

Are Sino-African Relations Mutually Advantageous?

An Analysis of The Use of Soft Power And Influence On The African Continent.

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Introduction

This essay will seek to explore the rise of soft power of China through looking at the Sino-African relationship and how the relationship has grown stronger the last few decades. This essay will attempt to answer this conundrum by examining the different ways one can use soft power, as a tool for raising a country's level of influence. This essay will attempt to answer the research question: Is the Sino-African relationship a mutually advantageous one? The findings will show that the relationship is beneficial for the leaders of both African countries and China economically and politically.

In the attempt of doing this, the essay will define the term "soft power" with the help of political scientist Joseph Nye who argues that soft power has grown to be as important as the traditional hard power as a result of the growing interdependence of countries' economies. After the essay has established what soft power is, and how it can be used to increase ones influence, the focus will shift to influence, more specifically the different variables of exercising influence.

K.J Holsti (1995) gives a great analysis of how countries can exercise influence in his book "International Politics: A Framework for Analysis", which gives five key variables of exercising influence. In the second part of the theoretical aspect of the essay, these five points will be examined, as well as exemplified of practical situations where they may be applied. Examining these five points will help to understand China's actions on the African continent further by hopefully giving an overview of what they may gain in terms of influence. From that point the essay will take a look at the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank Group and the World Trade Organization, as we seek to understand where China might exercise their influence.

We will be studying the Bretton Woods organizations from a historical point of view to begin with, this will be to further understand how the aforementioned organizations came to be, explaining why they are built the way they are with the power structures favoring the United States and Europe. Following the historical overview of the organizations, we will look at central criticisms aimed at these institutions from an anti-globalization-movement point of view. The criticism we will be looking at suggests that the institutions are built in a way that ensures hegemony of the western powers over the international economy, thus keeping the balance of power in a state that favors the west and more specifically the United states of America.

When we've gone through the most important aspects of the criticism the IGOs have received, we will look at China's economical and industrial revolution, starting with the Mao-regime in the aftermath of World War 2, through Deng Xiaoping, and examine where they are today. In the process the essay will also be studying their historical perception of the world order and reveal how it has always been one of suspicion and caution. This section will be analyzed with the help of Henry Kissinger's *World Order*, where he argues that the main difference of ideologic belief in the Sino-American relationship lies in China's rejection of the idea that the spread of liberal democracy and human rights is an obligation of the international community.

After we have discussed the theoretical matter, we will move on to see what has been going on in the Sino-African relationship. In this section of the essay the data will show a sharp rise in investments over the last couple of decades stemming from China towards the African continent, investments that have mainly been made towards infrastructure and cultural buildings. The essay will be doing this by looking at general investments China has made in African infrastructure, before examining the Sino-Sudan and the Sino-Angolan relationship more closely.

Soft Power

Joseph Nye defines soft power as "the ability of a country to structure a situation so that other countries develop preferences or define their interests in ways consistent with its own." (Nye, 1990. P168) By using instruments of one's soft power, such as cultural attraction and an attractive ideology, a country will be more likely to attract other countries to follow their way of doing things. The defining wording of Joseph Nye's definition that opposes the characteristics most people would ascribe the term that is power, is that the use of soft power *encourages* rather than coerces other countries to develop preferences that match those of the country using the instruments of soft power. The classical approach of using hard power to make other countries do as you want consists of ordering, while the soft-power approach consists more of persuasion by structuring a situation that encourages the other state to "want what you want". Nye (1990) compares the use of soft power to that of parenting, arguing that when raising a child, a parent will get further by shaping their child's beliefs and values than by relying on constant control. In political science this notion can be converted to say that it's easier to influence countries by shaping their political and societal culture over time, than to be reliant on applying political and/or economic pressure as a controlling mechanism. (Nye, 1990. P165-166)

American political scientist, Joseph Nye argues that soft co-optive power is just as important as the traditional hard power; he argues that if a country's power is legitimate it will meet less resistance from other countries. If it can make international norms consistent with its society, it is less likely to have to change, and if it supports and helps build institutions and manages to form these with similar ideological views as their own, they'll be less likely to be forced to use an expensive method of hard power in the future. (Nye,1990. P167) These measures work as a precaution towards future encounters in international politics and relations as setting the agenda for future negotiations or diplomatic exchanges helps the country structure these encounters within a narrative that fits the agenda they've helped set in place. These structures will in theory then work in their benefit in IGOs (International governmental organizations) such as the UN or the WB without the need of military interference or other measures from the state.

Nye sees the increased importance of soft power as a result of globalization and the interdependence it has created across borders and continents. An open economy and increased social mobility seem to have enhanced the need for close relations amongst countries and within the realms of international organizations whether it be through official or unofficial channels. Large countries simply can't afford to intervene in smaller countries to push their agendas through the use of hard power as they were able to some decades ago, not due to the push back from the country they wish to influence, but rather due to the pushback it may receive from the international community and the economical or political cost that comes with it.

The Key Variables of Exercising Influence

The first of five variables Holsti (1995) lists as key in exercising influence is the relevancy of the resources a country inhabits. Consider the Vietnam War and the relative military strength of the USA versus that of north Vietnam, with a special focus on the nuclear capability of the USA. With the nuclear devices the United States had in its possession one would think north Vietnam would fear an imminent nuclear attack on its soil and act in coherence with this fear. This was not the case, Holsti (1995) argues that this lack of fear towards the nuclear recourse of the western power was born out of an irrelevancy of nuclear capability to the situation. Holsti (1995) argues that the mere quantity of a certain recourse a country possesses in any given political situation does not equate to the country's influence, the relevance of the resource, as well as the country's willingness to use it must also be accounted for. (Holsti 1995. P122-123)

The second variable can be described as an interdependence between two countries in any influence relationship. It is significantly tougher to influence a country that has no dependence on support or trade from the influencing country, as the influencing country will have little to no leverage in a negotiating situation. (Holsti 1995. P123) In earlier decades when the economy was not as open for trade as it is today, countries would more often tend to use force to influence other countries rather than diplomatic measures. This, in practical terms, means that a country with an open economy could more easily be influenced than those with closed economies, as they'll be more dependent on trade with other countries.

A third variable is described by Holsti (1995) as technical experience, with a special focus on the ability to gather knowledge. The importance of technical expertise has, according to Holsti (1995), advanced in coherence with the evolution of increased availability of tools of globalization that lets governments easily understand cultures, alliances and geographical matters in countries and continents far away from its own borders. (Holsti 1995. P123) As this book was written in 1995, the availability of such tools will only have increased and evolved during the last twenty-four years. Whether the increased availability of these tools will have strengthened or weakened technical expertise as a variable for exercising influence will depend on whether important information at this point is readily accessible to all, or if the information not readily to all has become even more valuable.

The fourth variable Holsti (1995) discusses is responsiveness or more precisely: "the willingness to be influenced" (Holsti 1995. S124). This variable can be described as a willingness a country possesses to accept temporary loss of resources in order to help another country with important issues it faces. An example of this could be entering agreements that in more beneficial to the partner country, especially if that country is weaker positioned economically or politically. Acts like these might seem costly in the short term but could, however, bring significant gains in the long haul through future allegiance or cooperation with other nations.

The fifth and final variable Holsti (1995) lists as key for exercising influence is related to "costs and commitment" (Holsti 1995. S124). The more prior commitments a country has, the less susceptible it will inevitably be to influence. This will be the case due to the costs that will come with breaking their prior commitments. If there are no costs, the variable of prior commitments will not apply to the same extent. The cost associated with turning one's back

on prior commitments is, in other words the reason a country with prior commitments will be tougher to influence than those without.

Following these five variables affecting the exercise of influence, Holsti (1995) provides six ways influence can be exercised: Persuasion: this method implies simply discussing a proposal and eliciting a favorable response to the issue at hand. The offer of rewards: A promises to reward B financially or politically. The granting of rewards: In instances where a governments credibility is not very high, a country might insist a reward be given in advance as a show of good faith. The threat of punishment: Threatening to increase tariffs, withdraw foreign aid or otherwise weaken its relations with the other country. The infliction of non-violent punishment: Carrying out threats it has made in hopes of altering a country's behavior. The last of the six ways influence can be exercised is by force: The use of violent measures.

Bretton Woods

After World War II the European powers together with the United States of America ended their period of protectionist policy that dominated the interwar period. In addition, they were looking for ways to make countries more dependent on one another, seeing that a state of interdependence was less vulnerable to conflict. In this period, many of the International Governmental organizations we know to this day were created. Organizations such as: The International Monetary Fund, the International Bank (now called the World Bank Group) and General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) which later developed into the World Trade Organization were all established in the wake of the second World War and are known as the Bretton Woods organizations.

As the planning and creation of the Bretton Woods organizations were done by European countries along with the United States of America, the values and organizational structure of the organizations are to certain extents influenced by western ideals. The president of the World Bank Group sits on a five-year term, and is traditionally American, whilst the managing director of the IMF is traditionally European, it is worth mentioning that there have been no exceptions to this general tradition as of 2019.

A number of anti-globalization theorists have criticized the Bretton Woods organizations for being built as a mechanism to retain US hegemony in the international economy. The criticism from some go even further as to suggesting that in the current setup of Bretton Woods organizations, countries with developing economies find it tougher to grow their

economy due to certain aspects of the IMF that hinders them from competing in the open on equal grounds as the fully industrialized countries in the open market. In doing so it hinders the economic growth and keeps the developing countries in poverty. (Buckman, 2005)

The reasoning behind this criticism lies particularly in the weighting of votes when members are to vote on a resolution, where certain criteria decides how many votes each country are allowed to cast. In the IMF for instance, a supermajority of 85% of the voting power is needed to change a country's weight of voting. The US has a quota of 17.46% of the total votes, which in effect means they have a de-facto veto on any decisions regarding the changes made in the weighing of votes. China, as the second largest economy, has a quota of 6.42%. In practice this means that any decision the US does not approve of, may be "vetoed" if they see fit. Each country's votes are cast in bulks with other countries represented by an executive director on the executive board. Seven countries have their own executive director on the executive board, these are China, The United States, Japan, The United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia, Germany and France. (Paloni, 2006. P27-28)

Those who criticize the weight of voting in the Bretton Woods organizations have made a distinction between "voting weight" and "voting power", where the former is the country's quota and the latter is how much power a country's vote has over the outcome of the voting. In a case where Japan would want to change the weights of voting, with the US disagreeing, Japan's voting power would be far less than their weight of vote, due to the need for a supermajority of 85%. The voting power of countries with developing and underdeveloped economies would be non-existent even in comparison with that of Japan. As the weighting of votes is quite common in NGOs the majority of the voting power will always reside with strongest country with the most powerful allies as exemplifies in the IMF.

Chinese Foreign Policy

China has historically had a complicated relationship with the international order and the powers that be. During the early 1900s, the leading Asian power was Japan, a country with an expansionist policy that sought to exercise its influence by using force, occupying Manchuria and stretches of central and eastern China in 1937. China then came out as a victor of the second World War, leading to Mao Zedong establishing the Democratic Republic of China, proclaiming a China that would strengthen itself through a state of "continuous revolution" (Kissinger 2014. P221). With Mao and the Chinese communist party "The entire institutional spectrum came under attack: Western democracy, Soviet leadership of the communist world,

and the legacy of the Chinese past.” (Kissinger 2014. P221) The traditional Chinese culture was blamed for having caused a passiveness that paved the way for foreign intrusion. The distaste for the established institutions and the powers that be continued until Mao’s reign ended. The reign of Mao did lead to revolutionary plans such as the great leap. These plans led to a great deal of human loss but ultimately Mao’s idea of continuous revolution did succeed in kick-starting the industrialization of China. The economic growth would however be further accelerated under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping. (Kissinger 2015. S223-224)

Under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping China opened up its society and reformed its economy, pursuing what Xiaoping defined as “socialism with Chinese characteristics.” (Kissinger 2015. S224) This was during the late 1970s, amidst the turmoil that came with the Cold War between the then two superpowers: The Soviet Union and the United States of America. In this period, China entered into an international state system that was built without their participation, built on Westphalian principles something senior leaders had expressed concerns with. Kissinger proclaims the senior figures in Chinese politics expect the international order to gradually evolve to a state where China has a central role in international rule making, which would be more in line with the military and financial power the country possesses. Meanwhile China has become more active on the world scene, gaining soft power by acts such as hosting the Olympics and reciprocal visits with world leaders, regaining its historical stature as a nation with great influence. (Kissinger S222-226)

The interesting question, and one this essay aims to shed light on, is in what ways China seeks to chance the face of world politics, imposing its influence on the structures that the western powers have become accustomed to. We have, as China has become more and more active on the world stage, seen examples of China exercising its influence. Following Liu Xiaobo receiving the Nobel peace for his humanitarian work towards ending the one-party rule in China, Chinese froze its diplomatic relations with Norway, this had a massive impact on Norwegian fishing-industries as the Chinese market has become what it is today

A peek into the ideas China values regarding international relations was given by Deng Xiaoping:

National sovereignty is far more important than human rights, but the Group of Seven (or eight) often infringe upon the sovereignty of the poor, weak countries of the third world. Their talk about human rights, freedom and democracy is designed only to safeguard the

interests of the strong, rich countries, which take advantage of their strength to bully weak countries, and which pursue hegemony and practice power politics. (Kissinger 2015. S230)

This quote might help explain China's non-interference-policy, further elaborating on why the country so often votes against interfering in countries deemed as tyrannical or violating the human rights by most in the international community. The country's philosophy is merely built upon a different set of values than that of the western society, or of the "group of seven" that Xiaoping refers to. China seeks not to interfere in matters it deems beyond their control, beyond their borders and beyond their responsibilities as a nation. The quote also speaks volumes on what Xiaoping sees as the end-goal of many of the western powers – to build a hegemony hiding behind a smokescreen they often refer to as the responsibility to protect. The quote can furthermore be interpreted as a critique of the many obligations that come with human aid given to countries of the third world, obligations China notoriously do not attach in agreements with countries they might not share ideology with.

African Politics

African politics is in the west depicted in the West as turbulent and corrupt with power shifting as a result of conflict rather than democratic elections. One hears of presidents ruling over a matter of decades rather than over terms of years with greater influence over political matters than what we are accustomed to in the liberal-democratic West. Western media heavily covered the Arab Spring with the uprising of protests in countries such as Libya, against the tyrannical rule of Muammar Al-Ghaddafi and in Egypt against Hosni Mubarak. Protests that were coined the Arab Spring and led to change of rule in those two countries as well as in others. Popular western movies have been made depicting civil war in African countries, such as "The Last King of Scotland", depicting Idi Amin's rise and fall from power in Uganda and Hotel Rwanda, depicting the conflict between the Hutu's and the Tutsi's resulting in an attempted ethnic cleans of Tutsi's.

The acts of Idi Amin in Uganda, and the actions of radical Hutu's in Rwanda were horrible acts against humanity. What led up to both of the tragic war-crimes were, however, the same influences that led to battles in the streets of Egypt and Libya in the Arab Spring, a fear of losing power. The fear of losing power resides with today's leaders of African countries who have come to power undemocratically. To stay in power, the leaders (Presidents, dictators or monarchs) depend heavily on threats, and the carrying out of threats, as well as material

benefits to supporters, without which, the ruling elites in neo-patrimonial Africa countries would not be able to govern. (Taylor, 2007)

The Sino-African Relationship

In trying to improve the effectiveness of aid, OECD countries met in Rome in 2003, then in Paris in 2005 and agreed on the Paris Declaration of Aid Effectiveness. Aid from China is programmed in a similar fashion, they however rarely give budget support as is often the case with the OECD countries. Another major difference lies in the strings that are attached with the aid given to third world countries. Where the OECD countries' aid often (though not listed in the Paris declaration) contain political constraints, the Eight Principles for China's Aid to Foreign Countries (1964) lists: "In providing aid to other countries, the Chinese Government strictly respects the sovereignty of the recipient countries, and never attaches any conditions or asks for any privileges" as its second principle out of the eight. This bullet point may be a considerable reason why Chinese aid seems more favorable than that of the OECD countries. One condition that does apply however, is that China only gives aid to countries it has diplomatic ties with. (Bräutigam (2010)

A great deal of the investments made by the Chinese on the African continent is not made directly using the financials of the state, but rather by corporations within China that have been strongly encouraged by the government to invest in different sections of Africa as a part of Beijing's 'going out' policy. (Fijalkowski, 2011) To be able to convince privately owned businesses to invest in foreign lands by assisting them with practical information and subsidizing them is a great advantage for the Chinese government to have, but it does not come without a set of challenges. A growing dismay has begun to form amongst Africans in different states about the Chinese corporations working within their lands, with concerns of where the money is going. Some have also become unhappy with the lack of employment opportunities within the companies, as they often bring their own workforce. This comes as a concern to the leaders in Beijing who seek to promote a positive image of China in Africa. These problems could have been easily solved if it were not private actors engaging in Africa, but rather state-owned enterprises.

One of the five key variables of influence the essay discussed earlier was the relevancy of a given resource. The resource of being able to influence privately owned enterprises in their country is a considerably strong one to have for China to use if they are to succeed with their

‘going out policy’. This resource might however become irrelevant if they are no longer able to influence these corporations once it has invested in foreign lands. The variable of influence of domestic corporations will especially become irrelevant if the aim is to enhance their reputation or increase their soft power in Africa. This aim becomes tougher to accomplish when “the gap between bureaucratic principals and corporate agents’ goals are widening and there is already evidence of Chinese corporations taking steps that are at odds with Chinese government interests”. (Fijalkowski, 2011)

The last quarter of a decade one has seen a significant rise in co-operation between the great power of Asia that is China, and a number of African nations. In the short span of five years, between 2000 and 2005, the trade between China and Africa rose from 10bn\$ to 28bn\$ (French, 2014). These are comparatively small numbers compared to an import-export total of 116bn\$ in the first seven months of 2018. (Li, 2018) In addition to the rise in trade, diplomatic ties have grown stronger, the amounts and sizes of investments have grown larger and visits between leaders have become more frequent. A number of political scientists have dug into this theme in search of China’s intentions on its “second continent” (French 2014), their intention’s French (2014) suggest, may be more complicated and focused on the long-term than seen through an analysis based on empirical data. (Alden, 2006) A complete of infrastructure build with the help of Chinese aid is quite impossible to make, as China keeps its aid hidden from the public. (Alden, 2006) It is possible that a general theme of their investments can be seen through showing a small sample of their major investments over the last few decades.

The first contribution China officially made to the African continent in terms of aid was their contribution to the building of The TAZARA Railway, also known as the TamZam Railway. The TAZARA Railway stretches from the eastern parts of Tanzania, to the coast of Zambia and was opened in 1975, at that time being the only route Zambia’s Copperbelt could take if trading in bulk without having to surpass white-minority governments of Rhodesia or South-Africa. China’s contribution to the TAZARA Railway is interestingly enough to this day their largest aid-project. Joining TAZARA on Alden’s list is football stadiums and foreign ministry buildings in different countries of Africa. (Alden, 2006)

This contribution was made as early as the 1970s, long before China had grown into the (arguably) economic superpower they are today. What this shows us is that China’s African endeavors are not something new, the country has been an actor on the African stage for

several decades building up its soft power by tightening its bonds with the governments and people of African states through major, popular investments. This investment portrays a classic example of the fourth variable Holsti (1995) listed as key to exercising influence, where China, itself a developing country at the time, accepted a temporary loss of resources to help a country in need of its help.

As early as 1993, the Chinese state-owned oil company (CNPC) purchased oil refineries in Algeria worth \$350m, it has since invested large amounts of money into partnerships with oil and gas companies in Sudan, Angola, Algeria and Gabon. The pattern of China's investments in Africa follows a pattern of investing in established companies within the industry rather than buying the rights for future exploration on its own. One of the aforementioned countries, Sudan, is by some estimates assumed to be China's leading overseas investment targets to date. (Alden, 2006) A country that in the recent years have been in armed conflict with the recently established country of South-Sudan, as well as being war-torn by militias within their own borders, China is taking risks investing large sums into the country's economy. With the president of Sudan additionally being accused of war crimes, the western countries typically steer clear of major investments in the country, with the US, as mentioned earlier, having placed them on the list of countries funding terrorism.

The Sudanese Case

Al-Bashir seized power in the country of Sudan through a coup with the political party National Islamic Front (NIF) in 1986 after gaining only 6% in a democratic popular vote the same year and swiftly implemented strict Sharia-law in the country, implementing amongst other punishments, public floggings and cross-amputations, this in addition to harboring Osama Bin-Laden in its country until 1996. Al-Bashir has become less radical since the early stages of his rule, bettering the economy before loosening the restrictions on exports and imports, cutting ties with the most radical figures of the NIF as well as welcoming back political figures previously exiled. Sudan strengthened its ties with neighboring states Egypt while Mubarak was in power, a man they once attempted to have assassinated, Uganda, a country they continuously have undermined through financing rebel-groups, as well as contributing to peace-negotiations between Eritrea and Ethiopia. It has since signed the 1997 International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings and the 1999 International Convention for the Suppression for the Financing of Terrorism. Sudan however

remains on the US list of terrorist sponsors, which means that trade sanctions remain from the US. (Martin, 2002. S116)

The following proceedings in Sudan concerning its president Al-Bashar is one of special interest for this essay. Omar Al-Bashir has been wanted by the ICC for war crimes since 2005, claiming he committed (amongst other allegations) genocide. Two arrest warrants have also been issued, one in 2009 and one in 2010. (coalitionfortheicc) The reaction to the warrant shows the divide in interests between the liberal-democratic countries and countries such as China and Russia, where the former support the ICC's decision, while the latter question it. Russia expressed its concerns about "the possible negative developments of events in Sudan following the application of the Prosecutor of the ICC», while China called the indictment "an inappropriate decision, taken at an inappropriate time" (Ciampi, 2009).

The disagreements over whether the indictment from the ICC was justifiable were discussed to the extent that a vote for deferral was discussed in the security council of the UN. The main reason the deferral never materialized was that the US expressed that it would have voted against it. An actual arrest hasn't materialized yet, despite the arrest-order being issued fourteen years ago. During these fourteen years Al-Bashir has visited several countries currently members of the ICC, all of which have either failed to, or refused to, place him under arrest. Among those countries was China, though they are not a member of the ICC (Ciampi, 2009).

The welcoming of Al-Bashir from Beijing may be seen as a disapproval of the legitimacy of the ICC by Chinese leadership. Openly refusing to accept the demands of the NGO undermines their power, while also asking the international society what they are willing to do about it. China is now in a position where there are few who dare to challenge them openly, as they are such an important trading partner to have due to their large economy which both imports goods from, and exports goods to, most countries. Sanctions from China would be detrimental to most countries, which is why they seek to be on their good side, publicly speaking out against them therefore is not something a country, or an NGO, does lightly. China seems to have structured a narrative of international diplomacy that fits their agenda, as was a feature of the use of soft power that was discussed earlier.

The welcoming of ICC-charged Al-Bashir also goes to show that Xiaoping's statement a few decades ago still stands. They view the situation as the ICC imposing its influence on matters that are Sudan's to deal with, challenging their sovereignty in the name of human rights.

China, as Xiaoping eloquently expressed during his reign, values sovereignty higher than the smokescreens of human rights and liberal democracy the western powers hide behind to exercise their influence. Hosting a visit from Al-Bashir might in that sense be a way of showing the world that China no longer wants to blindly oblige to the norms and customs created by the group of seven during America's hegemony.

The Angolan Case

The Angolan Civil war was a conflict that lasted from 1975-2002. It was a war fueled by wealth accumulated through natural resources, where the fighting matter was the control of the vast amounts of natural resources the country possesses. Amidst the civil war, Angola was ranked 160/174 by the UN Human Development Index. (Frynas, 2001. S1) Since the war ended in 2002, the economy of Angola grew to become one of the most successful in Sub-Saharan Africa with the help of China's technical and financial support in over 100 projects in areas ranging from energy and water to fisheries and public works within 2007. (Campos, 2008. S1)

The Sino-Angolan relationships dates back to the era of Angola under the colonial power of Portugal. China financially supported the liberation movements of three separate groups struggling to decolonialize the country. Tensions grew between the ruling party of Angola during the 70s, leading China not to recognize the newly liberated country. Their first trade agreement was signed in 1988, with several agreements following that shifted their collaboration from one of arms, to one of trade. Angola grew to be the second largest trading-partner of Sub-Saharan Africa, Jose Eduardo Dos Santos, Angola's president called the Sino-Angolan relationship: "mutually advantageous (...) "pragmatic (with) political preconditions." (Campos, 2008. S1-4) China is heavily invested in the country's energy sector, as was the case in Sudan.

Mutually Beneficial Relationship

This essay began with defining the term soft power as "the ability of a country to structure a situation so that other countries develop preferences or define their interests in ways consistent with its own." (Nye, 1990. P168) The way China has structured situations that have made African countries' preferences in line with its own is through their foreign policy guidelines, as well as through economic measures such as aid and investments over a sustained period of time. China's "no strings attached" foreign-investment policy has seemed

preferable to the foreign-investment policies from OECD countries that, more often than not, are lined with political and/or economic terms.

The difference in strings attached to investments and aid can be seen in context with four of the five key ways Holsti (1995) lists as ways of exercising influence. These four are the promise of rewards, the granting of rewards, the threat of punishment and the carrying out of punishment. While the liberal-democratic countries who cherish human rights, open economies and democracy seeks to influence African countries such as Sudan or Angola with the use of threats of punishment or the carrying out of punishment, China exercises its influence by the promise of, or granting of, rewards without the threat of or execution of punishment so long as the other party accepts the one-China policy. The threat from the liberal-democratic countries will typically be no longer giving aid or threatening to impose trade-tariffs as the one the US still has in Sudan if a country doesn't make political or humanitarian changes.

This essay has focused mainly on the positive and negative effects the political leaders of China and the African countries face as a result of the growing ties in Sino-African relations, without discussing the consequences facing the people of the African states of the essays' interest. Western ideals such as freedom of speech, a free press and the freedom of religious beliefs aren't values' the Sudanese or the Angolan people enjoy to the extent the citizens of European or northern American states are accustomed to, nor are the Sudanese or Angolan regimes likely to be influenced into granting these freedoms by China.

The citizens of African countries with developing economies have not, according to the anti-globalizations-theorist, benefited from the current international economic policies. They argue that the systems in place, particularly the system of the Bretton Woods organizations, are built in a fashion that hinders sustainable growth for developing economies. If the anti-globalization theorists are correct in their findings, the people of African countries with developing economies may benefit from a shift in power structures and Chinese influence rather than OECD influence.

It is easy to see why several African leaders find the Sino-African relationship as one that benefits them. Close ties with China hands them the opportunity of exporting a vast amount of natural resources to a country with significant resources, while still retaining the sovereignty to rule as they see fit within their own borders. China has demonstrated through their welcoming of Al-Bashir into Beijing in 2011 that they won't cast aside a fruitful

relationship when faced with international pressure and, in doing so, has protected the interests of regimes the west deems unfit. These two factors, Chinese investments strengthening their economy supporting (at the very least not protesting) their way of ruling make the Sino-African partnership an advantageous one for African states.

China's interest in Africa may be a more complicated matter to analyze. Among the main focal points of their African endeavors is without a doubt the access to a vast amount of important natural resources in the energy sector. A great deal of their major investments on the continent have been in the oil sector, with Angola being their main source of oil on the continent. The fast-paced growth of China's economy has led to the urbanization of its people, something which inevitably has increased the need for natural resources in order to sustain the growth they have been experiencing. A logical answer to this challenge was to seek alternative sources of energy, which, among other places, they found in politically unstable parts of Africa.

Creating ties with African countries can also have long-lasting diplomatic effects for China. Leaders of the Asian power see the African continent as having unfulfilled potential and are committed to helping them develop by investing heavily in their infrastructure as well as through the well documented trade, helping them reach their potential. A secondary goal with their major investments and trade deals on the African continent will be that other countries they invest in develop in the same mold as Angola who has strengthened their economy and infrastructure, thus becoming a regional power. Angola's economic rise is still in the early stages, but if it becomes the force it, through its vast amounts of natural resources has the potential to become, China will have helped create an influential ally for itself.

There is precedence for the tactic of helping to build or rebuild countries' economies as a way of strengthening ties. This was something the US did after the second world with the Marshall Plan along with the aforementioned Bretton Woods' organizations. The Marshall plan was a measure set in place as to help rebuilding Europe after the devastating effects of the second World War, which had left Europe in ruins. The post-war European situation was not unlike the conditions Angola found itself in following the Angolan civil war. Whether the rise of Angolan economy will be as swift and far-reaching as that of the Western-European, however, remains to be seen.

The empirical data, supported by the theoretical approach in this essay, has shown that the Sino-African relationship is a mutually beneficial one.

NB:

Al-Bashir was overthrown by the Sudanese military in the middle of April 2019.

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