept separate form other forms of unrest, some characteristics of urban disorder are worth noting. Legislative and executive centres, as in the buildings themselves, are found in or near city centres, providing a physical focal point for mobilisation (Thomson, Buhaug, Rosvold, & Urdal, 2017; Adamson, 2016). In addition, cities are concentrations of people, making it easier to overcome the problem of collective action. The combination of proximity to centres of power and ease of mobilisation makes cities particularly prone to the forms of unrest often associated with elections. While civil wars are often fought by relative few individuals in rural areas, urban environments are more conducive to mass mobilisation around events such as elections (Buhaug & Gates, 2002). Some empirical support for this focus can in part come from Dercon's (2012) study of the 2006 electoral violence in Kenya support this focus, finding that urban residents were more likely to experience violence.

To quickly summarise and repeat the object of interest, this thesis defines social disorder as

general acts civil unrest that takes near elections.

2.2   Elections and social disorder

To make the relationship between elections and social disorder clearer, I will first focus on the effects elections alone, mostly ignoring potentially confounding factors. This naive approach is useful as it can make clear the otherwise complicated relationship between elections and social disorder, allowing for an easier formulation of basic expectations.

Ideally, elections are stabilising. They serve as an alternative means of conflict resolution, allowing disputes to be settled by the means of the ballot rather than the bullet (Goldsmith, 2014). Through elections, leaders are held accountable economically by giving incentives to align government spending and policy choices with the attitude of the electorate, or risk losing power in a violent rebellion (Fearon, 2011; Przeworski, 1991; Schumpeter, 1943/2006). Replacing a government that does not align with the voters' preferences is less costly than changing the leader through violent means (Fearon, 2011). This way of thinking is often framed in the context of civil wars, representing a choice between either participation, in this case voting or running in the election, or departure, for example rebellion, from the electoral process. To use Dunning's (2011) terminology, voting and fighting become substitutes; actors choose one course of action over the other, depending on what they think will serve their purpose the best at the moment.

Acting as pressure release valves, elections can also serve to defuse potentially violent situations (Goldsmith, 2015). Elections give leaders an opportunity to enter power-sharing arrangements, where political concessions given to an otherwise strong rival can reduce grievances, and thus the rivals incentive to utilise violence (Goldsmith, 2015; Cheibub & Hays, 2015). This form of bargaining can lead to small concessions and incrementally over time give large changes, again giving incentives to routinely participate in the non-violent competition over power. Alternatively, especially in the face of a potential civil war, a decisive election result in favour of either incumbent or opposition can stabilise a country, as it

shows a position of strength, making rebellion or dissent infeasible (Butcher & Goldsmith, 2016).

While reality shows that not all elections are free of violence, some emphasise the importance of the learning experience (Anderson & Mendes, 2005). Lindberg (2009) argues that repeat elections over time build confidence and trust in the democratic institutions, while Anderson and Mendes (2005) find that repeat elections reduce the potential for protest. Proponents of this line emphasise the stabilising potential of elections.

At the same time, elections are by nature competitive events, where political elites struggle in over positions of power (Höglund, 2009; Salehyan & Linebarger, 2014). In addition to being competitive, elections are uncertain, but mostly in their outcome, meaning that the actors involved can not know for certain who will win, but know approximately what the odds of winning are, and how efficient various strategies for influencing the election might be (Przeworski, 1991). In addition to peaceful ways of influencing the election, i.e. campaigning, anyone with ambitions to power has several tactics available for securing votes (Collier, Hoeffler, & Söderbom, 2008; Schedler, 2002). With actors knowing more or less both what the costs and benefits of the various strategies are, the basic logic is that they will choose the one(s) that give the most benefit for the least amount of cost.

One of the main, traditional ways of gathering votes is mobilising. Parties are often the main anchorage of this mobilisation, rallying people along party ideology to either shows of support for the party or more simply: actually go and vote (Omotola, 2011). While this mobilisation often can take peaceful forms, it can equally often happens along existing cleavages in society, for example be ethnicity, religion, or regional affiliation (Eifert, Miguel, & Posner, 2010; Butcher & Goldsmith, 2016; Brancati & Snyder, 2012; Fjelde & Höglund, 2014). Politicians that seek to mobilise along these lines emphasise differences rather than commonalities, creating an "us against them"-mentality, which risks triggering a counter-mobilisation in their opponents (Höglund, 2009; Eifert et al., 2010). The counter-mobilisation increases both tensions and the perceived stakes of the election, increasing the risk of violent clashes. These existing cleavages are also often a source of pre-existing

grievance, and the mobilising serves to exasperate the already latent conflicts. Chaturvedi (2005) finds support for this effect, by showing that elections with few undecided voters, commonly ones where the electorate is split into and mobilised in clear socio-political groups, experience more violence.

In addition to campaigning, parties can consciously utilise violent tactics as a way of influencing the polls, and securing the desired outcome (Dunning, 2011). The high stakes of the electoral competition can result in elections being viewed as a zero sum game, which makes them more likely to spark violence because the costs of losing becomes much higher (Mueller, 2011). As it is the one chance one has to secure power, it becomes an "all or nothing" struggle where one does all it takes to secure victory. The increase in risk of violence comes from the willingness to resort to the most extreme measures in order to win, no matter the cost, which means little restriction on the use of violence. Of course, elections are ideally repeat events, introducing the "shadow of the future" into the calculations (Butcher & Goldsmith, 2016; Przeworski, 2011). As long as there is a probability of making electoral gains in the future, violent struggle might not be the preferred course of action.

While most election-related mobilisation is organised by competing elites, elections can also serve as a spark for a bottom-up form of mobilisation, usually in the form of swift and spontaneous riots (Höglund, 2009). Where elite-driven mobilisation is more often than not meant to influence the election, these more unorganised forms often arise as a response to events, such as the announcement of elections results.

In addition to incentives to use violence to attempt to influence an election, elections can cause a dynamic of mobilisation, repression and escalation that leads to increased levels of unrest and violence (Davenport, Johnston, & Mueller, 2005). In this context, elections serve as a focal point of with which to overcome the collective action problem (Knutsen, Nygård, & Wig, 2017). In addition to the mobilisation being an element of disorder itself, it can spark further, reactive disorder (Davenport et al., 2005). For example, non-violent protests can be met with lethal repression, giving making it likely for the non-violent mobilisation to further increase mobilisation, possibly increasing the risk of non-lethal disorder sliding

out of control (Anisin, 2016).

While most of the discussion above for how elections affect mostly pre-election unrest, unrest that takes post-elections have a slightly different character, and a logic of its own (Hafner-Burton, Hyde, & Jablonski, 2016). Even if the various effects can be challenging to differentiate empirically, exploring them theoretically is worth while.

As the votes are cast, post-election unrest can not influence the election directly. Instead, post-election unrest is a response to results, and an attempt at either enforcing said results or protesting against them (Höglund, 2009; Hafner-Burton, Hyde, & Jablonski, 2013). When the results of the election are clear-cut, the threat of disorder quickly subsides (Rapoport & Weinberg, 2000) As long as the victory is perceived to be a legitimate one, the losers accept the results and turn their efforts toward winning the next one. However, given electoral misconduct, either in the form of fraud or violence, the masses already mobilised for the election gain a new cause to rally against, protesting the results (Daxecker, 2012). This is especially salient when international monitors are present to provide legitimacy to the allegations of fraud (Daxecker, 2014). Combined with the dynamics of mobilisation and repression, it opens another avenue for elections to spark violence.

Based on the literature at large, election periods seem to simultaneously decrease and increase the risk of social disorder. However, I would argue that the competitive nature of election on its own works against the stabilising effects. Looking only at the costs and benefits, actors participating in the competition have little to no incentive to exclusively utilise non-violent means to influence the election, increasing the risk of social disorder. In addition, elections are also a period where both violent and non-violent means of influencing politics are more cost-effective than otherwise, giving incentives for parties and elites to delay action until the election period (Harish & Little, 2017). This gives more reason to expect higher levels of unrest in election periods as opposed to non-election periods. We can therefore expect that:

Hypothesis H$_1$: *Election periods are associated with higher risk social disorder than non-*

election periods.

This however, is as stated merely a simple expectation based on an unrealistic or naive simplification of the relationship. The following section expands this simplistic expectation and hypothesises how regime types can confound it.

2.3   Regime types and social disorder

Before looking at how regime types influence the relationship between elections and social disorder, a brief discussion on the how to conceptualise, classify, and distinguish between regime types is required.

Two ways of looking at democracies and authoritarian regimes are either viewing all regimes through the lens of democracy and democratic institutions, assessing the degree of democracy (Schedler, 2002). The question becomes one of more or less, where one ranks regimes on how democratic it is. An alternative approach does the same, but regards authoritarianism as a qualitatively different beast (Gilbert & Mohseni, 2011; Schedler, 2002). Here one views both the democratic and authoritarian regimes as separate concepts, and judges regimes based on both autocratic and democratic they are.

An example of the first approach of classifying regime types is based on a combination of procedural and civil and political liberties, using both the quality of elections and the respect for civil liberty together to classify various regime types (Stockemer, 2010; Schedler, 2002). This gives a spectrum from no elections and no respect for civil liberty, i.e. repressive authoritarianism, to fully competitive elections and full respect for civil liberties, fully consolidated democracies. An example of the second, two-tailed approach, is the one used by Marshall Monty, Jaggers, and Gurr (2017) in creating the Polity indices.

Borders between various classifications of regime types are foggy at best, and misleading and confusing at worst (Schedler, 2002; Levitsky & Way, 2010). Still, I choose to follow a fairly common, but simplistic way of distinguishing regime types, used by among others

Diamond (2002), and dividing regimes in three broad groups: democratic regimes, authoritarian regimes and hybrid regimes or anocracies. Elections, and more importantly the competitiveness of them is one of the main differing characteristics of these types. The three groups are then as follows: Authoritarian regimes with non-competitive elections, anocracies with competitive, but flawed, elections, and democracies with fully competitive elections.

The relationships between regime and social disorder hypothesised follow, as will be shown in the following sections, the inverted u-shape put forward in previous research (A prominent example is Hegre, Ellingsen, Gates, & Gleditsch, 2001). Autocracies have the means to quell dissent, democracies give little reason to turn to violence, while anocracies exhibit none of these traits. While this relationship has been weakened in regards to civil war, it may still hold true for other forms of civil conflict (Vreeland, 2008).

2.3.1 Democracies

"Democracy is a system in which parties lose elections" (Przeworski, 1991, p.10). While a simplistic definition, it sums up how the central component of democracies, electoral competition contributes to lower levels of disorder. First focusing on the procedural part of democracy, i.e. the peaceful transfer of power, is useful to show how democracies condition the effects of elections on social disorder. In democracies elections are not only viewed as the primary, but the only legitimate route to power (Levitsky & Way, 2010).

Democratic regimes have the capacity to enforce both rules and civil liberties makes institutional costs high in democracies. The rule of law is guaranteed, and violent means are not viewed as a legitimate way of influencing the election (Collier, 2009). Allegations of fraud are settled by a strong, robust judiciary, punishing actors that do not respect the rules of the competition (Huntington, 1968; Salehyan & Linebarger, 2014). This makes any attempt at using violence to influence the election more costly (van Ham & Lindberg, 2015). By comparison, campaigning then becomes a more efficient alternative of influencing the

vote due to the relative costs, giving incentives to prefer peaceful action over violent action. When choosing what strategies to pursue, knowing that the government or incumbent is restricted from responding with violent means, gives more incentives for actors to prefer non-violent action.

In established democracies there exists little to no electoral violence. States that have experienced several consecutive elections also experience less violence, giving some support for the idea of a self enforcing democracy (Goldsmith, 2014; Salehyan & Linebarger, 2014; Fearon, 2011). Repeat elections combined with stable institutions make the prospect of future elections credible. The struggle for power becomes less intense, as one has the same opportunity to compete on the same level next election, decreasing the incentives for violence (Przeworski, 1991). Credible elections, and little incentive to commit electoral fraud reduces the chances of post-election mobilisation in order to contest the results, further lowering the risks of electoral violence.

Some argue that protests, strikes, demonstrations and other forms of irregular participation are legitimate ways of expressing political concerns, and a healthy component to any functioning democracy (Carey, 2007). Due to the electoral competition, and the mobilisation and rivalry that follow, one could therefore expect to see an increase in such behaviour However, the decision to take to the streets can be just as easily triggered by the proposal of a new laws, infrastructure projects or events, as by elections, giving no reason to suspect any more irregular participation during elections. Put together, the traits above leads to the following expectation in the relationship between social disorder during election periods in democracies:

Hypothesis H$_2$: *Elections held in democratic regimes do not significantly increase the risk of social disorder.*

As the research question emphasises eventual differences between lethal and non-lethal violence, some expectations should be stated. There is a relative lack of theory explicitly concerning differences between lethal on non-lethal disorder, but based on the discussion

above some expatiations can be made. Since the use of violent disorder is both not viewed as legitimate and the illegitimacy is enforced, one should expect actors to prefer non-lethal strategies over lethal ones. This is particularity strengthened by the point made by Carey (2007), that non-lethal disorder can be a sign of a healthy democracy. Due to the the nature of H_2, the expectation becomes as follows:

Hypothesis H_3: *If elections held in democracies do increase the risk of social disorder, it will be an increase in non-lethal disorder*

2.3.2 Authoritarian regimes

This section is concerned with a rather narrow subset of authoritarian regimes, namely ones that have most of the traits of authoritarianism, and still hold elections; a from of regime Diamond (2002) calls hegemonic electoral authoritarianism. A prominent example of this kind of regime is Zaire under Mobutu, who held regular elections featuring himself as the only candidate. It should be noted that there is a significant subset of authoritarian regimes do not hold elections at all, and that these will not be covered by the theory.

Elections can be found in many authoritarian regimes, especially in the post-cold war era (Schedler, 2002). However, unlike in democracies and anocracies, elections, even vaguely multi-party ones are what Cheeseman and Klaas (2018) refer to as "Potemkin elections", mere façades or shams meant to serve other purposes than a real competition over power. For example, many elections are only held in order to satisfy minimal requirements from external actors like foreign governments and NGOs (Salehyan & Linebarger, 2014). This makes many of the destabilising mechanisms presented in section 2.2 less relevant, as the lack of competition does not provide an avenue for mobilisation. As elections are not a viable route to power, the incentives to fully commit to the electoral competition are reduced. Indeed, scholars find that authoritarian regimes that hold elections are more likely to last than ones that do not (Gandhi & Przeworski, 2007; Lust, 2009). Looking at the institutions of authoritarian regimes, Gandhi and Przeworski (2007) show that autocrats hold elections

to appease or stave off potential rivals by co-opting them into either the autocrats own party or into the institutional framework, for example a parliament (Gandhi & Przeworski, 2007). Co-opting gives incentives for the (former) rival to support the regime by linking certain goods and privileges to continued support of the regime, thus decreasing the risk of violent dissent (Lust, 2009).

Another reason for holding elections in otherwise closed authoritarian regimes is to glean information about opposition strength and preferences (Butcher & Goldsmith, 2016). By knowing the relative strengths of the government and opposition, an autocrat can figure out the best ways of either co-opting or repressing dissent, making such approaches more efficient (Wig & Rød, 2016). On the flip side, the elections also reveal information about the incumbent, which can potentially backfire if the incumbent is shown to be in a weaker position than expected.

While repression may take violent forms, what Levitsky and Way (2010, p.58) call "high intensity coercion", especially authoritarian regimes also have a myriad of non-violent means of suppressing dissent, or "low intensity coercion". Examples of the latter are surveillance, low-profile harassment, and denial of public services, all meant to nip challenges in the bud. Two important features of low intensity coercion is that it rarely, if ever, reaches news headlines; and that successful coercion removes the need of high intensity coercion. The implication here is that authoritarian regimes, where soft coercion is especially prevalent, experience less violence due to the suppression of credible threats, removing the need to pursue violent action (Davenport, 2007; Levitsky & Way, 2010).

Another factor that may play into the relationship is the lack of a strong civil society in authoritarian regimes. As civil society is important in mitigating the coordination problem of mobilisation. This plays into the low intensity coercion above, as suppressing the formation of robust civil society is a part of ensuring regime survival.

The incumbent under an authoritarian regime wields quite a lot of power in shaping the institutions. Since this is an efficient way of manipulating elections, due to low financial

costs and a low risk of being caught, autocrats have incentive to pursue this strategy when it is available (van Ham & Lindberg, 2015). The opposition on the other hand faces a greater challenge. While they may use violence to attempt to influence the election, chances are such attempts will be met repression, thus vastly increasing the cost and feasibility of such actions (Davenport et al., 2005; van Ham & Lindberg, 2015). In addition, the lack of real competition and high mobilisation costs reduces the incentives for political rivals to go all in when participating, because of the high risks of repression and low probability of a pay-off in the form of a transfer of power. In sum, these mechanisms produce the following expectation:

Hypothesis H$_4$: *Elections held in authoritarian regimes do not significantly increase the risk of social disorder.*

Returning to the question of if there is a difference between lethal and non-lethal forms of disorder, the same strategy used for democracies is used here. The lack of constraints that an authoritarian regime has in choosing how to repress dissent, or even the threat of dissent, can affect the kinds of disorder one is likely to see. Knowing that the government likely will violently repress any form of dissent, the incentives for an opposition to form non-lethal protest movements are reduced. This gives the expectation:

Hypothesis H$_5$: *If elections held in democracies do increase the risk of social disorder, it will be an increase in lethal disorder*

In authoritarian regimes there is an issue of endogeneity, where elections are not held independent of the levels of violence (Goldsmith, 2014). Authoritarian leaders can choose to hold elections strategically to avoid having to fight a costly civil war, or as a way to at least give the illusion of potentially granting concessions to dissidents (Cheibub & Hays, 2015). In other words, high levels of violence may lead to elections. Since this thesis lacks the tools to deal with this issue, this problem endogeneity is one that must accepted, but be aware of.

2.3.3 Anocracies

Anocracies or hybrid regimes are two different names for the same phenomenon: Regime types that exhibit a mix democratic and authoritarian traits, placing them in the muddled middle of an imagined scale with pure democracies and pure autocracies as the outermost points (Bogaards, 2009). Two characteristics of two features are especially relevant: the act of holding competitive elections and the quality of the institutions at large. The category of anocracy is broad, and consists of a wide range of heterogeneous regimes (Stockemer, 2010).

By definition, anocracies have weaker democratic institutions than democracies, but still hold more or less meaningful or competitive elections. "Meaningful" and "competitive" in this case means that elections are viewed as the primary route to power, and that that the competition is real, if unfair. This combination gives both incumbent- and opposition actors space to pursue violent actions than under the democratic rule of law (Collier & Vicente, 2011). Since, as stated earlier, electoral and governmental institutions are fundamental for both the rules of competition and the enforcement of said rules, they should directly influence the costs associated with choosing violence as part of an electoral strategy. In settings where institutions are not able to enforce rules of electoral conduct, or not able to even set the rules, the costs of pursuing violent actions become lower, thus increasing the probability that actors will pursue violence (van Ham & Lindberg, 2015).

In regimes of competitive authoritarianism, where elections show at least a minimum level of competition, opposition parties are allowed to compete, but are almost by rule denied complete victory, i.e. a transfer of power (Levitsky & Way, 2010). This is due to the uneven playing field, skewed in the incumbents' advantage. However, opposition is still allowed, again in a very real competition, to gain vote shares and win seats (Bogaards, 2009; Levitsky & Way, 2010). This combination of competitiveness, the right to participate and lack of meaningful outcomes can potentially create reasons for violence or dissent (Butcher & Goldsmith, 2016). This effect can also be framed as institutional inconsistency (Gates,

Hegre, Jones, & Strand, 2006) Inconsistencies in institutions gives rival parties an arena and opportunity to air grievances and make demands to the incumbent, while at the same time facing a rigged or heavily skewed playing-field (Salehyan & Linebarger, 2014; Gates et al., 2006). This discrepancy solves the collective action problem parties often face, by allowing them to use the election to enable mobilisation, while at the same time piling structural grievance on top of it (Salehyan & Linebarger, 2014). The combination of mobilised masses and grievance is a particularly volatile one, giving a high risk of violence breaking out.

Looking at Latin America, Machado, Scartascini, and Tommasi (2011) find that in countries with weaker institutions, citizens have incentives to pursue unconventional or non-institutionalised means of participation or influence, as opposed to institutionalised ones. Translating this effect to election periods, weak institutions make taking to the streets preferable to voting, taking grievances to court, or other forms of "routine" political activities; increasing the risk of violence breaking out.

According to Mueller (2011), the malleability of institutions further influence the incentives for using electoral violence, for both parties. Malleable institutions, often found in newer and/or non-consolidated democratic regimes, can make the prospect of losing even less palatable for both the incumbent and opposition. A large minority ethnic or political group that poses a credible threat to power might, should they lose, be faced with a government that changes the electoral institutions to hinder the opposition from posing a credible threat at the next election (Mueller, 2011; Cederman et al., 2012; Butcher & Goldsmith, 2016).

As incumbents have a natural fear of losing power, one can assume that they are in general willing to do what it takes in order not to lose power (Hafner-Burton et al., 2013). In an environment where institutional constraints are lacking, i.e. in hybrid regimes, this translates to a willingness to use violence to secure election victory. This is particularly relevant for close races or in situations where the final results are uncertain, as every action to swing the vote can be the one needed to secure victory (Salehyan & Linebarger, 2014; Levitsky & Way, 2010). This effect can take the form of incumbents taking violent action

against non-lethal forms of unrest, where the unrest serves as an indication of opposition support (Hafner-Burton et al., 2013).

Whether lapses in electoral procedures are the fault of poor planning and lack of skills or the product of political misconduct, i.e. a concious effort to illegally skew the election in is not necessarily relevant for the people disadvantaged by the lapses (Birch & Muchlinski, 2017). The disadvantaged will blame political motive, and this grievance can slide into violence (Birch & Muchlinski, 2017; Höglund, 2009).

In addition to the weakness of formal institutions presented above, informal institutions can also have an impact on the risks of electoral violence. Looking at how incumbency and incumbent advantages, Taylor et al. (2017) emphasise the relevancy of patrimonial power-structures, or clientelism, as further conditioning the regime-effects found in the region (Fjelde & Höglund, 2014). In these patron-client relationships an incumbent will have a network of clients; elites that have been granted advantages such power, land rights, or protection from corruption, but are reliant on the incumbent, their patron, to keep them (Taylor et al., 2017; Salehyan & Linebarger, 2014). This gives the clients vested interests in the incumbent, further raising the stakes of the election. The increase in cost of losing makes both the incumbent and the clients more willing to utilise electoral violence to keep power. A new candidate running from the same party as the previous politician will not have the same network of patrons to support him (Taylor et al., 2017). Even if there is some form of inheriting patronage, the new candidate has not yet proven to give out the required advantages to give the elites incentive to partake in the both costly and risky process of influencing an election through electoral violence.

While patron-client relationships are, from a theoretical standpoint at least, more common in presidential systems, where the individual and the individuals force of personality are important in creating and maintaining, but exist in parliamentary systems as well (Lynch & Crawford, 2011; Lindberg, 2003). Especially in sub-Saharan Africa, that features a combination of weak institutions that equate control of the state with control of all other things and "big man", personality based politics, patron-client structures take a central role in

enabling social disorder, particularly when an incumbent is running (Omotola, 2011).

Hypothesis H₆: *Election periods in anocratic regime types will significantly increase the risk of urban social disorder.*

Looking towards differences lethal and non-lethal disorder, several of the mechanisms described above hint at an increase in the risk of lethal disorder especially. However, unlike in democracies and autocracies, the opposition has no clear incentives to prefer one course of action over the other. While the threat of lethal government repression is present, it is not certain, making non-violent action a viable, but not absolute, alternative. Since it is potentially easier to mobilise participation in non-violent/lethal forms of disorder, one might be willing to at least at first attempt the non-lethal course of action. Combined with the dynamics of mobilisation, repression, and potential escalation, this gives the following expectation:

Hypothesis H₇: *The increase of risk in anocracies will be seen in both non-lethal and lethal forms of social disorder.*

What should be noted is the lack of any relative strength of the expectation, allowing for a larger increase in one or the other.

2.4 Conditioning factors

In addition to the main argument presented above, that regime types confound the relationship between elections and social disorder, there are other, and for this analysis less important, factors that affect the risk of social disorder breaking out. As these often are structural of nature, and are useful especially for control purposes, they are also worth briefly exploring. They also relate to the general nature of the research question, by being part of the conditions that either increase or decease the overall risk of disorder.

While being indirectly tied to regime type, state or bureaucratic capacity has an important

effect of its own, as capacity is essential to hold elections in a satisfactory way (Salehyan & Linebarger, 2014). In addition, state capacity also contributes to a government's general ability to quell and counteract violence, (Fearon & Laitin, 2003). While not going into the scholarly debate on what consitutes state capacity, one should therefore expect capable, in this case richer, states to experience less violence (Salehyan & Linebarger, 2014).

In the civil war literature GDP growth has been put forward as an contributing factor separate from general levels of wealth (Collier, 2004). First, a high growth can contribute positively by providing increased levels of wealth, and thus better state capacity. In addition, economic growth has an effect of its own, through being a measure of the success or failure of a government's economic policies (Collier, 2009). Poor growth is often attributed to poor policies, giving a reason to want to replace the government, intensifying or raising the stakes of the election. In addition, poor economic performance can be a grievance of its own, that political rivals can utilise to overcome problems of collective action.

Elections held in conflict environments can trigger increases in hostility on their own (Höglund, 2009; Höglund, Jarstad, & Kovacs, 2009). In addition to the increased levels of violence conflicts by nature produce, elections in the shadow of civil war show more polarisation and uncertainty, raising the stakes of the election. This increases the risk of many of the mechanisms presented earlier firing.

3   Method and data

Due to the nature of the research question at hand, a quantitative approach appears to be the most appropriate. As I seek to find out under what general conditions elections risk sparking disorder, the ability of statistics to uncover patterns in large data is more suited than a more finely detailed qualitative approach. This section first covers the data used for this analysis, then discusses the particularities of the statistics. The data take the form grouped time series cross-section, registered at the country-month level, with a time span from 1960-2012 due to data limitations. Finally an empirical overview of the data and key variables is given.

3.1   Dependent variable

For data on the dependent variable, social disorder, there are several relevant alternative data sources. Probably the most popular conflict data come from UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict dataset (Gleditsch, Wallensteen, Eriksson, Sollenberg, & Strand, 2002), but its focus on larger scale warfare makes it unsuited for exploring general levels of disorder. Other sources include the Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset (ACLED), Social Conflict Across Africa (SCAD), and Urban Social Disorder (USD) datasets. Both ACLED and SCAD cover entire countries, and provide detailed data on both non-violent and violent events. They are however limited in other ways, with ACLED only providing data on Africa from 1997 to the present, and SCAD only covering Africa and parts of Latin America from 1990.

While the wide temporal and spacial scope makes USD well suited for a cross-national study, it does come with some drawbacks. The focus on urban disorder creates a potential issue with validity, as the data does not fully match the concept of interest. While the conceptualisation draws forward the urban element as a potentially conducive environment for social disorder, it does not limit the theoretical scope of analysis to cities. Considering

that my other variables, most importantly the demographic controls, are on the country-level, aggregating the data to a country-level seems beneficial. Urban disorder is then used as an indication or a proxy for the levels of election related disorder on a country-wide level. A challenge here is that USD, being limited to only events that take place in major cities, can under-report of the total number of events in comparison to the country-wide datasets, and worse, potentially capture a whole different dynamic than the general trends. These costs however, are in my opinion worth bearing. In the interest of a nearly global sample, the choice then falls on the 2.0 version of USD (Urdal & Hoelscher, 2012).

USD uses the news aggregate *Keesing's Record of World Events* to generate measures instances of social disorder in major cities, mostly capitals, across the developing world, covering a time frame from 1960 to 2014. It covers a wide range of types of political disorder, from peaceful protests, to terrorism and violent attacks, to general warfare.

In addition to the potential validity challenges, there are some issues with potential bias when dealing with event data gathered from news sources (Ortiz, Myers, Walls, & Diaz, 2005; Bahgat, Buhaug, & Urdal, 2017). There is the potential of language bias, where smaller scale events can be under-reported because they do not reach large and/or relevant enough new sources. Strong and/or authoritarian regimes have capacity have a certain capacity to censor negative news stories, potentially under-reporting particularly less serious episodes of violence. In addition, as noted both in Bahgat et al. (2017) and in section 2.3.2, these regimes also have a capacity to prevent events happening in the first place, creating a dual media and regime effect. These are unfortunately tricky to separate, and should be taken into account in the later analysis. The final media selection bias to be aware of is that countries of strategic, diplomatic, or economic interest to international audiences, often from the developed world, of the news sources are more frequently reported on than countries that are not of interest (Salehyan & Linebarger, 2014; Ortiz et al., 2005). Countries the sphere of interest can be expected to be reported less thoroughly on, making events taking place there less likely to be reported. The unpredictable ebb and flows of these focuses complicates the bias, making it hard to correct for.

For the analysis I therefore aggregate the original city-level data to country-level, giving the data a country-month format, with one data point per country per month. Three variables are generated from the aggregated count-data: *Events*, *lethal* events, and *non-lethal* events. Events represents the total number of the number of events in a given country in the given month, lethal represents the number of events with at least one death, while non-lethal represents events with no deaths. In addition I create tree dichotomous measures of unrest, that shows if a country experienced any events, lethal events, or non-lethal in a given month, 0 being no events, 1 being at least one event. The reason for this recoding is statistical, and will be discussed in section 3.3.

Looking more concretely at how the data is distributed, 5,711 country-months, or about 10 percent, experiences at least one event of urban disorder. Differentiating between lethal and non-lethal forms of disorder, the latter is slightly more common than the former. 2,678 country-months, about 4.9 percent, experience at least one event of lethal disorder, while a total of 3,737 months report at least one non-lethal event. Looking at regional differences, Asia has the highest frequency of event months, with 2,152. Latin America, MENA, and Sub-Saharan Africa are more evenly distributed, with 1,316, 1,141, and 1,102 event months respectively.

There is a time trend present as well, showing a gradual increase in the average number of event months, over the the course of the selection. As other variables also show a similar trend, which might have an impact on the model, this trend will be explored further in section 3.4.

3.2   Independent variables

3.2.1   Elections

The first main independent variable is election periods. Data on elections are collected from the National Elections Across Democracy and Autocracy (NELDA) dataset (Hyde &

Marinov, 2012). It all national elections in states with a population over 500,000 from 1945 to 2012 where mass voting was allowed, and includes several variables with information about the elections themselves. This dataset is chosen as the source for electoral data because of its comprehensiveness, being the only dataset to cover both the spacial and temporal scope of the analysis.

The variable *election* is coded as a dichotomous variable, where 1 denotes a month where an election takes place, here defined as when the ballots were cast, and election round ended. 0 denotes months were no election took place. Multiple rounds of elections are treated as individual observations Months where more than one elections take place, mostly due to executive and legislative elections on the same day, are also given the value of 1. This coding of same day elections is not especially problematic unless one either wants to distinguish between types of elections, or look at variables concerning the elections themselves.

The final data ends up covering 1,237 elections. The distribution is fairly uneven, ranging form China, Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Yemen having held no elections in the time period, to Iran and Japan having held the most at 38 and 33 elections respectively. The looking at how the dependent variable is distributed across elections, 200 election months experienced an event, 93 lethal events, and 134 non-lethal events.

3.2.2   Regime

To measure regimes, there exists a plethora of both sources and different operationalisations. The probably most utilised measure of regime type is the Polity IV index (Marshall Monty et al., 2017). The index uses a combination of two measures, one of autocracy and one of democracy, to assign countries scores ranging from -10 to +10, -10 being strongly autocratic, +10 being strongly democratic. This form of index is useful for identifying and differing between regimes close to polar ends of the scale, but is not at efficient when differing between the regimes in the muddled middle of the spectrum (Marshall Monty et al., 2017). Due to the nature of scoring, several different combinations of autocratic and democratic traits

may result in the same overall score. This may potentially confound of mislead analysis that is preoccupied with hybrid regimes, as I am. In addition, the Polity data have a potential issue with endogeneity when used to analyse conflict (Vreeland, 2008). Since two of the component variables of the index explicitly includes violence, one risks overstating the effect of violence.

An alternative measure of regime type can be found in The Regimes of the World (RoW) measure of regime type from version 7 of the V-dem dataset (Coppedge et al., 2017). RoW uses a combination of a Schumpeterian or procedural classification and criteria based on Robert Dahl's polyarchy to distinguish between regime types. This results in four categories: Closed autocracies, where there is either no elections or no meaningful competition, Jordan being a classic example, but the military regime of Myanmar also falling into the category. Second cateogry is electoral autocracies, that hold *de facto* multiparty elections, but have significant irregularities or violations of civil rights, such as in Mexico under the hegemonic rule of PRI. The third category is electoral democracies, that hold meaningful competitive elections show only a basic respect for civil rights. Finally, we have liberal democracies, that in addition to the traits of electoral democracies show protection from minorities and robust judicial oversight. The only country that consistently falls into this final category is Japan.

Looking at the sample, the distribution of regime types is skewed towards the first two categories. Closed autocracies and electoral autocracies make up 39.73 percent and 38.19 percent of the observations respectively. In contrast, electoral democracies make up 18.17 percent of the observations, and democracies stand the least, at 3.91 percent. This skewness is explained by both the time-frame and spacial features of the selection. Due to the data covering several waves of democratisation, from Latin-America in the 1970's and 1980's (Huntington, 1993) to the more recent wave of the introduction of multiparty elections across Africa 1990's, it is natural to see an over-representation of the more authoritarian-bent regime types. In addition, the geographical focus on the developing world excludes most of the established democracies in the world, contributing to the skewness. To provide

an image of what this distribution looks like, and how it has changes over time, I present the time trends in figure 1.

Figure 1: *Time trends of Regimes of the World, smoothed polynomials*

With its four ordinal categories strictly follow the theoretical categorisation of regime types done in section 2.3. One can discuss whether or not the category "electoral democracy" falls under the hybrid regime umbrella, or is a classification of weak or failed democracy. For example, modern Turkey is consistently coded as an electoral democracy, as is India. The wording of the coding also hints at it being a classification of failed democracy, saying that "Free and fair multiparty elections [...] liberal principles of respect for personal liberties, rule of law, and judicial as well as legislative constraints on the executive not satisfied" (Coppedge et al., 2017, p.265). However, treating it as a hybrid regime should not be problematic, as anocracies also exist on a spectrum. By providing two categories for hybrid regimes, one can distinguish between the more democratic bent anocracies and the more authoritarian bent ones.

The main strength of the RoW-measure is that its measure relates directly to the aspects of regimes that are of interest, mainly the electoral procedures and institutions, and how much respect there is for them. This allows for a better distinction in degrees of anocracy, differing between de jure and de facto multiparty elections, in addition to the respect for civil rights,

providing a more nuanced picture of regimes than an index can. The operationalisation gives in other words an opportunity potentially unpack some potential effects of the various degrees hybrid regimes. While I based on previous research do not expect the mechanisms to be different across the categories, any eventual difference would present interesting avenues for future research.

While RoW does not include an explicit reference to violence, it does contain electoral fraud and misconduct as a part of its measure (Lührmann, Tannenberg, & Lindberg, 2018). As violence during election periods However, this is a common enough across most measures of democracy that include elections as a metric it is hard to avoid.

Nevertheless, the alternative regime measures are used to test robustness. Here I primarily use the other main measure of democracy, the already mentioned Polity IV index (Marshall Monty et al., 2017). In addition to the original index, I employ two recoded versions. First, in order to make Polity more similar to the original RoW, I create a categorical variable, following the recommendation of Marshall Monty et al. (2017). Regimes that score from -10 to -6 are categorised as autocracies, -5 to 5 as anocracies, and -6 to 10 as democracies. To account for the potential endogeneity in using Polity for studies of conflict I also use the alternative created by Vreeland (2008). This alternative variable, *xpolity*, removes the two problematic components of the original Polity, creating a scale from -6 to +7.

3.2.3   Controls

Control variables on GDP per capita, GDP growth, and population size are all obtained from the World Bank Development Indicators (WDI). The WDI provide coverage on a wide set of variables, and cover a wide range of countries and time span. GDP per capita is used as a control for government or bureaucratic capacity. While not a perfect proxy, there is some support for it being a fairly good indicator of overall government capacity (Hendrix, 2010). For purposes of control and consistency with other studies I use the constant 2010 U.S.-dollar version of the measure. To adjust for the skewness of the variable,

it is log transformed. Data on population size is similarly transformed, as it shares the same problems with skewness. GDP growth is the annual percentage growth of GDP.

Data on the final control, civil war, is collected from the UCDP dataset (Gleditsch et al., 2002). The variable civil war is a dichotomous measure, indicating whether or not a country experienced a civil war, defined as intra-state conflict with at least 25 battle-deaths, in a given year. 1 indicates civil war, 0 indicates no civil war.

3.3   Statistical models

A couple of features of the data structure are important to note when choosing how to estimate the models for analysis. First of all, the data take the shape of what is commonly referred to as *time series cross-sectional* (TSCS) data, a subtype of panel data featuring a moderate number of units, i, over a large span of time, t (Beck, Katz, & Tucker, 1998).

Second, the shape of the dependent variable is central when choosing how to best estimate the models for analysis. In this case, it has two shapes: one coded as a count, one as a dichotomous measure. For count variables that exhibit greater variance than mean, as is the case with our event data, a negative binomial model is appropriate. However, there is a potential violation of an assumption that needs to be discussed. Negative binomial regression (NBR) models assume independent observations, an assumption that counts of violence is likely to violate. By using the alternate, dichotomous measure, one gets around this problem. A TSCS-corrected logit-estimation then becomes the most viable form of estimation, and the one that will be used in the analysis. NBR-estimation will be used to check for robustness.

What must be noted is that NBR-models ask a slightly different question than logit-estimations. Where logit is preoccupied with how factors affect the probability of, in this case, a month experiencing an event, the NBR-model looks at the how factors affect the frequency or the number of events a month experiences. Looking back at the research ques-

tion, a logit-estimation seems to produce the results that are more suited do answering it than an NBR-estimation.

TSCS-data features more often than not temporal/serial dependence or autocorrelation which, if not accounted for, can risk in inflated p-values and risk false positives (Mehmetoglu & Jakobsen, 2016; Beck et al., 1998). To deal with this issue I to two thing: First I follow the advice and procedures given in Beck et al. (1998) and Mehmetoglu and Jakobsen (2016), and create a variable that counts the number of months since the country last experienced an event. In addition I create a set of smoothing variables, a cubic spline, to control for eventual non-linearity of the impact of time. These cubic splines are not reported in the results, but are included in the model. Secondly I account for autocorrelation by including a variable for yearly trend, year-1, to account for the longer time-trends in both disorder and number of elections. In addition, to minimise the risk of reverse causality, the relevant control variables plus the variable on regime are lagged by 12 months. Since all these variables are measured on a yearly basis, rather than a monthly one, a 12 month lag controls for the previous year. To account for the trend-lines in the data, described below, a yearly trend variable is created. It is equivalent to year-1, controlling for the value of the previous year, thus avoiding eventual seasonal variation.

The final methodological discussion that needs to be made is the one between fixed- or random-effects models (Petersen, 2004). While some argue that fixed-effects estimation is the better option, as it both captures all time-invariant variables that can influence the dependent, and make eventual causal inferences more clear (Mehmetoglu & Jakobsen, 2016). Its drawback however, is that it cannot include variables that do not change over time. As all of my variables do vary, this is not an issue. Beyond the statistical reasons for choosing one over the other, Petersen (2004) emphasises the importance of considering the question one is asking, and choosing the model that fits to answer it. In this case I seek to find out how the risk of social disorder changes when a country holds an election, focusing on how the risk of disorder changes when a government transitions from a non-election state to an election-state. Fixed-effects estimation is well suited for to answer this kind of

question.

The analysis is done using the STATA 15 software package.

3.4   Descriptive statistics

Finally, I present the descriptive statistics of the main variables to give a clearer picture of what the data looks like.

Table 1: Summary Statistics

VARIABLES	N	Mean	SD	Min	Max	Frequency
election	55,008	0.0225	0.148	0	1	1,237
events	55,008	0.104	0.305	0	1	5,711
lethal	55,008	0.0487	0.215	0	1	2,678
nonlethal	55,008	0.0679	0.252	0	1	3,737
polity	48,830	-1.093	6.877	-10	10	
gdpgrowth	45,885	4.312	6.819	-64.05	106.3	
civilwar	51,885	0.245	0.430	0	1	12,727
regime	51,582	0.863	0.846	0	3	
xpolity	48,830	-0.0307	4.443	-6	7	
politydum	48,830	1.157	0.838	0	2	
gdplog	45,564	24.05	1.754	19.30	29.61	
poplog	54,972	2.551	1.338	-1.200	7.208	

Table 1 shows the complete summary statistics of the combined dataset. As means and standard deviations are not particularly useful for dummy variables, the frequency of the value 1 is reported. What is worth noting and briefly commenting on is the discrepancies in observations between the various variables. The GDP capita and GDP growth variables have the largest amount of missing values, missing for large spans of time on both Syria and Somalia. While the missing values are an issue, as they show signs of being systematic, they are not critical. As the WB is viewed as one of the more credible sources for GDP, I choose to accept the missing values the use of this data entails. The polity-variables show a similar, but not as large, level of missing values.

Figure 2: *Time trends of elections and urban social disorder, smoothed polynomials*

Due to due some lack of overlap between the missing values of polity and GDP, the final sample then includes a N of 42,928 observations over 86 countries across the developing world. The complete country list can be found in the appendix.

Figure 2 shows the mentioned trends of both events of disorder and elections. As the smoothed polynomials show, there has been a general increase over time both in the number of elections and the number of event-months. While interesting empirically, the trend confirms the concern of non-stationary from the last section, necessitating the need to control for a yearly trend. The same time trend of disorder is presented in figure 3, where the trends in lethal and non-lethal disorder are separated. As we can see, they follow more or less the same trend lines, with slightly differing spikes between lethal and non-lethal violence.

Figure 3: *Time trends of lethal and non-lethal events of urban social disorder, smoothed polynomials*

4   Analysis

This section deals with the empirical analysis of the data, and testing the hypotheses formulated in section 2. The main findings are presented in table 2. First I test whether election months increase the risk of experiencing urban social disorder; models (1-3), differing between total, lethal, and non-lethal events. Then I include an interaction effect between elections and regime type, models (4-6), to test whether regime type has a conditioning effect on elections. I present and discuss the sensitivity of the findings by presenting and discussing alternate model specifications, before finally discussing the results in light of the theory.

4.1   Results

Table 2 shows the main findings of elections' effect on urban social disorder. Models (1-3) show all events, lethal events, and non-lethal events, respectively. The difference in the number of countries included between the models is caused by Singapore not experiencing any lethal events, thus being dropped by the fixed effect estimation. Looking first at the results of the basic models, we can see that months with an election have a significantly higher risk of experiencing at least one event of social disorder. This translates to 62 percent higher odds of a month with an election experiencing at least one event of disorder over not experiencing an event of urban disorder. For lethal violence, the effect is strongest in the same month as the election, with a 60 percent increase, and a 31 and 29 percent higher odds in the months preceding and succeeding an election, respectively. Non-lethal violence shows a slightly weaker effect, with a 52 percent increase in odds.

Moving to the regime measure, where democracies are the reference category, closed autocracies and electoral autocracies and electoral democracies are all significantly more likely to experience urban social disorder than democracies. Translating into odds, closed autocracies have a 90 percent higher odds of experiencing a month of disorder than democracies,

Table 2: Panel adjusted logit estimates of the effect of elections on events of urban social disorder. Developing world 1960-2012, Country-fixed effects.

	(1) Events	(2) Lethal	(3) Non-lethal	(4) Events	(5) Lethal	(6) Non-lethal
Election	0.483***	0.475***	0.427***	-0.860	-12.41	-0.734
	(0.0893)	(0.123)	(0.103)	(0.606)	(517.6)	(0.606)
Election - 1	0.0179	0.271**	-0.0542	0.0182	0.272**	-0.0548
	(0.0996)	(0.131)	(0.118)	(0.0996)	(0.131)	(0.118)
Election + 1	0.182*	0.256**	0.110	0.182*	0.256**	0.110
	(0.0940)	(0.129)	(0.110)	(0.0941)	(0.129)	(0.110)
L.Closed Aut.	0.644***	1.103***	0.670***	0.604***	1.044***	0.636***
	(0.139)	(0.279)	(0.149)	(0.140)	(0.279)	(0.150)
L.Electoral Aut.	0.537***	0.990***	0.528***	0.497***	0.939***	0.489***
	(0.135)	(0.276)	(0.144)	(0.135)	(0.276)	(0.145)
L.Electoral Dem.	0.411***	0.868***	0.391***	0.374***	0.815***	0.362**
	(0.132)	(0.274)	(0.141)	(0.132)	(0.274)	(0.141)
L.Election*Closed Aut.				1.401**	13.01	1.216*
				(0.631)	(517.6)	(0.639)
Election*L.Electoral Aut.				1.422**	12.86	1.312**
				(0.620)	(517.6)	(0.625)
Election*L.Elecotral Dem				1.340**	12.90	1.055*
				(0.631)	(517.6)	(0.640)
L.Civil war	0.410***	0.518***	0.301***	0.411***	0.518***	0.301***
	(0.0481)	(0.0666)	(0.0566)	(0.0481)	(0.0666)	(0.0566)
L.GDP growth	-0.0130***	-0.0144***	-0.0115***	-0.0130***	-0.0144***	-0.0115***
	(0.00244)	(0.00311)	(0.00305)	(0.00244)	(0.00311)	(0.00305)
L.ln.GPP capita	0.270***	0.298***	0.260***	0.272***	0.299***	0.261***
	(0.0629)	(0.0986)	(0.0727)	(0.0629)	(0.0986)	(0.0727)
L.ln.Population	0.888***	2.052***	0.396*	0.884***	2.046***	0.392*
	(0.193)	(0.320)	(0.222)	(0.193)	(0.320)	(0.222)
Year trend	-0.0166***	-0.0428***	-0.00806	-0.0166***	-0.0427***	-0.00806
	(0.00532)	(0.00868)	(0.00612)	(0.00532)	(0.00868)	(0.00612)
eventmonths	-0.240***	-0.283***	-0.211***	-0.240***	-0.283***	-0.211***
	(0.0130)	(0.0192)	(0.0151)	(0.0130)	(0.0192)	(0.0151)
Observations	42,928	42,366	42,928	42,928	42,366	42,928
Number of cown	86	85	86	86	85	86

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

electoral autocracies a 71 percent higher odds, and electoral democracies a 50 percent higher odds. This effect is larger for lethal events, with 200, 169, and 138 percent increases respectively. For non-lethal violence this effect i slightly weaker than total events.

The results in the basic models (1-3) give some support for H_1, that election periods increase the risk of urban social disorder. While the effect ot elections is significant and does not in any substantial degree vary in strength different lethal and non-lethal disorder, the differences between models (2) and (3) hints at varying dynamics behind lethal and non-lethal violence. As we will see, similar results are found when including the interaction term, so the differences between non-lethal and lethal violence will be discussed there.

While the controls are not central to the analysis, a basic overview of their effects is given. Countries experiencing a civil war have a higher risk of experiencing events, and especially lethal events. These findings are not particularly surprising, as USD does not explicitly exclude acts of warfare or battles from the dataset. GDP growth has a significant, negative effect, indicating that higher levels of growth reduces the risk of disorder. This effect is stable across the three models. GDP capita is significant for total and non-lethal events, and has a positive effect, indicating that countries with a higher GDP have a higher baseline risk of social disorder. This counter-intuitive finding the result of the fixed effects estimation. As both GDP growth and GDP capita in a fixed effects model capture economic growth; GDP growth directly and GDP capita through changes from year, they should in theory capture the same effect. What exactly GDP capita is capturing is capturing is hard to say, but as it is not critical to the analysis it will not be discussed further. Finally, population size is significant and positive for all and lethal events, meaning that larger population sizes increase the risk of particularly lethal forms of disorder.

4.1.1 Interaction effects

To test the remaining hypotheses, the effect of elections is allowed to vary across regime types. This is done by expanding the original model with an interaction effect between

election and regime, as shown in models (4-6). For an easier and more substantive interpretation of the interaction effects, figure 4 shows the marginal effects of elections on the risk of total levels of disorder across regime types. The values of the predictive margins however are necessary to comment on. Due to the fixed effects estimation, margins assumes the fixed effect to be zero. While this might be the cause of the small values in the predicted effects, it is beyond my statistical capabilities to asses. Substantial interpretation of the marginal effects will therefore be limited, and I will instead use them to show what the relationship looks like.

Before discussing the interactions fully, the changes between the base model the one with interaction are worth commenting on. As both the election variable and regime measure are combined, it makes little sense to discuss their individual coefficients. However, the leads and lags of election are worth noting, as they do not change from one set of models to the other. The month after elections still increases the risk of total urban disorder, significant on the 0.1 level, and both the month before and after elections have an increased risk of lethal disorder. The controls remain largely unchanged between the base and interaction models.

Figure 4: *Predictive marginal effects of the interaction term of elections and regime type on total events*

As wee see in figure 4, the baseline for each regime shows a similar pattern to the one in model 1, with closed autocracies having the highest risk of urban disorder, liberal democracies the lowest. The effect of elections on the the probability of experiencing urban social disorder is, as expected, not constant across regimes. Elections in closed autocracies increase the risk of experiencing events of urban disorder. While the baseline risk of disorder in electoral autocracies is lower than closed autocracies, the effect of elections remain more or less the same, giving a slightly lower overall combined effect. We also see a significant and weaker effect of elections in electoral democracies. This is in combination with a lower baseline than electoral autocracies. Finally, there is a non-significant negative effect of elections in democracies, where election months actually have a lower risk of experiencing an event of urban disorder.

Going back to the hypotheses, there are some interesting findings. The models show support for H_6, that hybrid regimes have a higher risk of experiencing disorder in election periods. Looking at the marginal effects, we find support for H_2. Indeed, the effect of elections is negative, showing that elections in democracies actually have a stabilising effect by decreasing the risk of social disorder. This effect is fails to reach significance, however. Interestingly, the results go contrary the expectation in H_4, showing that elections in authoritarian regimes actually do have an effect on the risk of experiencing an event of disorder, as illustrated in figure 4.

Both the decrease in the effect of elections, and the unexpected effect in closed autocracies, can show support for Gates et al. (2006) theory of institutional inconsistency, meaning that any mix of autocratic and democratic traits is, at least in the short term, destabilising. What the institutional inconsistency-view fails to account for, however, is the higher baseline risk in autocracies.

Moving on to the differences between lethal and non-lethal violence, the main pattern of the interaction for both is more or less the same as for the total events. For non-lethal violence, we see that the effect of elections is positive, increasing the risk of disorder, and similar in

Figure 5: *Predictive margins, interaction term of elections and regime type on the probability of non-lethal events*

Figure 6: *Predictive margins, interaction term of elections and regime type on the probability of lethal events*


strength for both closed and electoral autocracies. The effect is weaker, but still positive, for electoral democracies, and finally negative for liberal democracies. The decrease in the effect of elections between electoral autocracies and electoral democracies looks to be larger than the corresponding drop in total events. While only elections in electoral autocracies obtains significance on the 0.05 level, the 0.1 level significance of the other effects, barring liberal democracies, should not be fully discounted. Lethal violence shows a similar pattern to total and non-lethal disorder, but the failure of the lethal interaction effect to reach any forms of significance makes the substantive difference fairly large.

Before discussing both the general finding and the difference between lethal and non-lethal disorder fully, it is worth comparing the results to the expectations made earlier. Temporarily disregarding the lack of significant effect of elections in democracies, figure 5 shows no support for H_3. The lack of significant effects of elections on lethal violence goes against the expectation in H_7, that the increase in disorder in hybrid regimes will be both lethal and non-lethal disorder. For authoritarian regimes, the lack of significant findings on lethal disorder also go against expectations, in this case H_5.

As speculated earlier, the differences in results between models using lethal disorder and the ones using non-lethal disorder, can hint at varying dynamics that drive the different types

Table 3: Coefficient plot of logit and Negative Binomial estimates of the effects of elections on urban social disorder

of disorder.

4.2 Sensitivity

To test the model for sensitivity I run a series of alternative specifications. The fist set of estimates, shown in table 3, is equivalent to the base model (4), estimated using negative binomial regression. The results of this alternative estimation are more or less equivalent to the logit estimates, at least when only looking at the significance and direction of the effects. As the coefficients are not identical between logit and NBR, a direct comparison of them is not useful. However, the similar results of the original count variable and the transformed dichotomous measure show that the recoding produces consistent results.

The next set of tests for robustness changes the main independent variable, regime type. I run three versions of model (4), total events with interaction terms, replacing RoW with the alternate measures from the Polity index. The coefficients of election, regime measure, and their interactions from the estimates are presented in table 4. The full models are included

Table 4: Odds ratio estimates of the effects of elections and regime type on urban social disorder

in the appendix. As the interaction terms are hard to interpret based on the coefficients alone, the marginal effects of the three models are shown.

Unlike in the main models, the inverted u-shape relationship between regime and social conflict often put forward in the theory shows up in all recodings of the polity-variable. The plots show that elections have little to no effect in fully autocratic regimes, an increasingly larger effect for more anocratic regimes, before decreasing again for democratic regimes. For both the polity and the recoded xpolity the peak lies around the 0-point of the scale, or where the democracy and autocracy components of the indices meet.

Comparing RoW directly to its polity counterpart, the dummy (figure 6), we see that elections in autocratic regimes increase the risk of disorder, but that the effect is weaker than the one for anocracies. This runs counter to the findings with RoW, where the effect of elections in autocracies is stronger than for anocratic regimes. Also worth noting is that the basline risk is more stable in the dummy version of polity, instead of the steady decrease

Figure 7: *Predictive marginal effects, polity-dum*

Figure 8: *Predictive marginal effects, polity*

Figure 9: *Predictive marginal effects, xpolity*

in RoW.

To summarise, the alternative model specifications show that the results that elections increase the risk of urban disorder in anocracies are robust, as are the findings that elections have no significant effect in democracies. The opposite effects of RoW and polity on elections in autocracies however, put the robustness that effect into question, as they show diametrically different effects.

4.3   Discussion

While the concept of interest as stated in the research question and theory is social disorder generally, the dependent variable in this analysis is limited to urban social disorder. This discrepancy between the wider conceptualisation and measurement creates as discussed earlier a potential issue with the validity of the study. Care must therefore be taken in making any form of generalisation beyond trends in urban disorder. In addition, as the sample only covers the developing world, generalisations of a truly global nature are also made with peril. Keeping the pitfalls and caveats of the analysis in mind, I now look at and discuss how the results match up earlier studies of election related disorder.

First looking at the general results of total disorder, which to very briefly summarise found that elections increase the risk of disorder, but that this effect was conditioned by regime type. Elections in closed and electoral authoritarian regimes and in electoral democracies all increase the risk of an event of disorder, while elections in democracies have no significant effect.

To do a more substantive discussion of the results, my findings are partially consistent with both Gates et al. (2006) inconsistent institutions, and the idea that electoral competition can overwhelm weak or underdeveloped institutions from amongst others Przeworski (1991) and Salehyan and Linebarger (2014); albeit in slightly varying degrees. For democracies and hybrid regimes, both theories are consistent and robust, with the results showing the expected patterns across specifications. Some support for state weakness can also be found in the controls, recent or ongoing civil war larger and population increasing the risk of disorder, again consistent with the theory.

However, the findings on closed autocracies go against the expectations of the theory. While one could attribute the positive effect of elections in even closed authoritarian regimes to institutional inconsistencies, the theory fails to account for the higher baseline risk of disorder in authoritarian regimes than in hybrid regimes. Viewed in the light of the more specific argument of Hafner-Burton et al. (2013), that the lack institutional constrains increases

the risk of violence breaking out, this unexpected finding can potentially make more sense. While their argument was in section 2.3.3 framed in the context of anocratic regimes, it can help to explain the higher risks of disorder in authoritarian regimes, as autocrats face little to no institutional constraints in using violence. The question then becomes one of motivation, and again theory falls short, as the structures of authoritarian regimes

In sum, it can look like the lack of real electoral competition and high mobilisation costs for the opposition does not exert as large a stabilising force in authoritarian regimes as the literature would suggest. However, looking to the sensitivity tests, the alternate measures of regime more closely reflect the expectations of institutional inconsistency and institutional weakness. As the only difference between the sensitivity tests and the main model is these alternate regime measures, there is a case to be made that some of the explanation lies in the differences between the variables. More specifically, as the effects are stable across anocracies and democracies, differences in how the datasets categorise autocracies can help explain the differing results.

As RoW uses the lack of *de facto* multiparty elections to categorise autocracies, it can potentially group several types of different autocratic regimes together, much in the same way Polity risks grouping together anocracies. The effect that is captured in the model is then the sum effect of all regimes without multiparty elections. This explanation is not wholly satisfactory either, as it still does not explain the inconsistencies in a satisfactory way.

My findings are in other words robust for hybrid regimes and democracies, and less robust for autocracies. The robust findings are in line with both alternate model specifications and earlier research, most concretely Salehyan and Linebarger (2014), giving an indication that urban disorder at least partially can work as a proxy for the general trends of social disorder.

The second main aspect of this thesis is exploring the difference between lethal and non-lethal violence in the context of elections. To quickly summarise, the results showed no

significant effect of the election month on the risk of events of lethal violence, but an increased risk the months before and after an election. For non-lethal disorder, the patterns are largely the same as for the total events, with slightly weaker effects for electoral democracies and closed autocracies. There is no effect in the months preceding and succeeding elections.

What do the differences between lethal and non-lethal disorder tell us? Most directly, the results show that different parts of the electoral process, with non-lethal forms of disorder prevalent in the same month as the election, and especially in electoral autocracies; and lethal violence taking place further away temporally.

The temporal crudeness of the model limits this part of the discussion, since it is unable to differentiate between pre- and post-election disorder. Being able to tell whether the effect observed for non-lethal violence is one post-election reaction to results, as Höglund (2009) and Daxecker (2012) suggests, or a more general effect of more mobilisation close to elections would give an indication to where to focus further research.

As the legitimacy cost of non-lethal disorder is lower than for lethal violence, it might be the preferable course of action to close to elections (van Ham & Lindberg, 2015). Lethal violence has a high visibility, especially close to an election when all attention is on the parties, using it can have consequences. Incumbents or opposition that seize victory, but resorted to lethal disorder to do so, can be accused of fraud, and which risks sparking protests that can challenge the electoral results, as Hafner-Burton et al. (2016) finds. One could then expect elites to utilise violent action longer before the election, in an effort to camouflage the fraud, mitigating the risk of serious violence breaking out.

Another possible explanation is the difference in natures, with non-lethal disorder often being events of mass mobilisations, while lethal disorder can involve comparatively few individuals. Lethal disorder is then used as a tactical, long-term means of influencing an election, while non-lethal disorder needs an impending election to overcome the collective action problem. Another possible explanation is that there is a difference between urban

and non-urban disorder, where former has an emphasis non-lethal mobilisation due to the proximity to power centres and the higher concentration of people to mobilise. As the dependent variable is focused on cities, this is not an unlikely cause.

There are two main drawbacks to the way the model is specified. One is, as mentioned, the temporal crudeness, which potentially obfuscates exactly what mechanisms of mobilisation that are taking place. Second, is the fact that while I differentiate between lethal and non-lethal violence, I do not separate violence based on perpetrator, or the actor that initiates the violence. While there are several studies that separate between governmental and opposition violence, many of the mechanisms behind social disorder rely on or are influenced by dynamics between lethal and non-lethal action, where government and opposition, mobilise and react to each other. Especially as government actors in theory have the monopoly on legitimate use of force, controlling both the army and police, one could think that governments were more likely to use lethal violence than the opposition.

5 Conclusion

"Under what conditions do national elections increase the risk of social disorder?". With the steady increases the number of elections, hybrid regimes, and events of social disorder recent years have given us, questions like this become more pertinent than ever.

This thesis attempted to cast more light on this subject by seeing if previously researched determinates for election related social conflict, many found for Africa, held true for a larger part of the developing worlds.

The main findings is a nuanced picture of how elections can lead to disorder: While I find that elections do give a statistically significant increase in the risk of social disorder, the effects are conditional on regime and type of disorder. The mixed regimes of electoral autocracies and electoral democracies show consistent higher risks of social disorder during elections than their fully democratic counterpart, with mixed results of elections in autocracies. Elections are also as expected free of most problems in democracies, giving support to two main mechanisms: that institutional inconsistencies provide an excuse for mobilisation, but does not give proper representation; and institutional weakness, where the weaker institutions are unable to contain the force of full blown electoral competition.

Looking at the second contribution, exploring the difference between lethal and non-lethal disorder. While significant effects were found for both, they differed in their timing in relation to the election-month. While elections increase the risk of non-lethal unrest in the same month, the increase in risk happens in the months before and after for lethal unrest. Whether this unexpected finding is a product of differences between samples, city versus country, or time-frame is hard to tell, and is left open as an avenue for future exploration.

This thesis being preliminary and exploratory in nature, it has limits that are worth commenting on, as they provide insight into useful ways forward for the research. While electoral violence in cities seems empirically to be a fairly good indicator for the general pattern of country wide disorder, any generalisations must be made with care. By using city-level dis-

order as a proxy, I risk overstating city-specific mechanisms. A conservative interpretation of the results is therefore that elections increase the risk of non-lethal disorder in cities. However, the consistent results of the measures of total events, some generalisation, at least only to the developing world, can be made.

While mechanisms such as institutional weakness in the theory were used to explain how elections could increase the risk of social disorder, the thesis lacked the tools to explicitly model these mechanisms. Further research should find measures for capacity, weakness, and inconsistency in order to figure out which of the mechanisms are conducive for mobilisation.

However, the results provide a foundation of which to build general theories of the conditions enabling social disorder. finding or developing robust measures with wider coverage is needed to gain a better understanding of the mechanisms that shape electoral disorder. One lesson for policy-makers stands howver: Elections will for the foreseeable future remain divisive, mobilising, and competitive events, and will still need robust institutions to stop the electoral competition from escalating into violence.

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A   Appendix

Table A1: Country-month frequencies, total, lethal, and non-lethal events of social diosorder.

Country	N	Events	Lethal	Non-lethal
Afghanistan	636	182	141	69
Algeria	605	99	53	57
Angola	445	22	5	17
Argentina	636	158	35	133
Armenia	264	24	5	20
Azerbaijan	264	39	9	30
Bangladesh	492	113	42	82
Bolivia	636	84	19	72
Brazil	636	111	39	82
Burkina Faso	628	14	7	9
Cambodia	636	59	30	34
Cameroon	636	10	5	5
Chad	628	25	17	11
Chile	636	122	44	104
China	636	102	15	94
Colombia	636	89	49	50
Congo	628	34	25	10
Congo, DRC	630	55	28	37
Costa Rica	636	15	1	14
Cote d'Ivoire	628	39	19	24
Cuba	636	25	6	21
Dominican Republic	636	43	25	25
Ecuador	636	50	13	38
Egypt	636	107	46	71
El Salvador	636	84	48	63
Ethiopia	636	48	35	19
Georgia	264	41	14	29
Ghana	636	23	8	18
Guatemala	636	69	37	41
Guinea	636	36	19	20
Haiti	636	77	56	34
Honduras	636	36	11	27
India	636	210	94	146
Indonesia	636	100	27	81
Iran	636	158	80	107
Iraq	636	175	150	61
Japan	636	57	8	51
Jordan	636	53	23	34
Kazakhstan	264	9	3	6
Kenya	588	62	29	43
Kuwait	618	22	8	15
Kyrgyzstan	264	19	6	14
Laos	636	25	11	17
Lebanon	636	188	147	87
Liberia	636	33	22	12

Libya	636	41	16	25
Madagascar	630	33	16	20
Malaysia	636	36	9	27
Mali	627	16	5	12
Mexico	636	53	17	39
Mongolia	636	15	2	13
Morocco	636	55	12	45
Mozambique	450	14	11	4
Myanmar	636	53	18	37
Nepal	636	71	23	55
Niger	628	25	11	18
Nigeria	627	64	38	36
Pakistan	636	220	144	108
Panama	636	35	7	31
Paraguay	636	29	5	25
Peru	636	105	38	84
Philippines	636	111	47	80
Rwanda	611	19	16	3
Saudi Arabia	636	28	20	9
Senegal	632	25	9	16
Singapore	564	3	0	3
Somalia	630	111	89	39
South Africa	636	136	58	107
South Korea	636	115	18	105
Sri Lanka	636	107	69	49
Sudan	636	57	21	40
Syria	636	72	54	26
Tajikistan	264	23	14	9
Tanzania	612	9	4	5
Thailand	636	92	22	81
Togo	632	31	16	19
Tunisia	636	38	10	31
Turkey	636	191	94	134
Turkmenistan	264	3	1	2
Uganda	602	55	34	25
United Arab Emirates	492	4	2	2
Uruguay	636	54	9	49
Uzbekistan	264	9	5	5
Venezuela	636	77	26	61
Vietnam	636	106	60	67
Yemen	636	68	40	39
Zambia	578	33	16	18
Zimbabwe	565	73	20	59
Total	51,862.00	5,661.00	2,660.00	3,696.00

Table A2: Panel adjusted logit estimates of the effect of elections on events of urban social disorder. Sensitivity analysis, polity variables.

VARIABLES	(Politydummy) events	(Polity IV) events	(xPolity) events
Election	0.444**	0.898***	0.798***
	(0.183)	(0.170)	(0.181)
0bL12.politydum	0		
	(0)		
1L12.politydum	0.00643		
	(0.0567)		
2L12.politydum	-0.0737		
	(0.0628)		
Election*1L12.politydum	0.283		
	(0.240)		
Election*2L12.politydum	-0.161		
	(0.239)		
L12.polity		-0.00644	
		(0.00404)	
cL12.polity#cL12.polity		-0.00201**	
		(0.000852)	
Election*cL12.polity		-0.000127	
		(0.0156)	
Election*cL12.polity#cL12.polity		-0.00990***	
		(0.00358)	
L12.xpolity			-0.0118
			(0.00740)
cL12.xpolity#cL12.xpolity			-0.00163
			(0.00196)
0b.election#coL12.xpolity			0
			(0)
Election*cL12.xpolity			0.0301
			(0.0303)
0b.election#coL12.xpolity#coL12.xpolity			0
			(0)
Election*cL12.xpolity# L12.civilwar	0.403***	0.391***	0.408***
	(0.0490)	(0.0493)	(0.0490)
L12.gdpgrowth	-0.0140***	-0.0146***	-0.0137***
	(0.00267)	(0.00267)	(0.00266)
L12.gdplog	0.209***	0.195***	0.212***
	(0.0655)	(0.0659)	(0.0654)
L12.poplog	0.715***	0.622***	0.692***
	(0.192)	(0.194)	(0.192)
yeartrend	-0.0148***	-0.0120**	-0.0138***
	(0.00537)	(0.00544)	(0.00534)
eventmonths	-0.232***	-0.231***	-0.231***
	(0.0134)	(0.0135)	(0.0135)
cL12.xpolity			-0.0161*
			(0.00841)
Observations	41,021	41,021	41,021
Number of cown	84	84	84

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

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