PAMPHILIOUS FAANU

Dealing with Traditional Conflicts: A review of the actors, mechanisms and dynamics of the Dagbon Chieftaincy Conflict in the Northern Region of Ghana.

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Supervisor: Dr. Sarah Khasalamwa

Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Trondheim
Faculty of Social Sciences and Technology Management
Department of Geography

NTNU – Trondheim
Norwegian University of
Science and Technology

ABSTRACT

This thesis looks at third party actors' roles and mechanisms employ in the Dagbon chieftaincy dispute and, how the disputants perceive their work. The findings are based on interviews with NGOs, the royal families and expert witnesses who are directly involved in the mediation process. The interviews reflect on both state and non-state third party actors' strategies and legitimacy issues surrounding their composition and work. The study establishes that the state constituted Wuaku commission to investigate the Criminal aspect and make recommendations to the government and, the Committee of Eminent Kings to use customary means to resolve the dynastic dispute. The commission work is over but the committee of kings is the main mediation body still mediating the dispute. The Wuaku commission suffered legitimacy issues because it was politically tainted hence, did not get the needed cooperation from the disputants. On the other hand the committee of eminent kings experiences full cooperation from all actors in the conflict. The work of the committee yielded a Roadmap to Peace, which is under implementation. The roadmap has some benchmarks for realization. The performance of Naa Mahamadu IV funeral rites, which is one of the benchmarks, is the bone of contention to resolution. Besides the state actors, there are also non-state actors that are working to promote peace and change the behavior and attitude of the disputants. This helps prepare them for mediation. The celebration of the Bugum and Damba festivals concurrently and independently by the regent of Naa Mahamadu IV, Mion Lana; Alhassan Abudu Ziblim (Abudu family) and Ya-Na Yakubu II caused the dispute. The study also reveals that there is friction between tradition and modern democratic practices in the king making causing mediation difficult.

DEDICATION

I dedicate this work to my late father, Peter Faanu Tintuo, my lovely mother, Zini Faanu, my siblings and the family at large. I specially dedicate this work to my lovely daughter, Emily Mwinyelle Faanu for adding meaning to my life.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

CBOs	– Community Based Organizations
CDD	– Centre for Democratic Development
CODEYAC	– Community Development and Youth Advisory Centre
CPP	– Convention People Party
CSOs	– Civil Society Organizations
DANIDA	– Danish International Development Agency
DAYA	– Dagbon Youth Association
FBOs	– Faith Based Organizations
FM	– Frequency Modulation
FOMWAG	– Federation of Muslim Women Association of Ghana
GDCA	– Ghana Developing Communities Association
GHANEP	– Ghana Network for Peace
GSS	– Ghana Statistical Service
LI	– Legislative Instrument
MCE	– Municipal Chief Executive
MMDAs	– Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies
MP	- Member of Parliament
NDC	– National Democratic Congress
NGOs	– Non-governmental Organizations
NPP	– New Patriotic Party
PNDC	– Provisional National Defense Council
RAND	- Research and development
REGSEC	– Regional Security Council
SPI	– Sustainable Peace Initiative
UN	– United Nations
UNDP	– United Nations Development Program
UNICEF	– United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund
WANEP	– West Africa Network for Peace
WIPB	– Women in Peacebuilding
YPC	– Yendi Peace Centre

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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background

Prior to the Second World War, interstate conflict was the predominant form of organized violence in international relations. During the Cold War and the period that followed it, intrastate violence and inter-communal conflicts have become the principal form of conflict in international relations and peace studies. Intrastate violence and communal-conflict appear to be dominant in developing countries. Most notable are the countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America. The trend of these conflicts is on the ascendency especially in African countries. Over the past two decades the number of civilian uprisings either against the government or between communities for various reasons, measured by their frequency and aggregate levels of violence, has been well documented in a large number of studies (Marshall & Gurr, 2003; McGowan, 2005, 2006). The common feature of these intrastate conflicts in developing countries is their occurrence as a result of competition for resources such as land, which always have historical antecedent, or the competition for a throne (to become a king or chief). African continent has witnessed a number of bloody conflicts since the end of the Cold War resulting in serious consequences including political, social, economic and humanitarian problems. The turbulent African continent is the home of inter-ethnic and intra-ethnic conflicts often characterized by some international influence. Most of these internal conflicts have world powers backing either the rebel groups or government forces with different kinds of support (Brown, 1996), typical of such internal/intrastate conflicts in contemporary times are the South Sudan civil war, Syria crisis and the Crimea crisis in Ukraine. There is therefore the need to better understand how developing country such as Ghana is working to resolve intrastate disputes focusing on the Dagbon chieftaincy dispute in Northern Ghana. This thesis explores the factors or forces that are shaping and influencing these intrastate conflicts and the mechanisms employed by third parties to mitigate them.

Ghana is variously noted as lying in a turbulent region of sub-Sahara Africa but to

a large extent manage to avoid major violent conflict at the national level. However, apart from some coup d'états before the fourth republic in 1992, Ghana has experienced numerous inter-ethnic and intra-ethnic conflicts, chieftaincy conflicts and land related conflicts. Notable among them are the prolonged conflicts between Peki and Tsito; Nkonya and Alavanyo in the Volta Region (Gati, 2008); Mamprusi and Kusasi in Bawku, in the Upper East Region; as well as Konkomba and Nanumba; inter-ethnic and the Abudus and Andanis in Dagbon; intra-ethnic, (Awedoba et al., 2010; Lund, 2003; Martinson, 1994; Ladouceur, 1972) in the Northern Region of Ghana.

Chieftaincy institution is a very important establishment in the Ghanaian society. Before the advent of colonial rule, governance was organized around this institution. In the traditional Ghanaian society, chiefs performed and continue to perform a number of roles such as being military leaders and defenders of their people; as chief priests who perform religious roles within their jurisdictions; as symbols of identity, sources of honor and as sole custodians of customary lands (Prah & Yeboah, 2011). However, the chieftaincy institution in Ghana is bedeviled with numerous conflicts. Accordingly, chieftaincy disputes are not recent phenomena and neither are they restricted to only one traditional area. In Ghana it is argued that almost every traditional area has encountered a chieftaincy dispute in one way or the other in history (ibid). Most of these disputes are protracted and probably unresolvable.

In this research perspective, on March 24, 2002 the stone aged chieftaincy dispute between the two ruling gates of Dagbon, the Abudu and the Andani, led to violent clashes resulting in the death of the overlord of the area, Ya-Na Yakubu Andani II and at least 28 others (Mahama, 2009). The events leading to this dispute, the actors' legitimacy in the resolution process for successful or otherwise to the resolution form the subject matter of this study.

1.2 Globalization and Conflicts

Even though there is a vast literature on globalization, it is difficult to give a precise definition of the concept. Hence, Gallie (1962) as cited in Patman (2006) argues the term globalization is an essentially contested concept. However, (Patman, 2006) holds that the

concept can be broadly defined as the intensification of interconnections between societies, institutions, cultures, and individuals on a worldwide basis. Globalization therefore implies *a shift in geography* whereby borders become increasingly porous. Amongst other things, the process of globalization involves a compression of time and space, shrinking distances through a dramatic reduction in the time taken, either physically or representationally, to cross them (Dicken, 2007; Findlay & O'Rourke, 2007; Osterhammel & Petersson, 2005; Patman, 2006). As a result, the world is perceived as a smaller place as issues of the environment, economics, politics, conflict and security intersect more deeply at more points than previously was the case (Clark, 1997).

According to (Conversi, 2009) the idea of nationalist and ethnic conflicts erupted as a consequence of social changes brought about by modernity, and this has remained an incontrovertible paradigm in the study of ethnic conflict and nationalism. The force of nationalism has spread well over the nineteenth century into the age of globalization with far-reaching consequences. Although the reach of globalization is historically unprecedented, some of its features such as advancement in technology and the tremendous growth in the media accompanied the rise of modernity and the rise of conflicts. However, analysts are divided on the impact of globalization on the sovereign state in the realm of security. Robert G. Patman classifies the analysts' arguments into three categories; the hyperglobalists, the skeptics and the transformationalists.

According to (Patman, 2006) hyperglobalists hold that, the growing interconnectedness of national economies through globalization gradually negates the significance of territorial boundaries and paves the way for the demise of the sovereign nation-state. This has made peace and security issues of any state to be a global issue. The interconnectedness nature has made it possible for free movement of goods and services including modern weaponry and ammunitions for violence. The proliferation of media in this era has made it easier for access to information mobilization for development. But it should be noted that the media also serve as the very means through which insurgents and unrest civilians use to mobilize support for violence. The hyperglobalists contend that one of the crucial effects of globalization has been to reduce and ultimately eliminate the space for states to manage national security policy and

violence. The emergence of a borderless world enables nation-states to use the same technology used by the insurgents to mobilize support from internal and external partners to overcome violence and security issues. Hence, national security agenda is shifting from one centered on the military capability of a state towards that of common or co-operative security.

In contrast, Patman (2006) holds that the skeptics basically believe that little has changed in the international arena. Rejecting the hyperglobalists position as politically naïve, the skeptics argue that the impact of globalization on the sovereign state is much exaggerated. On this view, the state is not the victim of this process, but its main architect. It is argued that the sovereign state is still the sole institution tasked with the responsibility for establishing the preconditions for governance: security, political stability, the rule of law, education and training, and infrastructure (Haworth, 1997 in ibid). Indeed, many of the civil conflicts in modern times have involved the use of force and violence to have access to resources in the nation-state. Thus, according to the skeptics, the norm of statehood remains very real and is a key motivation for intra-state conflict.

Finally, Patman (2006) asserts that the transformationalists reject the tendency to juxtapose state sovereignty and globalization. According to this school of thought, the state is not automatically diminished by globalization nor unaffected by it. Rather, the role of the sovereign state in the international system is being transformed by states themselves in relation to the perceived costs and benefits associated with the globalization process. For transformationalists, sovereignty is a dynamic concept that is under-going a new phase in its evolution. While it would be premature to anticipate the sudden collapse in the security function of the state, transnational pressures on the sovereign state from without and within are promoting a broader and more co-operative approach to security. Convinced that states are increasingly confronted by security challenges that cannot be resolved on a purely national basis, the transformationalists contend that the security of states must be widened to encompass the security of the individual.

These trends highlighted above present both interesting and testing times for sovereign states in managing security issues in the growing globalization era. States have to assume greater responsibilities in the area of conflict and violence because the principles of globalization have enlightened citizens and made it easier to access arms and other technologies that can be used to perpetuate violence. The growing proliferation of the media is irreversible and the onus lies with the state to devise mechanisms to deal with violence. Considerable amount of technological resource is now at the disposal of individuals and groups and such people benefiting from globalization also have the ability to influence their followers to incite violence. Typical is the Andani and Abudu royal dispute in Ghana. The Abudu and the Andani gates use the media for support to incite violence therefore escalating the dispute. Indeed the era of globalization has opened up avenues for various forms of conflicts and violence across the globe. But the same globalization has created technologies that states can use to overcome these disputes. Hence globalization can be argued to be a double-edged saw.

1.3 Statement of the Research Problem

Ghana has largely succeeded in escaping large-scale conflict but never immune from low-level violence. There have been cases of village shoot-outs involving the use of sophisticated weapons with occasional and persistent outbreaks of ethnic violence among several communities (Hutchful, 2003). These low-level communal conflicts have presented enormous security challenges and they continue to be a clear danger to the consolidation of democracy and social peace in Ghana (ibid). Violent conflicts greatly undermine development and human security in any geographical setting. Inter- and intra-ethnic conflicts have been prominent in Ghana under the current democratic dispensation. Most studies on Ghana conflicts (Awedoba et al., 2010; Abubakari, 2008; Albert, 2008; Kusimi et al., 2006) hold that these conflicts are common in the northern part of the country. These studies lament how these conflicts draw back development of northern Ghana. This part of the country is impoverished with overlapping ethnic groups and any violence can easily spread therefore undermining development. There are various efforts to resolve these disputes but the area is ravage with conflicts. Taking into consideration that these conflicts are ethnic and customary, there is therefore the need for unbiased and

independent third party to intervene for resolution. Typical of such conflicts that needs legitimate and unbiased third party is the Dagbon chieftaincy conflict. Scholars such as (Galtung, 1958; Ridley‑Duff & Bennett, 2011; Webel & Galtung, 2007) hold that the third party actors have to effectively build a rapport with the disputants by using their communication and other professional or personal skills that qualified them to be selected as a third party actors for resolution. This would help define their neutrality and independence in the resolution process.

The obvious question regarding third party ability to resolve the Dagbon conflict is whether the mediators can eliminate or reduce the divergent expectations of the parties? So the onus lies with the third parties to be able to produce more convergent expectations faster and mutually acceptable. As a theoretical proposition, the third party might be possible to produce more convergent expectations in a variety of ways. The neutral parties may facilitate the exchange of essential information and improve communications between the Andani and Abudu parties, thus improving their understanding of each other's claims and defenses. But this to a large extent depends on the legitimacy of the neutral persons, the mechanisms/strategies of resolution employed and how such persons are perceived to overcome the deadlock.

Hence, the main thrust of this study is to examine the third party actors' roles and how they are perceived in the Dagbon chieftaincy dispute resolution process in the Northern Region of Ghana for democratic development. The study is also concerned with identifying the actors in the Dagbon conflict resolution process and the mechanisms they use in attempt to resolve the dispute. Special attention is focused on the neutral parties legitimacy and the conflict parties' interest that resulted in the deadlock.

1.4 Significance of the Study

Conflict resolution argument has been well developed with ideas of grander concepts and this research seeks to draw from the vast and well-developed literature for the resolution of Dagbon crisis. The third party actors in the resolution and their legitimacy are of interest. This is because the conflict is characteristically unique; owing to the fact that it is inherently traditional, customary and political, which is variously described as family

conflict. So therefore, the information emanating from this research can be useful to addressing similar disputes in future considering the fact that this kind of dispute is becoming dominant in Ghana. The researcher thinks internationally, there is limited knowledge about how to address dynastic/royal family disputes. The findings therefore seek to bridge that gap. It will also be helpful to international and local organizations that are interested in promoting peaceful co-existence for sustainable development in Ghana.

In addition, this thesis highlights the nature and scope of conflicts most especially in northern Ghana and the capacity and lapses of the state in overcoming such conflicts. This therefore serves as a guide to the state in resolving conflicts in Ghana. The findings would help international communities and humanitarian organizations in understandings the root of such disputes and how to resolve them. This work also adds to the existing literature on the conflict resolution practices in Ghana and provides direction for future research.

1.5 General Objective

The main objective is to examine the role, the mechanisms, and legitimacy of the actors of the Dagbon conflict resolution process in the Northern Region of Ghana for democratic development. In order to realize the general objective, the researcher seeks to meet the following specific objectives:

1. To identify the third party actors and assess how the disputants in the resolution process perceive them.

2. To examine strategies/mechanisms third parties use in the resolution process.
3. To assess the effect of the conflict on Ghana's democracy.

1.6 Research Questions

The main research questions are as follows:

1. Who are the actors in the Dagbon conflict resolution process?
2. How do the disputants perceive the neutrality of the third parties?

3. What strategies/mechanisms do the third party actors promote to resolve the conflicts and promote peace in the Dagbon area?

4. What are the effects of the conflict on Ghana democracy?

1.7 Study Area

The Northern Region, which occupies an area of about 70,383 square kilometers, is the largest region in Ghana in terms of land area. It shares boundaries with the Upper East and the Upper West Regions to the north, the Brong Ahafo and the Volta Regions to the south, and two neighboring countries, the Republic of Togo to the east, and La Cote d' Ivoire to the west. Dagbon (Dagombaland or the Kingdom of which the Ya-Na is the overlord) is located in the Northern Region of Ghana. The people are called Dagbamba (hereafter Dagomba). The Dagombas speak Dagbani, which belongs to the Mole-Dagbani sub-language group of the Gur languages (Carscious, 2013). Yendi is the traditional capital of Dagbon and the throne of the kings (Ladouceur, 1972; Tsikata and Seini, 2004; Albert, 2008). Yendi, the site of the current violence, lies about 98 km east of Tamale, the regional capital of northern region. The traditional capital of Dagbon and the regional capital of the region are the study areas of this research. The overlord of the Kingdom is called Ya-Na. Dagbon is arguably the largest Kingdom in Northern Ghana. It composed of twelve (12) administrative Metropolitan, Municipal and Districts Assemblies (MMDAs) out of the total of twenty-six (26) in the region (ghanadistricts.com).

As shown in the map below, apart from the Dagomba, there are also other tribes like the Konkomba, Anufo, Basari, Bimoba, Zantasi, Kotokoli, Kabre and Gonja (Mahama, 2009) surrounding the kingdom. The 2010 Population and Housing Census estimated the population of Dagbon at 1,254,476 out of the total population of 2,479,461 in the Northern Region; representing 50.59% of total population of the Northern Region (G.S.S., 2010). Majority of the people in the region are engaged in agriculture. The crops that they produce include yam, maize, millet, guinea corn, rice, groundnuts, beans, soya beans and cowpea. Livestock kept include cattle, sheep, goats, pigs and poultry birds for domestic and commercial purposes. Other economic activities include weaving, agro-processing (Shea butter extraction), meat processing, fish mongering, wholesale and retail of general goods, transport and many others. A good number of the populous are engaged in small to medium scale manufacturing business. They include smock weavers,

blacksmiths, bakers and mechanics (ghanadistricts.com).

Figure 1: Map of Ghana Highlighting Northern Region. Adapted from (ghanadistricts.com)

CHAPTER TWO: RESEARCH CONTEXT AND LITERATURE

2.1 Conflicts in Ghana

Analyzing conflicts in Ghana, it is possible to identify different categories of continuous conflict, some of which are violent. These include inter-ethnic conflicts, mostly centered on control over land and other resources and sovereignty issues, what (Brukum, 2004) has describes as wars of emancipation or secession. The second category of conflicts is intra-ethnic conflicts partly over land ownership, traditional rulership/power, and probably the location of state institutions and services. But (Tsikata & Seini, 2004) hold that it is mostly over chieftaincy succession and conflicts between state institutions, like the police and communities over policing and, law and order issues. There are others that argue for religious conflict, but that is very rare in Ghana since the beginning of the Fourth Republic in 1992. These categorizations tend to have multiple triggers as causes of the dispute.

The inter- and intra-ethnic conflict however, has been very dominant in the contemporary conflicts in Ghana. Since the focus of this research is on the chieftaincy dispute, a highlight of some common of such conflicts is relevant. Note that the distribution of these disputes is not even. The northern part of Ghana is largely dominated by these conflicts and various reasons are attributed to this (see Tonah, 2012; Awedoba et al., 2010; Tsikata & Seini, 2004). For (Tsikata & Seini, 2004), there are several longstanding inter-ethnic and intra-ethnic disputes among various communities across Ghana. They hold that in the Volta Region alone, four main conflict areas have been identified and these comprise the Nkonya/Alavanyo conflict, Nkwanta conflict, Peki/Tsito conflict and Abutia/Kpota conflict (Daily Graphic, 2003 cited in ibid). Furthermore, according to (Tsikata & Seini, 2004) in the Northern Region, there are longstanding often-violent inter-ethnic conflicts between the Gonjas and the Konkombas and, between Dagombas and Konkombas. The longstanding Dagbon crisis, which re-surfaced in 2002, is also a typical intra-ethnic conflict located in the northern region. The Brong-Ahafo Region also witnessed violent clashes between the Nafana and Ntore ethnic groups at Brohani near Wenchi over land and sovereignty. There has been similar communal violence in the Upper East and Upper West regions of Ghana.

From the above brief outline of the nature and scope of conflicts in Ghana, it is quite clear that northern Ghana just like most scholars affirm is the hub of these conflicts. For instance Steve Tonah emphatically supported this claim by saying "although chieftaincy conflicts are found throughout Ghana, there is a widespread perception in the country that northern Ghana is particularly prone to such conflicts" (2012:2). He further reasons that this is probably because some conflicts in the north have been very violent and protracted, involving several ethnic groups living over a wide geographical area. Most of these conflicts are a result of succession to a chieftaincy position or title (Abubakari, 2008; Anamzoya & Tonah, 2014).

2.2 The Dagbon conflict in perspective

Competition for Ya-Na, the biggest prize of all, and the important chiefships in Dagbon has always been fierce resulting in violence and bloodshed (Awedoba, et al., 2010). Martinson, (1994) argues that during this period, the attainment of the Nam (traditional authority) is through violence, maneuvers and even through assassination by slaying or otherwise. But Awedoba et al., (2010) posit that while chiefship remains so important to Dagombas and attainment is that violent, it is still governed by rules and regulations, even if these are not always obeyed to the letter. The ascension onto the Ya-Na throne is restricted to only princes of Ya-Nas. A royal prince occupying any of the village gates (Mion, Karaga and Savelugu) qualifies in principle to *contest* for Kingship in Yendi, when it becomes vacant. *Contest* is restrictively used here. What it means is that when the skin in Yendi becomes vacant, chiefs from these dukedoms will officially declare their intention to vie for the throne to the kingmakers. The Abudulai I (Abudu) and Andani II are royal princes that became kings through this practice of contest in the past. It is however important to indicate that the Abudu and the Andani gates are lineage gates – the major lineages that descended from Ya-Na Abudulai I and Ya-Na Andani II (two brothers of the same father – Ya-Na Yakubu I, but different mothers). These two lineages are expected to take turns to becoming a Ya-Na if the throne in Yendi is vacant. This marks the trace of the dispute in the Kingdom. Mahama (2009) laments how over hundred years the Abudu and Andani royal families of Dagbon succeeded to the Dagomba throne in alternative succession until 1954 when the Abudu family caused a

breach in the rotational succession system by setting aside some Dagomba customary laws governing the rotational system. It is alleged by (Mahama, 2009) that the Abudu family abolished the customary and the soothsaying system of selecting the Ya-Na. An eleven-member selection committee was put in place to select the Ya-Na by voting marking the transition from traditional system of governance to modern democracy. The new system widens the candidature to the Yendi throne instead of the restricted three village gates. The new rule also denied Mion Lana Andani (Andani family) who was to succeed Naa Mahama III (Abudu family); instead the Nam was given to Naa Abudulai III (Abudu family), eldest surviving son of Naa Mahama III. Thus Naa Abudulai III succeeded his father without occupying any of the three village gates. A breach to the rotational system. The manipulation continued in 1967 when Naa Abudulai III died. The constitutional provision of rotational system was violated again with the third time an Abudu royal member, the eldest surviving son of Naa Abudulai III was given the Nam (see Mahama, 2009). Figure two (2) below is the genealogical tree showing the succession of kingship from Naa Yakubu I till the murder of Naa Yakubu II in 2002.

The current Dagbon crisis, resulting in the murder of Naa Yakubu Andani II, overlord of Dagbon in 2002 is about legitimate succession to the status of Ya-Na. This particular conflict was not the first time. This particular dispute results in deadlock because of the associated issues arising in its resolution. The Abudu family waited for such opportunity to demand the performance of the final funeral rites of Naa Mahamadu IV. The performance of this funeral is the deadlock to the resolution. Awedoba et al., (2010:193) indicate that there have been "antecedent crises since Ghana's independence". The March 2002 killings that involved the Ya-Na and at least 28 other people was the latest development in the dynastic rivalry between the Andani and the Abudu branches of the royal family (MacGaffey, 2006). Like other chieftaincy disputes in northern Ghana, the role of the previous colonial administration is being variously argued as a causative agent in the Dagbon dispute. Most notable factor according to Awedoba et al. (2010) is the colonial partition of the kingdom between the British (controlled the Western Dagbon, where the Andanis are on the ascendency) and the Germans (controlled the Eastern Dagbon, where the king and Yendi were). This has great bearing on the sharp division in the kingdom.

The actors of the Dagbon conflict since the demise of Naa Yakubu I in 1849 have been the Abudu and the Andani royals and their sympathizers or supporters. It is variously argued that the Dagbon conflict is a family conflict (Ladouceur, 1972; MacGaffey, 2006; Odotei & Awedoba, 2006). As indicated earlier, Naa Abudulai I (Abudu) and Naa Andani II were both the sons of Naa Yakubu I but from different mothers. Naa Abudulai I was the eldest son and his mother was Gbanzalum Lamisi and Naa Andani II mother was Galibang Budaali. Note it is prohibited from the Dagbon constitutional rule and practice for two or more sons from one woman to be a Ya-Na, and no prince can rise above the father in the rulership of the kingdom. This therefore restricts the Ya-Na position to only sons of Ya-Nas. The constitution proverbially put it that: *no woman can bring forth two lions.* Dagombas refer to Ya-Na as lion; therefore the symbol of the Ya-Na is lion.

After the death of Naa Yakubu I, the eldest son, Naa Abudulai I succeeded him and thereafter Naa Andani II. The succession to the skin was based on the constitutionally defined rule of rotational system until 1953 when Naa Mahama III from the Abudu gate demised. At this point there was serious manipulation and conspiracy in both gates to bend the rules in their favor. For instance there are arguments that the Abudu family influenced the amendment of the 1930 constitution that defined the committee for the selection and installation of chiefs. The 1930 constitution stipulates that a four-member committee of kingmakers is responsible for the selection of a king through soothsaying (Constitution of Dagbon Kingdom, 1930). But in 1948, through the support of the British as alleged, the Abudu family amended the constitution and increased the committee for selection to eleven-member and selection was to be done through voting, instead through traditional practices of soothsaying (Asiedu, 2008; Mahama, 2009). The practice of two constitutions since 1948 coupling with the interference of national politics in the Dagbon chieftaincy issue (see Anamzoya & Tonah, 2014; Tonah, 2012; Asiedu, 2008; Odotei & Awedoba, 2006), has sharply defined the dynamics of the 2002 dispute. Politicians, as argued are implicated in the complicated dynastic dispute for various reasons including political gains. Politicians are accused of conspiring with either of the gates to perpetuate violence. Most notable is the fact that the Andanis are accusing the New Patriotic Party (NPP) government of conspiring with the

Abudus to murder the king in 2002. These other actors behind the scenes are referred to as invincible and invisible hands in this study.

2.3 The Dagbon Chieftaincy Institution and National Politics

Many scholars conclude that the Dagbon conflict has been highly politicized because chiefs, royals and the educated elites in Dagbon have a tradition of being involved in national politics and have often used their influence in government to attain high traditional office. One of such scholars is Steve Tonah (2012) who argues that the desire of Ghana's two main political parties (the National Democratic Congress- NDC and the New Patriotic Party- NPP) for electoral votes in keenly contested elections has contributed to the politicization of the Dagbon conflict since the return to civilian rule in 1992. The Dagbon chieftaincy dispute has been the most divisive conflicts in the country in the history of the institution itself. As it stands the differences between the two gates remained clear and members of the Abudu family are very much aware that they cannot change the status quo as long as the NDC government remains in power. Similarly, the Andanis and their supporters are also aware that any change in government especially, power shifting to the NPP has implications for their rule.

The Dagbon chieftaincy became an election issue during the campaign for the 2000, 2004, 2008 and 2012 elections. Tonah (2012) for instance, holds that there were rumors that the NPP would depose Ya-Na Yakubu Andani II if it won power in the 2000 elections. Similarly, the NPP was alleged to have promised to assist the Abudu gate perform the funeral of their deposed king, Ya-Na Mahamadu Abudulai IV at the Gbewaa Palace if they won power. These rumors were denied by the NPP but eventually the NPP won the elections in 2000 and the king was murdered in 2002. The public criticized the government at the time of meddling and incriminating in chieftaincy matters. The inability of the government to control the 3-day killings confirmed that the government had hand in the murder as alleged by the Andani family. Tonah (2012) further indicates that in the subsequent elections the NDC exploited this arguing that the NPP left the Andanis and their supporters to their fate after the Abudus attacked them. Many also believed that the conflict could not have continued for three days without complicity of the NPP government and the security agencies in the country.

Historically there have been governmental attempts to resolve the dispute.

Unfortunately, these have resulted in the politicization of the dispute. According to Asiedu, (2008) the management of the Dagbon conflict takes its genesis in the 1940s and it seems to have been through ad-hoc measures. But as governments changed and the dispute recurred, committees were set up and their findings and recommendations often appeased one of the rival gates at the very expense of the other. For instance, after the election in 1960 that saw the Convention People Party (CPP) come into power, the Andani family elites in the government accused the Ya-Na (Naa Abudulai III) of having physical deformities and therefore not fit for the position as King of Dagbon. The Ya-Na was accused of defective eye and toes and by custom cannot be king. President Kwame Nkrumah had to intervene to prevent political doom in the North because of the mounting pressure and appeal from the Andani family. Hence, in 1960 President Nkrumah summoned a meeting involving all Dagomba chiefs in the country where he sought to find a solution that would be satisfactory to both sides. The resolution that the meeting agreed upon culminated in a Legislative Instrument (L.I. 59), which sought to allow the incumbent king to finish his term (cf. Ladouceur, 1972; Asiedu, 2008). But a clause in the L.I. 59 proposed that upon the death of the incumbent, the skin would revert to the Andani Gate to allow for the customary rotation of succession to proceed. However, with regard to the fact that the Abudu Gate had twice in succession occupied the skin, another clause was introduced in the L.I. 59 to allow the Andani Gate to also occupy the skin twice in succession starting from the death of the incumbent (see figure 2) Ya-Na Abudulai III (who was from the Abudu Gate), after which the established alternating system would resume and proceed in its normal way (Ladouceur, 1972: 100-106). But events in the middle of the 1960s changed everything and the conflict resumed. President Nkrumah's government was overthrown through a coup d'état in 1966, and on September 14, 1967, Ya-Na Abudulai III passed away too (Asiedu, 2008).

In 1968 Naa Andani III was enskinned and ruled for only four months. Prior to his death LI59 was repealed and he was to be dethroned but he died in 1969 and his son became the regent. Installation of the new Ya-Na became game of manipulation from both sides for succession again. This played on till the events of today. The 2002 incidence also saw the interference of the state again. The state constituted the Wuaku commission to investigate the conflict and identify the perpetuators for prosecution.

16

Naa Yakubu I (1824-1849)
Until his rule, line of succession to the Dagbon skin was a uni-linear. He was the father of Naa Abudulai I and Naa Andani II – the creators of the two royal Gates. Upon the death of Naa Yakubu I, he was succeeded by his elder son, Naa Abudulai I (which created the Abudu Gate), who was also succeeded by his younger brother Naa Andani II (whose line of succession became known as the Andani Gate)

Naa Abudulai I (1849-1876)
He ruled for 27 years. Upon his death succession went to the Andani Gate

Naa Andani II (1876-1899)
He ruled for 23 years. Upon his death succession went to the Abudu Gate

Naa Alhassan (1900-1917)
Succession went to the Andani Gate upon his Death

Naa Bukari (1920)
He abdicated within hours after enskinment due to old age and failing ill health. He nominated from the Abudu Gate to succeed

Naa Mahama II (1938-1948)
Succession rotated to the Abudu Gate, upon his death

Naa Abudu II (1920-1938)
Upon his death succession reverted to the Andani Gate

*Naa Mahama III (1948-1953)
Upon his death succession did not revert to the Andani Gate, sparking the succession dispute

**Naa Andani III (1968-1969)
Ruled for only 4 months
Upon his death, succession was supposed to remain in the Andani Gate for one more turn before reverting to the Abudu Gate, as per the L.I. 59 passed in 1960 by the Nkrumah government. However this L.I 59 was repealed, and in Busia's government the skin was given back to the Abudu Gate

*Naa Abudulai III (1954-1967)
Upon his death, succession went to the Andani Gate as per L.I. 59, which called for the Andani Gate to have two successive turns

Naa Yakubu II (1974-2002)
His reign ended in a regicide on March 27, 2002. Upon his natural death, succession would have reverted to the Abudu Gate. However, since his life was cut short by a regicide, by the Dagomba custom, it's taken that he did not serve his entire term in office and therefore succession would have to remain in the Andani family. This is the present dilemma.

**Naa Mahamadu IV (1969-1974)
In 1974, the National Redemption Council (NRC) regime revoked the decision to install him as the rightful King, and rather implemented the L.I. 59. As a result he was de-enskinned and instead Naa Yakubu Andani II enskinned in 1974.

Figure 2: Genealogy of Ya-Nas from Ya-Na Yakubu I. Adapted from Asiedu (2008) and Mahama (2009). Succession between gates ⟶ Succession within gates ⟶ Breach of Succession ⟶

*Abudu gate ruling two successive times without the Andani gate rule. Breach of the rotation system. **Interference of national politics in the Skin affairs. These kings were dethroned.

Also, the Committee of Eminent Kings was set-up to use customary ways to resolve the dispute. The committee's work involved getting the two disputants to agree to come to the table for settlement. After many years of deliberations with the disputants, the committee's efforts eventually yielded what became known as the "Roadmap to Peace" which came into effect on March 30, 2006 at the Manhyia Palace in Kumasi (Committee of Eminent Chiefs, 2006). The "Roadmap to Peace" spelt out five major benchmarks in the conflict resolution and peace building process, which this research seeks to assess their level of achievement.

Currently there is still a stalemate in the realization of the recommendations of the roadmap to peace. The disagreement between the disputants on the peace deal is on the final funeral rites of the dethroned king, Naa Mahamadu IV. The Abudu family wants the funeral to be performed as a King but the Andani family says Naa Mahamadu IV cannot be recognized as a Ya-Na because he was dethroned before he died. As such the funeral cannot be performed following the laid down traditions and customs of Ya-Na funeral in Dagbon. The Committee of Kings' peace deal made agreement for the dethroned King final funeral rites to be performed with assurance to both gates that due process would be followed but the Andani family still fear because of suspicions of mischief from the Abudus.

Carscious (2013) holds that, following the deadlock over the roadmap; the Committee of Eminent Chiefs met with accredited representatives of the Abudu and Andani families to agree on a "Final Peace Agreement". Following the proposals of the final peace agreement the government of Ghana is supposed to renovate the palace for the funeral of the two late Kings to be performed. But this has not been done for reasons best known to the state. According to (myjoyonline.com, 2016) there has been mounting tension at the Gbewaa Palace with both gates threatening each other for renewed violence. And the state has discharge heavy security presence at the area. Following this, the Abudu royals have petitioned President John Dramani Mahama to grant them access to the Gbewaa Palace to perform the final funeral rites of Naa Mahamadu IV. This follows an ultimatum they issued earlier threatening to enter the palace by force if government fails to meet their demands (myjoyonline.com, 2016). The situation is really volatile and the final peace agreement is far from realization.

CHAPTER THREE: CONCEPTS AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This chapter presents and discusses the theoretical framework and concepts used for this study. It first deals with brief conceptual explanations. The third party is conceptualized by outlining their role and legitimacy in this study. Mediation theory, which advocates for a neutral and unbiased third party in the resolution process, is used to provide the theoretical underpinning of the study. This theory helps provide the linkage between mediators, the disputants and the issues surrounding the stalemate. The Prisoner's Dilemma Scenario of the game theory is also used as complementary theory to understand the conditions that led to the stalemate.

3.1 Conflict Resolution

According to Wallensteen, (2011:8) conflict resolution is "a situation where the conflicting parties enter into an agreement that solves their central incompatibilities, accept each other's continued existence as parties and cease all violent actions against each other". This definition implies that there must be a peace agreement between the warring parties, which is an integral part of conflict resolution. The peace accord is a vital step to a lasting arrangement or peace. Based on this, this research uses Johan Galtung's theoretical analysis on violence that distinguishes between negative and positive peace (1958) to understand how peace is central to the Dagbon conflict resolution process. Johan Galtung holds that negative peace refers to a situation that is *not war* but where structural violence exists. The Dagbon case can best be fit with the negative peace. In the kingdom people continue to live in fear despite no violence since 2002. Most of the non-state third party actors are working behind the scenes to foster peace. Whereas positive peace is a situation where human beings are not impeded from fully developing and living out their life-span - a situation sometimes referred to as *peace with justice* (Galtung, 1958). This distinction is crucial for the idea of peacebuilding and resolution, which is tied to positive peace rather than negative peace. It is in the concept of positive peace that there is potential for a critical, problematized form of theory and practice of conflict resolution. On the other hand, Boutros-Ghali (1993) describes peacebuilding in "An Agenda for Peace", as strengthening those institutions that do most to consolidate a sense of confidence and well being between people. He asserts that it is increasingly clear

the fundamental elements for peacebuilding are to be found in democracy, cooperation and development. According to Boutros-Ghali, democracies almost never fight each other but as it stands in modern times this assertion has been criticized a lot. In every democracy there is citizen participation in government and authorities decisions making, political tolerance and equality, transparency and accountability and control of abuse of power. However, in the Dagbon kingdom there are issues of winner takes all in the traditional system, abuse of power and non-involvement of other gate members in decisions and traditional political activities. This signifies how different systems have different ways of governance either democratic or non-democratic. The Dagbon case has the tendency to undermine democracy in Ghana. Democracy supports the cause of peace and, peace in turn, is prerequisite for development. So democracy is essential as much as development is an integral part of peacebuilding and conflict resolution. Peacebuilding and conflict resolution may offer a broader, more inclusive, and less discursive means of rethinking the issue at hand. In the Dagbon case, the peace accord was first informal where the mediators encouraged the parties to have some understandings on each other's view. Thereafter, the parties together with the committee of eminent kings reached a more formal peace deal. The study therefore used peace-building concept to be able to establish the actions taken by the Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs) and Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) to identify the social structures that need support to solidify peace in the Dagbon conflict resolution process.

It is worth noting that conflict resolution has forms; the conventional form of adjudication and arbitration/negotiation used to resolve legal disputes and the modern alternative form of dispute resolution that employs mediation (Mnookin, 1998). The difference however is that in the traditional litigation system or arbitration, the decision of the third party - arbitrator or the judge is characteristically binding and final, and subject to judicial review only if a party can show that the arbitrator or the judge was corrupt or in the case of arbitration, acting outside the scope of the jurisdiction conferred by the parties' agreement (Mnookin, 1998). In the case of the alternative form of resolution that involve mediation, the third party decisions are not binding and he/she has no authority to impose decision on the parties. Third party has to work on the positions of the disputants to reach a compromise. Deutsch et al., (2011) assert that the third party has

to develop rapport-building skills, cooperative and decision-making skills which are needed for constructive resolution of the conflict. However, according to Deutsch et al., (2011) without competence in the skills, a cooperative knowledge orientation and knowledge of conflict process is insufficient to develop a cooperative resolution. Relatively, the third parties in the Dagbon dispute having only skills is insufficient to develop a cooperative process without the cooperative orientation and motivation to apply the skills. The third parties therefore need to have the competence and be well equipped with the orientations, norms, and values of the conflict for a constructive resolution. The crust of the third parties effort is to search for solutions that satisfy the needs of both parties in the Dagbon dispute by creating opportunities for mutual influence and responsiveness. The Andani and the Abudu royals can also demonstrate the possibility to influence each other through their own actions and the key element in this process is mutual reassurance.

Taking into consideration of the fact that in Ghana conflicts are either inter- or intra-ethnic in nature the common resolution strategy employed to resolve dispute is mainly the alternative mechanisms that employ the use of mediators and conflict management organizations. The various state and non-state bodies mandated to resolve the Dagbon chieftaincy dispute are trying to establish communication, dialogue and trust-building activities between the Abudus and the Andanis, as that would help change their perceptions and promote cooperative solutions. The resolution process has not been smooth and the mediators throughout the process have had to restart the whole process because of rising issues.

3.2 Third Party Legitimacy

Following the end of the Cold War, there has been an increasing need not only to comprehend the origin and the causes of intrastate conflicts, but also to understand how to manage if not end them (Regan, 2002). The United Nations (UN) alone has seen a number of peacekeeping operations across the globe and various other national and multinational efforts have taken on increasing importance in efforts to reduce civil conflicts. Despite the comprehension of the underlying causes may be important in addressing and resolving such conflicts, knowledge of the current dynamics between the

disputants and the third party is key for evaluating the likelihood of achieving successful outcomes (Siqueira, 2003). This would appear to be particularly critical in intra-ethnic conflicts where tradition and modernity appear to be in friction and a more persuasive intervention is required in the form of mediation and negotiation. There are various types and kinds of third party interventions. However, the focus of this research is limited to the dynamics of third-party interventions that have the long-term goal of ameliorating and overcoming the Stone Age chieftaincy conflict in the Dagbon kingdom.

A third party is broadly defined as an actor that helps the conflict parties resolve the conflict or regulate or suppress the level of violence. A chunk of available literature on third party activity focuses on mediation through negotiation. Hence, Touval & Zartman (1985:7) define mediation as "a form of third-party intervention in conflict for the purpose of abating or resolving that conflict through negotiation" and which entails "helping the adversaries communicate", "endeavoring to change their images of each other" and often "suggesting compromises" and "inducing them to change their stance". Third party neutrality or impartiality and legitimacy are integral criteria in several definitions of mediation. These qualities of the third party are especially important in the case of ethnic conflict, which is customary in nature. These qualities of the third party actors in the Dagbon conflict resolution would enable them to understand the underlying cultural norms and beliefs surrounding the dispute. The conflict has an intersection of modern practices and traditional practices, which opposes diametrically. The conflict is also characterized by traditional and national politics making it unique in every sphere. It therefore takes only an entirely neutral, unbiased and legitimate third party that is accepted by the disputants to avert the stalemate.

In Ghana customary conflict resolution through mediation is carried out by a person or persons of high social standing, commonly chiefs or elders, who use their social legitimacy and facilitative skills rather than manipulation and sanctioning to reach agreement. However, other trusted actors within the civil society, drawing upon a locally accepted framework, can also carry out mediation. These third parties possess little leverage, and their role is more geared towards facilitation and integration than manipulation and imposition. According to Moore (2014), being a mediator involves

artful skills to assist the parties in reaching a mutually acceptable agreement on the issues in dispute. The third party role associated with local, often customary conflict resolution processes such as the Dagbon case is to be able to show a strong potential for building trust, neutrality for legitimacy and reaching durable peace agreements. Legitimacy here is a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of the third party are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions (Suchman, 1995). The government of Ghana in 2003 constituted the Committee of Eminent kings who are high caliber personalities in the social structure of Ghana to mediate the Dagbon crisis. The aim of the committee is to use customs and traditions to find lasting solution to the dispute.

3.3 Conflict Mediation Theory

Johan Galtung theoretically represents conflict in a triangle as being the composition of attitudes and behavior. He argues it is the attitudes and behavior of the disputants that defines the conflict trend. It therefore implies that in a conflict situation be it violent or non-violent there are always competing and divergent goals that necessitate hostile behavior and negative attitude toward each other. Huczynski & Buchanan (2007:764), also see conflict as *"a process that begins when one party perceives that another party has negatively affected, or is about to negatively affect, something the first party cares about"* while Michel Nicholson, holds that "*a conflict exists when two people wish to carry out acts which are mutually inconsistent"* (1992:11). The definition of conflict can therefore be extended from single people to groups.

Johan Galtung (1969:169) ABC Triangle as shown below shows some "injustice and structural violence" in a conflict situation. The issues surrounding the Dagbon conflict are behavioral and attitudinal. And this brews some form of injustice according informants. The injustice in the succession to the throne results to the sporadic violence that characterized the kingdom. Galtung makes distinction between physical and psychological violence, and in the Dagbon dispute the physical violence is suppressed but the psychological violence, which has to do with attitude and behavior, is the problem at hand. Conflict widely defined as the competition for "incompatible goals" should not be confused with the attitudinal and behavioral consequences of conflict that are often destructive (Galtung, 1958). The Dagbon conflict is behavioral and attitudinal in nature

and the consequence of this divergent behavior and negative attitude from both royal gates resulted in the 2002 killings. To better understand the Dagbon situation Johan Galtung A-B-C triangle is adapted to illustrate how the Abudus and Andanis divergent attitudes and hostile behavior led to the 2002 conflict in the kingdom. Galtung holds that the triangle is often in ever escalating spiral and efforts must be made to de-escalate the attitude and behavior to resolve the conflict.

Figure 3: The Conflict Triangle (Galtung, 1958)

For Galtung, the triangle serves the double purpose of keeping the three apart, and of relating them with the arrows of two-way causation. The behavior of conflicting parties escalate leading to new incompatibilities, a string of derived conflict generated by acts of physical and verbal violence. He argues that since they are derived, their solution in isolation would not solve the basic conflict, but may serve the purpose of de-escalation, and hence prepare the ground for solving the basic conflict. On the other hand, attitudinal processes also take place, with their well-known tendency to develop in a parallel fashion. There are important symmetries in the perception; they are to some extent mirror images of each other, through imitation and projection. Therefore the task of a third party to resolve the dispute is the de-escalation of all three, A, B and C but not the C, conflict alone (Galtung, 1958).

Theorizing Johan Galtung triangle in the Dagbon chieftaincy dispute reveals some relational issues between the feuding parties and between the disputants on one hand and

the mediators, which are behavioral, and attitudinal in nature. The two royal gates have hostile attitude towards each other with already defined aims to achieve at the negotiation table. The attitude of the parties in the mediation process is best linked to the entrenched and non-compromising behavior, which led to the present deadlock. The effort of the mediators to work on the parties' attitude and behavior invariably resulted in spontaneous refusal and non-cooperation of the Abudu gate in the mediation meetings of the Committee of Eminent Kings. So the key challenge for the mediators is to reestablish a cooperative relation from both gates by assuring them of their neutrality, unbiased and independence of the whole process. The aim is to gain positive attitude and behavior from the gates. However, it should be noted that not only negative attitude and behavior escalate the dispute. Johan Galtung argues that in a very basic sense a person in dilemma is richer than a person without one because the dilemma is a kind of raw material out of which personal growth may come. In such case conflict would be welcomed rather than abhorred. The conflict therefore creates positive attitudes from the parties because of the gains involved (1969). The powerful and invisible hands in the Dagbon dispute can be typified in this sense. The mediators have to work on such positive attitudes just like the negative attitude and behavior.

Conceptualizing conflict as always began with perceptions of negative effects (on the other) and the actions of incompatible goals, the de-escalation process has to focus on addressing the perceptions which are often behavioral and attitudinal in nature. The conflict triangle above ideologically represents the intra-ethnic dispute in the Dagbon Kingdom. The conflict is variously classified as a family conflict with entrenched behaviors and attitudes. The goal of the disputants however is common (the desire to be a King) but the behavior and attitude put up by the parties involved are divergent with mutual interest. There has been a claim of double-way perceived negative effects from both gates of the royal family through their various actions and inactions in the Kingdom. This escalates the behavioral and attitudinal processes of the dispute. Conflict resolution processes, therefore, are likely to be more successful if they address both the actions and perceptions of the Andanis and the Abudus in the dispute, and to the third party. If the third party is biased as alleged by both gates on different occasions then the third party presence in the process can best be described as a *shadow neutral*. The attitudinal and

behavioral difference in the resolution process clearly defines the entrenched positions taken, which resulted in the deadlock as illustrated by the Prisoner's Dilemma Scenario of the game theory below.

Following the above arguments, this study uses the mediation theory to unravel how the mediators in the Dagbon dispute are working to de-escalate the attitudinal and behavioral processes attached to the conflict. Mediation as an alternative way in dispute resolution in the twentieth century plays an important role in every forms of dispute resolution across the globe. According to (Zartman, 2000), over half of the negotiated solutions in internal and ethnic conflicts during the twentieth century were achieved through mediation that involved third parties. The theory employs the use of third party that is adjudged as neutral and independent of influence. The third parties in the Dagbon conflict resolution process are NGOs and persons of good social standing in the society constituted in the form of committees and commissions by the state. Thus in Ghana, mediatory activities are often carried out by prominent chiefs or traditional authorities, religious leaders, NGOs, state set-up committees/commissions based on their social standing in the community. The neutrality of the mediators is paramount in the sense that any tendency to take side in the conflict would by all means cause the mediation to halt. Parties that are not favored by the mediators because of bias would refuse to cooperate resulting deadlock. According to Stulberg (1981) third parties have to be unfamiliar to the conflict, trustable, unbiased and intending to be neutral and do not impose decisions on the disputants in mediation. Also the work, suggestions and decisions of the mediator should solely be based on the mediator's professional and personal skills but not from any powerful invisible hands such as the state or any prominent body with interest in the conflict as alleged to be the case in Dagbon, which is vividly politicized.

The state in different occasions constituted commissions of enquiry and committees to resolve the dispute, but disputants variously questioned the neutrality, credibility and independence of these commissions/committees. Typical of such third parties neutrality and independence that was questioned is the Wuaku Commission that was set-up in 2002 to investigate the matter and proposed solutions. This group was accused by the Andani gate as politically in bed with the ruling government, which was implicated in the conflict. Not all the parties accepted the Wuaku commission as mediator

and this was a challenge to the commission's work. This is however in direct contravention with mediation theory that holds that the process of mediation is characterized by non-compulsory procedure in which an impartial, neutral party is invited or accepted by parties in dispute to help them identify issues of mutual concern and design solutions to these issues which are acceptable to the parties (Stulberg, 1981). The theory therefore stipulates that the process is non-compulsory and there is no legal liability attached to any party refusing to attend. It is worth noting that the refusal of the Andani family to participate in the mediation process at the beginning served as an obstacle to the process. This is because the commission had no authority to unilaterally impose decision on the parties. Therefore, effective feature of any successful mediation hinges on the total cooperation and willingness of the disputants to reaching a settlement, which was lacking in the works of the Wuaku commission.

Furthermore, the theory holds that the mediator helps the parties identify issues of mutual concern and develop mutually acceptable solutions. These characteristics reaffirm both the parties to be involved in the process and, limit the mediator's authority (Stulberg, 1981). The authority of the various mediation bodies in the Dagbon chieftaincy dispute is very restricted and limited. They have no power to force the parties to negotiation and cannot impose any decision on the parties. Their work rests solely on identifying the issues and urging them to use customary ways (the codified Dagbon customs and traditions in succession) to reach an agreement. Therefore the mediators serve as facilitators, educators or communicators who helps to clarify issues, identify and manage emotions, and create options, thus making it possible to reach an agreement avoiding an adversarial battle in court (Webel & Galtung, 2007:56-58). The inability to impose decision on the parties in the resolution process has resulted in the present stalemate because each party goes to the negotiation table with entrenched positions expecting only their goals to be met to the disadvantage of the opponent. Joseph Stulberg stipulates that using the theory of mediation in conflict resolution, mediators' roles are to be a catalyst in the process. The presence of mediators is expected to affect the parties' interaction yielding positive results at the end. Therefore the effort of the mediators especially the Committee of Eminent Kings in the Dagbon dispute resolution process is to facilitate negotiation between the Abudu and Andani gates by educating them on the

need to reach agreement for durable peace.

Mediation theory implies the combination of the mediator's functions, skills and personal characteristics, which the committee of kings is endowed with, to create a working mediation structure. The combination also establishes the framework for evaluating conducts and, prescribes the language and demeanor appropriate to the authority (Stulberg, 1981). The committee decides the venues for mediation in consultation with both gates in order to get a neutral turf for the conduct of discussions. Furthermore as stated elsewhere the mediator has to establish effective communication. Hence, the committee of kings structured the agenda for discussion and structured effective communication too in the parties to deal with the impasse. Most often in mediation, which issue to discuss first on the agenda is often a challenge. Stulberg (1981) therefore suggests that the mediator may approach the situation by dividing issues and proposals according to their common subject matter. The discussions are therefore categorized into issues that seem most susceptible to prompt resolution. Similarly, the mediator can also divide the issues and proposals into variety of substantive categories and discuss the easy ones first. The mediators of the Dagbon conflict resolution process have employed this latter approach. The parties' proposals and issues were categorized into five benchmarks as stated earlier. But the realization of the last three benchmarks agreed upon is creating the deadlock. Why the deadlock? To further understand what led to the present stalemate in the mediation process, the Prisoner's Dilemma scenario of the game theory of Merrill Flood and Melvin Dresher work at RAND (Research and Development) Corporation in 1950, which was later, formalized by Albert W. Tucker is used qualitatively to illustrate the situation below.

3.4 The Game Theory

Myerson (2013) defines game theory as the study of mathematical models of conflict and cooperation between intelligent rational decision-makers. For him, game theory provides general mathematical techniques for analyzing situations in which two or more individuals make decisions that will influence one another's welfare. But in this study the theory is descriptively used to suit the qualitative approaches. In the language of game

theory, a game is a social situation involving two or more individuals and these individuals are called players just like the actors in a conflict situation. The basic assumptions that game theorists make about players according to (ibid) are that they are rational and intelligent. Rational means each decision maker makes decisions consistently in pursuit of his own objectives. So in the game theory each of the players is to maximize the expected value of his/her own payoff (Bernoulli, 1738; Neumann & Morgenstern, 1947 cited in Myerson, 2013) and the payoff is measured in some *utility* scale. Myerson further asserts that the decision-maker bearing in mind the utility value assigned to the various possible outcomes would always choose the option that maximizes his/her expected utility. Myerson called this the *expected-utility maximization theorem* (2013:3). Myerson however cautions that the logical axioms that justify the expected-utility maximization theorem are weak consistency assumptions. The key assumption of the theorem is often a sure thing or substitution axiom that can be paraphrased as: "If a decision-maker would prefer option 1 over option 2 when event A occurs, and he/she would prefer option 1 over option 2 when event A does not occur, then he/she should prefer option 1 over option 2 even before he/she learns whether event A will occur or not" (Myerson, 2013:3). This assumption plus other technical regularity conditions is sufficient to guarantee that there exists some scale of utility that the decision-maker can choose the prefer option that gives the highest expected utility value. This idea of rational decision-makers maximizing the expected utility value of the game theory is depicted below using Prisoner's Dilemma scenario in analyzing the Dagbon conflict.

3.4.1 The Prisoner's Dilemma

The mathematician, Albert Tucker is often credited with the formulation of the prisoner's dilemma ever since the creation of the game theory (Axelrod, 1984). Since the introduction of the game theory, it has become a popular tool used by both the social sciences and biological sciences in explaining human behavior under certain circumstances. According to (Asiedu, 2008) it is so called prisoner's dilemma because the originator of the idea allegedly used two prisoners who have both committed a crime, but each has a choice of either serving the minimum sentence, the maximum sentence, or not serving any prison term at all. Under the scenario the prosecutor told both prisoners

the same thing. The prosecutor presented to the prisoners that;

If both prisoners cooperate by confessing (C, C), they will both get a reward (R, R) of lesser sentence i.e. minimum sentence. But if both defect (D, D), that is neither confesses, the prosecutor will still manage to pin part of the crime on them, and they will both get punished (P, P) with higher sentences. However, if one of them cooperate by confessing and the other defects (C, D), the one that cooperates gets a deal with the prosecutor and gets set free (T) while the betrayed party (B), goes to jail for the maximum years. The theoretical understanding of this is that if one of the prisoners cooperates by confessing to the prosecutor as a result of temptation (T) of being set free, the other one who defects (D) get betrayed (B) hence severely punished. This implies one wins and the other loses creating a zero sum game. On the other hand if both cooperate, both will be rewarded (R, R) with minimum sentences. Thus by cooperating, the gain is higher for both creating a win-win situation. On the contrary if both defect, they both get punished (P, P) with the maximum sentence resulting in a deadlock (Asiedu, 2008).

3.4.2 The Prisoner's Dilemma Puzzle of the Dagbon crisis; The Game Theory

The Dagbon chieftaincy dispute at the current stage can best be analyzed using the Prisoner's Dilemma. The mediation efforts of the third parties seem to have come to a stalemate as a result of a dilemma that both disputants find themselves in, regarding whether to cooperate with or renege on the peace deal brokered by the Committee of Eminent Kings. In this scenario mutual cooperation that would have ended the dispute seems to be missing, as suspicion, perceived bias, unchanged attitudes and behaviors, and mistrust rather hold sway.

Asiedu (2008) quoting Clause 'C' of the agreement lamented how the ongoing mediation of the Dagbon conflict by the Committee of Eminent Kings seems to have reached a deadlock as a result of disagreements on the Final Peace Agreement by both disputants on one of the key recommendations. The Clause 'C' of the Agreement partly reads:

".... The Bolin-Lana as Regent of Naa Mahamadu Abdulai IV shall enter the old

Gbewaa Palace as regent of his father and not as regent of Dagbon. His stay at the old palace shall commence on 22 December 2007 and terminate on 17 January 2008. Entry into the palace takes place only upon a letter to that effect from the Eminent Kings addressed to the Regional Security Council (REGSEC) to enable the REGSEC grant him access to the old palace, and upon the submission by the Abudulai family of a funeral programme and approval by the Eminent Kings. During this period he shall perform all ceremonies necessary for the funeral of his father ONLY..." (Committee of Eminent Kings, 2007 cited in Asiedu, 2008:14)

The dilemma of the Abudu family/gate was a counter press conference rejecting the recommendations of the final funeral rites of Naa Mahamadu IV from the committee (Abudu royal Family, May 29, 2008 in Asiedu, 2008). The recommendation holds that the funeral rites of Naa Mahamadu IV be performed in the old Gbewaa Palace. According to Asiedu (2008), the Abudus' contention was that under no circumstance should the funeral rites be held in the old Gbewaa Place instead they want the funeral performed at the current and newly built Gbewaa Palace. In their view there is only one Palace in Dagbon and the funeral cannot be done in any other place (i.e. Old Gbewaa Palace). Any act of such will amount to "aberration of the Dagbon culture"(Abudu Royal Family, May 29, 2008 in Asiedu, 2008:15). It is important to note that while the Abudus are agitating for the funeral rite to be performed in the new palace, the dethroned late king was buried at the old palace where passed kings are always laid to rest.

On the other hand, the dilemma of the Andani royal family/gate is fuelled by the conviction that the Abudu gate is trying to be mischievous and that once they occupy the palace for the funeral rites of Naa Mahamadu IV, they would use the opportunity to install a successor since the position is presently vacant (Republic of Ghana, 2002a in Asiedu, 2008). Also since the tradition of Dagbon holds that you do not de-stool a Ya-Na; a Ya-Na who proved unacceptable is simply killed and once installed a Ya-Na cannot be de-stooled, the Andani gate feels that if the Abudu gate decides to install a Ya-Na, even if he is found to have violated customs cannot be de-stooled (Tsikata & Seini, 2004). Also the Committee of Eminent Kings recommendations stipulate that a 24/7 security presence be made available to enforce and ensure that the Abudus abide by the

rules whilst occupying the Palace for the funeral rites. But the Andani gate accused the state and its security agencies of being in bed with the Abudu gate, hence the Andani gate was uncertain their royal cousins would abide by the tenets of the Peace Deal (Asiedu, 2008). Furthermore, the Abudu gate occupying the Gbewaa Palace means the Andani gate who currently occupies there have to vacate, but the Andani gate has a misgiving of the transition period (Albert, 2008).

		Abudu Gate	
		Cooperate	*Defect*
Andani Gate	*Cooperate*	R, R (Win-win)	B, T (Zero-sum game)
	Defect	B, T (Zero-sum game)	P, P (Deadlock)

Figure 4: The Prisoner's Dilemma of the Dagbon crisis

Using the prisoner's dilemma puzzle in the Dagbon scenario, whereas a mutual cooperation between the two disputants (Andani gate and Abudu gate), as indicated in the diagram above, would ensure a win-win (R, R) pay-off for both, the present total rejection (double defection) of the agreement by both parties rather ensures that both get the maximum punishment (P, P), delay in resolution and thus leads to the present deadlock.

Finally, the use of the Prisoner's Dilemma in the Game theory in this study assists the researcher to explore the role of the various third party actors in the resolution process. The researcher also seeks to find out whether the feuding gates accept the legitimacy of these actors to work towards compromise. This would in essence ensure changing of attitude and behavior of the disputants.

CHAPTER FOUR: METHODOLOGY

This chapter outlines the methodological approaches used for this study. The research employed qualitative method and its techniques from data collection to analysis. The qualitative approach was preferred due to the explorative nature of the research questions. The research predominantly focuses on the perspectives of the informants and the data collection techniques used includes structured-interviews and observations. Besides, secondary data sources were explored for relevance information and understanding of the theory and concepts of the study. In a geographical research like this, humanistic geographers employ the qualitative method because it seeks to explore the meanings, emotions, intentions and values that make up our taken-for-granted life worlds that closed questions could not capture (Kitchin & Tate, 2013; Clifford et al., 2010). Considering the fact that the research is on conflict; very sensitive and feeling oriented, using the positivists' approach would not have brought out the emotions, feelings and values attached to the phenomenon in the subjects. Furthermore, according to Payne & Payne (2004) qualitative methods assume that sociological understanding of a phenomenon should be based on the meanings that social actors bring to a particular interaction. Through this understanding, theories grow inductively and the researcher is less concerned with grand theories and generalizability. Conflict is a critical phenomenon and the processes involved in resolution are very complex, therefore, qualitative method and its approaches enables extensive research designs; where the emphasis is on pattern and regularity in large 'representative' data sets, which is assumed to represent the outcome of some underlying (causal) regularity or process. This research therefore adopted a humanistic approach which argued that human behavior is subjective, complex, messy, irrational and contradictory (Clifford et al., 2010). As such, the researcher drew on methods such as face-to-face interviews and observations that allowed for the exploration of meanings, emotions, intentions, values and experiences of the Dagbon chieftaincy dispute. The respondents lived meanings were immediately accessible and communicated not only by words but the tone of their voice, expressions and gestures in the natural flow of conversation (Kvale, 1996). This chapter concludes with the limitations associated with the research process after a presentation on how data was transcribed and analyzed.

4.1 Sampling Technique

Since the methodological approach to this research is qualitative which focused on the specific role third parties play in resolving the Dagbon chieftaincy dispute and how the disputants perceive them, the sampling design is purposive sampling (also known as judgmental sampling). The researcher deliberately selected key informants not because they are typical but because they know more about the conflict and the various efforts put in place to resolve it. According to (Kitchin & Tate, 2013), elements for study are selected based on the researcher's prior experience of the study area. Whilst on the field stakeholders that are third parties (both state and non-state) were selected for interviews purely based on the role they play in the Dagbon conflict resolution process. Informants for this research were drawn from the Northern Regional Peace Council, Ibis Ghana, Women in Peace Building (WIPB), Ghana Developing Communities Association (GDCA), Dagbon Youth Association (DAYA), Radio Justice, Yendi Peace Center (YPC), chiefs from Gbewaa Palace Tamale, Community Development and Youth Advisory Centre (CODEYAC), personalities from both gates and the academia. These informants have been or are part of the mediation process. Table 1 below shows the respondent profile for this study.

Also, snowballing as a sampling technique was effectively employed for the data collection while on the field. Snowballing is a technique used by researchers whereby one contact or participant, is used to help recruit another, who in turn puts the researcher in touch with another (Clifford et al., 2010:535). Through the snowballing informants refer the researcher to other potential informants whom they knew personally. But this was based on the initial contacts made on the names and addresses of other third parties actors, which might fulfill the sampling requirement. For the purpose of clarity, both purposive and snowball sampling methods are non-random in nature (Kitchin & Tate, 2013). This research is not concerned with statistically rigorous representativeness as a primary issue in the design since it is qualitative (Clifford et al., 2010). A properly designed non-probability and non-random sample, however, provided a reliable means of explaining and interpreting information about the population without examining every member or element but the sample.

4.2 Sampling Procedure

In this research, the researcher desired to obtain information about a population through questioning respondents on the Dagbon dispute resolution process. Non-random and non-probability sampling procedures were carried out, as the researcher needed very specific actors for the data accumulation to be sufficient (Kitchin & Tate, 2013). This was done using purposive and snowball sampling methods. The respondents were selected primarily for the roles they have in compatibility for this study. Using Google search engine, NGOs and other non-state groups that are key actors in the Dagbon chieftaincy dispute resolution process were identified. Based on this population so identified, a sample was selected comprising of state and non-state actors. Contacting, questioning, and obtaining information from a large population, is extremely expensive, difficult, and time consuming.

Furthermore, the researcher is of the view that a smaller sample size lends itself to the application of more rigorous controls, thus ensuring better accuracy. These rigorous controls allowed the researcher to reduce non-sampling errors such as interviewer bias and mistakes, and data processing and analysis errors. According to Clifford et al., (2010:86) sampling procedures are important because they can introduce various sources of bias into a research project. Sampling bias arises when the sample size is not large enough and accurately represents the study population. The danger with purposive method is that the researcher exercises judgment on informant's reliability and competency. This is important because inappropriate informants will render the data meaningless and invalid. So the choice of the informants can be a source of bias to the study. This was control for by selecting the appropriate respondents. Also, the researcher asked appropriate questions that brought out the information sought to obtain and prevented any possible error through questioning. The non-sampling errors were reduced through a pilot study at the pre-field stage that allowed careful testing of the interview guide and.

4.3 Sample Size and Frame

According to Marshall et al., (2013:11) "other than selecting a research topic and appropriate research design, no other research task is more fundamental to creating

credible research than obtaining an adequate sample. Ensuring that there is enough data is a precursor to credible analysis and reporting". However, (Patton, 1990:242-243) posits that there are no rules for sample size in qualitative inquiry. The size and frame of a sample depend on what you want to know, the purpose of the inquiry, what is at stake, what will be useful, what will have credibility, and what can be done with available time and resources. However, while qualitative methodologists unlikely agree on the exact sample sizes needed for qualitative studies, they generally agree that a number of factors can affect the number of interviews needed to achieve saturation (Marshall et al., 2013). The concept *data saturation* "entails bringing new participants continually into the study until the data set is complete or when the researcher gathers data to the point of diminishing returns; when nothing new is being added" (ibid: 11). So through the research process, factors such as the quality of interviews, number of interviews per participant, sampling procedures, and researcher experience did influence the size of the research sample. More than fifteen interviews were conducted. The sample frame was difficult to create and practice because of inadequate source and access to information. For instance, the main three-member committee mediating the dispute was difficult to reach, so the research resorted to their working documents and, royal and non-royal participating members of their meetings for the needed information.

TABLE 1: Respondents Profile

CATEGORY	NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS
NGOs	6
Royal Families (Abudu and Andani)	6
Academia	2
Northern Regional Peace Council	1
The Media	1
TOTAL	**16**

4.4 Data Collection

The data collection methods for this qualitative research included structured interviews, observations, and field notes. Additionally, secondary sources of data were also used. The combination of these different data collection methods according to (Barton, 2012) enabled the researcher to get a holistic picture of the phenomenon under consideration. For (Limb & Dwyer, 2001), these qualitative research approaches help researchers to understand lived experiences and the collective meanings of the everyday lives of people. The research therefore combined the various qualitative research methods to help the researcher get a vivid account of participants on the role(s) of the third parties in the Dagbon chieftaincy dispute resolution process and how the disputants perceive them. It is worth noting that before the researcher initiated the data collection through fieldwork, some pre-field work activities were carried out to help achieve the objectives. The researcher after identifying the topic and defining the objectives, the chosen methods for the study were aligned with the objectives and theoretical approaches, identified some key informants and also did pilot study to test the research questions. The pilot study helped test the feasibility, the time and the cost of using the interview guide in the research (Crang & Cook, 2007). Boud et al. (2013) assert that the complexity of the field environment may overwhelm the learner as new observations follow on rapidly from each other and there is little time to reflect on what is being learnt. Therefore, a preparatory phase for the fieldwork in which researchers are introduced to the nature of the study topic, the academic concepts that the study engages, site-specific information and so on can help prepare them for the complexity of the field situation (Warburton & Higgitt, 1997:333).

4.4.1 Interviews

Considering the explorative nature of the research questions, qualitative interviews were used to gather data for this study. This is because interview allows the researcher to produce a rich and varied data set in less formal setting (Kitchin & Tate, 2013). In this research, interview allowed the researcher to thoroughly examine the experiences, feelings and opinions of the subjects on the subject matter (Bryman, 2012; Crang & Cook, 2007). However, interviews come in various forms; from highly structured to

completely unstructured forms. Structured open-ended interviews were used to explore the third party actors' strategies and role(s) in the resolution process and how they are perceived. During the fieldwork, the researcher conducted interviews with key informants in the northern region of Ghana; specifically, Tamale and Yendi as indicated above (section 4.3). Using structured open-ended interview enabled the researcher to control the conversation and also ensured the questions used were highly structured and standardized. The use of open-ended interview enabled the interviewees to respond freely by giving whatever answer they wish without being constrained to categories provided by the interviewer (see Kitchin & Tate, 2013).

The use of structured open-ended interview also enabled the researcher to ask informants the same basic questions in the same order. Structured interview ensured an increased comparability of responses to all questions for every informant. This was made possible through the use of an interview guide (see Appendix A) that outlined the topics and issues covered in some sequence. The use of an interview guide when interviewing informants ensures flexibility of follow-up questions that may arise in the course of interviewing and create room for easy responses to these questions (Bryman, 2012). The qualitative methodology through the conduct of interviews did provide the researcher the opportunity of recording the face-to-face dialogue. Audio recording the interviews was an ideal way of storing data for future reference and eliminated detractions that notes taking could have brought into the interview (Kitchin & Tate, 2013).

4.4.2 Observation

While on the field, the researcher did some observations by interacting with the subjects of the study area. According to (Matthews & Ross, 2014) it is difficult to conduct a qualitative research devoid of observation as a medium of data collection. Observation involves the use of the human senses such as sight, touch, smell, hearing and taste to collect data (Barton, 2012; Matthews and Ross, 2014). It therefore represents one of the main avenues for collecting information about our natural settings or real world. The researcher on daily basis visited the Gbewaa Palace in Tamale and interacted with some elders and chiefs. As they were aware of this work, the researcher in the process of interaction spontaneously raised issues on the dispute. This was done to observe the way

they speak about each other (i.e. the Abudus and Andanis). The researcher also observed how the subjects discussed the works of the commission and committee set up by the state to intervene in the dispute. The observation revealed a kind of peaceful relation between the chiefs but hostile relation between the youth and supporters of the two gates in the kingdom. There are also exceptions especially concerning how the gates relate with the state actors in the resolution process because of alleged bias. The observation allowed the researcher to record the lives of the people as they live it rather than asking them to reflect critically upon their actions in an artificial encounter such as interview.

In this research my role as a researcher could be described as covert observation (Kitchin & Tate, 2013). With this type of observation the researched community had no knowledge of being observed. The researcher is aware of the ethical issues associated with the covert observation strategy (ibid). But justifiably, because the conflict is very sensitive and most people do not like talking about, if they were told they have been observed they would have acted differently in the presence of the researcher. Also owing to the fact that the conflict occurred over a decade ago but lying dormant with rising issues, telling the subjects that they were being observed would not have yielded the needed information. The researcher's personal interaction and observation with the subject helped determine how the two feuding gates relate and how they perceived the third party actors in the resolution process. The kind of relation established reveals that the entrenched positions taken by the two gates in the resolution are largely based on ideological difference and interest.

4.4.3 Secondary Data

This research also accessed data from library books, topic-related articles from journals and internet sources as form of secondary data. Secondary data refers to data already collected and documented in books, progress reports, annual reports, financial records, electronic formats and other relevant medium that are normally stored in libraries and archives (Bryman, 2008). On the other hand, Kitchin and Tate, (2013:226) define secondary sources as materials recorded after the event from second parties. The recorder (researcher), therefore, has no personal experience of the event itself. Based on this, documentary data from the Committee of Eminent Kings, the Wuaku commission and

other state agencies directly involved in the conflict and the mediation process were of utmost importance to this research. Data from the committee report (roadmap to peace) and the reports of the Wuaku commission provided the researcher with valuable insight into the structures, mechanisms and the way forward in the resolution. Other scientific publications in the form of books and articles on the phenomenon were extensively used. Justifiably, the researcher considered secondary data because Kitchin and Tate, (2013: 60) hold that from the "conceptual perspective, the data required may not be available in any form apart from secondary and, methodologically, secondary data enables replication of analysis, allowing different researchers to corroborate analytical findings, allowing the possibility of longitudinal and trend analysis, broadening both the scope and dynamism of variable and the size of the data sets used in a piece of research".

4.5 Data Analysis

Data analysis in qualitative research is a continuous process. In this study data analysis was done throughout the research process. Barton, (2012) posits that data analysis is the process of describing and interpreting data in relation to the research questions under consideration in the study. Analyzing the data is about "chopping up, (re)ordering, (re)contextualising and (re)assembling the data that is so diligently constructed. It is about translating a messy process into a neat product" (Crang & Cook 2007: 133). The analysis was done linking the data to the theoretical approach of the study. The researcher started by examining, categorizing and tabulating data of the study. Thus, in the early stages of the analysis, the researcher began by going back and rereading all primary materials gathered. In doing this, the researcher was able to remind himself of the contexts in which the data were constructed as the research progressed.

Having done this, the researcher started a more in-depth study of the data. At this stage the primary materials were formatted into word document for indepth study. Each of these word-processed copies labelled for easy identification, categorization and coding (Crang & Cook, 2007). In categorizing the processed data for coding, themes were identified linking them to theoretical concepts for analysis. Dey, (2003) holds that such classification and description of data helps to see how concepts are interconnected. In

order to make the coding necessary for efficient analysis, the researcher made coding decisions at the early stage of interview through interview notes and questions designing. For the purpose of this research thematic analysis was used to analyze and interpret data. Thematic analysis is one of the most widespread approaches to analyzing qualitative data (Sarfo, 2013). Matthews and Ross (2010: 373) define thematic analysis as "the process of working with raw data to identify and interpret key ideas or themes". It also involves examining the data to identify the relationships between them in order to address the specific research questions (Matthews & Ross, 2010). The adoption of thematic analysis helped the researcher to examine the perspectives of the observations gathered in the natural social setting as well as helped address the specific research questions and subject matter under consideration.

4.6 Researcher's Reflexivity and Positioning

Clifford et al., (2010) define reflexivity as a critical and conscious introspection and analytical scrutiny of oneself as a researcher. Reflexivity is not simply navel gazing; it is about examining our own practice in order to gain new insights into research. In this research, the researcher maintained high professional standards of investigation that are needed in every social research. The researcher ensured proper selection and systematic application of the right methods for the conduct of the study. The researcher kept every step of the research process under review and set performance standards for himself while thinking about how the informants are reacting to being studied. After every stage of the research process, the researcher constantly evaluated himself and the achievements to ascertain the progress of the work done. This was done to ensure the validity of the findings. Validity according to (Kitchen & Tate, 1999; Kitchin & Tate, 2013), is about the soundness, legitimacy and relevance of a research theory and its analysis. The researcher was therefore concerned with the soundness of the research strategies used in the empirical investigation and reflected on this severally.

Reflexivity was also used as an "intellectual resource rather than defensive audit" (Payne & Payne, 2004:192). This is because the self-awareness of the researcher not only produced more convincing research but also began to question the very basis of the whole research process. The researcher tried at this stage to reflect on the importance the

subjects attached to the phenomenon. So the researcher scrutinized the reactions and behavior linking them to the culture of the subjects to drive home the value attached to it. Reflecting on this enriched my knowledge level of the phenomenon and the cultural value of the subjects. The researcher's experience and reflection therefore served as a potential resource, which the researcher converted into observation notes, which stimulated fresh thinking of the research process.

Positioning himself on the field, the researcher considered himself as an outsider (not a native of the study area). As such, he was mindful of the cultural difference and other social life styles of the study area. This was considered to ensure the reliability of the data collected and the conclusions drawn. Reliability refers to the repeatability or consistency of a finding (Kitchin & Tate, 2013). The theoretical and methodological approaches of the study ensured consistency and repeatability of findings with similar earlier researches. Initially the researcher encountered challenge of access to subjects to conduct the study but this challenge was overcome with help from Center for Democratic Development (CDD) Ghana, Tamale Office. Some informants especially chiefs and other personalities were unapproachable since the conflict is very sensitive and people do not like talking about it. They were very emotional when the issue of the conflict was raised. They suspected the researcher is affiliated to one of the political parties the kingdom is polarized along and could use the information for political gains. The researcher had to obtain introductory letter from CDD, where he was doing academic internship to have access to the area. CDD introduced the researcher as their research associate to the informants especially the disputants before they could grant him the interviews. Owing to this the researcher tried hard to remain neutral between him and the subjects and not indicate any interest of taking sides (see Crang & Cook, 2007).

4.7 Ethics and Knowledge/Power Relations

Research is always bound up in issues of ethics and power/knowledge relations hence is, inherently political (Crang & Cook, 2007). In conducting research, the researcher has to be very sensitive to the rights of the subjects. According to (Payne & Payne, 2004) researchers have the obligation to their informants, which are every bit as important as their obligations to their funders. While there exist many ethical issues (see Box 3.1 in

Crang & Cook, 2007:29), Clifford et al., (2010) identified confidentiality and anonymity as two important issues that a researcher must not disregard. The researcher in this study therefore prioritized the needs and concerns of the participants to ensure their safety and privacy as well as confidentiality of the information obtained. The researcher upheld the integrity of all participants by ensuring their anonymity. The researcher entreated participants to freely give their consent to participate and advised that they could terminate their involvement for any reason, at any time. Also, participants' identities; political and royal support, were protected by making them anonymous in my final report unless otherwise permitted by the participants to use their names.

The researcher anticipated some power relation issues between traditional authority and officials of NGOs; the roles and responsibilities both sides may have to compromise (Wade 1984 cited in Crang & Cook, 2007). In such situations where "more powerful elites are being studied, on the one hand they/we may be seen as a threat, i.e. the researcher having the power to open up these people's lives for ridicule or ruination by other groups (Cook 1993; Johnson 1992 in Crang & Cook, 2007:14) as such the researcher was very cautious in time of power play. Furthermore, these powerful people have the power to deny researcher's access or even stifle the research contract. To overcome any unequal power relations, (Bourdieu 1988, 1990a; Strathern 1989 cited in Crang & Cook, 2007:16) assert that the researcher has to "study 'our own' cultures, cease taking them as some universal benchmark and problematize their values". However, in this research power relations were well managed to balance the level of informants and the researcher. Since the key informants of this research were organizations, royal families, the academia and conflict experts, research power relations were of little problem. This is because most of them are into research and they know the nitty-gritty of conducting research. And also, the researcher being a native of Wa has introduced himself as one of their northern brothers from Wa seeking to learn the northern Ghana traditional system of rule and customs. Prior to the interviews the researcher also introduced himself as a research associate from CDD Ghana conducting research on the phenomenon for academic purpose. This effort of identity helped ameliorate the researcher's access to the informants and eased through on the issues of power relations.

4.8 Challenges and Limitations of the Research

Conducting field research is not always as smooth as it may appear due to limitations and constraints that the researcher might face. At times the depth of the research and consequently the data might affect the process. In this study, the researcher was limited by time and finance. Looking at the research objectives, a lot of time was needed to gather all necessary information from the parties and the general public. The researcher could have done participant observation by attending the mediation meetings if time was in excess. The researcher had to combine an academic internship with the fieldwork to collect the data and this was a challenge. So writing the internship project alongside collecting data for this research was a great challenge because researcher had to spent great time in producing a 30-credit worth internship project, which constrained the data collection for this thesis. Also considering the fact that the research topic is very sensitive and people were not comfortable talking about it, might have also affected the validity of data of this research. Of greater challenge was the researcher inability to speak to the three kings of the Committee of Eminent Kings who are entrusted by the state to resolve the dispute. Despite this, royal and non-royal participants of the committee meetings were interviewed to understand the progress of work of the committee on the dispute.

Moreover, it was difficult to make interview appointments with NGOs and other bodies considering the fact that they were busy with work and other important assignments. Interview appointed times were rescheduled severally because of the busy nature of the NGOs and this affected the time framed for the fieldwork. Hence, time was woefully inadequate. The researcher employed the use of research assistant, which came as a cost to the researcher. Research assistant was necessary because the researcher does not understand the local language of the area.

Finally, the sample methods for this research being purposive and snowballing might have limited the findings of this research to generalization. Nevertheless, analytical generalization might still be appropriately applied because that is the basic foundation of qualitative research.

CHAPTER FIVE: FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS

This chapter presents an analysis and discussion of the findings from the research fieldwork. It examines the research participants' perspectives and experiences in relation to the research questions and the theoretical underpinnings of the study. The researcher begins discussion and analysis by first seeking to understand the nature of the actors (both the disputants and the third party actors) in the Dagbon conflict resolution process and the strategies they employ to overcome the deadlock. After which, the researcher presents and discusses the legitimacy issues surrounding the third parties, i.e. how the disputants perceived the neutrality and independence of the third parties. Highlights are made on the barriers to mediation. The researcher then discusses the effects of this dispute on Ghana's democracy and the underlying causes and triggers of the 2002 dispute in the kingdom. These discussions are based on the theoretical underpinnings of the research, which aimed at providing answers to the research questions.

5.1 Actors in the Dagbon Dispute resolution process

The research revealed that, after the March 25-27, 2002 conflict in the Dagbon kingdom that resulted in the murder of Ya-Na Yakubu II and twenty-eight others, there has been both state and non-state efforts to settle the dispute. The first action the state took after suppressing violence was to constitute the *Wuaku Commission* to investigate the matter and make recommendations to the government for further action. The state also constituted a Committee of Eminent Kings to try to use customs and traditions to settle the dispute between the Abudus and the Andanis in the kingdom. Apart from the state actors, the study realized that other non-state actors are also involved in the resolution process. These non-state actors range from Community Based Organizations (CBOs), Faith Based Organizations (FBOs) to both local and foreign NGOs. Some of the non-state actors are involved in the process as part of their social corporate responsibility to the community. Others that are development oriented need peaceful co-existence to carry out their projects in the area hence, they join the campaign for peace and resolution. For instance concerning why they got involved in the resolution process, one of the NGOs said, "*we realized that Dagbon is vulnerable as far as political and chieftaincy conflicts are concerned that no development can take place in the midst of confusion and tension.*

So we decided to add some elements of peacebuilding to our program. That has sometimes brought us at the cutting edge of dealing with chieftaincy and other related conflicts in the Dagbon area in particular and northern Ghana as a whole". Socio-economic development of the area and the consequences that are associated with conflict are the principal aims of these actors intervention in the dispute. It is worth mentioning that the intervention of both the state and non-state actors in the dispute is very significant and the issues surrounding these bodies in the resolution process cannot be ignored. Therefore, further discussions on the works of the third party actors are indicated below.

5.1.1 The State-Actors

The aftermath of the 2002 royal murder in the dynasty of Dagbon saw a royal and public outcry for peace in the kingdom. A royal member interviewed revealed that, *"the Andani family, during a press conference on the murder of the Ya-Na on Wednesday April 3rd, 2002 called for the institution of an Independent Commission of inquiry composed of non-partisan personalities of high credibility and integrity to probe the murder of the King and the 28 others".* The Andani family made this call with the aim of getting the perpetrators of the violence and carnage to be identified and punished accordingly. The constitution of the republic of Ghana mandates the state/government to constitute commissions or committees to mediate in any dispute that has the tendency of affecting a section or the whole of the country. In fulfilling this mandate the Government of Ghana on several occasions tried to intervene in the Dagbon dispute. In 2002 the state appointed the commission of inquiry and, the committee of eminent kings in 2003 to mediate in the dispute.

The Wuaku Commission was to investigate what the government at the time called *"the events and resultant deaths and injuries of persons which occurred in Yendi in the Dagbon Traditional Area of the Northern Region between 25th and 27th March, 2002"*as epitomized in (Mahama, 2009). Despite the state's credibility to appoint a neutral and independent commission or committee to mediate the case was doubted, only the state had the primary responsibility to do so. The state's credibility was tainted because of the politicization of the dispute. It therefore became no surprise when the Andani family

questioned the legitimacy of the Wuaku commission to enquire into the issue. The Andanis questioned the neutrality and independence of the chairperson of the commission because he is a stalwart member of the NPP government and therefore could not be neutral and independent of the government influence. The issues of neutrality and independence ultimately affected the work of the commission as the Andanis rejected the findings and recommendations at the end. The research also established that the state constituted a Committee of Eminent Kings to find customary solution to the dispute while the state deals with the criminal aspect. The Committee of Eminent Kings headed by the Asantehene, Otumfuo Osei Tutu II is currently on the ground working with the disputants and other important personalities in the conflict. On the other hand the work of the Wuaku Commission is over and the recommendations haphazardly implemented as the Andani family holds.

a. Wuaku Commission

As indicated earlier, on April 25, 2002, the NPP government at the time appointed a Commission of Inquiry under the chairmanship of Justice Isaac Kwaku Wuaku, a retired Supreme Court Judge and two other members, Prof. Kwesi Yankah of University of Ghana and Mrs. Florence Brew, an Educationist to enquire about the events and resultant deaths in Yendi from March 25-27, 2002 and to identify those responsible, and recommend appropriate actions against any person judged to be responsible. During this research it was revealed that the commission established a number of issues in their report to the government that were partly in tandem with the claims of the Andanis accusations. The Wuaku Commission Report established that "the Gbewaa Palace was set ablaze by members of the Abudu gate. In an attempt to escape from the encircling blaze and gunfire, many Andanis either received serious gunshot wounds or were shot dead. The late Ya-Na and all those killed within the Palace and its environs were killed by Abudu fighters." See appendix B for the executive summary of the commission reports.

The above establishment of the commission was variously supported by most of the informants interviewed during the fieldwork. A number of informants even further argued that the Abudu members had support from the government to murder the King. A royal member interviewed lamented how the telephone lines and electricity in the area were cut off, and the security agencies in the area did nothing to avert the situation. He

said, *"the murder was triggered by the negligence of the government in power at that time. Because when the thing started on the 24th of March 2002, telephone lines were cut off, electricity cut off. I am saying is the negligence of the government in power, look at the Police Station to the Gbewaa Palace, the Army Detachment to the Gbewaa Palace, the commander of the Army detachment said the armor car has a problem with the battery, the Ya-Na sent messengers to them and he detained them and you push further to ask what was the municipal security council doing? REGSEC met but the regional minister didn't attend the meeting, the deputy didn't, the Municipal Chief Executive (MCE) was chairing the meeting."*

Linking the above to the commission findings, the commission noted with regret, the indifference and inaction of some key state agencies such as the police, the military, the Minister for Interior and member of parliament (MP) for Yendi, Alhaji Malik Yakubu Alhassan and the officers at the Ghana Telecom during the crisis. The minister was accused of lifting the curfew put in the area to ensure order during the Bugum and Damba festivals. *The commission confirmed what the Andanis said about the telephone lines by emphasizing that "the Ghana Telecom lines were down on 25th March when the crisis began and were restored on 27th March when the carnage was over"* (Wuaku Commission Report). The commission however found no adverse findings against the interior minister but recommended that the police and army commanders in the area should be reprimanded. This did not go down well with the Andani family and they continue to conclude that the government supported the Abudus to murder the king and therefore instituted a biased commission to cover up. This affected the legitimacy of the commission. It was also established by the commission that some members of the Abudu gate (Yidana Sugri and Iddrisu Jahinfo) *were seen on 27th March holding severed parts of the late Ya-Na Yakubu Andani II soon after the Ya-Na had been killed. The commission therefore presumed that these people killed the Ya-Na and recommended their arrest and prosecution."*

Subsequently the commission described the March 2002 incidence as a war. The Commission's conclusive description of the carnage in Yendi as a *war* was probably based on the circumstantial evidence that arms were imported into Yendi and that the situation before the Bugum Festival merited the declaration of emergency by the security

agencies. However, the Commission's subsequent recommendation that persons that were presumed to have killed the Ya-Na should be tried was quite controversial. It is worth noting that the Andanis were part of the commission meetings that concluded the murderers be tried in court but what they did not agree was the commission's decision that the crimes were committed during war. The Andanis argue that since crimes committed during war are war crimes they should be handled differently from crimes such as murder. *The Andanis argue that war is not fought at home; the king was attacked at his palace and this cannot be war.* The controversies of the commission's recommendations are based on the political reasons behind the murder. According to an informant (Andani family), "*It is indeed strange and incredible that the Wuaku Commission which described the events leading to the murder of the Ya-Na as a 'three-day war' came to a shocking conclusion that 'two people should be presumed the killers of the Ya-Na. There is no such thing as presumption in the offense of murder. A person can only be charged with the offense of murder if he/she intentionally and unlawfully kills another person. To charge Yidana Sugri and Iddrisu Jahinfo as the presumed murderers of the Ya-Na will be an exercise in futility.*"

However, it is important to note that these presumed murderers were eventually arrested and tried. But there were contradictions of accounts in the trial and the accused were discharged for lack of evidence to support prosecution. The Commission's Report did not also shield the suspicion of government collusion in the death of the king and the twenty-eight (28) others as its actions and inactions revealed that. For instance in tandem with (Mahama, 2009) some key witnesses to the incidence especially, the Municipal Chief Executive was deliberately not called to testify in the meetings of the commission. The Andanis raised red a flag on this. These actions of the commission affected its legitimacy as a third party to resolve the dispute. The work of the commission on the incidence marks the genesis of the deadlock in the 2002 incidence.

b. Committee of Eminent Kings

The constitution of Ghana in principle places chieftaincy as an independent institution of government and above national politics. As such chieftaincy dispute are to be settled by the Regional House of chiefs, the National House of chiefs and at the worse level, the

Court of Appeal. In tandem with this constitutional provision, the government in 2003 appointed three eminent kings to mediate the Dagbon dispute using traditions and customary practices. The government exercising its constitutional mandate reveals legitimacy issues surrounding the status of the persons, the methods used and the appointing authority itself. The disputants, because of political interference, have questioned the legitimacy of the third parties at these three levels on several occasions. This affects mediation.   Many of the informants interviewed however have confidence in the committee of kings in resolving the dispute but lamented how they are incapacitated by the interference of national politics in the dispute. It was also revealed that the chieftaincy institution is bedeviled with common and unnecessary disputes that undermine local and national development.

The overall aim of this committee is to use non-partisan approach and customary ways to bring the Andani and Abudu gates to a compromise to resolve the dispute. The committee since its inception has met with the disputants several times at Manhyia in Kumasi and these meetings resulted in what became "roadmap to peace." The roadmap has five benchmarks to overcome the dispute. First, the committee and the disputants agreed to bury the remains of the slain king. Secondly, the eldest son of the late king, Kampakuyana Andani enskinned as Regent of Dagbon. Thereafter, the funeral rites of the former dethroned king, Naa Mahamadu Abudulai IV and the slain King, Ya-Na Yakubu Andani II to be performed respectively. Finally, a new Ya-Na would be enskinned by the kingmakers following the established traditions and customs. However, there are some obstacles to the roadmap and typical is the performance of the funeral rites of Naa Mahamadu Abudulai IV. The study revealed that the Abudu family wants the former dethroned king funeral be performed as a king but their cousins, the Andanis are of the view that the late Naa Mahamadu IV was not a king when he died hence, his funeral cannot be performed as such. The Andani family holds this view based on the traditions and customs of Dagbon. In the traditions and history of Dagbon dethronement and past living king are not known. The case in hand is due to the introduction of modern democratic practices in the making of a king (the 1948 constitution), which the Andanis do not subscribe to. The fear of the Andanis is the tendency to replace modern democracy with the traditional practices of king making. If this is allowed, with time king making

would become a pure national politics in the kingdom. When one of the chiefs in the Gbewaa Palace was interviewed, he said: *"This funeral is difficult to perform because people do not want to agree to laid down Dagbon customs and principles. By the supreme court ruling of 1987, the ruling in part says that even though de-enskinment is not know in Dagbon custom, the selection and enskinment of the late Naa Mahamadu Abudulai IV was null and void and it went further to make an order that his sons are qualified to contest for the gate kings of Mion, Karaga and Savelugu. Which means that by law his enskinment we should not be talking about it, it is a forgone conclusion..."*

It therefore means that critical to the resolution process is to find a way to overcome the performance of the Naa Mahamadu's funeral. These notwithstanding many interviewees have faith and confidence on the eminent kings to mediate and resolve the disagreements. As it stands the main obstacle to the full implementation of the peace deal is the funeral rite of Naa Mahamadu Abudulai IV. The committee is still putting in more effort to get the two gates agree on how to perform Naa Mahamadu IV funeral. Data from the research points to the fact that the committee of kings is the only state actor in the mediation which legitimacy is not questioned by the disputants. This committee is perceived to be neutral, independent and credible hence gains the needed cooperation from the disputants. This probably is the fact that the members are credible individuals with high social standing in the country. There are however, some spontaneous issues raised about the committee, which shall be discussed later.

5.1.2 Non-State Actors

Private organizations such as NGOs, CBOs, FBOs, private media houses and some UN agencies have initiated their own activities, and some collaborated with the state in diverse ways to mitigate the adverse effects of the Dagbon crisis. The main role of these organizations is to positively influence the agenda and nature of the mediation and negotiation process of the dispute. They do this by criticizing, admonishing and presenting their viewpoint of the issues. FBOs such as the Catholic Secretariat and the Federation of Muslim Women Association in Ghana (FOMWAG) in the kingdom were very instrumental in promoting peace through a variety of workshops and conference targeting the youth and women who are often considered vulnerable in crisis. They

championed the need for peaceful co-existence and peaceful resolution of the conflict. The catholic secretariat through the Catholic Bishop of Yendi Diocese established a peace center in Yendi, the traditional capital of the kingdom to build on the capacities of the royal families and prepare them for the mediation process. The study revealed that these organizations did not work in isolation. Their activities were linked to the activities of the various bodies set up to resolve the dispute.

Also, community based organizations such as CODEYAC, Women in Peacebuilding (WIPB), Tehsuma, Culture for Peace, the Regional Peace Council and NGOs such as GDCA, WANEP/GHANEP, DANIDA and UNICEF also teamed up under the umbrella of Sustainable Peace Initiative (SPI). These organizations drew resources from various sources together for invaluable humanitarian services, conflict management and peacebuilding services in the kingdom since 2002. They organized trainings for opinion leaders and chiefs in conflict resolution and restorative justice. These organizations were very instrumental at the earlier stages of the dispute through their collaboration with other stakeholders, such as Ghana's development partners, and the Christian Council of Ghana to end the crisis. The royal families saw the NGOs as capable of transforming the conflict since they perceived the government as deeply implicated itself in the affairs historically and presently. The government is accused of using the crisis for political gains. NGOs therefore serve as critical trust building actors in the Dagbon crisis management and resolution process. The NGOs are seen as trustworthy, non-partisan, unbiased in addressing the substantive issues and providing the needed assistance to the disputants. This notwithstanding, some NGOs were chastised by the royal families and other interviewees. For instance an informant argued that, *"Instead of the CSOs/NGOs to tell the youth groups the effects of their actions and how it would affect the whole area they were rather cushioning them. And this was nothing to help solve the problem. What they used to do is to gather youth groups and talk to them, feed them and give them per diem. So it was rather encouraging them to misbehave, because if you were identified as a notorious group, they continuously inviting you to workshops and other things and they benefitted from that."*

Opinion leaders of the area were of the view that NGOs should rather educate the youth on the effects of their actions on the kingdom's development and join hands with

community leaders through mass communication on the need for peace. The NGOs heeded to this and joined the community leaders to organized peace programs through local radio stations and typical of such programs in Bekalsaa on Justice FM in Tamale. This program, according to the manager of the FM Station, has transformed the attitude of the people, especially in the area for lasting peace. The program is often aired at dawn and tried to educate the youth to stop violence in the area. It also helped mobilize people to form a taskforce to pick up intelligence for the security agencies in the area. Most interviewees are therefore of the view that the works of the CSOs/NGOs are in no doubt relevant in the resolution process but, most often they do not deal with the real issues of dispute and that the resolution itself lies in the hands of the two royal families. For instance when the Regional Peace Promoter Rev. Fr. Thaddeus Kuusah was interviewed he revealed how Nayiri (one of the eminent kings) expressed frustration in the whole process. He proverbially said, *"Father, you will go to a village and you come across a stream as a visitor, you don't know how deep that stream is. It's people from the village who will tell you don't pass here because it is very deep. The moment he gave me this, I was assuming what he meant. What he was trying to tell me was that, the Abudus and the Andanis, they only know how deep the issue is and they can solve their own problems."* The proverb from the Nayiri raises some issues of internal disunity, sabotage and maneuver in the royal kingdom.

There are general accessions that the kingdom is fractured diametrically making it difficult if not impossible for third party resolution. The disunity and sabotage makes the work of the third party as only prevailing over the royals but cannot actually go into the internal dynamics of the dispute. The internal issues are only known by the two royal gates, which the third parties are not privilege to. The parties recognize the committee of kings and the various non-state actors works but resolution itself lies in the hearts of the two gates.

5.1.3 Brief History of the Disputants

When *Ibrahim Mahama; a former de facto advisor to Ya-Na Yakubu II* was asked to provide the historical understanding of the dispute he said, Dagbon Chieftaincy is

historically linked to a man called Gbewaa whose ancestors came from Mali, surfaced at Pusiga and declared the entire area of Dagbon, Mamprugu and Nanum as his territory. According to Mahama, Gbewaa ruled for sometime and died. Thereafter, his descendants took over the place. A time came, they quarreled and divided the territory amongst themselves. The eldest son took over Mamprugu. The second one took over Dagbon. The third one took over Nanum and they decided that the descendants of Gbewaa, both male and female should become chiefs in Dagbon. So, the son who established this was called Shitobu. After Shitobu's death, his son, Nyagsi took over. Even before he died, the son was allowed to tour the whole *state* and ensure that the people who were claiming to be the rulers, who were fetish priests, were all exterminated and then they took over the territory. So after his predecessors, Nyagsi continued the process and then he decided that chieftaincy in Dagbon should be *promotional*. Promotional means, one should occupy a smaller skin and be promoted to a bigger skin. So ever since, they made sure that the son of a Ya-Na can occupy any skin in the entire area of Dagbon whether eastern, western or southern and he can move round the whole place. He can occupy in his promotional process as many as four chiefships before he gets to Yendi, the main seat of the kingdom. Mahama added, ever since, they also made sure that apart from the princes, we had what we called the elders, the Wozorha people; these are the visitors who joined the Ya-Na in his wars. They are not a royal blood but they occupy key chiefships like Tolon, Gushiegu and other places. Then of course, when it came to the time of Naa Yakubu I who died in about 1829 as shown in the genealogical tree in chapter two above, his two sons succeeded one after the other and they tried to ensure that the skin was tied to their descendants and this marked the beginning of the Abudu-Andani family.

Ya-Na Yakubu I had two sons from two different wives as indicated elsewhere in this research. The first son was Abudulai who occupied the skin after Naa Yakubu I. It was after the death of Ya-Na Abudulai that his cousin Ya-Na Andani took over. Descendants after them continued this rotational system of rulership through constitutional codification of the rules of succession until 1954 when confusion erupted between the cousins. According to Ibrahim Mahama, *"when he (Ya-Na Andani) occupied the skin and died, it went to Abudulai's son. When Abudulai's son died, it went to Andani's son and rotation continued for about 150 years. When in 1954, the other side,*

Abudulai decided to truncate it. In other words, refusing to allow rotation to move. So the problem of Abudu-Andani came in 1954. And then of course, after series of commissions of enquiry, ... they said that okay, succession should continue by rotation. And the late Ya-Na was appointed 1974 when the matter was resolved. But before he could complete his term of office, he was murdered in 2002. That is where we are now."

From the above narration, it can be deduced that the dispute is purely a family matter and all the issues surrounding it can best be resolved by the willingness of both royal gates to adhere to traditions and customs. The desire for power and rulership cause both gates to involve in conspiracy, manipulations and maneuvers to ascend the throne thereby abrogating the rules and regulations of the 1930 constitution of Dagbon that govern the rotational system. It is revealed that from the historical perspective both gates were best friends, best brothers and fought together in wars against their enemies. But the current loggerheads of the royal families can be linked to the colonial administration interference in the chieftaincy institution, the amendment of the 1930 constitution in 1948 to do away with the traditional way of king making and the thereafter interference of the national politics in chieftaincy affairs. But these are just issues surrounding the crust of the matter which lies in the hearts of the families. This is because when Ibrahim Mahama was asked what could be done to overcome this? He doubted saying, *"until the parties themselves are prepared to have peace. It's like taking a horse to the riverside. You are able to take the horse to the riverside, but the horse itself must drink. And of course, if the two parties, if one of them particularly say I want to go this way, if you don't go that way then I am not going any other way. Then the matter will stand still."*

5.2 Third Parties Strategies in the Resolution Process

As indicated before, the Dagbon dispute resolution process has witnessed a lot of both state and non-state actors' effort in varied ways. These actors employed different strategies depending on the capacity of the actor. At the state level there have been several court rulings, commissions of inquiries, committee works to get the disputants compromise. Here the strategy employed by the state is mainly the involvement of third party through mediation and adjudication. The challenge however is how modern mediation practices can be used to address traditional conflicts? Such conflicts are

traditional and need traditional approach to address them. Perhaps, there is the need to move from traditional practices of king making to modern democratic practices of voting as codified in the 1948 constitution. This would allow for the modern methods of mediation to be used to address such disputes. However, most of my interviewees are of the views that the state use of the court system to deal with chieftaincy issues like the Dagbon chieftaincy dispute, historically and currently rather exacerbated the issue. The informants argued that even the 1992 constitution of the republic of Ghana chapter seven decrees the chieftaincy institution in Ghana as an independent body and should handle all chieftaincy disputes using the regional house of chiefs and the national house of chiefs. So informants are of the view that the Supreme Court ruling of the 1986 that dethroned Naa Mahamadu IV and made Naa Yakubu Andani II the king set the pace for the 2002 conflict in the kingdom. But before the court rulings in 1986, as the study revealed, there was a committee known as Ollenu committee set up by General Ignatius Kutu Acheampong regime to look into the issue. This committee consulted the 1930 and 1948 constitutions of the kingdom and declared Naa Mahamadu IV installation as null and void. In the words of an informant; *"this committee also went with the 1930 constitution and said the 1948 constitution lacked legitimacy. And based on this the committee said the enskinment of Naa Mahamadu IV is null and void and that arrangement should be made to de-enskin Naa Mahamadu IV and en-skin Naa Yakubu II (1st in Dagbon history and tradition you see de-enskinment and you now have a former king still living). This brought its own politics to Dagbon. This went on from 1974, the Andani reigning and the Abudus appealing till the Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC) government came."*

Unlike its predecessors who formed committees upon committees, the PNDC government used the court system. The court finally upheld Naa Yakubu II. But in order to accommodate the two gates in the rotational system, the court entreated Dagombas to accept Naa Mahamadu IV as a former Ya-Na. This signified some form of constitutional crisis because dethronement has no place in the Dagbon constitutional system. The study however revealed that because of political pressure from the national level, the Andanis have to oblige and accepted Naa Mahamadu IV to stay in the Palace. Naa Mahamadu

died in 1988 and burial and funeral rites became a problem, which is still the main issue in the present deadlock.

On the part of the commissions and committees set up prior to 1986 court rulings, which were alleged to have national political party colors just like the Wuaku commission in 2002, informants just like the disputants question their legitimacy and independence to work on the real issues surrounding the dispute. Many informants are of the view that because Abudus and Andanis have political affiliations with the NPP and the NDC respectively, any commission or committee set up by any of these parties' government turn to favor their affiliate. For instance, an informant cited the Wuaku commission that was set up by the NPP government as prejudicial with its findings and recommendations. The Andanis accused the commission of trying to shield the criminals and the government, which they accused of helping the Abudus to murder the king while accepting the efforts of the committee of kings to get resolution.

Basically, the strategy use by the committee of kings in the Dagbon resolution process is mediation. The committee is working on the behaviors and attitudes of the disputants, urging them to reach a compromise. The disputants have taken entrenched positions and the task of the committee is to get them soften their positions and compromise. The committee establishes a communication rapport between the disputants and meets the disputants at a neutral ground (Manhyia) for mediation. This is in tandem with the mediation theory of conflict resolution. The committee is also working on the disputants to get them modify historical beliefs and customs to meet the changing times of modernization and globalization. The effort of the committee yielded the "Roadmap to Peace" which is under implementation despite the hiccups.

On the other hand, the non-state actors are basically involved in peace works in the kingdom throughout the resolution process. The study revealed that during the active stages of the conflict, NGOs, CSOs, CBOs, FBOs and other stakeholders in the region teamed up to form Sustainable Peace Initiative (SPI) to manage the conflict. This consortium of organizations used different strategies to create awareness, provide humanitarian services and provide capacity building training to the youth, women, chiefs and opinion leaders. For instance when the executive director of CODEYAC was asked the strategy they use, he said, *"when you are in the position where the community is*

vulnerable; where people can fall out with each other and conflict occur or there is a sense of insecurity. At that stage the strategy would be one of trying to build peace in order to prevent conflict. So one of the strategies would be peacebuilding and conflict prevention…. You start engaging the different parties in the debate. We do that taking into consideration the different social structures and strata. We deal with chiefs and opinion leaders, women leaders, Youth leaders and so on. Then we now program a kind of mass communication strategy that would reach far and near so that is no longer involving only the leadership."

These non-state actors obtain funding and logistics from donors like DANIDA, UNICEF and UNDP. These international organizations are working behind the scenes through the local NGOs to ensure that peace returns to the area. It was also revealed that strategically, these actors collaborate with the state actors in various ways in their effort to ensure peace in the area. This is what the program officer of GDCA said when asked how they collaborate with the state, *"...because, we have done this with prior information to the District Assembly, which represent the state at the local level. They are not sitting members in the committee but they are aware of our activities. Also the National Peace Council working on behalf of the state on peace issues has been duly informed. So at the state level that is how much we involved in them. But the actual work of the committee does not need to have them physically present to proceed."*

But it also came to light that the non-state actors are handicapped in the resolution process in the sense that they do not have the authority and capacity to bring in external mediators on their own to mediate between the parties. The main handicap as cited by the executive director of CODEYAC is, *"the Dagbon issue we were handicap because the government by itself had already established some committee of mediators who were supposed to manage the conflict at two levels. One level was the three eminent kings committee and the second level the commission (Wuaku commission) to look at the criminal aspect. So we could no longer interfere with those systems."*

As at the time of this research, September 2015, these CSOs/NGOs have organized several meetings, workshops, seminars among others that brought both Abudu

and Andani royals, youths and women groups together with the aim of involving all peace loving people in the peace process in Yendi as well as Dagbon for the swift development of the area. The Yendi Peace Center (YPC), a faith based organization run by the Catholic Dioceses of Yendi is particularly instrumental in promoting peace in Yendi, the seat of the violence. Most of the respondents interviewed acknowledged the efforts of the center and other non-state actors by crediting them for working hard to get the disputants attend the mediation. So, the principal work of these non-state actors is to make sure that they do the groundwork to get the people to agree to participate in those institutions' meetings that the government had established. For instance one of the NGOs said *"if not for their effort there was a time the gates did not even want to meet any longer and any body. So they have to pursue them, go from one chief to another, encourage them to participate."* This accordingly helped work on the attitude and behavior of the gates to reengage in dialogue through the committee of mediation. When this happened the government could not do anything and the committee was stranded. The parties took entrenched positions. It is therefore the effort of these non-state actors that has actually given a lifeline to the committee of eminent kings, which is gradually yielding results.

5.3 Barriers to the mediation

Mediation efforts from both the state and non-state third party actors have witnessed some challenges and setbacks. First, the state constituted mediation body especially the Wuaku commission suffered personality attacks from the Andani family throughout the inquiry process. The Andani family held the view that the commission is politically tainted and was not willing to attend the meetings of the commission. The Andanis abandonment of the commission meetings slowed down the works of the commission and, they ultimately rejected its reports. The chairperson of the commission is a staunch member of the then governing party; NPP and the issue of neutrality and independence were raised. This affected the mediation effort of the commission.

On the part of the Committee of Eminent Kings, key barrier to their work is the entrenched positions taken by the disputants. The disputants have different goals to meet at negotiation and not ready to meet each other at a common point. Because the theory of mediation asserts that the mediators have no power to impose decision on the disputants,

the committee of kings is therefore incapacitated in situations like this. The stalemate of the mediation is as a result of these entrenched positions taken by the disputants and this has become a problem for the mediators. Furthermore, the disputants have different preferences therefore making mediation very difficult. The Abudu family wants the funeral rite of Naa Mahamadu IV to be performed as legitimate late king and due processes followed with power shifting to them since the immediate late king is an Andani family. On the other hand the Andani family are of the view that Naa Mahamdu IV funeral cannot be performed as a late king because he was dethroned before he died and the traditions and customs of Dagbon do not recognize dethronement. Hence his kingship is null and void. Further, they are holding that, Naa Yakubu II reign was truncated because he did not die a natural death and after the funeral rites they expect an Andani to be enskinned for the continuation of the slain king regime. So long as the positions taken by the two gates on the performance of the Naa Mahamadu funeral rites are different mediation cannot proceed.

5.4 Perceptions of the Disputants on the Mediators

When informants were asked how the disputants perceived the third party mediators; both state and non-state actors, the issue of neutrality, bias and independence emerged. This was particularly directed to the Wuaku commission set up in 2002 by the President Kufuor administration to investigate and establish the facts leading to the events and the resultant deaths and injuries in Yendi between 25th and 27th March 2002. According to the informants, the public, particularly the Andani family and the families of the people that were murdered along with the king expected the commission to make full, faithful, unbiased, impartial and independent enquiry into the incidence but the conclusion drawn by the commission was sadly described as politically tainted and prejudicial. The Andanis, referring to the commission as the replicate of NPP intention to shield the truth, challenged the formation of the commission. These perceptions from the disputants affected the legitimacy of the commission to gain cooperation from the disputants for independent and neutral judgment as the theory of mediation holds. Legitimacy is a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of these mediators are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs,

and definitions (Suchman, 1995). Therefore, neutrality and independence of the mediators are key elements to determine their legitimacy. But these were lacking in the commission's work from the beginning to the end of the whole process.

The scenario of the prisoner's dilemma that theoretically illustrates the stalemate is as a result of the perceptions of non-neutrality and bias of these state' constituted third parties. The Andani family rejected the Wuaku commission reports and some of its recommendations. Therefore government actions on the report did not see the involvement and cooperation of the Andani family hence both gates are punished with the long-standing deadlock and sporadic violence in the kingdom.

5.4.1 Independence and Neutrality

Regarding the qualities of neutrality and independence on the part of the third party actors, informants especially, the Andani royals interviewed revealed that all state and non-state actors except the Wuaku commission have been neutral in the composition and deliberation. The interviewees described the Wuaku commission as politically tainted and its decisions as politically motivated. For instance, they alleged that the chairperson of the commission was one time the Volta Regional Chairman of the then ruling party (NPP). Based on this the Andanis argued that neutrality which is a key component of the theory of mediation was compromised for political gains. For instance one of the informants recounted the reaction of the Andanis towards the commission when it was constituted saying, *"the Andani family upon the announcement of the commission by the government questioned the legal authority of the commission since it was not established by any constitutional instrument, the neutrality of the chairman we challenged, since he is a member of the ruling party (NPP), the venue of the hearing we questioned because it has historical bearing on us, we questioned why some key witnesses we know in the incidence were not invited to give accounts, and the final conclusions and recommendations of the commission we rejected because they were prejudicial and politically influenced."*

These issues raised by the disputants did not help the mediators (Wuaku Commission) to de-escalate the behavior and attitudes of the disputant in the conflict, which are

diagrammatically linked in Johan Galtung (1958) *conflict triangle*. It therefore implies that from the onset of the resolution process, the state had it wrong from the composition of the commission through to the implementation of the politically motivated recommendations of the commission, which resulted in the deadlock.

On the other hand most informants were of the view that all CSOs/NGOs and the Committee of Eminent Kings works in the resolution process are credible, independent and neutral. The study revealed that, the disputants cooperatively attend all meetings, workshops and conferences of these organizations and are also cooperating with the committee of eminent kings to overcome the deadlock. The crust of the work of these NGOs/CSOs is to work on the behavior and attitude of the disputants and prepare them for negotiation at the committee level as indicated above. As it stands the committee of kings and the NGOs works, as epitomize by (Galtung, 1958, 1969; Stulberg, 1981), are focused on addressing the negative perceptions from the disputants, which are basically attitudinally and behaviorally linked with ideological difference. So, the study established that the quality of third party neutrality and independence could only be found in the NGOs/CSOs and the committee of eminent kings but not the Wuaku commission. The deadlock as the study reveals was caused by the decisions of the Wuaku commission, the actions taken by the government on the commission recommendations and the court ruling on the accused persons in the murder.

5.5 The Royal Dilemma

The two royal gates of the Dagbon kingdom are in dilemma and this affects their choices in decision-making. The first dilemma emerges with the difficulty to accept and follow which constitution in the selection and enskinment of the king. The kingdom is now governed by two constitutions; the 1930 and the 1948 constitutions. The Andanis recognize the 1930 constitution as the legitimacy-governing document while the Abudus adhere to the 1948 constitution saying the 1930's was amended which gave birth to the 1948 constitution as the legal document in the kingdom. References are always made to these documents by the disputants to support their views making it difficult for the mediators to reach resolution. There is therefore the need for a *hybrid constitution* that will meet the demands of both parties to replace these disputed constitutions.

The second dilemma is the practice of modern and traditional values concurrently in the making of the king. There has been incidence of modern democratic practices incorporated in the selection and installation of the king especially in 1954. The 1948 constitution has modern democratic practices in the selecting and making of the Ya-Na while the 1930 constitution is purely based on traditions and customs. The Abudus uphold 1948 constitution which stipulates that the king should be selected through voting by eleven-member committee of kingmakers whiles the Andanis adhere to the 1930 constitution which states that a four-member committee is responsible for selecting the king through soothsaying and oral traditions. There is therefore friction between modernity and tradition in the kingdom. The way out of this is a new constitution that will satisfy both parties. The new constitution with retrospective effect may help define the position of a dethroned king to overcome the deadlock on the performance of Naa Mahamadu IV funeral rites since the present constitutions have no clause catering for such situations. The biggest dilemma in the kingdom is the performance of the funeral rites of Naa Mahamadu. So, NGOs and other interested parties should work towards addressing this dilemma and every other thing would come into place thereafter. There is the need for NGOs to exploit the constitutional crisis option by channeling resources for constitutional conference in the kingdom to draft a new constitution.

5.6 Causes and triggers of the dispute

Regarding the question what the triggers and causes of the dispute are, making it still unresolved, the data pointed toward a number of factors which the researcher summarized under constitutional crisis/succession plan violation, the role of "invisible and invincible hands", suppression of justice and, reign and legitimacy.

5.6.1 Constitutional crisis/succession plan violation

In conflict analysis, conflict theorists point out that there are objective reasons that usually serve as a motivation for two or more groups to get locked up in contention. Results from the data collected through the interviews and observations indicate that a section of informants alluded to chieftaincy as the main cause of the conflict. However, I asked myself if chieftaincy in itself is a cause of the conflict, then why every chiefdom is

not in conflict? The issue of chieftaincy as the cause of the conflict in Dagbon could thus be understood in the context of conspiracy. How does conspiracy work in the Dagbon conflict? The answer to this question can be seen in the succession to the Yani. There is some kind of conspiracy between the gates and their political affiliates. The politicians as argued are using the disunity in the kingdom for political gains but the same can be said for the gates. The gates are also lobbying with politicians to get things turn in their favor. One informant for instance said, "… *but when blaming take note. At one time the Abudus cross-carpeted from the Danquah-Busia party to the CPP to get favors. So it means they also lobby complicating the whole issue.*" So depending on the turn of things at a time, gates approach their political affiliates looking for help to get the throne thereby promising politicians their subjects support in elections in return for that.

Despite most of the literature on the Dagbon crisis (Albert, 2008; Tonah, 2012; Anamzoya & Tonah, 2014) argue that the dispute is as a result of politicization, in the field, informants' views point to constitutional crisis. They argued that the concurrent operation of the 1930 and the 1948 constitutions in the kingdom is the root of the Dagbon crisis. For instance, an interviewee, Dr. M. H. A. Bolaji, Lecturer and Coordinator at School of Business and Law in University for Development Studies, Wa argued that, *"yes it is politicization of the conflict but there is something underneath and that is constitutional crisis. The 1930 and later 1948 came into play in Dagbon dating back colonialism. The British influenced their codifications and that has been the case ever since."* The study revealed that the chiefs and elders at the time of codification of the rules expressed reservations because they are used to oral traditions through talking drums to remind them of their roles. Despite the reservations, the rules were codified yielding the 1930 constitution. Thereafter, in 1948 using the modern form of governance and democracy, the Abudu family had support from the colonial administration to amend the 1930 constitution giving birth to what is called the 1948 constitution in the kingdom and this allowed them continue to retain the skin even though it was supposed to rotate to the Andanis after the death of Naa Mahama III (Abudu family) in 1953 (Mahama, 2009) holds that too. The data revealed that in 1954 the Abudu family used the 1948 constitution and interrupted the succession by rotation and voted the Bolin Lana Abudulai (Regent) as Ya-Na Abudulai III. The point to note is that the Abudus ignored the 1930

constitution, which holds that the four kingmakers are the only legitimate body to install the Ya-Na through soothsaying but not through voting as they did. So there is no clear cut constitutional position when it comes to the installation of Ya-Na and this continues to be a source of confusion and violence in the kingdom. There is a breach of procedure and protocol in king making in the kingdom.

5.6.2 Role of the "invisible and invincible" hands

Politicians and other powerful individuals in the royal gates are variously accused of causing the unresolved nature of the Dagbon chieftaincy dispute. Data from the study shows that the Abudu and the Andani royal gates have political affiliations with the NPP and NDC respectively. They believe and uphold the political ideologies of these parties. As a result politicians at the national and local levels are accused of using the dispute for political gains. But from this research perspective, it is evident that the blame is a double way. In as much as politicians are to be blamed the royal gates too have to be blamed because it is evident in this study that they approach the politicians for favors such as lobbying for support to ascend the throne. Nevertheless, it is constitutionally clear that national politics should be distanced from chieftaincy issues. It should be noted that this requirement is tenable if chapter twenty-two of the constitution of the Republic of Ghana is allowed to work. This chapter stimulates that no chief should take part in active politics and any chief wishing to do so should abdicate his stool or skin (Ghana Constitution, 1992). The researcher is of the view that both politicians and chiefs are to be blamed in the Dagbon crisis.

However, this study supports Carscious (2013) study on the crisis, which had over sixty percent of respondents, confirmed that politicians are the cause of the stalemate. The politicians and powerful individuals that are behind the scenes are collectively described in this study as *the invisible and invincible hands*. Nevertheless, informants partly blame the royals for creating a crack in the family making it easy for the politicians to penetrate for their selfish interest. There is mistrust, maneuver, unfair traditional system and hostile relation between the gates. This makes it easier for individuals with selfish interest to take advantage. The manager of Radio Justice and one time executive of Dagbon Youth Association (DAYA); Alhassan Salifu, proverbially confirmed this by saying, *"there is a saying that if a wood splitter wants to split a firewood easily he would*

look at where there is a crack and he can fix the chisel at the crack and hit to split. That is what the politicians do. They are taking advantage of our disunity. So whoever comes out with a vital information or point that would make us united, they would destroy the person. Because he would deny them their success in politics."

The argument that politicians are to blame in this research as the cause of the unresolved nature of the dispute is in tandem with previous works by (Tonah, 2012; Awedoba et al., 2010; Anamzoya & Tonah, 2014; Albert, 2008) among others. To come out from this dilemma that the gates found themselves, informants are of the view that until the two gates realize that politicians and powerful individuals are using their disunity for personal gains; and agree to meet in their home to unite, clean all mistrust, make fair succession plan and accept each other as one family, the effort of any third party would only de-escalate violence but not resolve the dispute. Some informants described the dispute in the kingdom as *time bomb* and can explode at any time.

5.6.3 Suppression of justice

Also there was an issue of injustice that resonates in the data. Both gates spoke differently arguing that there is no justice in the Yani succession. Here justice is approached from two perspectives; from ascension to the Yani and, from the state effort to resolve the dispute. From the perspective of the ascension to the Yani, historically, the Andanis argue that their cousins (the Abudus) have unfairly ascended the throne and ruled on two occasions, which is not supposed to be the case following the rotation plan in the kingdom. The Andani family cited the case in 1920 when Naa Bukari from the Andani side was made the king by the kingmakers after Naa Alhassan (Abudu family) but the Abudus and the colonial administration (the British) conspired and removed him from the skin on the account of old age. This was done and Naa Abudulai II (Abudu family) was made king. In the same vain, in 1954 the Abudus family used the amended constitution as described above to ascend the throne again unfairly and unjustifiable means, the Andanis argued (refer to the genealogical tree in chapter 2).

On the recent incidence that resulted in the murder of the king in 2002, the Andanis therefore are of the view that their cousins are trying to use another unfair and unjustifiable means to ascend the throne again just like they did before. On the other hand the Abudus hold the view that the Andanis were part of the amendment of the 1930

constitution and they do not see how the use of the 1948 constitution is unjustifiable and unfair. These perceived injustices in the kingdom have negative toll on the mediation process of the third parties. Suspicions are at play especially in the Andani family since they do not trust their cousins and are not willing to allow them to enter the palace to perform the funeral rites of Naa Mahamadu IV.

On the perspective of the state effort to arrest the criminals that murdered the Naa Yakubu Andani II in 2002 and prosecute them, the Andanis lament how justice is being suppressed when the accused persons were arraigned before court and later acquitted for lack of evidence from the state prosecutors. The Andanis see the process as unjust and unfair towards them and, shielding the criminals whom they strongly believe are their cousins, the Abudus. As far as the current dispute is concerned both gates believe strongly that not until justice is done, there would not be peace in Dagbon. Interestingly, whereas finding and punishing the murderers of Ya-Na Yakubu Andani II represents justice to the Andanis, their cousins have different opinion and disagree. This is what Saha Naa, one of the chiefs at the Gbewaa Palace said when speaking on justice and fairness, *"...so when Naa Mahama III died (from Abudu side), his regent Naa Abudulai III, was to have moved to Mion so that Naa Andani will come to Yendi but this never happened, so he was a regent and made king. So when he also died his regent who was Naa Abudulai III (Naa Bula Bila) also stayed on the skin. At that time Andanis said, no if we allow this to continue, our gate will be closed because at that time Naa Andani was over 80 years, so if he had died in Mion, the Andani gate would have been blocked just like the Mahami gate (the third gate) that was blocked. So they petitioned the authority.... So, Nkrumah had to come in to plead with Naa Andani to allow Naa Bula Bila and that was where LI 59 was enacted to regulate the case."*

The LI 59 in essence as epitomized in (Mahama, 2009) resolved the crisis at the time but the incidence after the overthrow of President Nkrumah changed the situation. There are issues of sustainability to intervention. The overthrow of Nkrumah reversed the situation as the next government repealed the LI 59. In essence as it stands the Andanis least expected any one to use war or murder to ascend the throne and when the incidence occurred in 2002 they were dumbfounded. Injustice continues to brew in the kingdom and third parties efforts are not centered on retributive justice in the system but

restorative justice. The third parties are incapacitated and only the state has the power to ensure retributive justice, which the Andanis are yeaning for. It is important to note that the Andanis using the traditional system of governance want instant and retributive justice. They want those who kill by the sword to die by the sword. They insist the alleged assailants of the king should be meted out with the highest punishment in the country. This sort of contradicts with the modern practices of mediation in the case, which aim at restorative justice. This has forced the mediation into tangent.

5.6.4 Reign and Legitimacy

On the question what triggered the 2002 killings, a number of issues came up but outstanding among them were the concurrently autonomous celebration of the *Bugum and Damba festivals* in the kingdom by both gates, the lifting of curfew imposed on the area and the negligence of the government at the time. It is important to note that, the Ya-Na is the only legitimate and ceremonial organizer of these traditional festivals. But the research data shows that in 2002, both Ya-Na Yakubu Andani II and the regent of Naa Mahamadu IV, Mion Lana; Alhassan Abudu Ziblim (Abudu family) independently organized these festivals. The Andanis questioned the legitimacy and authority of the Mion Lana to perform these traditional festivals. It is only the Ya-Na that has the reserved right to perform such festivals not a regent or any chief when there is a sitting king. The Andanis saw this as a challenge to the legitimacy of the reign of Ya-Na Yakubu II. The youth of these two gates therefore clashed and the king and at least twenty-eight others were murdered. Furthermore some informants are of the view that the Abudus made utterance that the king had stayed too long on the skin and needed to be eliminated for them to ascend the throne. To support this claim, this is what Ibrahim Mahama, the de facto legal advisor to the slain king said when interviewed, *"well, the Abudus said that they were impatient. They said that he has lived too long. They made that utterance. When we assembled in Yendi and they were trying to interview the parties to find out why they kill Ya-Na and they said he had lived too long. By that time he had ruled for 28 years, so they were waiting for him to die and he was not dying, so they killed him. That is the basic reason for the killing."*

Furthermore, the government for that matter the security agencies of the area are variously accused by informants of gross negligence, which resulted in the killings, and

the aftermath incidences of the area. This accusation confirmed the findings of the Wuaku Commission on the security agencies and some government official roles in the conflict at the time. The police and the military bases in Yendi that are close to the Gbewaa Palace did nothing to avert the conflict. The Andanis are therefore of the view that since these agencies directly take instructions from the government, their inactions during the time shows that the government was in bed with the Abudus to kill the king. This position of the Andanis resonated throughout the data of the study.

5.7 Effects of the conflict on Ghana's democracy

When interviewees were asked the effects of the conflict on Ghana's democracy, a variety of consequences were mentioned. The researcher has critically assessed the data on this question and summarized the effects as follows. First, most of the interviewees argued that the conflict has resulted in polarization of Dagombas along the two dominant political parties in Ghana, the NDC and the NPP. They lament how even non-royals in the kingdom are torn along these parties in the kingdom because of their support for the two gates. It is significant to remember that as illustrated earlier in this study that the two gates; Abudus and Andanis have political allegiance with the NPP and the NDC respectively. One of the informants of this study even asserted that national politics in the region is defined along the two gates. This means that when one supports either NDC or NPP it clearly transcends to which gate that person support in the kingdom. This is what an informant from the YPC said on the effect on democracy, *"though democracy is thought to be good but in this part of the country it does not work. It has caused more harm than good. Because, if you have people who believe that this party belong to us and that party belong to them is not the best. This has gone deep into their tradition."*
Critical of this polarization in the kingdom is the creation of factional voting which is not a good practice in any democracy. Democracy votes based on quality of the candidate or the party but in the case of Dagbon the data revealed that wrong people are often elected into offices in constituencies where either of the two gates dominant in numbers. Voting in such constituencies is based on identity and affiliation not the capability and quality of the candidate or the party. This is in opposition of the principles of democracy: freedom of participation and choice as shown in (Boutros-Ghali, 1993) agenda for peace.

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Second, the data also points to the fact that the conflict is a stain on Ghana's democracy. Informants argued that democracy itself has its own conflict but an organized conflict; where people agree to disagree. But the conflict is a stain. People in democracy are expected to follow laid down rules, procedures, and cultural norms and respect authority but in the case of Dagbon this is different. So, if this continues to linger in Ghana democratic practices, her global partners would think otherwise of the country. Globally, Ghana's democracy is variously described as the best in the sub-region. This attracts many investors into the country for development. Also, closely linked to this is the fact that the conflict has created some negative image about northerners (people from northern Ghana). Northerners are perceived undemocratic and always perpetuate violence and most interviewees lamented this. This accession has the tendency to generate into national violence if such comments are not managed properly. In events like this, groups rise against each other, and this is contrary to the preach for equality in democracy. Boutros-Ghali holds democracies seldom fight and perpetuate inequality but the crisis in Dagbon has created inequality and sporadic violence in the kingdom. This is therefore a stain on Ghana's democracy.

Third, in the kingdom, subject groups that are under the Yani rulership, may use the opportunity to advocate for autonomy, which is also democratically conflictual. Historically these subject groups are part of Dagbon and they pay homage to the Ya-Na. With the sporadic nature of violence in the kingdom these subject groups may demand autonomy. The demand for autonomy has its own accompanied factors such as ownership of land. And because land is a valuable asset, the agitation for paramountcy and autonomy is highly impossible and this has the tendency to degenerate into violent conflict between subject groups in the kingdom and the Dagombas.

Fourth, because of the disunity and hostility between the Abudus and the Andanis, in communities where sub-chiefs were installed by the dethroned king, Naa Mahamadu IV, these chiefs are not respected and they do not get the needed support as legitimate chiefs under the kingship of Ya-Na Yakubu Andani II. Such chiefs cannot control the subjects. The executive director of CODEYAC speaking on this said, *"the Yani chieftaincy is the central or the nerve center of Dagbon traditional politics so definitely*

when the center has a problem it spread to other distributaries of that center. So because we have problem in Yani, in every community you find these divisions. Chiefs are there who have been enskinned by Abudus' Naa Mahamadu IV and others by Andanis' Naa Yakubu II. Currently, majorities are enskinned by Naa Yakubu II because he has been there for a long time. In the communities where the Andanis are the majority people don't respect chiefs who were enskinned by Naa Mahamadu IV and vice versa. Such chiefs cannot control the subjects so they flout the local authority." When this happen in such communities it leads to lawlessness and traditional democracy is crumpled down because, these chiefs have no power to invite such people for query and fine.

Quite contrary and what can be referred to; as positive effect is that the conflict has brought the area in focus globally. Most scholars since the incidence in 2002 have developed interest in the phenomenon thereby bringing the area into focus. Dagbon kingdom and traditions are now placed on the spotlight of most scholars and, researchers trying to understand the issues. Furthermore, at the global level, countries and people interested in Ghana local issues got to know in 2002 that there is a kingdom of great importance like Dagbon in Ghana. For instance this is what the project officer of GDCA said on the effects of the conflict on Ghana*; positively the conflict has brought the area into focus. It goes a long way to mean that even if one didn't know there is a place called Dagbon, as a result of the conflict, major part of the world is aware of Dagbon in northern Ghana. Also to a larger extent individuals are benefitting from donor support and that might even be the reason why it is so difficult to resolve. To such people it is a positive outcome.* The conflict therefore creates positive effects, which benefit people just like (Galtung, 1969) assertion.

5.8 The Way Forward

Reflecting on the various accounts from the field it is evident that the disputants are in clearly defined entrenched positions with none ready to bend to meet the other. NGOs and stakeholders have already put in enormous effort to soften their positions but more need to be done to reach resolution. The starting point to overcome this is to talk the disputants into the writing of a new constitution that satisfies both gates in the kingdom.

Most of the informants cited this as the way out of this crisis. The new constitution would cater for all the lapses in the 1930 and 1948 constitutions and in a way meet modernity.

Secondly, it is difficult to do away with politics in the crisis since the chieftaincy institution itself is political but it is recommended that national politicians should minimize their interference in chieftaincy affairs in the country if not completely desist from such acts. Politicians and traditional authorities have to abide by the national constitutional provision that states that traditional matters such chieftaincy issues should be handle by the Regional and National Houses of Chiefs. If both chiefs and politicians stick to the constitutional provision, it would go a long way to avert future similar crisis. As a matter of fact such cases should always be referred to the National house of chiefs instead of the state forming politically tainted commissions and committee to exacerbate the situation. Therefore the invisible and invincible hands in the Dagbon crisis should be done away with and allow the mediators work on the case. It is true the state has the sole responsibility to ensure peace and provide security to her citizens but that should be purely a matter of the security agencies of the country, not politicians. The state has the responsibility to end all violence emanating from chieftaincy disputes but the resolution should be referred to the National house of chiefs.

CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION

Information gathered from the research data points to the fact that there are both state and non-state actors in the Dagbon conflict resolution process at various level. This chapter briefly summarizes the findings of the study in relation to the research questions.

6.1 Third Party Actors and their Mechanisms

Data from the research revealed that right after the March 2002 dynasty killings in the Dagbon kingdom, both state and non-state actors have been actively involved to return peace and orderliness to the area. The state constituted the Wuaku commission in April 2002 to first investigate the incident and make recommendation for government action. The state also set-up the Committee of Eminent Kings to use customary ways to resolve the dispute. The actions of the state are however not restricted to these bodies in ensuring peace in the area. The security agencies are also re-enforced to ensure peace and orderliness in the kingdom for the committee to work properly. The study also found that the state actors were formed with defined responsibilities. The Wuaku commission was only to investigate the murder, identify the killers, and recommend appropriate punishment to the government for implementation. On the other hand, the committee of kings was set-up to mediate between the disputants using customs and traditions to get them negotiate their difference.

The strategies used by these two bodies were different. The Wuaku commission was to enquire into the case and inform the government what it found but could not compel government to implement its findings. The data therefore revealed that the commission was prone to manipulations and bias and there were a lot of legitimacy issues surrounding it because it was politically tainted. On the other hand the committee of kings employed the strategy of mediation with no binding decision in the case. The committee of kings worked on the entrenched positions of the disputants by establishing rapport building through communication. This committee only serves as a facilitator, educator and mediator in the resolution of the dispute. The study found that the effort of this committee resulted to the "Road to Map to Peace" in the resolution process. The road map has five benchmarks to achieve for the resolution of the dispute. The benchmarks are: 1. Agreement to bury the remains of the slain king, 2. Installation of a regent, 3. Performance of Naa Mahamadu IV final funeral rites, 4. Performance of Naa Yakubu II

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final funeral rites, and 5. Installation of new Ya-Na for the kingdom. These benchmarks are progressively accomplished despite the hiccups. The process is at a stall on the third benchmark because of disagreement between the disputants. The work of the committee is positively assessed as effective in resolving the dispute. It is however, unclear how soon the resolution would come since there is entrenched position taken to the realization of the third benchmark.

The non-state actors in the resolution process are NGOs residing in the northern region. The NGOs works are basically on peace promotion and doing some grounds work to get the disputants attend the meetings of the committee of mediators. The NGOs organized workshops, seminars, conferences and other platforms targeting the youth, women, and the royals to get them stop the violence and return to the negotiation table. The data of the research revealed that, had it not been the work of the NGOs there was a time the disputants were not willing to meet or attend the mediation meetings because of difference of interest. But for the intervention of the non-state actors, they softened their positions and returned to mediation. So despite the non-binding and voluntary nature of the non-state actors in the Dagbon conflict resolution process, their activities in ensuring peace and co-existence positively influenced the successes chalked by the committee of mediation.

6.2 Perception surrounding third party actors' work

When the issue of legitimacy was raised in the research process, respondents revealed that between the two state actors, the Wuaku commission was described as politically tainted and its findings were politically motivated and prejudicial. This especially was the view held by the Andani family. But existing literature also attested to the fact that the chairperson of the commission is an active member of the NPP government. So the perceived bias of the commission work and influence from the government is something that cannot be contested. Contrary, the committee of kings is perceived to be neutral and independent. Hence, the legitimacy of the committee of kings is not contested and it has gained cooperative support from the disputants and all that are interested in the resolution; i.e. the state itself. The committee of kings is deemed credible and unbiased because it comprises traditional rulers who are of high social standing in the Ghanaian society.

6.3 Causes of the conflict and effects on Ghana's democracy

The study revealed that the causes of the conflict are varied with underlying factors. The encounter of modern democratic and traditional practices however challenges king making practices in the kingdom. This has been a source of intractable conflict in the Dagbon chieftaincy. By way of summary, outstanding among the variables are: politicization of the chieftaincy institution (the invincible and invisible hands), constitutional crisis, suppressing of justice and the issue of legitimacy when it comes to rulership. The concurrent celebration of the Damba and Fire festivals by Ya-Na Yakubu II and the regent of Naa Mahamadu IV in the kingdom were cited as the trigger of the dispute. The question of right of legitimacy and authority to perform these festivals was at play. The Andanis considered the action from the Abudu family as disrespectful and challenge to the legitimacy and authority of the ruling king. This resulted in a clash between the royal families in 2002. However, there are underlying unresolved historical issues, which always come to play at the slightest chance.

On the other hand data on the effects of the conflict on Ghana's democracy revealed the following: First, the research revealed that the conflict caused polarization in the kingdom. Even non-royals are split along the political affiliations of the Abudus (NPP) and the Andanis (NDC). This creates factional voting and qualified candidates are not often elected into offices. Secondly, the dispute is also assessed to have stained the democratic successes of Ghana. Investors that moved into Ghana, especially the northern part because of the peaceful nature of the place pulled out causing development to slow down. Also, chiefs that were installed by Naa Mahamadu IV in the community gates of the kingdom suffer legitimacy issues. These chiefs lost respect from community members because of the division in the kingdom. In such communities law and order is undermined and security become an issue. Quite contrary, in the global perspective, the conflict brought the kingdom into focus, and people, researchers and development partners that are interested are working behind the scenes to return to peace.

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<u>Appendix A</u>

A1: Interview Guide for NGOs

"What are the role(s) and mechanisms third party actors employ in the resolution of the Dagbon chieftaincy dispute? And how do the disputants perceive these actors?" This interview guide represents the key questions and points for consideration that will take up the bulk of the interview. The interview will be structured open-ended allowing for control of conversation and ensuring questions are highly structured. Open-ended structured allows for flexibility and follow-up. The nature of the structured elements of the interview may also necessitate jumping back and forth between topics.

The interview will take no more than 45 minutes, and it is possible that not all questions will be covered, depending on time and answers given.

1. Introduction

➢ Outline of Master Thesis project
➢ Confirmation of use of personal and organizational details, information and interview   transcript
➢ Outline of the structure of the interview
➢ State for the record, your name, position and organization (if permission is granted)

2. Research Questions in sections

<u>Actors in the resolution process</u>

➢ Who are the primary actors in the Dagbon dispute?
➢ Are there any third party actors in the dispute?
➢ If yes, who are they?

<u>Strategies in the resolution of conflict and promotion of peace</u>

➢ Does your organization have strategies/mechanisms in place to resolve the Dagbon conflict and promote peace in the area?
• If yes, please outline.
• If no, why?
➢ Does your organization collaborate with the State in your effort to resolve the Dagbon conflict?

- If yes, what are the ways you collaborate?
- If no, any reasons?
➢ Do you involve politicians and external mediators in your effort to resolve the conflict and promote peace? Why?
➢ What are the possible effects or challenges of this collaboration?
➢ Does your organization also collaborate with other NGOs (both locally and globally) to resolve the conflict and build peace?
  - If yes, in what ways?

Barriers to the resolution of the conflict
➢ In your experience, what are the challenges you face in working to resolve the Dagbon conflict?
➢ What could be done to overcome these challenges?

Reasons for the conflict and the effects
➢ In your work to resolve the conflict, what do you discover as the triggers of the conflict?
➢ What do you identify as the underlying or root causes of the conflict?
➢ In your view, what are the effects of the conflict on Ghana democracy both locally and internationally?

Thanks for your response and time.

Appendix A2: Interview Guide for the Royals and Academia

 "What are the role(s) and mechanisms third party actors employ in the resolution of the Dagbon chieftaincy dispute? And how do the disputants perceive these actors?" This interview guide represents the key questions and points for consideration that will take up the bulk of the interview. The interview will be structured open-ended allowing for control of conversation and ensuring questions are highly structured. Open-ended structured allows for flexibility and follow-up. The nature of the structured elements of the interview may also necessitate jumping back and forth between topics.

The interview will take no more than 45 minutes, and it is possible that not all questions will be covered, depending on time and answers given.

1. Introduction

- ➢ Outline of Master Thesis project
- ➢ Confirmation of use of personal details, information and interview transcript
- ➢ Outline of the structure of the interview
- ➢ State for the record, your name and royal affiliation (if permission is granted)

2. Research Questions in sections

Actors in the dispute

- ➢ What is your view on the unresolved Dagbon conflict?
- ➢ In your view, who are the third party actors in the dispute resolution process?

View on the third party work in resolution process

- ➢ How do you perceive the neutrality and independence of the third party actors in the resolution process?
- • Based on the response above, do you think they can resolve the dispute?
- ➢ What strategies do you suggest NGOs and the State can employ to resolve the Dagbon conflict?
- ➢ Do you think it is advisable for NGOs to involve political parties and politicians in the resolution of the Dagbon conflict?
- • If yes, Why?
- • If no, Why?

Barriers to the resolution of the conflict

➢ In your view, what do you think are the challenges that hinder the third party mediation efforts in the resolution process?

➢ What could be done to overcome these challenges?

Reasons for the conflict and the effects

➢ In your opinion, what are the causes of the conflict?

➢ Should politicians be blamed for the unresolved nature of the conflict?

• If yes, why?

• If no, why?

➢ In your view what are the effects of the conflict on Ghana democracy and development both locally and internationally?

Thanks for your response and time.

Appendix B: Executive Summary of the Wuaku Commission Report

The following is the Executive Summary of the Wuaku Commission Report presented to President John Agyekum Kufuor.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On 25th April, 2002, His Excellency President John Agyekum Kufuor, by Constitutional Instrument, 2002 (C.I.36), appointed this Commission of Inquiry, chaired by Justice I.N.K. Wuaku, to investigate the Yendi disturbances of 25th to 27th March, 2002, identify the perpetrators and make appropriate recommendations to the President.

The Commission relied on public testimonies of witnesses, memoranda, on site visits to the scene of events at Yendi and the burial grounds, briefings (in camera) by the Security Agencies (i.e. the BNI and the Police) as well as evidence in camera, to inform its work and arrive at the findings and recommendations contained in this Report.

2. Evidence was also taken from relevant personnel of the Military, the Police, the Volta River Authority (VRA) and Ghana Telecom in Yendi and Tamale, who were on duty at the time of the conflict.

3. Towards the period for the celebration of the Bugum Festival at Yendi between the 24th-26th of March 2002, the Yendi District Security Council (DISEC) received reports that arms were being clandestinely smuggled to Yendi, and that some people had planned to cause mischief (by attacking others) during the festival.

4. In order to avert this, and by so doing preserve the peace in the area, the DISEC decided that a curfew should be imposed on Yendi, and the celebration of the Bugum Festival banned altogether.

5. This decision was communicated to the Northern Regional Security Council (REGSEC) at Tamale for the necessary action to be taken thereon. The REGSEC acted on the recommendations of the DISEC by informing the then Minister for the Interior, Alhaji Yakubu Malik Alhassan of the decision. The said Minister quickly acted on the recommendations by imposing a curfew on Yendi, and banning the celebration of the year's Bugum Festival at Yendi. These decisions were backed by an Executive Instrument issued on Saturday, the 23rd of March 2002. The curfew and the ban, however, were hastily revoked by the then Northern Regional Minister, Prince Imoru Andani in the evening of Sunday, 24th March 2002 upon assurances of peace by the late Ya-Na Yakubu Andani II.

6. In the morning of Monday, the 25th of March, 2002 the late Ya-Na Yakubu Andani II and his elders gathered at the Gbewaa Palace to commence the celebration of the festival; but before the ceremony could begin one Ziblim, a servant of Ya-Na (who had earlier on

been sent by the Ya-Na's Mbadugu to go and call an elder to the Palace), came back to the Palace to inform the Ya-Na, that he had been assaulted by some youth of the Abudu Family, who had also destroyed his bicycle in the process. Not long after this, gunshots were heard in the Palace area (i.e. Nayilifon).

The immediate cause of the disturbances, therefore, was the attack on Ziblim and the subsequent destruction of his bicycle by the Abudu Youth in the morning of Monday, the 25th of March 2002.

The shootings or exchange of gunfire between the factions (i.e. the Abudus and the Andanis), unfortunately continued for three days without the intervention of the Security Forces (for various reasons), resulting in the deaths of at least twenty-eight (28) people including the Ya-Na, injuries on many others, the burning of thirty-six (36) houses and the destruction of the Gbewaa Palace.

7. The injured who were treated and discharged at the Yendi and Tamale Hospitals numbered thirty-two (32), excluding those who applied self-medication. Autopsies performed on the bodies by a Pathologist from the 37 Military Hospital, Accra, revealed that all the deaths resulted from gunshot wounds.

8. The Commission finds that the disturbances that took place at Yendi between the 25th-27th of March 2002 were caused by:

(a) The longstanding chieftaincy dispute between the Andani and Abudu Gates/Families.

(b) The unfettered acquisition of local and sophisticated arms or weapons over a long period of time by the Andani and Abudu Families and/or their agents and the inability of the Security Agencies to prevent/retrieve same.

(c) The insistence of the Abudu Family to celebrate certain festivals previously held solely under the auspices of the Ya-Na (thereby challenging the authority of the Ya-Na as the Overlord of Dagbon).

(d) The hasty lifting of the curfew and ban imposed on the celebration of the Bugum Festival by the then Regional Minister, Prince Imoru Andani; and

(e) The assault on Ziblim by some Abudu youths in the morning of Monday, the 25th of March 2002.

9. Based on Findings made, the Commission makes the following recommendations:

RECOMMENDATIONS

PART I

PERPETRATORS

Individuals who committed the various crimes should be charged with the following offences under the Criminal code;

1. Murder

2. Conspiracy to Murder

3. Attempted Murder

4. Causing Unlawful Damage

5. Assault

6. Arson

7. Illegal Possession of Firearms

8. Unlawful Military Training.

MURDER

Yidana Sugri Iddrisu Gyamfo

CONSPIRACY TO MURDER

Iddrisu Iddi "Mbadugu" Ex- Zalankola-Na

Mahamadu Abdulai "Samansama"

Shani Moro.

ATTEMPTED MURDER

Sulemana Baba "Baba Kroga"

Abdulai Karim "Cheke"

Alhassan Alhassan "Baku"

Kwame Alhassan "Achiri"

ARSON

Iddrisu Gyamfo " Pachie"

Issifu Baba

ASSAULT

Okros

Imoro Champong

Fuseini Alhassan "Ayoma"

ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF WEAPONS

Mohammed Achiana Abdul Salam

Fuseini Yamusah

Issifu Baba

Mohammed Sayibu

Ibrahim Adam

Sononu Bakomi

Bashiru Shinashi

S.S. Amin

Maama Mole

Zakari Zakplasi

Irwanu Bingo

Shirasu

Ibrahim Yashina

Bashiru Gyima

Iddrisu Ziblim "Sayendo"

Mahamadu Ziblim "Pashena"

Fuseini Alhassah "Ayoma"

CAUSING UNLAWFUL DAMAGE

Iddrisu Halidu

UNLAWFUL MILITARY TRAINING

Ibrahim Adam

Sonunu Bakomi

Bashiru Shinashi

S.S. Amin

Maama Mole

Bashiru Gyima I

rwanu Bingo

Ibrahim Yashina

Shirasu

LAWYER IBRAHIM MAHAMA

The Commission recommends that for suborning witness, the above-named should be referred to the General Legal Council for necessary action.

Prince Imoru Andani,

Former Minister, Northern Region - He should be charged with criminal negligence.

Mohammed Habib Tijani,

District Chief Executive, Yendi

While the Commission commends the District Chief Executive, however, it recommends his re- assignment to another position or office outside Yendi, due to the mistrust of his role in the conflict, however well intended, has engendered among certain groups of people under his jurisdiction.

Alhaji Malik Alhassan Yakubu

Member of Parliament, Yendi Former Minister for the Interior

The Commission makes no adverse findings against him.

Francis Laryea Okang,

Area Manager, Ghana Telecom

The Commission recommends that he should be reduced in rank.

The Military

The Commission recommends that those in command positions in Yendi at the time of the crisis should be reprimanded.

OTHER RECOMMENDATIONS

*The military detachment in Yendi should be upgraded into a Garrison, to ensure stability in the area.

*The Yendi Police Station should be adequately resourced with men and logistics to enable it deal speedily with exigencies.

PART II

The following recommendations are considered incidental and reasonably related to the Yendi events.

*The Government should, as a matter of urgency, vigorously implement regulations governing the importation, use and manufacture of firearms in the country.

*The Government should embark on a thorough, sustained, and impartial exercise towards the retrieval of unlicensed arms in the Dagbon area. The proliferation of arms in the Dagbon area has implications for national security, and should be considered a priority by Government.

*The Government should clamp down on, and disband all private armies, operating outside the auspices of the Ghana Armed Forces.

*There should be no parallel traditional office holders, apart from those appointed by the Ya-Na, according to custom.

*The celebration of the Bugum Festival in Yendi should be banned/suspended until a Ya-Na is enskinned.

*When restored, the Bugum Festival in Yendi should be observed under the auspices of one supreme traditional authority: The Ya-Na.

*On the other hand, the Eid-ul-Adha (Salah) is observed by Moslems throughout the world, and need not be celebrated under one supreme traditional authority. The security agencies (REGSEC, DISEC) must, however, ensure that the Public Order Act is strictly complied with in the conduct of all such public events.

*The celebration of Bugum in Yendi, when restored, should undergo reforms respecting the time of day for the festival's procession, approved routes, the nature of torches permissible, the use of firearms, and other objects that can be misapplied for criminal acts.

*Serious steps should be taken to revive the Dagbon Traditional Council, made up of all its accredited and recognized members.

*The Dagbon Traditional Council should, as a matter of urgency, ensure that the funeral of Mahammadu Abudulai IV, former Ya-Na, who died in 1988, is performed in accordance with Dagbon custom.

*The body of the late Ya-Na Yakubu Andani II, currently at the Yendi Government Hospital, should be properly preserved until it is buried according to custom.

*The Government should make conscious efforts to reconcile the two royal gates of Dagbon.