

Acknowledgements

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Abstract

In this study the framing in Norwegian print media coverage of immigration during the peak of the European migration crisis of 2015 is investigated. In a content analysis of articles (news stories, opinion pieces, editorials) covering immigration in three Norwegian newspapers over two periods of four weeks, the use of five generic frames is studied: responsibility, conflict, economic consequences, human interest, and morality frames. Further, the arguments presented in the generic frames were analysed and sorted into proposed categories of issue-specific frames. The results show that the media to a great length frame immigration and refugee as issues of political conflict between parties. The parties however, preferred to frame own policies on immigration as the responsible alternative. The communicator presenting the frame, seem to be as important for the framing as the media outlet (tabloid vs. broadsheet). The framing during the peak of the migration crisis differed somewhat from the control period of February 2018: framing of immigration as responsibility was to some extent replaced by a perspective on economic consequences. The qualitative investigation of the frames suggests that the Labour Party managed to set the agenda by proposing that Norway should take 10 000 extra Syrian refugees, and thus forced their opponents to alter their framing. Finally, there seem to be a division between professional and amateur actors in their use of tone and terms when discussing immigration. The use of negative terms and tone was almost exclusive to 'ordinary people' through opinion pieces, while the media and other professional actors kept a quite neutral tone.

Sammendrag

I denne oppgaven analyseres bruken av tolkningsrammer (framing) i norske papiravisers dekning av innvandring under den europeiske migrasjonskrisen i 2015. Gjennom en innholdsanalyse av artikler (nyhetsartikler, leserinnlegg, ledere) som omhandler innvandring i tre norske aviser, over to perioder på fire uker hver, undersøkes bruken av fem generiske tolkningsrammer: ansvar, konflikt, økonomiske konsekvenser, menneskelig fokus, og moralske rammer. Argumentene som utgjorde de generiske tolkningsrammene ble analysert og sortert i foreslåtte kategorier med saks spesifikke tolkningsrammer. Resultatene viser at mediene i stor grad presenterte innvandring som en politisk konflikt mellom partiene. Partiene derimot, foretrakk å presentere sin politikk på innvandring som det ansvarlige alternativet. Kilden bak tolkningsrammene ser ut til å ha en vel så sterk effekt på tolkningsrammene som medietypen (tabloidavis vs. 'fullformat'). Bruken av tolkningsrammer ved toppen av migrasjonskrisen skilte seg på noen områder fra kontrollperioden februar 2018: det å presentere innvandring som et spørsmål om ansvarlighet ble til en viss grad erstattet av et perspektiv på de økonomiske konsekvensene. Gjennom den kvalitative undersøkelsen av tolkningsrammene kan en tolke det som at Arbeiderpartiet greide å sette nyhetsagendaen gjennom sitt forslag om at Norge burde ta i mot 10 000 ekstra syriske flyktninger, og dermed presset motstanderne sine til å endre sin vante bruk av tolkningsrammer. Det kan se ut til å være et skille mellom profesjonelle og amatører i bruken av begreper og undertone når innvandring blir diskutert. Negative begreper og undertone kom nesten utelukkende til syne gjennom leserinnlegg av 'vanlige folk', mens mediene og andre profesjonelle aktører var relativt nøytrale i sin omtale av innvandrere.

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Introduction

The summer of 2015 marked the Norwegian political peak of the migration crisis, when the Parliament on 10 June after negotiations settled on accepting 8 000 Syrian refugees over three years, in addition to the normal quota of UN-refugees. The final stages of the negotiation were completed without the presence of two parties represented in the parliament: the left-wing Socialists (SV), and the right-wing Progress Party (FrP). The former party suggested that Norwegian efforts were too scarce, while the latter party claimed that pushing the already set quota would endanger Norwegian culture and society, and that other forms of help would be more efficient.

As over 1 000 000 refugees crossed the Mediterranean Sea on their way to Europe in 2015, and thousands died trying (UN, 2015), the debate on how to react escalated in Norwegian media. The Labour Party (AP) advocated, after their party congress, that Norway should take 10 000 Syrian refugees (NRK, 2015). This proposal, and the number 10 000, characterised the summer's debate, both until and after the settlement of 10 June.

As so often before when migration is the topic, the debate seemed to revolve around FrP and their supporters on the one side, and a coalition of centre-left parties and voters led by AP on the other. The two competing narratives were: immigrants threatening Norwegian culture, welfare, and way of life; or, the privileged Norwegian society's obligation to accept as many refugees as possible due to the humanitarian crisis in Syria. The former narrative was paired with arguments such as "help in their own areas" (Fremskrittspartiet, 2015), while the latter emphasised values such as *solidarity* and *humanity*.

Today however, with no election campaign, nor daily updates on refugees trying to cross the Mediterranean Sea, immigration does not seem to be on the everyday news agenda. Even though the topic is important to Norwegians (Karlsen, 2015), policies on immigration and integration are only occasionally discussed, often related to specific events.

Research Questions

Arguments and narratives in the media do not depend solely on political actors and sources. The media itself is also an important actor. Through framing, the media influence the way the audience perceive current events (Entman, 1993). Framing can affect the way in which the

audience perceive migrants and refugees (Thorbjørnsrud, 2015); how the public vote in campaigns by highlighting certain aspects (Gerth & Siegert, 2012); and alter people perception on the legitimacy of refugees (Lawlor & Tolley, 2017)

Consequently, this study will investigate the way in which the migration crisis of 2015 was framed in Norwegian print press. To be able to evaluate the framing of the 2015 migration crisis, the newspaper debate will be compared with data from early 2018. Further, both quantitative and qualitative data will be analysed to detect differences and similarities.

The overarching research question is:

How was immigration framed in Norwegian print press during the 2015 European migration crisis?

In addition to descriptive data of the framing of immigration in 2015 and 2018, analysis will be provided through four subordinate dimensions: (1) is framing dependent on media outlet; (2) did the framing of immigration during the migration crisis differ from 'normal'; (3) which actors were present in the debate; and (4) which tone and terms were used when debating immigration?

Terms

The terms *immigrants*, *asylum seekers*, and *refugees* have different practical and political meanings. Immigrants means anyone born abroad who stays in Norway, with parents from outside of Norway. Asylum seekers have applied for protection as a refugee in Norway; and refugees have been granted permanent residency (IMDi, 2015). The differences are important to recognise; however, this study analyses the Norwegian debate on all *foreigners*, and thus, the general terms *immigrants* and *immigration* will be used. A discussion on the use of terms in the media will be provided.

Context

Later, when looking at the issues discussed during both the migration crisis and today, it will become evident how fundamental certain events are for the debate on immigration. Thus, some differences in the political landscape, and a few events need to be clarified in advance.

Firstly, a change in the government coalition: After the 2017 election, the Liberal Party entered the government alongside Progress and the Conservatives. Thus, their role in the debate have been somewhat changed, as they are now in government with the most restrictive party on immigration. The government coalition is also likely to affect the Conservatives rhetoric: it is not the most visible party in immigration and refugee debates, but in loyalty to the Progress Party, they can be assumed to stay quieter than expected from the leading government party.

Secondly, some events of early 2018 have had impact on the debate. First, Labour employed a new spokesperson on immigration, who was accused of copying FrP's policies on immigration (TV2, 2018). His statements led to reactions from all parties, including his own, and commentators from many actors. Later, the election campaign in Denmark was characterised by a discussion on restricting immigration law, this also resulted in a Norwegian debate. Finally, a proposal on a new emergency law from the government resulted in a debate on the legal protection for immigrants and refugees. These three issues were the theme of over half of the coded frames from February 2018.

Framing

To understand the concept of framing, a brief introduction is needed. Under, the origins of the concept will shortly be explained; a few different approaches to the concept will be described; and the two relevant classifications of frames will be accounted for. Thereafter, a review of the relevant literature will be provided.

Origins of Framing

The term *framing* refers to the way in which a story is presented. In political science the *story* is usually news stories about politics or political matters, or the way political agents present their view or proposed policies. The term originates from psychology, as Tversky and Kahneman (1981) proved that choices are affected by the way the alternatives are presented. In their case, they presented a problem of which program to adopt as a response to a deadly disease. The programs were exactly the same, but they were either presented as number of deaths, or number of survivors.

Iyengar (2016) explains framing as "the way in which options about an issue can be altered by emphasizing or de-emphasizing particular facets of that issue." (p. 254). Valkenburg, Semetko, and de Vreese (1999) describes framing as a means to "simplify and give meaning to events, and to maintain audience interest." (p. 551). As *framing* has been operationalised very differently by researchers, and because of its different uses, the term has been criticised for not being very clear. Entman has given a definition which has set the standard for later use:

Framing essentially involves selection and salience. To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communication text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described. (1993, p. 52)

This is the definition from which framing have been operationalised in this thesis. It is emphasised that a frame needs to be presented by a *communicator*, and that it needs to define a *problem*, a *causal interpretation*, and/or a *treatment recommendation*.

Different approaches to framing

Gamson and Modigliani (1989) did ground-breaking research on the presentation of nuclear power in the media, in which they analysed the relationship between media discourse and public opinion. In many ways, this was the kick off for modern framing research in political science. Thus, they adopted the psychological concept of framing into media and political science. They argued that the way nuclear power was presented, for example as a potential deadly weapon, or as cheap energy, would affect the way the public would think of, and to what degree they would support, nuclear power.

More physical aspects of framing have also been studied. Aalberg and Jenssen (2007) showed through an experiment where they had one female, and one male actor read the same message as a political candidate, that evaluation from the audience was affected by the candidate's gender. Both the popularity of the message, and the popularity of the candidate him/herself, was affected. Iyengar and Barisione (2015) also attempted to find racial and sexist biases related to the 2013 Italian election. However, they found that partisan cues had the strongest effect on perception and support.

The examples above are exclusively of framing effects. Framing research is also conducted on *frame building* and media frames, which are more relevant for this thesis. According to de Vreese (2005) frame-building refers to the process between newsroom and frames in the news, where internal and external factors affect the presentation of the news. The result of this process are the frames we can find in the media. Internal factors in the newsroom and within journalism may include prices and budget, and media outlet and its interests (Gans, 1980, p. 288-9). External factors could be audience and sources, as well as the competitive environment in which the media exists (ibid; de Vreese, 2005).

Classification of Frames

The manifested media frames are usually divided into two types: issue-specific frames, and generic frames (de Vreese, 2005; Matthes, 2009). Issue-specific frames are, as the name suggests, frames that are specific to an issue. In the case of this study – the Norwegian media discourse on immigration – an issue-specific frame could be a presentation of immigration as a threat to Norwegian values, or as an asset to the Norwegian society. Construction of these frames are thus dependent on the issue. Generic frames on the other hand, are not dependent on issue, these can be used, and found, across all issues and news stories. The two most prominent uses of generic frames are: Iyengar's (1996) dichotomy of *thematic* or *episodic* framing; and, Semetko and Valkenburg's (2000) five generic frames; whereas the latter is most relevant to this thesis.

Semetko and Valkenburg (2000) studied the use of five generic frames in newspaper articles and television news stories surrounding a Head of State meeting in Amsterdam. The frames were: (1) The conflict frame, emphasising "conflict between individuals, groups, or institutions as a means of capturing audience interests." (P. 95). (2) The human interest frame, which "brings a human face or an emotional angle to the presentation of an event" (p.95). (3) Economic consequences frame, which "reports an event [...] in terms of the consequences it will have economically" (p.96). (4) The morality frame, in which a problem or event is put "in the context of religious tenets or moral prescriptions" (p. 96). And finally, (5) the responsibility frame, which "presents an issue [...] to attribute responsibility for its cause or solution" (p. 96) to an individual or a group. They found that the attribution of responsibility was most often used, followed by conflict, economic consequences, human interest and morality. Their study is one of the most cited works within framing research (Matthes, 2009),

and their generic frames have been used as an example to follow when approaching framing deductively (Matthes & Kohring, 2008).

Literature Review

In the following section the literature relevant to this study will be reviewed. First, research on framing of immigration in general, with some articles focussing on Norway specifically. Secondly, three articles investigating the framing of the migration crisis in Norway, Austria, and Romania. And thirdly, research on who is quoted, and given a voice, in the Norwegian debate on immigration.

Framing of Immigration

In the context of immigration to Norway, there have been a few studies focusing on human interest framing specifically. Figenschou and Thorbjørnsrud (2015) compared articles using human interest framing in Norwegian, French, and U.S. news media, in coverage of irregular immigration. By coding all articles with a human face or example to it, they found that the use of human interest framing tended to present stories from the irregular immigrants' side, contrary to results from previous research. Further, they suggested that human interest framing did not necessarily reduce the quality of the news reports.

In a study designed to evaluate the effect of human interest framing, Beyer and Figenschou (2014) found that the audience were critical of the media handling of a specific case dealing with an irregular immigrant to Norway. They suggested that human interest frames may actually work against the media's intention, by fatiguing the audience instead of engaging them. However, this was a case in which the media attention was extraordinary by Norwegian standards.

To explain the popularity of studying exactly human interest framing in relation to irregular immigration, one could look to Ihlen, Figenschou, and Larsen (2015). They found that human interest framing was the most popular strategy for both immigration authorities trying to limit irregular immigration, and for NGO's wanting to liberalise immigration policies. Thus, human interest framing has been the gateway to several studies on framing of immigration. Still,

Aalberg and Beyer (2015) found that the effects of human interest framing varies along with party affiliation in the audience.

Benson and Wood (2015) compared news coverage in the same countries, Norway, France and the U.S., to study differences in framing of irregular immigration. They did not focus on human interest frames, or any other of Semetko and Valkenburg's (2000) generic frames; their focus was on *problem*, *cause*, and *solution* frames. Further, they examined who was quoted in coverage on immigration. The study showed that all countries primarily quoted government sources, and that the majority of statements were frameless. However, the most used category of frames in the framed quotes, were problem frames. These could be narratives of society's problems in dealing with immigration, as well as immigrants' problems in their new society.

In an experimental study of framing effects on a Norwegian audience, Aalberg, Iyengar, and Messing (2012) found that Norwegian willingness to accept immigrants is affected by the economic and educational background of the audience. Further, they exposed some racial preferences in the Norwegian public. These findings fit into the picture painted by Benson and Wood (2015) with media focus on potential problems following immigration.

In an analysis of Dutch regional newspapers, d'Haenens and de Lange (2001) used Semetko and Valkenburg's generic frames and questionnaire. In addition to evaluating the framing, they examined differences between news reporting in areas with different public opinions on immigration. They found that all three relevant newspapers used human interest framing most often. In the other end, d'Haenens and de Lange found no use of the morality frame.

Lawlor and Tolley (2017) have conducted an extensive analysis of Canadian print media over ten years. They found differences in framing of immigrants and refugees: immigrants were framed in an economic perspective, whereas refugees were to a greater extent framed in terms of their validity, intentions, as well as a potential security threat. Further, they found a more episodic framing and coverage of refugees, and that immigrants were discussed in a more positive tone than refugees.

In a rapport ordered by the Norwegian Directorate of Integration and Diversity (IMDi), Strand, Wærholm, Nilsen, and Kjær (2015) analysed the media coverage of immigration and integration in Norway through several print and online newspapers. Though they did not

focus on framing, they analysed the content through different perspectives. They categorised the relevant articles into problem, resource, and neutral perspectives, and found that a neutral perspective was most frequently applied, followed by problem and resource perspectives, respectively.

The Migration Crisis

Another Norwegian research was conducted by Hognestad and Lamark (2017). They studied perspectives on the migration crisis in Northern and Southern regional Norwegian newspapers. Their perspectives bear resemblance to some of the frames introduced by Semetko and Valkenburg. The most frequent perspectives found, included a help perspective, problem perspective, neutral perspective, critique of authorities, and refugees as resources. The help perspective was the dominant perspective in their data, despite differences between the regions. This is perhaps not very surprising, given the context of the migration crisis. Further, the least frequent perspective, was the perspective of refugees as resources.

In a study of Austrian newspapers' framing of the 2015 migration crisis, Greussing and Boomgaarden (2017) found that "stereotyped narratives of security threat, economisation, and – to a lesser extent – victimisation" were employed (p. 1763). That is, typical issue-specific frames of immigration and refugee were attributed, despite the extraordinary situation. Further, they too compared framing in 'quality' and tabloid newspapers and found that the framing in these aligned in times of crisis. Finally, they suggest that the issue-specific framing narrowed down to only a few repeated frames on long-term effects of the migration crisis as the media focus increased.

An analysis of Semetko and Valkenburg's (2000) five generic frames was conducted on Romanian online media outlets by Corbu, Buturoiu, and Durach (2017). They found that the Romanian outlets framed the crisis through responsibility and conflict perspectives. Further, they found that the outlets had a quite neutral tone towards refugees, and a more negative tone towards the EU. By these findings, they suggest that the Romanian media outlets focused on accountability, both in terms of the crisis itself, and in terms of responsibility for the refugees.

Who is given a voice?

Figenschou and Beyer (2014) analysed the debate on immigration in Norway in terms of which sources were quoted in news articles and TV news stories. They operationalised five major groups and found that political elites were the most often quoted primary sources, followed by cultural elites and 'ordinary people'. As the two elite groups were by far the most cited sources, they concur with previous studies (Allern, 2001; Aalberg & Elvestad, 2012). However, Figenschou and Beyer suggest that through opinion pieces and forums, ordinary people and non-experts challenge the elite dominated debates.

Further, Strand et al. (2015) found that people of immigration background are poorly represented in Norwegian media. With another perspective than Figenschou and Beyer, namely the immigrants', they found that news stories dealing with topics related to immigration, most often does not use immigrant sources. Only in two out of seven stories, people of immigrant background are cited as sources. In most of the stories with immigrant sources, they are cited as ordinary citizens, however, the cases in which immigrants are experts, victims, or suspects have increased over the last couple of years. In this study the ethnic background of the communicators is not included. Still, these findings somewhat confirm Figenschou and Beyer's, and Benson and Wood's claims: the debate on immigration is heavily dominated by elites and governmental sources.

Norwegian Media and the Newspapers

When analysing framing in Norwegian print newspapers, background on the Norwegian media model and newspapers is necessary. Consequently, a short review on Norwegian print press will be provided, followed by an introduction of the three sampled newspapers.

Media System

The Norwegian media system is a democratic corporatist system, in which the public broadcaster has a strong role (Benson & Wood, 2015, p. 808), and public funding of news media is provided. Further, the media is characterised by editorial freedom, and communication services are conceived as a public good (Engelstad et al., 2017, p. 50). The system can be contrasted with the liberal, market-oriented system of The U.S., which is to a greater extent governed, and funded, by market interests (Benson & Wood, 2015, p. 808). The

democratic corporatist media system, which is found in Northern and Central Europe, is further characterised by historically strong political parallelism, manifested in party press, and later a high level of journalistic professionalisation (Hallin & Mancini, 2004, p. 144-5).

As the Norwegian party press was steadily phased out from the 1970's-90's, many of the newspapers still stuck to values connected to different ideologies – often conservative or social democratic (Schwebs & Østbye, 2012). Moreover, as the number of journalists increased, they were professionalised, and the newspaper content moved away from reporting towards critical investigation. The print newspapers today contain opinion pieces. Letters to the editor have always been a part of the newspapers, however, today pieces on current events are included in more or less permanent sections of the newspapers. These are, unlike many online forums, controlled and accepted by the editors of the newspaper (Ibid, p. 77).

The Newspapers

Three print newspapers are included in the empirical analysis of this thesis: *Aftenposten*, *Dagsavisen*, and *VG*. These newspapers were also analysed by Aalberg and Brekken (2007), as well as constituting the print media sample from Norway in a special edition of *American Behavioral Scientist* (Thorbjørnsrud, 2015). Norway has one of the highest circulation rates of newspapers in the world (Hallin & Mancini, 2004, p. 145), and *Aftenposten* and *VG* have the highest circulation in Norway (Medie Norge, 2017). *Aftenposten* historically represent the conservative elite, and *VG* is the biggest tabloid in Norway. *Dagsavisen* has a lower circulation than the two other newspapers, however, it was found fit to represent the elite left perspective, given their history as social democratic party press. Further, analysing the same newspapers as in earlier research will improve the credibility when comparing results.

Despite the professionalisation, Allern (2001, p. 44; p. 72-3) claims that there has been a tabloidisation of Norwegian newspapers with *VG* in a front position. In his content analysis of ten Norwegian newspapers, he finds that the most popular content is politics and public management (p.124-6). However, the coverage is characterised by conflict and scandals, particularly in the national newspapers. Without a specific migration perspective, Allern further describes crime and justice as popular topics; again, particularly in *VG*. These findings may have implications on the framing of immigration.

This Study's Contribution

As frames have been studied in countless ways, and the findings from previous studies differ as much as their methods do, it is necessary to specify the aim of this thesis. By using a method inspired by one of the most validated works on framing, namely Semetko and Valkenburg's, the prime contribution of this thesis will be to describe and analyse the debate on immigration in Norway in terms of their five generic frames. Many studies have already focused exclusively on human interest framing (Figenschou and Thorbjørnsrud, 2015; Beyer and Figenschou, 2014; Ihlen, Figenschou, and Larsen, 2015), but few have given attention to them all (Greussing & Boomgaarden, 2017; Corbu et al., 2017). The main contribution of the study will thus be to describe the Norwegian debate on immigration at the peak of the migration crisis of 2015, and compare it with the debate of today, in terms of the five generic frames.

Next, a qualitative look into the argumentation in the debate will be provided. Thus, studies of generic and issue-specific frames will be combined. In that way, the study will contribute with an understanding of how the same generic frames can be attributed by opposing sides of a debate and show interesting facets of the relationship between generic and issue-specific frames, as well as change in generic frames as a result of context.

Further, three Norwegian newspapers will be compared, to investigate differences between tabloids and broadsheets, as well as between political affiliation. Even though more newspapers would have had to be included to make any definite claims in this issue, the use of different newspapers will provide for a better insight to Norwegian print press as a whole.

Finally, as earlier research has showed a heavy elite domination in the immigration debate (Figenschou & Beyer, 2014; Benson & Wood, 2015; Strand et al. 2015), this thesis includes opinion pieces in the print papers, to incorporate the perspective of 'ordinary people' or non-experts. By including several communicators, possibilities of more varied views on, and evaluations of, immigrants are present. Thus, the study will contribute in the understanding of different actors' perception and consideration of immigrants and refugees.

Method and Data

Sampling

The main empirical analysis of this thesis is based on a quantitative content analysis of three major print newspapers in Norway: *Aftenposten*, *Dagsavisen*, and *VG*. Using the search engine Atekst from Retriever, made it possible to access all printed articles from the three newspapers. The sampled periods were two periods of four weeks each: June 2015 (1 June – 28 June), representing the peak of the migration crisis, and the parliament settlement of 10 June; and February 2018 (29 January – 25 February), as the newest available period as the work on this thesis was initiated. Five keywords¹ were used in the search to find all articles related to immigration.

The keyword search resulted in 463 hits in Period 1, and 356 in Period 2. These were however, not all related to immigration in a Norwegian context. Examples of irrelevant hits were news stories on effects of Britain leaving the European Union and Donald Trump's suggested border wall. The selection was conducted according to the following criteria: (1) migration, immigration, or refugee had to be the topic; and (2), Norwegian politics and/or interests had to be present. To match these criteria, all headlines and first two paragraphs were read. Thereafter, the text surrounding the hits from the keyword search was examined. As a result of the second criterion, typical standardised reports on the amounts of refugees in the world were excluded. The criteria did however, not discriminate on author. Thus, news articles, commentaries, and opinion pieces were all included. These criteria narrowed the hits to 128 and 78 articles, respectively from Period 1 and Period 2.

Operationalisation

As frames were the research units, the possibility of several frames per article was present. The frames were separated from one another by an operationalisation of Entman's (1993, p. 52) definition of frames. First of all, each frame needed to be presented by a communicator. The communicator could be the journalist or author, or an interviewee. Frames were not coded on quotes from third parties. That is: reproduced quotes gathered by the author from other sources than the primary source would not be included. After having identified a communicator, each frame needed to contain one or more of the following: (1) a problem

¹ The search string was [translations in brackets]: flyktning* [refugee] OR innvandrer* [immigrant] OR migranter* OR muslim OR asyl* [asylum]

definition, related to immigration to Norway; (2) a causal interpretation, related to immigration to Norway; or (3), a treatment recommendation, again related to immigration to Norway. This means that every time a new communicator, and/or a new problem definition, causal interpretation, or treatment recommendation were presented in the article, a new frame was coded.

The highest number of frames in one article was six, but most of the articles only contained one frame. Those articles which contained several frames were usually either issues discussed by opposing parties and introduced by the journalist, or they were chronicles by politicians in which several arguments supporting their view on immigration were presented. The total number of frames coded was 252: 157 from the Period 1 (June 2015), and 95 from the Period 2 (February 2018).

Coding of Generic Frames

Making the criteria clear in advance, made it possible to deductively code the generic frames (Matthes, 2009; de Vreese 2005). The approach was deductive as each frame coded, was sorted into one of the five generic frames provided by Semetko and Valkenburg, using their questionnaire (2000, p. 100; Appendix). As Semetko and Valkenburg had already validated the relationship between their questions and the different frames, their generic frames were made mutually exclusive in this study. Thus, each coded frame was placed in one, and one only, of the five generic frames: attribution of conflict, responsibility, economic consequences, human interest, or morality. Every time a frame was located by identifying a communicator and one or more of the three conditions described above, the yes/no questions from the questionnaire were asked.

Matthes and Kohring (2008) states that when coding deductively it is crucial "that the frames are indeed known beforehand and that they suit the topic currently under investigation" (p. 262). As shown in the theory and background, (irregular) immigration has been studied quite heavily. Further, d'Haenens and de Lange (2001) used Semetko and Valkenburg's (2000) generic frames and questionnaire in their research "Framing of Asylum Seekers in Dutch Regional Newspapers". Even more convincing for this study: Both Greussing and Boomgaarden (2017), and Corbu et al. (2017) applied the five generic frames on the coverage of the migration crisis in Austria and Romania, respectively.

Finally, de Vreese (2012) emphasise that all framing studies, as they all seem to differ somewhat in approach, need to be clear on which features of the content they analyse. An important note to make in the case of this study, is that it does not focus on the visuals of the articles. That is, images related to each news story, have not been included in the study. Neither have statistics, charts, or models; only the text material in the articles was coded. To ensure the reliability of the coding, a random 10 percent of the coded articles were also coded by a fellow student. The inter-coder reliability test resulted in an acceptable Cohen's kappa ($\kappa=.81$), which controls for accidental agreement in coding (Cohen, 1960).

Coding Issue-specific Frames

Subordinate to the quantitative, deductive approach to the generic frames, the arguments were also noted with the intention of proposing several issue-specific frames. This approach was inspired by Hänggeli and Kriesi (2010), as they gathered arguments in a Swiss direct-democratic campaign. The fact that a generic frame can be used to promote opposing views on an issue, makes a qualitative approach to the arguments an advantage. For each generic frame coded, the arguments were collected and later categorised into possible issue-specific frames, following Thomas' (2006, p 242) process of coding in an inductive analysis:

The Coding Process in Inductive Analysis

Initial reading of text data	Identify specific text segments related to objectives	Label the segments of text to create categories	Reduce overlap and redundancy among the categories	Create a model incorporating most important categories
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The first two steps, *initial reading* and *identifying specific text segments*, were included in the initial coding of generic frames. Thus, the arguments written out in the code book were already sorted into segments related to objectives. Further, the arguments within the same generic frames were labelled into categories such as "Conflicting values between Norwegians and immigrants," "European responsibility to take refugees," and "Successful immigrant."

As an example of qualitative coding of an issue-specific frame, the arguments from the economic consequences frame could be explored. A representative from a humanitarian organisation argued that helping refugees in and around Syria would be more efficient both economically and practically. A similar argument was proposed by a Progress politician in another chronicle: he suggested that 150 000 refugees in refugee camps could have "been helped" for the same amount of money it would cost to take 10 000 Syrian refugees to Norway. These are both coded under an issue-specific frame labelled 'Priority' as shown later in Table 3.

The reliability of this part of the study is lower than in Semetko and Valkenburg's validated questionnaire. As stated by Thomas (2006) "Different evaluators may produce findings that are not identical" (p. 240) when approaching qualitative data. Also, Matthes and Kohring (2008, p. 260) criticise inductive approaches to frame research for tending to be unreliable, as researchers are not transparent in the way they determine their frames. However, these issue-specific frames are not suggested as framework for later research, they merely provided insight into the varied use of the generic frames, both by different communicators, and different media outlets. Further, the recurrent arguments coded as issue-specific frames are accounted for in Table 3.

The Debate's Balance

To evaluate the balance of the debate, and whether one of the sides were more present than the other, a question on the way immigrants or refugees were discussed in the frames was added. The alternatives in the codebook (Appendix) were: (1) positive, (2) ambivalent, (3) negative, or (4) neutral tone toward immigrants. Further, the terms that were used when describing immigrants were noted. The terms gave insight in the way immigration and immigrants/refugees were discussed in the news articles.

Another way to analyse the balance of the debate, is through the communicator. Included in the codebook was a question on who the communicators were. This would show if politicians from specific parties, or representatives from certain organisations were given more coverage in the newspapers than others. Of course, who is given coverage depends on other variables connected to media logic and issue ownership, however, it gives an interesting insight into the debate.

Time Span

Finally, using two periods of time made it possible to compare the situation around the peak of the migration crisis, to the debate today. By comparing both generic and issue-specific frames, it was possible to study the relationship between context and frames, as well as the different media outlets and situations. This comparative element was also necessary when evaluating the findings in terms of previous research, as a case study on the peak of the migration crisis would be difficult to compare with more general studies on framing of immigration.

Results

In the following chapter, the findings will be discussed through six sections. First, the total distribution of frames in the three newspapers will be investigated. This first section will provide indications for whether framing is affected by the media outlet. Secondly, the difference in generic frames between the two periods – June 2015 and February 2018 – will be analysed, which will be further explored in the chapter's third section, where the issue-specific frames under each generic frame will be examined. In that way, the generic frames' areas of use, will be connected to the comparative element of the research. The second and third section will constitute the basis for answering whether the debate of 2015 differed from 'normal'. Fourth, an examination of the communicators in the debate will be conducted, which will be followed by the fifth element of the discussion: a closer look into the different parties' application of generic frames. The study of the communicators and the parties' framing will show which actors are present, and given a voice, in the debate. Finally, in the sixth section of the discussion, the tone towards immigrants and terms used to describe immigrants and asylum seekers will be studied, providing answer for the final question. Each section will be completed with a summarising paragraph, laying the groundwork for the study's conclusions.

Distribution of Frames

The distribution of frames between the three newspapers was quite even. A total of 91 frames were coded in Dagsavisen, followed by 90 frames in VG, and 71 frames in Aftenposten. The most heavily applied frame was the conflict frame, followed by the responsibility frame, the

economic consequences frame, the human interest frame, and the morality frame, respectively.

Table 1
Total Distribution of Frames by Newspapers

	Aftenposten	Dagsavisen	VG	Total
Conflict	28	42	31	101
	39,4%	46,2%	34,4%	40,1%
Economy*	5	9	18	32
	7,0%	9,9%	20,0%	12,7%
Responsibility	24	26	33	83
	33,8%	28,6%	36,7%	32,9%
Human Interest	10	9	6	25
	14,1%	9,9%	6,7%	9,9%
Morality	4	5	2	11
	5,6%	5,5%	2,2%	4,4%
Total	71	91	90	252
	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

* Significant at $p < 0,5$

The most applied frame was, as indicated the conflict frame. The distribution of conflict framing does however vary between the newspapers: In VG, about one third of the total number of applied frames were conflict frames; in Aftenposten, about 40 percent; while in Dagsavisen almost half of the applied frames were conflict frames. In Table 4 below, it is evident that the distribution of communicators also varies in the three newspapers. The different communicators are likely to affect the attribution of frames, as different groups have different meanings and interests on the matter. In the case of Dagsavisen, a large portion of the frames applied are communicated by journalists. Looking back at the evolution of Norwegian newspapers, an obvious explanation emerges: the professionalisation of journalists, and their critical approach to power elites. Further, according to Hernes (1978) polarisation, conflict, and contrasts are popular means for the media to gain attention to their news reporting.

The economic consequences frame was found in 12,7 percent of the total number of frames. This is however, perhaps the most interesting frame to have a closer look at: the distribution

in the three newspapers is very unlike; and, as one can tell from Table 2 it was almost exclusively attributed in June 2015. Both of these findings will be further discussed: the difference between the newspapers can again be explained by the communicators; and the uneven distribution over the two sampling periods will be investigated in the next section, as well as in the section on the issue-specific frames.

The distribution of responsibility frames was relatively high – about one third of the frames – and relatively even between the newspapers. However, as the results of Table 2 shows, it was more extensively applied in February 2018 than in June 2015. The increase of responsibility frames will also be further discussed below.

The results show a quite low presence of human interest frames, which is somewhat surprising given the results of previous research on the framing of immigration. In total, about 10 percent of the frames in the newspapers were human interest frames, ranging from 7 percent in VG, to 10 percent in Dagsavisen, and about 14 percent of the frames found in Aftenposten. The relatively low frequency of human interest frames may be due to the fact that images and visual aspects of the news articles were not coded. However, as will be discussed when looking at the issue-specific frames, typical narratives of successful immigrants are included in the data material.

The morality frame was almost absent in the articles sampled for this study's. This should not come as a surprise when looking at the results of previous research. Further, when coding the generic frames as mutually exclusive, the morality frame may be secondary to other frames, and thus impossible to code using the chosen design. Looking to the issue-specific frames may provide for an example: as several of the responsibility frames are categorised under the statement "Norway as rich, affluent country is responsible for helping refugees" in the 'Solidarity' frame (Table 3), one could argue that the moral perspective is present as well. However, Semetko and Valkenburg's definition of the morality frame is strongly connected to religion, which is perhaps less present in Norwegian newspapers.

To summarise the total distribution of frames in the three newspapers, the most noticeable result is the frequent use of conflict frames, followed by responsibility frames, and economic consequences frames, respectively. The high number of conflict frames may be explained by a media preference of conflicts (Allern, 2001; Hernes, 1978). Secondly, relatively few

examples of human interest frames were found. As this is the case for both June 2015 and February 2018 (Table 2), it cannot be explained by the 'state of emergency' at the peak of the migration crisis. However, the coding may have affected the outcome, as text content was preferred. The newspapers had quite similar distribution of frames, with two important differences: Dagsavisen's high number of conflict frames; and the larger presence of responsibility frames in VG. Both of these differences will be further discussed as results of communicators.

Change in Framing over the two Periods

In the next table, the differences in attribution of frames in the two sampling periods are shown. The frequencies and percentages of each frame for each period are included. There are two obvious differences between the periods: attribution of the economy frame was 13,6 percent lower February 2018 than in June 2015; while attribution of the responsibility frame increased with 14,7 percent in February 2018. A small increase in attribution of the conflict frame is also evident. The change in human interest framing is negative, though very small; while attribution of the morality frame is almost non-existent in the second period.

Table 2

Frames Compared over the two Periods

	June 2015	February 2018	Difference
Conflict	61 38,9%	40 42,1%	+3,2%
Economy	28 17,8%	4 4,2%	-13,6%
Responsibility	43 27,4%	40 42,1%	+14,7%
Human Interest	16 10,2%	9 9,5%	-0,7%
Morality	9 5,7%	2 2,1%	-3,6%
Total	157 100,0%	95 100,0%	N=252

Some of the changes are likely to be results of the context change between the two periods. The steady attribution of conflict frames however, shows that the media's role of presenting politics in a competitive, or scandal, perspective, is ever-present. Also, immigration is a topic in which both political parties and the electorate are split (Aardal, 2015). Thus, the parties benefit on stating their positions as different than their opposition's.

The increase of responsibility frames attributed, can be interpreted as a process of going back to normal, after the very intense situation of the summer of 2015. Both Progress and Labour – the two most active parties in the debate (Table 6) – advocate policies on immigration and asylum that is "strict and responsible" (Fremskrittspartiet, 2018) or "strict, fair, and humane" (Arbeiderpartiet, 2018). Consequently, both parties try to frame their policies as the responsible alternative. Thus, the responsibility frame should by both parties be frequently used; however, as the issue-specific frames will show, the parties used the frame in somewhat different ways.

When looking at previous research only, the extensive economic framing of June 2015 is somewhat surprising. Lawlor and Tolley (2017) found that immigrants were to a greater extent framed in terms of economic consequences than refugees. The debate of June 2015 was to a great length related to Syrian refugees, still, questions of economic consequences were frequently asked, as opposed to the debate of February 2018. Yet again, the great effect of context appears. There was no room for questioning the validity of the refugees' need for protection, as the humanitarian crisis and war was widely covered in the media. Thus, the 'normal' framing of refugees was affected.

As stated, the situation of 2015 was different than 'normal', as the migration crisis had its political peak in Norway, and Labour's proposal of taking 10 000 extra Syrian refugees had set the agenda. As will be discussed later, Progress' attribution of frames may have been decided by their defensive position. Also, as the Labour proposal gained so much attention, many of the frames attributed by readers, editors, and experts were decided by the big question dominating the Norwegian debate on immigration. The state of the debate is also likely to have promoted the use of economic consequences frames in June 2015. As the debate revolved around the number of extra refugees to accept, the discussion around the economic effects is not very surprising.

The findings suggest that conflict frames are popular in the immigration debate in both special situations, like the migration crisis, and in a 'normal' situation, represented by February 2018. The conflict frames are most often attributed by journalists (Table 5); yet, they are also frequently used by readers and politicians. The most important changes between the two periods are the increase of responsibility frames, and the decrease of economic consequences frames. These changes are both likely to represent the extraordinary situation of June 2015 and are thus rewarding when trying to understand the framing of the migration crisis. During the crisis, the debate on whose policies are the most responsible, was to a certain extent replaced by economic counter frames. The situation of June 2015 can be described, though very simplistic, as a debate between the majority of parliament parties and politicians and humanitarian organisations on the one side, and the Progress Party and a large portion of VG readers on the other. The former side had the agenda on their side, while the other attacked their stand by the attribution of conflict frames and economic consequences frames. The debate was framed as a conflict by the media.

Issue-Specific Frames

Using Thomas' (2006, p. 242) mentioned model for the coding process of the inductive analysis, made it possible to narrow down the issue-specific frames. In this process, one of the challenges of inductive coding became evident: namely the fact that the content is very much dependent on context. In practical terms, this meant that coding the issue-specific frames across the two periods was difficult. However, the findings are not exclusively inductive; some of the arguments were more easily located and categorised, as they have been used frequently in media covered debates through several years. Also, a few frames were detected in both periods.

The ambition of a qualitative analysis is not to generalise the findings into a population; the motivation is to understand a phenomenon (Forman & Damschroder, 2007, p. 41), in this case the debate on immigration in Norway. Thus, the results from this part of the study are relevant when trying to understand the qualitative differences in the debate on immigration at the peak of the migration crisis, compared to today. Further, both as a result of the context difficulties mentioned, and to be able to compare the debate on immigration at the peak of the migration

crisis to the debate today, the two periods have been coded separately. Only those frames found more than five times in the material are included.

As this section is quite extensive, it is divided into five subsections: First, the results of the issue-specific coding are presented in Table 3, where the frames are labelled and shortly described. Thereafter, the issue-specific subframes of the four relevant generic frames are presented and discussed. The order follows Table 3: Conflict is followed by economic consequences, responsibility, and finally, human interest frames.

Table 3
Issue-Specific Frames

Generic Frames	Issue-Specific Frames	
	June 2015	February 2018
Conflict	Anti-establishment	Cultural
	Progress in conflict with other parties	Immigrants in conflict with Norwegians
	Public vs. Elite	Political conflict
	Elites in conflict with public	Government in conflict with opposition
		Labour crisis
		Conflict within Labour
		Government conflict
		Conflict within government
Economic Consequences	Priority	
	More refugees could be helped in and around native countries	
	Cost	
	Taking the planned number of refugees is too expensive	
Responsibility	International responsibility	International responsibility
	International/European responsibility to help refugees	International/European responsibility to help refugees
	Solidarity	Solidarity
	Norway as rich, affluent country is responsible for helping refugees	Norway as rich, affluent country is responsible for helping refugees
	Municipal responsibility	
	Municipalities are left with responsibility national politicians will not take	
Human interest		Successful immigrants
		Interviews with successful immigrants/refugees

Immigration was to a great extent framed as a topic characterised by conflicts in the data material (Table 1), both in June 2015 and in February 2018 (Table 2). The popularity of the conflict frame does not however mean that the frame is always used in the same way; the framed conflicts referred to everything from conflicts within parties, to conflicts between minorities and majorities, and conflicts between specific politicians. The issue-specific conflict frames were primarily used to describe immigration as a conflicting issue for the political parties, and not as arguments for or against immigration or taking refugees. There are however two exceptions, that are both arguments used to criticise any liberalisation of immigration, or increased numbers of accepted refugees. First, the frame suggesting that the political elites are in conflict with the population, labelled 'Public vs. Elite'. This frame was particularly popular with readers who claimed that the leaders of the opposition parties were not in touch with public demand, and the frame was often combined with a request of a referendum on the Settlement of 10 June. Secondly, a less context dependant frame, the framing of immigrants/foreigners as having values that are not compatible with Norwegian values, and thus a conflict between immigrants and Norwegians, labelled 'Cultural' frame in Table 3.

Both of the issue-specific economic consequences frames, originated in the debate of June 2015. They are both frames created as a reaction to the price of accepting 8 000 - 10 000 extra Syrian refugees. First, a frame very popular with both readers and, especially, Progress Party politicians: the 'Priority' frame, stating that for the amount of money necessary to take 10 000 extra refugees, more than 150 000 can be helped in refugee camps closer to Syria. Second, immigration and taking extra refugees were merely framed as too expensive, labelled the 'Cost' frame. Some of these frames include comparisons to other political expenses, such as elderly and/or poor people in Norway.

Under the generic *Responsibility* frame, the only two frames recurring in both periods are located. The first frame was used both for and against increased Norwegian efforts in the migration crisis. In the relevant articles, immigration and refugees were framed as areas of responsibility for the international or European community, and thus the frame was labelled 'International responsibility' frame. Some claimed that Norway should – as an example for the international community to follow – increase its efforts. Others, claimed that Norway should not act before international, or European, agreements had been settled. Next, Norway was framed as a rich and affluent country that had a responsibility to help less fortunate people

and countries. Thus, the least Norway could do was to accept Syrian, (especially in the 2015 articles) or other refugees. This second issue-specific responsibility frame, was labelled 'Solidarity'. Finally, in the articles from June 2015, immigration was framed as a municipal problem, under the 'Municipal responsibility' frame. It was argued, primarily by Progress politicians, that the opposition leaders would give an impossible responsibility to the municipalities by accepting more refugees.

The last recurring issue-specific frame was exclusive to the articles from 2018. These were mainly stories about, or interviews with, successful immigrants or refugees. Thus, framing immigration and integration as projects with potentially prospering outcomes for the Norwegian society as a whole. Several of these interviews were with Syrian refugees, arriving at the peak of the migration crisis.

Media Created Conflicts and Party Conflicts

The issue-specific frames found in Table 3 show that the conflict frames were attributed differently in the two periods. During the peak of the migration crisis, the two subcategories found under conflict frames were both related to AP's proposal. The first, most attributed by journalists and editors, were frames of conflict between Progress and other parties, labelled 'Anti-establishment'. Obviously, some may say, as Progress did not participate in the final stage of the parliament negotiations. The frame was however also attributed by Progress politicians themselves, as they claimed to be the only party fathoming the vast consequences of the settlement. Secondly, immigration was framed as an issue in which the public and elites were in conflict, under the 'Public vs. Elite' frame. Both of these frames were popular among readers, as well as Progress politicians demanding a referendum over the settlement. Both strategies have historically been widely applied by FrP: taking a position as an outsider in the political establishment and calling for referendums over decisions by other parties (Fangen & Vaage, 2014).

As Table 3 suggests, there were some differences in the conflict framing of February 2018. It was mentioned earlier that the new spokesperson on immigration from AP resulted in reactions from all directions. He was accused of copying FrP policies and received both positive and negative response from all sorts of actors – particularly his own party members. The frame most obviously related to this specific issue, is the framing of conflict within Labour, labelled 'Labour crisis'. Of course, this could also be interpreted in the context of

Labour's weakened position since the autumn of 2017, which has lately characterised the news coverage.

The same situation, AP's new spokespersons' proposals on immigration policies, further resulted in a new conflict between the government and the opposition – primarily between FrP and AP – over the issue-ownership on strict immigration policies. Even though both parties tried to frame their policies as the responsible one, the media predominantly framed their proposals as a battle between the parties over voters sceptical of the level of immigration, resulting in the 'Political conflict' frame. Integration and political challenges seem to be neglected when the media had the chance to describe political conflicts.

Next, an issue-specific frame connected to cultural differences, namely the potential conflict between 'Norwegians' and immigrants, labelled the 'Cultural' frame. This frame had a wide range of uses, and in a larger study it could have been divided into several frames. It was attributed by readers denying the possibility of a successful multicultural society, experts evaluating integration efforts in the aftermath of the migration crisis, and by humanitarian organisations claiming (especially female) immigrants were discriminated in the labour market. Both those critical of multiculturalism, and those pointing to integration efforts, questioned possible incompatible values of Muslims and of liberal democracies, and Norwegians' unwillingness to accept traditions related to Islam.

The final recurring issue-specific conflict frame, the 'Governmental conflict' frame, found only in February 2018, was related to the government coalition. The main reason for this is of course FrP's outsider position in all questions related to immigration and asylum policies. These conflicts are probable to frequent in the news agenda as long as the party has support. However, the important change from 2015 to 2018, was the Liberal Party's admission to the government. The Liberals are even further away from FrP's policies than the Conservatives. As a liberal representative was given the job as secretary of state under Progress' famously outspoken minister of justice, emergency, and immigration, a potential conflict was framed by all newspapers.

Economic Consequences – Just a Counter Frame?

As mentioned earlier, the economic consequences frame was barely applied at all in February 2018. To answer why this was the case, one could look to the application of the frame in June

2015: economic consequences frames were almost exclusively used as counter arguments against taking the proposed 10 000 Syrian refugees. The economic consequences frames have, as described above, been categorised into two issue-specific frames: the 'Priority' frame, and the 'Cost' frame.

Both frames were applied by the fronts fighting against taking extra refugees, chiefly constituted by FrP and readers. Particularly a calculation provided by FrP was presented several times: for the amount of money Norway will spend on taking 10 000 refugees, 260 000 could be helped outside refugee camps, or 160 000 could be helped inside refugee camps around Syria (Aftenposten, 2015). The specifics of this 'help' was never clarified, yet the argument frequented through the sampling period.

The 'Cost' frame: taking refugees as too expensive, was exclusively applied by readers in opinion pieces. This shows a fundamental difference between frames applied by politicians and readers: Politicians need to come up with alternative action, while readers can simply call out in rage over what they see as failing politics. Some of the frames applied by readers, also turned the focus to priority, as they instead of looking for alternatives to help refugees, looked for what would be given a lower priority if one were to take 10 000 refugees. Thus, they framed helping extra refugees as an attack on the elderly, as politicians would, according to these opinion pieces, cut in the funding of retirement homes to finance the settlement of Syrian refugees.

Responsibility – The Main Aim for Politicians?

Later, Table 5 shows that the responsibility frame was the most popular with politicians over all, and by Table 2 we can see that the application of the frame had a great increase from June 2015 to February 2018. As discussed above, it may seem like the responsibility frame is the frame that politicians prefer to attribute when advocating their immigration policies.

However, despite the increase of responsibility frames attributed in the second period, Table 3 shows that fewer issue-specific responsibility frames were used frequently in February 2018. One frame was exclusive for the peak of the migration crisis: namely, 'Municipal responsibility'.

Just as the 'Priority' and 'Cost' frames, the 'Municipal responsibility' frame was mainly attributed by Progress politicians and readers who were opposing the Labour proposal and the

Parliament settlement. Thus, the frame is very much context dependent, and issue-specific to the agenda set by Labour's proposal before entering the negotiations. When attributing the frame, the communicators emphasised the unbearable responsibility for the municipalities of housing and settling the proposed 10 000 refugees, as they already struggle with a waiting list. The frame was used as an argument *against* the settlement, and later *for* a referendum on the decision of taking 8 000 refugees. As neither of their aims were reached, the frame practically disappeared by February 2018.

The other two recurring frames, increased in popularity from the first period to the second, and were fundamental in the total increase of responsibility frames applied. First, the 'International responsibility' frame, which was attributed by most communicators, through all the newspapers. By framing immigration and refugee as responsibility for the international community, the communicators called for a common EU or UN front on migration. Those opposing further migration to Norway used the current (lacking) policies as an argument for not taking more refugees than already established. Others, claimed new policies were necessary, as countries like Turkey and Greece, as well as Middle Eastern states, were left with too much responsibility.

Secondly, the frame labelled the 'Solidarity frame' was also applied across both periods. Using this frame, the communicators framed immigration and refugee as areas of responsibility for rich and affluent countries. Norway should promote the value of solidarity, as its history – like the current situation in Syria – is characterised by poverty, war, and occupation. Thus, Norway should lead the way, and set an international example by welcoming those in need. This frame was popular among all communicators who supported liberal policies on immigration and asylum, particularly journalists, editors, and humanitarian organisations. Also, it was the preferred frame for those supporting the Labour proposal of taking 10 000 extra Syrian refugees.

Back to Normal – Successful Immigrants

In the second period, February 2018, another frame repeatedly occurred, labelled the 'Successful immigrants' frame. As stated in previous research, the human interest frame is one of the most applied frames on immigration in Norway, and stories about successful immigrants have been a popular strategy for those supporting liberalisation of migration policies (Ihlen, Figenschou, & Larsen, 2015). This issue-specific frame was not frequently

applied in the first period, which can be interpreted as an effect of the ongoing migration crisis and parliament negotiations. At the peak of the crisis and negotiations, the previously mentioned responsibility frames of 'International responsibility' and 'Solidarity' were preferred when supporting liberalisation. Consequently, one could suggest that the context of the extraordinary situation characterising the summer of 2015 called for different framing than the 'everyday' debate on immigration.

By summarising the issue-specific frames, the strategies behind the generic frames become more understandable. The conflict frame is to a great extent attributed by journalists when reporting on immigration. The economic consequences frame seems to mainly have been used as counter arguments in the immigration debate of June 2015. The parties themselves prefer to frame their immigration and refugee policies as responsible, and further attribute the frame to challenge their opponents' sense of responsibility. Finally, as the human interest frame appears to have been attributed sporadically in the June 2015 debate, it was not an important strategy for any of the actors in the debate. However, in February 2018, the well-known stories about successful immigrants reappeared.

Distribution of Communicators

Next, attention will be given to the communicators behind the frames. The distribution of communicators in the three different newspapers will be presented in Table 4; while the different groups of communicators' applications of frames are investigated in Table 5. The results presented in both tables will be briefly presented, and thereafter their implications will be discussed to a greater extent.

Table 4
Distribution of Frames by Communicators

	Aftenposten	Dagsavisen	VG	Total
Humanitarian	3	12	5	20
Organisation	4,2%	13,2%	5,6%	7,9%
Expert	4	7	2	13
	5,6%	7,7%	2,2%	5,2%
Reader	11	1	46	58
	15,5%	1,1%	51,1%	23,0%
Activist	2	0	1	3
	2,8%	0,0%	1,1%	1,2%
Journalist	26	48	16	90
	36,6%	52,7%	17,8%	35,7%
Editor	5	1	9	15
	7,0%	1,1%	10,0%	6,0%
Labour (AP)	0	11	6	17
	0,0%	12,1%	6,7%	6,7%
Progress (FrP)	12	6	3	21
	16,9%	6,6%	3,3%	8,3%
Conservatives (H)	2	1	1	4
	2,8%	1,1%	1,1%	1,6%
Christian Con. (KrF)	0	1	0	1
	0,0%	1,1%	0,0%	0,4%
Socialists (SV)	1	0	0	1
	1,4%	0,0%	0,0%	0,4%
Liberals (V)	5	3	1	9
	7,0%	3,3%	1,1%	3,6%
Total	71	91	90	252
	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

Both of the broadsheet newspapers, Aftenposten and Dagsavisen, have their highest frequencies of frames attributed by journalists. Of the 90 frames in the tabloid VG, however, there were 46 frames attributed by readers. That is, over 50 percent of the frames in VG were found in opinion pieces. The most active political parties were Labour and Progress. Respectively 17 and 21 frames have been coded by these two parties. The Liberals have also been present in the debate, but to a lesser degree. Further, Labour and Progress had their major presence in different newspapers; Labour frames were most often found in Dagsavisen, while the highest amount of Progress frames was in Aftenposten. Finally, humanitarian organisations clearly preferred exposure, or were most often accepted, in Dagsavisen.

The next table, Table 5, also describes the communicators, only this time by their attribution of frames. All of the politicians are categorised in one group. Framing by the different parties will be presented in the next section.

Table 5
Total Distribution of Frames by Communicators

	Politician	Hum. Org.	Expert	Reader	Activist	Journalist	Editor	Total
Conflict*	15	4	7	21	1	46	7	101
	28,3%	20,0%	53,8%	36,2%	33,3%	51,1%	46,7%	40,1%
Economy	6	2	0	18	0	6	0	32
*	11,3%	10,0%	0,0%	31,0%	0,0%	6,7%	0,0%	12,7%
Responsibility*	26	12	4	16	0	17	8	83
	49,1%	60,0%	30,8%	27,6%	0,0%	18,9%	53,3%	32,9%
Human Int.*	1	0	0	1	2	21	0	25
	1,9%	0,0%	0,0%	1,7%	66,7%	23,3%	0,0%	9,9%
Morality*	5	2	2	2	0	0	0	11
	9,4%	10,0%	15,4%	3,4%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	4,4%
Total	53	20	13	58	3	90	15	252
	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100%

* Significant at $p < 0,5$

The conflict frame was most popular with journalists, as almost half of the coded conflict frames were attributed by this group. Readers and politicians also attributed the frame to some extent, followed by experts and editors. The economic consequences frame was most often attributed by readers. However, it was also used by politicians and journalists. The responsibility frame was clearly preferred by politicians. Also, journalists and readers attributed the responsibility frame, followed by humanitarian organisations, editors, and experts, respectively. The human interest frame was almost exclusively attributed by journalists; while the morality frame was barely used.

Who is Given a Voice?

Journalists constitute the largest group of communicators, as shown in Table 4. This is perhaps not very surprising, as journalists are responsible for the narrative voice of most news articles. Further, over half of the frames (46 of 90) attributed by journalists, were conflict frames; and a vast majority of the frames were neutral in tone towards immigrants. By these numbers, it is safe to assume that journalists to a great length frame immigration as a political conflict between parties and actors, as suggested above. This approach is understandable as van der Brug et al. (2015) explains politicisation of immigration through the two dimensions *salience* and *polarisation*. The question of accepting more refugees to Norway is obviously polarised, and discussing the opposing sides comes natural to the media. This is also confirmed by the issue-specific frames in Table 3; the conflict frames are often used to emphasise political conflicts.

The second largest group was, perhaps more surprisingly, readers. This finding is interesting in terms of earlier research where elites are claimed to dominate the debate on immigration. In the data material analysed, 23 percent of the frames were attributed by readers. First of all, given the limited space made available for opinion pieces in the newspapers, it is obvious that immigration is a topic that engage readers. Secondly, the high presence of 'ordinary people' as participants in an ongoing debate, may be a result of the democratisation of the newspapers (Schwebs & Østbye, 2013), and broader features of the Norwegian society: even though newspapers mostly present elite perspectives, the value of egalitarianism influence all institutions. The democratic culture and social inclusion characterising the Nordic societies (Englestad et al., 2017), may manifest through media debates. However, it may also suggest an actual division between the elite commentators, and the 'ordinary person.'

The readers' presence however, very much varies across the newspapers; 46 of the 58 frames attributed by readers were found in VG; 11 reader frames were located in Aftenposten; and only one frame used by a reader was detected in Dagsavisen. Consequently, a significant difference between the tabloid and the two broadsheets was found. A possible explanation of the difference, may be the format of the comment section of the newspapers: VG has dedicated two full pages to opinion pieces, in which some of the pieces are very short; Aftenposten only has one such page, and the pieces are most often longer than the ones found in VG; while Dagsavisen does not have any pages exclusively dedicated to readers' comments.

Next, the third largest group was politicians. Of the total number of frames, 21 percent were attributed by politicians, representing six parties: Labour (AP), Progress (FrP), Conservatives (H), Christian Conservatives (KrF), Socialists (SV), and Liberals (V). FrP was responsible for 21 frames, AP for 17, Liberals 9, followed by H, KrF, and SV, respectively. To explain the dominant parties in the debate, issue ownership is relevant. According to Karlsen (2015) AP and FrP have been the two parties in which most people trust when it comes to immigration. Thus, their domination of the political debate is very understandable. However, the distribution of frames by the two parties is very different in the two periods covered, and further, the way they are given coverage also differs. Somewhat surprising is perhaps SV's low presence in the debate, as they also withstood from the final part of the parliament negotiations. However, in their case, as a protest against too little being done.

Even though FrP should, by their issue-ownership, be a popular source in news coverage of immigration, they are claimed not to be cited in accordance with their position (Figenschou & Beyer, 2014). This study supports that claim, as FrP are the communicator behind only two frames in the second period of sampling. In the first period, they are responsible for 19 frames. Of these however, only five are citations, the rest of the frames originates from chronicles by FrP politicians. Looking to AP's frames, out of their 17, only four originated from chronicles. The numbers are too low to draw any certain conclusions, but the tendencies concur with the picture drawn in earlier research. Important to note is the choice of not coding third part frames. Progress was perhaps more visible in the debate than the numbers suggest, however they were not interviewed to the same degree as Labour; rather their Facebook posts were quoted, or the same statement repeated in several news articles. Furthermore, it is interesting to have a look at the distribution of frames by the different parties in the three

newspapers. FrP's majority of frames were present in the right-leaning *Aftenposten*, while the majority of AP frames were located in the left-leaning *Dagsavisen*. If the newspapers are not partisan to the same extent as they have historically been, at least it may seem that politicians prefer communication with the newspapers somewhat sharing their values.

After politicians, by visibility in the debate, the next groups were humanitarian organisations and editors. Figenschou and Beyer (2014) also found advocacy groups as the fourth most cited group after power elites, cultural elites, and 'ordinary people'. In their study, the advocacy groups were often cited in relation to their fields. The same can be said in this study: the humanitarian organisations, or advocacy groups, were most present in coverage on how to handle migrants, racism, and integration. Particularly the organisations *Flyktninghjelpen* and *Antirasistisk senter* were active in commenting on immigration policies; they are advocacy groups for helping refugees, and to prevent racism. When immigration was politicised during the peak of the migration crisis, they were dependent on being visible. Anything else would have been very unexpected. The most used newspaper for the humanitarian organisations was *Dagsavisen*, which fits with the newspaper's, and organisations', left-leaning positions.

The relative large amount of editorial comments on immigration policies, could be interpreted as a manifestation of the democratic corporatist media system (Hallin & Mancini, 2004). With the historically high degree of political partisanship, and tradition of non-neutral editorial sections, the editors' presence in the debate should not come unexpected. Furthermore, editorial freedom from intervention has been mentioned as one of the pillars of the Nordic media model (Engelstad et al., 2017, pp. 50-51), and in combination with partisanship, the result is necessarily editorial comments on salient issues. Editorial presence however, varies between newspapers. The most active editors were those in VG. This point is interesting, as VG is the only tabloid and does not affiliate with any values or parties. The editors of *Dagsavisen* were almost invisible in the debate, with only one frame registered to them.

The Parties' Use of Generic Frames

Table 6 demonstrates which generic frames that were attributed by politicians, or political parties, in the newspapers. In contrast to the general distribution of frames, the most popular

frame attributed by politicians, was the responsibility frame. The two biggest actors were still Progress and Labour.

Table 6
Distribution of Frames by Parties

	AP	FrP	H	KrF	SV	V	Total
Conflict	6	5	1	0	1	2	15
	35,3%	23,8%	25,0%	0,0%	100,0%	22,2%	28,3%
Economy	0	5	0	0	0	1	6
	0,0%	23,8%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	11,1%	11,3%
Responsibility	10	8	3	0	0	5	26
	58,8%	38,1%	75,0%	0,0%	0,0%	55,6%	49,1%
Human	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
Interest	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	100,0%	0,0%	0,0%	1,9%
Morality	1	3	0	0	0	1	5
	5,9%	14,3%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	11,1%	9,4%
Total	17	21	4	1	1	9	53
	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

Attribution of conflict frame was the second most used strategy by the political parties. Further, Progress used the economic consequences frame 5 times, whereas Labour used the morality frame 3 times. Important to note is the relative small N; only 53 frames were attributed by politicians or political parties. Thus, the findings are less conclusive than those in the abovementioned tables.

Party-Preferred Responsibility

The parties' presence in the debate on immigration have already been discussed above. However, the different parties use of the five generic frames is also a question of interest. Only Progress and Labour have enough frames sampled to suggest any tendencies. Three noticeable findings will be discussed.

First, none of the two parties primarily attributed conflict frames. Thus, it seems the parties' preferred frames do not match those that were most present in the print newspapers in total,

which further shows that the media play an important role in a politicised debate. Further, the disconnection between party frames and the media in general supports the idea of a less partisan press.

Secondly, AP's attributed frames were most often responsibility frames. This has traditionally been FrP's rhetoric related to immigration. At least two explanations of this somewhat surprising result could be plausible: the first period was characterised by AP's offensive suggestion of taking 10 000 Syrian refugees, and therefore they were able to stick to the suggestion, and further let FrP attack their proposal with different approaches. Also, the second period was very much affected by AP's new spokesperson on immigration, who was frequently accused of stealing FrP's rhetoric on immigration.

Thirdly, FrP's attributed frames were almost evenly split between conflict, economic consequences, and responsibility frames. Again, AP's offensive position in the first period offers an explanation. FrP was forced to attack a proposal which sat the news agenda for the entire period of parliament negotiation. They confronted the proposal on several fronts: its price, its neglect of the popular will, and its irresponsibility towards Norwegian culture and society. It could seem like AP managed to set the agenda through a strong frame, which according to Hänggeli and Kriesi (2010) depends on the credibility of the source, as well as the frame's "congruence with central cultural themes" (p. 143). As the migration crisis dominated the news coverage and the Norwegian society collectively looked for the best way to help, the responsible, leading opposition party, with a strong tradition of solidarity, suggested that Norway should take 10 000 extra Syrian refugees. With both credibility on the matter, and a proposal that matched the general wish to contribute, AP may have put FrP in a defensive position.

The study of the two most active parties in the immigration debate in Norway, FrP and AP, shows that media framing does not necessarily follow the political elites. Further, during the peak of the migration crisis, AP seems to have stolen FrP's position as a self-proclaimed responsible party on immigration through framing. Finally, AP's ability to set the agenda may have forced FrP to frame immigration in other ways than they usually would. If February 2018 can be seen as a representative period for 'normal' immigration debate in Norway, the peak of the migration crisis represents an extraordinary situation for the two parties with issue-ownership on immigration.

It should come as no surprise that journalists constitute the largest part of frames in the three newspapers. Further, the journalists prefer the conflict frame, which is only natural as the frame has already been established as the most frequently used in the material. Conflict framing by journalists can be explained by their role as critical investigators of power elites, and, the perhaps less noble factor: their media logic driven hunt for scandals and conflicts. The readers however, with less available space for expression of opinion, had a more evenly divided attribution of frames. Yet, relative to other communicators, they had a high attribution of economic consequences frames, due to their focus on the price of taking refugees. The politicians preferred the responsibility frame, highlighted by the two most active parties – Labour and Progress – stated policies on immigration. Progress' attribution of frames were, nevertheless, somewhat more varied, as they were forced to fight Labour's proposal.

Tone Towards, and Terms Describing, Immigrants

In the question of tone towards immigrants, most communicators, particularly the professional ones, were characterised by a tone of neutrality. A Pearson's chi-square test showed a significant asymmetry when analysing tone against newspapers, with a more negative tone in VG (Ringdal, 2014). This however, seems like an obvious result of the amount of opinion pieces in the tabloid. Table 7 shows the tone of the total amount of frames. Of the 19 positive frames journalists were responsible for 9; and of the 14 negative frames 13 were attributed by readers.

Table 7
Tone Towards Immigrants

Positive	Ambivalent	Negative	Neutral
19	5	14	214
7,5%	2,0%	5,6%	84,9%
			N = 252

Even after sorting the terms used to refer to immigrants or refugees, the list still contained fifteen labels. Most of these were quite neutral, matching the findings from tone towards immigrants. Some however, could be interpreted as at best ambivalent, and a few are very clearly negative.

Table 8
Terms Used to Refer to Immigrants

Terms [Translation in brackets]	Frequency
Refugees [Flyktninger]	168
Immigrants [Innvandrere]	69
Asylum seeker [Asylsøkere]	50
Syrian refugees [Syria-flyktninger]	17
Underaged asylum seekers [Mindreårige asylsøkere]*	17
UN refugees [FN-/Kvoteflyktninger]	14
Migrants [Migranter]	12
Immigrant women [Innvandrerkvinner]	8
Immigrant children [Innvandrerbarn]	4
Muslim	3
Negative terms**	3
LGBT refugees [LHBT-flyktninger]	1
EU migrants [EU-migranter]	1
Economic migrants [Økonomiske migranter]	1
Total	368

* Constituted by the terms: 'Asylbarn', 'Oktoberbarn', and 'Underaged asylum seekers'

** Includes the terms: 'Ikke-integrerbare flyktninger', 'Islamist', and 'Luksusflyktninger'

The table shows that there was a total of 368 terms used in the 252 frames, meaning that more than one term was included in several of the frames. The most used term is by far 'Refugees', followed by 'Immigrants' and 'Asylum seekers'. These are all quite neutral terms, though it could be argued that 'immigrant' is somewhat less positive, particularly in the case of the migration crisis, as the term does not recognise the need for protection embedded in the terms 'refugee' and 'asylum seeker'. In the mid-section of the table, the terms 'Immigrant women' and 'Immigrant children' are included, often used to describe vulnerable groups in the process

of integration; and in the bottom of the table more specific terms are found. Only three undoubtedly negative terms were coded.

Tone and Terms: Neutral Professionals – Affected Amateurs

As the results in Table 7 shows, a large majority of the coded frames were neutral in their tone towards immigrants. Almost 85 percent of the frames were neutral, which means that the frequencies of all the other categories – positive, ambivalent, and negative – were under 20, and constituted 7,5 percent, 2 percent, and 5,6 percent, respectively. There were two interesting findings: first, half of the positive frames were attributed by journalists; secondly, 13 out of 14 negative frames were attributed by readers.

The fact that journalists constituted a significant share of the positive frames, could be interpreted in relation to research showing that Norwegian journalists are to a great extent left-leaning (Nordiske Mediedager, 2018). This is however a discussion for another study. The readers' split tone towards immigrants on the other side, can be seen as a lack of professional rhetoric in contrast to the other communicators. Even though a great majority of the negative frames from readers appeared in VG, it does not necessarily say anything about the newspapers position; it is more likely to be a result of the newspaper's larger space for opinion pieces. However, as pointed out by Schwebs and Østbye (2013), the newspapers do have an editorial responsibility to check and approve all opinion pieces. Thus, a possibility presents itself of VG allowing negative comments to a greater extent than the broadsheets.

Strand et al. (2015) found that people of immigrant origins more often were characterised in a problem perspective in debates on specific issues, in which readers were included. The results of this study show the same tendency: twelve of the fourteen negative frames were attributed in the first period, when the debate was dominated by the question of whether or not to take 10 000 Syrian refugees. The specific question under debate led to negative characteristics, and sometimes hateful descriptions, of immigrants and refugees.

The general neutrality can also be found in the terms used to describe immigrants or refugees, presented in Table 8. Only three of the frames contained terms that were clearly negative. The three negative terms were all found in opinion pieces. In most of the frames, the terms 'Refugees', 'Immigrants', or 'Asylum seekers' were used. Particularly 'Refugees' and 'Asylum seekers' are clearly neutral. The terms 'Immigrant', can be somewhat difficult to interpret. In

this study, as mentioned in the introduction, the term is used as it includes all non-Norwegians in Norway. However, when describing refugees, as so often in the 2015 debate, the use of 'immigrants' could be seen as negative, as it does not acknowledge the rights and needs included in the status as either refugee or asylum seeker.

Only 20 times was the term 'Immigrant' used in the 2015 data material, and 6 of these frames were opposing the settlement. In the remaining 14 frames either several terms were used, or they were debating integration and not the migration crisis. It thus seems the negativity of the term is dependent on context. In February 2018, about 75 percent of the times the term 'immigrant' was used, the topic was either AP's new spokesperson on immigration, or the Danish election campaign, in which immigration was frequently discussed. Consequently, it seems like in a normal situation at least professional actors distinguish between refugees and immigrants (Lawlor & Tolley, 2017).

The data material shows that the communicators to great extent use neutral terms, and a neutral tone, when discussing immigrants and refugees. However, the unprofessional group of communicators, namely the readers in opinion pieces, to some degree allow themselves to utter negative characteristics. Also, the readers sometimes misuse the term 'immigrants' when describing asylum seekers or refugees; whether deliberate or not is hard to state. The negative tone, and possible negative terms, were more present at the peak of the migration crisis than in February 2018.

Conclusions

When analysing generic frames, immigration was framed as a conflicting topic in the media debate of both the special case of June 2015, and in February 2018. The conflict frame covered a wide range of issue-specific frames: conflicts between parties, coalitions, and people. The frame was particularly popular with journalists and editors but was also applied frequently by politicians. Journalists' application of conflict frames may be explained by media logic (Hernes, 1978) or tabloidisation of the media (Allern, 2001). The parties on the other side may genuinely disagree on policies, as the topic was politicised (Brug et al. 2015); however, they also benefit on promoting their positions as alternate to their opposition's. Further, the sampling criteria may have led to a preference of conflict frames, as the frames needed to include politics or interests.

In contrast to earlier research, this analysis did not find a widespread application of human interest frames. The coding of the generic frames may have had an effect on the results: the frames were coded as mutually exclusive, and visual aspects were not included. Thus, human interest features may have been overlooked. However, as the findings are results of the sampling criteria, one can argue that human interest framing is not as relevant when discussing immigration *policies* as when debating immigration in general. Further, the research showed that in the 'normal' debate of February 2018, a pattern of interviews with successful immigrants emerged. Thus, it might seem like the 'extraordinary' debate of June 2015 disrupted the framing of immigration, and that other arguments and frames were more often attributed.

Responsibility frames and economic consequences frames were also used quite frequently in the debate on immigration, matching the results found in the Romanian framing of the migration crisis by Corbu et al. (2017). The extent to which the responsibility and economic consequences frames were applied however, were very much dependent on context.

Economic consequences frames were used to a greater extent in the data material from 2015, and often as counter frames, or responses, to the proposal of taking 10 000 Syrian refugees. The concentration of a few issue-specific frames being repeated in June 2015 may resemble the findings of Greussing and Boomgaarden (2017), where economisation and to some extent, victimisation were important perspectives. In the Norwegian case, however, the focus on a potential security threat was not used to a great extent. Further, the economic consequences

frame was almost absent in the debate of February 2018, which was somewhat surprising in terms of earlier research (Lawlor & Tolley, 2017). The responsibility frame on the other hand, was more intensely applied in 2018, as the parties fought for the position as the most responsible party on immigration.

The distribution of frames was very similar in all three newspapers, the one obvious exception being the application of economic consequences frames. In VG the presence of economic frames was higher than what was found in *Aftenposten* and *Dagsavisen*. When analysing communicators and issue-specific frames, the explanation appeared: the amount of opinion pieces. Another exception was the high share of conflict frames attributed in *Dagsavisen*; even higher than the two other newspapers. Again, it seems framing is dependent on communicators, as a higher share of the frames was attributed by journalists. The correlation between communicators and frames complicates the relationship between media outlet and framing, which calls for further research on the chain of causation.

The analysis of the issue-specific frames further confirmed the frames' dictation by context. Obviously, the 2015 data material was largely related to the ongoing migration crisis; however, the themes of the articles from 2018 showed that a significant share of the news articles originated from the same events. Only two issue-specific frames were found in both periods: the 'International responsibility' frame and the 'Solidarity' frame. These frames are issue-specific to immigration and refugee in general, and not to any specific event. The methodological choice of coding the issue-specific frames subordinate to the generic frames may have prevented the possibility of detecting more issue-specific frames across the two periods. However, the coding provided for an interesting insight into the debates' distinctiveness, and further showed how argumentation changed along with context. Again, Greussing and Boomgaarden's (2017) claim that the migration crisis led to a concentration of only a few frames is relevant. The analysis of the issue-specific frames confirmed that the actors on both sides of the debate narrowed their argumentation; particularly the 'solidarity' frame was attributed by the side for taking 10 000 extra refugees, and the 'priority' and 'cost' frames were popular among those opposing the proposal.

A wide range of actors participated in the debate on immigration: journalists, readers through opinion pieces, politicians, editors, and humanitarian organisations constituted the largest groups. Journalists were advocates for the conflict frame, while politicians' attribution of

frames varied with the context. The study's inclusion of readers offers new insight. Even though the readers do not represent a collective front in their opinion on immigration, the majority of their frames seem to have mirrored the right-wing Progress party's frames. Previous research (Benson & Wood, 2015; Figenschou & Beyer, 2014) has shown that elites are to a greater extent organised, and quoted, in news media than 'ordinary people'. Thus, one could argue that the less organised groups utilise opinion pieces, particularly VG's easily accessible format, to promote their anti-elite points of view.

Finally, the vast majority of terms used when describing immigrants were neutral. The three terms 'Refugees', 'Immigrants', and 'Asylum seekers' were used most frequently. As discussed above, the term 'immigrant' may be interpreted as less positive than the two terms 'refugee' and 'asylum seeker'. A closer look into the material confirmed that most of the frames including the term 'immigrant' in June 2015, were attributed by readers opposing the proposal of taking extra refugees. In February 2018 the term 'immigrant' was more actively used, as the debate did not revolve around refugees to the same extent. However, most of the professional communicators seem to use the terms correctly. Also, the tone towards immigrants was mainly neutral. By including opinion pieces in the analysis however, some negativity towards immigrants was found. Of the frames obviously positive, about half were attributed by journalists. Most of these positive frames were attributed while discussing humanitarian help, somewhat confirming Lawlor and Tolley's (2017) claim that immigrants and refugees are framed differently. This study however, only focussed tone towards immigrants, not tone towards immigration in general, and it did not separate discussion on immigration and refugee. These nuances call for further investigation.

This study to some extent confirms the assumption presented in the introduction: there was two competing narratives in the debate on immigration during the migration crisis. The Labour party early set the agenda of the debate by proposing to take 10 000 extra Syrian refugees. In a coalition with several other opposition parties and humanitarian organisations wanting to liberalise policies on immigration and refugee, Labour stuck to their proposal, framing it as responsible and solidary. Their frames were strong due the people's collective need for a response to the humanitarian crisis in Syria, as well as Labour historical credibility as a party of solidarity. This put the opposing side, fronted by the Progress Party, in a defensive position, altering the way they usually frame immigration. Now, Progress needed to attack Labour's proposal, and turned to a narrative of Labour's lacking will and ability to

understand the economic and cultural consequences of their proposal. Further, more and better help could be provided outside Norway.

Yet, a third narrative must be added. A narrative preferred by journalists and political commentators, dictated by media logic and journalistic norms: the narrative of political conflict. As one side focussed on the humanitarian crisis, and the other on consequences for Norwegian economy and society, the media to a great length concentrated on the political battle over voters. This third narrative, seem to be the preferred narrative by the media independent of situation, as it is still employed almost three years later.

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Appendix A: Codebook

Category	Variable	Description	Value
C1	Newspaper	Id of Newspaper	1 = Aftenposten 2 = Dagsavisen 3 = VG
C2	Date	Date of publication	
	Theme of the article	Open	
	Which terms are used to refer to immigrants, ethnic minorities, etc...	Open	
	Tone towards immigrants in the frame?	Positive tone: immigrants positive claim or immigration is paired with positively valanced attributes Negative tone: negative claim or immigrants are paired with negatively valanced attributes Ambivalent tone: Positive and negative tone is present in the same article No evaluation: no tone about immigration is detectable	1 = Positive 2 = Ambivalent 3 = Negative 4 = Neutral
C3	Communicator	Who comes up with the proposition/ frame	Open: politician from specific party, representative from interest group, journalist etc. (If not identified as other, voice belongs to journalist)
C4	Problem definition	Do the communicator suggest: 1) that the migration crisis is a problem 2) that Norway has a role in dealing with the migration crisis	0 = no 1 = yes
C5	Causal interpretation	Do the communicator: 1) suggest a reason for the migration crisis; 2) predict an effect on Norway caused by the migration crisis;	0 = no 1 = yes
C6	Treatment recommendation	Do the communicator: 1) recommend any response to migration crisis; 2) recommend any response as preparation to migration crisis	0 = no 1 = yes
C7	Conflict frame	Emphasises on conflict between	Present = 1 Absent = 0

		individuals, groups or institutions to capture audience interest.	<p>1) Does the story reflect disagreement between parties/individuals/groups/countries?</p> <p>2) Does one party/individual/group/country reproach another?</p> <p>3) Does the story refer to two sides or to more than two sides of the problem or issue?</p> <p>4) Does the story refer to winners and losers?</p>
C7.1	Issue-specific conflict frame	Description of how conflict frame is applied (only used if C7 is present)	<p>1 = conflict between parties</p> <p>2 = conflict within gvt. and supporting parties</p> <p>3 = conflict between gvt. and opposition</p> <p>4 = conflict immigrants vs. majority society</p> <p>5 = other</p>
C8	Economic consequences frame	Presenting event, problem or issue in relation to economic consequences on an individual group, institution, region or country.	<p>Present = 1</p> <p>Absent = 0</p> <p>1) Is there a mention of financial losses or gains?</p> <p>2) Is there a mention of the costs/degree of expense involved?</p> <p>3) Is there a reference to economic consequences of pursuing or not pursuing a course of action?</p>
C8.1	Issue-specific Economic consequences frame	Which economic consequences are suggested? (only used if C8 is present)	<p>1 = immigration leads to negative ec.con. for society</p> <p>2 = immigration leads to positive ec.con. for society</p> <p>3 = money spent in conflict zone areas more effective</p> <p>4 = more important to spend on pressing national problems than immigration</p> <p>5 = other</p>
C9	Responsibility (including moral responsibility) frame	Presents an issue or problem to attribute responsibility for its cause or solution to the government, or to an individual or group.	<p>Present = 1</p> <p>Absent = 0</p> <p>1) Does the proposition suggest that some level of government has the ability to alleviate the problem?</p> <p>2) Does the proposition suggest that some level of government is responsible for the problem?</p> <p>3) Does the proposition suggest solutions to the problem?</p> <p>4) Does the proposition suggest that an individual or group of people is responsible for the problem?</p>
C9.1	Issue-specific responsibility frames	Who assumes/ declines/ are attributed/given responsibility? (only used if C9 is present)	<p>1 = Norway cannot take responsibility for more refugees as integration already struggles</p> <p>2 = states cannot take more refugees as municipalities will not take them</p>

			<p>3 = Norway should take responsibility as we have general abundance</p> <p>4 = Norway should take responsibility because of history as refugees during WWII</p> <p>5 = Gulf states should take responsibility</p> <p>6 = not Norway's responsibility</p> <p>7 = other</p>
C10	Human interest frame	Presenting event, issue or problem in an emotional angle.	<p>Present = 1</p> <p>Absent = 0</p> <p>1) Does the proposition provide a human example or "human face" on the issue?</p> <p>2) Does the proposition employ adjectives that generate feelings of outrage, empathy, caring, sympathy, or compassion?</p> <p>3) Does the proposition emphasize how individuals and groups are affected by the issue?</p> <p>4) Does the proposition go into the private or personal lives of the actors?</p>
C10.1	Issue-specific human interest frame	Who is personally affected by policy/proposition (Only used if C10 is present)	Open
C11	Morality frame	Presenting issue or event as dependant on a moral stand, or make reference to God or other religious tenet	<p>Present = 1</p> <p>Absent = 2</p> <p>1) Does the proposition contain any moral message?</p> <p>2) Does the proposition make reference to morality, God, and other religious tenets?</p> <p>3) Does the proposition offer specific social prescriptions about how to behave?</p>
C11.1	Issue-specific morality frame	What is the moral argument? (only used if C11 is present)	

Appendix B: Framing Questions

Attribution of responsibility:

Does the story suggest that some level of government has the ability to alleviate the problem?

Does the story suggest that some level of government is responsible for the issue/problem?

Does the story suggest solution(s) to the problem/issue?

Does the story suggest that an individual, or group is responsible for the issue/problem?

Does the story suggest the problem requires urgent action?

Human interest frame:

Does the story provide a human example or "human face" on the issue?

Does the story employ adjectives or personal vignettes that generate feelings of outrage, empathy/caring, sympathy, or compassion?

Does the story emphasise how individuals and groups are affected by the issue/problem?

Does the story go into the private or personal lives of the actors?

Does the story contain visual information that might generate feelings of outrage, empathy/caring, sympathy, or compassion?

Conflict frame:

Does the story reflect disagreement between parties/individuals/groups/countries?

Does one party/individual/group/country reproach another?

Does the story refer to two sides or more than two sides of the problem or issue?

Does the story refer to winners and losers?

Morality frame:

Does the story contain any moral message?

Does the story make reference to morality, God, and other religious tenets?

Does the story offer specific social prescriptions about how to behave?

Economic frame:

Is there a mention of financial losses or gains now or in the future?

Is there a mention of cost/degree of expense involved?

Is there a reference to economic consequences of pursuing or not pursuing a course of action?

Appendix C: Relevance for Teaching in the Norwegian Educational System

In a media reality characterised by polarisation, 'fake news', and anonymous editors, the development of a critical sense has never been more important. The ability to detect media frames will further encourage readers to question the motives behind news coverage and information. By implementing, and promoting, these skills in secondary education, the pupils' ability to evaluate credibility and quality of information will increase.

Personally, as a teacher, the process of conducting this study has also been rewarding. The study media framing in Norwegian print press has given me insight into the dynamics of party politics and the media, making me more aware of possible differences between what parties say, and what they actually mean. This insight will hopefully prove itself valuable when teaching new generations in the social sciences.