Table 1. Rusbridger’s 12 reasons

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Reason** | **Argument** |
| *The nature of consent* | ‘What role do we citizens have in consenting to what’s going to be done? Are we allowed a knowledge of what’s going to happen to our emails, our text messages, our photographs … the intrusive capacities of this technology? … [I]t may be that we’re prepared to give away that privacy in return for security, but is there a meaningful nature of consent?’ |
| *The role of parliaments* | The British Parliament does not have sufficient understanding of the technology, of their having rejected this type of data collection the one time it was actually offered for them to vote on, and their not being told that it was already being used and continued to be used since. Is there a meaningful form of Parliamentary control over governments’ digital intelligence practices? |
| *Legality across technologies* | If the police were ‘suddenly [given] powers to come into our houses and seize our papers, we would be horrified … [W]here is it written that the digital world is to be treated separately from the physical world?’ Which assumptions about the physical world are taken to apply to the digital? Is an email to be seen and treated the same as a letter in a sealed envelope, requiring a warrant issued by a judge on the basis of probable cause before police can open it? Or is it equivalent to a postcard left lying in the open, or a loud conversation in a public space? |
| *The role of the private sector* | Governmental digital surveillance ‘piggybacks’ on private sector telecom and internet service providers. How many went beyond what they were legally required to do, and do the customers and shareholders of these companies have the right to know how their information is being used and whether that’s on a legal or a voluntary basis? |
| *Encryption and the integrity of the Web* | This aspect concerns ‘all our bank statements, all our medical records, all our emails … [I]f what has happened is that the NSA has gone around creating trapdoors and weaknesses in the encryption of the Web itself, then the system that we all use has been compromised, because you can’t produce trapdoors that are used by the good guys but not by the bad guys.’ |
| *Risks to the digital economy* | Potential impacts on Western technology companies of the rest of the world thinking that these technologies are being used as spyware. Other economic dangers may be added, such as the potential harms for businesses of industrial spies using the same ‘trapdoors and weaknesses’ that government intel agencies such as the NSA have created. |
| *International relations* | Is it OK to be bugging the president’s phone of a country that is supposedly a friend? |
| *Privacy* | According to Rusbridger, ‘The collection of billions of events per day is the most staggering potential invasion of privacy in history’. This concerns not only communications content, but also ‘metadata’ - the content-accompanying technical information that shows who has been in contact with whom, where, and for how long. Because ‘[c]ontent is often confusing and troublesome, “metadata” is the stuff you want. But they treat metadata as something you don’t need a warrant to get a look at.’ |
| *Confidentiality* | Similar but not identical to privacy, confidentiality refers to certain privileged forms of communication, such as between doctor and patient, lawyer and client, priest and parishioner, or journalist and source. ‘Anybody who has a confidential relationship, or thinks [Rusbridger’s emphasis] they have a confidential relationship, is going to have to change the way they communicate and learn about encryption.’ |
| *Proportionality* | This hinges on *effectiveness*. The costs, including social costs, of this massive endeavor, can only be defended if results are reasonable in proportion to those costs. And yet, the effectiveness of the NSA mass surveillance programs and of similar programs elsewhere has been an ‘evidence-free zone’ [Rusbridger’s term]. As with truthfulness, this impinges critically on consent and the role of parliaments. |
| *Information security* | The accumulation of whistleblowers from the NSA data collection programs and related programs shows that ‘even the most secure databases in the world are evidently not secure.’ Can we trust these agencies with all our most personal and sensitive data? What further risks to our data integrity and security do these massive databases represent, even beyond the invasion of our privacy that the databases in themselves may constitute? |

Figure 1: Numbers of articles in Norwegian print news, 2013, found in A-Tekst/Retriever using search terms ‘NSA OR Snowden’

Table 2: Norwegian print news article modalities re: surveillance and Snowden, June 2013.

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Referring to | Positive | Neutral  | Negative |
| Surveillance | 11 | 180 | 78 |
| Snowden | 31 | 230 |  8 |

Table 3: ‘Rusbridger reasons’ mentioned in Norwegian national and regional print news coverage of NSA and Snowden leaks, June 2013.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Rusbridger Reason | 1 Consent | 2 Role ofParliam. | 3 Legality | 4Role ofPr. Sector | 5Encryp-tion | 6Risks to Dig. Econ. | 7Internat’lRelations | 8Truth-fullness | 9Privacy | 10Confiden-tiality | 11Propor-tionality | 12 InfoSecurity |
| Number of mentions | 37 | 20 | 49 | 61 |  - | 12 | 64 | 22 | 78 |  7 | 32 | 18 |

Table 4: Number of ‘Rusbridger reasons’ mentioned per article of NSA OR Snowden coverage in Norwegian national and regional print news, June 2013

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Number of ‘Rusbridger reasons’ mentioned |  0 (of these, number focused on Snowden as person) |  1 |  2 |  3 |  4  |  5 |  6  |  7 or more |
| Number of articles | 120 (88) | 45 | 43 | 26 | 19 | 14 |  5 |  3 |

Table 5. Issue clusters

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Relationship to Big Data debates | Cluster name | ‘Rusbridger reasons’ within cluster |
| Core issues in current Big Data debates | Framing | The nature of consentPrivacyConfidentialityLegality across technologiesThe role of the private sector |
| Overarching issues of technology regulation | Regulation | The role of ParliamentsInternational relations |
| Overarching issues of technology regulation | Measurement | TruthfulnessProportionality |
| Peripheral issues | Management | Encryption and the integrity of the WebRisks to digital economyInformation security |

Figure 2: Numbers of articles in Norwegian print news, 2014, found in A-Tekst/Retriever using search terms ‘Snowden OR NSA’

Table 6: ‘Rusbridger reasons’ mentioned in Norwegian national and regional print news coverage of NSA and Snowden leaks, June 2014.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Rusbridger Reason | 1 Consent | 2 Role ofParliam. | 3 Legality | 4Role ofPr. Sector | 5Encryp-tion | 6Risks to Dig. Econ. | 7Internat’lRelations | 8Truth-fullness | 9Privacy | 10Confiden-tiality | 11Propor-tionality | 12 InfoSecurity |
| Number of mentions |  1 |  - |  3 |  2 |  1 |  - |  9 |  2 |  6 |  - |  - |  1 |

Table 7: Number of ‘Rusbridger reasons’ mentioned per article of NSA or Snowden leak coverage in Norwegian national and regional print news, June 2014

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Number of ‘Rusbridger reasons’ mentioned |  0 (of these, number focused on Snowden as person) |  1 |  2 |  3 |  4  |  5 |  6  |  7 or more |
| Number of articles | 58 (48) |  9 |  8 |  - |  - |  - |  - |  - |

Figure 3: Numbers of articles in Norwegian print news, 2015, found in A-Tekst/Retriever using search terms ‘Snowden OR NSA’

Table 8: ‘Rusbridger reasons’ mentioned in Norwegian national and regional print news coverage of NSA and Snowden leaks, June 2015.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Rusbridger Reason | 1 Consent | 2 Role ofParliam. | 3 Legality | 4Role ofPr. Sector | 5Encryp-tion | 6Risks to Dig. Econ. | 7Internat’lRelations | 8Truth-fullness | 9Privacy | 10Confiden-tiality | 11Propor-tionality | 12 InfoSecurity |
| Number of mentions |  7 |  7 |  24 |  6 |  3 |  1 |  16 |  6 |  40 |  5 |  6 |  10 |

Table 9: Number of ‘Rusbridger reasons’ mentioned per article of NSA or Snowden leak coverage in Norwegian national and regional print news, June 2015

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Number of ‘Rusbridger reasons’ mentioned |  0 (of these, number focused on Snowden as person) |  1 |  2 |  3 |  4  |  5 |  6  |  7 or more |
| Number of articles | 43 (37) |  45 |  10  |  8 |  3 |  6 |  - |  - |