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An intensive comparison of political populist discourse in the US

Pol 3901

Master's thesis in Lektor i samfunnsfag (MLSAM)
Supervisor: Peter Maurer
June 2019

Master's thesis

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Kunnskap for en bedre verden

Abstract:

The lack of consensus and continued debate in academia on the topic of populism, shows the need for further study. This thesis seeks to add to this debate, through an intensive comparison of political populist discourse in the US. A trend in the literature this thesis sought to bridge, is the apparent "over-focus" on right wing populist movements, particularly in the west, by focusing on populism as a whole discourse. The thesis establishes through selected literature a lens we can view political populistic discourse through. Through this lens we find evidence of "a common core" of the populistic discourse, a core which both Trump and Sanders fit into. We also find that the candidates ideological leanings color their respective discourse, which highlight stark differences in the populist discourse. In so doing this thesis seeks to cast new light over a relatively under-studied aspect of populistic discourse.

Key Words: Populism, Discourse, Politics, The United States, Bernie Sanders, Donald Trump

Sammendrag:

Mangelen på consensus og den pågående debatten I akademia på temaet populisme, viser behovet for videre studier. Denne masteroppgaven søker å bidra i denne debatten gjennom en intensiv sammenligning av det politisk populistiske diskursen i USA. Trender I populisme litteraturen viser en overvekt av studier som fokuserer på høyre-lenende populistiske bevegelser, som et resultat er venstresiden underrepresentert i litteraturen, i hvert fall i Europa og USA. Denne oppgaven søker å studere populismen som diskurs in sin helhet, og har derfor valgt ut kandidater for datainnsamling representert av de to fløyene av amerikansk politikk. Bernie Sanders (Demokrat) og Donald Trump (Republikaner). Masteroppgaven etablerer gjennom utvalgt litteratur en «linse» vi kan se populisme diskursen gjennom. Gjennom denne linsen, finner vi bevis for en såkalt «felles kjerne» i populisme diskursen, både Trump og Sanders diskurser passer inn i denne kjernen. Videre finner vi at kandidatenes ideologi er med på å farge deres diskurs ytterligere, som gjør at diskursene beveger seg utenfor kjernen, i forskjellige retninger.

Nøkkelord: Populisme, Diskurs, Politikk, USA, Bernie Sanders, Donald Trump.

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1. Introduction

"Populism is a little like pornography" in Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart's famous characterization: it's hard to define, but one knows it when one sees it. (Gusterson, 2017)

The above quote is how Gusterson (2017) starts his article with a simple yet effective characterization of populism. You know it, when you see it. But do we? And are we able to properly recognize populism when we in fact see it? This simple assertion that we, scholars, journalists, everyday people know "populism" when we see it, is both a core truth or feature and complexifying spiral at the same time. By this I mean that populism as a concept, term or label, has grown, morphed and expanded a lot throughout the years, since it was first mentioned in academia and politics at the turn of the 20th century. According to historian Michael Kazin (2016) this "contested and ambiguous concept" combines elements of "a creed, a style, a political strategy, [and] a marketing ploy." One reason for this "bloat" might be the historical academic interest in the subject area, which has been somewhat sporadic and erratic, with research spikes when "new" empirical examples or data points pop up. Jansen (2011, p. 76) asserts that the lack of clarity and conceptual coherence undermines the concept's utility: "such usage may be appropriate for journalistic purposes, but it is inadequate for social scientific analysis." He adds that "the fundamental problem is that most academic discussions of populism continue to rely on folk theories. Everyday usage of the term is overly general, applying to any person, movement, or regime that makes claims by appealing to ordinary (i.e., nonelite) people" But if this term is so hotly contested should we as scholars even bother discussing it?

In short, yes, we should. We can view the continuing debate over populism as an indication that there is something important, promising, resonant not to mention resilient about populism as a concept that warrants further study. Indeed, as tentative attempts to bridge the different literatures on populism have taken place over the past few decades (see, for example, Mudde and Kaltwasser 2018; Kanovan 1999; Taggart 2000; Mudde 2004; Hawkins 2010; Woods, 2014), it is natural to expect some serious intellectual and terminological arguments to occur in this collision between different approaches.

In this thesis I will seek to compare contemporary right leaning and left leaning populist political discourse in the United States exemplified by statements collected from Bernie Sanders and Donald Trump. By answering the following research question:

How, and or if, does the populist discourses of Trump and Sanders fit within the theoretical frames of populism.

This research question leads us to several follow-up queries, namely does Sanders and Trumps populist discourse fit within the established theoretical frames for populism, or does these frames need to be expanded? Is the emergence of the anti-media discourse from Trump a new populist discourse, or does it fit within a subcategory of established populism discourse? The goal of the thesis is to further examine whether the theory on populism as a discourse needs to be refined, rebuilt or simply updated. This thesis will study statements made by the candidates on social media (twitter) and through campaign speeches, and selected interviews. The emergence of social media in political campaigns have proven to be a powerful tool for populists across the world, these new channels allows the populist candidates to spread their messages unhindered by older mediums built in mediation and editorializing. By examining tweets, we get new look at the populist discourse in America directly from the source.

Circling back to the opening quote of this section, Critical reflections of populism state that the conceptual net of populism has been cast to broadly. As a consequence, a myriad of political discourses and a disparate number of political and social movements are too easily classified as populist. As an example, Moffitt and Tormey (2014, p. 381) observed that:

> "Currently, populism can be seen in action in settings as disparate as the United States, the Netherlands, Thailand and Venezuela, where the rise of the Tea Party, the controversy around Geert Wilders, the continuing influence of exiled former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra and the success of Chavismo, respectively, exemplify regional variations of the phenomenon".

Despite the many critical reflections and criticisms of populism. Most studies on the topic assert that despite the lack of a settled and shared definitional basis and methodology, a broad consensus in the literature nevertheless exist. Namely that the concept of populism has, at least, three core components that can be viewed as common denominators that function as a relatively coherent conceptual framework that serves as the basis for empirical assessments of populism (see section 2.1). Following the generally accepted core, Moffit (2016 p.17) and Woods (2014) identifies four ways academics approach populism in contemporary literature. They either treat populism as an ideology, as a strategy, or as a discourse or as a broader political logic. Of these

four this thesis will highlight three of them, ideology, strategy and discourse. The number of texts that view populism as a political logic has not gained traction in the scholarly community, being limited mainly to Laclau (2005), Laclau sought to spearhead a new branch of populism research, but scholars (Kögl,2010. Johnson, 2017) have instead elected to cherry-pick arguments and work them into the three more dominant approaches. These approaches will be examined in greater detail in section 2.2

2. Theory

2.1 What is populism? a broader and narrower approach.

As Jagers and Walgrave (2007, p. 322) note

> "populism always refers to the people and justifies its actions by appealing to and identifying with the people; it is rooted in anti-elite feelings; and it considers the people as a monolithic group without internal differences except for some very specific categories who are subject to an exclusion strategy."

They argue that these three elements define populism and anchor it ideologically and discursively.

Mudde and Kaltwasser, (2012, p. 8 & Mudde, 2004 p.543). Add to this by stating that: "populism is a thin-centered ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, 'the pure people' and the 'corrupt elite', and which argues that politics should be an expression of the general will". Mudde (2007) further argues that populists show authoritarian leanings, approving strong and charismatic leadership which expresses the voice of the people without caring about different mechanisms that ensure institutional checks and balances and the protection of minority rights. This latter point by Mudde about authoritarian tendencies might be folded into the previously presented points as an expression of the general will of the people. I would however argue that the authoritarian examples we find empirically and, in the literature, might be a result of skewed empirical examples. Given that a majority of populist movements examined in the last 70 years have been right-wing populist movements, where authoritarian traits are show, it does not give us sufficient basis to broadly state that all populists are authoritarian. I would rather argue that the trait of the authoritarian leader can be folded into a sometimes-common occurrence. Namely that of the charismatic leader, which in and of itself is a clear trait of authoritarianism, but we still find charismatic populist leaders, (Bernie Sanders, Elisabeth Warren, Boris Johnson) who

don't display overt authoritarian tendencies. I would further argue that a charismatic messenger (front figure) is a central part of populism, whether this figure turns out to be autocratic or not.

To summarize the broad core parts of populism scholars can agree on, is that populists appeal directly to «the people». «Us vs them» or anti elite attitudes are central. Finally, there is some selection or fine picking of "who" the people is. Rhetorically populists will always refer to "the people" as a monolithic group without internal divisive elements, when in reality some groups are victims of an exclusion strategy. I would like to add that in most cases there exist a charismatic massager to drive the populist movement onwards.

Figure 1. Broad definition of populism.

Finding the above model, a bit to general, this thesis would rather favor a model presented by Aalberg et.al(2017) In chapter 2 of their book Reinemann present a narrower definition of populism. This model builds on the thoughts from Jagers and Walgrave (2007:334-336), Figure 2 is still a broad model, yet more specific than Figure 1.

Figure 2. (Aalberg et.al, 2017 p.16)

Reinemann finds some shortcomings in the model, namely that Jagers and Walgrave fail to account both in their writing and in the model of how to deal with a candidate that might be advocating against out groups and elites but provides no notion of the people. Similarly, the model highlights that left leaning populists, tend to be in the anti-elite populism, while excluding populism tend to be prevalent by right leaning movements. This approximation fits with this thesis chosen research objects, Trump and Sanders, where both largely can be said to be complete populist, while a fair portion of their communication fits within the model of figure 2, as we shall see in section 4. Figure 2 works well within more quantitatively leaning works, since it is very handy to ascertain whether a candidate is populist, or to what degree he/she is populist. As we shall see in section 4, the empirical data rarely fits neatly into the boxes figure 2 presents us with. However, it provides us with a good entry point for a deeper dive into the discourse from the candidates.

2.2 The three main scholarly approaches to populism

In this section I will highlight the three main approaches when researching populism, Table 1 provides a brief summary.

Figure 3.

The three approaches to populism

Approach	Theoretical	Discourse	Strategy
Populism is	Thin-ideology, cant stand on its own	A rethoric style, used by politicians	Strategy used by charismatic leader
Core features	Anti establishment, nativism, authoritarianism	"The people vs elites", rethorical analysis, Text and speech	Politicians relationship to followers, ability to mass followers
Short-comings	Overuse of ideology, fails to capture left-wing	Failes to capture effect of charismatic leader	"The people" is less important here
Notable scholars	Mudde, Kaltwasser, Stanley, Taggart,	De la Torre, Gidron & Bonikowski, Hawkins,	Weyland and Barr

2.2.1 Populism as an ideology

In contemporary literature the approach that treats populism as an ideology has claimed the dominant position. Much of this dominance, particularly within European political science, can be attributed to the contribution of Mudde (2004, 2007), whose writings on populism have set the agenda for corporativists in the field. Mudde (2007 p.23) puts forward a minimal definition of populism as "a thin-centered ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, 'the pure people' and 'the corrupt elite', and which argues that politics should be an expression of the "volonté general (general will) of the people". For Mudde, the strength of a minimal definition of populism as an ideology lies in its ability to be applied to comparative analysis's which can transcend regional differences. This thin-centered and straight forward definition also lets Mudde shed populism of much of its accumulated normative baggage. He further argues that by conceptualizing populism as a "thin-centered" ideology, we can understand that populism does not exist in any "pure" form, but rather that it is always present in mixed forms with other ideologies. For instance you cannot be a just a populist, but rather a socialist populist (Sanders), or a conservative republican populist (Trump). Stanley (2008) among others adopts Mudde's definitional framework and furthers it.

Moffit (2016, p.18-19) raises two critical points towards this school of thought. Firstly, he argues that the term "ideology" is being used to liberally in the literature as a catch all term, which in some cases eclipses and swallows up other approaches (like discursive approach) thusly losing its initial allure of clarity. He further argues that authors, whether on purpose or not, add to their definition of populism to make it work in political analysis. In so doing one

could argue that Mudde's thin ideology might not be enough to sustain research into the nuanced realities of populism. Building on this critique Moffit (2016) questions whether a thin ideology can become so thin as to lose its conceptual validity and usefulness. As Freeden (1996:486) notes other "thin ideologies" like ecologism, and feminism, both started with a clear core of concepts. These two ideologies "have since made strenuous efforts to accumulate a range of conceptual furniture that will thicken their ideational density and sophistication and extend their appeal and viability".

2.2.2 Populism as a strategy

Authors working within the ideological approach are not the only ones who have sought to develop a minimal definition of populism. Scholars who see populism as a political strategy have also attempted to present a minimal definition. Weyland's (2001 p.14) definition of populism has here proved a popular one for empirical analysis, especially in cases related to Latin America. He defines populism as "a political strategy through which a personalistic leader seeks or exercises government power based on direct, unmediated, institutionalized support from large numbers of mostly unorganized followers"

Barr (2009) focuses on populism's organizational features, examining populist movements modes of election campaigning. In this approach populism is not defined by the political values of the political actor, nor by the way that they communicate, but by their relationship with their followers. While those working with these kinds of definitions are correct to highlight the important position of the leader within populism, the primary difficulty with them is that they identify strategies or 'direct' modes of organization that appear across the political spectrum in many different manifestations that we would ordinarily never consider calling 'populist'; indeed, a number of social movements (such as religious or millenarian movements) or forms of community politics could easily fall under such a definition (Hawkins 2010 p.168). Overall this approach tends to focus most of its attention on the politician enacting the "strategy" and not as much the traditional consideration of "the people" which we find common in the other approaches.

2.2.3 Populism as a discourse

Cezayirlioğlu (2017 p.15-16) aptly shines the spotlight on one of the major issues with populism as a political theory. Namely that the theory is based on empirical data, largely derived from

the current interests of journalists and scholars to define components of populism to explain right-wing movements in North America and Europe. Political actors like Donald Trump, Marine Le Pen, Nigel Farage, Geert Wilders, Victor Orban and Norbert Hoffer with their rhetoric add to scholars, Mudde included, "negative" fixation for populism. Cezayirlioğlu (2017) argues that the ideological approach has an additional problem to those mentioned above, namely that it has a too rigid structure, which supplements the previous points made by Moffit (2016).

This is where De la Torre (2010) argues for discursive approach, based on his observations in Ecuador. De la Torre finds the ideology approach to be too rigid, and rather defines populism as a "rhetoric" that constructs politics as a moral and ethical struggle between the people and the oligarchy. (2010 p.4)

Populism as a discursive political style employed by political actors rather than an ideology leads us to perceive it as a "mode of political expression that is employed selectively and strategically by both right and left, liberals and conservatives" (Gidron & Bonikowski, 2013, p. 8). At this point, populism takes on a new meaning and dimension allowing us to modify how we assess it. In the two preceding approaches populism is treated as a binary choice, you either are or are not populist. Scholars who view populism as a discourse argue that a political actor can be 'more or less' populist at different times depending on how and when they use populist discourse. In his work on populism as a discourse, Hawkins (2010 p.30–31) further explains the difference between these approaches by arguing that a discourse:

> "lacks the official texts and vocabulary that accompany an ideology and must be discerned through more diffuse linguistic elements such as tone and metaphor and by a search for broad themes".

So, while an ideology has a normative program for political action, Hawkins claims that a discourse does not. As such, he argues that while a figure like Chávez may have a populist discourse, his ideology is not populism, but socialism. A minor shortcoming of this approach is that it only covers "half of the picture" as it were. By focusing on speech and text the discursive approach misses out on the charismatic leader which the populism as a strategy is built around.

2.3 Populism in the United States of America, a brief historical overview.

Historian Michael Kazin is perhaps the leading voice in historical populistic studies of the US. He published in 1998(a) the book *"The populist persuasion : an American history"* where he expands the term populism, and adapts it to the last 120 years of US political history. In the same year he also authored a paper *"Democracy Betrayed and Redeemed: Populist Traditions in the United States"*(1998b) which offers a more bite-sized cliff notes re-telling of populism in the United States. Kazin views populism in the context of U.S. political history as three distinct branches which occasionally intersects with one another; populism has been a movement, a critique and a discourse. The first mentions of populism in modern academia refers to the agrarian populist movement in the US in the 1890s. This movement concisted largely of farmers and other skilled workers, it gathered most support in the South, Midwest, and Rocky mountain areas. The movement's demands were primarily economic in nature. The farmers wanted more equal treatment in a new shifting marketplace increasingly dominated by industrial corporations and large landowners. Craft workers wanted to stop the process of proletarianization. A variety of solutions were proposed and attempted – including strict regulation of railroad rates. (Kazin,1998b p.77) The movement, would within few years morphed into the People's party, which itself would eventually disband in 1908. The early movement, and People's party manage to galvanize a sizable majority in many state legislatures, but the party fractured after the 1896 election, where they did not manage to field a candidate with mass support from their disparate caucuses.

Kazin moves on to cover his claim that populism also shows itself in American history as a "critique". In this regard, Kazin presents "a tale as old as time", or atleast one which have been around since the early 1800s in America.

> "Central to the populist critique was the antagonism between the large majority of "producers" and a tiny minority of elite "parasites." The precise terms changed over the years – but the terms of the critique did not. The producers were always the creators of wealth and the purveyors of vital services: their ranks included manual workers, small farmers, small shopkeepers, and professionals who served an unstylish, less-than-wealthy clientele." (Kazin, 1998b p.79)

This mode of populism offers a vigorous attack on class inequality, and Kazin argues that it has been an ever-present narrative in US politics since the 1800s, after the People's party dissolved the rhetoric has been picked up by several political parties. Populism as a critique is perpetually hostile to large, centralized institutions that stand above and outside communities of the workers. Kazin highlights that the populist critique lays the foundation for a strong tradition of

oppositional discourse in the US. However, Kazin points out that there must be a distinction made between the "critic" and the "discourse". Kazin views the "critic" as a furthering of the plights of the social groups originally encompassing in the populist movement, in updated forms, namely that the critique stems from small farmers, blue-collar workers etc, which constitutes a popular anti-monopoly faction in U.S history. By contrast the populist discourse has taken this core and occasionally twisted and misused it. As a political tool, the populist discourse has shown to have many uses. It has been deployed multiple times in elections in the early parts of the 20th century by both parties to appeal to new constituencies. This occurred in the era of World War I when Socialists on the Great Plains remade themselves into champions of the same small farmers they had earlier seen as anachronisms in an age of monopoly capitalism. They called the resulting organization the Nonpartisan League – and it grew powerful enough to capture the state government of North Dakota and hold it for five years. (Kazin, 1998b p.81)

In the period after the second world war, the populist discourse became co-opted by the republican party and closely tied to conservative values. Kazin says that: «There is nothing surprising about this. A populist discourse is capable of serving different masters because it transcends the ideological division between "left" and "right" ".

2.4 Key findings of selected studies.

Hawkins 2009 study "Is Chávez Populist?", seeks to creating a comparative measuring instrument for cross-country studies and historical analyzes of populism as discursive style. The purpose of the study was to compare the rhetorical expression of various heads of state and to grade them and their statements on scale based on how populistic that statement was. The number of heads of state in the study was 40 and most of them resided in South America. The material of the study consisted of 4 speeches per candidate.

The grade used in the study consisted of a scale from 0-2 where 0 stands for no populist expressions or very little. 1 stands for a rhetorical expression that strongly correlates with populist elements. 2 stands for a rhetorical expression that correlated extremely strongly with populist elements. To carry out the graduation of the Heads of State, Hawkins recruited and trained students to manually analyze and grade the Heads of State based on the grading scale and associated ideal type that Hawkins produced. (Hawkins, 2009 p.1050-1051 & 1062-1064) The result of Hawkins analysis show where one had a suspicion that a populist profile existed

for a candidate, it largely corresponded to the result. Hawkins thus assessed that populism as a discursive style is a good analyzable framework that can be used to profile actors as populist or non-populist, and more importantly categorize to what degree said actor is populist.

Cezayirlioğlu's master thesis: "Rethinking Populism: 'the People' as a Popular Identity Subject in Bernie Sanders' Discursive Articulation" (2017) focuses exclusively on Bernie Sanders populist communication. Here the author seeks to tackle how Senator Sanders' political communication constructs and operationalizes two key populistic tenants, namely that of "the people" and the antagonism towards "the other". The analysis of the paper follows these two levels, focusing in the first round on how "the people" is constructed in Sanders rhetoric. The second level of the analysis focuses on how Sanders constructs his political communication to be anti-elites.

On the first level, Cezayirlioğlu finds that the definition for "the people" that he found did not fit into the mainstream assumption of a "taken-for-granted" monolithic group. Rather he found that Sanders shows inclusive characteristic thanks to discursive practice mentioning and embracing excluded identities such as immigrants, gender identities, illegals and racial and cultural minorities.

> "Finally, the thesis demonstrates how Sanders communicates an antagonized identity as a persona causing inequalities and motivated by greed, insatiability and nerviness. At total, the populist rhetoric of Sanders constitutes what Laclau and Mouffe (1985) propose for the construction of popular identities: defining boundaries of the identity; accumulating different segments of society including subordinated ones through demands and values; constructing an antagonized counterpart which is the constitutive outsider." (Cezayirlioğlu 2017 p.90).

As Cezayirlioğlu's thesis might be somewhat limited in scope, and it is nowhere close to answering all the questions regarding populism and political communication. It does however contribute by providing a lens to view populist discourse through Laclau and Mouffe's theory. Furthermore, the theoretical discussion and analysis work that Cezayirlioğlu presents a new framework to study populist movements, which has been evaluated rather narrowly in the literature at large thus far.

Tommy Jeschko's (2016) thesis uses Hawkins (2009) methodology and applies it to the US primary election campaign from 2016. His main research question was to find out if:

"When populist actors reach political success and threaten the establishment, parts of the establishment respond by including populist language to counteract the challenger" (Jeschko 2016 p.1)

Jeschko finds that Clinton generally did not alter her speeches to include more populistic language, although he did find few instances here and there. In contrast Jeb Bush increased his use of populist language throughout his campaign. Jeschko admits that the sample size for his study might have been rather small, and therefore could at best serve as a general indicator, and not as a definitive confirmation of the theoretical framework he presented.

Norris & Inglehart (2018) book focuses on the current and potential future dangers of authoritarian populist party support in the US and Europe. They argue that however small or seemingly limited parties with authoritarian populist rhetoric might be, their support has more than doubled in parliaments throughout Europe since the 1960s. Their books posit a general theory for explaining and mapping an increase in polarization over "the cultural cleavage" which has divided liberals and conservatives in electorates both in Europe and the US. They conclude their study by highlighting dangers to western liberal democracy, brought about by the rise of authoritarian populism, and what can potentially be done to mitigate these dangers and risk of system collapse.

Of the studies presented above, only two have studied populistic discourse in the US specifically. As can be gleamed from both Jeschko (2016) and Cezayirlioğlu (2017) no large scale study on the level of Hawkins (2009), have been conducted in the US context yet. This study will not, as mentioned attempt this, but it also shows that the field for studying populist discourse on the federal level in the US is a rather open field. One Cezayirlioğlu (2017) takes a deep dive into Bernie Sanders to better chart the left-wing populist discourse, while Jeschko takes a wider approach, and looks for more generalities following the methodology of Hawkins (2009). This thesis selects a middle ground between the two, choosing to take a deeper dive into the discourse emanating from Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders, to cover the breadth of the political spectrum, not just one side. By doing this we can illuminate certain aspects hitherto left in the dark, for instance whether there are commonalities in the discourses of the candidates which are ideological opposites. Another dimension which will be presented more in section 3.2, is the time axis, by studying the discourse over time we can see if and how it has evolved through two election cycles.

2.5 How this thesis operationalizes populism

As we have seen in the previous section and summarized in table 1, the different approaches to populism research each has its own strengths and weaknesses. The theoretical foundations for this thesis views and treats populism as a discourse. While at the same time borrowing elements from the two other approaches. My operationalization of populism draws a bridge between Mudde's assertion of populism as a thin centered ideology to Gidron & Bonikowski (2013:8) assertion that populism is a "mode of political expression that is employed selectively and strategically by both right and left, liberals and conservatives". Populism as a discourse has enough markers defining it for what it is and is not, that it is able to stand on its own as a discourse. But even on the discourse level we see the populist discourse being colored by the candidate's ideological leanings, resulting in how the candidate usually applies populistic discourse in their campaigns. This study, as stated in the introduction, seeks to examine whether Sanders and Trumps populist discourse fit within the established theoretical frames for populism, as seen in figure 1 and 2 in section 2.1. But this thesis seeks to examine the entire populist political discourse (in the US context), while also looking for internal differences and similarities. In this operationalization populism as a discourse has a solid core, at the very center of said core rests a sense that something is wrong with society, and that the populist can change it for the betterment of "the people". At this point in the layer, we are still operating within a pure populist discourse, this is where the concepts of the people, the elites that have caused the "wrongness". Further by defining the people, the populist starts to be influenced by his or her ideology, since by defining who "the people" are, they also define who "the people" are not, (this is a point we will see as a clear distinction later between Trump and Sanders.)To what extent the outgroup is defined, we could view as being shaped by the ideological discourse of the candidate. After this point the populistic discourse of a given candidate will be further influenced by their underlying ideology and its accompanying discourse[1] The essence of their populist discourse remains the same, but the details, the targets, the arguments will change and evolve and gain further "color" and "texture" based on other political discourses.

3. Methods

The previous section established how this paper operationalizes populism building on theoretical concepts from literature. By doing an intensive comparison, through discourse analysis, we can best chart the political populistic discourse in the US and see if there are

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[1] For instance, socialist-discourse for Sanders, or conservative discourse for Trump.

commonalities and differences between the two political fronts of the discourse in the US. The objects of this study will be statements collected from presidential candidates, Donald Trump[2] and Bernie Sanders. Sanders is the current junior senator from Vermont, having served in that capacity since 2007, previously serving as a congressman for Vermont from 1991 to 2007[3]. Before running and winning the 2016 presidential election Donald Trump had no tangible experienced with public service. Both Trump and Sanders appeared on the fringes of their respective parties, as populists often do. By studying their respective discourse, we can better identify whether there is a coherence between them to better get a view of the full range of the discourse, and also uncover differences within the populist discourse itself, mainly on the right vs left axis. As explored in the narrower definition of populism (Aalberg et.al, 2017 p.16) we enter this examination with certain assumptions, that Sanders will lean more on anti-elite discourse, whereas Trump would focus more on exclusion of out groups, both will likely venture into complete populism

Further exploration of the data gathering, and material selection will be detailed in section 3.2. In the following section 3.1 discourse analysis is explored and operationalized.

3.1 Discourse analysis

In a similar vein as populism, discourse analysis is also a term greatly shaped by the eye of the beholder. One cannot explore or seek to utilize discourse analysis without mention Michel Foucault, who through his works is regarded the "father" of the field. Foucault was crucial in the development of the field of discourse analysis, he however did not provide scholars with a singular clear definition of the term discourse. For Foucault this is not a major hurdle, since he thought that the nature and meaning of the term discourse would be attributed and discovered through its use. Hammer (2017) roots his work in Foucault but endeavors to establish certain frameworks or scaffolds we can work from in our analysis.

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[2] Currently serving as the 45th president of the United States of America
[3] Sanders is the longest serving independent candidate in US history, he does however caucus with the democratic party (voting with them) and has since 2015 been more closely affiliated with the party, running for the 2016 and 2020 primary elections for president on the democratic party ticket. (Wikipedia contributors, 2019)

"To make the term "discourse" analytically usable we have to link it to a set of other terms and adapt these to the field we have chosen to study. The central question then becomes, not what a discourse is, but what we are able to observe through the use concept" (Hammer,2017:94)[4]

In Hammer's (2017) view we (scholars) should avoid the pitfall of reducing the discourse analysis to a "method". He argues that it is better to view discourse analysis as a lens to view reality. When Hammer observes something in the empirical world as a discourse new nuances emerge. He further argues that these nuances appear quite different than if he were to view reality searching for culture, ideology, structures, trends or narratives. Discourse analysis becomes something unique and particular. One often selected vehicle of discourse analysis is the study of language, in the social sciences language is often reduced to a surface study, Hammer argues that through a discourse analytical lens we can through language gathered in, documents, interviews, observations, gain entrance into the "actual" reality, whether this reality be dominated by subjective intentions or objective facts. A simplification that Hammer rejects is that discourse analysis reduces all reality to language / speech, making speech the causal link to our reality. He argues that the analysis is more complex, saying that:

"To analyze discourse is not about transforming everything to language, but rather to study how shifting utterances are working, and what effects they have in narrowed circumstances. Put in other words, how an utterance occurs and how it factors into movable processes where reality is formed and transformed."   (Hammer, 2017: 94-95)

To further explain the nature of discourses Hammer draws an analogy to fashion.

"We have all probably experienced that something we thought nice or pretty [clothing] suddenly might be considered antiquated (and wise versa, where something we had defined as ugly or strange, suddenly becomes fashionable). These changes have little to do with our own personal tastes. Rather, we are affected by currents beyond ourselves, a movable order which is not regulated through formal rules, instead through something already in existence, namely the clothes and the style that is in use. Think about this: By any given point in time, we all know that fashion is a temporary apparatus, an outcome of changeable processes. Nevertheless, it canalizes our thoughts and actions, and thus becomes an order that takes part in forming us – even though we know that it might change in an instant." (Hammer, 2017: 95)

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[4] Hammer (2017) is originally written in Norwegian, the quotes from his work are translated by the author of this thesis.

In Hammers fashion analogy we find some points that might be useful to bring with us into the discursive analysis perspective. Perhaps the most import is the concept of the «dynamics» at play. Namely that we know that the logic of fashion is to not stop, but to be ever moving. Such is also the case with a discourse. We might try to chart the origin of a discourse (or fashion) or its changes over time, but chiefly that a discourse will always be in motion. One of the hallmarks of discourse analysis is just this, that we as scholars hold firm that the process of change itself is viewed as a productive. Essentially it does not really matter which comes first or last, but that "reality" is viewed as a current which might be affected by breakoff points but nevertheless is able to create connections which for a time can work to steer our actions in one direction instead of another. Hammer (2017: 96) summarizes his understanding of discourse as follows: "Discourse is the everchanging process in which reality meets, is processed, ordered and is given direction. Or put in other words, the name we give to an analysis in which we seek *not* to show what reality is, but rather how it emerges, is molded and transformed."

As mentioned above, Hammer takes the concepts from Foucault and tries to solidify them. He acknowledges himself that he might have strayed a bit from Foucault's terminology, and uses a portion of his book to strictly present discourse analysis through Foucault. He starts with a topic from Foucault that is a key element of the methods of this dissertation, namely statement analysis.

3.1.1 Foucaults Statements Analysis

According to Foucault (1972:86) it would be wrong to view a discourse as identical to language. The focus point of the analysis is not the word, or sentence, but the statement itself, and the field of other statements, practices and institutions it stands in relation to. To best understand what discourse analysis is about, we must first understand what a statement is, how it is created, in what way it represents a small piece of a bigger picture and what effect the statement might have.

One possible approach might be to say that a statement is something that occurs in a concrete context, and which through its emergence does something to affect this context in one way or another. If we are to ascribe something the statues of a statement, it must in other words re-present reality for us. The hyphen in the previous sentence is not placed at random by Foucault. A statement is not a representation of something else, neither is it a free presentation, it lands somewhere between the two. In other words, we as scholars should realize that there is no a

priori – list of statements. But how can we then capture and delineate a discourse? Foucault (1972: 31-37) gives us some help here, by taking a step by step approach where he presents that our way of speaking, the terms we use or even the topics we talk about each can be effective in a discourse. Foucault stresses however that no one of the above-mentioned aspects can be used to chart a discourse alone. The discourse is a praxis, something we participate in, where objects are defined, where different figures of speech overlap with each other, where terms are distributed and interacting, where strategic opportunities emerge. The statements do not originate or exist on the inside or the outside of all of this, rather the discourse emerge as a result of the interactions of all of the above. This means that nothing is predetermined to be a statement, and that a statement cannot be a statement in and of itself. It is up to us the scientist, to identify the statement as part of the larger discourse.

Perhaps most central to Foucault's statement analysis is the theoretic assumption that no statement stands on its own. Rather each statement should be seen as existing in relation to a row of other statements. This means that the discourse cannot be assumed to be unambiguously and objectively discernable. Rather, the discursive field should be seen as numerous connections, breaking points, and constructed borders, which means that ultimately it is down to the scientist to determine what is categorized and considered within the parameters of a given discourse. According to Foucault the scientist cannot operate completely autonomously in regard to discourse analysis. He/she must still operate within the constraints of the term discourse, which Hammer (2017) helped us establish in the last section. Namely that the discourse points to something that is in constant movement, but at the same time it does not flow freely. Foucault suggests that scientists should look for statements that seek to marc a clearer border for the discourse, by establishing a "negative identity", or what the discourse is not, makes the selected discourse more easy to define and emborder. In the case of populism, there are a myriad of opinions as to what populism is and is not, within the academic discourse. But by doing what say, Mudde (2004) did and claimed that populism is a thin ideology that cannot stand on its own, he found a border, to which he could launch his further exploration into what populism is. Similarly, I want to attempt the same, within my presented operationalization of populism, namely that I view it as a discourse, I want to see how Sanders and Trump respectively with their statements in social media and campaign speeches have affected the larger political populist discourse in America, which leads us nicely in to the next section.

3.2 Data Selection and sampling

In this section I will go into more detail of the thought process behind the refinements to the methodological approach for this thesis. Some of the early refinements were made to accommodate the general assumption of the thesis, that politicians can easier engage in populist communication on an unmediated medium like social media platforms. From there the question rose, which social media platforms should be drawn upon for data sampling? From studies like (Bossetta, 2018), which finds that political campaigns in the US tend to be active on all or most of the major social media platforms, (Twitter, Facebook, Youtube, Snapchat, Instagram among others.) Drawing on samples from all of these might be a to large undertaking, besides the direct relevance of finding examples form all of these platforms might not yield as much fruit as a thorough focus on one of them. The two biggest social media platforms politicians are active on are decidedly Facebook and Twitter, highlighted in Bosetta (2018). The subjects of interest Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders made the final selection easier. Both politicians seem to favor Twitter as their chosen method for social media communication, Donald Trump is rather infamous in this regard. In addition, Twitter seems to be the most dominant platform used for personal use by politicians in the US. Which raises the obvious question, why focus on the United States? And just on two politicians? Why not take a broader look at more western countries to look for overarching trends? To first address the question of why the US? I would argue that the United States unique geo-political position as a lonesome super power of the western world, and later since 1990 the entire world in total, puts it in a position to affect other countries. What happens in America tend to be picked up around the West, if not the world. Take as an example President Obama's use of social media in political campaigning in 2008, with its success similar campaign strategies was used around the western world in elections in the years following 2008, (Kreiss,2012 & 2016, Harris and Harrigan, 2015.) Why just the two politicians? The main goal was to find two political actors that could serve as ideological opposites while still being categorized as populist, mainly be the media but also academia. Trump (Republican) and Sanders (Democrat) belonging to each of the two parties in America, both are also placed generally on the extreme fringe of each party. Making the possible comparison fascinating and allowing to explore differences and similarities between left wing and right-wing populism. Trump and Sanders rhetoric thus becomes good indicators for the larger populist discourse in the US, but also allows for exploration of the more niche left and right-wing divides of populism in the US.

3.2.1 Limitations.

The methodological approach charted in 3.1 of doing a intensive comparison through a discourse analysis with an emphasis on Statements analysis allows me as the researcher more freedom to explore and chart the discourse, which would best suited for this thesis research question, to challenge the existing theory, and perhaps make additions to it. If this thesis was to follow a stricter methodological schema, like a quantitative approach, or other more constrictive discourse analyses like Hawkins content analysis, it would detract from the hole in the literature this thesis seeks to mend. Another argument against doing content analysis or grading of discourse, is that such an exercise is highly impressionistic and somewhat biased, not to mention time consuming. It would also be difficult to establish good and reliable results for the coefficient by being the only person doing the rating. Studies like Hawkins (2009) used several people for its grading of statements, by the constraints of the thesis it is to be a solitary effort, which would be a herculean undertaking, and as mentioned would detract from the reliability and robustness of the results. As seen in the previous section another study has replicated Hawkins methodology (Cezayirlioğlu, 2017), although this study having suffered a little for being a lot less expensive than Hawkins, while also having a single grader, the author concedes that their results are telling of general trends, but not anything more concrete, where the author concludes that further study is needed. By doing an intensive-comparison of the discourses we circumvent this potential pitfall of reliability, however a new "problem" arises, that of reaching statement saturation. In the following sections I detail the sources selected for the statement's analysis.[5]

3.2.2 Selecting data: Twitter

The data used for the analysis in this thesis is gathered from the politicians public twitter profile, twitter.com/@realdonaldtrump and twitter.com/@BernieSanders respectively. Twitter advanced search made the collection process easier, since it allowed for specific searches through the mentioned accounts, limiting time period, and searching for choice words or phrases where applicable.

Donald Trump only uses his own twitter account for personal use, since his inauguration Trump's white house staff has been using the @Potus account for communication, this account

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[5] Note; the selected material of statements for this thesis could have been expanded to include a broader set of sources for the statements. After conducting a thorough search through multiple campaign speeches and twitter messages a great deal of repetition in statements were observed, thus the discourse was charted and framed suitably to this thesis needs through the selected materials in section 4.

often mimics, or mirrors messages sent on Trump's personal account. Senator Bernie Sanders has two twitter accounts, @sensanders and @BernieSanders, the @sensanders account is seemingly associated with the senator's election campaigns for senate, whereas the @BernieSanders account seems to be the Senators personal account.

I have touched on a potential reliability issue with using and analyzing social media content, how can we as scientist know that Trump and Sanders themselves are typing out the messages that appear on their accounts. The notion that Trump or Sanders each author all of their tweets are highly unlikely, in the case of Trump very visible markers have emerged over time, which might indicate whether it is the President himself tweeting or if the message is authored by staff. A prime indicator is which device the message is posted from, Trump famously tweets from his iPhone (Rosenberg & Haberman, 2018), further the language used is a clearer indicator. The more sophisticated language, the higher the chance that said tweet was not authored by Trump. The website factba.se marks their twitter archive with "likely staff" or "likely Trump" on all of the president's tweets, using among others the criteria I mentioned above. For Sanders it has proven more difficult to determine if the man himself types out the tweets or if all the tweets are done by staff. The language use and grammar are overall consistent in the Tweets from Sanders. Whichever way we cut it, this detail is rather trifle, since in my view the messages being sent from the accounts are done in the name of the politicians which means that they are ultimately responsible for the content being distributed by the accounts.

A question that needs answering in this context is, why not use Facebook as well? As shown earlier Facebook is also used by campaigns and candidates. For this point I would argue that Twitter is a more open social medium than Facebook. Tweets are sent out in public, for everyone to read. In addition Twitter activity hits many multipliers for politicians, by multipliers I mean persons spreading the message from the politician to their followers, media-pundits and journalists have shown to be increasingly active on twitter, which again means that messages, statements, comments, made by politicians on twitter might be pulled up on national TV for further dissemination, thereby reaching even broader audiences outside the social media platform. In contrast news and messages on Facebook are spread mostly through closed groups and friend connections, making it less ideal for political mass communication.

The selections of tweets will mainly be drawn from the primary-campaign period circa April 2015 to June 2016, for both candidates, and compared with newer tweets and speeches starting from February of 2019. Bernie Sanders announced his candidacy for president in the 2020 election on February 19th, in a short YouTube video announcement releasing alongside a longer

interview on CBS This Morning on the same date. Donald Trump technically launched his re-election campaign on his inauguration day January 21st, 2017, by filing papers with the federal election commission. This early re-application takes the theorem of the "permanent campaign" to new levels, (Graham, 2017) Trump held his first 2020-campaign rally in Florida on February 15, a mere 29 days into his presidency. Since Trump technically never stopped campaigning, all his tweets since 2015 could be said to serve a political goal. In the case of the data gathering for Trump, the focus has been primarily to mirror that of Sanders, at least in regard to time periods. Trump's "permanent campaign" has however yielded fruits of a possible emerging populist discourse, the "anti-media" branch, which will be examined more thoroughly, otherwise the selection criteria for tweets stay the same for both candidates where statements with clear populist messaging will be highlighted in accordance with the presented theory. By comparing social media statements from two candidates from opposite ends of the political spectrum strengthens the study by furthering its main goal, to chart the breadth of the populist political discourse in America. Comparing tweets from two primary campaign periods it further strengthens the study. By being able to compare utterances on the time axis in addition to the left-right political axis, we can see in what ways the discourse from the candidates have evolved, or if it has evolved at all. But through initial data gathering the Tweets alone were found to be of too little substance, leading us to the next section.

3.2.3 Selecting Data: Campaign Speeches & Interviews

Twitter messages might not encapsulate the wider substance of the politician's political opinions and discourse. Therefore, we examine excerpts from several campaign speeches to broaden our view of the discourses. Here I will analyze the announcement speeches of both candidates as well as one other political rally speech held a few months after the candidate's respective announcement. The campaign announcement speeches were selected because it is in these speeches that the candidates introduce themselves to the public "properly" for the first time as a candidate for president in a given election cycle. These speeches tend to be widely discussed in both TV and print media for mass dissemination of the candidates messaging. What material and appeals included in these speeches should hit at the political core messaging of the candidate and should therefore give a substantial baseline for the candidate's populist discourse.

4. Analysis

In this section I will present and analyze data gathered using the methods highlighted in the previously. This section will be split into two prime categories, statements made by Bernie Sanders and Donald Trump. Each section will be presented through subsections based on the main discourse category of the statements made, some statements might have messaging which could place them in multiple categories. The statements will be numbered based on the order they are presented, for instance statement S#1 for statements for Sanders and Statement T#1 for Trump and so on. The sourcing of the statement[6] will be presented for each statement, whether it stems from a tweet or a statement made during an interview or campaign speech. At the start of each main section I will comment briefly on the candidate's overall communication style and main markers of their populist discourse, additionally a short summary of the sources of the statements.

4.1 Analysis of Bernie Sanders' Discourse

Senator Bernie Sanders of Vermont generally communicates in a clear and concise manner. His statements all seem to serve to back up the broader points he wishes to communicate and appear more professional in his communication than his counterpart in this study. Through analyzing Statements from sanders, two main trends emerge, that carry through from his 2015 statements to his 2019 ones. Sanders rhetoric heavily relies on anti-elite elements, where he condemns the "billionaire-class". Otherwise he embraces "the working man and woman». This is reflected in his policy proposals which all seek to bolster the "middle class" (free college, higher minimum wage, single payer health care,). In longer statements like speeches and some 2019 tweets, he is well within the definition of "full populist" according to the narrower definition of populism as seen in figure 2. In shorter tweets especially prevalent in the 2015 campaign his communication is clearer either "anti-elite" or "empty populism."

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[6]See Appendix 1 for complete list of Tweets used in the analysis from both examined accounts
  See Appendix 2 for complete list of campaign speech statements and media interview excerpts used in the analysis from both candidates.

4.1.1 Overview of source material and discursive trends

The speech later cited as "C-span, 2015" was Sander's campaign announcement speech for the 2016 presidential election. The speech was given on the 26th of May 2015 at a rally in Waterfront Park on the shore of Lake Champlain in Burlington, Vermont. [7] Sanders mirroring his approach to announcing his 2020 presidential run to his 2016. Like in 2015 he first announced he was running during a TV interview. In 2019 Sanders did a 30 minute in dept interview for CBS This morning, which aired February 19th, 2019. At the same time Sanders released a 10-minute 48 seconds video on his official YouTube channel, which contained an abbreviated "cliff-notes" version of what he spoke about in the interview. In early March 2019, Sanders held multiple campaign rallies in short succession, mainly re-iterating his core policy ideals, from the video. These rallies were held much closer in time to his announcement than his official campaign kick-off in 2015 which took place a month after he first announced on April 30th, 2015. (Klein & Saenz, 2015)

The tweets selected for this section are primarily sampled from the time around Sanders campaign announcement in May 2015, further there are some tweets from later on in the summer and autumn of 2015. The general trend of Sanders tweets is that he is extremely consistent in his communication. As seen in the quotes from his speech and later interview. The working people are the clear "inn-group" and the billionaire class are the "out-group". In some cases, he uses both discourse elements in a tweet, however due to the 180-character limit, we find shorter, "sound-bite" like statements compared to the longer, more elaborate ones from his speech. In examining tweets from Bernie Sanders in 2019 we a clear continuity of his discourse emerges, see statement 9 and 10 further below as an example.

Discursively Sanders largely continues the 2016 campaign in his current bid for the 2020 race. He sticks to his established anti-elites' rhetoric, while focusing on his "inn-group" the working class of "regular people of all colors". Sanders repeatedly makes statements claiming that the society is "rigged" in favor of the rich elites, and that he wants to change this. Trump appears as an additional "problem" Sanders wants to solve, he does not however often lump Trump in with the rest of the billionaire elite, he elects rather to talk about his "out-group" mostly in vague terms, "billionaire hedge-fund managers", however he sometimes goes strikingly specific with name dropping the Koch brothers and Jeff Bezos. This last point is mostly

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[7] In the speech Sanders presents the issues he would like to focus on in his campaign, including campaign finance reform, poverty, raising the minimum wage, Wall Street reform, tax policy, climate change, and health care reform.

prevalent in interviews and campaign speeches, one can find one tweet here and there specifically echoing a point made in a speech or interview, for instance that Amazon as a company pays 0 dollars in tax, and that he wants to change that. Overall Sanders comes across very consistent in his messaging, which can likely be attributed to his long career in politics.

4.1.2 Discourse concerning "the people"

> "Brothers and sisters now is not the time for thinking small. Now is not the time for the same old same old establishment politics and stale inside-the-Beltway ideas. *Now is the time for millions of working families to come together to revitalize American democracy*, to end the collapse of our middle class, and to make certain that our children and grandchildren are able to enjoy a quality of life that brings them health, prosperity, security and joy, and that once again makes the United States the leader in the world in the fight for economic and social justice, for environmental sanity, and for a world of peace." (C-span, 2015 timestamp: 28:48) [Statement[8] S#1]

In this statement Sanders is mostly concerned with gathering "the people" around him. At the same time, he throws some minor shade at his main competitor Hillary Clinton without mentioning names. "*Now is not the time for the same old same old establishment politics and stale inside-the-Beltway ideas"*. But rather something new, Sanders. Sanders here implies that previous politicians did not have "the people's" best interests at heart, whereas he, will help them secure a future where they can thrive, and be assured that future generations will benefit from it as well. This hopeful, "we can still fix this" attitude becomes very central as one of the discursive "cores" Sanders uses to appeal to the ingroup, namely an appeal to their hope of a brighter tomorrow.

> [...] That is the nation we can build together, and I ask you to join me in this campaign to build a future that works for all of us, and not just the few on top. Thank you, and on this beautiful day on the shore of Lake Champlain, I welcome you aboard. (C-span, 2015 timestamp: 1:01:45) [Statement S#2]

The above quote is the last sentence of the speech. In its Sanders gathers the threads from the speech and reiterates the main message. The speech overall has clear populist discourse markers, primarily the anti-elite sentiments, and the clear selection of an "inn group" which subsequently delineates an "out group".

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[8] Emphasis in italics have been added by the author to clearer highlight aspects of the statements which will be key for later discussions.

JOHN DICKERSON: You used to talk about a *revolution*. That's what you're talking about here?

BERNIE SANDERS: That's right. In other words, w-- once again, it's not gonna happen inside the *beltway*. The only way that Congress and the White House is gonna move is when millions of *people really do stand up and say*, "Enough is enough. We want a government--" not just rhetoric; this is reality-- "*a government that works for all of us*, not just wealthy campaign contributors." (CBS,2019, Timestamp: 05:30)
[Statement S#3]

In this sample we see clear echoes to Sanders announcement speech of 2015, even re-usage of the same words and sentences, ("inside the beltway" for instance). and the last sentence being a clear echo to the previous campaign, but also earlier expressed sentiments. For the rest of the interview Dickerson and Sanders discuss Medicare, taxation and wealth inequality for a fair amount, but Sanders' responses are largely just straight no-nonsense responses to Dickerson's questions, very few statements carried clear populism discourse markers, opposed to the 3 quoted above.

But who are "the people" for Bernie Sanders? and what does he want the people to do? He repeatedly states that he wants a revolution, and for the people to join him in this revolution. Sanders being ideologically an "old-school socialist" would appeal to the working classes. Establishing Sanders as a socialist at his core, is key here. Because his populist discourse as we have examined in this thesis approach to populism, agrees that populism cannot be an ideology on its own, but rather works a discursive style or appeal, reinforcing the candidates core beliefs. Sander's appeal to the people comes across as somewhat timeless, if you substitute some of his policies you can find parallels in say 1950s socialist class discourse, where one would seek to embrace the working class, look suspiciously at those with more wealth, and overall seek a society with less or even minimal social differences. Not venture to far into the policy realm, where Sander's suggestions also clearly follow the core tenants of socialism al be it with a twist making it fit the challenges of modern American politics. But back to his discourse, Sanders embraces the working man and woman, people of color and minorities. Sanders clear message to "the people" is that you can have a better life, and indeed deserve a better life, but "roadblocks" have been placed in front of said prosperity in the name of profit which goes to the top1%. Circling back to Sanders call for a revolution, he might wish for a massive sudden change to the US society (akin to the communist revolution in Russia), but at the same time Sanders through his policy proposals are more cautious, taking into consideration that it takes time for Americans to generally accept change. He might advocate for "the people" to join his

revolution, but these are more surface level statements, perhaps akin to Trump's "build the wall" in effect, an applause line in other words.

> @BernieSanders
> It's not Bernie, it's you, and it's us. We all must do our job in waging the political revolution.
> 2:30 AM - Jul 21, 2018
> [Statement S#4]

S#5 above is a typical example of a Sanders tweet, where he yet again encourages a political revolution, but yet again if one is to look at his actual proposals, these would be considered very far reaching reforms. Berg (2018) emphasizes that the term revolution, historically refers to sudden and far reaching changes to a society, the French revolution as an example. But that in later years the colloquial use of the term has loosened its definition. So, is Sanders advocating for a massive realignment of the US system akin to the French revolution where a centuries old tradition of monarchy was changed, back and forth over a period of 10 years? Perhaps not, but he is suggesting changes to the American system of government, which by modern semantic understandings of the term might be considered revolutionary. A further discussion over the semantic qualities of what should constitute a revolution in modern American politics I find bearing little fruit and relevance to the thesis research question. To reiterate, Sander's calls for a revolution, works more as a populistic and rhetorical device, as an applause line and rallying cry for "the people", although

> @BernieSanders
> They have the money, but we have the people. In the end, I believe the people can win. Join our campaign at http://BernieSanders.com/join .
> 5:30 PM - May 4, 2015
> [Statement S#5]

In this short tweet we see an example where sanders both appeal to "the people" and "harps" on the elite, "They have the money". This tweet is sent three weeks before Sanders officially started his 2016 campaign. Contain short sound bites which eventually would get elaborated on in his campaign speech, as seen above. This tweet, and others like it from his 2016 campaign, communicate short, clear and concise messages. A trait often attributed to "populist politicians" are that they are communicating in a "simpler" way, more directly aimed at the people. Most, if not all of Sanders tweets, include both the anti-elite and the "inn-group" appeal, but rhetorically some tweets skew more heavily towards one side versus the other exemplified in S#6 below.

4.1.3 Anti-Elite Discourse

> "Today, we stand here and say loudly and clearly that; "Enough is enough. This great nation and its government belong to all of the people, and not to a handful of billionaires, their Super-PACs and their lobbyists." (C-span, 2015, timestamp: 28:25)

[Statement S#6]

This line of the speech, has clear populist markers, where Sanders communicates clear anti-elite sentiments towards *"a handful of billionaires, their Super-PACs and their lobbyists"* Sanders also raises the specter of another aspect of populist discourse, namely that the political system is "broken" or "rigged", which in this case will be explored as a sub category of the anti-elites discourse. These allusions become clearer in later quotes, but for this one Sanders alludes that the government belongs to the people and not the billionaires. Minor aspects of common inclusionary rhetorical markers are also present in the statement, by the use of words like "we" and "the people". Sanders with this opening salvo sets up a clear "us vs them".

> "Today, we live in the wealthiest nation in the history of the world but that reality means very little for most of us because almost all of that wealth is owned and controlled by a tiny handful of individuals. [...]" (C-span, 2015 timestamp: 32:12)

[Statement S#7]

Continuing the messaging from the above quote, Sanders highlights further the divide between the "rich" and the "poor" in the US. Here the anti-elite sentiments continue, in the following sentences he continues to highlight the wealth inequality in America, and states that his campaign will seek to "fix that". This appeal to a sense of injustice, is a key political argument of sanders, and also a populist communicative marker. Sanders seeks to appeal to his "inn-group" the working people of America while pushing away the "out-group" the billionaire class. Sanders in this statement becomes and affirmative example of this thesis definition of populism, namely that it cannot stand on its own, but must be supported by a different underlying ideology, in this case socialism. Wealth redistribution is one of the key tenets of socialism.

> BERNIE SANDERS: We have a *president* who is a *racist*, who is a *sexist*, who is a *xenophobe*, who is doing what no president in our lifetimes has come close to do doing, and that is trying to *divide us* up. What presidents-- even conservative presidents, liberal presidents, they understand their function is to *bring our people together*. This guy is trying to divide us up. *That has got to end.*(CBS,2019, timestamp: 02:17)
> [Statement S#8]

A new line of Sanders discourse is presented in the below quote, namely the anti-Trump portion. Since Sanders lost the democratic nomination in 2016, he started reluctantly supporting Clinton, and more vigorously opposing Trump. This statement by Sanders neatly summarizes his many views of Trump as the president. There are no clear, overt, populist markers in this statement, we can however find some if we read between the lines. Sanders positions Trump as part of the "elite" he is in opposition to, he also draws attention to a particular feature of Trump's presidency namely that through his words and actions he divides the country instead of uniting it. Sanders notes that previous presidents of both parties sought to be uniters, whereas Trump is a divider, which poses a great danger to the society, and he wants to put a stop to it by first winning the primary then the general election.

> @BernieSanders
> Millions of Americans are working longer hours for lower wages, while virtually all new income goes to the people who need it the least.
> 9:03 PM - May 23, 2015

[Statement S#9]

In this tweet we can clearly observe that Sanders is placing himself well into the anti-elite populism of highlighted by Reinemann (Aalberg et.al,2017). The sting of the tweet being delivered after the comma, where it turns from a message embracing the inn-group, to a sharp critique of the elite., turns towards anti-elites sentiments in the second part of the tweet, after the comma. As a contrast, re-examine S#5 where Sanders starts off anti elite, but turns to embrace "the people" in the latter part, making that tweets more embracing than antagonistic. One could perhaps argue that these types of statements puts Sanders into a mode of full populism, but here Reinemann's model fall a bit short. Sanders has no clear-cut "out-group", since we cannot count the "rich elites" in this regard. One could argue however that Sanders, through his discourse, in accordance with our operationalization of populism, has a hidden outgroup rarely referenced directly. On one hand we have the base voters of the opposition, those people who are responsible for empowering the elites by being "fooled" into voting for the opposition and on the other hand we have Sanders who clearly defines who "the people" are for him, in so doing he also subtly defines who they are not. Hillary Clinton infamously referred to Trump supporters as a" basket of deplorables" (BBC, 2016) Based on the data searches for Sanders he has never spoken ill of the voters for his opponents, he rather speaks ill of his opponents, highlighting their flaws, attempting rather to win over those voters to his side. So yes, by enforcing a strict narrow definition of populism Sanders cannot be said to be a full populist. But perhaps this is for the better, Sanders has stated that he famously has never run a

negative add on any of his opponents, which is true to certain extent. Excluding an outgroup directly often means painting said out-group in a negative light, Trump does this almost without effort as we shall see in section 4.2.3.

> @BernieSanders
> Today 46% of all new income goes to the top 1%. Millions of Americans are forced to work 2 or 3 jobs just to survive. Over half of our people live paycheck to paycheck. And 3 people own as much wealth as the bottom 50%.
> We won't accept a rigged economy any longer.
> 4:11 PM - Mar 13, 2019
> [Statement S#10]

In November 2017 Twitter doubled its character limit per tweet from 140 characters to 280.In S#11 we can observe twitters change in policy in action. S#11 echoes S#10 above but uses more space and complete sentences in contrast. The tweet from 2015 is short and to the point, not expanding much on its contents. While in contrast the 2019 tweet has virtually the same message, but expands upon it with broader examples like, 46% of all new income goes to the top 1% = virtually all new income goes to the people who need it the least. In both tweets Sanders strikes upon the contrast between his in-and-out groups. However, in the 2019 tweet he underlies the message with a clear anti-elites / rigged system message.

> @BernieSanders
> This country belongs to all of us, not just the billionaire class. That's what this campaign is all about.
> 5:30 PM - May 10, 2015
> [Statement S#11]

> @BernieSanders
> It is not acceptable that millionaire hedge fund managers are able to pay lower effective tax rates than truck drivers or nurses.
> 9:02 PM - May 11, 2015
> [Statement S#12]

The two above tweets are both very much "on message" spaced a day apart. Clear anti-elite discourse on display here. In the second tweet, Sanders starts to name-drop specific professions which he will do more throughout the campaign, this to seemingly further define "the people" and "the working class" compared to the elite of millionaire hedge fund managers. Again, he alludes to the discourse stated more clearly in the campaign speech, of the system being rigged and unjust for "the people" in favor of the "billionaires".

4.1.4 Unfair system discourse

> [...] There is something profoundly wrong when, in recent years, we have seen a proliferation of millionaires and billionaires at the same time as millions of Americans work longer hours for lower wages and we have the highest rate of childhood poverty of any major country on earth. There is something profoundly wrong when one family owns more wealth than the bottom 130 million Americans. This *grotesque level of inequality* is immoral. It is bad economics. It is unsustainable. *This type of rigged economy* is not what America is supposed to be about. This has got to change and, as your president, *together we will change it.* (C-span, 2015 timestamp 34:30)
>
> [Statement S#13]

This part of Sanders discourse has been alluded to in the above sections. The "unfair-system" discourse is something we find examples of in both of the candidates' discourses, however they approach it a bit differently. In s#13 this point emerges clearly, contrasting that which Sanders has alluded to in both the previous sections, flowing through them as an undercurrent of sorts. The concept that the entire system is rigged against "the people", where they will lose, and the billionaires will win. Reading between the lines what Sanders is saying here is approximately: "It's not your fault, poor single mother, that you do not have enough money for food, see, it is the billionaire class that have rigged this entire system, but you and me together can fix it." In contrast to what we will see from Trump later, Sanders highlights that the "system" is rigged against "the people" because it has been controlled by billionaires and republicans, while Trump will later claim that the election system is rigged against him (party-elite then political elites). S#13 is somewhat typical of how Sanders presents his policy suggestions in this speech and in general, by mostly highlighting problems he sees in society and how these problems are worse for "working people". In some areas, for instance when he talks about climate change briefly, Sanders highlights how climate change has become a major crisis because powerful lobbyists for the rich have caused no political action on climate change for 30 years.

> @BernieSanders
> The Walton family makes more money in one minute than Walmart workers do in an entire year. This is what we mean when we talk about a rigged economy.
> 5:13 PM - Feb 14, 2019
> [Statement S#14]

> @BernieSanders
> The *Boomer* generation needed just 306 hours of minimum wage work to pay for four years of public college.
> Millennials need 4,459.
> The economy today is rigged against working people and young people. *That is what we are going to change.*
> 4:29 PM - Apr 24, 2019

[Statement S#15]

S#14 and S#15 underscores the points made in the previous paragraph, while providing more "current" examples. Sanders in both tweets, presents an "injustice" where "the people" are losing in favor of the rich elites, because the system is rigged, in the first tweet he merely points at the problem, while in the second vows to change it so the system is less rigged against the people.

4.1.5 Left-wing anti media discourse.

@BernieSanders
Corporate media wants you to think small, to think that we cannot provide education and healthcare for all. I strongly disagree!
2:50 PM - May 23, 2016

[Statement S#16]

@BernieSanders
We're not gonna allow the *corporate media* to define the issues for us. It's up to us to talk about reality in America.
3:32 AM - Jun 25, 2016

[Statement S#17]

@BernieSanders
In a nation where *corporate media* defines what's "acceptable," voter turnout lags behind almost every major nation and billionaires can buy elections, our job is to open the doors of democracy and elect candidates who support economic, social, racial and environmental justice.
12:49 AM - Jul 2, 2018

[Statement S#18]

The anti-media discourse from Sanders has very few entries in it, compared to Trump. Sanders "stays within his comfort zone" while attacking the media, as seen above. Sanders in his anti-media discourse highlights that the media is owned by corporations which again is owned by the rich elite, thereby reinforcing the messaging from the last two subsections, anti-elite and unfair system. Sanders puts the "corporate media" as another cog in the broken system driven by the elites. Where the media controls the messaging to favor the elites, or to support politicians which would further their interests. One of the core assumptions driving this thesis is that Politicians would favor to spread their messages on social media, that being an un-mediated platform, compared to TV or print media. This last point would be especially true for populist candidates, who would be viewed as fringe candidates with ideas that could upset the well-established status -quo, resulting in "uneven" coverage compared to more mainstream

candidates. At least that was the assumption, Twitter and social media has had a somewhat unexpected amplifying effect for populists like Trump and Sanders. This amplification is explored in some detail in section 3.2.2 where Twitter being a medium favored by journalist and TV-pundits for its ease of access to political candidates and mass audiences. Looking especially at S#18, Sanders highlights this possible censorship by the corporate media, and that it is up to "the people" to spread the message through social media, that way they can stay informed about "the reality" which the media might overlook. The left-wing anti media discourse could be said to be in its infancy, and perhaps it will not grow much, since candidates like Sanders has managed to maneuver around the roadblocks put up by the "corporate media", and yet manages to spread a powerful message, forcing the media to cover it in a way, through the echo effect of social media. However, the broader debate around Fox-News in relation to the democratic primary debates might provide a counter point. The short version is that the democratic party has decided that it will not (at the time of writing) broadcast its debates on fox news, since the network has proven to be very pro-republican and very anti-democrat in its broadcasts. Sanders being one of the candidates in the current race arguing against this decision, arguing that how can they (the democrats) hope to win over republican swing voters if they do not appear on those voters preferred channel.

4.2 Analysis of Donald Trumps' Discourse

Trump presents as a complete opposite to Sanders in many ways. Not just politically, but also in respect to communication style. Trump's way of speaking and communicating has been "praised" as a positive by voters, they say "he says it like it is" (Markovitz,2016). In analyzing Trump's statements, he generally utilizes very basic words, grammar and sentence structures. In his tweets, this "simplicity" is boiled further down to, non-complete sentences, abbreviations, and the infamous use of exclamation marks after a lone word, to emphasize his emotion, or thoughts on a matter, as seen in the example tweet below.

> @realDonaldTrump
> The Democratic Convention has paid ZERO respect to the great police and law enforcement professionals of our country. No recognition - SAD!
> 11:50 AM - Jul 27, 2016
> [Statement[9] T#1]

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[9] In statements by Trump as with Sanders, emphasis through the use of italics have been added by this author, other emphasis in his statements as seen above by the use of for instance all capitalized words are done by Trump.

In the wake of Trump's campaign launch on June 16th, 2015, he tweeted multiple times a day. The sampling below are the tweets which were mostly political and populistic in nature. For the rest of 2015 Trump did not tweet much about politics except for promoting his rallies. These rallies largely mirror his announcement speech in both content and tone. This trend for the speeches at least has lasted through 2017, and to this day. By some media pundits Trump's rallies have been characterized as Trump "just playing the old hits, again and again.". On Twitter we can chart certain developments, the style and tone of Trump's tweets stay mostly the same, but he acquires new targets in stages. In the early 2016 primary campaign he is mostly concerned with attack his republican rivals, this morphs to a laser like focus on Hillary Clinton around the time he becomes a frontrunner and secures the republican nomination. Trumps populist discourse can be said to be more "total populist" than Sanders, because he has clear inn and out groups, as well as a seemingly never-ending supply of elites to rail against.

4.2.1 Overview of source material and discursive trends

All the quotes from speeches in this section have been gathered from the website database factba.se, which keeps an up to the minute updated database of all of trumps statements, with live tracking and analysis of his tweets, and transcripts of all speeches and interviews. The selected speeches range from Trump's infamous announcement speech in 2015, to excerpts from a campaign rally few days before the election in 2016, to finally his first "official Trump 2020 campaign rally" held in Melbourne Florida February 2017. A bulk of the tweets presented in this section are from the same timeframe as Sanders, to provide an apt comparison on the time axis. However due to Trump's "constant campaign" the breath of material technically valid for use proved enormous. However, the relevancy of the content of said tweets has proven mixed. Since taking office Trump has tweeted almost daily, often multiple times a day, but extremely rarely do these tweets carry overt populist content. Most often Trump uses twitter to seemingly blow off steam, to air his frustrations to the public. Throughout 2017 and 2018 with increasing scrutiny from journalist and media, the anti-media rhetoric and discourse coarsened, and worsened, going so far as to call the media the enemy of the people[10]. Generally, Trump's populist discourse has the following key features, he embraces "his people", his fans, proving to have vide appeal in white-working class circles particularly among voters lacking higher education. Trump's out-group discourse is fear-based, where he warns his followers of the

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[10] Trump referred to the media as the enemy of the people for the first time on February 17th, 2017.

dangers of "the other" or immigrants, a key feature of Trump's out-group is the xenophobia and racism he appeals to in his voters. Trump's anti-elite discourse shifts multiple times throughout, a constant is that he focuses on how the elites are hurting *him*, making it harder for *him* to help "the people".

4.2.2 Discourse concerning "the people"

> "We *have people that aren't working*. We have people that have no incentive to work. But they're going to have incentive to work, because the greatest social program is a job. And they'll be proud, and they'll love it, and they'll make much more than they would've ever made, and they'll be -- *they'll be doing so well, and we're going to be thriving as a country, thriving*. It can happen. [applause] "(Factba.se, 2015, timestamp: 15:16)

> [Statement T#2]

This quote is a clear appeal to the "inn-group" the audience. Trump does not make any clear or specific policy suggestions. He vaguely suggests that social programs make people not want to work, and that he will fix it by giving them incentives, and everyone will be thriving as a result. The statement above is a typical Trump policy pledge, which coincidentally has proven to be typical of other populist movements as well. But even compared to other populist movements Trump in this instance appears on the extra vague side in his promises.

> We got $18 trillion in debt. *We got nothing but problems*. We got a military that needs equipment all over the place. We got nuclear weapons that are obsolete.

> We've got nothing. We've got Social Security that's going to be destroyed if somebody like me doesn't bring money into the country. All these other people want to cut the hell out of it. I'm not going to cut it at all; I'm going to bring money in, and we're going to save it. [applause] (Factba.se, 2015 timestamp: 26:58)

> [Statement T#3]

In a speech filled with asides, and short stories for the audience, only the 4 quotes above had clearly identifiable populistic tendencies. This is a trend we will examine again in Trump's tweets. But for now, in T#3 appears almost midway through the speech, here he eloquently summarizes his positions and appeals in T#2 and T#12 (which appear earlier in the speech). Again, Trump appeals to the fear of the people, by painting a bleak picture of America today, "We got nothing but problems". Trump in line with other republican politicians at the time were very concerned with the national deficit, where he breaks with republican policy is when he claims to want to save social security by "bringing more money in, and we are going to save it". Here Trump is slightly more specific on how he wants to save social security programmes,

but still not nearly as specific as Sanders appeared in his discourse. A general trend of Trump, emerges clearer here, as mentioned, his appeal to fear. Contrasted with Sanders which largely appealed to grievances through injustice and then hope, Trump twists things a bit more. By painting a picture of America in deep trouble, only Trump, the seasoned businessman can make America great again.

> @realDonaldTrump
> Well, we all did it, together! I hope the "MOVEMENT" fans will go to D.C. on Jan 20th for the swearing in. Let's set the all time record!
> 6:03 PM - Dec 16, 2016
>
> [Statement T#4]
>
> "I'm here because I want to be among my friends and among the people. This was a great movement, a movement like has never been seen before in our country our probably anywhere else. This was a truly great movement And I want to be here with you, and I will always be with you. I promise you that. I want to be in a room filled with hard working American patriots who love their country, who salute their flag and who pray for a better future." (Factbase, 2017 timestamp :04:10)
>
> [Statement T#5]

Contrasting further with Sanders, who as we saw makes clear outreaches to socialist discourse in his embrace of the people, Trump is on the other side rarely specific in his embraces. In T#4 and T#5 he appeals to "the people", but especially in T#5 gives little hints towards what he values about his ingroup. One could assume that the "the people" does not necessarily have to be referenced directly since Trump could view his twitter followers as a proxy, after all Tweets automatically appear for followers. Trump does not often refer directly to "his people" compared to Sanders who did so quite frequently. Below is an example of one such time Trump explicitly states which groups he includes in "the people".

> @realDonaldTrump
> We have to bring back and cherish the middle class - once the backbone and true strength of the U.S.A. It can happen!
> 4:17 AM - Jun 25, 2015
> [Statement T#6]

Again, here we see an example of his use of exclamation points to highlight his message. Trump here is also somewhat vague, as Sanders also was in the early stages, the middle class is a large amalgam. Furthering the point from T#5 Trump often references the people who attend his rallies as "his people" but other than that Trump makes few, if any direct appeals to his inn-group, outside of appealing to their assumed fears and grievances. By doing this Trump doesn't have to clearly identify a group he embraces, following the definitions of a discourse by

Foucault, Trump rather advocates for what his "people" should be against, rather than what they should be for. Anti- immigration, anti-globalization, anti-coastal elites and anti-mainstream media. By having his people be anti all of these he promises to fix these grievances thereby making America better.

4.2.3 Out-group discourse

The campaign announcement speech by Donald Trump has become somewhat infamous in American politics and media in later years, it is colloquially referred to as "when Trump came down the escalator,". The full speech is typical of Trump's oratory style and rhetoric, this style and rhetoric are reflected in bite-size in his twitter messages. Trump often starts a sentence and takes sidesteps to ad-lib comments to his notes.

> Thank you. It's true, and these are the best and the finest. When Mexico sends its people, they're not sending their best. They're not sending you. *They're not sending you*. They're sending people that have lots of problems, and they're bringing those problems with us. They're bringing drugs. They're bringing crime. They're rapists. *And some, I assume, are good people.* (Factba.se, 2015, timestamp: 01:56)
>
> [Statement T#7]

As mentioned above this speech has become rather infamous in American media in later years, mostly because of the above quote, particularly the way it ends. Calling Mexicans rapists and murderers was an explosive way to kick-start his campaign, while at the same time presenting right-wing populism markers. Trump's is clearly anti-immigration, those are his out-group, not all immigrants, as he will later state, wanting more immigrants from countries like Norway, (Pryser & Porter, 2018). Trump does not clearly identify the "inn-group" in this quote, he does however take a sidestep, to address the audience, signaling that the audience is his preferred "inn-group". Further he does not dislike all immigration, but he tends to dislike people of color from "poorer" countries than white Norwegians. Where Sanders appealed to a sense of injustice, that the elite had rigged the system against "his people". Trump appeals to a sense of fear, describing the "out-group" as "not their best," "they bring drugs and crime" "they are rapists."

> @realDonaldTrump
> I like Mexico and love the spirit of Mexican people, but we must protect our borders from people, from all over, pouring into the U.S.
> 2:15 AM - Jun 20, 2015
> [Statement T#8]

@realDonaldTrump
Mexico is killing the United States economically because their leaders and negotiators are FAR smarter than ours. But nobody beats Trump!
2:54 AM - Jun 20, 2015
[Statement T#9]

@realDonaldTrump
Druggies, drug dealers, rapists and killers are coming across the southern border. When will the U.S. get smart and stop this travesty?
3:22 AM - Jun 20, 2015
[Statement T#10]

In the above quoted series of tweets is the first and only time Trump mentions Mexico by name on twitter for the rest of 2015. For the rest of the primary campaign season, he repeats his want for increased border security, where the infamous "build the wall" slogan emerges after a short while. This series of "late-night-tweets" is heavy on the populist rhetoric, enforcing Trump's tactic of using "fear of the outsiders", to motivate and invigorate his base of supporters, this is particularly true in the first and third tweet. In the middle tweet Trump almost takes an aside, to comment on the economy, and to again reiterate his "outsider" status, by also labeling "the leaders" in the US dumb, "But nobody beats Trump!". So, in this series of tweets Trump echoes most of his populistic points from the announcement speech quoted above T#7.

 "We will have strong borders again, and I mean that. You've seen it in television. You've seen it on television. General Kelly, now Secretary Kelly, he's really doing the job. You're seeing it. The gang members, bad, bad people. I said day one**,** *and they're going out*. Or they're being *put in prison*, but for the most part, *get them the hell out of here*. Bring them back to where they came from."(Factba.se, 2017, timestamp:08:12)

[Statement T#11]

This statement was made by Trump on his first campaign rally in 2017, kicking off his 2020 re-election bid. Again, Trump emphasizes that the border isn't safe, and that dangerous immigrants are roaming free in the country, but thanks to Him and his administration they are beginning to get better control over the problem. The above statement is typical "empty rhetoric" from Trump, he doesn't actually provide proof that under his short term in office arrests of dangerous and violent immigrants has increased. Again, here he emphasizes the appeal to the fear of the outsider, but he has begun to fix it, or at least has a solution, "get them the hell out of here."

4.2.4 Anti-elite discourse

> Right now, think of this: We owe *China* $1.3 trillion. We owe *Japan* more than that. So they come in, they take our jobs, they take our money, and then they loan us back the money, and we pay them in interest, and then the dollar goes up so their deal's even better. How stupid are our leaders? How stupid *are these politicians* to allow this to happen? How stupid are they? [applause] (Factbase.se, 2015, timestamp: 16:06)
>
> [Statement T#12]

In this quote Trump does several things in one fell swoop. Firstly, he identifies several new "enemies" he can be antagonistic towards. Japan, China and the political establishment. Trump appeals to a sense of injustice here, claiming that Japan and China steal jobs and money from the people. This statement enforces Trump as a more traditional right-wing populist, being anti-elites, here exemplified by the ruling democratic elites, and the international community taking advantage of the US. Painting China as a foreign "adversary" Trump can stand in opposition to, is a discourse Trump furthers to this day, even in office. At the time of writing, President Trump has engaged in an escalating trade war with China, the consequences of which are starting to leave clearer markings in the US economy. But as a discursive element, China serves perfectly as a target to be in opposition to.

Switching gears to more domestic elites, this next series of tweets, gathered from July and September 2015, are typical examples of the message Trump was pushing at the time and throughout the 2016 campaign. Namely that he was self-funding his campaign, and that he was not "owned" by corporations and special interests, to what extent these claims are true, this thesis will not delve into. In this series of tweets Trump takes a page from Sander's playbook, by voicing his opposition to "the elites"

> @realDonaldTrump
> Remember that I am self-funding my campaign. Hillary, Jeb and the rest are spending special interest and lobbyist money.100% CONTROLLED
> <u>10:46 PM - Sep 5, 2015</u>
> [Statement T#13]
>
> @realDonaldTrump
> Many Super Pacs, funded by groups that want total control over their candidate, are being formed to "attack" Trump. Remember when u see them
> <u>9:05 PM - Sep 1, 2015</u>
> [Statement T#14]

@realDonaldTrump
Jeb's policies in Florida helped lead to its almost total collapse. Right after he left he went to work for Lehman Brothers—wow!
8:44 PM - Sep 8, 2015
[Statement T#15]

Trump also uses these tweets to attack his opponents, spelling out that Clinton and Bush are 100% controlled by special interests. These tweets are not directly populistic, although reading between the lines throughout these examples Trump emphasizes that he is not controlled by "the elite", and that all attacks against him are coming from these said elites and should not be trusted. This is mainly enforcing Trump's "outsider" narrative, but that is nevertheless implicitly populist in nature. Mostly since populistic candidates tend to come from the fringes of the political spectrum

@realDonaldTrump
If we let Crooked run the govt, history will remember 2017 as the year America lost its independence. #DrainTheSwamp
5:36 PM - Oct 18, 2016
[Statement T#16]

In this statement, much closer to the presidential election in 2016, we see one of the first occurrences of a clear anti elite sentiment, and campaign rallying cry, drain the swamp. Referencing the "swamp" of Washington lobbyist and political establishment and their corrupt practices. This statement and strategy could fit right at home in the Sanders campaign, the messaging proved quite effective as well, giving Trump a surge in popularity, compared to Clinton, as T#16 paints her as part of the swamp-creatures.

But I gave that expression at a speech and I go like, very timidly, *drain the swamp*. The place like really liked it. Then I said it with more energy the next time and they really liked it. And then a third time they really, really...and then now people are going crazy and they're screaming at me when I'm speaking drain the swamp, drain it. Between that and build the wall, these are two expressions, right. And we will build a wall. (Factba.se, 2016, timestamp: 14:05)

[Statement T#17]

T#17 is somewhat revealing of Trump's personal thoughts on the matter, the statement was given on the 5th of November, few days before the election, he would later state in 2017 clearer his bafflement at the popularity of the "drain the swamp" slogan. Trump retired the use of the slogan in the first half of 2017, giving vague reasons why, or in some cases claiming in rallies

that he had already drained the swamp. However it appears that Trump ran into a common "obstacle" that strikes populists when they actually get power, they suddenly become a part of the establishment and the elites they are railing against, Trump simply became part of the Swamp. Trump sidestepped this hurdle by picking a new target, the other branches of government, even though the republican party controlled both chambers of congress, Trump found it easier to demonize and antagonize "the democrats".

4.2.5 Trumps Anti-Media discourse

> @realDonaldTrump
> Only a fool would buy the @NYDailyNews. Loses fortune & has zero gravitas. Let it die!
> <u>4:54 PM - Jun 17, 2015</u>
> [Statement T#18]

> @realDonaldTrump
> The liberal clown @ariannahuff told her minions at the money losing @HuffingtonPost to cover me as entertainment. I am #1 in Huff Post Poll.
> <u>2:37 PM - Jul 18, 2015</u>
> [Statement T#19]

These two examples are not the first time Trump goes after media organizations, but they are the two clearest examples in the short time after he announces his campaign. Both of these tweets are in response to "unfair" coverage in Trump's view. Meaning that shortly before these tweets these organizations published stories unflattering to Trump. In the case of the Huffington post it is more clear what Trump's grievance is rooted in, namely that they elected to cover him as entertainment and not a serious candidate. It should be noted that extremely few media organizations treated Trump as a serious candidate in the early stages of the primary campaign, (Dugan, 2015) As we will later see, Trump's anti media discourse evolves drastically, this initial step simply places these media organizations as part of an elite that Trump opposes, the reasoning he often uses is that he claims that they are "failing". By doing this he subtly reinforces his own brand which is "success" or the opposite of failing. One could write a thesis of itself about the intrinsic irony of that previous statement, given Trump's repeated bankruptcies which would stand testament that his business acumen is everything but successful.

@realDonaldTrump
Reports by @CNN that I will be working on The Apprentice during my Presidency, even part time, are ridiculous & untrue - FAKE NEWS!
4:11 PM - Dec 10, 2016
[Statement T#20]

This statement from December 2016 sees the first reference to Fake news. This step in the anti-media discourse shows the evolution of the discourse driven by Trump. He takes a step claiming the coverage on CNN to be fake, and that they make up stories about Trump to hurt him. This notion of being covered unfairly or being wronged by the mainstream media, wil later fuel, some of the darker evolutions of the discourse.

@realDonaldTrump
The FAKE NEWS media (failing @nytimes, @NBCNews, @ABC, @CBS, @CNN) is not my enemy, it is the enemy of the American People!
11:48 PM - Feb 17, 2017
[Statement T#21]

A few months after he first introduces the term fake news, Trump escalates the volatility of the discourse, calling out a series of mainstream media organizations naming them *the enemy of the American People!*. Over the next two years Trump would keep up these attacks on the media, claiming time and time again that their coverage of him was unfair, unjust, and fake.

On February 20th 2019 New York Times Publisher A.G. Sulzberger responded to President Trump's continued attacks on a free press saying the following:

> "The phrase "enemy of the people" is not just false, it's dangerous. It has an ugly history of being wielded by dictators and tyrants who sought to control public information. And it is particularly reckless coming from someone whose office gives him broad powers to fight or imprison the nation's enemies. As I have repeatedly told President Trump face to face, there are mounting signs that this incendiary rhetoric is encouraging threats and violence against journalists at home and abroad." (Sulzberger,2019)

This statement was published the day after a New York Times and CNN journalist were assaulted covering a Trump rally in Texas in February of this year (Stelter, 2019). The anti-media discourse has proven a valuable tool for Trump, giving his followers a more tangible adversary, than other anti-elite discourses, which blames figures who often are out of reach or difficult to clearly define, for instance Sanders' billionaire class, and Trumps earlier attacks on "the swamp" and "china". It is difficult to make "the people" fear and hate, an amalgam concept like "the swamp" it has proven easier with the mainstream media, whose reporters often wear badges, clearly identifying them as part of said elite.

@realDonaldTrump
The Fake News Media has NEVER been more *Dishonest* or *Corrupt* than it is right now.
There has never been a time like this in American History. Very exciting but also, very sad!
Fake News is the *absolute Enemy of the People and our Country itself!*
<u>2:24 PM - Mar 19, 2019</u>

[Statement T#22]

To round out this section let us compare the evolution of the discourse from T#21 to T#22. The first striking aspect, is the elaboration of through the use of more words, emphasizing the place of this period in contrast to American history. Re-empathizing in the end that the country does have an absolute enemy, the news media. Through this discourse Trump, falls squarely within Muddes' definition of a populist, namely that populists tend to show authoritarian tendencies. As shown in the statement above, Trump calls the American news media dishonest, corrupt and the *absolute* enemy of the people and the country itself. As Mr. Sulzberger comments above, other authoritarian leaders throughout history have used similar rhetoric to control the press, and by extension the people. Perhaps most notably among these historical authoritarians are Josef Stalin, who is said to be the originator of the term "enemy of the people" in modern politics (Graham-Harrison, 2018)

5. Discussion and conclusion

5.1 Main findings

The main goal of this thesis has been to explore the breadth and width of the political populist discourse in America, through an intensive comparison of statements by Bernie Sanders and Donald Trump. In essence this thesis has sought to examine differences within the political populist discourse itself. In this section I will first highlight and discuss what emerged as the "common core" of populism from the discourse analysis. Then examine further the ideological differences in the discourse of Trump and Sanders, and how this is reflected in the broader populism discourse.

First, a reminder on how this thesis operationalize populism, here populism is viewed mainly as a discourse but with aspects of a hollow or thin ideology mixed in. Meaning that we operationalize the populist discourse, with a "common core" (see figure 1), where ideological differences will later steer and shape the discourse in new ways. In the core of the comparison

of their discourse we found similarities between the right and left proxies. They both embrace "the people" they are both anti elites, and they both exclude out-groups to differing extents. Following Reinemanns model (figure 2) we observed that Sanders most of the time places himself firmly as an anti-elite populist, (Reinemann observes this as "common" for left-wing populists). Whereas Trump is more comfortably placed in Reinemanns "complete populism", since Trump, statements hits all three main categories frequently. Does this then mean that we cannot call Sanders a "complete populist", yes, and no. If we are to follow the model Reinemann presents to the letter, then Sanders does not explicitly qualify as a complete populist. If we however follow this thesis operationalization of populism, where the exclusion of the outgroup is present through the act of defining "the people" as Sanders does to a greater extent than Trump, we can firmly place Sanders as well as a complete populist. Now we can start to examine in what ways and how the candidates ideological discourse adds "color" and "texture" to their populist discourse.

Circling back to the last point discussed in the previous section, the emerging anti media discourse. Both candidates engage in anti-media populistic discourse, however the ideological right-left dimension causes their ultimate grievance with the elite group to differ. Sanders representing the left-leaning populism targets what he calls "corporate media," tying that part of the discourse closely into his broader anti-elite discourse where he stands in opposition to large corporations and billionaires. It is here we can note that the statements for Sander's anti media discourse are not as numerous as Trump's on this subject. On average Sanders mentions the media on Twitter between two and four times a year[11], in a commonality with Trump, Sanders too criticizes the media's coverage of certain cases (environmental). He then proceeds to put a larger spotlight on cases he thinks the media is not covering enough. In the cases we saw in section 4.1.5 Sanders draws parallels to the corporations owning the media being to blame.

Trump, on the right-wing takes a different, more volatile approach. As seen above (in 4.2.5), Trump's anti media discourse starts as airing of small grievances of "negative news coverage", mostly stories about him that he disagrees with. In essence Sanders and Trump's discourses are in agreement on the core level, they both argue that the news-media is either inaccurately covering a story (Trump) or not covering a story enough (Sanders). Where we see a stark turn in this discourse is how Trump has shaped and amped up his attacks on the media. Trump's

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[11] See appendix 1 for Twitter advanced search parameters.

anti-media discourse has since the latter part of 2016 morphed into a more volatile or intense combative discourse, with the same core message. Namely that the media is treating him unfairly and making up lies to hurt him. By these new attacks against the media which has sparked much debate, and even ire from the "media-elite" itself through statements like the one Sulzberger (2019) made, we could argue that Trump's anti media discourse has evolved. Yet the core of the discourse has stayed the exact same, Trump's argument has not really evolved, it has grown fiercer, more intense and more aggressive with time. There is no doubt that the discourse has grown more hostile, we can observe this in real time by examining Trumps statement #19 through #21, but his main grievance has not changed, he is still complaining about news coverage of himself, he considers to be inaccurate or negative. It should be mentioned that in statement T#20 and #21 we see the adage of the "enemy of the people" line, showing clear parallels and shadows to authoritarian leaders like Stalin. Which adds the effect that Trump is cementing the media as a "new elite" for "his people" to be against, he clearly marks them as the enemy. In a more conservative view we could argue that a span of three or four years is too short of a time to see such a swift shift in a political discourse, be it a sub-branch of the populist discourse or not. In such a view one would view Trump's anti media discourse as having intensified rather greatly, but not shifting in its core messaging. If one follows in the reasoning of Mudde, where he argues that right-wing populist at some point will adopt authoritarian tendencies, we see through the intensifying of the discourse that Trump adopts such tendencies in this discourse. Norris and Inglehart (2018, p.9) highlight further that Trump's inaugural address (the infamous "American carnage" speech) encapsulates the main themes authoritarian leaders seeks to instill in the populace. Namely "authoritarian leaders and their followers seek strength and security because of the triumph of fear over hope, of anxiety over confidence, of darkness over light" (Ibid.) An observation on this point is that the discourse statements studied and presented in this thesis, excluding those related to the anti-media discourse, did show some other authoritarian markers in Trump's discourse if we are to follow Norris and Inglehart's definition above. This in regard to Trump's repeated appeal to the "fear of the other" to his people, and exclusion of the outgroup, "the Mexicans are rapists and murderers" for instance. On the other hand, one could argue that such statements by Trump, rather than being construed as an appeal colored by authoritarian ideological discourse, rather could be colored and driven forth by racist and nativist stirrings whom have long been a "shadowy presence" in republican politics, Trump merely shined a spotlight on it, and gave it mainstream appeal. Taking this logic one step further one could also argue that Trump as a republican shows courage by pinpointing and highlighting certain societal grievances – high

crime rates among immigrants, massive job loss, to low wage countries such as China – even though this might not please neoliberal elites who benefit economically from these trends (and, at the same time, are among the main sponsors of US-media and even academia).

Similarly, to the anti-media discourse the "unfair system discourse" is primarily presented through the lens of Sanders, but in both cases of Trump and Sanders this discourse places itself as an offshoot or as a sub-category of the anti-elite discourse. This aspect is also present in the anti-media discourse, where the media is treated as another elite to be against, (similarly to corporate elite, Washington elite etc.) The "unfair system discourse" is similar but also slightly different, in this branch both candidates present varying statements claiming that the political system itself is "rigged" in different ways. The word "rigged" is not chosen at random here, it's deliberate use instils a very particular notion or image in us the recipient, this image takes us right back to the very core of populism discourse, the notion that something is wrong. This shared commonality both in use of particular words and phrases are noteworthy, although we find similar tendencies in the anti-elite discourse for instance, it is here we perhaps see the most commonality between the different wings of the discourse. There are however differences, Sanders and Trump start out with similar notions of a rigged political system, in essence they both argue that the system is rigged in their opponents favor. It is at this point Trump stops his venture into this aspect of the populist discourse, he is content with claiming that the political elites have rigged first the primary elections in favor of his opponents, later in the 2016 campaign he would claim that the general election was rigged in Clinton's favor, aided by shadow organizations and the "fake news". Sanders adds further content to the discourse through his arguments. He rarely claims as directly as Trump that the election system is rigged against him personally, Sanders rather focuses on the issues of "Gerry-mandering" and "economic injustices" (wealth gap) to make his arguments that the system is rigged. Sanders takes a more "downwards up" or "grassroots" approach to this discourse branch than Trump, who focuses more on an "trickle down" or "upwards down" approach. Through his statements Sanders argues that society and the political system has been rigged by the "billionaires" through "Gerry-mandering" to enrich themselves on the behest of "the people" who are worse off for it. See for instance Statement S#15 as a clear example. Sanders thus appeals to the people at the bottom, to help him change the system so that it can seize to be rigged against them. Trump on the other hand argues that the elites have rigged the political process and the media to such an extent that he needs "the people" in large numbers to win. He argues that he is unable

to help "the people" by making America great again, because of this rigged system. In both dimensions of the discourse the elites are still placed squarely in the center as the causal factor triggering the "injustice" or feeling of a rigged system. Here we can also again reaffirm our operationalization of populism, as a discourse with a solid core, which is colored and given further context through the candidate's ideological leanings. We can draw slight parallels to republican economic policy and ideology of "trickle down economics", in Trumps anti media discourse, he too could have like Sanders, opted for a bottom up approach, saying that "the people" have been screwed over by the political elite. Trump claims this as well, but his main point in this discourse is still the notion that the system is rigged against *him*, and if he can overcome this "rigged system" he can make America great again, thus achieving a "trickle down effect" for the people.

In the anti-elites discourse Sanders yet again reaffirms his position, a position with very few additions or changes to it, unlike his counterpart, Sanders sticks largely to the same "elite" to be against, namely the billionaire class. In the vilification of this specific elite we can find more allusions to Sander's "out-group," namely the rich themselves. As stated in section 2.5, by clearly defining who "the people" are, Sanders also indirectly marks a group he cares little for, the billionaires. Sanders embrace of "his people" is largely rooted in his ideological leanings (socialism), which seeks to reduce the overall inequality apparent in society. Sander's thus stays squarely "on brand" throughout his discourse, no matter what he does or says, he finds a way to point out the differences of the wealth inequality between the "billionaire class" and the rest of the people. Trump takes a somewhat different approach to the anti-elite discourse, and subsequently his outgroup. In Trump's anti-elite discourse he steadily changes and updates the elites he is positioning himself against. Here we see another contrast to Sanders discourse, where Sanders constantly highlights the "hurt, and injustice" the elites are causing "the people", Trump does something similar yet different. On one hand he blames the different elites for the problems "the people" have, but he twists this point a bit, by constantly appealing to a sense of "fear and foreboding" in his followers. Through continued vilification of the chosen "out-group" (mainly, poor immigrants), Trump is instilling and repeating the notion of "fear of the other" caused by the elites poor leadership, but he, can fix it. Trump repeatedly find new elites to blame for the various things he thinks ails "the people", be it: his other republican opponents in the initial primary election, the political establishment in Washington (both parties and associated lobbyists), Hillary Clinton, Democrats in Congress, "unfair Judges" in the judicial

system or the media[12]. This ability to repeatedly find new "opponents" or elites to be in opposition to, could be a symptom of the "permanent campaign" nature Trump finds himself in. Through this act he also manages to sidestep a "problem" many scholars argue populists face once they are in office, namely that they become a part of the elite they have rebelled against. As mentioned Trump sidesteps this problem, by constantly and blazingly blaming everyone else for the lack of swift progress he promised on the initial campaign trail[13].

5.2 Additional findings

The candidates differ in the way they approach "the people". Sanders, as with previous discourses, is heavily influenced by socialist class discourse both in defining his "in-group" but also in his appeals to said group. Sanders discourse about "the people" would probably not have looked that much different had it been delivered in say the 1960s in the US, or for instance in a different western democracy like Norway (either in the 60s or today). Since his appeal and defined "inn-group" are so clearly colored and textured by his underlying ideology, it grounds his discourse clearly, although it does not change much, but neither does it need to. Sanders way of communicating is direct and to the point throughout all of his discourse. In contrast to his counterpart Sanders does not clearly push away or identify an "out-group" outside the frames we have discussed previously, by doing this Sanders keeps his discourse rooted in the inherent optimism of "the people" for a better tomorrow. Trump on the other hand, as we have established previously, appeals more clearly to the "inn-group" by clearly pushing away the "out-group". Trump in contrast to Sanders, does not in his discourse make clear attempts to define "the people", he keeps it all rather vague, electing rather to include whoever follows him on Twitter, or shows up to his rallies as "his people".

An aspect of this study that yielded surprisingly little fruit was the study of time axis. By the definitions of Hammer (2017) and Foucault (1972) a discourse is something in constant motion, ever changing and evolving. We did however chart very little "mass movement" in the discourses of the candidates over the years. Apart from the anti-media discourse which emerged clearly, and intensified greatly during the four-year time gap, little else in their respective discourses has seemingly evolved or changed. If we were to go into extreme detail we can chart the appearance of for instance "new anti-elite" branches for Trump, or new injustices from

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[12] This is a broad characterization of persons or groups Trump has spoken of as an elite, that stops him from fixing America.
[13] See for instance Blake, (2019) in *The Washington Post*: "Last week, Trump admitted his wall wasn't being built. Now, he's back to misleading".

Sanders, but no major movement in the core discourse was observed in the four-year span. One could argue that a possible reason for this lack of apparent evolution in the discourse is that these two candidates (both in their seventies) are at the height of their art discursively, that they have stretched their discourse as far as it can possibly go. A different approach might be to draw comparisons to other political discourses, or even the populist discourse itself, where we saw in section 2.3 that populism has evolved to serve different masters at different times, but the core ideals fueling the discourse has stayed relatively stable since they emerged in US politics in the 1890s.

5.3 Implications

In regard to possible implications for how we think about populism, one could argue that this thesis makes a good attempt at establishing the "common core" or "central core" of political populism discourse, further that the discourse sprouts in different directions based on the underlying political ideology of the candidates. This thesis has shown evidence through its intensive comparison of the discourse that such a core does indeed exist, and that it is not exclusively limited to the reference to "the people" but also "anti-elite" sentiments and exclusion of "out-groups". Further clear differences were observed in the discourse, both in the ways the candidates from the opposite wings of the political spectrum both approach populistic discourse, engage with it, and who they embrace, and who they target rooted in their respective ideological differences (or political party preferences). An area in which this thesis perhaps does not go far enough is to properly chart the breaking-line between what aspects of the discourse can be attributed to populism and which part that can be delineated to ideology, however the results and succeeding discussion does show that we within the political populist discourse can find commonalities across party lines, but also stark differences in the discourse which shows clear ties to ideological discourses, (like socialist discourse for Sanders.)

5.4 Conclusion

Nearing the end, we return to the introduction and the research question: *How, and or if, does the populist discourses of Trump and Sanders fit within the theoretical frames of populism.* One of the main challenges the literature presents us with in this thesis is that there is not *one*, established frame for populism, there are multiple where scholars are still debating which holds most merit. This thesis seeks to add to this debate, through an intensive comparison of political populist discourse in the US. A trend in the literature this thesis sought to bridge, is the apparent "over-focus" on right wing populist movements, particularly in the west, by focusing on populism as a whole in the US defining it as a discourse. Such a definition is best suited to

capture both sides of the political spectrum in the US. The thesis establishes through selected literature a frame, or lens, we can view populistic discourse through. Through this lens we find evidence of "a common core" of the populistic discourse, a core which both Trump and Sanders fit into. We also find that the candidates ideological leanings color their respective discourse, which highlight stark differences in the populist discourse. In so doing this thesis seeks to cast new light over a relatively under-studied aspect of populistic discourse. Other studies regarding populism as a discourse has mainly focused on Latin America and or Europe, a select few has focused on the United States. In this case the selection of Trump and Sanders serve as good proxies for the populistic political discourse from both parties, both candidates being considered "outsiders". By selecting material from social media (Twitter) we get access to unmediated direct statements from the candidates, to further bolster the discourse outside Twitter messages, statements from campaign announcement speeches were included to give more breadth to the discourse.

Considerations regarding future research in this area. One could perhaps conduct further research on this topic to develop better analysis tools to differentiate and delineate which parts of a discourse are colored by populism and which are colored by ideology. One could for instance argue that Trump is more of a complete populist than Sanders, that he is less colored by ideology, a study charting said driving forces could show promise. In such a case a study using the methodology of Hawkins (2009) with a could be a good place to start for such an analysis, to determine whether Trump is more populist than Sanders. Finally taking this thesis to it's perhaps obvious next step, by including candidates from other countries than the US, to do a broader more thorough examination of political populist discourse in say, western democracies, then perhaps expanding the scope further to include candidates from all continents.

The field of populism research is vibrant, where the lack of an established academic consensus warrants further studies of this somewhat elusive concept. This study has taken a step to better understand populism as a discourse. In some cases, it might be sufficient to know something "when we see it", but as populist movement across the west gain more traction, we as scientists should strive to understand this phenomena from all its angels and depts, not just its surface appearance.

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Appendix 1.

Following is a list of Tweets referenced in the thesis by both candidates of this study. These will be marked by their statement number from the main text followed by a direct URL.

[Statement S#4]

https://twitter.com/BernieSanders/status/1020466126961168390

[Statement S#5]

https://twitter.com/BernieSanders/status/595264188831797248

[Statement S#9]

https://twitter.com/BernieSanders/status/602203107087388673

[Statement S#10]

https://twitter.com/BernieSanders/status/1105848907936997376

[Statement S#11]

https://twitter.com/BernieSanders/status/597438485809606657

[Statement S#12]

https://twitter.com/BernieSanders/status/597854434463449089

[Statement S#14]

https://twitter.com/BernieSanders/status/1096064897467715584

[Statement S#15]

https://twitter.com/BernieSanders/status/1121058539634593794

[Statement S#16]

https://twitter.com/BernieSanders/status/734728106078920704

[Statement S#17]

https://twitter.com/BernieSanders/status/746516300243951616

[Statement S#18]

https://twitter.com/BernieSanders/status/1013555096397860865

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[Statement T#1]

https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/758238226180083712

[Statement T#4]

https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/809790978332786689

[Statement T#6]

https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/613908916871790592

[Statement T#8]

https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/612066176294866945

[Statement T#9]

https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/612076000529268736

[Statement T#10]

https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/612083064945180672

[Statement T#13]

https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/640279939061841920

[Statement T#14]

https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/638804903083778048

[Statement T#15]

https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/6413364094843166

[Statement T#16]

https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/788403448593002496

[Statement T#18]

https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/611200270203273216

[Statement T#19]

https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/622399905441583104

[Statement T#20]

https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/807588632877998081

[Statement T#21]

https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/832708293516632065

[Statement T#22]

https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1107981131012628481

Appendix 2.

Following is a list of statements gathered from excerpts made by the candidates in campaign speeches from political rallies, and also excerpts from a TV-interview. First, the sources for the statements will be presented. Then, in similar fashion to appendix 1 the statements will be marked following their statement number from the main text, followed by a citation, including timestamp. ¨

Sources:

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[Statement S#1] C-span, 2015, timestamp: 28:48

[Statement S#2] C-span, 2015, timestamp: 1:01:45

[Statement S#3] CBS,2019 timestamp: 05:30

[Statement S#6] C-span, 2015, timestamp: 28:25

[Statement S#7] C-span, 2015 timestamp: 32:12

[Statement S#8] CBS,2019, timestamp: 02:17

[Statement S#13] C-span, 2015 timestamp 34:30

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[Statement T#2] Factba.se, 2015, timestamp: 15:16

[Statement T#3] Factba.se, 2015 timestamp: 26:58

[Statement T#5] Factba.se, 2017 timestamp: 04:10

[Statement T#7] Factba.se, 2015, timestamp: 01:56

[Statement T#11] Factba.se, 2017, timestamp:08:12

[Statement T#12] Factbase.se, 2015, timestamp: 16:06

[Statement T#17] Factba.se, 2016, timestamp: 14:05