A cosmopolitan–communitarian cleavage around the world? Evidence from ideological polarization and party–voter linkages

Oliver Strijbis, Joshua Helmer and Pieter de Wilde

Abstract

Can structural conflict over globalization be observed outside Western Europe? When does such a cosmopolitan–communitarian cleavage emerge? These questions are highly relevant as similar conflicts over open borders seem to take place in various countries. To answer these questions, we analyze electoral competition on issues related to globalization such as migration and international integration in Germany, Mexico, Poland, Turkey, and the U.S. We investigate ideological polarization on these two issues at the level of both voters and parties, as well as their linkage through structural and issue voting. At the level of the voters, we analyze preferences on the two issue dimensions with data from the World Values Survey. In order to arrive at valid measures of parties' policy positions on the same dimensions, we combine data from electoral manifestos, public claims data, and expert surveys. Finally, we link voters' structural positions and issue preferences with parties' policy positions through a series of ordered logistic regressions. Our comparative analysis reveals that in our sample a cosmopolitan–communitarian cleavage can be observed only among the affluent immigration countries. We discuss potential explanations for this finding.

Introduction

In Western Europe, a new type of conflict is rocking societies and party systems, pitting the winners of a liberal world order with open borders and international integration against its losers. Opponents to immigration, European integration and free trade can be found on both the far left and far right of the political spectrum, while mainstream parties tend to be more supportive. At the same time, the Dutch elections of 2017 demonstrate that strong electoral campaigning in favour of open borders and the EU – as GroenLinks and D66 did – can also be a winning strategy. This conflict has been described as an emerging globalization cleavage (Kriesi *et al.* 2008, 2012; Hooghe and Marks 2017; De Wilde *et al.*, forthcoming) as the central issues of conflict – immigration and European integration – concern the degree, intensity and velocity with which societal interaction crosses state borders (Held *et al.* 1999). This conflict cross-cuts the traditional class and confessional cleavages identified by Lipset and Rokkan (1967). The opposing sides have been labeled GAL vs TAN (Hooghe *et al.* 2002), integration vs demarcation (Kriesi *et al.* 2008), or cosmopolitanism vs. communitarianism (Bornschier 2010; Teney *et al.* 2014; Zürn and De Wilde 2016; De Wilde *et al.* forthcoming). Cleavages have profound structuring effects on democratic politics. The extent to which a new cleavage on globalization exists may thus help us explain and understand the dynamics and logics of democratic politics in Western societies for years to come.

What remains unclear, however, is whether this cosmopolitan−communitarian cleavage is a peculiarity of Western Europe. If globalization stands at the roots of this conflict, it logically ought to be observable outside of Western Europe. The victory of Donald Trump in 2016, where he successfully combined opposition to immigration with opposition to free trade and pending international trade deals, appears to indicate that this conflict does indeed travel beyond Western Europe, yet provides limited evidence

only. Hence, this article tries to answer the following two questions, one descriptive and one analytical: Does a global cleavage between cosmopolitans and communitarians exist? And, if not, how can we explain variance in the existence of the cosmopolitan−communitarian cleavage across countries?

In the following, we describe and comparatively analyze the cosmopolitan−communitarian cleavage in Germany, Mexico, Poland, Turkey and the U.S.A. This unique case selection allows for the investigation of both the descriptive and the analytical questions and further allows us to conclude with some certainty whether the cosmopolitan−communitarian cleavage is a global phenomenon. The design reflects a most different systems design. While these five countries differ strongly in political, economic and cultural terms, they are all at least partial democracies and influenced by the forces of globalization. Should we find evidence in all five countries of a cosmopolitan-communitarian cleavage despite the differences, this provides strong support for the theory that globalization is indeed driving the emergence of this cleavage. To the extent that we find differences, we will be able to theorize possible explanations for them.

Concerning operationalization, this article applies the demanding cleavage concept formulated by Bartolini and Mair (1990) in order to assess the cosmopolitan−communitarian cleavage. The analysis first describes the cleavage by investigating polarization of preferences regarding immigration and international integration on the part of the electorate, the policy positions of the parties, and the linkage of the two through structural and issue voting. Given that one major challenge of the empirical literature thus far is the accurate measurement of parties' policy positions, we go beyond the current state of the art and triangulate party positions based on three widely used data sources: party manifestos, expert surveys, and claims data.

We then match party positions to voters' preferences on the same issues as measured in the World Values Survey. After linking the triangulated party positions and the voter positions, we are able to analyze structural and issue voting along the cosmopolitan−communitarian dimension.

We show that no global cosmopolitan−communitarian cleavage exists. Instead, this cleavage can be observed only in affluent established democracies. In addition, we show that globalization alone cannot explain the formation of the cleavage. Rather, we suggest that it is the interaction of a high-income context and high levels of globalization that generate a cosmopolitan−communitarian cleavage.

Theoretical Framework: Globalization and the cosmopolitan–communitarian cleavage

According to Bartolini and Mair (1990, 215; Bartolini 2000, 16–17), a 'cleavage' can be understood as a conflict in which three dimensions align: a structural, a normative and an organizational dimension. The structural dimension refers to a separation in society pitting groups with different demographics against one another, so that – for example – a person's class, religion or migration background provides strong information on her position in the cleavage. The normative dimension consists of policy preferences, values and group identity perceptions. Finally, the two sides of a cleavage require organized mobilization by political parties, trade unions, churches or other civil society actors. Hence, Bartolini (2000) states that the class cleavage did not exist as full-blown cleavage until socialist parties had successfully managed to instill a sense of class-consciousness and collective identity among workers, who then mobilized to support demands for social policy and redistribution based on the values of equality and solidarity.

According to Kriesi *et al.* (2008), the most recent generation of a cleavage in Western Europe is the result of globalization (also Hooghe and Marks 2017). In classic cleavage theory, major societal revolutions that reorganize the fabric of society stand at the root of the emergence of cleavages (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). For example, the class cleavage results from the industrial revolution which reorganized society fundamentally. Kriesi and colleagues argue that globalization constitutes the next such societal revolution. In many ways, the extent to which nation states have become integrated in regional and global systems is historically unprecedented. Rich, small and Western societies especially are economically highly dependent on international trade, have pooled their sovereignty through membership in powerful international organizations and feature rising shares of first or second generation immigrants (Dreher *et al.* 2008). To the extent that globalization indeed stands at the root of this cleavage, we can thus expect all countries subject to economic, political and cultural globalization to feature evidence of this cleavage, with the degree of globalization positively correlated to the degree of cleavage formation. Hence, the literature on the cosmopolitan–communitarian cleavage contains two hypotheses on its global existence:

Hypothesis 1: The cosmopolitan–communitarian cleavage exists also in world regions other than Western Europe.

Hypothesis 2: The more globally integrated a country the stronger the cosmopolitan–communitarian cleavage.

It has been argued that due to increasing exit options and individualization the cosmopolitan–communitarian cleavage might be less strongly anchored in social structure than the traditional cleavages (Kriesi 2010, Enyedi 2008). However, extant

5

research documents education as key factor shaping people's self-perceptions as winners or losers of globalization (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2006) and/or cosmopolitan and communitarian attitudes (Stubager 2008, 2009, 2013). The role of education for such attitudes and voting behavior has become so dominant that one might even speak of an "education cleavage" (Stubager 2010). Also, empirical research suggests education to have more predictive power for cosmopolitan vs. communitarian attitudes than class or occupation (Kriesi *et al.* 2006, Stubager 2010).

Beyond the well–educated there is also a second social group that belongs to the winners of globalization: Low-skilled immigrants who are able to increase their wages due to migration to a more developed country. In line with their interests it has been shown that immigrants are more positive towards European integration than natives are (Roeder 2011).[i] Also—together with the highly mobile among the well educated—immigrants form the stratum most engaged in transnational practices and experiences. These transnational relations, in turn, have shown to be systematically associated with positive attitudes towards globalization (Mau *et al.* 2008; Strijbis, forthcoming). Finally, and in line with the previous, it is well established that immigrants systematically favor Left (and sometimes Centrist) cosmopolitan parties over right communitarian ones (Tillie 1998; Bergh and Bjørklund 2011; Wüst 2004; Strijbis 2014).

Concerning the normative component, we draw on Zürn and De Wilde (2016), who argue that a political and societal conflict only becomes a true cleavage when both sides find ideological underpinning. Hence, as they say, the class cleavage only became a true cleavage when both sides of the conflict were ideologically underpinned by socialism and liberalism respectively. Two societal groups with integrationist and demarcationist preferences respectively thus do not qualify as sufficient evidence for a

cleavage. Instead, we need a systematic connection between policy preferences and more fundamental ideas or values before we can speak of a true or full-blown cleavage. Cosmopolitanism here refers to a worldview that starts off with a recognition of the human individual as ultimate unit of moral concern, from which universalist and globalist perceptions follow, including the attribution of rights to refugees and an acceptance of authority beyond the state for governance of global issues. Communitarianism, on the other hand, takes the community as ultimate unit of moral concern, stating that justice can only be realized within such a community. It follows that to realize justice, the community must be able to close itself off to outsiders, limiting membership, rights and duties.

At the organizational level, Western Europe has seen the rise of far right populist parties mobilizing on an agenda critical of open borders and international authority, as evidenced by stances against immigration, against European integration and against free trade. Far left political parties to some extent occupy a similar electoral space, although their opposition to globalization mostly targets economic globalization and political globalization, less so cultural globalization. While there is strong evidence that in Western Europe a cosmopolitan–communitarian cleavage exists today, it remains unclear whether globalization is in fact the catalyst behind the emergence of this cleavage (also Hellwig 2014, 8). To explore this further, we broaden the geographical scope of analysis beyond Western Europe.

Data and Method

To rigorously investigate cleavages, we are dependent on high quality and reliable data on public opinion, political parties and free public debate. This necessarily limits our inquiry to at least partially free and reasonably affluent countries. In practice, our

analysis is restricted to the OECD world. Within that pragmatic confinement, we employ a most different systems research design when it comes to globalization and focus on Germany, Mexico, Poland, Turkey and the U.S.A. These countries vary strongly on the degree and nature of economic, political and cultural globalization (see below). To the extent that we find similarities across all five countries, this would provide strong evidence for the universal nature of the cleavage.

Our design also allows for the isolation of causal explanations of difference, albeit in more tentative fashion. The reason is that beyond maximizing geographical variance by including countries from different regions, the choice of Germany and Poland versus the U.S. and Mexico, allows for paired comparisons with relation to regional integration and economic/cultural globalization. This is supported by Table 1, which shows values on two indicators that relate to immigration and supranational integration—the two globalization issues on which we focus in this article—as well as a measure for economic globalization. While Germany and Poland are members of the European Union, the U.S. and Mexico are with NAFTA regionally integrated in economic terms only. Second, while Germany and the U.S. are wealthy immigration countries, Mexico and Poland are clearly less affluent emigration countries. While Turkey cannot be paired with any of the other four countries in terms of geography, it should be noted that it is in terms of the combination of immigration and political integration the most similar to Mexico. This is also true in terms of economic integration where Turkey and Mexico are the least integrated. Germany, in contrast, stands out as the most integrated of the countries with Poland and the USA in the middle.

In sum, while the main aim of our case selection is to maximize variation, which allows us to test whether there is a universal globalization cleavage, the pair–wise comparison also allows to arrive at some tentative results regarding the causes of the

cosmopolitan−communitarian cleavage. If the globalization cleavage is primarily caused by immigration, we should find it only in Germany and the US. In contrast, if it is primarily caused by political integration we expect to detect it in Germany and Poland. Finally, if it is economic globalization that causes the cosmopolitan−communitarian cleavage, we would expect to find it primarily in Germany and to a lesser degree also in the US and Poland. This said, we are aware that due to the general dissimilarity of the five selected cases our design is better suited to test for the universal nature of the cosmopolitan−communitarian cleavage than for its variance across countries.

We will measure the degree to which a cleavage exists with a number of measures, which relate to all three dimensions of a cleavage as well as the salience of the conflict. First, we measure the polarization of the preferences of the voters and the positions of the parties on globalization issues. Second, we investigate the degree to which the preferences of the voters and the positions of the parties match. Finally, we measure whether there is a linkage between the structural positions of the voters and their vote choice relative to the parties' policy positions and whether this linkage is mediated by the voters' issue preferences. We now turn to each of the indicators used for this highly demanding analysis.

Triangulation of the parties' policy positions

The measurement of parties' policy positions is one of the most debated areas of comparative studies of parties and party systems and it is of little surprise that there remains no "best measure" of party positions. The use of any single measure of party policy positions comes with tradeoffs as each of the techniques have its weaknesses (for a list of potential sources of error see part A.5 in the supplemental material). Our

analysis deals with this problem by using the method of triangulation in order to derive a more valid measure of the party position than is available from a single data source. The underlying assumption is that there is a true latent party position, which all of our sources measure with more or less error. In order to identify the latent position and to allow for varying size of error we need to rely on at least three data sources.

In order to approximate the parties' true positions as close as possible, we combine data from party manifestos, expert surveys, and public claims. Triangulation from these three types of sources for the five cases under analysis is possible for the issues migration and international integration. We include all parties for which data was available in all three sources (for a full list see section A.1 in the supplemental material). The manifesto data used in the analysis is taken from the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP), which applies content analysis to party manifestos in order to derive data on 56 policy categories (Budge *et al.* 2001). For our purposes we make use of categories regarding multiculturalism to measure policy positions related to immigration and positions on international cooperation and the European Community related to international integration. In order to calculate party positions, we subtract the sum of negative quasi-statements surrounding a particular policy position from the positive. We provide a detailed list of the policy categories included in the analysis in section A.2 of the supplemental material.

Our second source is a claims analysis of media data. Like the manifesto dataset, claims analysis measures strategic public communication by parties to signal policy preferences to voters. For this paper, we draw on an original dataset of claims on five globalization issues in center-left, center-right and confessional newspapers in the U.S., Mexico, Turkey, Poland and Germany as well as speeches made in the UN General Assembly and the European Parliament made in the period 2004 – 2011 (De Wilde *et*

al. 2014). The total dataset contains 11810 claims, of which we use only those made by political parties from our five countries. Preferences on immigration, regional integration, free trade, globally combating climate change and upholding human rights universally are operationalized per issue at the level of a claim to indicate pro-integration (+1), neutral (0), or pro-demarcation (-1) positions regarding the opening-up of borders or international integration. Intercoder reliability of all variables used is well above the standard of .7 agreement coefficient (De Wilde *et al.* 2014). The party positions used in the analysis are then the means of all claims made by party representatives contained in the sample over the entire time period of analysis. A detailed list of the claims included in the analysis is provided in section A.3 of the supplemental material.

The third source we use to measure party positions is a "Survey of Experts on Political Parties and Globalization" conducted by Jack Vowles *et al.* (2009). Respondents were asked to estimate parties' positions toward immigration as well as toward international coordination on an eleven point scale. The exact question wordings are listed in part A.4 of the supplemental material.

Our three sources measure the same concept 'party position' with very different approaches. In order to obtain this single position, we conduct a principal component factor analysis for each dimension.[ii] Both analyses reveal a common factor with a high Eigenvalue (see section B.1 in the supplemental material). All three sources contribute to the explanation of variance. In the subsequent analyses, we use the predicted scores as party positions.

As argued in the theoretical section, one precondition for a cleavage is that the positions on the parties are polarized on the relevant issue dimension. The correct measurement of polarization at the party level is under debate. Some scholars suggest weighting the

positions by the respective strength of the party to estimate the polarization in the party system (Lupu 2014, Lachat 2008). Others argue to strictly separate demand and supply side and focus on the polarization of parties regardless of their recent vote share (Bornschier 2010, Klingemann 2005). We follow Bornschier's and Klingemann's argument that the potentially eligible supply of parties is what matters, and measure the polarization of this supply with the standard deviation of party positions for each of the two dimensions. However, in section B.3 of the supplemental material we replicate the analysis with the weighted indicator.

The measurement of the voters' issue preferences

In the second part of the analysis, we examine the distribution of the preferences of the population on the two dimensions migration and international integration. The only dataset with relevant items at the individual level for all five cases is the World Values Survey (Wave 5, 2005-2009). Since East and West Germany were sampled separately they are weighted to the correct proportion. In order to guarantee that the results are not biased due to differences in sample size in all joint analyses of all countries the samples are weighted to 1000 observations per country. No additional post stratification or sampling weights were used since they were not provided for all countries.

To measure a respondent's policy position toward migration, we use the three theoretically most meaningful of the very few items related to this issue. As expected, a principal component factor analysis including all countries extracts one single factor (see section B.2 in the supplemental material). For subsequent analyses, we use the predicted factor scores as indicator for preferences on migration policy.

The operationalization of preferences on international integration matches the broad concept we used at the party level. We take a set of questions which ask whether

specific policy issues should be dealt with at a national, regional or international level and compute a dummy variable for each issue that indicates whether a citizen is in favor of the delegation at the national or supra-national level with the latter consisting of a regional organization or the UN. A principal component factor analysis for tetrachoric correlation matrices reveals a common factor (see section B.2 in the supplemental material). Hence, we use again the predicted factor scores in our subsequent analyses. As at the level of the parties, we are interested not only in individual preferences but also in the polarization of these preferences at the country level. The standard deviation is again the appropriate measure.

[Table 2 about here]

Table 2 summarizes the data sources used and the time period for which they have been collected. The surveys have taken place between 2005 and 2007. The data on the policy positions of the parties stem from 2004 to 2013 with 2009 as the median for all three datasets. As can be deduced from the table the survey data slightly precedes the data on the party positions. This raises the question whether the time gap in the measurement of vote intentions and party positions biases our findings. Regarding the fact that voters' perceptions of parties' policy positions only change slowly, we are confident that the time gap between the party and voter data does not bias our findings. However, in section C.5 of the supplemental material we provide some evidence that the party positions have remained stable over this time period.

Measurement of linkage through positional matching and voting behavior

13

The third and last part of our analysis tests for a linkage between voters' structural position, preferences, and party positions. We consider a two-step approach to be reasonable: First, we compare the relative position of parties and the average position of the respective electorate. Thus, we see whether parties represent their voters' preferences with regard to the two globalization related issue dimensions and whether both are spatially related in instances where positions are polarized on both the party and the voter level. In a second step, we model the linkage on the basis of vote choice. We run regressions for each country and dimension to see whether vote choice of parties along their policy positions can be explained by the structural positions of the voters and/or their policy preferences regarding this issue. As we defend in the theoretical part of the paper, we measure the structural position of the voters based on their education levels and their migration background. Since we are interested in the overall effect of education on vote choice we treat the WVS' nine-point scale variable as a single metric variable. We consider a respondent to have migration background if at least one of her parents is born abroad. Since one might argue for indicators related to occupation as alternative structural variables that are linked to the globalization cleavage (Oesch 2006, 2008), we run additional models including a set of variables related to the type of occupation and sector of employment.

In order to measure the relationship between policy preferences of the voters and vote choice we rely on the measurement of the voters' issue preferences as described above. Unfortunately, these voter preferences and the positions of the parties are not measured on the same scale, so we are not able to model proximity voting with the individual distances between each voter and party. However, the high quality information about party positions allows us to specify an ordinal logit model. Therefore, the dependent variable is operationalized by the respondents vote choice, but computed in an order

according to the parties' positions. We use ordered logit rather than OLS since in the latter models the coefficients partly depend on the variance on the dependent variable. This said, we have replicated our main model with OLS and show that they yield consistent—though sometimes less significant—effects of our independent variables on vote choice (see below).

We consider the existence of a linkage between the voters and party positions to be present if three conditions are fulfilled: First, the structural independent variables (education and migration background) should be significant predictors of vote choice. Second, the policy preferences should be significant predictors of vote choice and their introduction should increase the model fit. Finally, the size of the coefficient should be reduced if we introduce policy preferences.

Cosmopolitan-communitarian cleavages in five countries

Citizens' policy preferences

The first two columns in Table 3 show the polarization of the citizens' policy preferences measured with the standard deviation per issue dimension. It depicts that the citizens' preferences on migration are most polarized in Germany and the U.S., followed by the other three countries. In the case of international integration, the citizens' preferences are most polarized in Turkey and the U.S. while Mexico and Poland are intermediate cases. Citizens' preferences on international integration are not polarized in Germany. Taken together, we find the highest level of polarization between cosmopolitan and communitarian preferences in the U.S. and Turkey and the lowest in Poland. Mexico has intermediate levels of polarization and Germany is a special case in that its voters are strongly polarized on migration but not on international integration.

Table B.3 in the supplemental material shows very similar results for alternative (weighted) operationalizations for polarization among the citizens.

[Table 3 about here]

Parties' policy positions

The polarization of the parties' policy positions is again measured with the standard deviation per issue dimension. The third column in Table 3 shows that the parties' policy positions on migration are polarized in Germany, Mexico and the U.S. but not in Poland and Turkey. In the case of international integration, the parties are polarized in Germany, Poland, and the U.S., but not in Mexico and Turkey. Taking the two dimensions together, we find strong polarization between cosmopolitan and communitarian party positions in Germany and the U.S., intermediate levels of polarization in Mexico and Poland, and low polarization in Turkey. Table B.3 of the supplemental material demonstrates that our findings are not dependent upon using an indicator that does not weigh for vote shares.

Positional matching

Taking the descriptive results from the voter level analysis and the party level analysis independently, it is evident that we could arrive at the conclusion that there is a cosmopolitan-communitarian cleavage without actually showing that the polarization of both dimensions is linked. Consequently, we investigate whether the polarization of parties' policy positions on the two issues matches the polarization of their voters' preferences. We look at each of the two issue dimensions in turn. Note that the voter

preferences and policy positions are standardized and that therefore only relational comparisons of their positions are possible. Keeping this in mind, Figure 1 shows that, in Germany, the U.S., and Turkey the parties' policy positions strongly match the voters' preferences when it comes to migration issues. The case of Germany is particularly revealing since the rank order of all five parties' perfectly matches the preferences of their voters. In the case of Turkey the evidence is less strong since the party positions are not polarized. While Germany and the U.S. are clear instances of agreement, the opposite is true for Mexico where the positioning of the parties does not closely resemble those of their voters. Poland provides us with an intermediate case. While the rank order of the Polish parties' positions and those of their voters do not correlate perfectly they seem to be positively related.

[Figure 1 about here]

Things look similar when focusing on international integration. For the U.S., there is again high agreement between the party and voter positions. However, and similar to the migration issues, the match between parties' and voters' positions is very low in the cases of Mexico and Turkey. Also, for Poland we observe an imperfect match between parties' and voters' position. While the results for the U.S., Mexico, and Poland on the issue of international integration are mostly similar to what we find for the migration issue, Germany poses a clear deviation. This is due to two reasons: First, the voters of the five parties are not polarized on this issue dimension since they are overwhelmingly pro-integration. Second, this is not true for the Left Party (Die Linke), which is far more skeptical about international integration.

[Figure 2 about here]

Vote choice

While the analysis of the match between the voters' preferences and the parties policy

positions goes a long way for the analysis of the linkage between these two levels, it

might still be the case that the issues are not salient enough to structure voting behavior.

Hence, in a final step we report the findings from the regression analyses, in which the

party choice (the dependent variable) is ordered according to the parties' policy

positions and predicted with the voters' structural positions (the independent variables)

and policy preferences on the same issue dimension (the mediating variable).

[Table 4 about here]

Table 4 shows results from ordered logistic regressions with the vote choice ordered by

the parties' policy positions on migration (more positive values reflecting more pro–

immigration positions) regressed on the independent variables. In each Table Model 1

shows the relationship between structural variables and vote choice, Model 2 introduces

the voter preferences, and Model 3 shows the results when controlling for left–right

self–placement and preferences for democracy.

The first three columns show the results for Germany. Model 1 reveals that the higher

the levels of education the more pro–immigration their vote choice. In contrast,

migration background has no significant impact on vote choice. Model 2 reveals that

the policy preferences of the voters regarding migration policy predict their vote choice

with regard to parties' policy positions. Also, the introduction of the preferences lead to

a reduction in the size of the education coefficient, which is an indication that policy

18

preferences mediate between education levels and vote choice. Model 3 finally shows that the results hold when controlling for left–right self–placement and democratic values.

Table 4 also shows significant relationships between independent structural variables and vote choice for Poland, Turkey and the US. However, in the case of Poland the relationship between attitudes towards immigration and vote choice is no longer significant (and the coefficient drops considerably) if we include left–right self–placement and attitudes towards democracy. The peculiarity for the US is that migration background rather than education levels predict vote choice with regard to migration policy. Since the US has a two–party system, which makes an overlap of cleavages likely, it is also important to mention that the relationship between preferences on immigration and vote choice remains of the same size (albeit not significant) when controlling for left–right self–placement. In the case of Turkey the results seem to speak for a strong party–voter linkage (but see below). In contrast to the other four cases we do not find signs of a migration cleavage for Mexico. In the Mexican case neither education, migration background or policy positions regarding immigration policy impact on vote choice.

[Table 5 about here]

Table 5 shows the same analysis for international integration. For Germany we find no effect of education levels or migration background on vote choice along this issue dimension. Also preferences on supranational migration seem not salient for vote choice along this dimension. We find the same non–results for Mexico (the effect of education on vote choice runs in the unexpected direction). In contrast, we find a

positive relationship between levels of education and vote choice for pro-integration parties in Poland. However, this relationship seems not to be mediated by preferences on international integration as we measure it. Finally, for the US we find that people with migration background have a higher probability of voting for a party with a pro–integration position (i.e. the Democrats). Also, this relationship seems to be mediated by policy preferences, but loses significance when controlling for left–right self–placement.

In order to test the robustness of our findings we apply a number of checks. First, we replicate the analysis with indicators for the occupation of the respondents (see section C.1 and 2 of the supplemental material). The results show that alternative structural variables do not significantly improve the explanatory power of the model. Consequently, it seems that we are not underestimating structural voting with regard to parties' policy positions on immigration and international cooperation. Second, we add issue dimensions that are not related to globalization in order to test whether we are overestimating the relationship between attitudes on immigration and international cooperation for vote choice (also section C.1 and 2 in the supplemental material). The results remain very similar. Third, we test whether our results remain similar if we use OLS rather than ordered logit (see section C.3 and 4 in the supplemental material). The results remain very similar with the exception that some of the coefficients lose significance for the US. Finally, we test the robustness of the findings when measuring the party positions based on the claims in the media—arguably the position that is most in line with the voters' perceptions—rather than our triangulation (also section C.3 and 4 of the supplemental material). In general, the results remain very robust when using this indicator. However, there is the major exception for vote choice based on preferences and party positions on immigration in Turkey. Since according to the

claims data—and opposed to our triangulated measure—AKP is more pro–immigration than CHP and we have only data on party positions for these two parties, the attitudes towards immigration are now negatively correlated with vote choice according to the parties' policy positions. Additional analyses show that the parties gave very little attention to the immigration issue.[iii] Together with the fact that the positions of the two parties were very close (see Figure 1) this speaks against a cleavage on the immigration dimension in Turkey.

Summary of the evidence

This section has analyzed the strength of a cleavage with regard to migration and international integration based on four indicators: polarization of voter preferences, polarization of party positions, the match of these preferences and positions, and its linkage through vote choice. Table 6 summarizes the findings for the five countries and two issue dimensions. We find clear evidence for the existence of a cosmopolitan−communitarian cleavage in the United States and Germany, although in the latter case this cleavage is exclusively based on the migration issue. Equally clear is the finding that there is no cosmopolitan−communitarian cleavage in Mexico and Turkey. The most ambivalent case is Poland where we only find week to medium polarization and only a partial match between voters' preferences and parties' policy position, but at the same time evidence for linkage by vote choice. Furthermore, once we control for left–right self–placement and attitudes towards democracy positions on migration and international cooperation no longer predict vote choice according to the parties' policy positions (see above). Hence, it is very likely that the globalization cleavage was only weak in Poland during the 2000s.

[Table 6 about here]

Towards an explanation

The evidence from the previous chapter suggests that the cosmopolitan−communitarian cleavage is not universal. Hence, current levels of globalization in OECD countries alone cannot explain the emergence of a cosmopolitan−communitarian cleavage. What is less clear is whether a specific dimension of globalization can explain the variance in existence of the cosmopolitan–communitarian cleavage across countries. Our evidence suggests that political globalization is not the main driver of the globalization cleavage: While Poland is a member state of the European Union and hence politically strongly integrated the U.S. is not. Consequently, our country comparison seems to indicate that political globalization does not explain the variance in the existence of a cosmopolitan−communitarian cleavage.

Also, levels of economic globalization do not fully co–vary with the extent to which a cleavage can be observed: Poland and the US were economically about equally globalized (see Table 1). However, Poland does not experience a cosmopolitan−communitarian cleavage to the extent that the U.S. does. If anything, it is immigration that triggers the globalization cleavage. This is indicated by the fact that we find cosmopolitan−communitarian cleavage in Germany and the US, but not in Mexico, Poland and Turkey—which did not have a high number of immigrants in the late 2000s. However, since immigration is causally and empirically strongly linked to affluence it would be premature to single it out as the major cause of the cosmopolitan−communitarian cleavage. Instead, we might rather hypothesize that

national affluence more generally is an important scope condition for the generation of a globalization cleavage.

Why should this be the case? In the most general form because in affluent countries globalization produces a critical mass of globalization losers which it does not in poorer countries: First, while economic globalization increases income inequality in middle- and high-income contexts, this relationship does not appear in low-income contexts (Bergh and Nilsson 2010). Instead, in poor countries all segments of the society tend to profit from globalization. Finally, in affluent countries the quality of democracy tends to be higher and consequently there is less conflict over the regime as such that superimposes itself on other cleavages (also De Wilde forthcoming).

While our data generally fits well to the hypothesis that the combination of globalization and affluence creates a cosmopolitan−communitarian cleavage, the case of Germany remains somewhat ambivalent. As expected, we find a cosmopolitan−communitarian cleavage if we take electoral competition on migration politics as an indicator. Surprisingly, however, we would not find such a cleavage if only focusing on the issue of international integration. Why should this be the case?

The explanation may lie in the unique combination of Germany's role in World War II along with the unification after the collapse of communism. Put simply, it may be that, given the combination of these two historical experiences, until the early 2010s German communitarians were not mobilized by a party from the right as we see in other countries but rather by one from the left. This party is the post-communist Left Party (Die Linke) which has its origins in the Socialist Party of the German Democratic Republic. As the Left Party is clearly antifascist, it was able to legitimately claim to be the representative communitarian positions. However, in contrast to communitarian parties from the right, The Left is internationalist in principle. While it is critical of

international integration when it comes to security and economic issues the party has a clear pro-immigration profile. Therefore, in terms of representing the communitarian voter, The Left is likely to fail as its nuanced position towards international integration lacks alignment with its stance on immigration. This is highlighted by the fact that its voters are more in favor of international integration than the party (see Figure 1) and about equally pro-immigration. It is perhaps unsurprising, then, that with the Alternative for Germany (AfD) recently a party is mobilizing successfully on a clearly communitarian position aligning its critical stance towards international (and in particular European) integration with a similarly negative position towards immigration (Schmitt-Beck 2017, Johann *et al.* 2016). Hence, replicating our analysis for the mid 2010s would probably show that Germany is now also a clear case of an affluent immigration country with a strong cosmopolitan−communitarian cleavage.

Conclusion

We have tried to answer two questions: can a cosmopolitan−communitarian cleavage be observed outside the Western European context? To the extent that it is not universally present, when does such a cleavage emerge? In order to answer these questions we have analyzed ideological polarization at the level of the voters, parties, and their linkage through vote choice in Germany, Mexico, Poland, Turkey, and the U.S.A. Our answer to the first question is a contingent yes. Since the cosmopolitan−communitarian cleavage can also be found in the U.S. it is not restricted to Western Europe. However, and this relates to the second question, a cosmopolitan−communitarian cleavage only appears to emerge in affluent societies. Several factors could account for this, including the existence of a comparatively high wage working class threatened by economic globalization, high levels of immigration

and a historically engrained liberal tradition. The first and second of these possible explanations strengthen the potential for communitarian mobilization, while the third provides the potential for cosmopolitan mobilization. Future research should try to isolate these factors. Our present research design does not allow for an analysis of the relative explanatory power of these factors. We have applied a data rich approach in order to describe in detail the cosmopolitan−communitarian cleavage in our five countries. This focus on the validity of measurement comes with a trade−off in the number of cases for which the analysis could be conducted. In particular, the labor intensity of generating the claims data restricts us to a limited time frame and country set. Major events that could influence the findings have happened in our countries of analysis since we stopped gathering data. The low number of cases and limited time-frame, in turn, limits the ability for hypothesis testing, as various possible explanations for the differences we observe cannot fully be ruled out. Hence, we present the identified scope condition of affluence in tentative ways and call upon future studies on the cosmopolitan−communitarian cleavage to include more countries and/or time points.

Bibliography

Bartolini, Stefano (2000) *The Political Mobilization of the European Left, 1860-1980: The Class Cleavage*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Bartolini, Stefano, and Peter Mair (1990) *Identity, Competition and Electoral Availability: The Stabilisation of European Electorates, 1885-1985*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Bartolini, Stefano (2000) *The Political Mobilisation of the European Left, 1860-1980; The Class Cleavage*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Bergh, Andreas, and Therese Nilsson (2010) "Do Liberalization and Globalization Increase Income Inequality?" *European Journal of Political Economy* 26 (4): 488–505. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2010.03.002.

Bergh, Johannes, and Tor Bjørklund (2011) "The Revival of Group Voting: Explaining the Voting Preferences of Immigrants in Norway." *Political Studies* 59 (2): 308–327. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9248.2010.00863.x.

Bornschier, Simon (2010) *Cleavage Politics and the Populist Right: The New Cultural Conflict in Western Europe*. Temple University Press.

Budge, Ian, Hans Dieter Klingemann, Andrea Volkens, Judith Bara, and Eric Tanenbaum (2001) *Mapping Policy Preferences, Estimates for Parties, Governments and Electors 1945-1998*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

De Wilde, Pieter (forthcoming) "Mapping policy and polity contestation about globalization: Issue linkage in the news". In *The Struggle over Borders*, edited by Pieter De Wilde, Ruud Koopmans, Wolfgang Merkel, Oliver Strijbis and Michael Zürn. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, in press.

De Wilde, Pieter, Ruud Koopmans, Wolfgang Merkel, Oliver Strijbis, and Michael Zürn (forthcoming) *The Struggle over Borders*. Cambridge University Press, in press.

De Wilde, Pieter, Ruud Koopmans, and Michael Zürn (2014) "The Political Sociology of Cosmopolitanism and Communitarianism: Representative Claims Analysis" *WZB Discussion Papers SP IV* SP IV (102). http://bibliothek.wzb.eu/pdf/2014/iv14-102.pdf

Dreher, Axel, Noel Gaston, and Pim Martens (2008) *Measuring Globalisation: Gauging Its Consequences*. Springer Science & Business Media.

Enyedi, Zsolt (2008) "The Social and Attitudinal Basis of Political Parties: Cleavage
    Politics Revisited." *European Review* 16 (3): 287–304.
    https://doi.org/10.1017/S1062798708000264.

Hainmueller, Jens, and Michael J. Hiscox (2006) "Learning to Love Globalization:
    Education and Individual Attitudes Toward International Trade." *International
    Organization* 60 (2): 469–98. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818306060140.

Held, David, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt, and Jonathan Perraton (1999)
    Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture. Stanford
    University Press.

Hellwig, Timothy (2014) *Globalization and Mass Politics: Retaining the Room to
    Maneuver*. Cambridge University Press.

Hooghe, Liesbet, and Gary Marks (2017) "Cleavage Theory Meets Europe's Crises:
    Lipset, Rokkan, and the Transnational Cleavage." *Journal of European Public
    Policy* 0 (0): 1–27. https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2017.1310279.

Hooghe, Liesbet, Gary Marks, and Carole J. Wilson (2002) "Does Left/Right
    Structure Party Positions on European Integration?" *Comparative Political
    Studies* 35 (8): 965–89. https://doi.org/10.1177/001041402236310.

Johann, David, Kathrin Thomas, Thorsten Faas, and Sebastian Fietkau (2016)
    "Alternative Messverfahren rechtspopulistischen Wählens im Vergleich:
    Empirische Erkenntnisse aus Deutschland und Österreich." In *Wahlen und
    Wähler: Analysen aus Anlass der Bundestagswahl 2013*, edited by Harald
    Schoen und Bernhard Weßels, 447–470. Springer.

Klingemann, Hans-Dieter (2005) "Political Parties and Party Systems." In *The
    European Voter*, edited by Jacques Thomassen, 22–63. Oxford University
    Press.

Kriesi, Hanspeter, Edgar Grande, Martin Dolezal, Marc Helbling, Dominic Höglinger,
    Swen Hutter, and Bruno Wüest (2012) *Political Conflict in Western Europe*.
    Cambridge University Press.

Kriesi, Hanspeter, Edgar Grande, Romain Lachat, Martin Dolezal, Simon Bornschier,
    and Timotheos Frey (2008) *West European Politics in the Age of
    Globalization*. Cambridge University Press.

Kriesi, Hanspeter (2010) "Restructuration of Partisan Politics and the Emergence of a
    New Cleavage Based on Values." *West European Politics* 33 (3): 673–85.
    https://doi.org/10.1080/01402381003654726.

Lachat, Romain (2008) "The Impact of Party Polarization on Ideological Voting." *Electoral Studies* 27 (4): 687–98. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2008.06.002.

Lipset, Seymour M., and Stein Rokkan (1967) "Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments. An Introduction." In *Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives*, edited by Stein Rokkan and Seymour M. Lipset, 1–64. The Free Press.

Lupu, Noam (2014) "Party Polarization and Mass Partisanship: A Comparative Perspective." *Political Behavior*, June, 1–26. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-014-9279-z.

Mau, Steffen, Jan Mewes, and Ann Zimmermann (2008) "Cosmopolitan Attitudes through Transnational Social Practices?" *Global Networks* 8 (1): 1–24. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1471-0374.2008.00183.x.

Oesch, Daniel (2008) "The Changing Shape of Class Voting." *European Societies* 10(3): 329–355.

Roeder, Antje (2011) "Does Mobility Matter for Attitudes to Europe? A Multi-Level Analysis of Immigrants' Attitudes to European Unification." *Political Studies* 59 (2): 458–71. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9248.2010.00871.x.

Schmitt-Beck, Rüdiger (2017) "The 'Alternative Für Deutschland in the Electorate': Between Single-Issue and Right-Wing Populist Party." *German Politics* 26 (1): 124–48. https://doi.org/10.1080/09644008.2016.1184650.

Strijbis, Oliver (forthcoming) "Who is the most frequent traveller? The cosmopolitanism of national, European, and global elites" In *The Struggle over Borders*, edited by Pieter De Wilde, Ruud Koopmans, Wolfgang Merkel, Oliver Strijbis, and Michael Zürn. Cambridge University Press, in press.

Strijbis, Oliver (2014) "Migration Background and Voting Behavior in Switzerland: A Socio-Psychological Explanation." *Swiss Political Science Review* 20 (4): 612–31. https://doi.org/10.1111/spsr.12136.

Stubager, Rune (2008) "Education Effects on Authoritarian–libertarian Values: A Question of Socialization." *The British Journal of Sociology* 59 (2): 327–50. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-4446.2008.00196.x.

Stubager, Rune (2009) "Education-Based Group Identity and Consciousness in the Authoritarian-Libertarian Value Conflict." *European Journal of Political Research* 48 (2): 204–33. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-6765.2008.00834.x.

Stubager, Rune (2010) "The Development of the Education Cleavage: Denmark as a Critical Case." *West European Politics* 33 (3): 505–33. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402381003654544.

Stubager, Rune (2013) "The Changing Basis of Party Competition: Education, Authoritarian–Libertarian Values and Voting." *Government and Opposition* 48 (3): 372–97. https://doi.org/10.1017/gov.2013.13.

Teney, Céline, Onawa Promise Lacewell, and Pieter De Wilde (2014) "Winners and Losers of Globalization in Europe: Attitudes and Ideologies." *European Political Science Review* 6 (04): 575–595. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755773913000246.

Tillie, Jean (1998) "Explaining Migrant Voting Behaviour in the Netherlands. Combining the Electoral Research and Ethnic Studies Perspective." *Revue Européenne Des Migrations Internationales* 14 (2): 71–95.

Vowles, Jack, Georgios Xezonakis, Timothy Hellwig, and Eva Coffey (2009) "Survey of Experts on Political Parties and Globalization, January 2009 – April 2009." http://www.jackvowles.com/Global.html.

Wüst, Andreas M (2004) "Naturalised Citizens as Voters: Behaviour and Impact." *German Politics* 13 (2): 341–359.

Zürn, Michael, and Pieter De Wilde (2016) "Debating Globalization: Cosmopolitanism and Communitarianism as Political Ideologies." *Journal of Political Ideologies* 21 (3): 280–301. https://doi.org/10.1080/13569317.2016.1207741.

Words (including Endnotes and References): 8046

Tables and Figures

Table 1: Selected cases and levels of globalization

World region	Country	Type of globalization Foreign born (2010)	Supranational integration	Economic integration
North America	USA	14.2	NAFTA	71.4
North America	Mexico	0.8	NAFTA	59.5
Europe	Germany	11.7	EU	80.6
Europe	Poland	1.8	EU	71.0
Asia	Turkey	2.4	EU candidate	57.1

Note: Economic integration is measured with the average value of the KOF index on economic integration for the time period 2005–2011 (Dreher et al. 2008). Data on foreign born from United Nations Population Division.

Table 2: Sources and period of data collection

Country	Mass survey (1)	Claims data (2)	Expert survey (3)	Party manifestos (4)
Germany	2006	2004-2011	2009	2005, 2009, 2013
Mexico	2005	2004-2011	2009	2006, 2009, 2012
Poland	2005	2004-2011	2009	2005, 2007, 2011
Turkey	2007	2004-2011	2009	2007, 2011
USA	2006	2004-2011	2009	2004, 2008, 2012

Sources: 1) World Value Survey Wave 5, 2) De Wilde et al. (2014), 3) Vowles et al. (2009), 4) Volkens et al. (2017).

Table 3: Polarization of party positions and voter preferences on migration and international integration

| | General population | | Parties | |
	Migration	International integration	Migration	International integration
Germany	1.08	0.77	1.07	0.96
Mexico	0.98	0.86	0.82	0.52
Poland	0.90	0.81	0.48	1.40
Turkey	0.98	0.99	0.20	0.73
USA	1.01	0.89	1.18	1.46
N	6580	6272	18	23

Notes: The values indicate standard deviations. For additional analyses with alternative indicators see section B.3 of the supplemental material.

Table 4: Ordinal logistic regressions of migration policy position of chosen party

	Germany			Mexico			Poland		
Parental migration background (1=yes)	0.003	-0.175	-0.199	0.468	0.463	0.452	1.440*	1.368	1.504
	(0.01)	(-0.65)	(-0.74)	(1.44)	(1.42)	(1.36)	(2.40)	(1.93)	(1.88)
Highest level of education	0.071*	0.031	0.007	0.011	0.012	-0.004	0.155**	0.146*	0.100
	(2.12)	(0.89)	(0.21)	(0.38)	(0.41)	(-0.16)	(2.64)	(2.47)	(1.68)
Gender (1=male)	0.041	0.053	0.121	0.029	0.031	0.054	-0.245	-0.210	-0.290
	(0.28)	(0.36)	(0.81)	(0.23)	(0.24)	(0.42)	(-1.22)	(-1.04)	(-1.41)
Age	-0.025***	-0.023***	-0.024***	-0.001	-0.001	0.001	-0.009	-0.010	-0.010
	(-5.80)	(-5.09)	(-5.32)	(-0.12)	(-0.12)	(0.08)	(-1.48)	(-1.58)	(-1.60)
Attitude towards migration (high=cos)		0.360***	0.226**		-0.015	-0.026		0.300*	0.232
		(4.80)	(2.93)		(-0.24)	(-0.41)		(2.46)	(1.87)
Left/right self-placement (high=left)			0.407***			0.099***			0.048
			(8.74)			(4.79)			(0.95)
Attitude towards democracy (high=democratic)			-0.098			-0.048			0.579***
			(-0.91)			(-0.56)			(4.25)
Observations	1036	1036	1036	843	843	843	379	379	379
Pseudo R-squared	0.027	0.040	0.093	0.001	0.001	0.012	0.022	0.029	0.048
BIC	1306.0	1296.2	1241.8	2016.3	2023.0	2015.0	914.3	913.9	908.3

t statistics in parentheses; * $p<0.05$, ** $p<0.01$, *** $p<0.001$

Table 4: Ordinal logistic regressions of migration policy position of chosen party (continuation from previous page)

	Turkey			USA		
Parental migration background (1=yes)	-0.671	-0.631	-1.314	0.744**	0.640**	0.591
	(-1.31)	(-1.23)	(-1.31)	(3.26)	(2.78)	(2.26)
Highest level of education	0.339***	0.343***	0.294***	-0.085	-0.162**	-0.199
	(6.40)	(6.36)	(3.92)	(-1.62)	(-2.93)	(-3.15)
Gender (1=male)	-0.521*	-0.538*	-0.398	-0.392**	-0.364*	-0.371
	(-2.13)	(-2.18)	(-1.14)	(-2.78)	(-2.53)	(-2.22)
Age	0.017	0.021*	0.028*	0.003	0.004	0.004
	(1.96)	(2.25)	(2.17)	(0.68)	(0.90)	(0.85)
Attitude towards migration (high=cos)		0.364**	0.394*		0.415***	0.419
		(2.78)	(2.23)		(5.41)	(4.68)
Left/right self-placement (high=left)			0.874***			0.695
			(8.07)			(11.49)
Attitude towards democracy (high=democratic)			-0.458*			-0.129
			(-2.49)			(-1.44)
Observations	389	389	389	849	849	849
Pseudo R-squared	0.101	0.117	0.525	0.020	0.047	0.254
BIC	448.1	446.4	268.9	1174.4	1149.3	921.8

Table 5: Ordinal logistic regressions of policy position regarding international integration of chosen party

	Germany			Mexico			Poland		
Parental migration background (1=yes)	0.183	0.184	0.091	-0.242	-0.257	-0.227	0.984*	0.984*	0.894
	(0.71)	(0.72)	(0.38)	(-0.57)	(-0.61)	(-0.56)	(1.97)	(1.97)	(1.81)
Highest level of education	-0.026	-0.026	-0.057	-0.125***	-0.128***	-0.090**	0.122*	0.122*	0.086
	(-0.84)	(-0.84)	(-1.93)	(-4.83)	(-4.91)	(-3.18)	(2.30)	(2.29)	(1.57)
Gender (1=male)	-0.210	-0.211	-0.121	-0.180	-0.192	-0.178	-0.012	-0.012	-0.069
	(-1.55)	(-1.56)	(-0.92)	(-1.51)	(-1.60)	(-1.48)	(-0.06)	(-0.06)	(-0.36)
Age	-0.027***	-0.027***	-0.026***	-0.004	-0.004	-0.003	-0.004	-0.004	-0.001
	(-6.68)	(-6.71)	(-6.81)	(-0.84)	(-0.83)	(-0.69)	(-0.80)	(-0.80)	(-0.20)
Attitude towards migration (high=cos)		-0.052	-0.086		0.090	0.079		0.003	0.060
		(-0.56)	(-0.98)		(1.14)	(0.99)		(0.02)	(0.49)
Left/right self-placement (high=left)			0.270***			-0.113***			0.324***
			(6.64)			(-4.78)			(6.36)
Attitude towards democracy (high=democratic)			0.273**			-0.162			0.342**
			(2.88)			(-1.94)			(2.71)
Observations	1087	1087	1087	943	943	943	454	454	454
Pseudo R-squared	0.026	0.026	0.056	0.011	0.012	0.024	0.008	0.008	0.058
BIC	1390.7	1397.5	1369.7	2577.3	2582.6	2564.1	1270.9	1277.0	1228.8

t statistics in parentheses; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table 5: Ordinal logistic regressions of policy position regarding international integration of chosen party (continuation from previous page)

	Turkey			USA		
Parental migration background (1=yes)	0.613	0.609	0.610	0.760***	0.718**	0.718
	(1.62)	(1.62)	(1.67)	(3.31)	(3.03)	(2.74)
Highest level of education	-0.207***	-0.209***	-0.169***	-0.085	-0.134*	-0.182
	(-5.52)	(-5.54)	(-4.57)	(-1.63)	(-2.48)	(-2.86)
Gender (1=male)	-0.034	-0.029	-0.137	-0.300*	-0.346*	-0.333
	(-0.20)	(-0.16)	(-0.81)	(-2.12)	(-2.40)	(-2.01)
Age	0.002	0.002	0.001	0.003	0.005	0.005
	(0.28)	(0.29)	(0.21)	(0.71)	(1.18)	(0.92)
Attitude towards migration (high=cos)		0.064	0.036		0.442***	0.354
		(0.73)	(0.42)		(5.41)	(3.81)
Left/right self-placement (high=left)			-0.194***			0.677
			(-5.64)			(11.22)
Attitude towards democracy (high=democratic)			0.213**			-0.047
			(2.84)			(-0.53)
Observations	517	517	517	844	844	844
Pseudo R-squared	0.033	0.033	0.071	0.018	0.043	0.240
BIC	1185.4	1191.1	1159.5	1167.5	1144.5	931.4

Table 6: Summary of evidence on the existence of a globalization cleavage

Issue dimension: Immigration

|	Germany	Mexico	Poland	Turkey	USA
Polarization voter preferences	strong	strong	medium	strong	strong
Polarization party positions	strong	strong	weak	weak	strong
Match of preferences and positions	strong	weak	medium	medium	strong
Linkage through vote choice	strong	weak	(strong)	(strong)	(strong)

Issue dimension: Surpanational integration

	Germany	Mexico	Poland	Turkey	USA
Polarization voter preferences	weak	medium	medium	strong	medium
Polarization party positions	strong	weak	strong	medium	strong
Match of preferences and positions	weak	weak	weak	weak	strong
Linkage through vote choice	weak	weak	(strong)	weak	(strong)

Notes:

Categorization for polarization based on following intervals: <0.7 weak, 0.7-0.9 medium, >0.9 strong.

Parentheses indicate results that are not robust to all specifications in Tables 4-5 and C.1-C.4 of the supplemental material.

Figure 1: Comparison between parties' and electorates' position on migration policy

Note: More positive values indicate more pro-immigration positions.

Figure 2: Comparison between parties' and electorates' position on international integration

Note: More positive values indicate more pro-international integration positions.

Endnotes

[i] It should be noted, though, that Roeder (2011, 466) finds immigrant nationals to be less pro–European than foreigners. Similar, Strijbis and Polavieja (forthcoming) find immigrants in Switzerland to have voted very similar as natives on an initiative that wanted to dissolve the agreement with the EU on the free movement of people.

[ii] We do not receive one single factor if we run a pcf with all six items (2 issues x 3 sources). This might foreshadow that we won't find polarization on both of these issues in all countries under analysis (see below).

[iii] In the 2007 and 2011 elections the AKP and the CHP dedicated less than 2% of the quasi–sentences in their manifesto to issues of multiculturalism. Compare this to Germany where between 2005 and 2013 all parties devoted a minimum of 6% (the SPD in 2005) of the quasi–sentences to multiculturalism. Also, De Wilde (forthcoming) shows that migration was of very low salience in the public debate in Turkey at the time.