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## "The Women Who Would Be Kings"

A study of the Argead royal women in the early Diadochoi Wars (323-316 BCE):  
The Rivalry of Adea-Eurydike and Olympias and the Death of the Argead dynasty

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## Chronology

*Note all dates are Before Common Era (BCE).*

### Period of Philip and Alexander

- 382 Likely birth year of **Philip II** of Macedon.
- 357 Likely birth year of Philip's children **Kynnane** and **(Philip) Arrhidaios**.
- 357 Philip marries **Olympias** (named Polyxena at this point).
- 356 Birth of **Alexander the Great**, Philip's chariot's victory in the Olympic Games and his victory over the Illyrians, prompting Olympias' name change.
- 354 Likely birth year of **Kleopatra**, daughter of Olympias and Philip.
- 345 Likely birth year of **Thessalonikē**, daughter of Nikesipolis and Philip.
- 338 Battle of Chaironeia which secured Philip's hegemony over the Greek peninsula and was Alexander's baptism of fire.
- 337 Philip's marriage to Kleopatra/Eurydike, daughter of Attalos, which caused a rift between him and Olympias and her children and they leave in self-imposed exile.
- 336 Philip is murdered at the marriage celebrations of his daughter Kleopatra and Alexander I of Epeiros. Alexander (of Macedon) is proclaimed king.
- 335 Alexander destroys Thebes and restores Macedonian control over Greece. Likely birth year of **Adea**, daughter of Kynnane and Amyntas. Alexander with the help of Olympias eliminates most of the Argead family to avoid potential dynastic challengers.
- 334-325 The great *anabasis*, "expedition", of Alexander and his army. The Macedonian army swiftly conquers the western territories of the Persian Empire and win virtually every battle and siege. At Granikos, Halikarnassos, Issos and Gaugamela they win important victories over greater odds and Dareios III of Persia is forced to effectively abdicate and is later killed by his own companions. Alexander is proclaimed king of Persia in 330. The campaign carries on eastwards and into the Iranian plateau, into Sogdia and Baktria. In 327 the army crosses over into modern Pakistan and India, but after a number of bloody battles and numerous river crossings they refuse to march further. In 324 the army returns to Babylon.
- 328 Alexander marries the Baktrian noblewoman Rhoxane, an unpopular choice

among the more traditional elements of the Macedonian officer corps and the army.

324 The mass wedding at Susa. Alexander marries all his generals and allegedly ten thousand of his officers and soldiers to Persian and Eastern wives. It evidently proves very unpopular and many Macedonian sets aside their wives after Alexander's death.

### **Period of the Successors**

323 Alexander dies in Babylon in June. The generals settle for a partition of the empire and elect **Perdikkas** as regent until Alexander's unborn child reaches majority. **Philip Arrhidaios**, at the behest of the army's rank and file, is proclaimed joint-king with Alexander's posthumously born son, **Alexander**.

322 **Antipater** fights the Athenians and Greeks in the Lamian War, and is successful with the help of Leonnatos and Krateros. Perdikkas and the royal army and court go to Asia Minor to subdue Kappadokia.

321 Kynnane, at Perdikkas' orders, is killed but the army threatens mutiny if Adea is not allowed to marry Philip Arrhidaios. Adea takes the name **Eurydike** after the marriage. Antipater, Antigonos and Ptolemy declare war on Perdikkas after it became known he would marry Kleopatra, Alexander's sister.

320 Perdikkas leads the royal army on an unsuccessful campaign in eastern Egypt. After a series of defeats and setbacks, Perdikkas is murdered by Peithon, Seleukos and other officers. The royal army and court go to Triparadeisos in Syria to meet with Antipater. Kleopatra is in house-arrest in Sardeis.

319 Antipater dies of poor health and old age. He appoints **Polyperchon** as regent of Macedon and as guardian of the joint-kings. **Kassander** immediately starts assembling support for his own claim to the regency, despite being appointed *chiliarch*. Adea and Kassander likely make a secret alliance.

318 Polyperchon presents Olympias with the guardianship of her grandson Alexander IV. Olympias mobilizes the support of her nephew Aiakides of Molossia. Kassander starts his rebellion and occupies Athens through his confederates. Polyperchon unsuccessfully tries to take Megalopolis in Greece.

317 The Molossian army of Olympias meets Adea's Macedonian army at Euia where Adea's army defects over to Olympias; Adea and Philip Arrhidaios are



- taken prisoner. They are later killed by Olympias. Polyperchon fails to hold Kassander's army back and Kassander besieges the city of Pydna where Olympias and Thessalonikē seek refuge.
- 316 The Siege of Pydna concludes with Olympias' assassination by Kassander. Eumenes loses the battles of Gabiene and Paraitakene to Antigonos and is executed.
- 315 Kassander marries Thessalonikē. Seleukos flees Babylon to escape Antigonos and to warn the other satraps of his ambitions. Antigonos besieges Tyros.
- 312 Seleukos and Ptolemy defeat Demetrios Poliorketes at Gaza and Seleukos returns to Babylon.
- 310 Alexander IV and Rhoxane are killed by Kassander, completing the destruction of the legitimate Argead royal line.
- 309 Herakles, Alexander the Great's illegitimate son and his former lover Barsine are killed by Kassander.
- 308 Kleopatra, still held by Antigonos in house-arrest in Sardeis, is approached with a marriage offer from Ptolemy. Antigonos realizes the danger of a marriage between the last unmarried Argead woman and the king of Egypt and has Kleopatra killed, allegedly while she was trying to escape.
- 301 Battle of Ipsos, where Antigonos is defeated by an alliance of Seleukos, Kassander and Lysimachos. The four Hellenistic kingdoms of the Seleukids, Antipatrids, Ptolemies and Lysimachids are solidified.
- 297 Death of Kassander, his son Antipater by Thessalonikē becomes king of Macedon and Greece.
- 296 Thessalonikē is killed by Antipater for allegedly favouring his younger brother for the throne.
- 281 Seleukos and Lysimachos meet at the Battle of Koroupedion where Seleukos is victorious, and as the sole surviving Diadoch is in control of most of Alexander's former empire. However, he is assassinated shortly after, his death in 280 finally ending the Successor Wars.

## Abbreviations

### Extant sources

Arr	Arrian, <i>Anabasis</i>
AEvt	Arrian, Photios' Epitome of <i>Tà Metà Alexandron</i>
Ath	Athenaios, <i>Deiphnosophistai</i>
Cur	(Quintus Rufus) Curtius, <i>History of the Wars of Alexander the Great</i>
Diod	Diodorus Siculus, <i>Bibliothēke Historike</i>
Hdt	Herodotos, <i>Historíai</i>
Hyp	Hypereides, <i>Eúxenippou</i>
Iso	Isokrates, <i>Philippos</i>
NepE	(Cornelius) Nepos, <i>Lives of Eminent Commanders, Eumenes</i>
Pau	Pausanias, <i>Helládos Periégēsis</i>
PluA	Plutarch, <i>Bíoi Parállēloi, Alexandros</i>
PluD	Plutarch, <i>Bíoi Parállēloi, Demetrios</i>
PluM	Plutarch, <i>Moralia</i>
PluE	Plutarch, <i>Bíoi Parállēloi, Eumenes</i>
PluPy	Plutarch, <i>Bíoi Parállēloi, Pyrrhos</i>
PluPh	Plutarch, <i>Bíoi Parállēloi, Phokion</i>
Pol	Polyainos, <i>Stratagemata</i>
Poly	Polybios, <i>Historíai</i>
Jus	Justin, <i>Epitome of Pompeius Trogus' Historicae Philippicae</i>
Theo	Theopompos, <i>Philippika</i>

## Modern research

FGrH	Fragmente der Griechischen Historiker, ed. Felix Jacoby, <i>Brill's New Jacoby</i>
ABSA	<i>The Annual of the British School at Athens</i>
AE	<i>Archaiologikē Ephemeris</i>
AJA	<i>American Journal of Archaeology</i>
AJP	<i>American Journal of Philology</i>
AHB	<i>Ancient History Bulletin</i>
AS	<i>Ancient Society</i>
ASCO	<i>Anabasis: Studia Classica Et Orientalia</i>
AW	<i>The Ancient World</i>
CH	<i>Chiron: Mitteilungen der Kommission für Alte Geschichte und Epigraphik des Deutschen Archäologischen Instituts</i>
CJ	<i>The Classical Journal</i>
CQ	<i>The Classical Quarterly</i>
CW	<i>The Classical World</i>
CPH	<i>Classical Philology</i>
GR	<i>Greece &amp; Rome</i>
GRBS	<i>Greek, Roman &amp; Byzantine Studies</i>
JCS	<i>Journal of Cuneiform Studies</i>
JDAI	<i>Jahrbuch des Deutschen Archäologischen Instituts</i>
JHS	<i>Journal of Hellenic Studies</i>
HE	<i>Hermes</i>
HES	<i>Hesperia: The Journal of the American School of Classical Studies at Athens</i>
HS	<i>Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte</i>
IJMS	<i>International Journal of Medical Sciences</i>
PH	<i>Phoenix</i>
PR	<i>Prudentia</i>
RAAO	<i>Revue d'Assyriologie et d'archéologie orientale</i>
REL	<i>Religio: Revue pro religionistku</i>
SC	<i>Syllecta Classica</i>
SCI	<i>Science Magazine</i>
YFS	<i>Yale French Studies</i>
TJ	<i>Theatre Journal</i>

## 1.0 Introduction

καὶ τοῦτο ἀκούσας Ἀλέξανδρος βέλτιον ἔφη βεβουλευθαι τὴν μητέρα: Μακεδόνας γὰρ οὐκ ἂν ὑπομῆναι βασιλευμένους ὑπὸ γυναικός.<sup>1</sup>

*“And when Alexander learned of this, he said that his mother had chosen better; for the Macedonians would never admit to be ruled by a woman.”*

When Alexander the Great died on 10 June, 323 BCE, he left behind a vast but recently subjugated empire, and no immediately obvious heir. In the place of a natural heir, a grown adult male to take of the throne, there was instead a collection of highly capable and ambitious Macedonian and Greek generals who coveted power and, ultimately, the position of king for themselves. Within a short while the fragile regency orchestrated immediately after Alexander’s death fractured and a long series of civil wars were fought among these would-be kings. In the end, after twenty years of on-and-off conflict, the Macedonian empire had finally given way to a number of Hellenistic kingdoms ruled by self-proclaimed successors of Alexander’s legacy, the *Diadochoi*. Διάδοχοι, “Successors”, is the name posterity have given the generals of Alexander the Great, reflecting both their public imagery as Alexander’s inheritors, but also the physical fact that they split the empire between themselves, creating Macedonian-style monarchies of their own.

In previous centuries the struggles of the Macedonian royal dynasty, the Argead family, had been characterized by internecine blood-feuds as a result of too many potential heirs to the throne. Following Alexander’s death the opposite was the case, for suddenly there was not a single capable male available to take over the kingship. There was Alexander’s mentally challenged half-brother Philip Arrhidaios, as well as Alexander’s posthumously born “half-barbarian” son, Alexander, by the Baktrian princess Roxane, none of whom seemed like good alternatives for the generals and the Macedonian army in the summer of 323. In this vacuum of traditional candidates for royal power, a number of women of the Argead dynasty came into their own politically, taking on roles unprecedented in the Greek and Macedonian world. The most important of these were Olympias, Alexander the Great’s mother, and Adea-Eurydike, his niece, and to a somewhat lesser extent his sisters Kleopatra, Kynnane, and Thessalonikē.

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<sup>1</sup> PluA: 68.1.

With no capable males to take the position at the head of the dynasty, and in a period of changing alliances, sudden civil war, and rapid disintegration of Philip and Alexander's empire, Olympias and Adea-Eurydike entered the world of politics and warfare in order to safeguard the future of their branch of the Argead dynasty. Just like the numerous Argead succession struggles of the past, they ended up fighting each other, enlisting the assistance of not only ambitious generals and would-be kings along the way, but also counted on and received help and support from the common Macedonian people and soldiery. Their rapid rise to power precipitated an even more rapid fall, and after a dramatic showdown at the head of opposite armies in 317, both Adea-Eurydike and Olympias were dead the following year, tragically helping bring about the effective end of the dynasty they had tried to restore.

The Successor Wars, the name for a series of conflicts between changing coalitions of generals and self-proclaimed kings, raged on and off from 321 until 280 with the death of Seleukos, the last of the original Diadochoi, but the Macedonian empire of Alexander came irreparably apart in 301 with the defeat of Antigonos Monophtalmos and his son Demetrios Poliorketes at the Battle of Ipsos. Before 301, a sequence of regents had unsuccessfully tried to keep the empire together, but Alexander's former generals had slowly acquired large territories and armies, and by the time of Olympias' death, the empire had fragmented into separate parts. In Asia, Eumenes, Alexander's former secretary and inveterate loyalist to the Argead clan, fought a long series of brilliant campaigns against Antigonos, before losing the crucial battle of Gabiene in 316 and was murdered. After defeating Eumenes, Antigonos clearly aimed for imperial dominance, and tried to strong-arm the other satraps (provincial governors) into submission. In response, the majority of the other major satraps and generals banded together and waged a long series of wars against Antigonos, who had become the most powerful of the Successors. In 306 and 305, one after another, many of the Successors proclaimed themselves kings in their own right, creating their own kingdoms in former imperial territories. The most important of these were Ptolemy in Egypt, Kassander in Macedon, Seleukos in former Persia, Lysimachos in Thrace, and Antigonos and Demetrios in Asia Minor, Greece, and Syria. In 302, all the other kings formed a grand alliance against Antigonos and Demetrios, and the following campaign culminated in the Battle of Ipsos in 301. There Antigonos and Demetrios were defeated and their empire was split among the victors. The kingdoms of Seleukos, Ptolemy, and Kassander (later conquered by the son of Demetrios) would remain as the principal powers in the eastern Mediterranean and Near East

for hundreds of years during the Hellenistic period, until finally eclipsed and conquered by the Roman Republic over the course of the last century BCE.

The period after 323 represented something completely new in terms of the Macedonian political reality. The sudden absence of a potential, capable male Argead heir, coupled with the enormous disposable military assets, as well as more than a single grand prize (the Macedonian throne was replaced with an entire empire), created an unprecedented situation. In the vacuum of traditional political leadership and organization, none of the old “rules” applied. For a window of time, from 323 to the Battle of Ipsos in 301,<sup>2</sup> the previous attitudes, conventions, and traditions were gradually put aside and *realpolitik* started to govern the actions of the principal players. A number of factors conspired to create this chaotic atmosphere. Firstly, there was a sudden lack of centralized leadership following the death of Alexander, the last person resembling a central leader figure died with the regent Perdikkas in 321. Antipater, who took on the mantle of the regency neglected to maintain any sort of control in Asia, foisting it off on Antigonos who almost immediately started his own bid for imperial control. Without a central figure in power who could keep the disparate parts of the empire together, it was bound to disintegrate rapidly, stretched as it was from Greece, to Egypt, to modern Afghanistan and Pakistan and most of the territory in between. Secondly, the enormous number of troops originally mobilized for service with the royal army was spread amongst the generals, providing each with the military muscle to assert themselves independently in opposition to each other and the shaky central administration. The attitude of the Macedonian soldiers had changed over the course of the *anabasis* and the royal army had become a quasi-mercenary force, loyal only to those willing to pay them and lead them to victory. Thirdly, as the Successor kingdoms show, there was no lack of prizes to be had for any would-be conquerors. The sheer size of the empire meant that an individual satrap ruled over large territories, and were in effect kings in all but name. Some were apparently sufficiently pleased with the lands they already had, like Ptolemy, Antipater, and Kassander, while others, like Antigonos and Seleukos, clearly harboured intentions to rule the whole empire and become “second Alexanders”. The wars in this period were civil wars,

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<sup>2</sup> It warrants a mention that there is some debate in the academic community as to the importance affixed to the Battle of Ipsos as the critical turning point in the Diadochoi Wars. However, for the sake of this thesis, it will be regarded as such due to its convenient end-mark date for the proper civil wars, and the transition to “international” wars.

Macedonians fighting Macedonians; soldiers and generals had reservations fighting comrades and compatriots, dreading the aspect.<sup>3</sup>

This period saw an erosion of conventions and norms attached to female activity in the political sphere to the point where women were able to directly command military forces and operate as nominally independent political actors. It foreshadows the activities of the later Hellenistic queens which in the same vein as Adea-Eurydike and Olympias attained considerable political influence and power. Notable among these are Arsinoë II of Egypt, Laodike I and Kleopatra Thea of Seleukeia, and of course the infamous Kleopatra VII of Egypt, the last of the Ptolemaic line.<sup>4</sup> They engineered dynastic politics, commanded the loyalty of military leaders, and were the true power behind weak husbands or minority sons. The norms and institutions of the earlier Argead period in Macedonia, formalized or otherwise, gave way to a new approach to politics and the concept of royalty. It is no coincidence that the semi-religious, semi-political practice of divine kings and queens appeared in this early Hellenistic period;<sup>5</sup> the imagery of divinity became a path to royal legitimacy when ties to the old Argead line were not available. Instead, the Hellenistic kings and queens succeeding the Diadochoi forged their own identity, expressing a clear break with the Argead past.<sup>6</sup>

The role of women in the Successor Wars is a field not given the attention it deserves from scholars. The narrative of the wars of the Successors has been almost completely dominated by the generals who would go on to found their own dynasties and kingdoms, and the exploits of the Argead women is often treated like a sideshow in the overall story. It is mainly due to the superb efforts by scholars like Elizabeth Carney and Grace Macurdy that research on the subject exist at all, but there are still questions left unanswered. What observable effect did the rivalry of Adea-Eurydike and Olympias have on the creation of the post-Alexandrian world order? Did their political activities benefit or hinder the Successors, or was it largely a self-contained affair without wider consequences at the time?

The Successor Wars, especially the first phase from 322-316, was a chaotic period, with events transpiring on three different continents, and one must be careful not to put too much

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<sup>3</sup> Diod: 19.41.1.; Jus: 13.6.17.: “Thus Macedonia, while its commanders separated into two parties, was armed against its own vitals, and turned the sword from warring against the enemy to the effusion of civil blood, being ready, like people in a fit of madness, to hack its own hands and limbs.”

<sup>4</sup> Macurdy (1932): 3-6.

<sup>5</sup> Roubekas, *REL* (2015): 7-22.

<sup>6</sup> Chaniotis (2003): 432-3, 435-7, 439-41.

emphasis on a few series of events in regards to the development of the post-Alexandrian and Hellenistic world. That being said however, there is certainly room to extrapolate on the careers of Adea-Eurydike and Olympias and see how they fit in with the overall history, not as the *peripeteiai* (“reversal”) they are presented as in the extant sources, but as Successors in every way equal to their male counterparts. Presently, there are only a few studies on the post-Alexandrian activities of the Argead women, and none of them goes particularly in-depth into the effect they had on the kingdoms and dynasties founded over the course of the last decades of the 4<sup>th</sup> century BCE. In fact, their influence was considerable. Especially the Macedonian kingdom of the Antipatrid dynasty would not have come into being had it not been for Olympias and Adea-Eurydike, and the clever way Kassander, the future king of Macedon, manipulated the legacy of these two queens. The activities of Adea and Olympias also created, if not a direct precedent, then at least significantly aided in the tearing down of the cultural barriers in the expanding Macedonian sphere which had up until this point barred women from political participation and accumulation of political power.

This thesis will set out to demonstrate that the activities of Adea-Eurydike and Olympias in the span 323-316, with a particular focus on the short period where the two were on opposite sides in a power-struggle for Macedonia in 319-317, had a significant effect on not only the immediate political landscape in Macedon, but also had consequential repercussions after their deaths. The Argead women, including the aforementioned two, but also Kleopatra and Kynnane, Alexander the Great’s sisters, were fully aware of their political importance in the zero-sum game of the Diadochoi Wars. What is not properly outlined in most studies is that they were also evidently quite able to see their new-found political reality as being *drivers* of events rather than spectators, which had been the case for previous generations of Macedonian royal women. Throughout this thesis, I will evince that the actions, identities, and public expressions of these women as independent political actors, with specific focus on Adea and Olympias, readily makes them the equals of the male Diadochoi. By tying in and examining as much source material as possible, a more complete idea of Adea-Eurydike’s and Olympias’ political identities, their motivations, and the course of their careers in the short but intense war in Macedonia and Greece in 319-316 will be presented, and how this affected the post-Alexandrian, the Successor, world order. Lastly, all this will be put into the wider perspective of the Diadochoi Wars and the establishment of the Successor kingdoms, and to what degree these women influenced the later dynasties in Macedonia and Asia will be briefly explored.



## 1.1 Nature of the Extant Sources

“[...] only a slow and deliberate approach will yield really valid knowledge. The modern study of ancient history is full of attempts to pile one hypothesis on another in a desperate effort to gain certainty, often in cases where no certainty is possible. It is sometimes forgotten that the evidence is miserably poor even for the periods which are best documented and that frequently we have to be satisfied with the vaguest scraps of information.”<sup>7</sup>

The above is an over forty year old quote which still rings true. Unlike the preceding period of Philip II and Alexander the Great, the Successor Wars are characterized by a dearth in source material; both in terms of quantity as well as quality. And of the extant sources, no Macedonian ones exist, only those written by Romans and Greeks. The lack of sources and the nature of the surviving material are such that there has been substantial discussion among scholars regarding the chronology of the period, divided into the “high” and “low” chronology schools which in places differ quite handsomely, which will be addressed below.

As far as scholars are aware, the now-lost histories written by Hieronymos of Kardia, a secretary or assistant to his countryman Eumenes and later to Antigonos Monophthalmos and his son Demetrios Poliorketes, was the most complete and detailed account of events written as well as the closest chronologically and geographically. Other historians such as Diodoros of Sicily and Plutarch incorporate parts of Hieronymos in their own works, but the standalone text has disappeared.<sup>8</sup> Hieronymos’ history of the Successors covered the timeframe 323 to 272 (well within his own considerable lifetime as he is said to have died at the ripe old age of 104),<sup>9</sup> but the narrative of Diodoros ends with the defeat of Antigonos in 301 at Ipsos, and Plutarch’s *Lives* only cursorily details events not directly involving his subjects Eumenes and Demetrios Poliorketes. The bias towards Eumenes and Antigonos in the texts of Plutarch and Diodoros in all likelihood originated from Hieronymos.

In the case of Plutarch’s *Parallel Lives*, something the author himself acknowledges, he is not necessarily interested in writing truthful history but rather more interested in conveying morality, and exploring the fates and characters of famous men.<sup>10</sup> His *Lives* is organized in “parallel” pairs, where Demetrios is paired with Marcus Antonius and Eumenes with Quintus

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<sup>7</sup> McNeal, *HS* (1970): 103.

<sup>8</sup> Hornblower (1981): 3. “[Diodoros] merely paraphrased or extracted [Hieronymos], without addition or interpolation except of the simplest kind”.

<sup>9</sup> Lucian, *Macrobii*: 22 (cf. FGrH 154: 6-8.).

<sup>10</sup> PluA: 1.2.

Sertorius, which leads to indirect and unhelpful comparisons between the subjects.<sup>11</sup> Sadly, *Events after Alexander* (“τὰ μετὰ Ἀλέξανδρον”) by Arrian (who compiled the *Anabasis of Alexander*), has only survived as small fragments (the “Vatican”, “Göteborg” and “Heidelberg” palimpsests) and in a brief summary by Photios.<sup>12</sup> Arrian’s *Events* apparently only covered the period 323 to 319, at least that is the timeline of Photios’ summary and the fragments that have survived.<sup>13</sup> It is believed that Arrian’s *Anabasis of Alexander* was based upon the (also lost) personal accounts of Ptolemy I of Egypt who accompanied Alexander on his campaigns as his personal friend and was a major figure in the wars that followed his death. It is not unlikely that Arrian’s *Events* were also based upon Ptolemy’s accounts, taken down sometime before the latter’s death in 283 BCE. The accounts available to us were written centuries after the fact, either in the last century BCE (Diodoros and possibly Pompeius Trogus which Justin epitomized) or in the first three centuries CE (Plutarch, Arrian, Pausanias, Polyainos and Athenaios).<sup>14</sup> Therefore, errors ascribed to temporal distance shows up here and there in the texts, such as misnaming persons, mislabelling the ties and relations between characters (for instance Justin calling Thessalonikē Arrhidaios’ daughter)<sup>15</sup> and problems regarding dates.

There is a myriad of other problems with ancient historiography, including political bias, moralization, divine intervention, the noted temporal distance from the events described and later abbreviated histories of lost texts. There is also the nature of the writing to consider. Justin’s epitome is so heavily condensed as to be nearly useless in places, and even the quite detailed narrative of Diodoros omits a lot of information.<sup>16</sup> Nevertheless, Diodoros’ books are critically important for research on this period given their level of detail and the fact that all the books relating to the Successor Wars have survived. His books eighteen through twenty covers on average 7.33 years per book, which is remarkably detailed when one considers his forty books long *Bibliothēke* covers “all of history” up until the time of Julius Caesar. In

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<sup>11</sup> Such as the splendid career and tragic fate of “handsome” Demetrios compared to the remarkable career of Antonius and his bid for power and later suicide with Kleopatra VII; and Eumenes the loyalist rebel who fought for the Argeads, and the noble rebel Sertorius who fought Sulla and his *optimates* supporters in Spain.

<sup>12</sup> Interestingly the title “τὰ μετὰ Ἀλέξανδρον” is only used by Photios and it is not known whether this is the actual title of Arrian’s books or not.

<sup>13</sup> Rhodes (2010): 30-1.

<sup>14</sup> Zambrini (2007): 211-5.

<sup>15</sup> Jus: 14.6.13.

<sup>16</sup> Cf. the “Göteborg Palimpsest” which details Antipater’s war with Perdikkas supporters in Asia Minor on his way back to Macedon with the joint-kings. Diodoros is completely mum on this and gives the impression of an uneventful journey.

comparison, Arrian's lost account of the Diadochoi, summarized by Photios in the 9<sup>th</sup> century CE, covers something like half a year per book, but it ends shortly after the Triparadeisos partition in 319, while Diodorus covers the period up until 301. Just like Plutarch, Diodoros is guilty of favouritism and is woefully negligent in his accounts of Lysimachos, Seleukos, and most critically in the context of this thesis, Adea-Eurydike and Olympias. Kleopatra, Kynnane and Thessalonikē, Alexander's sisters, are barely mentioned. Filling in some of the holes are Justin's epitome of Trogus and the fragments of Arrian. A further fact which merits a mention is the Greco-Roman social and political context in which the authors wrote. Despite being Greeks, both Plutarch and Diodoros were part of the Greco-Roman educated elite and wrote from that point of view. No Macedonian or Greco-Macedonian source from any of the Hellenistic successor kingdoms has survived, which means the only extant texts about Macedon and Macedonians are written from the perspective of city-state Greeks.

Another point is the one of characterization in the texts. As noted by Plutarch at the start of *Parallel Lives: Alexander*, he chose to read into the people depicted in their texts rather than treat their actions separately or objectively, for "we [talking about historians in general] are writing not histories, but lives and by no means is virtue or vice clearly present in even the most illustrious of deeds".<sup>17</sup> This practically leads to the condemnation of Olympias and her measures by Plutarch and (to a lesser degree Diodoros) to secure power in Macedonia through ascribing to her attributes that are "female" and "womanish". Her actions are attributed a measure of madness and jealousy not found in the male Successors in the texts, despite their similarly ruthless behaviour. This will be extrapolated on in Ch. 5.

The silence of the sources leads naturally to frustration and a lack of answers to critical questions, and the tendency of some of the sources, Diodoros in particular, to delve into digressions and *peripeteiai*.<sup>18</sup> The corresponding lack of coverage regarding the major characters and events is somewhat annoying. This creates a number of methodological problems on top of the already apparent ones. One often encounters arguments from silence, ignoring the historical empirical practice of *testis unus testis nullus*, a tendency born out of

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<sup>17</sup> PluA: 1.2.:

“οὔτε γὰρ ἱστορίας γράφομεν, ἀλλὰ βίους, οὔτε ταῖς ἐπιφανεστάταις πράξεσι πάντως ἔνεστι δῆλωσις ἀρετῆς ἢ κακίας [...].”

<sup>18</sup> Stories which feature a dramatic turn of events, commonly used in literary tragedy. An example from Diodoros is a story about a band of prisoners trying to escape a fortress, manage to capture it, only to be besieged for more than a year before being killed by Antigonos' troops (Diod: 19.16.1-5.). Meeus (2013): 85-8.

necessity.<sup>19</sup> Adoptions of arguments *e silentio* is a logical fallacy, but which in ancient history sometimes becomes a common necessity, has led to scholars unfairly being called “purveyors of fantasy” due to the poverty of source material.<sup>20</sup> A famous example of this practice of silent argument in the period of the Successors is the tendency to claim that Seleukos was one of very few (often the only) Macedonians who did not repudiate his Persian wife following the death of Alexander. In fact the sources only mention two names in this context, one of which set aside his Persian spouse (Krateros) and one who did not (Seleukos), and from this the conclusion that the Macedonians en masse abandoned their eastern wives has been made.<sup>21</sup> This is of course argued with the unpopularity of the “orientalization”-policy of Alexander among the Macedonian officers and rank-and-file in the back of the scholars’ minds, but it is still an assumption without enough actual evidence to back it up.<sup>22</sup>

There is also the possibility of the sources describing much more important events than the limited evidence seems to suggest, our lack of information on standard practice leaves modern historians in a difficult position on how to interpret the importance of events described, noted by Meeus as “the comparative weight of limited evidence”.<sup>23</sup> For instance, the confirmation of the Persian satraps in their positions held by the time of Alexander at Babylon in 323 and again at Triparadeisos in 320, could suggest a commitment to the fair and respectful treatment of the indigenous peoples of the empire that Alexander had instituted; it might have been a clear reversal of the previous attitudes of the army and the officers which had been largely anti-“eastern”.<sup>24</sup> The same can be said of tradition and institution in the Hellenistic kingdoms; “if the Macedonians ever did something, they always did it”, meaning that recorded events or processes have been or still are treated by historians as common practice.<sup>25</sup> As an example, a tendency to debate the importance of for instance the

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<sup>19</sup> Meeus (2013): 88-9.

<sup>20</sup> Wheatley (1997): 62; Meeus (2013): 84. Wheatley says this somewhat tongue in cheek.

<sup>21</sup> Meeus (2013): 84; Meeus (2009): 236. It does however make for a good story and is extrapolated in Bevan’s “House of Seleucus” (1902) in suitably flowery language. Grainger has a more measured take on it, suggesting real affection between Seleukos and Apama (2014: 13-14).

<sup>22</sup> PluA: 51.9-11, 54.4.-6.; Arr: 4.8.8-9.1, 4.12.3-5.; Cur: 8.1.45, 8.1.49-52, 8.5.13-20.; Diod: 18.77.7-78.1. The instances of Kallisthenes opposition to the practice of *proskynesis* and Kleitos Melas’ enraged speech about the king’s transformation into an eastern despot and subsequent murder is telling of the disapproval and tension within the ranks of the *grande armée*. Another example is the note made by both Curtius and Justin about the conservative nature of the infantry rankers and Meleagros’ mutiny in 323 concerning the mixed ethnicity of the yet-to-be-born Alexander IV (Jus: 13.2.6-8.; Cur: 10.6.20-1.)

<sup>23</sup> Meeus, (2013): 90.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid.: 89-92.

<sup>25</sup> Carney (2010): 196.

Macedonian army assembly has developed among scholars over the past decade, calling into question the previously maintained view of the Macedonian army assembly's power to confirm or even reject a potential monarch.<sup>26</sup> The events surrounding Adea's ascent to power at the Triparadeisos conference speaks volumes of the constitutional power the army had, both in terms of ability to force decisions to their benefit through threats and application of force, as well as reaching decisions which are at least in the sources deemed as legally binding.<sup>27</sup> The assembly was also used to give Olympias' trial and execution an air of legality by Kassander.<sup>28</sup> However, the answer to whether this represented an entrenched Macedonian institution or simply a circumstantial body with *de facto* legal power is still debated.

Arguments *e silentio* and *a fortiori* are an even greater hazard when it comes to women of this period, and due to the almost complete lack of reliable source material on non-Greek women, caution must be exercised when writing about the actions and motivations of the Macedonian royal women of the Successor Wars.<sup>29</sup> Carney said the following while underscoring the problems of assuming anything about the actual political power of aristocratic and royal females in antiquity: "The small amount and randomness of surviving material, or the prejudice toward women who played a public role found in some strands of Greek literary tradition [...] may exaggerate the apparent disproportion [in perceived power between males and females]."<sup>30</sup> There is a clear misogynistic trend among the ancient historians which should come as no surprise given the male-dominated societies of ancient Greece and Rome, where male "virtues" and pastimes like hunting, warfare and sports were regarded as the most prestigious activities pursuable.<sup>31</sup> Women exercising political power, an arena usually reserved for men, was anathema to the world view of the Greco-Roman historians, which is why Olympias in particular is the recipient of much criticism in the extant sources. Adea is on the other hand, despite her youth, is treated more respectfully. This might

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<sup>26</sup> See Carney, "Macedonians and Mutiny: Discipline and Indiscipline in the Army of Philip and Alexander" (*CPH*, 1996) and Roisman, "Royal Power, Law and Justice in Ancient Macedonia" (*AHB*, 2012) for two good examples of this.

<sup>27</sup> Roisman, *AHB* (2012): 139-141.

<sup>28</sup> Diod: 19.51.1-2.; Jus: 14.6.6, 6.9.

<sup>29</sup> Meeus (2013): 89.

<sup>30</sup> Carney, *AJP* (2005): 73. Granted, the text refers to the discrepancy in ascribed political power between males and females of the Hekatomnid dynasty of Karia during the 4<sup>th</sup> century BCE, but it could just as easily been written about the females of the Argead dynasty, and much of the same is echoed by Pomeroy about Arsinoë II of Egypt in the 3<sup>rd</sup> century (1984: 18-19).

<sup>31</sup> Carney. *AJP*, (1996): 563-5.; Miron, *AS* (2000): 39-41. Carney (2000): 35.

"Males in the Macedonian elite were expected to be intensely, even violently, competitive about virtually everything, but especially about war, hunting and politics." (James, et al. eds. 2012: 86)

be down to Kassander, one of the Successors, who was Adea's ally, respected her memory by giving her a royal funeral, and evidently a bitter enemy of Alexander the Great's branch of the Argead family. It could also be down to the sources' inherent admiration of Adea's Amazon-like martial methods, rather than Olympias' political manipulation "behind the scenes".<sup>32</sup>

Numismatic, archaeological, and epigraphic evidence of this period is sporadic, and offers very little insight into the activities of the Argead women, with a few very notable exceptions. First though, none of the queens, neither Adea nor Olympias were depicted on coins, the mints of the Macedonian empire continuing to mint coins with the likeness of Alexander the Great, as well as his son Alexander IV and Philip Arrhidaios. The coins struck by the Successor kings were, for the most part either struck with the likeness of Alexander, capitalizing on the Alexandrian legacy, or with the likeness of the new kings.<sup>33</sup> Not until the reign of Ptolemy II and Arsinoë II of Egypt (283-246 BCE) did queens become featured on coins.<sup>34</sup> Of notable archaeological evidence are the excavated royal tombs in Aigai, modern Vergina, especially the creatively named Tomb II, as well as an early 3<sup>rd</sup> century BCE cemetery in Beroia in northern Greece. The identity of the interred inhabitants of Tomb II is the subject of hefty debate in the academic community, and has been ever since the tomb's discovery in the 1970's, but there is good reason to believe that the remains of one of the bodies belong to Adea-Eurydike. Both of these findings will be addressed in further detail later.

## 1.2 Problems of chronology

As previously noted there have been extensive debate about the dating and chronology of the Diadochoi period roughly up until the decisive Battle of Ipsos in 301 BCE, divided into "high" and "low" schools of thought. Establishing a correct as possible timeline becomes a necessity in order to properly ascertain which events influenced others. The Successor Wars took place across three continents, involved huge armies and featured complicated diplomatic relations and exchanges; all of this obviously did not happen in a vacuum, and events influenced others. A good example of this is the dating of Eumenes' death and the dating of the critical battle of Gabiene. Eumenes was located in the middle of every major event in the

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<sup>32</sup> Carney, *HS* (1987): 496-7, fn.2.

<sup>33</sup> Howgego (1995): 50-3, 65-6. For instance, Antiochos Soter, the son of Seleukos, was apparently the first of the Seleukid kings to mint coins with his own likeness, meaning that the Seleukid kingdom used predominantly coins with Alexander's face on them until at least 280-79.

<sup>34</sup> Thompson, *AJA* (1955): 200-206.

early phases of the Successor Wars and was in regular correspondence with both Olympias in Europe and Kleopatra in Asia Minor. Correctly dating his death enables the establishment of a number of other occurrences and has implications for further events, including the death of Olympias, Kassander's rise to power in Macedonia, Seleukos' flight from Babylon and Antigonos' rise to effective kingship. It helps with ascertaining the time Adea were in Macedonia before the war broke out, and it is an absolute necessity when considering the archaeological and chronological discussion surrounding the possible tomb of Adea and Arrhidaios in chapter six.

Attempts at a compromise solution acceptable to both dating systems have been discussed the past decades, but a few words on these issues regarding chronology are still warranted. No matter which method of dating one chooses one is bound to encounter problems and contradictions. The high, low and compromise alternatives all have arguments in their favour, but the one which to me seems the most internally consistent with the source material is the low school, with some slight amendments. This is in no way an attempt to participate in the debate surrounding the chronology of the Successor Wars; instead I have tried to give a short overview of the complexity of the issue based around the example of dating Eumenes' death. I have tried my best to create a coherent timeline with dates deduced using the low chronology advocated by Errington, but also taking into account several aspects of the compromise solution as presented by Meeus.

The early part of this period, particularly the First and Second Successor Wars (322-320 and 319-315), saw events take place on up to three continents with a large number of central figures and names. The interconnected nature of what should in practice have been a centrally governed empire means that many of these events happened in relation to another and had consequences far beyond its vicinity. This is reflected well in the books by Diodoros who based his chapters around the events of each continent in the same year, centred on the most important figures, such as Antigonos, Kassander and Ptolemy. A number of these chronological problems with establishing a proper and somewhat certain sequence of events seem to stem from Diodoros' attempt to adapt the military four season year-cycle into the more common (among non-military men) Athenian *archon* and Olympiad chronology. Diodoros' books eighteen through twenty of his *Bibliothēke* on the Diadochoi are heavily

based on Hieronymos of Kardia, and his attempted correlation between seasonal years and Athenian *archon* years are full of flaws.<sup>35</sup>

There are relatively significant differences between the “high” and “low” chronologies: the high dates Perdikkas’ death and the Triparadeisos partition to 321, the deaths of Olympias and Eumenes to a few months apart in 317/316 and the pivotal Battle of Gaza to early 312, whereas the low chronology dates Perdikkas’ death to 320, Olympias and Eumenes to 316/315 and Gaza to year-end of 312.<sup>36</sup> The low chronology has been favoured by significant portions of the academic community, but it has some flaws such as a near total lack of events in 317/16 and an overabundance in 312/11.<sup>37</sup> It raises the question whether the persons in questions were physically able to be in so many places in a single year, considering the quite substantial distances, and the time of travel involved, especially when moving large armies as well. This creates a butterfly effect on later events, making it necessary to nail down as probable a timeline as possible. The divergence starts in 321/320 as Diodoros’ Book 18 is missing reference to two critical archon years (321/320 and 320/319), and he does not mention the 320 Olympiad either, making his further dating cumulatively more confused.<sup>38</sup> A supporting roster of epigraphic evidence has been used to nail down at least some tentative dates, but the evidence is such that it has been used by proponents by both the high and low schools as “proof” of both chronologies.

The most important epigraphic sources are the *Marmor Parium*, a marble inscription from the mid-3<sup>rd</sup> century BCE listing notable events from the time of the mythical kings of Athens all the way to 263 BCE, as well as the Babylonian *Chronicles of the Diadochoi* (BCHP 3), a cuneiform tablet fragment likely written sometime just after Seleukos became king of Babylonia (after 305). Other important cuneiform pieces include the *Uruk King List* and astronomical texts such as the *Solar Saros* which features astronomical dates and phenomena as well as notable events.<sup>39</sup> However, the *Marmor* only lists events as happening within a specific archon year, that is from July to June, and it is demonstrably in error several places

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<sup>35</sup> Errington, *HE* (1977): 479-482.; Anson, *GRBS* (2003): 373-77.

<sup>36</sup> Meeus, *PH* (2012): 74-5.

<sup>37</sup> *Loc. cit.*

<sup>38</sup> Anson, *GRBS* (2003): 374.

<sup>39</sup> *Loc. cit.*; Errington, *HE* (1977): 478-83.; Smith, *RAAO* (1925): 179-187.



such as misdating a solar eclipse in 310 by two years which in and of itself is not a major issue, but it calls into question the dating of other events as well.<sup>40</sup>

The dates referred to in this paper have been deduced using a low-high compromise chronology as initially suggested by Meeus,<sup>41</sup> based on Stylianou and Boiy.<sup>42</sup> The circumstantial correspondence between Diodoros and the *Diadochoi Chronicle* is convincingly argued for by Anson and Meeus, such as Diodoros' reference to Perdikkas "after ruling for three years, lost his [...] life" (18.36.7) and the chronicle's reference to "that same month the king [*sic.*] did battle with the satrap of Egypt [...] Month VIII, day 10" (1.23-4, *obv.*).<sup>43</sup> In some aspects the high chronology advocated by Bosworth makes a few "leaps of faith" which Anson and Meeus argues are a little too unsubstantiated. A good example of this is Bosworth's argument that Philip Arrhidaios' first regnal year is marked in the *King List* as the same year as Alexander's last (324), and his preference of the *List*'s note of eight regnal years instead of Diodoros' (almost certainly Hieronymos') precise note of six years and four months.<sup>44</sup> Meeus argues for a compromise between the high and low chronologies by the time of the Third Diadochoi War (around 315) which was originally postulated by Stylianou,<sup>45</sup> and corroborated by Tom Boiy.<sup>46</sup> This places Seleukos' flight from Babylon to 316, but does not fit very well with the low chronology's assumption with Eumenes' defeat at Gabiene and subsequent death in late 316 and early 315, and while it agrees with the high chronology by placing Antigonos in Phoinikia for 315 it creates a number of issues. Stylianou advocates for a "shift" from the low chronology to the high as soon as right after Triparadeisos in 320, which avoids the awkward vacuum and subsequent abundance of events in both chronologies.<sup>47</sup>

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<sup>40</sup> Anson, *GRBS* (2003): 376.; Boiy, *JCS* (2000): 117. The same eclipse is correctly dated in the Babylonian *Solar Saros* (BM 36754) (Alexander IV's 11<sup>th</sup>/Seleukos I's 7<sup>th</sup>, a crossover year, 312) and is mentioned by Diodoros (20.5.5) and Justin (22.6.1-2). Eclipses such as this are perfect benchmarks for dating events as they occur in accordance with a predictable and calculable celestial calendar.

<sup>41</sup> Meeus, *PH* (2012): 74-92.; Meeus (2013): 84-98.

<sup>42</sup> For further material on the low-high debate, see Errington (1970, 1977) and Anson (2003).

<sup>43</sup> The "king" referred to is understood to be Perdikkas in his role as regent. A later line says "the king [left] Antigon[us *in charge*] [...] [and he] went to the land Macedonia and did not return." (1.26.7, 1.27.8, *obv.*; Finkel and van der Spek translation). The second reference to a king is no doubt Antipater in the same capacity as *epemeletai* of the joint-kings after Triparadeisos, as it was he who made Antigonos *strategòs* of Asia. That he went to Macedonia to never return is because Antipater died shortly after returning home.

<sup>44</sup> Anson, *JCS* (2005): 127-8.; Anson, *GRBS* (2003): 373-9.

<sup>45</sup> Stylianou (1994).

<sup>46</sup> Boiy (2007b).

<sup>47</sup> Meeus, *PH* (2012): 76-82, 86-8.; Meeus (2013): 93-4.

The key to understanding the chronology is to correctly place the death of Eumenes since so many important events in both Asia and Europe in the same timespan are connected to it. As noted the *King List* states that Philip Arrhidaios reigned for six years and four months, which places his and Adea-Eurydike's death to October or November 317. Eumenes was aware of this by the time he was preparing to fight Antigonos in Iran, as is evidenced by a forged letter he circulated to the satrap of Persis in order to dissuade him from siding with Antigonos. This letter is too circumstantial to be a complete forgery.<sup>48</sup> Errington points out that this piece of deception by Eumenes happened in autumn and is described as happening some months after the "rise of the Dog-Star"<sup>49</sup> and therefore must have been in the autumn of 316, since the events in Macedonia happened around November the year before.<sup>50</sup> That means that the pivotal Battle of Gabiene which saw Eumenes betrayed to Antigonos must have happened that same winter, 316/315, further placing Seleukos' flight from Babylon to (early) spring 315.<sup>51</sup> This is a probability, but it means Antigonos would have had to move quite quickly from Babylon to reach Kilikia before year-end and winter and the cessation of military activities that entailed.<sup>52</sup> The only alternative, which Stylianou suggests, is that Seleukos fled Babylon in 316,<sup>53</sup> but that means moving the date of Gabiene and Eumenes' death back a year, in which case one has to regard the forged letter sent to Peukestas of Persis as either an invented story by Diodoros, or as quite a prophetic piece of fantasy by Eumenes.<sup>54</sup>

Lastly, for the purpose of this thesis, the dating has consequences for the circumstances surrounding the events described in the sources. Adea-Eurydike was in her mid to late-teens when she married Philip Arrhidaios, and would, if one accepts the chronological compromise, be around twenty years old at the time of her death in 317. It makes a difference

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<sup>48</sup> Diod.: 19.23.2-3. It details Olympias taking the regency of Alexander IV, defeated Kassander and had him executed, and directed Polyperchon to Asia Minor to invade Antigonos' territories. The omission of Arrhidaios and mention of Alexander IV means Arrhidaios' death was already old news for the intended recipients, as was the fact that Kassander had set out from Greece, but the outcome of the campaign was unknown.

<sup>49</sup> Diodoros: 19.18.2-3. The "Dog-Star" is the star Sirius which becomes visible in late July at the latitude of Mesopotamia and Babylon.

<sup>50</sup> Errington, *HE* (1977): 482-84.

<sup>51</sup> The Battle of Gabiene must have happened early enough in winter to allow Antigonos to settle his army into winter quarters afterwards for Diodoros says Antigonos' troops went into winter quarters in Media (19.46.1).

<sup>52</sup> Antigonos and his huge army took a detour to Susa after Gabiene and the execution of Eumenes to confiscate the money in the treasury there (Diodoros: 19.48.5-8), and spent at least some time as "honoured guests" in Babylon with Seleukos playing the unwilling host, delaying the march west even further.

<sup>53</sup> Meeus, *PH* (2012): 76-8.

<sup>54</sup> Given Diodoros' penchant on relying heavily on Hieronymos in books 18-20 and given Hieronymos closeness to the events surrounding Eumenes and Antigonos, I believe Diodoros' account of the campaigns of Eumenes in Asia 317-315 to have a high degree of veracity, including the story of the forged letter.

whether the events described were the result of a teenager making rash decisions with limited support among the nobles and military of Macedon, or she if had had several years to build up a base of support and form a relationship with, for instance, her alliance partner Kassander. It is also important considering the arguments presented in Ch.6.1 regarding a possible sister of Adea. We know that Adea-Eurydike spent at least two years in Pella, but using the compromise calculations, she will have had several years to form an alliance base, make life hard for Polyperchon the regent, and exercise royal power. Does the rash decision to sally out with the Macedonian army to meet Olympias at Euia, before Kassander has had time to get up from Greece with his troops, represent trust in Kassander’s ability to quickly get to Macedon to potentially mop up Olympias’ army; or does it mean Adea was afraid Kassander would join Olympias and turn coat?

For Olympias’ part, Eumenes is again at the centre of it. The sources explicitly mention the exchange of letters between the two, Eumenes in Anatolia and Mesopotamia and Olympias in Molossia. Letters require time to reach their recipients, and the high chronology leaves little to no time for the last round of letters from Olympias to reach Eumenes before he is supposed have lost at Paraitakene and eloped into the interior of Iran from where mail service would have to pass through hostile territory to reach Macedon. Would Olympias have dared to invade Macedon if she had learned from Eumenes through letters that he was about to be cornered in Iran by Antigonos’ numerically superior army? Losing her key ally in the east would have cleared the path for Antigonos to return to Macedon and clear out Eumenes’ ally Olympias. Regardless, the above has hopefully demonstrated the problem of correctly dating events of the period and ascertaining what events influenced others.

*Overview of the “high” and “low” schools of chronology*

<i>Important event</i>	<i>“High” school</i>	<i>“Low” school</i>	<i>Compromise</i>
Death of Alexander the Great	June, 323	June, 323	June, 323
Death of Perdikkas on the Nile	Mid 321	Early 320	Early 320
Triparadeisos Conference	Late 321	Late 320	Late 320
Antipater and Adea’s return to Macedonia	320	319	319
Death of Adea and Arrhidaios	Oct.-Nov. 317	Oct.-Nov. 317	Oct.-Nov. 317
Battle of Paraitakene	Early 317	Late 317	Mid 317
Death of Olympias	Early 316	Mid-late 316	Mid 316
Battle of Gabiene	Late 317	Late 316	Mid-Late 316

Death of Eumenes	Early 316	Early 315	Late 316
Seleukos' flight from Babylon	Mid 316	Early-Mid 315	Early 315
Battle of Gaza	Late 312	Early 312	Early 312

### 1.3 Modern Historiography

Research on the Argead women has for the longest time been sorely lacking. Blazing a trail on the subject in the 1930's was Grace Harriet Macurdy, her *Hellenistic Queens* (1932) a very worthy opening shot in the research tradition. However, it has not stood the test of time all that well, and suffers from a limited scope of attention, and a high degree of dependence on the extant sources with only a modicum of critical approach to the texts. With the increased focus on women's history in the 1970's, the Hellenistic and Macedonian women were given more attention, Sarah Pomeroy notably leading the charge with a number of important books and articles.<sup>55</sup> For the Hellenistic women of Macedonia in particular, Elizabeth Donnelly Carney is the most influential scholar and chief contributor, having written *Women and Monarchy in Macedonia* (2000), as well as *Olympias: Mother of Alexander the Great* (2006), in addition to a host of articles and other works. Carney remains easily the leading expert on the Argead women, their lives and circumstances. Her analysis of Olympias is formidable, as is her treatment of Macedonian female elites and royalty.<sup>56</sup>

Notably lacking is a thorough and detailed study on Adea-Eurydike. The only study solely dedicated to the young queen is Carney's article, *The Career of Adea-Eurydike*,<sup>57</sup> which is quite short, and though Carney does an admirable job with the quite limited source material available, it is still somewhat scant and scratches only the surface of Adea's motivations, actions, and possible legacy. It is worth mentioning that the extant sources barely mention Adea, only a few short passages have survived, those by Duris (through Athenaios) and Polyainos being anecdotal in nature, naturally limiting the scope of any possible research. However, there is still room to extrapolate on Adea's career as queen of Macedonia, most notably by taking into consideration her rival Olympias, as well as her mother Kynnane's influence. Other aspects to consider is her cooperation and antagonism with the various

<sup>55</sup> Primarily in this thesis' context, *Goddesses, Whores, Wives, and Slaves: Women in Classical Antiquity* (NY, 1975), *Women in Hellenistic Egypt* (NC, 1984).

<sup>56</sup> See for instance "Women and Basileia: Legitimacy and Female Political Action in Macedonia", *CJ* (1995), "The Sisters of Alexander the Great: Royal Relicts", *HS* (1988), and "Olympias and the Image of the Virago", *PH* (1993).

<sup>57</sup> Carney, *HS* (1987b): 496-502.

Successors, especially how she relates to the career of Kassander; to what extent did they cooperate, and influence each other's decisions? By compiling and examining all the potential source material, there are good grounds to make at least informed guesses as to the exact relationship between Adea and Kassander, providing context to later developments in Macedonian politics.

The interconnected and frankly confusing nature of the period in question (323-316 BCE) requires a quite detailed overview of the situation in the entire Near East to be able to convincingly answer any questions surrounding the Argead women and their actions. Past research has been largely content with regarding the story of Olympias and Adea as distractions or sideshows in the larger scheme of the Successor Wars in the same vein as the ancient authors did. More worryingly, the ancient authors' condemnation of especially Olympias' actions during her brief tenure as the effective ruler of Macedon has been largely uncritically repeated by modern (male) historians.<sup>58</sup> Carney laments on several occasions the echoing by modern scholars of the sources' matter-of-factly portrayal of gruesome and horrendous acts carried out by the Successors, while similarly cold-blooded atrocities ordered by Olympias are condemned.<sup>59</sup> Taking this into account, keeping in mind the inherent fallacy of the sources' cultural misogyny, caution must be exercised when dealing with the sources' portrayal of Olympias in particular, but also the other Argead women, despite the lack of as overt hostility as for instance Plutarch exhibits towards Olympias.

A multi-faceted approach is required to fulfil the ambitions of this thesis. Firstly, the activities of all five of the Argead women, though with particular focus on Adea and Olympias, must be considered as a whole and not individually. Especially in the case of Kleopatra, it must be inferred that Olympias was not only aware of her daughter's plans, but either complicit or gave her approval. Adea appears also to have followed the plan formulated by her mother, though this is hard to clearly pin down; the young queen might have operated on her own accord once her mother had been killed. They play off and overlap each other, and their relationship to the Successors was always shaped by their shared Argead ancestry first, and as individuals second.

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<sup>58</sup> Carney (2000): 9-11. This is mostly expressed through not making any overt effort to explain the contrast between the extant sources' portrayal between the male Successors and female Argeads. In some examples it goes much farther and borders on hostile. A good, if quite dated, example of this is David Hogarth (*Philip and Alexander*, 1897) deeming Olympias a "Jezebel of a Queen" and a "wild harridan" (1897: 137).

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*: 8-14.; Carney, *CJ* (1995): 379-81.; Pomeroy (1975): 228-9.

Secondly, the actions of a number of the key Successors must be drawn in to explain the course of the Macedonian power struggle. Primarily, these are Antipater, Kassander, and Polyperchon, and to a lesser extent Antigonos Monophthalmos, Perdikkas, and Eumenes of Kardia. Studies on these warlords are plentiful, but for the sake of this thesis their careers are only important insofar as they touch upon the activities in Macedonia roughly during the period 320 to 316. Antigonos and Eumenes are recurring names in this thesis, but they are deliberately kept in the wings, not presented in any great detail, as their actions were ultimately of a supportive nature, or in the case of Antigonos, destructive. Kassander receives quite a lot of attention, for the simple reason that he was the Successor Adea and Olympias were the most in contact and conflict with during 319-316.

Thirdly is the aspect of royal legitimacy, the Macedonian monarchical practice, tradition, and expression. There is a long-running debate among scholars as to how the Macedonian monarchy and state was organized; some belong to a “constitutional” school (e.g. J. Roisman and C. King),<sup>60</sup> while others are of the opinion the monarchy was more dictated by circumstance than customs, the so-called “autocracy school” (e.g. E. D. Carney and R. M. Errington).<sup>61</sup> However the monarchy was organized, it is clear that the Successor Wars and the Diadochoi period saw women exercising political power on a scale never before observed, and that it seems that this brokered very few protests among the average Macedonian, and not *because* of the gender of the ones issuing the orders, despite what one might be led to believe when considering the gender roles in ancient Macedon and Greece, or when reading the sometimes overtly hostile accounts by Diodoros and Justin.<sup>62</sup> The concept of legitimacy, both royal and otherwise, is a critical element in the discussion in this thesis, and just as the limits of royal authority, it is a heavily debated subject among scholars. Yet the use of key terms like “worthiness”, “honour” and “good reputation” in the sources, speak to there being a notion akin to legitimacy as it is known in modernity. However, the problem lies in our modern understanding of legitimacy stemming from the holding of an office, or some other sort of station within society.<sup>63</sup>

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<sup>60</sup> Roisman, “*Royal Power, Law and Justice in Ancient Macedonia*”, *AHB* (2012).; King, “*Macedonian Kingship and Other Political Institutions*” (2010)

<sup>61</sup> Carney, “*Women and Basileia: Legitimacy and Female Political Action in Macedonia*”, *CJ* (1995).; Errington, “*Macedonian ‘Royal Style’ and Its Historical Significance*”, *JHS* (1974).

<sup>62</sup> Confer Ch.3.1 and 3.2 of this thesis for a short analysis and comparison between the Athenian Greek and Macedonian perception of gender.

<sup>63</sup> Carney, *CJ* (1995): 367-370, 372-4.

As far as I am aware, no previous study of Olympias or Adea has attempted to place the two in a context where the premise is direct competition with the male Diadochoi; everyone has treated them like the *cultural* outliers they in actuality were in their own time, based on their different gender. However, by considering the fact that they achieved power on a scale no Macedonian woman ever had before, I feel the most natural method of approach is to consider their careers as integral parts of the Diadochoi Wars, just as much as Eumenes' rebellion and Seleukos' miraculous power-climb. Just as in the sources, most modern studies have regarded Adea and Olympias as "side-shows" to the main battles and wars of the period, a confused prelude to the ascendancy of Kassander in Macedonia. This approach is misguided, and is simply based on tacitly approaching the subject as written in the sources. Instead, this thesis will attempt to forego that assumption and form a picture of the Argead women as principal actors in the political struggles of the early Diadochoi Wars. Therefore, the discussion in this thesis is based on the premise of considering the Argead women as *political* equals based on their methods of action and results, but as *culturally* hindered in their portrayal in the extant sources, though if they were as culturally hindered in "the field" will be debated.

The novelty of this approach is limited, but not insignificant. There has been a lack of research on the Argead women for the past decade. The crowning achievement was Carney's *Olympias: Mother of Alexander the Great* in 2006, though that is discounting a number of articles, published both in journals and anthologies. A number of critically important articles have been included in the latest editions of Blackwells' *Companion to Ancient Macedonia* and *Companion to Women in Antiquity* (2010 and 2012 respectively).<sup>64</sup> The inclusion of modernist gender theories in this thesis is, as will be noted, problematic in regards to the temporal distance to the actors described. However, some aspects, such as the expropriation and exportation of public imagery outside the culturally defined gender mores (the "heteronormative matrix"), is quite interesting, which presents a new angle of examination regarding the portrayal of Olympias and Adea in the extant sources. Using this protean methodology, and leaning on significant amounts of research literature, hitherto unconsidered aspects to the career and rivalry of Adea-Eurydike and Olympias will be presented.

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<sup>64</sup> Roisman and Worthington eds. (2010).; James and Dillon eds. (2012).

## **2.0 Macedonian Politics**

In order to understand the truly momentous shifts in political practice during the Successor period compared to the preceding Argead era, it is necessary provide an overview of the Macedonian political structure as it was before the death of Alexander the Great. Within a short while, barely two decades after his death, this frame had morphed into something new, with old customs adapted to serve a new generation of kings who by necessity distanced themselves from the old Argead dynasty, as well as the expanded role of women in these new monarchic polities. Where before women had been largely unable to play a role in politics, the events of 323-316 made away with that practice, and created a precedent for coming generations of women in the Greco-Macedonian elites in the Hellenistic kingdoms. It is however important to point out that they did not in any way become the equals of their royal male husbands, brothers, or sons, there was still a gender gap, but it had been somewhat narrowed. Crucial to understanding the collapse of the old system are the elements of royal legitimacy and royal birth which for a time kept the Argead women in the high-stakes game of the Successor Wars. Just as legitimacy created opportunities, so too did it come with dangers. As the Argead women discovered, they became the enemies of all, including each other because of their shared familial connections, the omnipresent rivalry within the Argead clan intensifying. For a time royal legitimacy was a valuable political currency, ably employed by Olympias, Kleopatra and Adea, until the point where the Successors realized they could do away with the old order and create their own.

### **2.1 The Macedonian kingdom of Philip and Alexander**

The Macedonian kingdom was established sometime in the 7<sup>th</sup> century BCE in the region between the Thermaic Gulf, the Chalkidike, and the highlands in Pelagonia and Paionia (roughly the modern day Republic of Macedonia) on the northern outskirts of the Classical Greek political and linguistic sphere.<sup>65</sup> The first meaningful mention of Macedon in Greek literary sources was in Herodotos' accounts of the invasion of Greece by Dareios I.<sup>66</sup>

Macedonia remained largely a political, economic and military backwater until the reign of Philip II, continuously plagued by internal strife and periodic invasions by Illyrians and other war-like tribes in the region.<sup>67</sup> The Argead dynasty was the manifestation of the Macedonian monarchy and was outwardly very similar to the martial nobility of the country. The Argead

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<sup>65</sup> Thomas (2010): 67.; Carney (2000): 4-5.

<sup>66</sup> Hdt: 8.137-138.

<sup>67</sup> Thomas (2010): 74-8.; Asirvatham (2010): 102-4. ; King (2010): 374-6.



kings' primary role was to function as generals, successful ones at that; defeat on the battlefield was often accompanied by assassination attempts by other Argeads.<sup>68</sup> Successions were almost invariably accompanied by bloodshed as a king's accession was quickly followed up by violently removing any pretenders within the family. Likewise, the death of a king seemed to not have particularly destabilized the monarchy, he would simply be replaced by the next Argead able to defeat his opponents. Despite this confused and bloody method of succession, the Argead dynasty remained remarkably stable for its entire existence.<sup>69</sup>

Philip II, son of Amyntas III and Eurydike I, ruled from 359 until 336 and was undoubtedly the greatest king in Macedonian history. He achieved a lot during his reign, most notably the reformation of the Macedonian military and society, and the subjugation of the Greek peninsula, but for the purposes of this thesis the most interesting aspect of his life is his convoluted family life. According to Athenaios, generally accepted by scholars, Philip married seven times.<sup>70</sup> But despite his many nuptials he only fathered six children in total over a course of roughly twenty-five years: the daughters Kynnane, Thessalonikē, Kleopatra and the sons Arrhidaios and Alexander. He also had a fourth daughter, Europa, born by his last wife Kleopatra-Eurydike shortly before his death, but she never survived early infancy as both she and the mother were murdered by Olympias.<sup>71</sup>

Considering the lack of formal lines of succession in the Macedonian monarchy, this made Philip's court a viper's nest of interfamilial politicking and conspiracy. Though most likely untrue and exaggerated, Plutarch relates how Olympias allegedly gave Arrhidaios some kind of poison while still a youth which was the cause for his later mental deficiencies.<sup>72</sup> While likely not true or even verifiable, it speaks of the tense and dangerous atmosphere among Philip's wives and children. Mothers were only favoured as long as they could provide good male heirs,<sup>73</sup> and that is probably the reason why Arrhidaios' mother Philinna is never heard of again apart from the one note by Athenaios; Arrhidaios was born with a mental and

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<sup>68</sup> Carney (2000): 4-7.; King (2010): 376-8.

<sup>69</sup> Carney, *loc.cit.*; Carney, *CJ* (1995): 369-71.

<sup>70</sup> Ath: 13.557b-e. In possible chronological order, they were Audata, Phila, Nikesipolis, Philinna, Olympias, Meda and Kleopatra-Eurydike.

<sup>71</sup> Diod: 17.2.3.; PluA: 10.7.; Paus: 8.7.5.

<sup>72</sup> PluA: 77.5

<sup>73</sup> Carney, *HS* (1992): 172. "[...] nothing indicates that Olympias was any more or less a queen than Philip's other wives. Olympias lived her entire married life in a fluid situation in which her standing was determined by her interpretation (and that of the rest of the court) of royal actions and gestures."

possibly physical handicaps. Olympias was probably the leading wife of the “harem”<sup>74</sup> for most of the time with Philip, but that was seriously threatened in 337 when Philip married the much younger Kleopatra-Eurydike,<sup>75</sup> who could possibly provide a son to challenge Alexander’s position as unofficial heir apparent.

Philip had tried to restore some sort of order to the Argead dynasty following the death of his brother Perdikkas in 359 which had led to his accession to the throne. He had for instance married his daughter Kynnane to his nephew Amyntas, and several of his marriages brought diplomatic and political advantages (Audata and Meda were daughters of the Illyrian and Thracian kings respectively, and Nikesipolis was likely a marriage to bring Thessaly into the Macedonian zone of control).<sup>76</sup> And while the sources claim it was due to falling madly in love,<sup>77</sup> the marriage between Philip and Olympias secured an alliance with the kingdom of Molossia-Epeiros,<sup>78</sup> not a rash and poorly planned spur-of-the-moment decision as it is portrayed by for instance Plutarch. All of this completely came apart almost the moment Philip died, as Alexander III and Olympias set about murdering any potential claimants or threats to the throne, including Amyntas, Kleopatra-Eurydike and her daughter, as well as most of the extended Argead family. Of note was Alexander and Olympias’ decision to spare Arrhidaios, likely because they felt he could pose no threat.

This dynastic purge created two disparate branches within the Argead family: the one of Alexander, Olympias and Kleopatra, who cooperated closely following Alexander’s accession to the throne, and the rest, Kynnane (and her daughter Adea), Thessalonikē and Arrhidaios. None of these in the latter group are mentioned in any meaningful capacity, or at all, before the Diadochoi period following Alexander’s death in 323. Arrhidaios was in Babylon at the time of his brother’s death, while the rest were still in Macedonia. Kynnane quickly moved to unite their branch of the family tighter together by having the teenage Adea marrying her uncle Arrhidaios, a clear challenge to Olympias and Kleopatra, now left without

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<sup>74</sup> It is an important distinction that while the Macedonian kings were polygamous, they did not keep a harem as in the Persian tradition, and with the exception of Philip II, many seems to have been serially monogamous.

<sup>75</sup> Carney (2000): 72-4. Heckel (1978): 155-158. She might not even have been in her twenties when she married the forty-five year old Philip. Her name is listed as Kleopatra by Athenaios, Plutarch and Diodoros, but Arrian refers to her as “Eurydike” (3.6.5), and to avoid confusion with Olympias’ daughter named Kleopatra, I choose refer to her by both names hyphenated.

<sup>76</sup> Carney (2000): 57-8, 60, 68.

<sup>77</sup> PluA: 2.2; Cur: 8.1.26.; Ath: 13.557c.

<sup>78</sup> It took Philip’s intervention on behalf of Olympias’ younger brother Alexander to finally secure the Macedonian-Molossian alliance, and one can clearly see Olympias’ hand in Philip’s favourable treatment of Alexander and Molossian relations. Carney (2000): 64.

an adult male head for their familial branch. In response, they took it upon themselves to protect and safeguard the infant Alexander IV, and by 321, each branch of the Argead family had their own male figurehead in form of one of the joint-kings, but the real power behind the thrones were the women. This was made possible by the lack of any capable adult males. Clearly the women understood the absolute need for a male to eventually take official control; Alexander IV reaching majority for Olympias and a giving birth to a male heir for Adea-Eurydike. This would be imperative for the continued survival of the dynasty branches.

## 2.2 Royal legitimacy

A central tenet to the discussion on the female Argeads in the Successor Wars is the concept of royal legitimacy and whether the status of being born *porphyrogénnētos*, “into the purple” of the royal family provided a status akin to constitutional authority to individual Argeads. The nature of the Macedonian kingship and whether it was defined by *nomos*, “law” or “custom”, that can be likened to a constitution, or if it was defined by the king’s relationship with his subjects that defined his range of possible actions, is heavily debated. However, a few central themes can be identified and the concept of royal legitimacy is a recurring one.

The monarchy was *the* institution in Macedon, the centralizing aspect through which the citizens of the country expressed their nationality, the common nominator of loyalty and “ethnic” identity. And though the sources do not give any indications that there were any official limitations to the power of the monarchs, there was clearly something curbing the autocratic powers of the kings.<sup>79</sup> There is a lively debate between scholars attributing this limitation to quite well defined royal customs established through practice, and others who believe it was more down to circumstance and the factors surrounding each king’s reign.<sup>80</sup> Regardless of the expressions of power available to a king, his authority rested in the fact that he was an Argead, that he could prove he was a descendant of the legendary primogenitor Temenid family of Herakles’ son Temenos.<sup>81</sup> The Argead line ran unbroken from at least 510 (likely much further back, but sources are poor) to 309 when Alexander IV was murdered and the legitimate male line of the dynasty was extinguished. Yet it speaks volumes of the sanctity of the royal clan, the respect it was afforded by the Macedonians, that during the entire official reign of the joint-kings (323-309) none of the Successors proclaimed themselves king despite the joint-kings’ being quite obvious pawns for the various regents.

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<sup>79</sup> King (2010): 374-77.; Carney, *CJ* (1995): 368-75.

<sup>80</sup> Carney, *CJ* (1995): 368-9.; King (2010): 374-5.; Roisman, *AHB* (2012): 131-4.

<sup>81</sup> King (2010): 375-6.; Hdt: 8.137-9.; Thukydides: 2.99.3

The first of the Successors to claim royalty were Antigonos and his son Demetrios Poliorketes in 306, at least three years after the death of the last male Argead.<sup>82</sup> Even after Seleukos, Ptolemy and Lysimachos followed suit and proclaimed their own kingship, did none ever claim to be “king of Macedonia”; Antigonos and Demetrios were simply *basileis* without any regional affiliation, same with Lysimachos in Thrace, and Seleukos was originally “king to the Babylonians”,<sup>83</sup> as well as taking on the title “Macedonian” in emulation of former Persian Akhaimenid practice.<sup>84</sup> Compare this with Alexander the Great’s “king of all the Macedonians”,<sup>85</sup> and it can be inferred that there was a perception of Macedonia being the domain of the Argeads, at least during the first two decades of the Successor Wars. In the end Kassander may have adopted that title for himself after years of being the effective king of Macedonia, but it could just as well be that he avoided using that title for the exact same reason his rivals avoided it;<sup>86</sup> it was a title reserved for the now-extinct Argeads and a title sacrosanct as long as people who remembered the Argeads still lived.<sup>87</sup> Notable also is the fact that all the Successor kings proclaimed their kingship following a major military victory (Kassander excepted),<sup>88</sup> seeking validation through other means than through the legitimate royal line. In other words, since they could not boast of any legal claim to the diadem, they based their claims on military prowess, the most important directly observable aspect of the Macedonian-style monarchy.<sup>89</sup>

Royal legitimacy expressed itself in various ways during the Successor Wars, roughly in three categories which all play upon the same concept of appreciation for the royal blood of the recipients; in military, political and dynastical functions. The first is in evidence during

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<sup>82</sup> Diod: 20.53.1-2.; PluD: 17-8.

<sup>83</sup> Lund (1992): 55, 65-8.; PluD: 18.1-2.; *Diadochoi Chronicles*, BCHP 3: 4.41., rev.; Finkel and van der Spek translation. Seleukos later in his reign changed his title to refer directly to his imperial ambitions, adopting Antigonos’ more all-encompassing title.

<sup>84</sup> Grainger (2014): 68.

<sup>85</sup> Wehrli, *HS* (1964): 140, fn. 1. “Βασιλεύς Μακεδόνων représente le titre officiel de celui que nous appelons ‘roi de Macédoine’. Juridiquement, l’Etat était le peuple et non le territoire: voilà pourquoi aucun texte ne parle du ‘roi de Macédoine’, mais uniquement du ‘Βασιλεύς Μακεδόνων’”.

<sup>86</sup> PluD: 18.2.; Errington, *JHS* (1974): 23. Plutarch specifically mentions Kassander signing his letters and official documents without using a royal title, but an inscription from the city of Kassandreia (founded by Kassander in 316) carries the inscription “Βασιλεύς Μακεδόνων Κάσσανδρος” which speaks to the opposite.

<sup>87</sup> King (2010): 388-9.; Waterfield (2011): 142-5.; Jus: 15.2.10.; Grainger (2007): 128.

<sup>88</sup> Valassiades (2005): 405-6. Kassander had adopted the title *basileus* by at least 305-4, according to numismatic evidence, but without any textual evidence of a military triumph.

<sup>89</sup> Antigonos defeating Ptolemy at Salamis-in-Kypros, Lysimachos defeating the tribal Odrysians in Thrace, Ptolemy defeating an Antigonid attempt at invading lower Syria, and Seleukos after fighting a war in the eastern satrapies and in India.

Adea-Eurydike's and Olympias' brief campaign against each other in 317, which will be addressed in detail below, where both seemingly commanded quite considerable bodies of troops on a battlefield. Adea also wrested away command of the royal army following the death of Perdikkas at the Nile, forcing the generals Peithon and Seleukos to run their orders past her for approval, with the young queen commanding the loyalty of the troops. Kynnane also evidently controlled what can be described as a considerable military force which she personally gathered and commanded during her and her daughter's fateful sojourn to Sardeis in 321. The other two categories overlap in large parts, except in the case of Olympias and Kynnane, at least directly.

In the case of the joint-kings Alexander IV and Philip Arrhidaios, their political usefulness lay simply in their physical presence with one or the other of the Successors. Those of the Diadochoi who claimed the office of *epitropoi*, ("guardian"), or *autokrator epimelites*, ("supreme regent"), did so because they had the kings in their custody. They claimed they acted on the kings' behalf, in the kings' best interest. In reality, the kings were nothing but a smokescreen, a fig leaf, something tacitly admitted in the sources. Justin hints at this by putting into Ptolemy's mouth an objection to proclaiming Arrhidaios king because his mental limitation would make it possible for someone to hold authority through him.<sup>90</sup> This in turn is exactly what happened, at least for a while, until Kassander simply found it more expedient to have Alexander IV killed, the young boy-king the last real obstacle for Kassander's own bid for kingship in Macedon. All the Successors (with the notable exception of faithful Eumenes) paid nominal lip-service to the monarchy and repeatedly proclaimed their loyalty to the kings, but it was a flimsy cover; in reality they advanced their own causes.<sup>91</sup>

For both the Argead women and the male Successors, it was important use political marriages for all it was worth; for the women it allowed them to in part shape their own futures by voluntarily choosing their husbands (not very common for females of the Greco-Macedonian elites) from among the competing generals. Likewise, many of the would-be Successors sought the hand of Kleopatra, though not Kynnane or Thessalonikē. The Argead women's relation with the Successors was mostly strained. Only Olympias seemed to cooperate effectively with some of them (Polyperchon and Eumenes), possibly Adea as well (Kassander), though this is unclear. Both Kleopatra and Thessalonikē were targets for Successor marriage proposals, in the case of Thessalonikē she was given little choice, and

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<sup>90</sup> Jus: 13.2.11.

<sup>91</sup> Grainger (2007): 93-4, 96, 98, 106.; Carney (2000): 118.

was forcibly married to Kassander. The sources explicitly mention the fear among the other Successors when one of them courted the Argead women; indeed, Perdikkas' decision to marry Kleopatra was seen as firm evidence that he wanted to use Kleopatra's Argead status to vault himself into kingship, which in turn sparked off the Successor Wars.

Since women were not able to easily create a reputation for themselves, they were believed to be imbued with the *axiōma* ("worthiness", "good reputation", "exalted rank") and *timē* ("honour") of their fathers and husbands.<sup>92</sup> Like as in the Homeric tradition, sexual possession of women of high *axiōma* was regarded as taking into possession that same status. Sexual possession would in this case refer to the chastity of marriage, the legal control of a woman's person and her ability to reproduce.<sup>93</sup> This *axiōma* was not insignificant and could very well have been a critical element in several of the Successors' path to kingship. Phila, the revered daughter of Antipater,<sup>94</sup> had first been married to Krateros, one of Alexander the Great's best and most admired generals. After Krateros' death at the hands of Eumenes, she married Demetrios Poliorketes, son of Antigonos Monophtalmos. Demetrios inherited through Phila the *axiōma* and *timē* of both Antipater and Krateros, and Plutarch explicitly points out that this helped him secure the throne of Macedonia.<sup>95</sup> Her standing and prestige was so great that it was seemingly no problem that she was fifteen years older than Demetrios, despite initial protests from the groom.<sup>96</sup> The same was the case for the Argead women; their *timē* had its basis in Philip II (more so than Alexander), and they were apparently quite aware of it, using it for all it was worth. Atypical in this regard was Adea, doubly Argead through her parents' consanguineous marriage, who would certainly been aware of her ability to play the marriage game in the same way as Kleopatra did, but chose a different route.

However, in this world there was no room for Olympias and Adea to simply passively sit by and hope that their royal status and *axiōma* would be enough to protect them, because it quickly became clear that their royal blood was both a useful political tool, but also a double-edged sword. Just as it was a method to validate their exercise of power, it was also seen as a

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<sup>92</sup> Carney, *AJP* (1996): 563-4.

<sup>93</sup> Henry and James (2012): 86-9.; Miron, *AS* (2000): 41.

<sup>94</sup> Wehrli, *HS* (1964): 140-3. "Parmi les femmes qui jouèrent un rôle en vue à cette époque, Phila se distingue par sa rare intelligence, ses manières conciliantes et sa générosité [...]."

<sup>95</sup> *PluD*: 14.2., 37.3.

<sup>96</sup> Wehrli, *HS* (1964): 141. "Comme Démétrius montrait de la répugnance à épouser une femme de quelque quinze ans son aînée, Antigone lui dit: 'Où l'on trouve à gagner, il faut épouser en dépit même de nature.'"

threat by the Successors. Having one of the Argead women on one's side provided tremendous prestige and *éclat*, but it also meant garnering the distrust of the other Successors for the exact same reasons. For Adea and Olympias, when they made their bids for political influence, they most likely did so not out of a genuine desire for power for power's sake alone, rather, for the women of the Argead clan, political power was the same as personal survival, something they recognized early on. Their best guarantee to survive the civil wars was to have a firm base of power, through an heir with a tangible claim to the throne and an ally among the generals who could provide the military assets required to retain control. The lives of Argead women had been fraught with dangers during the Argead period, often falling victims to the periodic dynastic purges upon successions of new kings, but during the Successor Wars they became specific targets for both elimination and marriage (in the case of Thessalonikē, this overlapped; by forcibly marrying Kassander, she was no longer a part of the game, transferred from the Argead family to the Antipatrid), their royal blood either a threat to the new claimants or a method of legitimization. It is no tragic coincidence that Adea, Olympias, Kleopatra, Kynnane, and Thessalonikē were all murdered. Their deaths marked the transition from the Argead period into the period of the Diadochoi, the old dynasty of Macedon replaced by the families of the Successor generals.

### **2.3 The Kings, the Military and the Successors**

How did the world of politics the Argead women suddenly stepped into, look? Public life, politics and warfare was the domain of the males in Macedonian society, a gender barrier breached by Adea-Eurydike and Olympias. Males of the Macedonian elite were supposed to be politically active, effectively being a presence at court and form part of the king's *hetairoi*, take part in hunting and sports, and join in the *symposium*, drinking parties that had an important political role in Greco-Macedonian society. Women were banned from holding political office, were not allowed to join the hunts, or even be present during the *symposium*. Males of the Macedonian elite were expected to be avid hunters, accomplished horsemen and warriors, and able to hold their drink, very well illustrated by Plutarch in his description of Demetrios Poliorketes, who is painted as a hard-partying, hard-living, womanizing military maven.<sup>97</sup> The close knit social structure of the elites manifested itself in no better way than the custom of a king's *hetairoi*, "companions". These were members of the nobility who formed the king's court, most of who would have grown up alongside the future king as *paidai*, "pages", in his personal entourage. These formed the inner circle of the king's court,

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<sup>97</sup> PluD: 3.1-3, 16.4, 19.3-6, 20.1, 3-4.

and partook in the same activities as the king, and many of them formed the king's personal bodyguards and his military staff, *somatōphylakes*.<sup>98</sup> This inevitability gave rise to fractionalization within the court, especially during and after accessions. For instance, Alexander had to deal with his father's *hetairoi* Parmenion, Antigonos, Polyperchon and Antipater who, it can be argued, held Philip's memory in higher esteem than their current king. Simultaneously it has been claimed Kassander harboured particular ill feelings against Alexander's family because of his omission from his *hetairoi* and *anabasis* despite being peers.<sup>99</sup> While this method of charismatic kingship and an intimate court worked well when the king was alive and a model Macedonian monarch, this backfired tremendously after Alexander the Great's death. With his *hetairoi* suddenly bereft of their common personal denominator, they ambitiously turned on each other.

An important part of the life at court was the hunt, something the Macedonians apparently held as their favourite pastime. Both the "Alexander Sarcophagus" and the mosaics on the tombs of Vergina depict Alexander and his companions while hunting, riding on horseback.<sup>100</sup> Coins from the reigns of Alexander I and Amyntas III shows mounted hunters with spears and lions on the obverse side, clearly the most sought after prey.<sup>101</sup> Hunting prowess was a big part of the royal image and propaganda, for instance the *somatōphulax* and later king Lysimachos is said to have killed a particularly large lion with his bare hands while hunting in Syria during the *anabasis*.<sup>102</sup> An anecdote by Hegesander *apud* Athenaios explains how Kassander would remain seated while eating instead of reclining, because he had not yet killed a boar while hunting despite being thirty-five years old.<sup>103</sup> There were a number of practical aspects of the hunt, apart from allowing the king to bond with his companions through friendly competition and cooperation, such as practicing skills applicable in war and conflict, such as horseback riding, handling weapons like lances and javelins and acclimatizing the hunters to the feeling of mortal danger.<sup>104</sup>

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<sup>98</sup> Sawada (2010): 392, 402-6. Anson, *CPH* (2008): 136.

<sup>99</sup> Meeus (2009): 235.

<sup>100</sup> Sawada (2010): 400-1.

<sup>101</sup> *Ibid.*: 399.

<sup>102</sup> Lund (1992): 6-7, 160. This is conveyed by Pompeius Trogus via Justin, and is almost certainly a piece of propaganda by Lysimachos from his time as king of Thrace and Asia Minor. Curtius even deems it a *fabula*, but it does say something of the importance of hunting, especially beasts like lions, as a status symbol in the Hellenistic world.

<sup>103</sup> Ath: 1.18a.

<sup>104</sup> Xenophon, *Kynegetikos*: 1.18.; Sawada (2010): 401-2.



The bedrock of Macedonian politics, especially during the tumultuous Wars of the Successors, was military power and the support of the army. Though heavily debated, it seems as if the army of the Argead period had the constitutional power of announcing or confirming a king's accession by acclamation; this certainly happened following Philip II's and Alexander III's deaths.<sup>105</sup> The army (and by extension the Macedonian people, given the national character of the military) did not have the power to *elect* kings, but the support of the army meant, as a rule, that one could safely bet on enjoying the support of the Macedonian people in general as well.<sup>106</sup> The regular army following Philip II's reforms, the balance of numbers made up of the infantry phalanx, drawn from the regular Macedonian peasants and citizens were also an important political counter-force to the nobility for the kings.<sup>107</sup> During the Argead era this made the kings willing to court the army's support, for they still had a national character and the army clearly regarded themselves as Macedonians first and foremost, responding to appeals to their patriotism according to the sources.<sup>108</sup> During the Successor Wars, the lack of any one official "royal army" made this impractical. Instead, what had been a large united force of Macedonians was split amongst the Successor generals, supplemented by mercenaries and in some cases native troops. The military also had legal power in form of the "military assembly", a body which would convene to decide important matters, for instance during the succession crisis in June 323, and at Kassander's behest, the trial of Olympias in 316, forming a jury or a tribunal.<sup>109</sup>

By 323, after more than a decade of conquest, the Macedonian army in Asia had become less a national military and more of a quasi-mercenary force. Its main motivation became enriching themselves, though they still held a deep-seated respect and admiration for the king and the monarchy.<sup>110</sup> As the empire fragmented so too did its military, "indeed, the changed nature of the army in Asia required an Alexander to control it".<sup>111</sup> The generals at Babylon quickly found out that without Alexander, the army was a beast with a will of its own. The infantry phalanx, the bulk of the army and still mostly formed by ethnic Macedonians, forced the *somatōphylakes* and the generals to comply with their demands to make Philip's son

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<sup>105</sup> Cur: 10.6.1-3, 10.7.1-3.; Jus: 13.2.6-8.; Lock, *CPH* (1977): 99-100.

<sup>106</sup> Anson, *HS* (1991): 230-2.

<sup>107</sup> Lock, *CPH* (1977): 91-2.

<sup>108</sup> Carney (1996): 30.; Anson (1991): 236.

<sup>109</sup> Anson, *CPH* (2008): 137. Ironically, Antigonos used the exact same type of assembly to denounce Kassander's judgement of Olympias a few years later (Diod: 19.61.1).

<sup>110</sup> *Ibid.*; Anson (1991): 236.

<sup>111</sup> *Loc. cit.*

Arrhidaios king jointly with Alexander's posthumous son.<sup>112</sup> Alexander too had been forced to negotiate with his troops on several occasions, notably during the Indian campaign in 326 and again at Opis in Persis in 324. There he had called together assemblies of representatives from the troops in order to hear their grievances and explain his course of actions. Even though the distance between king and subject had never been far in Macedon, this diluted the relationship of power even further, the army realizing it could reject and protest even the king's actions.<sup>113</sup> This gave the army a completely different power than it previously had had and very shortly into the Successor Wars it evolved into little more than a mercenary force, willing only to follow those who promised riches and victory; except for a very short moment when they followed the relatives of Alexander: Adea and Olympias.

## 2.4 Argead women and royalty

The male line of the Argead dynasty ended with the death of Alexander IV in 309 BCE,<sup>114</sup> and the period of anarchy and uncertainty that followed after Alexander the Great's death in 323 all the way up until the re-establishment of the Antigonid Macedonian kingdom in 260's by Antigonos II Gonatas saw a large number of changes made to the Macedonian dynastic traditions. This is a period poorly covered in the extant sources, and no significant details about the activities of the royal Antigonid women, apart from the first generation, have survived.<sup>115</sup> There is really only a comparatively short time span where we can say anything approaching definite on the subject of Macedonian royal women, which not coincidentally is also the period when they were at their most active. While undoubtedly allowed greater freedom and room for action than women of the Greek elites, there is something to be said for drawing too many conclusions based on the examples of Eurydike, Olympias and Adea. Turned on its head, the same can be said in making too much of the silence of the sources before the period of the three aforementioned queens.

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<sup>112</sup> Jus: 13.4.3.; Diod: 18.23.2.; Meeus, *AS* (2008): 40-59.

<sup>113</sup> Carney, *HS* (1987): 498-501.; Anson, *HS* (1991): 236-9, 243.; Carney, *CPH* (1996): 28-31. The personal nature of the Macedonian monarchy, which included any citizen's right to direct petition to the king, meant that the soldiers of the army were not likely afraid to criticize their king, but he was likely subject to review by his subjects and troops (see *PluD.* 42.11); among his *hetairoi* the king would be *prōtos metaxū isōn*, and open to frank discussion by his peers. Full-on protests and the "mutiny" at Opis was however a new and worrying development, which would shape the relationship between the Diadochoi and their troops.

<sup>114</sup> Philip II's daughter Thessalonike survived to 295, but she had been forced to marry the Kassander in 316, meaning she was considered part of the Antipatrid dynasty, rather than the Argead. Her half-sister Kleopatra also lived longer than their nephew Alexander, but was killed by Antigonos in 308.

<sup>115</sup> Phila, daughter of Antipater and wife of Demetrios Poliorketes is the most famous of the Antigonid women, but she died in 287.

The Argead kings were polygamist and often had several wives concurrently, Philip II's seven wives is the best example of this.<sup>116</sup> But unlike the possibly semi-constitutionalized concept of an appointed *basileus*,<sup>117</sup> there was no *basilissa*, “queen”.<sup>118</sup> No first wife or royal consort was appointed, just as there was no official laws of succession; the kings apparently favoured wives at different times during their reigns, those able to provide the most suitable successors.<sup>119</sup> This lack of official standing within the royal household meant that the royal wives' closest allies were their children and vice versa, since when a king died a bloody free-for-all would be fought with the other royal wives and their progeny. The tight bond between mother and child is very well exemplified by the close relationship between Alexander the Great and Olympias.<sup>120</sup>

The complex Argead dynastic manoeuvrings and diplomacy was one of the chief reasons how the dynasty managed to not only survive but stay in power for hundreds of years. Despite the periodic bouts of fratricide the Argeads made sure to tie in the disparate branches into as close cooperation as the main branch as often as possible, often through the employ of consanguineous marriages. An example of this is Philip II marrying his daughter Kynnane to his nephew Amyntas in order to ensure his loyalty.<sup>121</sup> This practice also unfortunately provided fuel to the fire whenever a succession conflict broke out; since so many sons of the extended Argead family could claim they had ties to the main branch, they could claim the throne with some legitimacy (though it appears that this was a very secondary concern for the Macedonians). What did trouble the Macedonians was the idea that their kings might not be legitimate sons or “full-blooded” ethnic Macedonians. At least one Argead king was labelled as *nothos*, “bastard”,<sup>122</sup> and Alexander's agitated reaction to Attalos' implied claims of

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<sup>116</sup> Ath: 13.557b-e.

<sup>117</sup> Whether the Argead kings styled themselves *basileus* or if this is simply later reference in Greek texts is a matter for debate. See for instance Errington (1974), Carney (1995), and King (2010).

<sup>118</sup> While Macedonian kings were possibly titled as “king” by the time of Philip II, maybe earlier as well, the consorts of kings were not styled *basilissa* before well into the Successor Wars with Phila, wife of Demetrios Poliorketes, being the first to be referred to by title in 306. Apame and Berenike, consorts of Seleukos and Ptolemy respectively, were styled *basilissa* at least by 300 and 299. There seems to have been a transition from polygamy to at least nominal or serial monogamy among the Successor dynasties by the time of the *epigonoi*, roughly concurrent with the styling of royal wives as “queens”. Carney (1991): 161-4.

<sup>119</sup> Carney (2000): 24-6.

<sup>120</sup> Carney (1991): 154-56, 158-163.; Carney, *HS* (1992): 170-76.; Pomeroy (1975): 121-23.; Miron, *AS* (2000): 39-40.

<sup>121</sup> Pol: 8.60.; *AEvt*: 1.22.; Carney, *HS* (1988b): 392-3.

<sup>122</sup> Archelaos I, his mother was allegedly a slave (δούλη) to his uncle (Plato, *Gorgias* 471a-d).

bastardy,<sup>123</sup> as well as derogatory mentions of Eurydike I as an “Illyrian”, shows that the Macedonians were not only deeply concerned with the ethnicity of their kings, they expected their monarchs to be born inside wedlock and not as a result of a tryst with a paramour.<sup>124</sup>

## 2.5 Summary of Macedonian politics

The Argead women clearly understood their own inherent importance, brought about by their royal birth. Kleopatra, Kynnane and Adea all tried to exploit this to their own advantage. Olympias is different, seeing that she was born into a different royal family than the Argeads, but her *axiōma* was perhaps larger than any of the others, accumulated through her kinship with both Philip and Alexander. Royal legitimacy clearly played a major role in the decision-making process of the Successors, as none of the nominally all-powerful generals with tens of thousands of troops under their command tried to subvert the authority and memory of the Argead kings while any of its members were still alive, both male and female.

The customs of the Argead monarchy also contributed to the events that followed after Alexander’s death, as the violent removal of rival claimants, both legitimate and illegitimate, so common in previous centuries, resulted in a vacuum of potential candidates for the throne. A political practice which had worked in a relatively small kingdom, which had been incredibly politically stable for centuries, proved disastrous when applied on a grander scale. Alexander’s former generals quickly became aware that the stakes were higher, as well as the rewards, and when no capable monarch was there to hold the empire together, it fragmented. The empire was simply too large, political resources like money and troops too plentiful, to be managed properly by regents who were unable to control satraps who only a short while ago had been their peers. When the empire needed it most, there was a critical lack of unity, which in turn led to civil war, with all the persons involved chasing their own agendas, including, critically, the Argead women.

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<sup>123</sup> Carney, *HS* (1992): 174-7.

<sup>124</sup> Carney (2000): 41.; King (2010): 376-7. One need look no further than the almost unanimous disapproval of Herakles, Alexander the Great’s son with the Persian Barsine, among the *somatōphylakes* at Babylon in 323 as a potential heir; he was both half-Persian and a bastard.



### **3.0 Greco-Macedonian Women**

Women as a social group were a secondary class of citizens in the Greek world, in the Macedonian one as well, though to a somewhat lesser extent. However, cultural differences existed, including a degree of independence not observed in mainland Classical Greece, contributing to the eventual change in attitudes in relation to the role the royal women of the Argead clan played in the early phases of the Successor Wars. Both textual and archaeological evidence suggests the women of Macedonian elite played a much more significant role in society than their southern counterparts. The theory of performative gender as advocated by Judith Butler, though a product of the developing gender studies of the 1970's and 80's, and thus somewhat troublesome to apply to women dead literally thousands of years ago, may still hold value in relation to the attitude exhibited among both regular Macedonians towards their new queens, as well as the attitudes of the extant sources and their portrayal of said women and their role in Greco-Macedonian society. To understand the original position of the Argead women, it is prudent to have a general overview of the situation and conditions of the women in both Classical and early Hellenistic Greece, and Argead-era Macedon in mind, which will be provided in this chapter.

#### **3.1 Women in Ancient Athens**

The political power wielded by Adea-Eurydike and Olympias was unprecedented in Greek history. Females exhibiting traditional male virtues like political acumen and personal bravery taking on political roles were not only unheard of; it was anathema to the Greeks of the *poleis*. Aristophanes underscored the perceived ridiculousness of women in power in the comedy *Ekklesiazousai* of 391 BCE, wherein women passing as men (with fake beards and hairy armpits) pass ludicrous laws that transforms Athens into an unrecognizable and anarchic society. Though the role and rights of women differed somewhat from city state to city state, political office and political power was reserved for men only.<sup>125</sup> Using Athens as the measuring stick for female rights and conduct is problematic on a number of levels. For instance, the case was totally different in Sparta where women were allowed to hold property and was encouraged to live an active life outdoors. Athens is simply the city state with the most available source material, making it a natural point of reference, and given the high cultural and political status of Athens in the Greek world, it is natural to believe that many

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<sup>125</sup> Henry and James. (2012): 88-9.

other cities at least somewhat emulated the Athenians' way of life.<sup>126</sup> Another point which needs to be made is the nature of the sources which describe Athenian women and their lives; most of them are either speeches attributed to orators such as Demosthenes and Lysias, and satirical screenplays, giving female portrayal an underlying agenda such as comedic effect, politics or parody, not necessarily providing an entirely correct impression of the lives of Athenian girls and women.

The famous decrees of Solon institutionalized the relationship between man and woman, "proper" women and prostitutes, and their relationship with and rights within the state.<sup>127</sup> Women in Athens had only a modicum of rights compared to men. This stemmed largely from the city-state's concern with population control, ethnic considerations and the status of citizenship; women were considered important vessels of reproduction of "proper" citizens (primarily understood as good *male* citizens) of the state.<sup>128</sup>

Female sexuality and fertility was institutionalized for the purpose of property management within and between the households of the city-state.<sup>129</sup> With city-states jealously guarding their rights of citizenship it became imperative for the state to legally mandate population control measures which hinged on the chastity and fidelity of spouses to their husbands to produce legitimate children.<sup>130</sup> Social control was exercised by making women dependent on the senior male member of the *oikos*,<sup>131</sup> first as an unmarried girl and later as a spouse. It was assumed and expected that the girl/woman would be wholly devoted to the head of the *oikos*, severing connections to their old families when they became married. This complete transfer of loyalty was accompanied by quite substantial dowries amongst respectable families of means and gave the relationship between husband and wife a somewhat commercial air of ownership.<sup>132</sup> The senior male of the *oikos* had at all times guardianship of the females, in

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<sup>126</sup> Pomeroy (1975): 57. Carney (2010): 409-10.

<sup>127</sup> Ibid.: 57-9.

<sup>128</sup> Henry and James (2012): 86. "[...] by the Archaic period [...], women's fertility was exploited by men for the purpose of property management. Thus, women's chastity underpinned the stability of the social unit, be it familial or civic— and here it is important to note that chastity means not celibacy but fidelity to one's husband. Because unchaste women were seen as threats to that stability, they were marginalized. Conspicuous consumption and adornment by women, as well as their ability to speak in public, were found threatening and disallowed by law and custom as signifying lack of self-control."

<sup>129</sup> Ibid.: 86-8.

<sup>130</sup> Levick (2012): 97-9.; Pomeroy (1975): 65-7.

<sup>131</sup> οἶκος (sing.); "household", the basic social unit of the *polis*, including the nuclear family and whatever extended relatives and slaves housed by the core family. Other meanings include "house", "property", but also "multi-generational family", underscoring the dynastic mentality of the Greeks.

<sup>132</sup> Pomeroy (1975): 60-4.

very similar manner to the relationship one would assume existed between an adult and a non-matured youth; women always required permission for anything outside the scope of their expected duties in the family and household.<sup>133</sup>

The average age for menarche as well as a girl's first marriage was around fourteen, when they were married to considerably older men, though the exact age is somewhat diffuse.<sup>134</sup> Plato suggested thirty to thirty-five as the ideal age for a man to marry, while Hesiod claimed thirty. Regardless, Athenian men very rarely married before eighteen, the vast majority considerably later than that.<sup>135</sup> The major purpose of marriage was reproduction, providing the *polis* with new legitimate citizens.<sup>136</sup> There was a sharp distinction between the public and private spheres, with women's roles adapting accordingly. On the street and among people, in crowds, Athenian women were required to wear veils and be accompanied by chaperones, and were to limit activities where they might come into contact with men not of their own *oikos*.<sup>137</sup>

The home was the wife's domain where she primarily spent her time preparing the meals of the day, spun yarn and clothes and tended to other domestic business. Poorer women worked in shops, workshops or with some form of business, while more well off women spent their time in more of a managerial role overseeing the household.<sup>138</sup> Central to the concept of marriage was the management of dowry which accompanied a bride. Responsible fathers did not rear female children unless they envisioned a future where they would be able to provide their daughter with a proper marriage and a fitting dowry.<sup>139</sup> The chief function of marriage apart from the purely biological was the creation and solidifying of bonds between families or members within an extended family, and like in most royal and noble dynasties familial

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<sup>133</sup> Ibid.: 58, 62-3.

<sup>134</sup> Ingalls, *JCAC* (2001): 17-21.

<sup>135</sup> Roy, *GR* (1999): 4-6.; Pomeroy (1975): 68-9.

<sup>136</sup> Plut. *Perikles*. 37.3-5.; Roy, *GR* (1999): 4-5. Indeed, one of the major crimes attributed to the Thirty Tyrants of Athens during 404-403 was that they forced about the spinsterhood of many Athenian maidens by executing many eligible politically active and marriageable males, as well as relaxing the citizenship laws sufficiently to not require an Athenian mother to be considered a citizen. (Lysias. 12-21.; Demosthenes. 13.109-113.; Hyperides. 1.13.)

<sup>137</sup> Trümper (2012): 290-2, 296-9.; Pomeroy (1975): 79-80.

<sup>138</sup> Pomeroy (1975): 70-3.

<sup>139</sup> Foxhall, *CQ* (1989): 32-7.; Pomeroy (1975): 62-3.; Pomeroy (1975): 63.; Foxhall, *CQ* (1989): 34-5.; Levick (2012): 100-2. The ownership of the dowry is not clearly stated in the sources, and is sometimes referred to as being managed by the husband, and at other times mentioned in reference to the female in a possessive case. But it appears clear that the dowry always stayed with the female, as it was invariably transferred with the female in case of divorce, or the husband's death, back to the woman's family.



intermarriage was common among the elite in Athens.<sup>140</sup> Endogamy and consanguineous marriage was widely practised to keep wealth and land within the same family, without having to break off significant amounts of the family fortune.<sup>141</sup> Perhaps surprisingly, divorce was apparently quite common, available to both spouses, free of stigma, and pragmatically approached in a society so concerned with female attachment to familial units.<sup>142</sup> Women in Athens were not allowed to hold disposable fortune or property in their own right, nor could they represent themselves in court; a male advocate had to take on that role.<sup>143</sup> It was an existence defined by restrictions and boundaries, in very large parts beholden to the males in their lives, and only as exceptions, generally as widows beyond child-bearing age, could Athenian women live a free domestic life and hold property in their own name.<sup>144</sup>

### 3.2 Macedonian women

It is hard to ascertain in what exact ways daily life for Macedonian women differed in comparison to their southern Greek counterparts, but patterns can be recognized and assumptions made. Certainly the only literary sources we have on the subject concern themselves with mostly royal or noble Macedonian females, and not the average Macedonian peasant's wife or daughter. Caution in applying too many of the comparatively liberal attitudes towards women to the Macedonian population in general should be practiced. That said however, it is quite clear on the basis of the existing evidence, references in ancient texts, archaeological findings and epigraphic material, that Macedonian women in general lived quite differently than women in Athens. In many respects, Macedonian practice of married life and female independence can in some cases be likened to Homeric traditions.<sup>145</sup>

Unlike in Athens, Macedonian women clearly had a public as well as private role, and not kept limited to domestic chores and tasks, though the line between the two spheres appears to have been a bit blurred.<sup>146</sup> The nature of Macedonian society was intrinsically different to the tight social strata of Athens, the conditions for existence was simply too dissimilar. Instead of being dependent on cooperation within the confines of a *polis*, Macedonians were more or less exclusively pastoralists up until the reign of Philip II who, according to Arrian,

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<sup>140</sup> Mitchell, *CQ* (2012): 5-8.

<sup>141</sup> *Ibid.*: 6-7.

<sup>142</sup> Foxhall, *CQ*, (1989): 37-9.; Pomeroy (1975): 63-4.

<sup>143</sup> Levick (2012): 100, 103-4.

<sup>144</sup> *Ibid.*: 100.

<sup>145</sup> Carney (2010): 409-10.

<sup>146</sup> *Ibid.*: 410-12.; Carney (2012): 304.

undertook a massive Hellenization of Macedon, including the creation of cities on the *poleis*-model, though at least some cities must have existed before then.<sup>147</sup> Just like in rural Greece, living in loosely organized agricultural social units forced away the distinction between public and private as it intersected with the needs of the *oikos*.<sup>148</sup> While gender roles were roughly the same as in Athens –women stayed at home and took care of domestic chores while public life and upkeep of the family was the man’s domain– there seems to have been an overlap between the “male” and the “female” roles and activities.<sup>149</sup> However, unlike in Athens, females were apparently allowed to roam and wander much more freely, and even allowed to talk to unknown males.<sup>150</sup> Some evidence hints to Macedonian women having broader legal rights than their Athenian counterparts, especially in terms of property management; it appears, for instance, as if both single women and widows were able to buy, own, and sell landed property even without a *kurios*, “legal guardian”.<sup>151</sup>

The term “Homeric” is often used to describe the Macedonian royal dynasty and kingship, at least in its earlier configuration.<sup>152</sup> Not only because it was essentially a charismatic monarchy, dependent on its ability to fulfil the roles of military and political leaders, but also because of the independent nature of the royal women of the dynasty.<sup>153</sup> Despite taking a firm backseat during the reigns of their husbands, several of the Argead women took on a very active political role once a firm male figure was no longer present.<sup>154</sup> It appears that for the women of the elite and in the Argead household there would have been relatively few household chores to carry out; they were in all probability overseers of the activities of the slaves, delegating to them the tasks normally carried out by the women of the poorer classes.<sup>155</sup> During the Greek Archaic and early Classical periods however, the royal women acted “Homeric” in a strictly domestic sense, much like Penelope of Ithaka in the *Odyssey*, or

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<sup>147</sup> Arr: 7.9.2. Aigai and Pella, the two major *poleis* of Macedon proper, existed well before the 350’s, and a number of other cities that originally had been Greek colonies, like Amphipolis, was included into the Macedonian kingdom during Philip’s time.

<sup>148</sup> Pomeroy (1984): 7-8.

<sup>149</sup> Ibid.: 3-6, 8-11.; Kottaridi (2011): 93-5, 103.

<sup>150</sup> Carney (2010): 412.

<sup>151</sup> Carney (2010): 413-4.

<sup>152</sup> Ibid.: 410.; Carney (2012): 307-8.

<sup>153</sup> *Loc. cit.*

<sup>154</sup> Carney (2012): 304-5. “Everywhere, Greek peoples associated women with the *oikos*. [...] Initially, at least, these were household monarchies and thus female members of the royal dynasty were part of *basileia* (rule, monarchy, the kingdom), not apart from it. This is not to say that royal women regularly became independent or even partially independent actors on the political stage, but rather that, particularly in certain circumstances, the system made some political actions on their part not only possible, but even likely.” (304)

<sup>155</sup> Evans (2008): 65-8.; Carney (2010): 415-6.

any other Greek wife of the period for that matter, they primarily weaved and spun garments, cooked the household's meals and especially, as noted by Herodotos, baked bread.<sup>156</sup> Burial sites reinforce this impression, as graves of what most scholars assume are either elite or royal males and females, conform to this set of gender ideals; the men are buried with drinking vessels, weapons, items associated with athletic activity, while women are buried with toilet effects such as mirrors, jewellery, jars of body oil, combs and, interestingly, items associated with religious cults.<sup>157</sup> Noticeably, many exceptions to this stereotypic burial tradition also exists, with female graves containing daggers and even armour exist, including the famous grave of what is likely Adea-Eurydike in Tomb II at Vergina.<sup>158</sup>

While Greek houses of the Classical and Hellenistic periods did have separate *andrōn*, men's areas, where the men of the house would entertain guests and, especially important in Macedonia and the Greco-Macedonian Successor kingdoms, arrange *symposia*, drinking parties, there does not appear to have been any clearly designated "*gynaikeia*", female quarters.<sup>159</sup> This seems to have been the case both in upscale as well as working class homes. The royal palaces at Pella and Aigai mirrors this division; there was clearly a square room, entrance slightly off-centre to accommodate an uneven number of reclining couches, designed for the king's infamous *symposia*.<sup>160</sup> There is an argument to be made that the female quarters might have been located upstairs in two-story houses, as these are rarely recovered during archaeological excavations, but this is speculative.<sup>161</sup> While not hidden off in a designated part of the house, Greek husbands and guardians still took great care in controlling the traffic of visitors to their homes, hinted to by the close proximity of many *andrōn* to the main (very often the only) entrance, and view from to the outside was limited.<sup>162</sup> However, in Macedonia the palace at Aigai and other dwellings evidently had large verandas, very much in contrast with not only Athenian but also Greek practice in general.<sup>163</sup>

The somewhat more liberal attitudes Macedonians had towards the rights and freedoms of their females should not take away from the fact that their lives were to be centred around the

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<sup>156</sup> Hdt. 8.137.1-2.

<sup>157</sup> Carney (2010): 410-11.; Kottaridi (2011): 101, 110, 120.

<sup>158</sup> Ibid.: 410.

<sup>159</sup> Carney (2010): 411-2.; Evans (2008): 23-8.

<sup>160</sup> Carney, *SC* (2007): 141-2.; Evans (2008): 25.

<sup>161</sup> Evans (2008): 25.

<sup>162</sup> Carney (2010): 411.

<sup>163</sup> Ibid.: 417.

family, reproduction, and rearing of children. While Macedonian women might not have had to wear veils while outside their homes like Athenians, they still lived on average shorter lives than Macedonian males, childbirth and postnatal complications being the main causes for early death, regardless of social class and status.<sup>164</sup> In general they still could not lead public lives, apart from religious roles for a few of the upper classes, were still subordinated to their male *kurios*, while also partaking in the hard physical labour of the farm or shop if part of the lower classes. Exceptions exist, but these belong exclusively to the upper strata of Macedonian society, the royal women of the Argead dynasty.<sup>165</sup>

### 3.3 Gender as performance and performative gender

The subject of gender and sex is a multifaceted one and has come a long way in quite a short while, emerging as a subject of study and as an academic field in the 1960's. Simone de Beauvoir quite famously said in *The Second Sex* that “one is not born, but rather becomes, a woman”,<sup>166</sup> formulating a notion that gender is a procedurally acquired aspect of a person's identity and not a characteristic necessarily only based on the individual's sex. De Beauvoir argues that rather than being “born a woman” one is compelled by cultural influences to become one over time, being morphed by a culturally and societally accepted mould defined as “womanhood” which is not necessarily by definition a metaphysical certitude. Judith Butler is not entirely in agreement, rather slanting the voluntarist approach of de Beauvoir and the Cartesian self-construction performed by a *cogito*, external agent, which presupposes the existence of a subject before the gender.<sup>167</sup>

The danger of applying modern theories and ideas about sex, gender, and gender-roles, is the inherent possibility of being trapped in our own paradigm of understanding of gender and the male-female axis, and administering this to historical characters' motivation and action patterns. Applying generalist theories in particular becomes problematic both in the case of the characters studied in this thesis, but also due to the temporal distance, more than two

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<sup>164</sup> Carney (2010): 417.; Kottaridi (2011): 93.

<sup>165</sup> Exceptions include Kynnane's alleged participation in one of Philip II's campaigns against the Illyrians where she is supposed to have personally killed an Illyrian warrior-queen, and the highly public political duel of the rivals Olympias and Adea-Eurydike. (Pol. 8.60)

<sup>166</sup> De Beauvoir (1949): 301.

<sup>167</sup> Lloyd (2007): 38-40.; Butler, *YFS* (1986): 36. “Gender must be understood as a modality of taking on or realizing possibilities, a process of interpreting the body, giving it cultural form. In other words, to be a woman is to become a woman; it is not a matter of acquiescing to a fixed ontological status, in which case one could be born a woman, but, rather, an active process of appropriating, interpreting, and reinterpreting received cultural possibilities.”

thousand years. Just as the view on gender in general changes over the course of history, so too does the social and political circumstances which mould and adapt these views. Adea-Eurydike's and Olympias' completely unconventional political roles were not only accepted by the regular Macedonians at the time, but apparently quite welcomed judging by their acceptance to support the two women. Adea's rise to power was due to the popular support she had among the troops and Olympias was initially embraced as the guardian and regent in Macedon after Kassander started his rebellion. So instead of finding protestations due to females taking on traditionally male roles as political leaders, the opposite occurs; their dynastic connections and royal bloodlines subordinating their normative gender roles. The protests are present in the extant sources, but these are the feelings of the authors themselves, the actions of the people they describe tell a different tale.

It appears the concept of gender was a relatively fluid one in Ancient Greece and in the context of this thesis, studying two women who regularly displayed “un-feminine” traits and habitually ventured into the sphere of normative masculinity, it will prove necessary to include a short discussion on gender and modern theories surrounding performative gender roles. The Greeks seemed to have a problematic dichotomy when it came to regarding gender and sex.<sup>168</sup> A transitional distinction between the two was evidently not observed and masculinity and femininity stemmed in large parts from the pure physical aspects of a person, in the main reproductive organs and culturally defined “manly” and “womanly” characteristics.<sup>169</sup> However, exceptions such as the evidently naturally ordained *androgynē*, “man-woman”, seem to fly in the face of this biological sex-based gender distinction; “[a male] who is [...] congenitally effeminate, doomed to live out the confused material conditions of his conception within his gender identity”.<sup>170</sup> At the core of this gender-sex identification was the body's continuum of qualities – gender and characteristics of the sex was attributed to the body's inherent wetness or dryness and, especially after Aristotle, warmth and frigidity.<sup>171</sup> Therefore, in the Greek world, sex was on the surface chronologically and logically prior to gender, and the one followed naturally from the other.

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<sup>168</sup> [Hippokrates]: *Epidemics* VI 8.32.; “[...] Phaëthusa [...] a woman [...] having given birth at an earlier time, stopped getting her period [...]. After these things happened, her body was made male and became hairy all over; she grew a beard and her voice became harsh.”

<sup>169</sup> Holmes (2012): 53-5.

<sup>170</sup> *Ibid.*: 54, 76-7.

<sup>171</sup> Laqueur (1990): 37-40.; Holmes (2012): 46-8.

In the context of women “acting the part of men” as in the case of Adea-Eurydike and Olympias, for which they are even applauded in the accounts of Justin and Diodoros, Judith Butler’s theory of performative gender is interesting to consider, a theory problematizing the notion that gender is an expression of sex. According to Butler, gender is an amalgamation of a number of activities that, taken together, constitute the creation of a state that is called “gender”, which does not pre-exist the “gendered subject”.<sup>172</sup> More specifically, calling oneself a “woman” or “female” is based around a construct of the acts that generate that specific gender. It is created over time by the repetition of acts, gestures and enactments which is culturally defined as typifying that particular gender.<sup>173</sup> A line can be drawn between gender as performance and performative gender. “Performing gender” is the adaptation of a culturally defined role identified with the *subject* “woman”, whereas “performative gender” implies the production of effects which constitute the appearance of the *gender* “woman”. Butler has it that this acting out of the concept of gender is not an inherently conscious or even in evidence in of itself, but rather something produced and reproduced as a cultural and societal norm.<sup>174</sup>

“[...] Gender and gender identities are constructed through relations of power that are inherent in normative constraints that involve the sedimentation of gender norms over time. [...] It is the open-ended process of repetition and recitation that provides the conditions of possibility for subversive repetitions and thus agency. [...] [The] “doer” is not an intentional subject who stands behind the act as its originator, but rather constituted within it.”<sup>175</sup>

It is important to note that Butler does not mean this to be a theatrical model, which its initial wording might suggest; rather, it is a speech act model based around the concept of John Austin’s “performative utterances” in regard to the self.<sup>176</sup>

Adea-Eurydike and Olympias are clearly deviants in regards to Butler and de Beauvoir’s culturally mandated “feminine gender”, which becomes very clear in the way they are portrayed in the ancient sources. In particular Olympias receives quite a lot of criticism, both overtly for being a “woman in a man’s world”, as well as more subtle criticism on general grounds which one might expect be levelled at a male in the same position. However, the latter argument (as pointed out by Carney on several occasions) falls very flat when even

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<sup>172</sup> Butler (1990/2000): 33, 173.; Lloyd (2007): 42-3.

<sup>173</sup> Jagger (2008): 20-3.; Butler (1990/2000): 41-3.

<sup>174</sup> Butler (1990/2000): 7-11.

<sup>175</sup> Jagger (2008): 35-6.

<sup>176</sup> Butler, *TJ* (1988): 519-520.; Butler (2004): 99-101.; Jagger (2008): 20-3.

more critique-worthy actions by the male Successors are left uncommented.<sup>177</sup> Central to the treatment of the two queens in the extant sources are the cultural and social mores of the Greco-Roman historians themselves, which were as noted above in the case of the Athenians, quite restrictive in what they regarded as proper female behaviour. It is very interesting then, to consider Butler's view on the concept of drag and note how there is a surprising dissonance between what can be perceived as drag by Adea-Eurydike told by the ancient historians and Butler's view on drag's role in the "heteronormative matrix". For Butler, drag and cross-dressing is only meaningful within the context of heteronormativity, rejecting the opposition between "true" and "false" genders, and serves to illustrate how easily the impression of genders are established.<sup>178</sup> "Hence, as a strategy of survival, gender is a performance with clearly punitive consequences. Discrete genders are part of what 'humanizes' individuals within contemporary culture; indeed, those who fail to do their gender right are regularly punished."<sup>179</sup>

### **3.4 Summary of Greco-Macedonian women**

The role of women in both Greece and Macedonia was very much subordinated to the males of their families. Using Athens as a benchmark of Greek attitudes and practices regarding women and the differentiation between the genders, a good number of differences between Greek and Macedonian societies appear. The rights of women in Athens were extremely limited in our modern eyes, having little to no opportunity to participate in public life, barely able to administer property in their own name. In comparison, Macedonia appears more liberal. Women, while still largely barred from public life, were not limited in their daily lives to the same extent Athenian women were. However, their primary role in life was to provide offspring and be good "housewives", administering home and hearth. Included in this chapter is also a short overview of the theory of "performative gender" as advocated by Judith Butler, a theory propagating the idea of procedurally developed and culturally defined gender roles adapted over time. As a modern theory, which is aimed at explaining the concept of gender in the 20<sup>th</sup> and 21<sup>st</sup> centuries, means that there are problems applying it to women long-dead, but a few elements are still applicable, which will be addressed later on.

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<sup>177</sup> Carney (2006): 134-6.; Carney, *PH* (1993): 29-32.

<sup>178</sup> Lloyd (2007): 43-4, 66-8.

<sup>179</sup> Butler, *TJ* (1988): 522.

## 4.0 Ambitions, Motivations, Actions

Somewhat symbolically, each of the Argead women chose different paths to political ascendancy, some employing traditional avenues of influence in order to attain power such as marriage (Kleopatra), behind-the-scenes “manipulating” (Olympias), as well as overt military power (Kynnane and Adea-Eurydike). Every avenue proved to be a failure in the end, as all of them ended up murdered, misjudging the desire of the Successors to establish their own dynasties in opposition to the waning and weakened Argead dynasty and the lengths they were willing to go to. This chapter seeks to explain and extrapolate on the individual ways to power and the personal motivations of the Argead women, ranging from potential desire for personal political power, to religious conviction, to plans set in motion by a parent and therefore unavoidable. The patterns of action exhibited by the Argead women are complicated and a number of assumptions have been made. However, it is necessary to outline these in order to further explain how their actions shaped, influenced, and forced the male Diadochoi to respond to them, as they confidently exploited their exalted status among the Macedonian people and soldiery to their benefit. The actions of the Argead women clearly demonstrate that they were very aware of their own status and potential to exploit said status for political gain, which they made use of.

### 4.1 Kleopatra and the Successors

Diodoros relates how, nearly a decade after the death of her mother Olympias, Kleopatra (c. 354-308) was sought after by virtually every important general, all of them conscious of the fact that she would provide legitimacy and *axiōma*, “worthiness”, if they were to have a chance at claiming the empty throne.<sup>180</sup> Antigonos was afraid of what advantages his rivals would gain if they were to marry the by now near-middle aged Kleopatra, whom he kept in custody in Sardeis in Asia Minor, and had her killed in 308.<sup>181</sup> Kleopatra had lived in what can be described as house arrest in Sardeis almost ever since arriving there in 321, and apart

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<sup>180</sup> Dioid: 20.37.4:

“διὰ τὴν ἐπιφάνειαν οὖν τοῦ γένους οἱ περὶ Κάσσανδρον καὶ Λυσίμαχον, ἔτι δὲ Ἀντίγονον καὶ Πτολεμαῖον καὶ καθόλου πάντες οἱ μετὰ τὴν Ἀλεξάνδρου τελευτὴν ἀξιολογώτατοι τῶν ἡγεμόνων ταύτην ἐμνήστευον: ἕκαστος γὰρ τοῦτω τῷ γάμῳ συνακολουθήσειν Μακεδόνας ἐλπίζων ἀντείχετο τῆς βασιλικῆς οἰκίας, ὡς τὴν τῶν ὅλων ἀρχὴν περιστήσων εἰς ἑαυτόν.”

“Because of the distinction of her lineage, Kassander and Lysimachos, as well as Antigonos and Ptolemy and in fact all the leaders who were most important after Alexander’s death, sought her hand; for each of them, hoping that the Macedonians would follow the lead of this marriage, was seeking alliance with the royal dynasty, in order thus to gain supremacy over the entire realm for himself.”

<sup>181</sup> Dioid: 20.37.5-6.



from a few brief years right after Alexander's death, she remained a peripheral figure. Yet she came very close to being the dynastic kingmaker she and her mother envisioned in 323. In fact, she was indirectly the spark that lit off the Successor Wars, though war was really inevitable from the moment Alexander died.

Kleopatra and her mother Olympias cooperated closely their entire careers. Married to her uncle Alexander of Molossia, Olympias' younger brother, Kleopatra became regent for her very young son shortly after when Alexander died while campaigning in Italy. She acted in a royal capacity in securing grain shipments, serving as the religious *thearodoch* of the Epirote alliance, and sent missives to ambassadors.<sup>182</sup> Kleopatra was joined in Molossia by Olympias at some point during the 330's and it appeared they shared rule there for a time, before Kleopatra went to Macedonia to confound matters with the regent Antipater by taking over control of at least parts of government.<sup>183</sup> Once Alexander the Great died Kleopatra found herself in tough situation. Her nephew Alexander IV would not be able to rule for at least eighteen years, provided he lived that long, and the cabal of officers at Babylon clearly had their own agendas rather than protecting the future of the Argead dynasty. Kleopatra and Olympias (possibly together, despite some diffuse evidence) came up with the solution; Kleopatra, in her early thirties and still of child-bearing age, would marry the candidate most able to ensure Alexander's and the empire's security for the foreseeable future.<sup>184</sup>

This created a whole host of problems, including a conflict of interest between mother and daughter. Firstly, in 323/322 it was hard to foresee who would be the most likely of the generals to remain on top and retain control of the erratic army. Perdikkas was nominally in charge, but his authority was challenged by Antipater and Antigonos, both of whom had substantial military forces under their control. Secondly, it is very possible Olympias and Kleopatra had different agendas; Olympias was well into middle-age and too old to remarry and her aim was to see Alexander IV reach majority and take the throne, while Kleopatra was still young enough to have more children and these would immediately become legitimate pretenders to the throne.<sup>185</sup> If one of these children was a son, the father would instantly be

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<sup>182</sup> Carney (1988b): 394-6.; Carney (2000): 89.; O'Neil, *PR* (1999): 8-11.

<sup>183</sup> *Ibid.*: 396-8.; *PluA*: 68.3-4. This was evidently no covert take-over from Antipater by Kleopatra as Plutarch includes an anecdote where Alexander is supposed to have remarked that Olympias would have an easier job governing Molossia than Kleopatra would have in Macedonia.

<sup>184</sup> Meeus (2009): 70-3.; Carney (2000): 123-4.

<sup>185</sup> *Ibid.*: 123-5.; Carney (1988b): 398.

the king in all but name as full-blooded Argead heirs would be more palatable to the almost xenophobic Macedonian populace (and army) than Alexander's half-Persian son.

Kleopatra clearly desired political control over Macedonia for herself permanently, not satisfied simply being the future king's current co-guarantor of safety through a potential husband. This is possibly the reasoning behind her choice to offer her hand in marriage to Leonnatos in 322 as he was leading troops from Asia to Macedon to assist Antipater in the Lamian War against a collection of rebelling Greek *poleis*.<sup>186</sup> Ambitious Leonnatos clearly desired the throne, as he is noted imitating Alexander's royal trappings and stylistic choices (he wore his hair just like Alexander, and dressed in ostentatious clothes and armour), and he accepted Kleopatra's proposal, but was killed in battle before the marriage could take place.<sup>187</sup> Leonnatos would have been a very acceptable candidate for the throne as he was a relative of Eurydike I, Philip II's mother, and royalty from the Lynkestian petty kingdom which Philip had integrated into Macedon, as well as being part of the inner circle of the *somatōphylakes*, the *megistoi* ("greatest") along with Perdikkas and Ptolemy.<sup>188</sup>

Seemingly unperturbed and with Olympias' agreement, Kleopatra travelled to Sardeis in Asia Minor in 321 to meet up with the royal army and the mobile court. There she extended the same offer she had given Leonnatos to Perdikkas, also of royal stock and one of the *megistoi*, and the regent and guardian of the joint-kings to boot. The problem was that Perdikkas had already agreed to marry one of Antipater's daughters, a pledge probably already made during the tumultuous succession crisis in Babylon in the summer of 323.<sup>189</sup> Perdikkas had done this in order to secure an alliance with Antipater who effectively controlled Macedon and Greece, but when he suddenly was presented with the option of marrying Kleopatra, he balked at the original promise to Antipater. In an inelegant attempt at having his cake and eating it too, he officially married Antipater's daughter, but made a promise to set aside his new wife for Kleopatra as soon as he had dealt with Ptolemy and Antipater was no longer a threat.<sup>190</sup>

It is unclear whether Perdikkas harboured ambitions to become king from the start, or if he was simply trying his best to hold everything together for the joint-kings and the idea of

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<sup>186</sup> PluE: 3.5.; Diod: 18.12.1, 18.15.3-4.

<sup>187</sup> Diod: 18.15.4.; PluE: 3.9.; Meeus (2009): 69-73. NepE: 2.4.

<sup>188</sup> Curt: 10.7.8.; Just: 13.2.14.; Heckel (2006): 147, 150.; Carney, *HS* (1988b): 398-9.

<sup>189</sup> Meeus (2009): 72-5.; Carney (2000): 124-5.

<sup>190</sup> Jus: 13.6.4-8.; Diod: 18.23.3.; Carney, *HS* (1988b): 399-400.; Meeus (2009): 74-9.

personal kingship slowly formed in his mind.<sup>191</sup> Regardless, when presented with the opportunity to vault himself right into the position of prime candidate for the throne, either as king himself, or as the father of a son with Kleopatra who would be a perfectly viable Argead pretender, Perdikkas did not hesitate. This lack of hesitation led to his very clumsy handling of the situation, and when Antipater learned of Perdikkas' true intentions he declared war on Perdikkas, kicking off the Successor Wars.<sup>192</sup> Unfortunately for Kleopatra she had bet on the wrong horse, and within a year Perdikkas was dead, killed by his own lieutenants, Peithon and Seleukos. Antipater took over the regency and Antigonos was given authority to carry on the war against Eumenes and the other "loyalists". Kleopatra, "tainted" by her correspondence with Perdikkas and Eumenes, was kept in Sardeis for the rest of her life after refusing help from Eumenes in 320.<sup>193</sup> Eumenes, on his way back from defeating Krateros at the Battle of the Hellespont, arrived at Sardeis and, according to Justin "*ut eius voce centuriones principalesque confirmarentur*",<sup>194</sup> sought to confirm the legitimacy of his officers in the army by having the blessing of royalty.<sup>195</sup> Kleopatra, knowing that Antipater and his faction would interpret a meeting between her and Eumenes as conspiring with the rebels, sent Eumenes away without meeting him, afraid Antipater would use it as a pretence to have her murdered.<sup>196</sup> Antipater, upon arrival in Sardeis sometime later, was incensed, but Kleopatra argued ("more fiercely than expected of a woman", apparently in a fit of rage) that she had sent Eumenes on his way because of his status as rebel against the legitimate regent of the kings, and Antipater simply left her in peace after the debate.<sup>197</sup>

Kleopatra clearly understood her ability to tip the political scale in the favour of one of the would-be Successors, however it is unclear how independently she acted; was she carrying out Olympias' orders or was she more of a political free agent? Olympias' involvement is hard to ascertain and it differs from account to account. Justin reports that Olympias merely gave her approval to Kleopatra's fateful mission to Sardeis, while Diodoros does not mention

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<sup>191</sup> Diodoros (18.23.2-3) says Perdikkas did not have intentions to claim all of Alexander's empire from the very beginning, rather he began to aim for kingship once he gained control of the royal army and the joint-kings. Many of his decisions seem too short-sighted for kingship to have been his goal from the beginning.

<sup>192</sup> Meeus (2009): 73-82.

<sup>193</sup> Carney (2000): 125-8.; Carney, *HS* (1988b): 400-2.; Meeus (2009): 79-82.

<sup>194</sup> Jus: 14.1.7-8.

<sup>195</sup> The translation of this section is disputed; this interpretation is favoured by Bosworth (1992: 72).

<sup>196</sup> *PluE*: 8.12.; *AEvt*: 1.40.

<sup>197</sup> *AEvt*: 1.40.; Carney (2000): 126. Photios in his summary of Arrian's *Events* comments Antipater and Kleopatra parted peacefully. Carney counters with "[Photios'] statement means little, unless Arrian interpreted Antipater's failure to murder Kleopatra as a peaceful parting".

Olympias at all. Carney assumes, based on the tight cooperation between mother and daughter during Alexander's reign that the two came up with the idea of Kleopatra marrying Perdikkas together,<sup>198</sup> while Hornblower suggests a rivalry between Kleopatra and Olympias, and that Olympias after Kleopatra's imprisonment stopped caring about her, leaving her to her fate, though this seems highly doubtful.<sup>199</sup> However, there are indications pointing towards Kleopatra operating more or less without her mother's interference. Olympias' name is not mentioned in the sources at all in regards to Kleopatra's overtures to Leonnatos, which could well mean she operated without Olympias knowing, or against her wishes. Olympias may have been of two minds when it came to the question of succession and the family's future. With Alexander IV there was no father figure to contend with, only a "barbarian" mother in Rhoisane who had no power or influence in a Macedonian court. He was already two years old, not a hypothetical son not yet born by Kleopatra; who could tell if Kleopatra would have a son at all, or if he would survive early infancy? On the flip side, Alexander was under the control of Perdikkas and out of Olympias' reach and a lot had to go right for Olympias if she was to gain custody of him. A son by Kleopatra and Perdikkas would also be a "pure-blooded" Macedonian of undeniable royal pedigree, not half-Baktrian, which had upset the infantry at Babylon enough to mutiny. Yet this potential son would be under Perdikkas' (or whomever the father was) control and yet again outside Olympias' reach, reducing her to merely the queen-mother's mother. Regardless, Olympias was in a very precarious situation and Kleopatra in an almost equally difficult vice.

Kleopatra seems to have had a good relationship with her brother (they had exchanged numerous letters during the *anabasis*, and Alexander had sent her looted treasures from Persia), but whether or not she completely supported the idea of his son ascending to the throne one day is not clear. Also, she must have been aware of the bloody dynastic history of the Argeads; she had lived through the upheaval after Philip II's death after all. The only proper guarantee for her personal safety and that her branch of the dynasty was to "rapidly acquire a husband complete with a Macedonian army."<sup>200</sup> There was really no ideal candidate for Kleopatra to marry, no doubt she herself recognized that, since Leonnatos had been overly ambitious and Perdikkas had a penchant for making too many enemies, but Perdikkas seemed the better choice in 321.<sup>201</sup> But once Perdikkas was gone Kleopatra was dead in the water

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<sup>198</sup> Carney (2000): 126-7.; Carney, *HS* (1988b): 388.; Macurdy (1932): 51.

<sup>199</sup> Hornblower (1981): 161-3.

<sup>200</sup> Carney, *HS* (1988b): 399.

<sup>201</sup> *Ibid.*: 398-400.

politically. Antipater and Antigonos now held all the cards and had delegitimized Perdikkas' faction, leaving Kleopatra with no potential spouses with the military strength she (and by extension Olympias) needed. Nevertheless, Antigonos kept her under close supervision in Sardeis, mindful of the *axiōma* she could extend to a potential spouse. One wonders why Antigonos did not marry her himself (the fact that he already had a wife is not a valid counter-argument, taking into account the widespread practice of polygamy among the Successors), seeing as after 316 it became abundantly clear he had designs on the whole of the empire, or at least force her to marry his son Demetrios.<sup>202</sup> It might be down to Antigonos being the first of the Successors who planned to establish a personal dynasty, seeing as he was the first to proclaim himself and his son *basileis* in 306. Regardless, when Ptolemy tried to approach Kleopatra with a marriage offer in 308 (or vice versa), Antigonos had her killed on the pretext that she had tried to escape.<sup>203</sup>

In the end Kleopatra did not succeed in her mission, whether this was securing the future of her branch of the dynasty, or if it was to obtain political power for her own sake. As the full sister of Alexander the Great and daughter of Philip, she could have dictated the course of events by elevating one of the Successors up to proto-king in an instant, but after picking the wrong candidate twice she ended up under the thumb of Antigonos.<sup>204</sup> Kleopatra played the game and lost, but her variant of the traditional game of royal marriages was on her own terms, not the terms of a male *kurios*. Completely aware of her inherent importance, Kleopatra used traditional means of alliance-building in an untraditional way, and it seems more than fair to label her as one of the Successors, despite her failure at attaining substantial political power.<sup>205</sup> It is unclear how much Olympias approved or if she harboured doubt about what her clearly ambitious daughter would do once she had been married and possibly become mother to a future half-Argead heir. In the end, somewhat ironically, Kleopatra outlived her mother, one half-sister and her niece by several years.

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<sup>202</sup> Demetrios was married to the universally respected Phila, daughter of Antipater, in what was by all accounts a political marriage which over time became tender, but Demetrios would soon become renowned for his many wives, though he kept Phila as his “chief wife” for the entirety of their marriage. A forty-plus year old Kleopatra as a “trophy wife” would have added immensely to his personal prestige, and would not have upset the balance within his ever-growing family.

<sup>203</sup> O’Neil, *PR* (2000): 122, 124-6.; Meeus (2009): 81-8.; Carney (2000): 126-8.

<sup>204</sup> Carney, *CJ* (1995): 388. It is hard to ascertain which blood relation provided her with the most prestige in the eyes of the beholders among the Successors. Olympias is referred to as having the highest *axiōma* since she was the mother, sister and wife of kings (Alexander the Great, Alexander of Molossia and Philip II respectively).

<sup>205</sup> Carney, *HS* (1988b): 392.

## 4.2 Kynnane's Ambition

Kynnane put her plans into motion even before the conflict between the Successors sharpened. Unlike her half-sister Kleopatra, who almost instantly appeared in the minds of the Successors as a potential way into political power and legitimacy through marriage, Kynnane seemingly did not receive any marriage offers. One would assume that she, as a daughter of Philip II, would provide at least some legitimacy for any of the would-be kings, and indeed could be seen as a less overtly aggressive attempt at kingmaking than marrying Alexander's full sister Kleopatra, as Perdikkas so inexpertly did.

She was the eldest of Philip's children; probably well in her mid-thirties in 323, born sometime around 358.<sup>206</sup> If the same principle of *axiōma* applies for Kynnane as it did for Kleopatra there is no reason why the Successors would not look at her as a potential candidate for marriage if she still was of childbearing age. But since the sources, scarce as they are, does not mention any overtures by any of the Successors, one can assume she must have been at the very tail end of her fertile years, it cannot be so simple a reason as neglect or forgetfulness on the part of the would-be Successors. However, Kleopatra was approached by Ptolemy in 308, well into her forties, which means that she must still have been prestigious enough to extend legitimacy to a husband. This undoubtedly comes from her direct blood-ties to Alexander the Great, whereas Kynnane was "only" Philip's daughter by an originally Illyrian princess.<sup>207</sup>

No matter, not for her the traditional game of marriage, Kynnane had other plans. It has been speculated that there was little love lost between Kynnane and the main branch of the Argead family, stemming from Alexander's murder of her husband Amyntas upon his accession to the throne in 336.<sup>208</sup> After the conclusion of the Lamian War and shortly after Kleopatra had set off for Sardeis, Kynnane assembled an army and headed off to Sardeis as well with her teenage daughter Adea.<sup>209</sup> Antipater, flush from his victory over the Greeks in the Lamian War, had let his guard down and allowed Kleopatra to slip through his fingers and go to Asia Minor. So when Kynnane and Adea tried to do the same, he gathered troops to stop them

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<sup>206</sup> Pol: 8.60.; Greenwalt, *CW* (1988): 94.; Heckel (2006): 100-1. She had a few years on Alexander who was born in 356 and Kleopatra who was born in 354.

<sup>207</sup> Pol, *loc. cit.*; Carney (2000): 69-70.

<sup>208</sup> Carney, *HS* (1998b): 393.; Carney (2000): 129.

<sup>209</sup> Pol: 8.60.; Carney, *HS* (1987a): 498.; Carney, *HS* (1988b): 393.

from crossing the river Strymon near Amphipolis in eastern Macedonia, but Kynnane and her army forced their way across.<sup>210</sup>

Kynnane's plan was to marry her daughter Adea to Philip Arrhidaios. No doubt she had learned of the army forcing the generals to appoint Arrhidaios as joint-king with Alexander IV and planned to exploit this. Adea was doubly Argead, through her mother who was daughter of Philip, and from her father Amyntas who had been the son of Philip's brother. In addition Kynnane had personally given her daughter a martial education, just like she had received from her own mother.<sup>211</sup> These two in combination should in theory make her the perfect queen in the eyes of the Macedonian soldiery; a royal Argead through and through as well as trained in the ways of war.<sup>212</sup> The fact that she was actually able to swiftly recruit at least enough troops to force her way out of Macedonia, whether this was an "army" or just a sizeable escort, says a lot of the Macedonians' loyalty to their royal family.

However, Kynnane's bold scheme threatened virtually everyone in the faction-riddled Macedonian power politics at this stage. It threatened Perdikkas, who would lose control over Philip Arrhidaios if either Adea or Kynnane, or both in tandem, started to pull the strings using mentally challenged Arrhidaios as a mouthpiece. It threatened Kleopatra and Olympias because a son by Adea and Arrhidaios would automatically move further up the line of succession, ahead of any child by Kleopatra.<sup>213</sup> It also threatened Antipater and his control over Macedon and Greece since he had already made an enemy of Kynnane by trying to stop her, and only a year later Adea and Antipater would be at loggerheads. Kynnane had support from none of the generals, so she intended to do like Alexander and cut straight through this Gordian knot of political factions.<sup>214</sup> Kynnane must have known the dangers of this course of action and despite outmanoeuvring Antipater and Kleopatra she paid for it with her life. As she and Adea and their troops reached Sardeis they were met with a substantial force from the royal army led by Perdikkas' brother Alketas. Alketas ordered her to turn back, acting on orders from his brother the regent, but when Kynnane refused Alketas had her killed in front

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<sup>210</sup> *AEvt*: 1.22.; *Pol*: 8.60. "But Kynnane crossed the Strymon, forcing her way in the face of Antipater, who disputed her passage over it."

<sup>211</sup> *Pol*: 8.60.; *Ath*: 13.560f.

<sup>212</sup> Carney (2000): 130.

<sup>213</sup> *Ibid.*: 24-5.; As mentioned above, the Argeads did not formally have primogeniture succession, but it had become common practice through necessity that the eldest son was preferred as heir. There seems to have been an element of meritocracy involved as well, since Alexander was seemingly officially proclaimed Philip II's heir to the world after his exploits in the Battle of Chaironeia in 338 and the construction of the Philippeion monument which featured statues of Philip, his mother, Olympias and Alexander.

<sup>214</sup> Carney, *HS* (1988b): 393-4.; Carney (2000): 129-131.

of the two armies.<sup>215</sup> The soldiers of both armies, horrified at the sight of Kynnane's death, mutinied and demanded Adea be allowed to marry Philip Arrhidaios as Kynnane had wanted. Perdikkas, suddenly finding himself at the wrong end of an irate and unruly Macedonian army again, relented and the marriage took place at Sardeis in 321.<sup>216</sup>

Polyainos might be overly dramatic in his brief account of Kynnane's actions, possibly aimed at making her seem like an exotic warrior-princess rather than a proper Hellenistic woman.<sup>217</sup> Yet there is no doubt about Kynnane being a clever politician and knew she and her daughter were outsiders in the dynastic struggle, yet managed to strong-arm the Successors sufficiently to place her daughter on the throne as queen. It did however cost Kynnane her life but it was a strategy of dynastic survival, and she must have been aware of the very real danger of her mission to Asia Minor. That is not to say she expected to be killed, she likely imaged she would remain in a role similar to what Olympias tried to do, be the queen's main advisor and see to it that everything went according to plan.<sup>218</sup> She did not take into account Alketas' and Perdikkas' lack of touch with the Macedonian rank-and-file in the royal army. Perhaps more so than her sister Kleopatra, Kynnane had her ears to the ground and recognized the most effective route to power would be the direct one; military support and strength without the intermediary of a Perdikkas or a Leonnatos, and knew the Macedonian soldiers would remain loyal to the Argead family. It was a wholly untraditional choice of strategy for a woman in the Greco-Macedonian world, but it worked, and Adea, who became Eurydike on her marriage to Arrhidaios, learned from her mother's example and would use the same strategy over and over again in her brief but spectacular career as queen.<sup>219</sup>

### 4.3 Adea or Eurydike?

Adea was thrust onto the grand political stage after her mother's dramatic plan ended with her murder. Adea was deprived of her mentor and surrounded by generals who were if not overtly hostile, then at the very least unwilling to aid her. The teenage queen changed her

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<sup>215</sup> Pol: 8.60. "[...] Alketas with a powerful force advanced to give her battle. The Macedonians at first paused at the sight of Philip's daughter, and the sister of Alexander; but after reproaching Alketas with ingratitude, undaunted at the number of his forces, and his formidable preparations for battle, she bravely advanced to fight against him. She resolved upon a glorious death, rather than, stripped of her dominions, accept a private life, unworthy of the daughter of Philip."

<sup>216</sup> *AEvt*: 1.23-4.

<sup>217</sup> O'Neil, *PR* (1999): 6.

<sup>218</sup> Carney (2000): 131. Carney notes that Kynnane "seems knowingly to have embraced the dangers of her policy." This attribution might be coloured by hindsight, and though certainly Kynnane knew she had no allies among the generals, it appears unlikely that she knew she was travelling to her death.

<sup>219</sup> *Ibid.*: 129-132.; Carney, *HS* (1988b): 394.; Carney, *HS* (1987a): 498.



name to Eurydike either during or directly after her wedding, taking the name of her great grandmother Eurydike I, mother of Philip II.<sup>220</sup> Adea-Eurydike's situation was a unique one. Most politically active queens in patriarchal societies in history did so through their role as regents on behalf of kings still in their minority, but who would one day grow up and take the mantle of leadership for themselves. Adea-Eurydike exercised political power through a king that would forever remain mentally a minor; Philip Arrhidaios was probably born with a mental and physical handicap from birth, often euphemistically or misguidedly labelled as epilepsy by scholars.<sup>221</sup> This enabled Adea-Eurydike to use Arrhidaios as a mouthpiece, manipulating him like a child-king and utilizing her position as royal wife to its fullest potential. It gave her a platform from which she could address the army and the generals as a superior, not merely as a young girl. Her plan must have been a continuation of Kynnane's original plan; continue Perdikkas' (Philip II's brother, not the Diadoch) branch of the Argead dynasty from which her father Amyntas had come from, and complete the destruction of the Alexandrian line. If she and Philip Arrhidaios managed to produce a male heir he would be of comparable age to Alexander IV (around two years old at the time of Adea's and Arrhidaios' wedding) and a completely legitimate contender for the throne.<sup>222</sup>

The snag was if Arrhidaios was even able to father children, Adea certainly never gave birth and none of the sources claim she ever became pregnant in the period from 321 to 317. This no doubt influenced her decision-making process in 318 and 317. Her entire position was reliant on producing an heir. Her doubly Argead sanguineous connection and young age (she would have been in her late to mid-teens, possibly as young as fifteen in 321) made her a very lucrative target for marriage for any of the Successors who harboured ambitions to rule Macedon.<sup>223</sup> Her later alliance with Kassander might have ended with Arrhidaios eliminated

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<sup>220</sup> *AEvt*: 1.23. Carney, *HS* (1987a): 498.; Carney (2000): 33.

<sup>221</sup> Carney (2000): 134.; Carney, *HS* (1987a): 499 fn.9. Arrhidaios probably had epilepsy on top of a more serious disorder, most likely a mental handicap which did not make itself overly apparent before his youth. He was regarded as a minor by the Successors, and Perdikkas was appointed *epimeletai*, "guardian, care-taker", of both the kings, implying Arrhidaios was unable to make decisions independently (Carney calls him "not *capax imperii*"). Lastly, there's Justin's account of Ptolemy telling the officers in Babylon that Arrhidaios was unsuited as king "because of the extraordinary weakness with which he was affected, lest, while he had the name of king, another should exercise the authority" (13.2.11).

<sup>222</sup> Carney (2000): 134.

<sup>223</sup> *Loc. cit.* fn 61.

and Adea forced to marry Kassander much like Thessalonikē was, if Adea had survived the encounter with Olympias.<sup>224</sup>

The name change from Adea to Eurydike was no doubt a play at invoking the image of Philip's formidable mother in the collective memory of the Macedonians. For quite some time the theory that Eurydike was a dynastic name and a proto-title instead of the later Hellenistic *basilissa*, but this has been if not refuted, then at least been significantly challenged.<sup>225</sup> Heckel suggested that the name "Eurydike" was a proto-title which denoted the chief wife among the polygamous Macedonian kings, a theory which originated with Macurdy in 1932, but has since fallen out of favour, as the evidence seems more circumstantial than anything else.<sup>226</sup> Adea's name change was a way of creating an identity in the mind of the Macedonian soldiery, her primary avenue of support. As a peripheral and even exotic member of the Argead family, she needed a way to promote her person and political image. No better alternative than the name of the revered Eurydike I existed, promoting the idea of an energetic queen acting on behalf of her family. Whether this was her own idea or Kynnane's is not clear, but the sources say she became known only as Eurydike after her marriage.<sup>227</sup>

#### **4.4 Olympias, religion, *axiōma* and *timé***

Like Adea, enough sources have survived to form an idea of Olympias as a character. It appears that central to her identity was her mythological genealogy and religious conviction. If we are to believe Theopompos, Olympias fervently believed her ancestors to include Achilles and Helenos of Troy, famous heroes from Greek mythology.<sup>228</sup> The Molossian-Epirote royal family, the Aikids, prided themselves on their illustrious lineage which they claimed could be traced all the way back to Troy and King Priamos. No doubt Olympias was

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<sup>224</sup> Orosius (3.23.29-30.) relates how Kassander only allied with Adea out of lust which is highly doubtful to say the least. Even without drawing other flaws of Orosius and his texts into the discussion, it should be enough to note that this seems completely improbable. Kassander was one of the most careful and manipulating of the Diadochoi, he would not have let his shot at dominion over Macedonia be dictated by sexual desire, nor would Adea allow the alliance to be formed on this basis; she had everything to lose and little to gain in such a treaty.

<sup>225</sup> Ogden (1999): 22-4.; Macurdy (1932): 23-5. See also Heckel 1978b and Carney 1987a, 1987b.

<sup>226</sup> Carney (2000): 32-4. Such as the previously mentioned Kleopatra-Eurydike being appointed "chief wife" by receiving a new name, Eurydike, at the time of her marriage to Philip, is not conclusive when she is called simply Kleopatra by all other sources but Arrian. "Eurydike" was probably an aristocratic name, with long ties back to Greek culture and mythology, but was not a "throne name".

<sup>227</sup> *AEvt*: 1.23.

<sup>228</sup> Theo: *FGrH* 155 F 355.

the source for Alexander's fascination with Achilles and the heroes of the *Iliad*.<sup>229</sup> Olympias likely had or took on four different names during her life, her birth-name being Polyxena, the name of King Priamos' youngest daughter and later Achilles' lover.<sup>230</sup> Her second name was Myrtale ("myrtle") which likely was connected with her interest in the Dionysiac religious rites.<sup>231</sup> Her names were changed, presumably by herself with the exception of "Olympias", to correspond with different stages in her life. Her last name which she either took on as an epithet or replaced Olympias with, was Stratonikē, "military-victory", following her defeat of Adea-Eurydike at Euia in 317.<sup>232</sup> This practice of name-changing shows clearly that Olympias was very conscious of how she presented herself publically, as well as demonstrating the multisided aspect of her personal identity.

Olympias is also credited with changing the practice of the Macedonian Dionysian cults,<sup>233</sup> drawing the criticism of Plutarch in the process, allegedly warping the minds of young Macedonian maidens. She apparently created or patronized an all-female Dionysiac festival and provided tame pet snakes to use in the ceremonies and rites, and according to Plutarch she allegedly "strove after these [intense and superstitious religious services/sacrifices] inspirations and carried out these frenzies more barbarically".<sup>234</sup> Regardless, religion and mysticism was personally important for Olympias. Her alleged fascination with snakes and the introduction of snakes in cultic rites being accredited to her is more credible, snakes were a common theme in Epirote religious imagery and practice; it would not be a stretch of the imagination to think that Olympias brought the practice with her to Macedonia after she became Philip's wife.<sup>235</sup>

The fantastical story of Alexander's divine bastardry is another example of Olympias relationship with mysticism. Though retold by Plutarch and Justin, both of which seemingly despised Olympias and would not hesitate to discredit her, the story might very well have originated with Olympias herself. In the first telling of the story Olympias is said to have

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<sup>229</sup> Carney (2006): 5-8. Carney, *AJP* (1996): 563, fn.2.; Euripides (*Andromache*, 1239-49) relates the ancestry of the Aikids back to the captive Andromache, wife of Hektor of Troy, and Neoptolemos/Pyrrhos, the son of Achilles. It is no coincidence that so many of the Epirote kings were named Pyrrhos and Neoptolemos.

<sup>230</sup> Heckel (2006): 181-3.

<sup>231</sup> Ogden (2010): 23.

<sup>232</sup> *PluM*: 401a-b.; Jus: 9.7.13. Heckel, *CH* (1981a): 79-86.

<sup>233</sup> Dionysos was one of the most revered gods in Macedonian society, with the kings personally patronizing a number of temples and festivals in Dionysos' honour, traditions stretching back to at least the 5<sup>th</sup> century (Christesen & Murray, 2012: 431-5).

<sup>234</sup> *PluA*: 2.5.

<sup>235</sup> Carney (2006): 92-3. Carney, *AS* (1987a): 40-1, fn.16.

become pregnant after dreaming her womb was struck by a bolt of lightning (representing Zeus), while the second version tells of Philip sexually shunning her after discovering she “shared bed” (not a euphemism, but literally) with a snake (later representing the Egyptian god Ammon).<sup>236</sup> This second version was obviously circulated after Alexander’s conquest of Egypt, but it plays on the first version and the presence of the snake is not circumstantial.

Alexander famously portrayed himself in his later reign as a divine bastard in the same vein as his heroes Herakles and Achilles. Olympias may well have been the origin of this belief, her own intense fascination with her heroic ancestors is well-attested and no doubt influenced her son.<sup>237</sup> Taking this into account, Olympias emerges as a woman with a clear historical identity. She was the daughter of a king, her ancestors were famous heroes and kings from Greek mythology, and she knew how to appropriate and export ideas and imagery. Yet she knew the dangers of politics, shrewdly manoeuvring through the court of Philip. Regardless if she was the source behind the story of Zeus being Alexander’s “real” father, she apparently knew the danger to her son and herself owing to the bastardry implied; when asked of it she allegedly quipped, “Will Alexander never stop slandering me to Hera!”<sup>238</sup> Macurdy charmingly deems Olympias a “[...] woman of genius, and probably always close to the borderline of insanity”.<sup>239</sup> Her later actions following her son’s death show that Olympias clearly knew how to play the political game. She initially avoided the direct spotlight by staying away from the centre of events, choosing to reside in Molossia while her rivals Antipater and later Adea-Eurydike held court in Pella. Olympias also had the foresight to clearly identify that her and her daughter Kleopatra’s long term success lay with the well-being of young Alexander IV. Her connection with the religious practices of Macedon might also have helped her in her bid for power. Carney postulates that Olympias choice of dress at the Battle of Euia (she supposedly rode at the head of the army dressed as a Bacchante to the beat of a *tympanon* drum) was an attempt to play on the Macedonians’ well-known dedication to Dionysos.<sup>240</sup> Evidently, she knew how to play to the sensibilities of the regular Macedonians to an even greater extent than Adea and Kynnane.

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<sup>236</sup> PluA: 2.2, 2.4.; Jus: 11.11.3.

<sup>237</sup> Eratosthenes *apud* Plutarch says Olympias told Alexander of his divine origin before he set off for Asia, but Plutarch follows up in the very same passage by stating “others” claim Olympias repudiated the idea.

<sup>238</sup> PluA: 3.2.

<sup>239</sup> Macurdy (1932): 28.

<sup>240</sup> Ath: 13.560f.; Carney (2006): 97, 99-100. “The army, of course, went over to Olympias for a number of reasons, but her Dionysiac image, irrespective of whether Duris was right to have her acting it out on the scene of battle, probably helped to sway them because of the popularity of the cult [...]” (97).

Olympias spent at least a year making up her mind before accepting the guardianship (*epimeleia, prostasia*) of Alexander IV when it was offered her by Polyperchon in 318. Why did she take so long to make her mind up? She clearly understood to accept it would mean getting directly involved in the cutthroat politics being carried out by the Successors. Polyperchon and Kassander were by now locked in war with each other over the viceroyalty of Macedon and Greece, and in Asia Antigonos and Eumenes were carrying on a seesawing conflict across Anatolia and Mesopotamia. Yet Olympias might have recognized a few political themes in Macedonia. For the average Macedonian the past four years had brought nothing but betrayals among the country's leadership, civil war and instability. To the Macedonians in Macedon the generals of Alexander were unknowns, having spent the past fifteen years abroad, the only stabilizing figure being Antipater, who died in 320. Even Alexander would have become a semi-legendary figure, setting out in 334 at the age of twenty-two and never returning; the same went for the entire generation of Macedonian men he took with him. Olympias would have represented continuum, a reminder of the old Argead order and the glory days of Philip II.<sup>241</sup> Diodoros notes she returned to Macedonia with her former *apodoché* and *timé*, “favour” and “honour”,<sup>242</sup> and the Macedonian troops of Adea-Eurydike's army at Euia recollected Olympias' *axiōma*, “worthiness”, as the daughter, sister and mother of kings, and changed their allegiance.<sup>243</sup>

Did Olympias know the Macedonian home army would respond this way to her return? A number of factors suggests otherwise. Firstly Olympias returned at the head of a foreign army, troops provided by her nephew, King Aiakides of Molossia. Despite the relatively close ties between Macedon and Molossia, it was still regarded as a foreign kingdom, and as the Greeks considered Macedonians culturally backwards, so too did the Macedonians regard the Molossians.<sup>244</sup> It would have been easy to judge it a foreign invasion had it not been for Olympias' presence. Secondly, Polyperchon, official regent and Olympias' ally, was not a popular figure and made himself even more unpopular by carrying out a disastrous campaign against Kassander whom many Macedonians must have felt was better qualified for the

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<sup>241</sup> Carney (2006): 69-71.

<sup>242</sup> Diod: 18.65.1.

<sup>243</sup> Ibid.: 19.11.2.; Jus: 14.5.8-10.

<sup>244</sup> One need not look further than Attalos' comments about Philip now being able to father “Macedonian sons”, implying Alexander was not properly Macedonian for having a Molossian mother (PluA. 9.4-5.; Jus. 9.7.4-7.). Confer also the Macedonian troops' attitude towards the commander Neoptolemos, a Molossian, in Eumenes' army (Waterfield (2011): 59.; PluE: 6.3-5.).

viceroyalty, being the son of the highly respected Antipater.<sup>245</sup> Thirdly, there was Adea-Eurydike to consider. She had demonstrated on several occasions that she could command the loyalty and respect of the Macedonian soldiers, her own carefully cultivated image as a warrior-queen would logically have endeared her to the troops.

All this counted for little in the end as the *axiōma* of Olympias and the memory of Philip triumphed all other considerations for the Macedonian home army, at least in that moment. Olympias would quickly sour her relationship with the Macedonians, but there can be little doubt as to the exalted figure she was in their collective minds. Her influence at court and religious leadership during Philip's reign, and the status as the mother of Alexander, combined with her illustrious family history trumped the fact that she was a female, the Macedonians disregarding the traditional gender barrier in politics in favour for a familiar face they knew and revered from the days of Philip.<sup>246</sup>

#### **4.5 Summary of motivations and actions**

The above discussion has laid out in some detail the possible stimulus and strategies employed by the four most important women of the Argead clan in this period. Intentionally, Thessalonikē, the half-sister of Kynnane and Kleopatra, has been left out as she did not act in any overtly political way until the very end of her life, in 297. In short, the approaches to both attaining and validating political power differed significantly between Adea, Kleopatra, Kynnane, and Olympias. Common to them all was the desire to see their own branch of the dynasty survive the chaos the Successor Wars brought about, which pitted them against each other.

Where Adea and Kynnane favoured a more direct political approach, Kleopatra chose a more traditional one, though employed in an untraditionally manner (political marriage), and Olympias tried a combination of both, heavily supported by her ability inspire loyalty through her connection with the previous kings. Olympias also successfully took advantage of religious and mythological ideas among the Macedonians; she had been a leading figure in the royally sponsored Dionysos cult, and in all probability made extensive usage of Dionysiac symbolism, not only as reported at Euia, but also in her public imagery, just as she had done during her time at Philip II's court. It is hard to determine whether personal ambition was a

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<sup>245</sup> Diodoros claims Kassander perceived Polyperchon to be more popular than himself, but he had relatively little problem finding allies for his cause and troops for his rebellion in 318 (Diod. 18.54.1-4.).

<sup>246</sup> Carney (2006): 74-5, 114

primary factor in the action patterns of the aforementioned women, but it seems that personal survival was the overarching concern. As had already by 321 become abundantly clear is that survival hinged on support from someone with available protection, be it direct control of military forces (Perdikkas, Antigonos), or the ability to call upon other generals through alliances (Antipater). Personal identity and presentation was important for them all, underscoring their status as royalty and worthy of the power they sought to amass. In the end, it all ties into the concept and perception of legitimacy, and its expression. However, this worked only in the short run. When Diadochoi like Kassander and Antigonos started to disregard “the rules” of the old order, and found it more expedient to have troublesome women like Olympias and Kleopatra removed, they did not hesitate. The Argead women’s *timé* and *axiōma* were important and offered protection and loyalty only so long as everyone tacitly agreed that was the case. Once the cracks started to appear in the façade of Argead prestige and royal legitimacy, the moment the idea of personal kingship and dynasties formed in the minds of Antigonos and Kassander, that was the moment the Argead women lost their significance; they became just another set of rivals for political power, not someone it was worthwhile ruling *through*, but rather a hindrance. No doubt the idea must have crossed the minds of Olympias, Kleopatra, and Adea; their royal blood was no guarantee that they would not be harmed, it had not stopped Alketas from murdering Kynnane. Therefore, the only solution was to acquire enough power for themselves to avoid becoming the next victims in the “murderous game of musical chairs”.<sup>247</sup>

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<sup>247</sup> Carney (2014): 7.

## **5.0 Rivalry of Adea & Olympias: Strategies**

Adea-Eurydike and Olympias turned into rivals shortly after both ascended to power, possibly recognizing the other's potential for political ascendancy way before that shift in relationship in 317. Adea-Eurydike had already by 317 proved she was not only a capable orator, but also a young woman who had a clear vision of identity she sought to export and solidify among the Macedonians. Olympias, on the other hand, relied on networks created and maintained since her time at the court of Philip II, her claim to power being through the exalted memory of her royal husband and son. Both women recognized their way to power lay in the elimination of the other. Their path to achieving the same goal, the ascendancy of their own branch of the Argead family, went roughly through the same avenues; both made use of a combination of military strength, social and familial connections, as well as a pragmatic and expedient political approach to the situation. This chapter seeks to lay out in detail the way both queens, for that is the title both aspired to maintain, tried to claim, maintain, and attain power in a changing Macedonian political reality. Especially, up to this point in Macedonian history, they uniquely made use of direct military power, both through intermediaries as well in their own rights as the sole (powerful and able) survivors of the Argead clan.

Attempting to outline all aspects of such a short but intense conflict as the one between Adea-Eurydike and Olympias quickly becomes an overly detailed affair, but it highlights the complexity of Macedonian politics of the period, and the role the two women were able to play. They were not only politically active, but a driving force behind the events that took place, forcing the other major actors to respond.

### **5.1 Military strength**

As noted previously the most effective route to political power for any of the would-be Successors was the availability of military force. By 318 most of the military assets were in the hands of a few major actors; Antigonos and Eumenes commanded the largest forces, with smaller armies under the control of Ptolemy in Egypt, Nikanor in the confederated "Upper Satrapies", Lysimachos in Thrace, and Peithon in Media. Macedonia and Greece on the other hand was a troublesome matter. The Macedonian home army, numbering some 25,000 troops and a sizable contingent of war-elephants brought from Asia by Leonnatos in 322,<sup>248</sup> was under Polyperchon's control in 318, but a wasteful campaign in Attika and a catastrophically

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<sup>248</sup> Diod: 18.68.3.



managed siege of the city of Megalopolis in the Peloponnese cost the lives of a large number of Macedonian troops.<sup>249</sup> Kassander meanwhile received reinforcements from Antigonos in Asia, as well as troops from many of the Greek cities and Macedonian loyalists, and though the total number is unknown it was certainly enough to force Athens and a number of Greek cities into submission. Polyperchon's blundering also cost him nearly all his Greek allies, preferring Kassander instead.<sup>250</sup>

Polyperchon comes across in the sources as a poor politician and at times an even worse military commander. As one of Alexander's generals on the *anabasis*, Polyperchon seems to be an exception to the generally very high quality of command prowess exhibited by most of the *somatōphylakes* and other generals like Hephaistion, Perdikkas, Lysimachos and Leonnatos.<sup>251</sup> Based on this legacy it seems odd for Antipater to choose Polyperchon as his successor to the regency, and even more odd when considering Polyperchon was of the same generation of Philip and Antipater, significantly older than the rest of the Successors.<sup>252</sup> Perhaps Antipater trusted someone from his own generation more than his son, despite Kassander being in his mid-thirties in 320, but irrespectively Kassander took serious offence, and organized a rebellion to remove Polyperchon from the vice-regal "throne". Officially, Polyperchon was the *autokrator epemelitai*, "supreme regent",<sup>253</sup> but the title of imperial regent had by 318 lost its effective meaning as the empire in effect had become a collection of satrapies, with Antigonos in Asia the closest to being an approximate imperial regent, all due to his brute military strength. The regent in Macedon was effectively a king in his own right, but still paying lip-service to the maintenance of the Argead dynasty and Alexander's empire.

Polyperchon's official authority resided in his custody of the joint-kings Alexander and Philip Arrhidaios; they gave him the political and constitutional authority necessary to retain control over Macedonia and its army. However, here too he blundered and when he departed Macedon to fight Kassander in Greece, he left the kings (at the very least Arrhidaios) and, crucially, Adea-Eurydike behind in Pella.<sup>254</sup> It is at this point he must have sent word to

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<sup>249</sup> Diod: 18.68.3-72.1.

<sup>250</sup> Ibid.: 18.74.1, 75.1-2.

<sup>251</sup> Hornblower (1981): 225. "a slight, unmeritable man"; Carney, *SC* (2014): 1-2.

<sup>252</sup> Heckel (2006): 226.

<sup>253</sup> Diod: 18.49.1-3.

<sup>254</sup> No sources mention this, but neither do the sources mention the kings in Polyperchon's custody or entourage during the fighting in Greece, before they place both Adea-Eurydike and Arrhidaios at the field of Euia. Heckel (1992: 197, fn.135 *apud* Carney, 2014) and Carney (2000: 135) argues for this, and given Polyperchon's

Olympias and offering her the *epimeleia* of her grandson Alexander.<sup>255</sup> He must have hoped that having Olympias on his side would endear him further to the Macedonians, and since this is before he set off on his disastrous Greek campaign, one can infer that he was already unpopular from the start. Why else would he give away a significant portion of his authority and in effect share out his power? Diodoros even points out that he also offered Olympias *basilike prostatesia*, a heavily debated term that might be taken to mean an undefined position of prominence and authority, though likely not a political office *per se*, rather an unofficial position of high honour.<sup>256</sup> Despite the fact that he had the upper hand on Kassander in terms of troop numbers, he cannot have been confident in his ability to defeat Kassander neither militarily nor politically, a surprisingly level-headed observation on Polyperchon's part if true. He tried the same move on Eumenes in Asia, offering him the custody of Philip Arrhidaios in addition to bribes of a more immediately useful nature, troops and cash, for his loyalty.<sup>257</sup> Polyperchon apparently recognized he was in a strenuous position, stuck between Kassander and Antigonos with no natural allies to call upon.

How do Olympias and Adea fit into all this? Olympias as we have seen spent at least a year, more likely the better part of two, trying to reach a decision as to what to do regarding Polyperchon's offer. She clearly recognized she would have to risk stepping into the "endless murderous game of musical chairs".<sup>258</sup> Polyperchon was willing to grant her all that she wanted, both as a queen-mother and as a grandmother; custody and wardship over her grandson as well as significant political control over Macedon. However, it was a decision fraught with risks as she would have been just as unsure as Polyperchon of the regent's ability to defeat Kassander in battle. If she threw her lot in with Polyperchon only for him to be ousted by Kassander a few months down the road, Olympias would have gained nothing and lost everything. So she reached out to Eumenes via letters to ask for his opinion. Eumenes, ever the loyalist to the royal dynasty, advised her to remain cautious and see who emerged victorious from the fighting before she threw her lot in with any one of the parties.<sup>259</sup> However, Olympias could not wait that long. By early 317 the war in Asia was

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pendant for shooting himself in the foot politically, it seems very likely. Alexander IV's location during this time will be discussed below.

<sup>255</sup> Carney (2006): 78-70.; Diod: 18.49.4.

<sup>256</sup> "Royal superintendence" is the closest English translation that still carries roughly the same meaning. Miron (2000): 36-7, fn.4-6.; Carney, *CJ* (1995): 373-6, fn. 15-6.; Hammond, *CQ* (1980): 471-6.

<sup>257</sup> Diod: 18.57.2-4.; PluE: 13.1-2.

<sup>258</sup> Carney (2014): 7.

<sup>259</sup> PluE: 13.1.; Diod: 18.58.2-4.

going badly for Eumenes (he would be killed one year later after the Battle of Gabiene in Iran), and Kassander seemed to be gaining the upper hand in Greece against Polyperchon. Worse yet for Olympias would have been the news that Adea-Eurydike had aligned with Kassander, forcing her to make a move before the young queen made good on her intention of taking complete control of Macedon.

Adea-Eurydike had as noted previously been able to either give Polyperchon the slip, or managed to convince the gullible regent to let her and Philip Arrhidaios stay behind in Macedonia when Polyperchon took his army south. Well free of the regent she drafted letters to among others Kassander, Antigonos and Polyperchon himself.<sup>260</sup> Whether Olympias forced her hand into choosing Kassander as an alliance partner, provided Adea had learned of Polyperchon's offer to Olympias, or if it was a pre-arranged partnership, is a bit unclear. It certainly seems on the surface like Adea naturally chose the opponent of Polyperchon. In the letters she ordered Polyperchon to surrender the regency and (most importantly) the army to Kassander, whom King Philip Arrhidaios supposedly had appointed his new viceroy and regent.<sup>261</sup> No one at the time or since was fooled by the king's signature on the letters, which clearly had been written by Adea.

Kassander was in a stronger position by the start of 317 than might be inferred from the lack of detail of his military actions (apart from the conquest of Athens) and the size of his armies. He had started with a very small force in 318 when he raised his banner in rebellion against Polyperchon, but he quickly took Piraeus, Athens' all-important port city and the Athenians were forced to accept Kassander garrisoning the city.<sup>262</sup> Polyperchon inexpertly tried to "restore the freedom" of the Greek cities through a proclamation in an attempt to cut Kassander off at the knees; much of his strength stemmed from support among the leadership of the Greek cities in Attika, the Peloponnese and Boeotia. However, Polyperchon's provision that the Greek cities would not rebel against the Macedonians, and any politician who did so would be exiled and his property confiscated, betrayed the intention of the decree.<sup>263</sup> Diodoros relays the declaration in full and in the passage preceding it he seems to genuinely believe the aim was to free the Greeks, while at the same time going after

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<sup>260</sup> Jus: 14.5.1-4.

<sup>261</sup> *Loc. cit.*: "[Adea-Eurydike] wrote in the king's name to Polysperchon [sic.], desiring him 'to deliver up the army to Kassander, on whom the king had conferred the government of the kingdom.' She made a similar missive to Antigonos, in a letter which she wrote to him in Asia."

<sup>262</sup> Diod: 18.64.1-2., 18.68.1-2.

<sup>263</sup> *Ibid.*: 18.55-6.

Kassander. He does not seem to have taken the provision to not fight the Macedonians into account, as it is quite clear that Polyperchon still wanted to retain control over the cities' foreign policy, keeping them in effective vassalage. The Greeks saw it for what it was, and mostly paid little attention to the declaration or openly declared for Kassander.<sup>264</sup> Kassander smoothly countered Polyperchon by removing the garrison in Athens and installing a popular philosopher as the new leader in the city, paying lip-service to the great democratic and philosophical traditions of the Athenians, while still retaining control.<sup>265</sup> With only a small ad-hoc force of Greeks, a few Macedonian supporters, and troops sent by Antigonos, Kassander was by mid-317 clearly winning the war in Greece.

Adea-Eurydike had already thrown her lot in with Kassander by this point. Polyperchon was stuck in a hopeless siege of Megalopolis, losing large numbers of troops and decidedly looking like the losing side in the war.<sup>266</sup> Why did not Adea wait until this point before casting her lot in with Kassander? Eumenes' advice to Olympias, to stay out of the war until one side emerged as the more powerful, was sound logic and common sense, qualities not unknown to Adea. She may have overplayed her hand by immediately reacting to Polyperchon's offer to Olympias. Polyperchon emerges through the sources as a pliable character, easily read and manipulated by both Kassander and Antigonos. Adea had proven to be a fiery orator, inciting the troops at the Triparadeisos conference to violence and almost murdering Antipater; she knew how to manipulate and convince people.<sup>267</sup> She had forced Peithon, who took command of the royal army after the death of Perdikkas by the Nile in 320, into near irrelevancy by forcing him to have every command decision go through her first.<sup>268</sup> She would certainly have been able to handle Polyperchon, who was not near the savvy politician Antipater had been. Olympias dithered during most of 318, unsure if she should accept Polyperchon's offer. Paradoxically, it was Adea-Eurydike overtly allying with Kassander which convinced Olympias to return to Macedon from Molossia. It is tempting to regard the alliance between Adea and Kassander as a marriage of necessity, an "enemy of my

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<sup>264</sup> Antigonos would a few years later make a very similar declaration which is praised by both Diodoros and Plutarch, painting Antigonos as a champion of Greek democracy (Diod: 19.61.3-4). Polyperchon does not receive the same treatment. Polybios sees through the façade when he comments "all kings [...] mouth of freedom as of a gift they offer to all and style all those who are thus loyal supporters their friends and allies, but as soon as they have gained their ends they commence to treat those who placed trust in them as servants, not allies" (Poly: 15.24.4).

<sup>265</sup> Diod: 18.74.3

<sup>266</sup> Ibid.: 18.69-71.

<sup>267</sup> *AEvt*: 1.30-33.; Diod: 18.39.1-4.

<sup>268</sup> Ibid. 1.30-31.; Diod: 18.39.1-2.

enemy”-situation. Yet Polyperchon was not overtly Adea’s enemy at this point, and as long as Olympias remained in Molossia where she had little actual influence, she was only a theoretical threat. Though the exact order of events is a bit unclear, it seems like Adea very quickly sprang into action once she made public her contact and cooperation with Kassander, asking for instance Antigonos for troops and assistance.<sup>269</sup>

Between returning to Macedon in 319 and 317 Adea and Kassander would have had ample time to communicate, both presumably being at court in Pella. Antipater died in 319 shortly after arriving back home, so the issue of the succession of the regency was clear for a good period of time before Kassander made his move. Adea and Kassander could during this period of roughly a year, perhaps more, have conspired to assist one another in getting rid of Polyperchon and Olympias. Kassander inherited Antipater’s feud with Olympias, and would later do his utmost to discredit her legacy; there was no love lost between the two.

Furthermore, Polyperchon had in Kassander’s eyes stolen the viceregal throne intended for him.<sup>270</sup> Adea’s motivations were just as clear. Olympias represented the most dangerous single enemy to Adea’s dynastic ambitions; both were dependent on the other’s death if their own branch of the Argead dynasty were to become ascendant. She would also benefit hugely by having a regent who she could cooperate with, instead of one who kept her almost as a hostage.

Justin says the following of their alliance: “Kassander, attached to her [Adea] by such a favour, managed everything according to the will of that ambitious woman.”<sup>271</sup> The favour mentioned is Adea appointing Kassander as her official regent, through the mouthpiece Arrhidaios. It is interesting to note that Justin attributes ownership of the arrangement to Adea, with Kassander acting on her orders. Justin, while having no great love for Olympias, is generally even-handed to Adea in the few passages where he mentions her, though almost invariably pointing out her ambitiousness.<sup>272</sup> Diodoros is mum as to who orchestrated the coalition, but it seems like Kassander acted in accordance to an already prepared plan of action.

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<sup>269</sup> Jus: 14.5.2-3. The contents of the letters are unknown, Justin only reports she sent them, signed by Philip Arrhidaios, but it must be inferred that she asked Antigonos for support, just as Kassander had done upon starting his rebellion against Polyperchon.

<sup>270</sup> Diod: 18.48.5., 49.1-2.

<sup>271</sup> Jus: 14.5.4

<sup>272</sup> There are a few exceptions, such as claiming that Adea-Eurydike acted out of “womanish emulation” and took “advantage of her husband’s weakness” (14.5.2)

By summer or autumn Olympias finally made her decision to travel back to Macedon, having finally accepted Polyperchon's offer of *prostasia*. She might have been influenced by correspondence from Eumenes, who had by this point been forced to retreat into Mesopotamia by Antigonos, and it started to look grim for Eumenes' cause. Olympias likely felt it was now or never, with Antigonos clearly supporting Kassander (he had had his navy capture a treasure fleet headed for Polyperchon, and had defeated the regent's troops in western Asia Minor),<sup>273</sup> her own ally Eumenes fighting a losing war, and Polyperchon having fumbled away his position of strength from a year ago. Making her gamble, she recruited the support of her enthusiastic nephew King Aiakides of Molossia and his army. Then something strange occurs in the sources. Diodoros notes the following:

“In Macedonia, when Eurydike, who had assumed the control of the regency, heard that Olympias was making preparations for a return, she sent a courier into the Peloponnese to Kassander, asking him to come to her aid as soon as possible; and, by approaching the most important of the Macedonians with gifts and great promises, she attempted to make them loyal to her person. But Polyperchon, aligned with Aiakides of Epeiros, gathered an army and led Olympias, and as well the son of Alexander to restore the kingship. So, as soon as he heard that Eurydike was at Euia in Macedonia with her army, he hastened against her with the intention of concluding the campaign in a single battle.”<sup>274</sup>

Suddenly Polyperchon is in Molossia instead of in southern Greece, having left a “part of his army” behind to carry on the luckless siege of Megalopolis. But the mention of “collected an army” means that he must have been either without troops or at least in no large numbers. On the other hand, Adea-Eurydike is now suddenly in possession of an army. And it must be inferred that this was a significant force, large enough that Adea risked open battle against the troops of Aiakides, who presumably commanded at the very least large portions of the Molossian military levy.<sup>275</sup> Diodoros says that “Polyperchon had come to be regarded with contempt because of his failure at the siege of Megalopolis, most of the Greek cities deserted the kings and went over to Kassander.”<sup>276</sup>

Firstly, it might be that not only the Greeks but also the Macedonians were sufficiently dissatisfied with Polyperchon that they switched sides. How else would Adea suddenly have gathered what both Justin and Diodoros calls an army? Diodoros notes that Antipater

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<sup>273</sup> Diod: 18.68.1., 18.72.

<sup>274</sup> Ibid.: 19.11.1-6.

<sup>275</sup> Pau: 1.11.3. Though a later source, Pausanias notes specifically that the Epirotes did not support Aiakides' expedition on behalf of Olympias, so presumably the troops were all from the Molossian half of the dual kingdom.

<sup>276</sup> Diod: 18.74.1.

experienced a critical manpower shortage when trying to gather troops to fight the Greeks during the Lamian War in 323.<sup>277</sup> He needed assistance from Leonnatos and Krateros in 322 to put the Greeks down, the two crossing from Asia with substantial forces. Roughly five years later the manpower situation had not improved. Krateros and Antigonos had brought the army back into Asia again along with reinforcements from Antipater.<sup>278</sup> Polyperchon's army of 25,000 in 318 must have been all that Macedonia could muster, and 4,000 of those are noted as "allies" by Diodoros, meaning mercenaries or troops drawn from Greek cities. And when significant portions of these had succumbed to hunger in Attika, died in the siege lines around Megalopolis, or been killed in battle by Antigonos' army in Ionia, it is not far-fetched to imagine that a large part of the army deserted Polyperchon, now possibly absent in Molossia, in favour for Kassander and Adea.

Secondly, Diodoros makes out Polyperchon as the one in charge, the one in command of the army, but later he portrays Olympias as the one who makes all the political decisions.<sup>279</sup> Olympias would also have been the one to provide the connection to the Molossian royal house, her nephew being the king.<sup>280</sup> Justin portrays Olympias as the one in charge of the army, and Duris of Samos does the same.<sup>281</sup> Polyperchon had by now lost most of his army and any credibility he may have had, his presence would have been secondary to Olympias who by now had most likely taken effective control.

Thirdly, the reference to the "son of Alexander" is problematic. Alexander IV's presence in Molossia is debatable. Certainly he was in the custody of Polyperchon when the war with Kassander broke out,<sup>282</sup> but the Greek of the original passage (19.11.2) is open to interpretation. It reads:

“Πολυπέρχων δὲ δύναμιν ἤθροισε προσλαβόμενος Αἰακίδην τὸν Ἑπειρώτην καὶ κατήγαγεν Ὀλυμπιάδα μετὰ τοῦ Ἀλεξάνδρου παιδὸς ἐπὶ τὴν βασιλείαν.”

“But Polyperchon, aligned with Aiakides of Epeiros, gathered an army and led Olympias, and as well the son of Alexander to restore the kingship.”

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<sup>277</sup> Diod: 18.12.2. Antipater commanded 13,000 troops in 323, and while his army numbered 40,000 at the Battle of Krannon the following year, a large percentage of these were Greek mercenaries, in addition to the 20,000 veterans brought by Leonnatos from Asia.

<sup>278</sup> Bosworth, *JHS* (1986): 8-13.

<sup>279</sup> Diod: 19.11.4-9. Carney (2006): 74.

<sup>280</sup> Heckel (2006): 5, 56.; Pau: 1.11.1-3.

<sup>281</sup> Jus: 14.5.9-10.; Ath: 13.560e-f.

<sup>282</sup> Diod: 18.62, 68.2.

Macurdy takes it to mean that the phrase “κατήγαγεν [...] ἐπὶ τὴν βασιλείαν” is a general expression that means Polyperchon meant for “the restoration of Olympias – and the boy too – to royalty”.<sup>283</sup> It is implied that Alexander is not present in Molossia, rather it was Polyperchon’s desire to give Olympias custody of him that drove her to join forces with the regent in the first place, that Alexander actually remained back in Macedon. Certainly it is not mentioned in any of the sources how Polyperchon arrived in Molossia, neither is Alexander and his mother Rhoxane (who had been brought to Macedonia by Antipater back in 321, along with Adea and Arrhidaios) mentioned until they are with Olympias during the siege of Pydna the following year.<sup>284</sup> The boy-king Alexander was Polyperchon’s last real political asset, having lost custody of Philip Arrhidaios, as well as most of his armed forces and allies. It would have been foolhardy for Polyperchon to deliver to Olympias the custody of Alexander, which would have made Polyperchon almost redundant as a political actor.

It has been commonly assumed that Alexander was in Molossia due to the fact that he was apparently betrothed to Deidameia, daughter of Aiakides, as reported by Plutarch.<sup>285</sup>

However, as Macurdy rightly points out, it did not require the physical presence of a child to agree to a betrothal between the Greco-Macedonian elites;<sup>286</sup> Alexander could well have remained back in Macedon.<sup>287</sup> This explanation accounts for both parties’ haste with assembling troops and meeting in battle so soon after showing their true colours. If Alexander IV remained in Macedon, then he would have been too close to Adea-Eurydike’s sphere of control for Olympias’ and Polyperchon’s comfort. Alternatively, it meant that Adea needed to move quickly to stop the Olympias-Polyperchon-Aiakides alliance from getting into Macedon and getting custody of the boy-king.

Much has been made of Adea’s decision to rush out into battle and meet Olympias and Aiakides at Euia in the autumn of 317. Some scholars have pointed out that she did not trust Kassander to help her, even though the sources (Diodoros and Justin both) explicitly state

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<sup>283</sup> Macurdy, *JHS* (1932): 259.

<sup>284</sup> Diod: 19.35.5.; Jus: 14.6.2. Justin confuses Alexander IV with Alexander the Great’s illegitimate son Herakles, but it is clear that it is Alexander IV in Olympias’ entourage.

<sup>285</sup> *PluP*: 4.3.

<sup>286</sup> Patterson (1991): 49-54.; Ingalls, *JCAC* (2001): 25-9. The Classical and Hellenistic Greek marriage practices did not in any way require the presence of either bride or groom; if anything it is the bride-to-be that would have been brought to the groom, not the other way around. Marriages and betrothals were organized and agreed through the *kurios* of either party if the bride and groom in question were minors. Macedonian and Molossian marriage practices may have differed in details from the Greek, but likely not significantly regarding this aspect.

<sup>287</sup> Macurdy, *JHS* (1932): 257.



that she sent word for him to bring his army up to Macedonia. It is usually inferred that Adea's decision to sally out with her army before Kassander had time to arrive is because she did not trust him to actually help her out. The common explanation is that he waited to see the result of the coming battle, or that he planned to, at some one point down the road, force Adea to marry him, after ridding himself of competition to the real throne of Macedon by killing Philip Arrhidaios.<sup>288</sup>

My interpretation is thus: As has been commented on previously, it is hard to imagine Polyperchon being so willing to hand over his last political asset to Olympias. He, same as Olympias, would have been all too aware of the cutthroat nature of Macedonian dynastic politics which had taken a murderous turn for the worse since the start of the Successor Wars. There would have been little incentive for Olympias to keep him on as a regent given his unpopularity among both Greeks and Macedonians. She could have had him removed and either proclaim herself as the official regent, or use Aiakides as an intermediary.<sup>289</sup> In Olympias' employ Diodoros later mentions the former *somatōphulax* Aristonous, who supported her against Kassander.<sup>290</sup> If she required a male regent for appearances sake, Aristonous would have served perfectly; a dependable Asian veteran who had been part of Alexander's inner circle would have been a perfect candidate. Based on the mentions of Olympias in charge of the army at Euia by Justin and Duris, as well as Diodoros clearly making her out as the driving force of policy once back in Macedon, it seems likely that Polyperchon, along with Alexander IV, never went to Molossia at all. He could have returned to Macedonia when he got word that Olympias and Aiakides were gathering troops, though with Pella presumably under Adea's control, he might have taken up residence in Pydna, a fortified and strategic city a moderate distance south of Pella. There Polyperchon would be close enough to quickly return to Pella if Olympias was successful, as well as safe with a number of escape routes open if Adea and Kassander won out. In addition, the next time he is mentioned, it is an attempt to stop Kassander's army from entering Macedonia from the mountainous southward route up from Boeotia and through Thessaly, suggesting that he was already in position to oppose Kassander' approach either before or immediately after the

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<sup>288</sup> Carney (2000): 135-6.; Carney (1987a): 500-1.; Waterfield (2011): 88-9.; Romm (2011): 277.

<sup>289</sup> The usual caveats for Macedonian racism would apply here, had it not been for the *axiōma* attached to Olympias, which might have triumphed over casual racism, at least initially.

<sup>290</sup> Diod: 19.35.4, 50.7-8. Aristonous is listed by Arrian as a *somatōphulax* at least in 325, but his career during the *anabasis* is obscure (Arr: 6.28.4). He was a loyal support of Perdikkas, perhaps one of his close lieutenants along with Seleukos (Cur: 10.6.16).

confrontation at Euia.<sup>291</sup> Supporting this possibility is the fact that Alexander IV and Rhoxane are next mentioned as being at Pydna in Olympias' entourage during the siege of the city the following year.<sup>292</sup> Olympias might have had time to bring Alexander up from Pydna to Pella, and Diodoros specifically points out that after Adea's and Arrhidaios' murder and when Kassander was about to return, Olympias with Alexander, Rhoxane and Thessalonikē in her retinue, retired to Pydna.<sup>293</sup>

Then there is the curious case of Plutarch's account of Polyperchon in Phokis. There he consistently mentions Polyperchon as travelling with a singular king and it is implied later in the same chapter that it is Philip Arrhidaios, as he allegedly tries to assault an orator and Polyperchon has to physically restrain him.<sup>294</sup> Yet there is no mention of Adea-Eurydike, who would have accompanied Arrhidaios, only for the simple reason that Polyperchon could not leave her to her own devices unattended. It seems very strange that Polyperchon would have separated the king and queen, and at the same time left Alexander IV back in Macedon where Adea could get at him. It could be that Plutarch confuses the two kings and the detail about the king's outburst was added for dramatic flair. It would certainly not be in contrast with Plutarch's artistic style, and that little anecdote is the only indication of the identity of the king; the previous mentions of him does not hint at his age (Alexander being around six at this point and hardly capable of assaulting anyone). However, the detail of a singular king lends the passage some credence, as it might well be that the *other* king accompanied Polyperchon into Greece in 318. That supports the theory that Adea-Eurydike and Arrhidaios had been left behind in Macedon when Polyperchon left to fight Kassander. Polyperchon remained possibly in contact with Olympias only by correspondence all the while. Diodoros could be describing his intentions, rather than his actual physical actions in the passage shown above.

Returning, finally, to Adea's decision to make a stand at Euia, a number of elements were at play. Firstly, it is evidently clear that she knew Olympias were coming over from Molossia with a sizeable force. What she also may have been aware of is that Polyperchon was in the vicinity, just a few days south at Pydna along with Alexander IV, if we choose to accept the previously outlined reasoning behind the king's possible location. She sent word to

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<sup>291</sup> Diod: 19.35.3

<sup>292</sup> Jus: 14.6.2.; Diod: 19.35.4-5.

<sup>293</sup> Diod: 19.35.3-6.

<sup>294</sup> PluPh: 33.4-7.

Kassander to come to Macedonia with his army as quickly as possible,<sup>295</sup> but she did not wait for him to arrive with reinforcements. Either she felt she had the military strength to beat back Aiakides' Molossians, or as has been commonly claimed, she did not trust Kassander enough to not turn on her when he finally arrived.

Secondly, she was motivated by her desire to be portrayed as a warrior-queen. Just as Olympias' heroic ancestors was a cornerstone of her personal identity, so too was the Illyrian warrior and military culture important to Adea, being raised by Kynnane in a fusion of Macedonian courtly education and Illyrian warrior training.<sup>296</sup> At the Battle of Euia, according to Duris of Samos, "Eurydike came forward clad like a Macedonian soldier, having been already accustomed to war and military habits in the household of Kynnane the Illyrian."<sup>297</sup> While some doubt may be affixed to the veracity of Duris' story, even if it is untrue, it is remarkable that none of the other historians like Diodoros and Justin pointed out such a story. One would imagine that a young woman dressing up as a soldier would be odious to the Greco-Roman males, the same ones who do not hesitate to lambast Olympias for displaying "bloodthirstiness" and "vile jealousy" which according to Justin and Plutarch stems from her being a woman.<sup>298</sup> Rather than being offended at Adea-Eurydike's assumption of male accoutrements, it might just instead be an example of the authors' tacit approval of Adea's display of "male" behaviour; the same behaviour Diodoros and Justin applauds in their description of her death, which will be addressed below.<sup>299</sup>

The two also change their tunes when they describe Olympias' death, Justin pointing out that she did "not [shirk] from the sword, or crying out like a woman, but submitting to death like the bravest of men."<sup>300</sup> Just as Olympias is, according to the ancient historians, at her most barbaric and dangerous when acting as a woman, she is at the same time at her most noble and brave when acting as a man.<sup>301</sup> The same applies to Adea-Eurydike, dressed in armour, when she personally leads the Macedonian army in the field. This is an example of what Butler would qualify as a display of reverse- and parody of heteronormativity, but is instead of being reacted to with revulsion or protestations "by a symbolic that would eradicate those

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<sup>295</sup> Diod: 19.11.1.

<sup>296</sup> Pol: 8.60.

<sup>297</sup> Ath: 13.560f.

<sup>298</sup> Jus: 14.6.1. "[...] having committed great slaughter among the nobility throughout the country, like a furious woman rather than a queen, [Olympias] turned the favour with which she was regarded into hatred."

<sup>299</sup> Diod: 19.11.5-7.

<sup>300</sup> Jus: 14.6.9.

<sup>301</sup> Carney, *PH* (1993): 29-30. Carney (2006): 129.

phenomena that require an opening up of the possibilities for the resignification of sex”<sup>302</sup> it is instead met with approval. It seems to be a case of adhering to a male ideal that does not lose cultural or political significance by being carried out by a different gender, despite the cultural biases of the ancient authors. In short, while nominally something that should have been vile and preposterous in the eyes of the Greek and Roman historians, it is either simply pointed out as fact, or not commented on at all.

If Adea-Eurydike was to have any credibility as a powerful queen, capable of handling affairs in her own name, she needed to demonstrate to the Macedonians that she was just as capable of leading troops as a male. Therefore, Duris’ claim that she rode into battle dressed in the armour of a Macedonian phalangite seems very in character with her personal perception and identity.<sup>303</sup> Paradoxically, her failure was political, rather than military, not taking into account the high prestige and honour the Macedonians held Olympias.

This subchapter has attempted to explain and categorize the events of 318 and 317 through primarily a military lens of observation. Brute military strength was the key factor for any of the would-be Successors, both in Asia and in Europe. But in Greece and Macedonia it was heavily infused with a political character and consideration which was largely absent in the war being concurrently carried out in Asia between Antigonos and Eumenes; their war was more conventional. Polyperchon proved himself an unskilled general and politician, being continually bested by Kassander while nominally in a position of much greater strength, and had to rely on the custody of the joint-kings as his only political weapon which he desperately tried to use. He lucked out by finding an ally in Olympias, though it looked for a long time like she might sit out the conflict. Adea-Eurydike, given her circumstances, did well using the assets at hand, but ultimately her lack of a true base of military support was her downfall, as well as misjudging the attitudes of her Macedonian subjects. Kassander was unavailable, likely made so by the haste Adea had in engaging Olympias and Aiakides in battle. Kassander would do his very best to make up for it later, starting in 316.

## **5.2 *Philia***

While military strength is the easiest observable aspect of the Successors’ path to power, the politics of alliance and *philia*, “friendship”, was just as important, the alliance-making just as crucial to the long term success of the prospective dynasties as success on the battlefield.

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<sup>302</sup> Butler (1993): 131.

<sup>303</sup> Ath: 13.560f.; Carney (1987a): 500. Carney (2000): 136-7.

Despite the chaotic situation of 323-316, before the clear ascendancy of Antigonos Monophtalmos, the Greco-Macedonian concept of friendship played a role in the development of the post-Alexandrian alliances and power blocs. Perdikkas, while notorious for his penchant for creating enemies, was careful during 323-322 in cultivating the friendship and loyalty of several key Macedonians in Babylon, such as Seleukos, Eumenes, Peithon, and possibly Antigenes.<sup>304</sup> Just as it was imperative for the Macedonian kings to cultivate a good relationship with their *hetairoi*, so too was it important for the Macedonian nobility to maintain a similar relation with members of the upper strata of society. Foreshadowing the practice of the later Hellenistic courts, these members of what even during this early period could be described as a court, were called *philoï*, “friends”.<sup>305</sup> The same term would in short order replace the *hetairoi* in the Seleukid, Ptolemaic and Antigonid royal courts of the Hellenistic period, though they served largely the same roles, their official and unofficial repertoire of tasks in fact expanding over time compared to the *hetairoi*.<sup>306</sup>

*Philia* in the Hellenistic world can be described as a mutual, personal reciprocal bond of obligations, loyalty, and solidarity between two persons (both men and women) of roughly equal social status, at least in the Classical Greek sense of the term. The goal of *philia* was nominally to attain the same common goal, and display united action towards the fulfilment of that common goal, the showcase of united action meant to strengthen the bond between the sides in the *philia*. Though theoretically, according to the Classical Greek tradition of *xenia* and *philoxenia*, the partners in a *philia* relationship were supposed to be peers, more often than not, one part was subordinate to the other, and over the course of the Hellenistic period the social gap between the *basileus* and his *philoï* widened.<sup>307</sup> Despite the somewhat unimpressive term *philia* and the superficial similarity the name might suggest, it is highly unhelpful to think of the relationship between the Hellenistic *basileus* and the *philoï* of the court as a Greco-Macedonian version of the Roman patron-client dynamic. Unlike the Romans, the Hellenistic system was thoroughly based around the monarchy as the institutional frame; everything centred around the constitutional body of the king. The term

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<sup>304</sup> Cur: 10.6.16.; PluA:77.6.; Jus: 13.4.10-23. Antigenes should not to be confused with Antigonos; Antigenes was the aged commander of the elite *Argyraspides*, “Silver-shields”, the Macedonian infantry guard, who made great account of themselves as loyal troops to Eumenes (PluE: 13.2-4.; Pol: 4.8.2.; Diod: 18.61.1-3.).

<sup>305</sup> Pachidis (2006): 258-9, fn. 44.; Herman (1981): 110-111, fn.21.; Diod: 19.11.8.

“[...] ἐπέλεξε δὲ καὶ τῶν Κασάνδρου φίλων τοὺς ἐπιφανεστάτους ἑκατὸν Μακεδόνας, οὓς ἅπαντας ἀπέσφαξεν.”

<sup>306</sup> Herman (1981): 103, 108-111.; Paschidis (2006): 252-55.; Strootman (2011): 69-71.

<sup>307</sup> Strootman (2011): 69-70.; Herman (1981): 110-2.

*philos* is a vague one, both in term of its social boundaries, as well as its operational mandate, its sets of tasks and expected duties. As lower-case “friend”, it implies reciprocity, informality and equality with the other party (the *basileus*, or some other *kyrios*-figure), while upper-case “Friend” carries the annotation of an institutionalized asymmetrical relationship, not similar to friendship at all.<sup>308</sup> *Philia* is devoid of the much more clearly delineated areas of duties and responsibilities that the Roman clientelism presupposed, and is much more fluid in both its organization as well as its expression; the king appointed his *philoï* personally without any systemized framework surrounding the appointments, and the appointment was likely permanent.<sup>309</sup> The origin of this practice as a formal political structure can be found in the early Hellenistic courts of Kassander, Lysimachos, and Seleukos, as they furthered the same practice they themselves had grown up with as *paides* and later as *hetairoi* in the court of Philip and Alexander.

The term *philoï* seems to have been in use during the Successor Wars, and not one inserted by the later historians like Diodoros and Curtius.<sup>310</sup> Its significance to this thesis is considerable. *Philia* was obviously a central tenet to the social and political makeup of the Successor kingdoms that were established following the civil wars of the late 300’s, and as the roots of this practice predated these kingdoms, it had importance in the late Argead kingdom as well. Applying some of the overarching ideas from the theory of historical network analysis, the concept of *philia* becomes a very easy avenue for tracking the contact networks of the important figures during the period. For instance, Arrian specifically mentions a relationship of *philia* between Kleopatra and Eumenes.<sup>311</sup> Keeping in mind that the more organized aspects of the *philia* dynamic was still a few decades into the future in 320, it is still significant in that it presupposes a cordial relationship of mutual respect and cooperation between the two. The exact nature of *philia* between the royal women and the Successors they cooperated with is somewhat tricky to pin down. Using the aforementioned definition of *philia* as a bond of cooperation, mutual obligations and respect (the “lower-case” version), without adding the dimension of a “*kyrios*” in the relationship, then both Adeia-Eurydike and Olympias can be seen to have courted several close relationships with central figures. Most

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<sup>308</sup> Herman (1981): 111.

<sup>309</sup> Paschidis (2006): 252, fn.18.

<sup>310</sup> Confer epigraphic material such as *Royal Correspondence* (RC) 6 and *Oriens Graeci Inscriptiones Selectae* (OGIS) 4.

<sup>311</sup> *AEvt*: 1.40.

obvious are the axes Olympias-Eumenes and Adea-Kassander, though a few more can be identified upon close scrutiny of the sources.

Adea-Eurydike and her mother Kynnane, as previously noted, started off in 322/321 not only with none of the Successors as their allies, but as the common enemy of all of the most powerful Diadochoi; Perdikkas, Antipater, and Antigonos. The radical change of circumstances over the course of 321-319 saw the dynamic between the Successors shift. Again, as previously noted, the outbreak of war in Macedonia and Greece between Polyperchon and Kassander opened Europe as a theatre of war, with both factions seeking as many allies as possible. Adea and Kassander seemed to have been supporting each other from the outset of the conflict. Adea sent letters to Antigonos on behalf of King Philip Arrhidaios, officially asking the *strategòs autokrátōr*, “supreme commander” as appointed by Antipater at Triparadeisos, to accept Kassander as the rightful regent, rather than Polyperchon.<sup>312</sup> Antigonos, interested in eliminating Polyperchon (the regent stood in Antigonos’ path to the ultimate prize, Alexander the Great’s in-effect vacant throne), agreed to accept and assist Kassander’s claim to the imperial regency and the viceroyalty of Macedon.<sup>313</sup> The fact that Adea helped Kassander secure actual military support (Antigonos sent Kassander, according to Diodoros, four thousand troops and a considerable naval force) almost at the exact moment Kassander hoisted his flag in rebellion, speaks volumes. Justin’s claim that Adea was the mastermind behind the execution of the rebellion might not be that far-fetched after all. Given that, if one chooses to accept the compromise solution to the chronological issues inherent to the period, that Adea and Kassander had spent the better part of two years together at court in Pella, it should not come as a surprise that the two had already a finely honed plan of action in place to oust Polyperchon from power.

The late 4<sup>th</sup> century CE historian Orosius unconvincingly claimed Kassander’s and Adea’s alliance was based on Kassander’s sexual lust for the young queen. By merely pointing out that the title of Orosius’ work is called *Historiae Adversus Paganos*, “Histories Against the Pagans”, it should be clear that this is a highly unlikely scenario, based on the historian’s abundantly clear bias.<sup>314</sup> This claim is not echoed by any of the other extant sources.<sup>315</sup> While

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<sup>312</sup> Jus: 14.5.2-3.

<sup>313</sup> Grainger (2007): 103-4.

<sup>314</sup> Orosius: 3.23.28-30. This is without pointing out the obvious chronological flaws of Orosius’ text, written some seven centuries after the death of the persons described, which even further discredits his text. He mentions for instance in the same chapter that Seleukos after Alexander’s death was appointed satrap of Antiocheia in Syria, a city he would himself found some twenty years later (3.23.10).

there is a possibility that Orosius copied a source which has not survived the centuries, it still seems odd that none of Diodoros, Justin, Pausanias, and Duris mentions the same, especially given Pausanias' dislike for Kassander.<sup>316</sup> In addition, it certainly seems Orosius' sources were a combination of Suetonius, Livy, Eusebius, Eutropius, and Florus; none of whom (apart from Livy) produced any meaningful texts on Hellenistic history.<sup>317</sup> Returning to Kassander and Adea, and disregarding Orosius, it should however not be discounted that either one or the other envisioned a potential marriage, once Polyperchon and Olympias had been dealt with. This is highly speculative, and such an arrangement would most certainly have favoured Kassander, given that he would have been granted the inherent *timé* of his spouse, rather than the other way around, and Adea would have lost her (rather flimsy, such as it was) expression of official power, the kingship of Philip Arrhidaios, and her ability to carry out her ambitions through it.<sup>318</sup> Carney is of the opinion that Kassander's and Adea's alliance was one of convenience, contrived because of their common foes, Olympias and Polyperchon, and that neither party trusted each other, constantly wary of the other's actions and intentions.<sup>319</sup>

As it stands, the evidence for an alliance between Adea and Kassander long in the making seems abundant. Carney's argument that Kassander deliberately dithered on his journey back towards Macedon after Adea sent word for him to return feels overly critical of Kassander. I favour the following interpretation: Kassander was tangled up in the siege of Tegea in the Peloponnese, though he had the same summer, in 317, made a flying visit to Macedon to confirm his regency by having it validated in person by Adea and Arrhidaios, before returning to his campaigns in Greece.<sup>320</sup> In fact, that Diodoros points out that Kassander's allies in Greece reacted with disbelief and confusion when he left the Peloponnese so suddenly,<sup>321</sup> suggests that he did not deliberately kill time before marching to Adea's rescue. He even left his Greek allies in the lurch, an army under the control of Polyperchon's son

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<sup>315</sup> Macurdy (1932): 51. "The late tale that she [Adea] bought Cassander with the price of her person is an invention; her passion was for power, not love-intrigue."

<sup>316</sup> Pau: 9.7.2. Pausanias relates, in gossip-like fashion, how Kassander allegedly died of dropsy in 297 with worms bursting from his body while he was still alive.

<sup>317</sup> Croke (2007): 575.

<sup>318</sup> Carney (2000): 136.;

<sup>319</sup> *Loc cit.*

<sup>320</sup> Waterfield (2011): 88-9.

<sup>321</sup> Diod: 19.35.1.

“[...] συμβεβηκότα πρὸς μὲν τοὺς Τεγεάτας διελύσατο, τὴν δὲ δύναμιν ἀναλαβῶν προῆγεν ἐπὶ Μακεδονίαν, καταλιπὼν τοὺς συμμάχους ἐν πολλῇ ταραχῇ [...]”



nearby and in prime position to strike once Kassander left, endangering the gains he had made during the last years of campaigning, again suggesting that his departure was a sudden and unsolicited one. He would not have done this if he had already planned to leave Adea “to the wolves”; rather it seems that circumstance got in the way, the request for reinforcements from Adea arriving later than intended. Why else would Kassander risk the incredible gains he had made against superior odds over the past few years if he had planned from the outset to arrive fashionably late to provide rescue to Adea and Arrhidaios? The fact that Adea decided on sallying forth without waiting for Kassander can thus mean that rather being mistrustful of her alliance partner, she was instead confident that her military strength was sufficient to defeat Olympias’ and Aiakides’ army; it was after all composed of Molossian troops, who would normally be no match for the formidable Macedonian phalanx, at least in the mind of the Macedonians themselves.<sup>322</sup> Adea and Kassander must quickly have ascertained, after the former and the joint-kings had arrived in Macedon in 320, that they were in prime position to help each other. As soon as Antipater died in January or February 319 (a tentative dating, but he died at least some time before mid-year 319) and his will that Polyperchon rather than Kassander would “inherit” the regency became known,<sup>323</sup> Kassander would have searched for potential allies for his planned rebellion. Adea did not mourn the death of Antipater, it was he who had quelled her first attempt at gaining significant political power during the Triparadeisos conference, and Polyperchon seemed like an uninspired choice; an old man of the same generation as Antipater and Antigonos, likely one of Philip II’s *hetairoi*. Adea would much rather have aligned herself and her cause with the much more dynamic Kassander, who had everything to prove and clearly the capacity and political goodwill to carry out his intention of taking effective control of Macedon.<sup>324</sup> Another, no doubt crucial, aspect to their alliance was Kassander’s abhorrence of Olympias, apparently inherited from his father.<sup>325</sup>

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<sup>322</sup> Cf. fn. 244.

<sup>323</sup> Diod: 18.48.1, 4. Diodoros is not specific as to the time of year when Antipater died, it depends on whether he used the *archon* dating system or the Macedonian seasonal one (cf. Ch. 1.2). What is clear is that Antipater died almost immediately upon returning to Macedon from Asia (Grainger, 2007: 98.; Waterfield, 2011: 73).

<sup>324</sup> Grainger (2007): 104. Antipater’s long stint as the viceroy and most visible aspect of the Macedonian monarchical authority for the past two-plus decades (334-319) would have made significant portions of the Macedonian populace and nobility predisposed towards his son Kassander.

<sup>325</sup> This is at least what is commonly believed, and it seems a highly probable hypothesis. According to the tradition ascribed to Sir William W. Tarn, Kassander used Olympias as a ploy in his propaganda campaign to legitimize his control of Macedon, playing up her destructive tendencies and lack of rational thought “based on her womanish intuition”. (Tarn, 1948: 261-2.; Carney, 1993: 32-3.)

In fact, Kassander, seemingly more so than any of the other Diadochoi, had few inhibitions with foregoing and even tearing down long-time traditions and conventions within the Macedonian society. He would prove to be the murderer of Alexander's mother, wife, and both sons, the man who did the most to eradicate what remained of the Argead tradition.<sup>326</sup> What drove him remains an enigma; the common conclusion is that he inherited his father Antipater's distrust of Olympias and his reservations towards Alexander,<sup>327</sup> but this does not satisfactorily explain the lengths he went to destroy Alexander's legacy. Indeed, the feud is believed to have gone both ways; Olympias may very well have believed that Antipater and Kassander had been behind her son's death in Babylon, and that the incredible story of Kassander and his brother Iolaos poisoning Alexander during their very brief visit in 323 was keenly felt by Olympias to be the truth.<sup>328</sup> He is often labelled as a vindictive and cruel man, who harboured a lingering bitterness for being left behind when all his peers left for Alexander's great *anabasis*,<sup>329</sup> but again this seems like a poor reason for his subsequent murders. He obviously did not hate the Argead dynasty as a rule, given that he willingly cooperated with Adea-Eurydike, married Thessalonikē, and according to Diodoros, sought Kleopatra's hand in marriage while she was at Sardeis.<sup>330</sup> It is easy to draw the conclusion that these were all actions aimed at self-legitimization and building up his political standing within Macedonia, but if this is the only reason then he made an uncharacteristically boorish decision by desecrating Olympias' corpse by having it thrown in a ditch, uncovered and unobserved by any religious service following her execution. Instead it seems more likely that he simply hated Alexander's branch of the Argead family. He was the peer of all the *megistoi* and *somatōphylakes*: the same age as Perdikkas, Leonnatos, Ptolemy, and Lysimachos,<sup>331</sup> but had been left at home with his father as the rest of his generation went with Alexander to Asia. He might well have been bitter about this. Whether this was because he was particularly disliked by Alexander is unclear, it could just as well have been that he was physically frail, it is likely that he was tubercular, possibly from a young age.<sup>332</sup> This

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<sup>326</sup> Kassander had Olympias killed in late 316, Alexander IV and his mother Rhoxane murdered in 309, and finally had Alexander's illegitimate son Herakles murdered in 307, along with his mother Barsine, Alexander the Great's one-time paramour (Heckel, 2006: 19, 70, 138, 242.)

<sup>327</sup> Pau: 9.7.2-4.

<sup>328</sup> Carney (2006): 68, 71-2.

<sup>329</sup> *Loc. cit.*

<sup>330</sup> Diod: 20.37.4.

<sup>331</sup> Heckel (2006): 79.

<sup>332</sup> *Ibid.*: 81.; Pau: 9.7.2.; Eusebios, *Chronographia*: 1.231. Pausanias says Kassander died in 297 from dropsy (oedema), but it might just as well have been tuberculosis as Eusebios noted ("a wasting illness"), which his son

would fit in with his lack of success at hunting; he was simply not physically fit for warfare and the hunt because of chronic disease, though he was a vigorous commander during the Successor Wars.

That Olympias' network of potential alliance partners was larger than Adea's should not come as a surprise; she was around fifty years older, and subsequently had had fifty years longer to build up her *philia* network. However, she was, in the words of Carney, more "street-wise" in her decision to not immediately choose a side in the conflict.<sup>333</sup> She reached out to Eumenes, who was far afield in Asia, for advice, which means that either the two had had contact previously, before the *anabasis*, or that the same *philia* Eumenes and extended to Kleopatra, was also extended to Olympias simultaneously.<sup>334</sup> Regardless, Eumenes and Olympias kept up a regular correspondence all the while she was in Molossia, biding her time before returning to Macedon. They clearly both benefited from the exchange; Eumenes could convincingly claim to his troops (including the headstrong *Argyraspides* infantry guard) that he had the blessing and approval from one of the most prestigious members of the Argead family still alive, and Olympias received valuable insight and advice regarding the situation she found herself in. In addition to Eumenes Olympias could also, as previously noted, count on the enthusiastic, if somewhat foolhardy support of her nephew King Aiakides of Molossia-Epeiros.<sup>335</sup> Aiakides owed his throne to the intervention by Olympias on his behalf to King Philip, following the death of Alexander I of Molossia, the husband of Kleopatra.<sup>336</sup>

Furthermore, Olympias could count on the support of some key Macedonians, previously mentioned in passing. Aristonous had been one of Alexander the Great's *somatōphylakes*, and subsequently one of Perdikkas' lieutenants. How he had arrived in Macedon by 317 is a mystery, but it is clear that he was active during Olympias' short reign in 317 and 316.<sup>337</sup> He commanded troops, as well as the garrison of the highly important city of Amphipolis in north-eastern Macedon.<sup>338</sup> Olympias also trusted Aristonous to appoint him general of her troops in 316, and ordered him to oppose Kassander's crossing into Macedon from Greece,

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Philip also died from, only months after Kassander's own death, that is at least the theory of Carney, amongst others (*AM*, 1999: 209).

<sup>333</sup> Carney, *HS* (1987a): 501.

<sup>334</sup> Carney (2006): 70-1.

<sup>335</sup> Aiakides would later feel the repercussions of his unconditional support for Olympias; his subjects refuted him after a short while, and preferred his son Pyrrhos (of Roman fame) for the throne (*PluPy*: 2.1). The coup happened while Olympias was at Pydna, or else he would have come to her rescue.

<sup>336</sup> Errington, *GRBS* (1975): 40-4.; Carney (2006): 67-8.

<sup>337</sup> Diod: 19.35.4, 50.7-8.; Cur: 10.6.16.

<sup>338</sup> *Ibid.*: 19.50.3.

while she and her entourage fled to Pydna.<sup>339</sup> Aristonous continued fighting against Kassander well into 315, long after Olympias had fallen into Kassander's custody, loyal to her cause. It took Olympias sending him a personal letter for him to surrender Amphipolis, as he believed, unaware of Eumenes' death, that support from him and Polyperchon would be forthcoming, and that together they would rescue their queen.<sup>340</sup> Olympias could, even after having nominally wrecked her reputation amongst the Macedonian nobility, following her purges in 317, court officers and nobles of high rank who believed in her cause, either believing she represented their best shot at power or they still felt loyalty to the Argead dynasty. Even Polyperchon, who had tried his best to tie her to his cause, realized he was the junior partner in the relationship, and fought for her banner, even after she had been confined to Pydna. That is, until he was forced to realize Olympias had lost, and Kassander, following the successful siege of Pydna in late 316, sat with all the cards; the custody of Alexander IV and effective control of Macedon and Greece (Arrhidaios was dead by this point, killed on Olympias' orders). Even then Polyperchon continued to fight a hopeless campaign, now as a subordinate of Antigonos and beholden to his support, before finally succumbing to Kassander in 308 (after a confused affair where he tried to install Alexander the Great's illegitimate son Herakles as the new king).<sup>341</sup>

However, that is not to say that every instance of cooperation between one of the Argead women and someone represents evidence of an extensive *philia* network. For example, during Adea-Eurydike's attempt at taking command of the royal army at Triparadeisos, she was aided by one Asklepiodoros, the army's *grammateos*, "secretary", and by one Attalos, who may have been Perdikkas' brother-in-law.<sup>342</sup> These were not likely part of Adea's circle of *philoï*, rather Perdikkan loyalists who saw her as their best bet to oppose Antipater and Antigonos during the negotiations, their cooperation with the young queen temporary only, certainly they are not heard from again. The same goes for Olympias; despite her no doubt large network of friends and associates built up over her many decades at court (she seems for instance to have had, paradoxically, many supporters in Athens),<sup>343</sup> not everyone she came in contact with would have been part of this group. Polyperchon might well be the most obvious of these, since Olympias took her good time (two years) responding to his repeated

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<sup>339</sup> Diod: 19.35.4-5.

<sup>340</sup> Ibid.: 19.50.6-8.

<sup>341</sup> Carney (2014): 12-15.; Hornblower (1981): 222-4.; Diod: 20.20.1-4.

<sup>342</sup> *AEvt*: 1.30-3.; Carney (2000): 133.; Billows (1990): 68, fn. 31.

<sup>343</sup> Diod: 18.65.2.

offers. Olympias is noted by Hypereides in his speeches for donating to temples, sending associates on “shopping trips” to the great *agora* in Athens, as well as addressing the Athenian *ekklēsia* through letters on several occasions.<sup>344</sup>

So, both Adea-Eurydike and Olympias evidently maintained networks of potential allies and “subordinates”, keeping a number of key figures in reciprocal relationships, though to a varying degree. It is hard to distinguish these from potential short-term alliances of necessity, but the very least the Adea-Kassander and Olympias-Aiakides-Eumenes axes were most likely the fruit of long-term exchanges, as both speak to long-term contact and extended periods of cultivating friendships. Less so the connection between Olympias and Aristonous, who seems to have been the case of one of Perdikkas’ supporters attaching himself to what remained of his original cause; Olympias represented the legitimacy of Alexander’s son. However, in the end, despite “playing the game” correctly in terms of alliance-building in the traditional sense, it was not enough to circumvent the military strength wielded by the other Diadochoi. For Adea, she was simply either unlucky or too head-strong; either her message to Kassander took too long to reach him, or she was too confident in her own ability to defeat Olympias and Aiakides. For Olympias, Aiakides would prove a poor ally with too lacklustre support among his own nominal elites to provide effective support in the long term, and Polyperchon had already shown his incompetence by the time 316 rolled around, clearly demonstrating to Olympias and Aristonous, whom stood by Olympias even unto the end, that he was not an effective alliance partner.

### 5.3 Murder

Olympias, following her victory at Euia over Adea-Eurydike and Philip Arrhidaios, after Adea’s Macedonian army had deserted to Olympias’ side, had the royal pair imprisoned, possibly in Pella, but more likely some other fortress in Macedon. Adea, leaving her husband behind, had tried to effect a getaway to Amphipolis, but was captured a short while after the battle.<sup>345</sup> Olympias had the royal pair imprisoned and after a short while ordered the murder of Arrhidaios, eager to destroy the rivalling branch of the Argead dynasty. Both Diodoros and Justin criticize Olympias when she afterwards forced Adea-Eurydike to kill herself, deeming it overly cruel (“she did not carry her fortune as a human being should”).<sup>346</sup> According to the sources, Olympias offered Adea the choice between a noose, a sword, and a goblet of poison

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<sup>344</sup> Hyp: 19, 25.; Carney, *PH* (1993): 33.

<sup>345</sup> Diod: 19.11.3.

<sup>346</sup> *Loc.cit.*

so the young queen could choose her own demise. Instead Adea-Eurydike chose to hang herself using her own belt, defying her captor and rival to the last.<sup>347</sup> While cruel, Olympias' decision to let Adea choose how to end her life seems, if not magnanimous, then at least somewhat respectful; Olympias would never have let Adea live, she was too much of an important figure for that who had too many supporters among the Macedonians (despite the army refusing to fight for her against Olympias). Diodoros says that the "greater punishment" given to Adea was due to her repeatedly stating that the *basileia* belonged to her by right rather than Olympias, which evidently upset the older woman.

The whole sequence regarding the last stand and defiant death of Adea-Eurydike, who also apparently took care to dress and cover her husband Arrhidaios' corpse before meeting her own destiny, reads very much like a Greek tragedy.<sup>348</sup> In fact, it is strikingly similar to the death of Antigone in Sophokles' eponymous play, a tragic figure cut down by cruel tricks of fate while in her prime.<sup>349</sup> The sources paint Adea as the victim of events out of her control; abandoned by her troops, her ally Kassander, left to the tender mercies of her irate rival, before striding courageously to meet her end. The details may well have been exaggerated by Diodoros, whose narrative is the most complete, much like Polyainos' likely over-the-top presentation of both Kynnane and her mother Audata as fierce Illyrian warrior-queens, in the same mould Adea was allegedly formed. However, the result remains undisputable; Adea-Eurydike and Arrhidaios were both killed by Olympias, completing the dynastic purge which started when Alexander the Great became king in 336, and the murder of Adea's father Amyntas and the other members of the extended Argead family. Olympias, Kleopatra, and Thessalonikē were now the only members left of the Argead family, including hapless Alexander IV, now suddenly the sole *basileus* of the empire at the age of six.

Having completed the murder of Adea and Arrhidaios, Olympias was now the leading political figure in Macedon. She had the *basilike prostaia* Polyperchon had offered her, *epitropeia*, "guardianship", of her grandson Alexander, and evidently full control over the Macedonian kingdom. Yet she quickly turned the opinion against her by, as previously noted,

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<sup>347</sup> Diod: 19.11.2-7.; Jus: 14.5.10.

<sup>348</sup> Diod: 19.11.6-7. "[Olympias] sent her a sword, a noose, and hemlock, and bade her to use whichever of these she pleased as a means of death, not showing any respect whatsoever for the former dignity of the victim whom she was unlawfully treating, nor moved to empathy for the fate that all share. [...] Eurydike [...] prayed that similar gifts should fall to the lot of Olympias. She [...] ended her life by hanging herself with her belt, neither weeping for her own fate nor succumbed to her heavy misfortunes."

<sup>349</sup> Sophokles, *Antigone*: 1222-3.

murdering around a hundred nobles, most of them associates of Kassander who was either actively or had previously supported his rebellion. Just like the murder of Adea, Diodoros and Justin are very critical of Olympias' actions. Justin says Olympias "committed great slaughter among the nobility throughout the country, like a furious woman rather than a queen, she turned the favour with which she was regarded into hatred",<sup>350</sup> and Diodoros echoes the sentiment, taking the opportunity to insert a quote allegedly uttered by Antipater on his deathbed, a warning that women must never be allowed to rule Macedon.<sup>351</sup> This whole passage seems extremely contrived. Olympias is presented as a furious harridan, seemingly mindlessly massacring opponents and innocents alike. Political murders were certainly not foreign to the Macedonians; in fact it was regarded as a natural aspect of politics, a necessary evil. The list of examples is extensive. Alexander the Great had his general Parmenion, his son, and a large number of *paidoi*, aristocratic youths, killed after a foiled assassination attempt in 327,<sup>352</sup> Perdikkas ordered the massacre of thousands of rebelling Greek mercenaries who left their garrisons in Baktria,<sup>353</sup> and Antigonos Monophtalmos had Antigenes burned alive after the Battle of Gabiene.<sup>354</sup> Billows put it succinctly when he says, "[Antigonos] was at times ruthless and harsh, but being harsh and ruthless was inherent in the career of command he followed and the times in which he lived".<sup>355</sup> The sentiment is equally true of Olympias; her position was not inherently different than the other Successors' despite her gender being different, she too was forced by necessity to commit politically motivated murders, given the malevolent Macedonian way of doing politics. That Olympias' political purge is somehow seen as worse than her son's rage-induced murders of a large numbers of teenage pages seems hypocritical at best. Olympias receives the exact same treatment in Plutarch and Arrian's accounts of the purges following Alexander's succession in 336, where Olympias is lambasted for cruelly murdering Kleopatra-Eurydike and her infant daughter.<sup>356</sup>

The cultural bias of the ancient authors shines clearly through, and as pointed out by Carney, these passages have more in common with the beloved *peripeteia* of the authors, especially

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<sup>350</sup> Jus: 14.6.1.

<sup>351</sup> Diod: 19.11.9. The quote is suspiciously similar to one penned by Plutarch, where Alexander the Great is supposed to have said that the Macedonians would let themselves be ruled by a female (PluA: 68.1).

<sup>352</sup> Carney, *CJ* (1981): 223-31. It is possible Alexander in a fit of rage might have killed so many of the *paidoi* that the institution ceased to exist, or at least dramatically changed character. The pages are not mentioned again until after Alexander's death.

<sup>353</sup> Diod: 18.7.1-9, 18.14.1.

<sup>354</sup> Ibid.: 19.44.1.

<sup>355</sup> Billows (1990): 11.

<sup>356</sup> Carney, *PH* (1993): 36-41.

Diodoros, and seem overly moralistic and rhetorical.<sup>357</sup> Diodoros seemingly cannot help himself further on, commenting the following: “[Olympias] when she met with a similar reversal, she experienced a death that was worthy of her cruelty”.<sup>358</sup> Hornblower suggests that Diodoros’ account of Olympias “bloodshed” might well have been court gossip, given an air of truth through Hieronymos’ account of events, which Diodoros uncritically copied for his own use.<sup>359</sup> It seems more likely to be Diodoros doing the moralizing on his own accord, based on his cultural perception of what a woman is supposed – and not supposed – to be doing; creating a narrative of an evil virago, a cautionary tale of what happens when women attain political power.

Olympias is the only one of the Argead women to receive this type of treatment in the sources, Adea being called ambitious and manipulating by Justin is the closest comparable statement, and it sounds quite hollow by comparison. Is this because Olympias were somehow worse than Adea-Eurydike at being a female with political power, or is it simply that Adea had less time to enact similar political schemes? Why is not Kynnane, who is presented as a warrior-princess, the recipient of any criticism if the concept of women undertaking male behaviour is what was anathema? Paradoxically enough, it seems that when women act like men they are, if not praised, then at least spared for condemnation. Somehow, Justin and Diodoros attribute Olympias’ behaviour to something inherently “female”,<sup>360</sup> her actions motivated by lust for revenge and envy. Her death is another example of this. After seeking refuge in the city of Pydna, and after enduring a long and arduous siege by Kassander and his troops, Olympias surrendered in late 316 after having been ensured that she and her retinue would be given safe conduct.<sup>361</sup> Not so, for Kassander immediately convened an “assembly of the Macedonians”, most likely a tribunal composed of the troops of his army, and sentenced Olympias to death for the crimes she had done.<sup>362</sup> The troops he sent were unable to carry out the sentence, they were too mindful of her *axiōma* to kill their former queen. Unperturbed, Kassander bade the relatives of the people Olympias had murdered to do the deed. Suddenly, the sources change their tune, and Justin in particular paints a heroic spectacle worthy of any great Greek drama:

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<sup>357</sup> Carney, *PH* (1993): 42-3.

<sup>358</sup> Diod: 19.11.7.

<sup>359</sup> Hornblower (1981): 121.

<sup>360</sup> Carney (2006): 129.

<sup>361</sup> Diod: 19.35.5, 36.1-2, 50.5.; Jus: 14.6.4-5.; Pol: 4.11.3.

<sup>362</sup> Ibid.: 19.51.1-3.



“Olympias, seeing armed men advancing towards her, bent upon her destruction, went voluntarily to meet them, dressed in her regal apparel [...]. [She did] not [shirk] from the sword or the blow, or crying out like a woman, but submitting to death like the bravest of men, [...] so that you might have perceived the soul of Alexander in his dying mother. As she was expiring, she is said to have settled her hair, and to have covered her feet with her robe, that nothing unseemly might appear about her.”<sup>363</sup>

This contrasts sharply with the moralizing foreshadowing of “a cruel fate” in the previous passages by both authors. The underlying moral is inescapable, when acting the role of men, the Argead women are at their best and most noble, while acting as “women”, whatever that might mean, they are irrational and barbaric.

#### **5.4 Summary of Adea’s and Olympias’ rivalry**

As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, there is an abundance of details provided in the above text, but it demonstrates the complex situation in Macedon in 319-316, the chaotic nature of which meant that Adea and Olympias were able to rise to the very top of the political food-chain, if only for the briefest of moments. They both made use of all possible avenues to amass power in response to the other, such as military strength, forging of alliances, as well as politically motivated murder. The extant sources invariably condemn particularly Olympias’ actions, painting her as somewhat a worse and more destructive queen than Adea. The complex nature of the interpersonal relations in this short period has been covered as well in an attempt to provide both context and a possible explanation to how events played out. In the end though, while somewhat overly simplistically framed, the rivalry between the two Argead women lead in the end to the destruction of their remaining family.

Their militaristic overtures ended ultimately in failure, Adea defeated by Olympias, who in turn was overcome by Adea’s ally Kassander. Yet it seems to be a case of circumstances getting in the way of both women, rather than critical misjudgement on their own part. Carney concluded that Adea-Eurydike’s approach to power was a straight-forward militaristic power-grab, that the young queen was carried on the back of popular support by the Macedonian army.<sup>364</sup> I have tried to show that Adea’s plan of action was more sophisticated than that, and that she made extensive use of diplomacy and interpersonal relationships in her attempt at securing supremacy over Macedon. Adea’s critical mistake was the assumption that her doubly Argead status (both her parents had been Argeads by blood) would provide

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<sup>363</sup> Jus: 14.6.9-12.

<sup>364</sup> Carney, *HS* (1987b): 501.

enough *axiōma* to counter the good reputation and the high standing Olympias still had among the Macedonians, despite her years of absence.

Likewise, Olympias made a number of mistakes, but as pointed out, they were motivated by political expediency, not an inherent malice as the extant sources state. Olympias' major miscalculation was that she had faith in the abilities of Polyperchon, the support of Aiakides, and hoping that Eumenes would be able to defeat Antigonos and sent support from Asia. All three proved wrong; Polyperchon proved time and again that he was both a poor general and a poor politician, Aiakides was ousted from his throne by angry subjects and replaced by his son Pyrrhos, and Eumenes was eventually defeated at Gabiene in far-off Iran. Olympias showed more political good sense than Adea, and despite their poor showing, relied on the heavy military lifting to be carried out by male subordinates and allies. Adea had cultivated an image of a warrior-queen, which might well have worked in the short run, but it hard to foresee the Macedonian army continuing to accept being led on a long campaign by a woman barely twenty years old. Olympias knew she would not be able to present herself as a credible military commander, and instead played to the historical and religious legacy of the Argeads and Macedonians, using Dionysiac imagery to dramatically underscore her image in the eyes of the Macedonians at Euia.

Kassander was ultimately left as the victor as the dust settled in 316. He was left with no domestic enemies (apart from Polyperchon, who was now isolated and de-legitimized) and with the custody of Alexander IV. This provided him with the perfect opportunity to convincingly claim that the position of regent which Adea had given him was still valid, setting him on the path to eventual kingship a decade later. He would go on to cleverly manipulate the memory of both Adea and Olympias in a way to further his own legitimacy, playing up the connection he had had with the young *basilissa*, and condemning Olympias for her brutality. The crowning achievement in this process was the interment of Adea and Arrhidaios in a grand royal tomb in the tombs of the old capital Aigai, which will be discussed in the next chapter.



## 6.0 The Diadochoi and the Legacy of Adea and Olympias

Building on the points made in the preceding chapter, how did so Kassander and the other Diadochoi benefit from, or simply adapt to, the new political situation created by Adea and Olympias? They had proven that it did not require a male Argead to personally lead troops in the field for the royal dynasty to be a power to be reckoned with; even a girl in her late teens, Adea, was enough to throw the system out of balance. Kassander, more than any of the other Successors, probably out of necessity given his exposed and difficult political and military position in Greece and Macedonia, was either forced, or, as will be discussed below, sought to position himself in a way to garner support from what he might well have perceived as ideally placed candidates for power-sharing. The cooperation between Adea and Kassander have traditionally been explained as a “marriage of necessity”, but by burying deeper it seems like there was more to it than that. It certainly turned out in the end that Kassander benefited greatly from his association with *basilissa* Adea-Eurydike, using her memory as an effective political ploy, and harnessing support from Macedonians angered at her and others’ death to vault himself into the kingship of Macedon, after the death of first Olympias and later Alexander IV. Crucial to this is the projections of personal loyalty, possible familial connections, and the concept of legacy Kassander promoted after Adea-Eurydike’s death.

### 6.1 The wives of Kassander?

Kassander, after the murder of Olympias and the surrender of Aristonous in Amphipolis, was the undisputed *princeps* in Macedonia. Only Polyperchon remained in Greece, but his army was small and he was not much of a threat. One of the first things Kassander did after concluding the business at Pydna was to marry Thessalonikē, daughter of Philip II and Nikesipolis.<sup>365</sup> Thessalonikē’s first mention in the sources is that she was a part of Olympias retinue at Pydna. It is implied that the marriage is a forced one; certainly Thessalonikē was not given much choice in the matter, and Antigonos in his address at Tyros, protested the marriage precisely on the grounds that it was a forced one and therefore not legitimate.<sup>366</sup> Thessalonikē had been part of Olympias’ entourage from Macedonia, possibly all the way from Molossia, Olympias likely having acted as Thessalonikē’s step-mother for years.<sup>367</sup> After the death of Adea and Olympias, Thessalonikē was the last of the Argead women left (Kleopatra was locked away in Sardeis, unavailable), and Diodoros notes how Kassander

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<sup>365</sup> Jus: 14.6.13.; Diod: 19.52.1-2.

<sup>366</sup> Diod: 19.61.2.

<sup>367</sup> Ibid.: 19.35.4-5.; Carney, *HS* (1988): 386-7, fn. 4, 5.

married her obviously out of a desire to further his own ambition to one day claim the Macedonian throne.<sup>368</sup>

However, a few things stand out as strange about this marriage, notably the age of the bride and groom. Kassander had to be around forty at this point, having been born no later than 354 if Hegesander's anecdote is to be believed (cf. Ch.2.3, fn. 103) and Thessalonikē had to be close to her mid-thirties.<sup>369</sup> For two members of the upper-most strata of the Macedonian elite to still be unmarried at such advanced ages is very strange. Thessalonikē is more understandable than Kassander; she had spent her entire life in almost seclusion, under the control of first Philip II and then Olympias. By the time she had come of marriageable age, her half-brother Alexander had succeeded to the throne, and he was notoriously careless in all matters of dynastic marriages, even those pertaining to himself.<sup>370</sup> Olympias would understandably not have complicated the already extremely convoluted political situation between the Successors by making Thessalonikē available for marriage, especially with her own daughter Kleopatra in the hands of Antigonos, and therefore vulnerable.<sup>371</sup>

On the other hand, Kassander being a bachelor in 316 seems not only strange, but extremely unlikely. His father Antipater had been an astute player in the dynastic game, marrying off his daughters to key Diadochoi, such as Perdikkas, Krateros, Ptolemy, and Demetrios. It seems incredulous that he was not able to find a suitable wife for his favourite son before his death.<sup>372</sup> Which is where a *stèle* uncovered in Beroia becomes very interesting indeed. Olga Palagia (2008) provides a new interpretation of the inscription and imagery of a marble grave relief, which was clearly not part of the original tomb it was discovered in, rather brought in from a different site (see Fig.[...]). The inscription reads:

“Know that beneath me is the tomb of Hadeia [sic].<sup>373</sup> Terrible Hades seized her after an illness while she was still a virgin, not ready for marriage. She died, leaving in great and everlasting mourning her mother Kynnana, who bore her, and her father Kassander.”<sup>374</sup>

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<sup>368</sup> Diod: 19.52.1

<sup>369</sup> Heckel (2006): 79, 265.; Carney (2000): 155-7.

<sup>370</sup> Carney (2000): 155-7.; Carney, *HS* (1988): 386-8.

<sup>371</sup> Macurdy (1932): 53.; Carney, *HS* (1988): 388.

<sup>372</sup> Kassander was most likely not Antipater's eldest son, that was in all probability Iolaos or Nikanor. Phila was likely the first-born of Antipater's children. However, it seems clear that Kassander was his most-favoured child, as he was the one who received the post of *chiliarchos* of Macedon after Antipater's death, and judging by Kassander's reaction to not being appointed the new regent.

<sup>373</sup> Adea (Αδεα), or Adeia (Αδεία), are both Doric variations of Hedeia, which means “sweet” (Palagia, 197). The name inscribed on the monument is “ΑΔΕΑ ΚΑΣΣΑΝΔΡΟΥ”, meaning “Adea, daughter of Kassander”.

Palagia's interpretation of the inscription, combined with an analysis of the imagery, is very interesting. The combination of the names Kassander, Kynnane and Adea seems too intentional to be circumstance, and the imagery, despite its somewhat toned down expressions of grief and splendour, points towards royalty or at the very least high nobility.<sup>375</sup> Palagia's theory, based in large parts on the same arguments presented above regarding Kassander's age, is that Kassander was, by the time he married Thessalonikē, already married to another daughter of Kynnane, a sister of Adea-Eurydike, and that they already had a son together.<sup>376</sup> Now, this proposed Kynnane II is not mentioned in any of the ancient texts, and one should take note of the inherent problems of arguments *e silentio* (cf. Ch.1.3), and Heckel presents a critique of Palagia's article, basing his counter-arguments on the extant textual evidence.<sup>377</sup>

Let us consider however, the arguments in favour of Kynnane II being the sister of Adea-Eurydike, and that her husband was Kassander, son of Antipater. Firstly, it would neatly explain why Adea-Eurydike so clearly aligned with Kassander in 318 and 317, and why she chose to use her influence through her husband Arrhidaios to have Kassander officially replace Polyperchon as regent. Even if we presume that Adea was the elder of the two sisters, Kynnane II could not have been much more than a year younger, given the short duration of Kynnane and Amyntas' marriage before the latter's murder. Given than Adea herself was in her mid-teens in 321 when she married Arrhidaios, Kynnane II would have just reached menarche, quite young for marriage by Macedonian standards. Kassander could scarcely have asked for a better spouse, now that her sister was the queen of the empire and without a troublesome interfering mother like Kleopatra had, since Kynnane had been killed by Alketas in 321. According to Diodoros, Kassander had made marriage overtures to Kleopatra, but he does not make it clear when these proposals were extended, and might very well have been just before or just after Kleopatra left for Sardeis.<sup>378</sup> Heckel notes that Antipater was very opposed to Kynnane, and that he might very well have been opposed to any marriage agreement that strengthened the position of any of the Argead women.<sup>379</sup> Heckel claims that

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<sup>374</sup> Palagia (2008): 196. Transcribed by Palagia; “*Gnōthi ton Adeias up’ emoi taphon, en et’ aōron / parthenon eg nousou deinos emarpse Aidēs / matri de kēdos aei mega Kunnanai, a min etikte, / kai mega Kassandrōi patri lipousa ethanen.*”

<sup>375</sup> Ibid.: 198-204.

<sup>376</sup> Ibid.: 204-8.

<sup>377</sup> Heckel, *ASCO* (2013): 51-60.

<sup>378</sup> Diod: 20.37.4.

<sup>379</sup> Heckel, *ASCO* (2013): 53-4.

it seems strange that if a marriage between Kassander and an Argead already existed, why would Polyperchon be appointed *epimeletes* and Kassander relegated to the lower rank of *chiliarchos*? However, it does not seem out of character for Kassander to do something his father opposed. Instead, a counter-argument to Heckel's point would be that this might be the exact reason why Antipater promoted another man ahead of his own flesh and blood; Kassander had defied him on such an important issue as marriage that Antipater did not trust him with the leading position in the kingdom.

Secondly, Kynnane II's existence solves the problem of Kassander's sons. Kassander had three sons; Philip, Antipater, and Alexander. After Kassander's death in 297, Philip (IV) ruled for a few months before dying of "a wasting disease", most commonly believed to be tuberculosis, which his father also may have suffered from.<sup>380</sup> After Philip died, his brothers Antipater and Alexander partitioned Macedonia between them, before they murderously fell out with their mother and each other.<sup>381</sup> Palagia offers the theory that Philip was Kynnane II's son, rather than Thessalonikē's. That means he would have been several years older than his brothers, perhaps as much as five years older. This is significant considering that after his death, Thessalonikē acted in a regent-like capacity for Antipater and Alexander, who ruled jointly.<sup>382</sup> Antipater, the elder of the two, could have been at most seventeen years old in 297, since his parents had married in mid-316, his younger brother possibly sixteen. It seems incredulous that over thirty year old Thessalonikē, almost from the moment of marriage, while Kassander still had to be away on campaign in Greece, would be able to carry to term and give birth to three sons in extremely rapid succession.<sup>383</sup> That Antipater and Alexander were somewhere around sixteen and fourteen respectively in 297 (which is still a stretch, given Thessalonikē's approaching menopause in 316) makes Thessalonikē's role as mediator and regent for the two much more plausible. If they had both been around eighteen, the age of majority in Macedonian society, there would have been little need for such a measure.

Thirdly, expanding on a point made above, Adea's and Kassander's alliance becomes not simply one of necessity; it becomes one of blood-relation, as the two were in-laws. Adea was no admirer of Antipater, the two had had several very public rows, and it seems strange on the surface for her to so willingly support his son. If Kassander had opposed his father in

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<sup>380</sup> Eusebios, *Chronographia*: 1.231.; Pau: 9.7.2.

<sup>381</sup> Plu*D*: 36.; Pau.: 9.7.3.; Jus: 16.1.1-9.

<sup>382</sup> Plutarch, *loc. cit*; Grainger (2007): 138-140.

<sup>383</sup> Palagia (2008): 207-8.

marrying Adea's younger sister, that would change the dynamic between the two completely. It may also be one of the reasons why Olympias chose to wait so long before making up her mind to align with Polyperchon; she knew that Kassander and Adea would join forces the moment Olympias made a move, as both queens knew they could not let the other live if their familial branches were to survive. For it does seem strange that Olympias would wait so long before throwing her lot in with Polyperchon, who from the start of the war between him and Kassander, looked very much like the strongest part. By the time Olympias made a move, with Aiakides in tow, Polyperchon had lost the balance of his army and Kassander had received support from Antigonos. This eventuality renders moot Carney's theory of Kassander intentionally dithering in Greece while Adea marched out to do battle. As already outlined, Kassander acted in a hurry once he got the news of Olympias' invasion, perhaps both to protect his queen as well as his wife, who most certainly had been left behind in Macedonia when he went south.<sup>384</sup> Athenaios makes special mention of Macedonians not bringing their wives and women with them on campaign, unlike the members of the Persian elite, which makes it likely that Kynnane II would have remained back in Pella with her sister.<sup>385</sup>

Arguments from silence can never provide answers, only attempt to postulate theories which can never be fully proved, and this is such a case, but in Heckel's words "the combined effect of the arguments from silence is deafening".<sup>386</sup> Heckel's counter-arguments to Palagia's theory are mostly based on the silence of the textual sources, and he makes quite a few good points, but ultimately falls short of disproving Palagia. The most crucial one seems to be the lack of mention by Diodoros in regards to the marriage status of Kassander, and that the familial relationship between Kassander and the dead Adea and Kynnane. After all, Kassander likely did have them buried in the royal catacombs in Aigai, but the omission in Diodoros' account of any sort of relationship between the dead and Kassander is telling.<sup>387</sup> However, conferring Hornblower's above comment regarding Diodoros' account of the death of Olympias perhaps being the result of court gossip (cf. 5.3, fn. 359 and the associated discussion), combined with what we know of Diodoros' penchant for (seemingly) uncritically copying other authors, this omission does not completely sink the "Kynnane II"-theory.

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<sup>384</sup> Cf. fn. 321 and the associated discussion in the text in Ch. 5.2.

<sup>385</sup> Ath: 13.557b. Another example is Demetrios leaving Phila behind whenever he went on campaign (PluD: 22.1, 32.1).

<sup>386</sup> Heckel, *ASCO* (2013): 54.

<sup>387</sup> *Ibid.*: 56-8.



Indeed, since Hieronymos is Diodoros' main source, it seems reasonable to point out that since Hieronymos was occupied in the eastern part of the empire, a companion of first Eumenes and then Antigonos, his information of Macedonian events could well be less detailed than the events in the East.

Another of Heckel's arguments is that if Kassander was already married to an Argead (Kynnane II), why would he need to marry a second one in Thessalonikē in order to credibly position himself for kingship?<sup>388</sup> This is not in my opinion a concern, since the Successors clearly wanted every possible avenue of legitimization; Kassander for instance had a city constructed in his wife's name (also named Thessalonikē, modern Thessaloniki), the act of city-founding an exhibition of royal power. Clearly he was not satisfied with just having an Argead wife, he need to emulate the acts of the Argead kings as well. In addition, as pointed out several times, the *axiōma* of the Argead women was always something desired by the Successors, regardless of marital status. Simply confer 4.1 and the events surrounding Kleopatra, especially after the death of her mother and while in Sardeis.<sup>389</sup> All that said, the existence of Kynnane II can likely never be decisively proven, and as Heckel points out, the less-than-glamorous truth, is that the grave relief could well be commemorating the dead daughter of two Macedonian nobles, their combination of names a fortuitous coincidence.<sup>390</sup>

## 6.2 The royal tombs of Aigai – the grave of Adea-Eurydike

In 1977, while investigating the vast necropolis at Aigai, modern Vergina, a remarkably untouched tomb was discovered. It featured a large frieze over a temple-like entrance. Creatively entitled Tomb II, it stood apart from Tomb I nearby, (which had at some point been thoroughly robbed, but was likely the resting place for Amyntas III), inside its own tumulus.<sup>391</sup> Tomb II holds the cremated remains of a male and a female; the male was probably in his forties and the female in her early- to mid-twenties.<sup>392</sup> Tomb III, discovered nearby and also extravagantly decorated, holds the cremated body of a teenage boy, no doubt the hapless Alexander IV. There is still considerate debate within the academic community as to who is interred in Tomb II. The original studies made by its excavator, Manolis

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<sup>388</sup> Heckel, *ASCO* (2013): 56.

<sup>389</sup> The relevant passage by Diodoros (20.37.4) is even cited by Heckel in his article, but he does not take into account the lengths the Diadochoi were willing to go to attain the *timé* and *axiōma* of potential spouses. Confer Ch. 2.2, 4.1, 4.4 and 5.2.

<sup>390</sup> Heckel, *ASCO* (2013): 59.

<sup>391</sup> Hammond, *ABSA* (1991): 69-75.

<sup>392</sup> *Ibid.*: 75-6.; Borza, Palagia, *JDAI* (2007): 83-4.

Andronikos, as well as subsequent studies in the 1980's and 90's came to the conclusion that the male was Philip II, that the female was Kleopatra-Eurydike, the both of them having been buried in quite a hurry by Alexander the Great before he set out for his Asian campaign.<sup>393</sup> However, a combination of factors makes this unlikely, and after several rounds of forensic examinations, it seems the remains are those of Philip Arrhidaios and Adea-Eurydike, an idea gaining more and more traction in the academic community, though not without protest.<sup>394</sup> The point of this subchapter is to as convincingly as possible argue for Tomb II being the resting place of Adea and Arrhidaios, which has significance in relation to Kassander's later ascension to the Macedonian throne.

Firstly, there are a number of logical shortcomings if this is indeed Philip II's grave. As described by Borza and Palagia, Tomb II has a much larger antechamber than both Tomb I and Tomb III, the antechamber being where the remains of the female have been buried. The size of the antechamber is roughly three-fourths of the size of the "main" chamber, indicating that the person buried there was quite important, despite being a female, and therefore nominally of secondary importance to her spouse in the Greco-Macedonian culture.<sup>395</sup> Unlike other graves of Macedonian elites of the 5<sup>th</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup> centuries, the antechamber is not merely a repository for grave goods buried with the person, rather it is the site for a double burial that in all likelihood happened simultaneously.<sup>396</sup> If this is indeed Philip II's grave, then why would Alexander, and more crucially Olympias, have granted Kleopatra-Eurydike such a stately interment, including a large quantity of grave goods, but even more importantly, such an elaborate and princely burial?<sup>397</sup> Even by disregarding Pausanias' overly dramatic account which claims Olympias had Kleopatra-Eurydike and her neonate daughter burned alive on hot coals,<sup>398</sup> it is still obvious Olympias had the much younger woman killed.<sup>399</sup> It makes little sense that she would then proceed to arrange a royal burial for the woman she had just murdered. The earlier claim that the bones of an infant had been found in the chamber as well has been refuted, further indicating that we are not dealing with Kleopatra-Eurydike's remains.

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<sup>393</sup> E.g.: Andronikos (1984); Andronikos, *ABSA* (1987): 1-16.; Hammond, *ABSA* (1991): 69-82.; Musgrave et al., *AW* (1991): 3-9.; Musgrave et al., *IJMS* (2010): s1-s15, retrieved from <http://www.medsci.org/v07p00s1.htm>

<sup>394</sup> E.g.: Borza, Palagia, *JDAI* (2007): 81-125.; Gill, *HES* (2008): 335-58.; Borza, *PH* (1987): 105-21.

<sup>395</sup> Borza, Palagia, *JDAI* (2007): 85.; Borza, *PH* (1987): 107.

<sup>396</sup> *Loc. cit.*

<sup>397</sup> *Ibid.*: 84-6.

<sup>398</sup> Pau: 8.7.5.

<sup>399</sup> The allegation is echoed by both Diodoros and Plutarch, though less dramatically than in Pausanias' account.

Another element is the somewhat disappointing grave chamber if the male body interred is indeed Philip II. Even though the friezes and wall-paintings are expertly crafted,<sup>400</sup> the architectural design of the tomb leaves a lot to be desired, especially when compared to Tomb I, presumably belonging to Philip II's mother Eurydike (this is at least the opinion of Andronikos, Hammond).<sup>401</sup> The design of Tomb II also leaves the impression it was completed in two stages; an earlier phase, more attentive to design, and a later phase which paid less attention to architectural arrangement, though featured a magnificent frieze depicting mounted hunters, in the process of killing a lion, a potent royal symbol as pointed out above (Ch.2.3).<sup>402</sup> The earlier argument that Alexander had swiftly concluded the burial of his father since he was readying to leave for Asia and therefore had expedited the construction of the tomb, sounds quite hollow. It seems much more likely that it was Kassander who had an earlier constructed tomb expanded to accommodate Adea-Eurydike as well as Philip Arrhidaios.

Secondly, there is the forensic evidence to consider. A quite extensive study of the remains in Tomb II was carried out by Musgrave et.al. in 1991, which, in short, came to the conclusion that the damage to the skull of the male suggested that it was indeed Philip II.<sup>403</sup> Philip had lost an eye to an arrow during the siege of Methonē early in his reign, disfiguring his face.<sup>404</sup> However, as pointed out by Borza and Palagia, there is a serious discrepancy in the logic of the forensic team in regards to the method of burial, namely that the bodies were both cremated. Only a single source, Justin, posits that Philip II was cremated, and the account is strikingly similar to similes often found in Roman poetry, such as Ovid. The king's *philoi* were apparently distraught because the torches lit in celebration for the king's daughter's (Kleopatra) marriage, was now being used to light the king's funeral pyre.<sup>405</sup> The nature of the account, which seems suspiciously theatrical, combined with no mention from any other source that Philip was cremated, suggests that he might just as well have been inhumed. While cremation was the preferred method of treating a dead body in both Classical Greece and in the later Hellenistic kingdoms, burial practice in Argead and early Hellenistic

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<sup>400</sup> Andronikos (1984): 87.

<sup>401</sup> Borza, Palagia, *JDAI* (2007): 83-9. Borza and Palagia are of the opinion that Tomb I is not the resting place of Eurydike I, rather it was potentially the grave of Philip II, but unfortunately looters have at some point carried off all the grave goods and significantly damaged inscriptions and artworks in the tomb.

<sup>402</sup> Hammond, *ABSA* (1991): 75.

<sup>403</sup> Musgrave, *AW* (1991): 3-9.

<sup>404</sup> Diod: 16.34.5

<sup>405</sup> Jus: 11.1.4.

Macedon seems to have been split between cremation and inhumation, at the very least practiced concurrently.<sup>406</sup>

Accepting that Philip II's body was not cremated, and that the remains are Arrhidaios' cremated bones, why then is the skull so severely damaged? The arrow to the eye was not the only wound Philip II suffered, he also broke his collar bone, broke his leg, and critically, the dagger which killed him in 336, but none of these injuries are commented in significant fashion.<sup>407</sup> Interestingly, the first forensic team commissioned by Andronikos to examine the bones (Langenscheidt and Xirotiris) came to the conclusion that there was no evidence for neither a traumatic eye wound, nor any sign of healing in the eye-socket.<sup>408</sup> The second forensic team (Musgrave et.al.) came to a radically different conclusion, claiming that the skull showed clear indications of traumatic injury.<sup>409</sup> Then a third examination (Bartsiokas), came to the same conclusion as the first team, that there was no reason to believe the body had suffered severe damage to its skull.<sup>410</sup> More importantly however, is that Bartsiokas determined that the cremation had happened "dry", as in the body had been cremated a good while after death, the flesh and muscles having atrophied away. Philip II's burial happened shortly after his death, there is no reason to believe otherwise, and there is serious doubt affixed to whether he was cremated or not, but in all likelihood not. By contrast, Philip Arrhidaios would certainly not have been cremated immediately by Olympias after she had him murdered in 317; there would be no reason for her to do so. Instead, it is reported by Diodoros that Kassander had both Arrhidaios and Adea-Eurydike buried with royal honours in 316 or possibly 315, after he had defeated Olympias;<sup>411</sup> which means that the cremation of Arrhidaios' body would most certainly have taken place a considerable time after his death, accounting for the "dry" bones.

Musgrave et al. presented in 2010 an aggressive defence of their original claim, postulating that Bartsiokas was wrong on nearly all the critical theoretic tenets, including the effect cremation would have had on "dry" and "wet" bones, as well as repeating their findings on the skull of the male.<sup>412</sup> While I am not qualified to comment on the taphonomic and

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<sup>406</sup> Borza, Palagia, *JDAI* (2007): 84.

<sup>407</sup> Borza, *PH* (1987): 106.

<sup>408</sup> Borza, Palagia, *JDAI* (2007): 107.; Xirotiris, Langenscheidt, *AE* (1981): 142-60.

<sup>409</sup> Musgrave, *AW* (1991): 4-8.

<sup>410</sup> Bartsiokas, *SCI* (2000): 511-4.

<sup>411</sup> Diod: 19.52.5

<sup>412</sup> Musgrave et al., *IJMS* (2010): s4-s5.

pathologic findings, I am able to point out a number of chronological shortcomings in the study. The first is the aforementioned presumption that Philip II was indeed cremated, which is addressed above. Another assumption made is that Philip Arrhidaios would have been cremated shortly after death on “ethical grounds”.<sup>413</sup> Musgrave et al. assume that the Macedonians would have found the practice of burying a body, then exhuming it for cremation, and then reburied, abhorrent. Yet that is exactly what happened roughly a century later, when the Seleukid king Antiochos III in 192 cremated and buried the Macedonian dead after the Battle of Kynoskephalai in 197.<sup>414</sup> There is no reason to believe Macedonian cultural mores would have decayed so dramatically in less than a century and a half; from immediately cremating recent dead on “ethical grounds” to leaving dead bodies alone for five years. The final counter-argument I will make, is the study’s attempt to logically exclude the possibility that it the remains belong to Arrhidaios and Adea.

It is unparalleled and incredible that corpses recovered in this way from their initial burial would have been secondarily cremated at their new resting-place. [...] They were transferred, surely, as already-cremated skeletons, the result of a rite paid to them by well-wishers after their deaths. They could not therefore have been re-cremated [...]. Their cremation had already occurred months before, like the cremations of other distinguished dead, whether Eumenes or Craterus, or the princely youth (possibly Alexander IV) in Tomb IV.<sup>415</sup>

As can be inferred from previous discussions in this thesis, Olympias would certainly not have extended the royal courtesy of a proper cremation to her fierce rival Adea-Eurydike. They had been bitter enemies for the *basileia* of Macedon, and just as Kassander would later mistreat Olympias’ corpse, there is no reason to believe Olympias was that much more gracious to her defeated adversary. Diodoros says both that Olympias had for many days treated her royal prisoners “παρανομήσασα” (“unlawfully”) by walling them up,<sup>416</sup> and Adea herself had to clean and address her husband’s wounds before she ended her own life.<sup>417</sup> Afterwards, Olympias’ had Kassander’s brother Nikanor murdered, and overturned the grave of Kassander’s other brother, Iolaos.<sup>418</sup> Based on this, there is absolutely no grounds for assuming she would then proceeded to have Adea and Arrhidaios buried with proper religious and royal honours. There is also no reason why any “well-wishers” would

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<sup>413</sup> Musgrave et al., *IJMS* (2010): s5.

<sup>414</sup> Appian, *Syrike*: 4.16.

<sup>415</sup> Musgrave et al., *IJMS* (2010): s9.

<sup>416</sup> Diod: 19.11.5.

<sup>417</sup> Ibid.: 19.11.7.

<sup>418</sup> Ibid.: 19.11.8.

have been allowed near the corpses either, as they were still potent political symbols, which Kassander later exploited, and it must be inferred that Olympias was aware of this as well.

Thirdly and lastly, one has to take into account the grave goods in the tomb. The quantity, nature, and extravagancy of the grave goods interred with the dead bodies make it clear that Tomb II is a grave for royalty.<sup>419</sup> The list of items is too extensive to detail in full, but it features tremendous amounts of ornate and gilded objects, often of gold and silver, in addition to elements of martial nature. Crucially, a number of *phiales*, religious libation vessels, and *kylikes*, drinking cups, in silver are among the goods buried with the bodies.<sup>420</sup> As pointed out by Gill, the importance of these objects is the weight inscriptions on them, a common practice in Greco-Macedonian society, because the bullion of valuables was often just as important as their aesthetic value.<sup>421</sup> The Macedonian weight standards differed from the Greek weight of coins (the standard Macedonian coin was the *stader*), which was used as a measurement for bullion content. During Philip II's reign, this amounted to around 4g (4.02-.10g) per *drachma*, which was the baseline model for comparison.<sup>422</sup> But Alexander changed the weight of the *stader* by around 20% sometime around 334-3, increasing the weight of bullion per *drachma*. And the mass of silver in several of the objects found in Tomb II uses this heavier standard as weight.<sup>423</sup> The chronological implication of this is that many of the valuables were manufactured *after* the death of Philip II in 336, by at least several years. And many of the other objects in the tomb, such as pottery, showed no signs of wear and tear, meaning they had been freshly manufactured when placed in the tomb.<sup>424</sup> By the logic presented by Musgrave et al., that Philip II was cremated "wet", as in the body still having muscles and flesh, that the cremation and burial happened quickly after death, this presents a chronological conundrum. Certainly Alexander would not have left for his Asian campaign with his father unburied, having waited for his new weight standard to be implemented before putting valuables in the tomb. The military effects among the grave goods have been taken as evidence for the identity of the male being the war-like Philip II, and not his mentally and physically challenged son Philip Arrhidaios. This is not necessarily proof of anything more than that the one who buried the royal pair was extending a royal

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<sup>419</sup> Kottaridi (2011): 137-47.; Gill, *HES* (2008): 335-6.

<sup>420</sup> Gill, *HES* (2008): 335-6, 343-4.

<sup>421</sup> *Ibid.*: 336-41.

<sup>422</sup> *Ibid.*: 340-3.

<sup>423</sup> *Ibid.*: 342-4. The weight of the objects and their mass of bullion were compared to the inscriptions found on the objects, resulting in a *drachma* measure of around 4.3g.

<sup>424</sup> *Ibid.*: 345.

courtesy to a king of an empire “won by the spear”, and does not by rule mean that the interred was a famed warrior.<sup>425</sup>

Therefore, the logical conclusion is that it is indeed Philip Arrhidaios and Adea-Eurydike that lie buried in Tomb II at Vergina, rather than Philip II and Kleopatra-Eurydike. They were put there by Kassander, either as an expression of personal loyalty to his possible sister-in-law or (more likely) a political statement aimed at showing the world that he respected the sanctity and memory of the Argead clan and the legitimate queen of Macedonia. The grave goods interred were to reflect their exalted status. The lack of the remains of Kynnane is a problem, seeing as Diodoros reports that Kassander had Kynnane’s remains brought over from Asia Minor and buried alongside her daughter. Whatever happened to her body is a mystery, but does not take away from the arguments in favour of Tomb II being the resting place of Adea and Arrhidaios. However, more decisive proof is needed to securely identify the bodies.

### **6.3 The world of the Diadochoi and Epigonoi**

In 309 Kassander had Alexander IV and his mother Rhoxane murdered after they had spent years in effective house arrest in Amphipolis.<sup>426</sup> Then, within a short while after Antigonos and Demetrios used the absence of any Argead heirs to proclaim themselves *basileis*, Kassander did the same in Macedon. This was effectively carried out through a combination of his earlier cooperation and possible familial connection with the on-paper legitimate *basilissa* of Macedon, as previously described and debated, his shrewd exploitation of Adea’s legacy, and his military supremacy in Macedon and Greece. His legitimacy rested on his authority given to him by Adea-Eurydike as the royal regent, a position that was confirmed by Antigonos, Ptolemy, and Lysimachos, as long as Alexander IV, the last Argead, was alive.<sup>427</sup> That position of power simply transferred over into kingship a few years later, after Alexander’s murder. Kassander completed the final destruction of the Argead line by having Herakles, Alexander the Great’s illegitimate son, murdered in 309, as Polyperchon (without any legitimacy after the death of both Olympias and Alexander IV) had tried to install him on the throne. Instead, Kassander bought off his old and gullible adversary, and Polyperchon had

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<sup>425</sup> Borza, Palagia, *JDAI* (2007): 111-7.; Borza, *PH* (1987): 111-4. In addition, a number of the items, including an iron helmet and some golden and ivory shields, are thought to be from Alexander the Great’s personal armoury, seeing as damage to the helmet corresponds to references of battle damage from the *anabasis* in the extant sources. The shields are also depicted on medallions furnished for Alexander’s veterans after the Indian campaign.

<sup>426</sup> Diod: 19.105.2.; Jus: 15.2.5., cf. 16.1.15.

<sup>427</sup> Ibid.: 19.105.1

Herakles murdered, removing the last barrier for Kassander's proclamation of kingship.<sup>428</sup> Adea-Eurydike's role in Kassander's rise to power is not insignificant. She was the one who elevated him from simply a rebel in a conflict with the legitimate regent (Polyperchon), to the role of officially appointed regent, suddenly forcing Polyperchon into a difficult position. Using her husband Arrhidaios' official authority, Adea had in fact de-legitimized Polyperchon, at least in the eyes of many of the other Successors, such as Ptolemy and Antigonos.<sup>429</sup> Her proclamation of a change of regent must have carried more *formal* authority than the appointment of Polyperchon by a dying Antipater, but the facts on the ground were more convoluted. As pointed out several times above, in the chaotic climate of the Successor Wars, legitimacy was, ultimately, secondary to pure military strength.

While the last of the women of the Diadochoi period to play a significant political role, Olympias and Adea were certainly not the last Macedonian women to have extraordinary political careers in Hellenistic history. Women had previously played an important, if passive, part in the power politics of the royal and noble families of Macedon; as marriage partners they were valuable expressions of friendship between elites, so-called "marriage alliances".<sup>430</sup> As the Successor Wars continued, this practice became even more important between the incipient royal families, on a scale not previously observed in Macedonian society. While marriage celebrations in earlier Argead times had been toned down affairs and apparently not becoming grandiose public spectacles before late in Philip II's reign,<sup>431</sup> this took on a whole new scale after the creation of the Diadochoi kingdoms. A good example of this is the spectacular nuptials between Seleukos and Demetrios Poliorketes' daughter Stratonikē in 299, which featured numerous banquets, speeches, the presence of Demetrios' entire navy, and ended with a stately parade from Rhosos to Antioch.<sup>432</sup> Other marriage alliances were plentiful during this latter phase of the Successor Wars; Demetrios married Pyrrhos of Epeiros' sister Deidameia,<sup>433</sup> Lysimachos married the widow of a tyrant in a city in Anatolia to gain control of it, before swiftly setting her aside for Arsinoë, a daughter of Ptolemy.<sup>434</sup> Many of these women would go on to play a part in public affairs, such as

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<sup>428</sup> Carney (2000): 149-51.; Jus: 15.2.3.; Diod: 20.20.1-2., 20.28.; Pau: 9.7.2.

<sup>429</sup> This is hinted at in Diodoros' account as Kassander quickly received aid from Antigonos, and letters promising support from Ptolemy, neither of the them apparently very fond of Polyperchon.

<sup>430</sup> Carney (2000): 18-21.

<sup>431</sup> Ibid.: 203-5.

<sup>432</sup> PluD: 31.3-32.2.

<sup>433</sup> Ibid.: 25.2.

<sup>434</sup> Ibid.: 31.3.; Pau: 1.7.8.; Diod: 20.109.6-7.; Carney (2000): 173-5.



ambassadorial roles, high priestesses of cults which increasingly became dominated by a semi-divine portrayal of royalty (Stratonikē I), or even as active participants in power politics (Arsinoë of Thrace and Arsinoë I of Egypt).<sup>435</sup> If this can be concluded to be a direct result of Adea's and Olympias' activities during their short political careers in the early Successor Wars is uncertain. However, they certainly set precedence, an important first step which "lowered the bar" for any later queens and royal women.

Certainly, the most important factor for the changing attitudes towards and roles of Hellenistic royal women was the need for the male Diadochoi to legitimize their claim to power. As has been explained at length, this was the reason why the Successors initially joined up with the Argead women, either as political allies or marriage partners. As the Argead clan died out, the families of the Diadochoi became by default the new possessors of the highest category of *axiōma* and *timé*. Having won their lands "by the spear", they were within a short while the *de facto* replacements for the Argeads, and by the end of the generation of the Diadochoi and the start of the generation of the *Epigonoi*,<sup>436</sup> they had become the *de jure* monarchic polities. While the memory of the Argeads still existed in Macedonia, there appears to have been somewhat of a reluctant attitude among the kings of both the short-lived Antipatrid, as well as the first generation of the Antigonid (Demetrios Poliorketes) dynasties, to claim the former Argead title of "king of the Macedonians".<sup>437</sup> In the words of Grainger, into which one can easily fit Seleukos and Lysimachos as well:

"This was a political manifesto. Antigonos was stating that he was now, by virtue of victories of his army and fleet, the legitimate successor to Philip and Alexander. [...] He was creating a new dynasty, replacing the Argeads with the Antigonids. [...] Proclaiming himself king did not make Antigonos the successor to Alexander's *kingdom* [my emphasis], and by claiming it Antigonos was actually joining Kassander and Ptolemy in refusing to restore the empire as a whole. The royal proclamation was a gesture of defiance and a confession of overall failure."<sup>438</sup>

After around 300 BCE the official title of *basilissa* started to appear on inscriptions. It is a crucial point to make that *basilissa* does not mean simply "wife of king", nor does it mean "female king", rather its connotation is "female royalty", but no direct English translation

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<sup>435</sup> Carney (2000): 171-7.; Macurdy (1932): 78-82, 109-111.

<sup>436</sup> Ἐπίγονοι, "inheritors", referring to the sons of the original Diadochoi, such as Antiochos I Soter, Ptolemy II Philadelphos, and Antigonos II Gonatas. Technically Kassander and Demetrios belongs to this group, but they were contemporary with the Diadochoi, such as Seleukos, Antigonos and Lysimachos, straddling both groups.

<sup>437</sup> PluD: 18.2-3. This apparently came to an end after the tumultuous years of the reigns of first Demetrios, then Ptolemy Keuranos, both of whom claimed the title in an attempt at legitimizing their coups of royal power.

<sup>438</sup> Grainger (2007): 125.

exists.<sup>439</sup> It was not an exclusive title, held only by the wife of a king, but neither was *basileus*, since both Antigonos and Demetrios held the title concurrently, the pair of them ruling the Antigonid kingdom together. It did not mean the *basilissa* had the power of a *basileus* either, but it certainly meant she had more formal and informal responsibilities and privileges than during Argead times, when no such title is attested. It is an important distinction to make that Adea-Eurydike, during her imprisonment by Olympias, according to Diodoros at least, made claim for the *basileia*, “the rule”, of Macedonia, not that she was the *basilissa*. The references to her as such are my own insertions, but while anachronistic, is an apt description of her role in Macedonian politics in the span 320-316; her role was more like the Hellenistic *basilissa* than the previous, title-less position. No other Hellenistic royal women would later actively command troops on the battlefield as Olympias and Adea had done, but many would on several occasions take on as large (and sometimes larger) roles in the governing of their respective kingdoms, the most famous example being Kleopatra VII of Egypt, and her involvement with Julius Caesar and Marcus Antonius.

#### **6.4 Summary of Adea’s and Olympias’ legacy**

The easiest observable results of the short period of political supremacy of Adea and Olympias, was the way Kassander managed to weave the memory of both into his strategy of attaining royal power in Macedonia. He had been Adea-Eurydike’s ally, her appointed regent, and possibly her brother-in-law as well. The arguments from silence regarding a possible sister of Adea marrying Kassander early in 319 or 318, as advocated by Palagia, presents a potential explanation as to why the two ended up supporting each other as they did, as well as filling in a few chronological gaps in the personal history of Kassander and his family.

Kassander represents in many ways the essence of the Diadochoi. He was evidently very ambitious, intelligent, a fine military commander, and was a thoroughly capable politician. He knew how to create a public image of himself, and how to use symbolism to suit his own ends. He used the death of Adea as a political tool, condemning Olympias’ heavy-handedness in such a manner that the extant sources likely portrayed it as fact,<sup>440</sup> building up Adea-Eurydike’s queenship in the process.

The stately interment of Adea-Eurydike and Philip Arrhidaios was maybe partly a propaganda ploy and partly an expression of personal loyalty to Adea. She was after all the

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<sup>439</sup> Carney (2000): 225-7.

<sup>440</sup> Tarn (1948): 261-2.

one who had enabled him to make his impressive ascension which eventually ended with kingship over all of Macedon. Despite numerous bouts of arguing about the identity of the ones buried in Tomb II in Vergina, the evidence seems to logically point in the direction of Adea and Arrhidaios, which fits in quite nicely with Diodoros' account of how events shaped out after Adea's death and following Kassander taking control, with him burying Adea and Arrhidaios with all the deference they were entitled to. Regardless of the actual consideration and meaning behind the tomb fashioned by Kassander (whether purely political or somewhat motivated by a sense of duty or personal honour), it certainly worked out as part of his political imagery. Practically, it represented that the Argeads were gone; King Philip Arrhidaios and Queen Adea-Eurydike might be dead, but their memory lived on, as Kassander made sure their bodies were treated with honour and respect. In the process he was building up his own (likely already considerable) standing among the Macedonian populace. Their burial at the traditional capital of Aigai would likely have been a grand and solemn affair, following on the heels of Kassander's impressive military victory against Polyperchon and Aristonous, and after the murder of the Olympias. If this seems like groundless conjecture, then consider simply the fact that both Adea and her mother Kynnane had led troops in the field, and the army's outrage at Kynnane's murder, which speaks of a considerable degree of respect among the average Macedonian soldier and citizen.

It would be presumptuous to claim that the actions of Adea and Olympias somehow initiated a veritable revolution in gender relations among the upper strata of the Hellenistic elites in the following centuries. However, tendencies can be observed, and the following period saw an increased role for royal women in the Hellenistic courts. Where before women like Olympias had been criticized in the sources for taking too active a part in religious practices, by the turn of the 3<sup>rd</sup> century BCE royal women in both the Seleukid and Ptolemaic courts were leading figures in cults dedicated to not only the traditional Olympian gods, but also cults promoting the divine nature of the Hellenistic royal families.<sup>441</sup> For instance, where Olympias had been condemned for "pulling the strings" in regards to her son and daughter in earlier times, Stratonikē I of Seleukeia was used time and again as an ambassador, her role in mediating between the Seleukids and Antigonids seen as a natural part for her to play, given her familial relationship to both.<sup>442</sup>

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<sup>441</sup> Roubekas, *REL* (2015): 8-10, fn.28.

<sup>442</sup> Carney (2000): 171-2.

## 7.0 Conclusion

The murderous chaos of the Diadochoi Wars did away with a number of conventions, some of which had previously been considered pillars of Macedonian society. The most crucial was the undisputed rule of the Argead dynasty. The family who had ruled Macedonia from at least the 7<sup>th</sup> century BCE was done away with, their existence more of a hindrance than a help to the increasingly ambitious and unscrupulous Successors, and by 308 they had murdered every one of the remaining members of the Argead family. The empire of Philip II and Alexander the Great was ultimately replaced by the Successor kingdoms of the Hellenistic Near East, eventuated by the wars which lasted from 323 to 281.

Adea-Eurydike's and Olympias' role in this process was relatively small, but very far from insignificant. Their time at the top of Macedonian politics was brief, and quickly replaced by Kassander's longer-lasting primacy. Though in the end, it seems more than fair to call them Diadochoi, as they exhibited the exact same level of ambitions, the same approach to *realpolitik*, as well as the same ability to attain and employ military power, despite their fundamentally different premise. However, unlike the male Diadochoi, their position as members of the Argead royal family made them (along with Kleopatra, Kynnane, and Thessalonikē) both attractive targets for alliance, as well as dangerous pieces in the political game. Regardless of their gender, it is not ungrounded conjecture to point out that their playing field was inherently different from, yet similar to male Diadochoi such as Ptolemy, Antigonos, or Seleukos. They had all been versed in the Macedonian way of conducting politics; they all had presided in Philip's court. And where Olympias and Kleopatra had acquired a more "underhanded"-approach because of the peculiarities of the interfamilial relations of the extended Argead family, Adea and Kynnane had opposed this in order to adapt a more martial, "male", approach to their political adversaries. In the eyes of their contemporaries, as well as the later historians, such as Diodoros or Justin, they had to prove their worth several times over. Unexpectedly, Adea and Olympias demonstrated that they were able to not only harness the nominal loyalty, but also the actual support from the Macedonians, who still held the memory of their former king Philip II in high regard; both Adea and Olympias could very convincingly claim connection to that great king.

“It reveals much about the principals: the ingenuity of Seleukos, Ptolemy’s caution, the recklessness of Demetrios, the obduracy of Lysimachos, the age and slowness of Antigonos, the cunning and carefulness of Kassander.”<sup>443</sup> Many of the same personality traits and descriptions can be given to the Argead women as well.

Both Adea-Eurydike and Olympias showed an aptitude for politics, for exportation of personal imagery, and were adept at using the social and cultural aspects of the Macedonian aristocracy to their advantage, as evidenced by the above attempt at outlining their *philia* with key actors. The ultimately destructive rivalry between Adea and Olympias was one not necessarily of their own accord; it had its origin in the internecine family feuds of the Argead dynasty, made even tenser by Philip II’s reckless polygamist approach to succession tactics, which resulted in several familial branches within the Argead dynasty. Based on history and the traditions of the Argead family, there could have been no other solution to the existence of two disparate branches. One had been behind the systematic murder of the other, naturally resulting in animosity, though perhaps more of a dynastic nature than an emotional one, considering the policy of endogamy and structuralized consanguineous marriages within the Argead clan.

Throughout the thesis, a number of concepts and theories have been explored, tried, and applied. This includes an overview of the debate surrounding the chronology of the Successor Wars as well as an attempt at providing a compromise solution to the two schools of thought. This was extrapolated through the examination of both schools of thought, and through taking into close consideration the source material (and the shortcomings of said material) a tentative timeline have been provided, upon which the chronology of the thesis has been based. The reason for this has been to be able to piece together other events happening within the same time-span Chapter three presents a very short introduction to the modernist theory of performative gender, as advocated by Judith Butler, and an attempt at fitting aspects of this theory into the action patterns of Adea and Olympias have provided some interesting considerations in the main discussion. Chapter six features a number of archaeological discussions, of which I am not properly qualified to comment critically upon, and as such I have contained the discussion to concentrate on chronological short-comings and comment on where the arguments of the archaeologists contrasts with extant sources, or more coherent claims by other archaeologists. This has been adapted to fit in with the overall discussion

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<sup>443</sup> Grainger (2007): 133.

regarding Adea and Olympias, as well as the other Argead women and Kassander the *Epigonos*. It would be supercilious to claim that this thesis presents a revisionist re-interpretation of the Argead women's role in the early Successor Wars; both the scope of this thesis and the skills of its author are too limited for that. Instead, I have tried to look as closely as possible on a short series of events where Adea and Olympias serve as the centre of not only attention, but the moving centre of events as well.

The names of both Adea-Eurydike and Olympias fell out of common usage amongst the queens and princesses of the Hellenistic kingdoms. Where there were numerous "Kleopatras" in both the Ptolemaic and Seleukids kingdoms, there would be few royal women carrying the name Eurydike, and none at all named Olympias, save in Epeiros. If this is significant or not is mostly conjecture. Certainly it seems that the Successors learned their lesson after 323-316; do not take any of the Argead women lightly. First had been the effect Olympias had had in the court of Philip II, no doubt the young *paides*, Perdikkas, Lysimachos, Leonnatos, Seleukos, would have seen the formidable Molossian queen in courtly daily life, heard her speak, at the very least formed an opinion regarding Alexander's mother. Then, when the empire came apart, they would once more have had to deal with the female descendants of Philip. Kleopatra sought to completely upset the delicate balance reached through intense negotiations in Babylon over the summer and fall of 323, by simply bypassing the generals' accommodations, and simply elevate first Leonnatos, then Perdikkas, to practical kingship. Shortly after Kynnane forced the hand of the Perdikkan faction by opposing both Antipater, Antigonos, and Perdikkas by appearing in front of the royal court in Sardeis, demanding her royal daughter marry the newly crowned king Philip Arrhidaios. While it cost Kynnane her life, she set her daughter on the intended path to royal dominance, creating mortal enemies of most of the Successors in the process. It all came to a head in 317 after years of confused civil conflict in both Europe and Asia, with Macedonians fighting Macedonians; and in this confusion Adea-Eurydike and Olympias, representing not only their own branches of the Argead clan, but also the interests of many others (Macedonians, Athenians, Molossians, the *chiliarchos* Kassander, the *epitropos autokratōr* Polyperchon). Almost as soon as the dust settled in 316, the Argead dynasty was reduced to a shadow of its former self; only hapless Alexander IV and Kleopatra remained, both in captivity. Thessalonikē had been forced into marrying Kassander, passing out of the Argead family and into the Antipatrid in the eyes of the Greco-Macedonian culture. With the death of Kleopatra in 308 at the hands of Antigonos' subordinates, the Argead dynasty was exterminated.

Now, despite this tragic ending, the story of the Argead women does not read intrinsically differently from the story of some of the other Successors; Perdikkas, Seleukos, Peithon, and Demetrios, to name only a few. It merits a mention that of all principal actors in the Diadochoi Wars, only three died of natural causes (Antipater, Kassander, and Ptolemy), everyone else, including the five Argead women, were all murdered by one rival or another. The Diadochoi Wars ended almost in the same vein as it had begun. In 281 Seleukos was the sole survivor of the generation of men who had gone with Alexander to Asia, and apart from Egypt, he controlled the rest of Alexander's vast empire. Just as he was about to claim Macedonia, he was murdered by an estranged son of the late Ptolemy of Egypt, and Seleukid control of the large empire dissolved almost overnight. But instead of sparking off a new series of civil wars, the Hellenistic kingdoms solidified into polities which would remain quite constant for centuries, until they were all conquered by the Romans. As previously noted, the queens of Seleukeia and Egypt were often politically active, including instances where they even sparked off wars between the two kingdoms.<sup>444</sup> It is therefore somewhat ironic that no other *basilissa* of the Macedonian kingdom was notably politically active following the death of Adea and Olympias. Demetrios' wife Phila had a quite important public role, but she was her husband's ally in all regards, not personally a political actor, despite being described as holding her own court and unit of bodyguards.<sup>445</sup> Indeed, it seems like Macedonia reverted back to traditional customs regarding royal women following the establishment of the Antigonid dynasty, that the newly expanded role of "royal woman" was limited to the kingdoms of the Seleukids and Ptolemies. In the words of Macurdy:

"We know nothing of any political action on the part of Laodice [Laodike V, wife of Perseus, the last Antigonid king] while she was a Macedonian queen, nor of any of the queens of that country after the stormy times of Olympias and the young queen [Adea-] Eurydice. The power for which the fourth-century queens strove was theirs only by force of circumstances and because of their own strong will and determination to secure it. With the queens beginning with Thessalonice the normal condition of the Macedonian monarchy reasserts itself, in which the people will suffer no woman to be their king."<sup>446</sup>

While this would have been a poetic way to end this thesis, it is however an oversimplification of a number of factors. Firstly, the argument that Adea and Olympias

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<sup>444</sup> E.g. Kleopatra Thea in Seleukeia, and Berenike I in Egypt, both of whom used dynastic strife and weakened internal political situations to amass considerable power. Laodike I of Seleukeia poisoned and killed the other wife of Antiochos II Theos, sparking off the Third Syrian War with Egypt.

<sup>445</sup> Carney (2000): 165-9.

<sup>446</sup> Macurdy (1932): 75-6.

ascended to the top in Macedonia in the span 319-316 through sheer force of will and happenstance, is oversimplified. While not incorrect, Macurdy's argument lacks some nuance in relation to the aforementioned circumstances. The unique conditions of the Diadochoi Wars created a situation never before or since seen in antiquity; no other empire collapsed so suddenly, while still being the military, economic, and cultural hegemon and no other outside enemies to contend with. The abundance of prizes, and the abundance of takers for these prizes, created the ferociously internecine state of affairs in which everyone with some sort of credibility, be it through a fig-leaf office like that of *epitropos autokratōr*, or through connection with the royal family and former kings, could become legitimate challengers for political primacy. In this chaotic atmosphere, the gender of the contender mattered little for the war-weary Macedonians; they only wanted someone to lead and protect them. This window of opportunity closed with the death of Antigonos at the field of Ipsos in 301, as the Hellenistic Successors kingdoms became firmly established states. Secondly, and interestingly, while some of the same conditions which enabled Adea's and Olympias' rise to power existed in the latter days of the Antigonid dynasty, specifically after the Second Macedonian War and Philip V's loss to the Romans, no royal Antigonid women stepped in to fill the political void. Just as with the Argead family, so too did the Antigonid split into two branches towards the end of its existence, both sides featuring minority aged heirs.<sup>447</sup> But where in the 4<sup>th</sup> century this had enabled Adea and Olympias to fill the role of regent, this did not occur in the 2<sup>nd</sup> century. Neither did murders of royal women happen, as noted by Carney, "In Antigonid Macedonia, royal wives were too insignificant to be worth murdering."<sup>448</sup> More than anything, it is reminiscent of Argead dynastic politics from before 336 BCE.

As pointed out in the introductory chapter, one should be wary of ascribing too much importance to a single series of events in the formation of the Hellenistic world. There is no direct causality between the actions of the Argead women in the Successor Wars and the expanded role of royal women in the Hellenistic kingdoms. That is not to say that there were no carry-over, and if anything it would have made the Diadochoi aware of the potential power women could attain if given the opportunity. It also highlighted the importance of actual royal legitimacy, as well as the projection of perceived legitimacy. If royal legitimacy,

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<sup>447</sup> Plutarch, *Aemilius Paullus*: 8.3.; Jus: 28.3.9-16. Demetrios II died in 229 and left an underage son as heir and Antigonos III Doseon was appointed the boy's regent. Instead of taking the kingship for himself, he acted dutifully as the future Philip V's caretaker.

<sup>448</sup> Carney (2000): 199.



i.e. connection to the old royal clan, was not present, then the Successors would manufacture their own. Which is why such displays of wealth and power like the ostentatious celebrations of Stratonikē's and Seleukos' wedding was so important, in a world where the old order had been replaced by new ones, the creation of royal imagery was paramount.

Finally, the legacy of Adea-Eurydike and Olympias was two-fold; in the short term they paved the way for Kassander's rule of Macedonia, for without both of them he could not credibly have claimed the kingship the way he did, providing him with both a political and symbolic ally in Adea, and a perfect adversary in Olympias. In the long-term, the two queens' activities created precedents for political power held by women, a tradition which soon died in Antigonid Macedonia, but which carried on and developed further into institutionalized public roles for royal women in the Seleukid and Ptolemaic kingdoms. Most strikingly, Adea's and Olympias' ability to control, project, and wield political power, matters nominally held as the domain of men, speaks to the powerful individuals these two were. One very young and thrust violently unto the scene; the other old and wise, a lifetime of experience of politics at court, the two ended up on opposite sides, and tragically brought each other down, both of them victims of a dynastic situation long in the making. In the words of Sir William Tarn, "If Macedonia produced perhaps the most competent body of men the world had yet seen, the women were in all respects the men's counterparts."<sup>449</sup>

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<sup>449</sup> Tarn *apud* Macurdy (1932): ix.

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### 8.3 Further research


The natural avenue for further research into the role of the Argead women is to conduct a more in-depth comparison between the Argead royal women and the royal women of the succeeding Hellenistic dynasties. In this thesis I have scratched the surface as to the connection between the two groups, but the thesis' constraints have made the analysis nothing more than superficial.

Several avenues of approach could be of considerable interest. The first is to look more closely on the Antigonid royal women, and contrast their public and domestic roles, as well as their seemingly much less prominent position within the Macedonian kingdom. Touched upon briefly in the concluding chapter, there is certainly room to extrapolate on this subject. Another potential area for further study would be the Seleukid and Ptolemaic royal women. The source material for this period and subject is much richer than for both the Argead and Antigonid women, and while a heavily discussed subject, it is still an interesting proposition to more closely examine the changing role of the royal women in the turn-over phase from the Diadochoi Wars to the early Hellenistic kingdoms. Interesting characters in this regard would be the aforementioned Stratonikē I of Seleukeia, wife of both Seleukos I and Antiochos I, as well as formidable Arsinoë II of Egypt, whom might have attained more power and a more prominent position than even her famous kinswoman Kleopatra VII.

In short, there are still much more that can be done on this subject, and the above are only hurriedly constructed ideas; certainly many more are possible. Nothing would please this student more than further studies conducted on the incredible Argead women; it has decidedly been the most interesting academic journey I have ever undertaken.

## **Appendix I – Genealogic table of Philip II’s extended family**

## Family of Philip II



## Appendix II – Prosopography

*Note I have tried to keep the entries as focused on the period 323-316 as possible, and have in most cases only cursorily dealt with the individuals' life during Alexander's and Philip's reigns, but in some cases this period is important in the context of the individual's affairs during the Diadochoi period. Great thanks to Professor Waldemar Heckel for creating his wonderful collection of biographies of the Alexandrian period, which is extensively employed in the creation of this prosopography.*

### **Adea (Eurydike)**

Originally named Adea, but renamed Eurydike upon marriage to Philip Arrhidaios in 320 (*AEvt* 1.23; *Pol* 8.60). Born sometime between 338 and 335 to Kynane and Amyntas, brother of Philip II (*Arr* 156 F 9.22; *Cur* 6.9.17, 10.24), Amyntas was known to be dead by spring of 335, so Adea would have been born before the end of that year (*Arr* 1.5.4). Raised by Kynane after Amyntas' death, and received a martial education by her mother, and though nothing is known of her upbringing other than that, it can be presumed she lived in the royal residence in Pella along with her mother (*Pol* 8.60; *Ath* 13.560f). She became titular queen of Macedonia and its empire in 321 following her marriage to the newly crowned Philip (III) Arrhidaios (*AEvt* 1.22-3). The Macedonian troops, agitated after the murder of Kynane, demanded Adea being allowed to marry Arrhidaios, as had been the intention of both Kynane and Adea, which the Successors agreed to under the pressure of a potential mutiny (*AEvt* 1.22-3; *Pol* 8.60). She and Arrhidaios presumably married as she reached the royal entourage and army as they were making their way to Triparadeisos in Syria in late 321 or early 320, she was still likely in her mid- or late teens. On the way to the Syria, Adea apparently forced Peithon, the temporary general of the royal army and custodian of the joint-kings, to never issue an order without her permission, taking total control (*AEvt* 1.30-31; *Diod* 18.39.1-3). At the conference in Triparadeisos, Adea-Eurydike so agitated the royal army that they nearly killed the newly appointed regent Antipater, as well as Antigonos and Seleukos when the two came to the assistance of Antipater. After this, she was kept subdued by Antipater, though through what means is uncertain. She was aided in her attempted mutiny by a certain Asklepiodoros, mentioned as the army's *grammateos*, "secretary" (*AEvt* 1.32-3; *Diod* 18.39.3-4). She travelled with Antipater and her husband Arrhidaios back to Macedonia following the partition at Triparadeisos, and arrived sometime in 320. Held in check by Antipater, she found an opening upon the regent's death in 319 and when the ineffective Polyperchon took over the regency (*Diod* 18.48.4). The threat of an alliance between



Olympias, as the head of what remained of the Argead royal family and the regent Polyperchon –who had called her back from self-imposed exile in Molossia to become the *epimeletes*, guardian, of her grandson Alexander IV– made Adea-Eurydike seek an alliance with the disgruntled and disinherited son of Antipater, Kassander (Jus 14.5.2-4). Adea’s hold on the throne of Macedonia through the mentally challenged Philip Arrhidaios was dependent on Olympias not getting custody of the young Alexander IV, who would in time grow up to become Arrhidaios’, - and by extension Adea’s -, senior in the joint-kingship and in the Macedonian regicidal tradition, have both Adea and Arrhidaios murdered (Diod 18.57.2, 18.58.4; Jus 14.5.1-4). Not waiting on Kassander who was in Greece fighting Polyperchon’s allies, she took an army and met Olympias and Polyperchon’s Molossian army near Euia in 317 (Ath 13.560f; Diod 19.11.1-2; Jus 14.5.9). Adea’s army defected to Olympias, and Adea and Arrhidaios ended up as prisoners to Olympias (Diod 19.11.2; Jus 14.5.10). She and her husband were badly mistreated by Olympias who shortly after killed Arrhidaios and gave Adea a number of tools with which to kill herself. Adea tended to her dead husband’s body before shunning all the offered instruments and hung herself with her own belt (Diod 19.11.5-7). Her body, along with that of her husband, was later buried with full royal honours by Kassander in the royal tombs at Aigai in 315 (Diod 19.52.5; Ath 4.155a).

### **Alexander (IV)**

Alexander IV of Macedonia was the son of Rhoxane and Alexander the Great. He was born a few months after his father’s death in 323, no later than September, and was immediately appointed joint-king of Macedonia and the empire upon his birth along with Philip Arrhidaios (*AEvt* 1.1-2, 1.8; Jus 13.4.3; Diod 18.23.2). Perdikkas served as his guardian until his death in 320, afterwards Antipater and then Polyperchon took over that role, until Alexander’s grandmother Olympias became his guardian for a short time in 317/316. Alexander and his mother accompanied Perdikkas and the mobile court and royal army to Kappadokia and Asia Minor in 322/321, before going to Egypt in 320 (Pau 1.6.3; Jus 13.6.10; *AEvt* 1.28). Following the Partition at Triparadeisos he was brought by Antipater to Macedonia. He was originally entrusted to the care of Antigonos, but Kassander mistrusted Antigonos and feared he would use Alexander as a pawn in a bid for power, and persuaded Antipater to bring Alexander to Macedonia along with Adea and Philip Arrhidaios (*AEvt* 1.38, 1.43-45). Olympias, in 318, organized the betrothal of Alexander to Deidameia, the daughter of her nephew Aikides of Molossia, but it never came to fruition (*PluPy* 4.3). Alexander was with Olympias during the Siege of Pydna, and after the city’s surrender he and his mother

Rhoxane was sent to Amphipolis to be kept under close watch by Kassander (Diod 19.35.5, 19.52.4; Jus 14.6.2, 14.6.13, 15.1.3). Kassander was promised the position as regent and overall commander of Europe by Lysimachos, Antigonos and Ptolemy until Alexander came of age (Diod 19.105.1), but this did not stop Alexander and his mother from being murdered in 310 by the commander of the guard set to watch him. His body, along with his mother's, was concealed after the murder (Diod 19.105.2; Jus 15.2.5, cf. 16.1.15). Tomb III of the royal tombs in Vergina is most likely his final resting place.

### **Antipater**

Antipater was a general and *hetairoi* of Philip II and was during the reign of Alexander in command of "Europe" and viceroy of Macedonia and Greece (Arr 1.11.3; Cur 4.1.39; Jus 11.7.1). He had a number of children, most notably the daughters Nikaia, Phila and Eurydike and his sons Kassander and Iolaos. Antipater and Olympias had a longstanding feud that started early during Alexander's reign, which carried over into the period after Alexander's death. Antipater was had to fight the sudden Athenian-led insurrection known as the Lamian War in 323 when it became known Alexander was dead (Diod 18.8). While under siege in the city of Lamia, Antipater sent for help from Krateros and Leonnatos in Asia, and duly managed to defeat the Greek army at Krannon in 322 (Diod 18.12.4, 18.13.1-3, 18.14.4, 18.15.1-3, 15, 18.17; *AEvt* 1.9, 1.12; Jus 13.5.15; *PluD* 27.1, 28.1). Antipater and Krateros entered an alliance, Krateros married Antipater's daughter Phila (Diod 18.18.7), and Perdikkas sent word asking for Nikaia's hand; he was seeking an alliance with the empire's second-most powerful warlord (*AEvt* 1.21; Diod 18.23.1). But later Antigonos came to Antipater and told him Perdikkas had was planning to secretly set aside Nikaia in favour of Kleopatra and make a bid for kingship by marrying an Argead (Diod 18.23.4-24.1, 18.25.3; *AEvt* 1.21, 1.24). Antipater secured an alliance with Ptolemy and declared war on Perdikkas, assisted by Antigonos, Ptolemy and Krateros (Diod 18.14.2; *AEvt* 1.24). Despite the defeat and death of Krateros and his army at the hands of Eumenes near the Hellespont, Antipater continued on towards Syria where he learnt that Perdikkas had been assassinated (Diod 18.29-31.1; *AEvt* 1.28). At Triparadeisos, he met with the cowed Peithon and Seleukos who had brought the remnants of the royal army formerly under Perdikkas' command up from Egypt (*AEvt* 1.31-2; Diod 18.39.1-2). There Antipater had to deal with the irate Adea-Eurydike who had through her authority as queen effectively wrestled control from Peithon during the march from Egypt, and her control over the rank and file was expressed when the royal army almost killed Antipater when he tried to reason and discuss with them at

Triparadeisos. Only a timely rescue effort by Seleukos and Antigonos stopped the soldiers from lynching the old general (*AEvt* 1.31-33; *Pol* 4.6.4; *Diod* 18.39.1-4). Antipater then managed somehow to silence the young queen and commenced with partitioning the empire among the officers, ensuring he had control of Macedonia and Greece, while giving Antigonos “supreme command of Asia”. He also entrusted the joint-kings to Antigonos, but Kassander distrusted Antigonos, and Antipater had to carry out a clever ploy to sneak away with the joint-kings and a large amount of treasure from Antigonos on their way home from Syria (*Diod* 18.39.4-7, 19.29.3; *AEvt* 1.34-8, 1.40-4). Antipater and his army had to fight a series of battles and assault a number of cities in Asia Minor held by Perdikkans and royalists on their return journey (cf. the “Göteborg” palimpsest). On the way back to Macedon in 319 he took ill, and before he died he appointed Polyperchon as the new regent and as the guardian of the joint-kings, much to his son Kassander’s consternation. He died a short time after reaching Macedonia (*Diod* 18.48).

### **Kassander**

Kassander was the second or third son of Antipater, born no later than 354 BCE (*AEvt* 1.14.; *Diod* 18-39.7, 48.5.; *Jus* 13.4.18.; *Ath* 1.18a). It is possible he was born tubercular, and that he was of frail build because of it. He did not join his peers on Alexander the Great’s Asian campaign, and is first mentioned visiting the king in Babylon in 324 to answer for allegations of mismanagement levelled against his father (*PluM* 180f.; *PluA* 74.2-6). After Alexander’s death, Kassander returned to Macedonia, but is not mentioned participating during the Lamian War. His next appearance is at the Triparadeisos conference, where he received the position of *chiliarchos* of the cavalry of the army, a largely meaningless title at this point. He was evidently mistrustful of Antigonos, and convinced his father to bring both joint-kings back to Macedonia, instead of giving up custody of one of them to Antigonos (*Diod* 18.39.7.; *AEvt* 1.38, 1.42). When Antipater died and transferred the regency and guardianship of the joint-kings over to Polyperchon, Kassander took it as a personal affront, believing he should inherit his father’s titles and authority (*Diod* 18.48.4-5, 49.1-3). He organized a rebellion against Polyperchon, enlisting the help of Adea-Eurydike beforehand, along with considerable elements of the Macedonian nobility (*Diod* 18.49.1-2, 54.1-2.; *PluE* 12.1.; *PluPh* 31.1, 32.1). He fought a brilliant campaign against Polyperchon in Greece after receiving military support from Antigonos and allied Greek city-states, and after Polyperchon’s failed attempt at enlisted Greek support through his “freedom of the Greeks” proclamation, Kassander gained almost complete control of Greece (*Diod* 18.54.3, 55-56,

68.1, 69.3-4, 74.1-3, 75.1-2; *NepE* 3.2; *Pau* 1.4.1, 11.3). After having been appointed official regent by Adea-Eurydike, he was summoned back to Macedon by the queen in 317 to help defeat Olympias and her Molossian army provided by Aiakides (*Diod* 19.11.1; *Jus* 14.5.8). His Greek allies in the Peloponnese reacted with shock and confusion at his sudden departure, given the presence of an army under Polyperchon's son nearby (*Diod* 19.35.1). However, he arrived too late to rescue Adea and Arrhidaios, who had been captured and murdered by Olympias by the time Kassander entered Macedonia with his troops. In addition, Olympias murdered Kassander's brother Nikanor and a large number of his supporters in the Macedonian aristocracy (*Diod* 19.11.5-8). He bypassed Polyperchon's army who had taken up position to bar his entry into Macedon, and besieged Olympias and her entourage in the city of Pydna for a good while before Olympias surrendered in 316 (*Diod* 19.35.1-5, 36.1, 49.1-50.5). He had Olympias murdered after putting her through a sham trial in a committee composed of his own troops and supporters (*Pau* 9.7.2; *Pol* 4.11.3; *Diod* 19.51.1-5; *Jus* 14.6.6-12). Shortly after, Kassander married Thessalonikē, daughter of Philip II, possibly leaving her little choice in the matter (*Diod* 19.52.1; *Pau* 9.7.1, 4; *Jus* 14.6.13; *PluPy* 6.3).

By this point he had become effective king in Macedonia, and had in his custody Alexander IV and his mother Rhoxane, whom he kept under close guard in the city of Amphipolis (*Jus* 14.6.13; *Diod* 19.52.4). He had Adea-Eurydike, Arrhidaios and Kynnane buried with royal honours in the former Argead capital of Aigai (*Ath* 4.155a; *Diyllus*, *FGrH* 73 F1; *Diod* 19.52.5). In 309 Kassander ordered the murder of Alexander IV and Rhoxane, and the following year convinced Polyperchon to murder Alexander the Great's illegitimate son Herakles, whom Polyperchon was trying to install as the new king (*Paus* 9.7.2; *Jus* 15.2.3-5). This paved the way for the other powerful Diadochoi, including himself, to proclaim themselves kings, now that the last legitimate males heirs to the throne were all dead (*Jus* 15.2.10-12). The rest of his reign until his death in 297 was dominated by a continuous series of wars with Antigonos and Demetrios as part of an alliance with Lysimachos, Seleukos, and Ptolemy, campaigning in Greece and Asia Minor, before culminating with the Battle of Ipsos in 301. Kassander did not directly take part in this battle, but he sent considerable reinforcements to Seleukos' and Lysimachos' joint army. He died in 297 from tuberculosis or oedema, and was succeeded by his eldest son Philip, possibly the son of his marriage with Kynnane II (as argued in chapter 6.1 in this thesis), but Philip would die a few months later (*Diod* 21.2.1-3; *Jus* 15.4.24, 16.1.1; *PluD* 36.1), the resulting fallout within the Antipatrid

family leading to its destruction at the hands of Lysimachos, Pyrrhos of Epeiros, and Demetrios Poliorketes.

### **Kleopatra**

Kleopatra was born to Olympias and Philip, the only full-blood sibling of Alexander the Great (Ath 13.557c; Diod 16.91.4-6; Jus 13.6.4, 14.1.7). She was in all probability born sometime between 355 and 353. It was at the celebrations of her wedding to Alexander I of Epeiros-Molossia that Philip II was murdered by Pausanias in 336 (Diod 16.91.4-6; Jus 9.6.1-3, 7.7). She had a son Neoptolemos, and a daughter named Kadmeia with Alexander of Epeiros, and became a widow around 332, and exercised powers as regent on behalf of her son Neoptolemos (PluPy 5.11). After Alexander the Great's death in 323 Kleopatra approached the *somatōphylax* Leonnatos with an offer of marriage, either through her own agency or at the behest of her mother. Leonnatos accepted but died in battle against the Thessalians in the Lamian War before the marriage could take place (PluE 3.9; Diod 18.15.3-4). Unperturbed, she went to Sardeis in Lydia to make the same offer to Perdikkas. She was still young enough to have children and her royal blood made her the perfect springboard for any ambitious Diadochi into legitimate kingship (Diod 18.23.1-3; Jus 13.6.4, 6.7, AEvt 1.21). Things became complicated when Perdikkas' intention of marrying her became known to Antipater and Antigonos, and she took up permanent residence in Sardeis. Eumenes served as her go-between and advisor (AEvt 1.26; Diod 18.25.3). After Perdikkas' death Eumenes came to Sardeis to get Kleopatra out from under Antipater's control and to legitimize his position as the leader of the royalist cause. But Kleopatra refused to go with Eumenes, scared of compromising her position with Antipater and Eumenes left for Kappadokia (Jus 14.1.7; PluE 8.6-7). After this Kleopatra remained in Sardeis until 308 when Ptolemy of Egypt made her a marriage offer and despite the fact that she was too old to have children, her status as the only remaining Argead made her a prestigious prize. Antigonos, king of Asia Minor and Syria, snapped up the news and feared the effect such a marriage and had Kleopatra murdered (Diod 20.37.3-6).

### **Kynnane**

Kynnane was the daughter of Philip II and the Illyrian princess Audata-Eurydike, Philip's first or second wife (Ath 13.557b-c; AEvt 1.22). She was born around 358 and accompanied her father on campaign in Illyria around 340 during which she allegedly fought and killed an unnamed Illyrian queen in hand-to-hand combat (Pol 8.60). Shortly after she married

Amyntas, Philip's nephew, and gave birth to a daughter, Adea, after a year or so (*AEvt* 1.22). Amyntas was killed by Alexander after he became king in 336 (*Arr* 1.5.4), and after Alexander left for his anabasis, Kynnane remained unmarried in Macedonia where she raised her daughter in the traditional Illyrian manner (*Ath* 13.560f). After the news of Alexander's death reached Macedonia, Kynnane and Adea left Pella, raised a small body of troops and went over to Asia Minor, avoiding Antipater's attempt to stop her. She planned to have her daughter married to the newly crowned Philip III Arrhidaios. Outside Ephesos she and her retinue were stopped by Perdikkas' brother Alketas and a portion of the royal army. Alketas ordered her to turn back, but she defiantly refused and was murdered by Alketas (*Pol* 8.60; *AEvt* 1.22, 24). Alketas' army mutinied at the murder of the royal princess and demanded that Adea be taken to Philip and the main army. Kynnane's remains was later returned to Macedonia by Kassander and buried with royal honours with or near her daughter's remains at Aigai (*Pol* 8.60; *AEvt* 1.23; *Diod* 19.52.5; *Ath* 4.155a).

### **Olympias**

Olympias, originally named Myrtale or Polyxena (*PluM* 401a-b; *Jus* 9.7.13) was the daughter of the Molossian king Neoptolemos and the sister of the later Molossian/Epirote king Alexander I (*Jus* 7.6.10-11; *Diod* 19.51.6, 19.72.1). She claimed descent from Pyrrhos, son of Achilles, on her mother's side (*Theo FGrH* 115 F355). She married Philip II of Macedonia in 357 after they met on the island of Samothrace, allegedly while being inducted into the Mysteries (*PluA* 2.2; *Cur* 8.1.26; *Jus* 7.6.10-11; *Ath* 13.557c). She had two children with Philip, Alexander who was born in July 356, and Kleopatra who was born later, possibly two years after Alexander (*Diod* 16.91.4; *Ath* 13.557c). Since Alexander's birth coincided with the news of Philip's sponsored chariot winning the race at the Olympics and the defeat of a hostile Illyrian army, it is likely it was at this point that Myrtale changed her name to Olympias (*PluA* 3.8; *Jus* 12.16.6). She was in all likelihood a devotee to exotic religious cults and in particular the cult dedicated to Dionysos (*PluA* 2.8-9; *Ath* 13.560f, 14.659f-660a). She was quite arrogant, and a domineering and interfering mother (*PluA* 9.5, 39.13; *Cur* 5.2.22, 9.6.26), but had a close and warm relationship with her son Alexander (*Arr* 6.1.4-5; *Cur* 10.5.30). Not much is known about her relationship with her daughter. She is accused by Plutarch for giving Arrhidaios, Philip's son by Philinna, poison or drugs which made him mentally deficient. He was in all likelihood born with a mental disability and Plutarch's accusations are only intended to incriminate Olympias (*PluA* 77.8).

She spent considerable time in Molossia while she and her son was in exile following the falling out between Alexander and Philip during the latter's marriage celebration with Kleopatra, daughter of Attalos (Arr 3.6.5; Ath 13.557d; PluA 9.6-11; Jus 9.7.3-5). We know little of her activities in Macedonia while Alexander was on his anabasis, but we do know that they kept up regular correspondence through letters (Diod 17.32.1; PluA 39.7-8; Arr 6.1.4-5). She withdrew back to Molossia after quarrelling with Antipater at some point after 330 and exchanged places with her daughter Kleopatra who had been acting as regent for her young son after her husband, Neoptolemos (the younger) of Molossia had died (Pau 1.11.3; PluA 68.4-5; Arr 7.12.6-7; Diod 18.49.4; Jus 12.14.3; Hyp 25). After her son's death in 323 she quickly moved to ensure the survival of her grandson and the future of (her part of) the dynasty. She convinced Kleopatra to offer herself in marriage to first Leonnatos and then Perdikkas after the former was killed in the Lamian War (*AEvt* 1.21; Jus 13.6.4-5, 11-13). After this failed and Perdikkas became beset on all sides by enemies, and her daughter had been put in house-arrest in Sardeis, she was approached by the regent Polyperchon in 319 to take over the role as *epemeletai*, guardian, of her grandson Alexander (Diod 18.49.4, 57.2). She carried on correspondence with Eumenes while still in Molossia, and tried to use her political influence to order around generals in Macedonia and Greece (Diod 18.58.2-3, 65.1-2). With the assistance of her nephew King Aikides and his Molossian army, Olympias made the crossing from Molossia into Macedonia in autumn 317. There she met Adea-Eurydike in command of the Macedonian home army at Euia, where the Macedonian army allegedly upon seeing Olympias deserted Adea and the young queen and King Philip Arrhidaios was taken prisoner (Pau 1.11.3-4; Ath 13.560f; Jus 14.5.1-10; Diod 19.11.1-8). After returning to Pella she had Philip and Adea walled up and then Philip murdered. She forced Adea to end her own life, but this act of highhandedness lost Olympias her support among the Macedonians, in addition to her purge of opponents among the Macedonian nobility (Diod 19.11.5-9, 35.1; Pau 1.11.4). After Kassander returned to Macedonia with his army, Olympias along with Alexander IV, Thessalonikē, Rhoxane and the rest of her retinue, was forced to seek refuge in the city of Pydna which Kassander then placed under siege (Diod 19.35.5, 36.1-2; Jus 14.6.2-4). After waiting in vain for reinforcements from Polyperchon and Aikides and at supplies' end, Olympias surrendered to Kassander on the guarantee of personal safety. However, Kassander broke his word and had Olympias condemned to death by a body of Macedonian nobles and soldiers. Olympias was killed by relatives of the victims of her purges (Diod 19.49.1-51; Jus 14.6.5-12).

### **Philip (III) Arrhidaios**

Arrhidaios was the son of Philip II by his fourth wife Philinna (Ath 13.557c; Jus 9.8.2, 13.2.11). He was born mentally and physically challenged (PluA 10.2; Diod 18.2.2; Jus 13.2.11, 14.5.2; PluM 337d). The sources do not mention him at all during Alexander the Great's reign, but he was in Babylon when Alexander died in summer of 323 (Cur 10.7.2; Jus 13.2.8). He was proclaimed king and given the name Philip by the mutinous army who opposed the generals' appointment of Alexander's new born "half-barbarian" son as king of the empire (Cur 10.7.1-7; Diod 18.2.2; Pau 1.6.2; AEvT 1.1). He was kept as a puppet and mouthpiece by the regent Perdikkas (Diod 18.22.1; PluM 791e) and accompanied him on the campaigns in Kappadokia and Egypt (Paus 1.6.3; Jus 13.6.10). He was married to his niece Adea in 321, possibly at Sardeis (AEvT 1.23; Pol 8.60). After Perdikkas' murder and the tumultuous Triparadeisos conference in 320, he was brought back to Macedon by Antipater (AEvT 1.45). His wife Adea-Eurydike used him as a way to legitimize her political actions, using him a puppet (AEvT 1.31-3; Jus 14.5.1-4). After the Battle of Euia in 317, Arrhidaios and his wife were captured by Olympias. Shortly after capture, Arrhidaios was murdered by a group of Thracian assassins sent by Olympias (Diod 19.11.2-5; Pau 1.11.3-4; Jus 14.5.10).

### **Polyperchon**

Polyperchon was born in Tymphaia between 390 and 380, and was a contemporary of Philip II, Antipater, and Antigonos (Arr 2.12.2, 3.11.9). He was a general in Alexander's army during the entirety of the Asian *anabasis*, but does not seem to have distinguished himself particularly. He was sent home with the veterans led by Krateros who were dismissed at Opis in 324 (Jus 12.12.8; Arr 7.12.4). Krateros had been appointed to take over the viceroyalty of Macedon and Greece from Antipater, and Polyperchon was Krateros' second-in-command. He helped Antipater and Leonnatos defeat the Greeks in the Lamian War (Diod 18.16.4). He was allied with Antipater and Antigonos in the short war against Perdikkas. He was appointed *epimeletes* of the joint-kings and regent by Antipater at the latter's deathbed in 319 (Diod 18.49.1-3, 47.4, 48.4; PluPh 31.1; AEvT 1.38). This led to Kassander raising his banner in revolt, believing the regency should have gone to him. Polyperchon, originally with a large army, fought a very ineffective campaign against Kassander in 318 and 317, and inexpertly tried to enlist the help of the Greek cities, which ultimately drove them further away (Diod 18.55.2-57.1, 18.70-1; Pol 4.14, 4.11.2). He offered Olympias the wardship of her grandson Alexander IV in 319 (Diod 18.49.4, 57.2), but having lost most of his troops, either to battlefield losses or attrition while on campaign, he likely retired to Pydna with his remaining



troops. He failed to block Kassander and his army in 316, who was responding to the call for reinforcements from Adea, when it arrived from Greece, and was forced to retreat (Diod 19.35.3). After Olympias' death, Polyperchon returned to Greece to continue his resistance against Kassander, who was by 316 clearly the *princeps* in Macedonia. A falling out between Antigonos and Kassander in 315 saw Polyperchon joining Antigonos against Kassander, and he continued to fight on with military support provided by Antigonos from Asia (Diod 19.57.5, 60.1, 61.1-3, 62.5). After a long series of back and forth, Polyperchon went into a sort of retirement by 311, his son taking over military command in Greece, but in 308 he came out of retirement and attempted to place Alexander the Great's illegitimate son Herakles on the Macedonian throne (Diod 20.20). However, Kassander convinced his old adversary Polyperchon to murder Herakles, in return receiving a pardon and the chance to serve Kassander. Polyperchon agreed, and had Herakles killed (Diod 20.28.2). Polyperchon's fate is unknown, the last record of him is fighting against Ptolemy's footholds in the Peloponnese in the aftermath of the Ipsos campaign in 301 (Diod 20.100.6, 103.5-7).

### **Thessalonikē**

Half-sister of Alexander the Great, daughter of Nikesipolis of Pherai and Philip II, she was most likely born sometime around 344 (Ath 13.557c; Pau 9.7.3; Diod 19.35.5, 52.1). Nothing is known about her life before she is mentioned as part of Olympias' retinue at Pydna in 316, apart from the fact that her mother apparently died shortly after her birth, and that Olympias apparently took on the role as Thessalonikē's guardian (Diod 19.35.5; Jus 14.6.13). After the death of Olympias she was either convinced or forced to marry Kassander (Diod 19.52.1, 61.2). Kassander would later found the eponymous city in her name. They had possibly three sons together: Philip, Alexander and Antipater (PluD 36.1-2; PluPy 6.3), though as outlined in Ch. 6.1, Philip might have been Kassander's son by Kynnane II. Her career as Macedonian queen is equally unclear as her past before 316, but she was killed around 296 by her son Antipater as she apparently favoured his younger brother Alexander after Kassander's and Philip's deaths (PluD 36.1; PluPy 6.3; Diod 21.7.1; Jus 16.1.1-4).