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The European Union debate in 2004-05 on the lifting of its arms embargo against China

A study of foreign policy making in the
European Union

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List of abbreviations

ALDE	Group of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe
ASEM	Asia-European Meeting
CAAT	Campaign Against Arms Trade
CEO	Chief Executive Officer
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
COREPER	Comité des Représentants Permanents / Committee of Permanent Representatives
DESO	Defence Export Services Organisation
DG	Directorate-General
DG TRADE	Directorate-General for Trade
EADS	The European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company N.V.
EEAS	European External Action Service
EMU	Economic and Monetary Union
EP	European Parliament
EPC	European Political Cooperation
EPP	Group of the European People's Party (Christian Democrats)
EU	European Union
FPA	Foreign policy analysis
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
GAERC	General Affairs and External Relations Council
IGC	Intergovernmental Conference
IR	International relations
MEP	Member of the European Parliament
MP	Member of Parliament
NATO	The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
PES	Group of the Party of European Socialists
PRC	The People's Republic of China
PSC	Political and Security Committee
SEA	Single European Act
TEU	Treaty on European Union
UEN	Group of the Union for Europe of the Nations

UK
UK MoD

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
UK Ministry of Defence

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1.0 Introduction

The European Union (EU) deliberated in 2004-2005 the possible lifting of its arms embargo against China. However, the embargo was never lifted, as disagreements among member states increased in 2005 and prevented a clear EU consensus on the issue. This demonstrated how the fact that an eventual lifting would have had to have been decided by unanimity in the European Council complicated the decision process, and how national differences within foreign policy may sometimes be too substantial to be resolved. This process of European foreign policy coordination therefore becomes the basis of the present thesis' aim to identify the main foreign policy decision makers during the arms embargo debate.

The changes in international relations after the end of the Cold War¹ and the Maastricht Treaty's increased focus on the EU's political aspect provided a more welcoming environment for a potentially more coherent EU foreign policy.² Even though these structural changes within the international environment, and within the EU itself, might have facilitated increased foreign policy coordination, it is not, however, evident that member states loosened their grip on nationally controlled foreign policy in favour of a supranational EU foreign policy.³ Were member states really willing to transfer the same amount of sovereignty in foreign policy as they had done in areas such as commercial and agricultural policy? This is a central question when investigating whether member states or Community actors⁴ were the main decision makers in the arms embargo case.

I have chosen to focus my analysis of European foreign policy making on the EU discussions on the lifting of its arms embargo against China in 2004-2005. This embargo, together with other sanctions interrupting EU-China relations, was imposed by the 1989 Madrid European Council as a response to the Chinese repressions of the Tiananmen Square

¹ Knud E. Jørgensen. (2004). "European foreign policy: conceptualising the domain" in W. Carlsnaes, H. Sjursen and B. White (eds.). *Contemporary European FP*. London: Sage Publications, pp. 32-56.

² The two terms "European foreign policy" and "EU foreign policy" are both used in the present thesis. The two terms also overlap because of the co-existence of different kinds of foreign policy in the EU: Community foreign economic policy, CFSP and member state foreign policies. Both terms, nonetheless, refer to the system of foreign policy coordination primarily within the EU system. See also Brian White. (1999). "The European Challenge to foreign policy analysis." *European Journal of International Relations*, 5 (1), pp. 36-66, pp. 46-47.

³ There are different views on the degree member states have been willing to go to in the integration of foreign policies. On the one hand, Smith and Allen argues that the emergence of a foreign policy realm within the EU have led to an increased convergence of member states' national foreign policies. On the other hand, Hill, points to how foreign policies within the EU remain nationally controlled until there is a federal EU state. Hazel Smith. (2002). *European Union Foreign Policy; What it is and what it does*. London: Pluto Press, pp. 267-275 and David Allen (1996). "Conclusions: The European rescue of national foreign policy?" in Christopher Hill (ed.). *Actors in Europe's foreign policy*. New York: Routledge, pp. 288-304. Christopher Hill. (1993). "Shaping a federal foreign policy for Europe." in Brian Hocking. (ed.). *Foreign Relations and federal states*. Leicester: Leicester University Press, pp. 268-283.

⁴ "Community actors" refer to supranational EU actors and institutions, such as the Commission, the European Parliament and the High Representative for the CFSP.

protests in June 1989. However, the following normalisation of affairs in the 1990's, led to a rapid development of EU-China relations and to the establishment of the EU-China strategic partnership in 2003. Eventually, this arguably resulted in Chinese, and Franco-German, demands for a lifting of the embargo in order for the EU and China to fully enjoy the benefits of their partnership. This arms embargo case illustrates the general tensions between the different EU member states' interests, and also between Community foreign economic policy and the intergovernmental Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).⁵ The mix of commercial and political interests in the embargo debate was evident in the tension between the human rights advocates' emphasis on the situation in China, and businesses' interest in trade with China. This demonstrated how the "uneasy mix,"⁶ inherent in the EU-China relationship, might have been a source of conflict both within and between member states.

In addition to what happened regarding the lifting debate itself, it is also important to note how other events in the EU might have affected the handling of the case. During the peak of the discussions in 2004 and 2005, the EU was largely preoccupied with preparations and adjustments related to its ten-country membership enlargement in 2004. Also, the extensive work towards finalising the Lisbon process and the Constitutional treaty added to the EU's work load and might have distracted the agenda away from the arms embargo case.

1.1 Research question

The aim of the present thesis is to identify the decisive actors in the EU's arms embargo deliberations. This is grounded on current debates about whether there is an emerging EU foreign policy or whether the majority of foreign policy-making remains an area strictly reserved for member state governments. Can we see signs of Community actors having considerable influence, or were they left on the outside while national governments called the shots? The potential evidence of Community influence in this member state dominated policy area, would then suggest a major transfer of power to the EU level. In order to be able to say something about whether the EU's foreign policy is mainly governed by member states or Community actors, the explicit research question for the present thesis is:

Which actors decided the main course of events during the European Union deliberations on a possible lifting of its arms embargo against China in 2004-2005?

⁵ David Allen. (1996). "Conclusions: The European rescue of national foreign policy?" in Christopher Hill (ed.). *Actors in Europe's foreign policy*. New York: Routledge, pp. 288-304.

⁶ Stephan Keukeleire and Jennifer MacNaughtan. (2008). *The foreign policy of the European Union*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, Chapter 11, pp. 318-322, p. 321.

In addition to this main research question about who decided, it is also necessary to consider other important aspects of foreign policy coordination within the EU. Were Community actors able to influence the course of events despite the fact that arms embargoes were under the member states' jurisdiction? Could the structure of the CFSP itself and the possible Europeanization effects have contributed to explaining the EU's foreign policy system? Also, what decided the member states' positions in the first place? This last question explains why I have chosen to include foreign policy analysis (FPA) as a way of exploring the sources of member states' foreign policy positions in the arms embargo case. FPA and the debate about whether traditional FPA can be applied to European foreign policy, is thus the main theoretical framework of this thesis.

1.2 Justification of the study

All studies must be seen in relation to previous work on the subject. This is how one may discover certain unexplored aspects or approaches to the issue at hand, which again might make the study more interesting and innovative. The next section discusses previous research and theoretical approaches related to my study, and considers how the present thesis adds something to the already existing approaches.

1.2.1 Previous research

The following section looks at three different approaches of previous research on the subject of the present thesis: the EU-China relationship, the impact of the arms embargo discussions on this relationship and the EU foreign policy system in general.

Previous research on the EU-China relationship can also be divided into three different approaches: one focusing on the "US factor," another one based on economic cooperation, and a third political one concerning democracy promotion. Scholars, such as Jing and Ross et al. adhere to the first and triangular approach which looks at how the Sino-European relationship is affected by the EU and China's respective relationships with the US.⁷ These academics thus focus on how the world's major powers interact and how this might affect the global balance of power. The much discussed "rise of China" may also be placed within this

⁷ Jing Men (2007). "The EU-China strategic partnership: Achievements and challenges." *Policy paper no. 12*, European Studies center, University of Pittsburgh and Robert S. Ross, Ø. Tunsjø and T. Zhang (eds.) (2010). *US-China-EU relations : Managing the new world order*. London: Routledge.

realist approach.⁸ Algeri, however, belongs to a second group of scholars which avoids power politics explanations and looks at how the relationship is conditioned by increased interdependence and EU-China trade.⁹ The third approach to the EU-China relationship distances itself from both balance of power-considerations and the primacy of commercial interests, as it emphasises the relationship's political aspects, such as human rights compliance and democracy promotion.¹⁰ This last approach emphasises the more contentious aspects of the EU-China relationship, and it is, as previously mentioned, possible to see how the arms embargo case might show how these political and economic objectives may clash as the relationship evolves.

The EU arms embargo against China has been mentioned in studies on the EU-China relationship as one of several recent examples of Sino-European tensions. However, there has not been done much research on this case specifically. That is why I have chosen to focus the present thesis' analysis on the arms embargo debate in the EU, in order to try to be able to say something more about it than the fact that it was a source of EU-China tension. The literature which does exist on this particular case also seems to be divided along the abovementioned lines of EU-China research. A recurring emphasis on the impact of the transatlantic relationship on the EU's arms embargo discussions confirms this.¹¹ Weinrod, amongst others, places himself within this category as he argues that the EU's stance on the lifting tends to accommodate the US' interests.¹² The divide between power politics and economic centred approaches is also evident, as Jones, Griffin and Pantucci focus on the transatlantic influence on the discussions,¹³ while Tkacik and Tkacik jr. argue that the arms embargo debate was solely shaped by member states' economic interests.¹⁴

In previous research on European foreign policy in general, one may see a divide between scholars focusing on, firstly, the mere existence of a European foreign policy,

⁸ For further research on the 'Rise of China,' please consult: Ming Xia. (n.d.). "China Threat" or a "Peaceful Rise of China"? [Electronic version]. *The New York Times* and Robert G. Sutter. (2005, February). "China's Rise in Asia – Promises, Prospects and Implications for the United States." *Asia-Pacific Centre for security studies*.

⁹ Franco Algeri. (2002). "EU economic relations with China: An institutional perspective." *The China Quarterly*, 169, pp.67-77.

¹⁰ Emilie M. Hafner-Burton. (2005). "Trading human rights: How preferential trade agreements influence government repression." *International Organization* No. 59, pp.593-629 and Karen E. Smith. (2005). "Beyond the civilian power debate." *Politique Européenne*, 1(17), pp. 63-82.

¹¹ Bruce W. Weinrod. (2006). "US and European Approaches to China." *Mediterranean Quarterly*, 17(2), pp. 17-31.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Seth G. Jones. (2007). *The Rise of European Security Cooperation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Chapter 7, pp. 220-243 and Christopher Griffin and Raffaello Pantucci. (2007) "A Treacherous Triangle? China and the Transatlantic Alliance." *SAIS Review*, 27(1), pp. 161-170.

¹⁴ John Tkacik jr. and John Tkacik. (2005). "Forgetting Tiananmen: Eager to rebuild trade, EU ignores rights violations." *Heritage foundation*.

secondly, on the primacy of member states, and, thirdly, on the institutional framework of the EU's foreign policy.

The first approach includes theoretically and FPA-oriented studies, which focus on the concept of an emerging independent EU foreign policy as something else than the sum of member states' national foreign policies. Both Jørgensen and Carlsnaes address this conceptualisation issue and emphasise the complexity of studying European foreign policy.¹⁵ They approach this complexity by focusing on the overall picture of the EU foreign policy landscape. Hill also positions himself within these discussions, as he claims that there can be no EU foreign policy without a federal EU state.¹⁶ While this macro-level approach is helpful for grasping the generalities of a multi-level foreign policy system, a more in-depth study of the system's different actors would be necessary in order to understand how the substructures of this system work.

One of these more in-depth approaches to the study of European foreign policy is the second group of scholars, which focuses on the foreign policy systems of different member states. Hill, Manners and Whitman belong to this group, as their comparative approach looks at how the individual characteristics of member states' foreign policy systems and traditions still control European foreign policy.¹⁷ The third approach to the study of European foreign policy concentrates on institutional actors. Nuttall, Keukeleire and MacNaughtan represent this third and more structural approach.¹⁸ As opposed to Manners and Whitman, they focus on the EU institutions' influence in European foreign policy, and consequently, take the foreign policy debate over to a European level, away from its traditionally national environment. This approach's emphasis on the importance of the institutionalisation of European foreign policy, and on the interaction between these institutions, points to a *sui generis* nature of the EU as a foreign policy actor. Kreutz also emphasises this impact of the EU's institutional framework

¹⁵ Knud E. Jørgensen. (2004). «European foreign policy: conceptualising the domain.» in W. Carlsnaes, H. Sjørnsen and B. White (eds.). *Contemporary European FP*. London: Sage Publications, pp. 32-56 and Walter Carlsnaes. (2004). «Introduction.» in W. Carlsnaes, H. Sjørnsen and B. White (eds.). *Contemporary European FP*. London: Sage Publications, pp. 1-10.

¹⁶ Christopher Hill. (1993). «Shaping a federal foreign policy for Europe.» in Brian Hocking. (ed.). *Foreign Relations and federal states*. Leicester: Leicester University Press, pp. 268-283.

¹⁷ Christopher Hill. (ed.). (1996). *Actors in Europe's foreign policy*. New York: Routledge and Ian Manners and R. G. Whitman. (eds.). (2000). *The foreign policies of European Union member states*. New York: Manchester University Press.

¹⁸ Simon Nuttall. (1996). «The Commission: the struggle for legitimacy» in Christopher Hill. (ed.). *Actors in Europe's foreign policy*. New York: Routledge, Chapter 6, pp. 130-150 and Stephan Keukeleire and Jennifer MacNaughtan. (2008). *The foreign policy of the European Union*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

as he argues that foreign policy actors behave differently according to whether this framework have placed them on the “inside” or on the “outside” of the foreign policy making process.¹⁹

Even though Hill’s edited comparative work on the actors of European foreign policy does include a chapter on the Commission,²⁰ most studies of European foreign policy seem to focus on the prominent roles of either member states or Community actors. This divide between member state and institutionally oriented approaches might be explained by the constant tension between supranationalism and intergovernmentalism in the European integration process. The limited existence of research on European foreign policy which includes both the national and Community level, thus justifies the approach of the present thesis’ analysis. The following analysis consequently aims to look at both types of actors, Community and member state, in order to get a more complete picture of the arms embargo case and possibly of the European foreign policy system in general. Even though such an approach may still conclude that one of these two types of actors was indeed more important, it is still interesting to look at both in order to evaluate the difference. This combined angle thus has the possibility of expanding the comparative member state approach by including an analysis of Community actors, while it, at the same time, may add something to the institutional approach, by considering the domestic sources of the participating member states’ positions.

1.2.2 Theoretical framework

I have chosen foreign policy analysis to be the theoretical framework of the present thesis as it will help analyse the domestic sources of the member states’ foreign policies. FPA’s aim to identify foreign policy influences will thus help to answer my research question about who the main decision makers in the arms embargo case were, and it will also justify the choice of FPA as the present thesis’ theoretical framework. This theoretical framework is more extensively discussed in chapter two of the present thesis.

As opposed to other grand theories of international relations, such as realism and liberalism, FPA is more focused on analysing what is already there rather than predicting what might happen. Even though realism could have been a useful tool for analysing how member states acted as unitary and self-interested actors in the arms embargo case,²¹ I have chosen to open the realists’ “black box” and look at domestic sources of the member states’

¹⁹ Joakim Kreutz. (2004). “Reviewing the EU Arms Embargo on China: the clash between value and rationale in European Security Strategy.” *The Central European review of international affairs*, 22, pp. 43-58.

²⁰ Christopher Hill. (ed.). (1996). *Actors in Europe’s foreign policy*. New York: Routledge.

²¹ Kenneth N. Waltz. (1979). *Theory of International Politics*. New York: McGraw Hill.

positions. Also, the realists' emphasis on the anarchic environment of international relations, and their scepticism towards international institutions, would have excluded the EU's institutional framework and the non-state EU actors from the analysis.²² Liberalism's focus on preferences, interdependence and the importance of international institutions is thus much closer to my approach.²³ However, while liberalism could have been a suitable theoretical framework, I have chosen to base my analysis on Moravcsik's liberal agency centred FPA in order to focus more explicitly on the sources of foreign policy preferences in International Relations (IR). Moravcsik presents a liberal FPA which focuses, firstly, on how groups within the domestic society influence the government's foreign policy formation, secondly, on how governments represent the interests of subsets of their societies, and thirdly, on how nationally defined foreign policies may be transformed in an international setting.²⁴

While Moravcsik's abovementioned domestically oriented FPA should be ideal in explaining the sources of the member states' position in the arms embargo discussions, it is not, however, evident that this framework can be successfully applied to the actions of Community actors and to the possible Europeanization effects. Instead of disregarding liberal FPA because of these challenges, I have chosen to investigate whether traditional FPA has to be supplemented with additional IR theories, such as Europeanization, or replaced with a new type of FPA, in order to successfully analyse European foreign policy. This is also in line with current debates about the state-centred FPA's applicability to a changing and possibly post-state European foreign policy.²⁵ Most of the previous research on the applicability of traditional FPA has, however, mainly focused on the EU's foreign policy system in general. That is why I aim to explore whether traditional FPA may more easily explain one CFSP-case, instead of the institutional structure of the EU foreign policy system. The present thesis, in addition to its main purpose of analysing which actors were the decisive ones in the arms embargo case, thus also looks at whether traditional liberal FPA may be a sufficient framework for this analysis. This would potentially contribute to the current debates about the applicability of traditional FPA to the evolving and perhaps *sui generis* character of EU foreign policy.

²² Jack Donnelly. (2009). "Realism," in Burchill, A. et al. (Eds.). *Theories of international relations*. (4th ed.). New York: Palgrave Macmillan, Chapter 2, pp. 31-56.

²³ Robert O. Keohane and J. S. Nye. (2001). *Power and interdependence* (3rd ed.). New York: Harper Collins Publishers.

²⁴ Andrew Moravcsik. (2006). "Preferences and power in the European Community: A liberal intergovernmentalist approach." in Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, M. (Ed.) *Debates on European integration*. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan. Chapter 11, pp. 264-303.

²⁵ Please see chapter two, section 2.3, for a more in-depth description of the discussions concerning traditional FPA's applicability in Europe.

1.3 Approach and sources

The present thesis evaluates the different actors' competences, positions, and actions during the arms embargo discussions. The course of events, from the Chinese request for a lifting in 2003, until the EU dropped the subject in late 2005, is considered together with a more detailed analysis of the foreign policy influences within the EU and its member states. The analysis of the member states focuses primarily on the United Kingdom (UK), Germany, France and Sweden. I have chosen France and Germany because of how they initiated the debate on a possible lifting,²⁶ and because of their position as two of the three larger EU states, the "big three," which traditionally play an essential role in shaping EU foreign policy.²⁷ The UK is another natural choice considering its place as the last of these three larger EU states. Also, its self-proclaimed role as a bridge between the EU and its "special partner," the US, could suggest that it would be an interesting point of analysis, in order to see whether member states' external bilateral relationships influence EU policy making.²⁸ Sweden comes into the analysis not as one of the "big three," but as a neutral and more recent member state, with perhaps a different domestic political system than the other three. The choice of Sweden can also be justified by the possible domestic tensions between the importance of Swedish defence industry, and Sweden's embeddedness within the Nordic countries' tradition for human rights advocacy.²⁹

Even though the present thesis also aims to say something about the EU's foreign policy system in general, it must, however, be noted that one case cannot explain the wide range of foreign policy issues in the EU. One must also consider that decisions are often taken by individuals acting as a member state representative or Community actor and that this would mean that the "general" behaviour of a particular actor may change as there is a change of member state Governments or Community offices. There will always be case-specific factors differentiating one case from the general tendency, but a certain degree of generalisation may, nonetheless, help explain some of the underlying generalities of European foreign policy. This generalisation is also desirable for the sake of the development of the study.

²⁶ Richard A. Bitzinger. (2004, December 31). "A Prisoner's Dilemma: The EU's China Arms Embargo" [Electronic version]. *China Brief*.

²⁷ Stephan Keukeleire and Jennifer MacNaughtan. (2008). *The foreign policy of the European Union*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, Chapter 5, pp. 124-147.

²⁸ Brian White. (2001). *Understanding European FP*. New York: Palgrave, Chapter 6, pp.118-14i and Hugo Young. (1999). *This blessed plot: Britain and Europe from Churchill to Blair*. London: Overlook.

²⁹ Nicola Casarini. (2006, October). "The evolution of the EU-China relationship: from constructive engagement to strategic partnership." *European Union Institute for Security Studies Occasional Paper*, 64.

Official documents, previous research on the subject and newspaper articles make up the three main groups of sources for the present thesis' analysis. The first group, official documents, provides primary sources which are important proofs of the different actors' official positions. The present thesis considers a wide range of primary sources in order to be able to fulfil the abovementioned aim of providing an analysis of both member state and Community actors in European foreign policy. Commission Policy papers on the EU-China relationship, Presidency Conclusions from the European Council and European Parliament (EP) Resolutions on the arms embargo are some examples of official EU documents included in the present thesis' analysis. Also, speeches made by the Commission President and the Commissioner for External Relations, available from the different EU institutions' web archives, have been useful for identifying the EU's official positions. These primary documents are interesting as they present actors' views without the additional interpretations inherent in secondary sources. However, it is also important to be aware of some of these sources' limits. For example, the Presidency Conclusions of the European Council are essential documents for identifying its main decisions, but the collegial nature of the European Council creates vague conclusions without any reference to which member states opted for which solutions during the deliberations. This may be a way of projecting an image of a strong and united EU, but it also makes it difficult, if not impossible, for researchers to analyse the internal processes within the European Council. However, they still serve as important points of reference for the general priorities of the EU. Another aspect worth considering is the fact that the contents of the member states' Presidency programmes, of China and the EU Commission's policy papers on each other and of other official statements might not be the actual agenda or position of the issuer, but the result of a deliberate strategy or diplomatic niceties created to please their audiences. This may suggest that the formulation of official documents might also have been affected by the socialisation effect inherent in the social-constructivist "logic of appropriateness."³⁰ This considered, they are, nonetheless, useful documents emphasising the working programmes and agendas of these institutions.

Published provisional agendas and press releases of minutes from the Council and the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) have also been used as a way of assessing the amount of time granted to the lifting discussions and, consequently, how highly they were prioritised. However, since these documents present the institutions' provisional agenda, it is not evident that they were completely followed in the actual meetings. However,

³⁰ This socialisation effect and the "logic of appropriateness" are extensively discussed in chapter two and six.

they still give an idea of the amount of work planned for that given session. Moreover, minutes from plenary sessions in the EP, available in the EP's online archives, have been a way of assessing the different members of the European Parliament's (MEPs) positions on the arms embargo lifting. Furthermore, online documents reproducing debates in the Swedish, British and French Parliaments, as well a resolution from the German Bundestag, have been crucial in the work of evaluating whether domestic political actors in the member states favoured the lifting. It is, however, also important to note that members of parliament (MPs) expressing their discontent, might not be representing the whole party group. Other sources of information on the arms embargo and about the EU's international human rights policy have been speeches from the EU's delegation to Norway's 2010 seminar on human rights³¹ and publications by non-governmental organisations (NGOs), such as the British Campaign Against Arms Trade (CAAT). In considering these sources, it is also important to keep in mind that this human rights seminar and the interest groups may possibly provide more single-sided accounts of the arms embargo case.

In addition to the abovementioned primary sources, I have also chosen to base the present analysis on a number of secondary sources. Previous research is central to any study, as it places the analysis into a wider context, and provides different scholars' interpretations of the subject. As accounted for above, there is an extensive amount of existing literature on the different aspects of European foreign policy. A large number of these has been included in the present thesis, but I have chosen to focus on Manners and Whitman and Hill's comparative studies on member states' foreign policies and Keukeleire and MacNaughtan's institutional studies, as they each focus on the different main actors treated in the analysis.³² It is, however, also important to note that some conclusions within previous research might be outdated or less relevant because of the constantly evolving nature of the EU. Previous research is, nonetheless, an essential supplement to official documents, as they may help provide a more analytical account.

Newspaper articles have also been an important source of key actors' statements when official documents have been hard to come by. Articles from the EU observer and several Chinese online media, in particular, have been helpful in identifying the course of events of

³¹ Jan Egeland (2010, November 17) "Seminar on human rights." Speech Presented at Conference on Human Rights with the EU's delegation to Norway, Oslo, Norway and Janos Herman. (2010, November 17). "Seminar on human rights." Speech Presented at Conference on Human Rights with the EU's delegation to Norway, Oslo, Norway.

³² Ian Manners and R. G. Whitman. (eds.). (2000). *The foreign policies of European Union member states*. New York: Manchester University Press, Christopher Hill. (ed.). (1996). *Actors in Europe's foreign policy*. New York: Routledge and Stephan Keukeleire and Jennifer MacNaughtan. (2008). *The foreign policy of the European Union*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

the arms embargo discussions, especially as these media are focused on the internal EU processes and on China's wish to emerge from the "arms embargo discrimination," respectively. It is, however, also essential to note that different newspapers may be biased towards certain positions or societal groups, and that English versions of Chinese newspaper articles may present a different view than the original article. However, much because of the recent nature of the arms embargo case, they were, nonetheless, important sources of information regarding how the arms embargo debates progressed and developed.

1.4 Thesis outline and main arguments

The next chapter presents FPA as the theoretical framework of the present thesis and outlines the particular approach chosen for this case study: Moravcsik's liberal agency-based FPA. The second chapter also explores some of the challenges which FPA faces in a changing European foreign policy environment, and discusses the possibilities of a new supplemented or transformed European FPA with Europeanization as an additional explanatory factor.

Chapter three describes the development of EU-China relations since the formal establishment of diplomatic ties in the 1970's, and considers the relationship's different aspects and points of disagreement. It also places the arms embargo discussions within the wider context of an evolving strategic partnership between two economic giants, and emphasises how the lack of a unitary EU foreign policy might affect the process and outcome of EU-China cooperation. Here, it is also argued that the debate on the lifting of the arms embargo was partly the inevitable result of an improved and developed EU-China relationship, as China was in a strengthened position to ask for more in return for access to the growing Chinese market.

Chapter four explores the institutional context of the arms embargo case, and the positions and possible impact of EU institutions. Firstly, it considers the possibility for Community actors, with limited formal CFSP competences, of influencing the arms embargo debate. Secondly, it points to how governments, with CFSP competences, may be formally trapped between the national and supranational in intergovernmental EU institutions, while national interests continue to define their actions. The main argument here is that even though Community actors seemed to want to make an impact, by actively expressing their opposition or support for the lifting, their influence was still marginal as long as their formal CFSP competences were limited.

Chapter five discusses the member states' actions and emphasises how the unanimity rule guaranteed their primacy. Firstly, it explores the influence of domestic actors in the

foreign policy formation process of four EU member states. The chapter states that the increased centralisation of foreign policy around the office of the Prime Minister was one of the main sources of member states' foreign policy positions, while the impact of other domestic actors seemed to vary according to each member state. The chapter also considers how the arms embargo case was affected by the member states' national priorities during their EU Presidencies, and, finally, it points to the important US' impact on EU affairs.

Chapter six provides an analysis of European foreign policy and seeks to identify some of its main traits based on the arms embargo case. Firstly, it emphasises how the member states were indeed the decisive actors. The CFSP remained controlled by member states much because of how the unanimity-based structure of the CFSP hindered the development of a supranationally structured EU foreign policy. Secondly, it demonstrates that while traditional liberal FPA can help explain some of the domestic aspects of the arms embargo debate, there are certain factors which remain unaccounted for by this state-centric FPA approach. The non-state EU actors' potential influence and the vertical and horizontal effects of Europeanization are two of these aspects which emphasise how traditional FPA is not completely sufficient when analysing European foreign policy. However, chapter six concludes by pointing to how the continuation of an issue-specific traditional liberal FPA, with an added element of Europeanization theory, may be justified as long as European foreign policy remains a differentiated system of several institutional and decision making regimes, and as long as the CFSP remains intergovernmental.

2.0 Foreign policy analysis in a changing Europe

Foreign policy analysis (FPA) is a theoretical subfield of International Relations (IR), which aims to explain the foreign policies of a state, based on different theories of social sciences.³³ While Carlsnaes has classified the different perspectives of FPA with an elaborate matrix,³⁴ Hudson and Vore have presented the analysis' three recurring main approaches: a domestic approach based on national sources of foreign policy, an approach focused on decision-making and lastly, a psycho-milieu approach centred on the cognitive explanations of foreign policy.³⁵ As previously mentioned, I have chosen Moravcsik's liberal FPA perspective, belonging to the first and domestic approach, as the basis for my analysis.

The purpose of this chapter is to present the theoretical framework of the following analysis of the arms embargo discussions in 2004-2005. The chapter begins by defining the traditional framework of FPA and by pointing out the different dichotomies within the field. Secondly, it presents Moravcsik's liberal agency-based FPA approach. Finally, it explores the challenges to traditional FPA in post-Cold War Europe and points to the current debates about the potential of a distinct European FPA. As a part of this, it also introduces Europeanization theory as a possible supplement to the theoretical framework.

2.1 Foreign policy analysis

The analysis of foreign policy also calls for a definition of foreign policy itself. Scholars seem largely to agree that foreign policy is the action taken by one government towards a group beyond its borders.³⁶ Despite this arguably general agreement on the definition of foreign policy, there are, however, some divergences. Hudson points to governments' primacy in foreign policy making,³⁷ while Hill emphasises how other independent and non-governmental

³³ Valerie M. Hudson. (2008). "The history and evolution of foreign policy analysis." in S. Smith, A. Hadfield and T. Dunne. (eds). *Foreign Policy: Theories, actors, cases*. New York: Oxford University Press. Chapter 1 , pp. 11-30.

³⁴ Walter Carlsnaes. (2002). "Foreign policy." in W. Carlsnaes, T. Risse and B. A. Simmons. (eds). *Handbook of International relations*. London: Sage publications Ltd. Chapter 17, pp. 331-349.

³⁵ Valerie M. Hudson and C. S. Vore. (1995). "Foreign policy analysis yesterday, today and tomorrow." *Mershon International studies review*, 39(2), pp. 209-238.

³⁶ For several more in-depth discussions on the definition of foreign policy, please see Valerie M. Hudson. (2008). "The history and evolution of foreign policy analysis." in S. Smith, A. Hadfield and T. Dunne. (eds). *Foreign Policy: Theories, actors, cases*. New York: Oxford University Press. Chapter 1 , pp. 11-30, Christopher Hill. (2003). *The changing politics of foreign policy*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan and Walter Carlsnaes. (2002). "Foreign policy." in W. Carlsnaes, T. Risse and B. A. Simmons. (eds). *Handbook of International relations*. London: Sage publications Ltd. Chapter 17, pp. 331-349.

³⁷ Valerie M. Hudson. (2008). "The history and evolution of foreign policy analysis." in S. Smith, A. Hadfield and T. Dunne. (eds). *Foreign Policy: Theories, actors, cases*. New York: Oxford University Press. Chapter 1 , pp. 11-30.

actors may also have their own foreign policy.³⁸ Similarly to Hudson, Moravcsik's liberal FPA points to the states as the main foreign policy makers.³⁹ However, he also points to how the state is not an international actor in itself, but "a representative institution, constantly subject to capture and recapture, construction and reconstruction by coalitions of social actors."⁴⁰ He thus acknowledges the important role of non-governmental actors' preferences within a state's foreign policy formation, which could suggest that his approach is in general more positively oriented towards non-governmental actors as foreign policy makers. These different interpretations of foreign policy actors point to an essential element of the debate about whether the EU has or may develop a unitary foreign policy. Will foreign policy making remain reserved for the state or may other independent actors, such as the EU, be allowed to enter the stage?

The fact that foreign policy includes both internal and external aspects places it at the crossroads of domestic policies and international relations. Carlsnaes points to this mix by explaining how the early years of FPA were marked by a debate about whether it belonged to the study of public policy or to International Relations.⁴¹ Hill further emphasises this dilemma by pointing to how the internal and external origins of foreign policy emphasise how this particular policy area might have to be analysed differently than other public policies.⁴² This might again show how different scholars' foci on the domestic or on the international aspects of foreign policies have led to the development of different FPA approaches.⁴³ The absence of a general theory of FPA, and consequently the lack of clearly defined analysis criteria, leave it up to the analyst to choose between a number of available FPA approaches.⁴⁴ These approaches are more commonly categorised into actor- or structure-based studies, domestically or internationally oriented research or works based either on the process or on the outcome of foreign policies.⁴⁵ Despite these contrasting perspectives, state-centrism and

³⁸ Christopher Hill. (2003). *The changing politics of foreign policy*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

³⁹ Andrew Moravcsik. (1997). "Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics." *International Organization*, 51(4), pp. 513-553.

⁴⁰ Andrew Moravcsik. (1997). "Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics." *International Organization*, 51(4), pp. 513-553, p. 518.

⁴¹ Walter Carlsnaes. (2002). "Foreign policy." in W. Carlsnaes, T. Risse and B. A. Simmons. (eds). *Handbook of International relations*. London: Sage publications Ltd. Chapter 17, pp. 331-349.

⁴² Christopher Hill. (2003). *The changing politics of foreign policy*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

⁴³ Valerie M. Hudson and C. S. Vore. (1995). "Foreign policy analysis yesterday, today and tomorrow." *Mershon International studies review*, 39(2), pp. 209-238.

⁴⁴ Brian White. (1999). "The European Challenge to foreign policy analysis." *European Journal of International Relations*, 5 (1), pp. 36-66.

⁴⁵ Valerie M. Hudson. (2008). "The history and evolution of foreign policy analysis." in S. Smith, A. Hadfield and T. Dunne. (eds). *Foreign Policy: Theories, actors, cases*. New York: Oxford University Press. Chapter 1 , pp. 11-30.

the importance of looking inside the "black box"⁴⁶ of the state in order to identify the sources of foreign policies, are often considered main criteria ground for most FPA approaches.⁴⁷

As previously stated, there are three main FPA approaches which still remain the field's principal points of reference.⁴⁸ Firstly, James Rosenau's comparative approach laid the foundations for the domestic approach to FPA, where it is essential to look inside the state structures to uncover domestic sources of foreign policies.⁴⁹ The second FPA approach, based on Richard Snyder's decision making theories, focuses on the process of foreign policy making and provides a link between FPA and organisational theory.⁵⁰ The last, and perhaps most contested strand of FPA, is the psychological milieu approach. Harold and Margaret Sprout's study of the psychological context and the predispositions of decision makers is on a level beyond the objective analysis of foreign policies.⁵¹ Carlsnaes places these abovementioned different FPA-approaches into a matrix of four main perspectives: one structural, one agency-based, one social-institutional and, lastly, one interpretative actor perspective.⁵² These four perspectives have again been categorised according to the foreign policy dichotomies of collectivism-individualism and objectivity-subjectivity.

While FPA is pointed to as the better alternative to a "black box" view of the state,⁵³ neo-realists challenge this by arguing that the unitary rational state's relative power and its position within the international system are the only factors that can explain a state's foreign policy.⁵⁴ Waltz, a neo-realist, claims that it is impossible to find an explanatory generalising theory if one is to focus on states' preferences as the level of analysis.⁵⁵ He also argues that while international relations and foreign policies are linked, they explain entirely different things.⁵⁶ It is also evident that neo-realism's structural emphasis on relative power distribution

⁴⁶ For literature on the liberalists' opening of the "black box" of the state, see e.g. Robert O. Keohane and J. S. Nye. (2001). *Power and interdependence* (3rd ed.). New York: Harper Collins Publishers.

⁴⁷ Christopher Hill. (2003). *The changing politics of foreign policy*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

⁴⁸ Valerie M. Hudson and C. S. Vore. (1995). "Foreign policy analysis yesterday, today and tomorrow." *Mershon International studies review*, 39(2), pp. 209-238.

⁴⁹ In Valerie M. Hudson. (2008). "The history and evolution of foreign policy analysis." in S. Smith, A. Hadfield and T. Dunne. (eds). *Foreign Policy: Theories, actors, cases*. New York: Oxford University Press. Chapter 1, pp. 11-30.

⁵⁰ Richard C. Snyder. (1962). *Foreign policy decision-making: an approach to the study of international politics*. Glencoe, IL: Free Press.

⁵¹ Harold Sprout and Margaret Sprout. (1956). *Man-milieu relationship hypotheses in the context of international politics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

⁵² Walter Carlsnaes. (2002). "Foreign policy." in W. Carlsnaes, T. Risse and B. A. Simmons. (eds). *Handbook of International relations*. London: Sage publications Ltd. Chapter 17, pp. 331-349, p. 336.

⁵³ Valerie M. Hudson and C. S. Vore. (1995). "Foreign policy analysis yesterday, today and tomorrow." *Mershon International studies review*, 39(2), pp. 209-238, p. 210.

⁵⁴ Walter Carlsnaes. (2002). "Foreign policy." in W. Carlsnaes, T. Risse and B. A. Simmons. (eds). *Handbook of International relations*. London: Sage publications Ltd. Chapter 17, pp. 331-349.

⁵⁵ Kenneth N. Waltz. (1996). "International politics is not foreign policy." *Security Studies*, 6, pp. 54-57.

⁵⁶ In Christopher Hill. (2003). *The changing politics of foreign policy*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 161.

and on how the state's relative position within the international system decides that state's foreign policy, clearly contradicts FPA's focus on the internal factors of the state itself. Consequently, the neo-realist view of the state as a "billiard ball" cannot be equalled to FPA's state-centrism.⁵⁷

Despite neo-realists' criticism of FPA as being of limited use in a world where states are arguably unitary and rational actors, I have chosen FPA as the theoretical framework for the present thesis. This is because I believe that we can get a more differentiated and nuanced analysis of a case by including domestic factors from the inside of the "black box," even though the international system itself may also influence foreign policy formation. I believe that the study of the 2004-2005 debate on the lifting of the arms embargo, is embedded within the analysis of the sources of the different member states' foreign policy positions and within the investigation of how these positions converged and clashed with each other and with EU level actors. However, because of FPA's state-centrism, the EU level may be a challenging level of analysis for traditional FPA. This challenge will then serve as the starting point for the present thesis' additional assessment of whether a new and European FPA framework is needed.

2.2 Moravcsik's domestic approach to foreign policy analysis

Because of the eclectic nature of FPA, it is essential to choose one of the many FPA approaches in order to be able to perform a somewhat coherent analysis of a given case study. I have chosen to base my FPA framework on Moravcsik's liberalist approach. This theoretical framework is one of the individualist and objectivist agency-based perspectives from Carlsnaes' matrix and belongs to the domestic strand of FPA.⁵⁸ Moravcsik aims to free liberalism of the realists' recurring criticism of it being a utopian theory, and he further points to the necessity of moving away from the realist assumptions of the state as a rational, unitary actor in order to look at domestic sources of states' given preferences.⁵⁹ Hill also agrees with Moravcsik by stating that foreign policy can never be removed from its domestic context.⁶⁰

Moravcsik presents three core assumptions of his liberalist approach to FPA: the primacy of societal groups, the representative function of governments and the

⁵⁷ Joseph S. Nye (2009). *Understanding international conflicts – An introduction to theory and history*. New York: Pearson International Edition.

⁵⁸ See above in Walter Carlsnaes. (2002). "Foreign policy." in W. Carlsnaes, T. Risse and B. A. Simmons. (eds). *Handbook of International relations*. London: Sage publications Ltd. Chapter 17, pp. 331-349.

⁵⁹ Andrew Moravcsik. (1997). "Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics." *International Organization*, 51(4), pp. 513-553.

⁶⁰ Christopher Hill. (2003). *The changing politics of foreign policy*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

interdependence within the international system.⁶¹ The primacy of societal actors and the assumption that their positions are prior to politics, point to the bottom-up aspect of foreign policy. Here, Moravcsik focuses on how societal groups identify their preferences and then export them to the state level via political exchange and collective action.⁶² An example of how societal groups influence the foreign policy preferences of governments is how the interests of agricultural groups affected, and still affect, French foreign and European policy.⁶³ The second assumption focuses on the state's representative function and on how the government always represents interests of certain groups within the domestic society.⁶⁴ Governments define the states' interests according to who they represent and subsequently operate according to these interests in international relations. This is reinforced by the fact that many political parties are still founded on the interests of certain societal groups or commercial business interest. One example of this is the labour parties' connection with labour organisations. As previously mentioned, the state becomes an actor in international relations only because of its representative function. Finally, the assumption regarding the interdependence between states in the international system, points to how some states' national interests may constrain the room to manoeuvre of other states.⁶⁵ Here it is necessary to look at national interests within an international setting, and this is perhaps especially imminent in the case of EU member states, as they all take part in a larger framework of foreign policy coordination. This last assumption also adds a structural dimension to the agency-based perspective, seeing that international interdependence is often based on international institutions or structures.

I have chosen this particular FPA framework because of the fact that these assumptions aim to analyse a wide range of domestic sources of foreign policy. The arms embargo case's belonging within the intergovernmental context of the CFSP makes it important to explore how and to what extent these member state positions were affected before they reached the negotiation table in the European Council. Moravcsik's three core

⁶¹ Andrew Moravcsik. (1997). "Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics." *International Organization*, 51(4), pp. 513-553.

⁶² Andrew Moravcsik. (2006). "Preferences and power in the European Community: A liberal intergovernmentalist approach." in Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, M. (Ed.) *Debates on European integration*. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan. Chapter 11, pp. 264-303.

⁶³ Andrew Moravcsik. (2000). "Le grain et la grandeur. Les origines économiques de la politique européenne du général de Gaulle (2ème partie)." *Revue française de science politique*, 50 (1), pp. 73-124.

⁶⁴ Andrew Moravcsik. (1997). "Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics." *International Organization*, 51(4), pp. 513-553.

⁶⁵ Walter Carlsnaes. (2002). "Foreign policy." in W. Carlsnaes, T. Risse and B. A. Simmons. (eds). *Handbook of International relations*. London: Sage publications Ltd. Chapter 17, pp. 331-349.

assumptions thus create the framework of my domestically oriented analysis. Firstly, the importance of societal actors and domestic social demands is explored through considering whether domestic societal groups affected the formation of member states' positions in the EU arms embargo deliberations. Secondly, it is evaluated whether government representatives defined state preferences based on particular subsets of domestic society, and perhaps especially whether defence industries or other business interests were represented. Thirdly, the possible constraints of other states' interests and the interdependence within the international system are considered in the analysis of the interaction of the sometimes diverging member states positions.

The complex and "low politics"-nature of the arms embargo case and its potential of engaging a range of different actors, defence companies, Chinese lobbying groups, businesses with commercial ties with China, and human rights activists, make it even more important to consider the possible domestic sources of the member states' positions. Putnam's "two-level game" also points to this domestic aspect of international negotiations and shows how a domestic FPA approach may be useful for analysing foreign policy coordination in the EU's CFSP.⁶⁶ Moravcsik and Nicolaidis point to this coexistence of a domestic and international environment as they argue that while governments in the Amsterdam Treaty negotiations "were concerned above all to avoid the impression of symbolic failure, they remained concerned to avoid any domestic ratification controversy (...)."⁶⁷ This two-level game thus refers to how governments, in international negotiations, must consider how their actions are being received by both their domestic constituents and by their international negotiation partners. This can also be argued to be describing elements of the relationship between Moravcsik's first and third assumption, connecting the pressure from societal groups with the constraints posed by other states in the international environment.

The fact that I have chosen to focus on a liberalist and agency-based FPA approach, does not, however, mean that structural FPA is irrelevant in this particular case. The impact of Europeanization and of the CFSP structure itself on foreign policy making in the EU, is therefore assessed in chapter six of the present thesis. I have, nonetheless, mainly focused on the agency-based approach, much because of how the unanimity rule and the intergovernmental nature of the CFSP point to the primacy of member state actions. Also, this

⁶⁶ Robert D. Putnam. (1988). "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games." *International Organization*, 42, pp. 427-460.

⁶⁷ Andrew Moravcsik and Kalypso Nicolaidis. (1998). "Federal Ideals and Constitutional Realities in the Treaty of Amsterdam." *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 36 (Special Issue), pp. 13-38, p. 19. See also Simon Hug and Thomas König. (2002). "In View of Ratification: Governmental Preferences and Domestic Constraints at the Amsterdam Intergovernmental Conference." *International Organization*, 56 (2), pp. 447-476.

focus on the agents and their behaviour is essential in order to be able to answer the research question about which actors were the main decision makers in the arms embargo case.

While Moravcsik's liberal FPA seems to be vital in the task of analysing the different member states' foreign policy positions, the abovementioned EU structure, where non-governmental actors might claim a more important role in EU foreign policy making, suggests that traditional FPA may encounter a growing number of challenges as the EU's foreign policy system evolves. These potential clashes between traditional state-centred FPA and a possibly post-state EU foreign policy are further discussed in the following section.

2.3 The European Union: a challenge to traditional foreign policy analysis?

According to Jørgensen, the end of the Cold War led to an increased interest in European foreign policy and changed both its content and conduct.⁶⁸ This marked a gradual move away from the realist Cold War paradigm of a black and white view of the world. It also paved way for a "softer" definition of foreign- and security policy, which was more in line with the ideas of European integration. Consequently, one could argue that this change facilitated further developments of a united European foreign policy and opened the door to multicausal analyses of foreign policy beyond the primacy of national governments.⁶⁹

As the abovementioned changes might have marked the beginning of a more coherent and supranational EU foreign policy, White is one of several scholars who have studied how this development might create challenges for the existing FPA.⁷⁰ The establishment of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy with the Maastricht Treaty, and further developments during the 1990's, illustrated how this policy field had evolved since the 1970's EPC, while it still maintained the strictly intergovernmental nature of EU foreign policy coordination.⁷¹ Despite this continued intergovernmentalism and member state primacy, Smith, nonetheless, argues that the establishment of the CFSP led to an extensive and effective EU foreign policy covering all aspect of foreign relations.⁷²

White identifies three types of "European foreign policy," in order to clarify this potentially broad term: the Community-oriented foreign economic policy, the

⁶⁸ Knud E. Jørgensen. (2004). «European foreign policy: conceptualising the domain.» in W. Carlsnaes, H. Sjørnsen and B. White (eds.). *Contemporary European FP*. London: Sage Publications, pp. 32-56.

⁶⁹ Valerie M. Hudson and C. S. Vore. (1995). "Foreign policy analysis yesterday, today and tomorrow." *Mershon International studies review*, 39(2), pp. 209-238.

⁷⁰ Brian White. (1999). "The European Challenge to foreign policy analysis." *European Journal of International Relations*, 5 (1), pp. 36-66.

⁷¹ An exception to this is the EU's foreign economic policy, which was, up until the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty, within the first Community pillar of the EU.

⁷² Hazel Smith. (2002). *European Union Foreign Policy; What it is and what it does*. London: Pluto Press, p. 267.

intergovernmental CFSP and the member states' national foreign policies.⁷³ These three parallel types of foreign policy, together with the co-existence of member states and EU-level actors, illustrate how the EU could be considered a multi-level polity with a multi-layered foreign policy.⁷⁴ The different and parallel foreign policy configurations within this non-state actor, where foreign economic policies and political foreign policies are divided into two different regimes, respectively, thus pose a set of challenges to traditional FPA.⁷⁵ Also, the potential emergence of supranational EU actors as the decision makers of an independent EU foreign policy emphasises how a traditionally state-centric FPA might have difficulties explaining this unorthodox foreign policy environment. Furthermore, the increased Europeanization of member states' domestic politics and the fact that member states' foreign policies towards other member states within the tightly knit EU structure can no longer be considered as purely "foreign,"⁷⁶ also complicates the analysis of a state's foreign policy.

The abovementioned state-centrism of traditional FPA is often viewed as the main obstacle to applying FPA to the foreign policy actions of non-governmental EU actors.⁷⁷ However, White also argues that FPA is more often defined as actor-centred rather than state-centred, and that it may therefore be adapted as the nature of foreign policy actors change.⁷⁸ Another central point of deliberation is whether the EU should be considered an independent foreign policy actor or merely another international organisation.⁷⁹ This is the foundation for the ongoing debate between the state-centrists and Europeanists' views on FPA of EU member states, where the former sees the EU as just another international organisation while the latter points to the EU as an independent foreign policy actor.⁸⁰

As previously noted, the changes in the realm of post-Cold War European foreign policy have sparked several debates concerning the applicability of traditional FPA. Ginsberg argues that the multidimensional structure of contemporary European foreign policy makes it

⁷³ Brian White. (1999). "The European Challenge to foreign policy analysis." *European Journal of International Relations*, 5 (1), pp. 36-66, pp. 46-47.

⁷⁴ Ole Wæver. (1994). "Resisting the temptation of post foreign policy analysis." in Carlsnaes, W. And Steve Smith. (Eds.). *European Foreign Policy; The EC and changing perspectives in Europe*. London: Sage Publications, pp. 238-273.

⁷⁵ F. Andreatta. (2010). "The EU's IR: A theoretical view." in C. Hill and M. Smith. *International relations and the EU* (2nd Ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 21-43.

⁷⁶ Brian White. (2004). "Foreign policy analysis and the new Europe" in W. Carlsnaes, H. Sjursen and B. White (eds.). *Contemporary European FP*. London: Sage Publications, pp. 11-31.

⁷⁷ Christopher Hill. (2003). *The changing politics of foreign policy*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 3.

⁷⁸ Brian White. (2004). "Foreign policy analysis and the new Europe." in W. Carlsnaes, H. Sjursen and B. White (eds.). *Contemporary European FP*. London: Sage Publications, pp. 11-31 and Brian White. (1999). "The European Challenge to foreign policy analysis." *European Journal of International Relations*, 5 (1), pp. 36-66.

⁷⁹ F. Andreatta. (2010). "The EU's IR: A theoretical view." in C. Hill and M. Smith. *International relations and the EU* (2nd Ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 21-43.

⁸⁰ Reuben Wong. (2010). "The Europeanization of FP" in C. Hill and M. Smith. *International relations and the EU* (2nd Ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 149-170.

impossible to analyse it with only one theory.⁸¹ One suggestion has been to combine the existing FPA with other IR approaches. Europeanization theory has been one of the approaches considered as an addition to the traditional FPA framework.⁸² Wong outlines three categories of Europeanization which would be particularly helpful in analysing its effect on national foreign policy making.⁸³ Firstly, a top-down perspective of national adaptation, which explores how domestic structures and policies are being influenced by the country's participation in the European integration process. Secondly, a bottom-up perspective, which focuses on the projection of national preferences to the European level, where the EU becomes a "vehicle for national goals."⁸⁴ Lastly, a cross-level socialisation process, which looks at how preferences and identities may be redefined according to the "logic of appropriateness," and as a result of regular interaction between national and European representatives.⁸⁵ This last constructivist element of Europeanization theory emphasises the possibility of change in actors' values and preferences as a consequence of socialising with other actors.⁸⁶ This interaction leads to a sense of community, which consequently becomes the foundation for this community's "logic of appropriateness." Contrary to realists' "logic of consequence," this constructivist logic explains how actors behave according to what the other members of their community find appropriate.⁸⁷

Europeanization theory's focus on the effects of regular interaction within the EU framework thus makes it a particularly suitable addition to the present thesis' theoretical framework of a mainly nationally focused traditional FPA. This is because it may identify an entirely different set of influences in national foreign policy formation. That is why I have chosen to evaluate whether this additional focus on Europeanization effects could be useful in the analysis of the arms embargo case.

In addition to the idea of combining traditional FPA with other IR approaches, there are others who discuss the possibility of developing a distinct FPA for European foreign policy. While White advocates the continuation of a slightly adapted traditional FPA,

⁸¹ Roy H. Ginsberg in Brian White. (2004). "Foreign policy analysis and the new Europe" in W. Carlsnaes, H. Sjursen and B. White (eds.) *Contemporary European FP*. London: Sage Publications, pp. 11-31.

⁸² Brian White. (2004). "Foreign policy analysis and the new Europe" in W. Carlsnaes, H. Sjursen and B. White (eds.) *Contemporary European FP*. London: Sage Publications, pp. 11-31.

⁸³ Reuben Wong. (2010). "The Europeanization of FP" in C. Hill and M. Smith. *International relations and the EU* (2nd Ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 149-170.

⁸⁴ Reuben Wong. (2010). "The Europeanization of FP" in C. Hill and M. Smith. *International relations and the EU* (2nd Ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 149-170, pp. 152.

⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶ Emanuel Adler. (2002). "Constructivism and International Relations." in W. Carlsnaes, T. Risse and B. A. Simmons. (eds). *Handbook of International relations*. London: Sage publications Ltd. Chapter 5, pp. 95-118.

⁸⁷ Ibid.

Manners and Whitman opt for a completely transformed European FPA, and Smith points to the possibility of operating with different FPA according to the issue-area in question.⁸⁸ Larsen also proposes such an issue-specific FPA framework, where the level of EU involvement and national advocacy in each respective case decides what kind of FPA will be applied.⁸⁹ This approach is based on three different FPA frameworks: firstly, a traditional state-centred FPA where the EU is just one of many international organisations, secondly, a transformed FPA which would account for new actors and the merging of national and EU discourses, and lastly, a post-modern FPA which mixes the two first frameworks, in order to consider both the state and the EU as significant foreign policy actors.

The present thesis' study of the arms embargo case explores whether Moravcsik's traditional liberalist FPA still could be considered a sufficient framework of analysis in the arguably changed foreign policy realm of Europe. Here, the argued state-centrism of traditional FPA and the focus on domestic sources of foreign policy are some of the central points of consideration. In addition to this FPA framework, I also consider whether Europeanization could be an additional explanation of foreign policy positions as member states interact with each other and with EU institutions in a complex system of cooperation and coordination. The question remains thus whether a traditional FPA framework still could be applicable, or whether additional approaches, such as Europeanization, or a transformation of traditional FPA would be needed.

⁸⁸ In Brian White. (2004). "Foreign policy analysis and the new Europe." in W. Carlsnaes, H. Sjursen and B. White (eds.). *Contemporary European FP*. London: Sage Publications, pp. 11-31.

⁸⁹ Henrik Larsen. (2009). "A distinct foreign policy analysis for Europe? Towards a comprehensive framework for analysing the FP of EU member states," *European Journal of International Relations*, 15(3), pp. 537–566.

3.0 The EU-China relationship: from trade agreement to strategic partnership

In the EU's⁹⁰ European Security Strategy from 2003, *A secure Europe in a better world*, China is emphasised as one of the EU's most important strategic partners.⁹¹ With this in mind, the chapter aims to provide a helpful context for the following chapters' analysis of the 2004-2005 arms embargo discussions. This is done by demonstrating just how important and substantial the EU-China relationship is and how this has, in turn, been influenced by the gradual development of the EU's international role.

Firstly, the chapter considers how this relationship has often been characterised by a mix of rapprochements and tensions, where economic relations always seem to have the upper hand. Secondly, it explores how these rapidly developing economic relations hit a politically rough patch after the Chinese repressions of the Tiananmen Square protests in 1989. Thirdly, it looks at how the tensions following the Tiananmen events were quickly reversed by a fifteen year long phase of normalisation of affairs in the EU-China relationship. And lastly, it considers how the high point of EU-China relations in the end of 2003 arguably initiated the EU's debate on the status of its arms embargo against China.

3.1 A trade-oriented start for the EU-China relationship

The establishment of the EU's foreign policy mechanism in 1970, the European Political Cooperation (EPC),⁹² formalised the coordination of member states' national foreign policies and launched the possible beginning of a more unified European approach to international affairs. It remained, nonetheless, mainly an arena for joint declarations, to which member states could, at will, subscribe. In the context of these joint declarations on international events, the EU collectively recognised the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1975 after signs of modernisation in the PRC and as a result of increasing trade between the two.⁹³ The fact that both the PRC and the Republic of China, also known as Taiwan, strived to be recognised as the international society's legitimate China, complicated the two Chinas' relationship with the rest of the world. Also, even though the UK, Luxemburg and Denmark

⁹⁰ Even though the EU was formally named the EC up until the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, I will refer to it as the EU for the sake of simplicity.

⁹¹ European Council. (2003). European Council: Brussels December 12th 2003: *European Security Strategy: A secure Europe in a better world*.

⁹² John Van Oudenaren. (2010). "The European Union as a Foreign Policy Actor. Toward a New Realism." in Tiersky, R & Van Oudenaren, J.(eds.). *European Foreign Policies. Does Europe still matter?* Plymouth: Rowman&Littlefield, pp. 15-41.

⁹³ Kjeld Erik Brødsgaard and Wai Mun Hong. (2009). "EU-China relations: Economics still in command? " *EAI Background Brief no. 484*.

had recognised the PRC already in the 1950's, most member states waited until the beginning of the 1970's, thus making it difficult for the EU to establish formal relations with China up until this point. The formalisation of the EU-China relationship came about after the end of the Chinese Cultural Revolution in 1976 and the emergence of the PRC's "open door policy," following Mao Zedong's death in 1976.⁹⁴ These internal reforms in the PRC⁹⁵ consequently paved way for another economic climate, which facilitated an EU-China agreement on deeper economic cooperation: first with the 1978 trade agreement and then with the upgraded 1985 trade and economic cooperation agreement.

The 1978 trade agreement introduced the most-favoured-nation treatment between the EU and China in matters regarding import and export charges.⁹⁶ The 1985 trade and economic cooperation agreement maintained the regulations from 1978, but brought the cooperation to a new level by formalising the EU and China's intentions of developing economic cooperation within areas such as industry and energy. The agreement's goal of achieving a trade balance also called for an increased favourable treatment of EU imports in China as well as a gradual liberalisation of Chinese imports into the EU.⁹⁷

The 1980's became a decade where both the EU and China experienced internal economic developments as they also increased their standing in the world.⁹⁸ The EU's focus on completing and improving its Single Market through the Single European Act of 1985 strengthened its "actorness" and contributed to increased interdependence between its member states. The EU's increased participation in the international arena was also visible through the abovementioned establishment of the EPC and by the fact that the EU was actively engaged in the more "soft security" aspects in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. The EU-China relationship was, however, mostly steered by economic cooperation, and consequently by the Community-oriented foreign economic policy.

The reforms in China in the 1980's triggered EU support for further development as well as the establishment of several programs of cooperation within science and technology.⁹⁹ China's rapid development also soon allowed it to establish itself as an important global actor,

⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁵ From now on the People's Republic of China (PRC) will be referred to as China.

⁹⁶ Xiaotong Zhang. (2010). "A letter to the new EU trade commissioner's China team." *The EU-China Observer*, 1, pp. 8-13.

⁹⁷ The European Council. (1985). *Agreement on trade and economic cooperation between the European Economic Community and the People's Republic of China*. OJEC L 250/1, 19.09.1985.

⁹⁸ Franco Algieri. (2002). "EU economic relations with China: An institutional perspective." *The China Quarterly*, 169, pp.67-77.

⁹⁹ European Commission. (2010). *EU-China Relations: Chronology*.

and it was this change of status which eventually led international actors to start considering the abovementioned “rise of China.” Some scholars have also tried to point to these shifts in the international system’s balance of power as an explanation for the gradual development of the EU-China relationship during the Cold War, by emphasising the sense of community in having the USSR as a common adversary.¹⁰⁰ This positive development of relations in the 1980’s did not however last the entire decade, as the repressions of the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests led to a disruption of EU-China relations.

3.2 The 1989 events as a catalyst for the relationship’s human rights dimension

The economic predominance of the EU-China relationship in the 1980’s was supplemented by a human rights dimension with the EU’s reactions to the repressions of the Tiananmen Square uprising in June 1989. Despite a substantial growth in EU-China trade, which had developed from virtually nothing in the early 1970’s up to one per cent of the EU’s total foreign trade in 1989,¹⁰¹ the Madrid European Council of June 1989 clearly stated that the EU would not let the Tiananmen repressions go by unnoticed.¹⁰² The interruption of all high level contact as well as an arms trade embargo against China, represented some of the main measures set down by the Madrid European Council in order to condemn China’s unfair treatment of its citizens claiming their right to democracy. The fact that China claimed that 241 people had been killed in the days of June 1989, whereas NATO presented a number closer to 7 000 casualties,¹⁰³ illustrates the lack of information regarding human rights practices in China and complicates the EU-China relationship’s human rights dialogue accordingly.

Despite its demands for respect for human rights, the 1989 declaration was vague.¹⁰⁴ It showed a political will to point out what needed to be done, but the EPC’s lack of legally binding measures reduced EU foreign policy to declarations which remained at the mercy of each member state’s voluntary compliance.¹⁰⁵ The present thesis’ analysis of the 2004-2005 debate on the EU arms embargo shows how this politically but not legally binding nature of

¹⁰⁰ David Shambaugh, E. Sandschneider and Z. Hong. (2008). “From honeymoon to marriage.” in Shambaugh, Sandschneider and Hong. (eds.) *China-Europe relations: Perceptions, policies and prospects*. London: Routledge pp.302-316.

¹⁰¹ Nicola Casarini. (October, 2006). “The evolution of the EU-China relationship: from constructive engagement to strategic partnership.” *European Union Institute for Security Studies Occasional Paper*, 64. p.9.

¹⁰² European Council (1989). *European Council: Madrid 26 and 27 June Reproduced from the Bulletin of the European Communities*, No. 6/1989.

¹⁰³ Andrew Rettman. (December 17, 2010). “Ashton pragmatic on China in EU foreign policy blueprint.” *EU Observer*.

¹⁰⁴ Pascal Vennesson. (2007). “Lifting the EU Arms Embargo on China: Symbols and strategy.” *EurAmerica* (37) pp. 417-444.

¹⁰⁵ John Van Oudenaren. (2010). “The European Union as a Foreign Policy Actor. Toward a New Realism.” in Tiersky, R & Van Oudenaren, J.(eds.). *European Foreign Policies. Does Europe still matter?* Plymouth: Rowman&Littlefield, pp. 15-41.

the embargo also jeopardised its effectiveness.¹⁰⁶ The constant duality of national and European foreign policy also complicates the analysis of the decisive factors in the arms embargo case, as it shows how the member state primacy might prevent the emergence of an independent EU foreign policy.

3.3 The normalisation of relations: fifteen years of increasing cooperation

Despite the 1989 declaration's condemnations of China's actions, the majority of its sanctions did not seem to be able to resist the pressures within the EU for increased trade with China.¹⁰⁷ Despite the rough start in 1989, the 1990's turned out to be a decade of increasing EU-China trade and cooperation. The EU's total trade with China in 1993 was 30 840 million ECU, equalling approximately 40 billion US dollars.¹⁰⁸ Furthermore, there was a major increase in EU-China trade up to 60 billion and 220 billion US dollars in 2000 and 2005, respectively.¹⁰⁹ Pan Wei emphasises this growth and points to how this has made the EU increasingly more dependent upon trade with China.¹¹⁰ China's increase from a 1% to a 6% share of the EU's total foreign trade, in 1989 and 2009 respectively, also confirms this. It is also noteworthy that the US has fallen behind the EU in its total trade with China, and thus possibly suggesting an increased importance of the EU and China as the world's most important trading powers.¹¹¹

Bilateral relations between China and the EU were re-established by the European Council, only 16 months after the Tiananmen-sanctions were imposed.¹¹² Dent explains this by arguing that the EU's main goal concerning China in the 1990's was to move from containment to engagement,¹¹³ and Algieri confirms this by pointing to how German and Italian businesses interested in trade with China pushed for this normalisation process.¹¹⁴ This quick normalisation has therefore often been explained by the attraction of the growing

¹⁰⁶ Kristin Archick, R. F. Grimmett and Shirley Kan. (May 27, 2005). "European union's arms embargo on china: implications and options for US policy." *CRS Report for Congress*.

¹⁰⁷ Franco Algieri. (2002). "EU economic relations with China: An institutional perspective." *The China Quarterly*, 169, pp.67-77.

¹⁰⁸ European Commission. (1994). *Towards a New Asia strategy*, COM(94) 314 final. Annex III, table 2.

¹⁰⁹ Kjeld Erik Brødsgaard and Wai Mun Hong. (2009). "EU-China relations: Economics still in command?" *EAI Background Brief no. 484*. p. 2.

¹¹⁰ John Fox and François Godement (2009). "A power audit of EU-China relations" *ECFR Policy report*.

¹¹¹ Kjeld Erik Brødsgaard and Wai Mun Hong. (2009). "EU-China relations: Economics still in command?" *EAI Background Brief no. 484*. p. 3.

¹¹² European Commission. (2010). *EU-China Relations: Chronology*.

¹¹³ Christopher Dent. (2005, July 22). "China's economic relationship with the EU" Speech held at the US – China Economic and Security Review Commission : 'China's Growing Global Influence: Objectives and Strategies.' Washington DC, USA.

¹¹⁴ Franco Algieri. (2002). "EU economic relations with China: An institutional perspective." *The China Quarterly*, 169, pp.67-77.

Chinese market.¹¹⁵ The market-oriented EU wanted to re-establish the many contacts created with the Chinese during the 1980's. In addition to these commercial objectives, the absence of substantial Taiwanese lobby groups in Europe, the limited amount of European military interest in South East Asia and the change in world dynamics after the end of the Cold War, also seemed to explain the relaxation of tensions.¹¹⁶ The abandonment of the 1989 sanctions, except for the remaining arms embargo, was followed by the release of the EU's first policy paper on China in 1995; *A long-term policy for China-Europe relations*, which emphasised China's increasingly important global role. This paper also explicitly pointed to the normalisation of EU-China relations as an important step towards increased bilateral trade and investment.¹¹⁷ Looking at the normalisation from the Chinese point of view, Ting Wai, on the one hand, points to how realists explain this by the fact that China wished to improve its relations with Europe in order to balance against the increasingly unilateral USA. On the other hand, he further emphasises how liberalists argue that the Chinese rapprochement to Europe in the 1990's was mainly due to a desire of being integrated into the international community's financial and political institutions.¹¹⁸

These developments of the EU-China relationship occurred while Europe redefined itself as the global defender of both economic and foreign policy multilateralism.¹¹⁹ The EU had developed into a different foreign policy actor, at least in the name, from the one that it had been before the creation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) with the Maastricht treaty in 1992. Despite the increased institutionalised character of this foreign policy arrangement, the continued predominance of member states in the CFSP made the coordination and formulation of EU common foreign policy difficult and put national positions up against each other. This possibility of member states undermining each others' interests may be said to contribute to the lack of unity within the framework of the intergovernmental CFSP,¹²⁰ and is further discussed in chapter five of the present thesis.

¹¹⁵ Jing Men (2007). "The EU-China strategic partnership: Achievements and challenges." *Policy paper no. 12, European Studies center, University of Pittsburgh.*

¹¹⁶ David Shambaugh, E. Sandschneider and Z. Hong. (2008). "From honeymoon to marriage." in Shambaugh, Sandschneider and Hong (eds.). *China-Europe relations: Perceptions, policies and prospects.* London: Routledge, pp.302-316.

¹¹⁷ European Commission. (1995). *A long-term policy for China-Europe relations*, COM(95) 279 final.

¹¹⁸ Ting Wai. (2011.). "EU-China relations in the age of globalization and regionalization." *EurAmerica*, 41(1), pp. 181-213.

¹¹⁹ John Van Oudenaren. (2010). "The European Union as a Foreign Policy Actor. Toward a New Realism." in Tiersky, R & Van Oudenaren, J.(eds.). *European Foreign Policies. Does Europe still matter?*, Plymouth: Rowman&Littlefield, pp. 15-41.

¹²⁰ John Fox and François Godement (2009). "A power audit of EU-China relations" *ECFR Policy report.*

As the EU-China relationship developed during the 1990's and the early 2000's, the EU initiated new dialogues with China to emphasise its increased attention to this particular region. The 1995 launch of an EU-China Human Rights Dialogue, the first Asia-European Meeting (ASEM) in 1996, and the launch of the top-level EU-China summit in 1998, demonstrate some of these new initiatives.¹²¹ The 1998 EU Commission Policy paper on China; *Building a comprehensive partnership*, emphasised the broader aspects of EU-China relations, with a particular focus on dialogue between governmental and non-governmental actors.¹²² This decade thus proved to be a period of increasing relations between the EU and China, even though the arms embargo remained the proof of unresolved political differences.

3.4 The high point of EU-China relations and the road ahead

The set of new initiatives which emerged during the 1990's could be said to have led to the apogee of EU-China relations in the early 2000's. 2003 saw the formalisation of this increased cooperation as the 2003 European Security Strategy called for a stronger strategic partnership between the EU and China,¹²³ and as the EU and China both issued a policy paper on each other in October that same year. The EU's Policy paper, *A maturing partnership - shared interests and challenges in EU-China relations*, pointed to the need for updating the EU's China policy because of the increased EU-China interdependence.¹²⁴ As China, also in 2003, published its first policy paper on the EU, some argued that this clearly indicated that China was ready to take a step away from dealing with EU member states separately and start working with the EU as a more equal and unitary partner.¹²⁵ In its paper, China also emphasised the importance of maintaining good relations with the increasingly influential EU, and confirmed the assumed high point of relations by claiming that EU-China relations had never been better. These positive outlooks on EU-China relations in the 2003 policy papers could indeed suggest that the EU-China relationship had evolved substantially since the interruption of affairs in 1989. However, it is also possible to argue that this was merely a high point of diplomatic niceties and rhetorical formulations.

Several scholars also claim that the EU-China relationship and the EU-US relationship are correlated and that relations between the three parties have become a diplomatic

¹²¹ European Commission. (2010). *EU-China Relations: Chronology*.

¹²² European Commission (1998). *Building a comprehensive partnership with China*, COM(98) 181 final.

¹²³ European Council (2003). European Council: Brussels December 12th 2003: *European Security Strategy: A secure Europe in a better world*.

¹²⁴ European Commission. (2003). *A maturing partnership - shared interests and challenges in EU-China relations*, COM(2003) 533 final.

¹²⁵ John Fox and François Godement (2009). "A power audit of EU-China relations" *ECFR Policy report*.

triangle.¹²⁶ Ting Wai claims that there is a “US factor” in EU-China relations which affects the nature of the cooperation.¹²⁷ This suggests that the deterioration of EU-US relations would lead to an improved EU-China relationship. Considering the build-up of transatlantic tensions before and during the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, one could argue that this could have contributed to the simultaneous improvements of EU-China relations. The US’ impact on the EU-China relationship and its special relationship with the UK are further explored in chapter five of the present thesis.

There are different explanations to why the debate on the lifting of the arms embargo came about in 2003-2004. It is evident that the explicit wording in China’s abovementioned policy paper on the EU and the Chinese Premier’s calls for a strategic partnership in early 2004, both demanded a reconsideration of the arms embargo.¹²⁸ Also, Brødsgaard and Lim, among others, claim that it was the 2003 high point of EU-China relations which made it possible for China to push for a complete normalisation of affairs by asking for more in return for their market access.¹²⁹

The EU-China relationship quickly developed from trade-oriented relations in the 1980’s, via the political tensions over the 1989 Tiananmen repressions and finally, back to a rapid normalisation of affairs in the 1990’s, which consequently led to an increasingly close relationship. Despite the maintenance of the arms embargo and the abovementioned efforts to include political aspects, such as human rights compliance, into the newly established strategic partnership, it still seems that economic growth and trade interests remain the corner stone of EU-China relations. This priority of economic interests above human rights considerations also seemed to be the main reason for the initiation of the arms embargo debate. However, the fact that the embargo was not lifted, suggests that political considerations might have, nonetheless, been present in the EU-China relationship. These ups and downs of the EU-China relationship show both the immense potential of EU-China cooperation as well as how this relationship often is conditioned by whether the EU member states are able to act unanimously. This is a matter which is more thoroughly explored in the

¹²⁶ Robert S. Ross, Ø. Tunsjø and T. Zhang (eds.) (2010). *US-China-EU relations : Managing the new world order*. London: Routledge.

¹²⁷ Ting Wai. (2011.) “EU-China relations in the age of globalization and regionalization.” *EurAmerica*, 41(1), pp. 181-213.

¹²⁸ David Shambaugh, E. Sandschneider and Z. Hong. (2008). ”From honeymoon to marriage.” in Shambaugh, Sandschneider and Hong (eds.). *China-Europe relations: Perceptions, policies and prospects*. London: Routledge pp.302-316.

¹²⁹ Kjeld Erik Brødsgaard and Chee Kia Lim. (2009). “EU – China: Managing a strained relationship.” EAI Background brief no. 483 and Pascal Vennesson. (2007). “Lifting the EU Arms Embargo on China: Symbols and strategy.” *EurAmerica* (37), pp. 417-444.

following chapters' analysis of whether Community actors or member states were the main foreign policy decision makers in the arms embargo case.

4.0 The institutional context of EU foreign policy

Keukeleire and MacNaughtan point to the complex institutional structure of the EU and call the EU's foreign policy system "single by name, dual by regime and multiple by nature."¹³⁰ This regime duality is illustrated by the fact that foreign policy within the EU is divided between an intergovernmental CFSP regime and a Community foreign economic policy regime, which consequently leads to a differentiation of actors' competences and influences. This differentiation becomes clear as the formal competences of intergovernmental institutions contrast the arguable marginalisation of Community institutions within the EU's CFSP. The purpose of this chapter is thus to identify these different institutions and actors' actions and assess their impact on the arms embargo debate.

Firstly, the chapter presents the institutional context of the arms embargo case. Secondly, the chapter looks at the Community actors' competences, or lack thereof, in the CFSP and explores how they positioned themselves during the predominantly intergovernmental arms embargo discussions.¹³¹ Thirdly, it presents the formal CFSP competences of the EU's intergovernmental institutions and considers the latter's role in the arms embargo debate.

4.1 The institutional context of the arms embargo

The abovementioned plurality of foreign policy frameworks and competences within the EU makes it impossible to analyse the arms embargo case without having considered its proper EU foreign policy context. When the June 1989 Madrid European Council imposed a series of sanctions against China, it was within the framework of the European Political Cooperation (EPC).¹³² This joint statement did not, however, impose one collective EU arms embargo against China, as arms embargoes were still under member state jurisdiction.¹³³ Consequently, the issued set of member state embargoes were never incorporated into the legal framework of the EU and the joint statement remained a non-legally binding agreement dependent upon each member state's individual interpretation.¹³⁴ These individual interpretations also allowed

¹³⁰ Stephan Keukeleire and Jennifer MacNaughtan. (2008). *The foreign policy of the European Union*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, Chapter 3, pp. 66-97, pp. 66

¹³¹ Stephan Keukeleire and Jennifer MacNaughtan. (2008). *The foreign policy of the European Union*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, Chapter 1, pp. 8-34.

¹³² European Council (1989). *European Council: Madrid 26 and 27 June Reproduced from the Bulletin of the European Communities*, No. 6/1989.

¹³³ Joakim Kreutz. (2004). "Reviewing the EU Arms Embargo on China: the clash between value and rationale in European Security Strategy." *The Central European review of international affairs*, 22, pp. 43-58.

¹³⁴ Pascal Vennesson. (2007). "Lifting the EU Arms Embargo on China: Symbols and strategy." *EurAmerica* (37) pp. 417-444.

a *de facto* continuation of arms trade with China, despite the existence of an arms embargo.¹³⁵ This emphasised the limited effects of EPC decisions, and Dinan agrees with this as he points to the European Council foreign policy declarations' lack of status within community law as one of the main reasons for why there is no coherent EU foreign policy.¹³⁶ He nonetheless admits that these declarations provide a certain point of reference for European foreign policy.

Compared to the CFSP, the EPC was a looser coordination-mechanism of national foreign policies which only functioned when each member state considered it desirable.¹³⁷ Individual member states could also at any given moment withdraw from these merely politically binding declarations.¹³⁸ The incoherence of the EPC is further emphasised by White as he argues that voting within the EPC was avoided, and that member states still pursued independent foreign policies.¹³⁹ However, he also points to how the growing agenda and the increased interdependence in international relations gradually changed governments' foreign policy behaviour up until the creation of the CFSP. Nuttall calls this emerging change in government behaviour a "coordination reflex," which suggests a habit of conferring with other member states before defining its own foreign policy.¹⁴⁰ This may also be argued to be the essential precondition for a functioning and coherent CFSP.

Even though the CFSP framework in place during the arms embargo debate possessed greater legally binding capacities than the EPC,¹⁴¹ the debate itself was still marked by the principle of consensus. This was because of the fact that the member states had decided that any potential lifting of the arms embargo would happen under the unanimity rule, even though there was no legal framework obliging them to do so.¹⁴² Even though this might suggest a habit of cooperation, seeing as they did not opt for unilateral approaches to the case, one can also see how the member states were safeguarding the primacy of their own national interests through this unanimity rule

¹³⁵ Joakim Kreutz. (2004). "Reviewing the EU Arms Embargo on China: the clash between value and rationale in European Security Strategy." *The Central European review of international affairs*, 22, pp. 43-58.

¹³⁶ Desmond Dinan. (ed.) (1998). *Encyclopedia of the European Union*. Basingstoke: Macmillan, pp. 188-189.

¹³⁷ Joakim Kreutz. (2004). "Reviewing the EU Arms Embargo on China: the clash between value and rationale in European Security Strategy." *The Central European review of international affairs*, 22, pp. 43-58.

¹³⁸ Brian White. (2001). *Understanding European foreign policy*, New York: Palgrave. Chapter 4, pp. 71-93.

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁰ In Helene Sjursen. (2003). "Understanding the common foreign and security policy: Analytical building blocks." in Michèle Knodt and Sebastiaan Princen (eds.). *Understanding the European Union's External Relations*. Oxon: Routledge, Chapter 2, pp. 35-53.

¹⁴¹ Joakim Kreutz. (2004). "Reviewing the EU Arms Embargo on China: the clash between value and rationale in European Security Strategy." *The Central European review of international affairs*, 22, pp. 43-58.

¹⁴² Joakim Kreutz. (2004). "Reviewing the EU Arms Embargo on China: the clash between value and rationale in European Security Strategy." *The Central European review of international affairs*, 22, pp. 43-58.

The abovementioned primacy of member states and the unanimity rule could suggest that a traditional analysis of the foreign policies of the member states could be enough to explain the arms embargo case. However, the fact that the member states had indeed decided to settle the arms embargo question within the framework of the European Council, would question the actual strength of an analysis which excluded this framework. An analysis based solely on member state foreign policies, would have led to a false illusion of the hegemony of completely independent member state foreign policies, as it would have excluded the possible impact of Community actors and institutions.

4.2 The European Commission, the High Representative for the CFSP and the European Parliament: Community actors in want of CFSP influence?

Smith emphasises how Community actors, such as the Commission, the High Representative and the European Parliament, may act as policy and norm entrepreneurs even though they have limited foreign policy competences.¹⁴³ Kreutz also points to this as he argues that the complex and intertwined nature of the EU's foreign policy framework might allow actors without such formal CFSP competences to influence the decisions according to their interests and abilities.¹⁴⁴ This potential myriad of foreign policy influences within the EU consequently makes it essential to consider a wide range of actors, and not just the member state governments, in a case study of EU foreign policy.

4.2.1 The European Commission

The Commission's foreign policy role has seen a gradual development. From being considered an unwanted factor of supranational influence within the EPC framework, the Commission gained full association and functioned as a link between the Directorates-General (DGs) and the EPC following the 1981 London report. Finally, it received a non-exclusive right to initiative within the CFSP in the TEU in 1992.¹⁴⁵ Much of its increased foreign policy role, beyond the exclusive competences within the Union's foreign economic policy, has been attributed to the growing interconnectedness of economic and political foreign policies.¹⁴⁶ The increased overlap in these areas has also led to more turf battles between the Commission and

¹⁴³ Karen E. Smith. (2008). *European Union foreign policy in a changing world* (2nd Ed.). Cambridge: Polity Press. Chapter 9, pp.230-240.

¹⁴⁴ Joakim Kreutz. (2004). "Reviewing the EU Arms Embargo on China: the clash between value and rationale in European Security Strategy." *The Central European review of international affairs*, 22, pp. 43-58.

¹⁴⁵ Simon Nuttall. (1996). "The Commission: the struggle for legitimacy" in Christopher Hill. (ed.). *Actors in Europe's foreign policy*. New York: Routledge, Chapter 6, pp. 130-150.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid.

the Council on foreign policy issues.¹⁴⁷ The establishment of a conditionality clause within EU trade agreements in 1995¹⁴⁸ is just one of many examples of this overlap, where the intergovernmental political foreign policy and the Community-oriented economic measures are combined in order to address the challenges of an increasingly interdependent and globalised world.

The 1999-2004 Commissioner for External Relations, Chris Patten, referred to these boundary problems within EU foreign policy as he addressed the European Parliament on the arms embargo issue on November 16th 2004.¹⁴⁹ Stating that the CFSP was not an issue area in which the Commission could take the lead, he nonetheless emphasised that the Commission was concerned about how a potential lifting of the embargo might influence the overall EU-China relationship. Patten further expressed the need for China to take concrete steps towards improving its human rights record, in order to convince the public opinion of the EU that the arms embargo could be lifted.¹⁵⁰ He also stressed the importance of a revised EU Code of Conduct on Arms Export in order to prevent an increasing export of EU arms to China. During the arms embargo debate in the EU, the EU Code of Conduct's criteria number two, three and four of the in total eight criteria, concerning human rights compliance, internal repression, and the regional security situation, respectively, were all pointed to by proponents of the lifting, as a safeguard against an increase in arms sales to China.¹⁵¹ The non-legally binding nature of the EU Code of Conduct, however, makes it as dependent on individual interpretations as the 1989 arms embargo and questions its actual impact. The Code of Conduct's demands for the EU-wide circulation of national reports on arms exports could of course create a certain "logic of appropriateness" amongst the member states, but the fact that each government is free to decide the amount of details to be included in these reports, limits the Code's ability to create a transparent arms export system.

Contrary to Commissioner Patten, the President of the Commission at the time, Romano Prodi, seemed to focus less on the human rights aspect as he, in October 2004, expressed his support for the lifting.¹⁵² Prodi had earlier that year in Beijing pointed to China

¹⁴⁷ Karen E. Smith. (2008). *European Union foreign policy in a changing world* (2nd Ed.). Cambridge: Polity Press. Chapter 3, pp. 54-75.

¹⁴⁸ Karen E. Smith. (2008). *European Union foreign policy in a changing world* (2nd Ed.). Cambridge: Polity Press. Chapter 5, pp. 111-141.

¹⁴⁹ Chris Patten. (2004, November 16). "Lifting the arms embargo on China: the Rueda Report on arms exports," speech presented at the European Parliament, Strasbourg, France. SPEECH/04/483.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid.

¹⁵¹ European Union. (1998). *The EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports*. 8675/2/98

¹⁵² Joakim Kreutz. (2004). "Reviewing the EU Arms Embargo on China: the clash between value and rationale in European Security Strategy." *The Central European review of international affairs*, 22, pp. 43-58.

as one of the EU's top foreign policy priorities.¹⁵³ He also seemed to try to assure China that the Commission prioritised EU-China trade and investment, while it was mainly the European public that was concerned about the human rights aspects of the lifting.¹⁵⁴ This shows how the human rights aspect of the EU-China relationship is abandoned in favour of economics and how it is framed as a demand coming purely from the European public opinion, rather than an element of EU conditionality.¹⁵⁵ In addition to this active engagement in promoting stronger commercial ties between the EU and China, Prodi also pointed out to Chinese Premier Wen that the Commission did not have any real influence on the member state-dominated embargo discussions.¹⁵⁶

As Commission President, Prodi enjoyed good-will from the leaders of the member states much because of the fact that he himself had previously been attending summits with them as a well-respected Prime Minister of Italy.¹⁵⁷ Rossant also points to how the Europeans' mistrust and dissatisfaction with the preceding Santer Commission had heightened the expectations towards the new Prodi Commission.¹⁵⁸ The grounds for these expectations can also be seen in Prodi's declared intentions of reforming the Brussels bureaucracy at the start of his Presidency.¹⁵⁹ One could thus argue that the personal background of Prodi and the hopes for how this Commission would be better than the last one, contributed to granting the Commission President a higher regard among Europeans and, consequently, a possibly increased influence of his foreign policy statements.

However, the lack of institutional consistency in the Prodi Commission, between the President and the Commissioner for External Relations, suggests that the Commission President had not laid out any common Commission position on the arms embargo case. Patten admits this inconsistency, but explains that Prodi's extensive delegation of responsibilities led to an amicable college of Commissioners which was less prone to turf battles.¹⁶⁰ This lack of extensive central direction would then help explain the institutional

¹⁵³ Romano Prodi. (2004, April 14). "The role of the EU in a changing world." speech presented at the CASS European Institute, Beijing, China, SPEECH/04/176.

¹⁵⁴ Romano Prodi. (2004, May 6). "Relations between the EU and China: more than just business." speech presented at the EU-China business forum, Brussels, Belgium, SPEECH/04/227.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid.

¹⁵⁶ Joakim Kreutz. (2004). "Reviewing the EU Arms Embargo on China: the clash between value and rationale in European Security Strategy." *The Central European review of international affairs*, 22, pp. 43-58.

¹⁵⁷ Barry James. (1999, April 19). "Prodi to Have Wide, New Powers as Head of the European Commission" [Electronic version], *New York Times*.

¹⁵⁸ John Rossant. (1999). "Commentary: Romano Prodi: Europe's First Prime Minister? (int'l edition)" [Electronic version], *Bloomberg Businessweek*.

¹⁵⁹ Desmond Dinan. (2004). *Europe Recast: A history of European Union*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

¹⁶⁰ Chris Patten. (2005). *Not quite the diplomat. Home Truths about world affairs*. London: Allen Lane, pp. 123.

inconsistency within the Commission. Commissioner Patten illustrated this as he was able to oppose the lifting of the embargo, despite the fact that the Commission President seemed to be generally in favour of it. Patten, having been the UK's last Governor-General of British Hong Kong, was used to negotiating with China and continued his Hong Kong human rights advocacy also in the EU's arms embargo debate.¹⁶¹ The fact that the British Commissioner, Patten, opposed the lifting, could also suggest that he might have been affected by national interests in the otherwise Community-oriented Commission, considering the UK's general reluctance towards a lifting. And even though Patten officially based his opposition to the lifting on China's lack of human rights compliance, he later also emphasised that the EU should always consult the US on EU-China matters.¹⁶² This transatlantic coordination reflex, within the mind of an EU level official, also illustrates how Patten might have been influenced by the foreign policy tradition of his home country.¹⁶³

The change of Commission in November 2004 saw the arrival of Jose Manuel Barroso as Commission President. In February 2005, Barroso claimed that the EU was ready to go ahead with the lifting of the arms embargo despite strong US opposition.¹⁶⁴ Later, in July 2005, Barroso, however, seemed to be more concerned for the human rights situation in China as well as its link to the possible lifting of the arms embargo.¹⁶⁵ Even though Barroso expressed the need for China to improve its human rights situation, he also seemed to point to the European Parliament and the European public opinion as the main reasons for why there was a human rights element within the lifting discussions.¹⁶⁶ Nonetheless, this sign of an increased level of human rights-considerations in the Commission could perhaps be explained by China's adoption of the Anti-Secession Law in March 2005. The controversy of this "one China"-policy law was that it explicitly allowed armed interventions against civilian secessionist movements in Taiwan.¹⁶⁷

Barroso, similar to Prodi, had the privilege of being a former Head of Government.¹⁶⁸ However, one could perhaps argue that his Government's unpopularity with the Portuguese

¹⁶¹ Nicola Casarini. (2006, October). "The evolution of the EU-China relationship: from constructive engagement to strategic partnership." *European Union Institute for Security Studies Occasional Paper*, 64.

¹⁶² Chris Patten. (2005). *Not quite the diplomat. Home Truths about world affairs*. London: Allen Lane, pp. 270-276.

¹⁶³ The UK position and its relation to the US opposition to the lifting are extensively discussed in chapter five of the present thesis.

¹⁶⁴ Honor Mahony. (2005, February 10). "EU set to lift China arms embargo despite US concerns" [Electronic version], *EU Observer*.

¹⁶⁵ Improve human rights situation, says Barroso [Electronic version]. (2005, July 15). *Asia News*.

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁷ Full text of Anti-Secession Law [Electronic version]. (2005, March 14). *People's Daily*.

¹⁶⁸ José M. D. Barroso served as the Prime Minister of Portugal from 2002 to 2004.

people, due to extensive austerity measures, and his party's massive defeat in the 2004 European elections, might have had a negative effect on Barroso's reputation.¹⁶⁹ However, Magone argues that Barroso, in spite of being criticised as uncharismatic and too pragmatic, was the right man for the job as this Commission Presidency would predominantly focus on maintaining consensus on the already initiated enlargement process.¹⁷⁰ This focus on compromise and consensus could perhaps also explain Barroso's somewhat more balanced view on the arms embargo, which emphasised both trade and human rights. One could also wonder, counterfactually, how influential the individual behind the Commission Presidency was, and whether the Commission would have played a more pro-active role in the arms embargo case if the more controversial Chris Patten, as proposed, would instead have assumed the Commission Presidency in 2004.¹⁷¹

The new Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy, Benita Ferrero-Waldner, also, as Barroso and Prodi, "blamed" the demands for an improvement of the human rights situation in China on the European Parliament and the European public opinion.¹⁷² She stated that the arms embargo should be lifted in order to reflect the recent and substantial developments of the EU-China relationship.¹⁷³ Ferrero-Waldner nonetheless referred to how the adoption of the abovementioned Anti-Secession Law had complicated the EU's work towards reaching a consensus on the arms embargo lifting.¹⁷⁴

There seemed to be more institutional consistency within the Barroso I Commission, as Barroso and Ferrero-Waldner seemed to be on the same page, even though Barroso appeared to be somewhat more concerned with the human rights aspect. Apart from Patten's abovementioned critical view of the possible lifting, the Commission as an institution seemed to favour a lifting. This support was largely based on the considerations for EU-China trade and for the strategic partnership with China, as human rights and conditionality policies remained in the background. This could perhaps be explained by the fact that the Commission had traditionally had an economic foreign policy role, sidelined by the CFSP, and often stuck in the middle between the latter and DG TRADE.¹⁷⁵ This is in spite of the abovementioned

¹⁶⁹ José M. Magone. (2005). "José Manuel Durão Barroso: A Political Scientist in the World of European Union Politics." *International Journal*, 60 (2), pp. 544-555.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid.

¹⁷¹ Ibid.

¹⁷² Chris Buckley. (2005, May 12). "EU offers China hope on embargo" [Electronic version]. *New York Times*.

¹⁷³ Ibid.

¹⁷⁴ Johnathan Watts. (2005, May 12). "Tiananmen inmates linked to EU arms embargo" [Electronic version]. *The Guardian*.

¹⁷⁵ Stephan Keukeleire and Jennifer MacNaughtan. (2008). *The foreign policy of the European Union*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, Chapter 3, pp. 66-97.

gradual overlap of economic and political foreign policies after the Cold War, which made it necessary to include Community instruments as a part of CFSP decisions.¹⁷⁶ Also, even though the Commission's role in CFSP has remained limited, its role as the EU member states' representative in international trade negotiations, such as in the World Trade Organisation, emphasises the external importance of the Commission. The increasing overlap between economic and political foreign policy and the fact that international trade can rarely be isolated from its surroundings could also suggest that the Commission's prominent economic role in international trade might have been more political than first assumed. Consequently, the Chinese emphasis on the importance of the lifting, the increasing EU trade with China, and the fact that the arms embargo case was mainly a question about whether to assume arms trade with China, would then also explain the Commission's trade-based positions in the arms embargo debate.

Another reason for why the Commission did not get more actively involved in the political aspects of the arms embargo case, could also be the fact that it was, at the time of the 2004-2005 discussions, preoccupied with the many political, economic and institutional challenges of the ten-country enlargement of the EU. In a 2004 speech, Prodi emphasised this enlargement process, the functioning of the European Monetary Union (EMU) and the work towards creating a constitution for Europe as the three main priorities for the EU in the following years.¹⁷⁷ This challenging set of priorities consequently might have muted the EU's response to the Chinese and Franco-German demands for a lifting, as the Commission might have considered the successful achievement of the enlargement more important than the arms embargo case.

4.2.2 The High Representative for the CFSP

The post of the High Representative for the CFSP was created by the Amsterdam Treaty in order to get a more tangible representative for the evolving foreign policies of the EU.¹⁷⁸ Depending on the mandate given from the Council and on the instruments at its disposal, the High Representative's task was to assist the Presidency in CFSP issues.¹⁷⁹

¹⁷⁶ Simon Nuttall. (1996). "The Commission: the struggle for legitimacy." in Christopher Hill. (ed.). *Actors in Europe's foreign policy*. New York: Routledge, Chapter 6, pp. 130-150, p. 133.

¹⁷⁷ Romano Prodi. (2004, April 27). "Les nouvelles priorités de l'Union européenne élargie." speech presented at the Académie des Sciences Morales et Politiques, Paris, France, SPEECH/04/204.

¹⁷⁸ Stephan Keukeleire and Jennifer MacNaughtan. (2008). *The foreign policy of the European Union*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, Chapter 3, pp. 66-97.

¹⁷⁹ The Lisbon Treaty replaced this post with a High Representative for the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, which is also to assume the role of the former Commissioners of External Relations. This

The High Representative, Javier Solana, expressed at first no comments on the arms embargo lifting, before he later announced that a revision of the embargo's status was the right choice.¹⁸⁰ In February 2004, he went further with his endorsement by claiming that the EU was indeed ready to follow through with this mainly symbolic and political gesture of lifting the embargo.¹⁸¹ Solana also showed a wish to be able to influence the intergovernmental CFSP, as he explicitly urged European leaders to lift the arms embargo against China, based on the claim that China had been making real progress on human rights and that the abovementioned EU Code of Conduct on Arms Export would hinder any increased arms sales to China.¹⁸² The High Representative furthermore pointed to how the arms embargo was an unfair arrangement as the EU-China relationship had developed substantially since the embargo was imposed in 1989.¹⁸³

The High Representative's advocacy for a lifting of the arms embargo might suggest that he, as well as the majority of the Commission, prioritised a steady and commercially beneficial relationship with a rising China, over concerns for human rights improvements. However, Solana also repeatedly justified the lifting by pointing to the changed human rights situation in China. But this argument remains somewhat unfounded as the opacity of the Chinese society makes it difficult to assess whether the human rights situation had indeed improved. It is perhaps difficult to place the High Representative within the FPA framework, as it does not represent a state but the CFSP and the EU as a Community actor, and as it has no formal competences besides the possibility of influencing the Presidency's foreign policy initiatives.¹⁸⁴ Also the fact that the European Council Presidency was up until the Lisbon Treaty a rotating member state Presidency, might have led to conflicts of interests between member states' national priorities and the Community nature of the High Representative.¹⁸⁵

In the case of the arms embargo, the High Representative seemed to opt for a sort of declaratory diplomacy through speech acts, in order to make his position known. Youngs

consequently increased the High Representative's scope of action and created a double-hatted link between the Community and intergovernmental realms of EU foreign policies.

¹⁸⁰ Joakim Kreutz. (2004). "Reviewing the EU Arms Embargo on China: the clash between value and rationale in European Security Strategy." *The Central European review of international affairs*, 22, pp. 43-58.

¹⁸¹ Solana: EU ready to lift China arms embargo [Electronic version]. (2004, February 5). *China Daily*.

¹⁸² EU's Solana: End China arms ban [Electronic version]. (2005, March 23). *CNN*.

¹⁸³ Solana: Arms embargo 'unfair' [Electronic version]. (2005, March 24). *China.org*.

¹⁸⁴ Stephan Keukeleire and Jennifer MacNaughtan. (2008). *The foreign policy of the European Union*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, Chapter 3, pp. 66-97.

¹⁸⁵ After the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty, December 2009, the President of the European Council and the High Representative for the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy attend the European Council meetings together with the Heads of Government or State. The President of the European Council, presently Herman Van Rompuy, now chairs the meetings as opposed to the pre-Lisbon arrangement of a rotating Presidency.

emphasises how Solana did in fact manage to influence EU foreign policies during his time as the High Representative, but that this influence was marked by the “more traditional style of diplomatic mediation and alliance-building (...),” rather than an activist interpretation of his Community role.¹⁸⁶ Solana’s time as Secretary General of NATO, could thus suggest that he had been influenced by this organisation’s emphasis on state sovereignty and intergovernmentalism. His NATO legacy also contributed to credibility and a high political profile in his dealings with European capitals, Washington and other international organisations.¹⁸⁷ This personal weight might also have increased the level of influence for an otherwise somewhat vague EU institution. Magone has also pointed to how the Atlanticist convictions of Commission President Barroso and the former NATO Secretary General, Solana, could have helped improve the EU-US relationship after the clear transatlantic drift during the 2003 Iraqi crisis.¹⁸⁸ However, this did not happen in the arms embargo case, as they both advocated a lifting in spite of the strong US opposition.¹⁸⁹ This might be explained by suggesting that their Atlanticist orientations were not as important as assumed or that their roles as Community actors made it more difficult to express their Atlanticist convictions if the EU majority was not on their side.

4.2.3 The European Parliament

Even though the participation of the directly elected European Parliament (EP) could perhaps have boosted the legitimacy of the CFSP, the EP’s foreign policy role remained limited.¹⁹⁰ The EP is only to be consulted and informed about CFSP issues, and even then, the Council Presidency decides to what degree this is to be done. As a way of increasing its influence in EU foreign affairs, the EP has initiated its own reports and resolutions on relevant matters in order to make its voice heard.¹⁹¹ During the 1980’s, the EP pressured the EU, and particularly the Commission, into including the abovementioned human rights clause in all trade agreements with third countries, and became thus increasingly known as an important norm

¹⁸⁶ Richard Youngs (ed.). (2006). Survey of European Democracy Promotion Policies 2000-2006, *Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior*

¹⁸⁷ Stephan Keukeleire and Jennifer MacNaughtan. (2008). *The foreign policy of the European Union*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, Chapter 3, pp. 66-97.

¹⁸⁸ José M. Magone. (2005). “José Manuel Durão Barroso: A Political Scientist in the World of European Union Politics.” *International Journal*, 60 (2), pp. 544-555.

¹⁸⁹ The US was strongly opposed to a lifting of the EU arms embargo mostly because of security interests in South East Asia. This position is further discussed in chapter five in relation to the UK Government’s position.

¹⁹⁰ Stephan Keukeleire and Jennifer MacNaughtan. (2008). *The foreign policy of the European Union*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, Chapter 3, pp. 66-97.

¹⁹¹ Ibid.

entrepreneur in the EU.¹⁹² The then Director of the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Jan Egeland, also pointed to how the EP's efforts as a norm entrepreneur have remained neglected, even though that it had called for human rights action at times when national governments and other EU institutions had remained silent.¹⁹³

The EP's human rights advocacy is also evident in the arms embargo debate. The European Parliament Resolution of December 18th, 2003 against the removal of the EU arms embargo clearly stated that China had to improve its human rights record before the EU could consider any lifting of the arms embargo. It also strongly urged the Council and the member states to keep the embargo.¹⁹⁴ The EP's two following resolutions on the Council's Fifth and Sixth reports on the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports, respectively, maintained the call upon the Council and member states to keep the embargo and emphasised the need to make the Code of Conduct on Arms Export legally binding for all member states.¹⁹⁵

In addition to these parliamentary resolutions, the transcripts of several 2005 EP plenary sessions demonstrated the EP's declaratory diplomacy and showed how the prospect of lifting the arms embargo against China was subject to much criticism in the EP.¹⁹⁶ The EP debate on the March 2005 European Council Conclusions demonstrated how members of the European parliament (MEPs) from different member states and different party groups, the EPP, PES and ALDE,¹⁹⁷ all expressed their opposition to the lifting.¹⁹⁸ In this debate, the Dutch ALDE MEP Dirk Sterckx expressed his bafflement over how the Council continued to discuss a lifting of the embargo despite strong and almost unitary opposition in the directly elected EP.¹⁹⁹ Furthermore, Italian PES MEP, Guido Sacconi, emphasised how there were still human rights repressions going on in China, and British ALDE MEP Graham Watson

¹⁹² Karen E. Smith. (2008). *European Union foreign policy in a changing world* (2nd Ed.). Cambridge: Polity Press. Chapter 5, pp. 111-141.

¹⁹³ Jan Egeland (2010, November 17) "Seminar on human rights." Speech Presented at Conference on Human Rights with the EU's delegation to Norway, Oslo, Norway.

¹⁹⁴ European Parliament. (2003). *Removal of the EU embargo on arms sales to China*, P5_TA-PROV(2003)0599

¹⁹⁵ European parliament. (2004). *European Parliament resolution on the Council's Fifth annual report according to operative provision 8 of the European Union Code of Conduct on Arms Exports*, P6_TA(2004)0058 and European parliament. (2005). *European Parliament resolution on the Council's Sixth annual report according to operative provision 8 of the European Union Code of Conduct on Arms Exports*, P6_TA(2004)0058 P6_TA(2005)0436

¹⁹⁶ European Parliament. (2005, April 27). *Plenary debate: Human rights in the world 2004 and the EU's policy*, European Parliament. (2005, June 23). *Programme of the British Presidency*, European Parliament. (2005, September 8). *Breaches of human rights in China, in particular as regards freedom of religion*, and European Parliament. (2005, November 16). *Arms export*.

¹⁹⁷ EP Parliamentary groups: European People's Party (EPP), Party of European Socialists (PES) and Alliance for Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE).

¹⁹⁸ European Parliament. (2005, April 13). *Meeting of the European Council (Brussels, 22 and 23 March 2005)*.

¹⁹⁹ Dirk Sterckx. (2005, April 13). *European Parliament. Meeting of the European Council (Brussels, 22 and 23 March 2005)*.

claimed that Europe would be “humiliated abroad” if it continued to promote trade over human rights concerns.²⁰⁰ Several EP plenary debates throughout 2005 conveyed the same message: a wish to keep the arms embargo until the human rights situation in China had improved substantially.²⁰¹ The Polish UEN²⁰² MEP Marcin Libicki, also acknowledged the limited effect of the arms embargo, but emphasised nonetheless, its symbolic importance, embodying the EU’s moral beliefs.²⁰³ The volume and coherence of MEP statements seem to suggest that the EP was a more or less united human rights-oriented actor. Viewed through Moravcsik’s FPA lens, this may consequently suggest that the EP behaved as a societal group which tried to export its human rights preferences to the main foreign policy decision makers.

The abovementioned Community actors’ different views on the arms embargo, however, emphasise the lack of a unified position among the Community actors of the EU in general. These different positions also reflect the abovementioned “uneasy mix” of commercial and human rights-oriented aspects of the EU-China relationship.²⁰⁴ This divide is illustrated by how the EP advocated a maintaining of the embargo based on human rights concerns, while the Commission and the High Representative generally favoured the lifting as a means of improving the EU-China trade-oriented relationship. Even though Keukeleire and MacNaughtan claim that Community actors become increasingly important because of an issue overload for the national representatives,²⁰⁵ the preceding analysis of Community actors’ actions illustrates how these supranational actors were still predominantly excluded from formal CFSP decision making. In spite of the fact that they still had the possibility of influencing other more powerful actors’ decisions through rhetoric action and suggestions, it remains, nonetheless, necessary to look at the intergovernmental actors’ actions in order to be able to understand what happened and who decided the course of events in the arms embargo case.

²⁰⁰ European Parliament. (2005, April 13). *Meeting of the European Council (Brussels, 22 and 23 March 2005)*.

²⁰¹ European Parliament. (2005, April 27). *Plenary debate: Human rights in the world 2004 and the EU’s policy*, European Parliament. (2005, June 23). *Programme of the British Presidency*, European Parliament. (2005, September 8). *Breaches of human rights in China, in particular as regards freedom of religion*, and European Parliament. (2005, November 16). *Arms export*.

²⁰² EP Parliamentary group Union for Europe of the Nations

²⁰³ Marcin Libicki. (2005, April 27). *European Parliament plenary debate: Human rights in the world 2004 and the EU’s policy*,

²⁰⁴ Stephan Keukeleire and Jennifer MacNaughtan. (2008). *The foreign policy of the European Union*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, Chapter 11, pp. 318-322.

²⁰⁵ Stephan Keukeleire and Jennifer MacNaughtan. (2008). *The foreign policy of the European Union*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, Chapter 3, pp. 66-97.

4.3 The European Council and the Council of the European Union: EU actors between the national and the supranational

Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace point to an on-going debate about the role and image of the Council, where some scholars characterise the Council as a national interest-oriented obstacle to “bright ideas from the Commission or the EP,” while others see it as a forum for negotiating the common good for the EU as a whole.²⁰⁶ This illustrates how intergovernmental institutions, such as the Council, may be caught in the dilemma of being governed by national representatives and at the same time serve as some of the main decision-making bodies of the Union.

4.3.1 The European Council

The European Council was not legally embedded within the treaty framework until the Single European Act (SEA) of 1986. Being initiated as a place for overall political direction of the EU in 1974, the European Council still remains the main decision maker of the CFSP.²⁰⁷ The member states’ Heads of Government or State, often together with their respective Foreign Ministers, make up the European Council, together with the President of the Commission and the High Representative for the CFSP. White points to the abovementioned Community aspect of the European Council as he calls it the EU’s “clearing house,” where contentious issues, which have reached a dead end in the Council, are readdressed for a final negotiation process.²⁰⁸ Keukeleire and MacNaughtan, however emphasise the national aspect of the European Council, as they claim that even though this was to be a body of overall political direction, it is nonetheless dominated by national foreign policies and domestic interests.²⁰⁹ They have, however, admitted that there is a certain consensus culture within the European Council, and that its major foreign policy decisions usually are the products of integrationist objectives.²¹⁰ As chapter five of the present thesis includes a more extensive analysis of the Presidency of the European Council, the following sections focuses on the European Council’s main decisions regarding the arms embargo debate

The first official mention of a possible lifting of the arms embargo is found in the Presidency Conclusions of December 2003, which expressed that “the European Council

²⁰⁶ Fiona Hayes-Renshaw and H. Wallace. (1997). *The Council of Ministers*. London: Macmillan. Chapter 1, pp.1-26, p. 2.

²⁰⁷ Stephan Keukeleire and Jennifer MacNaughtan. (2008). *The foreign policy of the European Union*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, Chapter 3, pp. 66-97.

²⁰⁸ Brian White. (2001). *Understanding European foreign policy*, New York: Palgrave. Chapter 1, pp. 1-26.

²⁰⁹ Stephan Keukeleire and Jennifer MacNaughtan. (2008). *The foreign policy of the European Union*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, Chapter 3, pp. 66-97.

²¹⁰ Ibid.

invites the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) to re-examine the question of the embargo on the sale of arms to China.”²¹¹ While the same document also emphasised the importance of defining the Union’s human rights policy, there was no indication of whether the European Council placed itself on the human rights or economic-oriented side of the lifting debate.²¹² The Conclusions following the June 2004 European Council restated the invitation to the Council to follow up on the arms embargo question, especially in regard to the possible impact on the EU-China relationship.²¹³ In December that same year, the European Council also emphasised the need to revise the abovementioned EU Code of Conduct on Arms Export in order to prevent increased arms sales to ex-embargo countries, but it did nonetheless call for a resolution of the arms embargo debate within the next Presidency period.²¹⁴ This explicit invitation to the next Presidency to finalise the arms embargo debate, could perhaps suggest that a consensus was within reach, but it could also have been a way for the current Presidency of showing China its devotion to the developing EU-China strategic partnership, without really having to resolve the case itself.

The expected finalisation of the issue, however, is nowhere to be found in the Conclusions of the next Presidency.²¹⁵ The June 2005 Conclusions marked the thirtieth anniversary of EU-China relations and stated the importance of the EU-China strategic partnership, but the lifting of the arms embargo was not even mentioned. The fact that the arms embargo was absent in the Conclusions of the British Presidency in December 2005 as well, suggests that the issue had slipped off the negotiation table despite the December 2004 Conclusions’ rather firm belief in a prompt finalisation. The non-mention of the arms embargo in the 2005 Conclusions might also be explained by how the European Council might have wished to appear strong in order to hide the institution’s internal disagreements on the contentious issue. This wish to appear united also explains why the Conclusions of the European Council in general do not reveal any internal divisions, but instead present a commonly reached consensus, conveyed by the Presidency. There is no indication of each member state’s position on different issues, and the European Council thus appears to be a

²¹¹ Council of the European Union. (2004, February 5). *Presidency Conclusions: Brussels European Council 12 and 13 December 2003*. 5381/04. Point 72.

²¹² Council of the European Union. (2004, February 5). *Presidency Conclusions: Brussels European Council 12 and 13 December 2003*. 5381/04.

²¹³ Council of the European Union. (2004, July 19). *Conclusions de la Présidence: Conseil Européen de Bruxelles le 17 et le 18 Juin 2004*. 10679/2/04.

²¹⁴ Council of the European Union. (2005, February 1). *Presidency Conclusions: Brussels European Council 16 and 17 December 2004*. 16238/1/04.

²¹⁵ Council of the European Union. (2005, July 15). *Presidency Conclusions: Brussels European Council 16 and 17 June 2004*. 10255/1/05.

college rather than a place for complex intergovernmental bargaining. The European Council's silence thus emphasises the need to look at individual member state positions in order to see what was going on underneath the surface. This could also suggest that a socialisation effect could be present within this institution, which is usually considered the epicentre of intergovernmentalism and member state interest representation.

4.3.2 The Council of the European Union

The Council, together with the European Council, is regarded as the main political and legal decision-making body of the CFSP.²¹⁶ It is to ensure that the CFSP remains controlled by the member states, while it also, through its numerous compositions and frequent meetings, promotes policy coordination and cooperation between the member states. Up until the implementation of the Lisbon treaty in 2009, the GAERC was in charge of foreign trade, international agreements, the CFSP and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).²¹⁷ This institution is, as previously mentioned, located somewhat in between the national and supranational logic of the EU. This is demonstrated by how it is governed by the interests and priorities of national ministers, while it is an EU policy maker, whose substructures become increasingly important and possibly communitarized. The fact that there is no one Council, but a myriad of different Council configurations of national ministers, also makes it difficult to say that it predominantly works for a common EU interest.²¹⁸

As previously mentioned, the task of reviewing the arms embargo was delegated by the European Council to the Council in December 2003.²¹⁹ Furthermore, the first Council discussions on the issue took place in the External Relations Council on January 26th 2004.²²⁰ At this Council meeting, which also covered development policy, the possibilities of peace in the Middle East, a declaration on cooperation with the Western Balkans and relations with Russia, the arms embargo against China seemed to be only one of the many time consuming points on the busy agenda.²²¹ The extensive agenda of the April 26th 2004 External Relations

²¹⁶ Stephan Keukeleire and Jennifer MacNaughtan. (2008). *The foreign policy of the European Union*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, Chapter 3, pp. 66-97.

²¹⁷ This constellation was changed with the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty. The GAERC is now divided into two separate councils: General Affairs Council and Foreign Affairs Council. See also Stephan Keukeleire and Jennifer MacNaughtan. (2008). *The foreign policy of the European Union*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, Chapter 3, pp. 66-97.

²¹⁸ Brian White. (2001). *Understanding European foreign policy*, New York: Palgrave. Chapter 1, pp. 1-26.

²¹⁹ Council of the European Union. (2004, February 5). *Presidency Conclusions: Brussels European Council 12 and 13 December 2003*. 5381/04.

²²⁰ Council of the European Union. (2004, January 26). *2559th Council Meeting: External Relations, 5519/04* (Presse 26).

²²¹ Council of the European Union. (2004, April 26). *2577th Council Meeting: External Relations, 8567/04* (Presse 116).

Council also confirms Keukeleire and MacNaughtan's argument about how the increased work load led to the fact that the exchange of views in the Council became a formality, rather than a time of genuine debate.²²²

With the abovementioned agenda overload in the Council, an increasing amount of issues were being transferred to the Committee of the Permanent Representatives (COREPER) for preliminary negotiations before the regular Council meetings.²²³ Consequently, a series of issues were being decided by national permanent representatives in COREPER or in the Political and Security Committee (PSC). The fact that nationally appointed experts in the Council's working groups have been increasingly involved in the decision making process also confirms the diversity and multi-level nature of the Council and of the EU. This transfer of issues to a lower level is demonstrated by the External Relations Councils of January 26th and April 26th 2004, which acknowledged the invitation to examine the arms embargo question, but referred it directly to COREPER and the PSC for further deliberations, without stating its position on the matter.²²⁴ However, there was also a work overload in COREPER, as the preparation for the annual EU-China summit, including the deliberations on a proposed statement on the status of the arms embargo, was listed as one of the sixty-four points on the agenda for the 2075th COREPER meeting on December 1st 2004.²²⁵ This could suggest that the lack of sufficient deliberation time on the arms embargo issue in the Council's many fora could be one of the reasons why there was no finalisation of the question. The little amount of time granted to the discussions of the embargo thus indicates that the arms embargo case was perhaps not one of the Council's top priorities. Also, as discussed in chapter five of the present thesis, one could argue that this lack of time was a result of the Presidencies' agenda setting where the member states in office were reluctant towards making the embargo lifting one their top Presidency priorities.

On the one hand, the fact that the EU Presidency's agenda seemed to be affected by national interests would then show how traditional liberal FPA may be a useful theoretical framework for the analysis of EU foreign policy. On the other hand, the complex mix of intergovernmental and supranational institutions might make the application of traditional FPA to EU foreign policy more difficult. Smith agrees with this by pointing to how the co-

²²² Stephan Keukeleire and Jennifer MacNaughtan. (2008). *The foreign policy of the European Union*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, Chapter 3, pp. 66-97.

²²³ Brian White. (2001). *Understanding European foreign policy*, New York: Palgrave. Chapter 1, pp. 1-26.

²²⁴ Council of the European Union. (2004, January 26). *2559th Council Meeting: External Relations*, 5519/04 (Presse 26) and Council of the European Union. (2004, April 26). *2577th Council Meeting: External Relations*, 8567/04 (Presse 116).

²²⁵ Council of the European Union. (2004, November 29). *Provisional agenda: 2075th meeting of the Permanent Representatives Committee*, OJ/CRP2 42.

existence of multiple actors and regimes makes the EU a *sui generis* actor.²²⁶ The non-governmental nature of Community institutions also complicates things for the state-centred FPA, as there are claims that the EU foreign policy system challenges the notion of traditional state sovereignty.²²⁷ Despite these arguments about the EU being too *sui generis* for a traditional FPA, the unanimity rule and the intergovernmental nature of the CFSP, point to how such a state-centred analysis may, nonetheless, be possible, as the member states seem to remain the main decision makers in EU foreign policy.

Sjursen confirms this primacy of member states in CFSP, as she argues that even though the EU's foreign policy system has become a complex network of different intergovernmental and supranational actors, it is still naive to think that member states will lose their influence in EU foreign policy.²²⁸ Also, the fact that the majority of the Council's deliberations on the lifting of the arms embargo, seems to have taken place during lunch meetings of the External Relations Councils,²²⁹ might suggest that there were in fact diverging member state positions on the issue which need to be further explored. This assumption is founded on the claim by Keukeleire and MacNaughtan, which points to how lunch meetings, as opposed to regular Council sessions, are considered a more suitable and confidential arena for the treatment of contentious and diverging issues.²³⁰ Consequently, this emphasises the need to consider how the different member states, and the domestic sources of their positions, affected the arms embargo case. The abovementioned intergovernmentalism of the CFSP and the indications that internal divergence within the Council might have affected the outcome of the arms embargo debate, thus explain why the next chapter considers the member states and domestic actors' actions.

²²⁶ Karen E. Smith. (2008). *European Union foreign policy in a changing world* (2nd Ed.). Cambridge: Polity Press. Chapter 9, pp.230-240.

²²⁷ Michael Smith in Helene Sjursen. (2003). "Understanding the common foreign and security policy: Analytical building blocks." in Michèle Knodt and Sebastiaan Princen (eds.). *Understanding the European Union's External Relations*. Oxon: Routledge, Chapter 2, pp. 35-53.

²²⁸ Helene Sjursen. (2003). "Understanding the common foreign and security policy: Analytical building blocks," in Michèle Knodt and Sebastiaan Princen (eds.). *Understanding the European Union's External Relations*. Oxon: Routledge, Chapter 2, pp. 35-53.

²²⁹ Council of the European Union. (2004, October 11). *2609th Council Meeting: General Affairs and External Relations*, 12770/04 (Presse 276), Council of the European Union . (2004, November 22). *2622th Council Meeting: General Affairs and External Relations*, 14724/04 (Presse 325) and Council of the European Union. (2004, December 13). *2633rd Council Meeting: General Affairs and External Relations*, 15461/04 (Presse 344).

²³⁰ Stephan Keukeleire and Jennifer MacNaughtan. (2008). *The foreign policy of the European Union*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, Chapter 3, pp. 66-97.

5.0 EU member states and EU foreign policy

White claims that “we cannot understand European foreign policy-making without looking at the separate foreign policies of member states.”²³¹ This is also the case with the analysis of arms embargo discussions. The abovementioned primacy of intergovernmentalism in the CFSP and the fact that the embargo was to be settled by unanimity in the European Council, both call for a more in-depth assessment of the member states’ actions and positions in order to provide a more comprehensive analysis.

The chapter firstly focuses on how domestic factors, such as national parliaments, business interests and special bilateral relationships, possibly shaped the arms embargo positions of EU member states. Secondly, it looks at how the rotating Presidency of the European Council might have been a potential source of national interest projection.

5.1 Member states and domestic sources of EU foreign policy

The multitude of EU member states creates a vast amount of domestic actors, structures and procedures to be accounted for in a nationally oriented analysis.²³² That is why, as explained in chapter one of the present thesis, this analysis is focused on four member states, the UK, France, Germany and Sweden, in order to try to provide a more in-depth analysis and to avoid a perhaps less analytical listing of all the then twenty-five member states’ actions.

The following comparative layout, structured around actors rather than member states, has been chosen in order to emphasise how national and domestic actors’ positions seem to reflect that type of actor’s typical positions, instead of their national affiliation.

5.1.1 The Governments

The intergovernmentalist nature of the CFSP gives the Governments a key role in deciding and formulating the EU’s political foreign policy. This also emphasises the Heads of Government or State’s prominent position in articulating and perhaps protecting national foreign policy interests on the EU arena. The member states’ Ministries of Foreign Affairs therefore see a certain decline of their traditional foreign policy power because of how the Prime Ministers²³³ become the “gate keepers” of national foreign policy, as EU foreign policy coordination increases. Tonra agrees with this as he argues that the increased complexity and

²³¹ Brian White. (2001). *Understanding European FP*. New York: Palgrave, Chapter 6, pp.118-141, pp. 118.

²³² The EU went from EU15 to EU25 May 1st 2004, before its most recent enlargement in 2007 which created the EU27 of today.

²³³ An exception from this prominence of the Prime Minister in foreign policy is France and Finland. These member states’ presidential systems gives the President, and not the Prime Minister, increasingly more control over foreign policy. However, these two presidents are also be included in the following discussions on the ‘primeministerialisation’ of foreign policy.

pace of the EU system has created an opportunity for the Prime Minister to become more involved in foreign policy.²³⁴ This centralisation of national foreign policy positions also illustrates how the Prime Ministers want to assure that the government speaks with one voice in Brussels.²³⁵ In spite of the possible co-existence of many and perhaps opposing domestic actors, this "primeministerialisation" emphasises thus how statements made by the Prime Ministers may arguably be a sufficient basis for the analysis of member states' actions.²³⁶

The German Chancellor, Gerhard Schröder and the French President, Jacques Chirac, were the first to explicitly call for a lifting of the arms embargo within the EU. On a state visit to China in December 2003, Schröder claimed that it was time for the EU embargo to be lifted.²³⁷ Chirac joined in during Chinese President Hu Jintao's visit to France in 2004 as he argued that the embargo was anachronistic.²³⁸ Schröder also promised China to push for an end to the embargo from the inside, as a way of promoting commercial ties between Germany and China.²³⁹ Economist Wolfe explained these lifting initiatives by pointing to Franco-German hopes of commercial good-will and increased trade with China after their 1990's economic slump.²⁴⁰ This suggests that economic benefits of the lifting seemed to upstage the human rights concerns which had initially led to the imposing of the embargo.²⁴¹ The Franco-German initiative was also evidence of a wish to Europeanize a national question in order to get the most effect out of it.²⁴² This Europeanization would then imply that France and Germany projected their national interests, of upgrading their respective relationships with China, into an EU context via the arms embargo case.

While the French Foreign Minister, Dominique de Villepin, also opposed the embargo because of China's new role as an important strategic partner,²⁴³ the German foreign minister,

²³⁴ Ben Tonra. (2000). "Denmark and Ireland," in Manners, I. and R. G. Whitman. (eds.). *The foreign policies of European Union member states*. New York: Manchester University Press, Chapter 12, pp. 224-242.

²³⁵ Anthony Forster. (2000). "Britain," in Manners, I. and R. G. Whitman. (eds.). *The foreign policies of European Union member states*. New York: Manchester University Press. Chapter 3, pp. 44-63.

²³⁶ Magnus Ekgren. (2004). "National FP coordination: the Swedish EU presidency." in Carlsnaes, W., H. Sjørnsen and B. White (eds.). *Contemporary European Foreign Policy*. London: Sage Publications, Chapter 13, pp. 211-226.

²³⁷ Frank Ching. (2004). "Changing dynamics in EU-china Arms relations." [Electronic version]. *China Brief*.

²³⁸ Chirac under attack over arms embargo comments [Electronic version]. (2004, October 10). *Taipei Times*.

²³⁹ Lisbeth Kirk. (2003, December 1). "Schröder wants to lift arms embargo against China" [Electronic version]. *EU Observer*.

²⁴⁰ Adam Wolfe. (2004, February 12). "France, Germany seek to resume China arms sales" [Electronic version]. *Asia Times*.

²⁴¹ Lisbeth Aggestam. (2000). "Germany." in Manners, I. and R. G. Whitman. (eds.). *The foreign policies of European Union member states*. New York: Manchester University Press, Chapter 4, pp. 64-83.

²⁴² Reuben Wong. (2010). "The Europeanization of FP." in C. Hill and M. Smith. *International relations and the EU* (2nd Ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 149-170.

²⁴³ Adam Wolfe. (2004, February 12). "France, Germany seek to resume China arms sales" [Electronic version]. *Asia Times*.

Joshka Fischer of Schröder's Government coalition party, the Greens, was more critical to a lifting without a more substantial update of the abovementioned EU Code of Conduct.²⁴⁴ The Greens' environmental and human rights-oriented policies were thus evident in the Foreign Minister' position. This also points to the perhaps inevitable political differences which exist within a coalition government on certain issues.

The UK Labour Government announced in the UK House of Lords in January 2004 that it gladly welcomed a review of the arms embargo.²⁴⁵ Baroness Symons, the UK Minister of State for the Middle East, International Security, Consular and Personal Affairs in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, emphasised the fact that the UK had already shown its arms control engagement by initiating the abovementioned EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports in 1998.²⁴⁶ She also claimed that this Code was a much better instrument for arms regulations than vaguely defined embargoes.

Even though the UK position on the subject initially seemed rather vague and undecided, Prime Minister Tony Blair eventually supported Chirac and Schröder's lifting bid in June 2004.²⁴⁷ However, the UK's special relationship with the US complicated the UK's position in the arms embargo case, as the US was clearly opposed to the lifting.²⁴⁸ The Chinese repressions of the Tiananmen Square protests had also led to an American arms embargo against China. This embargo was perhaps additionally motivated by the fear of an increasingly militarised China next to its Taiwanese allies,²⁴⁹ and the US strongly advocated the mutually reinforcing effect of these two embargoes as it pressed for a continuation of the EU's embargo during the 2004-2005 debate.²⁵⁰ The US' security interests and military presence in South East Asia also strengthened its aversion towards EU member states' possibilities of exporting an increased amount of advanced defence technology, which they had in turn acquired from the US, to China. As the present chapter's section on the Presidency of the European Council later demonstrates, the US' influence on the 2005 UK Presidency's agenda proved to be one of the main reasons for why the lifting did not happen. The UK

²⁴⁴ Joakim Kreutz. (2004). "Reviewing the EU Arms Embargo on China: the clash between value and rationale in European Security Strategy." *The Central European review of international affairs*, 22, pp. 43-58.

²⁴⁵ Baroness Elizabeth Symons. (2004, January 12). *UK Parliament House of Lords, Column 373China: EU Arms Trade Embargo*.

²⁴⁶ Ibid.

²⁴⁷ Richard A. Bitzinger. (2004, December 31). "A Prisoner's Dilemma: The EU's China Arms Embargo" [Electronic version]. *China Brief*.

²⁴⁸ Stephen Fidler and D. Dombey. (2005, January 20). "Top US official rejects Straw's attempt to ease tension over China arms embargo" [Electronic version]. *Financial times*.

²⁴⁹ Ibid.

²⁵⁰ Gudrun Wacker. (February 17, 2005). *Lifting the EU arms embargo against CN. US and EU position*. Working paper presented at the 1st colloquium of the TFPD-Working group "China's Rise." Washington DC, USA.

Government thus seemed to owe much of its hesitation in the arms embargo discussions to its powerful partner's strong opposition to the lifting and to the many beneficial links between British and American defence industries.²⁵¹

Sweden was early on reluctant towards a lifting of the arms embargo.²⁵² The public's human rights advocacy and interest in foreign policy questions put Sweden in an awkward position as the EU looked for a consensus on the arms embargo issue.²⁵³ Swedish Social Democratic Prime Minister, Göran Persson, nonetheless, showed his support for the lifting by calling for a more constructive dialogue with China without the constraints of the arms embargo.²⁵⁴ Persson, however, similar to Baroness Symons, also emphasised the need for a revised and more effective EU Code of Conduct, but explicitly stated that he would not veto the EU's lifting of this ineffective embargo.²⁵⁵ Laila Freivalds, the Swedish Foreign Minister, also favoured a lifting of the embargo as she assured human rights advocates that Swedish export rules would continue to prevent Swedish arms exports to China.²⁵⁶ She also argued that constructive engagement, instead of the continuation of the embargo, would be the best way of promoting democratic development in China.²⁵⁷

The Swedish Government's position did not seem to differ from other member states' positions, even though its Nordic tradition of human rights advocacy would suggest a clear Swedish opposition to the lifting of a human rights-based embargo. Miles explains this by pointing to how Sweden considered active involvement in the CFSP as a way of consolidating its "EU credentials" and of showing the EU its devotion despite its neutrality.²⁵⁸ This desire to fit in is also emphasised by Casarini, as she argues that neither Sweden nor Denmark wanted to be the one to break the EU consensus, despite considerable opposition in their national parliaments.²⁵⁹ This could perhaps suggest that both Sweden and Denmark followed the previously mentioned coordination reflex, arguably inherent within an evolving CFSP system. Sweden's move away from its traditional values in order to fit in, could perhaps also suggest

²⁵¹ Please see section 5.2 for a more in-depth analysis of the impact of the US-UK special relationship on the arms embargo case.

²⁵² US refutes Chirac's call to end China arms embargo [Electronic version]. (2004, January 29). *China Daily*.

²⁵³ Joakim Kreutz. (2004). "Reviewing the EU Arms Embargo on China: the clash between value and rationale in European Security Strategy." *The Central European review of international affairs*, 22, pp. 43-58.

²⁵⁴ Göran Persson. (2004, December 18). *Sveriges Riksdag. Riksdagens protokoll 2004/05:55*.

²⁵⁵ Ibid.

²⁵⁶ Laila Freivalds. (2005, February 2). *Sveriges Riksdag. Svar på skriftlig fråga 2004/05:804försäljning av vapen till Kina*.

²⁵⁷ Laila Freivalds. (2005, January 12). *Sveriges Riksdag. Svar på skriftlig fråga 2004/05:617EU:s vapenembargo mot Kina*.

²⁵⁸ Les Miles. (2000). "Sweden and Finland." in Manners, I. and R. G. Whitman. (eds.). *The foreign policies of European Union member states*. New York: Manchester University Press, Chapter 10, pp. 181-203.

²⁵⁹ Nicola Casarini. (2006, October). "The evolution of the EU-China relationship: from constructive engagement to strategic partnership." *European Union Institute for Security Studies Occasional Paper*, 64.

that a socialisation factor or the "logic of appropriateness" of the CFSP had affected Sweden's position. This socialisation effect, which Manners and Whitman point to as disproportionately linked with the size of each member state and its administration,²⁶⁰ would then have created a new and European sense of community and possibly affected the preference formation of Swedish government representatives. Even though the minority status of the Swedish Government made it perhaps necessary to consider the Parliament's position, the European socialisation process had arguably created another group of constituents, in this case the Swedish Government's counterparts in the EU, whose views also needed to be considered. This might be an example of Putnam's previously mentioned "two-level game," where national governments are simultaneously engaged both nationally and internationally during intergovernmental negotiations.²⁶¹

While Sweden avoided vetoing the lifting possibly because of socialisation effects, Germany, France and the UK seemed to base their lifting advocacy on three recurring arguments against sanctions: the fear of possible implications on commercial interest, the view that it would be too risky to antagonise the sanctioned country and the doubts about the effect of the sanctions.²⁶² German Chancellor Schröder's emphasis on trade relations,²⁶³ the French foreign minister Villepin's talk of China as a privileged partner,²⁶⁴ and the UK Government's, and Sweden's, focus on the EU Code of Conduct as a better functioning instrument for arms control,²⁶⁵ are indeed examples of how these different arguments against sanctions were employed by pro-lifting Governments. This clearly suggests that the lifting campaign was focused on the considerations for economic growth and trade, rather than on the human rights conditions in the sanctioned country. As previously mentioned, the tension between economic and political considerations thus becomes evident in the EU's relationship with emerging world powers, such as China.

²⁶⁰ Ian Manners and R. Whitman. (2000). "Conclusion," in Manners, I. and R. G. Whitman. (eds.). *The foreign policies of European Union member states*. New York: Manchester University Press, Chapter 13, pp. 243-273.

²⁶¹ Robert Putnam. (1988). "Diplomacy and Domestic Policies: The logic of two-level games." *International Organization*, 42(3), pp. 427-460.

²⁶² Karen E. Smith. (2008). *European Union foreign policy in a changing world* (2nd Ed.). Cambridge: Polity Press. Chapter 5, pp. 111-141, p. 138.

²⁶³ Eugene Kogan. (2005). "The European Union defence industry and the appeal of the Chinese market." *Studien und berichte zur Sicherheitspolitik*, 1.

²⁶⁴ Adam Wolfe. (2004, February 12). "France, Germany seek to resume China arms sales" [Electronic version]. *Asia Times*.

²⁶⁵ UK Parliament, House of Lords. (2004, January 12). *Column 373 China: EU Arms Trade Embargo*.

5.1.2 National parliaments and public opinion: subdued domestic opposition?

Even though the Heads of Government or State seemed to control the formulation of national foreign policies, it is also necessary to consider how the national parliaments positioned themselves vis-à-vis their respective Governments' stance on the arms embargo. Despite the executive nature of foreign policies, it can be argued that the domestic political climate will in some way or another always influence how governments behave internationally. Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace acknowledge this by pointing to the fact that there is much more to member state positions than their Governments.²⁶⁶ The extent to which the domestic political climate is able to influence its government's positions is, however, dependent on the government's support and standing within its country.

As the Council is not directly accountable to national parliaments, the task of informing and including parliamentarians in foreign policy decision-making remains that of each government in the respective member state.²⁶⁷ Manners and Whitman furthermore emphasise the individual governments' different views on this, as they point to how parliamentary scrutiny is an important factor in shaping the foreign policy of some member states, such as Sweden and Denmark, while other member states, with more centralised foreign policy frameworks, such as France and the UK, consider parliamentary oversight largely ineffective and redundant.²⁶⁸ The impact of national parliaments is thus expected to vary according to the wishes and practices of national governments.

According to Blunden, French leaders have taken it for granted that foreign policy is the President's prerogative and that "the building of Europe never should be a democratic or popular process."²⁶⁹ Consequently, French foreign policy-making remains a concentrated process where the President, in close "symbiosis" with the Quai d'Orsay, is the principal foreign policy actor. This is illustrated by the fact that Chirac strongly advocated the lifting of the arms embargo, while there was considerable opposition in the Assemblée Nationale. The opposition was evident as half of the 577 representatives in the French Parliament, and amongst them representatives from Chirac's own party,²⁷⁰ boycotted Chinese President Hu's parliamentary address in January 2004, and instead joined the demonstrations outside the

²⁶⁶ Fiona Hayes-Renshaw and H. Wallace. (1997). *The Council of Ministers*. London: Macmillan. Chapter 9, pp.211-243.

²⁶⁷ Fiona Hayes-Renshaw and H. Wallace. (1997). *The Council of Ministers*. London: Macmillan. Chapter 9, pp.211-243.

²⁶⁸ Ian Manners and R. Whitman. (2000). "Conclusion," in Manners, I. and R. G. Whitman. (eds.).*The foreign policies of European Union member states*. New York: Manchester University Press, Chapter 13, pp. 243-273.

²⁶⁹ Margaret Blunden. (2000). "France." in Manners, I. and R. G. Whitman. (eds.).*The foreign policies of European Union member states*. New York: Manchester University Press, Chapter 2, pp. 19-43.

²⁷⁰ Union pour un Mouvement Populaire.

Parliament buildings.²⁷¹ French parliamentary debates also demonstrated disagreements both amongst the French MPs and between the President and the Parliament concerning the human rights aspect of the embargo lifting.²⁷²

The German Bundestag demonstrated their opposition to the lifting, as German MPs, including the majority of Schröder's Social Democratic party, as well as his coalition party, the Greens, passed a resolution in late 2003 in favour of keeping the embargo.²⁷³ The fact that Schröder continued to advocate a lifting in spite of a clear bipartisan parliamentary majority, suggests that the Bundestag had limited influence on German foreign policy. Chancellor Schröder further emphasised the Government's primacy in foreign policy questions, as he claimed that "the constitution states that foreign policy is conducted by the federal Government. I take every vote in the Parliament seriously, but the constitutional position is clear."²⁷⁴ The abovementioned connection between the government and the domestic political climate in foreign policy making thus seemed to be broken by the explicit centralisation of foreign policy.

The British Houses of Parliament have not traditionally been a key player in the UK's foreign policy-making process.²⁷⁵ Foreign policy in the UK is a government prerogative and has also been increasingly concentrated within the Prime Minister's Office.²⁷⁶ Prime Minister Tony Blair's increased personal involvement in foreign affairs, through international summits and informal foreign policy networks, allowed the Prime Minister's Office to extend its foreign policy competence and thus remain the "gate keeper" of UK foreign policy.²⁷⁷ This centralisation of foreign policy has thus given the UK Parliament limited input into the foreign policy making process.²⁷⁸ In addition to limited parliamentary input, White also

²⁷¹ French MPs snub China president [Electronic version]. (2004, January 27). *BBC*.

²⁷² Please see Assemblée Nationale. (2004, March 23). "Question de M. Michel Jean pour la Ministère des affaires européennes" Question No 31821. and Assemblée Nationale. (2004, April 7). *Rapport fait au nom de la commission des affaires étrangères sur le projet de loi, adopté par le Sénat* (no 1418) et (no 1419). No 1516.

²⁷³ Deutscher Bundestag. (2003, December 10). *Gegen eine Aufhebung des EU-Waffenembargoes gegenüber der Volksrepublik China*, Drucksache 15/2169 and Nicola Casarini. (2006, October). "The evolution of the EU-China relationship: from constructive engagement to strategic partnership." *European Union Institute for Security Studies Occasional Paper*, 64.

²⁷⁴ German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder quoted in Hugh Williamson. (2005, March 31). "Schröder insists EU lifts China arms ban" [Electronic version]. *Financial Times*.

²⁷⁵ Anthony Forster. (2000). "Britain," in Manners, I. and R. G. Whitman. (eds.). *The foreign policies of European Union member states*. New York: Manchester University Press. Chapter 3, pp. 44-63.

²⁷⁶ Alasdair Blair. (2004). "Diplomacy: The impact of the EU on its member States." in Carlsnaes, W., H. Sjursen and B. White (eds.). *Contemporary European FP*. London: Sage Publications. Chapter 12, pp. 198-210.

²⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁷⁸ Anthony Forster. (2000). "Britain," in Manners, I. and R. G. Whitman. (eds.). *The foreign policies of European Union member states*. New York: Manchester University Press. Chapter 3, pp. 44-63.

claims that the British centralisation of foreign policy around the Prime Minister has increased public ignorance in Britain about the EU's impact on UK foreign policy.²⁷⁹

The UK Parliament Select Committee on Defence pointed to continued human rights violations in China as it stated, in its fourth report in 2004, that the EU arms embargo should not be lifted.²⁸⁰ This report also called for increased clarity about the identity of buyer countries in the UK Government's annual reports on arms export. Despite Baroness Symons' claim that the EU Code of Conduct would be a more efficient arms control instrument than the arms embargo, several MPs from the Conservative Party continued to question the lifting.²⁸¹ British Tory MP Mark Simmonds pointed to possible negative impacts of the lifting on the UK's defence industry and on British trade with the US.²⁸² He also expressed concerns about its impact on the UK's relations with the rest of South East Asia.²⁸³ Another Conservative MP, Michael Ancram, proposed a unilateral British continuation of the embargo in case of an EU lifting, but was confronted by Foreign Secretary Jack Straw, who pointed to the limited effects of unilateral arms embargoes.²⁸⁴

The majority of MPs criticising the UK Government's position in the arms embargo case seemed, however, to be members of the opposition, the Conservative Party. This might confirm Forster's argument that the British system of parliamentary whips guarantees that the governing party's MPs will support the Government's foreign policy positions.²⁸⁵ This system might thus prevent the same kind of bipartisan parliamentary opposition as was found in the German and French Parliaments. However, there were also Labour signatories of the April 2004 UK Parliament's Early Day Motion against the lifting of the arms embargo, but the fact that only 63 of a total of 659 British MPs signed this Motion may suggest that the British parliamentary opposition to the lifting was in fact quite limited, and that a large part of the abovementioned protests might have been mainly motivated by opposition party politics.²⁸⁶

The long periods of stable minority Social Democratic Governments in Sweden after the Cold War,²⁸⁷ have increasingly led to Sweden being regarded as having one of the more open state structures, where parliamentary scrutiny might affect national foreign policy

²⁷⁹ Brian White. (2001). *Understanding European FP*. New York: Palgrave, Chapter 6, pp.118-141.

²⁸⁰ UK Parliament, House of Commons. (2004). *Select Committee on Defence, Fourth Report*.

²⁸¹ UK Parliament, House of Lords. (2004, January 12). *Column 373 China: EU Arms Trade Embargo*.

²⁸² Mark Simmonds. (2004, December 20). *UK Parliament House of Commons. EU.-China arms embargo*.

²⁸³ Mark Simmonds. (2004, December 21). *UK Parliament House of Commons. EU.-China arms embargo*.

²⁸⁴ UK Parliament, House of Commons. (2004, December 20). *EU.-China arms embargo*.

²⁸⁵ Anthony Forster. (2000). "Britain," in Manners, I. and R. G. Whitman. (eds.). *The foreign policies of European Union member states*. New York: Manchester University Press. Chapter 3, pp. 44-63.

²⁸⁶ UK Parliament. (2004, April 19). *Early Day Motion 986*.

²⁸⁷ Les Miles. (2000). "Sweden and Finland" in Manners, I. and R. G. Whitman. (eds.). *The foreign policies of European Union member states*. New York: Manchester University Press, Chapter 10, pp. 181-203.

making.²⁸⁸ The Governments' minority position, a more assertive Parliament and a general scepticism towards European integration, have consequently led to a political climate where the Swedish Government increasingly seeks to accommodate the Parliament.²⁸⁹ However, while foreign policy formation in Sweden also, ultimately, remains in the hands of the Prime Minister, the Government's increased willingness to consult the Riksdag, suggests that the Swedish system is more open to parliamentary input than its French, German or British counterparts.

At the time of the arms embargo debate, there was also strong human rights-based opposition in the Swedish Parliament against the Social Democratic minority Government's support of the lifting. Left Party²⁹⁰ MP Alice Åström argued against the lifting by pointing to how China had never admitted the repressions of Tiananmen Square.²⁹¹ She also criticised the Swedish Government's lack of external consistency in its reactions to human rights violations in countries important to Swedish commercial interests.²⁹² Cecilia Wigström of the Liberal Party also called for more conditionality in Sweden's relations with China and for diminishing the gap between rhetoric and practice in the Government's human rights policy.²⁹³ She also accused the EU and the Swedish Government of prioritising business over human rights in the arms embargo case, and suggested that Sweden should instead side with the US.²⁹⁴

Furthermore, another Liberal Party MP, Carl B. Hamilton, argued that even though the embargo might not be as effective as expected, the lifting of it would send a political message to China suggesting that the EU and Sweden had forgotten about the 1989 Tiananmen repressions.²⁹⁵ This symbolic importance of maintaining the arms embargo as diplomatic leverage for human rights improvements in China was also pointed to by Metten.²⁹⁶ The fact that other parliaments, the British, German and French Parliaments and the EP,²⁹⁷ also mentioned this political symbolism of the lifting of the embargo, might suggest, that the position of the actor was more important than its nationality, when it came to preference

²⁸⁸ Ian Manners and R. Whitman. (2000). "Conclusion," in Manners, I. and R. G. Whitman. (eds.). *The foreign policies of European Union member states*. New York: Manchester University Press, Chapter 13, pp. 243-273.

²⁸⁹ Ibid.

²⁹⁰ The Swedish socialist party Vänster. Some of its main party policies are feminism, environment protection and opposition to nuclear power.

²⁹¹ Alice Åström. (2004, December 18). *Sveriges Riksdag. Riksdagens protokoll 2004/05:55*.

²⁹² Alice Åström. (2005, February 9). *Sveriges Riksdag. Riksdagens protokoll 2004/05:72*

²⁹³ Cecilia Wigström. (2005, February 9). *Sveriges Riksdag. Riksdagens protokoll 2004/05:72*.

²⁹⁴ Cecilia Wigström. (2005, March 12). "Vi borde inte tåga när EU häver embargot mot Kina" [Electronic version]. *Dagens Industri*,

²⁹⁵ Carl B. Hamilton. (2005, April 5). *Sveriges Riksdag. Riksdagens protokoll 2004/05:98*

²⁹⁶ Vincent Metten. (February 25, 2011). "Should the EU lift the arms embargo on China?" *Euractiv*.

²⁹⁷ Marcin Libicki. (2005, April 27). *European Parliament plenary debate: Human rights in the world 2004 and the EU's policy*,

formation. Consequently, this might suggest that there is a link between the positions of parliaments of different levels, as these legislatures' "outsider"-position in foreign policy making might make it easier and less costly for them to promote human rights over business relations.²⁹⁸

Just as in the UK, the opposition in the Swedish Parliament against the lifting also seemed mainly to come from the non-governing parties: the Liberal party and the Christian Democrats, but also from the minority Social Democratic Government's two supporting parties, the Green party and the Left party. This could suggest that the parliamentary discipline in Sweden on foreign policy resembles the one in the UK Parliament, unlike the French and German parliamentary systems. The fact that the Left Party and the Greens were only supporting parties and not actually in office, would exclude their MPs from the governing party's parliamentary discipline. One might perhaps argue that this parliamentary discipline in the Swedish Riksdag facilitated parliamentary scrutiny, as the Government expected the support from at least its own MPs. Also the minority position of the Government made parliamentary consultation less avoidable.

Despite broad European parliamentary opposition, the governments seemed to carry on with their work towards the lifting. This sometimes clear divide in foreign policy between the governments and the directly elected MPs, could suggest a limited impact of public opinion on foreign policy. However, it is also important to consider that the members of the governments deciding these foreign policies were, in many cases, also directly elected members of the national legislature and thus representing the people. Also, the Social Democratic MPs in Sweden and the Labour MPs in the UK House of Commons were all publicly elected, but did, nonetheless, generally seem to agree with the Governments' position. Another point is that the centralisation of foreign policy around the President in France cannot really be said to have isolated the public's opinion, seeing that the French President was directly elected by the people. Hill therefore points to how the public's limited impact can mainly be explained by the lack of public involvement and interest in national foreign policy, and not by a deliberate government marginalisation of the public.²⁹⁹

²⁹⁸ Joakim Kreutz. (2004). "Reviewing the EU Arms Embargo on China: the clash between value and rationale in European Security Strategy." *The Central European review of international affairs*, 22, pp. 43-58.

²⁹⁹ Christopher Hill. (2003). *The changing politics of foreign policy*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Chapter 10, pp. 250-282.

In the arms embargo case, however, the human rights aspect of the issue seemed to engage the public and lead to a general opposition to their governments' lifting advocacy.³⁰⁰ Non-governmental organisations (NGOs), such as Amnesty International, Saferworld and the British Campaign Against Arms Trade (CAAT), also expressed their human rights based opposition to the lifting. Robert Parker of Amnesty International and Roy Isbiter of Saferworld clearly stated, in the UK Parliament, that the embargo should instead be strengthened and serve as a human rights bench mark.³⁰¹ CAAT repeatedly urged the UK Government to sever its close links with the defence companies³⁰² and CAAT's Ann Feltham also fervently advocated that the arms embargo should be maintained because of the embargo's political symbolism.³⁰³

The different national parliaments and the publics' opposition, in states where the governments clearly advocated a lifting of the embargo, could then again suggest that the actors' roles influenced their preference formation more than their nationality. The abovementioned socialisation effect might have affected the Governments' positions as they had to consider the "two-level game,"³⁰⁴ while negotiating a consensus within the European Council. The national parliaments and the national public opinion, however, would be less constrained by this socialisation effect as they would not have to take part in the actual negotiation process. Kreutz points to this phenomenon by explaining how it is necessary to consider the actor's role in the policy making process in order to analyse its actions.³⁰⁵ As previously discussed, he further emphasises how those "outside," in opposition, often opt for another stance than those "inside," in power. One might thus argue that the fact that the national parliaments enjoy little formal competences in national foreign policy making puts them in an "outsider" position. Consequently, this "outsider" position might have made it easier for them to stick with their human rights-based argumentation as they would not have to consider the possible negative Chinese reactions to this contentious aspect of EU-China relations.

³⁰⁰ Christopher Griffin and R. Pantucci. (2007). A Treacherous Triangle? China and the Transatlantic Alliance. *SAIS Review*, 27(1), pp. 161-170.

³⁰¹ UK Parliament. (2004, April 21). *Examination of Witnesses* (Questions 100 - 107).

³⁰² New Parliamentary Arms Export Report: Concern at cuts in Government Department licensing arms Exports [Electronic version]. (2005, March 24). *Campaign Against Arms Trade*.

³⁰³ Ann Feltham. (2004, September). "EU threatening to lift China embargo" [Electronic Version]. *Campaign Against Arms Trade*.

³⁰⁴ Robert Putnam. (1988). "Diplomacy and Domestic Policies: The logic of two-level games," *International Organization*, 42(3), pp. 427-460.

³⁰⁵ Joakim Kreutz. (2004). "Reviewing the EU Arms Embargo on China: the clash between value and rationale in European Security Strategy." *The Central European review of international affairs*, 22, pp. 43-58.

5.1.3 Business interests and foreign policy

There is an ongoing debate about the impact of non-governmental actors on national foreign policy making. While realists emphasise the continued primacy of the state, the evolving international environment of an increasingly globalised world might suggest that state actors may no longer claim to be the exclusive foreign policy actors. The growing interdependence shows how transnational companies and organisations form new types of networks outside existing state structures, and makes it necessary to include a wider range of actors within the study of foreign policies. The proliferation of foreign policies has thus not just opened up the process to other national players, but also to non-governmental actors, such as multi-national companies and trade unions.³⁰⁶ This proliferation thus contributes to the increasingly complex analysis of a state's foreign policy formation. A number of scholars acknowledge the possible impact of transnational and non-governmental actors. Manners and Whitman are among those who argue that non-governmental interests can no longer be ignored,³⁰⁷ and Strange emphasises the impact of business interests, by announcing the “retreat of the State” where the markets take control over their former masters, the governments.³⁰⁸ This intertwined nature of diplomatic and trade relations is also illustrated by the increasingly popular practice of having an entourage of important business leaders accompany the Heads of State or Government on their state visits.³⁰⁹

In the case of the arms embargo, Kogan argues that the close links between arms export and the defence industry allow the national defence companies to pressure their respective governments into leading a foreign policy in favour of the defence industry's interests.³¹⁰ He further emphasises how the overall decrease in European defence budgets has shifted arms exporters' focus onto China and its rapidly growing defence market. French and German government representatives have pointed to how it is impossible to ignore the potential of this newly opened arms market.³¹¹ Cabestan refers to this growing link between governments and different business interests as he argues that while France was pressured by

³⁰⁶ Christopher Hill. (2003). *The changing politics of foreign policy*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Chapter 4, pp. 72-96.

³⁰⁷ Ian Manners and R. Whitman. (2000). “Introduction,” in Manners, I. and R. G. Whitman. (eds.). *The foreign policies of European Union member states*. New York: Manchester University Press, Chapter 1, pp. 1-18.

³⁰⁸ Susan Strange (1996). *The Retreat of the State: The diffusion of power in the world economy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

³⁰⁹ Margaret Blunden. (2000). “France.” in Manners, I. and R. G. Whitman. (eds.). *The foreign policies of European Union member states*. New York: Manchester University Press, Chapter 2, pp. 19-43.

³¹⁰ Eugene Kogan. (2005). “The European Union defence industry and the appeal of the Chinese market.” *Studien und berichte zur Sicherheitspolitik*, 1.

³¹¹ Ibid.

defence industry giants such as the French Thales and the Franco-German-Spanish EADS³¹² to resume sales to China, Germany was mainly under pressure from German civilian industry, which hoped that a lifting would lead to commercial good-will from China.³¹³ This shows how the symbolic value of the lifting of the last Tiananmen sanction could be as important to the improvements of EU-China relations as the actual lifting of the embargo. Consequently, Kogan argues that it is indeed the commercial enterprises that would gain the most if the embargo was lifted.³¹⁴ This can be explained by the expected post-embargo good-will from China, who had been pushing for the lifting as a way of restoring its international status, and by considering the maintenance of European and national export restrictions.³¹⁵

The fact that leading European defence companies described China as “just another market,” demonstrated their support for the lifting and suggested that they might have tried to influence their respective governments’ positions.³¹⁶ The Anglo-Italian Finmeccanica and the Swedish Ericsson were among those opposing the embargo.³¹⁷ This was also the case with Philippe Camus, the CEO of EADS, who claimed that the embargo was a “remnant of the Cold War.”³¹⁸ The French defence company Dassault explicitly showed its interest in the growing Chinese defence market as it concluded a deal with China in 2005, worth 12 billion Euros, in anticipation of the lifting of the embargo.³¹⁹ This also demonstrates the non-legally binding character of the 1989 arms embargo and of the 1998 EU Code of Conduct.³²⁰ From 55 million Euros in 1990, the EU member states’ arms exports to China had increased to a soaring 400 million Euros in 2004.³²¹ While this might have been even higher if there was no arms embargo, it is clear that the embargo had not been as effective as opponents of the lifting might have argued.

³¹² The European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company N.V.

³¹³ Eugene Kogan. (2005). “The European Union defence industry and the appeal of the Chinese market.” *Studien und berichte zur Sicherheitspolitik*, 1.

³¹⁴ Ibid.

³¹⁵ European Union. (1998). *The EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports*. 8675/2/98.

³¹⁶ Eugene Kogan. (2005). “The European Union defence industry and the appeal of the Chinese market.” *Studien und berichte zur Sicherheitspolitik*, 1.

³¹⁷ Jerker Hellström. (2009, November). *EU’s vapenembargo mot Kina ur ett svenskt perspektiv*. Stockholm: FOI, Totalförsvarets Forskningsinstitut.

³¹⁸ Eugene Kogan. (2005). “The European Union defence industry and the appeal of the Chinese market.” *Studien und berichte zur Sicherheitspolitik*, 1, pp. 11.

³¹⁹ David Shambaugh. (2005). “Lifting the EU arms embargo on CN: An American perspective” in Bates Gill and G. Wacker (Eds.) *China’s Rise: Diverging US-EU perceptions and approaches*. Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, pp. 23-29.

³²⁰ Eugene Kogan. (2005). “The European Union defence industry and the appeal of the Chinese market” *Studien und berichte zur Sicherheitspolitik*, 1.

³²¹ Jerker Hellström. (2009, November). *EU’s vapenembargo mot Kina ur ett svenskt perspektiv*. Stockholm: FOI, Totalförsvarets Forskningsinstitut.

Even though it seems like defence companies were generally in favour of lifting the embargo, some companies appeared to be more reluctant. Journalist Rana Forhoonar claimed that important technology transfers between US and European defence companies and the importance of contracts on the US defence market, led European defence companies to choose the US' side in the arms embargo debate.³²² As previously mentioned, the US was strongly against the EU abandoning its embargo against China, and pointed to the human rights violations in China and to the risk of militarily destabilising South-East Asia as reasons for keeping the embargo.³²³ The US House of Representatives' February 1st 2005 Resolution on the possible lifting of the EU's embargo called upon the EU to "reconsider this unwise action," and pointed to how such a lifting would be in direct conflict with US security interests and to how it might limit transatlantic technology transfers.³²⁴

The US' clear opposition to the lifting and the threats of interrupting transatlantic defence industry cooperation might thus explain why Mike Turner, CEO of the British defence company BAE Systems, ruled out arms sales to China in an effort to "do nothing to jeopardize our position with the US."³²⁵ Swedish MP, Carl B. Hamilton also expressed his fear of US repercussions towards the largely British-owned Swedish defence industries in case of a lifting.³²⁶ The previously pro-lifting EADS and French Dassault seemed moved away from their initial position, as they stated that sales to China were not on their agenda.³²⁷ One explanation for EADS' and Dassault's possible change of mind could be the fact that the US threats of interruptions of technology transfers across the Atlantic might have become more imminent as the US formalised its opposition in the 2005 House Resolution.³²⁸

The close connection between defence companies and the government administration in the UK might serve as an example of how integrated business interests might be within governmental structures. The Defence Export Services Organisation (DESO)³²⁹ within the UK Ministry of Defence (MoD), established direct links between the UK Trade Department and the defence companies and provided UK defence companies with export assistance in order to

³²² Rana Forhoonar. (2005, March 7). "Arms Embargo: No lift in sales"[Electronic version]. *Newsweek*.

³²³ Adam Wolfe. (2004, February 12). "France, Germany seek to resume China arms sales" [Electronic version]. *Asia Times*.

³²⁴ United States Congress. (2005, February 1). *Urging the European Union to maintain its arms embargo on the People's Republic of China*. H. RES. 57.

³²⁵ Rana Forhoonar. (2005, March 7). "Arms Embargo: No lift in sales"[Electronic version]. *Newsweek*.

³²⁶ Carl B. Hamilton. (2005, February 23). *Sveriges Riksdag. Interpellation 2004/05:415 Hävt vapenembargo mot Kina*.

³²⁷ Rana Forhoonar. (2005, March 7). "Arms Embargo: No lift in sales"[Electronic version]. *Newsweek*.

³²⁸ United States Congress. (2005, February 1). *Urging the European Union to maintain its arms embargo on the People's Republic of China*. H. RES. 57.

³²⁹ DESO, within the Ministry of Defence was reorganised into The Defence and Security Organisation (DSO) within the UK Trade and Investment in April 2008.

promote and increase their overseas trade.³³⁰ These explicit links were again emphasised with the so-called “revolving door” practice, where MoD and defence company employees exchanged jobs and thus became socialised into a sense of community with both governmental and non-governmental colleagues.³³¹ This socialisation process would then also perhaps increase the defence companies’ influence in UK foreign policy as personal relationships strengthened official links. The fact that the main British defence company, BAE Systems, clearly opposed any lifting that would damage its links with the US, might then help explain why the UK Government eventually seemed to join the BAE Systems in their US-influenced opposition towards the lifting.³³²

The formal links between the UK MoD and the defence companies provided explicit channels for the business interests’ impact on government policies. In Germany, France and Sweden, the links are perhaps not as formalised as in the UK, but the defence companies might still have a considerable impact on the Governments’ positions. As previously mentioned, the German Government’s emphasis was mainly on improving commercial trade ties with China and this might be a result of commercial businesses’ influence on German foreign policy. The French and German Governments’ emphasis on the importance of gaining access to the Chinese market demonstrates how diplomatic and trade relations become intertwined.³³³ Also, the fact that Chirac’s state visit to China in 2005 finalised French companies’ contracts with China, worth four billion US dollars, clearly suggests that there might be a link between business interests and government policies.³³⁴

The Swedish defence companies’ close ties with the UK defence industry would suggest that they were as concerned as the BAE Systems for potential repercussions from the US. This fear was addressed by MP Carl Hamilton in the Swedish Riksdag.³³⁵ The Swedish Foreign Minister, Laila Freivalds, did not reject his concerns, but focused on how a close dialogue with the US would be the way to approach the problem.³³⁶ The fact that this was indeed accounted for, also suggests that the Swedish defence industry’s interests had an

³³⁰ UK Parliament. (2010, August 26). *Written evidence from the Campaign against Arms Trade, Defence Committee*.

³³¹ Lambert, M., Rattenbury, J. & Prichard, I. (2003). “The political influence of arms companies.” *Campaign Against Arms Trade*.

³³² This is more thoroughly discussed in the present chapter’s section on the UK’s Presidency of the European Council, 5.2.

³³³ Johann Hari. (2005, January 26). “Tony Blair’s claims to a moral arms policy are being drowned out by sad, cynical laughter” [Electronic version]. *The Independent*.

³³⁴ Richard Bernstein. (2004, October 15). “Europe: Chirac bends to China keeping Gaullist legacy” [Electronic version]. *New York Times*.

³³⁵ Carl B. Hamilton. (2005, February 23). *Sveriges Riksdag. Interpellation 2004/05:415 Hävt vapenembargo mot Kina*.

³³⁶ Laila Freivalds. (2005, April 5). *Sveriges Riksdag. Riksdagens protokoll 2004/05:98*.

impact on the formation of the Swedish position. The importance of trade relations in all of these four countries might suggest that the commercial interests might have succeeded in getting their voice heard. This influence is, however, difficult to assess, as it is rarely identified by government officials, and as it is possible that governmental policies promoting business relations would have existed even without the business interests' advocacy.

If the BAE Systems and other defence companies did indeed manage to influence the governments' position, it would be necessary to consider who the government really represented. Did they become commercial agents of the defence companies' subset of society or were they representing the society in a more general manner? These questions point to Moravcsik's liberal FPA's notion of the governments' representative role in foreign policy, and could demonstrate traditional domestically oriented FPA's ability to explain aspects of European foreign policy.³³⁷ This is further discussed in chapter six in the assessment of traditional FPA's applicability to an evolving EU foreign policy.

5.1.4 The impact of member states' special bilateral relationships

In addition to parliamentary scrutiny and business interests, special bilateral relationships create an external factor in the formation of member states' foreign policies. States cannot be seen as isolated islands and it is therefore also necessary to look beyond state borders in order to identify the sources of national foreign policies. Moravcsik includes an element of this in his liberal actor-centred FPA approach, where interdependence causes one state's preferences to pose constraints on the room to manoeuvre and the preferences of another given state.³³⁸ Manners and Whitman also look at external sources of foreign policies as they focus on how EU member states' bilateral relationships and special interests might "ring-fence" their foreign policies and thus affect their behaviour in the EU.³³⁹ These special relationships might thus become additional steering mechanisms of member states' foreign policies.³⁴⁰

The UK's special relationship with the US is perhaps the most evident of these relationships. The three concentric circles of British foreign policy, presented by Winston Churchill in 1948, the American, the European and the one regarding the Commonwealth, had for a long time been the basis for the UK's foreign policy priorities, before the decline of the

³³⁷ Andrew Moravcsik. (1997). "Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics." *International Organization*, 51(4), pp. 513-553.

³³⁸ Ibid.

³³⁹ Ian Manners and R. Whitman. (2000). "Introduction," in Manners, I. and R. G. Whitman. (eds.). *The foreign policies of European Union member states*. New York: Manchester University Press, Chapter 1, pp. 1-18.

³⁴⁰ Ian Manners and R. Whitman. (2000). "Conclusion," in Manners, I. and R. G. Whitman. (eds.). *The foreign policies of European Union member states*. New York: Manchester University Press, Chapter 13, pp. 243-273.

Commonwealth left Britain with two main circles.³⁴¹ Young points to how these three circles served as a “biblical text for the justification of strategic indecision” of British foreign policy.³⁴² This “strategic indecision” is thus evident in the UK’s process of defining its foreign policy priorities within a foreign policy realm clearly torn between the US and Europe. Britain’s self-proclaimed role as a bridge builder between the EU and the US has perhaps been one way of trying to combine these two remaining circles.³⁴³ However, the British coordination reflex with the US still remains strong, despite the ever-evolving CFSP system, which embeds the UK deeper within the EU foreign policy framework. Blunden has tried to explain this “US reflex” by pointing to how the US, in a post-imperial world, becomes the UK’s power multiplier.³⁴⁴ This could then explain why the UK still seems to avoid siding with the EU against the US, as the American superpower might appear to the UK to be its lifeline to great power status.

As previously mentioned, the UK’s position in between the US and the EU also seemed to have an effect on its position in the arms embargo case. The US opposition to the lifting left the UK in a position where its special partner’s interests explicitly clashed with those of its partners in the EU.³⁴⁵ The previously mentioned US House of Representatives Resolution against the embargo lifting³⁴⁶ and the US State Department’s claims that the US and EU arms embargoes against China were complementary sanctions,³⁴⁷ clearly demonstrated the US opposition. The US’ impact on the British position was perhaps explicitly confirmed by the fact that the UK Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw, began talking to other EU member states about the possibility of postponing the lifting in early 2005.³⁴⁸

The EU member states’ bilateral relations with China are also possible factors which might have influenced the preferences of member states in the embargo discussions. Despite arguments about the impossible task for one EU member state to handle China on its own in

³⁴¹ Brian White. (2001). *Understanding European FP*. New York: Palgrave, Chapter 6, pp.118-141.

³⁴² Hugo Young. (1999). *This blessed plot: Britain and Europe from Churchill to Blair*. London: Overlook, pp. 32.

³⁴³ Anthony Forster. (2000). “Britain.” in Manners, I. and R. G. Whitman. (eds.).*The foreign policies of European Union member states*. New York: Manchester University Press. Chapter 3, pp. 44-63.

³⁴⁴ Margaret Blunden. (2000). “France.” in Manners, I. and R. G. Whitman. (eds.).*The foreign policies of European Union member states*. New York: Manchester University Press, Chapter 2, pp. 19-43.

³⁴⁵ Siemon T. Wezeman and M. Bromley. (2005). ”Chapter 10. International arms transfers” in Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. *2005 Yearbook*. Stockholm: SIPRI.

³⁴⁶ United States Congress. (2005, February 1). *Urging the European Union to maintain its arms embargo on the People’s Republic of China*. H. RES. 57.

³⁴⁷ US refutes Chirac’s call to end China arms embargo [Electronic version]. (2004, January 29). *China Daily*.

³⁴⁸ Daniel Dombey and R. Minder. (2005, March 23). ”Positions unmoved on China arms embargo” [Electronic version]. *Financial Times*.

an increasingly globalised world,³⁴⁹ larger EU member states still compete with each other in order to obtain beneficial bilateral commercial ties with China.³⁵⁰ France and Germany's pursuit of major contracts with China in the aviation and high technology field, respectively, and the UK's wish to enter the Chinese financial market, might have prevented the emergence of a common and more comprehensive EU China policy.³⁵¹ These member states' individual pursuits of improved bilateral trade relations with China thus create a myriad of Sino-European relationships, despite the fact that international trade is under the jurisdiction of the Commission and the Common Commercial Policy. This framework, which allows the parallel pursuit of national interests, shows how differences between the EU member states' foreign policies might be the main obstacles to creating a more assertive and coherent EU foreign policy.³⁵² The reluctance towards establishing a more European foreign policy might also possibly be explained by member states' illusions of foreign policy *grandeur*, which make member states believe their own foreign policy capacity to be greater than a united EU approach.³⁵³ This illusion of *grandeur* might perhaps also be found in the speeches of French MP Jean-Louis Debré and President Hu in the Assemblée Nationale in January 2004, as they both emphasised the importance of their bilateral relationship in their struggle to survive in a globalised and Americanized world.³⁵⁴ This difficult co-existence of member state and EU foreign policies, within a somewhat vague CFSP framework, becomes even clearer when these member states, affected by national parliaments, business lobbies, and various bilateral special relationships, assume the Presidency of the European Council for six months.

5.2 The rotating Presidency of the EU: a Community institution or an opportunity for national interest projection?

The rotating Presidency was, up until the implementation of the Lisbon treaty,³⁵⁵ in charge of chairing all meetings in the Council, the European Council and in their respective sub-

³⁴⁹ John Fox and F. Godement. (2009). "A power audit of EU-China relations." *ECFR Policy report*.

³⁵⁰ Nicola Casarini. (2006, October). "The evolution of the EU-China relationship: from constructive engagement to strategic partnership." *European Union Institute for Security Studies Occasional Paper*, 64.

³⁵¹ Ibid.

³⁵² John Fox and F. Godement. (2009). "A power audit of EU-China relations." *ECFR Policy report*.

³⁵³ Gudrun Wacker (2010). "Changes and continuities in EU and China relations: a German perspective." in Robert S. Ross, Ø. Tunsjø and T. Zhang (eds.). *US-China-EU relations: Managing the new world order*. London: Routledge, pp. 77-100.

³⁵⁴ Jean-Louis Debré. (2004, January 27). "Réception de M. Hu Jintao, Président de la République Populaire de Chine, devant l'Assemblée Nationale," Speech given at the Assemblée Nationale, Paris, France. and Hu Jintao. (2004, January 27). "Réception devant l'Assemblée Nationale," Speech given at the Assemblée Nationale, Paris, France.

³⁵⁵ With the Lisbon treaty, implemented December 1st 2009, the rotating Presidency was replaced with a permanent presidency of the European Council, while keeping the rotating presidency for chairing Council meetings in all areas but foreign policy.

structures. In addition to this extensive task, the country holding the Presidency was also in charge of representing the EU in CFSP matters, of informing the European Parliament of main decisions and of setting the agenda of the European Council.³⁵⁶ The fact that member states assume a Community role for six months, might also prevent an efficient Presidency, related to the lack of continuity and a possible national bias.³⁵⁷ The central question remains whether the member state holding the Presidency will indeed work “in the service of the Union” or whether it will follow a nationally oriented agenda.³⁵⁸ Even though most member states plan the Presidency according to traditional foreign policy mechanisms,³⁵⁹ it is also evident that there has been a Europeanization of national administration as the execution of the Presidency does not just involve the member state’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The Presidency’s role has been described as a mix between administrative manager, agenda setter and consensus builder,³⁶⁰ where the member state holding the Presidency must find the fine line between passivity and overstated activism.³⁶¹ While some member states may look at this as a great opportunity to put their imprint on the development of the EU, others may see it as a constraint to national priorities and feel that a strictly Community-oriented manner of running things is expected. The following section looks at how the relevant Presidencies acted and possibly shaped the outcome of the arms embargo discussions.

Italy held the Presidency when the arms embargo debate was initiated in late 2003. Even though Hellström claims that the Italian Presidency tried to lift the arms embargo during its time in office,³⁶² the only evidence of this was the December 2003 agreement to put the issue up for further discussion.³⁶³ The lack of a lifting decision could perhaps be explained by the fact that the Presidency’s three main priorities were set out to be the conclusion of the inter-governmental conference (IGC) on a Constitution for Europe, the achievement of the Lisbon strategy, and a re-establishment of the EU’s broken ties with the US after the Iraqi

³⁵⁶ Stephan Keukeleire and Jennifer MacNaughtan. (2008). *The foreign policy of the European Union*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, Chapter 3, pp. 66-97.

³⁵⁷ Ibid.

³⁵⁸ Anna-Carin Svensson. (2000). *In the service of the European Union: The role of the Presidency in negotiating the Amsterdam Treaty 1995-1997*. Uppsala: Statsvitenskapliga föreningen i Uppsala.

³⁵⁹ Magnus Ekgren. (2004). “National FP coordination: the Swedish EU presidency.” in Carlsnaes, W., H. Sjørnsen and B. White (eds.). *Contemporary European Foreign Policy*. London: Sage Publications, Chapter 13, pp. 211-226, pp 223.

³⁶⁰ Anna-Carin Svensson. (2000). *In the service of the European Union: The role of the Presidency in negotiating the Amsterdam Treaty 1995-1997*. Uppsala: Statsvitenskapliga föreningen i Uppsala.

³⁶¹ Ibid.

³⁶² Jerker Hellström. (2009, November). *EU’s vapenembargo mot Kina ur ett svenskt perspektiv*. Stockholm: FOI, Totalförsvarets Forskningsinstitut.

³⁶³ Council of the European Union. (2004, February 5). *Presidency Conclusions: Brussels European Council 12 and 13 December 2003*. 5381/04.

war.³⁶⁴ The last priority, suggests that Italy would not go out of its way to promote the lifting of an arms embargo which the US was so clearly in favour of keeping. Di Quirico also emphasises Italy's possible dilemma as he points to how Italian Presidencies of the European Council are generally influenced by the tension between Italy's Anglo-American priorities and the Franco-German axis of the EU.³⁶⁵ Being a member state which generally tended to promote national interests during its EU Presidencies,³⁶⁶ it is perhaps not that surprising that the arms embargo lifting, which would have been an unwanted source of transatlantic tension, was not on the top of the Italian Presidency's agenda.

The following Irish, Dutch and Luxembourgian Presidencies, running from January 2004 until the end of June 2005, however, all proclaimed themselves to be "in the service of the Union."³⁶⁷ These smaller member states' "follower attitude" was perhaps also emphasised as they seemed to be following the already decided review process of the arms embargo. The programme of the Irish Presidency pointed to the 2004 EU enlargement as its main priority, and illustrated, as previously noted, how the EU was preoccupied elsewhere at the time of the arms embargo debate.³⁶⁸ And even though human rights were listed as one of the top CFSP priorities in the annual programme of the 2004 Irish and Dutch Presidencies,³⁶⁹ Ireland avoided taking sides with the human rights promoters in the arms embargo case during its time in office.³⁷⁰

During 2004, the EU seemed to be arriving at a consensus in the arms embargo case, as the December 2004 Dutch Presidency conclusions invited the next Presidency to finalise the well-advanced work on the lifting.³⁷¹ The failure of previous Dutch EU Presidencies' attempts to promote a more assertive EU human rights policy, might also explain why the

³⁶⁴ Council of the European Union. (2003). "Europe: citizens of a shared dream - Programme of the Italian Presidency of the Council of the European Union."

³⁶⁵ Roberto Di Quirico. (2003). "Italy, Europe And The European Presidency Of 2003." *Notre Europe*.

³⁶⁶ Antonio Missiroli. (2000). "Italy." in Manners, I. and R. G. Whitman. (eds.). *The foreign policies of European Union member states*. New York: Manchester University Press, Chapter 5 pp. 87-104.

³⁶⁷ For more on the Irish, Dutch and Luxembourgian claim to be "in the service of the Union," see Brigid Laffan. (2003). "Ireland and Europe: Continuity and change: The 2004 Presidency" *Notre Europe*, p. 40, European Parliament. (2005, July 21). *Work programme of the Netherlands presidency and Luxembourg Presidency Priorities* (2004). *EU2005.lu*.

³⁶⁸ EU Irish Presidency Environment Programme January-June 2004. (2003) *Environment Bulletin*, 58.

³⁶⁹ The Council of the European Union. (2003, December 1). *Operational Programme of the Council for 2004 submitted by the incoming Irish and Dutch Presidencies*, 15369/03.

³⁷⁰ Andrew Rettman. (2011, July 27). "Leaked cable shows fragility of EU arms ban on China" [Electronic version]. *EU Observer*.

³⁷¹ Council of the European Union. (2005, February 1). *Presidency Conclusions: Brussels European Council 16 and 17 December 2004*. 16238/1/04.

Netherlands did not try to pursue the human rights aspect of the arms embargo case, despite their history of international norm entrepreneurship.³⁷²

Luxembourg's tendency of assuming the view of the EU majority, might explain why the arms embargo issue, originally set to be finalised in the first months of 2005, seemed to slip off the table as the fragile EU consensus gradually crumbled. Svensson further explains this by arguing that it is impossible for a Presidency to side with the opposition when there is another clear EU majority.³⁷³ The increased US pressure to keep the embargo, together with the Chinese adoption of the Anti-Secession Law in March 2005, seemed to halt the finalisation of the arms embargo issue as it created even more internal division in the EU.

As the UK assumed the EU Presidency in July 2005, its priorities were economic reform, social justice, security and a strengthened European role in the world, especially via strategic partnerships with Africa and the Middle East.³⁷⁴ It therefore seems that the UK based its EU Presidency's foreign policy objectives on central issues of British foreign policy: relations with its former colonies in Africa and the Middle East. This might suggest that both the UK and Italy chose a more nationally oriented approach to its Presidency, compared to the three preceding Presidencies, which thus confirms Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace's claim that larger member states more frequently promote national interests during their Presidencies.³⁷⁵

The fact that the UK seemed to keep away from addressing the arms embargo case in the latter half of 2005, emphasises how the avoidance of a subject, and not just the advocacy of particular national interests, could also be an example of promoting national interests.³⁷⁶ Svensson argues that a Presidency will never lead the EU in a direction contrary to its own convictions, and this might have been the case as the UK refrained from following the already EU agreed process of reviewing the status of the arms embargo.³⁷⁷ As previously mentioned, Tony Blair supported the lifting of the arms embargo in 2004, provided that the EU Code of Conduct would be strengthened, but the US pressure on the UK Government appeared to have

³⁷² Rik Coolsaet and B. Soetendrop. (2000). "Belgium and the Netherlands" in Manners, I. and R. G. Whitman. (eds.). *The foreign policies of European Union member states*. New York: Manchester University Press, Chapter 7, pp. 128-143.

³⁷³ Anna-Carin Svensson. (2000). *In the service of the European Union: The role of the Presidency in negotiating the Amsterdam Treaty 1995-1997*. Uppsala: Statsvitenskapliga föreningen i Uppsala.

³⁷⁴ Priorities of the UK Presidency of the EU 2005. (2005). *EU2005.gov.uk*,

³⁷⁵ Fiona Hayes-Renshaw and H. Wallace. (1997). *The Council of Ministers*. London: Macmillan. Chapter 5, pp. 134-158.

³⁷⁶ Anna-Carin Svensson. (2000). *In the service of the European Union: The role of the Presidency in negotiating the Amsterdam Treaty 1995-1997*. Uppsala: Statsvitenskapliga föreningen i Uppsala.

³⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

taken its toll when the issue was to be finalised in 2005.³⁷⁸ It was reported that an increased US pressure was indeed the reason why the UK Government abstained from putting the arms embargo on the agenda during its 2005 Presidency.³⁷⁹ Furthermore, White refers to a recurring UK tendency of promoting transatlantic interests during its Presidencies as he points to how the 1998 UK Presidency promoted the successful finalisation of extensive EU-US trade agreements.³⁸⁰ It might thus seem that the UK's US coordination reflex remained strong in spite of its temporary Community role. As previously mentioned, this might also be an example of Moravcsik's claim about how other states' policies and interests might affect the actions of other states.³⁸¹ The interdependence factor in foreign policy shows how domestically defined foreign policies might have to be adjusted when operating in an environment where several other states also want to achieve their foreign policy objectives.

Consequently, the US' influence here seemed to play an important part as the arms embargo debate appeared to be pushed off the EU agenda in late 2005.³⁸² The close connection between the UK and the US Governments, strengthened by their cooperation in the "War on Terror," appeared to have provided a channel of influence all the way into the agenda setting of the Presidency of the European Council and demonstrated the continued US impact on European affairs. Another source of US influence might have been the abovementioned powerful links between US and UK defence industries and the British defence companies' concerns for how a lifting would affect their industry's transatlantic cooperation. The prominent place of British defence companies within the UK Government thus strengthens this second and initially non-governmental channel of US influence.

The US' impact on European politics might also be found in the fact that the arms embargo issue was never really taken up again. This time it was not just because of the US' direct influence, but because of the European leaders' more personal views of the US. British MEP Charles Tannock claimed in June 2005 that the fact that one of the most fervent supporters of the lifting, Chancellor Schröder, had been severely weakened domestically might also bring the arms embargo debate to a natural end.³⁸³ The November 2005 change of

³⁷⁸ Jerker Hellström. (2009, November). *EU's vapenembargo mot Kina ur ett svenskt perspektiv*. Stockholm: FOI, Totalförsvarets Forskningsinstitut.

³⁷⁹ Honor Mahony. (2005, March 23). "EU leaders remain unchanged on China arms embargo"[Electronic version], *EU Observer* and China arms embargo moves off EU agenda [Electronic version]. (2005, November 9). *Financial Times*.

³⁸⁰ Brian White. (2001). *Understanding European FP*. New York: Palgrave, Chapter 6, pp.118-141.

³⁸¹ Andrew Moravcsik. (1997). "Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics." *International Organization*, 51(4), pp. 513-553.

³⁸² China arms embargo moves off EU agenda [Electronic version]. (2005, November 9). *Financial Times*.

³⁸³ Tannock, C. (2005, June 23). *European Parliament Debate. Programme of the British Presidency*.

Chancellor in Germany, from the lifting advocate Schröder, to the more human rights-oriented Atlanticist Christian Democrat, Angela Merkel, might have affected the process considerably. Also, as Nicolas Sarkozy took over as President of France after Chirac in 2007, the two member states, which had been the drivers of the lifting campaign, France and Germany, found themselves under the leadership of a much more US-friendly duo. This change of leaders also seemed to dampen the two countries' habit of criticising the US, the most recent example being the Iraqi war and the following transatlantic drift in 2003.³⁸⁴ Even though China still continues to demand a lifting of the embargo,³⁸⁵ and Baroness Catherine Ashton has repeatedly pushed for a lifting of the embargo after she became the High Representative for the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, there does not seem to be any member state willing to assume the leading role of the lifting campaign any more.³⁸⁶ This could possibly be explained by the fact that the continued US opposition to the lifting would dissuade the now more pro-US Governments of France and Germany. This change of direction clearly points to how important individual characteristics and convictions of Heads of State or Government might be for the direction of the respective member states' foreign policies. In addition to the US opposition to a lifting, the EU's time consuming economic and monetary challenges following the financial crisis of 2008, also contributed to keeping the arms embargo off the agenda as the EU mainly focused on internal affairs.

While it is possible to blame the EU's indecision in the arms embargo case on the UK's avoidance of the issue, the adoption of the Chinese Anti-Secession Law and the Chinese failure to ratify the United Nations' Covenant of Civic and Political Rights have also been pointed to as reasons why the lifting slipped off the EU agenda in late 2005.³⁸⁷ This was especially the case in Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands where the socialisation effect, which seemed to have muted the national opposition, weakened as the EU's consensus was shaken by the prospect of an Anti-Secession Law.³⁸⁸ It is possible to argue that while human rights violations had already been one of the public and national parliament's main arguments against the lifting, the Anti-Secession Law no longer made it possible for national governments to circumvent these arguments in favour of economic interests. Even though the US opposition to the lifting clearly influenced the EU member states in various ways, the

³⁸⁴ John Fox and F. Godement. (2009). "A power audit of EU-China relations." *ECFR Policy report*.

³⁸⁵ Andrew Rettman. (2012, May 2). "China seeks high-tech weapons, 'respect' on EU visit" [Electronic version]. *EU Observer*.

³⁸⁶ Vincent Metten. (2011, February 25). "Should the EU lift the arms embargo on China?" [Electronic Version], *Euractiv*.

³⁸⁷ China arms embargo moves off EU agenda [Electronic version]. (2005, November 9). *Financial Times*.

³⁸⁸ Nicola Casarini. (2006, October). "The evolution of the EU-China relationship: from constructive engagement to strategic partnership." *European Union Institute for Security Studies Occasional Paper*, 64.

Chinese adoption of the Anti-Secession Law may thus have tipped the scale in favour of keeping the embargo. The abovementioned priority of economic growth and trade in EU-China relations, which motivated the lifting campaign, thus seemed to lose its momentum as the human rights aspect suddenly became clearer with the Anti-Secession Law. However, it is also possible to argue that the member states' abandonment of the lifting might not have been motivated by the human rights situation in China, but by yet another economic concern, such as the defence industry's loss in case of a potential cut in technology transfers from the US. Also, this Anti-Secession Law could be considered as a more acceptable reason for postponing the lifting, than the "mere" influence of Europe's big brother, the US. At least, the UK might have found it easier to obtain support for postponing the lifting on the grounds of human rights concerns, rather than because of a threatening US' discontent.

After having considered several factors of the member states' national foreign policies, the governments, and the Prime Minister especially, seemed to remain the key decision makers in the arms embargo case. The "primeministerialisation" had concentrated foreign policy around the office of one person and demonstrated the prominence of the European Council in the CFSP. Among the Governments influencing EU foreign policy, it still seemed that the "big three" were the most influential member states. Also, even though national parliaments in most cases had monitoring mechanisms for foreign policy and may have had an impact on foreign policy in some more open member states, the general picture demonstrates how governments seemed to decide the respective member states' position in the lifting debate.³⁸⁹ Business interests also proved to be able to affect foreign policy, as economy and trade interests increasingly became important in member states' foreign relations. Special interest and bilateral relationships were also emphasised as important sources of foreign policy, as the UK-US special relationship seemed to have affected the British European Council Presidency's dropping of the arms embargo debate. This shows how the "double responsibility" of the Presidency often seems to place the member state in office in the difficult position of choosing between national and EU priorities.³⁹⁰

The next chapter provides a more comprehensive analysis of the importance of the different types of actors' roles in the arms embargo discussions. It also focuses on how and whether the theoretical framework chosen for this particular case study, traditional liberal FPA, might explain the arms embargo discussions and European foreign policy in general.

³⁸⁹ Fiona Hayes-Renshaw and H. Wallace. (1997). *The Council of Ministers*. London: Macmillan. Chapter 9, pp.211-243.

³⁹⁰ Anna-Carin Svensson. (2000). *In the service of the European Union: The role of the Presidency in negotiating the Amsterdam Treaty 1995-1997*, Uppsala: Statsvitenskapliga föreningen i Uppsala, pp. 223.

6.0 European Foreign policy: foreign policy coordination or emerging post-state EU foreign policy?

Even though a case study might draw attention to certain general aspects of foreign policy in the EU, it is always risky to generalise a specific case in order to explain the bigger picture. With this in mind, it is, nonetheless, important to consider whether and how the present analysis of the arms embargo case might help explain the general tendency of EU foreign policy. Does the answer of this thesis' research question, about who decided in the arms embargo case, contribute to a better understanding of the overall CFSP system? Is it still relevant to argue that member states remained the key feature of EU foreign policy, or is there a development towards a more supranational and united foreign policy in the hands of supranational institutions? Also, have these developments changed European foreign policy so substantially that traditional liberal foreign policy analysis (FPA) is no longer applicable?

This concluding chapter firstly focuses on whether the member states were indeed the main decision making actors in EU foreign policy at the time of the lifting discussions. Secondly, it assesses the applicability of traditional FPA to the arms embargo case and discusses the need for a new and European FPA. Finally, the chapter concludes by arguing that while traditional FPA still has considerable explanatory ability, because of the member states' primacy, the effect of Europeanization and the issue-specificity of EU foreign policy must be accounted for in an analysis of EU foreign policy.

6.1 The foreign policy primacy of member states, with a hint of Europeanization

The unanimity rule is the main feature of the EU's CFSP and allows member states to remain in control. The potential veto by any of the member states demonstrates the fragility of EU foreign policy and leaves practically all foreign policy decisions, apart from the foreign economic policy competences of the Community, at the mercy of the different governments in the European Council. Spence points to the negative aspect of this as he argues how the often difficult process of achieving a consensus on contentious foreign policy issues in the EU leads to more member states pursuing their own strategies as the European alternative would be considered inefficient and non-desirable.³⁹¹ That is why it is possible to argue that while unanimity ensures the member states' control over the EU's foreign policy, it is perhaps also evident that the structure of the CFSP itself becomes an obstacle which prevents the creation of a more Community-oriented foreign policy. The member states remain the principal actors

³⁹¹ David Spence in Brian White. (2001). *Understanding European foreign policy*. New York: Palgrave. Chapter 5, p. 99.

without any real desire to give up their veto in exchange for coherence. The transfer of power and competences to the EU can also be seen as a result of member states' costs- and benefits-assessments where they are more willing to cede powers if the benefit of this is substantial. Also, it might be possible that foreign policy is considered a particularly important policy area, where the benefits may not be as evident as in other areas. The fact that the member states voluntarily decided that a lifting of the 1989 arms embargo would need unanimity in the European Council,³⁹² clearly shows how embedded the unanimity rule is within EU foreign policy making. One could also argue that the question concerning the embargo still remains unresolved partly because of the reservations of some member states, making it impossible to arrive at a consensus in 2004-2005. As previously argued, the end of the debate was also largely caused by external factors, such as US opposition to the lifting and China's adaptation of the Anti-Secession Law. However, these factors consequently affected the formation of the member states' positions in the European Council.

It is also not just the consensus-based decision making process of the EU's foreign policy which points to how important national interests are. The fact that the foreign policy agenda seems to be set by the larger EU member states, also exemplifies the primacy of member states. Even though the Commission gained shared right to initiative in the foreign policy realm with the Maastricht treaty, there was a sense in the Commission that this right was not to be used unless it would coincide with a clear consensus among the member states.³⁹³ Jørgensen also emphasises how EU foreign policy is steered by member states and explains how some of the larger and more influential member states form "k-groups" in order to set the EU agenda.³⁹⁴ These member states work together in a sort of "minilateralism" in order to project their interests and to get their positions multilaterally accepted and legitimised within a larger institutional setting.³⁹⁵ Jørgensen especially points to the Franco-German axis as one of these recurring "k-groups."³⁹⁶ France and Germany's abovementioned fervent advocacy in favour of the arms embargo lifting may thus exemplify a "k-group" in action and demonstrate how member states' national foreign policy objectives may influence the EU agenda.

³⁹² Joakim Kreutz. (2004). "Reviewing the EU Arms Embargo on China: the clash between value and rationale in European Security Strategy." *The Central European review of international affairs*, 22. Pp. 43-58.

³⁹³ Simon Nuttall. (1996). "The Commission: the struggle for legitimacy." in Christopher Hill. (ed.). *Actors in Europe's foreign policy*. New York: Routledge, Chapter 6, pp. 130-150, p. 138.

³⁹⁴ Knud E. Jørgensen. (2004). «European foreign policy: conceptualising the domain.» in W. Carlsnaes, H. Sjørnsen and B. White (eds.). *Contemporary European FP*. London: Sage Publications. pp. 32-56, p. 40.

³⁹⁵ Knud E. Jørgensen. (2004). «European foreign policy: conceptualising the domain.» in W. Carlsnaes, H. Sjørnsen and B. White (eds.). *Contemporary European FP*. London: Sage Publications. pp. 32-56.

³⁹⁶ Ibid.

Even though member states seemed to remain in control of EU foreign policy, national foreign policy of these member states can now be said to be even less the result of an exclusively domestic foreign policy interest formation. Increased international interdependence embeds member states' national foreign policies within a broader framework and affects their preference formation. Ekgren refers to this embeddedness by pointing to how the execution of the Swedish Presidency in 2001 showed how closely linked Swedish and European administrations were.³⁹⁷ These strong links are also clear in the case of the UK, where almost forty years of EU membership have embedded the British administration deeply within the CFSP structure.³⁹⁸ While this might appear to constrain British foreign policy, considering the potential conflicts of interests between its European and Transatlantic priorities, the CFSP embeddedness has been argued to be a way for Germany to normalise its foreign policies.³⁹⁹

This framework of interconnected national foreign policy structures and the increased contact between member states, thus create the perfect setting for a possible Europeanization of national foreign policies. The national government representatives' constant contact with EU officials or with their counterparts in other member states leads to a socialisation which might again lead to a change in their preference formation.⁴⁰⁰ Wong defines this socialisation in the EU as a "reflex communautaire," where national government representatives no longer exclusively adhere to their national environment.⁴⁰¹ In the arms embargo case, Sweden's decision not to veto the lifting despite considerable domestic opposition, could be pointed to as evidence of this socialisation, as it seemed to be more important for the Swedish Government to behave according to the EU's "logic of appropriateness," than to adjust its foreign policy position according to domestic opinion.⁴⁰² The Swedish Government's abovementioned wish to consolidate its "EU credentials" clearly points to how the expectations of its EU counterparts seemed to matter more than the view of its domestic

³⁹⁷ Magnus Ekgren. (2004). "National FP coordination: the Swedish EU presidency." in Carlsnaes, W., H. Sjursen and B. White (eds.). *Contemporary European Foreign Policy*. London: Sage Publications, Chapter 13, pp. 211-226. pp 223.

³⁹⁸ Anthony Forster. (2000). "Britain." in Manners, I. and R. G. Whitman. (eds.). *The foreign policies of European Union member states*. New York: Manchester University Press. Chapter 3, pp. 44-63.

³⁹⁹ Lisbeth Aggestam. (2000). "Germany." in Manners, I. and R. G. Whitman. (eds.). *The foreign policies of European Union member states*. New York: Manchester University Press, Chapter 4, pp. 64-83.

⁴⁰⁰ Reuben Wong. (2010). "The Europeanization of FP." in C. Hill and M. Smith. *International relations and the EU* (2nd Ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 149-170.

⁴⁰¹ Reuben Wong. (2010). "The Europeanization of FP." in C. Hill and M. Smith. *International relations and the EU* (2nd Ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 156.

⁴⁰² Nicola Casarini. (2006, October). "The evolution of the EU-China relationship: from constructive engagement to strategic partnership." *European Union Institute for Security Studies Occasional Paper*, 64.

constituents, and consequently, illustrates how this wish to be accepted was an important part of its foreign policy preference formation.⁴⁰³

In addition to the abovementioned effects of the European context, the Community actors' increased entrepreneurship may lead to a less member state centred EU foreign policy. One example of this, is how the EP's reputation as the main norm entrepreneur in the EU⁴⁰⁴ was evident also in the arms embargo case. Its resolution against the lifting,⁴⁰⁵ as well as protests by several MEP's, show how the EP stated its opposition, in the hope of influencing the final outcome.⁴⁰⁶ Also, members of the Prodi and the Barroso I Commissions, except for Commissioner Patten, publicly argued in favour of the lifting.⁴⁰⁷ The High Representative for the CFSP, Solana, also called for a lifting of the embargo,⁴⁰⁸ and consequently joined the abovementioned Community actors in their efforts to influence the debate through declaratory diplomacy. This advocacy of actors with limited formal CFSP competences might then suggest that there was at least a perceived chance of influence, if not a real one. Kreutz addresses this difference between formal and informal powers and points to how the complex system of the EU may allow more informal influence as the intertwined structures create new, informal channels of influence.⁴⁰⁹ While the influence of actors with formal competences is much more clear and explicit, the possible influence of those who do not participate in the decision making process could be just as important, but is, nonetheless, much more difficult to assess. This is because these actors would mainly rely on influencing the decisive actors through rhetorical action. The fact that several Community actors clearly stated their position in the arms embargo debate, would arguably demonstrate their belief in their ability to make an impact, despite their limited formal CFSP competences and despite the probability of being bypassed by the final say of the member states in the European Council.

6.2 Foreign policy analysis of the EU: domestic focus on the member states or a new European framework?

As previously argued, the changing nature of foreign policy making in Europe, complicates the task of finding an appropriate framework of analysis. That is why one must consider how

⁴⁰³ Les Miles. (2000). "Sweden and Finland." in Manners, I. and R. G. Whitman. (eds.). *The foreign policies of European Union member states*. New York: Manchester University Press, Chapter 10, pp. 181-203.

⁴⁰⁴ Karen E. Smith. (2008). *European Union foreign policy in a changing world* (2nd Ed.). Cambridge: Polity Press. Chapter 5, pp. 111-141.

⁴⁰⁵ European Parliament. (2003). *Removal of the EU embargo on arms sales to China*, P5_TA-PROV(2003)0599

⁴⁰⁶ See the section on the EP in chapter 5 for a more thorough description of the EP's actions.

⁴⁰⁷ Please see the section on the Commission in chapter 4 for a description of the Commission's position.

⁴⁰⁸ EU's Solana: End China arms ban [Electronic version]. (2005, March 23). *CNN*.

⁴⁰⁹ Joakim Kreutz. (2004). "Reviewing the EU Arms Embargo on China: the clash between value and rationale in European Security Strategy." *The Central European review of international affairs*, 22, pp. 43-58.

new structures and non-governmental actors may influence the mainly intergovernmental process of foreign policy formation, and consequently, how these new elements can be incorporated into existing frameworks of analysis.

6.2.1 Moravcsik's liberal foreign policy analysis and the arms embargo case

Moravcsik argues that “an understanding of domestic politics is a precondition for, not a supplement to, the analysis of the strategic interaction among states.”⁴¹⁰ Moravcsik's liberal agency-based FPA approach thus emphasises the importance of domestic actors in the formation of national foreign policies, before they enter the international stage.⁴¹¹ In an EU setting, this approach is therefore focused on what happens within each member state and how this affects the member state's final negotiation position in the European Council.

In the arms embargo case, it seems like Moravcsik's FPA framework can still be applied, even though the debate took place within an EU context where domestic sources of foreign policy might not be the only ones. Moravcsik's first criterion of his liberal, agency-based FPA, the primacy of societal groups in national foreign policy formation, emphasises how groups within a society work towards exporting their preferences to the governing elite through collective action and political exchange.⁴¹² Here, these groups' preferences are “prior to politics” and thus fixed before any political debate. The Swedish Left Party and Green Party's strong advocacy against the lifting may serve as an example where groups in the domestic society might have affected the government's position through their pre-political tradition of human rights advocacy.⁴¹³ However, the arguments of issue-specific interest groups in the UK, such as Amnesty International, Saferworld and CAAT, appeared to have less direct influence on the Government's position. This might suggest that the source of domestic pressure is more vital in deciding how influential this pressure is, rather than the sheer number of people disagreeing with a given government position. The fact that the Left Party and the Green Party, which strongly opposed the lifting of the embargo, were also the two supporting parties of the Swedish minority Government, suggests that the Government

⁴¹⁰In Andrew Moravcsik. (2006). “Preferences and power in the European Community: A liberal intergovernmentalist approach.” in Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, M. (Ed.) *Debates on European integration*. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan. Chapter 11, pp. 264-303.

⁴¹¹ Andrew Moravcsik. (1997). “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics.” *International Organization*, 51(4), pp. 513-553.

⁴¹² In Andrew Moravcsik. (2006). “Preferences and power in the European Community: A liberal intergovernmentalist approach.” in Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, M. (Ed.) *Debates on European integration*. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan. Chapter 11, pp. 264-303.

⁴¹³ Sveriges Riksdag. (2005, February 2). *Svar på skriftlig fråga 2004/05:804 försäljning av vapen till Kina*. And Sveriges Riksdag. (2004, December 18). *Protokoll 2004/05:55 Riksdagens protokoll 2004/05:5*.

had to take their views into consideration in order to secure support in the Riksdag and remain in office. While this illustrates how the Swedish Government was affected by the country's more open and corporatist tradition, the largely two-party system of the UK and the centralised presidential system of France might have made these respective Governments less dependent upon support from domestic groups. It is thus possible to argue that while the relationship between the government and the society may shape national governments' preferences, the degree of influence of these societal groups varies according to country and issue area.

Moravcsik's second point of analysis considers how governments act as representatives of groups within their respective societies. He illustrates this by arguing that government representatives are "embedded in domestic and transnational civil society, which decisively constrains their identities and purposes."⁴¹⁴ In the arms embargo case, the strong institutionalised links between the UK Government and the defence companies may suggest that there is an increased chance that the Government would listen to and perhaps represent the interests of this particular group. The fact that both the British Government and the British defence companies' reluctance towards the lifting was based on a fear of how the lifting might affect their relationship with the US, suggests that their positions were linked. Dover emphasises the strong links between foreign policy and national defence companies, and one could perhaps argue that the UK Government might have acted as the defence companies' representatives as it ultimately, following US pressure, remained hesitant towards a lifting of the embargo.⁴¹⁵ It has also been argued that the French Government was under heavy pressure from French defence companies, who, contrary to their British counterparts, generally favoured a lifting of the embargo.⁴¹⁶ Also, the increasingly popular practice of having business leaders accompany Heads of Government or State on their state visits to China, while the latter finalised important trade agreements, demonstrates how Governments could act as representatives of certain business interests in their respective countries.

The tendency of accommodating major domestic interest groups may also be strengthened by the governments' wishes to remain in office with the help from these said

⁴¹⁴ Andrew Moravcsik. (2006). "Preferences and power in the European Community: A liberal intergovernmentalist approach." in Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, M. (Ed.) *Debates on European integration*. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan. Chapter 11, p. 271.

⁴¹⁵ Robert M. Dover. (2007). "For Queen and Company: The role of Intelligence in the UK's arms trade." *Political Studies*, 55, Pp. 683-708.

⁴¹⁶ Eugene Kogan. (2005). "The European Union defence industry and the appeal of the Chinese market." *Studien und berichte zur Sicherheitspolitik*, 1.

groups.⁴¹⁷ This could perhaps explain why Schröder and Chirac, both on their way out as national leaders in 2005, were more willing to defy domestic opposition, than their counterparts in the UK and in Sweden, who both still relied on public support to remain in office. Schröder and Chirac's inevitable exit as Heads of Government and State became clear as Schröder was confronted with a parliamentary motion of confidence and was defeated in the September 2005 federal election. This placed Schröder in a difficult position during the lifting debate in late 2005, as it was clear that Angela Merkel would assume office as German Chancellor in November that same year. As Chirac had only two years left of his maximum of years in office in 2005, he did not have to worry about accommodating domestic opposition in order to win the next presidential election. On the other hand, the fact that the British and Swedish Prime Ministers, Blair and Persson, had both general elections coming up at the time of the arms embargo debate, in May 2005 and 2006 respectively, might thus explain why they seemed more willing to take domestic groups' opinions into account, as their support might help them secure another term in office.

The importance of interdependence is the third core assumption of liberal FPA, which emphasises how national interests must be considered in relation to its international context. The possible constraints created by one state's national interests upon another state's actions is a typical example of how interdependence may alter previously defined national strategies.⁴¹⁸ The fact that the lifting debate was to be resolved by unanimity in the European Council, left the pro-lifting member states dependent upon the actions of hesitant member states, which had the ability to block such a lifting. This illustrates how some member states' strategies might be affected by other member states' preferences. The unanimity rule and the possibility of a single-state veto thus demonstrated how national interests of one member state could constrain the other states' room to manoeuvre. Furthermore, this illustrates how the international environment must be accounted for, even in traditionally state controlled foreign policies. Also, the US' threats of imposing restrictions on technology transfers from US to European defence companies illustrate Moravcsik's interdependence emphasis on negative

⁴¹⁷ Andrew Moravcsik. (2006). "Preferences and power in the European Community: A liberal intergovernmentalist approach." in Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, M. (Ed.) *Debates on European integration*. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan. Chapter 11, pp. 264-303, p. 272.

⁴¹⁸ Walter Carlsnaes. (2002). "Foreign policy." in W. Carlsnaes, T. Risse and B. A. Simmons. (eds). *Handbook of International relations*. London: Sage publications Ltd. Chapter 17, pp. 331-349.

policy externalities, where one government's policy creates costs for a group outside their national jurisdiction.⁴¹⁹

While traditional liberal FPA might help explain the abovementioned aspects of the arms embargo case and the respective parties' positions, there are also elements which cannot be explained by this framework. Liberal FPA's focus on the importance of domestic actors might be challenged as the increasing "primeministerialisation" gives the Prime Minister a "gate keeping"-role in national foreign policy, which may limit the other domestic actors' influence.⁴²⁰ BBC's Kershaw pointed to this "primeministerialisation"-effect as he argued that Blair's ten years as the UK's Prime Minister had led to an increased presidential nature of the British political system, which consequently had "eroded the authority of the House of Commons."⁴²¹ In the arms embargo case, the importance of the Prime Minister, or in this case the Chancellor, also became evident as Schröder vowed to push for a lifting despite strong parliamentary opposition.⁴²² This primacy of one single person would also increase the chance of possible socialisation effects resulting from his or her regular participation in the European Council, where the views of European colleagues might become more important than domestic opinion.

Another element of the arms embargo case, which traditional FPA has difficulties explaining, is the role of supranational EU actors. Despite the fact that they do not possess formal competences in CFSP, they are still a part of the EU's foreign policy system, and might influence decisions taken by member states.⁴²³ It is therefore important to include them in the analysis of European foreign policy, even though it might be more difficult to find proof of this informal influence. Their supranational nature is difficult to place within the traditional state-oriented FPA and the only way to do this would perhaps be through an EU adaption of traditional FPA where the EU replaces the state's role, and where the EP and the Commission assume national positions they would hypothetically have in an EU state. If one is to transfer Moravcsik's liberal FPA to the European level, one could argue that the Commission's promotion of business interests could parallel a national government

⁴¹⁹ Andrew Moravcsik. (2006). "Preferences and power in the European Community: A liberal intergovernmentalist approach." in Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, M. (Ed.) *Debates on European integration*. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan. Chapter 11, pp. 264-303.

⁴²⁰ Magnus Ekgren. (2004). "National FP coordination: the Swedish EU presidency." in Carlsnaes, W., H. Sjursen and B. White (eds.). *Contemporary European Foreign Policy*. London: Sage Publications, Chapter 13, pp. 211-226.

⁴²¹ Ian Kershaw. (2007, May 10). "How will history judge Blair?" [Electronic version]. *BBC*.

⁴²² Hugh Williamson. (2005, March 31). "Schröder insists EU lifts China arms ban" [Electronic version]. *Financial Times*.

⁴²³ Joakim Kreutz. (2004). "Reviewing the EU Arms Embargo on China: the clash between value and rationale in European Security Strategy." *The Central European review of international affairs*, 22, pp. 43-58.

representing a subset of society, businesses trading with China, and thus include the Commission as an agent acting as a representative of trade and commercial interest.⁴²⁴ Even though Hill opens up for a redefinition of traditional FPA, where the primary actor is an independent but not necessarily a state actor,⁴²⁵ it is evident that this transformation of traditional FPA remains a very experimental approach since the EU does not yet have the clear characteristics of a state.

As well as the increased foreign policy role of the Prime Minister and the supranational nature of EU actors, the Europeanization effect is also excluded by Moravcsik's liberal agency-based FPA. The main elements of Europeanization within foreign policy; projection of national preferences to the EU level, adaptation and convergence of national positions and, lastly, the socialisation effect,⁴²⁶ all point to potentially important foreign policy influences within a country belonging to the closely knit EU framework. Socialisation is perhaps the less tangible aspect of Europeanization, which deals with how government representatives, who have regular contact with their European counterparts, are being socialised into a community where their previously defined preferences might change according to the EU's "logic of appropriateness." This clearly contradicts liberal FPA's claim that national foreign policies are fixed preferences not subject to change, and emphasises the social-constructivist foundation of socialisation theory within Europeanization. A clear example of this during the arms embargo debate was the fact that Sweden, despite substantial domestic opposition and a tradition of human rights promotion, decided not to veto the lifting of the arms embargo. As mentioned above in chapter five, this was explained by the fact that Sweden, being a more recent EU member, wished to consolidate its place within the CFSP by following an assumed majority within the European Council and by adapting to a perceived "logic of appropriateness."⁴²⁷ Another example of potential socialisation effects, might be the fact that two other Northern European member states, Denmark and the Netherlands, also seemed to adapt their position to the emerging lifting consensus in the EU in 2004, even though human rights advocacy traditionally was one of their main foreign policy objectives.⁴²⁸ Traditional liberal FPA does not seem to include any frameworks of analysis able to account

⁴²⁴ Andrew Moravcsik. (1997). "Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics." *International Organization*, 51(4), pp. 513-553.

⁴²⁵ Christopher Hill. (2003). *The changing politics of foreign policy*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

⁴²⁶ Reuben Wong. (2010). "The Europeanization of FP." in C. Hill and M. Smith. *International relations and the EU* (2nd Ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 149-170.

⁴²⁷ Les Miles. (2000). "Sweden and Finland." in Manners, I. and R. G. Whitman. (eds.). *The foreign policies of European Union member states*. New York: Manchester University Press, Chapter 10, pp. 181-203.

⁴²⁸ Nicola Casarini. (2006, October). "The evolution of the EU-China relationship: from constructive engagement to strategic partnership." *European Union Institute for Security Studies Occasional Paper*, 64.

for this socialisation effect, as it would perhaps instead have explained the Swedish reluctance towards a lifting veto by pointing to the human rights advocacy of Swedish societal groups. The possible redefinition of values and preferences, which happens during a socialisation process, thus points to a central aspect of European foreign policy formation which might be neglected in the case of a purely domestically focused FPA.

6.2.2 A new framework of foreign policy analysis for the EU?

Because of these potential shortcomings of traditional liberal FPA, there have been calls for a new and transformed FPA more suitable for a Europeanized foreign policy environment.⁴²⁹ Knodt and Princen suggest one type of adapted FPA as they point to how a general shift from actors to process in FPA might make it easier to analyse the individual foreign policy processes of the EU, without having to regard for its much disputed “actorness.”⁴³⁰ However, it is also difficult to imagine the emergence of a new FPA framework that would be able to include the underlying structures and elements of this complex foreign policy system. This complexity is illustrated by how the previously mentioned co-existence of two different policy regimes within the EU’s foreign policy framework, one Community-based and one largely intergovernmental, creates a type of dualism, where the actors’ competences vary according to which type of regime the case belongs to. White also acknowledges this differentiation of EU foreign policy, but presents three different branches of European foreign policy: foreign economic policy, CFSP and the member states’ foreign policies.⁴³¹

This very case-by-case configuration of the European foreign policy system thus suggests that as long as EU foreign policy remains as issue-specific as this, it would be nearly impossible to find *one* FPA framework that would be able to explain all these different aspects. The gradual overlap of the three abovementioned branches of European foreign policy also complicates the search for one coherent theoretical framework as the system remains intertwined and differentiated at the same time. The Commission’s very different roles in foreign economic policy, where it is the main negotiator, and in CFSP, where it only

⁴²⁹Ben Tonra, Ian Manners and Richard Whitman are amongst those arguing for a new and transformed European FPA. For a more thorough explanation of these views: in Henrik Larsen. (2009). “A distinct foreign policy analysis for Europe? Towards a comprehensive framework for analysing the FP of EU member states,” *European Journal of International Relations* 15(3), pp. 537–566 and Ian Manners and R. Whitman. (2000). “Conclusion,” in Manners, I. and R. G. Whitman. (eds.). *The foreign policies of European Union member states*. New York: Manchester University Press, Chapter 13, pp. 243-273.

⁴³⁰ Michèle Knodt and Sebastiaan Princen (2003). “Understanding the EU’s external relations: the move from actors to process.” in Michèle Knodt and Sebastiaan Princen (eds.). *Understanding the European Union’s External Relations*. Oxon: Routledge, Chapter 11, pp. 195-208, p. 206.

⁴³¹ Brian White. (1999). “The European Challenge to foreign policy analysis.” *European Journal of International Relations*, 5 (1), pp. 36-66.

has a shared right of initiative, show how each given issue decides which actors should be the main point of analysis. As previously mentioned, Larsen also agrees with this issue-specific European FPA as he presents three co-existing European FPAs: traditional, transformed and post-modern FPA.⁴³² Here, the different actors' levels of engagement decide which one of the three approaches would be suitable for every case. Traditional FPA is applied to cases with strong articulation of national foreign policy and where the EU is considered just another international organisation. Transformed FPA would help explain cases where the EU dominates the field. Lastly, post-modern FPA is applied to cases where both the EU and member states actively advocate their foreign policy interests. The latter is perhaps therefore the most complex version of Larsen's analyses, as it encompasses both member state and Community systems in a double analysis. This would also confirm the need for considering both member state and Community actors in my analysis of the arms embargo case, as the active engagement of both types of actors was evident. Consequently, it is possible to argue that an issue-specific approach to European foreign policy is necessary as long as there are several parallel regimes of competences and relevant actors within the European foreign policy system. As long as foreign economic policies and the CFSP co-exist in this state of dualism, it is difficult to operate with one FPA of the EU. The question is thus whether this dualism may be circumvented in the future, as a consequence of how the 2009 Lisbon Treaty abolished the EU's three-pillar structure and launched a European diplomatic service.⁴³³

Despite the challenge of a differentiated European foreign policy system, the primacy of member states in the CFSP and in the arms embargo case, could however, suggest that it is indeed possible to explain much of this case based on Moravcsik's traditional liberal FPA approach. The fact that one member state could have single-handedly vetoed the whole case makes it important to look at the domestic sources of this position. This importance of the national positions thus advocates a more general and IR-oriented FPA as Moravcsik discards the need for a special European FPA: "although the EC is a unique institution, it does not require a *sui generis* theory."⁴³⁴ The argument for the continuation of traditional FPA is also supported by the fact that as long as the CFSP is largely intergovernmental, the EU's foreign policy remains a result of EU member states' foreign policy coordination rather than a set of supranationally defined foreign policy objectives.

⁴³² Henrik Larsen. (2009). "A distinct foreign policy analysis for Europe? Towards a comprehensive framework for analysing the FP of EU member states." *European Journal of International Relations* 15(3), pp. 537–566.

⁴³³The European External Action Services (EEAS).

⁴³⁴ Andrew Moravcsik. (2006). "Preferences and power in the European Community: A liberal intergovernmentalist approach." in Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, M. (Ed.) *Debates on European integration*. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan. Chapter 11, p. 265.

Even though the traditional and domestically oriented FPA framework seems to capture much of the EU's foreign policy as member states remain the primary actors, it is also, as previously argued, important to consider the Europeanization effect. In the arms embargo case, the Swedish Government, on the one hand, seemed to be affected by this Europeanized socialisation as they discarded domestic opposition in favour of fitting into the EU's logic of appropriateness. On the other hand, the UK Government did not seem that socialised within the EU by the end of the debate, as they went from hesitation to support and then back to hesitation when it came to the lifting of the arms embargo. This shows how different member states are differently affected by Europeanization and that the scope of this additional explanatory factor to traditional FPA must be adjusted to each member state. Manners and Whitman explain this by pointing out that the smaller the member state's foreign policy administration system is, the more affected it will be by Europeanization and then especially socialisation.⁴³⁵ Consequently, this might explain how foreign policies in Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands seemed to have been affected by EU socialisation, while the "big three," France, Germany and the UK, with larger foreign policy structures of their own, appeared to have been less Europeanized and less influenced by how the rest of the EU wanted them to behave. Europeanization theories thus point to an additional way of explaining national foreign policy formation within the EU. Furthermore, this suggests that the best way to analyse member state dominated EU foreign policies would be to add a consideration for Europeanization effects to Moravcsik's traditional domestic FPA.

6.3 Concluding remarks

The arms embargo case showed how member states were still the main decision makers of the CFSP, while they themselves also were subjected to the Europeanization effects of European integration. The halt of discussions and the dropping of the subject followed a period of increased disagreement among the member states, which eventually proved to be too substantial to be worked out.⁴³⁶ The default unanimity process shows the difficulties of obtaining a consensus in an expanding EU, where member states range from nuclear and neutral states to states that have only recently emerged from the USSR's grip. As previously mentioned, the structure of the CFSP itself could be said to be the main obstacle to the emergence of a more coherent EU foreign policy, as it relies on a difficultly obtained consensus. Foreign policy's prominent role amongst other less contentious policy areas, also

⁴³⁵ Ian Manners and R. Whitman. (2000). "Conclusion." in Manners, I. and R. G. Whitman. (eds.). *The foreign policies of European Union member states*. New York: Manchester University Press, Chapter 13, pp. 243-273.

⁴³⁶ China arms embargo moves off EU agenda [Electronic version]. (2005, November 9). *Financial Times*.

demonstrates its close connection to the external sovereignty of the state and that this is an area where the member states' powers, inherent in the unanimity rule, are not easily, if ever, given up. This also emphasises the gap between European foreign policy and the otherwise largely quality majority voting (QMV)-based EU system. A change of decision-making procedures might then change the whole field of European foreign policy, as the unanimity rule possibly leaves the discussions at an impasse, while QMV encourages compromise through a process of intergovernmental bargaining. It is difficult to try to assess counterfactually the outcome of the arms embargo case if the European Council decisions had been QMV-based. However, it is possible that a QMV-based lifting decision might have been marked by the general tendency of majority decisions in the EU, where vague definitions, side-payments and member state opt-outs often occur.

The US' seemingly large impact on the arms embargo case, through influential links with member states, such as the UK, also points to the US as an additional obstacle to the development of a more coherent EU foreign policy. The fact that the US' position is still able to fuel disagreements among EU member states, as in the arms embargo case and more notably in the Iraqi war in 2003, illustrates how all EU member states do not always see their EU partners as their principal allies. Consequently, the dynamic between member states may affect the overall outcome of a foreign policy case in the EU. It is here possible to argue that the "camps" from the disagreements over the Iraqi war might have somewhat reappeared in the arms embargo case, seeing that the UK again eventually sided with the US, while France and Germany seemed more than willing to position themselves in opposition to the US.⁴³⁷ The fact that member states did not automatically side with fellow member states in foreign policy matters may also suggest that it is not the US itself that is limiting a coherent EU foreign policy, but the member states' lack of belief in an effective and efficient EU foreign policy.

These internal differences in the EU thus suggest that even though it might seem clear that it was the member states and not the Community institutions who remained the key decision makers in the arms embargo case, it is also necessary to identify the decisive actors within this group of states in order to provide a more comprehensive analysis. In the arms embargo case, France and Germany were clearly the member states who decided to put the lifting of the embargo on the agenda,⁴³⁸ but the fact that it was not lifted, may imply that they did not remain the main decision makers throughout the process. The UK's avoidance of the

⁴³⁷ Honor Mahony. (2005, March 23). "EU leaders remain unchanged on China arms embargo"[Electronic version], *EU Observer*.

⁴³⁸ Frank Ching. (2004). "Changing dynamics in EU-china Arms relations." [Electronic version]. *China Brief*.

subject during its 2005 Presidency, arguably due to US pressure, thus suggest that it was the UK which eventually decided the outcome of the arms embargo case.

In the arms embargo case it is also possible to see how different actors behave differently based on their position. As previously mentioned, Kreutz argues that an actor's position depends on whether it possesses an "insider" or "outsider" role.⁴³⁹ This is clear in the case of EU foreign policy, where domestic actors are increasingly being left on the outside as decisions take place in the Prime Minister's office and in the European Council. The "outsiders" of the arms embargo case, with limited formal competences, such as national parliaments, the EP and other Community actors, also seemed to adopt a more direct and possibly controversial stance, as they would not have to take part in the unanimity negotiations in the European Council. This is also a central argument for Airoidi, as she points to how the directly elected EP allows a broad range of MEPs, representing different fractions of European society, to advocate, and perhaps get the EP to adopt, certain positions which might have been considered too controversial for an institution "inside" the foreign policy decision making structure.⁴⁴⁰

The application of traditional liberal FPA to the arms embargo case proved that while this approach could explain a number of aspects of the member states' positions, it was not able to account for the Europeanization effects or for the advocacy of Community actors. While the latter might not have been decisive in this case, the Europeanization effect may add a whole other dimension to explaining preference formation at the national-European level. That is why it seems justifiable to maintain the traditional FPA framework, with an added Europeanization element, as long as European foreign policy remains member state controlled. One could also argue that the absence of a united and coherent EU foreign policy leads to the absence of a comprehensive FPA framework for the EU and its member states.

This continuation of traditional FPA of the EU would, however, be problematic in the case of more economic related foreign policies of the Union. Foreign economic policy has been the prerogative of the Commission since the establishment of a Common Commercial Policy in the Rome Treaty, and stands in clear contrast to the member state controlled policies of the CFSP. The abovementioned traditional FPA with an added Europeanization element would thus perhaps not be a sufficient framework of analysis for the EU's foreign economic policy. It would perhaps be difficult for this framework, based on the primacy of the state, to

⁴³⁹ Joakim Kreutz. (2004). "Reviewing the EU Arms Embargo on China: the clash between value and rationale in European Security Strategy." *The Central European review of international affairs*, 22, pp. 43-58.

⁴⁴⁰ Adele Airoidi. (2008). *The European Union and the Arctic. Policies and actions*. (Vol. 729). Copenhagen: Nordic Council of Ministers.

explain the central position of supranational actors. This is also why it is so important to acknowledge that the analysis of EU foreign policy must be customised to each case, depending on which decision making regime the case belongs to. However, the fact that economic and political aspects of foreign policy have been gradually interlinked since the end of the Cold War⁴⁴¹ makes it difficult to separate the EU's two foreign policy regimes completely. This may thus question the overall validity of traditional FPA in the EU if the intergovernmental and Community-oriented policies become increasingly intertwined. The arms embargo case also illustrated this, as the economic aspects of the embargo attracted Community actors' interests, while it still remained under member state CFSP jurisdiction.

The entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009 opened the door to a possible unification of these two foreign policy regimes. The abolishing of the EU's pillar structure deleted the explicit separation between intergovernmental and Community policy areas.⁴⁴² This, together with the establishment of the EEAS, could then possibly be the beginning of an effort to unite the different strands of EU foreign policy. Janos Herman, the chair of the EU's delegation to Norway, seemed to believe in this as he claimed in 2010, that the Lisbon treaty would create more effective and efficient foreign policy instruments for the EU.⁴⁴³ One of the focal points of further research on foreign policy in the EU would then naturally be the development of EU foreign policy after these fundamental structural changes. What effect will the abolishing of the pillar structure have on policies, such as the CFSP, which used to be clearly separated from the supranational first pillar? Will the establishment of co-decision as the default decision making procedure eventually "spill over" to the foreign policy realm?

Another point of interest would be to see how the emergence of two new EU actors, the non-rotating Presidency of the European Council and the High Representative for the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, may affect the EU's foreign policy. Will the new Presidency lead to a more coherent and long-term foreign policy strategy less affected by varying interests of the member states? Can the High Representative and the new President together be influential drivers for a more united EU foreign policy despite their limited formal competences? Also, as the present thesis' analysis of four member states' foreign policies may obviously have excluded important factors in EU foreign policy, originating from the other twenty-three member states, an updated analysis of the EU27 member states' foreign

⁴⁴¹ Stephan Keukeleire and Jennifer MacNaughtan. (2008). *The foreign policy of the European Union*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, Chapter 4, pp. 98-123.

⁴⁴² Stephan Keukeleire and Jennifer MacNaughtan. (2008). *The foreign policy of the European Union*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, Chapter 3, pp. 66-97.

⁴⁴³ Janos Herman (2010, November 17) "Seminar on human rights." Speech Presented at Conference on Human Rights with the EU's delegation to Norway, Oslo, Norway.

policies could be a suggestion for further research. This is also because it appears that the major comparative works have been written before the major EU enlargements of 2004 and 2007.⁴⁴⁴

When it comes to finding the most suitable FPA framework for foreign policies of the EU, one could argue that the debate will always be divided between those remaining faithful to a more generalizable and universal FPA and those seeking a customised European FPA for a *sui generis* EU. This is also a recurring aspect of the study of the EU in general and Jørgensen points to how researchers must decide whether or not they are satisfied with a less generalizable theory in their analyses of European foreign policy.⁴⁴⁵ The case of the EU and its member states' foreign policies is however a difficult one, as member states seem to hold on to their exclusive national competences in foreign policies longer than in other policy areas. This may also help explain the fact that the analysis of EU foreign policy may remain longer within a traditional framework, whereas other policy areas in the EU may need to be analysed within a transformed frame of reference.

The present thesis' analysis thus states that member states still seemed to be the main foreign policy decision makers in the EU at the time of the 2004-2005 arms embargo discussions. Even though these discussions were set within the EU's institutional structure, the Community institutions were not able to influence the case, because of their limited formal CFSP competences. The present analysis also shows how domestic actors may have affected the governments' positions, but that this influence varied greatly according to each member state. Lastly, the traditional liberal FPA proved able to explain a number of aspects of the case study because of the member states' foreign policy primacy, but it remains evident that there are areas of European foreign policy coordination which will remain unaccounted for by this theoretical approach. The Europeanization effect is one of these areas which cannot be explained by traditional FPA, but may nonetheless provide an important additional insight into the foreign policy formation of member states. The present thesis thus suggests that an issue-specific traditional liberal FPA may continue to help explain European foreign policy, as long as the CFSP remains intergovernmental, and as long as the Europeanization effects are accounted for.

⁴⁴⁴ Two of the main works on member states' foreign policies: Christopher Hill (ed.). (1996). *Actors in Europe's foreign policy*. New York: Routledge and Manners, I. and R. G. Whitman. (eds.). (2000). *The foreign policies of European Union member states*. New York: Manchester University Press.

⁴⁴⁵ Knud E. Jørgensen. (2004). "European foreign policy: conceptualising the domain." in W. Carlsnaes, H. Sjørnsen and B. White (eds.). *Contemporary European FP*. London: Sage Publications, pp. 32-56.

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