Rune Østerhus

Does Democratisation depend on God´s Will?

A cross-national analysis of how religious actors participating in nonviolent- and violent resistance campaigns impact democratisation in the years following the campaigns in the timespan 1975-2013

Master Thesis in Political Science

Supervisor: Charles Butcher

Trondheim, February 2018

Norwegian University of Science and Technology

Faculty of Social and Educational Sciences

Department of Sociology and Political Science

NTNU
Norwegian University of
Science and Technology

Abstract

This thesis examines the impact of religious participation in nonviolent- and violent resistance campaigns on democratisation in the years following the campaigns. The contribution of this thesis is twofold. First, it contributes with new theory regarding religious actors´ influence on democratisation in the years following nonviolent- and violent resistance campaigns. Second, it contributes with new empirical analyses that are cross-national. Using cross-national analyses for the time-period 1975-2013, I argue that religious actors can have both motivation and capacity to enforce democratisation in the years following resistance campaigns.

The results indicate that nonviolent resistance campaigns are likely to foster democratisation in the years following the campaigns. Religious actors´ participation in major nonviolent campaigns do not affect the impact of nonviolent campaigns substantially. However, when big religious actors participate in nonviolent resistance campaigns the likelihood of democratisation in the years following the campaigns increases significantly, thus corroborating the arguments in the thesis and scholars that claim collective action and mass mobilisation fosters democracy. On the contrary, violent resistance campaigns are found to have a negative impact on the likelihood of democratisation in the years following the campaigns, irrespective of whether a religious actor participate in the campaigns. The results also indicate that the size of religious actors participating in violent resistance campaigns do not have any substantial impact on the likelihood of democratisation in the years after the campaigns. In the thesis, it is discussed how this might be a consequence of religious actors´ lack of motivation and/or capacity to democratise a country when they participate in violent resistance campaigns.

II

Sammendrag

Denne masteroppgaven undersøker hvordan religiøs deltakelse i ikke-voldelige og voldelige motstandskampanjer påvirker demokratisering i årene etter motstandskampanjene. Denne oppgaven har et todelt bidrag. For det første bidrar den med ny teori knyttet til religiøse aktørers innflytelse på demokratisering i årene etter ikke-voldelige og voldelige motstandskampanjer. For det andre bidrar oppgaven med nye empiriske analyser som er tverr-nasjonale. Ved bruk av tverr-nasjonale analyser for tidsperioden 1975-2013, argumenterer jeg for at religiøse aktører kan ha både motivasjon og kapasitet til å tvinge gjennom demokratisering i årene som følger etter en motstandskampanje.

Resultatene indikerer at ikke-voldelige motstandskampanjer er antatt å fostre demokratisering i årene som følger etter motstandskampanjene. Religiøse aktørers deltakelse i omfattende ikke-voldelige motstandskampanjer påvirker ikke effekten av ikke-voldelige motstandskampanjer i nevneverdig grad. Men når religiøse aktører som stammer fra store religiøse grupper deltar i ikke-voldelige motstandskampanjer øker sannsynligheten signifikant for demokratisering i årene som følger etter motstandskampanjene. Dette underbygger argumentene i denne masteroppgaven, og støtter oppunder tradisjonen som hevder at kollektiv handling og massemobilisering fostrer demokratisering. På motsatt side blir voldelige motstandskampanjer funnet å ha negativ påvirkning på sannsynligheten for demokratisering i årene som følger etter voldelige motstandskampanjer, uavhengig av om religiøse aktører deltar i kampanjene eller ikke. Resultatene indikerer også at størrelsen på den religiøse gruppen som en deltakende religiøs aktør stammer fra ikke har noen betydelig påvirkning på sannsynligheten for demokratisering i årene som følger etter en voldelig motstandskampanje. I oppgaven diskuteres det hvordan dette kan være en konsekvens av at religiøse aktører som deltar i voldelige motstandskampanjer kan mangle motivasjon og/eller kapasitet til å demokratisere et land.

Acknowledgements

Table of Contents

Figures

Tables

"Bullies may land a punch and they may leave a mark, but they have never, not once in the history (of our United States) managed to match the strength and spirit of a people united in the defence of their future"

Joe Kennedy in Democratic response (CNN, 2018)

x

1.0 Introduction

In December 2010, a street vendor in Tunisia set himself on fire, sparking demonstrations and protests, developing into violent- and nonviolent conflicts in multiple Arab countries. Riots, coups and civil wars characterised the period that followed, as civilians gathered at public squares throughout Arab capitals, first to demand improved life conditions, later to call for regime change. People and pundits expressed hope and optimism regarding the prospects of a transition towards democracy in the Arab world. Despite the immediate optimism, it looks like the door might be closing on democratisation in most of the effected Arab countries (Masoud, 2015, p. 75). Hence, the optimism generated by the initial event of the Arab Spring has now given way to a pervasive pessimism (Gleditsch & Rivera, 2016).

The "democracy gap" in the Arab world is well known (Diamond, 2010, p. 93; Stepan & Robertson, 2003: 32). According to the Economist Intelligence Unit´s Democracy Index (2018), none of the countries in the Arab world were rated as a democracy at the onset of the Arab spring. Today, Tunisia is ranked as a flawed democracy, thus being the only Arab country where democratic optimism seems entitled. In the public discourse, the most common argument for the lack of democracies in the Arab world is that it must have something to do with religion (Diamond, 2010, p. 93). The lack of democracies combined with the fact that all the Arab countries have either predominantly or overwhelmingly Muslim populations gives the argument some face value. However, Alfred Stepan and Graeme Robertson (2003) write that the "democracy gap" should be called an "Arab" rather than a "Muslim" gap, as they identify that a number of non-Arab Muslim-majority states are *electoral overachievers*, whereas the same expression cannot be used for a single one of the Arab Muslim-majority states (Stepan & Robertson, 2003: 35). Other scholars argue that the democracy gap has more to do with the natural resource curse, as oil empowers authoritarian leaders and shapes countries´ development (Ross, 2012; Wenar, 2016).

By the 1960s the secularisation thesis was widely held among social science scholars, philosophers and humanities in general (Philpott, 2009, p. 189; Toft, Philpott, & Shah, 2011, p. 2). Their position was that religion would decline in belief, practice and influence, as a result of democratisation, freedom, rationalism and modern science among other factors. Hence, modern social science asserted that religion would fade and disappear (Rudolph, 1997,

1

p. 1). Samuel P. Huntington (1993) on the other hand, predicted that the dominating source of conflict in the years to come would be cultural, and that religious fault lines separating civilizations would be one of the most important factors for future conflicts. Moreover, a revival of religious communities´ significance in the post-modern era has thrived on modernity´s development, putting religious communities in a position where they are considered to be important actors in world politics. Daniel Philpott (2009, p. 184) argues that religion has become more prominent and more controversial in public life in the past generation, and calls for an increased focus on religion´s place in political science scholarship. Religious involvement in civil wars has increased dramatically since 1975, such that 55 percent of internal armed conflicts in 2015 were fought over religious issues (Svensson & Nilsson, 2017, p. 10). Moreover, previous research has shown that religious actors can be at the forefront of unarmed uprisings, as religious actors have played a role in popular democratisation movements (Toft et al., 2011, p. 92). Therefore, more deep theorising about religion´s political influence is needed, as this theorising could make contributions to explanations of religion´s influence on large-scale shifts and innovations in the international system (Philpott, 2009, p. 198).

This thesis examines the relationship between religious groups and democratisation by casting light on the question of what the impact of religious participation in civil resistance campaigns and civil wars is. Does religious participation in civil resistance campaigns enable or obstruct democratisation? Does religious participation in civil war deepen authoritarianism? The impact of different social actors on democratisation after civil resistance or civil war is an under-researched area. We know that nonviolent campaigns are more likely to result in post-conflict democratisation than violent campaigns (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011). But we know less about the contribution of particular social groups that mobilise in resistance campaigns to the prospects of democratisation in the years following the campaigns. Can different patterns of social mobilisation help us explain democratisation, and where do religious groups fit into this picture?

There is a public perception that religious actors are antidemocratic. Yet, we know that religious actors sometimes have contributed to democratisation (Huntington, 1991b; Toft et al., 2011). By looking at under what conditions religious groups do contribute to democratisation, a lesson can be learned on the role of religious actors. Further, this thesis will expand knowledge related to democratisation in the years following a civil war, where

there has been a relative scholarly neglect (Hartzell & Hoddie, 2015, p. 37). The focus of this study is global, but the results can speak to more specific cases. For example, by interpreting the impact of religious participation on democratisation in the years following the resistance campaigns in the countries affected by the Arab spring, this thesis can speak to questions related to the Arab vs. Muslim democracy gap.

The contribution of this thesis is twofold. It contributes with new theory on religious actors´ impact on democratisation in the years following a resistance campaign, and tests these theories empirically by using cross-national data analyses. I argue that religious actors can have both motivation and capacity to enforce democratisation in the years following a resistance campaign, and the results indicate support for this argument. I find that nonviolent resistance campaigns are likely to foster democratisation in the years following the campaigns, and that the likelihood of democratisation increases when religious actors that stem from big religious groups participate in the campaigns. However, violent resistance campaigns are found to have a negative impact on democratisation in the years following violent resistance campaigns. Moreover, when a religious actor participates in a violent resistance campaign, the size of the religious group that a religious actor stem from do not have any substantial impact on democratisation in the years after the campaign.

The progress in this thesis will be as follows: In chapter 2, I present a literature review of the theories that take aim to explain the puzzle of democratisation, with a special emphasis on how civic actors´ mass mobilisation and collective action are seen as vital to democratisation. Chapter 3 aims to outline central concepts and mechanisms that link religious participation in resistance campaigns to democratisation, before presenting the argument underlying the hypotheses in this thesis. In chapter 4 my research design is explained, through presenting the datasets underlying the variables used to do the cross-national analyses of how religious actors participation in resistance campaigns impact democratisation in the years following the campaigns. The results from the empirical analyses are presented in chapter 5, a chapter which ends with a discussion of the limitations of this study and the need for further research. After a conclusion of the results in chapter 6, the results are applied to the Arab countries, before rounding off the thesis with a discussion of the robustness of the results.

2.0 Literature review

The literature on democratisation can be divided into five explaining traditions. These five traditions highlight different processes that might drive democratisation, and are related to 1) economic and social factors, 2) political culture, 3) institutions, 4) leaders and elites as agents reshaping institutions and 5) collective action and mass mobilisation driving democratic changes. To give the reader an introduction to these traditional explanations, a review of how these five traditions explain the puzzle of democratisation is presented in section 2.1. Section 2.2 turns towards civil actor´s role in democratisation, with a special focus on collective action and mass mobilisation in nonviolent and violent conflicts. Lastly, attention is given to the relationship between religious actors and democratisation.

2.1 Explaining the puzzle of democratisation

Economic development involving industrialisation, urbanisation, high educational standards and increased wealth are seen as basic conditions facilitating democratisation (Lipset, 1959, p. 86). Moreover, economic development can mark the effectiveness of a political system. The capacity to engender and maintain the belief that existing political institutions are the most appropriate for society are of vital importance for a political system to sustain legitimacy (Lipset, 1959, p. 86). Thus, economic development, effectiveness and legitimacy are thought to be essential economic and social prerequisites facilitating democratic transitions.

Seymour M. Lipset (1959, p. 103) explicitly notes that economic development leading to an increase in wealth, a larger middle class, increased education and other related factors does not mean that democracy automatically will evolve and consolidate. Among the factors determining whether a transition will take place are historical factors. These may affect the way in which major issues dividing society are being handled. According to Lipset (1959, p. 92), religion stands out as one of the major issues affecting the political stability of a society. Cleavages within religious groups can be desirable for democracy, but cleavages between groups might cause challenges. Actors can overcome these challenges however, by shaping institutions and events in a direction that enhances the conditions for development of democracy (Lipset, 1959, p. 103).

In the early 1970s, scholars held pessimistic views about democratic development as a result

of breakdowns in several democratic systems. Robert Dahl (1971, p. 208) claimed that it was unrealistic to suppose that there would "be any dramatic change in the number of polyarchies within a generation or two". Soon after, the third wave of democratic transitions swept over much of Latin America and Southern Europe in the mid-1970s and through the 1980s. After examining the necessary conditions for democracy, Huntington (1984, p. 218) suggested that "the limits of democratic development in the world well may have been reached". However, it was the same Huntington (1991b) who famously named the transitions to democracy between 1974 and 1990 as "the third wave".

Through his analysis of the factors causing the third wave, Huntington (1991a, p. 13) points out five major factors that contribute to democratic transitions. Two of them coincide with Lipset´s (1959) social requisites of democracy, namely economic development and political legitimacy. In addition, the policies of external actors may enable or hinder democracy, depending on their policies. An example is the European Community´s decision to give membership to Greece, Portugal and Spain, which was a guarantee of democratic stability in these countries. On the contrary, Turkey´s application for membership in 1987 was met with little enthusiasm by the community (Huntington, 1991a, p. 14), leaving Turkey in democratic instability, and they are still ranked as a hybrid regime by the Economist´s Democracy Index (2014, p. 6). Fourth, the snowballing dynamic of earlier transitions may provide models for subsequent efforts at democratisation. Notably, a state´s first effort to establish a democracy has frequently failed, while the second effort often has succeeded. This might be due to learning from previous experiences (Huntington, 1991b, p. 173).

Finally, Huntington (1991a, 1993) includes religious factors as important for the occurrence of democratisation. Manifested in the Second Vatican Council of 1963-65, a striking shift in the doctrine and activities of the Catholic Church contributed significantly to the third-wave transitions to democracy. The transformation of the church´s role from defenders of the status quo to opponents of authoritarianism gave strength to oppressed actors, while he indicates that Islam has been a hindrance for the development of democracy in the Muslim Arab region.

Lipset (1994, p. 5) agrees with Huntington, saying religion has played a central role in creating favourable conditions for democratic development. He claims that there has been a positive relationship between Protestantism and democracy, while Islam, Catholicism, Orthodox Christianity, and Confucianism have had a negative relationship with democracy.

The explanation for the negative relationship is related to the traditionally close links between religion and the state in these other four religions. Stepan and Robertson (2003) disagree with Huntington and Lipset. They find that a number of Muslim-majority states are electoral overachievers, and that there are examples of relatively democratic Muslim-majority states such as Senegal, Indonesia and Turkey. Moreover, they find no Muslim gap compared to other religious identities when examining countries that suffer from extreme poverty. Their conclusion is that Islam cannot by itself explain the lack of Arab democracies (Stepan & Robertson, 2003, p. 39). Instead, Stepan and Robertson (2003, p. 41) encourage researchers to examine the political particularities of the Arab countries to disclose reasons for their antidemocratic features, instead of searching for religious or ethnic explanations.

Larry Diamond (2010, p. 94) also tells us "neither culture nor religion offers a convincing explanation for the Arab democracy deficit". Instead, Diamond (2010) points towards institutions as central for the enduring maintenance of authoritarian governing structures. He thinks that Arab rulers have developed unusual skills that they employ in keeping their hold on power. The institutions through which authoritarian regimes maintain their power are key pillars of Arab authoritarianism. Specifically, a strong and controlling state combined with a rule of law adapted for authoritarian rule are important components of the Arab institutions that sustain authoritarian rule (Diamond, 2010, p. 99). Oil drives much of the major powers´ interests in the region, thus empowering authoritarian leaders through the sponsoring of weapons and repression (Diamond, 2010; Wenar, 2016). Moreover, external forces in the region foster authoritarian statecraft by reducing the need for elites to tax their citizens (Ross, 2012). Historically, external support was provided from the Soviet Union, but now mainly Europe and the United States rely on natural resources, security assistance and political legitimacy in Arab autocracies (Diamond, 2010, p. 101). In addition, the Arab states reinforce one another in techniques of monitoring, rigging elections and repressing their citizens, culminating in an Arab league where discussions fostering democratic norms and means are absent.

Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) also view institutions as central, as political institutions decide the distribution of power in a society. In a state with absolutist political institutions, such as in most Arab countries, power is shared among a small number of people. These power-holders are likely to use their position to establish economic institutions that provide private goods for the power-elite. In contrast, pluralistic political institutions divide power

among the people of the state, with multiple groups and coalitions sharing power and implementing policies that provide public goods (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, p. 81). Hence, according to them, it is most likely the existing extractive political institutions in the Arab world that hinder a democratic development.

Huntington (1968) was one of the pioneers in developing the modern concept of institutions that Diamond (2010) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) build on. Thorbjørn Knutsen and Rune Østerhus (2016) tested the argument about the significance of institutions for democratic development in the countries most affected by the Arab spring. They found that regardless of existing regime type, a strong state, balanced by the rule of law and accountability, creates the most favourable conditions for democratic development (Knutsen & Østerhus, 2016, p. 331).

Guillermo O´Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter (1986) also point to the importance of economic factors or more enduring forms of political organization. However, they direct attention to the way institutions are continually reshaped by purposive human agency. They argue that transitions start because of important divisions between hardliners and soft-liners in the elite, thus emphasizing the role of leadership and elite interaction. Even though they admit that collective action may challenge a transitional regime, theorists within this tradition emphasise that popular upsurge is most likely to be short-lived, followed by a decline of the peoples´ importance for a transition (O´Donnell & Schmitter, 1986, p. 60).

Recently, Stephen Haggard and Robert Kaufmann (2016) steered the discussion about democratisation toward factors related to the nature of authoritarian and democratic institutions, regime performance and capacities for collective action on the part of civil society. They find that democratisation driven by mass mobilisation hinges on an authoritarian regime´s degree of cooperation with public actors, and the extent to which publics are capable of mobilising grievances in the political arena (Haggard & Kaufmann, 2016, p. 3). It is clear from Haggard and Kaufmann´s (2016) work that most democratic transitions involve resistance and collective action, which I focus on in the next section.

2.2 Civil actors´ role in democratisation

Democratisation can be developed from the "top-down" or from the "bottom-up". In the following sections, I will first briefly discuss how elite-led democratisation can occur from the top-down in the absence of pressure from civic actors. Thereafter, I will discuss existing literature on how civil society actors can foster democracy from below through collective action and mass mobilisation in nonviolent and violent conflicts. Lastly, the relationship between religious actors and democratisation is reviewed.

2.2.1 Democratisation in the absence of pressure from civic actors

In elite-led transitions, international inducements and constrains are expected to play a large role in the calculations that authoritarian incumbents make before making policy decisions (Haggard & Kaufmann, 2016, p. 142). When pressure from below is absent, elites evaluate international leverage and linkage to find out whether there is more to gain by transitioning to democracy compared to maintaining status quo. Leverage depends upon a government´s vulnerability to external democratising pressure, while linkage considers the density of economic, social, and political ties (Levitsky & Way, 2006, p. 379). Leverage is unlikely to yield sufficient inducement in the absence of linkage, and cross-national variation in international influences on democratisation is thought to be rooted in differences in degrees of leverage and linkage between countries (Levitsky & Way, 2006, p. 379). Both linkage and leverage are low in the Middle East, leading to limited degree and effect of external pressures in the region. This has been understood to be a factor contributing to the lack of democracies in the region. Contrastingly, central Europe and the Americas are regions with a high level of linkage, and in these regions nearly all competitive authoritarian regimes have democratised (Levitsky & Way, 2006, p. 380). These findings are corroborated by Haggard and Kaufmann (2016, p. 89), who find that the likelihood of elite-led transitions increases as the proportion of neighbouring democracies increases.

However, both Haggard and Kaufmann (2016, p. 99) and Adrian Karatnycky and Peter Ackerman (2005, p. 7) find that top-down transitions launched and led by elites have had a weaker positive effect on democratisation when compared to transitions strongly driven by civic forces. This thesis will therefore stay focused on the how civil actor´s participation in resistance campaigns may impact post-conflict democratisation in the following chapters.

2.2.2 How civil actors foster democracy through collective action in resistance campaigns

In relation to civil actors and collective action as democratising forces, there is considerable evidence that democratisation hinges on civil actors´ ability to mobilise mass participation and their capability to inflict costs on the governing regime through civil resistance campaigns (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2006; Cederman et al., 2010; Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011; R. B. Collier & Mahoney, 1997; Dahlum et al., 2017; Huang, 2016; Karatnycky & Ackerman, 2005; Wood, 2000). In the following I will discuss this literature by focusing on the distinction between nonviolent and violent strategies, although these scholars seem to build on a common basis where civic actors must have both motivation and capacity to bring about democratisation. Towards the end of this section I include some comparison between the two traditions, related to the effect of nonviolent versus violent resistance on democratisation.

Within the tradition on nonviolent tactics and civil resistance, Ruth Berins Collier and James Mahoney (1997, p. 285) paved the way for a new understanding of civil society actors as critical to democratic transitions by arguing that labour movements often played an important role in late twentieth century democratic transitions. However, they explicitly express that labour movements did not single-handedly bring about the demise of authoritarianism, and replace them with new democratic systems (R. B. Collier & Mahoney, 1997, p. 294). Labour movements seem to be one out of an array of players contributing to the destabilisation and delegitimation of authoritarian regimes, leading to a path towards democratisation. Thus, democratisation is likely to involve a transition game where collective protests help to reshape transitions and keep them moving forward. The space for social movements to appear in the reshaping and continuing transition opens up in later stages of the transition. Hence, specific collective actors may become important for the completion of the democratic transition, seeing the final stages through (R. B. Collier & Mahoney, 1997, p. 300).

Their findings have been supported by Karatnycky and Ackerman (2005), Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan (2011), Kristian S. Gleditsch and Maurizio Rivera Celestino (2013), Barrington Moore (1966) and Siriane Dahlum, Tore Wig and Carl H. Knutsen (2017), as they all find the presence of strong and cohesive nonviolent civic resistance campaigns to be a prominent factor contributing to democratisation. In the case of Dahlum et al. (2017), it is

industrial workers and urban middle classes that have the strongest positive effects on democratisation. These results provide support for the older ideas of Moore (1966, p. 418), who argued that the development of democracy or dictatorship is tied to revolutionary paths out of traditional society. The path to democracy goes through a capitalist-democratic route where the urban bourgeoisie emerge as a powerful civil actor and the aristocracy can either accept democratising demands or be destroyed by a bourgeoisie revolution (Moore, 1966, p. 430). Thus, a strong bourgeoisie can be the strategic actor determining the development towards democracy.

Within such 'distributive conflict' models of democratisation, socioeconomic inequalities constitute at least one of the motives for mass mobilisation with the target of forcing incumbent authoritarian elites to yield power to the people (Haggard & Kaufmann, 2016, p. 13). Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Evelyn H. Stephens, and John D. Stephens (1992, p. 6) build on Moore´s (1966) understanding of the path toward democracy, and see democratisation as an increase in political equality. The balance of class power affects the possibilities of democratisation, and class power is intimately related to civil society. They argue that a dense civil society can establish a counterweight to state power, and can function as a democratic force by changing the balance of power through collective action. High levels of inequality are believed to be associated with severe repression and authoritarianism (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2006; Boix, 2003). But democratisation may occur at intermediate levels of inequality where citizens are motivated to mobilise due to grievances without being threatening enough to invite elite repression (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2006), or where inequality is low and elites have little to lose by transitioning to democracy (Boix, 2003).

Investigating the violent path from civil war to democracy, Elisabeth J. Wood (2000) found that transitions to democracy can be *forged from below*, through sustained insurgency by lower-class actors. Wood (2000) claims that the path towards democracy is made up of two processes, the first being sustained mobilisation that eventually constitutes an insurgent counter-elite. Second, the accumulated costs of the insurgency inflicted on the economic elite may force through a compromise, as a substantial segment of the elite becomes convinced that they will be better off with a democratising compromise (Wood, 2000, p. 5). Thus, there is a significant overlap in the theoretical models that underpin nonviolent and violent paths toward democracy.

Reyko Huang (2016) finds results that corroborate Wood´s (2000) findings. Huang´s (2016, p. 9) main argument is that civil wars in which the rebel groups rely heavily on war-fighting support from civilians are more likely to be followed by democratisation, compared to wars that are fought with little civilian support. Mass mobilisation for war results in political mobilisation, and can further place pressure on post-war political elites to accommodate to civilian demands in order to ensure regime survival. According to Huang (2016, p. 5), more than half of the states emerging from civil war experience an increase in democratic qualities after a civil war, compared with prior to the war. However, Virginia P. Fortna and Reyko Huang (2012, p. 807) reveal that democratisation in post-conflict societies mostly have the same characteristics as democratisation elsewhere. They identify only two aspects of war with effects on post-conflict democratisation, namely negotiated settlements and whether wars are fought along identity lines. Wars that end in a negotiated settlement have a positive effect on post-conflict democratisation in the short run, while wars along identity lines have a negative effect (Fortna & Huang, 2012, p. 806).

Even though some research indicates that civil war and democratisation might come hand in hand, there is noticeable variation in how political regimes evolve through civil wars. Three years after a civil war has ended, about one out of four states has experienced a decrease in democratic quality, while one out of five states has experienced no change in democratic quality from prior to the war (Huang, 2016, p. 5). Fifteen years out, the states with an increase in democratic quality still make up more than half of the states. However, about fifteen percent of the states stay unchanged, while thirty percent of the states experiences a decrease in democratic quality from pre-war to fifteen years after the war.

In contrast to Huang´s (2016) somewhat promising findings on behalf of democratisation in the aftermath of a civil war, Chenoweth and Stephan (2011, p. 11) find that a little more than one out of four violent campaigns succeed in either engendering regime change or bringing about territorial independence, while nearly half of nonviolent campaigns succeed in the short-term. They also find that successful nonviolent resistance movements are likely to create more durable and internally peaceful democracies than transitions provoked by violent insurgencies (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011, p. 10). Other scholars have supported these findings (Bayer, Bethke, & Lambach, 2016; Gleditsch & Rivera, 2016; Karatnycky & Ackerman, 2005).

As the importance of specific collective actors´ role in affecting collective outcomes has been realised, it has been examined how labour movements (R. B. Collier & Mahoney, 1997), trade unions (Butcher, Gray & Mitchell, 2017), agrarian actors (Moore, 1966), industrial workers and middle-class movements (Dahlum et al., 2017) have affected democratisation. However, the impact of religious actors´ participation in civil resistance campaigns on post-conflict democratisation has not received the same attention. Hence, a gap exists in this research area, which I discuss in more detail below.

2.2.5 The relationship between religious actors and democratisation

According to Monica D. Toft, Daniel Philphott and Timothy S. Shah (2011, p. 92) more than 40 percent of the world´s 200 countries experienced substantial democratisation between 1972 and 2009. Religious actors have played a democratising role in 48 of the 78 cases identified as experiencing substantial democratic progress. Thus, religious actors were a prodemocratic force in more than 60 percent of the democratising countries during this period. In the hard case of the Middle East, Iraq and Kuwait are two of the cases with substantial democratic progress.

However, religious actors have played a counterdemocratising role in ten countries, actively obstructing democratic progress in the period 1972-2009. The authoritarian regimes in seven of these countries were helped by Muslim actors (Toft et al., 2011, p. 107). Thus, religious actors are not necessarily destined to have a positive or negative impact on post-conflict democratisation. These contrasting findings increase the importance of examining under what conditions religious actors may play a prodemocratising- or counterdemocratising role. While, Toft et al. (2011) have examined the impact of religious actors on democratisation they do not test their arguments on cross-national data.

It is not yet clear why religious actors have played a democratising role, and the impact of religious actor´s participation in democratisation has not yet been tested on cross-national data. In this thesis, I will add knowledge on how religious actors have played a democratising role through mass mobilisation based on religious traditions and beliefs. Moreover, I will do this by testing the impact of religious actor's participation in nonviolent- and violent resistance campaigns on post-conflict democratisation using cross-national data.

3.0 Theoretical foundations

In this chapter, I will first outline central concepts and mechanisms that link religious participation in resistance campaigns to post-conflict democratisation. Thereafter, I will present a theory of how religious participation in resistance campaigns impacts democratisation in the years following a campaign that emphasises the size of participating religious groups and the tactics they use.

3.1 Theories explaining the impact of religious participation on democratisation

Democratisation involves a transition from one political system to another. In the following sections, the characteristics of what can be called a nondemocracy or an autocracy is explained, before outlining the concept of democracy. Thereafter, the nature of nonviolent and violent resistance campaigns is clarified. An understanding of religion will be elaborated, before explaining what a religious actor is. Lastly in this subchapter, it is briefly theorised how religious participation in resistance campaigns can result in democracy.

3.1.1 What is nondemocracy and authoritarianism?

Nondemocratic regimes share one common element, namely that they represent the preferences of an elite subgroup, instead of representing the wishes of the population at large (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2006, p. 17; de Mesquita & Smith, 2011). However, there are stark differences between various nondemocratic regimes. Some of these differences can be used to sort between different types of authoritarianism. Authoritarian regimes have different ways to combine coercion and co-optation to protect the interests of elite allies, deflect opposition from below and maintain incumbents´ positions (Haggard & Kaufmann, 2016, p. 62).

The four most frequent types of authoritarian regimes are multiparty or competitive authoritarian regimes, military regimes, one-party systems and monarchies (Hadenius & Teorell, 2007, p. 148; Haggard & Kaufmann, 2016, p. 63). These can further be divided into subtypes or combinations of these types, but these four serve as the main types. Competitive authoritarian regimes rely on semicompetitive elections, co-optation and manipulation of political opposition. Formal democratic institutions are viewed as the principal means of obtaining and exercising political authority, and at least some opposition candidates are

allowed to participate in the elections (Levitsky & Way, 2002, p. 52). Often, competitive authoritarian regimes place great emphasis on ruling parties and legislative assemblies to exercise control. However, incumbents violate the rules of the democratic institutions so often and to such an extent, that the regime fails to meet conventional minimum standards for democracy. Russia under Vladimir Putin can serve as an example.

At the other end of the spectrum, the most repressive and exclusionary regimes limit representation, use widespread coercion, and control most or all social organisations (Haggard & Kaufmann, 2016, p. 63). Military regimes are directly or indirectly controlled by the military, as men who specialise in armed force and in maintaining order rule the government (Geddes, Frantz, & Wright, 2014, p. 148). It has been claimed that military rulers are more likely to abuse their citizens than civilian dictators. Despite this, military regimes tend to collapse peacefully, and to be followed by democratisation. General Augusto Pinochet´s regime in Chile can serve as an example.

One-party regimes, such as the Communist Party´s rule in Soviet Union, ban all other parties from participating in the political system. At the same time, they try to co-opt the opposition through the single party, to use the party as an instrument of authoritarian control (Svolik, 2012, p. 11). Monarchies are based on hereditary succession, such as is the case in Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and others. Through coercion and repression, a strong centralised government can limit political freedoms extensively. Regimes that primarily rely on repression and that are inherently exclusionary leave the opposition two options; either to stay underground, or take to the streets (Haggard & Kaufmann, 2016, p. 65).

3.1.2 What is democracy?
The concept of democracy is complex and multifaceted. A democratic regime can be seen as a way of governing a nation state, but no two democracies are exactly alike. Therefore, a number of different versions exist, where each democracy has more or less marked differences from other democracies (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006: 16). Diamond (2008, p. 21) groups the different versions of democracies into "thin" and "thick" versions. In the following, two conceptions of democracy will be elaborated. First, features related to electoral democracy, or what Dahl (1971, 1998) calls polyarchy, will be outlined as a "thin" conception of democracy. Second, liberal democracy will be discussed, based on the definition given by

Diamond (2008). His conception of liberal democracy should be viewed as a "thick" conception of democracy.

Polyarchy – a thin conception

The well-known economist Joseph Schumpeter (1943, p. 269) defined democracy as a system "for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people´s vote". This method of electing a government or a leader, through a popular election, is interpreted as a necessary condition for a democratic system to exist (Stepan, 2000, p. 38; Svolik, 2012, p. 16). Even though this is a normal definition of democracy, it is a definition of democracy at its minimum. This method as a definition of democracy must be considered as a thin conception of democracy.

Another thin definition of democracy is associated with Dahl´s (1998, p. 90) concept of polyarchy, a concept that is slightly thicker than Schumpeter's. A polyarchy is a political system with six democratic institutions. These include that officials must be elected by the citizens, and accountable to them and the constitution. The elections have to be free, fair and frequent, and the candidates need to compete freely for votes from the citizens. All citizens may have a right to freedom of expression, without danger of severe punishment on political matters (Dahl, 1998, p. 85). Further, access to alternative sources of information must be given, without government restriction, censoring or control of the information. Moreover, these institutions must allow associational autonomy. Thus, in a polyarchy citizens are given opportunity to form independent political parties, interest groups and other relatively independent forms of associations or organisations. Lastly, no adult can be denied the rights that are available to others as long as they live in the country permanently, and adhere to the laws. Through inclusive citizenship, citizens must be entitled to the rights necessary to maintain these institutions (Dahl, 1998, p. 86).

Liberal democracy – a thick conception

Diamond (2008, p. 20) outlines popular sovereignty, freedom, the rule of law, and accountability of rulers as essential elements of a liberal democracy. Since polyarchy is a thinner conception of democracy than liberal democracy, the characteristics of polyarchy must also be present in a liberal democracy (Diamond, 2008, p. 22). The central difference between them is that a liberal democratic system needs to include attributes that involve certain

democratic values to achieve a "thick" conception of democracy. Democratic structures will be mere facades, unless people come to value these essential values. The right to vote comes from the universal values of liberty and democracy. Thus, a liberal democracy has a "thicker" level of freedom, where individual liberties are more extensive than in a polyarchy (Diamond, 2008, p. 22).

Freedom concerns the freedom that religious and other minority groups should be given to practice their religion and culture (Diamond, 2008, p. 22). They should also be given the opportunity to participate equally in political and social life. Thus, individuals should be given substantial freedom of belief, opinion and discussion both privately and publicly. To secure the universal value of liberty and democracy, a "thicker" rule of law is needed. In a liberal democracy, the rule of law must be well known by the people. The laws should be universal, stable and clear, as well as nonretroactive. Thus, they help provide legal equality of all citizens, through having an independent judiciary that neutrally and consistently protects individual and group rights by applying the law (Diamond, 2008, p. 22). The processes of the rule of law and freedom should contribute to keep individuals safeguarded from torture, terror, unjustified detention, exile or other interferences in people's lives.

Another central element of liberal democracy is the "thickness" of the accountability of rulers. Liberal democracies should have an independent legislature, a court system and other autonomous agencies that are able to hold the rulers accountable. A vibrant civil society is an important factor in efforts to monitor the rulers. The civil society should therefore consist of a great diversity of organisations independent from the state, participating in providing and sharing different information to the people. Moreover, civilians who are accountable to the people through popular elections should be in control of the military and state security apparatus (Diamond, 2008, p. 22).

Democracy may be seen as a political system that varies in depth within these essential elements of democracy. In countries where the realisations of these are achieved in substantial measures, we speak of a liberal democracy. On the other hand, where these elements are neglected we may speak of an illiberal democracy (Diamond, 2008, p. 23).

3.1.3 What is the nature of nonviolent and violent resistance campaigns?

In his chapter about political power, Gene Sharp (1973, p. 47) claimed that resistance by non-cooperation and disobedience would be the most efficient and certain means for coercing states. Thus, in this paper, nonviolent resistance refers to the use of power by "the subjects´ declining to supply the power-holder with the sources of his power, by cutting off his power at the roots", without the use of direct violence (Sharp, 1973, p. 47). Hence, resistance is confrontational in nature, and different groups using different tactics can perform it. Civil resistance groups can use social, economic, psychological and political methods, including boycotts, strikes, protests, sit-ins and other nonviolent forms of civil disobedience and non-cooperative actions in order to remove or restrict the adversaries´ sources of power (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011, p. 12; Sharp 1973).

Both violent and nonviolent campaigns seek to take power from the power-holder by force (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011, p. 13). A number of different objectives may be the target of a campaign, such as policy objectives of increased personal liberties, obtaining greater privileges for a religious group, or to obtain full sovereignty from a state. However, the method of applying force differs across the different resistance types, and a campaign can be characterised as nonviolent if its primary resistance methods do not involve the use of physical violence. Violent resistance campaigns are concerned with the use of violent strategies exerted by nonstate actors (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011, p. 12). Examples of violent tactics are bombings, shootings, kidnappings, and physical sabotage of infrastructure or other types of physical harm against people or property. Competing groups may employ different means for achieving their objectives. Hence, in many cases, both nonviolent and violent campaigns may exist simultaneously (Cunningham, 2014). Moreover, both aim to impose costs on the state – one by severing dependency relations between state and society, the other by destroying state assets.

3.1.4 What is religion?

Instead of finding trade unions, political parties and interest groups to be the most significant form of social organisation and source of worldviews, a growing number of people find religion to fill this position in their lives (Rudolph, 1997, p. 5). There exist a vast number of religious worldviews and forms of social organisation, making it difficult to define religion. Intuitively, most people have an idea of what the term religion means, like a belief in God, the

supernatural or the afterlife. Often, these interpretations are too specific; for example a criteria of believing in God or gods would exclude Buddhists, who worship no God (Pals, 2015, p. 11). Therefore, more substantive or functional definitions might be better suited for including all religious beliefs. Substantive definitions define religions in terms of the beliefs and ideas that religious people affirm. Functional definitions are less concerned with these beliefs and ideas, and focus instead towards what a religion psychologically does for an individual or what it does for a group socially.

For the purpose of this thesis, religion involves a combination of beliefs, behaviour and belonging in a community (Toft et al., 2011, p. 21). Different elements of beliefs, behaviour and belonging can be identified. Most religions include most or all of the following elements; 1) a belief in God or other supernatural being(s), 2) a belief in attributes related to the supernatural being(s) making prayers or other communication possible and necessary, 3) transcendent realities, such as heaven or hell, 4) a distinction between the sacred and the profane, 5) a view that explains humanity´s relation to the world as a whole, 6) the bearing of religion on ethics, creating a code of conduct that should be followed, and 7) a temporal community bound by its adherence to these elements (Alston, 1998; Toft et al., 2011, p. 21). Through these elements, religious beliefs, behaviours and belonging to a religious association can give structure and meaning to human relations. By creating communities based on religious beliefs and practices, religious formations can facilitate collective religious actions contributing to cooperation or conflict (Rudolph, 1997).

3.1.5 What is a religious actor?

Sometimes religious actors participate in resistance campaigns. Here, a religious actor is defined as "any individual, group or organisation that espouses religious beliefs and that articulates a reasonably consistent and coherent message about the relationship of religion to politics" (Toft et al., 2011, p. 23). Thus, a variety of individuals, groups or organisations may be considered as a religious actor, depending upon their ability to articulate and express the relationship between their religious beliefs and their political pursuits. Examples of individual religious actors can be journalists, voters, activists or intellectuals pursuing political causes in the name of religion. The Muslim Brotherhood, Al Qaeda and Islamic Council of Norway are examples of organisations that function as religious actors. Other examples of religious actors may be religious political parties, such as the Justice and Development Party in Turkey or the

Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.

The degree of consensus among the individuals, groups and organisations functioning as political actors may vary. For instance, religious actors may be organised in a more or less centralised manner, leading to possibilities for different religious interpretations. Also, varying local conditions create political diversity, where political pursuits are shaped by more localised influences. For example, Muslims in Palestine have no preferences for religious influence in political affairs, while Muslims in Morocco strongly prefer Islamic guidance in political affairs which further are associated with a lower emphasis upon democratic norms and institutions (Tessler, 2002, p. 345). Thus, a religious actor might be part of a larger religious entity or collective where the members themselves are not unanimous (Toft et al., 2011, p. 23).

Like religion itself, religious actors are not territorially bound, but may cross borders and consist of populations that exceed billions of people. Susanne H. Rudolph (1997, p. 1) coined the term transnational civil society, referring to religious formations of sects, churches, movements, communities and auxiliary organisations. These different sorts of religious communities are important components and creators of the transnational civil society. This transnational trait gives religion the potential to mobilise far more members than most states, and religions often accept the legitimacy of states only conditionally (Philpott, 2007, p. 506).

3.1.6 How religious participation in resistance campaigns can result in democratisation

According to Huntington (1991b, p. 121) transitions leading to democracy are complex political processes, where a variety of groups struggle for power, for or against democracy, and towards other goals. He identifies the crucial participants of the process as either belonging to the government coalition, or to the opposition. The methods used to participate in a civil resistance campaign are likely to depend on a variety of factors, one of them being who the participating actors are. When it comes to religious actors, they can be individuals, groups and organisations, adopting political pursuits in the name of religion (Toft et al., 2011, p. 22). Within both the government and the opposition there will most likely be supporters favouring democracy as well as opposing democracy. Thus, the attitudes toward democracy among these groups, combined with the balance of power between them, shape how the transition process develops.

Religious actors participate in a resistance campaign when dissidents actively and publicly claim to represent a religious tradition, and engage in participating actions of collective dissent against the ruling regime with a goal of regime change or territorial independence (Butcher & Svensson, 2014, p. 20; Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011, p. 30). An example of nonviolent religious participation can be the Egyptian based Muslim Brotherhood´s support of a unified opposition´s demand for reform, where they, by using primarily nonviolent means, pressured Mubarak´s regime to change the presidential election process for the election in 2005 (Kaye, Wehrey, Grant, & Stahl, 2008, p. 34). The massacre in the Syrian city of Hama in 1982 may serve as an example of religious participation in a violent resistance campaign, as the Syrian regime violently confronted an insurgency led by the Syrian based Muslim Brotherhood (Doran & Shaikh, 2011, p. 231).

Post-conflict environments may open a window that is especially suitable for democratic transitions (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011; Huntington, 1984; Karl, 2005). These windows can serve as critical junctures, where institutions, political culture and external forces can be reshaped, adjusted and renegotiated. A transition to democracy is facilitated if both the groups dominating government and opposition hold prodemocratic political attitudes, religious values and beliefs (Huntington, 1991b, p. 123). If prodemoratic groups are strong in opposition but not in government, democratisation depends on events undermining the government, such as a resistance campaign or a civil war. This seems to have been the case in Egypt in 2005 and 2011 (Kaye et al., 2008, p. 34). If prodemocratic groups dominate in the governing coalition but not in the opposition, democratisation might be threatened by insurgent violence and potential backlash through an increase in power for antidemocratic groups in the governing coalition.

3.2 A theory of how religious actors impact democratisation after a campaign

In this section, I will first present the main arguments in this thesis, before outlining religious actors´ motivation and capacity to strive towards democratisation. Thereafter, it is theorised how religious actors´ participation in resistance campaigns impact democratisation.

3.2.1 The argument

In the years following a resistance campaign there is a critical window of opportunity to reshape and adjust the political system and culture in a country from authoritarian towards democratic systems (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011, p. 206; Huntington, 1984; Karl, 2005, p. 26). In this thesis, I argue that all transitions towards democratisation in the years following a resistance campaign will be elite affairs, as the elites are those who lawfully can wield significant political power at the national level during a transition regime (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2006; de Mesquita & Smith, 2011; Huang, 2016). Huang (2016, p. 27) argues that all elites have a hunger to stay in power, and will only choose democratisation if they believe the cost of tolerating democracy is lower than the cost of suppressing opposition groups.

Building on the tradition of collective action and mass mobilisation as drivers of democratisation (Cederman et al., 2010; Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011; R. B. Collier & Mahoney, 1997; Dahlum et al., 2017; Haggard & Kaufmann, 2016; Moore, 1966; Rueschemeyer et al., 1992; Wood, 2000), I adopt the framework developed by Dahlum et al. (2017, p. 6), and argue that civil actors must have both the motivation to create democratic institutions and the capacity to compel the regime to construct them in the years following a conflict. Thus, for democratisation to occur, potential protesters should be motivated to strive towards democracy by challenging the incumbent regime. Moreover, they need favourable opportunity structures and access to resources that makes them able to effectively engage in collective action against the state.

Variation in motivation and capacity is essential for how social groups behave, and thus, successful democratisation depends on both factors (Cederman et al., 2010, p. 96; Weinstein, 2006, p. 28). An increase in civil actor´s motivation and capacity to strive towards democratisation is likely to increase the elites´ costs of suppressing opposition groups, and

lower their costs of tolerating democracy. I will argue that religious actors have, under some circumstances, both the motivation and capacity to function as a civic actor that increases the elite´s costs of repression in the years following a resistance campaign. Based on these arguments a two-way table can serve to illustrate civic actor´s potential path towards democracy (see Figure 1).

Figure 1: The figure illustrates how civic actors can drive democratisation when they have both prodemocratic preferences and capacity.

Civil actor´s capacity

		Yes	No
	Yes	(1) Democratisation	(2) Nondemocracy
Civil actor´s preferences	No	(3) Nondemocracy	(4) Nondemocracy

When a religious actor or a coalition of actors engages in a resistance campaign with the goal of regime change or territorial independence there are three possible outcomes in the years following the campaign. The country can either experience democratisation, increased authoritarianism or a status quo where there are no changes in levels of democracy. I claim that religious actors participating in resistance campaigns either have preferences for democracy or autocracy (Philpott, 2007, p. 505; Toft et al., 2011, p. 30), and that they either have capacity to achieve their preferences or not (Cederman et al., 2010, p. 96; Dahlum et al., 2017, p. 6; Weinstein, 2006, p. 28). Following Figure 1, I argue that where (1) religious actors with preferences for democracy and capacity to enforce democratisation participate in resistance campaigns, the result is likely to be democratisation. (2) Where religious actors with preferences of democracy but without capacity to achieve their preferences, the result can be either increased authoritarianism or status quo in levels of democracy. (3) Where religious actors with preferences of nondemocracy and the capacity to achieve their preferences of nondemocracy, the result is likely to be increased authoritarianism. (4) Where religious actors do not have preferences for democracy and do not have capacity to achieve their preferences, the result is likely to be status quo in levels of democracy.

Thus, this thesis aims to explain how the motivation and capacity of religious actors participating in resistance campaigns can impact democratisation in the years following a resistance campaign.

On religious actors´ motivation to strive towards democratisation

To become a truly motivated dissident or rebellion, a person "must have a moral conduct that shows him to be the true priest of the reform to which he aspires" (Weinstein, 2006, p. 29). Thus, a person striving for democratisation must have strong preferences for this particular transition. The motivation for religious actors to engage in resistance campaigns can be a consequence of conditions that favour insurgency in general, such as political and economic instability, or grievances caused by poverty (Fearon & Laitin, 2003). Religious discrimination is likely to be a factor that especially motivates religious actors to participate in resistance campaigns (Akbaba & Taydas, 2011, p. 285). I argue that religious texts and traditions can be interpreted in a way that creates a prodemocratic posture towards a state among the religious members, thus motivating religious communities to become advocates of democracy (Philpott, 2007, p. 505; Toft et al., 2011, p. 29).

It is noteworthy that today, in mainstream interpretations of monotheistic religions such as Islam and Christianity, the validity of democratic processes to govern societies has become widely accepted, on average (Haynes & Ben-Porat, 2013, p. 155). Over 80 percent of the individuals in Muslim majority countries prefer democracy to other systems of governance (Driessen, 2017, p. 3). Moreover, a large segment of the population support democratic institutions fused with religious aspirations.

Through religious beliefs and ideals religion may provide a basis for identity and commitment that cross-cuts both ethnic and national identities, transcend national borders and unite civilizations (Butcher & Svensson, 2014, p. 4; Huntington, 1993, p. 26). Through providing people with a convenient substitute identity, religious communities might institute religious actors with both an identity and a moral that can be strongly in line with a specific conduct, through their political theology (Toft et al., 2011, p. 27). The stronger a religious actor holds a specific political doctrine, such as a strong preference for democratisation, the more likely it is that this actor will engage in certain forms of political activity that foster the prospects for democratisation (Toft et al., 2011, p. 29).

A religious actor can either develop a posture that is in favour of democratic governance, or in favour of a nondemocratic state (Philpott, 2007, p. 505). I argue that some religious values and beliefs are more compatible with one sort of governance rather than another. For example, if a religious actor favour religious laws that promote certain religious values rather than others, it is likely that an authoritarian regime will be more compatible with the interests of this religious actor than a democracy (Dahl, 1998; Diamond, 2008; Toft et al., 2011, p. 30). Hence, religious actors that favour a state where the authority of state rulers and clerics are closely woven are likely to be better off with a nondemocratic rule. Religious actors that favour religious freedom, separation of religion and the state and rule by the people are more likely to experience protection of their interests in a democracy (Toft et al., 2011, p. 30).

Because of the widely accepted validity of democratic processes as the preferred system of governance, I argue that most religious actors will have the motivation to strive towards democracy (Driessen, 2017; Haynes & Ben-Porat, 2013). However, I see those religious actors that use violent means to promote an increased role of religion in the state or society to be more likely to have authoritarian preferences. These means and targets are seen as antidemocratic, and are more likely to be compatible with authoritarianism than democracy (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011, p. 212; Dahl, 1998; Diamond, 2008; Toft et al., 2011, p. 30). Thus, I see preferences as signalled by the choice of resistance tactics, where religious actors that engage in nonviolent resistance campaigns are inclined to have preferences that are more compatible with democracy, while religious actors that participate in violent resistance campaigns are likely to have preferences that are more compatible with autocracy.

On religious actors´ capacity to bring about democratisation

In addition to motivational preferences, religious actors need the capacity to inflict costs upon the regime to force the regime into changes in democratic direction (Cederman et al., 2010; Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011; R. B. Collier & Mahoney, 1997; Dahlum et al., 2017). Following Chenoweth and Stephan (2011, p. 11), I argue that the main factor deciding a religious actor´s capacity to bring about democracy through participation in resistance campaigns depend on the ability to mobilise dissidents. An increased number of participators in resistance campaigns are associated with higher probability of tactical innovation and strategic variance, enhanced resilience when facing resistance from the ruling elite, an

increased number of loyalty shifts from opponents´ erstwhile supporters as the campaign continues, and an expanded civic disruption that raises the regime´s costs related to maintaining status quo (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011, p. 10).

Religious actors vary in their capacity to mobilise participators in a given country. In 2015, Islam was the second largest religious group in the world, consisting of 1,8 billion Muslims, while Christians were the largest with 2,3 billion people (Hacket, Stonawski, Potancokova, Skirbekk, Connor, Mcclendon, & Kramer, 2017, p. 8). In many countries, these religious groups constitute a large majority (Brown & James, 2017, p. 15). Approximately 360 million of the roughly 430 million people living in the Middle East and North Africa-region are Muslims (Hacket et al., 2017). Thus, for civic Muslim actors examining the potential domestic mobilisation pool, multiple countries in the MENA-region offers substantive numbers of potential dissidents.

Large, transnational religions like Islam and Christianity can make it possible for dissident groups to draw upon existing religious organisations when mobilising dissidents, reaching out to transnational, national and local religious communities. Pre-existing religious organisations in the MENA-region can serve resistance campaigns through a pre-fabricated mobilisation infrastructure consisting of information channels, shared norms, trust and reciprocity that can be useful for conducting a campaign (Butcher & Svensson, 2014; Gould, 1993; McAdam, Tarrow & Tilly, 2001;Tarrow, 2011; Weinstein, 2006). Religious leaders can serve as leading dissidents with moral authority and legitimacy, and may increase the probability of campaign success through defecting. Legitimacy is an important source of soft power, based on the attractiveness of an actor´s culture, political ideals and policies (Nye, 2004). A central trait of religious actors is their ability to initiate collective action based on a legitimised political theology, justified through their religious traditions and interpretations. This legitimacy can enhance the ability of religious actors to mobilise for collective action.

In short, I argue that organisational resources and large mobilisation pools available to religious actors can be converted into mass mobilisation of dissidents, which can lead to high levels of participation in resistance campaigns, and result in a capacity to enforce democratisation.

3.2.2 How religious actors´ participation in resistance campaigns impact democratisation

In this section, I will first discuss how a religious actor´s participation in a nonviolent resistance campaign impacts democratisation in the years following the campaign, and then discuss the impact of violent resistance campaigns. The transition outcomes are likely to be significantly different after a nonviolent resistance campaign compared to a violent resistance campaign, as nonviolent campaigns have a participation advantage due to low moral, physical, informational and commitment barriers to participation (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011, p. 10). Successful nonviolent resistance campaigns are built upon lowering the cost of joining the campaign, leading to increased participation, simultaneously increasing the odds of a successful outcome. Nonviolent campaigns are therefore most likely to achieve their goal of regime change when the participating actors are able to recruit a robust, diverse and broad-based membership that can erode the powerbase of the incumbent and maintain resilience in the face of repression (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011, p. 11).

Following quadrant 1 in Figure 1, I argue that if a religious actor that stems from a big religious group participates in a nonviolent resistance campaign, the resistance campaign is likely to be driven by a large number of dissidents and to be provided with a large-sized mass support. The nonviolent choice of tactics imply that these dissidents are likely to prefer democracy, and the religious actor is therefore hypothesised to have both preferences and capacity to enforce democratisation. The elites leading the regime in the years following the campaign will be unable to implement an authoritarian regime due to mass pressure, and will instead be forced to strive toward democratisation to stay in power (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2006; Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011, p. 10; de Mesquita & Smith, 2011, p. 9; Huang, 2016, p. 27).

Based on quadrant 2 in Figure 1, I claim that if a religious actor that stems from a small religious group participates in a nonviolent resistance campaign, the resistance campaign is likely to be driven by a small number of dissidents that rely on a small-sized mass support. The nonviolent choice of tactics is likely to imply that the religious actor prefer democratisation, but small religious actors will lack the capacity to enforce democratisation, as the elites are likely to strive toward nondemocracy in the lack of mass pressure toward democratisation (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2006; Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011, p. 10; de Mesquita & Smith, 2011, p. 10; Huang, 2016, p. 27).

I argue that violent insurgent victories are likely to cause a country to backslide into an authoritarian regime (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011, p. 209). This argument is based on the antidemocratic nature of the violent methods used to seize power. Moreover, due to participation barriers, violent resistance campaigns are likely to lack the popular mass support that is needed to achieve the advantages related to large-scale participation (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011, p. 32). In the years following a violent campaign, the losers are likely to stick with violence as their tactical method of choice. Therefore, the transition regime can be forced to embrace authoritarian methods of repression, coercion and violence to remain in power (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011, p. 212; Haggard & Kaufmann, 2016). Hence, after a violent resistance campaign the following years after the campaign is likely to be dominated by nondemocratic features and means of political contestations that decreases a country´s level of democracy. The elites controlling the ruling regime are likely to evaluate their threats, which involves doing a risk analysis of the costs of potentially igniting renewed violent conflict if they resort to suppression of widespread political activism (Huang, 2016, p. 29).

As represented in quadrant 3 in Figure 1, I contend that religious actors that stem from big religious groups participating in violent resistance campaigns are likely to have preferences that are more compatible with authoritarianism, as they are likely to promote preferences of a state religion and an increased role of religion in the society (Dahl, 1998; Diamond, 2008, p. 22; Svensson & Nilsson, 2017, p. 7; Toft et al., 2011, p. 30). They will be able to mobilise a relatively large number of dissidents when participating in violent resistance campaigns, and they are likely to be provided with a large-sized mass support. Transnational religious actors can often benefit from both external support and popular mass support through their organisation structure and their large mobilisation pool (Butcher & Svensson, 2014; Gould, 1993; McAdam et al., 2001; Weinstein, 2006). Thus, it is hypothesised that when religious actors from big religious groups participate in violent resistance campaigns the result is likely to be an increase in levels of authoritarianism.

As exemplified in quadrant 4 in Figure 1, small groups that do not have the preferences to create democratic institutions and lack the capacity to compel the regime into construct their preferences in the years following a campaign are not going to force the elites towards democratisation. I argue that when religious actors that stem from small religious groups participate in violent resistance campaigns, they are likely to neither have preferences (Dahl, 1998; Diamond, 2008, p. 22; Philpott, 2007, p. 505; Toft et al., p. 30) nor capacity to enforce

democratisation (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011, p. 11; Huang, 2016, p. 27).

Summarising my main hypotheses, I expect that;

(1) Nonviolent resistance campaigns have a positive association with levels of democracy in the years following the campaign-year.

(2) Religious actors that stem from big religious groups that participate in a nonviolent resistance campaign are expected to be associated with an increase in levels of democracy in the years following the campaign-year.

(3) Violent resistance campaigns have a negative association with levels of democracy in the years following the campaign-year.

(4) Religious actors that stem from big religious groups that participate in a violent resistance campaign are expected to be associated with a decrease in levels of democracy in the years following the campaign-year.

The main arguments behind hypotheses (1) and (2) are based on participation advantages, and the democratic nature of the nonviolent means used to strive towards regime change or territorial independence. Hypotheses (3) and (4) are based on lack of participation advantages, and the antidemocratic nature of violent means used to strive towards regime change or territorial independence.

4.0 Research design

The hypotheses in this thesis are tested on country-year observations from the time-period 1975-2013. In this section the methods, measures and datasets underlying the results are presented. The dependent variables and the seven control variables used are all retrieved from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) data (Coppedge, Gerring, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Fish, Glynn, Hicken, Knutsen, Krusell, et al., 2017). Therefore, characteristics related to the V-Dem Project will be presented more carefully, before outlining the indicators of polyarchy and liberal democracy, which form the dependent variables.

Next, the measures used to examine religious actor´s participation in resistance campaigns are discussed. The measure of religious actors´ participation in nonviolent resistance campaigns is based on a dataset called Major Episodes of Contention (MEC) (Chenoweth & Ulfelder, 2017), and further developed by Charles Butcher and Isak Svensson (2014). This dataset covers the timespan 1960-2013. Religious participation in violent resistance campaigns is retrieved from the Religion and Armed Conflict (RELAC) data by Isak Svensson and Desirée Nilsson (2017). RELAC covers the timespan 1975-2015. Thus, this thesis has been limited to cover the timespan 1975-2013, due to constrains in the accessible data. For measurements of the size of a religious actor participating in resistance campaigns on post-conflict democratisation, data from the Religious Characteristics of States project (RCS) has been used (Brown & James, 2017). This dataset goes back to as early as 1800, and up until 2015. Third I discuss the control variables used, before rounding off by outlining the methodological approach of OLS-regression and some of its limitations and challenges.

4.1 The Varieties of Democracy Project

The dependent variables measuring democracy have been retrieved from the V-Dem Project Mechkova & Sigman, 2016). The dataset being used for this paper, V-Dem data version 7.1 (Coppedge, Gerring, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Fish, Glynn, Hicken, Knutsen, Krusell, et al., 2017), includes 177 countries. It has more than 350 indicators on democracy and political systems, and a worldwide coverage from 1900 to present. The V-Dem project distinguishes between as many as seven principles of democracy (Mechkova & Sigman, 2016, p. 1). This thesis makes use of two, namely electoral and liberal democracy.

The two forms of democracy are scaled on a continuous 0-1 interval, where an increase in the variable indicates an increase in level of democracy (Coppedge, Lindberg, Skaaning, & Teorell, 2016, p. 586).

4.1.1 Measures of democracy

Out of 6251 country-year observations, the lowest registered polyarchy value is 0.01 and the highest is 0.95. For liberal democracy the lowest is 0.01 and highest is 0.92. To examine the impact on democratisation in the years following an active campaign-year (t), I have created lead variables 1 (t+1), 5 (t+5) and 10 (t+10) years into the future. Thus, the 6 dependent variables are named polyarchy (t+1), (t+5), (t+10) and liberal democracy (t+1), (t+5) and (t+10), and are used in six different regression-models.

The V-Dem project disaggregates democracy into its different conceptual dimensions, which allows the measures to reflect different aspects of the complex concept of democracy, and makes V-Dem particularly suitable for this thesis (Mechkova & Sigman, 2016, p. 1). Three features in particular distinguish V-Dem from other measures of democracy. First, the dataset is highly disaggregated with more than 400 detailed questions with predefined response-categories or measurement scales. Second, most of the data are assembled from survey responses by academics from the country in question, or other country experts. Normally, at least five independent experts respond to the questions for each country. Third, the dataset is constructed with the use of a modelling technique that calculates the point estimates taking coder characteristics, biases, and cross-coder inter-reliability into account for each country-year (Coppedge et al., 2016, p. 582).

V-Dem´s electoral democracy index attempts to cover to what extent the ideal of electoral democracy in its fullest sense is achieved, through capturing Dahl´s (1998, p. 85) conceptualisation of polyarchy (Coppedge, Gerring, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Fish, Glynn, Hicken, Knutsen, Marquardt, et al., 2017, p. 49; Coppedge et al., 2016, p. 582). It does this by constructing an aggregate index, containing 5 different sub-indexes. These sub-indexes involve measuring 1) freedom of association, as in how freely political and civil society organisations can operate, 2) the share of population with suffrage, 3) how free and fair elections are, 4) how elections affect the composition of executives in the

country and (5) freedom of expression. The electoral democracy index is formed by taking the weighted average of these five sub-indexes, and an average of a five-way multiplicative interaction between the five indices (Coppedge, Gerring, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Fish, Glynn, Hicken, Knutsen, Marquardt, et al., 2017, p. 49).

As the V-Dem electoral democracy index is composed of all these sub-indexes, it captures elements from all the four principles related to Diamond´s (2008, p. 20) concept of a thin democracy. When a country has a score of 0.5 on the electoral democracy index, this is considered as a threshold beyond which countries are considered to be electoral democracies in a minimal sense (Coppedge et al., 2016, p. 587). Both Diamond (2008, p. 22) and Coppedge et al. (2016, p. 586) emphasise that electoral democracy is an essential element of any other conception of democracy. The same measures that are included in the measurement of electoral democracies are therefore included when measuring liberal democracy.

To assess a thick conception of democracy, a measure of liberal democracy should include a measurement of the freedoms that religious, ethnic and other minority groups enjoy when it comes to religious and cultural practice (Diamond, 2008, p. 22). Further, the principle of the rule of law makes it necessary to examine whether laws are universal, stable and clear to the people. Having an independent judiciary, that contributes to provide legal equality of all citizens, is an important aspect of a liberal democracy (Diamond, 2008, p. 22). In addition, an independent legislature should hold the rulers accountable.

V-Dem provides a liberal democracy index that tries to examine to what extent the ideal of liberal democracy is achieved (Coppedge, Gerring, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Fish, Glynn, Hicken, Knutsen, Marquardt, et al., 2017, p. 51). It includes the electoral democracy index in its aggregation, in addition to thicker dimensions of the concept of democracy through 3 additional sub-indexes. These are 1) equality before the law and individual liberty which assess the country´s degree of freedom through 14 indicators, related to, for example, "freedom of religion" and "freedom from political killings" (Coppedge, Gerring, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Fish, Glynn, Hicken, Knutsen, Marquardt, et al., 2017, p. 436). This sub-index also includes 2) a measure of how transparent laws are, how predictable the enforcement of these laws is, and a sub-index measuring

judicial constraints on the executive. The last sub-index 3) assesses the legislative constraints on the executive, an index necessary to evaluate whether rulers are held accountable by elected parliaments.

As a whole, the liberal democracy index measures important aspects of a state´s ability to protect individual and minority rights against the tyranny of the state and the tyranny of the majority, and state repression in general (Coppedge et al., 2016, p. 282). A state´s ability to protect individual and minority rights is important to thicker conceptions of democracy, with religious freedom and opportunities for religious actors to thrive. Thus, the measure is highly relevant for an analysis investigating the impact of religious actor´s participation on post-conflict democratisation.

4.2 Religious participation in resistance campaigns

The main independent variables in this thesis are related to religious actors´ participation in nonviolent and violent resistance campaigns. According to Chenoweth and Stephan (2011, p. 30), religious participation in resistance campaigns occurs when dissidents publicly claim to represent a religious tradition, and pursue goals of regime change or territorial independence through actions of collective dissent against the regime. In this thesis, data on religious actors´ participation in nonviolent resistance campaigns has been retrieved from Butcher and Svensson (2014), while religious participation in violent resistance campaigns comes from Svensson and Nilsson (2017).

4.2.1 Religious participation in nonviolent resistance campaigns

The dataset developed by Butcher and Svensson (2014) builds on "Major Episodes of Contention" (Chenoweth, 2015), where each "episode" is a series of observable, continuous, coordinated and purposive mass events in the pursuit of a maximalist goal (Chenoweth & Ulfelder, 2017, p. 310). This interpretation of a major episode of contention (MEC) resembles Chenoweth and Stephan´s (2011, p. 14) definition of a nonviolent campaign. MEC-episodes must have at least 1,000 observed participants during more than one contentious event within one week of one another. In the dataset underlying this thesis it has been registered 379

observation-years of active major episodes of contention, which were coded as 1, while 5,918 observations where no major episodes of contention were registered were coded as 0.

Religious groups are registered as participating in a nonviolent campaign if self-identifying religious groups organise or participate in protests, strikes or other forms of nonviolent direct action (Butcher & Svensson, 2014, p. 20). Thus, religious groups engaging in peace-making tasks, provision of food, information or shelter to resistance groups or other indirect actions that religious groups often engage in, are not registered as religious participators in a nonviolent campaign (Vüllers, Pfeiffer, & Basedau, 2015). As a variety of individuals, groups or organisations may be considered as a religious actor, but there is no numerical threshold that differentiates participation from non-participation (Butcher & Svensson, 2014, p. 20; Toft et al., 2011, p. 23). Hence, the measure does not imply that religious participation by the entire religious group have occurred, but identifies that a section of a religious tradition participated in collective action. Two-hundred-and-one observations of religious participation in ongoing MEC´s were coded as 1, while 6,096 observations where no religious actors participate in any nonviolent resistance campaign were coded as 0.

Further, the dataset makes it possible to identify each religious actor´s religious affiliation, respectively as Muslim, Christian, Buddhist or Hindu. This information has been used in interaction with data from the RCS-dataset (Brown & James, 2017) (discussed below), to measure the size of a religious actor participating in a nonviolent resistance campaign.

4.2.2 Religious participation in violent resistance campaigns

The RELAC-data is based on the Uppsala Conflict Data Program´s UCDP Dyadic Dataset version 1-2016 (Svensson & Nilsson, 2017, p. 4; Harbom, Melander & Wallensteen, 2008), which is built on the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch, Wallensteen, Eriksson, Sollenberg & Strand, 2002). The UCDP/PRIO data record whether a government and a non-state rebel group were involved in an armed conflict over government and/or territory, resulting in at least twenty-five battle-related deaths in a calendar year (Harbom, Melander, & Wallensteen, 2008, p. 700; Svensson & Nilsson, 2017, p. 4). Capturing conflict between a government and each rebel group, both the UCDP- and RELAC-data are coded at a dyad-level (Svensson & Nilsson, 2017, p. 3). I use data from the UCDP/PRIO armed conflict

dataset (version 17.2, Allansson, Melander & Themnér, 2017) to measure the occurrence of violent resistance campaign. The UCDP/PRIO armed conflict dataset had to be collapsed into a country-year dataset, to be compatible with the other datasets used. After the collapse, 1,077 years of active armed conflict were coded as 1, while 5,219 observations of inactive conflict years were coded as 0 for the time-period 1975-2013.

Building on the UCDP/PRIO armed conflict dataset, Svensson and Nilsson (2017) focus on the stated positions of the actors involved in a conflict, and whether these concerned religion. According to Svensson and Nilsson (2017, p. 6), a conflict is conceptualised as religious if the warring parties come from different religious affiliations, or if the armed conflict is focused on religious issues. Thus, if the religious majority of the government and the religious majority of the rebel group come from different faith traditions, the conflict is coded as a religious identity-based armed conflict (Svensson & Nilsson, 2017, p. 9). Cases where rebel groups make explicit religious aspirations and demands (i.e. for Sharia law) were coded as conflicts with religious issues, even though the religious issue has not necessarily been the most important of the demands (Svensson & Nilsson, 2017, p. 8). In this thesis, I only record religious participation in UCDP/PRIO armed conflict year when the conflict has religious *issues* rather than religious identity. Not all rebel groups in civil wars characterised by identity differences make public, religious claims. In total, 277 observations of actors involved in armed conflict with explicit religious issues were coded as 1. Meanwhile, 6,019 observations of no religious participation in violent conflict were coded as 0.

Moreover, RELAC distinguishes between different types of demands, based on the claims made by the insurgents (Svensson & Nilsson, 2017, p. 7). When insurgent groups involved in an armed conflict are advocates of an increased role of either Islam or Christianity in the society or the state, their claims have been registered according to their religious affiliation. In interaction with data from RCS (Brown & James, 2017), the measure of religious claims is applicable for constructing a measure of the size of the religious group which a specific rebel group has claimed to represent.

4.2.3 The size of religious participation in resistance campaigns

Version 2.0 of the RCS project offers estimates of states´ populations and percentages of populations of specified religions (Brown & James, 2017, p. 5). It provides annual observations of these, which makes the dataset easy to merge with other country-year data. The annual observations are also a central asset of the dataset, making it favourable compared to competing projects such as World Religion Database or World Religion Project (Brown & James, 2017, p. 5). The number of missing values in the Demographics dataset is low, as RCS cover every country-year for every variable. The RCS demographic dataset draws upon data from twenty-four sources, such as United Nations/League of Nations and the World Christian Encyclopaedia in addition to census reports obtained directly from governments (Brown & James, 2017, p. 6).

In this thesis, the measures related to percentages of populations of specified religions are especially relevant. The four measures covering percentage of the broad categories Muslim, Christian, Buddhist and Hindu population have been used. When a country-year is identified as exhibiting religious participation I also recorded the size of the religious group that the participants derived from and/or claimed to represent. Where religious actors from multiple religious affiliations participated in a resistance campaign, only the religious actor from the religious affiliation with the largest percentage of population in that country has been registered. For example, both Muslims and Christians participated in major episodes of contention in Egypt in 2013. Christians made up approximately 11 percent of the Egyptian population at the time, while more than 88 percent of the population where Muslims. The measure is coded from 0 to 100, where the size of the religious actor participating in a nonviolent resistance campaign in Egypt in 2013 is coded as 88.

The argument behind this decision is that bigger religious actors are likely to be more consequential to future institutional change and a focus on smaller actors runs the risk of falsely identifying null relationships (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011, p. 39; R. B. Collier & Mahoney, 1997; Dahlum et al., 2017; Huang, 2016). Further research could, however, change this method of measurement and obtain different results. To re-iterate, this variable only gets a number for size if a religious group is participating in a MEC.

Using the same approach, a measure of the size of religious actors participating in violent resistance campaigns was created. While RELAC originally has 420 dyads, the collapsed RELAC dataset registered 257 Islamist- and 41 Evangelist claims in country-years over the 1975-2013 period. In 21 observations from Uganda and India, these two different sorts of claims were overlapping in a country-year. Where Islamist- and Evangelist claims have been made in the same country-year, the size of the religious actor stemming from the religious affiliation with the largest percentage of population was used to measure the size of the religious participator in the violent resistance campaign. For example, the size of the religious actor participating in Uganda in 2013 is coded as 84, because 84 percent of Uganda´s population are Christians. A total of 277 registered religious claims were coded into a measure of the size of the religious actor participating in each country, through interaction with the RCS data. The size is given in percentage of population, on a scale from 0 to 100.

4.3 Control variables

In order to test for the effects of the main variables, it is necessary to include control variables that can explain any relationship between religious participation in resistance campaigns and democracy. Here, the control-variables include democracy-level one year prior to the active campaign-year (t-1), GDP per capita, population, education, oil income per capita, and number of democracies in the region. Except for the variables measuring democracy, these control variables are derived from sources provided in the V-Dem expanded data version 7.1.

All models control for the level of democracy in the year before the observation year (t-1), as this can affect the level of democracy into the future (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011, p. 212). Countries that are already democratic when a resistance campaign occurs are more likely to remain democratic after the campaign ends, and find it easier to democratise further. There is also the possibility of ceiling effects where an already very democratic state cannot become much more democratic and vice versa. Hence, polyarchy-level one year prior to the observation-year is included as a control variable in the models examining polyarchy-levels into the future, while liberal democracy-level in the last year before the observation-year is included in the models examining levels of liberal democracy in the years following an active campaign-year. These were retrieved from the V-Dem country-year dataset version 7.1

(Coppedge, Gerring, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Fish, Glynn, Hicken, Knutsen, Krusell, et al., 2017).

Economic development fosters democracy (Diamond, 2008; Huntington, 1991a; Lipset, 1959), and this has been controlled for with Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, or the total output of a country divided by the number of people in the country (Bolt & van Zanden, 2014). To avoid challenges with highly skewed distributions, GDP per capita has been logged. The minimum and maximum coded values for GDP per capita (ln) are 5,3 and 10,5.

I also controlled for logged population in the country-year. The classical view is that population-size is inversely correlated with democracy (Colomer, 2007). Robert Dahl and Edward Tufte (1973) argue that community identity and consensus are easier to maintain in countries with a small population. As population-size increases, diversity of preferences, culture and language increase, thus increasing the chance of conflict and posing coordination problems that damages democratic prospects (Alesina, 2003, p. 304; Colomer, 2007, p. 58). However, John Gerring and Dominic Zarecki (2011, p. 7) present a different mechanism, saying that a larger population fosters democracy, partly due to greater capacity to contain conflicts once they erupt. In this thesis, I adopt the view developed by Gerring and Zarecki (2011), and control for (logged) population size (Goldewijk, Beusen and Janssen, 2010). Population (ln) measures the total population size, and is coded between 1,10 and 9,65.

In the last forty years, the developing world has become more democratic, more peaceful and wealthier. However, this is not the case for oil producing states. Oil producing countries such as Algeria and Iraq have suffered from decades of civil war, and may serve as examples of oil states that are no richer, no freer and no more peaceful than they were in 1980 (Ross, 2012, p. 1; Wenar, 2016, p. xv). Thus, what has been called the resource curse or the oil curse among political scientists is a common explanation for oil states being more likely to be authoritarian than non-oil states, as oil money are spent on weapons and repression. To control for this potentially damaging resource wealth, a measure of total oil income per capita has been included as a control variable (Haber & Menaldo, 2011). The variable has been logged to rescale the variable according to GDP per capita (ln), and to avoid highly skewed distributions. Thus, it has values between -4.09 and 11.27, and measures the real value of a

country´s petroleum production per capita. An increase in oil income per capita is assumed to be associated with a decrease in the level of democracy.

High educational standards are seen as a basic condition for democracy (Lipset, 1959, p. 86). Thus, an increase in levels of education is assumed to be associated with an increase in democracy. The "education" variable in this thesis measures the average year of education among citizens older than 15 years (Coppedge, Gerring, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Fish, Glynn, Hicken, Knutsen, Marquardt, et al., 2017, p. 376; clio-infra.eu). The minimum value registered at this variable is 0,02, while the maximum value is 13,48.

The policies of external actors are believed to cause an impact either for or against democracy, depending on external actors´ policies (Huntington, 1991a, p. 14). Diamond (2008, p. 52) suggests that popular mobilisation and protest as a model for democratic change may have the ability to move across borders. Moreover, Diamond (2010, p. 99) believes that external forces in the region may foster authoritarian governance. Thus, by examining the percentage of democracies in the region that a country resides (Haber & Menaldo, 2011), one should expect that a raise in the number of democracies in the region are associated with an increase in a country´s level of democracy. The measure is coded between 0 and 100.

4.4 Method of analysis and challenges related to regression

After merging the four datasets used as a basis for this thesis, I used OLS-regression analysis with polyarchy measured at t+1, t+5 and t+10 as dependent variable, and included all the independent variables explained in the research design-section above. The same was done with liberal democracy measured at t+1, t+5 and t+10 as dependent variable. The six regressions used to construct the results in this thesis have been modelled with standard errors clustered on the country. This way, the observations are treated independently across country-groups, while at the same time implying robust standard errors that relaxes the assumption that the error terms are independent of each other. The models were run in STATA version 14.2.

A standard OLS-regression with polyarchy (t+5) as a dependent variable was used to test for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity. A Woolridge test for autocorrelation in panel data was performed, giving a p-value of 0.00. Thus, autocorrelation was present in the model. The presence of autocorrelation can lead to heteroscedasticity, indicating that the model might predict some values of polyarchy (t+5) more precisely than others (Mehmetoglu & Jakobsen, 2017, p. 234). Therefore, the model was tested for heteroscedasticity, by running a Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test. The test gave a p-value of 0.00, meaning that the model had a problem with heteroscedasticity (Mehmetoglu & Jakobsen, 2017, p. 150). OLS-regressions assume that errors are independent of each other, and normally distributed. Hence, the tests suggest that the results might be biased. A likely source of this bias is unobserved and unobservable country variation. To mitigate this problem, I have used standard errors clustered on country, thus changing the standard errors such that the regressions can give reasonably accurate p-values (Mehmetoglu & Jakobsen, 2017, p. 235). In some robustness tests, I also used country fixed effects to isolate the over-time variation.

5.0 Results

The hypotheses in this thesis were tested with large-N data and quantitative methods. In this section I will first present some descriptive statistics, to give a first impression of what the empirical results say about the relationships between religious participation in resistance campaigns and democratisation in the years following resistance campaigns. Thereafter, the main results will be presented, displaying the results of the six regressions using clustered standard errors. Third, the relationship between democracy and religious participation by various sizes of religious actors is visualised, for religious participation in either nonviolent- or violent resistance campaigns. Fourth, the relationship between the control variables and democratisation into the future is discussed. Fifth, the limitations of the study and the need for further research are discussed.

5.1 A first look at religious actors´ impact on democratisation after campaigns

Table 1 presents the average score of polyarchy (t+5) in countries where small, medium, big or no religious actors participated in nonviolent or violent resistance campaigns. Participation from small religious groups are defined as religious actors that stem from a religious group consisting of less than 33 percent of the population in a given country. Participation from a medium-sized group is when religious actors stem from 33 percent or more of the population, but less than 66 percent. Participation from big religious groups is when religious actors stem from a religious group consisting of 66 per cent or more of the population. The table also shows the average polyarchy (t+5) score for countries where no religious participation in nonviolent and violent resistance campaigns occurred in the time-period 1975-2013.

Table 1: Average score of polyarchy (t+5) in countries where small, medium, big or no religious actor participated in ongoing nonviolent- or violent resistance campaigns.

Dependent variable (V-Dem): Average score on polyarchy (t+5)	Small religious actor participated	Medium religious actor participated	Big religious actor participated	No religious actor participated
Nonviolent resistance campaign (MEC)	0.42 (N=29)	0.53 (N=30)	0.52 (N=74)	0.49 (N=111)
Violent resistance campaign (UCDP)	0.64 (N=61)	0.58 (N=32)	0.26 (N=123)	0.38 (N=708)

5.1.1 The impact of religious participation in nonviolent campaigns

As seen in table 1, the average polyarchy score (t+5) in countries that have experienced religious participation in nonviolent resistance campaigns is lower for participation by small (0.42) compared to bigger groups (0.53 and 0.52). The score for small religious actors are below the 0.50-threshold for being considered an electoral democracy (Coppedge et al., 2016, p. 587). Thus, religious participation in nonviolent resistance campaigns with the target of regime change or secession seems on average to be associated with an authoritarian rule 5 years following a nonviolent campaign. In comparison, when medium or big religious actors participate in nonviolent resistance campaigns, the country will on average be associated with an electoral democracy. It is worth nothing that a size of more than 33 percent of the population seems on average to provide the capacity necessary for a religious actor to participate in imposing a level of polyarchy that on average is above the minimum democracy-threshold 5 years following a nonviolent resistance campaign.

The average score on polyarchy (t+5) for countries where no religious actor participated in nonviolent resistance campaigns lies between the scores for small and bigger religious actors, with a score at 0.49. The average score on polyarchy (t+5) for big participating actors is 0.03 points higher than the average for no religious participation in major nonviolent campaigns, showing that big religious actors can have a larger positive impact on democratisation in the years following nonviolent resistance campaigns, compared to no religious participation. The average score for big religious actors is 0.10 points larger for big religious actors participating in nonviolent resistance campaigns, compared to small actors. These numbers indicate that

big religious actors participating in nonviolent resistance campaigns may have a larger positive impact on democratisation in the years after the campaigns, compared to small actors. In figure 2, this impression is further strengthened. Corroborating theories on collective action and mass mobilisation, this can be seen as initial support for the notion that nonviolent resistance campaigns with the participation of large religious groups are more likely to increase democratisation, especially compared to movements with the support of small religious groups (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011; R. B. Collier & Mahoney, 1997; Dahlum et al., 2017; Haggard & Kaufmann, 2016; Karatnycky & Ackerman, 2005; Moore, 1966; Rueschemeyer et al., 1992).

Figure 2: Scatterplot of average score on polyarchy (t+5) (y-axis) and the size of religious actors participating in nonviolent resistance campaigns (x-axis) for the time-period 1975-2013. The line illustrates a linear prediction of the correlating values.

Figure 2 shows a scatterplot of the size of religious actors participating in nonviolent resistance campaigns and a country´s average score on polyarchy (t+5) for the time-period 1975-2013. Moreover, the figure presents a linear prediction based upon the correlation between them. The prediction-line has a steady increase in the average score of polyarchy (t+5) from just below 0.40 for the smallest actors participating in major nonviolent campaigns, up to more than the minimum democracy threshold of 0.50 for the largest religious actors that participate (Coppedge et al., 2016). Thus, the claim that the size of religious actors that participate in major nonviolent campaigns is important for

democratisation in the years following nonviolent resistance campaigns is further substantiated (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011; Dahlum et al., 2017; Toft et al., 2011). When the largest possible religious actors participate in major nonviolent campaigns, they are predicted to contribute to democratisation in the following years such that, on average, a minimum standard electoral democracy becomes the result. There are more points on the right side of the figure, telling us that big religious actors participate in nonviolent resistance campaigns with the target of regime change or secession more often than small religious actors. Also, the points on the right side seem to be farther away from the prediction line than the points on the left side, indicating a problem with heteroscedasticity.

5.1.2 The impact of religious participation in violent campaigns

The average score of polyarchy (t+5) is 0.64 in countries where religious actors participating in violent resistance campaigns stem from small religious groups, and is thus above the 0.50 threshold for being considered an electoral democracy (Coppedge et al., 2016, p. 587). The same accounts for medium religious actors, with a score at 0.58. Hence, small and medium religious groups participating in violent campaigns seem on average to be associated with democratic institutions 5 years into the future, such as free and fair elections of officials that are accountable to the citizens (Dahl, 1998, p. 85).

This is a surprising result. However, a closer look at the countries where small religious actors have participated in violent resistance campaigns reveals that in 83 active country-years only eight separate countries have experienced violent campaigns in the time-period 1975-2013. Out of these, more than half of the active observations stem from the consolidated democracies of United States and India, and the Philippines, which became democratised early in the time-period. These small religious actors participating in violent resistance campaigns in these democracies are probably unlikely to significantly change democratic institutions as they are unlikely to succeed in the first place. Instead, the causality might be reversed, such that small religious actors use antidemocratic violent means to promote their goals as they expect that participation in electoral politics will not pay-off (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011, p. 212; Dahl, 1998; Diamond, 2008; Toft et al., 2011, p. 30). Thus, it is democracy that causes small groups to opt for violence, not the other way around. Some democracies may also be more vulnerable to violent campaigns by smaller groups

(Chenoweth, 2010), although this is debated (Cederman, Gleditsch & Wucherpfennig, 2017). Another potential explanation is that small actors can use violent methods to voice their grievances and highlight the weaknesses of the power-sharing institutions in democratic countries that have institutions with democratic weaknesses (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011, p. 211).

Religious actors stemming from big religious groups that participate in violent conflicts have an average score of less than half of small actors, at 0.29. Thus, big religious actors participate in violent resistance campaigns that on average are rated as authoritarian 5 years after the observation-year. The numbers in Table 1 can give the expectation that an increase in the size of a religious actor participating in a violent resistance campaign is likely to be associated with a decrease in levels of democracy five years into the future. The prediction-line in Figure 3 indicates a negative impact on levels of polyarchy (t+5) when big religious actors participate in violent resistance campaigns. This suggests that when rebel groups that claim to represent big religious groups get involved in violent resistance campaigns, the democracy score is expected to decline significantly in the years following the campaigns. If one compares the prediction line in Figure 2 and Figure 3, it is expected that big groups using violent tactics will have a much more negative impact on levels of democracy than groups of the same size using nonviolent tactics.

In Figure 3, it can be seen that a religious actor stemming from a religious group consisting of less than 15 percent of the population is predicted to be associated with a score on polyarchy (t+5) above 0.60. In comparison, a religious actor stemming from a religious group consisting of more than 85 per cent of the population is predicted to be associated with a polyarchy (t+5)-score below 0.35. Again, challenges with heteroscedasticity can be spotted in the scatterplot, as the points seem to deviate quite a lot at the left side of the figure, while the points at the right side are closer to the prediction line. This challenge is minimised in the regressions by using clustered standard errors.

Figure 3: Scatterplot of average score on polyarchy (t+5) (y-axis) and the size of religious actors participating in violent resistance campaigns (x-axis) for the time-period 1975-2013.

5.2 Modelling the impact of religious participation in resistance campaigns

In this section I will present Table 2 (see Table 2). This table contains the main results of the six regressions with standard errors clustered on country. These are presented as six separate models, where each model examines the impact of religious participation in resistance campaigns on democratisation in the years following the observation-year. The impact of the independent variables on levels of polyarchy (t+1), (t+5), (t+10) and liberal democracy (t+1), (t+5) and (t+10) years into the future are discussed in the following order: occurrence of nonviolent resistance campaign, religious participation in nonviolent resistance campaigns, the size of religious actor participating in nonviolent conflict, occurrence of violent resistance campaign, religious participation in violent resistance campaigns and the size of religious actor participating in violent conflict. The results related to the control variables used in the six models are discussed in section 5.4

5.2.1 The impact of nonviolent resistance campaigns on post-conflict democratisation

As seen in table 2, the occurrence of a nonviolent resistance campaign has a positive and statistically significant association with level of democracy in the years following the campaign-year. These results corroborate others (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2006; Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011; R. B. Collier & Mahoney, 1997; Dahlum et al., 2017; Gleditsch & Rivera Celestino, 2013; Karatnycky & Ackerman, 2005; Rueschemeyer et al., 1992). The significance at 1%- and 5%-level for five of the six models suggests, in line with previous research, that civic forces can have a positive effect on democratisation through mass protest for regime change or secession.

Thus, through actions of collective dissent, civic actors may force through pro-social reforms and establish democratic structures, such as free, fair and frequent elections. These are seen as basic and necessary structures for a democratic system to exist (Dahl, 1998; Schumpeter, 1943; Stepan, 2000). The results in table 2 indicate that countries experiencing nonviolent collective dissent of this sort are more likely to develop the structures necessary for a polyarchy to exist 1, 5 and 10 years into the future. The positive and statistically significant association between nonviolent resistance campaigns and liberal democracy 5 and 10 years after the campaign-year tells us that resistance by non-cooperation and disobedience can be efficient means for strengthening democratic values necessary for a liberal democracy to foster (Diamond, 2008, p. 22).

Hence, it seems like nonviolent resistance campaigns have the ability to cut off the power from a country´s power-holder, and inflict costs that forces the power-holder to concede some level of democracy to the country´s citizens (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011; Sharp, 1973), and force the leaders to adjust their level of cooperation with the civic forces (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2006; Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011; de Mesquita & Smith, 2011; Diamond, 2008). As a result, major nonviolent resistance campaigns increase the chances of a country to transition into a democracy.

Table 2: Results from OLS-regressions with standard errors clustered on country, showing the impact of religious participation in resistance campaigns on democratisation in the years following the observation-year for the time-period 1975-2013.

Timespan: 1975-2013	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Dependent variable (V-Dem)	Polyarchy (t+1)	Polyarchy (t+5)	Polyarchy (t+10)	Liberal democracy (t+1)	Liberal democracy (t+5)	Liberal democracy (t+10)
Nonviolent resistance campaign (MEC)	0.04***	0.11***	0.09***	0.02	0.07***	0.06**
	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Nonviolent religious participation	-0.03	-0.08*	-0.02	-0.04	-0.07*	-0.02
	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Size of nonviolent religious participator (%)	0.00	0.00***	0.00*	0.00**	0.00***	0.00*
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Violent resistance campaign (UCDP)	-0.01**	-0.01	-0.01	-0.02**	-0.02*	-0.02
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Violent religious participation	-0.01	-0.02	-0.07	-0.01	-0.02	-0.06
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.06)
Size of violent religious participator (%)	0.00	0.05	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Polyarchy (t-1)	0.92***	0.78***	0.65***	-	-	-
	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.05)	-	-	-

Liberal democracy (t)	-	-	-	0.80***	0.69***	0.58***
	-	-	-	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.05)
GDP per capita (ln)	0.00	0.01	0.02*	0.03***	0.04***	0.05***
	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Population (ln)	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.00	-0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)
Oil income per capita (ln)	-0.00***	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.00***	-0.01***	-0.01***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Education	0.00	0.00	0.01	-0.00	0.00	0.01
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Democracies in region (%)	0.00***	0.00***	0.00	0.00**	0.00**	0.00
	(0.06)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Constant	0.01	0.00	-0.02	-0.23***	-0.27***	-0.32***
	(0.03)	(0.07)	(0.12)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.12)
Countries	148	148	148	148	148	148
Observations	4,092	4,092	4,092	4,092	4,092	4,092
R-squared	0.937	0.838	0.743	0.918	0.844	0.768

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

5.2.2 The impact of religious actors´ participation in nonviolent resistance campaigns

Religious participation in nonviolent resistance campaigns has a negative association with democracy in all 6 models. However, the association is insignificant in four of them, namely model 1, 3, 4 and 6. Thus, a religious actor´s participation, independent of the size of the group that the actor stem from, does neither undermine nor contribute to the level of democracy in the years following a campaign-year. Notably, five of the coefficients related to nonviolent religious participation indicate a smaller negative effect than the coefficients for the variable measuring the significant positive effect of nonviolent resistance campaigns. Hence, the results indicate that religious participation does not add any significant contribution to the democracy-score once the effect of a major nonviolent campaign has been accounted for. These results indicate that major nonviolent campaigns can be able to gain mass support and mobilise enough dissidents to pressure transition regimes to strive towards democracy irrespectively of whether religious actors participate or not.

However, the association is negative in model 2 and 5, and is significant at a 10%-level. The results in model 2 and 5 can be interpreted to indicate that religious participation in major nonviolent campaigns may have a slight negative impact on democratisation 5 years after the campaign, but this result is not robust across specifications.

5.2.3 The size of religious actors matters for post-conflict democratisation

The size of religious actors participating in nonviolent resistance campaigns is positively associated with democratisation in the years after the observation-year. This is the case for both polyarchy and liberal democracy. All the three estimations of liberal democracy, 1, 5 and 10 years following the campaign-year are statistically significant. Thus, the size of religious actors participating has a positive impact on short-term, as well as long-term levels of liberal democracy. The size of religious actor´s participation in major nonviolent campaigns also has a positive and statistically significant impact on levels of polyarchy 5 and 10 years following a campaign-year. Therefore, the evidence indicates that religious actors with a large mobilisation pool are likely to have a positive impact on democratisation into the future, thus substantiating the argument of this thesis and others about large civic actor´s potential for being drivers of democratisation (Cederman et al., 2010; Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011; R. B. Collier & Mahoney, 1997; Dahlum et al., 2017; Karatnycky & Ackerman, 2005).

Thus, the results suggest that big religious actors are motivated to strive towards development of polyarchy and liberal democracy 5 and 10 years after the active campaign-year, and they have the necessary capacity to enforce democratisation. Norms and trust are often based on religious texts and traditions which are included when developing one or another posture towards the governing regime (Philpott, 2007, p. 505). Religious actors holding a political theology that favour peace, nonviolence and religious freedom are likely to choose nonviolent tactics that are compatible with their political theology (Dahl, 1998; Diamond, 2008; Philpott, 2007; Toft et al., 2011, p. 30). One of the explanations behind big religious actor´s positive impact on democratisation in the years following a campaign-year can be that big religious actors have preferences for democracy in general (Driessen, 2017, p. 3; Haynes & Ben-Porat, 2013, p. 155) as they are likely to see their interests protected in a democracy, and their size provides them the capacity to enforce their preferences (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011; Dahlum et al., 2017, p. 11). Small religious actors might have the same preferences as big actors, but they do not seem to have the capacity to enforce democratisation.

This argument gains further momentum, as we now know that the size of religious actors matters for the opportunities of achieving democracy in the years after a nonviolent resistance campaign. When engaging in a nonviolent resistance campaign sustained levels of high mobilisation are important to enforce democracy in a transitional regime (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011), and the structure of religious institutions can contribute to overcome commitment problems between actors trying to achieve this goal (Kalyvas, 2000). Moreover, religious institutions can be useful both during - and in the aftermath - of a campaign, giving opportunity to draw upon pre-existing infrastructure consisting of information channels, shared norms, trust and reciprocity (Butcher & Svensson, 2014; Gould, 1993; McAdam, Tarrow & Tilly, 2001; Tarrow, 2011; Weinstein, 2006). These assets can increase the participation further, and contribute to enhanced resilience, higher probabilities of tactical variance and innovation, and increased likeliness of loyalty shifts within the regime during the campaign (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011, p. 10). All of these factors are potential benefits from having a large mobilisation pool, increasing a religious actor´s capacity to bring about democracy.

The implication of these results is that actors from large religious groups in favour of polyarchy are likely to promote a democratic system where officials must be elected by citizens, and are held accountable to them through the constitution (Dahl, 1998, p. 90). Their positive attitude towards liberal democracy is likely to build on and foster essential values associated with a liberal democracy, such as the universal value of liberty, religious freedom and the need for judicial constraints on the executives to provide legal equality to all citizens (Diamond, 2008, p. 22).

It is worth noting a substantial difference between polyarchy and liberal democracy in the results. The size of religious actors participating in nonviolent resistance campaigns has an insignificant and positive influence on polyarchy 1 year post-conflict, while the size of religious actors participating has a significantly positive impact on levels of liberal democracy 1-year into the future. Thus, the short-term effects of large-sized religious actors participating in nonviolent campaigns are more constructive for liberal democracy than for polyarchy. This is interesting, as it implies that large-sized religious actors seem to succeed in the implementation of democratic universal values such as liberty and social rights to a higher degree, while the implementation of democratic structures seems to be unaffected (Dahl, 1998; Diamond, 2008). These results can therefore be a consequence of religious actors´ work to improve values such as religious or political freedom.

5.2.4 The impact of violent resistance campaigns on democratisation into the future

All the six regression-models show a negative association between violent resistance campaigns and democratisation in the years following the observation-year. The negative impact is statistically significant in the short-term for both polyarchy (t+1) and liberal democracy (t+1) at a 5%-level, and for liberal democracy (t+5) at a 10%-level. This strengthens the stand that violent insurgencies are likely to be associated with deepening authoritarianism and repression, causing democratic backslide (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011, p. 209). Thus, the use of violent methods does not seem to be suitable for promoting democratisation in the years following a campaign, when compared to nonviolent methods.

As a consequence, it is possible to conclude that democratic practices and values of liberty and equality are likely to be restricted in a country 1 year and 5 years into the future after an ongoing violent resistance campaign (Diamond, 2008, p. 22). This is likely to be the result of an authoritarian regime´s coercion and repression to limit the violent dissidents´ political uprising and to avoid further insurgencies (Haggard & Kaufmann, 2016, p. 65). Alternatively, it could be the result of the new elite governing the transitional regime being forced to embrace authoritarian methods of coercion and violence to remain in power (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011, p. 212). Either way, the governing elite´s position as rulers in the years following the campaign-year are likely to be further strengthened by these means, at the cost of democracy (de Mesquita & Smith, 2011, p. 9).

5.2.5 The impact of religious actors´ participation in violent resistance campaigns

Religious participation in violent resistance campaigns has a negative association with both polyarchy and liberal democracy 1, 5 and 10 years after an observation-year. The association is insignificant in all the six models in table 2. These results indicate that religious actor´s participation in violent resistance campaigns does not add any significant contribution to the levels of democracy in the years following the observation-year once the effect of violent resistance campaigns has been accounted for. Thus, a violent resistance campaign is likely to lead to a negative impact on levels of polyarchy 1-year following an active campaign-year, and liberal democracy 1 and 5 years after the observation-year, irrespective of whether religious actors participate in the campaign or not.

In general, the use of violent methods to attempt to force through regime change or territorial independence can be seen as incompatible with democratic values, such as confidence in a country´s political and economic system (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011, p. 205). In addition, religious actors that support the use of violent methods to achieve regime change or secession may be more likely to have nondemocratic political theologies as well (Toft et al., 2011, p. 30). Religious actors that choose violent methods in the struggle towards regime change are potentially more likely to actively obstruct democratisation than to foster it one year into the future, substantiating findings by Toft et al. (2011, p. 107). However, it is important to make clear that this is likely to be the case irrespective of whether it is a religious or another civil actor that participates in a violent resistance campaign.

5.2.6 The size of religious actors does not matter for democratisation in the following years

Despite positive coefficients, the size of religious actors participating in violent resistance campaigns does not have any significant impact on the development of democracy, neither for polyarchy nor liberal democracy 1, 5 or 10 years following the campaign. Thus, the evidence does *not* support the hypotheses saying that religious actors that stem from big religious groups that participate in a violent resistance campaign are expected to be associated with a decrease in levels of democracy in the years following the campaign-year. Instead, in the years following a violent resistance campaign the pressure on the ruling elites to strive towards either authoritarianism or democracy seems to be either weak or absent, while the elites seem to be satisfied with status quo. These findings can be seen as weakening the argument that violent religious actors from big religious groups are likely to have authoritarian motives. However, religious actors that use antidemocratic violent means and at the same time promote an increased role of religion in the state are likely to have a political theology that are more compatible with authoritarianism than with democracy, as violent resistance campaigns still have a negative association with democratisation in the years following the campaigns (Dahl, 1998; Diamond, 2008; Philpott, 2007; Toft et al., 2011).

The results can also be explained by religious actors´ lack of capacity to promote their preferences through participation in violent resistance campaigns. Religious actors recruiting dissidents for participation in violent resistance campaigns are more likely to struggle with moral, physical, informational and commitments barriers, compared to religious actors recruiting for participation in nonviolent resistance campaigns (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011, p. 10). Thus, violent insurgencies are still likely to be driven by a relatively small number of fighters, irrespective of the size of the religious group that participating religious actors stem from (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011, p. 207). Violent campaigns are therefore likely to lack the mass support needed to achieve participation advantages. Hence, religious actors stemming from big religious groups participating in violent resistance campaigns does not necessarily lead to a strong and collective civic resistance with the capacity to bring about authoritarianism (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011, p. 204; Dahlum et al., 2017).

5.3 Illustrating the impact of religious participation in resistance campaigns

In this section I will illustrate the impact of religious actor´s participation in nonviolent- and violent resistance campaigns on democratisation in the years following the resistance campaigns. To do this, I have filled in actual data for two countries in model 2, before adjusting the size of the religious group that the religious actors stem from. This way, the polyarchy-score 5 years after the observation-year has been predicted for different sizes of the religious actors. The data for Egypt in 2005 has been used as an example of a nonviolent resistance campaign with the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood as a participating religious actor. Data for Syria in 1982 has been used as an example of a violent resistance campaign, with the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood as a participating religious actor.

5.3.1 Illustrating the impact of size of a religious participator in a nonviolent campaign

In 2005, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood demonstrated organisational strength and public popularity through winning 88 seats in the Egyptian parliamentary election (Kaye et al., 2008, p. 34). As a typical response from an authoritarian regime, the regime initiated targeted legal changes and coercive measures towards leaders and lay members of the Muslim Brotherhood, who engaged in a nonviolent resistance campaign towards the regime. The Muslim Brotherhood stems from the same religious group as 88 per cent of the Egyptian population (Brown & James, 2017), thus it is conceived as a religious actor that stems from a large religious group. In Figure 4 the impact of the Muslim Brotherhood´s participation in the nonviolent resistance campaign in Egypt 2005 on democratisation is illustrated according to model 2 from table 2 (using polyarchy (t+5)). The figure also illustrates the predicted impact on democratisation in the years following the campaign-year if the Muslim Brotherhood´s underlying religious group had been smaller or larger.

To create Figure 4, I used the setx-command in STATA, with MEC=1, nonviolent religious participation = 1, UCDP=0, violent religious participation=0, polyarchy (t-1)=0.21, GDP per capita (ln)=8.16, population (ln)=18.16, oil-income per capita (ln)=5.44, education=7.16 and percentage of democratic neighbours in region=11.11. The size of nonviolent religious participation was set to 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80, 90 and 100.

Figure 4: How various sizes of religious participation (%) in the nonviolent resistance campaign in Egypt 2005 could have affected democratisation 5 years after the resistance campaign in the country, according to model 2.

As seen in Figure 4, the mean score on polyarchy (t+5) is predicted to be approximately 0.32 in Egypt for the year 2005 if the Muslim Brotherhood had consisted of 10 per cent of the population. The figure illustrates a steady increase in mean score on polyarchy (t+5) as the hypothetical size of the Muslim Brotherhood increases. Had the Muslim Brotherhood stemmed from 50 percent of the population, the predicted mean score on polyarchy (t+5) would have been 0.40. If the Muslim population had stemmed from a religious group that encompassed the entire population, the predicted score after the Muslim Brotherhood´s participation in a nonviolent resistance campaign would have been just above the 0.50-threshold for being a minimum polyarchy (Coppedge et al., 2016).

Thus, Figure 4 illustrates that the size of the religious actor can be influential in deciding whether the outcome will be a transition to electoral democracy or not 5 years after the campaign-year. Thus, the figure gives sustenance to the people and pundits that expressed hope and optimism regarding the prospects for transitions towards democracy in the Arab world after the Arab spring. However, Egypt´s actual score on polyarchy (t+5) for the year

2005, thus, being the score for polyarchy (t) in 2010, was 0.22. The predicted score according to model 2 would have been 0.48. Hence, there is a negative 0.26 divergence between the predicted and the actual value, potentially indicating a closing of the window of opportunity for imposing democracy in Egypt (Karl, 2005; Masoud, 2015, p. 75). It should however be taken into consideration that in the following years Egypt´s polyarchy-scores experienced a jump up, leaving it at 0.37 for 2012.

5.3.2 Illustrating the impact of size of a religious participator in a violent campaign

In 1982, the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood led an insurgency against the Assad-regime, but the revolt was brutally suppressed by the regime in the Syrian city of Hama (Doran & Shaikh, 2011, p. 231). 90 per cent of the Syrian population were Muslims at the time, thus providing a substantial mobilisation pool for the Muslim Brotherhood. In Figure 5 the impact of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood´s participation in the violent resistance campaign in 1982 on democratisation 5 years after the observation-year is illustrated according to model 2 (polyarchy (t+5)). The figure also illustrates predictions of the impact on democratisation in the years following the observation-year if the Muslim Brotherhood´s underlying religious group had been smaller or larger.

Using the setx-command, I set UCDP=1, violent religious participation=1, MEC=0, nonviolent religious participation=0, polyarchy (t-1)=0.16, GDP per capita (ln)=8.8226, population (ln)=16.09, oil-income per capita (ln)=6.06, education=4.40 and percentage of democratic neighbours in region=0. The size of violent religious participation was set to 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80, 90 and 100.

Figure 5: How various sizes of religious participation (%) in the violent resistance campaign in Syria 1982 could have affected democratisation 5 years after the resistance campaign in the country, according to model 2.

As seen in Figure 5, the impact of the Muslim Brotherhood´s participation in the violent resistance campaign are not significantly different with a size of 10 per cent, compared to 100 percent. If the Muslim Brotherhood had stemmed from a religious group of 10 percent of the population, the mean score on polyarchy 5 years after the observation-year would have been 0.18. The predicted score would have been a little higher if they had stemmed from a religious group consisting of 100 percent of the population, but is still rounded off to 0.18. While the predicted score on polyarchy (t+5) for Syria in 1982 is 0.18, their actual score was 0.16, thus diverging by only 0.02.

5.4 How the control variables impact future levels of democracy

Polyarchy (t-1) was included as a control variable in model 1-3, while levels of liberal democracy (t-1) were included in model 4-6. These control variables have a positive and significant association with the level of polyarchy and liberal democracy 1, 5 and 10 years following the observation-year. Thus, the results for these two control variables are in line with the expectation that the former level of democracy is important for the level of

democracy in the future. An increase in the level of democracy one-year prior to a campaign increases the likelihood that the country will experience further democratisation in the future. Therefore, countries that are already democratic when a resistance campaign erupts are more likely to remain democratic after the campaign has ended (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011, p. 212).

The association between polyarchy 10 years into the future and GDP per capita is positive and significant at a 10%-level. Therefore, the claim that higher levels of GDP per capita are associated with higher levels of polyarchy in the years following an active campaign-year is strengthened. Levels of GDP per capita have a greater impact on levels of liberal democracy 1, 5 and 10 years into the future, being positive and statistically significant at a 1%-level, compared to the impact on polyarchy for the same years. It appears that economic development fosters both electoral- and liberal democracy, but it is particularly important for the development of universal values such as the people´s appreciation of popular sovereignty, freedom, rule of law, and accountability of rulers (Diamond, 2008; Huntington, 1991a; Lipset, 1959). Even though the scores are positive, GDP per capita does not have any significant effect on levels of polyarchy 1 and 5 years into the future. This is not in line with what was expected, as economic development is seen as basic conditions facilitating democratisation (Lipset, 1959, p. 86). These results might indicate that economic development does not automatically evolve and consolidate electoral democracy 1 and 5 years into the future, even though it increases the opportunities for fostering liberal democracy (Przeworski & Limongi, 1997).

Following both the classical and the modern view on the association between population size and democracy, it is a bit surprising that an increase in the size of population does not have any significant impact on levels of either polyarchy or liberal democracy 1, 5 and 10 years into the future. These results indicate that small-sized populations do not necessarily make it easier to produce consensual and democratic solutions, as predicted by Dahl and Tufte (1973). The insignificant effect of population-size also indicates that large populations do not necessarily handle campaigns in a more democratic manner than small populations, as suggested by Gerring and Zarecki (2011). One explanation for this can be that both democracies and authoritarian regimes have the ability to rule in an effective way, for

example by fostering economic development, to engender legitimacy as the most appropriate political system in a country (Lipset, 1959, p. 86). Hence, other factors such as GDP per capita or oil income can be more relevant factors for explaining democratic development, rather than the size of a population.

The relationship between oil income per capita and both polyarchy and liberal democracy 1, 5 and 10 years into the future is negative and statistically significant at a 1%-level. Thus, the results corroborate earlier research regarding the damaging impact of the oil curse on democratic development (Ross, 2012; Wenar, 2016). Oil-money is likely to sponsor authoritarian regimes´ weapons, repression and coercion of the people, and foster incumbent´s position as authoritarian rulers.

Although high educational standards are seen as a basic condition that facilitates democracy (Lipset, 1959), the results in table 2 indicate that education does not have any statistically significant impact on level of polyarchy or liberal democracy 1, 5 and 10 years into the future. This is somewhat surprising. A possible explanation can be that other factors will be more important in determining future political institutions than the educational standards and in this thesis, the nature of mass mobilisation appears to play a stronger role. Moreover, education may cause nonviolent campaigns in the first place, which further can foster democratisation (Butcher & Svensson, 2016).

An increase in the percentage of democracies in the region has a positive and significant impact on levels of polyarchy 1 and 5 years into the future at a 1%-level and at a 5%-level for liberal democracy in the same years. These results indicate that external actors are likely to cause an impact on prospects of democratisation, depending on the policies of the external actors (Huntington, 1991b, p. 14). They strengthen the notion that external forces in a region dominated by a high percentage of authoritarian regimes are likely to foster authoritarian governance in neighbouring countries in the aftermath of a resistance campaign in the region (Diamond, 2010). It should however be noted that the percentage of democracies in a region does not have any significant impact on levels of polyarchy or liberal democracy 10 years into the future, thus indicating that other factors such as GDP per capita might be more important in the long run.

It should also be noted that the constant is insignificant and varies between positive and negative values for polyarchy (t+1), (t+5) and (t+10). However, the constant is negative and significant for liberal democracy (t+1), (t+5) and (t+10), indicating that the average value for the different liberal democracy estimates would have a negative intercept if all the independent values where set to 0. As the variable measuring liberal democracy is continuous between 0-1, these constants indicate that any combination of the independent variables will have to contribute with a positive addition to the average score on liberal democracy (t+1), (t+5) and (t+10), to make the prediction-line cross the lowest possible level of liberal democracy.

5.5 On the limitations of this study and the need for further research

In this thesis, the size of religious actors participating in resistance campaigns have been measured as a percentage of the total population in a country, based on the size of the religious group that a religious actor stem from. It is not the case that all the civilians that stem from a specific religious affiliation will be both willing and capable of participating in a violent or nonviolent resistance campaign. The empirical link between religious actor´s participation and religious group size is fairly weak, and this measure limits the study´s validity regarding how large the participation in a resistance campaign actually is. Further research should try to measure the size of participation in a more precise manner, even if this can be challenging, especially when measuring the size of religious actors that participate in violent conflicts.

Along similar lines, I have not examined religious actor´s ability to mobilise dissidents. Previous research has found that the structure of religious institutions is a key factor for democratisation. Centralised, autocratic and hierarchical religious structures are likely to contribute to overcome commitment problems between actors trying to implement democracy, such as by Catholics in Belgium from 1870-1884 (Kalyvas, 2000, p. 381). Ironically, decentralised and democratic religious structures may hinder democratisation, as the impact by Islamic Salvation Front was in Algeria from 1988-1992 (Kalyvas, 2000, p. 393). Hence, in the future, it can be interesting to analyse whether the structure of religious

63

institutions may have an impact on religious actor´s ability to mobilise dissidents, through overcoming commitment problems between actors.

I also have not tested the effects of religious participation on other aspects of democracy. Advocates of participatory democracy have prescribed it as a key to a more democratic future (Held, 2006, p. 211). A participatory democracy is grounded on the idea that the people should be consulted about more than regarding which officials should take office. By frequent and direct consultation civilian actors can be given the opportunity to participate in the choice of both policy leaders and policy, and thus participate in deciding the substance of what is to be done (Fishkin, 2009, p. 76). Hence, future research can benefit from examining how religious actor´s participation in resistance campaigns impact levels of participatory democracy in the years following the campaign-year, to explore civilian actors´ opportunities to develop a democratic system that inherently demands a high level of participation from the civil society.

All studies are limited in relation to which control variables they do not or cannot control for. In this thesis, it could have been interesting to control for how autocratic regime-type may have an impact on whether religious actors choose nonviolent- or violent tactics (Cunningham, 2013), and whether regime type impacts levels of coercion and repression in the years following an active campaign-year. For example, the campaign in Syria in 1982 used to illustrate the impact of size of a religious participator in a violent resistance campaigns, can be interpreted as a resistance campaign where the autocratic regime forced the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood into using violent tactics through brutal suppression, while the Muslim Brotherhood might have preferred nonviolent tactics. In addition, countries with big groups are more likely to have participation by big groups, and a variable controlling for the size of the biggest religious groups in each country-year should have been included, as it also affects the strategic choice of nonviolent- or violent tactics (Cunningham, 2013). Moreover, the relationship between state authority and religious authority can impact opportunities for democratisation (Butcher & Svensson, 2014; Huntington, 1991b; Toft, Philpott & Shah, 2011, p. 32). Thus, in future research it should be examined how the size of religious actors participating in nonviolent- or violent resistance campaigns impact opportunities of democratisation at various levels of government involvement in religion.

6.0 Conclusion

This thesis has contributed with new theory on the relationship between religious actors´ participation in resistance campaigns and democratisation, and presents new empirical analyses in the research area by using cross-national data for the time-period 1975-2013. The main arguments behind the hypotheses made in this thesis claim that religious actors can have motivation and capacity, through their political theology and ability to mass mobilise dissidents, to enforce either democratisation or authoritarianism in the years following an active campaign-year.

The main results indicate that nonviolent resistance campaigns have a significantly positive impact on democratisation in the years following a campaign-year. While religious actors participating in nonviolent campaigns do not seem to impact the prospects of future democratisation *per se*, the participation of big religious actors in nonviolent resistance campaigns significantly increases the likelihood of democratisation. These findings substantiate the main arguments in this thesis, as big religious actors can have both motivation and capacity to enforce a transitional regime into post-campaign democratisation, thus corroborating other scholars´ work on democratisation through collective action and mass mobilisation (Cederman et al., 2010; Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011; R. B. Collier & Mahoney, 1997; Dahlum et al., 2017; Haggard & Kaufmann, 2016; Huang, 2016; Karatnycky & Ackerman, 2005; Moore, 1966; Rueschemeyer et al., 1992; Wood, 2000).

Violent resistance campaigns are found to have a significantly negative impact on democratisation in the years following an active campaign-year, especially for liberal democratic values, thus increasing a country´s chance of backsliding into authoritarianism (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011, p. 209). This is likely to be the case irrespective of whether a religious actor participate in the campaign or not, as religious participation does not have any significant impact on democratisation in the years following an active campaign-year. Thus, religious actors that participate in violent resistance campaigns seem to either lack preferences for democratic institutions and values or the capacity to compel states to create them and enforce them, or both.

6.1 Applying the results on the Arab countries

As big religious actors participating in nonviolent resistance campaigns seem to be motivated and capable of developing liberal democracy, their participation is associated with development of values such as liberty and religious freedom. These results stand in contrast to arguments claiming that support of democracy in Muslim majority countries is based on an understanding of democracy that is inconsistent with values of liberty and social rights (de Rigt, 2013; Inglehart & Norris, 2003). The results in this thesis indicate that big religious actors that engage in collective action but refrain from violence can positively influence the development of these values. If big religious actors participate in nonviolent resistance campaigns in Muslim majority countries, they may develop an understanding and a support for democracy that are more consistent with the liberal democratic values of liberty and social rights (Diamond, 2008, p.22). To test this argument, I tested for religious group fixed effects, and find that big Muslim actors do not have any significantly different impact on democratisation in the years following a nonviolent campaign compared to religious actors that stem from Christian, Buddhist or Hindu groups. Thus, big religious actors participating in nonviolent resistance campaigns can increase the opportunities of developing liberal democracies in the Arab countries, which are mainly Muslim majority countries.

The different results regarding the impact of nonviolent- versus violent resistance campaigns on democratisation in the years following an observation-year clearly indicate that civic actors that are advocates of democracy will be more likely to succeed if they choose the nonviolent path. In the dataset underlying this thesis, religious actors participate in more than three times as many active violent resistance campaign-years in the 21 countries that the World Bank Group (2017) define as the Middle East and North Africa, compared to nonviolent campaigns. Moreover, in the time-period 1975-2013, the size of the religious actors participating in resistance campaigns in all the Arab-countries have been bigger than fifty per cent. According to Butcher and Svensson (2014, p. 37) large groups become more likely to use violent tactics to resist the state as religious authorities and state authorities becomes more integrated. Their argument is that religious integration reduces the utility of nonviolent tactics, and thus forces the religious groups to switch to violent tactics. It should be noted that the validity of this argument has not been tested here, but these statistics can be interpreted as supportive of their argument.

The results imply that 1 and 5 years following an active violent resistance campaign, the elite´s position as rulers will be strengthened. Their strengthened position can be part of the explanation for why the long-term impact is insignificant for both polyarchy (t+10) and liberal democracy (t+10). As the elites recover their position as uncontested rulers, they are likely to do a new risk analysis. If they have succeeded in repressing all potential political threats, they are likely to go back to doing what Arab authoritarian rulers do best, namely govern through a combination of coercion and co-optation (Diamond, 2010, p. 99). This way, they can deflect opposition from below and maintain their position as incumbents (Haggard & Kaufmann, 2016, p. 62).

As the results indicate that the size of religious actors participating in violent resistance campaigns does not matter for democratisation in the years following the campaign-year, I believe violent civil uprisings to be short-lived, and followed by a decline of the civilians´ importance for a transition as rebel groups lose their significance in the period after the campaign (O´Donnell & Schmitter, 1986, p. 90). Therefore, in the following years after a violent campaign government transitions will be an elite affair, where the elites are likely to choose an authoritarian regime to stay in power (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2006; de Mesquita & Smith, 2011; Huang, 2016). The elites will only democratise if they evaluate international leverage and linkage to provide them with more to gain by transitioning to democracy (Levitsky & Way, 2006). Both linkage and leverage is low in the Middle East, which can be a partial explanation for the democracy gap in the region of the world where religious armed conflict is most prominent (Svensson, 2013; Svensson & Nilsson, 2017).

A combination of climate changes and technological development can lead to a decrease in the importance of oil in the following years, thus possibly changing the interests of the major powers that today foster authoritarian statecraft in the Arab region through sponsoring weapons and repression (Diamond, 2010, p. 100; Wenar, 2016). This can increase the chances of elite-led transitions towards democracy, as the pressure from external forces is changing. However, religious or other civic actors that are looking to enforce democratisation in the Arab region seems to be more likely to accomplish their targets by engaging in mass mobilisation and collective action using nonviolent means.

6.2 Robustness tests

To evaluate my models from Table 2, I first used the test-function in STATA to see if there was a significant impact of active MEC-years, by testing MEC=1 in the six regression models with standard errors clustered on country. Afterwards, the same was done with UCDP=1. All the twelve tests indicated that the six models were statistically significant, thus corroborating the main results.

As a robustness test, the six models presented in Table 2 were re-tested using country fixed effects with clustered standard errors. The results from this test mainly corroborate the findings in this thesis. I consistently find that the occurrence of major nonviolent resistance campaigns has a positive impact on democratisation in the year following an observation-year, and that big religious actors participating in nonviolent resistance campaigns increase the likelihood of democratisation in the following years. Violent resistance campaigns have a negative impact on democratisation in following years, and religious actors´ participation in such violent conflicts do not seem to add any significant contribution to future democratisation.

There is, however, a difference between the country fixed effects models and the models in table 2, as the impact of participating religious actors´ size becomes statistically significantly positive for the three polyarchy-models. Hence, the association between the size of religious actors participating in violent resistance campaigns and democratisation in the following years seems to be test-sensitive, with changes in significance depending on the method of modelling. Religious participation in resistance campaigns is a rare event (Butcher & Svensson, 2014, p. 37). Therefore, the analysis in this thesis depends upon a small number of observations of active resistance campaigns. While the results on religious participation in nonviolent resistance campaigns are robust, the small number of cases where religious actors participate in violent insurgencies is likely to impact the results when using quantitative methods. Hence, the results should be interpreted as suggestive when predicting the impact of various sizes of religious actors participating in violent campaigns on democratisation in the years following the observation-year. In a thesis of this length, it is difficult to explore these results further.

7.0 Literature

Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J. A. (2006). *Economic origins of dictatorship and democracy*.

Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J. A. (2012). *Why nations fail*. London: Profile Books.

Akbaba, Y., & Taydas, Z. (2011). Does religious discrimination promote dissent? A quantitative analysis. *Ethnopolitics, 10*(3-4), 271-295. doi: 10.1080/17449057.2011.561988

Alesina, A. (2003). The size of countries - Does it matter? *Journal of the European Economic Association, 1*(2), 301-316.

Allanson, M., Melander, E., & Themnér, L. (2017). Organized violence, 1989-2016. *Journal of Peace Research, 54*(4), 574-587. doi: 10.1177/0022343317718773

Alston, W. P. (1998). Religion, history of philosophy of. *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Retrieved 19 Oct. 2017, from https://http://www. rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/religion-history-of-philosophy-of/v-1/sections/what-is-philosophy-of-religion. doi:10.4324/9780415249126-K067-1

Bayer, M., Bethke, F. S., & Lambach, D. (2016). The democratic dividend of nonviolent resistance. *Journal of Peace Research, 53*(6), 758-771.

Boix, C. (2003). *Democracy and redistribution*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Bolt, J., van Zanden, J. L. (2014). The Maddison Project - Collaborative research on historical national accounts. *The Economic History Review 67*(3), 627–651.

Brown, D., & James, P. (2017). The religious characteristics of states - Classic themes and new evidence for international relations and comparative politics. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 1-37. doi: 10.1177/0022002717729882

Butcher, C., Gray, J. L., & Mitchell, L. (2017). Striking it free? Organized labor and the outcomes of civil resistance. *ResearchGate,* 1-45.

Butcher, C., & Svensson, I. (2014). *To arms or to the streets? Explaining the choice of religious groups between nonviolent and violent insurrection strategies*. Paper presented at the The Annual Convention of the Intenational Studies Association (ISA), Uppsala.

Butcher, C., & Svensson, I. (2016). Manufacturing dissent – Modernization and the onset of major nonviolent resistance campaigns. *Journal of Conflit Resolution, 60*(2), 311-339. doi: 10.1177/0022002714541843

Cederman, L.-E., Gleditsch, K. S., & Wucherpfennig, J. (2017). The diffusion of inclusion –

An open-polity model of ethnic power sharing. *Comparative Political Studies*, 1-35. doi: 10.1177/0010414017740602

Cederman, L.-E., Wimmer, A., & Min, B. (2010). Why do ethnic groups rebel? New data and analysis. *World Politics, 62*(1), 87-119.

Chenoweth, E. (2010). Demoratic competition and terrorist activity. *Journal of Politics, 72*(1), 16-30. doi: 10.1017/s0022381609990442

Chenoweth, E. (2015). *Major episodes of contention dataset.*

Chenoweth, E., & Stephan, M. J. (2011). *Why civil resistance works - The strategic logic of nonviolent conflict*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Chenoweth, E., & Ulfelder, J. (2017). Can structural conditions explain the onset of nonviolent uprisings? *Journal of Conflict Resolution, 61*(2), 298-324.

Clague, C., Gleason, S., & Knack, S. (2001). Determinants of lasting democracy in poor countries - Culture, development and instititutions. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 573*(16-41).

Clio-Infra. (2014). Datasets. Retrieved 27. May 2014, from http://www.clio-infra.eu/

CNN. (2018). Joe Kennedy on Trump - Bullies may land a punch [Speech]. Fall River, Massachusetts: CNN Politics. Retrieved 31. Jan. 2018, from https://edition.cnn.com/videos/politics/2018/01/31/sotu-response-joe-kennedy-bullies-may-land-a-punch-sot.cnn

Collier, R. B., & Mahoney, J. (1997). Adding collective actors to collective outcomes - Labor and recent democratization in South America and Southern Europe. *Comparative Politics, 29*(3), 285-303.

Colomer, J. M. (2007). *Great empires, small nations - The uncertain future of the sovereign state*. London: Routledge.

Coppedge, M., Gerring, J., Lindberg, S., Skaaning, S.-E., Teorell, J., Altman, D., . . . Staton, J. (2017). V-Dem Codebook v7.1 - Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project.

Coppedge, M., Gerring, J., Lindberg, S. I., Skaaning, S.-E., Teorell, J., Altman, D., . . . Wilson, S. (2017). *V-Dem Country-Year Dataset v7.1.*

Coppedge, M., Lindberg, S., Skaaning, S.-E., & Teorell, J. (2016). Measuring high level democratic principles using the V-Dem data. *International Political Science Review, 37*(5), 580-593. doi: 10.1177/0192512115622046

Cunningham, K. G. (2013). Understanding strategic choice – The determinants of civil war

and nonviolent campaign in self-determination disputes. *Journal of Peace Research, 50*(3), 291-304. doi: 10.1177/0022343313475467

Cunningham, K. G. (2014). *Inside the politics of self-determination*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Dahl, R. A. (1971). *Polyarchy - Participation and opposition*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Dahl, R. A. (1998). *On democracy*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Dahl, R. A., & Tufte, E. (1973). *Size and democracy*. Stanford: Standford University Press.

Dahlum, S., Wig, T., & Knutsen, C. H. (2017, July 6, 2017). Who revolts? Empirically revisiting the social origins of democracy. *ResearchGate*, 1-31.

de Mesquita, B. B., & Smith, A. (2011). *The dictator´s handbook - Why bad behavior is almost always good politics*. New York: Public Affairs.

de Rigt, S. (2013). Arabs want democracy, but want kind? *Advances in Applied Sociology, 3*(1), 37-46.

Diamond, L. (2008). *The Spirit of Democracy - The struggle to build free societies throughout the world*. New York: Holt Paperbacks.

Diamond, L. (2010). Why are there no Arab democracies? *Journal of Democracy, 21*(1), 93-112.

Doran, M. S., & Shaikh, S. (2011). Syria - The ghosts of Hama. In M. S. Doran, S. Shaikh, K. M. Pollack, A. Al-Turk, P. K. Baev, K. Elgindy, S. R. Grand, S. Hamid, B. Jones, S. Maloney, D. L. Byman, J. D. Pollack, B. O. Riedel, R. H. Santini, I. Sharqieh, Ö. Taşpinar, S. Telhami & S. E. Yerkes (Eds.), *The Arab Awakening* (pp. 230-240): Brookings Institution Press.

Driessen, M. D. (2017). Sources of Muslim democracy - the supply and demand of religious policies in the Muslim world. *Democratization*. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2017.1334054

Economist Intelligence Unit. (2018). The Economist Intelligence Unit´s Democracy Index. Retrieved 12.11.2017, from https://infographics.economist.com/2018/DemocracyIndex/.

Fearon, J. D., & Laitin, D. D. (2003). Ethnicity, insurgency and civil war. *American Political Science Review, 97*(1), 75-90.

Fortna, V. P., & Huang, R. (2012). Democratization after civil war - A brush-clearing exercise. *International Studies Quarterly, 56*, 801-808.

Geddes, B., Frantz, E., & Wright, J. G. (2014). Military rule. *The Annual Review of Political Science, 17*(7), 147-162.

Gerring, J., & Zarecki, D. (2011). Size and democracy revisited. *DISC woking paper series*. Budapest: Central European University.

Gleditsch, K. S., & Rivera Celestino, M. (2013). Fresh carnations or all thorn, no rose? Nonviolent campaigns and transitions in autocracies. *Journal of Peace Research, 50*(3), 385-400.

Gleditsch, K. S., & Rivera, M. (2016). Non-violence and democratization. *Prio Policy Brief* (Vol. 16). Oslo: PRIO.

Goldewijk, K. K., Beusen, A., Janssen, P. (2010). Long term dynamic modelling of global population and built-up area in a spatially explicit way - HYDE 3.1. *The Holocene 20*(4), 565-573. doi: 10.1177/0959683609356587

Gould, R. V. (1993). Collective action and network structure. *American Sociological Review, 58*(2), 182-196.

Haber, S., & Menaldo, V. (2011). "Do natural resources fuel authoritarianism? A reappraisal of the resource curse." *American Political Science Review 105*(1): 1-26.

Hacket, C., Stonawski, M., Potancokova, M., Skirbekk, V., Connor, P., Mcclendon, D., Kramer, S. (2017). The changing global religious landscape. *Pew Research Center*. Retrieved 6. Nov. 2018, from http://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/11/2017/04/07092755/full-report-with-appendixes-a-and-b-april-3.pdf

Hadenius, A., & Teorell, J. (2007). Pathways from authoritarianism. *Journal of Democracy, 18*(1), 143-157.

Haggard, S., & Kaufmann, R. R. (2016). *Dictators and democrats - Masses, elites and regime change*. Oxford: Princeton University Press.

Harbom, L., Melander, E., & Wallensteen, P. (2008). Dyadic dimensions of armed conflict, 1946—2007. *Journal of Peace Research, 45*(5), 697-710. doi: 10.1177/0022343308094331

Hartzell, C. A., & Hoddie, M. (2015). The art of the possible - Power sharing and post-civil war. *World Politics, 67*(1), 37-71.

Haynes, J., & Ben-Porat, G. (2013). Religion, secularization and democracy in the Mediterranean region - Problems and prospects. *Mediterranean Politics, 18*(2), 153-169. doi: 10.1080/13629395.2013.799322

Huang, R. (2016). *The wartime origins of democratization - Civil war, rebel governance, and*

political regimes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Huntington, S. P. (1968). *Political order in changing societies*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Huntington, S. P. (1984). Will more countries become democratic? *Political Science Quarterly, 99*(2), 193-218.

Huntington, S. P. (1991a). Democracy´s third wave. *Journal of Democracy, 2*(2), 12-34.

Huntington, S. P. (1991b). *The third wave - Democratization in the late twentieth century*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.

Huntington, S. P. (1993). The clash of civilizations? *Foreign Affairs, 72*(3), 22-49.

Inglehart, R., & Norris, P. (2003). The true clash of civilizations. *Foreign Policy, 135*, 62-70.

Kalyvas, S. N. (2000). Commitment problems in emerging democracies - The case of religious parties. *Comparative Politics, 32*(4), 379-398.

Karatnycky, A., & Ackerman, P. (2005). How freedom is won - From civil resistance to durable democracy (pp. 1-52). New York: Freedom House.

Karl, T. L. (2005) From democracy to democratization and back - Before transitions from authoritarian rule. *Vol. 45. Working Papers, no 4*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Kaye, D. D., Wehrey, F., Grant, A. K., & Stahl, D. (2008). Egypt. In D. D. Kaye, F. Wehrey, A. K. Grant & D. Stahl (Eds.), *More Freedom, Less Terror?* (1 ed., pp. 29-58). Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation.

Knutsen, T. L., & Østerhus, R. (2016). Fred er ei det beste? Stat, rett, ansvar og den arabiske våren. In N. Brandal & D. E. Thorsen (Eds.), *Den dannede opprører - Bernt Hagtvet 70 år* (pp. 306-339). Oslo: Dreyers forlag.

Levitsky, S., & Way, L. A. (2002). The rise of competitive authoritarianism. *Journal of Democracy, 13*(2), 51-65.

Levitsky, S., & Way, L. A. (2006). Linkage versus leverage - Rethinking the internationl dimension of regime change. *Comparative Politics, 38*(4), 379-400.

Lipset, S. M. (1959). Some social requisites of democracy - Economic development and political legitimacy. *The American Political Science Review, 53*(1), 69-105.

Lipset, S. M. (1994). The social requisites of democracy revisited. *American Sociological Review, 59*, 1-22.

Maseland, R., & van Hoorn, A. (2011). Why Muslims like democracy yet have so little of it. *Public Choice, 147*(3), 481-496. doi: 10.1007/s11127-010-9642-5

Masoud, T. (2015). Has the door closed on Arab democracy? *Journal of Democracy, 26*(1),

74-87.

McAdam, D., Tarrow, S., & Tilly, C. (2001). *Dynamics of contention*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Mechkova, V., & Sigman, R. (2016). Varieties of democracy (V-Dem) *Policy Brief*: The Varieties of Democracy.

Mehmetoglu, M., & Jakobsen, T. G. (2017). *Applied statistics using STATA - A guide for the social sciences*. London: SAGE.

Moore, B. (1966). *The social origins of dictatorship and demcracy - Lord and peasant in the making of the modern world*. Harmondsworth: Penguin University Books.

Nye, J. (2004). *Soft power - The means to success in world politics*. New York: Public Affairs.

O´Donnell, G., & Schmitter, P. (1986). *Transitions from authoritarian rule - Tentative conclusions about uncertain democracies*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Pals, D. L. (2015). *Nine theories of religion*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Philpott, D. (2007). Explaining the political ambivalence of religion. *American Political Science Review, 101*(3), 505-525.

Philpott, D. (2009). Has the study of global politics found religion? *Annual Review of Political Science, 12*, 183-202.

Porat, L. (2010). The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood and the Asad regime. In S. Feldman, K. Cherniahivsky, N. Sohrabi, A. M. S. Aly, K. Shikaki, N. Habibi, K. Mkyia, F. Dundar, L. Porat & J. W. Walker (Eds.), *Middle East Brief* (Vol. 47). Boston: Brandeis University.

Przeworski, A., & Limongi, A. (1997). Modernization – Theories and facts. *World Politics, 49*(2), 155-183.

Ross, M. L. (2012). *The oil curse - How petroleum wealth shapes the development of nations*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Rudolph, S. H. (1997). Introduction - Religion, states, and transnational civil society. In S. H. Rudolph & J. Piscatori (Eds.), *Transnational Religion and Fading States*. Oxford: Westview Press.

Rueschemeyer, D., Stephens, E. H., & Stephens, J. D. (1992). *Capitalist development and democracy*. Oxford: Polity Press.

Schumpeter, J. (1943). *Capitalism, socialism and democracy*. London: Routledge.

Sharp, G. (1973). *The politics of nonviolent action*. Boston: Sargent.

Stepan, A. C. (2000). Religion, democracy and the "twin tolerations". *Journal of Democracy, 11*(4), 37-57.

Stepan, A. C. (2012). Religion, democracy and the "twin tolerations". In T. S. Shah, A. C. Stepan & M. D. Toft (Eds.), *Rethinking religion and world affairs* (pp. 55-72). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Stepan, A. C., & Robertson, G. B. (2003). An "Arab" more than a "Muslim" democracy gap. *Journal of Democracy, 14*(3), 30-44.

Svensson, I. (2013). One God, many wars - Religious dimensions of armed conflict in the Middle East and North Africa. *Civil Wars, 15*(4), 411-430. doi: 10.1080/13698249.2013.853409

Svensson, I., & Nilsson, D. (2017). Disputes over the divine - Introducing the religion and armed conflict (RELAC) data, 1975 to 2015. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 1-22. doi: 10.1177/0022002717737057

Svolik, M. W. (2012). *The politics of authoritarian rule*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Tarrow, S. G. (2011). *Social movements and contentious politics – Revised and updated third edition*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Tessler, M. (2002). Islam and democracy in the Middle East - The impact of religious orientations on attitudes toward democracy in four Arab countries. *Comparative Politics, 34*(3), 337-354.

Toft, M. D., Philpott, D., & Shah, T. S. (2011). *God′s century*. New York: W.W. Norton & Company.

Vüllers, J., Pfeiffer, B., & Basedau, M. (2015). Measuring the ambivalence of religion - Introducing the religion and conflict in developing countries (RCDC) dataset. *International Interactions, 41*(5), 857-881.

Weinstein, J. M. (2006). *Inside rebellion - the politics of insurgent violence*. Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press.

Wenar, L. (2016). *Blood oil - Tyrants, violence and the rules that run the world*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Wood, E. J. (2000). *Forging democracy from below*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

World Bank Group (2017). *The Middle East and North Africa*. Retrieved 17. Jan 2018, from https://data.worldbank org/region/middle-east-and-north-africa.