

**The Opposition Deficit in EU Accountability:
Evidence from over 20 years of plenary debate in four member states**

CHRISTIAN RAUH
christian.rauh@wzb.eu

WZB Berlin Social Science Center

PIETER DE WILDE
pieter.dewilde@ntnu.no

NTNU Trondheim

Uncorrected authors' preprint! For quoting and citation please refer to the final version as published
in the *European Journal of Political Research*: <http://dx.doi.org//10.1111/1475-6765.12222>

Abstract: Debates about the EU's democratic legitimacy put national parliaments into the spotlight. Do they enhance democratic accountability by offering visible debates and electoral choice about multilevel governance? To support such accountability, we argue, saliency of EU affairs in the plenary ought to be responsive to developments in EU governance, has to be linked to decision-making moments, and should feature a balance between government and opposition. The recent literature discusses various partisan incentives that support or undermine these criteria, but analyses integrating these arguments are rare. We provide a novel comparative perspective by studying the patterns of public EU emphasis in more than 2.5 million plenary speeches from the German *Bundestag*, the British *House of Commons*, the Dutch *Tweede Kamer* and the Spanish *Congreso de los Diputados* over a prolonged period from 1991 to 2015. We document that parliamentary actors are by and large responsive to EU authority and its exercise where especially intergovernmental moments of decision-making spark plenary EU salience. But the salience of EU issues is mainly driven by government parties, decreases in election time and is negatively related to public Euroscepticism. We conclude that national parliaments have only partially succeeded in enhancing EU accountability and suffer from an opposition deficit in particular.

Key words: Accountability, European Integration, National Parliaments, Saliency, Text Analysis

Acknowledgements: This work profited from discussions with Pavel Šatra, Niklas Mäkinen, Alexandros Tokhi and Jan Schwalbach (who also managed the lion share of scraping and text cleaning for the Spanish case). The research benefitted greatly from participation in the PADEMIA (Parliamentary Democracy in Europe) European Union Lifelong Learning Programme. We are very grateful for constructive comments from Liesbet Hooghe, Matthias Koenig-Archibugi and the three EJPR reviewers. Thanks also to the organizers and participants of the Global Governance colloquium at the WZB; the panel 'Strategies of Politicizing Europe' at the Conference of Europeanists (CES), 14-16 April 2016, Philadelphia; the EUENGAGE Amsterdam Text Analysis Conference, 21-22 June 2016; and the LSE seminar on 'International Institutions, Law and Ethics', 22 February 2017. A replication archive is available at www.christian-rauh.eu/data-and-resources.

Introduction

European integration has come to affect most policy areas in European Union (EU) member states, ranging from classic supranational issues like competition and agriculture, to environment and even ‘core state powers’ such as taxation (Genschel and Jachtenfuchs 2014; Börzel 2005). The transfer and diffusion of political competences to levels beyond the nation state is accompanied by intensifying public debates as citizens and their representatives contest both the nature of policies and who should have authority to enact them (De Wilde et al. 2016; Rauh 2016; Hutter and Grande 2014; Statham and Trenz 2013; Hooghe and Marks 2009). This politicization of European integration highlights the challenge of establishing the democratic accountability of multi-level governance.

In this regard, the recent literature has focused on the role of national parliaments in EU governance (Auel and Höing 2015; Cooper 2012; Karlas 2012; Winzen 2012; Raunio 2009; Tans et al. 2007). Many scholars consider their active involvement in multi-level governance paramount to support democratic accountability of the Union (Raunio 2011; O'Brennan and Raunio 2007; Kiiver 2006). Virtually all parliaments have increased their formal oversight capacities to monitor their government's actions in Brussels (Karlas 2012; Winzen 2012). However, much of this control is exercised behind closed doors. Without making oversight transparent, the government might ‘give account’ (Bovens 2007) for its actions in Brussels, but parliamentarians are not giving account to citizens. Picking this up, the recent literature emphasizes the communicative function of national parliaments in EU affairs (Auel and Raunio 2014b; Auel 2007). When and why do parliamentarians offer public debates about the powers and policies of the EU?

This literature has produced valuable insights, but also leaves important gaps. On the one hand, it rarely links the ‘how and when’ of parliamentary communication of EU affairs explicitly to the normative principle of accountability. Existing empirical research has focused more on mapping and explaining parliamentary debate without asking whether the observed patterns render Europe's multi-level polity more accountable (Auel and Raunio 2014a; Closa and Maatsch 2014; Wendler 2013). On the other hand, extant research mainly looks at distinct events or key policies of European integration only. We know how national parliaments debate the EU budget (De Wilde 2014), Treaty change (Wendler 2014), or the Euro crisis (Wonka 2016 ; Closa and Maatsch 2014). We also know much about the conditions under which EU topics become a formal agenda item

(Auel et al. 2016; Auel and Raunio 2014a). But only selecting episodes that are about European integration in the first place does not fully acknowledge the nature of multi-level governance (Hooghe and Marks 2001). Against the broad scope of today's EU powers, parliamentarians may highlight political opportunities and constraints of multi-level decision-making in each and every public debate, even if these debates have not been flagged as primarily EU-related.¹

Thus our ambition in this article is twofold. First, we contribute to the call for a disciplinary 'rethink [of] what democratic accountability is all about' (Olsen 2016: 16) by theoretically assessing strategic incentives for partisan communication of EU affairs against normatively derived criteria for publicly accountable governance.² Second, we empirically capture and analyze the salience of EU affairs as a necessary condition for accountability across the whole spectrum of publically visible debates in domestic plenaries. Employing state of the art web scraping and text mining methods, we trace and explain variation in a time- and language consistent measure of term-level references to the EU in more than 2.5 million MP speeches. This presents the full corpora of plenary debates in the German *Bundestag*, the UK *House of Commons*, the Dutch *Tweede Kamer* and the Spanish *Congreso de los Diputados* in periods from 1991 to 2015. Hence, we assess the degree to which parliaments enhance the accountability of the EU across different periods of European integration, across different configurations of domestic partisan competition, and across weak and strong parliaments facing more and less Eurosceptic electorates.

The following section develops three criteria along which salience in parliamentary debate would enhance EU accountability – responsiveness to EU governance, linkage to actual decision-making moments, and government-opposition balance. These criteria are contrasted with hypotheses on strategic partisan incentives to push or dampen EU-related debates. Section three outlines data collection efforts and statistical procedures. Our major results are presented in section four. We find that EU references on the plenary floor increase systematically with the consecutive, treaty-based transfer of political authority to the EU, as well as its exercise through major policies and the 138 European Council summits during our investigation period. But we also find that EU emphasis is

¹ Consider, for example, a debate that has the preservation of a national park as the agenda item. While this may initially appear to be a non-European debate, MPs can easily make reference to the EU's Natura 2000 policy and Habitat Directive, including all the decision-making processes and EU institutions involved in making them.

² From here on, we refer to 'accountability' as shortcut for 'public democratic accountability'.

mainly driven by government parties, is hardly affected by EP elections, decreases during national election campaigns, and is negatively associated with a more Eurosceptic public opinion. We accordingly conclude that national parliamentarians have only partially succeeded in enhancing EU accountability. Communication of EU affairs in domestic plenaries is responsive to supranational governance, but it falls short in terms of providing balanced debates that offer electoral choice.

Emphasising the EU in domestic plenary debates – normative and strategic expectations

The EU is generally credited with three channels of delegation and accountability (Norris 1997). Through each of these channels, citizens delegate powers to representatives, who then delegate to governments and agencies. To make sure these ‘agents’ act in the best interest of their ‘principals’, elected politicians employ a range of scrutiny mechanisms to hold government to account while civil society organizations engage in ‘fire alarm mechanisms’ (Strøm et al. 2003; Pollack 1997). Citizens, in turn, hold these intermediaries to account through donations, membership and elections. In the first, supranational channel, citizens directly elect Members of the European Parliament which subsequently hold sway over the European Commission and act as co-legislators with the Council of Ministers. In the second, direct channel, citizens are represented in EU decision-making through the civil society organizations they are members or donators of, who then lobby the European institutions or organize citizen initiatives.

But for the wider citizenry the third, national channel remains the most important one. Citizens are represented in EU governance by their national government, which is held accountable by the national parliament (Strøm et al. 2003; Bergman 2000). Governments are involved in all important decisions, from Treaty change in the European Council, to the appointment of the European Commission, to day-to-day governance in the ordinary legislative procedure. In an era of ‘new intergovernmentalism’, member state governments appear to have further strengthened their control over EU governance recently (Bickerton et al. 2015; Schimmelfennig 2014). Accordingly, citizens and public media direct their attention and demands for policy mostly through this third channel (e.g. Koopmans 2007).

To assess how well this channel of accountability works in normative terms, we need to differentiate the concept of *accountability*. On the one hand it refers to institutions and procedures that guarantee

that agents are punishable if they ignore their principals' preferences. On the other hand, it refers to the act of *account giving*, a practice in which the agent communicates to the principals what it does and why, trying to argue that it makes good use of its delegated powers (Bovens 2007). The one element of accountability cannot function without the other. Without institutionalized accountability, it is unlikely that account giving would happen and when it does, it remains without consequences. Similarly, having institutions for accountability in place without the actual act of account giving does not suffice either (Papadopoulos 2010: 1034). Whether or not principals maintain, alter or retract their delegation of powers would in this case be random and unjustified.

National parliaments are institutionally accountable to voters and also have largely enacted institutions for holding their executives to account in EU affairs (Karlás 2012; Winzen 2012). In this article we thus focus on the act of account giving. Extant oversight institutions become democratically meaningful only if MPs also make their EU stances publically visible. In this vein, plenary debates are a key venue for understanding whether MPs communicate the opportunities and constraints of EU affairs to their domestic audiences (Rauh 2015; Auel and Raunio 2014b; Gattermann et al. 2013: 15-6). Not all plenary debates about the EU make it to the news (De Wilde 2014) but unlike in committee meetings behind closed doors, MPs speaking on the plenary floor know that anything they say can be heard by the wider electorate. In this vein, we focus on the *salience of EU affairs*, i.e. the amount of references to the polity, politics and policies of the EU in plenary debates. This quantitative amount of EU emphasis is arguably not a sufficient, but in our view a necessary condition for the generation of public accountability. Without disqualifying the need to analyze the qualitative contents of public arguments (cf. Wendler 2016), we consider it necessary to understand whether and how parliamentary representatives debate the opportunities and constraints of European integration at all. So, which patterns of plenary EU salience would be most conducive to furthering EU accountability?

We argue that *responsiveness to EU governance* is a first criterion deriving from this understanding of accountability. That is, raising salience of EU affairs ought to be substantively, significantly and positively related to the institutional basis of EU governance and the extent to which the EU exercises its authority. Without such responsiveness, we would face 'uncoupling of governance networks from the democratic circuit' (Papadopoulos 2010: 1034). The more competencies are pooled within the EU framework, the more EU influence on domestic affairs ought to be publically discussed within national parliaments. In this view, democratic accountability is not binary. Rather, it

presents a gradual scope. In today's world of global and European governance, account giving should follow the pattern of where – at national, European or global level – executive decision-making powers rest.

To avoid errors in the 'attribution of responsibility' (Schmitter 2004: 58), parliamentary EU salience should furthermore be positively connected to major moments of executive decisions and electoral choice. MPs should give account for their actions in office, ideally providing an adequate overview of these actions and the contexts in which they took place. Otherwise, citizens' ability to pass judgement is hampered by lack of information (Bovens 2007: 450). It follows that accountability is best served when the salience of EU affairs during election campaigns mirrors the salience of EU affairs outside of these events, so that the importance and relevance of the EU for politics ascribed by parliamentarians during their term matches what is communicated to citizens during the time of reckoning. But non-electoral opportunities for citizens to pass judgements matter as well. Even if they may not be voted out of office then, costs of accountability on international affairs could still come in the form of reputational loss (Grant and Keohane 2005). Hence, major decision-making moments in EU affairs like Council summits and the appointment of a new Commission ought to be accompanied by higher EU salience in the plenary as the government gives account for its actions when they take place and MPs communicate their position on these actions to citizens at the same time. We therefore propose *linkage to decision-making moments* as second criterion for the generation of EU accountability through national parliaments.

Finally, linking accountability to electoral choice highlights that conflicts in parliaments tend to be between government and opposition (but see Puntsher Riekmann and Wydra 2013; King 1976). If only government or opposition raise EU issues, citizens' assessment of which party they find closest to their own preferences on EU affairs would be lopsided. The accountability perspective, thus, treats all MPs as agents, not just the government. To serve accountability best, a *balance between government and opposition* would guarantee that all parliamentary actors justify their actions and preferences according to similar logics at the same time. This provides citizens with an optimal opportunity to pass judgement and decide whom to vote for in the next election if the EU or EU policies are an important concern. Notwithstanding differences in the arguments made, the amount of EU emphasis should respond to EU governance and major moments of decision-making – criteria one and two – in balanced ways.

The initial aim of the subsequent analyses is thus evaluative, figuring out whether patterns in the parliamentary practice of raising EU salience are conducive to accountability in terms of responsiveness, linkage and balance. To best assess the extent to which our criteria are met in practice, however, we also contrast them with positive theory from the literatures on EU politicization, partisan competition, and legislative-executive relationships. This helps to clarify the incentives and disincentives MPs face in meeting these normative criteria of EU accountability.

With regard to responsiveness to EU governance, the politicization literature conceptualises the growing public salience and controversiality of EU affairs as a direct product of political integration itself (De Wilde and Zürn 2012; Zürn et al. 2012; Schmitter 1969). The basic expectation is that awareness about the promises and pitfalls of governance beyond the nation state follows the actual shift of political authority to higher levels. With more competences delegated to the European Commission, with more national sovereignty pooled in the EU Council and the European Parliament, and with a broadening policy scope of EU activity, more and more constituencies are directly affected. These constituencies will increasingly mobilize and voice their EU-related demands and ask for corresponding justifications. Political elites – including domestic MPs – have an incentive to meet this demand, be it for policy- or for office-seeking motivations. Given that EU authority has increased with each and every treaty revision over the last decades (Biesenbender 2011), the baseline expectation is that we observe corresponding, stepwise level effects in plenary EU salience:

H1: The plenary salience of EU affairs increases with the progressive delegation and pooling of sovereignty through EU treaties (*authority transfer*)

But this relationship also depends on various ‘discursive opportunities’ (De Wilde and Zürn 2012) – which is directly related to the accountability criterion of linkage to decision-making moments. Such opportunities are generated where the EU actually exercises its treaty-based authority. We know that specific supranational policies provide crystallizing points for debates in national parliaments (Miklin 2014). EU directives are particularly likely to matter in this regard as they present the most encompassing and politically far-reaching policies that have to be formally transposed into domestic law. But MPs who wish to enhance EU accountability might chip in even earlier and show responsiveness to the initiatives the European Commission proposes. We thus expect that:

H2: The plenary salience of EU affairs increases with the number of directives and legislative initiatives adopted at the supranational level (*authority exercise*)

Societal demand for public justification of EU affairs is furthermore likely to rise when new supranational priorities are set in intergovernmental Council negotiations and inaugurations of a new European executive. Mass media also report disproportionately on such executive events, which have high news value due to importance, suspense and inter-personal conflict (Boomgaarden et al. 2013). This effect should be even stronger where such meetings directly address further authority transfers to the EU. Where primary EU law has to be ratified in the domestic arena, the societal demand for public information and justification should be strongest. Demand for political justifications will be particularly high when citizens are explicitly asked to vote on European matters. We therefore expect that MPs communicate about the EU when elections to the European Parliament and domestic referenda about EU issues are on the agenda for both normative and empirical reasons. The empirical literature on EU politicization indicates clear spikes in visibility and mobilization indicators around major EU summits, treaty ratifications, EP elections and EU referenda (Rauh 2016: Chap. 2; Uba and Ugglå 2011; Boomgaarden et al. 2010):

H3: The plenary salience of EU affairs increases around EU Council summits, inaugurations of a new European Commission, EU treaty ratifications, EU-related referenda, and EP elections (*executive events*)

While these hypotheses are conducive to the accountability criteria of responsiveness and linkage to decision-making moments, the literature on strategic partisan competition suggests MPs have incentives that are detrimental to supplying normatively desirable EU accountability. This literature sees parties as selectively emphasizing issues that are beneficial given their reputation among voters (Sides 2006; Petrocik 1996; Budge and Farlie 1983; Stokes 1963). Since MPs' careers depend on the fate of their parties, we need to control for the salience partisan campaigns ascribe to the EU.

'Issue ownership' theory, however, predicts that the criterion of a balanced supply of debates about EU affairs by government and opposition is unlikely to be met. On the one hand, government parties have to engage in collective decisions with other governments, the European Commission and the European Parliament. This often leads to compromise solutions that do not reflect original partisan preferences. On the other hand, citizens tend to be more sceptical about collective European decision-making than political elites (Hooghe and Marks 2009). For both reasons, a vote-

seeking government party has much to lose from emphasizing EU affairs. Opposition parties, in contrast, can capitalize on discrepancies between governmental action in the EU and voter preferences (Wonka 2016; Green-Pedersen and Mortensen 2010; Green-Pedersen 2007). It is thus not surprising to find parties in opposition to be critical of European integration and campaigning on this issue, while they turn more supportive and quiet once they are elected into office (Sitter 2001). Applying this logic to plenary debates means that:

H4: Parties in domestic opposition contribute more to raising the salience of EU affairs in plenary than parties in government (*opposition advantage*)

The electoral (dis-)advantages of raising EU salience, furthermore, vary not only across parties. Public opinion on EU membership differs strongly over time and countries (Boomgaarden et al. 2011; Eichenberg and Dalton 2007). Facing a more Europhile electorate, the opposition has much less to gain from attacking the government in EU affairs. In the face of a more Eurosceptic population, electoral considerations should lead to more intense parliamentary scrutiny of EU affairs making the government-opposition dynamic more pronounced (Auel et al. 2016; Raunio 2005; Saalfeld 2005):

H5: Differences in the plenary salience of EU affairs among government and opposition parties increase when public opinion on European integration becomes more negative (*popular Euroscepticism*)

Given the electoral risks of emphasizing EU affairs, office-seeking MPs may also undermine the criterion of decision-making linkage by sticking to more well-worn paths of domestic partisan competition. Other political issues like unemployment and immigration might be much higher on the political agenda (Hoeglinger 2016; Moravcsik 2006) and MPs might try to emphasize them without explicitly linking to the EU in election time. Thus, we expect that:

H6: The plenary salience of EU affairs is lower during national election campaigns than in other periods of the electoral cycle (*crowding-out*)

Finally we have to note possible linkages between institutionalized EU accountability and the practice of public account giving (Auel et al. 2016). In building up institutional capacities to control governmental action in EU affairs some parliaments have gone further than others (Auel et al. 2015; Karlas 2012; Winzen 2012). It is so far little explored whether formal powers, such as mandating

ministers for negotiations in Brussels or questioning them in specialized EU committees, translate into a higher *public* accountability. On the one hand, MPs may raise the salience of issues on which they can exert influence. This implies that powerful parliaments raise EU affairs more in public plenary debates than weak ones. However, the scant empirical evidence to date suggests a reversed relationship. In the powerful Danish *Folketing*, the influence of MPs depends on closed-door meetings (Møller Sousa 2008) where challenging the government in public is detrimental to behind-the-scenes influence (Auel and Raunio 2014b: 6-7). Likewise, EU salience in the Irish *Oireachtas* has dramatically decreased following the strengthening of respective committees (De Wilde 2014; Conlan 2007). In other words, control powers may silence MPs in plenary debates. Thus we need to control for the formal EU oversight powers of parliaments.

Data and methods

The discussion sets three cornerstones for our empirical strategy. First, taking the idea of multi-level governance seriously means that we should analyse EU salience across the whole domestic plenary agenda. Second, the investigation period should be long enough to cover variation in rarely changing variables such as EU authority and the partisan composition of governments. And third, our conclusions should not be biased to particular parliamentary or national contexts.

Our *country sample* follows a most-different design by including the German *Bundestag*, the Spanish *Congreso*, the Dutch *Tweede Kamer* and the UK *House of Commons*. These chambers and the countries they represent include two- and multi-party systems, countries with higher and lower baseline levels of Euroscepticism, and chambers with more and less EU oversight powers vis-à-vis the government. Furthermore, they differ on possibly intervening contextual factors: big and small, old and newer, and economically strong and weaker member states, as well as working and talking parliaments.

To arrive at a sufficiently long *investigation period*, we identified the most encompassing databases that provide access to the plenary debates of the four parliaments to then scrape and split debate protocols with own scripts written in the R language (for details see online Appendix A, as well as Rauh et al. 2017). We treat the resulting full-text vectors on speech level as the main empirical evidence for the issues that MPs want to emphasise in their publically visible plenary appearances.

| | Period available | N speeches | Ø speeches per month | Ø terms per speech | Unique terms |
|----------------------|-------------------|------------|----------------------|--------------------|--------------|
| DE: Bundestag | 1991-03 / 2013-09 | 149,553 | 607.94 | 550.82 | 600,925 |
| ES: Congreso | 1989-11 / 2015-10 | 131,986 | 515.57 | 526.92 | 360,012 |
| NL: Tweede Kamer | 1994-12 / 2015-11 | 787,879 | 3396.03 | 165.57 | 401,471 |
| UK: House of Commons | 1988-11 / 2015-01 | 1,463,637 | 5361.31 | 202.07 | 1,037,450 |

Table 1: Domestic plenary debate corpora

Table 1 reflects differences in parliamentary traditions. Unsurprisingly, the *House of Commons* as the model ‘talking parliament’ has the largest number of speeches. In the German and Spanish ‘working parliaments’, the overall number of plenary speeches is considerably lower which is only partly offset by a greater length of the average individual speech act. Due to the higher number of parties competing for parliamentary speaking time, the Netherlands has a high number of very short speeches.

To measure the *salience of EU affairs* in MPs’ public communication activities, we follow Rauh (2015: 123-4) and define the dependent variable as the degree to which a plenary statement makes reference to the EC/EU. Our measure builds on the intuition that the more a speaker wants to emphasize EU affairs, the more direct references to key elements of supranational decision-making he or she will provide in a given speech. Accordingly, the count of literal references to the EU polity, politics or policies is our basic observable indication of an MP’s preferred salience of EU affairs. Given the sheer size of the corpora, we rely on an automated, dictionary-based text analysis to retrieve these counts.

We start from the dictionary provided in Rauh (2015) which features an encompassing and flexible set of term-level references to the overall supranational polity, to the major institutional actors in this polity, as well as to various supranational policies and policy instruments of the EU. With the help of native speakers we translated the dictionary into the Dutch, English, and Spanish languages and exploit R’s regular expressions facilities to account for inflections, plurals or compound terms that might occur in the respective language. The final dictionaries only contain n-grams for which an EU reference is unequivocally clear on the term-level and are available for inspection and replication in Appendix B. Tagging scripts then retrieve the overall count of EU references from each individual plenary statement.

The raw count measures allow consistent comparisons of EU salience within parliamentary contexts, but are not fit for purpose when it comes to comparing across countries and languages. One reason is the variation in speech length (Table 1). Given much shorter speeches, MPs in the *House of Commons* or the *Tweede Kamer* have, *ceteris paribus*, a much lower probability to use one of the EU references we are counting than their counterparts in the *Bundestag* or *Congreso*. Country variation in the EU references per speech may then only be an artefact of diverging debate cultures. The most intuitive remedy is normalizing the salience measure along speech length; i.e. capturing the relative frequency of EU references tf_{EU} through dividing the raw counts by the absolute number of terms n in speech s :

$$(1) \quad tf_{EU,s} = \frac{\sum_s EU}{n_s}$$

Still, caution is warranted when comparing across languages. Table 1 indicates differences in the number of unique terms across the four corpora, which reflects well-debated linguistic differences.³ Some languages, English in particular, offer more unique words than others. If the overall number of terms available to MPs differs just because they speak different languages, we can hardly assume that the baseline probability of a single term in our dictionary is directly comparable even if all political circumstances were the same. Matters are complicated further by differing dictionary lengths produced by purely linguistic factors (Appendix B).

To tackle the challenge of comparing dictionary-based counts across countries, we assume that the 20+ years of parliamentary debate we observe for each of the four countries are a fairly good representation of the overall term distribution in the respective languages. This allows us to calculate a language-specific baseline probability of our dictionary terms. This is given by their overall frequency in the respective corpus divided by the overall number of terms in that corpus. The baseline puts the relative frequency of EU references observed in an individual speech into perspective. Formally, our final measure weights the relative term frequency of *EU* terms in speech s as calculated above with the relative frequency of *EU* terms in the overall corpus C of the same language:

³ Linguists heavily debate how to compare the number of unique terms across languages. The counts presented in Table 1 are a rather crude proxy in this regard: We pooled all speeches in a corpus, removed all punctuation, set everything to lower case, split tokens along whitespaces (`'\\W+'`) and collapsed the data to arrive at unique terms. Note that in line with Heap's law the differences in unique terms are not just simply a function of differing corpus sizes.

$$(2) \quad tf_{EU,s,c} = \frac{\sum_s EU}{n_s} / \frac{\sum_c EU}{n_c}$$

This standardized measure captures whether and to what extent a given speech falls short of (values <1), equals (=1), or exceeds (>1) the share of EU references compared to what we would expect under the usual term distribution in the originating language.⁴ It accounts for both varying speech lengths and varying dictionary term probabilities in the four parliaments, which makes it our weapon of choice. For multivariate analysis, finally, these data are aggregated to *party-month panels*.⁵ The dependent variable ‘salience of EU affairs’ ultimately captures the monthly average of language-standardized weights of EU references per speech for each party in each of the four parliaments.⁶

This variable is awkwardly distributed, however. First, it peaks at rather low levels but has a long right tail of rare observations with extraordinarily high EU emphasis. We correct for this positive skew with a standard $\log(1+x)$ transformation of the dependent variable, bringing the distribution close to the expected normal (Appendix C). Second, as the relative term frequency cannot be smaller than zero by definition, we deal with a constrained dependent variable. And third, we observe clusters exactly at this zero constraint (41/1,277 observations for government and 130/2,511 observations for opposition parties). Such distributions are typical for *censored data* in which the data collection procedure limits the information about the dependent variable at a certain threshold. Despite making the dictionaries as encompassing as possible, the zeros in our data might contain observations in which a few MPs have referred to the EU with some creative terminology or contextual allusions we could not cover. Treating those cases as true zeros in the estimation might lead to wrong conclusions. As a remedy, the econometrics literature offers Tobit regressions (Long 1997: chapter 7; Tobin 1958), which assume that an observation’s probability of being censored is governed by the same process that accounts for the variation in the observable range of the

⁴ We have also considered *tf-idf* measures frequently invoked in the information retrieval literature (e.g. Manning et al. 2008: Chapter 6). Rather than standardising on the corpus frequency, these measures use the inverse document frequency of dictionary terms to correct for term specificity. Log-transforming these *idf* weights, furthermore, accounts for skewed term distributions within languages and across documents. However, in our data the *tf-idf* measures correlate at .99 with our simpler corpus correction so that we can safely resort to the more intuitive measure (and supply the *tf-idf* measures in the replication data).

⁵ The panels are unbalanced because some parties drop out of or (re-)enter the parliament in question, because of summer breaks and election months, or because some parties do not speak in a given month.

⁶ A few parties are disregarded because they either held speeches only very infrequently (less than 5% of the country-specific corpus) or because we could not match them in the Manifesto data. The following parties/factions enter the panel for Germany: CDU/CSU, FDP, PDS/LINKE, and SPD. For Spain we cover: CiU, IU, PP and PSOE. The Dutch parties in the sample are: CDA, PvdA, VVD, D66, SP, GL, CU, LPF and the PVV. For the House of Commons the Conservatives, Labour, and the LibDems enter the panel analyzed below.

dependent variable. The joint estimation procedure thus treats the concept of interest (EU salience in our case) as a latent variable that is only observable above a specified threshold (zero in our case). We estimate these Tobit models on the pooled party-month observations, complement them with various diagnostics and robustness checks, and base our statistical conclusions on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors.

The party-month panels are enriched with a broad set of independent variables. In the null model we account for unobserved country variation captured in respective dummies taking the Netherlands as a reference category. With regard to factors relevant for the ‘responsiveness to EU governance’ criterion, we conceptualize *EU authority* (H1) as an additive function of scope, delegation and pooling of formerly national competences. Resorting to data on the respective EU treaty in force provided in Biesenbender (2011de), the variable sums the number of policy areas covered by EU primary law (scope), the share of EU decision-making powers with a Commission right of initiative (delegation), and the share of EU decisions subject to simple or qualified majorities in the Council (pooling). Two further indicators aim at the EU’s actual exercise of this political authority (H2). We measure the six-month moving averages of both *EU directives* adopted by the Council and the European Parliament and the number of *European Commission initiatives* for binding EU law. Both time-series are retrieved from Version 4 of the EUPOL dataset and end in December 2010 (Häge 2011).⁷

Regarding the criterion ‘linkage to decision-making moments’, we employ markers for *European Council summits*, inaugurations of a new *European Commission*, as well as *EU-related referenda* abroad or at home (H3). Based on researching various EU websites, these markers take a value of 1 during the event month, .5 in the immediately preceding and subsequent months, and zero otherwise. This smoothed event window assesses whether parliaments communicate EU affairs during preparation and follow-up of such key events. This varies, as some employ ex ante debates, while others focus on ex post scrutiny. Furthermore we mark the periods of EU Treaty ratification (between formal signature and entry into force) and employ an *electoral cycle* variable which measures the distance from and to the next European parliament election in a quadratic fashion (reaching -1 in the mid-term and

⁷ <http://www.frankhaege.eu/blog/eupol-dataset-description-published-european-union-politics> (last accessed: 17.03.2014). The cleaning script is available upon request.

zero in the election month). Finally a dummy for the Council presidency of the respective country is included.

With a view to the criterion of ‘government-opposition balance’, we separate estimations for both type of parliamentary actors to study differences in baselines and dynamics (H4). *Domestic Euroscepticism* faced by MPs in a given country is captured with the membership item from the biannual Eurobarometer surveys (H5).⁸ Like for EP elections, we include a *domestic election cycle* variable (H7). Furthermore we control for perceived *issue ownership advantages* with the share of quasi-sentences a party has devoted to the EU in the last election manifesto (Volkens et al. 2015). And we control for the fact that a party might be *internally split* on European integration with the item from the Chapel Hill Expert Surveys (Bakker et al. 2015; Ray 1999). We combined and interpolated the various waves and rescaled the variable to the 0-1 range (Hooghe and Marks 2009). Lastly, we capture variation in institutional accountability over parliaments and time with Winzen’s (2012) *oversight index*. This aggregates the presence of parliamentary information rights, the availability of institutional capacities such as specialized committees, and the disposal of mandating rights on EU issues.

Taken together, these data (fully summarized in Appendix D) give us a hitherto unseen perspective on plenary EU salience in the period 1991-2015 and provide 3,788 individual party-month observations until 2010 for which we have complete data on the variables needed to test the theoretical expectations derived in Section 2.

Results

To gain a descriptive overview of plenary EU salience, Figure 1 presents averaged weights of EU dictionary terms in plenary speeches over countries, and more importantly over government and opposition parties as well as the five different EU treaties in force.

⁸ The membership item was part of one spring and one autumn wave per year based on a sample of roughly 1.000 respondents being asked whether they consider their country’s EU membership as ‘a good thing, a bad thing, or neither good nor bad’. This is a widely used measure of public support for European integration since membership is the most ‘existential fact’ of the integration process (Eichenberg and Dalton 2007: 133). Unfortunately, the EC dropped the item from the autumn surveys 2011 onwards which limits the period available for multivariate analysis. All Eurobarometer data were retrieved from GESIS – Leibniz-Institute for the Social Sciences. Catalogue numbers, replication data and aggregation procedures are available upon request.




Figure 1: Aggregate plenary salience of EU affairs over different countries, parties and EU treaties in force

Let us briefly mention country differences first, marked as horizontal lines with 95% confidence levels in the left panel of Figure 1. Given only four observations in this regard, valid conclusions can hardly be drawn. But the alert reader might notice that the rank order neither fits the talking vs. working parliament distinction nor does plenary EU salience fit standard stories of more Europhile or Eurosceptic discourses in the countries under analysis.

A second, for our purposes more important set of insights addresses long-term variation in EU salience over the rising levels of authority in the consecutive EU treaties in force (H1). Initially the right panel of Figure 1 shows that our length and language standardized measure replicates Rauh's (2015) findings on the German *Bundestag*. But the view that plenary EU debate has generally increased with consecutive authority transfers to the supranational level is not straightforwardly supported in this univariate perspective. We do see upward trends in the Bundestag (at least until Lisbon) and the *Tweede Kamer*, but in the Spanish *Congreso* plenary EU salience declines slightly after the entry into force of the Nice treaty. In the British lower house the observed maxima of EU salience occur already when the Single European Act (SEA) and the Maastricht Treaty were still in force. Emphasis of EU issues in Westminster dropped on average in the period of the Amsterdam

treaty after which it returns to a mild, but statistically significant growth path again. Closer inspection of the British case shows that individual outlier months drive the early highs, especially between mid-1992 and mid-1993. The preparation and the domestic ratification phase of the Maastricht treaty account for the high salience of EU affairs in the British parliament during the early investigation period. This is consistent with H3. In fact, never before and never after was the average EU salience in any of the covered plenaries higher than in the *House of Commons* during the move towards a political Union in the early 1990s. The only monthly observations that come close are, again, the ratification of the Amsterdam and Lisbon treaties in the *House of Commons* and the ratification of the Lisbon treaty in the German *Bundestag*.

The third descriptive insight emerging from the left panel in Figure 1 concerns selective emphasis of EU affairs by government and opposition parties (H4). On average, plenary speeches from members of government parties contain significantly more EU references than speeches from the opposition. This holds in all four countries, despite differences in parliamentary traditions and working modes. Government participation drives this observation rather than partisan idiosyncrasies. A similar analysis of individual party means (not shown here) underlines this: they rarely deviate from the country means if the investigation covers both periods with and without government participation.

However, as the above examples of treaty ratifications in the UK show, short-term events might strongly affect these descriptives. Thus we now assess how the different expectations fare in multivariate analysis. Table 2 presents the Tobit regressions for the government and opposition party panels.

The null models (1) and (5) merely absorb the static country and party type differences we observe in Figure 1, where the constants re-affirm baseline differences in EU emphasis among government and opposition parties. Note that static country differences account for approximately 11 and 4% of the variation in EU emphasis observed by government and opposition parties respectively.

| | Government | | | | Opposition | | | |
|-------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
| EU Authority | | 0.139*** (0.031) | 0.115*** (0.031) | 0.164*** (0.038) | | 0.152*** (0.024) | 0.128*** (0.025) | 0.098*** (0.030) |
| EU directives | | 0.072* (0.032) | 0.049 (0.032) | 0.071* (0.031) | | 0.067** (0.023) | 0.032 (0.023) | 0.044+ (0.023) |
| Comm. initiatives | | 0.022 (0.031) | 0.060+ (0.034) | 0.036 (0.034) | | 0.008 (0.023) | 0.051* (0.024) | 0.044+ (0.024) |
| EU summit | | | 0.186*** (0.028) | 0.186*** (0.028) | | | 0.182*** (0.020) | 0.184*** (0.020) |
| Comm. inauguration | | | 0.060+ (0.035) | 0.050 (0.035) | | | 0.061* (0.026) | 0.063* (0.027) |
| Treaty rat. | | | 0.050+ (0.029) | 0.045 (0.028) | | | 0.076*** (0.021) | 0.056** (0.021) |
| EU ref. (elsewhere) | | | 0.045 (0.030) | 0.041 (0.029) | | | 0.026 (0.022) | 0.039+ (0.022) |
| EP election cycle | | | -0.014 (0.028) | -0.011 (0.028) | | | 0.006 (0.021) | 0.009 (0.021) |
| Council presidency | | | | 0.072** (0.027) | | | | 0.037+ (0.021) |
| EU ref. (domestic) | | | | 0.045 (0.036) | | | | 0.061* (0.026) |
| Parl. oversight powers | | | | -0.054 (0.052) | | | | 0.074+ (0.041) |
| Domestic Euroscept. | | | | -0.197*** (0.057) | | | | -0.106* (0.042) |
| National election cycle | | | | -0.055+ (0.032) | | | | -0.031 (0.022) |
| Manifesto EU salience | | | | -0.005 (0.027) | | | | 0.135*** (0.021) |
| Party EU dissent | | | | 0.110** (0.039) | | | | 0.058** (0.020) |
| DE | 0.298*** (0.036) | 0.321*** (0.036) | 0.318*** (0.035) | 0.483*** (0.055) | 0.192*** (0.029) | 0.223*** (0.029) | 0.222*** (0.029) | 0.252*** (0.044) |
| ES | 0.189*** (0.042) | 0.222*** (0.042) | 0.216*** (0.042) | 0.308*** (0.054) | 0.160*** (0.027) | 0.204*** (0.028) | 0.201*** (0.028) | 0.267*** (0.039) |
| UK | 0.459*** (0.038) | 0.494*** (0.039) | 0.488*** (0.039) | 0.708*** (0.088) | 0.319*** (0.029) | 0.368*** (0.030) | 0.365*** (0.030) | 0.402*** (0.064) |
| Constant | 0.704*** (0.027) | -0.997* (0.396) | -1.055** (0.401) | -1.037* (0.421) | 0.596*** (0.019) | -1.186*** (0.304) | -1.228*** (0.314) | -0.839* (0.334) |
| Adj. R ² | 0.11 | 0.12 | 0.15 | 0.18 | 0.04 | 0.07 | 0.10 | 0.12 |
| Observations | 1,277 | 1,277 | 1,277 | 1,277 | 2,511 | 2,511 | 2,511 | 2,511 |
| Log likelihood | -915.830 | -903.038 | -872.216 | -853.634 | -1,933.739 | -1,906.954 | -1,850.824 | -1,816.139 |
| Wald test | 154.688*** (df = 3) | 179.414*** (df = 6) | 251.706*** (df = 11) | 304.096*** (df = 18) | 125.225*** (df = 3) | 177.547*** (df = 6) | 319.440*** (df = 11) | 414.433*** (df = 18) |

Table 2: Tobit regressions of plenary EU salience (left censored at 0, log-transformed)

Notes: Standardized coefficients; robust standard errors in parentheses; ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05, + p < .1

The addition of the EU authority variables in models (2) and (6) is substantially more interesting for our purposes. Most strikingly, our combined indicator of the policy scope and the pooling and delegation of political competences in the consecutive EU treaties exhibits a positive and highly significant relationship to EU emphasis on the domestic plenary floor. The statistical association of supranational authority and EU salience in domestic plenaries is robust against the inclusion of additional controls in the later models. It holds for both opposition and government parties. However, the standardized coefficients suggest that governing parties in particular increase their plenary talk about Europe in response to consecutive authority transfers. This provides strong support for the authority hypothesis (H1) and clearly contradicts the expected opposition advantage (H4). Likewise, the indicators for the EU's main ways to exercise political authority exhibit somewhat smaller but positive coefficients (H2). The average number of EU directives adopted by the Council and the European parliament in the previous six months is associated with a higher average number of EU references in plenary speeches. This holds for both government and opposition parties. Finally, the number of European Commission initiatives put forward in the previous six months correlates with slightly increased EU salience on the domestic plenary floor. But this latter relationship is not fully robust across models. Taken together, these findings suggest that domestic plenary debate is responsive to the transfer of authority to Brussels and its exercise.

But the slowly changing nature of these independent variables explains only little additional variation in the monthly variation of partisan EU salience. Thus models (3) and (7) add short-term EU-level decision-making moments to the picture. We immediately see strongly enhanced EU salience around the 138 EU summits during our investigation period (H3). In the months surrounding meetings of the European heads of state or government, EU references in plenary speeches increase significantly. The standardized coefficient suggests that this is the strongest positive effect that we observe. Summits affect government and opposition parties almost equally. Thus, EU summits appear as the most important crystallizing events for a balanced parliamentary debate about Europe.

In contrast to EU summits, other EU-wide events lack uniform effects. During inaugurations of a new European Commission (H3) and treaty ratification periods (H3) we observe slightly higher plenary EU salience, but this association is significant for opposition parties only. Arguably, government parties have few incentives to talk about such events as their influence on the respective international negotiations has passed. Meanwhile, opposition parties welcome the opportunity to criticize lacking assertiveness of the respective government. The pattern looks similar where

referendums on EU integration occur in other EU states. But these coefficients are not statistically robust. Strikingly, we find no consistent effect of EP election cycles (H3). On average, plenary EU salience does not change when citizens are asked to vote directly on European matters.

The final estimation step in models (4) and (8) adds domestic factors. Each of the countries in our study held the rotating presidency of the European Council three times during the investigation period. We document significantly more EU emphasis in plenary speech during these times, in particular by governing parties. The months surrounding the two domestic EU referenda in our sample – the Netherlands in June 2005 and Spain in February 2015 – presented opportunities to opposition parties for raising EU salience (H3).

The institutional setup of EU affairs in a parliament also matters for the quantity of public debate about Europe. Here, we rely on Winzen's oversight index. The more information or mandating rights exist, the more the opposition addresses questions of European governance in plenary debates. For government parties the respective coefficient is negative but does not reach statistical significance.

The remaining domestic variables capture our expectations regarding a balanced government-opposition debate. Most importantly, our data do not support the common assumption that public Euroscepticism induces EU emphasis by opposition parties (H5). Rather they show that the government and the opposition emphasize the EU less, the more citizens say their country's EU membership is 'a bad thing'. This factor exhibits some of the strongest statistical associations that we find across and within our models. Plenary EU salience tends to go down around times of national elections, but this effect is not robust in a statistical sense (H6). The more parties raise EU issues in their election manifestoes, the more they subsequently raise EU issues on the plenary floor – but only if they ended up in the opposition. Arguably, opposition parties have more freedom than parties in government to pursue their EU priorities as communicated to the voter. Finally, we see that dissent on European integration among party activists, as assessed by the Chapel Hill experts, is strongly and robustly associated with more EU emphasis in plenary speeches. This effect is stronger for government parties, but also statistically significant for the opposition. Further research is needed in this regard but two explanations seem plausible: either dissenting backbenchers use plenary debates to clarify their EU-related stances or the higher EU salience is a product of party leaders trying to brush over internal differences, aiming to 'whip' their representatives in line.

Before we pull these findings together, some notes on their robustness are in order (corresponding checks are documented in Appendix E). The comparatively low model fit is not surprising given our highly sensitive and volatile measure of EU salience. EU issues compete against every thinkable issue that might catch the parliamentary attention at any given point in time. Modelling such agenda dynamics in full seems infeasible so that a low fit has to be accepted – unless it is driven by systematically omitted variables. A qualitative analysis of unusual regression residuals points to idiosyncratic events – such as the Lisbon judgement of the German Federal Constitutional Court in 2009, the Goodman report on parliamentary EU affairs in the *House of Commons* 2008, or debates about the services directive in 2005. It does not offer a consistently missing factor though. Excluding such outliers increases model fit markedly and leaves the main results intact. Furthermore, our main results remain robust to different assumptions about modelling the zero observations in our dependent variable. Finally, Appendix F replicates our main models by substituting the Manifesto salience variable with the highly correlated net EU support a party has expressed in the last campaign platform. Pro EU government parties refer less to the Union on the plenary floor than more sceptical government parties. The relationship is reversed for opposition parties: the more sceptical they were during a campaign, the less EU debate they provide on the plenary floor.

Lastly, we have also assessed the substantive significance of our findings. In Appendix G the interested reader finds a table that reverse-engineers the coefficients and expresses them as the number of monthly literal references to supranational politics in relation to meaningful changes in selected independent variables. This analysis of hypothetical scenarios underlines that the effects of public Euroscepticism, Council summits and EU authority are substantively meaningful. For example, the move from the SEA to the Maastricht Treaty alone accounts for 45 additional monthly EU references by government parties on the *House of Commons* floor. Given a mean of 346 monthly EU references by British parties in our investigation period, this is quite a meaningful increase. On this empirical basis, we can now turn to our conclusions about the generation of EU accountability through national plenary debates.

Conclusions

In light of the politicization of European integration and revived debates about the democratic accountability of the EU, the role of national parliaments in today's multi-level governance moves into the spotlight. Beyond their increased institutional oversight capacity, recent literature focuses on the communicative function of parliamentary debates. However, despite clear recognition that debating Europe in the plenary is a prerequisite for accountable European governance, few have ventured to articulate a coherent perspective on how and when Europe ought to be debated, let alone whether such normative standards are met in practice.

To meet this challenge, this contribution develops accountability preconditions for plenary debates, stressing the need for responsiveness to developments in EU governance, temporal linkage to decision-making and government-opposition balance. We then analyse comparatively whether, when and how much national MPs refer to the supranational polity, its politics and policies. Exploiting advanced web-scraping and text-mining tools, we study EU references in more than 2.5 million plenary speeches from the German *Bundestag*, the British *House of Commons*, the Dutch *Tweede Kamer* and the Spanish *Congreso de los Diputados* between 1991 and 2015. This provides a hitherto unprecedented perspective on the relative importance of supranational triggers and domestic partisan competition when it comes to explaining the amount of parliamentary communication on EU affairs across the whole spectrum of domestic parliamentary agendas.

Conventional knowledge has it that raising EU salience contains significant electoral risks, in particular for governing parties bound by intergovernmental compromises. In this view, politicians in government would strategically de-emphasize supranational powers. Our extensive empirical analysis contradicts this standard story. First, government and opposition MPs respond positively to developments in EU governance. As the EU gains in powers and exercises them more, they raise EU salience in plenary. These actions support accountability. Second, parties raise EU salience especially around EU summits. Hence, government reputation in intergovernmental negotiations is put at stake and citizen judgement facilitated. However, parliamentary activity does not support electoral judgement as plenary EU salience tends to decrease during election periods. The findings on our second normative criterion - linkage to decision-making - are thus mixed.

Finally, we argued balance between government and opposition in raising EU salience is the third normative criterion. It is needed to enable citizens to pass judgement on those in and those striving

for office. On this criterion, our findings are rather disturbing. Government parties structurally outperform the opposition in raising EU salience. Since this is observable in all our four countries and since we include all plenary speech, not just debates tabled as being about ‘Europe’, this behaviour of actors with executive responsibility cannot simply be ascribed to formal agenda-setting procedures. Worst from a perspective of accountability is that not only government, but also opposition parties, tend to emphasize the EU less as citizens become more sceptical about the EU. We are thus facing an opposition deficit in EU accountability. It is opposition parties in particular that are dropping the ball, by not debating Europe to a similar extent as government parties in plenary. This finding is all the more striking given that opposition parties tend to express more sceptical EU positions in their election campaigns (Appendix F) and many of the most vocal Eurosceptics tend to be over represented in the opposition.

What might explain the different emphasis of EU issues by government and opposition parties? One suspicion is that parties in power have more reporting duties with a view to the EU. But neither from a normative perspective on accountability nor from electoral incentives are opposition parties free from emphasizing the opportunities and constraints of multi-level governance in response to government driven EU talk. One might also suspect that governing parties discuss the EU more as part of mainly blame shifting, which would be in fact detrimental to accountability. In response to domestic criticism from the opposition, the government then ‘passes the buck’ to the EU. However, as documented by Hobolt and Tilley (2014: 111), politicians do not engage in blaming Europe as often as thought. Instead, some of our findings suggest that informational advantages of governing actors are an important factor. Given that opposition emphasis of EU affairs increases with formal oversight powers (see also Møller Sousa 2008), we hypothesize that learning about the nature and extent of EU policies and socialization into regular EU oversight activities have an effect on the supply of EU related debates. This also lends additional credibility to our argument that salience is an important precondition for accountability. If the information hypothesis holds, much of the plenary talk on Europe we document is substantive, based on detailed government and Commission documents, rather than on abbreviated stories from mass media. More qualitative research should investigate whether this is indeed the case.

In sum, we conclude that national parliaments have only partially succeeded in enhancing EU accountability. Communication of EU affairs within their plenaries is indeed responsive to supranational governance and the output it produces. But our findings also indicate a lack of

balanced debates and a limited supply of electoral choice to an increasingly attentive and often also sceptic European public.

Some shortcomings have to be acknowledged. First, while the findings are robust across the four national contexts, the results still indicate static differences across countries. We control for this, but do not explain it. Second, we analyse the amount of EU debate, not its content. This is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for adequate accountability. The discussion of some of our findings suggests that the systematic analysis of the content of EU-related messages is warranted. Third, our findings imply that we need more fine-grained theories and corresponding tests of government and opposition differences in EU emphasis. The tools and data supplied with this article can support these avenues of future research.

References

- Auel, Katrin (2007) 'Democratic Accountability and National Parliaments: Redefining the Impact of Parliamentary Scrutiny in EU Affairs', *European Law Journal* 13(4): 487-504.
- Auel, Katrin, Olga Eisele, and Lucy Kinski (2016) 'From constraining to catalysing dissensus? The impact of political contestation on parliamentary communication in EU affairs', *Comparative European Politics* 14(2): 154-176.
- Auel, Katrin, and Oliver Höing (2015) 'National Parliaments and the Eurozone Crisis: Taking Ownership in Difficult Times?', *West European Politics* 38(2): 375-395.
- Auel, Katrin, and Tapio Raunio (2014a) 'Debating the State of the Union? Comparing Parliamentary Debates on EU Issues in Finland, France, Germany and the UK', *Journal of Legislative Studies* 20(1): 13-28.
- Auel, Katrin, and Tapio Raunio (2014b) 'Introduction: Connecting with the Electorate? Parliamentary Communication in EU Affairs', *Journal of Legislative Studies* 20(1): 1-12.
- Auel, Katrin, Olivier Rozenberg, and Angela Tacea (2015) 'Fighting Back? And if Yes, How? Measuring Parliamentary Strength and Activity in EU Affairs'. In: C. Heffler, C. Neuhold, O. Rozenberg and J. Smith (ed.) *Palgrave Handbook on National Parliaments and the European Union*. Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan.
- Bakker, Ryan, Catherine de Vries, Erica Edwards, Liesbet Hooghe, Seth Jolly, Gary Marks, Jonathan Polk, Jan Rovny, Marco Steenbergen, and Milada Vachudova (2015) 'Measuring party positions in Europe: The Chapel Hill expert survey trend file, 1999–2010', *Party Politics* 21(1): 143-152.
- Bergman, Torbjörn (2000) 'The European Union as the Next Step of Delegation and Accountability', *European Journal of Political Research* 37(3): 415-429.
- Bickerton, Christopher J., Dermot Hodson, and Uwe Puetter (2015) 'The New Intergovernmentalism: European Integration in the Post-Maastricht Era', *Journal of Common Market Studies* 53(4): 703-722.
- Biesenbender, Jan (2011) 'The Dynamics of Treaty Change - Measuring the Distribution of Power in the European Union', *European Integration online Papers (EIoP)* 15(5): 1-24.
- Boomgaarden, Hajo G., Claes H. De Vreese, Andreas R. T. Schuck, Rachid Azrout, Matthijs Elenbaas, Joost H. P. Van Spanje, and Rens Vliegthart (2013) 'Across Time and Space: Explaining Variation in News Coverage of the European Union', *European Journal of Political Research* 52(5): 608-629.
- Boomgaarden, Hajo G., Andreas R. T. Schuck, Matthijs Elenbaas, and Claes H. De Vreese (2011) 'Mapping EU Attitudes: Conceptual and Empirical Dimensions of Euroscepticism and EU Support', *European Union Politics* 12(2): 241-266.

- Boomgaarden, Hajo, Rens Vliegenthart, Claes De Vreese, and Andreas Schuck (2010) 'News on the move: exogenous events and news coverage of the European Union', *Journal of European Public Policy* 17(4): 506-526.
- Börzel, Tanja (2005) 'Mind the gap! European Integration Between Level and Scope', *Journal of European Public Policy* 12(2): 217-236.
- Bovens, Mark (2007) 'Analyzing and Assessing Accountability: A Conceptual Framework', *European Law Journal* 13(4): 447-468.
- Budge, Ian, and Dennis Farlie (1983) *Explaining and Predicting Elections*. London: George Allen & Unwin.
- Closa, Carlos, and Alexandra Maatsch (2014) 'In a Spirit of Solidarity? Justifying the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) in National Parliamentary Debates', *Journal of Common Market Studies* 52(4): 826-842.
- Conlan, Patricia (2007) 'Ireland: Enhanced Parliamentary Scrutiny of European Affairs: But is it Effective?'. In: J. O'Brennan and T. Raunio (ed.) *National Parliaments within the Enlarged European Union. From 'Victims' of Integration to Competitive Actors?* Abingdon: Routledge.
- Cooper, Ian (2012) 'A 'Virtual Third Chamber' for the European Union? National Parliaments after the Treaty of Lisbon', *West European Politics* 35(3): 441-465.
- De Wilde, Pieter (2014) 'The Operating Logics of National Parliaments and Mass Media in the Politicisation of Europe', *Journal of Legislative Studies* 20(1): 46-61.
- De Wilde, Pieter, Anna Leupold, and Henning Schmidtke (2016) 'Introduction: The Differentiated Politicisation of European Governance', *West European Politics* 39(1): 3-22.
- De Wilde, Pieter, and Michael Zürn (2012) 'Can the Politicization of European Integration Be Reversed?', *Journal of Common Market Studies* 50(S1): 137-153.
- Eichenberg, Richard C., and Russell J. Dalton (2007) 'Post-Maastricht Blues: The Transformation of Citizen Support for European Integration, 1973-2004', *Acta Politica* 42(2/3): 128-152.
- Gattermann, Katjana, Anna-Lena Högenauer, and Ariella Huff (2013) 'National Parliaments After Lisbon: Towards Mainstreaming of EU Affairs?', *OPAL Online Paper Series* 2013(13).
- Genschel, Philipp, and Markus Jachtenfuchs (eds) (2014) *Beyond the Regulatory Polity? The European Integration of Core State Powers*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Grant, Ruth W., and Robert O. Keohane (2005) 'Accountability and Abuses of Power in World Politics', *American Political Science Review* 99(1): 29-43.
- Green-Pedersen, Christoffer (2007) 'The Growing Importance of Issue Competition: The Changing Nature of Party Competition in Western Europe', *Political Studies* 35: 607-628.

- Green-Pedersen, Christoffer, and Peter B. Mortensen (2010) 'Who Sets the Agenda and Who Responds to it in the Danish Parliament? A New Model of Issue Competition and Agenda-setting', *European Journal of Political Research* 49(2): 257-281.
- Häge, Frank M. (2011) 'The European Union Policy-Making Dataset', *European Union Politics* 12(3): 455-477.
- Hobolt, Sara, and James Tilley (2014) *Blaming Europe?: Responsibility Without Accountability in the European Union*. Oxford University Press.
- Hoeglinger, Dominic (2016) 'The Politicisation of European Integration in Domestic Election Campaigns', *West European Politics* 39(1): 44-63.
- Hooghe, Liesbet, and Gary Marks (2001) *Multi-Level Governance and European Integration*. New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
- Hooghe, Liesbet, and Gary Marks (2009) 'A Postfunctionalist Theory of European Integration: From Permissive Consensus to Constraining Dissensus', *British Journal of Political Science* 39(1): 1-23.
- Hutter, Swen, and Edgar Grande (2014) 'Politicizing Europe in the National Electoral Arena: A Comparative Analysis of Five West European Countries, 1970-2010', *Journal of Common Market Studies* 52(5): 1002-1018.
- Karlas, Jan (2012) 'National Parliamentary Control of EU Affairs: Institutional Design after Enlargement', *West European Politics* 35(5): 1095-1113.
- Kiiver, Philipp (2006) *The National Parliaments in the European Union. A Critical View on EU Constitution-Building*. Vol. 50. The Hague: Kluwer Law International.
- King, Anthony (1976) 'Modes of Executive-Legislative Relations: Great Britain, France, and West Germany', *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 1(1): 11-36.
- Koopmans, Ruud (2007) 'Who Inhabits the European Public Sphere? Winners and Losers, Supporters and Opponents in Europeanised Political Debates', *European Journal of Political Research* 46(2): 183-210.
- Long, J. Scott (1997) *Regression Models for Categorical and Limited Dependent Variables*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
- Manning, Christopher D., Prabhakar Raghavan, and Hinrich Schütze (2008) *Introduction to Information Retrieval*. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.
- Miklin, Eric (2014) 'EU Politicisation and National Parliaments: Visibility of Choices and Better Aligned Ministers?', *The Journal of Legislative Studies* 20(1): 78-92.

- Møller Sousa, Maja (2008) 'Learning in Denmark? The Case of Danish Parliamentary Control over European Union Policy', *Scandinavian Political Studies* 31(4): 428-447.
- Moravcsik, Andrew (2006) 'What Can We Learn from the Collapse of the European Constitutional Project?', *Politische Vierteljahresschrift* 47(2): 219-241.
- Norris, Pippa (1997) 'Representation and the Democratic Deficit', *European Journal of Political Research* 32(2): 273-282.
- O'Brennan, John, and Tapio Raunio (eds) (2007) *National Parliaments within the Enlarged European Union. From 'Victims' of Integration to Competitive Actors?* Abingdon: Routledge.
- Olsen, Johan P. (2016) 'Democratic Accountability and the Terms of Political Order', *European Political Science Review* OnlineFirst.
- Papadopoulos, Yannis (2010) 'Accountability and Multi-Level Governance: More Accountability, Less Democracy?', *West European Politics* 33(5): 1030-1049.
- Petrocik, John R. (1996) 'Issue Ownership in Presidential Elections, with a 1980 Case Study', *American Journal of Political Science* 40(3): 825-850.
- Pollack, Mark A. (1997) 'Delegation, Agency, and Agenda Setting in the European Community', *International Organization* 51(1): 99-134.
- Puntscher Riekmann, Sonja, and Doris Wydra (2013) 'Representation in the European State of Emergency: Parliaments against Governments', *Journal of European Integration* 35(5): 565-582.
- Rauh, Christian (2015) 'Communicating supranational governance? The salience of EU affairs in the German Bundestag, 1991-2013', *European Union Politics* 16(1): 116-138.
- Rauh, Christian (2016) *A responsive technocracy? EU politicisation and the consumer policies of the European Commission*. Colchester, UK: ECPR Press.
- Rauh, Christian, Pieter de Wilde, and Jan Schwalbach (2017) 'The ParlSpeech data set: Annotated full-text vectors of 3.9 million plenary speeches in the key legislative chambers of seven European states', *Harvard Dataverse*, V1 [cited 12.05.2017]. Available from <http://dx.doi.org/10.7910/DVN/E4RSP9>.
- Raunio, Tapio (2005) 'Holding Governments Accountable in European Affairs: Explaining Cross-National Variation', *Journal of Legislative Studies* 11(3/4): 319-342.
- Raunio, Tapio (2009) 'National Parliaments and European Integration: What We Know and Agenda for Future Research', *Journal of Legislative Studies* 15(4): 317-334.
- Raunio, Tapio (2011) 'The Gatekeepers of European Integration? The Functions of National Parliaments in the EU Political System', *Journal of European Integration* 33(3): 303-321.

- Ray, Leonard (1999) 'Measuring party orientations towards European integration: Results from an expert survey', *European Journal of Political Research* 36(2): 283-306.
- Saalfeld, Thomas (2005) 'Deliberate Delegation or Abdication? Government Backbenchers, Ministers and European Union Legislation', *Journal of Legislative Studies* 11(3/4): 343-371.
- Schimmelfennig, Frank (2014) 'European Integration in the Euro Crisis: The Limits of Postfunctionalism', *Journal of European Integration* 36(3): 321-337.
- Schmitter, Philippe C. (1969) 'Three Neo-Functional Hypotheses about International Integration', *International Organization* 23(1): 161-166.
- Schmitter, Philippe C. (2004) 'The Ambiguous Virtues of Accountability', *Journal of Democracy* 15(4): 47-60.
- Sides, John (2006) 'The Origins of Campaign Agendas', *British Journal of Political Science* 36(3): 407-436.
- Sitter, Nick (2001) 'The Politics of Opposition and European Integration in Scandinavia: is Euro-scepticism a Government-Opposition Dynamic?', *West European Politics* 24(4): 22-39.
- Statham, Paul, and Hans-Jörg Trenz (2013) *The Politicization of Europe. Contesting the Constitution in the Mass Media*. Abingdon: Routledge.
- Stokes, Donald E. (1963) 'Spatial Models of Party Competition', *American Political Science Review* 57(2): 368-377.
- Strøm, Kaare, Wolfgang C. Müller, and Torbjörn Bergman (eds) (2003) *Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Tans, Olaf, Carla Zoethout, and Jit Peters (eds) (2007) *National Parliaments and European Democracy: A Bottom-up Approach to European Constitutionalism*. Groningen: Europa Law Publishing.
- Tobin, James (1958) 'Estimation of Relationships for Limited Dependent Variables', *Econometrica* 26(1): 24-36.
- Uba, Katrin, and Fredrik Uggla (2011) 'Protest Actions against the European Union, 1992-2007', *West European Politics* 34(2): 384-393.
- Volkens, Andrea, Pola Lehmann, Theres Matthiess, Nicolas Merz, Sven Regel, and Annika Werner. 2015. The Manifesto Data Collection, edited by M. P. (MRG/CMP/MARPOR). Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB).
- Wendler, Frank (2013) 'Challenging Domestic Politics? European Debates of National Parliaments in France, Germany and the UK', *Journal of European Integration* 35(7): 801-817.
- Wendler, Frank (2014) 'Justification and Political Polarization in National Parliamentary Debates on EU Treaty Reform', *Journal of European Public Policy* 21(4): 549-567.

Wendler, Frank (2016) *Debating Europe in National Parliaments: Public Justification and Political Polarization*. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK.

Winzen, Thomas (2012) 'National Parliamentary Control of European Union Affairs: A Cross-national and Longitudinal Comparison', *West European Politics* 35(3): 657-672.

Wonka, Arndt (2016) 'The Party Politics of the Euro Crisis in the German *Bundestag*: Frames, Positions and Salience', *West European Politics* 39(1): 125-144.

Zürn, Michael, Martin Binder, and Matthias Ecker-Ehrhardt (2012) 'International Authority and Its Politicization', *International Theory* 4(1): 69-106.

Appendix A – Web-scraping and splitting parliamentary speech data

Our investigation periods aim to provide a sufficiently long time frame. We thus identified the most encompassing databases that provide digital full-text access to the plenary debates of the four parliaments under analysis. These databases were then scraped with own R scripts customized to the structures and formats of the respective database. Afterwards, a second set of scripts – again customized to the specific formats supplied – automatically cleans the downloaded material, splits it into individual speeches, and annotates the resulting observations with the speaker’s name, his or her party membership and/or specific parliamentary roles, as well as a time stamp.

We scraped the plenary protocols of the German *Bundestag* as plain ascii files from the parliament’s document server⁹ and then used regular expressions as well as external MP lists to split the stenographic protocols along formatting regularities. The Spanish data were scraped as pdf files from the website of the *Congreso*.¹⁰ We converted them to txt and conducted manual cleaning where necessary, before splitting the files also along formatting regularities. Parliamentary records from the *Tweede Kamer*, at least after 1994, were accessed as already well-structured xml files provided through the central online access point of the Dutch government.¹¹ Finally, the *House of Commons* debates were accessed via the digital Commons Hansard.¹² Besides varying URL structures, a particular challenge here were debates that stretch over an *a priori* unknown number of sub-pages. Splitting and cleaning, in contrast, is comparatively easy along the given HTML structure that has only rarely changed over time. All these procedures involved an intense back-and-forth and various cross-checks between the raw texts and the resulting data frames. Finally, a range of random sample debate comparisons verified that raw protocols and text vectors are identical with regard to speech content and speaker characteristics (see the *ParlSpeech* dataverse for further details).

We treat the resulting full-text vectors as the main empirical evidence for the issues partisan MPs want to emphasise in their publically visible plenary appearances, excluding only statements by the respective parliament presidents.¹³ These very frequent utterances usually serve debate organisation only, have no political content, but would increase computation time and seriously inflate the

⁹ <http://dipbt.bundestag.de/doc/btp> (last accessed: 25.05.2014)

¹⁰ www.congreso.es/portal/page/portal/Congreso/Congreso/Publicaciones (last accessed 17.12.2015).

¹¹ zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl (last accessed: 14.12.2015).

¹² www.parliament.uk/business/publications/hansard/commons/by-date (last accessed: 22.01.2016)

¹³ I.e. the *Bundestagspräsident* in Germany, the *Presidente del Congreso* in Spain, the *Voorzitter* in The Netherlands and the *Speaker of the House* in the UK as well as their respective deputies and temporary stand-ins.

denominators of our relative salience measures discussed below. Having removed these instances, our data collection efforts result in more than 2.5 million speeches available for analysis.

| | Period available | N speeches | Ø speeches per month | Ø terms per speech | Unique terms |
|----------------------|-------------------|------------|----------------------|--------------------|--------------|
| DE: Bundestag | 1991-03 / 2013-09 | 149,553 | 607.94 | 550.82 | 600,925 |
| ES: Congreso | 1989-11 / 2015-10 | 131,986 | 515.57 | 526.92 | 360,012 |
| NL: Tweede Kamer | 1994-12 / 2015-11 | 787,879 | 3396.03 | 165.57 | 401,471 |
| UK: House of Commons | 1988-11 / 2015-01 | 1,463,637 | 5361.31 | 202.07 | 1,037,450 |

Table A1: Domestic plenary debate corpora

Appendix B – Dictionaries of EU term-level references

The original German dictionary has been created by Rauh (2015) reading one verbatim record of a plenary debate with an explicit EU issue on the agenda and one without such an agenda in each year of the investigation period (46 debates and a total of ~ 920 MP speeches). Each term-level EU reference found has been stored in the dictionary. Afterwards, the individual terms were generalized by regular expressions to include all possible inflections, plurals and derived compound terms possibly used in the German language.¹⁴ With the help of native speakers we have translated and adapted this dictionary into a Dutch (Appendix B2), English (B3) and Spanish (B4).

The dictionaries were then used as an input for a tagging script that automatically retrieved the number of hits per MP statement in the whole corpus. Along intense discussion in the whole research team and various pretests of individual n-grams in the corpora we ensured to keep only terms for which an EU reference is evident without further context to avoid ‘false positives’ (for example by including terms such as ‘Schengen’ or ‘CAP’ which are historically contingent or have additional meanings). We then manually checked the 50 statements with the highest number of EU references and a random sample of the same number of statements without hits to further assess the completeness of the dictionaries. Manual and automated tagging produced identical results.

Note that the dictionary lengths vary due to language specifics. Amongst other things, the prevalence of compound terms or the usage of hyphen constructions differ across languages. While ‘EU consumer policy’ in the British case would be matched by the higher-level term ‘EU’ already, the German equivalent ‘EU-Verbraucherpolitik’ requires a separate dictionary entry to be matched (in our setup specifically achieved by ‘(eu|eg)-[a-zAÖÜß]*politik(en){0,1}’).

Note furthermore that we included only constructs for which it is unequivocally clear on the term level that they refer to the EU. For example we would not count ‘Schengen’ but, amongst others, ‘European visa policy’. Thus we measure EU salience rather conservatively but guard ourselves against false positives that might occur as many terms have rather ambiguous meanings in different national contexts. And while we most likely underestimate the absolute number of EU references this does not matter for the discussions below as long as we can a) assume this bias to be consistent over time and parties *within* a given country and b) correct for this with the operationalisation and estimation procedures (with regard to language normalization and censored regressions).

¹⁴ Note that the final dictionaries contain exactly one whitespace left and right of each term to exclude in-word occurrences of abbreviations, for example. In the speeches to be coded we removed any non-text information, doubled whitespaces etc. and set them to lower case.

Appendix B2 – Spanish dictionary of term-level EU references

| EU polity | EU politics | EU policy |
|--|---|--|
| unión europea | comisión europea | mandato europeo |
| comunidad europea de la energía atómica | parlamento europeo | política exterior y de seguridad común |
| comunidad económica europea | consejo europeo | cooperación policial y judicial |
| comunidad(es)(0,1) europea(s)(0,1) | banco central europeo | mercado(s)(0,1) ([a-zaióñü]*)(0,1) ([a-zaióñü]*)(0,1) ([a-zaióñü]*)(0,1) europeo(s)(0,1) |
| ue | comisario(s)(0,1) europeo(s)(0,1) | agenda ([a-zaióñü]*)(0,1) ([a-zaióñü]*)(0,1) ([a-zaióñü]*)(0,1) europea |
| cee | funcionario(s)(0,1) europeo(s)(0,1) | presupuesto europeo |
| euratom | ejecutivo europeo | programa(s)(0,1) europea(s)(0,1) |
| tratado(s)(0,1) constitutivo(s)(0,1) de la (unión europea ue ce)(0,1) | elecciones europeas | regulación(es)(0,1) europea(s)(0,1) |
| tratado de la unión europea | eurodiputado(s)(0,1) | reglamento(s)(0,1) europeo(s)(0,1) |
| tratado de (maastricht ámsterdam niza lisboa roma fusión funcionamiento) | diputado(s)(0,1) al parlamento europeo | norma(s)(0,1) europea(s)(0,1) |
| acta única europea | miembro(s)(0,1) del parlamento europeo | objetivo(s)(0,1) europeo(s)(0,1) |
| tfue | consejo de ministros | medida(s)(0,1) europea(s)(0,1) |
| tue | consilium | instrumento(s)(0,1) europeo(s)(0,1) |
| isue | tjue | estándar(es)(0,1) europeo(s)(0,1) |
| tratado por el que se establece una constitución para europa | bce | cooperación(es)(0,1) europea(s)(0,1) |
| constitución europea | alto representante de la unión para asuntos exteriores y política | legislación(es)(0,1) ([a-zaióñü]*)(0,1) ([a-zaióñü]*)(0,1) ([a-zaióñü]*)(0,1) europea(s)(0,1) |
| tratado constitucional | política europea | ley(es)(0,1) ([a-zaióñü]*)(0,1) ([a-zaióñü]*)(0,1) ([a-zaióñü]*)(0,1) europea(s)(0,1) |
| ampliación(es)(0,1) de la (unión europea comunidad europea ue ce) | competencias de la (unión europea comunidad europea ue ce) | derecho(s)(0,1) ([a-zaióñü]*)(0,1) ([a-zaióñü]*)(0,1) ([a-zaióñü]*)(0,1) europeo(s)(0,1) |
| unión económica y monetaria de la (unión europea ue ce)(0,1) | elecciones al parlamento europeo | derecho europeo |
| uem | | procedimiento(s)(0,1) legislativo(s)(0,1) ([a-zaióñü]*)(0,1) ([a-zaióñü]*)(0,1) ([a-zaióñü]*)(0,1) europeo(s)(0,1) |
| (cel ces ue)[1-9][1,2] | | directiva(s)(0,1) europea(s)(0,1) |
| proyecto (común)(0,1) europeo | | reglamento(s)(0,1) europeo(s)(0,1) |
| unificación europea | | normativa europea |
| integración europea | | (decisión decisiones) ([a-zaióñü]*)(0,1) ([a-zaióñü]*)(0,1) ([a-zaióñü]*)(0,1) europea(s)(0,1) |
| marco institucional de la (unión europea comunidad europea ue ce) | | directiva(s)(0,1) ([a-zaióñü]*)(0,1) ([a-zaióñü]*)(0,1) ([a-zaióñü]*)(0,1) europea(s)(0,1) |
| instituciones europeas | | reforma(s)(0,1) europea(s)(0,1) |
| constitución europea | | normativa(s)(0,1) europea(s)(0,1) |
| | | compromiso(s)(0,1) europeo(s)(0,1) |
| | | estrategia(s)(0,1) europea(s)(0,1) |
| | | política europea de seguridad y de defensa |
| | | esdp |
| | | pcsd |
| | | (ordenamiento jurídico jurisdicción procedimiento legislativo) europe(a o) |
| | | procedimiento de infracción |
| | | cuestión prejudicial |
| | | moneda(s)(0,1) europea(s)(0,1) |
| | | moneda única |
| | | moneda común europea |
| | | zona euro |
| | | eurozona |
| | | zona del euro |
| | | fondo europeo |
| | | pacto de la estabilidad y de crecimiento |

Appendix B3 – Dutch dictionary of term-level EU references

| EU polity | EU politics | EU policy |
|---|---|---|
| europese unie | (eu)eg)-commissie | (eu)eg)-([a-zèèèèiöü]*){0,1}beleid |
| europese (economische atoom){0,1}gemeenschap(pen){0,1} | europese commissie | europa(es se) ([a-zèèèèiöü]*){0,1}beleid |
| eu | (eu)eg)-commissaris(sen){0,1} | europa(es se) ([a-zèèèèiöü]*){0,1}unie |
| eg | europese commissaris(sen){0,1} | europa(es se) manda(at ten) |
| eeg | (eu-eg)-ambtena(ar ren) | gemeenschappelijke markt |
| euratom | europese ambtena(ar ren) | europa(se es) buitenlands- en veiligheidsbeleid |
| (eu)eg)-verdrag(en){0,1} | europese executive | politiële en justitiële samenwerking in strafzaken |
| europese verdrag(en){0,1} | europa(es se) parlement(s){0,1} | europese ([a-zèèèèiöü]*){0,1}markt(en){0,1} |
| verdrag(en){0,1} van (rome maastricht amsterdam nicel lissabon) | (eu)eg)-parlement | (eu)eg)-([a-zèèèèiöü]*){0,1}agenda(s){0,1} |
| (rome maastricht amsterdam nicel lissabon)-verdrag(en) | ep | (eu)eg)-([a-zèèèèiöü]*){0,1}budget(ten){0,1}begroting(en){0,1} |
| europese eenheidsakte | europese verkiezingen | (eu)eg)-([a-zèèèèiöü]*){0,1}programma(s){0,1} |
| europese grondwet | (eu)eg)-verkiezingen | (eu)eg)-([a-zèèèèiöü]*){0,1}regeling(en){0,1} |
| europese grondwettelijk verdrag | europarlementar(ier iers ier iers) | europese ([a-zèèèèiöü]*){0,1}regeling(en){0,1} |
| grondwet voor europa | (eu)eg)-parlementar(ier iers ier iers) | (eu)eg)-([a-zèèèèiöü]*){0,1}voorschrift(en){0,1} |
| (eu)eg)-uitbreiding | raad van ministers | europa(se es) ([a-zèèèèiöü]*){0,1}voorschrift(en){0,1} |
| europese monetaire unie | europese president | (eu)eg)-([a-zèèèèiöü]*){0,1}eis(en){0,1} |
| europa van de [1-9]{1,2} | (eu)eg)-voorzitter(schap){0,1} | europese ([a-zèèèèiöü]*){0,1}eis(en){0,1} |
| (eu)eg)-{0,1}[1-9]{1,2} | europese raad | (eu)eg)-([a-zèèèèiöü]*){0,1}(doel(en){0,1} doelstelling(en){0,1}) |
| europese project(en){0,1} | (eu)eg)-top | europa(se es) ([a-zèèèèiöü]*){0,1}(doel(en){0,1} doelstelling(en){0,1}) |
| europese (integratie eenwording samenwerking) | eurotop | (eu)eg)-([a-zèèèèiöü]*){0,1}(maatregel(s){0,1} aktie(s){0,1}) |
| (eu)eg)-institutie(s){0,1} | europese top | europese ([a-zèèèèiöü]*){0,1}(maatregel(s){0,1} aktie(s){0,1}) |
| europa(es se) institutie(s){0,1} | (eu-eg)-lidsta(at ten) | (eu)eg)-([a-zèèèèiöü]*){0,1}instrument(en){0,1} |
| economische en monetaire unie | europese lidsta(at ten) | europa(se es) ([a-zèèèèiöü]*){0,1}instrument(en){0,1} |
| emu | europa(es se) hof van justitie | (eu)eg)-([a-zèèèèiöü]*){0,1}standaard(en){0,1} |
| | europa(es se) gerechtshof | europese ([a-zèèèèiöü]*){0,1}standaard(en){0,1} |
| | europese centrale bank | (eu)eg)-([a-zèèèèiöü]*){0,1}norm(en){0,1} |
| | ecb | europese ([a-zèèèèiöü]*){0,1}norm(en){0,1} |
| | ecb-[a-zèèèèiöü]* | (eu)eg)-([a-zèèèèiöü]*){0,1}samenwerking |
| | hoge vertegenwoordiger van de unie voor | europese ([a-zèèèèiöü]*){0,1}samenwerking |
| | europa(es se) beleid | (eu)eg)-([a-zèèèèiöü]*){0,1}wet(ten) |
| | europa(es se) niv(o)eau | europese ([a-zèèèèiöü]*){0,1}wet(ten) |
| | (eu)eg)-niv(o)eau | (eu)eg)-([a-zèèèèiöü]*){0,1}wetgeving |
| | europa(es se) proces(sen) | europese ([a-zèèèèiöü]*){0,1}wetgeving |
| | europa(es se) besluit (vorming) | (eu)eg)-([a-zèèèèiöü]*){0,1}recht |
| | (eu)eg)-bevoegdhe(id den) | (eu)eg)-([a-zèèèèiöü]*){0,1}recht(spraak sorde){0,1} |
| | europese bevoegdhe(id den) | (eu)eg)-([a-zèèèèiöü]*){0,1}richtlijn(en){0,1} |
| | | europese ([a-zèèèèiöü]*){0,1}richtlijn(en){0,1} |
| | | (eu)eg)-([a-zèèèèiöü]*){0,1}verordening(en){0,1} |
| | | europese ([a-zèèèèiöü]*){0,1}verordening(en){0,1} |
| | | (eu)eg)-([a-zèèèèiöü]*){0,1}beslissing(en){0,1} |
| | | europese ([a-zèèèèiöü]*){0,1}beslissing(en){0,1} |
| | | (eu)eg)-([a-zèèèèiöü]*){0,1}besluit(en){0,1} |
| | | europese ([a-zèèèèiöü]*){0,1}besluit(en){0,1} |
| | | (eu)eg)-([a-zèèèèiöü]*){0,1}besluitvorming(sproces sprocessen){0,1} |
| | | europese ([a-zèèèèiöü]*){0,1}besluitvorming(sproces sprocessen){0,1} |
| | | (eu)eg)-([a-zèèèèiöü]*){0,1}strategie(n){0,1} |
| | | europese ([a-zèèèèiöü]*){0,1}strategie(n){0,1} |
| | | gemeenschappelijk(e){0,1} veiligheids- en defensiebeleid |
| | | gvdb |
| | | europese veiligheids- en defensiebeleid |
| | | evdb |
| | | gemeenschappelijk(e){0,1} buitenlands- en veiligheidsbeleid |
| | | europese ([a-zèèèèiöü]*){0,1}recht(spraak sorde){0,1} |
| | | europa(se es) ([a-zèèèèiöü]*){0,1}recht |
| | | vweu |
| | | europese munteenheid |
| | | gemeenschappelijke munt |
| | | eurozone |
| | | europa(es se) ([a-zèèèèiöü]*){0,1}fonds(en){0,1} |
| | | (eu)eg)-([a-zèèèèiöü]*){0,1}fonds(en){0,1} |
| | | stabiliteits- en groeipact |

Appendix B4 – English dictionary of term-level EU references

| EU polity | EU politics | EU policy |
|--|---|---|
| (eu ec)[1-9]{1,2} | ecb | (c e)sdp |
| (european europe's eu's) constitutional treaty | ecj | (common european) foreign and security polic(y)ies |
| (rome maastricht amsterdam nice lisbon) treat(y)ies | ep | (common european) security and defen(s)c(e) polic(y)ies |
| ec'(s){0,1} | european (official(s){0,1} civil servant(s){0,1}) | eurozone euro zone euro area |
| economic and monetary union | european (politics policy) | cfsp |
| eec'(s){0,1} | european central bank | european ([a-z]*){0,1}polic(y)ies |
| emu | european commission(er ers){0,1} | european ([a-z]*){0,1}(act(s){0,1} bill(s){0,1} law(s){0,1} legislation(s){0,1} statute(s){0,1}) |
| eu'(s){0,1} | european competenc(e es ies) | european ([a-z]*){0,1}(aim(s){0,1} goal(s){0,1} target(s){0,1}) |
| euratom'(s){0,1} | european council | european ([a-z]*){0,1}decision(s){0,1} |
| european ([a-z]*){0,1}(integration unification cooperation) | european court of justice | european ([a-z]*){0,1}directive(s){0,1} |
| european_communit(y)ies | european election(s){0,1} | european ([a-z]*){0,1}engagement(s){0,1} |
| european (economic atomic energy)communit(y)ies | european executive | european ([a-z]*){0,1}guideline(s){0,1} |
| european institutions | european level(s){0,1} | european ([a-z]*){0,1}(measure(s){0,1} action(s){0,1}) |
| european project(s){0,1} | european member state(s){0,1} | european ([a-z]*){0,1}(provision(s){0,1} prescription(s){0,1}) |
| european treat(y)ies | european parliament | european ([a-z]*){0,1}(requirement(s){0,1} allowance(s){0,1}) |
| european_union'(s){0,1} | european procedure(s){0,1} | european ([a-z]*){0,1}(standard(s){0,1} norm(s){0,1}) |
| single european act | european summit(s){0,1} | european ([a-z]*){0,1}agenda(s){0,1} |
| treat(y)ies of (rome maastricht amsterdam nice lisbon) | mep(s){0,1} | european ([a-z]*){0,1}budget(s){0,1} |
| treaty establishing a constitution for europe | policy on europe | european ([a-z]*){0,1}f(u)nd(s){0,1} |
| treaty on (the functioning of the)(0,1)european union | | european ([a-z]*){0,1}programme(s){0,1} |
| | | european ([a-z]*){0,1}regulation(s){0,1} |
| | | european ([a-z]*){0,1}strateg(y)ies |
| | | european (case-law jurisprudence legal) |
| | | european (single internal)market(0,1) |
| | | european [a-z]* union |
| | | european currenc(y)ies |
| | | european mandate(s){0,1} |
| | | police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters |
| | | single currency |
| | | stability and growth pact |

Appendix C – Distribution and transformation of the dependent variable




Figure C1: Distribution and transformation of the dependent variable

Appendix D – Dataset description

| Variable | Tech.name | Description | Government parties | | | | | Opposition parties | | | | |
|----------------------------|-----------------|--|--------------------|--------|--------|--------|------|--------------------|--------|--------|--------|------|
| | | | Min | Med. | Mean | Max | SD | Min | Med. | Mean | Max | SD |
| Country | country | ISO 3166 country code | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Party | party | Abbreviation of party name | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Month | month | Month in 'YYYY-MM' format | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| EU emphasis | eu.w | Average, lang. standardized, relative frequency of EU terms | 0,00 | 0,74 | 0,85 | 7,57 | 0,66 | 0,00 | 0,58 | 0,75 | 9,38 | 0,73 |
| EU emphasis (log) | eu.wl | log(1+eu.w) | 0,00 | 0,55 | 0,57 | 2,15 | 0,31 | 0,00 | 0,46 | 0,50 | 2,34 | 0,33 |
| EU authority | eu.authority | Scope (# of policy areas) + delegation (% decisions with Comm. initiative) + pooling (% decisions with Council majority voting; Biesenbender (2011)) | 135,40 | 150,90 | 151,80 | 159,50 | 6,93 | 135,40 | 150,90 | 151,90 | 159,50 | 7,03 |
| Comm. proposals | compropsma6 | Moving average of Commission proposals adopted in the last six months; Häge (2011); ends 12/2012 | 28,00 | 42,17 | 43,41 | 66,17 | 7,18 | 28,00 | 42,17 | 43,39 | 66,17 | 7,23 |
| EU directives | eudirectivesma6 | Moving average of EU directives adopted during the last six months; Häge (2011); ends 12/2010 | 0,50 | 4,17 | 4,32 | 11,50 | 1,74 | 0,50 | 4,17 | 4,36 | 11,50 | 1,76 |
| EU summit | eusummitma | 1 during summits, .5 in preceding and subsequent months, else zero | 0,00 | 0,50 | 0,66 | 1,00 | 0,33 | 0,00 | 0,50 | 0,66 | 1,00 | 0,33 |
| Treaty rat. | t.rat | 1 during months between treaty signature and entry into force, else zero | 0,00 | 0,00 | 0,40 | 1,00 | 0,49 | 0,00 | 0,00 | 0,41 | 1,00 | 0,49 |
| Comm. inauguration | comminaugma | 1 during months with inauguration of a new EU commission, else zero | 0,00 | 0,00 | 0,05 | 1,00 | 0,19 | 0,00 | 0,00 | 0,05 | 1,00 | 0,18 |
| EU ref. (elsewhere) | EUrefma | 1 during months with EU referenda in other EU MS, .5 in preceding and subsequent months, else zero | 0,00 | 0,00 | 0,14 | 1,00 | 0,30 | 0,00 | 0,00 | 0,14 | 1,00 | 0,30 |
| EU ref. (domestic) | DomRefma | 1 during months with EU referenda in country, .5 in preceding and subsequent | 0,00 | 0,00 | 0,01 | 1,00 | 0,06 | 0,00 | 0,00 | 0,01 | 1,00 | 0,07 |

| | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|--------------------------------|-----------------|--|-------|-------|-------|------|------|-------|-------|-------|------|------|
| | | months, else zero | | | | | | | | | | |
| Council presidency | presidencyma | 1 during months in which COUNTRY holds EU presidency, else zero | 0,00 | 0,00 | 0,14 | 1,00 | 0,34 | 0,00 | 0,00 | 0,13 | 1,00 | 0,34 |
| Manifesto EU salience | man.eu.salience | Share of EU related statements in last election manifesto | 0,00 | 2,96 | 3,20 | 7,05 | 1,54 | 0,00 | 2,66 | 2,95 | 7,30 | 1,84 |
| Domestic Euroscept. | eb.mean | Mean of nationally averaged, re-scaled EB membership item (1='Good thing', 3='Bad thing'); GESIS; ends 07/2011 | 1,22 | 1,47 | 1,53 | 2,04 | 0,21 | 1,22 | 1,46 | 1,51 | 2,04 | 0,21 |
| National election cycle | nat.cycle | Quadratic decay from 0 during dom. election to -1 in mid-term | -1,00 | -0,75 | -0,67 | 0,00 | 0,30 | -1,00 | -0,75 | -0,68 | 0,00 | 0,29 |
| EP election cycle | ep.cycle | Quadratic decay from 0 during EP election to -1 in mid-term | -1,00 | -0,75 | -0,66 | 0,00 | 0,29 | -1,00 | -0,75 | -0,66 | 0,00 | 0,30 |
| Parl. oversight | wep | Index for institutional parliamentary powers in EU affairs; Winzen (2012) | 0,33 | 1,67 | 1,56 | 2,17 | 0,53 | 0,33 | 1,50 | 1,47 | 2,17 | 0,54 |
| Party EU dissent | che.dissent | Dissent on Europ. integration among activists of PARTY; Ray/Chapel Hill Expert Surveys, rescaled [0:1] | 0,04 | 0,26 | 0,26 | 0,63 | 0,15 | 0,02 | 0,23 | 0,26 | 0,75 | 0,15 |
| DE | DE | Country dummy | 0,00 | 0,00 | 0,34 | 1,00 | 0,47 | 0,00 | 0,00 | 0,26 | 1,00 | 0,44 |
| ES | ES | Country dummy | 0,00 | 0,00 | 0,16 | 1,00 | 0,37 | 0,00 | 0,00 | 0,25 | 1,00 | 0,43 |
| UK | UK | Country dummy | 0,00 | 0,00 | 0,18 | 1,00 | 0,39 | 0,00 | 0,00 | 0,18 | 1,00 | 0,38 |

Table D1: Available variables and their descriptive statistics

| Country | EU salience available from | <i>Data available</i> | |
|---------|-------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| | | Unique parties in parliament | Party-months with complete IV data |
| DE | 1991-03 | 5 | 1,076 |
| ES | 1989-11 | 4 | 826 |
| NL | 1994-12 | 9 | 1,202 |
| UK | 1988-11 | 3 | 684 |

Table D2: Complete party-month observations by country

Notes: Complete cases are right-censored since data on EU policy output measures end in 12/2010 (see above); number of unique parties in parliament may vary over legislative periods.

Appendix E – Regression diagnostics and robustness checks

How much can we rely on the statistical conclusions presented in the main text? To tackle this question we conducted a range of post-estimation diagnostics and robustness checks. Initially, the residuals from models (4) and (8) show no systematic heteroskedasticity or autocorrelation across and within countries or parties. But we do see a relatively low model fit in Table 2 of the main text. On the one hand, this is not surprising given our highly sensitive and volatile measure of EU emphasis. It competes against every thinkable issue that might catch the attention of domestic parliaments at any given point in time. Modelling such agenda dynamics in full seems infeasible so that a low fit has to be accepted. On the other hand, a low fit is problematic where the causes are not random but result from omitting systematically relevant variables. Indeed, the regression diagnostics in Appendix D indicate slightly left-skewed residual distributions with long right tails. This suggests that our models strongly underestimate EU emphasis in a few individual party months. Thus we qualitatively analysed the content of those debates for which the residuals exceeded a three standard deviations distance from their mean (12 months for government, and 37 months for opposition parties). We find that these cases contain very specific national debates about European issues. The strongest outliers, for example, come from Germany in autumn 2009 where the Bundestag was not only debating ratification of the Lisbon treaty but also the institutional responses to the Lisbon-judgement of the German Federal Constitutional Court which demanded stronger parliamentary involvement in EU affairs. Similarly, the Goodman report on *House of Commons* scrutiny procedures in EU affairs accounts for an unusually high number of EU references in the British lower house in February 2008. Furthermore, the proposed EU services directive in 2005, and some international events with strong EU involvement such as the WTO Cancun meeting in 2003 are reflected in positive individual party-months outliers of EU-emphasis. While these idiosyncratic explanations are plausible, we cannot derive general patterns from them. To be nevertheless sure that they do not leverage the above discussed results, we recalculated our main models without these outliers. The model fit increases by about 3.5 percentage points each, the diagnostic plots improve markedly, but our main results are by and large replicated. Exceptions are the only rarely changing parliamentary oversight index which closely fails to reach statistical significance in this specification and the negative effects of the national cycle which come out much more pronounced and statistically significant for both government and opposition.

Finally, we also checked in how far our assumptions about zeros on the dependent variable drive our results. To this end we replicated model (4) and (8) with a simple OLS estimation, assuming that zeros indicate absence of EU emphasis, and repeat the procedure without zero observations, thus ‘explaining’ only the observable range of EU emphasis (Table E1). Again our major conclusions are not affected. The positive effects of foreign and domestic EU referenda as well as Commission inaugurations come out a bit more pronounced particularly for opposition parties, and the national election cycle switches signs for the opposition but only if we exclude all zero observations. So for the latter variable and parliamentary oversight institutions some caution is warranted, all other statistical associations appear pretty robust.




Figure E1: Regression diagnostics Model (4)




Figure E2: Regression diagnostics Model (8)

| | Tobit w/out outliers | | | OLS models | | |
|---------------------------|----------------------------------|---------------------------------|----------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| | Gov. | Opp. | Gov. | Gov. (no zeroes) | Opp. | Opp. (no zeroes) |
| EU authority | 0.151 ^{***} (0.036) | 0.100 ^{***} (0.027) | 0.162 ^{***} (0.037) | 0.153 ^{***} (0.036) | 0.097 ^{***} (0.029) | 0.095 ^{***} (0.029) |
| EU directives | 0.065 ^{**} (0.029) | 0.049 [*] (0.021) | 0.071 [*] (0.031) | 0.078 [*] (0.030) | 0.044 [*] (0.022) | 0.041 ⁺ (0.022) |
| Comm. proposals | 0.039 (0.029) | 0.040 ⁺ (0.022) | 0.035 (0.033) | 0.035 (0.032) | 0.041 ⁺ (0.023) | 0.044 ⁺ (0.023) |
| EU summit | 0.202 ^{***} (0.025) | 0.201 ^{***} (0.018) | 0.178 ^{***} (0.027) | 0.158 ^{***} (0.027) | 0.166 ^{***} (0.019) | 0.137 ^{***} (0.019) |
| Treaty rat. | 0.025 (0.026) | 0.040 [*] (0.019) | 0.041 (0.027) | 0.026 (0.027) | 0.052 [*] (0.020) | 0.041 [*] (0.020) |
| EU ref. (elsewhere) | 0.035 (0.026) | 0.018 (0.019) | 0.043 (0.029) | 0.055 ⁺ (0.028) | 0.041 ⁺ (0.021) | 0.052 [*] (0.021) |
| Comm. inauguration | 0.042 (0.035) | 0.045 ⁺ (0.024) | 0.051 (0.035) | 0.057 ⁺ (0.035) | 0.062 [*] (0.026) | 0.058 [*] (0.026) |
| EP election cycle | -0.015 (0.027) | 0.018 (0.019) | -0.013 (0.028) | -0.026 (0.027) | 0.008 (0.020) | 0.007 (0.020) |
| Council presidency | 0.088 ^{***} (0.027) | 0.036 ⁺ (0.019) | 0.070 ^{***} (0.027) | 0.068 [*] (0.026) | 0.036 ⁺ (0.020) | 0.039 ⁺ (0.020) |
| EU ref. (domestic) | 0.017 (0.022) | 0.036 [*] (0.018) | 0.044 (0.036) | 0.044 (0.036) | 0.059 [*] (0.026) | 0.055 [*] (0.026) |
| Parl. oversight powers | -0.044 (0.051) | 0.050 (0.039) | -0.050 (0.051) | -0.029 (0.051) | 0.072 ⁺ (0.040) | 0.077 ⁺ (0.041) |
| Domestic Eurocept. | -0.194 ^{***} (0.054) | -0.096 [*] (0.039) | -0.187 ^{***} (0.055) | -0.162 ^{**} (0.053) | -0.100 [*] (0.040) | -0.098 [*] (0.039) |
| Nat. election cycle | -0.085 ^{**} (0.028) | -0.049 [*] (0.020) | -0.047 (0.031) | -0.009 (0.030) | -0.015 (0.021) | 0.037 ⁺ (0.021) |
| Party EU dissent | 0.102 ^{**} (0.035) | 0.055 ^{**} (0.019) | 0.106 ^{**} (0.038) | 0.101 ^{**} (0.037) | 0.056 ^{**} (0.020) | 0.055 ^{**} (0.020) |
| Manifesto EU salience | 0.006 (0.024) | 0.132 ^{***} (0.019) | -0.004 (0.027) | 0.003 (0.026) | 0.129 ^{***} (0.020) | 0.125 ^{***} (0.019) |
| Observations | 1,265 | 2,474 | 1,277 | 1,236 | 2,511 | 2,381 |
| Adj. R ² | 0.21 | 0.14 | 0.177 | 0.161 | 0.122 | 0.102 |
| Log likelihood | -739.788 | -1,540.355 | | | | |
| F statistic | | | 16.194 ^{***} | 14.143 ^{***} | 20.287 ^{***} | 16.082 ^{***} |
| <i>Wald test</i> (18 df) | 372.637 ^{***} | 471.223 ^{***} | | | | |

Notes: ***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05, +p < .1; Standardized coefficients, robust standard errors in parentheses, Country fixed effects and constants estimated but not shown

Table E1: Alternative model specifications




Figure E3: Regression diagnostics, Model (4) outliers excluded




Figure E4: Regression diagnostics, Model (8) outliers excluded

Appendix F – Controlling for EU positions voiced in party manifestos

The salience of EU issues in party manifestos is strongly correlated with the partisan position on these issues (as capture by the standard Manifesto net-support measure). When parties mention the EU at all in their campaign platforms, they tend to do so in a positive manner. This appendix highlights that parties ending up in the opposition are somewhat more sceptical towards the EU than parties ending up in government (Figure F1). Given the correlation of the salience and position variables, however, collinearity prohibits including them both in our main models. To see whether this choice affects our conclusions, Table F1 replicates the models 4 and 8 from the main text by substituting the Manifesto salience measure with the expressed net EU support from the same data source. Our main conclusions remain robust to this alternative specification while the coefficients for the EU position variable highlight once more diverging behaviour of government and opposition parties. The more support parties ending up in government expressed in their manifesto, the less they tend to refer to the EU on the plenary floor. For opposition parties this is reversed: Having voiced more positive (sceptical) positions in their manifesto is associated with more (less) EU references in parliament. This bolsters our conclusion on the opposition deficit.




Figure F1: Mean EU support in party manifestos of opposition and government parties

| | Government | Opposition |
|------------------------------|---|--|
| EU Authority | 0.155 ^{***} (0.038) | 0.129 ^{***} (0.030) |
| EU directives | 0.066 [*] (0.031) | 0.051 [*] (0.023) |
| Comm. proposals | 0.038 (0.034) | 0.039 (0.024) |
| EU summit | 0.183 ^{***} (0.028) | 0.184 ^{***} (0.020) |
| Treaty rat. | 0.044 (0.028) | 0.065 ^{**} (0.021) |
| EU ref. (elsewhere) | 0.045 (0.030) | 0.029 (0.022) |
| Comm. inauguration | 0.053 (0.035) | 0.059 [*] (0.027) |
| EP election cycle | -0.014 (0.028) | 0.002 (0.021) |
| Council presidency | 0.071 ^{**} (0.027) | 0.039 ⁺ (0.021) |
| EU ref. (domestic) | 0.047 (0.036) | 0.051 [*] (0.026) |
| Parl. oversight powers | -0.073 (0.051) | 0.068 (0.041) |
| Domestic Euroscept. | -0.157 ^{**} (0.060) | -0.123 ^{**} (0.042) |
| National election cycle | -0.052 (0.032) | -0.033 (0.022) |
| Party EU dissent | 0.097 [*] (0.039) | 0.071 ^{**} (0.023) |
| <i>Manifesto EU position</i> | <i>-0.063[*]</i> <i>(0.030)</i> | <i>0.054[*]</i> <i>(0.022)</i> |
| Adj. R2 | 0.18 | 0.1 |
| Observations | 1,277 | 2,511 |
| Log likelihood | -851.683 | -1,833.634 |
| Wald test (df = 18) | 311.267 ^{***} | 358.064 ^{***} |

Notes: *** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05, + p < .1; Standardized coefficients, robust standard errors in parentheses, Country fixed effects and constants estimated but not shown

Table F1: Replicating the main models (4 and 8) with Manifesto EU position instead of salience

Appendix G – Substantive effects

Do the estimated effects matter? After several steps of standardisation and variable transformations it is arguably hard to assess the substantive significance of these findings. Thus for Table G1 we reverse-engineered the coefficients from our main models and expressed them as the number of monthly literal references to supranational politics in relation to meaningful changes in selected independent variables. The presented figures assume that all other factors stay at their mean and that the respective party gives the average number of monthly speeches that we have observed during the overall investigation period in the respective parliament. To further put this into perspective, we also add the investigation period means of EU references and literal references to budgetary issues (crudely captured by counting mentions of ‘tax’, ‘spending’, and ‘budget’ in the respective language).

| | | <i>Predicted change in monthly absolute number of EU references</i> | | | | | | | |
|-----------------------------------|--|---|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-------|-----|
| | | DE | | ES | | NL | | UK | |
| IV | Exemplary change in IV | Gov | Opp | Gov | Opp | Gov | Opp | Gov | Opp |
| EU authority | SEA to Maastricht | +19 | +12 | +12 | +8 | +12 | +7 | +45 | +28 |
| | SEA to Lisbon | +30 | +19 | +20 | +13 | +19 | +12 | +73 | +28 |
| EU directives | Ten add. EU directives in last six months | +4 | +2 | +2 | +2 | +2 | +2 | +9 | +6 |
| EU summit | One European Council | +32 | +35 | +21 | +23 | +20 | +22 | +78 | +84 |
| Council presidency | Normal period vs. national Council presidency | +11 | +6 | +7 | +4 | +7 | +4 | +28 | +15 |
| Parliamentary oversight | No inst. vs. full document access with mandatory government memorandum | -5 | +8 | -3 | +5 | -3 | +5 | -13 | +19 |
| Euroscepticism | Opinion on EU member- ship swings from ' <i>good thing</i> ' to ' <i>neither/nor</i> ' | -43 | -27 | -28 | -18 | -27 | -17 | -103 | -65 |
| Investigation period baselines | Ø EU references / month | 96 | 47 | 116 | 34 | 57 | 27 | 346 | 150 |
| | Ø Budg. Ref. / month | 988 | | 446 | | 719 | | 1,808 | |

Table G1: Substantive effects for government (model 4) and opposition parties (model8)

Note: Response to EU authority for the NL case are partially out-of-sample predictions based on Dutch parties' responses to quantitative authority shifts observed for the Maastricht, Amsterdam, Nice and Lisbon treaties 'only'.

In summary this data indicates that the observed relationships describe substantively meaningful effects. For example, even if all factors would stay the same, the treaty-based authority transfer in the move from the SEA to the Maastricht Treaty alone accounts for 45 additional public monthly EU references by government parties on the *House of Commons* floor. Had all other conditions stayed the same until the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the isolated effect of the formal transfer of political competences to Brussel through the four consecutive treaty revisions accounts for 73 additional governmental EU references in British plenary debates. This alone represents around 21% of the average monthly number of EU references we would expect from these parties given our investigation period averages.

The substantive effect of the average number EU directives adopted in the last six months is not as impressive. The prediction is that ten additional directives – the EU adopts 43 in such a period on average – would, for example, lead to only four and two additional plenary EU references from the German government or opposition, respectively. This probably partially reflects that hardly all of these directives are transposed and debated within this six-month period, but it also re-emphasizes that the formal transfer of authority seems to have stronger effects on plenary EU emphasis than the actual exercise of authority. What matters clearly, however, are the periods in which the EU heads of state and government set the basic priorities of supranational decision-making: In the months around EU summits our models predict between 20 and 84 additional EU references in the domestic plenaries – again, holding everything else constant. In absolute terms, this effect is only trumped by domestic Euroscepticism. For example, a hypothetical shift of public opinion from considering EU membership a good thing to being indifferent on average is predicted to lead to 103 or still 17 EU references less for British government and Dutch opposition parties, respectively. Finally, our crude comparison to budgetary issues suggests that communication about EU affairs is far from completely dwarfed by this prime competence of national parliaments.