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German Reprisals in Norway During the Second World War

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Preface and acknowledgements

The process for finding the topic I wanted to write about for my master's thesis was a long one. It began with narrowing down my wide field of interests to the Norwegian resistance movement. This was done through several discussions with professors at the historical institute of NTNU. Via further discussions with Frode Færøy, associate professor at The Norwegian Home Front Museum, I got it narrowed down to reprisals, and the cases and questions this thesis tackles.

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Abstract

The research topic of this master's thesis seeks to map the German use of reprisals as a tool of occupation in occupied Norway, between 1940 and 1945. As part of this effort, previous researches that have touched upon the subject are used as the base of the empirical content. The monographs are in part compared to each other, and in part compared to findings of this thesis. Later years has seen some of the perceptions of the war in Norway change. This includes the topic of reprisals. This thesis attempts to answer some questions regarding reprisals. What the German authorities did. Who among the German authorities made the decisions. What factors influenced the use of reprisals. Finally, how were the reprisals in Norway, compared to another occupied country, the Netherlands. In terms of methodology, the findings of this thesis are that executions and hostage-takings were the most common reprisal methods, followed by a handful of other methods, including civilian martial law. The methods mirrored the intentions of the most prominent German authority figure in Norway, *Reichskommissar* Josef Terboven. He considered Norway to be a side-step on the career ladder, and sought to stabilise the country, so he could leave for a more prestigious post. His main personal policies for achieving stability was to subdue the population, and to do as little damage as possible to the economy, while doing so. As a result of Terboven's ambitions and need for control, he sought to dominate the administration in Norway. As a result, he was the only one to order reprisals in Norway. In spite of his short temper, his ambitions seem to have moderated his decisions regarding reprisals. His temper also had the effect of turning the Berlin central leadership against him, limiting his reprisal options towards the end. The most important influences on the reprisals were the actions and policies of the Norwegian resistance movement, the distance to the front lines, and intervention from Berlin. The Netherlands has many things in common with Norway, making comparisons natural. However, the two countries are also different in some key ways, causing a greater toll on the Netherlands than on Norway, in terms of reprisals. Occupied Norway suffered from the reprisals enacted upon the population during the war. Every reprisal is a tragedy in its own right. Compared to the Netherlands however, this thesis has found that the reprisals could have been a lot worse, if not for a few key differences, as described above.

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1. Introduction

The Second World War is an integrated part of the Norwegian people's identity. As such, it has been the subject of many books and movies, and many of those who lived during the war have told their children and grand-children of what they experienced. Over time, the generation of people who lived through these difficult years is nearly gone, and historians have begun to shift the perspective into a broader one. More facts have come to light, archives have been opened, and the emotional climate surrounding the memory of the war has cooled enough that some research has emerged that seeks to disprove established narratives. These researches have not all been well received, highlighting the emotional aspects of the topic of the Second World War. At the heart of any history of occupation lies the question of how the civilian population was treated by the occupying forces. The treatment of civilians is perhaps best illustrated by how the occupying forces used reprisals when they experienced any resistance to their rule. This thesis will investigate the use of reprisals on the civilian population of Norway during the German occupation from 1940 to 1945.

This thesis aims to map the history of reprisals in Norway, as a tool of the German occupational government. As such, three reprisals that were committed in Norway have been picked out, and will be covered in this thesis. The first of these is the declaration of martial law in Central Norway October 1942. The second reprisal to be covered is the execution of five hostages following the train sabotage attack in Mjøndalen October 1943. The third and final of the reprisals in Norway to be presented is the execution of 34 hostages after the assassination of head of Statoil Karl Marthinsen February 1945. In addition, the heavy water sabotage attack in Vemork at the end of February 1943 is covered. The aftermath of the attack provides an insight into the reasoning behind considering reprisals. This attack stands out as one of the largest sabotage strikes during the Second World War. The choice not to enact reprisals is significant, and provides insight into the considerations behind reprisals.

For comparative reasons, reprisals committed in the Netherlands is also covered. These two countries found themselves in a generally similar situation during the Second World War. The comparative grounds will be further discussed in the next section dedicated to the research topic. A general layout of the thesis structure will be provided in section 1.2, titled Chapter Introduction.

1.1 Research topic, reprisal background

The research topic explores the German policies of reprisals as a strategic tool during the German occupation of Norway. The thesis will assess reprisals chiefly from the German point of view, but also touch upon the effect of the countermeasures made by the Norwegian resistance movement and their British and Norwegian colleagues in SOE. Four sub-topics will be considered, followed by a delimitation of the research topic, source material, a short explanation of the German offices responsible for presiding over reprisals, and the most important decision-makers. The Netherlands will be presented as a topic for comparison.

The first sub-topic concerns how German reprisals were used in Norway. In essence, what exactly did the German authorities do when they were committing reprisals? How were their methodologies formed by motives, and how did they evolve as the war went on? This sub-topic was chosen because it has only been covered case-by-case. While elements of an escalation and parts of the topic of reprisal has been touched upon in previous research, this has not been explored further. The motives of the *Reichskommissar* in Norway, Josef Terboven, have gotten a mention in the monograph *Hitlers Norge*, but has not been tied together with any of the reprisals featured in this thesis.

The second sub-topic aims to identify who made the decisions to commit acts of reprisal. *Reichskommissar* Terboven is a clear decision-maker in the case of reprisals carried out in Norway, but the thesis will also look into what role the acting military leader of the Wehrmacht in Norway, general Nikolaus von Falkenhorst played in the decision-making, as well as that of the SS in Norway. A part of this sub-topic is exploring the role that the different considerations of the leaders ordering the reprisals had in shaping the methodology outlined in the first sub-topic, as the war progressed. While the topic of the authorities behind the reprisals has been partially broached before, this sub-topic aims to cover the topic for more than just one case, and to see how the selection of cases differed from the cases from the Netherlands.

The third sub-topic explores what factors influenced the German government's reprisals. These motivations will be discussed on a case-by-case basis, as well as relating to the overall policies guiding the decision-makers. This sub-topic will also assess whether or not said policies changed. There is not enough available data for a robust statistical analysis of the effects of various influences, but some trends that surface might be identified. Furthermore, the reports from the

German Intelligence branches in Norway comment and make conclusions on cases relevant to their stance on reprisals, as a reaction to the Norwegian resistance.

The fourth sub-topic is a comparison between the preceding three sub-topics and the administration of another, and in many ways similar, German-occupied country: The Netherlands. The manner in which this comparison will be done is that a summary of the dynamics of reprisals and sabotage in the Netherlands will be made at the end of the empirical chapter. These will then be compared to the Norwegian cases in the discussions chapter. The final sub-topic was designed to cover a part of each of the previous three sub-topics that has not been done to any great degree. The reprisals in Norway, the leaders who ordered them, and the influences on the leaders and the reprisals they ordered have not been compared at length before, to the Netherlands, nor to other countries. The limitations to this sub-topic are discussed at the end of this section.

The choice of the Netherlands as a comparison to Norway is due to the similar administrations in each country, with for instance both countries having had a *Reichskommissariat*. This distinction implied that both countries were intended for annexation once the war ended, had the Germans won. This was in part due to both peoples' inclusion by race theorists as "Aryan". A purely military governorship on the other hand, would have signalled purely military goals being behind the occupation. Erecting a *Reichskommissariat* on the other hand, signalled political motives. The political grasp of the *Reichskommissar* included all civilian powers and functions that were held by the now-absent government, monarchy included in the cases of Norway and the Netherlands. The *Reichskommissariat* was not independent. It was, in essence, an executive arm of the central leadership in Nazi Germany, answering to Hitler specifically. In both cases, both countries eventually had shadow cabinets made up of Nazi sympathisers from Norway and the Netherlands, respectively. The eventual establishment of the Quisling- and Mussert shadow governments changed little in respect to the formal power of the *Reichskommissariat*, however. Both countries also had resistance organisations that committed acts of sabotage and assassination, for which the German authorities committed acts of reprisal.

The histories of the two countries are not perfectly similar, however. The head of the SS in the Netherlands, Hanns Albin Rauter¹, was responsible for several decisions related to reprisals in the

1 Hanns Albin Rauter, born 1895, died 1949. Rauter was the head of the SS in the Netherlands. March 1945, Rauter was injured in an attack by the Dutch resistance. His temporary replacement ordered harsh reprisals. Rauter was arrested after the war, and executed for war crimes in 1949.

Netherlands. Wilhelm Redieß² was more muted in his role in the reprisals in Norway, than his colleague in the Netherlands. The reasons behind this will be part of this thesis, in sections 2.3, 2.4 and 4. Furthermore, the nature of the resistance movements in either country were very different. The Dutch organisations were manifold, counting at the very least three major military organisations, one sabotage and assassination group, and several smaller, specialised organisations. As will be presented in chapter 2, the contact between the SOE and the Dutch resistance was often plagued by informants, arrests and raids. The affected organisations were infiltrated for a long time before the SOE caught on. The Norwegian resistance movement (Milorg) on the other hand was not infiltrated to the same degree as their counterparts in the Netherlands. While there were infiltrations of single cells, the central leadership managed to stay hidden until 1943, when its existence was revealed. Even after the revelation, the Milorg organisation managed to operate until its disbandment until after the war. Finally, the manner of reprisals from the German authorities was different. Execution, food embargo, and deportation played a bigger role in the Netherlands, than in Norway. In Norway on the other hand, declarations of martial law and the temporary banning of certain goods were used as a tool of reprisal.

The description of reprisals in the Netherlands will be mostly based upon established monographs, and will be limited to describing reprisals to serve as a comparison to the German usage of reprisals in Norway. Another limitation in this thesis is that not all cases of reprisals will be covered in this thesis. Instead, a selection of four events from Norway have been chosen, and five from the Netherlands. The reasons for choosing these events will be presented in the next three paragraphs.

There are four cases from Norway that will be covered in this thesis. The first of these is the declaration of martial law in Central Norway. The martial law was chosen because it is one of the major reprisals committed in Norway, and has several characteristics that makes it important to this thesis. The second event is the Mjøndalen train sabotage. This event is chosen in part because it is one of the few reprisals that involved hostage killings, besides the previously mentioned martial law, and the assassination of Karl Marthinsen³. Another reason for its choosing is that the event mirrors closely an attempted train sabotage in the Netherlands one year before the Mjøndalen

2 Wilhelm Redieß, born 1900, died 1945. Redieß, or Rediess, was head of the SS in Norway during the entirety of the war. Unlike his counterpart in the Netherlands, Redieß was described as subservient to the *Reichskommissar*.

3 Karl Alfred Nicolay Marthinsen, born 1896, died 1945. Karl Marthinsen was a member of the NS as of 1933, and head of Stapo as of 1941. He was additionally made head of *Landshirden* in 1944. He was assassinated by the Norwegian resistance movement in February 1945. See sections 2.2 and 3.4.

sabotage. The third and last of the reprisals covered in this thesis are the executions following the killing of Karl Marthinsen. This reprisal was chosen due to it being one of the last and largest of the reprisals committed in Norway as a reaction to resistance activity. In addition to these three reprisals, the German reactions after Operation Gunnerside will be covered. This is due to the conspicuous absence of reprisals. The heavy water sabotage, as it is more commonly known, has been touted as one of the most successful sabotage operations during the entire war. The fact that no reprisals were committed afterwards therefore, makes it a significant contrast to the other three cases.

All the operations and reprisal episodes mentioned above will be described in more detail in their respective sections in chapter 3, and when they appear in the previous research in chapter 2. The reprisals in Telavåg would also have been included into the thesis if sufficient new information was found. Ultimately however, it was judged that there was insufficient new information about Telavåg to justify adding it to the research topic.

There are four main cases of reprisals in the Netherlands that will be covered. In addition, a fifth will be mentioned: The first of the five reprisals followed the failed sabotage attempt against a military train in Rotterdam. It will not be detailed as thoroughly as the other four. This is due to a scarcity of research providing any information about the reprisal. The reason it is added is due to its many similarities with the Mjøndalen sabotage attack and resulting reprisal. The second of the reprisals was named operation *Silbertanne*. It is chosen for two reasons. Firstly, the reprisal was ordered by the head of the SS in the Netherlands, *Höherer SS- und Polizeiführer* (HSSPF) Hanns Rauter. Secondly, the reprisal is unusual in how it was conducted, and the apparent underlying policy that informed the decisions. The third of the reprisals is the 1944 food embargo. The embargo is chosen in part because of its consequences for the Netherlands and the final of the reprisals there. In part it is chosen because it was ordered by the *Reichskommissar* in the Netherlands. Finally, the reprisal illustrates an important difference between each of the two *Reichskommissars* in either country. The fourth reprisal is the raid on Putten. It is chosen because the raid was ordered by general Christiansen, the head of the Wehrmacht in the Netherlands. The fifth and final reprisal in the Netherlands is the series of executions related to De Woeste Hoeve. While there are more cases covered in the Dutch portion of the thesis, the Norwegian reprisals are covered in greater detail. This is in part due to limited previous research on the subject of reprisals in the Netherlands, and in part for the sake of brevity. Together, all the reprisals featured span from August 1942 to March 1945.

For comparative reasons, the census of 1942 in both Norway and the Netherlands are needed. While they cannot give a fully accurate view of the differences between Norway and the Netherlands, the censuses can aid in providing some insight into the scope of the differences between the two countries. In Norway, by the beginning of 1943, the population surpassed 3'000'000, according to the Norwegian Statistical yearbook of 1943.⁴ In the Netherlands in 1943, the population count had passed 9'000'000 people.⁵ These numbers will be used to compare the death tolls with the population counts in section 4.4.

Reprisal policies remained a part of the German occupation during the Second World War. The SS was, however, a new instrument. The SS organisation included courts, military forces, and a central administration to punish a rebellious populace behind the front lines. That does not mean the Wehrmacht went unused. According to the established policy, the resistance activity that impacted the work of the civilian administration, the occupied territory's civilian administrator had the final say in what punishment was to be meted out. In the case of Norway, this would be Josef Terboven. In the Netherlands, it was Arthur Seyss-Inquart. In military matters, it was the head of the Wehrmacht in that country. In the case of Norway, this was general Nikolaus von Falkenhorst, until he was replaced by Rendulic, who in turn was replaced by Böhme. In the Netherlands, the head of the Wehrmacht was Friedrich Christiansen, who held his position until the war's end.

In addition to these two posts, there was the HSSPF. In Norway, Wilhelm Redieß held the position of head of SS-Norway, while Hanns Albin Rauter held the position of head of SS-Netherlands. The heads of the SS in each region had the authority to order executions and reprisals, at least, when it pertained to their own stations, and in civilian matters when *Reich* security was involved. This caused some overlap with the civilian authorities. Confusingly, the regional SS was a subdivision of the civilian government, and acted as the enforcement arm of the civilian authorities. At the same time, the head of the SS, titled *Reichsführer-SS*, had the ultimate control over the SS, subdivisions included. Heinrich Himmler, who held this position for the vast majority over the war was also not subject to the authority of the *Reichskommissars*. While the *Reichskommissars* answered only to

4 Statistisk Sentralbyrå, "Statistisk årbok for Norge 1942", <<https://www.ssb.no/a/histstat/aarbok/1943-1945.pdf>>, last accessed 01.05.2017

5 Statistics Netherlands, "Population, households and population dynamics; from 1899", <<http://statline.cbs.nl/Statweb/publication/?DM=SLLEN&PA=37556ENG&D1=0-44,53-60&D2=1,11,21,31,44,51,61,71,81,91,101&LA=EN&HDR=G1&STB=T&VW=T>>, last accessed 01.05.2017

Hitler, the *Reichsführer-SS* did still have at least some informal and formal power over the *Reichskommissars*, as a consequence of his control over the SS. The degree to which the control stemming from the informal power existed would vary, depending on how heavily the *Reichskommissars* relied on the SS. This will, in the case of Norway, come up in sections 1.5.3 and 2. For the Netherlands, not as much is known, but what is known will be presented in section 2.5.

The degree to which the HSSPF could exert control varied from person to person. The authority of the HSSPF to order reprisals stemmed from their role as a police force answerable to the *Reichsführer-SS und Chef der Deutschen Polizei*, and then to Hitler. The exact, practical limitations to their authority regarding reprisals is difficult to pin down. Their authority to order reprisals stems from a 1939 decree giving them the responsibility of, among other things, “eliminating the injurious influence of those sections of the population of foreign origin constituting a danger to the *Reich* and the German community [...] the *Reichsführer-SS* is empowered to issue such general instructions and take such administrative measures as may be necessary to carry out these duties”. Following that decree, Himmler could instruct the offices under him to carry out any actions he deemed necessary to keep Germany safe.⁶ The formal authority of the *Reichsführer-SS* was theoretically limited to matters of *Reich* security, as stated by the above-mentioned decree. This limitation did not necessarily mean much however. In theory, most of the situations covered in this thesis could be construed to fall under the umbrella of the *Reichsführer-SS*. The HSSPFs themselves had little practical function or power, except when directed by Himmler's intervention, or one of his standing orders. As a result, each HSSPF's authority would vary depending on the force of his personality, and that of the civilian administrator in the territory in which he worked.⁷

Finally, as the supreme authority, Adolf Hitler could involve himself and order reprisals directly. His word would carry great weight in shaping any decision relating to reprisals. In such case that he wished to however, he could also personally order reprisals. There was no formal requirement for when this could be done. However, this manner of ordering reprisals would only rarely happen. No such cases are covered in this thesis, but the fact that it could happen is still relevant to the research topic, and is brought up in section 2.4.

6 Broszat, Martin, Buchheim, Hans, Jacobsen, Hans-Adolf, Krausnick, Helmut, *Anatomy of the SS State*, 1968: pp. 217-ff

7 Broszat, Martin, Buchheim, Hans, Jacobsen, Hans-Adolf, Krausnick, Helmut, *Anatomy of the SS State*, 1968: pp. 236-238

An important part of the context in decisions about whether or not to use reprisals, were the international conventions on the rules of war. These rules stated that warfare was to be confined to uniformed soldiers, and that the civilian populace was not to interfere or to be interfered with. The history of reprisals and how they related to the rules of war in the midst of war has been a complicated story, as described by L. Zuckerman in his investigation of the treatment of Belgium during the First World War. The second World War set a whole new standard with its genocide, setting aside any link to international conventions. Even so, in some cases, the rules of war had some impact and put some restraints on the use of reprisals. This thesis will not look into whether or not the German authorities adhered to the rules of war. However, the rules play an indirect role in how both sides in the war tried to use the civilian participation or non-participation to further their cause.⁸

1.2 Chapter introduction

The first chapter is the introduction, and introduces the contents of the thesis. It is divided into four sections. It introduces the thesis and research topic as well as the relevant background information on Germany's use of reprisals prior to the Second World War along with general background information needed for the thesis' topic. The introduction chapter also includes information on the source material used in this thesis, including source criticism. The chapter ends with a short introduction to each of the events covered in this thesis.

The second chapter provides information on previous researches that touch significantly upon the topic of reprisals. To restrain the amount of content in this thesis, only the relevant parts of each monograph is presented, as none of the monographs have reprisals as their main topic. The historiography of these monographs will be part of the focus for the chapter. Some works, like Nøkleby's 1992 monograph *Josef Terboven*, are used in this thesis, but are not given their own section in the chapter for previous research. This is done in some instances due to an insufficient amount of unique findings that would benefit from their own section in the research chapter. In the case of others, including *Josef Terboven*, the delimitation from the previous research chapter is due to many of the findings being mirrored in other works, such as Nøkleby's later work, *Hitlers Norge*, which does have its own section in the chapter.

The third chapter presents this thesis' empirical research, which combines the findings of previous

⁸ Zuckerman, Larry, *The Rape of Belgium: The Untold Story of World War I*, 2004: pp. 1-4, 103, 132-137, 264-266, 274

research with the source material introduced in section 1.2. The chapter is divided into five parts. The findings are presented by studying four different events in Norway, and the German reactions, as well as some background information to provide context. At the end of each part, the previous research is compared to findings in the source materials, to discuss any contradictions, questions or disputes that may be attached to the events. It is during this part of the presentation that the specific source materials get scrutinised, as mentioned above. Finally, the fifth part is about events in the Netherlands, that are presented together.

The fourth chapter discusses the findings in chapter 3. The chapter is divided into four sections, one for each of the three research sub-topic. The first three sub-topics of method, leadership, and influence are discussed one after the other, before a comparison is made between Norway and the Netherlands, in terms of the first three sub-topics.

The fifth and last of the main chapters serves as the conclusion chapter. It is composed of five sections. The first four give a short summary of the central findings relating to the methodology, leadership, influences, and comparison of the research topic. The summary is followed by a conclusion relating to the main points of the previous four sections, highlighting the differences between Norway and the Netherlands, and the most historiographically contentious topics.

Following the five main chapters is the list of abbreviations, a list of sources, and the bibliography. The abbreviation list serves as a list of various abbreviations, phrases and non-English names present in the text, and a short explanation of these. If something has more than one name, the names will all be listed directly underneath the alphabetically first name. The reference list contains references to all the literature and source materials used in this thesis.

1.3 About the Source Material

In this section, the source material used for this thesis will be presented. As part of the presentation, each category of source materials will undergo a general source criticism. Said criticism consists of five considerations. The first consideration is who or what the source or sources behind the source material is. The second consideration is how credible the source material is. The third consideration is how objective the source behind the source material is. The fourth consideration is how accurate the source material is. Finally, the fifth consideration is how applicable the source material is.

The British source material consists largely of archived files from the SOE archives in the National

Archives in Kew, London. Other materials are also included, such as files from investigations of suspected rogue SOE agents, which are filed outside the SOE collections. The authors of the SOE files are most often British or Norwegian. In either case the authors were employed at the SOE, or at the very least associated with SOE operations. The SOE files also contain relevant articles and cut-outs from newspapers, letters either addressed to SOE personnel or intercepted by SOE, and any other types of material relevant to the topic of each file. The credibility of each source material used from the British archives depends largely on each entry. The sources themselves are by and large credible, but at times, they have their own sources that, as it was in wartime, could be less so. The same is the case for accuracy. While the sources themselves would strive for accuracy, the sources they themselves built on may not. Therefore, scrutiny must be placed upon the British source material whenever it comes up. This will be done when applicable, in chapter 2. On the topic of applicability, the source material that is used in this thesis largely reports on cases where reprisals were not committed. In this case, the material is mostly applicable in order to reveal the factors involved in the German decision not to enact any reprisals. The objectivity of the source material is largely dependant on context, such as which particular author is behind the material, and for what purpose have they produced it. The source material that has been used for the purposes of this thesis is judged to be sufficiently objective, as the material generally pertains to topics that the authors have little cause to be biased about, or leaves little room for bias to manifest to begin with.

The source material regarding Joseph Goebbels consists of his diaries. The parts of the diaries used in this thesis stretch from July 1939 to March 1945. Written by Goebbels, propaganda minister of the German Nazi regime, the diaries follow events as seen from his perspective. As a consequence, most information found in the diaries regarding the Norwegian resistance is second-hand at best. The diaries were written or dictated by Goebbels himself. The diaries have been structured to function as raw material for an autobiography. This format puts Goebbels' diaries in a position between a diary, and an autobiography. While an autobiography would be more prone to withholding information that might not be well-received by a wider audience, one could expect someone writing for their own personal benefit to be more forthcoming with events or information they might not otherwise share. A diary meant to serve as basis for an autobiography cannot be fully trusted like a private diary could. It may still be considered a more trustworthy source than an autobiography, however. Events have a better chance of being unfiltered by anything other than personal bias, than events meant for the public eye. In this regard, the diaries of Goebbels mention events that would be unlikely to be well received by the general public. These events include, but are not limited to, references to reprisals and atrocities committed to civilian populations in

occupied countries.⁹ For the most part, the diaries are anything but objective. Goebbels added a lot of his own viewpoints into everything he wrote in the diaries. As a consequence, nothing in it is written from an objective point of view, unless it is a topic that Goebbels does not care enough about to have an opinion. When it comes to the research topic, Goebbels is most relevant through his friendships with both Terboven, Himmler, and Hitler, all of whom were relevant authorities in Norway, when it came to reprisals. As for direct applicability, Goebbels also had discussions with, and gave advice to, Terboven. In summary, Goebbels' diaries can be a useful source of information. However, due to the diaries' nature, one would have to be careful to accept any information from it at face value. It is most valuable for information on the perceptions prevailing with the people with whom Goebbels had contact.

Another diary has also been used in this thesis, which was written by Heinrich Christen. Christen was an administrator for the German occupation forces in Norway, and at different times served as head of the branches in Bergen and Trondheim. Included in these branches are the responsibility for the civilian administration of the surrounding areas. The diary is written during his time in Norway, including a collection of poems written in Soviet captivity. The diary mostly concerns day-to-day accounts of the work-related activities of Christen himself, and thoughts of his family, or news from his wife. Every now and then however, he comments on current events in Norway. These events include the British raids on Lofoten, Svolvær and Måløy, as well as other events in or near the areas for which he is responsible. His biggest involvement in the struggle between the Norwegian Resistance and the German occupation forces is during the martial law in Central Norway, in 1942. The credibility of the source is difficult to gauge. As such, the purpose of the diary needs to be reviewed. Judging from the rest of the diary's contents, the purpose of the diary was as it seems: a journal for Christen to write down his thoughts, and the events he witnessed or partook in during the day. Much of the diary is devoted to parties, receptions, meetings, trips, communication with Christen's family, and so on. Following the war, the diary remained in the possession of Christen's family. This leads into the second part of answering the question of credibility, namely how the diary came to be published. The diary was still in the possession of Christen's family when it was discovered by historian Odd Aspheim. The family loaned Christen's diary out to Aspheim at his request. It was then translated into Norwegian, annotated and provided an afterword by several

9 Fröhlich, Elke, *Die Tagebücher von Joseph Goebbels, Part 1, Volume 8*, 1998: p. 409

historians¹⁰. The diary was published in 2009 under the name *Okkupantens Dagbok*¹¹. The contents of the diary will be discussed with this background in mind when his diary is used as source material in chapter 3. The accuracy of the material hinges on the previously mentioned potential issues with objectivity and credibility. There is reason to suspect inaccuracies. Likely, such inaccuracies are caused by personal biases, lack of information, and similar reasons. There is no direct evidence of deliberate inaccuracy. As for the applicability of the source, Christen was head of the department responsible for Central Norway during the martial law there. This puts his input on the subject in the limelight, so to speak. On this topic, Christen also provides a second source: a report that was sent to Himmler and Hitler's SS-liaison following the sabotage at Fosdalen¹². This report falls under the category of German official documents. As such, that particular report's qualities as source material is considered part of said category, see below in this section.

The source material from the German archives consist of roughly two categories. The first category of source material is in the RSHA files. The second category are reports from branches of the civilian authorities in Norway, including SS members not affiliated with the RSHA and the *Reichskommissariat*. The latter category's authors will be introduced as relevant in the empirical chapter. Otherwise, the two categories will be discussed together. The first category contains two source material collections from the RSHA: A collection of reports called *Meldungen aus Norwegen*, and the Berlin Archives file on which the collection is based, *R-70 Norwegen*. These two sources are mostly similar. The main difference is that the intention of *Meldungen aus Norwegen* was to serve as a guide to the state of affairs in Norway for intelligence officers coming to Norway during the war. *R-70* on the other hand, serves as raw material for *Meldungen aus Norwegen*. Furthermore, *Meldungen aus Norwegen* contains material from a handful of other files than *R-70*. The authors of *Meldungen aus Norwegen* are a small handful of people. The most central of these are Heinrich Fehlis¹³, the German chief of police¹⁴ in Norway; Herbert Noot, head of the

10 Translation by Stein Ugelvik Larsen. Annotations by Espen Ingebrigtsen, Halvor Sperbund, Stein Ugelvik Larsen. Afterword by Halvor Sperbund, Knut Harald Ekle, Stein Ugelvik Larsen.

11 English: "Diary of the Occupant/The Occupant's Diary"

12 See section 3.1.

13 Heinrich Fehlis, born 1906, died 1945. He took over the position of *Befehlshaber der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD – BdS* in Norway in 1940. In this position, which is translated to chief of police in this thesis, Fehlis had the highest authority over German police forces in Norway. He answered to Redieß and Terboven in Norway, but was also in effect under the command of Reinhard Heydrich.

14 Formal title *Befehlshaber der Sicherheitspolizei und der SD – BdS*, meaning commander of the Security police and the security service. This title belonged to whomever was in charge of the German police forces in Norway. The

Sicherheitsdienst; and Georg Wolff, *SS-Hauptsturmführer* in the *Sicherheitsdienst* and editor of *Meldungen aus Norwegen*.

The reports themselves, as well as those from the SS and *Reichskommissariat*, are written for the benefit of the German authorities in Norway, and the central leadership in Berlin. The editorialised *Meldungen aus Norwegen* is constructed as a tool for intelligence officers arriving in Norway, to allow them to gain insight into the situation in Norway. As a consequence, the question of credibility, objectivity and accuracy reflects this. On the topic of accuracy, the reports aim to be as accurate as possible, given what the intelligence community knows at any given time. When the topic revolves around the German institutions themselves, the RSHA reports' knowledge should be considered accurate, objective and credible, for the purposes of this thesis. When the topic is Norwegians, the various actions committed by the resistance, or similar, the objectivity comes into question, as does accuracy. Again, however, whether their information is correct or unbiased is of less relevance in this context. The question is what they knew, and how they acted as a result, not how correct their information was.

1.4 Overview of events

This section is dedicated to providing a short summary of the events featured in this thesis. Each of the following paragraphs deal with a single reprisal event, and a brief summary of the related events immediately preceding the reprisal. The second event to be presented is the heavy water sabotage in Vemork. This event stands out, as remarked previously, as it is not a reprisal. In summary, the events to be presented are: the declaration of martial law in Central Norway, the heavy water sabotage, operation *Silbertanne*, the Mjøndalen train-sabotage, the food embargo preceding the *Hongerwinter*, the Putten raid, the assassination of Karl Marthinsen, and finally the reprisals at De Woeste Hoeve. At the end of each brief description, the sections that describe or discuss the events will be pointed out. All the events figure to some degree in each of the discussion chapter's sections, but the events aren't equally important to each. The sections from chapter 4 that are pointed out are the sections in which the events are most important.

The first event was the declaration of martial law in Central Norway, 6 October 1942. The martial law was preceded by, and connected two, three incidents shortly prior to the reprisal. These three were the Majavatn-affair, and the sabotage attacks on Glomfjord and Fosdalen. The first of these

title was subordinate to the previously mentioned HSSPF, as well as the *Reichskommissar* and the head of the RSHA.

was not a sabotage operation, but an ambush on Wehrmacht soldiers who were lured into said ambush by a previously captured resistance member. The Glomfjord and Majavatn events led to a number of arrests, many of whom were executed during the later martial law. The third event, the attack in Fosdalen, was much “cleaner” as far as a sabotage operation goes, than either Majavatn or Glomfjord, but civilians had been implicated. Immediately after these events, *Reichskommissar* Terboven declared martial law in Central Norway. During said martial law, 34 people were executed, and around 700 houses were searched for tobacco, alcohol, and food stockpiles. The reason behind the martial law, and the methods used during it are of importance to this thesis, and are brought up in sections 3.1 and 4.1. In this reprisal, there are several central people. The first of these is the *Reichskommissar* in Norway, Josef Terboven. There's also regional administrator Heinrich Christen, chief of German police Heinrich Fehlis, head of Gestapo in Trondheim Gerhard Flesch, HSSPF Wilhelm Redieß and NS' leader¹⁵ in Sør-Trøndelag Henrik Rogstad. The aforementioned people were all involved with the decisions made during the martial law. Finally, Adolf Hitler is also indirectly involved, as will be brought up in sections 2.4 and 3.1.

The second event to be covered is the operation most commonly known as the heavy water sabotage. It happened 28 February, 1943, near Vemork in Norway. The operation was carried out by two resistance groups, composed of Norwegian saboteurs trained in *Kompani Linge*. The sabotage action struck the heavy water production plant in the Vemork facility, with no casualties to either side. The German authorities did not carry out any reprisals following the sabotage. The decision not to make reprisals is the chief topic of sections 3.2 and 4.3. The central people in this event are *Reichskommissar* Terboven and general Nikolaus von Falkenhorst.

The third event was operation *Silbertanne*. The operation was initiated as revenge for the assassinations of two members of the Dutch shadow cabinet during the spring of 1943. *Silbertanne* was initiated September that same year, and lasted until September 1944. During said time, more than fifty people were murdered by a death squad. In addition, raids were made on universities, and hundreds of people were arrested. This event is mostly mentioned in sections 3.5 and 4.1.

The fourth event in this thesis was the Mjøndalen train-sabotage, which was carried out in Norway by communist saboteurs in October 1943. The sabotage was conducted via a timed charge placed on a railway, which blew up a troop transport train. Nobody is sure how many German soldiers were

¹⁵ Formal title *NS-Fylkesfører*; roughly translating into county leader. This title was held by the leaders of the counties in occupied Norway.

killed in the explosion and resulting derailment, but some estimate around 70 or more. The resulting reprisal was the execution of five hostages taken from the area, ordered by *Reichskommissar* Terboven. The methods and influences involved with this reprisal are brought up in sections 3.3, 4.1, and 4.3.

The fifth of the events in this thesis was a food embargo in the Netherlands. The food embargo was ordered by the *Reichskommissar* in the Netherlands Arthur Seyss-Inquart, in reprisal for a nationwide railway strike. The embargo was lifted after some time, but lasted long enough to contribute to a critical food shortage in the Netherlands. The embargo was one of the factors leading to the food shortage known as the *Hongerwinter*. The embargo and its impact and implications are discussed in sections 3.5, as well as 4.1, 4.2, 4.3.

The sixth event is referred to as the Putten raid. It was carried out by Wehrmacht forces in the Netherlands. The raid was a reprisal for an attack by resistance members on Wehrmacht soldiers. Several houses were burned to the ground, and over 600 people were taken captive. Of those 600, the majority were deported. The details of this raid are provided in sections 2.5 and 3.5. The raid is also featured in sections 4.2 and 4.3. The most important distinctions to make in the raid is the man who made the decision, and the influences surrounding him.

The seventh event was the assassination of Norwegian head of *Statspolitiet*¹⁶ (Stapo), Karl Marthinsen. The assassination was carried out 5 February, 1945. Four days later, 34 people were arrested to be executed. Of those, 29 were executed, and the last five remained secretly in arrest until the war ended. The reprisal executions are featured in sections 3.4, 4.1 and 4.3.

The eighth and final event was a reprisal that followed an attack by a resistance cell at De Woeste Hoeve. The attack had been a botched raid for food by the resistance, where the resistance group mistakenly attacked a car containing SS officers, including the HSSPF in the Netherlands, who was wounded. The other two officers were both killed. In reprisal, 8 March 1945, 263 people were executed. This final reprisal is featured in sections 3.5, 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3.

¹⁶ In English: State Police. The organisation was more or less analogous to the German Gestapo, filling the same role under NS, as the latter did for the Nazi regime.

2 Previous research

The past research that will be presented here comprises several monographs. Each of these monographs will be presented in order of year of publication. They each touch upon reprisals committed by the German authorities in Norway, against the Norwegian people. The monographs each have differences in how they view the reprisals and the focus of their research. Mackenzie's monograph *The Secret History of the SOE* investigates Norway and the reprisals committed in this country, from the point of view of the SOE. *Norge i Krig* on the other hand is focused around the occupation of Norway itself, and views the occupation from the point of view of Norway as a nation. *Himmlers Norge* focuses on the occupation of Norway from the point of view of Heinrich Himmler, and the various organisations he headed. While some events in Norway are featured, only those relevant to Himmler are mentioned. The final of the Norwegian monographs, Nøkleby's *Hitlers Norge*, focuses on internal matters in Norway, like *Norge i Krig*. In the case of *Hitlers Norge* however, Terboven and the German central authorities are the main topic, and it is from their perspective that the reprisals are seen in the monograph. In short, these works together represent the essential points of view for at least one of the reprisals. In the cases of the rest, represent most of the relevant events.

2.1 The Secret History of SOE

The first research that touched upon reprisals in Norway was written by William J. M. Mackenzie. The full title of the monograph is *The Secret History of SOE: the special operations executive 1940-1945*. The monograph details the various operations of the SOE, as well as its origin and disbandment. Mackenzie writes of each of the region- or nation departments separately. The topics are further divided into pre- and post- late 1942, giving each occupied nation or region's office two chapters. A special exception is made in the case of the Netherlands and Belgium, which share chapters, dubbed "The Low Countries". As the first research into the topic, Mackenzie's monograph is the oldest piece of research this thesis will deal with. While finished in 1946, it was not published until 2000 following Mackenzie's request that publicising wait until after his own death. As such, the monograph has seen little attention outside of privileged access, compared to other, more public, works. Due to its proximity in time to the events it details, the research bears marks of being a first recounting. Certain events are portrayed differently from younger works, as will be demonstrated below. This fact does however provide the benefit of displaying what perceptions existed in the

beginning, before the author's added benefit of later redactions and corrections. The early nature of the work eases the task of drawing a historiographical line from 1946 until today.

Mackenzie's monograph contributes to the topic of the martial law in Central Norway, the reprisals in De Woeste Hoeve, and a general outline of the sabotage efforts SOE and Dutch resistance and the German reaction in the Netherlands to said efforts.

The first event mentioned by Mackenzie is the declaration of martial law in Central Norway. In the autumn of 1942, the situation in Central Norway came to a head, Mackenzie writes. Following the tragedy at Majavatn, the German civilian authorities declared a state of martial law in Trondheim and surrounding areas, later dubbed "the martial law in Central Norway". The Glomfjord and Fosdalen sabotage acts get mentioned as well, but it is clear that Majavatn is considered the primary trigger for the martial law.¹⁷ No other acts of German reprisal in Norway that are relevant to this thesis are mentioned. This absence is not too surprising, as most of the other reprisals had little or nothing to do with the SOE-Milorg dynamic. The reprisals after the 1941 raids get a brief mention, in that they were described as "not severe".¹⁸

In all, reprisals in Norway get little mention. The first cause for this lack of mention is that the author makes direct mention of only two resistance actions that caused such reprisals, as well as the heavy water sabotage, which pointedly caused no reprisals from the German authorities. The second cause for the lack of mentioned reprisals, the author writes from the point of view of the SOE, where the focus lies in the efficacy of the SOE, Milorg, as well as other attached organisations, and the competence of, and cooperation between, the organisations involved in the fight against the German authorities. From the SOE point of view, reprisals only matter as long as the resistance movement, government-in-exile, and the SOE are affected by reprisals, or make policies regarding them. As a result of the point of view of Mackenzie's monograph, most of the reprisals in Norway are left out. Additionally, the reprisals that are included get mentioned mostly in passing, with one exception. The martial law in Central Norway is covered to a greater extent than the other reprisals that are covered at all. This coverage is due to the degree to which the martial law affected the SOE, and brought several issues with the way the SOE was conducting itself in Norway to light.

On the topic of German actions against the Dutch resistance and its operations, Mackenzie remarks

17 Mackenzie, W. R. M., 2000: p. 650

18 Mackenzie, W. R. M., 2000: p.204

that very nearly every Dutch resistance organisation was compromised in some way or another by the Gestapo's informers. Prior to the end of 1942, very little was done from the SOE that the RSHA did not infiltrate very soon after. As a result, not much was achieved by the SOE until late in the war. Near the end of August, 1944, the British army's advances into Dutch territory forced the situation. Along with the failed Operation Market Garden from 17 to 25 September 1944¹⁹, the advances prompted the Dutch resistance to conduct itself in a more overt manner. The sabotage acts that were called for as part of Market Garden caused in turn several more sabotage acts even after Market Garden had ended, that continued into October. The German response to these acts of sabotage was slow to take effect. The first cases of reprisals for the above-mentioned sabotage acts were to deport randomly chosen able-bodied men to German labour camps. Suspected assistance prompted brutal punishments in turn, Mackenzie writes, without elaborating. He also writes that over 400 lives were said to have been taken as a result of “an attack on the Gestapo chief Rauters[sic]”. An attached footnote by the editor in 2000 corrects his name to Rauter, and his position to SS chief in Holland. It also corrects the estimate of deaths from the De Woeste Hoeve executions to over 250.²⁰

The reprisals had a great effect on the SOE's ability to function in the Netherlands. Several contacts, leaders and otherwise were either caught up in the reprisals, or targeted specifically. In spite of all this, the SOE wireless contacts were never broken in any one area, and some form of function was restored shortly after the reprisals had passed. Rescues and sabotage actions were mounted around the turn of the year 1944-1945.²¹ The above account of the Dutch resistance accounts for the most part for the portions of the resistance with which SOE had contact, and rather less on the Dutch resistance at large, which stood for most of the fighting. Mackenzie does touch upon the subject however, with a brief summary of the major organisations in the country, and some of the reprisals carried out against the Dutch population. In reference to Rauter however, he shows his information's rough and untested quality. The number he gives – over 400 – for lives lost is highly inaccurate. Later research gives the following two figures: 117 lives lost in the area where Rauter was attacked, and 147 prisoners of the Gestapo, for a total of 263 hostage killings.²² While 263 is still a high

19 Operation Market Garden was meant to liberate the Netherlands, but the invasion force was repelled after a few days. The operation contributed in sparking violence between the resistance organisations and the German occupying forces.

20 Mackenzie, W. R. M., 2000: pp. 645-646

21 Mackenzie, W. R. M., 2000: pp. 640-645

22 Huyskamp, Ruud, *Desperate Times, Desperate Measures: German Oppression, Dutch Resistance, and the Tragedy at De Woeste Hoeve*, 2011: p. 3

number – much higher than any one act of reprisal in Norway, as we will see – it falls far short of “over 400”.

2.2 Norge i Krig

Norge i Krig (In English translated as *Norway at war*) was written at the turn of the 1990s by several noted historians. Comprising eight works in all, each book in the series investigates an aspect of the occupation of Norway. Additionally, if read in sequence, they progress more or less chronologically. Of these eight works, two books are relevant to this thesis as they contain research on reprisals. Volumes six and seven deal with the the Home Front and the Outfront, respectively. The theme of reprisals feature in this topics, seen from the point of view of each volume's focus. The authors of these volumes are Ivar Kraglund, Arnfinn Moland and Olav Riste. Magne Skodvin is the editor. The findings presented in *Norge in Krig* will be presented by volume, as each volume has its own author, or authors. The two volumes contribute on each of the Norwegian cases featured in this thesis. Volume six covers the three reprisals in chronological order. Volume seven provides information on the heavy water sabotage, from the British and Norwegian perspectives.

Volume six, titled *Hjemmefront*, or Home Front, is authored by Ivar Kraglund and Arnfinn Moland. The martial law in Trondheim is covered over five pages in the sixth volume. Here, it is supposed that Fosberg was likely the last drop that caused the declaration of the martial law. It was only the next day that the martial law was declared in Sør- and Nord-Trøndelag, as well as the district of Grane *herred*²³ in Nordland. Majavatn and Glomfjord are also considered to be likely contributors. On the topic of the reason given for the executions, the German authorities called them a penance for the recent illegal activities in the district. The conclusion regarding the German reason for the executions during the martial law in Central Norway is to be considered murder of hostages, as a part of a policy of terror.²⁴

The next topic of relevance to this thesis is the reprisals after the Mjøndalen sabotage. October 7 1943, a sabotage action was carried out by the Osvald group against a train transporting military personnel near Mjøndalen. The explosion and derailment killed several soldiers. In response, several hostages were taken, and the government demanded a petition against the sabotage. In spite of the petition getting 4'000 signatures, five of the hostages were still shot by the German

23 A *herred* is an old name for a *kommune*. The English equivalent is district.

24 Kraglund, Ivar, Moland, Arnfinn, *Norge i Krig: Bind 6: Hjemmefront*, 1987: pp. 108-109

authorities.²⁵ This sabotage action, and the reprisals that followed, are compared with the later sabotage action at the Jørstad bridge, 13 January 1945. While the latter action had a larger effect than the attack on the Mjøndalen railway, there was no reprisal from the German government. The authors surmise this is due to the different circumstances. The sabotage act at Jørstad bridge was one of a larger systematic effort to hinder German troop movements. Reprisals were less effective in such circumstances, where it was plain to the German authorities that the sabotage acts were part of a larger, well-led campaign against German interests in Norway, and not isolated cells striking where they could. In this new approach to sabotage, reprisals would do little to sway the perpetrators, or the civilian population.²⁶

8 February 1945, the head of the Norwegian Stapo Karl Marthinsen was shot. The assassination, which was given the go-ahead by the Norwegian government-in-exile, led to the heaviest death toll for a single event in Norway. Over the two following days, 29 men were executed for the killing, in an act of reprisal by the German and Norwegian Nazi authorities. Within the NS, the sentiment was that more should be done as a deterrent. The Norwegian NS-affiliate organisation *Hirden* – analogous to the Nazi party's SA – voiced similar sentiments, and many were shocked by the assassination, feeling unsafe. In spite of these concerns, no more was done beyond the above act of reprisal, write Moland and Kraglund.²⁷

Volume seven, titled *Utefront*, which translates directly to outfront, is named for the part of the Norwegian forces that was stationed abroad from Norway. This includes the Government-in-Exile, the Armed Forces, *Kompani Linge*, and the latter's associates in the employ of the SOE. The sole theme visited by this volume that is of relevance to this thesis, is the heavy water sabotage in February 1943. It is written that the attack was carried out to hinder any German attempts. Codenamed Gunnerside, the operation was successful, and extremely precise. It had been carried out as a second attempt following the failure of operation Freshman, which only added to the difficulties faced by this second group. Of any reactions by the Germans, the volume writes nothing.²⁸ The volume is not very detailed in the description of either the action itself, or the operation Freshman that preceded it. Nothing is written about the German reactions. Operation Gunnerside will be described in more detail in section 3.2.

25 Kraglund, Ivar, Moland, Arnfinn, *Norge i Krig: Bind 6: Hjemmefront*, 1987: pp. 134-135

26 Kraglund, Ivar, Moland, Arnfinn, *Norge i Krig: Bind 6: Hjemmefront*, 1987: pp. 137-138

27 Kraglund, Ivar, Moland, Arnfinn, *Norge i Krig: Bind 6: Hjemmefront*, 1987: p. 266

28 Riste, Olav, *Norge i Krig: Bind 7: Utefront*, 1987: pp. 149-151

2.3 Himmlers Norge

The monograph *Himmlers Norge* is written by Terje Emberland and Matthew Kott. The monograph was written as a result of a call for more research into the aspects of the German occupation of Norway that had not yet been covered.²⁹ As a result, the monograph revolves for the most part around the SS and RSHA. In the course of these themes however, there are references to two events that are relevant to this thesis. It is important to note, however that the events are described from an SS-centric point of view. This limitation excludes a lot of information that could have been relevant. The events presented by this monograph are the martial law in Central Norway, and the sabotage of the heavy water plant at Vemork.

The monograph sheds light on the relationship between *Reichskommissar* Terboven and the SS in Norway. In an effort to minimise the influence of his rivals, foreign minister Joachim von Ribbentrop and leader of the *Reich* ministry for occupied Eastern territories Alfred Rosenberg, Terboven leaned heavily on the SS. To begin with, every institution of the *Reichskommissariat* was already somewhat dependent on the support of the SS due to their executive position in the civilian administration, as described in section 1.3. The Norwegian *Reichskommissariat* however, was even more so. SS officers held a large number of positions within the *Reichskommissariat*, and communication with Hitler went via the SS communication channels.³⁰ Like what happened in the Netherlands, one might then assume that the head of the SS in Norway might be that much more active, including in the field of reprisals. This increased activity did not happen in practice, however. While Wilhelm Redieß, the head of the SS in Norway, did participate in reprisals on an administrative level, and advised Terboven in that regard, he did little on his own with respect to reprisals. This inactivity is observed later in the monograph. When introducing Redieß, the monograph includes a quote from Falkenhorst, referring to Redieß as a completely subordinate personality who always obeys Terboven. The monograph also supplies sourcing to other characteristics that describe him as subordinate, weak, or in similar terms.³¹

The next relevant topic covered by *Himmlers Norge* is the martial law in Central Norway. The monograph opens with a summary of factors that led Terboven to put the long-term goal of

29 Emberland, Terje, Kott, Matthew, *Himmlers Norge: Nordmenn i det Storgermanske Prosjekt*, 2012: pp. 9-13

30 Emberland, Terje, Kott, Matthew, 2012: pp. 136-ff

31 Emberland, Terje, Kott, Matthew, 2012: pp 123-124, 356

pangermanism on the backburner, and turn to shorter-term goals of stabilisation and economic growth in the country. Stability in Norway would be prerequisite for Terboven being allowed to leave the country behind. Following this introduction, the mounting insurrection in Trøndelag is brought up in light of Terboven's need to assert his control. The monograph then details how the martial law in Central Norway was executed. It does not specify who chose the ten people who were to be executed, only that it was decided in a conference including SD and NS. There is also no mention of whether or not the action was pre-planned, or what triggered it, beyond the general situation and need to assert control as mentioned above.

At the conclusion of the section on the martial law, Himmler's reaction is documented. It is stated that he was incensed on receiving the reports on the martial law. Himmler railed against Terboven, and later told Fehlis in no uncertain terms that any further hostage-takings were to be approved by the *Reichsführer-SS* beforehand.³² The most interesting thing to be taken from the monograph's description of the martial law is the final point about Himmler's order to Fehlis, which may go a long way to answer the question of why there were so few acts of revenge involving hostages that were undertaken until the assassination of Karl Marthinsen.³³

The heavy water sabotage gets mentioned in passing by the monograph. The sabotage event was here used as an argument against subordinating the SS under Wehrmacht. The SS was, it was said, best equipped to deal with a fifth-column attacker, which the Norwegian resistance was said to be able to act as. The attack on Vemork was used to support this claim. Following this, Terboven proposed the formation of a *Sicherheitsbereich Norwegen*³⁴, wherein which the SS, *Waffen-SS* and so on could be deployed to fight paratroopers, saboteurs and partisans.³⁵ Beyond this however, the sabotage is not mentioned again in this monograph.

The sabotage against the railway in Mjøndalen was not given a mention in this monograph, nor was the assassination of Marthinsen. In general, little is said on the topic of reprisals, except in the above two cases. The monograph does however provide two additional contributions. It puts forward that Redieß did indeed have the authority as leader of the SS in Norway to involve himself more in reprisals, in the shape of hostage takings, and that Himmler and Terboven are both reasons why he

32 Emberland, Terje, Kott, Matthew, 2012: pp. 355-356

33 Emberland, Terje, Kott, Matthew, 2012: pp. 267-269, 580

34 English "Security area Norway"

35 Emberland, Terje, Kott, Matthew, 2012: p. 404

was so muted in this regard. It also provides a possible explanation for why there were relatively few hostage killings in Norway.

2.4 Hitlers Norge

The fourth research included in the section about previous research is *Hitlers Norge*. Full title *Hitlers Norge: Okkupasjonsmakten 1940-1945*, the monograph was written in 2016 by Berit Nøkleby, who also contributed to the previously presented *Norge i Krig*. In *Norge i Krig*, Nøkleby presents several findings which are relevant to this thesis, and play a part in mapping the developments of the later historiography. Much of the research in *Hitlers Norge* mirrors findings from another of Nøkleby's works, *Josef Terboven: Hitlers Mann i Norge*, and adds to said findings.

One of these findings is that Terboven, while unenthusiastic about staying in Norway, was committed to doing what he saw as his duty. For the Norwegian people, this meant two things. First, it meant that the extent to which *Wehrmacht* was allowed to extract resources from Norway for their upkeep was restricted, so as to not overwhelm the Norwegian economy. On the same note, it also meant that Norway was treated better as far as economic exploitation was involved, than they would otherwise have been. Secondly, Terboven's commitment meant that any opposition to the Third Reich's rule was dealt with in the most severe manner that Terboven could get away with. This second point was to be felt by the Norwegian people and the resistance movement as the war escalated.³⁶

The topic of the martial law in Central Norway gets a good deal of attention from Nøkleby. The description of the martial law begins with a meeting in Berlin, 11 August 1942. During this meeting, Terboven was told by Hitler that he did not need to take any sort of care in Norway. After the meeting, Terboven declared his intention to declare martial law in some part of Norway, before the winter.³⁷ Next, Nøkleby describes the events preceding the martial law. She gives a short description of the Majavatn affair, followed by the Glomfjord attack, and finally the Fosdalen attack. "This was the occasion Terboven had been waiting for", writes Nøkleby. The monograph then details which forces and how many were involved in the execution of the martial law, before moving on to the group of people that would decide who were to be executed as penance.

During the first day of the martial law in Central Norway, Nøkleby writes, ten hostages were arrested and later executed. These hostages were picked during a conference between Terboven,

³⁶ Nøkleby, Berit, *Hitlers Norge: Okkupasjonsmakten 1940-1945*, 2016: pp. 144-145, 193-205, 236-237

³⁷ Nøkleby, Berit, 2016: p. 237

Rediess, Flesch, Fehlis and the local NS official, Henrik Rogstad, writes Nøkleby. Additionally, fifteen more were executed the next day, after a drumhead court-martial at Falstad.³⁸

Nøkleby's monograph also has some information on why there occurred no reprisals following the heavy water sabotage. According to the monograph, the lack of reprisals after the heavy water sabotage was caused by German authorities assuming that the sabotage group was a British operation. This assumption followed a large-scale scouring of the expanse of Hardangervidda.³⁹ The monograph's description of the lack of reprisals ends here. While the description is largely correct, there are a few more details, that will be presented in section 3.2.

2.5 The Reprisals in the Netherlands

There is a scarcity of established, English-speaking research relevant for the Dutch comparison. As a result, some of the information used in this thesis is found by combining two websites written in English, with a Dutch monograph written by Louis De Jong. The two websites that are dedicated to the purpose of memorialising the victims of World War II atrocities. The websites are *erepeloton.nl*, homepage for the foundation *Vereiniging Erepeloton Waalsdorp*, and *Putten.nl*. The latter is a homepage for the village of Putten. The former is a public historical foundation. Both sources detail the reprisals that happened in their respective areas of Waalsdorp and Putten. As a result, they are both highly applicable for this thesis.

The Dutch monograph mentioned above is called *Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden in de Tweede Wereldoorlog*, written in 1976 by Dutch historian Louis De Jong. The main drawback to this monograph is the fact that it is written in Dutch, necessitating translation. A second drawback is the monograph's age. However, the main use for this monograph is as a verifiable and reputable basis for the claims of the other sources used for the reprisals in the Netherlands. In this capacity, the monograph contributes a great deal of information.

Another monograph provides some further insight into the reprisals in the Netherlands, as well as background information on both the resistance movement and the German authorities. The monograph is named *The Dutch under German Occupation* and was written in 1963 by Werner Warmbrunn. It is one of the few monographs about the occupation of the Netherlands, that is written in English. In addition, the monograph includes a short summary of the authorities behind

38 Nøkleby, Berit, 2016: pp. 248-252

39 Nøkleby, Berit, 2016: pp. 257-258

the reprisals, and the development of the Dutch resistance movement and the reprisals selected for comparison in this thesis. It is for these reasons this monograph forms the basis of part of the section on the Netherlands.

The final research used for the reprisals committed in the Netherlands is the master thesis of Ruud Huyskamp. Titled *Desperate Times, Desperate Measures: German Oppression, Dutch Resistance, and the Tragedy at De Woeste Hoeve*, the thesis details the events surrounding the reprisals at Woeste Hoeve. The reprisals at De Woeste Hoeve are the focus of the research topic of Huyskamp's thesis. The thesis is written in English, and is a newer work than De Jong's monograph. It is for these main two reasons that Huyskamp's thesis is used.

3. Empirical work

This chapter combines the previous research presented in the previous research chapter with this thesis' sources, that were presented in the introduction chapter. Each of the cases are presented in their own sections. Prior to these sections is a short summary of the situation in Norway and the war in general, as well as contextually useful information. This summary begins with the first major causes of tension in occupied Norway, ending with the build-up of the resistance in Central Norway.

Prior to the martial law in Central Norway, several major events had taken place in the Second World War. The prior year, the Combined Operations (CCO)⁴⁰ raids took place. Beginning in March 1941, and ending December the same year, the CCO coastal raids had made a stir in occupied Norway. The effects of the raids were also felt in Berlin, where Hitler ordered an increase of Norwegian coastal defences, in preparation for an invasion that was surely to come. This increase was at first short-term, as the invasion was thought to be imminent. During 1942 however, coastal batteries were erected along the Norwegian coastline.⁴¹ The coastal raids were not alone in causing a stir, however. 22 June, 1941, the invasion of the Soviet Union began, under the code-name Operation Barbarossa.⁴² Both of these events were mentioned in Heinrich Christen's diary. The first event caused fears to rise about an imminent invasion of Norway. The invasion of the Soviet Union caused a generally stricter atmosphere, Christen writes.⁴³

In the Autumn of 1941, Terboven gained one of his chief weapons for reprisal. 10 September 1941, he wrote to Himmler, stating his need of a court of his own. He did not trust the *Wehrmacht* courts, and his own *Deutscher Gerichtshof* had no judges. Himmler offered Terboven the use of the *SS- und Polizeigericht*: the courts of the SS. Due to the small numbers of *Waffen-SS* in Norway, the courts had a small workload, and could easily be taken into use by Terboven. When used by Terboven, the judgements could be appealed before the *Reichskommissar*. Normally, the appeals would have been decided by the *Reichsführer-SS*.⁴⁴

40 Combined Operations, shortened CCO, was a British initiative to raid the European continent under occupation by the German forces. In 1941, the CCO raided the Norwegian coastline as well.

41 Dear, I. C. B., Foot, M. R. D., *The Oxford Companion to the Second World War*, 1995: 54, 198-199, 275, 521

42 Weinberg, Gerhard L., *A World at Arms: A global history of World War II*, 2nd edition, 2005: pp. 1004-1009

43 Christen, Heinrich, *Okkupantens dagbok*, 2009: pp. 165-170

44 Nøkleby, Berit, *Josef Terboven: Hitlers mann i Norge*, 1992: pp. 176-177

By the fall of 1942, the eastern front had begun to stagnate around Rzhev, and the battle of Stalingrad was beginning. The German holdings in the east had reached their high-water mark. The ferocity of the fighting at the Eastern Front, while not necessarily at its absolute highest, was certainly on a level of violence that affected the rest of the occupied territories. As a result, tensions were rising everywhere. This tension also affected things in Norway, where fears of invasion was still high due to the above-mentioned raids.⁴⁵

There was also rising tension from within occupied Norway. The first martial law in Norway had been declared by Terboven in Oslo, October 1941, following a workers' strike. Several people were arrested, and two men, Viggo Hansteen and Rolf Wickstrøm, were executed. The martial law was enacted based on an earlier decree by Terboven, enabling him to declare a civilian martial law. The civilian martial law was distinct from military martial law in that Terboven was in control of the former, while Falkenhorst would have been in control of the latter.⁴⁶ February 1942, the teacher's union had called for a general strike. Meanwhile, Terboven had his own problems with the church, fronted by archbishop Einar Berggrav. The military resistance had been rebuilding itself as well. The Norwegian Homefront, represented by Milorg, was cooperating with the SOE in preparation for an anticipated invasion in Central Norway. At the head of these problems came the first of the cases that will be reviewed, the martial law in Central Norway.

3.1 The martial law in Central Norway, October 1942

The declaration of martial law in Central Norway has been a topic of some disagreement between historians, concerning two particular aspects of the declaration. The first of these aspects revolves around why it was declared. The second aspect surrounds who selected the hostages to be executed. The various views surrounding these two questions will be presented before the account of the events is presented.

In the area of Central Norway, centered around Trondheim, resistance activity was on the rise in both scope and visibility in 1942. The cause for the increased activity was the SOE plan to build up a resistance movement to accommodate an invasion along the coast of central Norway. The build-up on the Norwegian mainland continued even after the invasion plan was scrapped, however, due to a lack of proper communication between Milorg and the SOE.⁴⁷ This build-up got the attention of

45 Dear, I. C. B., Foot, M. R. D., *The Oxford Companion to the Second World War*, 1995: pp. 343-347, 589

46 Nøkleby, Berit, *Hitlers Norge*, 2016: p. 297

47 Kraglund, Ivar, Moland, Arnfinn, Skodvin, Magne, *Norge i Krig Fremmedåk og frihetskamp 1940-1945: bind 6*

Terboven. His reaction was to draft plans for a future declaration of martial law,⁴⁸ which was to be accompanied with several restrictions on goods as a punishment. The heaviest toll however, would be the arrest and execution of hostages. The hostages were determined when the plan was put into action. Whether this was always part of the overarching plan is unknown.⁴⁹

Simultaneously with the build-up of the resistance, the SOE, Milorg and *Kompani Linge* coordinated several sabotage attacks in the area. Three events in particular were to influence Terboven's decision to implement his plans. The first event happened 6 September 1942, when a resistance group tasked with supplying local resistance groups around the Helgeland area confronted pursuing *Wehrmacht* forces. Several German soldiers fell. In the aftermath, 24 resistance members were rounded up and arrested. The event would be known as the Majavatn affair.⁵⁰ The second event was a sabotage attack upon a sulphur-mining relay station in Glomfjord, 20 September 1942. Finally, the Fosdalen sabotage occurred 5 October 1942. The sabotage warranted a report to Himmler and the SS liaison to Hitler, Karl Wolff. The report referenced the earlier two events at Majavatn and Glomfjord as well. The report to Himmler supposed that the perpetrators were two Norwegians, led by an Englishman.⁵¹ The report continued that the saboteurs used an English handkerchief to gag a watchman, then signaled for local help with a flashlight. Finally, the report concluded that Fosdalen marked the “final nail in the coffin” which led to the declaration of martial law in Trondheim and the surrounding areas.⁵² The report's conclusion does not have the final say on the matter of what caused the martial law, however. According to Goebbels' diaries, Terboven had told Goebbels privately that the Fosdalen sabotage was a convenient excuse to execute his plans for martial law. The purpose of the martial law was to make an example for any Norwegians who would otherwise be tempted to resist the occupying Germans.⁵³ These findings will be compared to the previous research in 4.3, as they pertain to what influenced the decision-makers into declaring the martial law in Central Norway.

Hjemmefront, 1988: pp. 94-111, 114

48 In Norway, this specific declaration of martial law would become known as «Unntakstilstanden i Midt-Norge»; the martial law in Central Norway.

49 Nøkleby, Berit, *Hitlers Norge*, 2016: p. 237

50 Kraglund, Ivar, Moland, Arnfinn, Skodvin, Magne, *Norge i Krig Fremmedåk og frihetskamp 1940-1945: bind 6 Hjemmefront*, 1988: p. 108-111

51 They were, contrary to the report's supposition, all Norwegians.

52 NS 19/1973, "Sabotage in der Fosdalen-Grube in Malm (Bericht des Chefs der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD)", pp. 1-3

53 Fröhlich, Elke, part II, book 6, 1996, p. 140

The first point of contention concerning the martial law in Central Norway is what caused the launching of the reprisal. It has previously been thought by Mackenzie that the declaration of martial law was a reaction to the events at Majavatn. Within this point of view, the build-up of the resistance in Central Norway acted as an irritant. This view is contested by later historians, as seen in sections 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4. As presented in the 1987-1990 work *Norge i Krig*, the view has been that Fosdalen was the trigger, with the possibility that the other two events contributed. Nøkleby's *Hitlers Norge* agrees with both the conclusion, and the accompanying possibility of Glomfjord and Majavatn having contributed to the declaration of martial law in Central Norway.

The factors which drove Terboven to reprisals in this case was more complex than in most of the other cases. Unlike Telavåg and Oslo, where he had declared reprisals as a result of specific events, in the case of Trondheim there are more events to consider. There are also semi-contradictory reasonings involved. Each event had its own factors that would affect Terboven. Mackenzie's supposition that Majavatn was the deciding factor is no surprise. It stood out as a “messy affair” to the British onlookers, and the resistance members that were rounded up in the aftermath made up the majority of the executed. Out of 34 people to be executed as a result of the martial law, 24 were the people arrested after Majavatn. They were subjected to court-martials by the SS courts at the request of Terboven. The other 10 were picked out from among the citizens of Trondheim.

According to Heinrich Christen's diary, the citizens were supposed to be from the “Jøssing-intelligentsia”, as Terboven had put it. They were picked by NS-fylkesfører Henrik Rogstad. Then, Terboven, Redieß, Flesch, and Christen formed what he refers to as a tribunal. Here, writes Christen, Terboven would read a name, and ask if the other members of said tribunal had any objections. Christen then writes that he objected only to two of these, who at his time of writing still lived. Another who was to die survived due to his being physically unavailable at the time. One is then led to assume that three other people were picked in their steads, but this is not stated outright by Christen. In addition to the executions, tobacco, alcohol and food stores were seized. During the first day of the martial law, over 700 search warrants were signed as part of this process, writes Christen. The events recounted by Christen reference what Nøkleby referred to as a conference, as observed in section 2.4.⁵⁴ According to the report on the martial law that Redieß sent to Himmler, a total of 1434 houses were searched, and 91 people arrested, during the martial law. The arrests were due to the curfew, illegal radios, weapons or large amounts of money for which the arrestees could not account. As such, while the house searches can be regarded as a part of the methodology of the

⁵⁴ Christen, Heinrich, 2009: pp. 171, 173-176

martial law, the resulting arrests were strictly speaking a consequence of the martial law.⁵⁵

What neither Christen nor Redieß mentions is the arrest of all male Jews in the affected area. As noted by Nøkleby, it is likely that the arrest of the Jews was not an original part of the plans for the martial law. Nøkleby points the finger at Gerhard Flesch, who was the commander of Sipo in Trondheim. Part of the reasoning for Flesch was behind the order lies in Terboven leaving the treatment of the Jewish population up to the local Sipo commanders.⁵⁶

The truthfulness of Christen's account of the events is not a simple thing to gauge. The martial law in Trondheim is the worst atrocity he had a hand in. It was also the atrocity with which Christen was the most involved, according to himself. It is here, if anywhere, that Christen would have the most to gain by downplaying his role. If so, he could have made up two unnamed people who he would then “spare” by objecting to their executions. The third person who was not killed is an odd detail in this respect, but can conceivably have been added to lend detail to the story, to make it seem more likely to be true. Without a second source to verify his claims, it is difficult, if not impossible to make a concrete conclusion regarding the truthfulness of Christen's claims. What information is available makes it seem unlikely that the information is deliberately false, however.

The most interesting discrepancy that comes from Christen's account is the mention of Christen's own name. At the same time, he does not mention Fehlis. This contradicts the findings of Nøkleby. It is likely that Fehlis was present as well, in his capacity as chief of police, even though he went without mention by Christen. If this is the case, Christen's presence still needs to be added as a correction to Nøkleby's account of the conference. The issue of Fehlis' presence and Christen's absence from the conference in *Hitlers Norge* led to a phone interview with the author, Berit Nøkleby. During said interview, Nøkleby agreed that Christen could well have been present, as the sources regarding the meeting came from hearings that took place several years after the event. Nøkleby also pointed out that the conference referenced in *Hitlers Norge* was not the only one of its kind. It could well be that some of the conferences had different participants, in which case both accounts of the conference or conferences were true, though not at the same time.⁵⁷

The martial law in Trondheim demonstrates that it was not enough for the sabotage operations to be

55 NS 19/157, “*Persönlicher Stab der Reichsführer SS*”, pp. 4-5

56 Nøkleby, Berit, *Hitlers Norge*, 2016: pp. 250-252

57 Phone interview with Berit Nøkleby, 8.5.2017

seemingly English-led to avoid reprisals. During the Fosdalen sabotage, like the later attack on the heavy water plant at Vemork, British effects had been left behind, in the shape of the British handkerchief, mentioned in Christen's report to Himmler. Furthermore, at least one of the Fosdalen attackers spoke English during the attack itself. Unlike the heavy water sabotage however, civilian help was verified by the German authorities. The civilian involvement, or supposed so, during the Fosdalen and Glomfjord sabotage attacks likely played its part in overshadowing the factor of whatever leadership was behind the resistance activity. Likewise, the attack came with a general increase in local resistance activity, and at the head of other incidents. Put simply, the area had been subject to a long build-up of tension, and as a result, Terboven wanted a target to lash out at. Hitler's earlier approval had expedited this lashing, and the events prior to the martial law provided the target.

3.2 The heavy water sabotage, February 1943

The second event included in this thesis is the sabotage attack on the heavy water plant at Vemork, just west of the small city of Rjukan. The heavy water sabotage was conducted under three different operation code-names. The first of these was Grouse. Consisting of four Norwegian operatives from Kompani Linge, the group's task was to lay the foundations for the next operation, codenamed Freshman⁵⁸. Freshman consisted of thirty British sappers⁵⁹, who were to be dropped into Norway in gliders towed by bombers. Unfortunately, the operation failed during the landing portion, with one bomber and both gliders crashing. Everyone that survived the crashes were arrested, tortured and shot by the German SD⁶⁰ in accordance with Hitler's commando order.⁶¹ When the SOE learned of this, they began looking at other possible ways to stop the heavy water production.⁶² The men from Grouse immediately volunteered to stay put and aid any further attempts on the factory. They were therefore asked to await another group.

This new group, codenamed Gunnerside, consisted of eight Norwegians from Kompani Linge. They

58 Freshman was made up from soldiers from several countries in the British Dominion countries, including Australians.

59 The title of sapper refers to combat engineers, whose role it was to perform engineering duties. These can include demolitions task, hence their relevance for the operation.

60 SicherheitsDienst, in English Security Service. This organisation was the branch of RSHA whose task it was deal with military forms of resistance and infiltration. It was, and still is, often confused with its sister organisation, Gestapo, whose area of expertise lay in political types of resistance.

61 The commando order was an order to execute any captured saboteur, even in military dress. The order was illegal according to International law, and several officers of the Wehrmacht and SS were tried for executing it, post-war.

62 DEFE 2/222, «*Freshman*», 1942, page unknown

were dropped by parachute on the second attempt. The group linked up with Grouse, which had now been renamed Swallow. The two groups joined forces, and executed their attack on the heavy water plant. The men were dressed in British uniforms and carried British equipment. During their infiltration, which avoided the attention of any German guards, they surprised and disarmed a Norwegian night-watchman inside the complex, to whom they spoke Norwegian. The parts necessary for the production of heavy water, that they had come to destroy, were blown up without issue. The detonation had not caught the attention of the guards, and it was only after the saboteurs had made good their escape that the alarm was sounded.

Not long after the attack, Falkenhorst inspected the site. According to Norwegians said to have been at the site, he remarked that the attack must be considered to be a military action.⁶³ This information, if correct, is significant. However, the source is second-hand. The meaning of the quote can be understood in more than one way. The explanation forwarded by historian Gunnar Myklebust seems the most likely. Myklebust wrote in *Tungtvannssabotøren* that general Falkenhorst had uttered the quote to argue against the execution of civilians. Terboven himself had wanted to execute ten civilians from Rjukan, and had threatened to execute five if further sabotage was committed in the area. Additionally, tells Myklebust, the newspaper *Daily Mail* claimed that seventeen communists had been executed the following day, as reprisal for the attack. The newspaper further claimed that the executions had been ordered by Redieß. This claim had however been built on few and poor sources, Myklebust remarks.⁶⁴ It is unknown what the motivation for those executions really was. *Meldungen aus Norwegen* makes no mention of the executions, in spite of speaking of the heavy water sabotage itself in several instances. In addition, the reports from the Gunnerside group include a watch for reprisals, and make no mention of the seventeen executed prisoners. As a result, the executions cannot be taken to have been meant as a reprisal.

To assess why this sabotage action did not lead to any reprisals, certain factors should be determined. The parts of the aftermath to the sabotage operation that are used to map these factors have been supplied by three different sources. First are the diaries of Goebbels. The second group of source materials are the SD reports, gathered from *Meldungen aus Norwegen*, and also in part from R-70 NORWEGEN. The third group of source materials are the field reports from the Gunnerside/Swallow group that carried out the sabotage operation. The fourth and final group of source materials are the meeting minutes between Joseph Terboven, the *Reichskommissar* in the

63 HS 2/185, "Operation GUNNERSIDE", 1942-1943: p. 35

64 Myklebust, Gunnar, *Tungtvannssabotøren: Joachim H. Rønneberg – Linge-kar og fjellmann*, 2011: pp. 200-204

Netherlands Arthur Seyss-Inquart, and the central leadership in Germany.

A few days prior to the attack, Terboven had remarked to Goebbels in a conversation, that his recent actions in Norway had left the Norwegian resistance cowed. When speaking of recent actions, it is likely that Terboven was referring to the martial law in Central Norway.⁶⁵ His comments demonstrate that Terboven at least wanted to display confidence in the situation in Norway. It is not as simple to state whether he was in fact confident, or whether he felt that the pressure from the resistance movement was lowered. Considering the context in which he made the comments however, it can be argued that he did in fact feel more in control of the situation prior to the sabotage attack on Vemork. The martial law and other events had caused the population cause for alarm. The effect upon the SOE and resistance had been to rethink how they had been conducting themselves. Combined with the end of operation Jupiter⁶⁶, the overt resistance activity in Norway dipped for some time. Combined with the fact that the activity level was low, as seen in *Norge i Krig*, it seems likely that Terboven meant what he had said to Goebbels in January 1943, at least. From the outside point of view, it might well seem like the resistance had been cowed by the martial law. In light of the relative inactivity, compared to mid-1942, Terboven's confidence is understandable.⁶⁷ The tension was far from gone, although it had been lessened since September the previous year. This does not seem to have diminished Terboven's personal anger over the attack, however. As seen above, Myklebust refers to Terboven as furious, and promising reprisals for any follow-up attacks.

The presumed identities of the attackers is an important factor in the case of the heavy water sabotage. In this regard, each of the source materials provide insight into what was supposed by the German authorities about the attackers. The first of these source materials, the SD reports on the matter, make three distinct comments on the heavy water sabotage. The first comment comes immediately following the attack. The initial report concludes that the operation appeared to them to have been carried out by saboteurs from England. The phrase “aus England kommende Saboteure” is specifically used in the report, as opposed to simply calling them English.⁶⁸ This indicates that while the attack was thought to be British, the saboteurs were not necessarily thought to be British themselves. The second and third comments follow in the next two paragraphs.

65 Fröhlich, Elke, *Die Tagebücher von Joseph Goebbels, Part II, Volume 7*, 1995: p. 53

66 Refers to the invasion plans for Norway, which had been scrapped, as seen in the second paragraph of section 3.1.

67 Kraglund, Ivar, Moland, Arnfinn, *Norge i Krig: Bind 6: Hjemmefront*, 1987: pp. 120-122

68 Larsen, Stein Ugelvik, et al, *Meldungen aus Norwegen*, 2008: pp. 1021, 1064, 1180

According to the Gunnerside/Swallow groups' reports on events, the above conclusion by the SD contradicted the German authorities' earlier impressions from immediately after the attack had been carried out. The official German proclamation regarding the suspects described them as “probably civilian”, in spite of them having been observed to be in English uniforms.⁶⁹ The Gunnerside/Swallow group transmitted a message 10 March 1943, reporting that 300 people had been arrested, and that some hostages had been taken in, and obligated to report, following the attack. In a second transmission 13 March, the group reported that there had been no reprisals, and that the hostages had been released. Two Norwegian guards, one inspector and one engineer remained in arrest by this date.⁷⁰ In all likelihood, the proclamation's claim that the perpetrators were civilian was because the sectors of government that were behind the proclamation had not yet been appraised of the conclusion that the sabotage attack was a military action. Either way, the later SD reports surmise that the perpetrators were Norwegian or Norwegian-speaking, but under British command.

Another radio-message from the saboteur groups Gunnerside and Swallow claimed that general von Falkenhorst had appeared impressed with the way the sabotage had been conducted.⁷¹ This final piece of information had come via Norwegians present during von Falkenhorst's inspection of the debris from the explosion.⁷² The final claim of the Gunnerside/Swallow report is therefore somewhat more uncertain, as it came to the Gunnerside group second-hand, as hearsay. Myklebust has picked up on this however, stating that Falkenhorst influenced the outcome of the aftermath from the heavy water sabotage. He had argued against reprisals, saying the operation was military. In this way it seems that Falkenhorst was a key influence on the decision of Terboven not to conduct any reprisals.

The next step in determining the reason for the lack of reprisal is impact. It has been debated back and forth since before the attack was made, how important heavy water was for the German war effort. It has settled in recent times with the conclusion that with or without the heavy water plant operational, the German efforts to construct a nuclear bomb in time for the war were doomed. The question then is, was the attack's impact so unimportant as to not warrant a response? There are a few factors that argue against this notion. Firstly, there's the fact that the attack itself showed the

69 HS 2/185, "*Operation GUNNERSIDE* ", 1942-1943, p. 36

70 HS 2/185, "*Operation GUNNERSIDE*", 1942-1943, pp. 35, 42

71 HS 2/185, p. 42

72 Interview with Joachim Rønneberg, 23 October 2016

German forces to be at least somewhat vulnerable. Secondly, in 1944 the German authorities attempted to transfer the remaining heavy water to Germany. While this cannot be seen as a direct reaction to the attack, it nonetheless indicates that the heavy water had some value to the German authorities in Berlin. The third factor arguing against the idea that the attack had little impact on the war effort comes from German meeting minutes from a meeting between the central leadership in the Third *Reich*, and the occupied territories. During the meeting, Terboven had been asked if nitrogen from the factory neighbouring the heavy water plant could be used to supply the construction of artillery ammunition. Terboven responded that this would not be advisable. He claimed that if such preparations were made, the factories would be disabled in short order, either by sabotage by the Norwegian resistance, or by allied bombing. He was backed up by two unnamed experts present at the meeting. The nitrogen plant was instead set to the task of shipping the nitrogen product as fertiliser, the original purpose of the factory complex, to the Danish farming industry.⁷³

Another factor that can possibly be involved in the decision comes from the aftermath of the martial law in Central Norway. As presented in section 2.3, Himmler had lashed out verbally at Terboven following the hostage executions. While the order not to commit any further hostage-killings had not yet been distributed to the SD, the potential impact of Himmler's reaction to Terboven cannot be ruled out as a factor in the decision not to execute any of the hostages mentioned above.

From the reports in particular rise what appears to be a paradox. The heavy water sabotage clearly affected the war effort – though in a different field of industry than intended – and was committed by presumed Norwegian nationals under British command. These two factors had, only months before, been the among the contributing factors to the declaration of martial law in Central Norway. While the Gunnerside group had left behind British effects, this had not stopped the reactions following Glomfjord and Fosdalen. Unlike those attacks, the Gunnerside group had only spoken in fluent Norwegian to the civilian they encountered, not displaying any English. In spite of these factors, the reaction, which began fiercely with 300 reported arrests, quickly dissolved into only a handful of arrests, and that of people directly involved with the factory. There are several possible contributing factors to this lack of reaction. The most likely contributors include the operation's early classification as a British military action, the large-scale manhunt following immediately

73 R 26-IV/16, "Nahrungsmittellieferungen aus Norwegen und den Niederlanden" p. 6

afterwards, the apparent lack of civilian involvement, Himmler's negative reaction to the reprisals in Central Norway, and finally what has appeared to be von Falkenhorst's views of the operation. To adequately explain the sabotage's lack of reprisals, the aforementioned factors need to be considered. This will be done more thoroughly in section 4.3.

3.3 The sabotage at Mjøndalen, October 1943

Prior to the Mjøndalen sabotage, the war had been heating up considerably. The gains against the Soviet Union had stopped altogether by October. The pivotal battles at Stalingrad and Kursk were over, both ending with a Soviet victory. The long, slow push towards Germany had begun.⁷⁴ With these events came a distinct stiffening in the German responses everywhere, as pointed out by previous research. The Norwegian resistance also began to change. For a long while, there was disagreement between the Home Front and their counterparts in Norway, as to how the resistance should conduct itself. On the one hand, the resistance movement's handling of sabotage had been refined. Of the sabotage acts conducted in 1943 and 1944, few would cause significant reprisals. As put forth by *Norge i Krig* in section 2.2, this was in part caused by the new SOE and Milorg approach to sabotage acts vis-a-vis reprisals. Countermeasures including leaving behind effects originating in the United Kingdom. Civilian involvement was minimised, and an effort was made to hide what civilian involvement could not be avoided. Finally, sabotage operations were carefully chosen, with regards to where and how to strike. Emphasis was placed on minimising casualties as far as possible, especially civilian.⁷⁵

That is not to say that reprisals did not occur. One act of sabotage that did trigger reprisals from the German authorities was the railway sabotage that occurred in Mjøndalen, 7 October 1943. Planned and executed by the Communist Osvald-group, the sabotage attack targeted a troop transport train. The first car in this troop transport was civilian, to act as a deterrent against sabotage attacks. The attack had however been carefully timed by the Osvald group, so that when the train passed over the bomb, it would detonate after having first been passed over by the civilian train car, so that the first car to be hit was a military car. In this way, the civilian losses would be minimised. The resulting damage was three derailed transport cars, and an unknown number of dead *Wehrmacht* soldiers.

The German authorities reacted quickly. They arrested several hostages, and demanded a petition to

⁷⁴ Dear, I. C. B., Foot, M. R. D., *The Oxford Companion to the Second World War*, 1995: pp. 347, 590, 822, 824-825,

⁷⁵ Dear, I. C. B., Foot, M. R. D., *The Oxford Companion to the Second World War*, 1995: pp. 640, 738

be signed by at least 4'000 people, or hostages from the above-mentioned arrests would be shot. In spite of this petition reaching its goal, five hostages were shot in reprisal for the sabotage attack.⁷⁶ These five executions had been ordered by Terboven.⁷⁷ The order to execute the hostages brings up one question. As stated in section 2.3, Himmler had reacted quite negatively to the executions of hostages following the martial law in Central Norway. What then was Himmler's involvement in this instance, assuming there was any? As the executions had been ordered by Terboven personally, Himmler's order not to engage in hostage activities did not apply to the five executed in this case. Himmler did not have the formal jurisdiction to overrule him. He did have ways to pressure Terboven however, as Terboven relied on the SS communication channels to communicate with Hitler. The fact that the five hostages were shot would therefore indicate that either Himmler was at least neutral in regards to the executions, or that Terboven decided to go ahead regardless of what Himmler thought of it. Of the two possibilities, either or both can be the case. It could also be possible that the death toll would have been higher, if not for Himmler's reaction to the martial law the year before. It is unfortunately impossible to tell, without a testimony from Terboven. Goebbels' diaries do not mention whether Himmler had any involvement in the reprisal, but mentions that several soldiers had been killed in what he referred to as a series of sabotage attacks.⁷⁸ As observed in the previous section, Terboven had claimed earlier to Goebbels that he had cowed the Norwegian people.⁷⁹ Terboven would later make a similar claim, as late as 6 August 1944.⁸⁰ The accuracy of Goebbels' remarks in this instance is likely poor. Goebbels has not proven particularly accurate in describing other events in Norway in other cases either. He is also very vague in his description. From the interactions between himself and Terboven, it can at least be inferred that the German deaths were noticed in Berlin by Goebbels, if nobody else. Furthermore, the claims from Terboven that Norway was stable and the people cowed show that Terboven at the very least wanted to make it seem this was the case. Combined with the fact that the activity level was low, as seen in *Norge i Krig*, it seems likely that Terboven meant what he had said to Goebbels in January 1943 at least.

3.4 The assassination of Karl Marthinsen, February 1945

In the final year of the war, events were decidedly moving towards the end. This much was apparent to most people. The east front had in effect turned into a long fighting retreat ever since the end of

76 Kraglund, Ivar, Moland, Arnfinn, *Norge i Krig: Bind 6: Hjemmefront*, 1988: pp. 134-135

77 Nøkleby, Berit, *Josef Terboven: Hitlers mann i Norge*, 1992: pp. 228-229

78 Fröhlich, Elke, part II, Volume 10, 1994: p. 112

79 Fröhlich, Elke, part II, Volume 7, 1993: p. 53

80 Fröhlich, Elke, part II, Volume 13, 1995: .p. 232

the battle of Kursk. By late January 1945, the Red Army had pushed the German forces into Poland. Around the same time, the concentration camps had begun evacuation in death-marches headed west, to hide the Nazi crimes there. 27 January, Red Army troops liberated the Auschwitz concentration camp.⁸¹

In the Autumn of 1944, a handful of events caused Terboven to lose some of his reprisal powers in Norway. By order of Hitler, Terboven could no longer order reprisals against the Norwegian population. Due to Hitler relaxing the *Führer*-order around 1 February 1945, Terboven could resume using the SS-courts for reprisal executions. However, Terboven would have to rely on requesting executions from the SS courts.⁸²

In Norway, the resistance had been escalating activity since the 1943- late 1944 lull in sabotage activity.⁸³ Chief of *Statpolitiet* (Stapo) and *landshirdsjef*⁸⁴ was reported to be planning to take control over all of NS' combat organisations, in order to put up a fight against the resistance near the end of the war. As a consequence of these reports, the leadership of the Home Front decided to have him assassinated. On 8 February, 1945, men from *Oslogjengen*⁸⁵ waited for Marthinsen's car near the top of a hill, where it would be driving the slowest. When the car reached the top, they shot Marthinsen down. The driver was also hit in the attack, but survived his injuries.⁸⁶ According to an article by historian Lars-Arik Vaale, Terboven immediately requested 75 executions. Two Norwegian ministers of the NS shadow cabinet objected to this, and when Terboven refused them, they had a discussion the next day with chief of police Fehlis that led to the request to be moderated to 34.⁸⁷ Nøkleby does not mention the request for 75 executions, but does mention that the 34 who were executed had been picked out following instructions from Terboven to avoid executing anyone who had not done something illegal.⁸⁸ 29 out of the 34 people who were picked out were executed

81 Dear, I. C. B., Foot, M. R. D., *The Oxford Companion to the Second World War*, 1995: pp. 203, 291

82 Nøkleby, Berit, *Josef Terboven: Hitlers mann i Norge*, 1992: pp. 268-270, 273

83 Kraglund, Ivar, Moland, Arnfinn, *Norge i Krig: Bind 6: Hjemmefront*, 1988: pp. 136-137

84 Title means leader of *Hirden* in Norway, a rough NS equivalent to the SS.

85 In English: The Oslo Gang. The group was composed of resistance members from Milorg and *Kompani Linge*. They were responsible for much of the sabotage activity in Oslo during the second half of the war.

86 Larsen, Stein Ugelvik, et al, *Meldungen aus Norwegen*, 2008: p. 1523

87 Vaale, Lars Erik, "Skjebnesvanger Likvidasjon", <<http://www.dagbladet.no/kultur/2006/02/11/457480.html>>, last accessed 09.05.2017

88 Nøkleby, Berit, *Josef Terboven: Hitlers mann i Norge*, 1992: p. 274

that same day, 9 February 1945.⁸⁹ The last five were arrested and discovered alive after the war was over. Before their discovery, they had also been believed to be dead.⁹⁰

According to the SD report, the people who were executed had been arrested prior to the assassination for having resistance sympathies, committing sabotage, or other related acts.⁹¹ This was the single largest number of hostages shot in Norway, as a result of any one occurrence. The fact that the hostages who were executed had consisted of previously arrested people makes this the only such instance among the Norwegian reprisals this thesis features. The reprisal for the assassination of Marthinsen was carried out after the Norwegian branch of the RSHA had already concluded that acts of reprisal no longer worked as a deterrence.⁹² In spite of this, the executions were ordered. While the RSHA had already made the conclusion that reprisals had lost their effect, Terboven appears to have been careful to only do what had not been forbidden by Hitler's Führer-order the previous Autumn. Goebbels had remarked several times in this time period that Terboven had been too heavy-handed with the Norwegian people.^{93 94} In a comparison between Terboven and Seyss-Inquart, Goebbels had remarked that Terboven only knew how to employ a "hard hand".⁹⁵ Goebbels' diaries also at times indicate that some of the criticisms of Terboven stem from Knut Hamsun, and the Swedish press.^{96 97} The earlier curtailing of Terboven's reprisal authorities by Hitler indicates Hitler's attitudes towards Terboven's methods, as well. More importantly, by blocking Terboven from ordering reprisals directly, Hitler indirectly put Fehlis in charge of deciding how many were to die after the assassination of Marthinsen. In this way, the authority to order executions was divided between Terboven and Fehlis. In addition, the Führer-order contributed to the reprisal consisting solely of court-martial executions.

89 Larsen, Stein Ugelvik, et al, *Meldungen aus Norwegen*, 2008: pp. 1580, 1615

90 Dahl, Hans Fredrik, Hjeltnes, Guri, Nøkleby, Berit, Ringdal, Nils Johan, Sørensen, Øystein, "*Norsk Krigsleksikon 1940-1945*", <<http://www.nb.no/nbsok/nb/e036c01828538f45e76000a61706dbf4.nbdigital?lang=no#267>>, last accessed 21.04.2017

91 Larsen, Stein Ugelvik, et al, *Meldungen aus Norwegen*, 2008: p. 1615

92 *Norsk Krigsleksikon 1940-1945*, 1995: p. 349

93 Fröhlich, Elke, *Die Tagebücher von Joseph Goebbels, Part II, Volume 14*, 1995: pp. 283, 376

94 Fröhlich, Elke, *Die Tagebücher von Joseph Goebbels, Part II, Volume 13*, 1995: p. 232

95 Fröhlich, Elke, *Die Tagebücher von Joseph Goebbels, Part II, Volume 9*, 1995: p. 577

96 Fröhlich, Elke, *Die Tagebücher von Joseph Goebbels, Part II, Volume 8*, 1993: p. 556

97 Fröhlich, Elke, *Die Tagebücher von Joseph Goebbels, Part II, Volume 15*, 1995: p. 189

3.5 The Netherlands, 1942-1945

There are two topics regarding the Netherlands that need to be investigated for this thesis.

The first topic is the nature of the administration that committed reprisals in Netherlands.

The second topic is a selection of the reprisals themselves. The three most prominent cases of reprisals in the Netherlands are, in order of appearance: Operation Silbertanne, The Food Embargo following *Dolle Dinsdag*, the executions at Woeste Hoeve, and the Putten raid. Additionally, an earlier reprisal following a failed train sabotage in Rotterdam is mentioned. This mention happens before the other reprisals, as it is chronologically the first.

As told by the Oxford Companion to the Second World War, the conditions in the Netherlands were less severe compared to other occupied countries in Europe.⁹⁸ Even so, harsh reprisals were put in place as the war progressed. By the end of the war, an estimated 800-1'500 people had been executed as hostages. According to Mackenzie, the estimates for the total number of executed in relation to resistance activities in general reached 2'800.⁹⁹

As stated in section 1.1, the authority to order reprisals was roughly split between three positions. This was as much the case in the Netherlands, as anywhere else. As *Reichskommissar*, Arthur Seyss-Inquart had overall authority to order any reprisals following enemy action that impacted civilian matters. The head of the *Wehrmacht* in the Netherlands, Friedrich Christiansen, had the overall authority to order reprisals against enemy action that impacted military interests. Finally, the head of the SS in the Netherlands, HSSPF Hanns Albin Rauter, had the authority to order reprisals following enemy action that impacted the security of the *Reich*. There was also some overlap between the authority of the *Reichskommissar* and that of the HSSPF. This can among other times be seen when the SS conducted reprisals following the assassinations of several Dutch national socialists, see the paragraph on the second case of reprisals.

The occupation of the Netherlands included, as of August 1942, the German authorities keeping 1'000 Dutch citizens hostage, in the event of future acts of sabotage. One case of them using this policy was in August, 1942. After an attempt to blow up a German troop train in Rotterdam, five hostages were executed by order of Rauter. Four of these victims were among the 1'000 hostages mentioned above. The fifth was connected to the royal household, and was selected for this reason.

98 Dear, I. C. B., Foot, M. R. D., *The Oxford Companion to the Second World War*, 1998: p. 998

99 Mackenzie, William, *The Secret History of the SOE*, 2002: p. 647

The sabotage, it would later turn out, was attempted by a Dutch Communist.¹⁰⁰ One can see some parallels with the later Mjøndalen attack, which was described in section 3.3. The key difference is that the sabotage in the Netherlands was only an attempt, which did not cause any German deaths, unlike Mjøndalen. As such, the reaction by Rauter in the Netherlands seems to have been harsher than that of Terboven in Norway. The harsh reaction, it should be noted, comes before the catalysts that were *Dolle Dinsdag*, the opening of the Western Front, or any such event. The Rotterdam attack was also a full year before the Mjøndalen attack. This would lead one to conclude that Rauter was more inclined to execute hostages in similar circumstances than Terboven was.

The first of the three reprisals to be discussed followed the assassination of two major Dutch collaboration figures. The assassination of Hendrik Seyffardt¹⁰¹, 5 February 1943, was the first of these, carried out by one of the Dutch resistance organisations. Two days after the assassination of Seyffardt, the same organisation struck again, shooting another member of the collaboration government and his wife, 7 February, 1943. Several more assassinations followed through the year, and in 1944.¹⁰² By order of HSSPF Rauter, the SS organised the reprisal operation. They named it Sonderkommando *Silbertanne*. *Silbertanne* was undertaken by a death squad between September 1943 and September 1944, and caused 54 deaths before being terminated by the Dutch Shadow Cabinet's leader, Anton Mussert.¹⁰³ Several raids on Dutch universities were also undertaken during *Silbertanne*, and hundreds of arrests were made. An unknown number of the arrested died in captivity.¹⁰⁴ Rauter defended *Silbertanne* during his trial after the war, claiming it contributed to stopping the assassination of Dutch national socialists. Warmbrunn points out that the assassinations continued, and in fact accelerated, as the German occupiers became more brutal.¹⁰⁵ The operation was significant in a few key ways. It was very different from other reprisals in this thesis, in the way it was carried out. In addition, it was an act of reprisal ordered by a head of an SS chapter, not the *Reichskommissar* nor head of the *Wehrmacht* in the occupied territory. It also demonstrates that

100 Warmbrunn, Werner, *The Dutch under German Occupation 1940-1945*, 1963: pp. 52-61

101 Seyffardt, Hendrik, born 1 November 1872, died 6 February 1943, was Rijkscommissaris for the Dutch Shadow Cabinet, and second in rank to the Cabinet's leader, Anton Mussert. His assassination triggered Operation *Silbertanne*, see main text.

102 Warmbrunn, Werner, *The Dutch under German Occupation 1940-1945*, 1963: pp. 206-208

103 Mussert, Anton Adriaan, born 11 May 1894, died 7 May 1946, was declared leader of the Dutch people 13 December 1942 by Adolf Hitler. Following this, two assassinations took place in his government, see main text. When he learned of the ongoing reprisal operation, he was furious, and ordered its cessation.

104 De Jong, Loe, *Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden in de Tweede Wereldoorlog*, 1976: p. 1276

105 Warmbrunn, Werner, *The Dutch under German Occupation 1940-1945*, 1963: pp. 207-208

the SS, while not directly affected by the assassinations to which it reacted, still had sufficient authority to commit reprisals in revenge for actions that affected other parts of the *Reich*. Likely, the assassination of Seyffardt and his colleague was seen as a security matter for the *Reich*, giving HSSPF Rauter the mandate he would need for *Silbertanne*. Finally, *Silbertanne* and the post-war trial of Rauter demonstrates how the Dutch resistance and German occupants caused each other to escalate the cycle of violence in the Netherlands.

The next three reprisals were conducted after the event that would be named *Dolle Dinsdag*, or Crazy Tuesday. Preceding *Dolle Dinsdag*, due to the approaching Western Front, a state of martial law was declared the day before, on 5 September 1944.¹⁰⁶ The next day, on 6 September 1944, following wild rumours and highly inaccurate reports of allied advances into Dutch territory, several ill-advised actions by the Dutch resistance general populace demonstrated the Dutch people's hostility to their German occupiers. This event and the impending defeat of Germany, writes Huyskamp in his thesis, were the primary causes for the increased brutality in the Netherlands. Dr. Karl Georg Eberhard Schöngarth, who would later act in Rauter's stead to order the reprisals at De Woeste Hoeve, was appointed to the SD to clamp down hard on any resistance. Trials for resistance fighters were suspended and replaced by summary executions, by order of Hitler.¹⁰⁷

The second of the four main reprisals in the Dutch chapter was a food embargo. During the allied campaign to liberate the Netherlands, railway workers in the Netherlands went on strike. The strike had been requested by the Dutch government-in-exile.¹⁰⁸ As reprisal for the strike, food transportation into the Netherlands was embargoed. This, along with a food shortage due to German ration cuts and a harsh winter in 1944, lead to the starvation catastrophe known as *Hongerwinter*, or Hungerwinter. It was, writes Huyskamp, Seyss-Inquart who had ordered the food embargo. This embargo contributed to the deaths of 15'000 people.¹⁰⁹

The Autumn of 1944 saw mixed successes on the Western Front. While operation *Silbertanne* was ongoing, on 25 August 1944, Paris was liberated by the Free French forces. The Western Front continued to be pushed toward the French borders. Operation Market-Garden began 17 September

106 Warmbrunn, Werner, *The Dutch under German Occupation 1940-1945*, 1963: p. 55

107 Huyskamp, Ruud, *Desperate Times, Desperate Measures: German Oppression, Dutch Resistance, and the Tragedy at De Woeste Hoeve*, 2011: pp. 15-17

108 Kagge, Gunnar G., *To Små Land i Stormaktenes Krig*, 1990: pp. 93-95

109 Huyskamp, Ruud, *Desperate Times, Desperate Measures: German Oppression, Dutch Resistance, and the Tragedy at De Woeste Hoeve*, 2011: p. 31-32

1944, causing the above-mentioned *Dolle Dinsdag*-event. By 25 September, it was cut short. Small parts of the Netherlands were, however, liberated. Just before the second of the reprisals covered in this thesis was to begin, the Belgrade offensive had begun, pushing the *Wehrmacht* out of Serbia. The offensive was still under way when what was to be known as the raid on Putten happened. In other areas of the war, the *Wehrmacht* was being attacked in Carpathia. The Western Front had however begun to stagnate some, and the *Wehrmacht* were holding the Allies at a standstill in the West, defending Hürtgen Forest in preparation of their counter-offensive scheduled for December 1944.¹¹⁰

The third round of reprisals to be covered in this thesis, and one of the most infamous of the reprisals would be carried out by order of the head of the *Wehrmacht* in the Netherlands. Following the killing of a *Wehrmacht Leutnant*¹¹¹ by the Dutch resistance during an attack the night of 30 September-1 October 1944, general Friedrich Christiansen ordered a raid on the village of Putten, 2 October, 1944. 87 homes were burned, several women and children were arrested, and a total of 661 male inhabitants were deported to the concentration camp called Kamp Amersfoort. From there, 602 were sent to Neuengamme concentration camp. The other 59 were released due to age or infirmity. Most of the ones sent to Neuengamme died. In the end, only 48 returned after the war had ended. Of these, 5 later died due to their injuries after a short while. In total, 552 people died as a result of the deportations.^{112 113}

Between the raid on Putten and the last reprisal to be covered in this thesis, the last hope of victory for the Germans was gone. While the attack on the Ardennes Forest had met with initial successes, it could not be sustained, and eventually broke. Their resources exhausted following the failed attack, the German forces were back to a fighting retreat in the West Front. On the Eastern Front, the Red Army had begun marching into Germany via Prussia and Pomerania. It was against this backdrop that the last of the Dutch reprisals would happen.¹¹⁴

The final round of reprisals that will be covered in this thesis followed a botched attempt at stealing

110 Dear, I. C. B., Foot, M. R. D., *The Oxford Companion to the Second World War*, 1995: pp. 39-40, 304, 562

111 German, translates to lieutenant.

112 Putten.nl, «The Raid», <http://www.putten.nl/Configuratie/Ondersteunende_navigatie_header/English/The_Raid>, last accessed 06.03.2017

113 Huyskamp, Ruud, *Desperate Times, Desperate Measures: German Oppression, Dutch Resistance, and the Tragedy at De Woeste Hoeve*, 2011: p. 19

114 Dear, I. C. B., Foot, M. R. D., *The Oxford Companion to the Second World War*, 1995: pp. 39-40, 230, 381

a truck by resistance members. The attempted theft led to two SS officers dead, and the grievous wounding of Rauter himself. In the Netherlands, the desperation that mounted as the *Hongerwinter* unfolded had caused people to seek out any food source it could. The resistance movement had caught wind of a stockpile of meat, which they intended to steal.¹¹⁵ 6 March, 1945, Rauter's car was accidentally attacked by resistance members during the resistance attempt to get at the food stockpile. The resulting reprisals led to the execution of 116/117¹¹⁶ men rounded up from prisons near the site of the attack, and 147 prisoners held by the Gestapo in several other areas. The reprisal executions had been ordered by Rauter's temporary replacement, Karl G. Ebenhardt Schöngarth, with the advice and blessing of Rauter.¹¹⁷ The reprisal at De Woeste Hoeve was unusual because of its high death toll. The high death toll is especially unusual in its volume, in spite of occurring so close to the end of the war. The high death toll appears to be attributed to three main factors. First, the people behind it were both known to be firm followers of the policy of terror.¹¹⁸ Second, the German leadership in the Netherlands were at this time still considering resisting even if Berlin should fall in the future. The third factor is more complicated than the previous two. It seems likely from the available evidence that the reprisal at De Woeste Hoeve was based on the policy of terror, which had been implemented in 1943, and steadily reinforced since then. Said policy is known to have served as the foundation for *Silbertanne* and other executions, and reprisals committed by the SS leadership in the Netherlands, particularly the previously mentioned Schöngarth and Rauter.¹¹⁹ The policy of terror is not known to have been retracted, which would leave it up to the occupational leadership whether to follow the policy or not. In the Netherlands, it seems the violence between resistance organisations and the occupying Germans caused it to be used more and more until the war ended.

In summary, the officers responsible for the reprisal, Schöngarth and Rauter, could refer to the

115 Huyskamp, Ruud, *Desperate Times, Desperate Measures: German Oppression, Dutch Resistance, and the Tragedy at De Woeste Hoeve*, 2011: pp. 32-33

116 Sources differ on this number. Some give 117 as the number, others 116 plus one German soldier who refused to fire. In either case, the total death toll is still given as 264, when adding the prisoners of the Gestapo and the 117 from the area.

117 Huyskamp, Ruud, *Desperate Times, Desperate Measures: German Oppression, Dutch Resistance, and the Tragedy at De Woeste Hoeve*, 2011: pp. 1-3

118 Huyskamp, Ruud, *Desperate Times, Desperate Measures: German Oppression, Dutch Resistance, and the Tragedy at De Woeste Hoeve*, 2011: pp. 11, 17

119 Huyskamp, Ruud, *Desperate Times, Desperate Measures: German Oppression, Dutch Resistance, and the Tragedy at De Woeste Hoeve*, 2011: pp. 3

policy of terror for justification. The leadership in the Netherlands were still undecided when it came to how they would act in the event of the central leadership's fall. In addition, the SS-officers Schöngarth and Rauter are both considered to have been fanatics. These factors together provide a probable explanation for the brutality of the reprisal.

There is a connection between the food embargo and the executions connected to De Woeste Hoeve. Following *Dolle Dinsdag*, and the connected railway strike, the tension between the German occupants and the Dutch population rose markedly. The food embargo in particular, combined with other factors of war that together caused the *Hongerwinter*, went on to cause the attack on Rauter. This attack in turn caused the mass executions associated with De Woeste Hoeve. The connection is worth noting because it illustrates the kind of social and economic problems that Terboven wanted to avoid, as seen in section 2.4. When striking against the Dutch populace by withholding food, Seyss-Inquart had indirectly contributed to more violence and disruption. While he was considered moderate both by Goebbels¹²⁰ and later historians, His concern was with obeying Hitler, and providing for the needs of the *Reich* itself. The cost to the Dutch population was less important.¹²¹

The Dutch resistance's manner of organisation plays into the manner in which some of these reprisals came to be. The distinct differences between the resistance groups that was formed precluded consolidation until late March 1945. By then, the all reprisals had already happened.¹²² The increasing willingness to assassinate Dutch collaborators during the latter half of the war, combined with the lack of a central leadership to guide the Dutch efforts and provide a greater degree of oversight and intelligence, led to mutual escalation between the Dutch resistance and the SS. Some parts of the resistance movement began the wave of assassinations, provoking acts of terror from the SS, which provoked other parts of the resistance in turn, causing them to back assassination as a method of resistance. In this way, the resistance and the German occupational forces caused a mutual escalation of violence.

120 Fröhlich, Elke, *Die Tagebücher von Joseph Goebbels, Part II, Volume 9*, 1995: p. 577

121 Warmbrunn, Werner, *The Dutch under German Occupation 1940-1945*, 1963: p. 30

122 Warmbrunn, Werner, *The Dutch under German Occupation 1940-1945*, 1963: pp. 213-215

4. Discussion

The goal of this chapter is to discuss the findings of chapter 3, and to compare them with the previous research in chapter 2. The discussion chapter is divided into four sections, one for each part of the research topic. The fourth section is the longest. The length is caused by the need to first summarise and discuss the findings of the Dutch section of chapter 3, and then to compare the findings regarding the Netherlands with the findings that revolve around Norway. The reprisals in the Netherlands will be discussed together. The other three sections, that deal with the reprisals in Norway, will discuss the findings more thoroughly.

There are four considerations to be made regarding the methods used in the reprisals. The first consideration is the evolution of the methods over time. This will be the main focus for section 4.1. The second consideration is the difference between the methods used by the actual decision-makers. This will be brought up in section 4.2 for Norway, and 4.4 for the Netherlands. The third consideration compares the methods caused by different influences. This is the topic in 4.3 for Norway, and 4.4 for the Netherlands. The fourth consideration compares the methods used in different countries. This will be brought up in section 4.4.

4.1 Reprisal methods

This section discusses the first research sub-topic, the methods used as a part of the reprisals. This part of the discussion regards how the methods evolved over time, what methods were used, and which methods served as the backbone for the reprisals as a tool of occupation. The discussion of each of the three featured instances of reprisal in Norway will be chronological. After the reprisals have been discussed separately, the methods will be summarised and discussed. The heavy water sabotage presented in 3.2 plays no part in this particular research topic. This is due to the heavy water sabotage not causing any reprisals to discuss. The severity of the reprisals will be compared to the Dutch cases in section 4.4.

The martial law in Central Norway was conducted as a large operation, with contributions by each branch of the *Wehrmacht*, the SS, and the civilian government. The reprisal as a whole consisted of several separable methods. First was the martial law itself. Part of the martial law was a curfew and house searches, during which stockpiles of alcohol, tobacco, food, weapons and radios were seized.

People caught in possession of weapons, radios or large amounts of unaccounted money were arrested, as were those out after the curfew was effected. The martial law was supplemented by several executions. Some of these executions were hostage killings without a trial, while others were a result of a drumhead court-martial. The total death toll of 34 people was the highest number of executions caused entirely by reprisals in Norway. Immediately after the martial law, the arrest of all male Jews in Trondheim was ordered. On the topic of Jews, Terboven had granted leeway to the local commanders of Sipo, and Flesch, the local commander in Trondheim may have taken advantage of the martial law to justify the mass arrest.

A month after the end of *Silbertanne*, the attack on the railway in Mjøndalen, Norway, provoked the next of the featured reprisals. The reprisals following the attack on the Mjøndalen railway were fairly straightforward, in terms of pure description. The German authorities, spearheaded by Terboven, took hostages, then they shot five of them. The unusual part of the reprisals in this particular case was the demand for a public outcry against the sabotage attack. This demand came before the executions, under threat of said executions. In spite of a petition getting 4'000 signatures, the five executions were then carried out by order of Terboven. The executions were also the first as hostage killings since the martial law in Central Norway.

The final of the reprisals from Norway presented here, followed the assassination of Karl Marthinsen. There was only one method used in this case. The arrest and execution of 34 hostages. This method is similar to the executions seen during the earlier martial law, and after Mjøndalen. However, two aspects of this reprisal separate the 29 executions from the executions of the other two reprisals. The first change is the fact that they are revenge for the assassination of a Norwegian collaborator and head of Stapo, rather than sabotage and German deaths. The second aspect is how Terboven could not order the reprisal directly due to Hitler's earlier order that he was not to order hostage-killings directly. Instead, he had to request them, with chief of police Fehlis having the final say. As a result, for the reprisal after Karl Marthinsen was assassinated consisted only of drumhead courts-martial.

4.2 Who made the decisions

The second research topic regards who made the decisions when it came to deciding whether or not to carry out reprisals in each of the cases in this thesis. The authority was not as constant as it might seem to be, due in part to extraneous circumstances, and in part due to the overlapping nature of the command structure of the occupation. As explained in section 1.2, there were four ways a reprisal

could be ordered. For those events that impacted civilian interests, the *Reichskommissar* was the ultimate authority. For Norway, this was always Josef Terboven. In the case of events that impacted military interests, the head of the *Wehrmacht* in Norway would theoretically have the final say. The head of the *Wehrmacht* in Norway was for the majority of the war Nikolaus von Falkenhorst. However, in both cases, the immediate superiors of each branch of occupational government could overrule the above-mentioned leaders. In the case of the *Wehrmacht*, the *Wehrmacht* high command could theoretically overrule the local head. The only authority above the *Reichskommissar* was Hitler himself, who could also choose to overrule the *Wehrmacht* high command. In addition to the two primary reprisal authorities, the heads of the SS in each occupied country had the authority to order reprisals in certain situations. As seen in section 3.5, this authority was used by Rauter and Schöngarth. In Norway on the other hand, that authority went unused by the HSSPF in Norway, Redieß.

In Norway, *Reichskommissar* Terboven was the most active of the authorities. As a side-effect of the martial law in Central Norway, the SS in Norway was ordered not to commit any hostage-takings in Norway after April 1943 without the go-ahead of Himmler himself. In addition, Terboven's dominating personality appears to have completely suppressed HSSPF Redieß. From what can be seen from the sources, he was only involved with reprisals when he was under instruction from the *Reichskommissar*. When it comes to the role of the *Wehrmacht*, little has been said about general von Falkenhorst's personality, but he apparently cooperated well with Terboven. He was for the most part involved with the *Kommandobefehl*, but apparently took no direct part in the reprisals presented. *Wehrmacht* forces took part in events such as the martial law in Central Norway, but in that case, they were loaned out to Terboven for the occasion. Falkenhorst did however play a part in the case of the heavy water sabotage, as detailed in section 3.2. This role can be speculated to have come from the overlap of the offices in the case of the heavy water factory. However, as the events suggest that the final decision lay with Terboven, the role of Falkenhorst in that regard is sorted under section 4.3, and will be discussed there. That is not to say Falkenhorst could not have overruled Terboven if the *Reichskommissar* would not reconsider, but whether he could is unknown from the available information. In the absence of information that makes it likely that Falkenhorst had the needed authority to do so, Falkenhorst will therefore be discussed in the capacity of an influence.

There is little to be said of either the HSSPF or the head of the *Wehrmacht* in Norway, when it comes to their motivations for reprisals. This is due to the fact that they appear not to have taken a

direct part in making the final decisions in any of those reprisals that are covered by the research topic. Terboven had put himself in control over reprisals in Norway. This control extended to most, though eventually not all instances of reprisal. There are two aspects of his methodology that characterise the Norwegian *Reichskommissar's* approach to reprisals. The first aspect is his short temper. The second aspect is his goal of leaving the *Reichskommissariat* in Norway for a more prestigious posting. From the findings outlined in chapter 2 and 3, it can be concluded that whatever Terboven may have reasoned when he made his increasingly harsh decisions, the methods he employed became increasingly harsh and less varied as the situation in Norway and the war at large escalated. Eventually, he does not appear to have had the mindset for seeking other methods to deal with the general situation in Norway, than the harsher methods he resorted to as the war progressed, as discussed in section 4.1.

The lack of variation in Terboven's methods may have been caused by his short temper, making it difficult for him to return to gentler methods later, once Norwegian resistance activities had angered him sufficiently. The possibility that his temper is to blame remains speculation, however. That said, judging by Nøkleby's findings outlined in section 2.4, he had a singular goal in mind throughout the occupation, in seeking to leave his post. To achieve his goal, he wanted to stabilise Norway as much as possible. As part of his efforts to stabilise the situation in Norway, Terboven sought to avoid causing excessive economic hardship in Norway. In short, Terboven's actions and reactions give the appearance of having been informed to a great extent by economic concerns.

Terboven's methods eventually caused him to lose some of his authority over reprisals in the last half year of the war. Due to Hitler's *Führer*-order in September 1944, Terboven was not able to directly order reprisals in the end of 1944, nor in 1945. Instead, he had to request drumhead court-martials from the SS. The featured case where Hitler's order applied was the assassination of Karl Marthinsen in 1945. In that instance, Terboven requested 75 executions. Fehlis eventually ordered 34 court-martials, after a discussion with two NS ministers, as detailed in section 3.4. For the final Norwegian reprisal, the authority to order reprisals is therefore more indirect for Terboven, going via Fehlis as well. According to one writer, Lars-Erik Vaale, this led to fewer executions than Terboven had wanted. Whether this was truly the case is unfortunately not known, as Vaale's article provided no sources for this claim.

When the arrest of all male Jews in Trondheim was ordered, Flesch may have executed a reprisal on his own authority. The technicalities of this are a complex matter. While Terboven in effect had a

monopoly on reprisals in Norway, the Jews may have been an exception. Whether they were depends on whether Flesch was behind the arrest-order. If so, whether their arrest can truly be said to have been a reprisal is difficult, as Flesch's motivation for the order is unknown. However, the order certainly gave the appearance of being a reprisal, or part of the martial law. Thus, for all intents and purposes, if Nøkleby's supposition that he was behind the order is correct, Flesch ordered at least part of a reprisal.

4.3 Influences on reprisals

The various incidents, persons, plans, and other factors that influenced the reprisals in Norway will be discussed in this section. First, overall factors that could potentially influence reprisals will be discussed. Then, influences that only applied to specific incidents will be discussed case-by-case.

The office of the *Reichskommissariat* was formally answerable directly to Hitler, and derived their authority from that of the *Führer*. As observed in section 2.3, the *Reichskommissar* was reliant on the semi-autonomous branch of the SS on which he relied for executing the *Reichskommissar's* directives. Terboven in particular was reliant on the SS due to his reliance on their communications channels, and the high number of SS officers in *Reichskommissariat* positions. This resulted in the *Reichsführer-SS* having some leverage over Terboven. With this leverage, Himmler could potentially pressure the *Reichskommissar* into acting according to the wishes of the *Reichsführer-SS*, as well as Hitler. The influence Himmler could have over Terboven appears to have come into play after the martial law in Central Norway, which had roused Himmler's anger. Himmler's April 1943 order to abstain from hostage-takings also effectively restricted the power SS had to enact reprisals in Norway.

While the SS was effectively subdued by the combination of Terboven and Himmler's influences, it would seem Terboven himself was not so easily subdued by Himmler. While Himmler had the means to apply pressure on Terboven via his control over the SS, Himmler had no formal authority over Terboven. Hitler on the other hand, had proven a great influence on Terboven himself prior to the martial law in Central Norway, providing him with the approval to do what Terboven saw fit. Hitler again proved a significant influence on the reprisals in Norway in the Autumn of 1944, when he barred Terboven from engaging in reprisals. While partially reneged some time later, the order still meant Terboven could only request drumhead court-martials for the final reprisal this thesis discusses.

The perceived risk of invasion likely played a part in determining the level of tension in Norway. Invasion had seemed to be imminent around the time the martial law in Central Norway was carried out. Coinciding with the realisation that invasion was not as imminent as feared, reprisals in Norway fell in both severity and frequency. The high-water mark for casualties from reprisals in Norway remained the martial law in Central Norway, though the reprisals for the assassination of Karl Marthinsen came close, near the end of the war. By this time, the war was considered lost by most people. Many had begun to consider what they would do if or when Berlin fell. At the same time, sabotage activity had been on the rise for a few months. In short, tensions were high once more by the time the assassination took place.

The above influences were not equally important. However, accurately identifying the importance of each influence is difficult. The most secure approach to an estimation of the importance of the various influences lies in comparing the influences against each other. Hitler was a greater potential influence than Himmler, given his formal authority over Terboven. Hitler did not often involve himself in the Norwegian reprisals however, but when he did, the effect was clear. The influence Hitler had provided prior to the martial law in Central Norway had a great impact on the decision to commit the reprisal. Hitler also influenced the reprisal after Marthinsen's assassination. Judging by Terboven's statements and actions outlined in sections 2.4 and 3.2, the general tension during that period was also a large factor.

Some influences were restricted to one reprisal act. This sort of influence included the circumstances of the resistance acts in question, the arguments of people attempting to influence the reprisals, and similar types of factors. These influences typically affected specific aspects of the reprisals, such as how severe the reprisals were, what sort of methods were used in the reprisals, and so on. Therefore, the influences are discussed according to what part of each reprisal they affected, and how the influences affected said parts.

The two major opportunities for influence on the martial law in Central Norway were whether or not to carry them out, and who and how many to execute. The influences on these decisions were many. Terboven's meeting with Hitler on 11 August 1942 was undoubtedly a major catalyst for his decision. In the same period of time, the many resistance acts surrounding Central Norway made the area an obvious target. Judging from the source material available, three resistance acts in particular stood out to the German authorities. The first of these acts was the Majavatn affair. The second was the Glomfjord mine sabotage attack. The third act was the Fosdalen mine sabotage

attack. Of these three, Fosdalen was the last straw.

As noted in section 3.1, Fosdalen can be confirmed to have been the final cause of the martial law in Central Norway. Terboven and Christen did declare as much to Himmler and Wolff. However, as pointed out in the same section, it is not the full picture. Terboven was looking for an excuse to begin with. That excuse was provided by the combination of the events at Majavatn, Glomfjord and finally Fosdalen. Virtually any event could have been the one that would provide an excuse for Terboven. As we can see from these findings, Kraglund and Moland's conclusion that Fosdalen triggered the executions of the martial law appear to be substantiated. In fact, the conversation between Terboven and Goebbels in section 3.1 shows that the above conclusion can be expanded. Not only could the executions themselves have been excused by anything. It appears the entire declaration of martial law itself could have been excused by any event. The purpose of the martial law was a pre-planned affair, meant to scare the Norwegian populace into silence.

During the martial law, the decision on who to execute was made by a handful of people. *Hitlers Norge* names Terboven, Fehlis, Fleisch, Redieß and the local NS-leader, Henrik Rogstad. *Okkupantens Dagbok*, the published version of Heinrich Christen's diary also forwards Christen's own name, in addition to four of the above five. Fehlis on the other hand does not get a mention. Christen also underscores that the decision was made by the German authority members in the group. He wrote that he had demanded ten names from Rogstad, at Terboven's instruction. He later mused on why it seemed this had been so easy for Rogstad however. So while Rogstad is apparently not quite as personally responsible for the ten names as previously thought, he is far from innocent.

With regards to the reprisal conference presented in sections 2.4 and 3.1 where the execution victims were picked out, it is highly likely that both Fehlis and Christen took part in the process. Christen claims to have rejected two names from the list. He does not mention whether new names were picked out then and there, or if a new conference was called later. One possibility is that a conference took place which Christen participated in, while Fehlis did not. In addition to said conference, one or more new conferences could have been called that included Fehlis as a participant, but not Christen. Fehlis would then take the finished list from the meeting, and pass it along to the *Sonderkommando* whose task it was to carry out the arrests and executions. It can also well be that Fehlis and Christen both took part, but with no mention of Fehlis on the part of Christen. Which of these two possibilities is the case is not known. Possibly, if additional sources were unearthed, it could be figured out what exactly is the case.

One thing is clear given the available information, however. Both Christen and Fehlis are highly likely to have been involved in the selection of the ten first victims of the martial law in Central Norway. Apart from the previous evidence provided by Nøkleby and Christen, both are logical choices for the conference, given their respective roles in the German administration.

The next event in line is the heavy water sabotage at Vemork. The final outcome of the sabotage was that no reprisals were committed. As can be seen in section 3.2, it can now be asserted that the impact of the sabotage was greater than previously thought.¹²³ While the heavy water itself was not as crucial as was thought at the time, the attack demonstrated that the factory facility was vulnerable to attack. Terboven was moved, in part by the heavy water attack, to avoid using resources from the facility for artillery manufacturing. Said unwillingness, combined with the 300 hostages that were taken, indicate that the attack could have caused reprisals. Terboven himself had proven himself quite willing to commit harsh reprisals, both before and after the heavy water sabotage. The factors that counted against reprisal must therefore have been enough to outweigh the above factors that counted for.

Of the factors presented in the empirical chapter that count against reprisal, Falkenhorst's involvement is likely the most important. It is also the factor it is most difficult to confirm. However, the argument he is said to have given is itself strong, as well as relevant to the decision regarding reprisals. The military nature of the attack, coupled with the attack's British origins, make a strong case against reprisals against the local populace, as it is plain they had no involvement. There is also the absence of casualties to consider. However, as indicated in several cases in the chapter for previous research, Terboven was a temperamental man, with no patience for dissent or hindrances to his will. This indicates that it is likely that the involvement of Falkenhorst was indeed true, as the arguments would likely have needed someone to champion them. The only person involved with Vemork who had the position to do so was Falkenhorst, who was on equal footing with Terboven in terms of authority in Norway.

The Mjøndalen train-sabotage, which happened 7 October 1943, provoked the execution of five hostages. The influences in this case are not as immediately apparent as the previous two. The tide of the war had been turning for some time. The battles at Stalingrad and Kursk had both been lost by the Germans by this point. The Norwegian resistance had adopted their new policies with

¹²³ Dear, I. C. B., Foot, M. R. D., *The Oxford Companion to the Second World War*, 1995: p. 974

regards to sabotage by this time however. In addition, 1943 was not an active year for the resistance movement. The result was that internal tensions were not quite so high as they had been prior to the martial law the year before. The sabotage was mentioned by Goebbels in a period of general silence between Terboven and Goebbels. In the only relevant discussion that Goebbels mentions in his diaries in this period, Terboven comments were about how quiet Norway had become. The attack happened a few months after Himmler had forbidden the practice of hostage-takings by the SS, April that same year. Himmler had also previously reacted angrily at Terboven, after the martial law in Central Norway. These factors could all have contributed to the relatively muted scale of the reaction, compared to the other reprisals Terboven was behind.

The final reprisal to be discussed, following the assassination of Karl Marthinsen on 8 February 1945, cost 29 people their lives. 34 had been scheduled for execution, but five were instead secretly detained until the war ended. There are three main influences that would cause this reprisal to nearly match the martial law in Central Norway in casualties. In general terms, the escalating tensions in Norway and the war in general put pressure on Terboven. In this specific case, the attack was an assassination carried out in the capital, which would most likely cause more anger than a sabotage attack. If Vaale's article mentioned in the empirical chapter is correct, there was another influence that pulled the reprisal in the more lenient direction: The two Norwegian shadow cabinet ministers that talked Fehlis down from 75 executions to 34. However, said information was not provided with a source in the article, nor does it appear elsewhere, rendering the finding uncertain. Vaale has unfortunately not been reachable prior to the deadline.

The greatest influence on the method used during the reprisal, the drumhead court-martial, was the *Führer*-order from September 1944. Due to said order, Terboven's only means of reprisal that appears to have been available to him was the SS-courts. The *Führer*-order was not the only influence on Terboven's actions, but it was quite clearly limiting Terboven's response, overriding all other concerns.

Of the 34 people who were to be executed, five were spared from the execution, remaining in imprisonment. All five survived the war. The reason or reasons why the five survivors were spared is unfortunately unknown, with the sources currently available. Perhaps, a future release of sealed documents, or a discovery of some sort, may shed further light on the circumstances of these five prisoners.

Historiographically, the findings of Nøkleby in *Josef Terboven*, mentioned in section 3.4, illuminate more than just the effect of the *Führer*-order on the Marthinsen assassination. The findings also contradict the supposition in Volume six of *Norge i Krig*, mentioned in section 2.2. There, the Mjøndalen sabotage had been compared to the Jørstad bridge sabotage near the end of the war, supposing the lack of reprisal was due to the increased activity and discipline of the resistance movement. However, regardless of the effect these factors could have had, the *Führer*-order was still in effect at the time of the Jørstad sabotage, and Terboven had not yet been granted the use of SS courts once more. By applying Nøkleby's findings to the theory from *Norge i Krig*, it becomes apparent that it cannot be known what effect the resistance movement policies had in the instance of the Jørstad bridge sabotage, due to the overriding effect of Hitler's ban on reprisals.

4.4 Comparison with the Netherlands

The next and final question is: how severe were the reprisals in Norway, compared to the reprisals in the Netherlands. How were the German methods in Norway compared to those used in the Netherlands, which were the offices and persons deciding on what to do, how were the decisions influenced by the situation during the different time-periods, and, most of all, which country suffered the most?

To make the comparison with the Netherlands, the Netherlands will first be discussed along the same lines as Norway in the previous three sections. The research topics will be discussed in the same order as previously: methods, decision-makers, influences. After each topic is discussed, a comparison will be made of the methods in either country, the leaders behind the reprisals, and finally the influences. Finally, an overall comparison will be drawn. Unlike the discussion of each research sub-topic with respect to Norway, the cases will be summed up.

The methods used in the reprisals in the Netherlands cannot be summarised as easily as the methods used in Norway. While killing remained the most common method, we see different forms of killing in addition to executions. In operation *Silbertanne*, 54 people were killed by a death squad. The victims were chosen randomly over the span of a year. The method was apparently chosen to inflict a more general type of terror, than that of publicised execution. Executions did occur however, during the De Woeste Hoeve reprisal, and earlier after the Rotterdam train sabotage attempt. De Woeste Hoeve claimed 263 Dutch civilian lives, while the Rotterdam reprisal cost five. But many of these executions were hostages that had been arrested previously by the SS, for the express purpose of executing them as revenge for resistance activity.

In contrast, the hostages in the reprisals in Norway were picked out after the fact, in a more spontaneous manner than in the Netherlands. In this, the SS in the Netherlands displayed a greater degree of pre-meditation as well as a greater freedom from restrictions than their counterparts in Norway. This is not to say that hostage-takings did not occur in Norway. As the Mjøndalen case has provided of an example of, hostages were sometimes used to ward off resistance acts. In that case however, the hostages were not imprisoned elsewhere to be executed if something were to happen. Instead, they rode in the front train car, in an attempt to ward off sabotage attacks by putting the civilians in the line of fire. In summary, the disparity between the way the occupying forces in the two countries approached hostage-takings indicates that hostage-takings in Norway were not as widely used.

Hostage-killings and executions were not the only ways a Dutch civilian could lose their lives. A large number of deaths also occurred indirectly in the Netherlands, as a result of other methods employed by the *Reichskommissar* and General Christiansen of the *Wehrmacht*. The deportations during the raid of Putten would cost 552 lives, as the deported men were worked to death in labour camps in Germany. The food embargo issued by the *Reichskommissar* exacerbated an already critical food shortage, contributing to the *Hongerwinter*, which caused an estimate of 15'000 lives by the end of the war. Judging from available research, both of these methods were motivated by a wish to punish the population.

Finally, some methods were employed that did not cause deaths, at least not on the scale of the other methods discussed above. During *Silbertanne*, part of the methodology included university raids, during which hundreds of people were arrested. In this case, the fear was more easily pinpointed than the secretive death squad referenced above. During the raid of Putten, houses were burned, and some people who were not deported were arrested, including women and children. These arrestees were later released.

All in all, the methods of the German authorities in the Netherlands appear to have few underlying motives, beyond suppressing the population. The SS aimed for terror. The *Reichskommissar* aimed to cow the population. General Christiansen for his part appears simply to have lashed out with no apparent goal except revenge.

The methods used in the Netherlands can most prominently be compared to the methods used in

Norway on three points. First, the severity of the methods. Second, the variety of methods used. Third, the motives behind the methods. Compared in absolute numbers to the reprisals in Norway, the methods in the Netherlands were more severe. More people died as a result of the reprisals in the Netherlands, than in Norway. The relationship between the numbers, using only executions in reprisals in either country give just under four executions in the Netherlands, for every reprisal execution in Norway.

Using the demographic numbers from 1942, provided in the introduction, even the number of people executed in the Netherlands outweigh the numbers in Norway. For every two Norwegians that get executed, three Dutch get executed. While these numbers do not by any means give an exact illustration of the situation due to the coverage being a sample selection only, the numbers can serve as an indication of how severe the reprisals were.

The methods in the Netherlands was in some respects of a wider variety than the methods in Norway. The reprisals in Norway were often limited to methods that could be described as bureaucratic. The declaration of martial law had basis in earlier enacted law. The executions were in large part based on trials. The various search-and-seizures and arrests during the martial law were part of the martial law itself. However, the ten execution victims picked out during the martial law did not have any grounding in law, and amounted to hostage-killings. On the other hand, the martial law provisions Terboven had made included various ways to strike at the population. Terboven was forced to abandon this method late in the war, however, and only ever used it twice.

Part of the reason why long-term hostage-takings were more common in the Netherlands than in Norway stems from the interventions of Himmler in April 1943, and Hitler in September 1944. While Himmler's intervention limited the ability of the SS to take hostages, Hitler's *Führer*-order stopped Terboven from any reprisals, including hostage-taking. Hitler's ban on reprisals is shown to have affected the methods available during the reprisal for the Marthinsen assassination in 1945. No such restrictions are known to have operated in the Netherlands.

The methods used were in part informed by the policies, attitudes and goals of the decision-makers behind the reprisals. As discussed in section 4.3, Terboven dominated the Norwegian reprisals for most of the war. *Reichskommissar* Seyss-Inquart had a comparatively more passive role within his government than his counterpart in Norway. He did however, order the national food embargo that would contribute greatly to the *Hongerwinter*, leading to an estimated 15'000 dead. When Terboven

struck against Norwegian food supplies, he only seized the excess food stores, and then only of targeted households in Central Norway. There are several contributing factors to this difference. First, the two *Reichskommissars* reacted to two different scales of resistance. While Terboven reacted to resistance activity in a limited area of Norway, the Dutch railway strike was nation-wide. In Terboven's case, the food seizures had been a part of a greater reprisal effort. Seyss-Inquart's food embargo was itself the reprisal. Finally, both reprisals were committed during periods of great tension. However, part of the tension lay in the threat of allied invasion. The threat was more immediate for the Netherlands, which was subjected to the attempted liberation in 1944 at the time. In Norway, the threat never materialised.

The food embargo was enacted at a time when rations were lower than ever, and the existing food supply was critically low. While it cannot be said outright that Seyss-Inquart intended the 15'000 deaths, when ordering the embargo he could not have expected the embargo to have no such consequences. Given the attitude his embargo indicates, it is not surprising that Seyss-Inquart has been described as uncaring toward his Dutch subjects, and a *Reich*-first type of *Reichskommissar*.

Several people had the formal authority to order reprisals within the Netherlands and Norway. However, not all of them exercised that authority. There are several reasons why the authority to order reprisals went unused by some. As described earlier Terboven had a large degree of control over the reprisals, including the SS courts. *Reichskommissar* Seyss-Inquart on the other hand had a looser hold on the SS. Due to the September 1944 *Führer*-order discussed in the methods and leadership section, Terboven's control over reprisals in Norway dropped dramatically prior to the Marthinsen assassination. As a result, Terboven had to rely on the SS courts to a greater degree than previously. In effect, the final reprisal was therefore not formally ordered by Terboven, but rather requested. Formally, the order came from SS chief of police Fehlis.

HSSPF Rauter, the counterpart of the HSSPF in Norway Wilhelm Redieß, was more active in terms of reprisals compared to Seyss-Inquart. Of the Dutch reprisals in the Netherlands that are covered in section 3.5, Rauter ordered the reprisals known as operation *Silbertanne*, and the executions following the Rotterdam train sabotage event. His stand-in following Rauter's injuries in the March 1945 attack, Karl Schöngarth, ordered the executions associated with De Woeste Hoeve, the place where Rauter was attacked. Redieß on the other hand is not known to have ordered any reprisals, which was a result of his subservience to Terboven and Himmler.

General Christiansen, head of the *Wehrmacht* forces in the Netherlands, also ordered reprisals of his own, resulting in the raid at Putten. While his counterpart in Norway, Falkenhorst, was active in other acts, such as influencing the outcome of the heavy water sabotage's aftermath, he did not order any reprisals himself. Falkenhorst's replacements, Rendulic and later Boehme, did not participate in any reprisals, nor influence any.

Turning to influences, the known factors that affected the reprisals in the Netherlands for the most part affected several reprisals each. First, there was *Reichskommissar* Seyss-Inquart's looser hold on the SS. The SS' freer reins was part of what led to the large pool of hostages taken prior to the first of the reprisals, in Rotterdam. It also let SS undertake Operation *Silbertanne* without protest from the *Reichskommissar*. The last reprisal, following the resistance attack at De Woeste Hoeve, was also influenced by this lack of involvement.

The second general influence in the Netherlands was the policies and make-up of the Dutch resistance movement. In Norway, the centralised organisation made a single set of resistance policies. These policies were aimed at minimising reprisals and casualties, which was significant for limiting the factors that could lead to reprisals. In the Netherlands on the other hand, there was no central leadership guiding the resistance movement. As a result, the various organisations were left to making their own policies. Many of the resulting policies were more aggressive than the policies used in Norway. The disparate and more aggressive policies left room for more occasions for reprisals, as with the Rotterdam train sabotage, operation *Silbertanne*, the food embargo, the raid on Putten, and the executions related to De Woeste Hoeve. This led to a forced-feedback system, where parts of the Dutch resistance would provoke the SS into retaliating, which caused more parts of the resistance to back the more aggressive policies, which turned into a spiral of violence. In Norway, such a development was delayed by the resistance movement's policies, and was eventually stifled by the negative impression Terboven had made on the central government in Berlin.

The findings presented in section 2.4 and discussed in this chapter indicate that Terboven meant to keep Norway as economically viable as possible. As a result, Terboven would typically avoid actions that caused excessive harm to the Norwegian economy. Seyss-Inquart on the other hand showed no signs of such a motivation or concern. He would take from the Netherlands what was asked of him, without nearly as careful a regard to the Netherlands. In addition, by the time Seyss-Inquart ordered the food embargo, the reigning policy informing the German authorities' actions in the Netherlands was a policy of terror. Together, these two modes of thinking came together to

invoke less regard for the welfare of the citizens than the policy of economic viability did in Norway. Seyss-Inquart had previously lowered rations, and reacted to the railway strike by embargoing transport of all food into the Netherlands. Seyss-Inquart was perhaps more moderate than Terboven, as claimed by Goebbels. Even so, Seyss-Inquart's greater lack of concern for the continued stability of the Netherlands wound up contributing to more lives lost than the approach taken by Terboven. Seyss-Inquart's lack of concern combined with the increased activity of the resistance movement in the Netherlands and the proximity of the front escalated the tension in the Netherlands substantially. In Norway, the resistance movement was more muted, centralised, and followed strict policies when engaging in resistance activities. When combined with the distance from the most active fronts and the German policies, much of the cause for tension that had contributed in the Netherlands was missing in Norway.

The strict control and economic concerns that defined Terboven's approach to *Reichskommissariat Norwegen* limited the ability of the SS to terrorise the Norwegian population. It also led to Terboven attracting the ire of first Himmler and later Hitler, which contributed to curtailing his own reprisal options. In the Netherlands, the seemingly more moderate Seyss-Inquart let the SS conduct their policy of terror unabated. He himself caused thousand of deaths via actions that separately seemed less significant. Together however, these actions set the stage for the catastrophic *Hongerwinter*. The contributions of the two countries' resistance organisations and exposure to open warfare served to amplify the disparities. The final result of the different policies, influences, and styles of leadership was that Norway suffered less than the Netherlands, at least as indicated by the featured events and reprisals.

5. Summary and Conclusion

The main goal of the research topic is to gain insight into the mechanisms of the German occupying administration's reprisals. To this end, the thesis' research topic is divided into four sub-topics. The first of these sub-topics concerns the methods most commonly involved in the reprisals. The second sub-topic is concerned with the leadership behind the reprisals. The third sub-topic revolves around the influences that affected the decisions made by said leadership, when it came to deciding whether to order reprisals, and how they should be committed. The fourth sub-topic compares the findings with information from previous research regarding reprisals in the Netherlands.

In this final chapter the summaries and conclusions from the findings in chapters 2, 3 and 4 will be laid out. The findings regarding the reprisals in both Norway and the Netherlands will be summarised in order of the first three research sub-topics. This means that the methods used in Norway and the Netherlands will be summarised first. Differences between the leaderships in the two countries will be summarised second. The influences that affected the reprisals in each country will be summarised third. This manner of comparison allows the fourth section to revolve around big-picture comparisons between the two countries. The fifth and final section will then draw up a conclusion surrounding the reprisals in Norway with respect to the research topic, and the historiography of the reprisals.

5.1 The methods of reprisal

The first question regarding the methods used in the reprisals is: What was the motivation behind the methods, and how did the methods evolve during the war? The comparison shows the methods used in Norway and the methods used in the Netherlands indicate very different underlying concerns.

The most commonly used method in Norway for reacting against resistance activities, was execution following a trial, as opposed to more “informal” methods of killing. People would be arrested or picked out from previously arrested sympathisers, resistance members or for similar reasons, and chosen for execution. Many were given mock trials. That did not mean there had to be tangible guilt involved in the choosing. As seen in sections 2.4 and 3.1, Terboven was apt to target members of what was referred to as the “*Jøssing-Intelligentsia*”.

The manner in which executions were ordered as part of reprisals in Norway contrasts certain methods used in the Netherlands. While the direct killings associated with reprisals were often of either of the two categories mentioned above, there were also instances of death squads which would kill people apparently at random, with neither trial nor arrest. Additionally, more indirect causes of death have been observed, such as those caused by the deportations at Putten, and the *Hongerwinter* caused in part by the 1944 food embargo. Furthermore, the SS in the Netherlands would arrest hostages for revenge against future sabotage. The practice of taking hostages in preparation for future resistance acts was explicitly forbidden in Norway as of April 1943, and has not been seen to have been practiced before then, in Norway. On one hand, hostages were taken in Norway as well. On the other hand, in such instances, the hostages were taken as a reaction to a sabotage act that had already occurred.

On all known occasions that hostages were taken in relation to a reprisal, the order to do so had come from Terboven, unlike in the Netherlands. There, HSSPF Rauter kept a freer rein over the SS, who made much more active use of the hostage-taking policy.

The preemptive hostage-takings in the Netherlands signal a significant difference in the mentality of the authorities responsible for reprisals in the Netherlands and those in Norway. While the SS in Norway had been forbidden to make use of this practice from April 1943, they had the opportunity to do so before that date. It seems likely that their reluctance to do take hostages in this fashion stemmed from the subservience Redieß toward Terboven. The same subservience would also cause him to take and execute hostages during the martial law, per Terboven's directives to do so after the meeting with the relevant leaders.

Other methods that were used in Norway included the martial law, arrests, and house searches. The martial law in particular acted as an umbrella for other methods, including the above two, as well as search-and-seizures of particular goods. Possibly, the martial law in Central Norway was also used to tack on the arrest of all male Jews in Trondheim. The exact circumstances of the arrest of the Jews are unknown.

The evolution of the methods in Norway follows an incline in severity that peaks where the thesis begins, with the martial law in Central Norway. After the martial law, there was a steep decline, with little activity relating to reprisals. The trend inclined once more in the latter half of 1943, and slowly climbed during 1944 until Terboven had his hands tied by the September 1944 *Führer*-order.

After the order, the only method Terboven used was the SS courts.

The variants of methods used in reprisals peaks during the 1942 martial law. Following that reprisal, the most common methods are narrowed down to hostage-takings¹²⁴, drumhead courts-martial, and methods not encountered in this thesis' selection of cases.

In the Netherlands, the degree of variation stayed largely the same, though the exact methods used would change between reprisals. Compared to Norway, the reprisals in the Netherlands met with little direct intervention from Berlin. It has not been observed by previous research that the reprisal authorities were moderated by the central government, as was the case in Norway on two occasions.

Concerning the historiography of reprisals, not much has previously been done to gauge the severity of the reprisals in Norway. Nøkleby broached the subject in *Hitlers Norge*, stating that Terboven had economic concerns that could overrule considerations towards reprisals. Myklebust has weighed in indirectly by making the claim that Falkenhorst had talked Terboven down from ordering reprisals after the heavy water sabotage. To better illuminate the topic of reprisal severity, this thesis has compared a selection of the reprisals made against the populations of Norway and the Netherlands.

While an incomplete selection can't provide the full measure of data that would be needed for a definitive answer, the disparity between those that have been selected still provide a general idea. If one is to compare the numbers of executed only, for every Norwegian execution victim there are four Dutch execution victims. The Norwegian number is found by summing the executed from the Marthinsen reprisal, the martial law in Central Norway and the Mjøndalen attack. Contrasting those numbers are those killed during De Woeste Hoeve and the Rotterdam sabotage attempt. Correcting the numbers with the population census of 1942 gives a rough estimate of the numbers of executed people per capita. Even when figuring in the population census, for roughly two Norwegians that were executed during the featured reprisals in Norway, three people were executed in the Netherlands during the featured reprisals in the Netherlands.

5.2 The authorities of reprisal

Who were the primary decision-makers to order the reprisals? The differences between Norway and the Netherlands in terms of leadership is distinct. In Norway, *Reichskommissar* Terboven was

124 Specifically, hostage-takings by order of Terboven, given the SS ban on hostage action by Himmler in April 1943.

the sole person to order reprisals. In the Netherlands, four different people ordered reprisals between 1942 and 1945. Unlike in Norway, the *Reichskommissar* was not nearly as active as his counterpart in Norway, in ordering reprisals. The SS picked up the slack, in that regard. The head of the *Wehrmacht* forces in the Netherlands, general Christiansen also ordered a single reprisal, known as the raid on Putten.

The main cause of the differences in reprisal activity within the leadership in Norway and the Netherlands was the very different styles of governance used by either *Reichskommissar*, which was connected to the different personalities of the *Reichskommissars*. The effect of their different approaches to leadership was exacerbated by the personalities of the HSSPFs in either country. Both Rauter and Schöngarth were much more aggressive than Redieß in their approach to reprisals and terror. Christiansen's personality also appears to have played a large role in the general's approach to the reprisal at Putten.

The historiography of Terboven's reprisals have been perhaps the most polarised, among the controversial topics in this thesis. This much has been noted in Nøkleby's *Josef Terboven: Hitlers Mann i Norge* in 1992. While the characterisation of Terboven has consistently been negative, overall, nuances have appeared in the last 30 years. In the terms of reprisals, Terboven was by all accounts an ill-tempered, harsh *Reichskommissar*, who wanted total obedience. The need for total obedience does however appear to have had the curious effect of limiting the scale of the reprisals, how much lingering damage said reprisals did to the Norwegian community, and how often reprisals would take place. As harsh as the style of governance Terboven employed was, it also precluded others from adding to the reprisals in Norway. It eventually also caused him to be forced to moderate his reprisals. As a side-effect, Fehlis was granted some authority over reprisals, in the final reprisal covered in Norway.

In the Netherlands, The SS was the government organisation to have done the most direct damage via reprisals in the Netherlands. If the SS in Norway had made the same approaches to terror and reprisal, it should be safe to say that the Norwegian people would be much worse off. It should also be said that the influences in the Netherlands that cause so much brutality were very different from those in Norway. That topic will be covered in sections 5.3 and 5.4.

5.3 The influences of reprisal

In discussing the various influences that affected the reprisals, some important aspects of the

context need to be taken into account. The course of the war effort at large affected the reprisals in both the Netherlands and Norway. How the reprisals were affected depended upon the reaction of the German leadership that encountered it, and the realities of their situations. For example, the opening of the Western Front on 6 June, 1944 had a greater escalating effect on the tensions within the Netherlands than in Norway. Likewise, the level and method of organisation within the resistance movements caused Norway to be more muted in their activities, taking care to minimise loss of life, leave behind British effects and avoid the Germans discovering any civilian involvement. The looser organisation in the Netherlands, the aggression of parts of the resistance movement, and the SS' terror policy caused the Dutch resistance to be gradually more aggressive in their methods, and harder to coordinate.

The forced-feedback system that developed in the Netherlands as a result of the first three of the above factors came together with the attempted liberation of the Netherlands, on 6 September 1944. The allied attacks in Dutch territory and the encouragement of the government-in-exile, combined with the looser organisation of the resistance movement came together to cause the string of incidents collectively known as *Dolle Dinsdag*. In the face of the blatant aggression, the German authorities struck back. The manner in which they reacted was informed by the personalities and perspectives of Seyss-Inquart, Rauter, and Schöngarth, as observed in 4.2 and 4.4.

Other factors that influenced the events in Norway and the Netherlands were unique to one country or the other. The *Dolle Dinsdag*-event in that respect was both the trigger for a reprisal, and an influence for later events, as touched upon in section 3.5, and discussed in section 4.3. An influence unique to Norway was the reaction of Himmler following the martial law in Central Norway. Where *Dolle Dinsdag*, the SS policy of terror and the *Hongerwinter* had acted together as a catalyst for De Woeste Hoeve, Himmler and his order regarding hostage-takings acted as an anti-catalyst. The same was true of the new sabotage policies in the Norwegian resistance movement following that same martial law. The most effective anti-catalyst in Norway was Hitler's *Führer*-order in September 1944. Putting a complete stop to reprisals in Norway for an extended period of time, the order also limited the reprisal tools available to Terboven after the Marthinsen assassination to requesting drumhead courts-martial from the SS courts.

Within the historiography of reprisals, the martial law in Central Norway has stood out among the reprisals in Norway. However, perspectives have changed since the end of the Second World War. One of the major details that have been subject to such changes is the cause for the reprisal itself.

The finding of this thesis is that the more recent works of Kraglund, Moland and later Nøkleby have been on the right track, as opposed to the much earlier work of Mackenzie. As Kraglund and Moland supposed, Fosdalen was the final of three events that caused the martial law to be declared in Central Norway. However, this thesis has also found that the trigger could have been virtually any act of resistance. That Fosdalen was the final straw appears to have been a matter of chance.

A smaller historiographical detail surrounds the conference within which the first ten victims of the martial law were picked out. The contention revolves around whether it was Heinrich Christen, leader of the civilian administration in Trondheim, or Heinrich Fehlis, the German chief of police, who took part in the conference. Due to the lack of sources it is not certain whether Fehlis and Christen were both present at the same time. If Fehlis and Christen both attended the same conference or conferences, he was not mentioned by Christen. Possibly, Christen forgot to mention Fehlis in his account, or one or more conferences took place, in some of which which Fehlis was present, but Christen was not, and vice versa. In either case, it seems that Christen took part in the selection process, and affected who was executed.

The historiographical discussion about the aftermath of the heavy water sabotage in Vemork have largely revolved around whether or not the attack was of importance to the war effort. However, as found in 3.2, there have been more factors in play that require consideration. The two most central findings are the effect the sabotage had, and the factors influencing the decision not to commit any reprisals. In reference to the former, the findings suggest that the sabotage attack, by proving that the facility was not safe from attacks, caused a diversion of resources from artillery munitions manufacture to artificial fertiliser. As to the latter, several different historians have offered differing opinions as to the lack of reaction. Myklebust makes the claim that Falkenhorst played a central role. Nøkleby on the other hand points to the apparently British origins of the attack.

The veracity of Myklebust's assertion cannot be guaranteed. Assuming the quote was translated correctly by the witnesses, and that it was not just hearsay, Falkenhorst did indeed play a large part. His insistence that the sabotage action was military in nature would be a major contributor. Nøkleby's assessment that the Germans thought the attack to be British in nature is more thoroughly verified.

An attack having been British had not stopped Terboven before, following the Fosdalen sabotage. While Fosdalen had not been the only contributor to the martial law, it had been a sufficient excuse.

As a result, it is deemed to be likely that the strictly military nature of the attack would contribute to the lack of reprisal. In such a case, Falkenhorst seems to be one of the few people around Terboven with the strength of character and formal position to insist the heavy water sabotage be considered military, and not eligible for reprisal.

The theory forwarded in Volume six of *Norge i Krig*, regarding the comparison of the Mjøndalen and Jørstad sabotage actions, were indirectly challenged by findings presented in *Josef Terboven: Hitlers Mann i Norge*. The example of the lack of reprisal following the Jørstad bridge sabotage used in *Norge i Krig* is not fully explained by the professionalism of the resistance movement. The *Führer*-order would have blocked Terboven from reprisal at the time, regardless of any other factors.

5.4 Comparison of Norway and the Netherlands

There is a general trend that can be observed, regarding the severity and brutality of the reprisals in either countries. This trend is closely related to the events surrounding each country, as well as the interactions between the resistance organisations and the German governments they oppose. The same trend is also observed internally in the German government structures, between the figures of authority that are involved in the reprisals.

The reprisal policies in Norway give the appearance of following a rising curve, which peaked twice in terms of brutality. The first of these two peaks was the martial law in Central Norway. The second such peak was the executions after the assassination of Karl Marthinsen.

In the Netherlands, the peaks of brutality aren't quite so simple to describe. The most brutal reprisals in terms of death toll are, in the case of the *Hongerwinter* and the raid on Putten indirect results of the methods used. They are also chronologically closer together than the largest two reprisal peaks in Norway. The final reprisal, at De Woeste Hoeve, caused more direct deaths.

The leadership structures responsible for ordering reprisals operated differently in the two countries. The *Reichskommissar* in Norway, Josef Terboven, was much more active than *Reichskommissar* Arthur Seyss-Inquart in ordering reprisals. On the other hand, Terboven was also concerned with safeguarding economic stability, contributing to smaller reprisals in Norway. Terboven also held greater control over ordering the reprisals, resulting in Norway's HSSPF Redieß being much less active than the Netherlands' HSSPF Rauter. The heads of the *Wehrmacht* were both largely uninvolved in reprisals, with the exception of Christiansen having ordered the raid on Putten.

One can see a steady rise in violence in the Netherlands, which accelerates as the front opens in Western Europe. In Norway however, there is a period between the end of 1942 and the beginning of 1945 which is significantly less violent than the Netherlands. This disparity appears to have been mostly caused by a handful of significant factors.

The first factor that contributed to the disparity was a more centralised resistance movement in Norway, which favoured caution and restraint. The second was the distance between the frontlines of the war and Norway. The third factor was the firm grip Terboven had over his subordinates, precluding most independent actions by the SS. The fourth factor was the influence of the policy of terror, which played a greater role in the Netherlands, due to the orders and policies put in place there. In Norway, on the other hand, Himmler had intervened to curtail the SS ability to conduct hostage-takings in Norway, and railed against Terboven for his conduct during the martial law in Central Norway. The fifth factor that contributed to a much calmer Norway was the small role the SS had in Norway compared to the Netherlands. The relatively small role was caused in part by HSSPF Redieß' muted role, the absence of the *Waffen*-SS in Norway, and Himmler's above-mentioned intervention. The sixth factor was the September 1944 *Führer*-order which barred Terboven from ordering reprisals until the beginning of February 1945, even then limiting him to requesting the SS courts.

5.5 Conclusion

The aim of this thesis was to look into the history of reprisals in Norway, as a tool of the German occupational government. An attempt has been made to answer some basic questions: What the German authorities actually did when they were committing reprisals. Who made the decisions. What factors influenced the use of reprisals. Finally, how were the reprisals in Norway compared to another country; the Netherlands.

Reprisals in Norway were committed with two chief considerations in mind. The first consideration was to scare the population into subordination. The second was to do this with minimal damage to the Norwegian economy. These considerations were made in order to stabilise the country, so that Terboven could request another posting. To achieve these ends, executions and hostage-takings were enacted. Sometimes these two methods were accompanied by other measures, for instance civilian martial law, and arrests.

As a result of Terboven's ambitions to leave and his intolerance of excessive independence in the offices under his control, he was effectively the only one who ordered reprisals upon the Norwegian population. With Redieß subservient to Terboven, the only other person who in effect had such an authority was Falkenhorst, and his successors to the position of head of *Wehrmacht* in Norway. They never used this authority. Terboven's hard-handed approach to reprisals eventually caused his reprisal authority to be limited to requesting drumhead courts-martial from the SS courts, however. This provided SS chief of police Fehlis with some form of authority as well, during the reprisals for the assassination of Karl Marthinsen.

The biggest overarching influences which affected the decisions made by Terboven were foremostly the organised resistance movement, which took special pains to minimise the risk of reprisals, and the occupied country's perceived remoteness or proximity relative to the front lines. There was also pressure from Himmler to avoid large-scale executions in the period following the martial law in Central Norway. Hitler's September 1944 *Führer*-order in turn influenced the final reprisal. Falkenhorst also appears to have acted as a moderating force in at least one instance, that of the heavy water raid.

Compared to the Netherlands, the progress of the war led to much less escalation of violence in Norway. The HSSPF in the Netherlands was much more active than his counterpart in Norway, following the policy of terror with what can only be described as fanatic zeal. The HSSPF and his subordinates in the SS were spurred on when the Western Front opened up in the Netherlands, and also by the events of *Dolle Dinsdag*. The Dutch resistance and the German occupational forces would continue to clash, triggering further reprisals until the end of the war.

It appears that due to Seyss-Inquart's milder reputation with the central leadership in Berlin, compared to Terboven, the atrocities of the SS in the Netherlands were overlooked to a larger extent. Terboven's harsher methods on the other hand made more of an impression, and caused more negative reactions most prominently from Hitler and Himmler. In this way, the less obvious actions of the SS were allowed to continue in the Netherlands. The SS in Norway on the other hand were reined in partly by Terboven, and partly because Terboven's actions caught the attention of Himmler and later Hitler. Said attention resulted in interventions against the reprisal process in Norway.

Research surrounding reprisals have long been something of a difficult topic to accurately cover.

Between self-serving testimonies from former *Reichskommissariat* employees, and perceptions affected by the emotional aspect of the topic of the Second World War, balanced discussion of reprisals have long been very difficult. This difficulty has coloured the descriptions of both the reprisals and the people involved in them.

Later years has seen some of the perceptions of the war in Norway change. This includes the topic of reprisals. The lexical work *Norge i Krig* speaks of reprisals in terms of revenge, control and oppression. Nearly thirty years later, *Hitlers Norge* brings up economy and career concerns influencing Terboven's decisions. The monograph points to facets of his governance that could not easily have been brought up earlier without being taken to be apologetic. *Himmlers Norge* also works to provide some perspective, pointing to the influence Himmler had in the decision-making. This thesis has aimed to follow up on the trend of attempting to have as neutral a perspective as possible, focused around the topic of reprisals.

There is no question that the reprisals in Norway were severe war crimes. After five years of oppressive occupation by a brutal regime with little regard for life, it is no wonder that the topic has taken so long to be ready for changes in perspective. However, as this thesis has found, the reprisals could have been a lot worse. If a person like Hanns Rauter or Karl Schöngarth had been in charge of the SS in Norway, with a *Reichskommissar* with the mindset of Seyss-Inquart, and a resistance organisation with a harsher attitude towards civilian deaths than the Norwegian resistance movement, the resulting reprisals could have been far harsher, and more numerous.

Abbreviation list

Abbreviation/Phrase | Meaning

| | |
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| <i>Dolle Dinsdag</i> | Nickname for the events on 6 November 1944, when wrongful reports led to Dutch acts of resistance in the occupied territories of the Netherlands |
| Freshman | Code-name for failed attack on the heavy water plant at Vemork, see *Grouse, *Gunnertime |
| Gestapo | <i>Geheime Staatspolizei</i> , part of *RSHA |
| Government-in-Exile <i>Eksilregjeringen</i> | Phrase used to refer to any nation's government, when it is forced out of the nation it serves, in the case of invasion of a foreign power. Refers to the Norwegian and Dutch governments during the Second World War. The phrase <i>Eksilregjeringen</i> refers specifically to the Norwegian government-in-exile |
| Grouse Swallow | Code-name for the group of four members of * <i>Kompani Linge</i> that were sent to Norway to serve as vanguard for *Freshman, later *Gunnertime, during the campaign to destroy the Vemork heavy water plant, see main text. Renamed Swallow after failure of *Freshman |
| Gunnertime | Code-name for the main group that, combined with Swallow, see *Grouse, attacked the heavy water plant at Vemork |
| <i>Heer</i> | The German land forces, part of * <i>Wehrmacht</i> |
| <i>Hirden</i> | Norse name for the King's guard. Used by <i>Nasjonal Samling</i> during World War Two. The organisation is a rough equivalent to the German SA |

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| <i>Kompani Linge</i> | Norwegian military force under British command. Used in resistance work, sabotage, assassination, training and more. The name became official after the Second World War, see *Nor.I.C. 1 |
| <i>Kriegsmarine</i> | The German navy, part of * <i>Wehrmacht</i> |
| <i>Landshirdsjef</i> | Leader of the NS organisation referred to as * <i>Hirden</i> |
| <i>Leutnant</i> | German for Lieutenant |
| <i>Luftwaffe</i> | The German air force, part of * <i>Wehrmacht</i> |
| Milorg MilOrg Mil.Org | <i>Militær-organisasjonen</i> , in English the Military Organisation, the military branch of the Norwegian resistance movement in Norway |
| Nor.I.C. 1 NorIC 1 NorIC | Original name of * <i>Kompani Linge</i> |
| Osvald-gruppen The Osvald group | The most active of the Communist resistance groups in Norway. The group collaborated on occasion with *Milorg |
| <i>Quisling-regjeringen</i> The Quisling government Quisling Shadow Cabinet | Collaboration government in occupied Norway, led by Vidkun Quisling. Ran partially parallel to the * <i>Reichskommissariat</i> in the government of occupied Norway |
| RSHA | <i>Reichssicherheitshauptamt</i> , intelligence organisation sorted under the *SS |
| <i>Reichskommissar</i> | German title for the governors of German-occupied territories |
| <i>Reichskommissariat</i> | The office of the * <i>Reichskommissar</i> |

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|--|---|
| SD | <i>Sicherheitsdienst</i> , division of *RSHA responsible mainly for counter-intelligence against military actions and operations |
| Sipo | <i>Sicherheitspolizei</i> , the name for the local *RSHA, divided into the *SD and the *Gestapo |
| SOE | Secret Operations Executive, London-based organisation responsible for sabotage operations and general undermining of the German war effort in occupied territories during World War II |
| SS | <i>Schutzstaffel</i> , originally a paramilitary group, later a loose part of the military- and enforcement services of the <i>Third Reich</i> |
| <i>Statspolitiet</i> Stapo | The Norwegian organisation, comparable to the German Sipo, serving under the *Quisling Shadow Cabinet |
| The Third <i>Reich</i> Nazi-Germany | The name used to describe Germany while under Nazi control, circa 1931-1945 |
| <i>Wehrmacht</i> | The German Armed Forces during the Second World War. It is divided into * <i>Heer</i> , * <i>Kriegsmarine</i> and * <i>Luftwaffe</i> |

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