Runar Strand Thorbjørnsen

Immigration framing by Norwegian political actors on Facebook 2015-2017

An empirical case study

Master's thesis

NTNU
Norwegian University of
Science and Technology

Runar Strand Thorbjørnsen

Immigration framing by Norwegian political actors on Facebook 2015-2017

An empirical case study

NTNU
Norwegian University of
Science and Technology

SAMMENDRAG

Formålet med denne masteroppgaven har vært å avdekke hvordan norske politiske aktører kommuniserer om innvandring på Facebook. I forlengelsen av dette ønsker oppgaven å svare på hvilke kommunikasjonsrammer som fører til høyest grad av interaksjon, målt gjennom antall likes og delinger. I tillegg undersøkes det om disse kommunikasjonsrammene endrer seg over tid med spesielt hensyn til flyktningkrisens stadier.

Nært 800 Facebook poster ble innhentet mellom 1. Januar 2015 og 31. Desember 2017, fra Sosialistisk Venstreparti, Arbeiderpartiet, Høyre og Fremskrittspartiet. En induktiv kvalitativ metode ble brukt for å analysere all rådata og lage en kodebok med definerte kommunikasjonskategorier. Denne kodeboken ble applisert på hele datamaterialet som så ble behandlet kvantitativt. Studien finner at kommunikasjonen i stor grad reflekterer det som har blitt funnet i tidligere forskning om innvandring. Fremskrittspartiets negative vinklinger utløser høyest grad av interaksjon. I tillegg viser studien at kommunikasjonsstrategiene rundt innvandring endret seg med hensyn til forskjellige tidsperioder i datainnsamlingen. Fremskrittsparitiet dominerer hele diskursen på Facebook, mens Høyre og Arbeiderpartiet viser større likhet enn forskjell.

ABSTRACT

The purpose of this thesis has been to uncover how Norwegian political actors frame the issue of immigration on Facebook. The thesis also seeks to answer what communicative frame registers the highest amount of interaction, measured through shares and likes. It also investigates if the frames of communication change over time, with special focus on the stages of the refugee crisis.

Close to 800 Facebook posts were collected between 1. January 2015 – 31. December 2017 from the Socialist Left, Labour, the Conservatives and the Progress Party. An inductive qualitative method was used to create a codebook, which was applied to the entire data collection subsequently. The data was then treated quantitatively for analytical purposes. The study finds that political actors in Norway frame the issue of immigration similiarly to previous findings. The right side focus is on the negative consequences of immigration, whilst the opposition favours sympathetic arguments infused with moral and emotional arguments. The negative frames of the Progress Party, especially crime, are most interacted with through shares and likes. The thesis shows proof that framing practices change over time. The Progress Party dominate the entire discourse on immigration on Facebook, whilst Labour and the Conservatives show more similarities than differences.

PREFACE

I would like to thank my good friend and colleague Jørgen Mehammer for invaluable help and support throughout our years together at NTNU. I must also thank my supervisor Peter Maurer for his support and guidance in writing this thesis.

Table of contents

1. Introduction

On March 20th of 2018, Sylvi Listhaug of the Progress Party had to step down from her role in the Norwegian government as Minister for Justice, Public Security and Immigration. 11 days prior, a Facebook post attacking the opposition party Labour was posted on her Facebook page. The post contained a picture of hooded men in military attire with firearms and the text; "Labour think the rights of terrorists are more important than the security of the nation". The post became controversial in part because Labour's youth party was the one attacked in the terrorist incident of 22. July, 2011. Labour leader Jonas Gahr Støre claimed Listhaug "purposely and calculated fanned the flames of hatred that the terrorist attack was built on" (Berge 2018). This lead to a vote of no-confidence which ultimately resulted in Listhaugs voluntary withdrawal from her ministerial role. The aftermath of the controversial Facebook post could have led to the government toppling, through internal struggles in the government coalition.

What the Listhaug-case demonstrates is that social media have become part and parcel of political communication, also in Norway. Facebook pages are essential communication channels where political parties reach their voters in an effective manner. According to Klinger & Svensson (2016) the traditional media follow mass media logic, whilst social media are linked to network media logic. Their delineation between the two revolve around ideals, commercial imperatives and technology. Where the traditional media model relies on centralized mass dissemination to subscribers by professionals, the network media logic relies on viral distribution to like-minded others on principles of connectivity and popularity (Klinger & Svensson 2016). The political message is presented away from the confines and editorial judgments of news media. It goes directly to followers in a hybrid environment where the message has the potential to reach as many as through traditional media. As Iyengar (2016) points out there is a huge amount of information one is exposed to through online news, whether they are from social media or not. And within the saturated realm of social media and politics, few issues are more debated than immigration.

According to the United Nations Refugee Agency, 2015 saw more than a million refugees traversing the Mediterranean bound for Europe by boat. The first significant increase in boat arrivals was seen from March to April, then increasing rapidly each month until it peaked in October with over 220.000 refugees arriving in Europe by boat (UNCHR 2017). Worldwide 65 million people are forcibly displaced, with one third of those deemed refugees (UNCHR 2017). According to the UNCHR (2017) these are the highest levels of displacement on record. The impact was felt across Europe, and immigration became a primary political issue.

The refugee crisis coincides with what Kenneth Roth, executive director of Human Rights Watch, describes as a growing discontent among the European public towards the status quo (Roth 2017). Roth (2017) describes the rise of populism as a by-product of this "cauldron of discontent". He points out that scapegoating of immigrants, refugees and minorities have become common, and that xenophobia, nativism, racism and Islamophobia are on the rise. The immigration discourse is central to the supposed polarization that scholars such as Iyengar (2016) point too when analyzing modern politics. Iyengar claims that the online space, where candidates, interest groups, news organizations and voters all converge, facilitates selective exposure (2016: 122). The availability of information is combined with user friendliness to help the consumer read the news they want. These mechanisms can lead to further polarization which Iyengar claims exists in the American context (2016:262-263).

Scholars have attacked questions surrounding politicians' use of social media, with a wealth of different research questions. Many researchers have investigated the potential effects social media has had on elections (Ahmad & Skoric 2014; Enli 2017; Marcella & Baxter 2013), as well as how politicians use social media and with what motivation (Adams & McCorkindale 2013; Broersma & Graham 2012; Conway, Kenski & Wang 2013; Evans, Cordova & Sipole 2014). Many have investigated the discourse surrounding immigration, but mainly through the lens of traditional news media, many of which will be presented in the literature review of the thesis. And this is the research gap I hope this thesis will contribute to. The discourse, or framing, of immigration on Facebook by political actors.

This thesis is a case study in Norwegian political actors framing of immigration on Facebook, and it hopes to contribute to the theory of immigration framing on social media.

1.1 Research questions

Through inductive qualitative analysis this thesis seeks to answer the following research questions.

RQ1: How do Norwegian political actors frame immigration arguments on Facebook, in the context of the refugee crisis?

RQ2: Which frames elicit the most reactions, measured through likes and shares?
RQ3: Does the framing of immigration change in the lead-up to elections?
RQ4: Does the framing of immigration change over the course of the refugee crisis in 2015?

1.2 Reading guide

This thesis consists of nine main chapters. In the second and third chapter I focus on framing theory and background information which I deem contextually essential. The next chapters present relevant literature on immigration and research done on Norwegian political actors' use of social media. The sixth chapter explains the methodological process before moving on to the findings chapter where I also answer the research questions. The final two chapters are reserved for discussion and conclusion. In the conclusion I reiterate my findings with regards to the four research questions presented above, and briefly describe the limitations of the thesis.

The framing practice of Norwegian political actors' is similar to what is presented in the literature review. The Progress Party dominate the discourse with negative framing and anti-immigration sentiment. I find that Labour and the Conservatives make out a centrist position in the data collection and that their arguments share similarties. The Socialist Left is the clear opposition party and focus their arguments on morally and emotionally based framing.

The frames of illegality, control and economy seemingly get the most interaction, especially when posed from the Progress Party. When eliminating the Progress Party from the regression analysis we see that the frame of moral and emotionally based arguments become significant for the remaining three parties. This indicates uncertainty of which factor determines high interaction in the Facebook discourse.

Finally I also find that the framing of immigration changes with regards to time periods. This is most clear in the lead-up to the 2017 parliamentary election where all actors other than the Progress Party have left the topic of immigration entirely

2. Framing theory

The concept of framing is popular and widely used within academia. It is used by scholars of political communication, cognitive sciences, social movements, bargaining behaviour and media effects to name some (Druckman 2001). It constitutes one of the most important aspects of public opinion (Druckman 2001). Framing effects occur when in the course of describing an issue or an event, the emphasis on a subset of potentially relevant considerations cause individuals to focus on these considerations when constructing their opinion (Druckman 2001).

Kahneman and Tversky (1981) showed through experiments that the portrayal of information alters individual's actions. By presenting the exact same hypothetical scenario, to two groups of test subjects, they registered different choices between the groups based on how the information was put to them. The dilemma was regarding which course of action you would take, given the outbreak of a serious Asian disease. One group was presented the dilemma as a) guaranteed saving 200 people, or b) a ⅓ chance to save all 600. This group overwhelmingly chose option a. The second group was given the same dilemma, phrased differently. They were given the choice of c), guaranteed death of 400 people or d), ⅓ chance of no one dying and a ⅔ chance of everyone dying. Most of this group chose option D. What Kahneman and Tversky (1981) proved through their experiments is that the framing of information affects choice.

According to Entman (1993) framing is to select some aspects of a communicating text and make these more salient. The framing of the communicating text can affect how we as receivers of information interpret the case at hand. Within politics, framing becomes the bedrock of all communication. Every political actor wants their way of framing a given case, to be the interpretation that the public agrees with. As Tankard (2001: 96) puts it; "Convincing others to accept one's framing means to a large extent winning the debate".

Due to framing being used in different strands of academia, the academic understanding of it is fractured. In 1993 Entman called for a unification among the scholars that used the concept;

> *"The idea of "framing" offers a case study of just the kind of scattered conceptualization I have identified. Despite its omnipresence across the social sciences and humanities, nowhere is there a general statement*

of framing theory that shows exactly how frames become embedded within and make themselves manifest in a text, or how framing influences thinking" (Entman 1993)"

To further the theoretical conversation Semetko & Valkenburg (2000) investigate the occurrences of frames that have been previously observed in news media. They develop a content analytic format designed to universally apply to news media framing research, specifically for five categories they identify. They call them generic frames. They are titled the *conflict frame,* the *economic consequence frame,* the *human-interest frame,* the *attribution of responsibility frame and* the *morality frame.*

Generic frames become part of the research design prior to data analysis and collection. By using the same set of categories with the same accompanying codebook, perhaps with minor alterations, the researcher can switch national contexts and platforms but still look for the same frames of communication.

2.1 Issue-specific framing

De Vreese (2005 adds a divider, between generic and issue-specific framing. The differences between the two can be boiled down to a deductive and an inductive approach towards the empirical analysis. The issue specific approach is inductive in nature by not analyzing the data through previously established frames (de Vreese 2005). Issue-specific frames mean that every topic or issue can have its own set of frames (Matthes 2009). The scholar begins data collection before defining the frames, and through analysis creates the frames. Shah et.al (2002) exemplify the issue-specific framing through their research of news media framing of the final stages of the Clinton presidency. They define three frames that the media were reporting on; "Clinton behavior scandal, "Conservative attack scandal" and "Liberal response scandal". These frames are obviously connected to a specific issue and can not be replicated in a different context.

What the Shah et.al (2002) example shows us is the tricky nature of an issue-specific frame's abstraction level. By committing to this type of research, the scholar is accepting of the fact that their results are only viable for that one context. However, if the researcher heightens the abstraction level of the framing categories, then the categories themselves can be used by others,

in similar contexts. To exemplify, if Shah et.al (2002) were to cluster all their scandal frames together in to a frame called "Scandal", the frame would be able to be used in other contexts, as scandals happen in every country's political reality.

For the purpose of this thesis I have chosen to use issue-specific framing. I want to find out what is specific to the Facebook communication of Norwegian politicians on immigration. As far as I am aware no one has done this yet, and I contest that when broaching a new topic of research, an initial qualitative understanding is advantageous. The advantages of an issue-specific framework is the same as with qualitative methods in general. The researcher allows herself to immerse deeper into the data to elicit understanding of it at a detailed and base-level. This understanding can hopefully over time contribute to a more generalized approach. In time I argue that the field will be more suitable for a deductive, generic approach.

3. Background

This chapter includes background information relevant to the thesis. Facebook and its functionality, Norway's political system and the political parties included in the thesis are described.

3.1 Facebook

Facebook is the largest social media platform in the world. Facebook had 2.1 billion active users in December 2017 (Facebook 2017). Norway's internet penetration rates are among the highest in the world, with around 96% of the population having access (Kalsnes 2016). Facebook is the Norwegian public's preferred social medium with 67% of the population using it daily (MediaNorway 2016). For those between the ages of 16 and 44, 86% use Facebook daily (MediaNorway 2016). According to the Reuters Institute Digital News Report (2017) 75% use Facebook in Norway, and 41% of those who use it regularly, use it for news consumption.

According to Enli (2015) politicians in Norway copy the logic of the media itself by paying attention to numbers such as likes, shares and retweets in the same the traditional media would concern themselves with viewer or readership. Esperås (2015) claims that the use of Facebook by Norwegian politicians resembles established media logic in the way news are presented and commented upon.

Amongst Norwegian politicians Facebook is also the preferred campaigning channel outside traditional media (Skogerbø & Karlsen 2014). Facebook has the potential to become an expansion of the public sphere in which political debate takes place. In many ways, it already has. Facebook pages have become one of the best sources in to examining a political actor's discursive strategies. The other alternative would be to look at party programs, speeches or interviews. The preference for using Facebook becomes apparent, it is a continuously updated source of data that follows a similar logic to the news.

3.1.1 Facebook's functionality

Facebook allows all users to create open profiles, titled pages that can be viewed by every other user on Facebook. This is in addition to a personal profile, which can only be seen by those that are confirmed friends. There is functionality built in to Facebook for users to interact with the information that is posted on these pages. The administrator of a page can create posts that appear on their respective timeline. Private users of Facebook can become followers of a given page by clicking the centrally placed follow button on the page. Users may "like", "share" and "comment" on posts. The amount of likes a post has received is seen in the left bottom corner of the post. Facebook friends of the user who likes the post might see an update on their own timeline, telling them that their friend has liked a certain post. By sharing a post the private user creates a link on their own timeline to the original post. Commenting on the post is the final interaction option open to users. Comments are shown below the original post, in time sorted after which has received the most likes. Comments have no upper character limit and will in many cases be longer texts than the original post. These functions are what lies behind what Klinger & Svensson (2016) describe as the network media logic. Through liking, sharing and commenting the original Facebook post is more likely to appear, and be read, by other users. The

information that shows up in a given Facebook feed is largely down to what your friends has liked, shared and commented on. Users of Facebook do not have to establish a follower relationship with a page in order to view, like, comment or share.

Every major political actor in Norway has a Facebook page.

3.2 Norwegian political system

The electoral system in Norway is based on proportional representation. This results in a large body of relevant Norwegian political parties. After the election of 2017 nine parties are represented in parliament, divided between 169 candidates. The current government consists of The Conservatives, The Progress Party and The Liberal Party. The previous government, elected 2013, consisted of the Conservatives and the Progress Party, with parliamentary backing from the Liberals and the Christian Party.

3.3 The political parties

To design this thesis I wanted to include government actors, and opposition actors. I also wanted to represent the biggest parties and political actors in Norway.

The parties included in the analysis are the Socialist Left Party, the Labour Party, the Conservatives and the Progress Party. The most obvious selection criteria are that Labour, the Conservatives and the Progress Party were the largest parties in Norway as of the election of 2013. The Socialist Left party barely scraped by the cutoff point at 4,1% of the votes. However, they represent a different end of the political spectrum, placing itself to the left of Labour. They are therefore included. The Socialist Left also show an upwards curve, increasing their election results by 1,9% from 2013 to 2017, seemingly increasing their political relevance over the course of the data collection period.

For individual actors to include in data collection, the party leaders of Labour (Jonas Gahr Støre), the Conservatives (Prime Minister Erna Solberg) and the Socialist Left party (Audun Lysbakken) were chosen. I chose to add Sylvi Listhaug as the final individual political actor. During most of the data collection, she was the minister for immigration and integration, and was in that capacity highly relevant to the issue. The individuals chosen are without a doubt among the most popular and well-known politicians in Norway.

In addition to the party and individual accounts I have included youth party accounts of the respective parties. Youth Parties are important in Norway as a breeding ground for political talent. After the terror attacks of 22. July 2011, Labour Youth and The Conservative Youth experienced increasing membership numbers. In 2013 Labour Youth had over 6.000 members and the Conservative Youth close to 5.000 (The Norwegian Directorate for Children, Youth, and Family 2013). According to organizational consultant in the Labour Youth Party, Ingvild Lockert, whom I contacted on Facebook, they had 13174 members as of 2017. The Progress Party Youth are the third largest youth party in Norway with just over 2.000 members (Bråthen 2017). According to Socialist Youth themselves, they have around 1.000 members, a number I got from contacting them on Facebook. The numbers as of 2013 were 732 (The Norwegian Directorate for Children, Youth, and Family 2013).

Research shows that use of social media is contingent on age (Larsson & Kalsnes 2014). Younger politicians adopt the social media platforms faster, and they use it more frequently. They also find that those in challenger positions with lower status within their own party use social media more. It is also logical to assume that younger actors will have a different understanding of social media, having grown up with it. Based on this I wanted to include youth party accounts for the potential to analyze communication internally in the party structure.

3.3.1 Socialist Left (Sosialistisk Venstreparti)

The party was founded in 1975 by a merger of the Socialist People's Party and the Democratic Socialists as well as other socialist forces previously united in the Socialist Electoral League (Norwegian Centre for Research Data). The Socialist Left describe themselves as a socialist party who wants to tackle the problems of our age through collective solutions (Socialist Left Party 2018). It advocates socialism independent of international centers, based on workers' control, decentralized power, gender equality and ecological principles (Norwegian Centre for Research Data). The party's first stint in government came in 2005.

3.3.2 Labour (Arbeiderpartiet)

Labour describe their ideology as one of social democracy, building their policy on the basic values of freedom, equality and solidarity (Labour 2018). The party has been part of government in several periods and is the largest party in Norway.

The Labour party are described as advocating a moderate form of socialism, combined with market-liberal principles (Norwegian Centre for Research Data). It has a strong connection to the Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions (LO) and receives substantial campaign funds from the organization.

3.3.3 The Conservatives (Høyre)

The Conservatives were founded in 1884 and describe themselves as a traditional Norwegian conservative party. The party is market-friendly and believes in liberal values that will strengthen the individual (The Conservatives 2018)

The Conservatives are traditionally the other major alternative to Labour, aiming its policy on promoting economic growth and securing the state's finances, as well as social security, private property, private initiative and personal liberty (Norwegian Centre for Research Data).

3.3.4 The Progress Party (Fremskrittspartiet)

The Progress Party describe themselves as a liberal party for the people built on the Norwegian constitution and Norwegian and western values of tradition and cultural heritage. They also say that their value system is based on humanism and Christian values (Progress Party 2018)

The party was founded in 1973 under the name Anders Lange's party for a Strong Reduction in Taxes, Duties and Public Intervention. Its success was moderate, receiving 5% of the vote in 1973, before losing all MP's in the following election. After Anders Lange's death the party changed name to The Progress Party and Carl Ivar Hagen became their new leader. During the late 1980's he would re-orient the party focusing on immigration, elderly care and crime (Bjerkem 2016). The party is often described as populist, and Bjerkem (2016) claims it is a more pragmatic and moderate far right populist party than many of its European counterparts.

The table below illustrates the number of followers each political actor has on Facebook. The data was collected 01.05.2018.

Table 1: Followers on Facebook 01.05.2018

Political actor	Followers on Facebook	Political actor	Followers on Facebook
Erna Solberg	239.077	Socialist Left	49.560
Jonas Gahr Støre	183.068	Labour Youth	41.319
Sylvi Listhaug	164.618	Audun Lysbakken	40.487
Progress Party	158.447	Conservative Youth	24.777
Labour	130.307	Progress Party Youth	22.178
Conservatives	123.567	Socialist Youth	14.095

4. Literature review

Most framing research on immigration is done in news media, something which is reflected by the literature that will be presented in this chapter. However, research has shown that political actors dominate as sources in news about immigration (Benson & Wood 2015). On this basis I argue that a literature review with a focus on news media is relevant for research done on social media. Also, the Facebook communication is influenced by what is going on in the media. In this way, the framing of messages on Facebook is happening in the midst of the media framing, and will therefore be influenced by it.

Another challenge of comparing these studies is that they rarely use the exact same methodology to establish which frame a given communicating text belongs to. Despite the research field's methodical frailty, I argue that there are certain patterns that cannot be overlooked.

4.1 Literature review

Greenberg and Hier (2001) find through content analysis of four Canadian newspapers what they call the securitization frame. The study was done in the context of Chinese boat refugees arriving in Canada. The language consists of a fear of crime and diseases. When sources from the right-wing populist party were part of the news story, the main framing of the Chinese refugees was illegality and crime followed by the cost to society. They especially emphasize the cost to the welfare state and how certain refugees are coming just to take advantage of the system or participate in organized crime. After securitization they found a frame of victimization. This frame portrays the migrants as passive victims of a situation, instead of illegals.

Immigration framing among those news outlets closest to the Mexican border frame immigrants as criminals and threats (Branton & Dunaway 2009). The researchers argue that this is due to

newspapers financial interests relying on established media logic, such as sensationalism to sell newspapers. Dunaway, Goidel, Kirzinger and Wilkinson (2011) measure framing of immigration news at the same time as they measure public influence. They find that exposure to news outlets who frame immigration negatively, significantly increases concern over immigration. They also find that the framing of immigrants in the state of Louisiana was mainly negative, and often with a focus on crime. One finding from their study showed that exposure to negative news coverage was a stronger predictor for seeing immigration as a concern than actual increase in immigrant population. They also point out that the tone of coverage is a stronger predictor for attitudes toward immigrants than the amount of exposure.

Kim, Carvalho, Davis and Muller (2011) seek to answer three questions regarding immigration in the U.S; why is it a problem, what causes it and what is the solution? The majority of news articles frame the reason for it being a problem as crime, social costs, national security and taking jobs away. The causes are evenly split between the economic situation in South-America, and failure of the immigration system combined with weak border control. The solutions focus mainly on immigration reform, making it easier for illegal immigrants to become legalized, tougher border controls and stricter law enforcement.

The tendencies found in the North-American context of immigration framing are also found in various European contexts.

Through a corpus analysis gathered from U.K articles on immigration between 1996 and 2005, Gabrielatos and Baker (2008) found that crime was the most common association to immigration. This effect was stronger the more tabloid and populist the newspaper was. Examining 30.000 news articles from Canada and the U.K, Lawlor (2015) found that the most commonly used frame was the "threat of violence" frame. The second most dominant frame was economic consequences, rarely portrayed as economic growth. In Horsti's (2007) study of what is newsworthy in Finland regarding asylum seekers the same patterns emerge. If the story was framed within crime or illegality, the higher the chance it would become news. In France the political discourse and framing of immigration centers around crime and illegality, followed by

economic consequences (De Wenden 2010). In this example, immigrants would often be labelled as consumers of the welfare state, not contributors.

Research done on television and online news in Cyprus reiterates the previous findings (Millioni, Spyrou & Vadratsikas 2013). Most of the news were framed within threat, encompassing both crime and illegality. The second most dominant frame was the victimization frame, at around 40% of total news items. Ten percent of the data was categorized within the "active agent" frame. The immigrants are here perceived as active contributors to society. Most of those described in this frame were rich foreign investors (Millioni et.al 2013).

In a study of six Australian newspapers Greussing and Boomgarden (2017) conclude that frames are dynamic and change according to external factors. The external factors they find in their study are those of the refugee crisis. In the beginning of the crises it was framed as a more distant issue focusing on the cause of the situation as well as victimization. As the crises grew closer to Austrian borders, the framing would change to more short-term consequences of illegality and crime, as well as economic challenges (Greussing & Booemgarden 2017). After September 2015 the framing changes again to more long-term consequences before shifting back to victimization and causes, as the issue salience rose towards the end of the research period.

Below is a summary table of the literature presented from North America and Europe.

Table 2: Literature overview North America and Europe

Literature review overview - North America and Europe				
Author(s)	**Year**	**Method**	**Relevant frames and terms**	**Data collection**
Greenberg & Hier	2001	Content analysis Critical discourse analysis	Crime and illegality Costs to welfare state,	News articles in papers N=246
Branton & Dunaway	2009	Content analysis	Crime and illegality Threat to society	News articles in papers N= 1538
Greussing & Booemgarden	2017	Computer-assisted content analysis	Securitisation Economy Humanitarian Background causes	News articles in papers N=10606
Branton, Dunaway, Goidel, Kirzinger	2011	Content analysis	Crime Negative	News articles in papers N=388
Horsti	2007	Frame analysis	Crime and illegality combined with control, dehumanizing metaphors	News articles in papers N=237
Kim, Carvalho, Davis, Muller	2011	Frame analysis	Crime and illegality Social costs National Security Safety of illegal immigrants Taking jobs away	News articles in papers Television news transcripts N= 450 (300 articles, 150 transcripts)
Lawlor	2015	Computer automated content analysis	Threat of violence, economic consequences	News articles in papers N= 29611
Millioni, Spyridou, Vadratsikas	2013	Frame analysis	Threat frame Victimization frame	Online news articles and Television evening news casts N=302

4.3 Norwegian literature review

Immigration has been part of the Norwegian political debate since the 1970's (Hagelund 2003). The first immigrants came from countries such as Pakistan, Morocco and Turkey. The issue became important to the Norwegian people in the context of cheap labor arriving and competing for jobs, as well as immigrants' vulnerable position in society (Hagelund 2003). Tighter immigration laws in the rest of Europe lead to Norway following suit in 1975 and instilling an immigration stoppage. Despite the stoppage which affected third world labor migrants especially, immigration continued through family reunification and refugees.

Bergh & Karlsen (2017) present polling data which shows that immigration was the most important public issue ahead of the election of 2017. The polling data also show that the far left and far right parties have a supporting base which believes that their party is best equipped to deal with immigration. 97% of Progress Party voters, and 70% of Socialist Left party voters believe this to be true. This polling data shows that there has been a sharp increase in the public's view of immigration as an important political issue (Bergh & Karlsen 2017). In 2001 and 2005 four and six percent respectively listed immigration as the most important political issue. These numbers must be seen in context with the refugee crisis. Sniderman, Peri, Figueiredo and Piazza (2000) contend that during times of external shocks, such as high levels of immigration, people become more susceptible to news on the issue.

Survey data show the Norwegian public thought there was a biased focus on positive immigration news, with too little focus on the negatives such as crime (Beyer & Matthes 2015). This shows a discrepancy between the public's view on immigration, and the media's focus. Such tendencies could motivate the public to use social media as their preferred news source. It is clear in the context of this thesis that the issue of immigration has never been more important in Norwegian politics.

4.4 Framing of immigration in Norway

Jørgensen and Meret (2012) identify two different frames of communication in the Norwegian political discourse, measured through parliamentary protocols, relating to irregular migrants in Norway. One side emphasizes the need for protection and shelter to those who need it, the other the importance of sending back those who are in Norway illegally. The right wing Progress Party exclusively frame the issue of asylum seekers and irregular migrants within illegality (Jørgensen & Meret 2012).

According to Gripsrud, Hovden and Mjelde (2017) the Norwegian press represented by tabloid newspaper VG and broadsheet newspaper Aftenposten occupy a middle position in the framing of immigrants compared to Denmark and Sweden. They show that framing of refugees is dynamic and time sensitive, as the frames changed according to what the major storylines at the time were. After the terror attacks in Paris, the framing of security and border control rose. In the aftermath of the worst drownings in the Mediterranean the frames became more sympathetic and with a focus on refugees as victims. The authors claim that the framing of immigration in Norway follows the same dynamic as the rest of Europe, however, it was less negative. Benson and Wood (2015) find evidence to support Gripsrud et.als (2017) claim that the coverage in Norwegian news outlets was less negative than in the European counterparts. Norwegian news were more likely to emphasize problems for immigrants, compared to the data collected in France and the U.S, which was more hostile towards immigrants.

In a study of local news in Norway, both television and newspapers, Hognestad and Lamark (2017) found that refugees mostly are framed in a perspective of needing help. This frame is similar to what is previously mentioned as a victimization frame. Following the help frame the researchers found a neutral perspective, followed by a problem frame, posing the immigrants as problems, not resources. The least used perspective by Norwegian local news was the framing of immigrants as resources to society. 34% of sources used in the total data collection were politicians.

Aalberg and Beyer (2015) specifically look for the prevalence of the human-interest frame in the coverage of immigration in France, Norway and the U.S. Contrary to their expectations they find that the frame was mostly used in the Norwegian press, often exemplified through the portrayal

19

of one or more immigrants as victims. They also find that the frame was preferred by those in the public who place themselves to the left on the political spectrum. The same tactic was used by pro-immigration advocacy groups in a study conducted by Ihlen, Figenschou and Larsen (2015), using the same data. The advocacy groups would use an individual perspective with an emotional angle to get attention from news outlets, especially in cases such as deportation. Thorbjørnsrud and Figenschou (2015) reiterate the findings of Aalberg and Beyer (2015), showing that the human-interest frame was most prevalent in the Norwegian news outlets, compared to France and the US. They also find that elite left newspapers were more likely to use a human-interest framing in the coverage of irregular immigration than elite right newspapers.

Below is a summary table on the literature presented from a Norwegian context

Table 3: Literature review Norway

Literature review overview - Norway				
Thorbjørnsrud & Figenschou	2015	Quantitative comparative analysis	Problems for immigrants Problems for authorities	News articles in papers N=1355
Ihlen, Figenschou, Larsen	2015	Ethnographic fieldwork and qualitative interviews	Human interest framing (NGO's)	Interviews with employees of NGO's and immigration authorities N= Unknown
Aalberg & Beyer	2015	Quantitative content analysis	Human interest	Articles in news papers N=1355
Benson & Wood	2015	Content analysis	Problems for immigrants Immigration reform	Articles in newspapers Online commercial news Online public news N= Approx 1500
Gripsrud, Hovden, Mjelde	2017	Quantitative content analysis	Scandinavia less negative framing than Europe Economic consequences	News articles in papers N=304
Jørgensen & Meret	2012	Frame analysis	Victimization frame Illegality frame	Parliamentary protocols N=Unknown
Hognestad & Lamark	2017	Frame analysis	Help frame Problem frame	Front pages of newspapers Local newscasts N= 605

5. Social media literature review

Enli (2015) investigated the adoption of social media use and strategy over the course of three months in 2013 among high ranking Norwegian politicians. Informants included then Prime Minister from the Labour Party Jens Stoltenberg, Knut Arild Hareide (Christian Democratic Party leader), Audun Lysbakken (Socialist Left Party leader), Trine Skei Grande (Liberal Party leader), and Siv Jensen (Progress Party leader). In addition to the politicians she interviewed political aides and PR-managers from the Conservatives, the Labour Party and the Liberal Party (Enli 2015). All informants were motivated by using social media in election campaigns due to it granting freedom from the limitations of editorial mass media. Enli (2015) points out that that prominent Norwegian politicians use social media to gain exposure and subsequently show their personalities.

In Skogerbø & Karlsens (2014) qualitative study of local politicians and social media habits they find that the motives for using social media was to build a personal image, to mobilize voters and to create dialogue with voters. The politicians' preferred social medium was Facebook, only two of the 31 informants did not have Facebook profiles. The mobilization of voters is also pointed out by Skogerbø & Karlsen (2014) who interviewed several Labour Party politicians regarding their adoption of social media in the 2009 election. Their main goal with regards to online marketing and social media was to mobilize voters and try to engage them more closely in the political process. During the period leading up to the 2009 election the Labour Party had 213.000 unique users visit their website, 61.000 views on Youtube, and Jens Stoltenberg (party leader) increased his following on Facebook from nearly 9.000 to 43.000. According to the Labour Party the social media campaign of 2009 was a success. These numbers are old, but I argue that they show the willingness among the Norwegian public to quickly adopt and use social media technology.

Kalsnes (2016) returns similar results as Skogerbø & Karlsen (2014) based off semi-structured interviews with PR and campaign managers for all the major Norwegian parties. Their motivation for use of social media in campaigning was threefold; (1) dialogue with voters, (2) feedback, and (3) to bypass media.

Karlsen & Enjolras (2016) use the 2013 Norwegian Candidate Survey to look at what politicians want to achieve with social media in campaigning. They find that the most important facets of social media for the 850 local politicians surveyed was "sharing links", "creating involvement", "reaching out", "direct communication" and "mobilizing supporters". On a scale from one to five where five indicates "very important", these five categories all scored four or above on average. They also survey the self-reported importance of different campaign communication channels. In 2013 the surveyed politicians thought Facebook was the most important campaign tool after local and regional newspapers.

Kalsnes, Krumsvik & Storsul (2014) look at how Twitter is used as a political backchannel and agenda setter during two televised political debates leading up to the election of 2011. They find that already in 2011 social media was used to debate politics in a Norwegian setting. Norwegian Twitter users' activity increased as the political debates leading up to the election were on TV. The topics discussed closely mirrored what the debate was centered on at the time, with an obvious slight delay in time. Skogerbø & Krumsvik (2014) find little evidence to support the results produced in other national contexts regarding intermedial agenda setting between social media and the traditional news. Looking at the 2011 Norwegian local elections they find little proof that it has become journalistic practice in Norway to use social media as sources around elections. According to Skogerbø & Krumsvik (2014) this must be seen in light of the Norwegian context where journalists' proximity to politicians is closer than in larger western democracies and the US.

Rogstad (2016) looks at whether Twitter in a Norwegian context can set the agenda ahead of the traditional news sources and finds that mainly it does not. However, there were cases which was reported first on Twitter before they became news. These cases were information on an environmental conference and news on gender equality. Rogstads (2016) collection of data took

place later than Skogerbø & Krumsvik (2014) and may indicate a tendency within Norwegian news media to use social media as sources. In summary Norway seems to lag behind what has become commonplace in US journalism especially regarding sourcing through social media.

5.1 My contribution

The research gap I seek to fill is lodged between the two main thematic dividers in the literature review. The framing of immigration on one side, and political communication on social media on the other. We know that the framing of immigration is negative and that the main sources in immigration news are political actors. From the social media literature, we know that politicians use social media for strategic self-representation, and that they pay attention to their interactions. None of these insights tell us anything about how political actors framed immigration in their direct communication to voters through social media.

To my knowledge no one has done research on political actors' framing of immigration on social media, or Facebook specifically. The chosen political actors are important entities in the Norwegian democracy. The topic of immigration has also never been more relevant in Norway, as proven by Bergh & Karlsens (2017) polling results. I argue on this basis the need for this research to be done, and the importance of the thesis' pioneering work. This leads me to the restating of my research objectives;

RQ1: "How do Norwegian political actors frame immigration arguments on Facebook, in the context of the refugee crisis?"

The initial research question is the point of departure. I wish to quantify and explain the differences between Norwegian political actors, as well as comparing results to the previous research done. To gain further understanding of the framing practices I want to include a measure of how the frames are interacted with and reacted to among the public. This leads me to my second research question;

RQ2: Which frames elicit the most reactions, measured through likes and shares?

Based on literature previously mentioned I also wanted to investigate whether framing practices changed over time. Using pre-defined time periods of the refugee crisis, as well as the lead-up to the two elections within the data collection period, my two next research questions are;

RQ3: Does the framing of immigration change in the lead-up to elections?

RQ4: Did the framing of immigration change over the course of the refugee crisis in 2015?

6. Method

6.1 Qualitative inductive methodology

This thesis has two methodological approaches. The first is a qualitative, bottom up coding of frames in Facebook posts. This process lead to the codebook which was used to code all Facebook posts. After this is completed, I use quantitative methods, mainly linear regression and descriptive statistics to analyze the results.

The principal purpose of qualitative inductive analysis is to condense extensive and varied raw text data into a summary format (Thomas 2006). To do this I combined perspectives on qualitative methodology from Thomas (2006) and Forman & Damschroder (2008). Thomas (2006) creates a process line with quantitative descriptors;

Table 4: Process line for qualitative inductive analysis

Thomas (2006) process line				
1.Initial reading of text data	2. Identifying specific text segments related to objectives Number: Many	3. Labelling segments to create categories Number: 30-40 categories	4. Reducing overlap and redundancy among categories Number: 15-20 categories	5. Creating a model incorporating most important categories Number: 3-8 categories

Forman and Damschroder (2008) propose the immersion, reduction and interpretation phase as the key aspects of the inductive analysis. The immersion phase corresponds to Thomas' (2006) first and second point, whilst the reduction phase is representative of the remaining three. To further the technical part of the analysis, I chose to apply a macroscopic discourse analysis to the reading of the text (Johnston 1995). This means a reading of the text that investigates "broad patterns of what is being talked and written about (...)" (Johnston 1995:230). This stands in

contrast to a micro-discourse analysis which "seeks to explain why the words, sentences, and concepts are put together the way they are" (Johnston 1995: 230). Practically this means that I look for the themes and categories of the text, not the underlying linguistic traits that make up the sentences. I argue that this suits a qualitative frame analysis. The primary purpose of inductive approaches is to allow findings to emerge from the themes in the data, without the restraints of a structured methodology (Thomas 2006).

6.2 Difference between frame and argument

An important delineation in frame construction that must be clarified is that between the argument, and the frame. This is rarely covered by other researchers and is yet more evidence of the scattered use of the framing concept. Framing is the process by which the political actor defines the issue for their audience (Matthes 2009). Hänggli and Kriesi (2010) state the frame is more than an argument. The frame enhances interpretation or evaluation of reality (Entman 1993). Hänggli and Kriesi (2010) describe arguments as the specific positions given actors have produced to support their own position or to undermine the position of their adversaries.

Relying on the information above, I define arguments as underlying traits of a frame. Several arguments can constitute a frame. The frame is created based on arguments which express something similar.

6.3 Data collection

To collect the Facebook posts I used the University of Oslo's own web browser tool *fb loader* to collect posts from public pages (University of Oslo 2017). The tool allowed me to collect all Facebook posts from open Facebook pages in the timespan 1. January 2015 - 31. December 2017. This procedure was done for each Facebook page included in the analysis, and then copied over to Microsoft Excel to filter and sort. After coding the entire file was uploaded to SPSS to perform statistical analysis. Using the search phrases *refugee, immigrant, immigration, foreigner, migrant, asylum and Syria,* I filtered the posts down to those which concerned immigration which resulted in a total of 805 Facebook posts. After this step I manually went through each

Facebook post from each political actor and deleted those posts who had no meaningful reference to immigration. This included posts that were invitations to seminars, or simple information such as who was newly appointed as a spokesperson on immigration. This left me with a total of 805 Facebook posts. After having completed the qualitative inductive analysis I cut another 34 posts, due to them not fitting into any of my categories. Several of these should have been deleted at the first junction, as they did not carry an argument which relates to immigration. This left me with a total of 771 posts. 557 of these posts were from the political right side of the spectrum, and 215 from the left. The distribution is displayed in the table below.

Table 5: Number of Facebook Posts on immigration pr. actor (1. Jan 2015 - 31. Dec 2017)

Distribution of Facebook posts on political actors					
Socialist Left Party: 67	Audun Lysbakken: 58	Socialist Youth Party: 24	Conservatives: 45	Erna Solberg: 22	Conservative Youth: 13
Labour: 17	Jonas Gahr Støre: 27	Labour Youth Party: 21	Progress Party: 183	Sylvi Listhaug: 268	Progress Party Youth: 26

6.4 Method for frame analysis

The reality of political communication is that it is strategic and deliberate. Strategic communication can be described as an "organization's vie for public attention, admiration, affinity, alignment and allegiance (...)" (Hallahan, Holtzhausen, van Ruler,Vercic, Sriramesh 2007). Politicians would previously have to deliver their messages filtered through journalistic practices, a mechanic the advent of Facebook (and other social media) has altered. The messages posted on the Facebook pages of these actors are unfiltered and often contain a lot of information. This creates a need for multiple coding. Thomas (2006) describes this as one of the underlying realities of qualitative coding that separates it from quantitative coding, a segment of text may be coded into more than one category. I argue that this is an advantage of the thesis. Multiple coding allows for more analytical opportunities, for example looking at what frames occur together for a given actor. This may give more insight into the communicative purpose of

the text, than if the posts were to be broken up into segments. All frames were added to the initial Excel spreadsheet and coded as present (1) or not present (0) for every Facebook post.

To begin the analysis of the data I drew a random sample of 100 posts from the entire data collection. This corresponds to the immersion phase of the process as I was familiarizing myself with the arguments and taking extensive notes. Having read through the subset I followed the proposed process line of Thomas (2006) which is described above. I read every post of each political actor and wrote notes on what arguments the actor was using. After having done this I was left with a lot of arguments that needed to be condensed. I color coded posts across political actors to visualize what I thought were similar arguments. Drawing on the literature I had already read regarding the framing of immigration, some frames seemed to warrant inclusion after reading through the material once. These were the frames of control, illegality and economy. Another reading of the entire data material resulted in the frames of integration, responsibility, morality and criticism.

Even though this thesis is qualitative using issue-specific frames, it was always a goal to attempt definition of frames at a high inference level. This means a possibility for the researcher to interpret the data at a higher abstraction level (Forman & Damschroder 2008). This will hopefully contribute to the thesis' methodological potential for reproduction in other national contexts, or with other social media platforms.

Some of the frames are influenced by the previous literature on the matter of immigration. As Thomas (2006) states; "the findings are shaped by the assumptions and experiences of the evaluator conducting the study and carrying out the data analysis". The frames of control and illegality are frames already used by several researchers in the field, some of which were presented in the previous literature review chapter. Economy corresponds entirely to what is termed economic consequences by Semetko & Valkenburg (2000). All arguments posed within a context of economics, be it gains or losses, are within this frame. The frame of morals, emotions, values and rights is like the one created by Semetko & Valkenburg (2000). The questions they ask when categorizing this frame are if the story contains moral messages, refers to God and

religious tenets or offer specific social prescriptions about how to behave (Semetko & Valkenburg 2000). In addition to arguments concerning right and wrong, arguments that are defended by the use of emotional or value-based arguments are included here.

The frame of integration refers to those posts that state how the political actor would integrate immigrants, either through culture and values or steps into employment. It also includes all posts containing specific examples of immigrants that are integrating well. This particular facet of the integration frame is reminiscent of the human interest frame proposed by Semetko & Valkenburg (2000).

The responsibility frame was created due to the amount of posts, especially within the Socialist Left party, that called for Norway to take responsibility for refugees. This contrasts with the more centrist view expressed by Labour and the Conservatives that the situation must be handled either by the EU and its member states, or in collaboration between Norway and the EU. Despite its similar name to Semetko & Valkenburgs (2000) responsibility frame, it is different. It only includes those posts which make a specific reference to the responsibility for refugees lying with a state or an international institution such as the EU and has nothing to do with individual responsibilities.

The final frame in the analysis is criticism. This is an additional frame that carries no meaningful discursive quality, it only registers whether a political actor was criticized. I argue for the inclusion of this frame because of the potential insights into who is being criticized by whom, and what for, being an interesting analytical opportunity.

A simple intercoder reliability test was performed using a randomly drawn subsample of 10% of the data collection. This test scored a 74% agreement.

6.5 Process line

As previously mentioned this thesis has two methodological approaches. The first is a qualitative, bottom up coding of frames in Facebook posts. The process line represents the concrete way I worked qualitatively to define a frame.

I start off with the reading of a specific post which contains x-amount of arguments. I then isolate the specific argument(s), usually a declaration of what the political actor sees as the solution for a given problem. I then define thematic categories the specific arguments belong to. The thematic argument is at a higher degree of inference and encapsulates several arguments. The thematic arguments are then put together in the end to make the frame. The table below illustrates the process, from right to left. So for instance, the specific argument "we must establish control at the border in order to safeguard our local communities" is boiled down to the thematic argument "border control". All border control arguments would then eventually become the frame of "Control". A process line for each category will be presented in the next chapter.

Table 6: Process line framework

Frame	Thematic arguments	Specific arguments	Specific post
Control	Border control	"Border crossing must be closed to achieve control"	"The border crossing at Storskog must be closed to make sure we have control of situation."

7. Findings

This chapter is divided into qualitative findings and quantitative findings. Firstly, I will go into more detail on the qualitative process and which arguments were predominantly used by which actors, and how these arguments became frames. This is an elaboration of the process line, and also the answer to the first research question. After this I will present quantitative data. The chapter ends by detailing the total distribution of all communicative frames for each political actor. Afterwards I will shed light on the second, third, and fourth research questions starting with what frames attract the most reaction, measured through shares and likes. Finally, I will show tables to illustrate the spread of frames on each political actor in pre-defined time periods.

All Facebook posts presented in this chapter are translated from Norwegian to English by me. The original posts in Norwegian are included in the appendix, sorted by date. Some findings will be cutouts of larger posts.

7.1 Qualitative findings – the arguments

Over the course of the immersion phase and its consequent defining of frames, several arguments were made by the political actors about immigration. In this chapter I will present the qualitative findings that served as the building blocks for the frames. After a brief explanation and presentation of the arguments that supported the building of each frame, each chapter will include an identical table to table 6. The table illustrates the process of deriving a frame from a Facebook post, through specific and thematic arguments.

7.2 Illegality

It did not take long to establish the first frame, given the clear tendency among the Progress Party to associate immigration with crime. This frame was hardly used by any other actor. The Progress Party would use an argument which related to crime to explain the challenges of

immigration. Many of these arguments were linked to deporting or sending our criminal foreigners;

> "The Progress Party are prioritizing deporting illegal immigrants. In 2015 the government has set a goal to deport 7800 foreigners who are staying in Norway illegally. About 40% of those who are being sent out have committed a crime or have been sanctioned" **06.08.2015 Progress Party**

> In government we have tightened the asylum and immigration policy. Increasing amounts of criminal asylum seekers are now being sent out of the country, and in Hordaland alone 40% more were deported compared to 2014. **Progress Party 19.01.2015**

After becoming Minister for Immigration and Integration Sylvi Listhaug would also use arguments linking immigration to crime on her Facebook page. In the data collection she is the first registered actor to use Sweden as an example of failed immigration policy. The Sweden comparisons became a staple throughout her ministerial period and caused much debate. The Sweden examples were always connected to crime;

> "Watch Dagbladet TV's interview with me in "Answer the question". Amongst other things i talk about a stricter asylum policy to stop parallel societies and lawlessness as we have seen in Sweden. We will never accept that in Norway!" **- Sylvi Listhaug 12.05.2016**

> "We must not let the left's naive asylum policy lead us down the path that Sweden are going with parallel societies where criminals reign. I hope Labour turn around and now realise the importance of a strict asylum policy" **- Sylvi Listhaug 09.05.2016**

The Progress Party Youth used similar arguments as their seniors with regards to illegality.

Table 7: Process line for the frame of illegality

Frame	Thematic argument	Specific arguments	Facebook post
Illegality	Threat of crime Deportations of criminals Immigrants described as illegals Any posts connecting immigrants/immigration to crime or illegality	"(…)immigrants from non-western countries are far more criminal than the rest of the population. Stop immigration from these countries" "We can not award those who do not follow Norwegian law"	"According to Statistics Norway immigrants from non-western countries are far more criminal than the rest of the population. That's why the Progress Party want to stop immigration from these countries entirely until we have control of integration and crime development. Do you agree?" (**Progress Party. Also coded as control)** Those who arrive at Trandum Immigration Detention Center are those who refuse to leave Norway voluntarily. They are themselves responsible for ending up there. We can not award those who do not follow Norwegian law. Those who are given refusals must be sent out, either voluntarily or with coercion. If not the entire asylum institute is undermined. Like and share! (**Sylvi Listhaug. Also coded as control)**

7.3 Control

Some of the more plentiful arguments in the data collection, across all actors, related to being in control of the immigration situation. These arguments would vary from short posts that pose the need for a "strict immigration policy" to posts with specific mentions of being in control. Several arguments emphasized the importance of reducing migrant arrivals and controlling borders;

> "The numbers speak for themselves. Strict asylum policy and clear rhetoric works. We are in control at the borders and make sure there is low immigration to our country. Norway needs a steady course, not new immigration experiments! Like and share. - **Sylvi Listhaug 22.08.2017**

> "Asylum numbers are sharply declining. Now we see the results of necessary tightening measures. We are in better control of the situation, and we are better equipped to return those with no claim to stay in Norway (...)" - **Conservatives 30.11.2015**

> "The number of asylum seekers thus far this year is the lowest since 1997. The Progress Party wants Norway to continue having a strict immigration policy. Like and share if you agree with us." - **Progress Party 23.06.2017**

Labour would also talk about the need to control the situation and being strict, but they would often qualify the need for it with elements of integration, morality or the international commitments of the state;

> "To Labour three things are decisive in asylum policy: 1. Control of the borders and asylum arrivals in Norway. 2. A good integration policy - those who are granted stay must start their lives here and become contributors. 3. Make sure that Norway upholds international law and safeguards asylum seekers rule of law." **Labour 05.04.2016**

> "Labour believes it is important with measure that makes sure we have control of immigration, at the same time as it does not inhibit integration and ensures Norway lives up to its international commitments. **Labour 06.06.2016**

> "-Labour wants to contribute constructively to a broad political agreement on development of a strict, fair and humane asylum policy (...)." **Labour 30.10.2015**

The Conservatives way of arguing this position are similar to Labour, indicating a greater willingness to qualify the need for reducing arrivals or tightening borders through other arguments;

> "The Conservatives have made big and necessary tightening measures in Norwegian asylum and immigration policy. A lot is good, but we wish the opposition would see the need for even more. That is decisive to be able to reduce the number of asylum seekers without reasons for being granted stay, and helping those who need protection in the best possible way" **The Conservatives 10.06.2016**

> "The Conservatives and the Progress Party propose measures to limit the amount of people who seek asylum in Norway. In the reception centers we will provide a sober but dignified service. The work on integrating those who are granted stay will be strengthened" **The Conservatives 09.11.2015**

Table 8: Process line for the frame of control

Frame	Thematic arguments	Specific arguments	Specific Examples (translated)
Control	Reducing number of arriving immigrants Tightening of borders Controlling situation to achieve safety Detaining unidentified immigrants	"Help get control of the flow of migrants without need for protection" "Development of a strict, fair and humane asylum policy"	The government is proposing legislature that will help get control of the flow of migrants without need for protection. We can not accept abuse of the asylum institute. **(Erna Solberg. Also coded as illegality)** "Labour wants to contribute to a political agreement on development of a strict, fair and humane asylum policy. We are ready to meet the other parties in parliament for conversations on this, says Jonas Gahr Støre. **(Labour Party. Also coded as morality)**

7.4 Integration

One of the more challenging frames to define was the frame of integration. The arguments contained within this frame differed greatly between political actors. One of the differences in the qualitative data relates to how the Progress Party and Sylvi Listhaug would argue integration as being the responsibility of the immigrant. Labour and Jonas Gahr Støre emphasize that successful integration is reliant on the efforts of the state or society. The Conservatives combine perspectives from Labour and the Progress Party, stressing both demands and a welcoming culture;

> "(...) We have a majority that wants to put demands and duties on immigrants, and there is an opening for banning islamistic leaders and imams access to the country" **- Progress Party 13.01.2016**

> "(...) Six parties in parliament have now gathered around an historic agreement to lift integration in Norway. This way we send a clear message that we as a society will succeed with the integration of the refugees that are now starting their lives with us, says Jonas Gahr Støre." **Labour 16.12.2015**

> "Norway must have a welcoming culture that includes immigrants. At the same time we expect high levels of effort and a will to get a job as soon as possible. Agree?" **22.11.2017 Conservatives**

Erna Solberg used the frame of integration to show immigrants that were succeeding with regards to integrating themselves. Of her total 22 Facebook posts, four of them were categorized

as integration, and three of the four were specific stories about immigrant individuals who were contributors to society. These posts referred to immigrant women she met for dinner, an immigrant family who moved to Salten and a Somali immigrant who worked at a hotel.

Audun Lysbakken also told stories of specific immigrants and integration, like Erna Solberg. Lysbakken and the Socialist Left focused their arguments on the responsibility of the state, criticism of the government policy and the potential of the immigrants;

> "Yasser was a basketball player and a DJ in Syria. Now he is at Nesna, fleeing the war. The refugees at Helgeland told med yesterday about their hopes and dreams for the future, and of the long waits at the asylum detention centre. In parliament the Socialist Left are working for quicker processing of asylum applications. Passive waiting is destructive for integration**." Audun Lysbakken 08.04.2016**

> "In today's christmas calendar there are 49 proposals that SL are forwarding to parliament for better integration and settlement of refugees. The Progress Party think that none of these people should stay in Norway. This is a bad recipe for integration. Refugees are not able to contribute to the Norwegian society, and become passive. Many become sick. Today's solution is expensive and bad, and will breed more hostility towards people who need protection in Norway. Let the refugees be part of their local communities and contribute with their knowledge and work effort!" **Socialist Left 15.12.2015**

Table 9: Process line for the frame of integration

Frame	Thematic arguments	Specific arguments	Specific Examples (translated)
Integration	Concrete examples of immigrants who are integrating positively Integration measures, both culturally and with regards to employment	"Now they are not only living in Fauske Nordland, but have become a part of the local community" "An important part of integration is that everyone understand and accepts the Norwegian values"	Winter sport on the telly and a Norwegian flag on the wall. Outside the house in Ankerveien the snow is falling. It's only been a year since the Houdaifa family from Syria and Lebanon came to Norway. Now they are not only living in Fauske, Nordland, but have also become a part of the local community. Mom and Dad are attending the introduction programme, the littles ones in kindergarten. Even the Salten dialect is starting to become apparent. A new life. **(Erna Solberg. Only coded as this frame)** An important part of integration is that everyone understands and accepts the Norwegian values. That is why we are imposing 50 hours of obligatory Norwegian culture and social studies as soon as possible for all asylum seekers. Do you agree? Like and share! **(Progress party. Only coded as this frame)**

7.5 Economy

The economic arguments in the immigration debate varied with party affiliation, as expected. Most of the economic arguments indicated that immigration was an economic challenge for the country. The Conservatives and the Progress Party would often refer to the need for a sustainable immigration or asylum policy. The use of the word sustainability was recurrent and seemed a conscious choice between the actors. It is reminiscent of how the Progress Party would use the term "strict" in describing their immigration and asylum policy.

In general, the economic arguments of the debate were posed in much the same way as they were illustrated in the literature review. The economic consequences are presented in a negative way and must be met with welfare cuts or the like. The counterbalance to these arguments were from the Socialist Left. However, the Socialist Left had no economic argument of their own other than critiquing the government's economic proposals. Their strategy was to criticize the government for poor spending. They would also often equate the expenses of immigration, with the expenses of giving tax cuts to the rich;

> "- To point out Syrian refugees as the biggest threat against the welfare state's sustainability is a diversion tactic. Yes, receiving many asylum seekers in a short space of time is expensive. But in time the threat from tax havens will be much more serious for the welfare state, says Snorre Valen, SL's second in command. **15.01.2016 Socialist Left**

> "Finally, we have a balance sheet for Sylvi Listhaug. The passive integration policy will cost us billions of kroner, the price of not integrating the asylum children will be sky high. All asylum children must be allowed to attend kindergarten! **Socialist Left 30.03.2016**

Few Labour posts concerned economy, and those that did were references to economic concerns in Labour-governed municipalities and concerns over privately owned asylum detention centres. A trend that is indicated in the rest of the data collection also made itself apparent with regards to economic arguments. The Labour Youth party's arguments were more similar to the Socialist Left than it was Labour.

Table 10: Process line for the frame of economy

Frame	Thematic arguments	Specific arguments	Specific Examples (translated)
Economy	Economic consequences of immigration, gains or losses Economic priorities Economic consequences of not taking/not taking a course of action Any post connecting immigrants/immigration to economy	"For every Syrian (…), we can supply roof over their heads, food, clean water, basic healthcare and education" "(…) Some of the money is taken from the foreign aid budget meant for Africa.The world's poorest are paying so that we can help a little bit here a home"	For every Syrian refugee that arrives in Norway, we can supply roof over their heads, food, clean water, basic healthcare and education for 26 people in Jordan. Still, it is considered the moral highground to do what matters most to the few. **(Conservative Youth. Also coded as morality).** The Syria agreement has become a limit on Norway helping more. Listen to Nicholas slaughter the agreement on NRK. - Some of the money is taken from the foreign aid budget meant for Africa. The world's poorest are paying so that we can help a little bit here at home. SL are inviting the other parties to keep their promise to help more. **(Socialist Youth. Also coded as morality)**

7.6 Morality

Using moral, emotional or value-based arguments was a common thread in the immigration discourse, especially for the Socialist Left. The major differences in type of argument is mostly between the Progress Party usage, and the Socialist Left usage. The Socialist Left's strategy of asking rhetorical questions would often support their use of moral arguments. The Socialist Left, Socialist Youth and Labour Youth would use emotional and value-based arguments much more than all other actors. Words like compassion, warmth and inclusiveness would often be coupled with judgment on what is right and wrong;

> "This is not worthy of Norway. In the midst of the refugee crisis the government are working to throw our children from Norway. This is an ice cold set of priorities, petty even by Progress Party standards. The SL are now demanding answers from the prime minister, she must stop this. **Audun Lysbakken 05.09.2015**

"Today there was a hearing at Parliament, about SL's proposal to let the deported asylum children have their cases treated again. This is the only decent thing Norway can do now. **Socialist Left 10.02.2015.**

"A greeting from the boss himself. Norway has both space and room to help Syrian refugees. Listen to Audun tell about his imperssions from refugee camps in Greece. **Socialist Youth 02.09.2015**.

" In light of the tragedy we are now faced with it is important that we wish refugees from Syria welcome! Sign the campaign, and say welcome Syria! **Labour Youth 04.09.2015**

Posts with reference to what is right and wrong were more common among all actors. The Progress Party would argue right and wrong in favor of Norwegians, not immigrants;

"The october children have been treated shamefully by the government. But it helps to fight! After pressure more parties are turning around, and the proposals that are being adopted today are a step in the right direction. SL will keep supporting the battle for a fair and humane asylum policy. **Socialist Left 14.11.2017**

"We have fought for years so that the gold pension for refugees and asylum seekers can be removed. This is a service that is deeply unfair towards Norwegians who have struggled and paid taxes through their entire lives. **Progress Party 03.12.2015**

"The Progress Party's immigration spokesman is suggesting removing asylum seekers values over 10.000 kroner. It is not right that they should receive free money from the state while they are sat on large values. **Progress Party 18.01.2016**

Table 11: Process line for the frame of morality, emotions and values

Frame	Thematic arguments	Specific arguments	Specific Examples (translated)
Morals, emotions and values	The right thing to do Argument based on values such as compassion and solidarity Arguments containing rights of individuals or groups	"They need our solidarity, not our cold indifference" "This is only fair, it is not fair that immigrants get better welfare benefits than others"	The last hours have seen the arrival of even more boats with refugees in Lesvos. We saw a large group come ashore last night, at these beaches they take their first steps in Europe. They need our solidarity, not our cold indifference. (**Audun Lysbakken. Coded in this frame only**) Finally! This is only fair. It is not fair that immigrants get better welfare benefits than others- (**Sylvi Listhaug. Also coded as economy**)

7.7 Responsibility

The arguments of responsibility, as they are defined in this thesis, mainly diverge in two ways. Either the actor states that Norway must take responsibility for refugees or the refugee situation, or the actor claims this is a European or international responsibility. Labour and the Conservatives unsurprisingly (both pro EU-membership) want solutions outside Norwegian borders;

> "It has been a hectic day in Brussels. In meeting with Angela Merkel and other conservative party leaders in the EU I have discussed migration. I believe we need common European solutions to help the refugees and to achieve control in the Schengen area. The solutions found by the EU now are incredibly important for Norway also. **Erna Solberg 17.03.2016**

> "Lasting solutions to the refugee crisis can only be found through broad and meticulous international co-operation(...)" **Jonas Gahr Støre 04.11.2015**

The Socialist Left and Labour Youth put their focus on the responsibility of the Norwegian state. Again we see that Labour Youth arguments are closer to the Socialist Left, than to Labour.

> "Two days ago, they found 50 dead refugees in a trailer. This election campaign will determine whether Norge contributes and helps, or not. The Progress Party say openly that they will sabotage the Syria decision. Socialist Youth, on the other hand, say that of course Norway should be a part of helping refugees from Syria." **Socialist Youth 30.08.2015**

> "A clear majority of the political and and humanitarian organizations agree: Norway must do more to handle the refugee crisis. **Labour Youth 28.09.2015**

> "400 died last Sunday, 700 died yesterday: The refugees that shipwreck in the Mediterranean is the shame of our time, and a catastrophe we were warned about. The government are hesitant. That is not good enough: Norway must take it's share of the responsibility (…)." **Socialist Left 20.04.2015**

Table 12: Process line for the frame of responsibility

Frame	Thematic arguments	Specific arguments	Specific Examples (translated)
Responsibility	State or EU must do more to help situation State or the EU must take more responsibility in immigration related manners Some state or organization must take responsibility (NOT individual responsibilities)	"(..)with a demand that Norway increase their efforts" "The government is most concerned with throwing out asylum seekers from Norway. SL think the most important thing right now is to help more refugees"	"Today the space in front of parliament is filled with white balloons. They represent the human beings that have drowned in a desperate escape across the Mediterranean. Almost 13.000 signatures with a demand that Norway increase their efforts, Save The Children and Press gave the party leaders. Now there is a debate in parliament on refugee policy, and Audun Lysbakken is bringing this demand to the hall." (**Socialist Left. Coded in this frame only**) The government is most concerned with throwing out asylum seekers from Norway. SL think the most important thing right now is to help more refugees. Karin, Marianne and i visited the NPA's asylum reception centre at Torshov today. (**Audun Lysbakken. Also coded as criticism**)

7.8 Criticism

As previously mentioned, criticism is not considered a frame on par with the six other categories in the analysis. All other categories represent a type of argument, whilst criticism only states whether someone was criticized in the Facebook post. Yet I find it interesting to highlight which actors criticized each other, and for what, in the context of the immigration debate. The Progress Party and Sylvi Listhaug particularly singled out Jonas Gahr Støre for a lot of criticism. They criticized Støre for being indecisive in asylum policy and for being responsible for the high amount of asylum seekers arriving in Norway. The Conservatives and the Progress Party never criticized each other for anything in the entire data collection. The Socialist Left criticized both the government, the government support parties and parties in the opposition;

"How much indecent immigration policy will the Christian Party and the Liberal party endure? How long will the Christian Party accept that the Minister for Immigration calls compassion for tyranny before they put their foot down? Only the Liberal Party and the Christian Party can depose this government. If their limit is not reached now, when?" **Socialist Left 05.01.2016**

"It's dramatic when the UN firmly critisises Norway's treatment of asylum seekers. Is this the type of country we want to be? The criticism is serious for the government, but just as much for Labour, the Christian Party, the Centrist Party and the Liberal party. They are responsible for irresponsible decisions when parliament struck by panic this fall. Only SL and the Green Party stood firm. What will Labour and the center do now? **Audun Lysbakken 15.01.2016**

"Erna Solberg missed quite heavily when she said she liked Razika because they had 'those kind of "naïve girl"-type songs. I like Razika because they make songs that are catchy, but also because they are tough enough to stand up for something. For example, the now very controversial message about compassion with refugees. **04.07.2016 Audun Lysbakken**

"Now the people are leading the way, while the government are lagging behind. Why can't Erna Solberg display the leadership the refugee crisis demands? **Socialist Left 10.09.2015**

When Labour criticized it was mostly directed at the Progress Party. The Conservatives hardly used criticism at all in the discourse, and when they did it was more to point out how their results were better than previous governments.

Table 13: Process line for the frame of criticism

Frame	Thematic arguments	Specific arguments	Specific Examples (translated)
Criticism	Criticism of another political actor	"Labour has left the responsible line of action, but The Progress Party still speak in clear terms: (…)" "(…) settled 50 percent more than SL managed in four years"	Labour has left the responsible line of action, but The Progress Party still speak in clear terms: Norway must have a strict and responsible immigration policy. What do you think? **(Progress Party. Also coded as control).** The Conservatives and The Progress Party have settled 50 percent more refugees than SL managed in four years. More people are getting a chance of employment and education, recreational activities and becoming a part of their community. Thanks for the amazing work that is now being done in the municipalities. **(The Conservatives. Also coded as integration)**

7.9 RQ1: How do Norwegian political actors frame immigration arguments on Facebook, in the context of the refugee crisis?

The qualitative findings make up the answer to the first research question. Norwegian political actors on Facebook communicate in much the same way as has been shown in the previous literature. The most dominant communication is negative and sees immigration as a threat to the welfare state or something that must be controlled. The framing of immigrants in a criminal light is among the least used in the data, and it is almost exclusive for the Progress Party to associate immigration with crime. Following negative threat frames the opposition argument is one of empathy, compassion and solidarity. This becomes the major counter-argument to the immigration debate in Norway, coupled with criticism of the governmental actors. There is little data to show that any political actors in Norway are interested in framing immigrants as positive contributors and gains for the state.

## 7.10 Quantitative findings

This chapter will analyze the frame distribution in a quantitative way. First, we look at the general distribution of frames before turning to the second research question, which frames elicit the most reactions. Finally I will present tables and analysis that illustrate dynamic frame distribution over for the political parties.

In total the data collection is 771 Facebook postings tallying 1055 frame counts.

For the purposes of the quantitative analysis I have chosen to group together the political actors into party categories. This leaves me with only the four different party categories. In the previous chapter I have shown the particulars of the political actors in a qualitative way. In the quantitative part I see little reason to differentiate between the Socialist Left and their youth party. Some actors have very few posts in the data collection so it would make little sense to

indicate the frame distributions in percentages. We have also uncovered that the only youth party difference to account for is between the Labour Youth and Labour. Also, there is little proof in the qualitative analysis to speculate in major differences between the high ranking politicians' pages, and their respective party pages.

The diagram below illustrates the distribution of all frames regardless of political actor.

Figur 1: Distribution of frames across all Facebook pages

As figure 1 illustrates, the frame of control was most used, followed by economy, morality, criticism and integration. Illegality and responsibility were least used.

The table below illustrates distribution of frames. The number represents how often the frame was counted for the given party. After the number, two sets of percentages follow. The top one refers to the percentage this frame accounted for, in that party's total use of all frames. The second percentage measure, in bold, shows how much of the total count of that frame the party was responsible for.

Table 14: Distribution of frames on political parties

Distribution all actors grouped as party	Control	Illegality	Economy	Integration	Resp.	Morality	Crit.	Totals
Socialist Left	0	1 0.49% **1%**	21 10,3% **10,9%**	13 6,4% **12,1%**	21 10,3% **42,8%**	83 40,8% **47,7%**	64 31,5% **38,5%**	**203 (100%)**
Labour	16 14,9% **5,8%**	1 0,9% **1%**	13 12,1% **6,8%**	14 13% **13%**	19 17,7% **38,7%**	28 26,1% **16%**	16 14,9% **9,6%**	**107 (100%)**
Conservatives	23 22,3% **8,3%**	4 3,8% **4,3%**	27 26,2% **14,1%**	14 13,5% **13%**	9 8,7% **18,3%**	22 21,3% **12,6%**	4 3,8% **2,4%**	**103 (100%)**
Progress Party	236 36,7% **85,8%**	87 13,5% **93,5%**	130 20,2% **68%**	66 10,2% **61,1%**	0	41 6,3% **23,5%**	82 12,7% **49,4%**	**642 (100%)**
Totals	**275 (100%)**	**93 (100%)**	**191 (100%)**	**107 (100%)**	**49 (100%)**	**174 (100%)**	**166 (100%)**	**1055**

The Progress Party dominate the entire discourse in general. They post a lot more on immigration than any other party. The frame of illegality is almost exclusively used by the Progress Party. The economy frame is used more by the Conservatives and the Progress Party, but not to the same degree as the control or illegality frame. Integration is relatively equally distributed as a total of the internal party use. The Progress Party never talk about the responsibility of either the state of Norway or Europe. The frame of morality is the top frame for the Socialist Left and Labour. With regards to criticism as a percentage of total posts, the Socialist Left criticize the most. The Conservatives criticize the least in the entire data collection.

7.11 Which frames elicit the most interaction, measured through shares and likes?

To answer the question of which frames generated the most interaction, SPSS was used for statistical analysis. By adding the amount of shares and likes for each post, dividing it by the followers of the account and then multiplying it by 100 we are left with a percentage of likes and shares of the accounts total following;

(Likes+Shares/x)*100

There is a methodological imprecision regarding this measurement. There is no way to find out how many followers a given Facebook page had in the past. The numbers used are all collected in 2018, meaning that the number of likes and shares a post received in 2015, is divided by the number of followers the account had in May of 2018. Despite this, the situation is equal for all accounts. I also argue that the relative size of the following between the party accounts, most likely has not changed much over the years.

By using the proportional combined shares and likes measure as a dependent variable, a regression was run with all frames as independent variables.

Table 15: Effect of frames on proportional number of likes and shares of the postings

	B	**SE$_B$**	**T**	**Sig.t**
(Constant)	1,638	0,179	9,153	<0,001
Control	,504	,170	2,966	0,003
Illegality	1,373	,214	6,412	<0,001
Economy	,523	,171	3,058	0,002
Integration	,256	,207	1,239	0,216
Responsibility	-,946	,269	-3,250	<,001
Morality	-,211	,180	-1,171	0,242
Criticism	-,169	,177	-,952	0,341
N	1055			
R2	0,116			<0.001
F (14,165)	43,706			

Table 15 shows a negative relationship between the frames of responsibility, morality and criticism on the dependent variable. The frame of responsibility is significant, but morality and criticism are not. All other frames have a positive relationship with the dependent variable. The frame of integration is not significant. Control, illegality and economy all have significant positive relationships with the dependent variable.

We must also take into account the dominant position of the Progress Party within the data collection. The dataset in itself is skewed due to the Progress Party and Sylvi Listhaug far outweighing all other actors with regards to posting on immigration. In an attempt to control for the effect we remove all Progress Party accounts from the dataset and run the regression again. The actors are now combined into parties and we therefore use the raw data number of likes plus shares as the dependent variable. This alters the model significantly, firstly by removing 642 frame counts and almost all counts of illegality.

Table 16: Effect of frames on raw number of likes and shares of the postings (Progress Party exempt)

	B	SE$_B$	T	Sig.t
(Constant)	408,710	135,108	3,025	,003
Control	523,615	145,547	3,598	<,001
Illegality	682,081	354,403	1,925	,055
Economy	284,640	138,164	2,060	,040
Integration	479,014	157,543	3,041	,003
Responsibility	-59,160	144,231	-,410	,682
Morality	251,796	118,611	2,123	,035
Criticism	-73,775	130,896	-,564	,574
N	413			
R2	0,115		<0.001	
F (4,534)	2701727			

Table 16 indicates that the control frame still has a significant and positive relationship with the dependent variable. There is also a positive significant relationship between the economy frame and dependent variable. The negative and non-significant effect of criticism and responsibility is unchanged.

The frame of integration now has a positive significant relationship with the dependent variable as opposed to in the previous model. The morality frame is the biggest difference between the two models. The exemption of the Progress Party has made the frame have a positive significant relationship with the dependent variable.

This answers the second research question. Negative frames that focus on the challenges of immigration such as control, crime and economic consequences consistently generate the highest amount of interaction, given that the Progress Party are included in the analysis. By removing the

dominant actor we see that the preferred frame of moral and emotional arguments generate higher interaction for those actors who use it. The analysis indicates that the effect of being the Progress Party in immigration related communication is the strongest predictor for high interaction on Facebook.

7.12 Frame change over time

In order to answer how frames change dynamically I collected posts from four different time periods within the data collection period. I chose to focus specifically on two important events; the refugee crisis and the parliamentary election of 2017.

I isolated all Facebook posts in the year of 2015 in three time frames. These time frames are designed with the basis in previous research done by Greussing and Booemgarden 2017. The first period is from 1. February – 1. May. The month of April especially saw much attention and public outcry regarding drownings in the Mediterranean, partly due to organizations such as the UNCHR directing media attention towards it. This period represents the realization of the realities in the Mediterranean and the beginning of the refugee crisis.

The second period is from 1. July – 30. September. This represents the climax point of the refugee crisis. The local elections of 2015 were also held on the 14. September. At this point the refugee crisis was a highly salient topic in Norwegian media (Hognestad & Lamark 2017). Greussing and Booemgarden (2017) claim that September became the climax month of the refugee crisis in Austria with the most amount of media coverage. Data from the International Organization for Migration (2017) also show that the highest death count in the Mediterranean Sea after April, was in September. Hence this unit of analysis will reflect the framing practice of the lead up to the election, as well as the most intense period of the refugee crisis.

The third time period is from 1. October – 31. December. The period represents the aftermath of the refugee crisis. According to Greussing and Booemgarden (2017) this media coverage of the crisis rapidly declines in an Austrian context, and the framing changes from more sympathetic and victimization based to focus on security and border control.

The final time period is 18 months later. The parliamentary election of 2017 was held on the 11. September so I gathered posts from 11. June – 11. September. The period was chosen to examine differences in framing practice when the media focus on the refugee crisis had declined severely. Also it gives us a chance to examine how immigration based argumentation was framed leading up to a parliamentary election, and if this framing differs from what was seen in 2015. A total of 310 posts were collected from the total data collection of 771 Facebook posts.

- 38 posts were collected from 1. February – 1. May
- 77 posts were collected from 1. July – 30. September
- 120 posts were collected from 1. October – 31. December
- 75 posts were collected from 11. June – 11. September

The table below illustrates the distribution of frames for each political party on each pre-defined period of time. The parentheses behind each political party indicates how many postings they made in the period

Table 17: Frame distribution over time periods on political parties

1. February – 1. May 2015						
Frame and political party	Control	Illegality	Economy	Integration	Responsibility	Morality	Criticism
Socialist Left (14)			1		4	6	6
Labour (4)			1		4	2	
The Conservatives (8)		1	3	3	1	2	
Progress Party (12)	4	3	3	3		2	3
Total	**4**	**4**	**8**	**6**	**9**	**12**	**9**

51

1. July – 30. September 2015						
Frame and political party	Control	Illegality	Economy	Integration	Responsibility	Morality	Criticism
Socialist Left (48)			4	2	10	31	14
Labour (7)	1		2		1	3	3
The Conservatives (7)		1	1		4	3	
Progress Party (15)	6	6	5	1			1
Total	**7**	**7**	**12**	**3**	**15**	**37**	**18**

1. October – 31. December 2015						
Frame and political party	Control	Illegality	Economy	Integration	Responsibility	Morality	Criticism
Socialist Left (19)			7	5	3	6	8
Labour (24)	7		6	7	6	8	7
The Conservatives (21)	15	1	3	3		4	
Progress Party (56)	38	3	16	4		4	8
Total	**60**	**4**	**32**	**19**	**9**	**22**	**23**

11. June – 11. September 2017						
Frame and political party	Control	Illegality	Economy	Integration	Responsibility	Morality	Criticism
Socialist Left (2)						2	2
Labour							
The Conservatives							
Progress Party (73)	29	15	21	14		10	16
Total	**29**	**15**	**21**	**14**	**0**	**12**	**18**

7.12.1 February – 1. May 2015

The first period was affected by the heightened issue salience of the refugee crisis. Most posts related to the refugee situation in the Mediterranean. The responsibility frame was used similarly on the left side calling for Norway to take responsibility for the situation and accept 10.000 quota refugees. This period saw rare messages of morality from the Progress Party. These messages were sympathetic to situation in the Mediterranean, but at the same time reflected the need for controlling borders and the potential economic consequence of the oncoming immigration. At this stage of the refugee crisis the Socialist Left party posts more on immigration. The Conservatives and Labour posted about the responsibility of the EU and other European states to handle the refugee crisis, something which is unique to these two parties. Their position on pro EU-membership are reflected in these posts. The morality frame was used the most and expressed sympathy for refugees and reflected on the tragedy of the situation.

The time period indicates that the refugee crisis and its consequent immigration discourse had not yet become a main topic of interest for politicians on social media. It is hard to gauge if there was a dominant discourse at all or a dominant topic. The distribution of frames shows a slight tendency towards morality and responsibility frames. The consequences of the refugee crisis was at this time in a Norwegian perspective unclear, and perhaps this explains the low amount of posts from the Progress Party compared to their generally dominant position in the data.

7.12.2. July – 30. September 2015

The second period is defined as the climactic point of the refugee crisis, as well as containing the local elections of 2015. The period shows clearer patterns in framing practice among the political parties. The Socialist Left dominated the discourse with regards to amount of posts, and their preferred morality frame was counted twice as much as any other category. Labour and the Conservatives make little contribution to the Facebook discourse, and the Progress Party are about as active as they were in the previous time frame. The period was defined by strong sympathetic statements towards the situation in the Mediterranean by all other parties than the Progress Party.

The use of the economy frame was balanced between right and left, with the Progress Party having four counts, the same as Labour Youth and the Socialist Left together. However, the use of the economy frame is different between the political actors. The Progress Party would either frame it as a threat to the welfare state, or emphasize the need for foreign aid, instead of receiving immigrants. The Socialist Left and Labour Youth would use the economy frame to talk about what they saw as failed economic proposals by the Progress Party. Especially the arguments of helping the refugees in their local area, and the threat to the welfare state was attacked. One of the arguments the Socialist Left posed was how the state of Norway could afford more quota refugees, if only the Progress Party did not want to allocate so much resources to tax breaks for the wealthy. They also called for increased focus on tax refugees, not refugees of war and terror.

7.12.3 October – 31. December

In the months after the high point of the refugee crisis, we see the first evidence of frame shift. The right side are now more active, and the frame of control far outweighs all other categories. The control frame was counted 60 times being used by both Labour, the Conservatives and the Progress Party. The control frame was expressed similarly across all actors relating mostly to the importance of reducing arrivals, asylum applications and border crossings in general.

The frame of economy was the second most used perspective, split between the Socialist Left, Labour, Sylvi Listhaug and the Progress Party. The frame was used differently, with the Progress Party and Sylvi Listhaug focusing on the removal of benefits for immigrants or threats to the welfare state. The time period sees the beginning of an argument from the Progress Party and Sylvi Listhaug which would become prevalent in the future; the argument of heightened immigration leading to cuts in welfare for ordinary people. This argument would become a central part of the Progress Party postings going forwards. The Socialist Left and Labour used the economy framing to criticize the government's spending or policy decisions, but show no sign of a competing economic argument to the Progress Party one.

7.12.4 11. June – 11. September 2017

The first finding with regards to 2017 is the total absence of Labour and the Conservatives. Only one post from the time period was from a different political party than the Progress Party. This is also the only of the four selected time periods which features the illegality frame, the frame previously shown to generate most interaction. The illegality frame was used to talk about criminal immigrants, deportations and terrorism in the lead-up to the election.

As election day drew closer the Progress Party would post shorter messages more frequently. These posts read like political slogans in a way that is not common for any of the other actors. They argued that if you wanted a strict immigration policy you should vote for them. The messages were short and contained the Progress Party staple of inviting to like and share. Their economic arguments were the same as before calling for a sustainable immigration policy in order to protect the welfare state. The integration frame had not changed much either focusing mostly on the responsibilities and demands that must be put on immigrants.

In summary we can answer research questions three and four by categorically stating that framing practices among Norwegian politicians change with regards to the stages of the refugee crisis, and the parliamentary election of 2017.

8.   Discussion

In this chapter I will discuss each of the research questions with a view on previous research.

8.1 Framing practices are similar to previous research in different contexts

Norwegian political actors framed immigration in much the same way that it has been portrayed in several national contexts across news media. In this thesis I have created my own frames that to varying degrees are similar to previously used ones. The frame of control, illegality and economy are predominantly used negatively in my data collection and would correspond to what

many have termed "threat" frames (Branton & Dunaway 2009; Millioni et.al 2013; Lawlor 2015). The control and illegality frames by their very nature define immigration as something with a series of negative consequences, and control was the most used frame. Going in to this research I expected a stronger focus by the Progress Party on crime and illegality, but their argumentative strategy of control perspectives dwarfed perspectives of crime. This could be due to the discourse in Norway in general being less negative towards immigrants, as is claimed by Gripsrud et.al (2017). Jørgensen and Meret (2012) also point out that the Norwegian immigration discourse occupies a middle-position with regards to negativity, compared with Sweden and Denmark. Others have stated that the success of the Progress Party is partly down to their moderation of typical populist sentiment (Bjerkem 2016). The fact that they are now dependent on co-operation with their governmental partners, The Conservatives, may have moderated their immigration arguments.

The major competing arguments came from the Socialist Left. However, the Socialist Left would rarely talk about immigrants as resources and potential gains for the country, instead focusing on a passive sympathetic tone reminiscent of what previously has been termed victimization. Millioni et.al (2013) define a frame describing immigrants as active contributors and find that it is very rare in the Cypriot context. The Socialist Left and Labour Youth would rarely invoke such arguments, giving any specific reasons or evidence for the positives of immigration. Many of the posts from the Socialist Left were criticism of the Progress Party, often on a moral ground. The discourse on immigration does not seem to have a contested field of unique arguments. One side, primarily the Progress Party and Sylvi Listhaug, has a clear focus on limiting immigration due to consequences that are pointed out and made clear to the receiver. The other side do not have concrete counter arguments. The Progress Party manage to create ties between immigration and a weakened welfare state, the need to cut in welfare for immigrants, the importance of deporting immigrants and the dangers of not controlling the borders. The Socialist Left, I argue, do not manage to create the same causality between policy standpoint and importance. They encourage compassion and doing the right thing, but they fail to address why immigration can be positive for the state. Perhaps the criticism of other actors came at the expense of their own unique positions and arguments?

Branton and Dunaway (2009) claim that newspapers tend to use sensationalism due to their profit-making goals. Focusing on sex, violence and crime are clear indicators of sensationalism. Branton and Dunaway (2009) also find that newspapers closer to the Mexican border use a more negative framing, knowing that proximity combined with sensationalism is effective as a media strategy. I suspect that the Progress Party and Sylvi Listhaug thought of this strategy when introducing Sweden as part of the immigration debate. Much of the Progress Party's arguments on illegality were shown through examples of Sweden. The arguments would state that we must never allow Swedish tendencies in Norway. The Facebook posts would paint parts of Sweden as lawless and run by criminals. Through this example the Progress Party managed to create a link between crime and immigration with an example that a lot of Norwegians had a connection too.

Furthermore, both Esperås (2015) and Enli's (2015) research states that politicians use social media in a way that resembles traditional media logic. In one way how they view shares, likes and comments as a type of currency (Enli 2015), and another in how they present the information (Esperås 2015). No actors seem to have grasped this better than the Progress Party, at least with regards to immigration. Their Facebook pages are effective tools that consistently generate a high amount of interaction. Their posts tend to be short, concise and to the point. The communication strategy seems deliberate and planned, something the recurrence of certain phrases and words elude to. They would encourage interaction by ending many posts with questions to their followers. The Socialist Left would also do this, but not to the degree of the Progress Party. This is in stark contrast to how especially Jonas Gahr Støre presented his posts on immigration. The posts were usually long and information heavy, handling several different policy positions at the same time.

The inclusion of youth parties was originally made due to the assumed difference between younger and older users of social media. With regards to the Progress Party youth and the Conservative youth, I find that they share the arguments of their mother parties. Neither of these parties spent any time criticizing their mother party. Labour Youth, however, were similar to the Socialist Left in how they argued their positions. They criticized Labour as well. This may be an effect of the mechanism that many have argued in the Norwegian public, the convergence of the Labour party and the Conservatives. The parties share similar policy standpoints, such as being

proponents of EU membership. Labour party secretary Kjersti Stenseng recently said that she hoped for fewer settlements in parliament between Labour and the government (Kalajdsiz & Omvik 2018), stating that no one should doubt that Labour is a left-side party. In 2012 Kari Gåsvåtn, journalist at Nationen, wrote about the tendency claiming that the parties' political program could be interchangeable. The analysis this thesis has supplied further fuels the notion of Labour and the Conservatives becoming increasingly alike.

8.2 Negative frames more likely to garner high interaction

Politicians in Norway pay attention to their interactions in much the same way a newspaper would pay attention to their readership (Enli 2015). Both represent currency in their respective fields, and the Progress Party seem to be the most adept in generating this currency, at least on the topic of immigration. Of the top 100 posts in the data collection, sorted by interactions, only five are from other actors than the Progress Party and Sylvi Listhaug. The frames of control, illegality and economy is shown to have a positive relationship with an increased measure of interaction, and they are the predominant Progress Party frames.

This finding could relate more to issue ownership than it does anything else, and that may also be the case for several of the studies in the literature review. As is shown by the polling results ahead of the 2017 elections (Bergh & Karlsen 2017), 97% of Progress Party voters think they have the best immigration policy. 477 out of 771 relevant posts in the entire data collection is from the three Progress Party actors. We know from the literature that political actors are most used as sources in news regarding immigration, and it is logical by extension that those with issue ownership over immigration will be most eager to appear in media to discuss it.

In other words, the result of the negatively loaded frames and arguments generating high amounts of interaction, may be reasonably attributed to the effect of being the Progress Party or Sylvi Listhaug. The Progress Party followers could be more prone to liking and sharing no matter the substance of the Facebook post, as immigration is an important issue to them. As the second model shows, the results change as soon as we remove the Progress Party from the regression analysis. The frame of morality becomes positively related on a significant level to the

dependent variable. This is further proof that the dominance of the Progress Party on the topic of immigration results in higher interaction. The Socialist Left especially use the morality frame as the competing argument, but it does not have the same effect on their following as the negative frames have for the Progress Party. The previously mentioned lack of a clear counter-argument to anti-immigration sentiment is nowhere to be found within the Socialist Left or Labour, which also could be a factor with regards to interaction.

Despite the uncertainties surrounding what exact variable generates interaction, I do think it indicates the Progress Party and Sylvi Listhaug's ability in communicating to their followers. Interviews with political actors illustrate that one of their primary goals on social media is to create interaction (Karlsen & Enroljas 2016; Karlsen & Skogerbø 2014). The Progress Party and Sylvi Listhaug will more often than not end their Facebook posts with either a question such as "do you agree?" or a call to like and share the post. The Progress Party in this way seem more interested in actually procuring their interactions. This strategy could have a positive effect on the Progress Party interactions. According to survey data (Beyer & Matthes 2015) the Norwegian public thought the news media focus on immigration was too positive. This may show that the Progress Party and Sylvi Listhaug have hit a nerve in their mainly anti-immigration sentiment that strikes a chord with the Norwegian public and is seen as more authentic than the traditional news media.

8.3 Political framing changes over time

8.3.1 Refugee crisis

The results regarding framing changes over time correspond to some extent with what Greussing and Booemgarden (2017) researched in an Austrian context. The initial time period contained messages of support and morality, as well as some economic statements regarding how best to solve the future challenges. No frames stood out as dominant in any way, but interestingly the most dominant frame in general, control, was not used much. The discourse was not centered on how we must close our borders and limit immigration, yet. The lack of posts from the Progress

Party leads me to speculate that the dawn of the refugee crisis had not hit Norway yet. Something which is supported by the fact that the period had the least amount of activity regarding immigration compared to all other periods. Also, the Progress Party might have tactically chosen to wait with their anti-immigration framing practice, to not seem unsympathetic to the situation.

The tendencies seen in the first time frame was cemented even more clearly in the second period at the high point of the refugee crisis and its issue salience. The sympathetic moralist frames with emotional arguments dominated the discourse and again the Progress Party were not highly active. They would use their preferred frames of control, illegality and economy but their postings in general are dwarfed by the Socialist Left. This does not suit the findings of Greussing and Booemgarden (2017) who at this stage found more anti-immigration sentiment than is visible in my analysis. This may relate to findings previously researched that find evidence to support Norwegian news media framing being less negative than that of their European counterparts (Gripsrud et.al 2017; Benson & Wood 2015).

The aftermath period of the refugee crisis sees the first clear change in framing practices and activity among the actors. The time that has passed from the most gruesome incidents in the Mediterranean seem to have given the Progress Party their voice back. At the same time the Socialist Left have become less outspoken on immigration. The months leading up to the period were affected by the Storskog-case which saw thousands of refugees trying to cross the border between Norway and Russia in Finnmark. The unprecedented levels of arrivals incited a debate of border control and it may have been easier for the right side to engage the frames of control in this climate. Labour are much more active, than they are in general, in the period using all frames except illegality evenly. This finding illustrates in many ways the centrist position that I argue Labour has positioned themselves in with regards to immigration. Their position revolves around the need for limiting influx focusing on the control frame, but also qualifying this frame with morality and emotionally based arguments.

The period marks the first time where the ramifications of what was happening in the Middle-East and the Mediterranean became Norwegian issues. I speculate that the power of the Socialist Left's strategy of compassion and sympathy evaporated as soon as the consequences made

themselves clear on the Norwegian border. At a time where the refugee crisis was a tragedy happening in distant and faraway lands, the compassionate and sympathetic arguments of the Socialist Left dominated the Facebook discourse among political actors. However, the issue would soon edge closer to our borders. This is when the Progress Party stepped in, to reclaim the debate on their terms. As soon as the issue came closer to Norwegian borders, the debate centered mainly on long-term consequences of not limiting influx in a way that corresponds with Greussing & Booemgarden's (2017) findings in Austria.

8.3.2 Parliamentary election

The last period furthers the tendencies seen between the second and third period. The political left and the Conservatives have left the topic of immigration entirely, allowing the Progress Party to dominate the discourse. The frame of illegality is used and some of the more popular posts with regards to interaction was posted in this time frame. At this point the media focus on the refugee crisis had subsided, and the discourse was centered more on general immigration policy.

I argue that the Progress Party and Sylvi Listhaug adopted a deliberate and conscious tactic with regards to the period, intensifying their posts on immigration in the final week of the election. The focus on criminality is deliberate and the Progress Party seem aware that the connection between immigration and crime spurs response in their followers. In the final days they would post the same short message calling for strict immigration policy in a way that was similar to slogan-based campaigns.

The period indicates that especially the Socialist Left find little reason to talk about immigration if they are not able to draw on real world happenings to argue in moral and emotional terms. The analysis has shown that Labour and Jonas Gahr Støre consistently shy away from the topic of immigration, this is especially evident in the lead up to the parliamentary election of 2017. This could be due to Labour realizing that immigration is not a topic that their potential voters care enough about. According to immigration spokesperson for the Progress Party, Jon Helgeim, Labour really wants the same immigration policy as them (Krosby 2018). If true, it would explain the hesitant nature of Labour on the topic. They can not be seen as openly supporting the

Progress Party, so the best tactic is to stay quiet on the issue and not establish a strong opposition. This could also serve to explain Labour's unwillingness to talk about immigration on Facebook in general.

9.   Conclusion

In summary the previous findings in the literature seem to hold for the Facebook discourse too. Negative threat frames are mostly used with moral and emotional arguments similar to victimization making out the opposition argument. However, the actors on the left are less visible in the discussion increasing their activity alongside media focus. Due to this the negativity of the control, illegality and economy frames become dominant.

The negative frames generate the most interaction on Facebook, measured in shares and likes. However, the results change when eliminating the Progress Party from the analysis. The answer to research question two becomes unclear and we can not categorically state that negative frames generate the most interaction. This effect could be attributed to other factors such as social media strategy, qualities of followers or the effect of issue-ownership, or a combination of them.

Framing does shift with regards to the stages of the refugee crisis, and especially with regards to the parliamentary election in 2017 where only the Progress Party were active in the immigration discourse.

The potential consequences of the framing practices are hinted at by other researchers. Dunaway et.al (2011) show in their research that negative news coverage is a stronger predictor for seeing immigration as a problem, than actual increased immigration. Given that Facebook pages become preferred news sources for the electorate, one can speculate that they will contribute to political polarization. Tendencies of political polarization have been seen in Norway as well. The far left party Red and the Progress Party experienced the highest increase in support in surveys done right after Sylvi Listhaug stepped down as a consequence of the controversial Facebook post (TV2 2018). If Facebook pages become important information hubs for undecided voters, then political actors will gain more power through unfiltered direct communication. The

democratic consequences of eliminating the mediation of traditional news media are potentially severe.

9.1 Limitations

In this subchapter I briefly want to bring up limitations of the thesis.

Due to working alone on this thesis I never considered analyzing the entirety of what can be posted on a Facebook page. I considered it too time consuming to also analyze all the blogposts, news stories, videos and photos the actors linked to. This may interfere with the coding of posts. When I am only reading the text, some of the total meaning could be lost with the exclusion of the accompanying picture, video or link.

9.2 Future research

I view the efforts and results of this thesis as a departure point for research into political actors' framing of immigration on Facebook and social media. Further research should seek to investigate the relationship between high degree of interaction on social media, and what governs it. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to give an answer as to why the Progress Party consistently achieves most interaction on Facebook.

Future analysis should also try to include more of the hybrid media network Facebook is a part of. This thesis has only focused on the textual output from the Facebook posts, disregarding photos, videos and links to other online sources. These elements should be included in larger projects where more manpower is available to handle all the data.

We must also continue to establish how these changes affect the public. I believe strongly that continued research into use of social media as a news platform is important. Continued research on intermedial agenda setting is important to measure the relative importance of social versus

traditional media. Hopefully the researchers of tomorrow will be able to gauge what impact social media discourse has, by both politicians and the public, on sentiment towards immigration. As mentioned in the introduction displacement levels are at an all-time high, and immigration policy and discourse is in my opinion more important than ever.

10. Literature

Aalberg, T., Beyer, A. (2015) Human Interest Framing of Irregular Immigration: An Empirical Study of Public Preferences for Personalized News Stories in the United States, France, and Norway. *American Behavioral Scientist.* 59(7): 858 – 875

Adams, A., McCorkindale,T. (2013) "Dialogue and transparency: A content analysis of how the 2012 presidential candidates used twitter". *Public Relations Review,* 39(4) s. 357-*359.*

Ahmed, S., Skonic, M. (2014) My name is Khan: the use of Twitter in the campaign for 2013 Pakistan General Elections. 47 *Hawaii International Conference on System Science pp. 2242-2251 2014.*

Baxter, G., Marcella, R. (2013). Do online election campaigns sway the vote? A study of the 2011 Scottish parliamentary election. *Libri, 63 (3)*, s. 190-205.

Benson, R., Wood, T. (2015) Who says what or nothing at all? Speakers, Frames and Frameless Quotes in Unauthorized Immigration News in The United States, Norway and France. *American Behavioral Scientist* 59 (7): 802-821

Berge, J. (2018). Støre raser mot Listhaug-innlegg; vi kan ikke ha en slik justisminister. Nettavisen online. Collected 02.05.2018 from: https://www.nettavisen.no/nyheter/innenriks/stre-raser-mot-listhaug-innlegg---vi-kan-ikke-ha-en-slik-justisminister/3423424469.html

Bergh, J., Karlsen, R. (2017) Politisk dagsorden og sakseierskap ved stortingsvalget i 2017. Collected 20.03.2018 from http://www.sv.uio.no/isv/forskning/prosjekter/valgforskning/aktuelle-saker/politisk-dagsorden-og-best-politikk-ssb.pdf

Beyer, A., Matthes, J. (2015) Public Perceptions of the Media Coverage of Irregular Immigration: Comparative Insights From France, the United States, and Norway. *American Behavioral Scientist.* 59(7): 839-857

Bjerkem, J. (2016) The Norwegian Progress Party: An established populist party. *European view* 15(2): 233-243.

Branton, R. P., Dunaway, J. (2009). Spatial proximity to the U.S.—Mexico border and local news coverage of immigration issues. Political Research Quarterly, 62, 289-302

Branton, R., Dunaway, J. (2009) Spatial Proximity to the U.S – Mexico Border and Newspaper Coverage of Immigration issues. *Political Research Quarterly,* 62(2): 289-302

Broersma, M., & Graham, T. (2012). Social media as beat: Tweets as a news source during the 2010 British and Dutch elections. *Journalism Practice,* 6(3), s. 403–419

Bråthen, A. (2017) Medlemsvekst I 2016. Collected 10.03.2018 from https://fpu.no/2017/01/04/medlemsvekst-i-2016/

Conway, B. A., Kenski, K., & Wang, D. (2013). Twitter use by presidential primary candidates during the 2012 campaign. *American Behavioral Scientist* 57(11), s. 1596-1610.

De Vreese, C. (2005) News framing: Theory and typology. *Information Design Journal. 13(1) , 51-62*

de Wenden, C. W. (2010). *Irregular migration in France*. In Triandafyllidou, A. (Ed.), Irregular migration in Europe: Myths and realities (pp. 115-124). Farnham, England: Ashgate

Druckman JN. (2001) The implications of framing effects for citizen competence. *Political Behaviour* 23:225–56.

Dunaway, J., Goidel,R.K., Kirzinger A., BC Wilkinson B.C (2011). Rebuilding or Intruding? Media Coverage and Public Opinion on Latino Immigration in Post Katrina Louisiana *Social Science Quarterly* 92 (4), 917-937

Eli Skogerbø E., Krumsvik, A.H. (2014) Newspapers, Facebook and Twitter. *Journalism Practice*. 9(3): 350-366

Enli, G (2017) Twitter as arena for the authentic outsider: exploring the social media campaigns of Trump and Clinton in the 2016 US presidential election. *European Journal of Communication,* 32(1) s. 50–61.

Enli, G. (2015) Politisk logikk eller medielogikk? Norske partiledares strategier, imagebygging og autensitet i sosiale medier. *Norsk medietidsskrift* 3(22): 1-19.

Enli, G.S, Skogerbø, E. (2013) Personalized campaigns in party-centred politics. *Information, Communication and Society.* 16(5): 757-774

Entman, Robert *(1993). Framing: Toward clarification of a fractured paradigm. Journal of Communication.* 43(4): 51-58

Esperås, E. (2015) Facebook-kommunikasjonen til norske partileiarar: sjangrar og nærsymbolikk. *Norsk medietidsskrift*. 3(22): 1-22.

Evans, H. K., Cordova, V., & Sipole, S. (2014). Twitter style: An analysis of how house candidates used Twitter in their 2012 campaigns. *PS: Political Science & Politics*, 47(2) s. 454–462.

Facebook (2018) Investor relations. Collected 15.04.2018 from: https://investor.fb.com/home/default.aspx

Figenschou, T.U., Thorbjørnsrud, K. (2015) Faces of an invisible population. *American Behavioral Scientist* 59 (7): 783-801

Forman, J., Damschroder, L. (2007), Qualitative Content Analysis, in Liva Jacoby, Laura A. Siminoff (ed.) Empirical Methods for Bioethics: A Primer (Advances in Bioethics, Volume 11) Emerald Group Publishing Limited, pp.39 – 62.

Gabrielatos, C., Baker, P. (2008) Fleeing, Sneaking, Flooding: A Corpus Analysis of Discursive Constructions of Refugees and Asylum Seekers in the UK Press, 1996-2005. *Journal of English Linguistics.* 36(1): 5-38

Golafshani, N. (2003). Understanding Reliability and Validity in Qualitative Research. *The Qualitative Report.* 8(4): 597-606

Greussing, E. Boomgaarden, H.G (2017) Shifting the refugee narrative? An automated frame analysis of Europe's 2015 refugee crisis. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*. 43(11): 1749-1774

Gripsrud, J., Hovden, J., Mjelde, H. (2017) The refugee crisis in Scandinavian Newspapers. Paper presented to the NordMedia conference 17-19 August 2017. Collected 10.03.2018 from: https://scanpub.w.uib.no/files/2016/09/SCANPUB-Refugee-Crisis-Tampere-2017.pdf

Gåsvatn, K. (2012) Ap og Høyre blir enda mer like. Nationen Online. Collected 23.05.2018 from: http://www.nationen.no/article/ap-og-hoApyre-blir-enda-mer-like/

Hagelund, A. 2003. "A Matter of Decency? The Progress Party in Norwegian Immigration Politics." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 29 (1): 47–65

Hallahan, K., Holtzhausen, D., van Ruler, B., Verčič, D., & Sriramesh, K. (2007). Defining strategic communication, International Journal of Strategic Communication, 1(1), 3–35

Hier, S., & Greenberg, J.L (2011) Constructing a discursive crisis: risk, problematization and illegal Chinese in Canada. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 25(3):490-513.

Hognestad, L.I, Lamark, H. (2017) Flyktningene kommer! Lokale mediers dekning av flyktningkrisen. *Norsk Medietidsskrift.* 2(24): 1-19.

Horsti, K. 2007. Asylum Seekers in the News: Frames of Illegality and Control. *Observatorio (OBS*) Journal* 1(1): 145-161.

Hänggli, R., Kriesi, H. (2010). Political framing strategies and their impact on media framing in a Swiss direct-democratic campaign. *Political Communication*. 27: 141-157.

Ihlen, Ø., Figenschou, T.U., Larsen, A. (2015) Behind the framing scenes: Challenges and opportunities for NGO's and Authorities Framing Irregular Immigration. *American Behavioral Scientist* 59 (7): 822-838

Ingrid Rogstad (2016) Is Twitter just rehashing? Intermedia agenda setting between Twitter and mainstream media. *Journal of Information Technology & Politics*. 13(2): 142-158

International Organization for Migration (2017) Missing Migrants. Collected 14.04.2018 from: https://missingmigrants.iom.int/region/mediterranean

Iyengar, S. (2016). *Media politics: A citizen's guide*. New York: W.W. Norton.

Johnston, H. (1995) A Methodology for Frame Analysis: From Discourse to Cognitive Schemata in Klandermans, Tarrow, Taylor (eds) Social Movements, Protest and Contention. University of Minnesota Press.

Joppe, M. (2000) The Research Process. *The Quantitative Report Journal.* 8(4):597-607

Jørgensen, M. B., Meret, S. (2012). Framing Scandinavian conceptualizations of irregular migration. *Nordic Journal of Migration Research*, 2, 289-297

Kahneman D., Tversky, A. (1981) The framing of decisions and the psychology of choice. *Science.* Vol. 211, Issue 4481, pp. 453-458

Kalajdsiz, P., Omvik, O. (2018) Skremmende linjeskifte fra Arbeiderpartiet. Nrk Online. Collected 23.05.2018 from: https://www.nrk.no/norge/_-skremmende-linjeskifte-fra-arbeiderpartiet-1.13998433

Kalsnes, B. (2016) The Social Media Paradox Explained: Comparing political parties' Facebook strategy versus Practice. *Social media + Society* 2(2)

Kalsnes, B.Krumsvik, A.H.;Storsul, T. (2014). Social media as a political backchannel: Twitter use during televised election debates in Norway. ASLIB Proceedings. 66(3): 313-328

Karlsen, R., Enroljas B. (2016) Styles of Social Media Campaigning and Influence in a Hybrid Political Communication System: Linking Candidate Survey Data with Twitter Data. *International Journal of Press/Politics*. 21(3): 338-357

Karlsen, R., Skogerbø, E. (2013) Candidate campaigning in parliamentary systems: Individualized vs. localized campaigning. *Party Politics.* 21(3): 428 – 439

Kim S., Carvalho J.P, Davis, A.G, Mullins, A.M (2011) The View of the Border: News Framing of the Definition, Causes, and Solutions to Illegal Immigration. *Mass Communication and Society*. 14(3): 292-314

Klinger, U. & Svensson, J. (2016). Network Media Logic: Some Conceptual Considerations. In: A. Bruns, G. Enli, E. Skogerbö, A. Larsson & C. Christensen (Ed.), Routledge Companion to Social Media and Politics: (pp. 23-38). New York: Routledge

Krosby, S. (2018) Mener Ap kopierer Frps innvandringspolitikk. TV2 online. Collected 10.05.2018 from: https://www.tv2.no/a/9648786/

Labour (2018) Om Arbeiderpartiet. Collected 05.03.2018 from https://www.arbeiderpartiet.no/om/

Larsson, A., Kalsnes, B. (2014) 'Of course we are on Facebook': Use and non-use of social media among Swedish and Norwegian politicians. *European Journal of Communication* 29(6): 653-667

Lawlor, A. (2015) Local and National Accounts of Immigration Framing in a Cross-national Perspective. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*. 41(6): 918-941

Lincoln, Y. S., Guba, E. G. (1985). Naturalistic inquiry. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage

Matthes, J. (2009) What's in a frame? A content analysis of media framing studies in the world's leading communication journals, 1990–2005. *Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly* 86(2): 349–367

MediaNorway (2018) Bruk av sosiale medier en gjennomsnittsdag. Collected 03.03.2018 from: http://www.medienorge.uib.no/statistikk/medium/ikt/412

Milioni, D., Spyridou L.P., Vadratsikas, K. (2015), Framing immigration in online media and television news in crisis-stricken Cyprus .*The Cyprus Review*, 27(1): 155–85.

Newman, N., Fletcher,R., Kalogeropoulos, A., Levy, D.A., Kleis Nielsen, R. (2017) *Reuters Institute Digital News Report*. Collected 02.02.2018 from:

https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/Digital%20News%20Report%202017%20web_0.pdf

Norwegian Centre for Research Data (Unknown date) *Partihistorie*. Collected 18.02.2018 from: http://www.nsd.uib.no/polsys/data/parti/partihistorie/

Progress Party (2018) *Prinsipp – og handlingsprogram*. Collected 06-04.2018 from: https://www.frp.no/hva-vi-mener/prinsipp-og-handlingsprogram

Roth, K. (2017) The Dangerous Rise of Populism. Collected 04.04.2018 from: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2017/country-chapters/dangerous-rise-of-populism

Semetko, H. A., & Valkenburg, P. M. (2000). Framing European politics: A content analysis of press and television news. *Journal of Communication*, 50(2), 93–109

Shah, D., Watts, M.D, Domke,D., Fan, D.P. (2002) ; News Framing and Cueing of Issue Regimes: Explaining Clinton's Public Approval in Spite of Scandal, *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 66,(3): 339–370.

Skogerbø, E., Karlsen, R. (2014) Mediatisation and Regional Campaigning in a Party Centred-System. *Javnost - The Public* 21(2): 75-92.

Sniderman, P., Peri, P., Figuereido, R., Piazza, T. (2000) The Outsider: Prejudice and Politics in Italy. Princeton, N.J. Princeton University Press.

Socialist Left Party (2018) Ta kampen for et varmt samfunn. Collected 15.05.2018 from https://www.sv.no/hovedsaker/

Stenbacka, C. (2001) Qualitative research requires quality concepts of its own. *Management Decision*. 39 (7):551–5.

Tankard, J. W. (2001). The empirical approach to the study of media framing. In S. D. Reese, O. H. Gandy & A. E. Grant (Eds*.). Framing public life* (pp. 95–106). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.

The Conservatives (2018) Om Høyre. Collected 04.04.2018 from: https://hoyre.no/om-hoyre/partiet/

The Norwegian Directorate for Children, Youth, and Family (2013) Medlemsskap i politiske ungdomspartier. Collected 05.04.2018 from: https://www.bufdir.no/Statistikk_og_analyse/Oppvekst/Samfunnsdeltakelse/Medlemskap_i_politiske_ungdomspartier/#heading7335

Thomas, D. (2006) A General Inductive Approach for Analyzing Qualitative Evaluation Data. *American Journal of Evaluation.* 27(2): 237 – 246.

Thorbjørnsrud, K. (2015) Framing Irregular Immigration in Western Media. *American Behavioral Scientist* 59 (7): 771-782

TV2 (2018) Frp og Rødt vinnerne i fersk måling. *TV2 online*. Collected 25.05.2018 from: https://www.tv2.no/a/9785429/

UNCHR (2017) Mediterranean Situation. Collected 05.03.2018 from: http://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/mediterranean

University of Oslo (2018) Facebook loader. Collected 03.04.2018 from:
https://www.uio.no/english/services/it/research/data-collection-and-analysis/fb_loader/

11. Appendix

11.1 Facebook posts (original)

FrP 19.01.2015
I regjering har vi strammet kraftig inn i asyl- og innvandringspolitikken. Stadig flere kriminelle asylsøkere sendes nå ut av landet, og bare i Hordaland ble det sendt ut hele 40 prosent flere i 2014.

Sv 10.02.2015
 I dag var det høring på Stortinget, om SVs forslag om å la de utsendte asylbarna få ny behandling av sakene sine. Det er det eneste anstendige Norge kan gjøre nå.

http://www.bt.no/nyheter/lokalt/Vurderer-retur-for-asylbarn-3298651.html

Sv 20.04.2015
400 døde forrige søndag, 700 døde igår: Flyktningene som forliser i Middelhavet er vår tids skam, og en varslet katastrofe. Regjeringen er avventende. Det er uholdbart: Norge må ta sin del av ansvaret. Nestleder Bård Vegar Solhjell skrev kronikk om katastrofene i Middelhavet i mars.

Sv 12.05.2015
– Regjeringen svikter flyktningene og svekker kommuneøkonomien i det reviderte statsbudsjettet som ble lagt fram i dag, sier SVs finanspolitiske talsperson Snorre Valen.

FrP 06.08.2015
FrP prioriterer å sende ut ulovlige innvandrere.
I 2015 har regjeringen satt et mål om å sende ut 7800 utlendinger som oppholder seg ulovlig i Norge.

Cirka 40% av de som blir sendt ut har begått annen kriminalitet eller er ilagt straffereaksjon.

Sos. Ungdom 30.08.2015
For to dager siden fant de 50 flyktninger døde i en trailer. Denne valgkampen vil avgjøre om Norge er med og hjelper, eller ikke. Frp sier åpent de vil sabotere Syriavedtaket. SU, derimot, sier at selvfølgelig skal Norge hjelpe flyktninger fra Syria.

sos. Ungdom 02.09.2015
En hilsen fra sjefen sjøl. Norge har plass og rom til å hjelpe syriske flyktninger. Hør Audun fortelle om sine inntrykk fra flyktningeleir i Hellas.

Auf 04.09.2015
I lys av tragedien vi nå står ovenfor er det viktig at vi ønsker flyktninger fra Syria velkommen! Signer kampanjen, og si velkommen Syria!

Lysbakken 05.09.2015
Dette er ikke Norge verdig. Midt i flyktningkrisen arbeider regjeringen med å kaste ut flere barn fra Norge. Det er en iskald prioritering, smålig selv til Frp å være. SV krever nå svar fra statsministeren, hun må stoppe dette.

Sv 10.09.2015
Nå er det folket som leder an, mens regjeringen dilter etter. Hvorfor kan Erna Solberg ikke utvise det lederskapet som flyktningkrisen krever?

Auf 28.09.2015
Et klart flertall av de politiske og humanitære ungdomsorganisasjonene er enige: Norge må gjøre mer for å håndtere flyktningkrisen!

Arbeiderpartiet 30.10.2015
– Arbeiderpartiet vil bidra konstruktivt til å få til en bred politisk enighet om videreutvikling av en streng, rettferdig og human asylpolitikk. Vi er klar til å møte partiene på Stortinget til samtaler om dette, sier Jonas Gahr Støre.

Gahr Støre 04.11.2015
Varige løsninger på flyktningkrisen kan bare finnes gjennom bredt og møysommelig internasjonalt samarbeid. Samarbeid trenger vi også her hjemme. Derfor er Arbeiderpartiet klare for samtaler med de andre partiene i Stortinget.

Oppgaven med å ta i mot, bosette og integrere flyktninger i omfanget som vi nå ser krever at vi strekker oss for å få til enighet om noen klare vedtak og signaler fra Storting og Regjering:

1. Vi kan søke enighet om klare mål for effektive løsninger internasjonalt, økt humanitær bistand til nærområdene, et bedre europeisk asylsamarbeid og orden ved vår grense mot Russland i nord.

2. Vi kan søke enighet om tiltak for at asylsystemet skal fungere bedre, i tråd med Flyktningkonvensjonen, herunder rask og effektiv retur av de som ikke har beskyttelsesbehov.

3. Vi kan søke enighet om opplegg for anstendig mottak, samtidig som vi hindrer at norske ordninger fremstår som mer attraktive slik at det påvirker flyktningestrømmen.

4. Vi kan sammen styrke integrerings-arbeidet, slik at nyankomne flyktninger raskt kommer i utdanning eller arbeid, og ikke blir gående passive.

5. Vi kan samles om rett og tilstrekkelig støtte til at kommunene kan lykkes med bosetting, norskopplæring, arbeidskvalifisering tilpasset den nye situasjonen.

Arbeiderpartiet er klar for å bidra til bred enighet og håper regjeringspartiene avklarer sin holdning til den dugnaden Statsministeren har invitert til.

Høyre 09.11.2015
Høyre og Fremskrittspartiet FrP foreslår tiltak for å begrense antallet mennesker som søker asyl i Norge. I mottakene skal det gis et nøkternt, men verdig tilbud. Arbeidet med integrering for dem som får opphold skal styrkes:

Høyre 30.11.2015
Asyltallene går kraftig ned. Nå kommer resultatene av helt nødvendige innstramminger. Vi får bedre kontroll med situasjonen, og vi blir bedre i stand til å returnere dem som ikke har krav på å være i

Norge. Slik kan vi gi god hjelp til mennesker som har krav på beskyttelse.
http://bit.ly/1OqTYms

(Foto av parlamentarisk leder Trond Helleland: Scanpix)

FrP 03.12.2015
Vi har i årevis kjempet for at gullpensjonen for flyktninger og asylsøkere skal fjernes. Dette er en
ordning som er dypt urettferdig overfor nordmenn som har slitt og betalt skatt gjennom et helt liv.

Sv 15.12.2015
Bak dagens luke i julekalenderen ligger 49 forslag som SV fremmer i Stortinget for bedre integrering og
bosetting av flyktninger. Frp mener at ingen av disse menneskene skal bli i Norge. Dette er en oppskrift
på dårlig integrering. Flyktningene får ikke bidra til det norske samfunnet, og blir passivisert. Mange
blir syke. Dagens ordning er dyr og dårlig, og vil bidra til mer fiendtlighet mot folk som trenger
beskyttelse i Norge. La flyktningene ta del i sine lokalsamfunn og bidra med sin kunnskap og
arbeidskraft!

Les mer: https://www.sv.no/blog/2015/12/14/inviterer-ap-og-sentrum-til-
asylenighet/

Ap 16.12.2015
I den nye integreringsavtalen har det vært viktig for oss å sikre at kommunene settes i stand til å
håndtere situasjonen med mange nye asylmottak og økt bosetting.

– Seks partier på Stortinget
har nå samlet seg om en historisk avtale for å få til et felles løft for god integrering i Norge. Slik sender
vi et tydelig budskap om at vi som samfunn skal lykkes med integreringen av flyktningene som nå skal
starte sine liv her hos oss, sier Jonas Gahr Støre.

Sv 05.01.2016
Hvor mye uanstendig innvandringspolitikk kan KrF og Venstre tåle? Hvor lenge vil KrF akseptere at
innvandringsministeren kaller nestekjærlighet for tyranni før de setter foten ned? Det er bare Venstre og
KrF som kan avsette denne regjeringen. Hvis ikke grensen er nådd nå, når?

FrP 13.01.2016
Innstrammingsvedtakene og integreringspakken er et historisk veiskille i norsk asyl- og
innvandringsdebatt. Vi har fått flertall for å sette krav og plikter til innvandrerne, og det åpnes for å
nekte islamistiske ledere og imamer adgang til landet.

Sv 15.01.2016
– Å peke på syriske flyktninger som den største trusselen mot velferdsstatens bærekraft er en lynavleder.
Ja, det å ta imot mange asylsøkere på kort tid er dyrt. Men over tid er trusselen fra skjulte
skatteparadiser mye mer alvorlig for velferdsstaten, sier Snorre Valen, SVs nestleder.

Lysbakken 15.01.2016
Det er dramatisk når FN kommer med knallhard kritikk av Norges behandling av asylsøkere. Er det et
slikt land vi vil være? Kritikken er alvorlig for regjeringen, men like mye for Ap, KrF, Sp og Venstre.
De har ansvar for uansvarlige vedtak da Stortinget ble grepet av asylpanikk i høst. Bare SV og MDG lot
være å snu kappen med vinden. Hva gjør Ap og sentrum nå?

FrP 18.01.2016

FrPs innvandringspolitiske talsmann tar til orde for å beslaglegge asylsøkeres verdier over kr 10.000. Det er ikke riktig at de skal motta gratispenger fra staten mens de sitter på store verdier.

Solberg 17.03.2016
Det har vært en hektisk dag i Brussel. I møte med Angela Merkel og de andre konservative partilederne i EU har jeg diskutert migrasjon. Jeg mener at vi trenger europeiske løsninger for å hjelpe flyktningene og få kontroll over Schengens yttergrenser. De løsningene EU finner nå er utrolig viktige også for Norge fremover.

Sv 30.03.2016
Endelig har vi fått et Sylvi Listhaug-regnskap. Den passive integreringspolitikken vil koste oss milliarder av kroner, prisen for ikke å integrere asylbarna skikkelig vil bli skyhøy. Alle asylbarn må få gå i barnehage!

Ap 05.04.2016
– Når regjeringen nå har kommet med sine forslag til Stortinget, skal vi behandle forslagene skikkelig og ordentlig, enkeltvis og samlet. Det innebærer ingen blankofullmakt, sier Jonas Gahr Støre om regjeringens forslag til innstramminger i asylpolitikken.

For Arbeiderpartiet er det tre ting som er avgjørende i asylpolitikken:

• Kontroll med grensene og med asylankomstene til Norge.
• En god integreringspolitikk – de som får opphold og skal bli, må komme i gang med livene sine og blir bidragsytere.
• Sikre at Norge overholder folkeretten og ivaretar asylsøkeres rettssikkerhet.

Lysbakken 08.04.2016
Yasser var basketballspiller og DJ i Syria. Nå er han på Nesna, på flukt fra krigen. Flyktningene på Helgeland fortalte meg i går om sine håp og drømmer for framtiden, og om den lange ventetiden på mottaket. I Stortinget arbeider SV for raskere behandling av asylsøknader. Passiv venting er ødeleggende for integrering.

Sylvi Listhaug 09.05.2016
Vi må ikke la venstresidens naive og snillistiske asylpolitikk lede oss ned veien Sverige nå opplever, med parallellsamfunn hvor kriminelle rår. Jeg håper Ap snur og nå skjønner viktigheten av en streng asylpolitikk.

Sylvi Listhaug 12.05.2016
Se Dagbladet TVs intervju med meg i 'Svar på spørsmålet'. Der snakker jeg blant annet om en strengere asylpolitikk for å hindre parallellsamfunn og lovløshet slik vi har sett i Sverige. Vi skal aldri akseptere det i Norge!

Ap 06.06.2016
Arbeiderpartiet mener det er viktig med tiltak som sikrer kontroll på innvandringen, samtidig som det ikke hemmer integreringen og sørger for at Norge lever opp til sine internasjonale forpliktelser.

Høyre 10.06.2016
Høyre har fått til store og nødvendige innstramminger i norsk asyl- og innvandringspolitikk. I sum er mye bra, men vi skulle ønske opposisjonen så behovet for ytterligere innstramminger. Det er helt avgjørende for å kunne redusere antall grunnløse asylsøkere, og hjelpe dem som trenger beskyttelse på en best mulig måte. Les mer her: http://bit.ly/1OgycUu

Lysbakken 04.07.2016
Erna Solberg bommet vel ganske kraftig da hun sa hun likte Razika fordi de hadde 'litt sånne «naiv jente»-sanger med mye stemning'. Jeg liker Razika fordi de lager låter som fenger, men også fordi de er tøffe nok til å stå for noe. For eksempel det nå så kontroversielle budskapet om solidaritet med flyktninger.

FrP 23.06.2017
Antallet asylsøkere så langt i år er det laveste siden 1997. FrP vil at Norge fortsatt skal ha en streng innvandringspolitikk. Lik og del hvis du er enig med oss.

Sylvi Listhaug 22.08.2017
Tallenes tale er tydelig. Streng asylpolitikk og klar retorikk virker. Vi har kontroll med grensene og sørger for lav innvandring til landet vårt. Norge trenger stø kurs, ikke nye innvandringseksperiment! Lik og del.

Sv 14.11.2017
Oktoberbarna har blitt behandlet skammelig av regjeringen. Men det nytter å kjempe! Etter hardt press snur nå flere av de andre partiene, og forslagene som vedtas i dag er et skritt i riktig retning. SV fortsetter å støtte kampen for en rettferdig og human asylpolitikk.

Høyre 22.11.2017
Norge må ha en velkommenkultur som inkluderer innvandrerne. Samtidig forventer vi høy egeninnsats og vilje til å komme raskest mulig i jobb! Enig?

11.2 Codebook

The codebook that was used for tallying all frames after the qualitative part of the thesis was completed.

Codebook for the study of Facebook posts by Norwegian politicians and parties

This codebook consists of 7 frames (C12-C18) of communication that were inductively created. After completion of this qualitative work this codebook was created and applied to the data collection. The other categories are contextual variables added for practical purposes.

Category	Variable	Description	Categories and values
Contextual			
C1	Political actor ID	Which politician or political party	Audun Lysbakken=1 Jonas Gahr Støre=2 Erna Solberg= 3 Sylvi Listhaug=4 Socialist Party=5 Labour=6 Conservatives=7 Progress Party=8 Socialist youth=9 Labour youth=10 Young Conservatives=11 Progress party youth=12
C2	Date	Date of the post	yyyy/mm/dd
C3	Title	Title of post	
C4	Likes	How many likes did the post get	Number of likes
C5	Shares	How many shares did the post get	Number of shares
C6	Comments	How many comments did the post get	Number of comments
C7	Facebook post link		Web URL to actual post online
C8	Geography Does the post mention cities/regions in Norway (regional), Norway as a country (national) or Europe and/or the rest of the world (international)	Regional=1 National=2 International=3 Not relevant/Undetermined=4 Does the post refer specifically to places in Norway, Norway as a country or any other countries around the world or transnational organizations such as the EU?	
Terminology and tonality			
C9	Length	Wordcount	1=below 100 2=100 or more

C10	Which terms are used to describe immigrants/refugees/asylum seekers?	All descriptive words registered for each actor	0=no terms describe immigrants/refugees/asylum seekers
C11	Tone towards immigrants/immigration/refugees/asylum seekers	Positive tone: Immigrants or immigration are paired with positive attributes/consequences **or** positive claim Negative tone: Immigrants/immigration paired with negative attributes/consequences **or** negative claim Both Neither	1= Positive 2= negative 3=both 4=neither
Inductively coded frames			
C12	Control frame Does the Facebook post refer to control in the context of immigration?	Present=1 Absent=0 • Need for strict immigration policy • Limiting influx of migrants • Control of borders and ID • Tightening of borders	
C13	Frame of illegality Does the Facebook post refer to criminality in the context of immigration?	Present=1 Absent=0 • Some refugees/asylum seekers/migrants are criminals • Criminal foreigners • With increased immigration there is a threat of increased crime • Deportations	
C14	Frame of economy Is the argument framed within economic consequences?	Present=1 Absent=0 • Threat to welfare state • Immigration as a cost/gains to the state • Immigrants as economic contributors/resources	
C15	Integration frame	Present = 1 Absent = 0	

	Does the Facebook post refer to plans on how to integrate immigrants? Either through employment or with regards to norms and values	- Immigrants need to adopt values of country - Immigrants need to get jobs to become part of society - Government/state must do more for integration - Specific examples of immigrants who are integrated well
C16	Frame of morality, values and emotional arguments Is the argument charged with morality, values or emotional arguments?	Present=1 Absent=0 - Judgments on what is right or wrong? - Invoking of emotional arguments? - Making reference to what is fair - Arguments based on compassion, solidarity, empathy,
C17	Responsibility Is increased immigration seen as the responsibility of the state? Is increased immigration seen as the responsibility of the EU or other international organizations?	Present=1 Absent=0 - Norway taking responsibility in refugee crisis/immigration policy? - Norway working with the EU to solve the refugee crisis/immigration policy? - The European (EU) responsibility for the refugee crisis/immigration
C18	Criticism frame Does the post criticise another political actor?	Present=1 Absent=0 - Another political actor mentioned negatively - Other political actor criticised for immigration related statements or proposals

12. Tables and figures