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A Discipline Divided

Polish Economists and the
Communist Regime, 1945–1960

Thesis for the degree doctor artium

Trondheim, May 2008

Norwegian University of Science and Technology
Faculty of Arts
Department of History and Classical Studies



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ACRONYMS

AAN	Archiwum Akt Nowych, the Archive of New Records, the state archive devoted to contemporary history.
AMSZ	Archiwum Ministerstwa Spraw Zagranicznych, archive of Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
APAN	Archiwum Polskiej Akademii Nauk, the Archive of the Polish Academy of Science.
APMW	Archiwum Państwowe Miasta Warszawa, the State Archive of the City of Warsaw.
ASGH	Archiwum Szkoły Głównej Handlowej, the archive of Warsaw School of Economics.
AUW	Archiwum Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, archive of Warsaw University
BPO	Basic party organisation, the party cell located in the workplace.
CC	Central Committee (in the text – of the PUWP)
CNRS	Conseil National de Recherche Scientifique in France
CPB	Central Planning Board (responsible for the first postwar economic plan)
CQC	Central Qualification Committee (Polish acronym CKK)
CUP	Polish acronym of the Central Planning Board, Centralny Urząd Planowania
DC	District Committee (in the text – of the PUWP, refers to city districts)
IKNP	Polish acronym of the First Congress of Polish Science
ITSC	Institute for the Training of Scientific Cadres, attached to the PUWP Central Committee, established 1950, Polish acronym IKKN, renamed Institute of Social Sciences (INS)
MSzW	Polish acronym of the Ministry of Higher Education, Ministerstwo Szkolnictwa Wyższego
NKVD	People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, Soviet secret police agency
Orgburo	Organisation Bureau of the PUWP Central Committee,
Politburo	Political Bureau of the PUWP Central Committee
PAN	Polish Academy of Science, established 1951
PAU	Polish Academy of Letters (based in Kraków)
PEA	Polish Economic Association
PSP	Polish Socialist Party

PTE	English acronym PEA, Polish Economic Association
PPP	Polish Peasant Party (opposition to PSP and PWP, headed by Mikołajczyk)
PWP	Polish Workers Party (communists)
PUWP	Polish United Workers Party, result of the merger of socialist and communist parties in December of 1948)
RC	Regional Committee (in this text - of the PUWP)
SGH	Main School of Commerce (today: Warsaw School of Economics) in 1949 renamed SGPiS
SGPiS	Main School of Planning and Statistics
UW	Warsaw University
UJ	Jagiellon University in Kraków

INTRODUCTION

Polish economists, the subject of this study, do not form an easily-definable group. While a wide-ranging categorisation of the profession might include all those employed in positions involving economic expertise, from junior accountants to the president of the national bank, this study will focus on economists who took an active part in the production, transmission and evaluation of scientific knowledge in post-war Poland. In practice this largely means economists who held academic positions. Ultimately, the decision on who was or was not a member of this tribe was made by the practitioners themselves, with the result that individuals recognised by other economists are included in this inquiry regardless of their education, institutional affiliation or professional experience. Over the years covered below, the composition and structure of this disciplinary group underwent not one but several profound transformations, some of these were caused by the Communist regime's ambitious science policy.

This study has two sets of protagonists: economists in academic institutions, and the Communist regime's policy makers. Both were highly resourceful. The former enjoyed the recognition and respect of society, were confident of their legitimacy, and had the advantage of long term incumbency in academic institutions. The latter controlled financial and administrative resources, enjoyed raw power, and brimmed over with revolutionary zeal. If we narrow the focus to the circumscribed stage upon which the confrontations and negotiations between the new regime and the established academic sector took place from the late 1940s to the late 1950s, communist domination was not obvious. From the start, neither of the two parties accepted its opponent's claims of control over scientific knowledge as legitimate, and the outcome of the confrontation was by no means pre-determined. This is a case study of the ensuing confrontations, negotiations and accommodations, and if we take stock of the situation from the point of view of 1960, we will find that there was no clear winner. Rather, both the Polish economists who had occupied the field in 1945, and the group

of communists introduced into academic positions by the Party,¹ were transformed by these confrontations with each other, and with the requirements of the regime. Indeed, this study is an investigation of the gradual and mutual transformation of both parties, from aggressive confrontation, to the apparent victory of the Marxist-Leninist economists, and then to the collapse of their monopoly over the field in 1956.

Stalin is reputed to have said that communism would fit Poland as a saddle fitted a cow. Indeed, communism – and especially its Soviet version – was not the preferred choice of the majority of Polish society, fiercely attached as it was to national culture and independence. Wartime experiences had confirmed the Poles' view of both of their powerful neighbours, the USSR and Germany, as threats to the nation's existence. Yet in 1944, following the Yalta Agreement, and backed by the Red Army and the NKVD, a Communist regime was established. Based on a case study of professional economists from academic institutions, the present investigation explores the relationship between a reluctant Poland and this revolutionary regime. It covers the period 1945 to 1960, during which time the new communist system was formed, experienced its first major crisis, and then regained stability.

It is a well-established fact among scholars of Soviet studies that the totalitarian model does not offer a satisfying description or explanation of the interaction between the communist regimes and the societies over which they ruled. Belief in the omnipotence of the Soviet Party was successfully challenged by revisionist historians even before the Soviet Union crumbled in the late 1980s. Scholars discerned a greater or lesser degree of interaction between the Soviet regime and various social groups, rather than a one way top-down communication between an active regime and a passive society.² Sources available from the early 1990s allowed better nuancing of a once heavily-schematic representation.³ Furthermore, research on other communist-ruled countries has helped us to challenge the view that the diversity of East and Central European societies was destroyed by the imposition of a uniformly sovietising system. Several studies demonstrate that historical experiences, local socio-

¹ When capitalised, "the Party" refers to the Communist party in Poland, which after 1945 was first called the Polish Workers Party and after the merger with the Polish Socialist Party as the Polish United Workers Party. In quotes I have kept the casing of the original.

² An important study was Fitzpatrick, Sheila, 1979. *Education and Social Mobility in the Soviet Union 1921-1934* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. For a review of the development of views on Soviet history during Stalin's rule see Reichman, Henry, 1988. "Reconsidering "Stalinism"". *Theory and Society*, 17, 57-89.

³ See for instance the volume of sources edited and commented on by Siegelbaum and Sokolov. Siegelbaum, Lewis H., Sokolov, A. K., Zhuravlev, Sergei & Kosheleva, L., 2000. *Stalinism as a way of life : a narrative in documents* New Haven ; London: Yale University Press. Kotkin, Stephen, 1997. *Magnetic mountain : Stalinism as a civilisation* London ; Berkeley: University of California Press.

economic conditions and national cultures deeply affected the various communist regimes' ability to sovietise their satellite states.⁴

The situation within Polish historiography is radically different at the levels of synthetic interpretations and narrow case-studies. The former, often written for a general public with an educational purpose in mind, perpetrate a vision of post-war history which is detached from, and to a certain extent incompatible with, the findings of specialised studies, including this one. The principal message in overviews of post-war history is that an alien totalitarian system was imposed against the will and without the participation of Polish society, and was sustained only by the threat of a Soviet invasion. Society is portrayed as the active subject only when opposition to the regime is discussed, and the narrative is usually structured by a division into strands relating to society, "us", and regime, "them". The strength of this narrative is that it chimes in with popular interpretations of Polish history, which shy away from uncomfortable evidence of compromise, and stress a story of noble uprisings against foreign oppressors. Polish history during the communist era tends to be analysed in national terms: the Polish Communist regime is seen as the extension, the "*agentura*", of the Soviet Union; unable and unwilling to represent Polish society, and in conflict with the interests of the Polish nation. According to this interpretation, the Communist regime was intrinsically alien to Polish society, both culturally and nationally. Together with a stress on the totalitarian aspects of the Soviet regime, this undermines any discussion of the interaction between the regime and society. It allows for no honourable, legitimate ways in which Poles could work with what is classified as a foreign and totalitarian system. A possible reason why the insights of revisionist historians have not occasioned any substantial reworking of Polish historiography's grand narrative is that totalitarianism fits so well with the logic of this narrative that it is hard to challenge. Totalitarianism explained why Polish society had to submit to Soviet domination (totalitarian regimes are not easily resisted), and described the relations between the regime and society in terms of polarisation and opposition (them and us, no co-operation, no common interests) thereby presenting a cohesive and attractive package. While a focus on international and political history has led historians to stress the conflict

⁴ In a recent review of Peter Kenez, Holly Case confirms the emergence of a consensus on the diversity of countries' experiences within the region. She traces the idea to Z. Brzezinski's 1960 book, and mentions the recent works of Bradley Adams, John Connelly, Charles Gati and Norman Naimark to support it. Review published on H-Net Book Review, <http://www.h-net.msu.edu/reviews/> accessed on 05.12.2007 For discussions of Polish historian's dealings with the totalitarian approaches see the contributions of A. Kemp-Welch and A. Friszke in Kemp-Welch, A.(ed.) (1999) *Stalinism in Poland, 1944-56 : selected papers from the Fifth World Congress of Central and East European studies, Warsaw, 1995*. Basingstoke: Macmillan.

between Polish and Soviet interests and culture, studies of the relations between the Polish regime and its society should have as their subject the many moments of interaction and negotiation between them. Such studies may lead to different conclusions and their synthesis may in the future give us a different grand narrative of Polish post-war history.

Further explanation of the present situation in Polish historiography may lie in the fact that Polish historians have concentrated on dealing with the legacy left by Party historians. Party-censored historiography not only furnished them with biased interpretations, but also left important areas uncharted – for instance, the role of the secret police, and the inner workings of the Party leadership. In order to rectify these omissions, historians have focused many of their efforts on studying the regime's abuse of power. After 1990, when politicians with backgrounds in anti-communist opposition came to power, the Party censorship was replaced with a focus on oppositional activities, particularly heroic resistance, rather than on more consensual forms of interaction with the regime. Anything that could be interpreted and represented by political opponents as co-operation or collaboration with the regime became sensitive material. The relationship between the new regime and Polish society continues to be the subject of controversy. The longevity of the debate initiated by Miłosz with *Captive Mind* in 1953, on the roles and moral dilemmas of Polish intellectuals, is one illustration of the acute feelings regime-society issues continue to arouse.⁵

Side by side with the cultivation of the totalitarian-nationalistic narrative of post-war history in general works, an increasing number of in-depth studies have been conducted both in and outside Poland. Today, several institutions conduct research into post-war Polish history, the most important being Warsaw University, and the Polish Academy of Science's Institute of History and Institute of Political Studies. Krystyna Kersten and her colleagues at the Institute of History at PAN produced individual and collective publications on post-war topics, particularly in the first half of the 1990s. Andrzej Paczkowski at the Institute of Political Studies first directed the efforts of his team towards the editing of collections of sources central to the understanding of the workings of the communist leadership, and then in the last decade published both syntheses and in-depth studies. At Warsaw University, Marcin Kula and his students have undertaken studies of various aspects of societal and everyday life

⁵ Miłosz, Czesław, 1953. *The captive mind*, 1st ed. New York: Knopf. Some important publications in this debate include Trznadel, Jacek, 1988. *Hańba domowa : rozmowy z pisarzami* Paris: Instytut Literacki, Ślabek, Henryk, 1997. *Intelektualistów obraz własny 1944-1989*: Książka i Wiedza. The last addition, in the form of a book for it is beyond the space of a footnote to document this debate in journals and newspapers, is Bikont, Anna & Szczęsna, Joanna, 2006. *Lawina i kamienie : pisarze wobec komunizmu* Warszawa: Prószyński i S-ka.

during the communist era.⁶ Other central institutions include the Institute of National Remembrance, and the private foundation “Karta”.⁷ The number of Polish history studies published outside Poland is naturally lower, but some of these stand out because of their dexterity in combining the approaches of western scholarship with thorough knowledge of Polish conditions, allowing for a more nuanced perspective than the totalitarian approach. A central work, Padraic Kenney’s study *Rebuilding Poland; Workers and Communists 1945-1950*, explored the limitations of the Polish Communist Party’s power. By displaying the communists’ difficulties when it came to accommodating and persuading their core electorate, the Polish proletariat, Kenney demonstrated the potential that might be had by making inquiries into the agency of the social constituency. Both his discussion of the importance of the “moral capital” of Polish workers, and the insights of Jan T. Gross into the evolution of Polish society during the Second World War, exemplify approaches that show society enjoying a more active role. Even closer to the subject matter of this thesis, John Connelly’s comparative study of university policies across Eastern Europe stresses the great cohesiveness of the Polish professors, who together with junior researchers formed a self-referential and influential “milieu” (*środowisko*).⁸ We still await a synthesis of Polish postwar history which could incorporate these insights into the overall narrative, revising it in the process. The paradox is that in current historiography the Communist regime is generally portrayed as being immensely unpopular and lacking in support and legitimacy, but nevertheless able to dominate and direct all sectors of society. This paradox is often solved by stressing the role of terror and fear, thus pushing interpretations in the direction of totalitarian approaches. In-

⁶ Publications of the PAN Institute of History include: Kersten, Krystyna et al. (eds.) *Polska 1944/45-1989*, Warszawa: Instytut Historii PAN, Kersten, Krystyna, 1991. *The Establishment of Communist Rule in Poland, 1943-1948*, 1. edition 1984. Berkeley: California University Press, Szarota, Tomasz (ed.) (2001) *Komunizm. Ideologia, system, ludzie*. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo NERITON, Instytut Historii PAN. Another scholar from the PAN Institute of History whose publications have been important for this study is Słabek, Henryk, 1997. *Intelektualistów obraz własny 1944-1989*: Książka i Wiedza. Examples of interesting works from the PAN Political Studies Institute are: A. Paczkowski, (ed.) *Centrum władzy w Polsce* (Warszawa 2003), A. Dudek, A. Kochański and K. Persak, (eds.) *Centrum Władzy. Protokoły posiedzeń kierownictwa PZPR. Wybór z lat 1949-1970*. (Warszawa 2000), A. Friszke, *Opozycja polityczna w PRL 1945-1980* (London 1994), K. Persak, *Sprawa Henryka Hollanda* (Warszawa 2006), 365. Warsaw University scholars most often publish their work in the Warsaw based Wydawnictwo TRIO series “W krainie PRL” Some examples are: Kochanowicz, Joanna, 2000. *ZMP w terenie. Stalinowska próba modernizacji opornej rzeczywistości*. Kosiński, Krzysztof, 2000. *O nową mentalność: życie codzienne w szkołach 1945-1956*, Tymiński, Maciej, 2001. *PZPR i przedsiębiorstwo. Nadzór partyjny nad zakładami przemysłowymi 1956-1970*. Thiriet, Damien, 2002. *Marks czy Maryja? : komuniści i Jasna Góra w apogeum stalinizmu (1950-1956)*, Sowiński, Paweł, 2005. *Wakacje w Polsce Ludowej : polityka władz i ruch turystyczny (1945-1989)*.

⁷ See the publications of the Institute of National Remembrance (IPN). Fundacja “Karta” keeps archives, collects diaries and oral history, and publishes the quarterly *Karta*.

⁸ Connelly, John, 2000. *Captive University: the Sovietization of East German, Czech, and Polish higher education, 1945-1956* Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. *The Unplanned Society*, a collective effort of Polish social scientists, is an interesting study which focuses on the late stage of the Communist regime’s rule, and yields a picture of Polish society as one composed of citizens unconcerned with revolutionary slogans, and disillusioned with politics, but focusing on their own immediate practical problems, and searching for forms of expression and socialisation outside Party control. These findings raise the question as to whether this situation was particular to the 1980s or if it could also describe earlier phases. Wedel, Janine R. (ed.) (1992) *The Unplanned Society. Poland during and after Communism*, New York: Columbia University Press.

depth studies must be made if we are to find an alternative explanation to this strange combination of power and impotence, and the modest aim of the investigation that follows is to contribute to such an attempt.

The starting point for this study is that there is no evidence suggesting that the Polish Communist Party was at any point omnipotent or in full control of Polish society. Instead, there are ample grounds to ask whether the Party was able to implement its objectives, and whether the pre-existing societal organisations and interest groups were truly passive and powerless. Were the Party's policies and decisions unilateral, dismissive of public opinion, and inspired solely by Marxist-Leninist ideology and the Soviet leadership? Did society impinge on the Party, affecting its outlook, decisions and plans? Despite the military support of the Soviet Union, the nascent Polish Communist regime had limited resources at its disposal, particularly in terms of human resources. It had to establish its power, and at the same time cope with vast challenges, such as the task of post-war reconstruction, armed resistance, and the hostility of both workers and peasants, not forgetting the strong position of the Church. Once the Polish Communist regime had gained a grip on these areas, and had built up a Party apparatus to oversee all areas of societal life, many hindrances stood between it and the unprecedented ambition, shared with homologous neighbouring regimes, to control and transform society. Science was of vital importance for the communist modernisation project, but not just any kind of science. The Marxist-Leninist view on science stressed the cognitive significance of class relations, and therefore denied the applicability of 'capitalist' science to the construction of communism. Hence, Polish academic institutions had to be reformed, and scholars re-educated in Marxism-Leninism.⁹ Several historians have pointed out that the regime's attitude to science was characterised by contradictions.¹⁰ On the one hand it claimed to put science at the centre of its policies and world-view, with Marxism-Leninism, the ruling ideology, presented as the only truly scientific doctrine. Here, the communists promised to surpass the old regime in promoting the scientific endeavour. On the other hand, the demand that Marxist-Leninist ideology should permeate science meant that the autonomy of scholars employed in academic institutions would be radically reduced.

⁹ Marxism-Leninism constituted a specific variant of Marxism, and was minutely defined and frequently revised by the Party leadership, which meant that political economy too had to fit into the strict and narrow confines of the 'central party line'.

¹⁰ Kremontsov, Nikolai, 1997. *Stalinist Science* Princeton: Princeton University Press, Péteri, György, 1998. Controlling the Field of Academic Economics in Hungary, 1953-1976. In G. Péteri (ed.) *Academia and State Socialism. Essays on the Political History of Academic Life in Post-1945 Hungary and Eastern Europe*. New York: Atlantic Research and Publications, Pollock, Ethan, 2006. *Stalin and the Soviet Science Wars* Princeton, N.J. ; Oxford: Princeton University Press.

In order to be able to effect a transformation of the economy and society, the communist leaders needed critical, imaginative scholars to furnish them with updated knowledge about problems, and to propose solutions. On the other hand, in their efforts to maintain their legitimacy and to secure a hold on power, they could allow neither criticism nor creativity. The regime was in need of social science expertise and intelligence, but paralysed the institutions that could provide it.

Scientists and scholars fill important functions in modern societies, by producing and transmitting expert knowledge. To that end, they partake in well-defined, complex social organisations which control the assessment of knowledge and the distribution of material and symbolic resources. By comparing the circumstances and development of the academic communities in the DDR, Czechoslovakia and Poland, Connelly portrays the Polish Communist Party as the least decided and least effective in bringing about a sovietisation of higher education. The results of Connelly's study suggest that further investigation of the relations between a regime and its academics could tell us something new about the nature, extent and limits of a regime's power, as well as revealing ways in which professional and institutional interest groups responded to and dealt with a given Communist regime.

Science is a topic which can be approached from a great many angles. György Péteri suggests four aspects of science which can be made the subject of inquiry. This study focuses on two of them: science considered as "*a societal institution within which purposefully organized cognition, research activity, the production of new certified knowledge takes place*" and as a "*set of collectivities of individuals engaged in the production of new knowledge*".¹¹ In his studies of Hungarian economics, he portrays the Communist regime as riddled with conflicts of interests, and torn apart by inherent contradictions. With Michael David-Fox, Péteri has also instigated a collaborative and comparative effort to explore the nature and evolution of science in state-socialist regimes.¹² Alongside Bourdieu and Whitley's takes on the dynamics and functions of scientific fields, these studies have played a decisive role in helping me to look beyond the narrow perspectives of source materials dominated by a Party bureaucracy,

¹¹ Péteri, György, 1998b. Controlling the Field of Academic Economics in Hungary, 1953-1976. In G. Péteri (ed.) *Academia and State Socialism. Essays on the Political History of Academic Life in Post-1945 Hungary and Eastern Europe*. New York: Atlantic Research and Publications. p.1

The other two aspects are science as "*a body of knowledge satisfying a particular set of criteria*" and science as a "*set of rules, norms and organisations*".

¹² David-Fox, Michael & Péteri, György, 2000. *Academia in upheaval : origins, transfers, and transformations of the communist academic regime in Russia and East Central Europe* Westport, Conn.; London: Bergin & Garvey.

and a historiography largely mesmerised by the influence and power of the Communist regime.

Initially, Bourdieu's concept of field of cultural production inspired me to conceive of Polish economics as a field characterised by the polarisation of positions and a scramble for power among economists.¹³ Richard Whitley's analysis of scientific disciplines as reputational organisations was extremely helpful in describing a framework of functions that need to be kept operational in order for a discipline to work.¹⁴ Both for Bourdieu and for Whitley, a field consists of practitioners who mutually acknowledge each other as artists or scholars, and the condition for a field's existence is its autonomy, in that only recognised practitioners can competently evaluate each other's output. I found Bourdieu's methodological advice which relates the development of a field to interrelationship and interaction between different positions in it, very helpful. This perspective allowed me to look in a new way at the non-Marxist economists who were marginalised from 1949 until 1956, and made it possible to note their continued importance in the development of Polish economics, an influence which persisted even during those years when they were barred from positions of decision-making and could not publish.

While Bourdieu's perspective has been a source of inspiration, a systematic exploration of the implications of his theories and concepts has never been an objective of this study. Moreover, during the early stages of my work on this dissertation, I became critical of certain aspects of Bourdieu's theory of cultural fields. In Bourdieu's interpretation cultural and scientific production discourses and arguments used by practitioners in internal discussions are merely the tools of a struggle for power over symbolic capital. His focus on power as the sole motive of cultural production, however, results in a reductionist view of human relations. With the concepts of field of cultural production and symbolic capital Bourdieu makes it possible to explain the divisions and polarisations which contribute to the dynamics within the field, but he does not elaborate on what keeps it together. The work of sociologist Richard Whitley has played an important role in providing a framework which helps to explain the cohesion of a disciplinary field. Whitley considers scientific disciplines to be a form of social organisation in which individuals join together to perform a set of tasks that involve the creation of new

¹³ Bourdieu, Pierre, 1993. *The Field of Cultural Production*. New York: Columbia University Press.

¹⁴ Whitley, Richard, 1982. The establishment and structure of the sciences as reputational organizations. In N. Elias, H. Martins & R. Whitley (eds.) *Scientific Establishments and Hierarchies. Sociology of the Sciences a Yearbook*. Dordrecht: D.Reidl Publishing Company.

knowledge, the evaluation of that knowledge, gate-keeping, and the transmission of certified knowledge to new recruits. Scientific production is a competitive activity which involves both continuous challenges of established theories and the critical assessment of each other's work. Scholars are bound together by their common interest in attracting funding, and by the fact that they both scrutinise each other's work and confirm each other's status as members of the field.

Covering the experience of the academic discipline of economics, provides an opportunity to observe how the social organisation of this field developed in interaction with the Communist regime. The social-political study of economics in our period is of particular interest for the following two reasons: Expert knowledge about the workings of economic processes is directly relevant to the formulation of economic policies. Whether a regime has access to competent expert knowledge about the way its economy works, and whether it is willing to use it, is highly relevant for the wealth of a nation. Indeed, Hungarian economists have been the object of several historians' attention, on account of their central role in successful economic reforms. Polish economics at that time was not a success story if measured in terms of its impact on economic policies. Polish economists saw their influence here being stunted from early 1948, despite the Communist regime's pledge that research-based economic knowledge would provide the foundation for economic policy. Instead, economic policy became the exclusive privilege of the Party leadership, as implemented by a servile planning bureaucracy. A short revival of hopes for influence in 1956 ended in disappointment when the communist leadership once more turned its back on professional advisers.

Although they were prevented from exerting influence over economic policy, Polish economists nevertheless found that their discipline was closely monitored by the Party. The regime's demand that all scholarly disciplines should reform and become Marxist-Leninist was applied to economics with particular energy and consistency because of the central role of political economy in Marxist ideology.

Economics is a discipline where bonds with professionals working outside academic institutions have been strong. Polish economists combined academic positions, political appointments and economic management, or moved frequently between them. Economists working outside academic institutions were able to make important empirical and theoretical contributions, and access to economic information was of the utmost importance to their colleagues in academic positions. Economists in research and higher education play a decisive

role in the life of the economic profession as a whole. Although the main focus is on academic economists, we will sometimes need to look at the larger groupings of professional economists, or of academics from other social sciences.

To sum up, the principal questions of this study deal with internal relations within the field of economics, and with external, political interventions. On the one hand, the regime assigned economics the task of furnishing the basis for economic policy, while, on the other hand, it wanted to exercise total control over the discipline. Which 'need' took precedence in the Polish case, and how did it evolve over time? Did the regime place priority on control or on independent expert information about the state of the economy, on critical evaluation of its performance or on control over what economists thought and said about it? A second set of questions relates to the implementation of the regime's aims in science policy: what means were at the regime's disposal and which did it choose to apply? How did the regime go about transforming Polish economics into a Marxist-Leninist science? What was the extent and effect of any unintended consequences of these policies on scholars and their work? This brings us to problems relating to the reactions and responses that the regime's actions elicited from scholars. How did the professional and academic communities respond to the demands, promises and pressures of the regime? What options did they see and which path did they choose to follow? Every relationship can go both ways, so we also need to ask how Polish academic economists, and the wider communities of scholars and professional economists to which they belonged, were able to make their presence felt within the Polish Communist regime.

Studies of science policy, institutional histories, and biographies continue to dominate literature on the history of Polish science. The standard accounts of the regime's policies towards science briefly mention collective chairs, the introduction of ideological subjects into university curricula, and the imposition of bans on teaching and publication on several prominent scholars. In very different ways, each approach exhibits serious problems in the understanding of the complex relationship between the political and academic spheres. Studies of national science policies, well-represented in Polish scholarship, engender two objections:¹⁵ firstly, they approach the issue from the perspective of the state, and its goals

¹⁵ Works focusing on national science policies in Poland include Chodakowska, Janina, 1981. *Rozwój szkolnictwa wyższego w Polsce Ludowej w latach 1944-1951* Wrocław: Ossolineum., Fijałkowska, Barbara, 1985. *Polityka i twórcy (1948-1959)*. Warszawa: PWN., Hartmann, Karl, 1962. *Hochschulewesen und Wissenschaft in Polen. Entwicklung, Organisation und Stand 1918-1960*. Frankfurt/Main: Alfred Metzner Verlag., P. Hübner, *Polityka naukowa w Polsce w latach 1944-1953. Geneza systemu*. (Wrocław 1992), W. Rolbiecki, *Geneza Polskiej Akademii Nauk (1930-1952)* (Wrocław 1990), B.

and initiatives, and do so at the expense of the initiatives and agendas of scientists and scholars. Secondly, national science policy covers such a very wide spectrum of disciplinary communities, academic institutions, and state agencies, as to necessitate either a radical delimitation or the sacrifice of in-depth analysis. Most authors have opted for the latter, and their narratives fail to cover in their analysis issues of implementation and actual effects and consequences. We cannot complain about lack of detail in the work of Piotr Hübner, whose two volumes on science policy in the early post-war decades is considered the standard work on this topic.¹⁶ It provides a catalogue of plans, initiatives and measures in science policy, and traces minutely the gradual restriction of the autonomy of academic institutions. Hübner's study, however, is problematic for at least two reasons. He chooses the Party/State and Science as the principal units of analysis. These large, aggregate entities obscure the diversity and conflicts of interest within each of these categories. It also presumes an inherent conflict of interests and conflict of values between State and Science. According to Hübner, these two were involved in a struggle where a lust for power and control and the search for truth confronted each other. The polarisation of State and Science, and the *a priori* belief that one of these is intrinsically good and the other bad, is not a good starting point for a nuanced discussion of the negotiations between them. The first important point to be made is that it is never "Science" and "State" who interact but humans that populate the various academic and political-administrative fields. The second point is that this interaction should be seen as an ongoing exchange through which politically administered resources for teaching and research are combined with the competence and expertise provided by practitioners of scientific fields. Furthermore, in Hübner's narrative, the identification of "Science" with academic institutions (senates, academies and societies) means that once the academic institutions have lost their autonomy, only individual scholars remain to face the Party/State colossus.¹⁷ In other words his approach tends to ignore the existence and importance of informal collectivities and disciplinary-professional cohesion of scholars.

Another approach which has enjoyed popularity is that of the history of individual academic institutions. There are many monographs on institutions.¹⁸ They have frequently been

Jaczewski, Organizacja i finansowanie nauki polskiej w okresie międzywojennym (Wrocław 1971), 232 p. 24 cm, B.
Jaczewski, Polityka naukowa państwa polskiego w latach 1918-1939 (Wrocław 1978).

¹⁶ Hübner, Piotr, 1992. *Polityka naukowa w Polsce w latach 1944-1953. Geneza systemu*. Wrocław: Ossolineum.

¹⁷ This is particularly striking in Hübner's book on the Kraków-based Polish Academy of Letters, entitled *Force against Reason*; Hübner, Piotr, 1994. *Sila przeciw rozumowi* Kraków: Polska Akademia Umiejętności.

¹⁸ The works of Danuta Drabińska and Teresa Suleja, while adopting an institutional focus, stand out in their thorough presentation of the wider context of the developments in the institutions they study. Drabińska, Danuta, 1993. *SGPiS w latach forsownych przeobrazen społeczno-gospodarczych Polski 1949-1956*. Warsaw School of Economics, Suleja, Teresa, 1995.

commissioned by academic institutions, and therefore serve a political agenda. They tend to reify the institution, provide it with an identity and history, and of course support its claim for funding. In many cases they create an impression of unity among the scholars of the institution which is illusory. They often overemphasise institutional identity at the expense of more significant disciplinary identities and interests across and within institutional boundaries. Also problematic is the fact that only a fraction of each discipline is accounted for in such studies. Because the regime controlled the legislative, repressive and administrative apparatus, it had no difficulty in decreeing the modification or closure of an institution. A focus on the fate of institutions therefore favours the same conclusion as that from national policy studies – that the Communist regime was able swiftly to take complete control of science and higher education.

Neither Polish economists, nor indeed any other scientific disciplines in Poland, have been the objects of in-depth studies.¹⁹ This lack of discipline-focused studies in the Polish context has been a serious challenge for my enquiry. It has only been sporadically possible to draw comparisons with the history of other disciplines, and many aspects of academic life, such as the organisation and efficiency of the Party in academic institutions, still need to be studied covering also other disciplines. As for economists, it is mainly in the context of the history of economic thought or of institutional history that their situation has been approached so far.²⁰

I have consulted a number of archival collections. In the holdings of the Archiwum Akt Nowych (State Archive of New Records) I have consulted the fonds of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers Party (KC PZPR), the Polish Economic Association (PTE), the

Uniwersytet Wrocławski w okresie centralizmu stalinowskiego, 1950-1955. Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego. Drabińska's choice of an institution dominated by one discipline also has the benefit of avoiding excessive fragmentation. Examples of more conventional and narrow institutional histories include Floryan, Władysław (ed.) (1970) *Uniwersytet Wrocławski w latach 1945-1970*, Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy imienia Ossolińskich, Zakrzewski, Zbigniew (ed.) (1976) *Akademia Ekonomiczna w Poznaniu 1926-1976*, Warszawa - Poznań: PWN.

¹⁹ In Poland it seems it is the history of writers which has captured general attention, and their community has been the subject of many articles and several studies. See for instance: Ślabek, Henryk, 1997. *Intelektualistów obraz własny 1944-1989: Książka i Wiedza*, Shore, Marci, 2006. *Caviar and ashes: a Warsaw generation's life and death in Marxism, 1918-1968* New Haven: Yale University Press.

Sociologists and historians have shown interest for their own disciplinary histories, but have devoted little attention to other disciplines. Nina Kraško has focused on sociology, but devotes a mere 20 pages to our period. Szacki, Jerzy (ed.) (1995) *Sto lat socjologii polskiej. Od Supińskiego do Szczepańskiego. Wybór tekstów.*, Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, Kraško, Nina, 1996. *Instytucjonalizacja socjologii w Polsce* Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, Romek, Zbigniew (ed.) (2000) *Cenzura w PRL. Relacje historyków.*, Warszawa: Wydawnictwo NERITON Instytut Historii PAN, Sitek, Ryszard, 2000. *Warszawska szkoła historii idei. Między historią a teraźniejszością.* Warszawa: Wydawnictwo naukowe Scholar.

²⁰ An overview of economics has been presented by Lukaszewicz, Aleksander, 1997. "Polish Economics and Transformation Challenges - 50 Years of Experience 1945-1995". *Discussion Papers Frankfurter Institut für Transformationstudien*, 97., Łukawer, Edward, 1985. *Spor o racjonalność gospodarki socjalistycznej. Z historii problemu.* Warszawa: PWN., Stankiewicz, Waclaw, 1998. *Historia myśli ekonomicznej* Warszawa: Polskie Wydawnictwo Ekonomiczne. Drabińska, Danuta, 1994. "Powstanie Szkoły Głównej Planowania i Statystyki." *Kwartalnik Historii Nauki i Techniki*, 39, 65-71.

Institute for Training of Scientific Cadres (ANS), and the Ministry of Higher Education (MSzW). At the State Archive of the City of Warsaw (APMW) I studied the files of the Warsaw Committee of the Polish Workers Party, and the records from the Basic Party Organisation of the PUWP at the Main School of Planning and Statistics.²¹ The archives of the Polish Academy of Science (APAN) hold the personal papers of some economists, and valuable documents regarding the First Congress of Polish Science and the activities of the Academy's Research Unit in Economics. The Special Holdings Section of the Warsaw School of Economics Library, the archives of Warsaw University (AUW), and of the Warsaw School of Economics (ASGH), also yielded some interesting material.²² Polish newspaper clippings about economists, economics and the economy that were systematically collected and conserved by the Press Archive of the Herder Institute in Marburg have allowed for an extremely useful overview of information and debates concerning economics in the daily and weekly press, both within Poland and in emigration centres. For the period 1945-1955, which is not covered by the collections of the Herder Press Archive, I have consulted: *Trybuna Ludu*, *Ekonomista*, *Życie Gospodarcze*, *Nowe Drogi*, *Życie Szkoły Wyższej*, and *Życie Nauki*.²³

Finally, I conducted a series of interviews with economists who were active in the period under study.²⁴ These interviews have served as a reservoir of information about daily life, relationships, and personal experiences. Even though they do not constitute a “representative sample”, they have been very helpful in providing the kind of knowledge which could never be found in archival records.

The principal challenge arising from archival searches made for this study is that there is an abundance of sources reflecting the perspectives of the political administrators of science, and scarcely any which reflect those of the scholars themselves. This imbalance is enhanced by the censorship and bans on publication which led to the silencing of many important scientists, who nevertheless continued not only to exist, but also to exercise influence through

²¹ The present name of the Main School (Szkoła Główna Handlowa) is Warsaw School of Economics. In the period covered by this study it changed names several times, most importantly from the Main School of Commerce to the Main School of Planning and Statistics in 1949. In this text it will some times be simply referred to as the Main School.

²² One more archive is mentioned in the list in the Appendix, the Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The one document from this archive which I have consulted during the work on this study comes from the collection of material I gathered during work on my Master's thesis. I have not undertaken any new explorations of this archive for the purposes of this study.

²³ Throughout the text I use Polish spelling whenever possible, making only exception for Warsaw. This applies even to the few quotes from texts that were translated from Russian into Polish, there I use the Polish convention for transcription of the cyrillic alphabeth. For technical reasons, however, Polish signs are not consistently applied in the footnotes and bibliography. For this I apologise.

²⁴ A list of names of my interlocutors is provided in the Appendix.

private channels of communication and their wide networks of colleagues and former students. Periodicals and records of public debates reveal the progress the Party had made at the time in asserting its control over access to publication, but the arguments and ideas voiced in such records are not representative of the entire field. As there is clearly a need to compensate for the bias towards the perspective of the Party, its bureaucracy, and its loyal economists, a central concern in the course of my research has been to restore to the silenced members of the scientific community their rightful place in history. Fortunately, it has been possible to find sources that even after 1948 reveal at least some of the reactions and responses of the 'bourgeois' economists. Stenographic records of meetings have proved to be especially useful. I was able to gather stenographic reports covering a wide range of interactions; mostly discussions which were open only to economists, and not to the general public. The pictures we get from the stenographic records of verbal exchanges, with unedited arguments, objections, insolence, and aggressive forms of expression, differ strongly from those given by the minutes and reports produced by the Party-controlled bureaucracy.

Chapter One, covering the period 1918 to 1947, sets the background by sketching the history of Polish economics in the first half of the 20th Century. Initially influenced by German and Austrian economic schools, Polish economists increasingly turned to Anglo-Saxon economic thought for inspiration in this period. In the twenty years between the two World Wars, Polish economists made substantial progress in consolidating the institutional foundations of their discipline: chairs of economics were active at all the universities, research institutes were established, and several business colleges were making good progress towards recognised academic status. Academic economics had close bonds with the larger body of professional economists, bonds which ensured continuous cross-fertilisation by bringing economic theories to managers and policy makers, and, to professors of economics, access to empirical data and to influence over economic policy formation. This steady progress was interrupted by the cataclysms of 1939 and after. The end of the war found the economists' profession decimated, dispersed and exhausted, but brimming over with commitment to a rapid reconstruction of the country. My investigation into the first post-war years, a task which in terms of sources presented great challenges, reveals the dynamism, energy and adaptability with which economists adjusted to a novel and swiftly-changing political, economic and social context. Continuity with the pre-war years prevailed in terms of the composition of the profession, but a generational shift, as well as a climate favourable to economists with socialist sympathies, ensured that there was no rigid transposition of pre-war constellations. The role of the

Communist regime, and the presence of Marxist-Leninist economists representing the interests and policies of the Communist Party, was negligible during these years, so the first aggressive and concentrated attack by the Communist Party in 1948 came as a great shock to many economists.

An analysis of this first meeting in February 1948, known as the Central Planning Board debate, forms the centre-piece of Chapter Two. The main objective of the communist attack on the Central Planning Board – the centre of economic policy formation since 1945 – was to weaken the Socialist Party and loosen its hold over economic policy. A secondary motive, but one that is important in the context of this study, was to challenge the dominant brand of western-oriented economics. During the debate, representatives of the Communist Party asserted that only Marxist-Leninist economics, as defined and controlled by the Party, could henceforth be tolerated. The circumstances and the content of this debate provide important information on the manner in which Marxist-Leninist economists entered the scene, and on how the established economists dealt with the Party's claims. The Central Planning Board debate put an end to the Board's influence over economic policy and also to the influence on policy-making by academic economists. It is important to note, however, that this confrontation took place in February 1948, nearly a year before the merger of the Socialist and Communist parties which produced the Polish United Workers Party, and more than a year before the PUWP initiated a concentrated effort to transform higher education and research. This delay gave rise to a particular set of circumstances, under which the intentions of the regime had been made clear but their implementation was not yet forthcoming. A study of the contents of the main periodical of economists, the journal *Ekonomista*, allows us to track the gradual restriction of intellectual autonomy in economics during this period.

Sources for the first post-war years are often scarce because of the challenges inherent in organising administration in a ruined country. However, starting in 1949, the PUWP initiated a comprehensive drive to transform higher education and research to fit with its plans for a new societal order, and the administrators of state, party and academic institutions produced increasing amount of documents. This abundance gives us a more detailed view of events but it also makes it necessary to allocate two chapters to the task of tracing the motives, actions and effects of the Communist regime's offensive in higher education and research.

In Chapter Three the focus is on higher education, where PUWP decisions radically and abruptly changed both the type of economic knowledge offered to students and the professors'

control over their chairs. Up to that moment economics had been taught at all universities by professors who had held these posts since before the war, or by their direct successors. From 1949, undergraduate training was offered at reformed business colleges, while students who wanted to pursue graduate studies only found them available at the Main School of Planning and Statistics that had been established to replace the Main School of Commerce (today the Warsaw School of Economics). This radical reduction in the number of institutions offering advanced economics was carried out to ensure that henceforth only Marxist-Leninist economists approved by the regime would teach the subject of political economy. Alongside the closure of many study programmes, the PUWP also took measures which reduced the professors' control over their chairs, meaning that they no longer decided what they would teach, which students they would recruit to research training, or what kind of research they would conduct themselves. An examination of the Main School of Planning and Statistics will allow us to observe the challenges and constraints that the PUWP scholars and officials encountered in the implementation of this bold transformation of higher education in economics.

Chapter Four traces economists' preparations for the First Congress of Polish Science, an event commissioned by the Politburo and organised with the professed goal of transforming research in every single discipline, on the basis of Marxism-Leninism. Carefully selected scholars were invited to represent the discipline, and to participate in the elaboration of a Marxist-Leninist critique of each sub-discipline and discipline, and the entire ensemble of Polish science. In the course of different Congress-related events held in 1950 and 1951, PUWP officials and Marxist-Leninist scholars, recently elevated to prominent academic positions thanks to the political patronage of the PUWP leadership, reinterpreted the past and publicly humiliated prominent representatives of the discipline. The Congress allowed the PUWP to broadcast both its commitment to science and the news that scholars fully endorsed the regime's policies. It did not, however, have the mobilising effect that the Politburo had hoped for. Examination of the documentation of the Congress shows that the changes it wrought on economists were superficial. It imposed new agendas, a new rhetoric, and a new disciplinary hierarchy, but it did not convince or activate economists. Through aggressive attacks and the public humiliation of scholars branded 'reactionary', the PUWP introduced an atmosphere of fear into scholarly discussions. The only alternative to statements conforming to the Party line on economics was silence.

The new order established by the PUWP in science only lasted for five years before it crumbled in 1956. Although it was short-lived, this epoch has left deep traces. For an economist out of favour with the regime, these were years of silence and of career prospects suspended for what seemed an indefinite period. Others were able to continue in their profession but had to accept marginal positions and subordination to political protégées of the PUWP, and were cut off from influence over economic policies and access to empirical data. They were isolated from international developments in the discipline, and able to conduct genuine discussions only among trusted friends, Polish economists did not have any outlet for expressing their dissatisfaction. This silence produced little source material, and so the major part of Chapter Five discusses the developments among the Marxist-Leninist economists. It was they who were supposed to make the new regime in economics work, but they too felt its constricting character. An examination of the discussion in early 1953 which followed the publication of Stalin's article on economics reveals how the Party leadership's demand that Marxist-Leninist economics conform to the prevalent party line made it impossible to conduct a constructive scholarly debate. Politics had invaded scholarly discussions, leaving no margin for doubt or alternative ideas. The second part of this chapter concentrates on another arena where Marxist-Leninist scholars found it increasingly difficult to reconcile professional and political arguments – the discussions of the body responsible for the allocation of academic titles in economics, the Social Science Section of the Central Qualification Commission. The expectation that the primacy of political qualification over scholarly output was only a temporary measure, as expressed in the earlier discussions of this body, were gradually replaced by increasing dismay at the interventions of the Party bureaucracy and the political overwriting of decisions on promotions undertaken by hand-picked Marxist-Leninist scholars. Scholars who were not trusted or favoured by the regime had no reason to wish this situation to be prolonged. What is more surprising is that even the group of scholars ostensibly favoured by the regime had many good reasons to look for change. These grievances were expressed loudly and with vehemence in 1956, when the Party's control over academic institutions and professions suddenly broke down.

Chapter Six investigates some of the central developments in the eventful year of 1956, and takes the story to about 1960, when the Party had regained its sense of purpose, and a stable new order was established. Both in terms of sources and the number of important events, 1956 alone could furnish ample material for an entire thesis. The modest aim here is to sketch the fundamental re-orientation of Polish economics of that year, and the renegotiation of its

relations with the regime. Following Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin and the death of Bierut, the Polish leadership lost control over the Party apparatus and over society. Among economists this became manifest during the Second Convention of Economists held in early June, where the situation in the discipline was assessed in highly critical terms. Young economists as well as those who had been doomed to silence since 1948 reclaimed freedom of research, access to economic data, and opportunity to advise economic policies. This was the beginning of an important public debate over the future direction of the Polish economy, which energised economists and provided the profession with wide publicity. With the establishment of an Economic Council, economists were also invited by the regime to articulate a reform proposal. The debate and the activity of the Economic Council relied on the input of both economists of Marxist-Leninist persuasion and those who had been previously stigmatised as 'bourgeois'. These categories which had served to re-order economics in the early 1950's became obsolete, as a new, more pluralist, field emerged.

POLISH ECONOMICS 1918-1947

Our understanding of the history of Polish economics in the interwar years has been strongly influenced by the polarised nature of interpretations of the period between 1918 and 1947. During its rule, the Polish United Worker's Party (PUWP) denigrated all economic thought apart from that of state-approved Marxist economics.²⁵ Opponents of the ruling regime, however, countered by claiming that the interwar years (1918-1939), and the relatively free immediate post-war period, were a positive era for Polish economics, and that it was after 1948 that education, research and the prestige of economics deteriorated severely.²⁶

The fall of communism brought an end to this polarity, and subsequent research has given us a clearer, more nuanced picture of economics in interwar Poland.²⁷ This means that attention

²⁵ In later chapters we shall return in more detail to the construction of a critique of the pre-war achievements of the discipline by the Communist regime. For the time being it suffices to say that the first ideologically motivated critique of so-called 'bourgeois' economics was put in very harsh and uncompromising terms. Only after 1956, were efforts made to publish a synthesis based on detailed presentation of the views of pre-war economists. Differences of opinion between independent-minded scholars and those obeying the ideological prescriptions of the Party delayed these efforts. In the early 1960s a team headed by E. Lipiński started working on a new synthesis of the history of Polish economic thought. Due to professional and political conflict the enterprise was abandoned. A new effort was made towards the end of that decade for a trilogy where E. Lipiński, J. Górski and T. Kowalik would write successive sections. Again political and professional disagreements in 1968 made it impossible to agree even on the basis of this work, and the full version of Kowalik's contribution, which covered 1864-1950, was only published in 1992. Kowalik's work was sequestered because of his support for the "revisionist" trend with its stress on the need for reform. Although originally part of the team preparing a general history of economic thought, Górski, Janusz, Kowalik, Tadeusz & Sierpiński, Witold, 1967. *Historia powszechnej myśli ekonomicznej, 1870-1950*, 1st ed. Warszawa: PWN. His contribution was removed from the second edition, and no references were made to his input. For a fuller explanation of the difficulties surrounding the publication of a history of Polish economic thought see the introduction to Kowalik, Tadeusz, 1992. *Historia ekonomii w Polsce 1864-1950*. Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy imienia Ossolińskich. Another team was more successful in producing a synthesis which was authorised by the ideological watchdogs of the regime. Guzicki, Leszek & Seweryn Żurawicki 1974. *Historia polskiej myśli społeczno-ekonomicznej : 1914-1945*. Warszawa: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Ekonomiczne.

²⁶ While this view could not be expressed in official publications prior to 1989, it was widely circulated by word of mouth and in émigré publications. Verbal and printed critiques of the achievements of Marxist-Leninist economics were widespread in 1956. See for instance the interventions at the Second Convention of Polish Economists in June 1956, printed in *Ekonomista* nr. 5, 1956 Nowicki, Jozef, 1991. *Luminarze polskiej teorii ekonomii XX wieku* Warszawa: PWN., p.17 For publications outside Poland see for example Drewnowski, Jan, 1979. "The Central Planning Office on Trial: An Account of The Beginnings of Stalinism in Poland." *Soviet Studies*, XXXI, 23-42., and articles in the London based daily *Dziennik Polski* for instance: Nowak, Jan: "Pamięci Profesora Edwarda Taylora" *Dziennik Polski*, London, 29.08.1964.

²⁷ Lityńska's work on the Kraków school of economics and Gazda's on the long-neglected catholic economic thinkers are examples of new research into Polish interwar economics. Lityńska, Aleksandra, 1995. *Polska myśl ekonomiczna okresu międzywojennego* Kraków: Akademia Ekonomiczna w Krakowie. Gazda, Zbigniew, 1996. *Nurt katolicki w polskiej myśli*

is now being given to the work of economists whose output was underestimated for ideological and political reasons, and that textbooks on the history of economic thought have been updated to include their profiles.²⁸

In the second part of this chapter, under the subtitle “Great Expectations”, we shall look into the first post-war years, which were for economists a period of intense work in a rapidly changing political landscape as far as the reconstruction of their discipline and of the national economy were concerned.²⁹ Despite being an extremely vibrant and interesting period, it has presented great challenges in terms of sources. The disorganisation and shortages of the era compromised the range and quality of archival materials related to Polish economics, meaning that the current section will rely largely on existing literature and published material. I shall endeavour to provide at least a sketch of how economists dealt with each other, and of how they attempted to re-establish their discipline in the immediate post-war years.

Conditions before 1939

Classic economic thought was concerned with the economics of the nation-state. After the Partitions of the 18th Century, Polish economists faced the dilemma of which State they should now scrutinise. Should they assist with the economic development of the occupying powers, or concentrate on devising the most efficient way of reaching independence? The tragic failure of successive armed uprisings prompted a new focus on the creation of wealth as a precondition for independence. Also, in the second half of the nineteenth century the Polish territories underwent a profound economic transformation, providing Polish economists with new areas for research.³⁰

ekonomicznej okresu Drugiej Rzeczypospolitej 1918-1939. Reassessments of the whole interwar period are now also available. Nowicki, Jozef, 1988. *Teoria ekonomii II Rzeczypospolitej* Warszawa, Kowalik, Tadeusz, 1992. *Historia ekonomii w Polsce 1864-1950*. Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy imienia Ossolińskich. Also interesting from the perspective of this study is Mróz's work on higher education in economics at the Main School of Commerce in Warsaw before 1939. Mróz, Maria Wanda, 1994. *Działalność dydaktyczna Wyższej Szkoły Handlowej - Szkoły Głównej Handlowej w latach 1915-1939* Warszawa: Szkoła Główna Handlowa. and Zagóra-Jonszta, Urszula, 1991. "Myśl ekonomiczna wobec idei planowania gospodarczego w Polsce w okresie międzywojennym". *Ekonomista*, 501-521.

²⁸ I have found Stankiewicz's text-book particularly useful. Stankiewicz, Waclaw, 1998. *Historia myśli ekonomicznej* Warszawa: Polskie Wydawnictwo Ekonomiczne. Profiles of the most important interwar economists are presented in Nowicki, Józef, 1991. *Luminarze polskiej teorii ekonomii XX wieku* Warszawa: PWN., and there are some biographies covering this period, such as Bobrowski, Czesław, 1985. *Wspomnienia ze stulecia* Lublin: Wydawnictwo Lubelskie, Zaręba, Janusz, 1985. *Reforma w testamentie : rzecz o Oskarze Langem*, Wyd. 1. ed. Warszawa: Młodzieżowa Agencja Wydawnicza.

²⁹ For a detailed analysis of political and societal developments in these years see Kersten, Krystyna, 1991. *The Establishment of Communist Rule in Poland, 1943-1948*, 1. edition 1984 ed. Berkeley: California University Press.

³⁰ For an introduction to the economic developments and their bearing on the economic thought of the late 19th Century see Kowalik, Tadeusz, 1992. *Historia ekonomii w Polsce 1864-1950*. Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy imienia Ossolińskich, Stankiewicz, Waclaw, 1998. *Historia myśli ekonomicznej* Warszawa: Polskie Wydawnictwo Ekonomiczne.

The development of economics as an academic discipline suffered greatly after the abolition of the Polish universities. Only with the advent of the cultural liberalism of the Habsburgs did this situation change, with the right to teach in Polish being accorded to the University of Kraków in 1861 and of Lwów in 1869.³¹ The blossoming of economic thought in Galicia, however, stood in stark contrast to the Germanisation and Russification policies in the rest of the Polish territories. There, economic thought was stimulated by the lively political and ideological debates of the era, but had no institutional base.

During the First World War, the Eastern Front undulated back and forth over Polish territory, while a number of different groups fought to promote Polish independence. In the west, there were armed actions and uprisings in Silesia, and in the east hostilities between Poles and Ukrainians. The Russian Civil War and the Polish-Soviet War raged in the undefined territories between the nascent Poland and Soviet Russia. When independence finally came, it required from the new Polish Government urgent solutions to many serious problems: the military threat from the Red Army, food-shortages, and epidemics. Economic policies were also fraught with challenges. To name just two: both currency and taxation reforms were needed to unite the three former partition territories under a single administration; and war-damage and the loss of access to the Russian market had seriously weakened the emerging industrial sector.³²

For scientific communities, independence meant a new start, and during the interwar years Polish economics underwent rapid and important developments. New universities and chairs of economics were founded in Warsaw, Poznań and Wilno, and staffed by scholars from the existing centres in Kraków and Lwów. To this we have to add two private institutions – the Catholic University in Lublin, and the leftist Free University in Warsaw,³³ as well as the Technical Universities (Politechnika) in Warsaw and Lwów, where professors of economics

³¹ Both these universities had chairs devoted to economics and fostered a number of economic thinkers. At Lwów **Julian Antoni Dunajewski (1861-1880)**, the first professor in economics, was also the first Pole to hold the position of Treasury Minister in Vienna. He was followed by **Leon Biliński (1846-1923)**, who was not only Treasury Minister but also the instigator of a bold reform of currency. After 1892, when Biliński left the university, Lwów had two chairs of economics. One of them was held by **Stanisław Głabiński (1862-1943)**, an adherent of historicism in economics and one of the founders of the National Democratic Party in Galicia. In Kraków the Chair of Political Economy established in 1883 was held by **Włodzimierz Czerkawski (1866-1913)** and from 1912 by **Adam Krzyżanowski (1873-1963)** who turned towards classical economic theory. Stankiewicz, Waclaw, 1998. *Historia myśli ekonomicznej* Warszawa: Polskie Wydawnictwo Ekonomiczne. p.320-322

³² Landau, Zbigniew & Tomaszewski, Jerzy, 1985. *The Polish Economy in the Twentieth Century* London: Croom Helm.

³³ The Free University, (Wolna Wszechnica Polska), established in 1918-1919 in Warsaw, from 1927 a section operated in Łódź, academic status granted in 1929. It employed many prominent scientists, and has been noted for its leftist profile and contributions to social sciences. The Łódź section became the basis for the establishment of Łódź University in 1945, but the main section in Warsaw was not reactivated after the War.

offered seminars and study programmes in the discipline. For economists, the slow progress in establishing departments of economics in their universities was highly unsatisfactory: with the exception of Poznań, economics continued to cohabit with law. Business colleges were established in Kraków and Poznań, with the most important being the Main School of Commerce in Warsaw, which was alone in gaining the right to confer masters and doctoral degrees.³⁴ The number of students attending business colleges in the academic year of 1937/38 was 4,131³⁵ and their instruction was assured by the existence of a staff of thirty professors and 157 docents.³⁶ In the 1930s, about 500 students a year graduated from these schools.³⁷ Research outside academic institutions was carried out in the Institute of Business Cycle and Price Research (led by Edward Lipiński and employing, among others, Michał Kalecki and Ludwik Landau)³⁸ and the Institute of Social Economy (under the direction of Ludwik Krzywicki, and employing economists, statisticians and sociologists).³⁹ Several

³⁴ The Main School of Commerce (Szkoła Główna Handlowa, known today as the Warsaw School of Economics), a private institution, was financed by tuition fees and some modest state subventions. A number of works detailing its history have been published. Most recently, during the celebration of its centenary, new publications have been added and some material made accessible on the internet. <http://www.sgh.waw.pl/ogolnouczelniarne/100lat/> accessed 2.06.2007. Mróz, J. Nowicki, ed., *Szkoła Główna Handlowa w Warszawie w latach 1939-1945* (Warszawa 1986), W. Morawski, ed., *Historia SGH w Warszawie 1906-2006* (Warszawa 2006), R. Bauer, ed., *Księga SGH. Pracownicy i absolwenci - kto jest kim?* (Warszawa 2004), *Pamiętnik trzydziestolecia Szkoły Głównej Handlowej w Warszawie, 1906-1936.* (Warszawa 1938), A. Minkiewicz, ed., *Poczet wybitnych profesorów SGH - SGPiS* (Warszawa 1986), 415.

³⁵ The figure of 4131 is the total number of students in Poznań and Kraków Business Colleges, Lwów Foreign Trade College and Warsaw Main School of Commerce. 1327 of the 4131 students were women. Hartmann, Karl, 1962. *Hochschulewesen und Wissenschaft in Polen. Entwicklung, Organisation und Stand 1918-1960.* Frankfurt/Main: Alfred Metzner Verlag. p.13

³⁶ A habilitation (habilitacja) was and still is in Poland and Germany the step following the doctorate and a precondition for a professoriate. A doctor who has written and successfully defended a habilitation thesis and gained the committee's approval of a public lecture may become a docent and be allowed to lecture at the university which granted him or her the title.

³⁷ Unfortunately the figures do not include economists educated at the universities, as they were grouped with law students. The four institutions included in these figures are the Main School of Commerce in Warsaw, the School of Foreign Trade in Lwów, Kraków Business Academy and Poznań Business Academy. Hartmann, Karl, 1962. *Hochschulewesen und Wissenschaft in Polen. Entwicklung, Organisation und Stand 1918-1960.* Frankfurt/Main: Alfred Metzner Verlag. p.14-15

³⁸ Institute of Business Cycle and Price Research (Instytut Badania Koniunktur i Cen) was organised in 1926-27 and fully functional from 1928. Lipiński, Edward, 1981. *Problemy, pytania, watpliwosci : z warsztatu ekonomisty*, Wyd. 1 ed.

Warszawa: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Ekonomiczne. **Kalecki, Michał (1899–1970)**, economist and policy adviser whose contributions to the discipline have won international recognition. **Landau, Ludwik (1901-1944)** worked together with Kalecki at the IBCPR on studies of national income and comparing the economic situation in different countries. Gazda, Zbigniew, 1998. *Słownik biograficzny ekonomistów polskich od XIII wieku do połowy wieku XX.* Kielce: Wyższa Szkoła Pedagogiczna im. J.Kochanowskiego w Kielcach.

Edward Lipiński (1888-1986) economist and one of the protagonists of this study, so we shall frequently return to his activities. Edward Lipiński studied economics at the Leipzig Handelshochschule and in Zürich, worked at the Polish Central Statistical Office in the early 1920s, taught at what would be later be the Main School of Commerce in Warsaw where he became professor in 1928. He continued to be strongly involved in the teaching and administration of the Main School until 1950, when he was transferred to Warsaw University by the decision of the Communist regime. He organised and directed the work of the IBCPR until 1939 and between 1945 and 1947 when it was reactivated under the name Institute of National Economy. He was active in the organisation of the Polish Economic Association serving as its president from 1945 to 1965 and as Editor of *Ekonomista* between 1928 and 1978. A member of the Socialist Party and later of the PZPR, he was a free-spoken and independent personality. Among scholars he was respected both for his pre-war academic record and for his wartime resistance. He went on to become an important figure in the political opposition in the 1970s and 1980s. Helena Hagemajer's introduction to Lipiński, Edward, 1981. *Problemy, pytania, watpliwosci : z warsztatu ekonomisty*, Wyd. 1 ed. Warszawa: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Ekonomiczne. Paweł Sowiński's article in Nowicki, Jozef, 1991. *Luminarze polskiej teorii ekonomii XX wieku* Warszawa: PWN, Skórzyński, Jan, 2000. *Opozycja w PRL : słownik biograficzny 1956-89.* Warszawa: Ośrodek Karta.

³⁹ Instytut Gospodarstwa Społecznego, founded in 1920 and led by the famous sociologist **Ludwik Krzywicki (1859-1941)**

journals devoted to economics were established, the professional associations formed in all the principal cities cooperated to organise national congresses, and Polish economists made increasing numbers of contacts with the Anglo-Saxon world. Indeed, with the support of the Rockefeller Foundation, an English-language journal was established in order to make the findings of Polish economists accessible to international scholars.

Development of economic thought

Originally, the eldest institutions, Lwów and Kraków Universities, were both influenced by the German historical school, but after 1918 this dominance waned. Kraków economists had already been inspired by Austrian subjectivism. In the interwar years the trademark of the “Kraków School of Economics” would be defence of the liberal market economy from state intervention. Poznań’s principal figure in economics, Edward Taylor, had studied in Kraków and was therefore predisposed to favour liberalism. Nowicki points out, however, that Taylor favoured only limited use of mathematics.⁴⁰ In Warsaw, neoclassical economics ruled the roost, and liberalism prevailed at Warsaw University, but because there were several institutions involved in economic research, the picture is more composite. At the Main School of Commerce, W. Zawadzki and his students concentrated on mathematical approaches close to the Lausanne school of Walras and Pareto,⁴¹ while economists connected with the Free University and the Polytechnic showed more support for interventionist economic policies. Only Lwów remained true to the historical school, at least to a certain extent, since Lwów scholars amalgamated their German historical heritage with approaches inspired by sociology and reflections on the social effects of capitalism.⁴²

Also in circulation were the economic ideas of socialists and of catholic ‘solidarist’ economists. While bitterly opposing each other, both these groupings were concerned with issues of justice in ownership and distribution of wealth. Socialist economists found it difficult to penetrate academic strongholds, but catholic solidarism was firmly anchored both

who is also recognized for his contributions to economics.

⁴⁰ Nowicki, Jozef, 1988. *Teoria ekonomii II Rzeczypospolitej* Warszawa :.p.204

Edward Taylor (1884-1964) studied under Kraków professor W. Czerkawski, and became professor of economics in Poznań when the Polish university was established there after World War One. Taylor is considered as the creator of a Poznań school of economics, which in methodological terms was close to that of Kraków. He continued to be active after 1945 and so will be spoken of in later chapters.

⁴¹ **Zawadzki, Władysław (1885-1939)** professor of economics at Wilno University and the Main School of Commerce in Warsaw

⁴² This summary of interwar economic thought is based on . Both Stanisław Grabski (1871-1949) and Tadeusz Brzeski (1884-1958), professors of economics at Lwów and Warsaw Universities respectively, can be classified as adherents of a sociologically-inspired brand of economics. Stankiewicz, Waclaw, 1998. *Historia myśli ekonomicznej* Warszawa: Polskie Wydawnictwo Ekonomiczne.p.338-339

in Lwów under Professor Caro and in the Catholic University in Lublin.⁴³ Economists with leftist sympathies and active socialist politicians had a much more prominent place in scholarly and political debates, although the number of academic positions they held was very limited. The Free University in Warsaw was alone among academic institutions in employing scholars who openly acknowledged their leftist views.⁴⁴ Communist economic thinkers were active in Polish lands before 1918, but the Polish authorities had banned the Communist Party because of its refusal to support the cause of Polish independence.⁴⁵ Communist Party members' overt tenure of academic positions was in these conditions impossible.

Social bonds and shared identities

Economists sought out each others' company in a number of fora, and established many professional and social networks.⁴⁶ At an institutional level, it was a common interest in the welfare of their institution, day-to-day collaboration on teaching and research, and good student-teacher relations that fostered vertical and horizontal bonds and allowed for a strong sense of inclusion. The Main School of Commerce is one such example of a cohesive, institution-based community.⁴⁷ The development of a strong 'esprit de corps' there was

⁴³ **Leopold Caro (1864-1939)** was professor of social economics at Lwów Polytechnic University from 1924 to 1935. He was President of the Economic Society in Lwów, and founder and editor of the Economic Society's journal *Dissertations and Reports of the Economic Society*, in 1932 renamed the *Economic Review (Przegląd Ekonomiczny)*. Gazda, Zbigniew, 1998. *Słownik biograficzny ekonomistów polskich od XIII wieku do połowy wieku XX*. Kielce: Wyższa Szkoła Pedagogiczna im. J.Kochanowskiego w Kielcach. Other representatives of Catholic economics in Poland were professors at the Lublin Catholic University: **Ignacy Czuma (1891-1963)**, **Antoni Szymański (1881-1942)**, **Czesław Strzeszewski (1903-1999)** and **Ludwik Górski (1894-1945)**, as well as Bishop Stanisław Adamski, who lectured at Poznań University. Gazda, Zbigniew, 1996. *Nurt katolicki w polskiej myśli ekonomicznej okresu Drugiej Rzeczypospolitej 1918-1939*.

⁴⁴ **Leon Biegeleisen (1885-1942?)** was Professor of economics at the Free University. **Oskar Lange (1904-1965)**, a student of Adam Krzyżanowski, who was involved in the socialist movement, encountered difficulties in finding employment in Poland, was offered a chair at the Free University but chose to accept an offer of a chair at Chicago University, appearing at the Free University only as a guest lecturer. Zaręba, Janusz, 1985. *Reforma w testamentie : rzecz o Oskarze Langem*. Wyd. 1. ed. Warszawa: Młodzieżowa Agencja Wydawnicza, pp.70-71
Socialist activists mentioned by Stankiewicz as having made important contributions to the economic debate were senator **Daniel Gross (1866-1942)**, and **Zygmunt Zaremba (1895-1967)**, the editor of *Robotnik* and a member of the Socialist Party leadership. Stankiewicz, Waclaw, 1998. *Historia myśli ekonomicznej* Warszawa: Polskie Wydawnictwo Ekonomiczne. pp.356-357

⁴⁵ Communist activists were repeatedly imprisoned, and many spent extensive periods in the Soviet Union. In 1938, Stalin too banned the Polish Communist Party, and during the Purges most of them were arrested: few survived. Communist activists who took up economic issues included Maria Koszutska (1876-1939) and Jerzy Heryng-Ryng (1986-1938), both of whom perished during Stalin's purges. Stankiewicz, Waclaw, 1998. *Historia myśli ekonomicznej* Warszawa: Polskie Wydawnictwo Ekonomiczne. p.357

⁴⁶ The literature is rather fragmentary but institutional histories and memoirs provide some insight into the issue. Biographies have proved a good starting point as they abound in references to friends, fellow students and teachers. Bobrowski, Zaręba, M. Wyczałkowski, *Życie człowieka kontrowersyjnego* (Warszawa 2004), A. Ivanka, *Wspomnienia skarbowca 1927-1945* (Warszawa 1964). The Polish Economists Association (Polish acronym: PTE) has published a number of biographical articles and obituaries in issues of the *Biuletyn PTE*, and graciously made them available on the internet. These cover the lives of Jan Drewnowski, Kazimierz Secomski and Stanisław Rączkowski among others. (<http://www.pte.pl>) The short survey of the PEA's history also provides an outline of associations of economists in the interwar period. Orłowska, Janina & Orłowski, Tadeusz, 1987. *Zarys Historii Polskiego Towarzystwa Ekonomicznego. W stulecie społeczno-zawodowego ruchu ekonomistów w Polsce*. Warszawa: PTE.

⁴⁷ Its professors were better paid than the state average, but had to work more, which meant they spent much of their time at the Main School, rather than moving between different institutions as was usual for state-university professors holding multiple positions. Mróz, Maria Wanda, 1994. *Działalność dydaktyczna Wyższej Szkoły Handlowej - Szkoły Głównej*

encouraged by the fact that the Main School often employed its own graduates and ensured that its staff spent more time at the institution than was usual in other academic establishments. Such close and exclusive communities of economists were less likely to be found in universities, where economics had to co-habit with law, and economists mixed to a greater extent with representatives of other disciplines. Institutional identities were also undermined by the considerable degree of mobility between institutions and the fact that many economists either had part-time work outside their academic institutions, or spent most of their careers in business and state agencies, only joining academic institutions for limited periods of time. However, case studies of, for instance, Poznań, where economics had its own section in the University, and of the University of Kraków, where the Rockefeller Foundation helped fund an Institute of Economics in the 1930s,⁴⁸ could modify this picture.

Alumni organisations could also act as focuses of contact-making and identity-building. That the Main School of Commerce's alumni organisation has a history of regular conventions should come as no surprise. In Poznań, former graduate students of Professor Edward Taylor formed an association to help them keep in touch when they left their *Alma Mater* to work in business or state agencies.⁴⁹ Nevertheless, it should be noted that the Poznań alumni network was based on allegiance to a professor rather than to an institution. John Connelly has stressed the high level of loyalty that Polish professors inspired in their students, and here Taylor's were not unique. Other professors of economics whose students continued to acknowledge their indebtedness and loyalty to their Master were Adam Krzyżanowski, Władysław Zawadzki and Edward Lipiński.⁵⁰ The latter two were professors at the Main School, for even at an institution with a marked *esprit de corps*, students still had strong bonds with their mentors. Furthermore, in the majority of cases strong links to a professor signified adherence to a particular theoretical and methodical direction in economics.⁵¹

Handlowej w latach 1915-1939 Warszawa: Szkoła Główna Handlowa.

⁴⁸ In the few years it was active, it provided an anchorage for a number of gifted junior economists, and for the temporarily chair-less Heydel. It also published a journal in English, making the work of Polish economists accessible to an international audience. However, even without the interruption of the war in 1939, the future of the Institute was uncertain. Neither the Polish Academy of Letters nor the Jagiellon University were able to take over its funding when RF support was phased out up to 1939 and there were no alternative sources of funding in sight. Haugstad, Aleksandra Witczak & Ingebrigtsen, Erik, 2003. National Policies and International Philanthropy: The Rockefeller Foundation and Polish and Hungarian Science between the World Wars. In G. Gemelli & R. Macleod (eds.) *American foundations in Europe : grant-giving policies, cultural diplomacy, and trans-Atlantic relations, 1920-1980*. Brussels: P.I.E.-Peter Lang.

⁴⁹ For an account of E. Taylor's relations with students see Nowak, Jan (Nowak-Jeziorański). 1964. Pamięci Profesora Edwarda Taylora *Dziennik Polski*, 29.08.1964.

⁵⁰ **Adam Krzyżanowski (1873-1963)** professor of economics at Jagiellon University in Kraków 1912-1949. He was politically active from the early 1920, was member of Parliament, participated in debates of economic policies. During the 1930 he criticised interventionist policies and resigned from Parliament in protest against repressions of the opposition.

⁵¹ All of the above-mentioned were adherents of mathematically-oriented neo-classical economics. Connelly argues that the

The regional centres of Kraków, Warsaw and Poznań seem to have generated a patriotism of their own, partly based on joint activities that over-rode the institutional divisions within each city, and partly generated in meetings with economists from other centres. The university communities of Kraków and Poznań shared a liberal, neo-classical theoretical orientation, and both took a critical view of the increasingly interventionist economic policies of the Polish government. Warsaw gradually grew in importance and provided a home for several different trends, while on the other hand Wilno failed to make any significant impact and Lwów kept aloof from the other centres of economics. This does not mean the political impact of the Lwów economists was weakened. On the contrary, with their preference for autarchy through protectionism and for state intervention to promote the development of domestic industry and capital, they provided the makers of economic policies in Poland with the kind of advice these officials increasingly wanted to hear.⁵² With the exception of congresses and the exchange of ideas through journals, the absence of a national association which could act as an integrating nationwide forum, served to strengthen regional schools and their identities.⁵³ The professional associations acted mainly as fora for the exchange of ideas by economists in individual cities, as no national organisation was created until 1945.⁵⁴ For the majority of economists, it would seem that regional identities were superimposed directly over personal bonds of loyalty to a professor, while institutional identities played a secondary role. Finally, there were communities of shared ideas. One example was the journal *Gospodarka Narodowa* (*National Economy*, edited by Czesław Bobrowski) and its associated Club, with readership

strong bonds with professors were a characteristic feature of Polish academic culture. Connelly, John, 2000. *Captive University: the Sovietization of East German, Czech, and Polish higher education, 1945-1956* Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. It is to be expected that similar circles of devoted and loyal students were also attached to representatives of historically-oriented economics such as Professors Głabiński in Lwów and Roman Rybarski (1887-1942) in Warsaw. The absence of accounts documenting their existence is probably due to the fact that the focus of my bibliographical search has been the post-war period. I have probably unearthed more material relating to those professors whose students were able to continue their careers in economics well into the post-war years. The stronghold of historical economics, Lwów, became part of the Soviet Union in 1939 and its academic staff suffered heavy losses and dispersal. Kalbarczyk, Sławomir, 2001. *Polscy pracownicy naukowy ofiary zbrodni sowieckich w latach II wojny światowej* Warszawa: Wydawnictwo NERITRON.

The point has been made about Professor Adam Krzyżanowski that he allowed his students to evolve in different directions. It was the combination of erudition and a very liberal attitude towards differing opinions which inspired the respect and devotion of his students. Thus while one of his students, Adam Heydel turned into a radical opponent of interventionist policies, Oskar Lange gained international renown for arguing for a planned economy. Zaręba, Janusz, 1985. *Reforma w testamentcie : rzecz o Oskarze Langem*, Wyd. 1. ed. Warszawa: Młodzieżowa Agencja Wydawnicza.

⁵² Both professors of economics in Lwów, S. Głabiński and S. Grabski, were active politicians in the National Democratic Party. Stankiewicz, Waclaw, 1998. *Historia myśli ekonomicznej* Warszawa: Polskie Wydawnictwo Ekonomiczne.

⁵³ See for instance work on the Krakow economists' association: Kowalski, A., Lityńska, A., Raganiwicz, J., Rybarski, A. & Szopa, B., 1993. *Zarys historii zorganizowanego ruchu ekonomistów w Krakowie 1867-1993* Kraków: PTE Kraków, Pollok, Artur, 2006. "Powstanie i rozwój Towarzystwa Ekonomicznego w Krakowie". *Biuletyn PTE*, 4-9.

⁵⁴ This assumption is based on the post-war claims justifying the creation of a national association, the PEA. However, further research may show that the regional associations did play a significant role in the integration of the discipline on a national scale, for instance through frequent invitations of lecturers from other towns.

and membership taken from the loose gathering of young economists working predominantly in the state apparatus and advocating an interventionist economic policy.⁵⁵

The existing literature on the subject of Polish economics in the interwar years is primarily concerned with the history of economic thought and with biographies of illustrious representatives of the discipline. As far as economists in general are concerned, few questions have been raised regarding their social and material conditions, the composition of their profession, or the ethnicity, gender and political orientation of those in academic positions.⁵⁶ What we can assert is that the economists of the interwar years were overwhelmingly male⁵⁷ and principally gentile.⁵⁸ Their family backgrounds were in business, the landowning gentry and the intelligentsia, although the last group was not necessarily wealthy. Because their careers developed at the intersection between academic institutions, the world of business,

⁵⁵ **Czesław Bobrowski (1904-1996)** studied economics at Warsaw University and in Paris. In the 1930s he worked in Moscow for the trade enterprise "Sowpoltorg" and later became department director at the Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reform. During the war he was in France and Britain. He returned to Poland in 1945 to play an important part in the later chapters of this study.

According to Bobrowski the "Gospodarka Narodowa" circle included around 40 persons, among the central persons he mentions: H. Greniewski, A. Ivanka, W. Jastrzębski, M. Kaczorowski, P. Kaltenberg, W. Landau, T. Łychowski, J. Poniatowski, J. Rudziński, K. Sokółowski, Z. Szempliński. Many of these names turn up in later chapters as several of the circle's members pursued successful careers in the state administration after the War. They were held together by shared opinions and social bonds, meeting at a coffee house once a week. As for their views on economic policies, they thought Kwiatkowski's Central Industrial Territory initiative was a good thing, only insufficient, which indicates they were for more radical state intervention in the economy. Bobrowski, Czesław, 1985. *Wspomnienia ze stulecia* Lublin: Wydawnictwo Lubelskie.p.76-77 Bobrowski describes the group as rather informal, but it appears that the Club had a board and an editorial team at least. Bobrowski, Czesław, 1985. *Wspomnienia ze stulecia* Lublin: Wydawnictwo Lubelskie.p.10

Other groups of economists with a shared outlook were found in the industry, trade and finance association known as "Lewiatan": A. Wierzbicki, H. Gliwicz, H. Tennenbaum, E. Rose and "The First Economic Brigade" (Pierwsza Brygada Gospodarcza) consisting of people working in the Ministry of Treasury gathered around dept.dir. Stefan Starzyński: A. Ivanka, A. Krahelski, W. Fabierkiewicz, B. Wścieklica and the editors of "Przemyśl i Handel" W. Gieysztor and C. Peche. Gazda, Zbigniew, 1996. *Nurt katolicki w polskiej myśli ekonomicznej okresu Drugiej Rzeczypospolitej 1918-1939*, p.92-93

⁵⁶ I have relied on more general studies of academics, intellectuals and a case study of the students of the Main School of Commerce. Baranowski, Krzysztof, 1981. *Kadra naukowa z zakresu dyscyplin społecznych w II Rzeczypospolitej Łódź: Uniwersytet Łódzki, Mróz, Maria Wanda, 1994. Działalność dydaktyczna Wyższej Szkoły Handlowej - Szkoły Głównej Handlowej w latach 1915-1939* Warszawa: Szkoła Główna Handlowa, Hass, Ludwik, 1999. *Inteligencji polskiej dole i niedole, XIX i XX wiek*. Łowicz: Mazowiecka Wyższa Szkoła Humanistyczno-Pedagogiczna.

⁵⁷ There were some exceptions: the economist **Zofia Daszyńska-Golińska (1866-1934)**, was never accepted by the academic establishment both on account of her gender and of her leftist past, but obtained a professorship at the private Free University, where she ran a seminar in economics for many years. Winclawski, Włodzimierz, 2001. *Słownik biograficzny socjologii polskiej* Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN.

Jadwiga Mrozowska, the first woman student of the Warsaw Main School of Commerce, completed her doctorate there and was employed as assistant until 1949 when she lost her job during the political 'verification' of employees. Two more doctorates were awarded to women at the Main School in the 1930s, to Aleksandra Kielkiewiczówna and Zofia Cichocka-Petrażycka. Source: <http://www.sgh.waw.pl/ogolnounczelniarne/100lat/Sylwetki/mrozowska> accessed 08.04.2005

⁵⁸ The difficulties encountered by students of Jewish origin were seldom of a formal nature, being in general due to the approach of radical nationalist student organisations. Although there was no formal segregation at the universities, it came to be introduced through the student's welfare organisations, which were organised separately by Jewish and non-Jewish students. The extent of the problems varied in time and space. In Warsaw, the Main School of Commerce was the stage of several brutal actions on the part of the nationalist-radical student groups in the late 30s, behaviour that was not acted upon effectively by the school authorities, while the University and the especially the leftist Free University saw less anti-Semitism.

and the realm of banking and state agencies, it is clear that prominent representatives of the discipline were members of Polish high society.⁵⁹

III. 1: Warsaw School of Commerce staff and students, probably mid 1930s.⁶⁰



There was a great distance between the heights at which the wealthy and influential professors lived and the lowly conditions endured by the junior researchers. In the 1930s, the disproportion between the number of economists qualified for academic research and the number of positions available for young researchers increased. Few professors were retiring, while the numbers of doctorates and habilitations were increasing. Docents had very limited prospects in terms of academic careers, and their *veniam legendi*, the right to lecture, provided them with prestige but no stable income.⁶¹ Research assistants and the more experienced adjuncts were employed on two to three year contracts, meaning that their income was at least predictable, if not particularly high. Many budding economists from the cohorts that would populate economics in the first decades following World War II spent the interwar years in a precarious material position, with very limited hope of academic careers. Understandably, this coloured their perception of the period, and made them more receptive to arguments for a radical reform of society.

⁵⁹ Senior positions in Academia were tolerably well paid. A professor could afford a life-style that was in accordance with the prestige the position conveyed, living in a villa and employing a housekeeper. At the Main School of Commerce where the salaries of professors were higher than at the state universities, but where in return they had to teach more and could not accept other positions, professors received monthly salaries of between 800 and 1500 złoty, compared to a docent's salary of 650 złoty and an assistant's of 240 złoty. Koźmiński, Leon, 1986. Chap. 7: Sytuacja po zakończeniu wojny. In J. Nowicki (ed.) *Szkola Główna Handlowa w Warszawie w latach 1939-1945* Warszawa: SGPiS. p.143

⁶⁰ http://akson.sgh.waw.pl/biip/www/Historia_zdjecia/Historia08.jpg Accessed 05.04.2005

⁶¹ Docents were hired for specific lectures only, see chapter on docents in Baranowski, Krzysztof, 1981. *Kadra naukowa z zakresu dyscyplin społecznych w II Rzeczypospolitej Łódź*: Uniwersytet Łódzki.

Political pressures and influence on policy making

An economist's political orientation was likely to have implications for his chances of a successful career. Supporters of Government policies were given access to lucrative jobs in the state administration.⁶² Although siding with the political party currently in power could certainly be advantageous, it did not preclude the rise to important positions of people indifferent or even actively unsympathetic to the ruling constellation.⁶³ According to Baranowski, as far as appointments to university chairs were concerned, most docents tried to keep a low political profile. During the rule of the Sanacja regime, the Ministry was reluctant to appoint outspoken supporters of the conservative National Democrats.⁶⁴ It was not able, however, to impose Sanacja-friendly scholars on predominantly anti-Sanacja faculties, and candidates had to please both the regime and the local faculty, a circumstance which hindered the careers of both outspoken rightists and radical leftists. The latter could find shelter at the Free University in Warsaw or at some research institute, but stood little chance within the university system. Oskar Lange's biography illustrates the difficulties of combining an academic career with involvement in the socialist movement, as his choice of topic and prospects of employment were affected by his political outlook. He was discouraged from submitting a thesis in political economy and followed the advice of his academic adviser by opting for the politically more neutral area of statistics.⁶⁵

However, since the removal of a professor from his chair was nigh on impossible, many scholars surprised those around them by taking a much more active part in political

⁶² Bobrowski commented thus on his job at the Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reform: "The material situation (...) became excellent after Jędrzejowicz's reform of bureaucratic salaries, which was so favourable to high-ranking officials that it was embarrassing. As a consequence, we moved from a two-room flat without a kitchen to a beautiful villa with a garden in the Żoliborz-district." Bobrowski, Czesław, 1985. *Wspomnienia ze stulecia* Lublin: Wydawnictwo Lubelskie. p.74
Baranowski asserts that the salaries of academics were lower than those of other state officials. Baranowski, Krzysztof, 1981. *Kadra naukowa z zakresu dyscyplin społecznych w II Rzeczypospolitej* Łódź: Uniwersytet Łódzki. p.121

⁶³ **Hilary Minc (1905-1974)**, economist, the most powerful figure of Polish economic policy from 1945 to 1956. Studied economics Warsaw and in France, worked during the interwar years in the office of Minister of Industry and Trade Eugeniusz Kwiatkowski, despite his communist sympathies. Bobrowski, Czesław, 1985. *Wspomnienia ze stulecia* Lublin: Wydawnictwo Lubelskie.

For more on the political sympathies and activities of Polish scholars see Jaczewski, Bohdan, 1978. *Polityka naukowa państwa polskiego w latach 1918-1939* Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich Wydawnictwo PAN, Baranowski, Krzysztof, 1981. *Kadra naukowa z zakresu dyscyplin społecznych w II Rzeczypospolitej* Łódź: Uniwersytet Łódzki.

⁶⁴ Sanacja is the term used to describe the political stance of J. Piłsudski and his followers. Originally a socialist, and therefore at odds with the conservative National Democrats (Endecja), Piłsudski (and after his death, the so-called 'Colonels' Regime') espoused increasingly authoritarian policies.

⁶⁵ **Oskar Lange (1904-1965)** internationally renowned Polish economist, remembered for his controversy with Miseses. Student of A. Krzyżanowski in Kraków, Lange obtained a chair of economics at Chicago University, where he spent the late 1930s and the war. In 1945 he returned to Poland. According to his biographer, came close to becoming the Minister of Foreign Affairs. In compensation for his disappointment he was made ambassador to Washington and the UN. He was part of the leadership of the Polish Socialist Party, and seems to have spent most of his time in the late 1940s in politics, putting his academic career on hold. He returned to academic work in the early 1950s but was not allowed to teach political economy, placed instead in a chair of statistics at the Main School of Planning and Statistics. He later moved to Warsaw University, and with the advent of the Thaw was admitted to political economy. Zaręba, Janusz, 1985. *Reforma w testamentie : rzecz o Oskarze Langem*, Wyd. 1. ed. Warszawa: Młodzieżowa Agencja Wydawnicza.

discussions once their appointments had been secured.⁶⁶ The initiative for suggesting candidates to chairs lay with the local institution. University law gave the Minister of Education the right to veto these proposals, and although this veto was seldom resorted to, some interwar governments were tempted to use this prerogative to stifle political opposition among academics. The most extreme case is that of the liberal Kraków professor Adam Heydel.⁶⁷ Heydel lost his chair after budgetary cuts following the retrenchments provoked by the Great Slump, and because of his and his colleagues' vociferous criticism of the Government's rough treatment of the opposition, notably the arrest and internment of opposition politicians in the Bereza camp.⁶⁸ This episode, however, was an exception to the rule and was followed, as the financial crisis caused by the Depression passed, and funding increased, by a smoother cooperation between academic communities and the regime.⁶⁹

Judging by available information, economists with academic degrees and strong links to academic institutions participated in policy making at national level and company level to a relatively high extent. Several ministers from the ranks of economists, and specialists with theoretical training in economics, worked in governmental agencies such as the Ministries of Finance, Agriculture and Commerce, the Central Statistical Office, the National Bank, business banks, insurance companies, and the cooperative movement.⁷⁰

The role of the state in the economy was the main issue with direct relevance for economic policy-making in the interwar years on which economists took different positions, with partisans of state intervention, dubbed "etatists", confronting the "liberals". The latter were not directly involved in the making of economic policies, but adhered to a laissez-faire policy⁷¹ while criticising government policies from academic positions. The Liberals based

⁶⁶ Baranowski, Krzysztof, 1981. *Kadra naukowa z zakresu dyscyplin społecznych w II Rzeczypospolitej* Łódź: Uniwersytet Łódzki, pp.168-170

⁶⁷ **Adam Heydel (1893-1941)** economist at Jagiellon University, vocal supporter of liberalism in economic policy and neoclassical economics. Died in Auschwitz.

⁶⁸ Heydel eventually got his chair back, surviving the interlude with the help of the Rockefeller Foundation. He had been away on a RF fellowship when his chair was abolished, and so officers of the Foundation felt a certain concern for his predicament, going as far as trying to persuade the Vice-Minister of Education to relent. Witczak, Aleksandra, 1997. Vitenskap, penger og politikk : Rockefeller foundations engasjement i polsk vitenskap 1918-1950. Norges teknisk-naturvitenskapelige universitet.

⁶⁹ Baranowski, Krzysztof, 1981. *Kadra naukowa z zakresu dyscyplin społecznych w II Rzeczypospolitej* Łódź: Uniwersytet Łódzki, pp.223-224 Haugstad, Aleksandra Witczak & Ingebrigtsen, Erik, 2003. National Policies and International Philanthropy: The Rockefeller Foundation and Polish and Hungarian Science between the World Wars. In G. Gemelli & R. Macleod (eds.) *American foundations in Europe : grant-giving policies, cultural diplomacy, and trans-Atlantic relations, 1920-1980*. Brussels: P.I.E.-Peter Lang.

⁷⁰ An overview is supplied by Baranowski, Krzysztof, 1981. *Kadra naukowa z zakresu dyscyplin społecznych w II Rzeczypospolitej* Łódź: Uniwersytet Łódzki.

⁷¹ Dziwulski, Kazimierz, 1981. *Spór o etatyzm : dyskusja wokół sektora państwowego w Polsce międzywojennej 1919-1939* Warszawa: PWN, Zagóra-Jonszta, Urszula, 1991. "Myśl ekonomiczna wobec idei planowania gospodarczego w Polsce w okresie międzywojennym". *Ekonomista*, 501-521.

their anti-interventionist stance on neo-classical economics, while the etatists favoured historically or sociologically-inspired economics and tended to support the National Democratic Party, although their interventionist stance had also appealed to the “Sanacja” regime of the 1930s. While economic policy makers tended to heed the advice of liberals in the first decade after Independence, the Great Depression tipped the balance in favour of interventionist and protectionist policies, and the etatists’ influence grew.⁷² Meanwhile, in academic institutions it was the liberals who saw their influence increase, with the liberal economists of Kraków leading the attack on interventionist policies. In Poznań, the first moves to import Keynesian economics to Poland were made, while in Warsaw, Kalecki independently developed ideas similar to those of Keynes within E. Lipiński’s Institute for Business Cycle and Price Research. As E. Lipiński also taught at the Main School of Commerce, these ideas and approaches were also made known there.

To sum up, we may conclude that economists made good progress during the interwar years, establishing a firm base for further development of the discipline. The Great Depression made economics attractive to gifted students, by motivating them to understand and solve the problems of the Polish economy. The poverty and social distress caused by economic depression provided a formative experience for budding economists, infusing them with doubts about the solutions proposed by the disciplinary establishment. Also, we might note that the rise of the neo-classical paradigm in the interwar years changed the outlook of the discipline. The need to master the complex tools of neo-classical economics, with its highly hermetic vocabulary, demanded the completion of university-level courses, making it easier for established economists to control access to the profession.

World War II

The disastrous legacy of the Nazi and Soviet occupations of Poland presents a serious challenge for the historian of science. There is no doubt that what happened in wartime had profound implications for Polish economists and hence for economics. The direct effects of the war, with many scholars killed and buildings destroyed, are amply documented. The war also affected the subject of any economist’s study: the economy. Other important aspects,

⁷² One example of “liberal” policies in the first decade is the fact that Poland took up a position alongside Norway, one of the most faithful keepers of the gold standard. E. Kwiatkowski’s introduction of planning and the development of the port in Gdynia are the principle examples of the interventionism of the last interwar decade.

however, such as the psychological and intellectual effects of the war on individuals and social groups, still await the attention of historians.

Nazi policies towards the educated Polish classes were as ruthless as they were ambitious. Poland was to be reduced to a reservoir of cheap, unskilled workers, and Polish culture and science were to be eliminated. The Soviet treatment of educated Poles was in many instances equally ruthless.⁷³ Lwów and Wilno Universities were taken over by the Soviet authorities and became Soviet institutions. The staff was dispersed and deported. The faculty members of Kraków University were collectively deported to Sachsenhausen, and released only after sustained international protest. Poznań was incorporated into the Reich and the Polish institutions there were taken over by a German administration. Polish university staff members fled from Poznań to Warsaw, where some engaged in clandestine activity, including the teaching of economics in university-level courses, the penalty for which was death.

III. 2: Professor Edward Lipiński at the Communal School of Commerce, used as a cover for the clandestine activities of the Main School of Commerce.⁷⁴



Social networks were crucial in the organisation of clandestine activities during the war, and for the circulation of information.⁷⁵ This is amply illustrated by the way the tightly-knit staff of the Main School of Commerce continued to meet at the library, to grow crops in the school grounds and, last but not least, to teach. Organised under the cover of a secondary Trade

⁷³ According to Jan Gross, if we compare Nazi and Soviet policies towards the Polish population in the first years of the War, before the Nazis launched their extermination of the Polish-Jewish population, the Soviets killed more people. Gross, Jan T., 2002. *Revolution from abroad. The Soviet Conquest of Poland's Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia.*, Expanded ed. ed. Princeton: Princeton University Press.p.299

⁷⁴ http://akson.sgh.waw.pl/biip/www/Historia_zdjecia/Historia10.jpg accessed 05.04.2005.

⁷⁵ Jan Nowak (Zdzisław Jeziorański) recounted taking books on economics from library holdings kept safe by A. Grodek and Z. Makarczyk in Warsaw to Professor Edward Taylor, who had settled in Kielce following the expulsion from Poznań. Nowak, Jan: "Pamięci Profesora Edwarda Taylora" *Dziennik Polski*, London, 29.08.1964.

School, the clandestine Main School of Commerce can boast of 139 Masters of Economics diplomas and three doctorates, with fifty one Masters and three doctorates being awarded immediately after the war based on work principally carried out during the war.⁷⁶ On the eve of the Warsaw Uprising, 820 students were studying economics, and when the capital was forcibly evacuated and systematically razed to the ground after the defeat of the Uprising, the Main School staff regrouped in Częstochowa, where they continued to teach. Docent Andrzej Grodek stayed behind in the empty city, hiding and guarding the library from looters and the elements with courage and determination.⁷⁷ He managed to salvage 98% of the Main School's books - a situation unique in Poland, where most academic libraries were destroyed. There were tensions among the staff, no doubt exacerbated by scarce resources and the difficulty of deciding on a safe course of action when danger was all around,⁷⁸ but the overall experience of clandestine education, when students and teachers had to trust each other with their lives, reinforced the bonds among Main School economists.

III. 3: The Main School of Commerce, main building, view from Rakowiecka Street.⁷⁹



Not all research activities came to a halt because of the war. Nowicki has compiled a bibliography of the research carried out during this period by employees of the Main School, in which he lists sixty items published before 1947.⁸⁰

⁷⁶ Nowicki, Józef (ed.) (1986) *Szkola Główna Handlowa w Warszawie w latach 1939-1945*, Warszawa: SGPiS. p.10

⁷⁷ **Andrzej Grodek (1901-1959)** economist and economic historian. Became professor of the Main School after the war and was elected its rector (1947-1949, 1957-1959)

⁷⁸ Lipiński's testimony on the conflict between him and Wakar in Nowicki, Józef (ed.) (1986) *Szkola Główna Handlowa w Warszawie w latach 1939-1945*, Warszawa: SGPiS.

⁷⁹ http://akson.sgh.waw.pl/biip/www/Historia_zdjecia/Historia14.jpg accessed 14.10.03

⁸⁰ Nowicki, Józef (ed.) (1986) *Szkola Główna Handlowa w Warszawie w latach 1939-1945*, Warszawa: SGPiS.p.59-62

During the war, Polish state structures were divided between the Government in Exile and its network of agencies inside occupied Poland, known as the Underground State. Within Poland, clandestine activities by experts included economic analyses of the current situation for the Government in Exile, and work on ideas for post-war reconstruction,⁸¹ with plans for future policies also being deliberated in London.⁸² Many academics, especially students, took part in the armed resistance. Economists felt very fortunate if they were able to secure some means of subsistence which allowed them to use their professional knowledge. The co-operative movement 'Społem', for instance, provided jobs for several young economists during the War.⁸³ None of this could compensate for the fact that for six years Polish economists had no influence over the management of their country's economic policies, an experience that would fuel their zeal in the post-war years.

The majority of economists who spent the war under Nazi and Soviet occupation endured six years without access to new literature, and were isolated from international developments in the discipline. Polish economists emerged from this ordeal in poor physical and mental condition, facing not only great difficulties in meeting the basic needs of their families but also an overwhelming need to reconstruct the national economy. Their academic institutions were in ruin, libraries had been ravaged, and the most basic office equipment was lacking.

Estimates of deaths among Polish scholars exceed one third of all scholars.⁸⁴ To this we have to add the survivors' poor mental and physical health, emigration, and the suspension of nearly all education and recruitment during the six war years. The human resources of the discipline had been blighted. Malnourishment, illnesses and deportations took a deep toll on elderly people, so much so that the losses among senior professors precipitated an age-related shift within the field. At Warsaw University only one of the five professors of economics returned to his post in 1945,⁸⁵ and at the University of Kraków only two of the original

⁸¹ Examples of economists' contributions: A. Grodek and M. Kielczewska prepared a report justifying the Oder-Neisse Polish border. p.52, 204. Jan Lipiński worked on reports on the financial situation of the General Government for the clandestine economic information agency working for the Government in Exile's Home Delegation (Delegatura Rządu na Kraj) Ibid. K. Secomski and others also worked on post-war economic policies Karpiński, Andrzej (ed.) (2000) *Kazimierz Secomski. Nauka, praca, działalność - w 90-lecie urodzin.*, Warszawa: Komitet Prognoz "Polska 2000 Plus" przy Prezydium PAN.

⁸² Bobrowski, Czesław, 1985. *Wspomnienia ze stulecia* Lublin: Wydawnictwo Lubelskie.p.140

⁸³ A. W. Haugstad interview with Stanisław Rączkowski, Warsaw, 2000

⁸⁴ Connelly, John, 2000. *Captive University: the Sovietization of East German, Czech, and Polish higher education, 1945-1956* Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. p.327 List of names of economists employed in higher education before 1939 who lost their lives during the war is provided by Gazda, Zbigniew, 1988. Reorientacja polskiej akademickiej myśli ekonomicznej w latach 1945-50. I am much obliged to prof.Gazda for enabling me to consult this unpublished doctoral thesis.

⁸⁵ 1946 *Spis wykładów Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego w Krakowie, rok akademicki 1945/1946*. Kraków: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, 1946 *Skład Uniwersytetu na rok akademicki 1946/1947*. Warszawa: Uniwersytet Warszawski, Gazda, Zbigniew, 1988. Reorientacja polskiej akademickiej myśli ekonomicznej w latach 1945-50. pp.118-129

professors remained. The historical school had been popular with a good number of the older economists, while practically all the younger ones had turned to neo-classical economics. The accelerated generational shift therefore also had consequences for the intellectual landscape of economics.

While many historical studies have explored the horror and destruction experienced by the population during the war, only a handful have taken up the question of how this affected Polish society subsequently. The insights they give us raise many questions, but do not provide a systematic exploration of this complex issue.⁸⁶

We need to know more about the way in which the craving for a return to “normality” structured post-war attitudes to cultural, political and professional activity. How did the individual traumas and collective experiences affect the interaction between economists after the war? Until more research is available it is difficult, nay impossible, to gauge the effect of the war on the intellectual production of economists and other scholars during the first post-war decades.⁸⁷

What is certain is that the Second World War changed Polish economics irreversibly, by altering the world view of the individuals who made up the discipline, and by radically transforming Polish society and its economy. The wilful efforts of Hitler and Stalin to eradicate Polish culture and science destroyed both human and material resources. Those Polish scholars who survived gained one thing from the war, a deep reservoir of admiration and respect for their society. By singling academics out for destruction, the enemy powers had made the nature of Poland’s principal asset clear to the Polish population. After the war, supporting clandestine higher education was considered equal in heroism to engaging in armed resistance.

⁸⁶ Kersten, Krystyna, 1991. *The Establishment of Communist Rule in Poland, 1943-1948.*, 1. edition 1984 ed. Berkeley: California University Press, Bessel, Richard & Schumann, Dirk (eds.) (2003) *Life after Death: Approaches to a Cultural and Social History of Europe during the 1940s and 1950s*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Wyka, Kazimierz „Life as if” published in English in Wedel, Janine R. (ed.) (1992) *The Unplanned Society. Poland during and after Communism*, New York: Columbia University Press. Gross, Jan Tomasz: “Geneza społeczna demokracji ludowych” in Gross, Jan T., 1979. *Polish Society under German Occupation: the Generalgouvernement 1939-1944*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, Szarota, Tomasz (ed.) (2001) *Komunizm. Ideologia, system, ludzie.*, Warszawa: Wydawnictwo NERITON, Instytut Historii PAN.

⁸⁷ Based on an analogy with the work done on the German population presented by Bessel, we can assume that a majority of the Polish population suffered from psychological disorders following trauma-inducing experiences during the war. Bessel, Richard & Schumann, Dirk (eds.) (2003) *Life after Death: Approaches to a Cultural and Social History of Europe during the 1940s and 1950s*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

1945-1947: Great Expectations

During the first post-war years, hopes for democracy and modernisation coexisted with brutal political repression, and with armed conflicts bordering on civil war.⁸⁸

For scholars, the priority in 1945 was the reactivation of higher education and academic institutions. The degree of destruction varied: Warsaw was depopulated and in ruins, while Kraków remained relatively intact but crowded with refugees from Warsaw, Lwów and Wilno. The wartime experience of organising research and teaching outside state frameworks did not end in 1945. Scholars met in ruined campuses to reopen universities and other institutions of higher learning. As soon as hostilities ended in the spring of 1945, students were admitted, the long summer vacation was cancelled, and courses started for those eager to make up for lost time.

In Kraków, economics had suffered serious losses, with the deaths of Professor Adam Heydel and the gifted docent Janusz Libicki, and the emigration of Professor Ferdynand Zweig. The remaining professor, Adam Krzyżanowski, was not well disposed towards communist rule and his ideas would find little resonance in the post-war years.⁸⁹ The economic debate was gradually restricted to discussing the issues dividing the socialist from the communist economic programmes. The trademark of Kraków economists was their scepticism about state intervention in the economy. As the central question was no longer the legitimacy of central planning but its shape, classical Kraków liberalism was considered irrelevant by policy-makers. This does not mean that the Kraków economists were unable or unwilling to adjust to the new realities. For instance, the launching of a study programme on Co-operatives (*Studium Spółdzielcze*), can be taken as a sign of adaptation to post-war economic conditions. A focus on co-operatives was in tune with the political programme and economic conceptions of a tri-sector economy dubbed ‘the Polish way to socialism’. Other Kraków scholars investigated and documented the effects of the war and the Nazi occupation, and legal scholars worked on the preparation of the Polish case for the Nuremberg Trials.

⁸⁸ Kersten, Krystyna, 1991. *The Establishment of Communist Rule in Poland, 1943-1948.*, 1. edition 1984 ed. Berkeley: California University Press, Paczkowski, Andrzej, 1993. *Zdobycie władzy 1945-1947* Warszawa: Wydawnictwa Szkolne i Pedagogiczne. A literary work which to my mind gives a very convincing portrait of these years, especially the seamless transition from war into a conflicted peace. is Miłosz’ novel *Zdobycie Władzy*, published in English as Miłosz, Czesław, 1955. *The usurpers*. London.: Faber and Faber.

⁸⁹ Although he engaged in some political activity after 1945, Adam Krzyżanowski never developed a close relationship with the emerging regime. He took part in the 1945 delegation to Moscow for the negotiations which preceded the creation of the Provisional Coalition Government, and was deputy to the Sejm from 1947 to 1949, when he resigned his mandate.

People started to return to their ruined capital shortly after the Red Army entered the empty city in January 1945. Among those returning was a docent of the Main School of Commerce, L. Koźmiński,⁹⁰ whose testimony illustrates the hardships faced by scholars in the first post-war years.

I was living in the library building with A. Grodek, sleeping on mattresses abandoned by the retreating armies, and trying to prevent the looting of whatever was left. The team protecting the property of the School received a monthly subsistence consisting of: 1500 zł for a docent or 2000 zł for a professor; soup from the canteen at Puławska Street; a monthly allowance of bacon; and the protection of a military post. Water was obtained by melting snow, and when that ended after some time, by carrying water from a well on Aleja Niepodległości. Heating was provided by burning the fence of a cemetery for German soldiers killed in the Uprising, in rudimentary ovens installed in some rooms. The struggle against pillage was a great problem.⁹¹

Due to the formidable challenge of running a country from within a sea of ruins, the status of Warsaw as the capital and academic centre was in question. The Minister of Education suggested that the Main School of Commerce should be moved to Łódź. The arrival of large numbers of students wishing to start their studies, however, prompted the decision by the School authorities to re-open in Warsaw.⁹²

At the Warsaw campus, there were 317 applications in May 1945 and in December 1945 the number of newly enrolled students was 610. They were for the most part worn out by the war and the camps, and had no food, nor any place to sleep among the ruins. After their dramatic experiences, they needed not only education but also support. Feeling responsible for those young people and for the preparation of qualified personnel for the nationalised economy, the Senate of the School decided to reopen the School in Warsaw and to move the Czestochowa unit to Łódź.⁹³

At Warsaw University the subject of economics was paralysed for a considerable period by a reduction in the number of professors from five to one. Meanwhile, at the Main School of Commerce, qualified and trusted junior staff members were at hand to fill any vacancies,⁹⁴

⁹⁰ **Leon Koźmiński (1904-1993)** economist, studied at the Main School, doctorate at Sorbonne. During the war he fought in the Warsaw Uprising. After the war he went on to become professor of the Main School in 1946 (prof.nadzw.)

⁹¹ Koźmiński, Leon "Sytuacja po zakończeniu wojny" in Nowicki, Józef (ed.) (1986) *Szkoła Główna Handlowa w Warszawie w latach 1939-1945*, Warszawa: SGPiS, p. 134 While Koźmiński does not make it clear who provided the support, we must assume it was the provisional Lublin-Government in co-operation with the Red Army.

⁹² Koźmiński, Leon "Sytuacja po zakończeniu wojny" in Ibid. p.135

⁹³ Koźmiński, Leon "Sytuacja po zakończeniu wojny" in Ibid. p.135

⁹⁴ 4 out of 7 docents survived: Drewnowski, Koźmiński, Wakar and Grodek. Mróz, Maria Wanda, 1994. *Działalność dydaktyczna Wyższej Szkoły Handlowej - Szkoły Głównej Handlowej w latach 1915-1939* Ibid.: Szkoła Główna Handlowa.p.89, Nowicki, Józef (ed.) (1986) *Szkoła Główna Handlowa w Warszawie w latach 1939-1945*, Warszawa: SGPiS.p.150

This institution displayed a considerable ability to reform and adapt to post-war realities. No doubt the generation shift made the changes easier, for the junior faculty had been debating the possibilities and need for the reform of study programmes from as long ago as the early 1930s. There were moves towards reform in the interwar years, but they became stranded on the banks of the senior staff members' hostility towards change. The war had changed this. Now, there was no longer a *status quo* to uphold, and reform came to be seen as necessary. The School Senate soon initiated work on a reform proposal which stressed the need for a swift provision of qualified specialists for the economic reconstruction of the country. It should be noted that the communist authorities, in the person of Franciszek Blinowski, were consulted during the drafting of the reform, and that both his suggestions and the needs and nature of a planned economy were taken into account.⁹⁵ The reform proposals, which were submitted to the School Senate in May of 1945,⁹⁶ envisaged the reorganisation of the main subject of business economics into four sector-oriented courses. All courses were to include the economic and technological aspects of each branch of the socialist economy. This reform was carried out in the spring of 1945 and teaching continued in this form until 1949.⁹⁷ Nine doctoral degrees, as well as a great number of masters' degrees, were awarded in this period.

The surviving Main School docents were very active in organising and re-organising their own *alma mater*. Grodek and Koźmiński concentrated on the running of the Main School, while others were active outside it. Drewnowski and Secomski held important positions on the Central Planning Board.⁹⁸ After serving as rector of the Main School from 1946-47, Wakar became rector of the Academy of Political Sciences. He also joined the Polish

⁹⁵ **Franciszek Blinowski (1907-1997)**, PWP-official. In the period 1948-1949, a member of the mass propaganda section, and from 1949 to 1951, a member of the economic section in the Central Committee apparatus of the PUWP. Janowski, Włodzimierz & Kocharński, Aleksander, 2000. *Informator o strukturze i obsadzie personalnej centralnego aparatu PZPR* Warszawa: PAN ISP. Koźmiński, Leon "Sytuacja po zakończeniu wojny" in Nowicki, Józef (ed.) (1986) *Szkola Główna Handlowa w Warszawie w latach 1939-1945*, Warszawa: SGPiS. p.138

⁹⁶ 1934, which is what the book says, must be an error, the context showing clearly that the entire work of the commission was done in 1945. Koźmiński, Leon "Sytuacja po zakończeniu wojny" in Nowicki, Józef (ed.) (1986) *Szkola Główna Handlowa w Warszawie w latach 1939-1945*, Warszawa: SGPiS.p.138

⁹⁷ The apparent nonsense of implementing educational reforms in late spring is explained by the fact that in that year there was no summer break. Uniejewska, Hanna in *Ibid.* p.96

⁹⁸ **Jan Drewnowski (1908-2000)** studied economics the Main School of Commerce and London School of Economics, spent the war in in a German POW camp, returned to Poland where he became professor at the Main School, joined the Socialist Party, worked at the Central Planning Board.

Kazimierz Secomski (1910-2002) before the war he studied and later taught at the Main School of Commerce, continuing to teach during the war in clandestinity. After the war worked first at the CPB, later at the Planning Commission, first as general director (1949-1954) and later as its vice-president (1955- 1956). He continued to hold highranking positions in the planning bureaucracy and government. Was not member of any political party. Moldawa, Tadeusz, 1991. *Ludzie władzy, 1944-1991* Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Państwowe PWN.

Workers' Party (the Communist Party, hereafter PWP, Polish acronym PPR), to the astonishment of his colleagues, who found the PSP (Polish Socialist Party) more attractive.⁹⁹

The Poznań economists were renowned for their pragmatism. While firmly grounded in neo-classical economics, they were not as opposed to interventionist policies as the Kraków School: after all Poznań was the place where Keynes was first studied in Poland.¹⁰⁰ Poznań University and the Business College (Akademia Handlowa) were vigorous and efficient, producing a large number of students in these first years.¹⁰¹ Poznań graduates filled many vacancies created by the War and the expanding economic bureaucracy, and this in turn provided the Poznań scholars with an extensive network in Warsaw.¹⁰²

There were few new academic institutions established in the immediate post-war years. It seems that in the absence of an active national policy for higher education, the initiative was left to the scholars themselves. Poznań economists managed to establish a subsidiary department in Szczecin, and the Main School of Commerce had one in Łódź. The efforts of the Law Department in Wrocław to establish a business college there were slow in showing results, since, recently transplanted from Lwów as they were, Wrocław economists lacked the established infrastructure of Poznań or the Main School. Success in building up a new institution in Wrocław would have demanded great efforts on the part of the Government, and these were not forthcoming. In other cases Government policies not only failed to allow for the support of local academic communities, but deliberately prevented it. Lublin and Toruń were blocked from establishing economic centres, despite their best efforts.¹⁰³ In sum, in the

⁹⁹ **Aleksy Wakar (1898-1966)** studied and then taught at the Main School of Commerce. The reason for the quick move has been widely debated. Born in Samara, Wakar spent a good part of his childhood in Warsaw before First World War. He completed secondary studies in Moscow and started studies in St.Petersburg. After a bout of forced participation in the Civil War on the White side Wakar settled in Warsaw. His experiences from the Revolution were, it has been argued, the reason why he decided early on that the communists would win, and that it would be best to start working with them. Also part of the story was Wakar's arrest by the Polish security police: he was handed over to the NKVD, who considered him a Soviet citizen. Imprisoned without trial – the reasons for this can only be conjectured and Wakar himself was not certain. He returned from a labour camp in 1955 and continued his career at the Main School. ASGH/Aleksy Wakar personal folder

¹⁰⁰ A student of E. Taylor, Stanisław Rączkowski managed to publish his thesis on Keynes just weeks before the war. A.W. Haugstad interview with Stanisław Rączkowski, Warsaw 2000

¹⁰¹ According to Gazda, about 1500 master degrees and 57 doctorates in economics were awarded by Poznan University before the section was closed down in 1950. To this we can add the 1415 diplomas in economics awarded by the Poznan Business School, which in the academic year 1946/47 had 4600 students enrolled. Gazda, Zbigniew, 1988. Reorientacja polskiej akademickiej myśli ekonomicznej w latach 1945-50.

¹⁰² Among prominent students of Edward Taylor we find Stanisław Rączkowski and Central Bank director Witold Trąpczyński. Stankiewicz, Waclaw, 1998. *Historia myśli ekonomicznej* Warszawa: Polskie Wydawnictwo Ekonomiczne. p.349

¹⁰³ The law and economics faculty of the private Catholic University in Lublin was transferred an institution run by the state, the Marie Curie-Skłodowska University Connelly. The Law Faculty at Toruń was closed down, chair of economics with it. Connelly, John, 2000. *Captive University: the Sovietization of East German, Czech, and Polish higher education, 1945-1956* Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. pp.138-140

first post-war years the increase in the number of institutions offering education and research opportunities in economics merely compensated for the loss of Wilno and Lwów.

The historical school, whose decline was well advanced before the war, was now reduced to a cipher by the effect of the loss of its stronghold Lwów, the recent war deaths, and the attractiveness of other schools of thought. Historians of economic thought have recorded the waning in importance of historical economics. However, the vacuum this left was not filled by liberal, neo-classically orientated economics of the type which had been on the offensive in the interwar years, as represented by the Kraków School. Instead, during the first post-war years Polish economists can be roughly sorted into groupings of interventionists with leftist sympathies, or of conservative liberals. While the former group's interest in and enthusiasm for planning was genuine, a fear of censorship and a realisation that debate was becoming futile led to an increasing reserve on the part of old liberal economists like Adam Krzyżanowski and Edward Taylor. Their resignation from the Scientific Council of the Central Planning Board, to which Czesław Bobrowski had invited them, suggests as much. Rather than tilting at windmills, they concentrated on teaching their students. The floor was left open to leftist-oriented economists who were fascinated by the opportunities and challenges posed by a planned economy. Despite their leftist sympathies these were not Marxist economists in any possible sense of this elusive term. Their vocabulary and methodology were those of the neo-classical school, and they had a growing interest in Keynes.

The immediate post-war period also saw the establishment and rapid development of the Polish Association of Economists (PEA). Membership swelled rapidly and the Association was generously funded by the institutions where its members held central positions: the Central Planning Board, the National Bank and, on a lower scale, several enterprises. Despite the desperate housing situation in Warsaw the headquarters of the PEA was established in an exquisite and centrally-located building, with offices, conference rooms, a library and a club where members could meet for discussions over coffee.¹⁰⁴ Founded by scholars, the PEA addressed itself to the entire profession, and the membership lists seethed with business administrators and bureaucrats.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰⁴ An equally centrally placed building in Gdańsk also bears the sign "Dom Ekonomisty". I do not, however, know more about its history - when it was handed over to the PEA and if it remains at their hands today.

¹⁰⁵ The lists of members were in the first postwar issues published in *Ekonomista* together with the PEA's yearly accounts. *Ekonomista* (1947:2) and (1948:2)

Debates over reform of higher education and research

In the years between the end of the war and the onset of the PUWP's reform of higher education, scholars and politicians took part in a lively debate about the organisation and role of science.¹⁰⁶ Three main orientations can be discerned, which differed on the desirability and shape of reform. Representatives of academic institutions, although not of one mind, at least agreed on their principal interests: the maximum degree of autonomy, and generous financial support from the state. This view was most actively represented by Kraków scholars, who opposed all projects which might restrict the discretionary power both of professors and of established academic institutions. They argued strongly for freedom of research and the objective nature of science, and spoke in favour of an increase in the power of the Polish Academy of Letters (PAU).

At the other end of the scale, the communists criticised the academic establishment, calling it "reactionary" and demanding a "break"- a radical transformation of the sector to match their new society. The communists' primary rhetorical weapon was the assertion that everything is political (i.e. all relations are power relations) and hence that there was no such thing as objective or free science. To this they added the contention that as it was the ideology that represented the proletariat (the sole non-exploitive class), Marxism-Leninism was alone among the different political options in being true and just. In science policy this translated into an insistence that Marxism-Leninism should be introduced into all scholarship immediately. What was more, given their strong position in the central political organs, and their low numbers within academic institutions, it was clear that the communists' aims would be best served by extreme centralisation of power in the hands of a Minister of Education, who, needless to say, would be under their control.

In between the two extreme positions of minimal change and revolution from above, several groups and individuals were to be found. Many were young, and affiliated to the Socialist Party. This was the case with the group of Kraków University docents who formulated their own reform proposal, and also with those economists from the Main School who now gathered around the Central Planning Board (CPB).¹⁰⁷ Their proposal was to create a central co-ordination and planning research organ linked to the CPB. Yet compared with the

¹⁰⁶ Chodakowska, Hübner, *Polityka naukowa w Polsce w latach 1944-1953. Geneza systemu*, Rolbiecki. For an overview in English, see Connelly, John, 2000. *Captive University: the Sovietization of East German, Czech, and Polish higher education, 1945-1956* Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

¹⁰⁷ The reform proposals prepared by socialists working at UJ in September 1946 and sanctioned by a "meeting of docents at UJ" are described in Hübner, Piotr, 1992. *Polityka naukowa w Polsce w latach 1944-1953. Geneza systemu*. Wrocław: Ossolineum. p.199-200

communists' scheme, this would allow for a much greater level of discretion to remain at the level of academic institutions. Some disciplinary communities, especially in the natural, medical, social and technical sciences, stood to gain from a new deal, while humanities, which had been the dominant area up to that point, could lose importance.

The jostling between these three positions in fact had a negligible impact on the final reforms. When the communist-sponsored plans for reform were made public, it became clear that even proposals submitted by the most influential academic institutions had not been taken into account, and no suggestions about or responses to the plan had been incorporated into any modified draft. The only effect of determined and vocal criticism on the part of the academic institutions was a slight delay in implementation. In Hübner's presentation the reforms were drawn up without the participation of the communities concerned.¹⁰⁸ However, it is clear from the documentation he presents that the communist decision-makers took care to include professors in the organs formulating the reforms, although not in the way expected or wished for by university rectors and senates, who considered themselves to be the only legitimate representatives of the sector in discussions with the Ministry and the PWP. The PWP, for obvious tactical reasons, chose to circumvent opposition to radical change in the sector by setting up new councils for the discussion of reform plans, composed of reform-friendly scholars.¹⁰⁹ The PWP's refusal to negotiate with the scholars through traditional mediation channels was a breach of theretofore-observed formalities in the relations between political and academic establishments. It might be excessive, however, if we were to conclude on this basis that the PWP displayed a total disregard for the opinions of academics in the process of preparing the reforms. Were that the case, it would be difficult to understand why any scholars bothered to sit on the new PWP-sponsored bodies. We might also fail to notice the tentative alliance between some scholars and the PWP.

Piotr Hübner's assumption that State and Science comprise two distinct groups of both protagonists and interests leads him to downplay any evidence which suggests that numerous individuals were crossing institutional boundaries or using complex strategies to promote their agendas. In Hübner's analysis, institutional affiliation determines any perception of the role and motives of an individual. Where an individual belonged to more than one institution or

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

¹⁰⁹ An outline of PWP policies in English is provided by Kersten, Krystyna, 1991. *The Establishment of Communist Rule in Poland, 1943-1948*, 1. edition 1984 ed. Berkeley: California University Press.p.378-381 Kersten takes into account Hübner's study, but points out the fact that the PWP council was manned by scholars of "unquestioned academic importance".

community of interest, this approach becomes problematic. Even a brief glance at the activities of prominent economists shows that they were active in academic positions, ministerial bodies and party organs simultaneously. Hübner's work, written at a time when free criticism of communist policies was impossible, concentrated on proving that the radical reorganisation of academic institutions after the war was not the result of scientists' demands but of the self-serving designs of the PUWP leadership. It was a position which, at the time Hübner put it forward, undoubtedly demanded a fair admixture of courage and integrity, and the polarised political context of the time may explain why he looked away whenever there appeared to be evidence suggesting that scholars participated in reform-making.¹¹⁰ Another historian of Polish science policy, Waldemar Rolbiecki, stressed the multiple interests and strategies of scientists, while at the same time adopting a perspective that the political regime would find more acceptable.¹¹¹ Rolbiecki's work was published, while Hübner's was banned for many years.¹¹² The result is that we have two interpretations, each with its own shortcomings. Hübner presents an almost overwhelming number of sources and details but, his interpretation is warped by an excessive insistence on the evil intentions of the all-powerful Party-State towards an idealised academic community united in its struggle for freedom. Rolbiecki's approach is more promising, in being open to a better-nuanced picture, but he has written much less on the subject, both in terms of detail and in the number of problems studied. There still remains a great deal to be researched within this topic. This study can only hope to make the limited contribution of attempting to investigate the role played by economists in the debates on reform. Professors and docents from Warsaw in particular were eager to embrace reform and planning, and seem to have entered into negotiation with the regime. For instance, Edward Lipiński had dealings with the PWP not only to secure resources for the Polish Economic Association but also to negotiate the publication of the *Ekonomista*, endeavours that we shall be returning to. We have already seen

¹¹⁰ It is to Hübner's credit that he does not avoid the presentation of such evidence, but he does not comment on it or incorporate it in his analysis and conclusion.

¹¹¹ For instance, when summing up the diverse reform proposals elaborated before the PWP's political turn-about in mid 1948, Rolbiecki concludes that all proposals included alternatives to the traditional academy led by members co-opted for life. Rolbiecki mentions three types of motives: firstly, a distrust of scholars, coupled with a desire to secure more power for Ministry officials, secondly, a desire to extend the supply of research material and graduates to the national economy, and finally the desire to empower junior scholars. Rolbiecki, Waldemar, 1990. *Geneza Polskiej Akademii Nauk (1930-1952)* Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, Wydawnictwo PAN, p.99

¹¹² Hübner's account of the conflict can be found in Hübner, Piotr, 1994. *Sila przeciw rozumowi* Kraków: Polska Akademia Umiejętności. p.408-413 Rolbiecki gives his views on the matter in Rolbiecki, Waldemar, 1990. *Geneza Polskiej Akademii Nauk (1930-1952)* Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, Wydawnictwo PAN, p.5

evidence that Andrzej Grodek did the same thing for the Main School, where he alternated between the positions of rector and pro-rector.¹¹³

At this stage I would like to look at the activities of Jan Drewnowski, who was particularly committed to science policy forums.¹¹⁴ Drewnowski came into science policy through his work at the Central Planning Board, where he participated both in the immediate distribution of funds to research¹¹⁵ and in conceptual work on research planning.¹¹⁶ The CPB drew up a proposal for a central science planning institution along the lines of the French CNRS. This proposal was monitored by ministry officials, who approved it before it was made public in 1947, a fact which demonstrates the extent to which the PWP strove to control science policy initiatives, even those coming from close political allies.¹¹⁷ Drewnowski's involvement in science policy continued even after the CPB debate, but the CNRS-inspired proposal lost relevance as the political standing of the CPB declined.¹¹⁸ Drewnowski, however continued to present modified versions of his proposal and to be active in science policy fora. All this was documented and fully described by Hübner, who consistently treats Drewnowski as the mouthpiece of the PSP, without exploring the possibility that Drewnowski could have had an active role in the formulation of PSP positions on science organisation. Nor does he consider Drewnowski's involvement in plans for reforms in the organisation of higher education and research in terms of his close ties to the Main School. How did Drewnowski reconcile his socialist affiliations with the interests of his profession and academic institution? Hübner relates a meeting in January 1948, where Drewnowski criticised the suggestion that the Main Council should approve en bloc all the decisions about appointments to chairs suggested by

¹¹³ Grodek probably made early contact with PWP, in 1945, in his capacity as curator of the ruined Main School and its library. It was also during his time as rector and pro-rector that the above-mentioned contact with PWP representatives was made. This coincided with the drafting of the study programme reforms at the Main School.

¹¹⁴ Participating in reform work were also other academics: on the PWP side, we should also mention that the influential head of the Section for Higher Education and Science at the Ministry of Education, was economic historian Stanisław Arnold, another graduate and lecturer at the Main School and the soon-to be rector of the Main School Czesław Nowiński, on the other end of the political scale, professor of Warsaw University Stefan Zaleski, who wrote the reform proposal submitted by the UW. Hübner, Piotr, 1992. *Polityka naukowa w Polsce w latach 1944-1953. Geneza systemu*. Wrocław: Ossolineum. p. 201 Chodakowska, Janina, 1981. *Rozwój szkolnictwa wyższego w Polsce Ludowej w latach 1944-1951* Wrocław: Ossolineum.

¹¹⁵ His central position in the Commission for the Reconstruction of Science (Komisja Odbudowy Nauki) meant he was in a position of great influence. The Commission was to distribute an allocation a sum of 100 million zloty, later raised to 300 million zloty. A clue to how much that influence mattered is provided by Hübner, when he quotes Drewnowski explaining that 52% of the funds allocated in the first year went to recipients who had been promised funds by Bobrowski and the Prime Minister. Hübner, Piotr, 1992. *Polityka naukowa w Polsce w latach 1944-1953. Geneza systemu*. Wrocław: Ossolineum. p.190

¹¹⁶ For Drewnowski in the Committee for Reconstruction of Polish Science, see Bobrowski, Czesław, 1985. *Wspomnienia ze stulecia* Lublin: Wydawnictwo Lubelskie. p.158

For allocation of funds to PEA, see published accounts of the association in *Ekonomista* (1947:2)

¹¹⁷ Hübner, Piotr, 1992. *Polityka naukowa w Polsce w latach 1944-1953. Geneza systemu*. Wrocław: Ossolineum. p.269-70

¹¹⁸ In November 1947, Drewnowski presented a proposal for the organisation of planning in research, continuing in a modified form the concepts of the CPB Ibid. pp.267-270

the Ministry. When his demand that the list of proposed candidates be read out and discussed was refused, he persisted in criticising three of the candidates for assistant professorships (extraordinary professorships) for their lack of scientific qualifications.¹¹⁹ Surely this shows that Drewnowski was on this occasion more concerned with the academic establishment's control over reputations than with expressing PSP policy or respecting the will of its PWP coalition partners? The only reason I can imagine for Hübner passing over this episode without any comment is that it had no significance in his world of clear-cut separation between State and Science.

I assume that Drewnowski's views on science policy were closely related to his position on the planned economy. He seems to have prescribed the same medicine for all. Economic policy, higher education and research in general needed reforms in order to create the basis for a modern, socialist society open to contacts with the West. It is also interesting to note how long Drewnowski continued to find his participation worthwhile, and how long he was allowed by the communists to engage in science policy. Even after the merger with the communists had put an end to hopes of a realisation of socialist policies, Drewnowski did not withdraw from science politics. In the extensive system of commissions and sub-commissions set up to prepare for the First Congress of Polish Science, which will be the subject of the Chapter Four, he assumed a position analogous to the one he held in the Main Council, as chair of a sub-commission on the organisation of science as well as member of the Executive Committee. He also continued to resubmit his proposals, making a last attempt in March 1950.¹²⁰ It was only the establishment of a Polish Academy of Science (PAN) on the Soviet rather than the French model, and his exclusion of from the PUWP, that ended Drewnowski's involvement. How should we interpret this insistence, this continued belief that his efforts counted? Is this a case of political naiveté, or of influence that has been mis-judged by historians? And what was his and his colleagues' reaction to the failure of these efforts; what lessons did they draw from their experiences? At present, we do not have at our disposal sufficient knowledge to form an opinion about either the role of scientists in the debates preceding the reforms, or what impact the failure of their attempts had on later developments and attitudes. I quite agree with Hübner, that it would seem that the reform measures carried

¹¹⁹ Ibid. p.341

¹²⁰ Drewnowski presented his proposal at a joint session of the Organisation of Science Section of the Main Council and the Subsection for the Organisation of Science of the Congress of Polish Science. Drewnowski also published his ideas in what Hübner calls the last forum of discussion on the subject of planning in science, namely the third volume of the journal *Mysł Współczesna* Ibid.pp.624-627

out after the political turnaround in the summer of 1948 were formulated by the stalinist faction of the Communist Party, that of Hilary Minc, Jakub Berman and Bolesław Bierut.

Publication opportunities

The evolution of scientific disciplines is dependent upon scholars having control both over access to publication and over the quality and variety of publication channels. Before 1939, economists who wished to publish their work in Poland could choose between several journals specialising in economics, as each regional centre had its own publication,¹²¹ while the post-war period was characterised by centralisation and the domination of Warsaw-based journals.¹²² *Ekonomista*, published in Warsaw by the Polish Economic Association, became the focal point of Polish economics.¹²³ The founding assembly of the PEA which gathered in Łódź in December 1945 saw the publication of *Ekonomista* as one of its most urgent tasks. At the time, in the absence of specialised publications, economic policy discussions were taking place in the Party press. In 1945 and 1946 *Przegląd Socjalistyczny* contained articles on economic matters by Bobrowski, Lange, Hochfeld, Dietrich, Rapacki and Lipiński, while *Nowe Drogi* served as a forum on issues of economic policy for representatives of the PWP, with Brus editing the economic section and attracting contributions by Hilary Minc and Jędrychowski, among others.¹²⁴ The journey towards the publication of the first issue of

¹²¹ In Warsaw '*Ekonomista*' (Economista), the first theoretical economics journal in Polish, appeared for the first time from 1864-1874, resumed publication in 1901, and remains active today. In Lwów there was '*Przegląd Ekonomiczny*', in Poznań '*Ruch Prawniczy i Ekonomiczny*' and in Kraków '*Czasopismo prawnicze i ekonomiczne*' Orłowska, Janina & Orłowski, Tadeusz, 1987. *Zarys Historii Polskiego Towarzystwa Ekonomicznego. W stulecie społeczno-zawodowego ruchu ekonomistów w Polsce*. Warszawa: PTE. p.18-19. We may also mention *Economic studies* which appeared in Kraków in English. Economic policy issues were also the main interest of the Warsaw-based *Gospodarka Narodowa*. Orłowska, Janina & Orłowski, Tadeusz, 1987. *Zarys Historii Polskiego Towarzystwa Ekonomicznego. W stulecie społeczno-zawodowego ruchu ekonomistów w Polsce*. Warszawa: PTE.p.13

¹²² Poznań's *Ruch Prawniczy i Ekonomiczny* and Kraków's *Czasopismo prawnicze i ekonomiczne* did not re-emerge until after the Thaw.

¹²³ A continuation of the journal of the pre-war Warsaw Economists Association, its editor from 1928 to 1975 was Edward Lipiński. In 1947 the editorial board further included: Prof. Adam Krzyżanowski, Edward Taylor, and Stefan Zaleski Orłowska, Janina & Orłowski, Tadeusz, 1987. *Zarys Historii Polskiego Towarzystwa Ekonomicznego. W stulecie społeczno-zawodowego ruchu ekonomistów w Polsce*. Warszawa: PTE. The executive committee of the journal consisted of: S. Zalewski, J. Drewnowski, W. Hagemeyer, S. Rączkowski, K. Secomski and J. Zagórski.

¹²⁴ **Włodzimierz Brus (1921-2007)** economist, started his studies at the Free University before the war, continued in the Soviet Union (Leningrad University – replaced to Saratov). Returned to Poland with the Polish Division of the Red Army, worked in the economic section of *Nowe Drogi*. One of the protagonists of the study.

Julian Hochfeld (1911-1966) socialist politician, studied in Kraków and Paris, doctor of economy (1937), member of PSP from 1930, spent the war in the Soviet Union and later London. Upon his return to Poland he was editor of *Przegląd Socjalistyczny*, lectured at the Main School and was vice-president of the Central Planning Board.

Tadeusz Dietrich (1905-1960), socialist politician, studied economics in Łódź and Poznań, worked before the war in the Ministry of Treasury, where he continued to be employed after 1945, Vice-minister from 1948. Minister of Domestic Trade (1949-1952), Minister of Finance (1952-1960).

Rapacki, Adam (1909-1970) Son of Marian Rapacki (socialist politician and lecturer at the Main School of Commerce), A. Rapacki had studied economics at the Main School of Commerce and in Italy, at the time of this debate he was member of the PSP Central Executive Committee and Minister of Maritime Affairs. Rapacki is best known outside Poland for his activity as Foreign Minister when he launched the Rapacki-Plan in 1957Held, Joseph, 1994. *Dictionary of East European history since 1945* Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press.

Stefan Jędrychowski (1910-1996) communist politician obtained a doctorate in law at Wilno University where he was active

Ekonomista in 1947 was fraught with difficulties, but once they had been overcome scholarly discussions could resume.

The wartime destruction of paper factories, print shops and editorial offices severely hampered all publication activities. These practical problems were gradually overcome, and during the first two years after the war previously active private firms, associations and institutions resumed their publishing work.¹²⁵ During the year that followed the founding of the PEA, the board managed to set up an editorial office, secure allocations of money and paper, and establish contact with a printing-house in Łódź. Last but not least, articles and reviews were secured and prepared for printing, and political assent was obtained. All this was no small achievement given the situation.

The accounts of the PEA show that in 1946, the association's first year, it had already managed to secure a publishing allowance directly from the CPB, where many of the association's members worked.¹²⁶ In the years of post-war penury, securing money was not necessarily the end of the problem.¹²⁷ Decisions about the use of paper were taken within the highest government organs.¹²⁸ In these circumstances it is not surprising that the first periodicals to appear in economics were endorsed by institutions like the CPB or the National Bank.¹²⁹ During this period, economists were probably in a better position than other scholars

in the leftist student community. Joined the PWP in 1944 and became member of its Central Committee in 1948. Went on to hold many prominent positions in the Party apparatus and Government, among them: Minister of Maritime Affairs and Foreign Trade (1945-1947), vice-president of the Planning Commission (1949-1951), Politburo member (1956-1971), Minister of Foreign Affairs (1968-1971). Mołdawa, Tadeusz, 1991. *Ludzie władzy, 1944-1991* Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Państwowe PWN.

¹²⁵ The first printing shop was up and running in Warsaw in June 1945 but to meet print demands in the capital material was sent for printing to Łódź and Kraków. Lojek, Jerzy, Mysliński, Jerzy & Władyka, Wiesław, 1988. *Dzieje prasy polskiej* Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Interpress. Mysliński p.153-4

¹²⁶ The CPB donated 1,000,000 zloty for publications in 1946 and 1,800,000 zloty in 1947. By the second half of 1947, the PEA was making money from the sale of *Ekonomista* and the first of the two books they published themselves, allowing the journal to pay honoraria to the authors. For sums paid to the different authors see the published accounts of the PEA: "Polskie Towarzystwo Ekonomiczne, Zarząd Główny. Bilans zamknięcia na dzień 31.12.1946 r." *Ekonomista* (1947:2) p.157-158 and "Polskie Towarzystwo Ekonomiczne, Zarząd Główny. Bilans na dzień 21.12.1947" *Ekonomista* (1948:2) p.175

¹²⁷ In the same vein there is Bobrowski's account of how he hardly received any pay during his time as director of the Central Planning Board, but was housed in a luxurious compound with other government and party leaders, with all goods down to cigarettes being provided free of charge. Bobrowski, Czesław, 1985. *Wspomnienia ze stulecia* Lublin: Wydawnictwo Lubelskie.

¹²⁸ See quote in chapter 2, p.16 Jędruszczak, Hanna (ed.) (1983) *Wizje gospodarki socjalistycznej w Polsce 1945-1949. Początki planowania. Materiały źródłowe*. Warszawa: PWN. The Central Planning Board debate: the speech by Eugeniusz Szyr, the Vice-Minister of Industry and Trade 19.02.1948. p.587-8

¹²⁹ The CPB published the periodical *Gospodarka Planowa* and financed the publications of the PEA which, in addition to the *Ekonomista*, included the series "Biblioteka PTE" which by mid 1948 had 6 titles published and 7 in preparation. The National Bank published the monthly *Wiadomości NBP*: in addition to a monthly report on the economic situation in Poland this featured articles on topics related to the bank's activities. Authors in the 1946 and 1947 issues included W. Trapezyński, J. Lubowicki, J. Zagórski, M. Orłowski, Z. Pirożyński, S. Rozmaryn., T. Dietrych, M.R. Wyczałkowski, K. Secomski and J. Świdrowski, who not only wrote articles, but had their books published by the bank. Information gathered from adverts for publications in *Ekonomista* 1947 and 1948 issues as well as the accounts of PEA published in *Ekonomista* (1947:2) and (1948:2).

when it came to publishing, since representatives of the discipline were close to or indeed party to decisions about the allocation of resources.¹³⁰ This proximity to the political decision-makers also seems to have been helpful with regards to obtaining political endorsement for the publication of *Ekonomista* and in the relationship with the emerging censorship bodies.

The books market was first revived by private publishers, and only became subject to political control from 1948. For periodical publications such as journals the situation was quite different. Private companies had already been banned from publishing newspapers and journals in 1944. Social associations, academic institutions, and political parties had the right to publish periodicals¹³¹ subject to political approval, and certified by a concession.¹³² In 1946 the paper and printing industries were nationalised, so that control over publication was transferred to the PWP-controlled and aptly-named Ministry of Information and Propaganda. At the same time the apparatus of censorship was under being constructed, and went through a series of changes and restructurings before the censorship office that would dominate the history of the People's Poland emerged (GUKPiW).¹³³ Regrettably, the role of censorship in scientific journals remains unresearched, so it is unclear whether censorship was applied prior to printing, and how control of the published material was handled, once the green light for publication of the *Ekonomista* of 1946/47 had been given. In fact the situation evolved rapidly: while the 1947 issues sometimes contained material that might have been excised if rigorous controls had been carried out, in 1948 evidence of censorship in the journal steadily increased.¹³⁴

Finally, the editorial board of *Ekonomista* had to collect, select and prepare material for printing. In order to investigate the problems of finding materials and political backing for the

¹³⁰ As well as the PEA publications another example of this trend was the research institution which E. Lipiński was leading at the time, the Institute for National Economy (IGN), which published its bulletin as an appendix to the CPB journal *Gospodarka Planowa*. Ibid.

¹³¹ Lojek, Jerzy, Mysliński, Jerzy & Władyka, Wiesław, 1988. *Dzieje prasy polskiej* Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Interpress. p.155

¹³² Although the 1938 press decree which merely demanded registration had not been formally revoked, the power to issue concessions for periodical publications was first given to the Ministry of Information and Propaganda, and then, once it was established, to the Censorship Office (CBKB, later GUKPPiW). Nalecz, Daria (ed.) (1994) *Główny Urząd Kontroli Prasy 1945-1949*, Warszawa: PAN ISP. p.17

¹³³ From 1945 a Central Office for the Control of Press, Publications and Public Events, best known by the long acronym GUKPPiW, was established under the aegis of the Ministry of Public Security. Its remit included the right to issue permission for publishing journals. Mysliński, Jerzy in Lojek, Jerzy, Mysliński, Jerzy & Władyka, Wiesław, 1988. *Dzieje prasy polskiej* Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Interpress. p.153. Those studies of censorship that are available focus on political censorship, and pay little attention to the effects of censorship on scientific activity. Romek, Zbigniew (ed.) (2000) *Cenzura w PRL. Relacje historyków*, Warszawa: Wydawnictwo NERITON Instytut Historii PAN.

¹³⁴ A glaring example of this is that in *Ekonomista* (1947:1), Janusz Libicki's obituary specified that he had been captured by the Soviets, imprisoned in the camp at Kozielsk, and probably murdered in Katyn. We shall return to the evolution of censorship in the 1948 issues in greater detail in Chapter Two.

journal, I shall look more closely at the content of *Ekonomista* from the first volume in 1947. The publications in this volume reflected a great interest in Keynesian economics and planning among established economists.

The editorial at the beginning of the first post-war issue of *Ekonomista*, published in March 1947, defined the profile of the journal.¹³⁵ The text reflects both the hopes held at the time of its writing (the end of 1946 or even the start of 1947) and the concerns of the editorial board.

We are for progress and the development of science. But progress and the development of science are most closely linked to the progress and development of the economy. We do not adhere to any economic doctrine, because the development of theory in economics has reached such a stage that we can today freely speak of the absence of “schools” in economics. We profess the principle of freedom of inquiry to be especially useful and necessary in a period in which the forms and shape of life are only in the process of developing, through the ‘trial and error’ method.¹³⁶

This was written before the communists turned their attention to economics, and while the Socialist Party had considerable influence over economic policy. In this text the legitimacy of the discipline rests on an identification with economic development and modernisation. While the passage referring to the discipline quoted above was couched in ideologically neutral language, the wording used to refer to the contemporary economic and political setting was closer to the political rhetoric of the Communist regime:

The science of economics is presently at a so-called critical moment. The planned economy is based on the revolutionary will of the planners and does not take into account ‘eternal’ and ‘unchangeable’ economic laws as formulated by the middle-class science of the nineteenth century. Do economic laws exist in a planned economy? What makes up the values and content of economic theory in such an economy? These are the questions that science has to answer in order to justify its existence.¹³⁷

This text echoed both the voluntarism of socialist and communist ideas, and the genuine enthusiasm and optimism in the circle of economists in Poland, at a time that appeared to

¹³⁵ W. Fabierkiewicz, B. Klapkowski, A. Krzyżanowski, W. Krzyżanowski, E. Lipiński, J. Lubowicki, Z. Makarczyk, F. Młynarski, M. Orłowski, S. Rączkowski, K. Secomski, W. Skrzywan, Cz. Strzeszewski, J. Świdrowski, E. Taylor, W. Trąmpczyński, E. Ugniewski, A. Wakar, M. Wyczałkowski, S. Zalewski, A. Żabko-Potopowicz, Orłowska, Janina & Orłowski, Tadeusz, 1987. *Zarys Historii Polskiego Towarzystwa Ekonomicznego. W stulecie społeczno-zawodowego ruchu ekonomistów w Polsce*. Warszawa: PTE.

¹³⁶ Editorial manifesto opening the first post-war issue of *Ekonomista*, (1947:1)

¹³⁷ Editorial manifesto opening the first post-war issue of *Ekonomista* (1947:1). The strange term ‘middle-class science,’ is an effort on my part to convey the fact that although a better translation of the neutral-sounding ‘nauka mieszczańska’ would be ‘bourgeois science’, the term ‘bourgeois’ corresponds in Polish to ‘burżuazyjny’ which had a pejorative ring and was communist propaganda lexis.

produce a sellers' market of unheard-of dimensions in economic knowledge. The content of the journal, however, appears to show that the editors found it difficult to find good, suitable articles.¹³⁸ The opening article by Lange was probably commissioned by the editor, there was one excerpt from a doctoral thesis, and at least two of the articles were re-worked versions of lectures given in 1946.¹³⁹ Also, all the Polish authors were based in the capital, and even Rosenstein-Rodan's contribution was based on a lecture held at the PEA during his stay in Warsaw. Communication with the other towns was clearly still difficult. Three articles discussed policy-related issues: Secomski (who worked at the CPB) and Wyrozembski (who would later be a renowned Marxist-Leninist) wrote an article on foreign trade which did not bear a trace of the Marxist-Leninist approach,¹⁴⁰ and, finally, Rosenstein-Rodan wrote on the industrialisation of developing countries.¹⁴¹ If considered on its own merits, it would seem there was nothing out-of-the-ordinary about the first issue, either in terms of quality or of political controversy. If we compare this first issue with the subsequent 1947 examples, however, it stands out from the rest in its blandness. The later issues had contributions from economists representing a range of trends: the new planning partisans from the CPB as well as those who opposed planning; and representatives of the liberal Poznań and Kraków schools alongside socialists and scholars from the Catholic University. There were also review articles on Anglo-Saxon and French literature and contributions from British scholars. One of the first reviews, for instance, discussed "The Economics of Full Employment" – a collection of papers by economists working at the Oxford University Institute of Statistics during the

¹³⁸ The *Ekonomista* (1947:1) issue had 5 articles, followed by 3 reviews and 12 obituaries. Articles: O.Lange: "The subject and method of economics", P.Rosenstein-Rodan. "On the industrialisation of poor countries", J.Zagórski: "Profit in competition" (*Zysk konkurencyjny*), Z.J.Wyrozembski: "Outlines of foreign trade policies", K.Secomski: "Methods for financing extraordinary expenses".

¹³⁹ Oskar Lange was the only one to receive payment for his article in this issue, before payment for articles became general in issue (1947:3/4), indicating that this article was especially commissioned by the editor, Lipiński. *Ekonomista*. See the accounts of PEA published in *Ekonomista* (1947:2).

Józef Zagórski's article was a chapter from his doctoral thesis "Ogólna teoria konkurencji" written under Edward Lipiński's supervision. It contained references to Walras, Joan Robinson, and Chamberlin.

¹⁴⁰ **Zygmunt Jan Wyrozembski, (1907-1979)** I lack detailed biographical information on his subject, but it appears that he worked at the Ministry of Foreign Trade in the first postwar year, in 1946 professor of economics and later was the vice-rector at the Academy of Political Science (ANP). In 1949 he joined the Main School of Planning and Statistics as one of the Marxist-Leninists sent there to reform the institution.

In view of Wyrozembski's later commitment to Marxism-Leninism, it would be tempting to assume that his presence in this issue could have been solicited to ensure publication, the content of his article, however, does not support such an interpretation. It deals with the foreign trade deficit, the obsession of all post-war economic discussions. Although the Soviet Union is mentioned as a promising trading partner, and reference is made to the 1945 trade agreement made between the two countries, it would be difficult to interpret this article as even remotely Marxist-Leninist.

¹⁴¹ **Paul N. Rosenstein-Rodan (1902-1985)**, specialised in problems related to economic growth in developing countries; educated at the University of Vienna; lectured in London where he, during the war, came into contact with Polish economists who worked on plans for the industrialisation of Poland; from 1947 he worked in the USA. (Stankiewicz p.488) The article in *Ekonomista* (1947:1) was based on the lecture he gave at the PEA, and was edited for publication by Helena Tatar-Zagórska and Jan Lipiński, both students of Edward Lipiński.

war.¹⁴² So, had the editorial board been particularly cautious not to offend any political sensitivities in order to secure the printing concession, and then become bolder, or had the difficulty in getting hold of contributions from other towns made the first issue more homogenous not only geographically but also in terms of approach? The sources available do not answer this question. What is certain is that 1947, as it appeared in *Ekonomista*, was a year of intellectual freedom and increasing scientific production. The main effort was directed towards understanding and discussing the importance of new developments in the discipline, notably Keynesian economics and the problems of planning. References in the articles were made to works by Polish, English, French, German and Austrian economists, and there were occasionally references to Marx and contributions from leftist Western economists such as Sweezy, Dobb and Bettelheim.¹⁴³

The same orientation towards western scholarship is visible in the titles of books produced in 1946 and 1947 under the aegis of the PEA and the National Bank.¹⁴⁴ Some of the works published were in fact written during the war.¹⁴⁵ Among economists, books from abroad were in greater demand than new Polish publications. Initial concerns voiced at the founding meeting of the PEA related to the publication of a bibliography and the procuring of books published in the years while Poland was cut off from international academic developments by the war. Such a bibliography was published in *Ekonomista*, and the contributions considered to be most interesting were reviewed, translated and published. These pluralist, optimistic features of the 1947 publications were balanced by the political context of 1947, when hopes for the future of democracy began to dissolve. Indeed due to the delays caused by editorial work and printing, these publications might have seemed overly liberal by the time they reached their readers.

¹⁴² The reason why this book received attention in Poland was probably related to the fact that a Polish economist was one of the contributors. M. Kalecki had worked at this institute during the war. The book contained contributions by F.A. Burchardt, M. Kalecki, G.D.N. Worswick, E.F. Schumacher, T. Balogh and K. Mandelbaum. Basil Blackwell, Oxford 1944.

¹⁴³ In issue 1947:2, Edward Lipiński's article included references to Robinson, Burns, Norris, Pareto, Marshall, Neuman, Morgenstern, Marx, Schumpeter, and Sweezy, while his student Jozef Zagórski argued against a thesis by Lerner and Hotelling by referring to J. Robinson, Coase, Norris and Harrod.

¹⁴⁴ Prior to 1948 private publishing houses co-existed with the officially impartial but in reality PWP-controlled publishing house *Czytelnik* and the organs of the political parties. Both the PEA and the BN used private publishers for their books. The PEA used the Łódź-based *K. Rutski press*, while the BN used the firm *Trzaska, Evret i Michalski*, established in Warsaw in 1920, which published among others the book for which Jan Drewnowski was criticised in 1948 during the Central Planning Board debate. The academic presses, controlled by universities and scientific associations but depending on the State for paper allocation, showed no great activity in the field economics during this period.

¹⁴⁵ For instance: E. Taylor's book on the theory of production (1947), J. Zagórski's study of the general theory of competition (1947) and K. Secomski's book on investment policies from the same year. The publication of the translation of F. Benham's "Economics" by a group of POW's led by J. Drewnowski during their imprisonment in Germany, was another example. Kowalik, Tadeusz, 1992. *Historia ekonomii w Polsce 1864-1950*. Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy imienia Ossolińskich. pp.282-283.

Economists and economic policy

Simply in themselves, wartime destruction and the difficult economic situation of the inter-war years constituted the strongest possible incentive to participate in the reconstruction and development of the country. In the words of Zdzisław Sadowski, born in 1925 and thus one of the youngest economists to have witnessed the inter-war and war years:

*... based on their own experience, young Polish economists of this generation had to be more sensitive to the backwardness and poverty of their country than anyone else. It is therefore very understandable that after independence had been regained, even in a very restricted form (...) educated Polish economists immediately devoted their energy and creative powers to the task of reconstructing the country.*¹⁴⁶

The overwhelming majority of economists were neither communist Party members nor communist sympathisers. In the first post-war years their political engagement and their relation to the emergent Communist regime was informed by the hope that Poland would choose its own path, not the dictates of the Soviet Union. Those who had spent the war in exile now had to make a decision on whether they would return. Among those who returned home were the economists Oskar Lange and Czesław Bobrowski. Bobrowski explained his decision to return from France as follows:

*“In the beginning, to a certain degree, I worried about the shape of the new political regime in Poland. However, I reflected that a priori someone who could loyally work for the pre-war regime, in spite of all the antipathy he felt towards it, did not have the moral right to back away from co-operation with the new one.”*¹⁴⁷

It is difficult to analyse all the reasons for or against return, but it seems that those who returned were motivated by a desire to act, and to affect the course of economic development in their war-torn country, something which they shared with their colleagues in Poland.

Meanwhile, scholars appear to have oscillated between different attitudes towards the emerging regime and the possibilities of taking on expert roles in the new political set-up. In Kraków, law and economics scholars were active in the political arena, both in the establishment of the Coalition Government, and in preparing documents for the Peace Settlement and the Nuremberg Trials. However, they were increasingly seen as and targeted by the PWP as a ‘bed of reactionary forces’. Indeed Kraków was a stronghold of the PPP, so

¹⁴⁶ Sadowski, Zdzisław “Kazimierz Secomski i drogi polityki rozwoju Polski” in Karpiński, Andrzej (ed.) (2000) *Kazimierz Secomski. Nauka, praca, działalność - w 90-lecie urodzin.*, Warszawa: Komitet Prognoz "Polska 2000 Plus" przy Prezydium PAN, p.27

¹⁴⁷ Bobrowski, Czesław, 1985. *Wspomnienia ze stulecia* Lublin: Wydawnictwo Lubelskie. p.143

Kraków academics were not obvious choices as advisors for the socialist and communist politicians who controlled economic policy. Finally there was an element of natural selection, as those Kraków economists who wished to take on roles as experts in the new regime moved to Warsaw.¹⁴⁸

Before the War, Poznań University was dominated by scholars with national democratic sympathies. After 1945, in order to understand their position, it is useful to look at the relations between national democrats and the emerging Communist regime. According to Kersten, once it became clear that there would be no legal political activity by the National Democratic Party in post-war Poland, many ND activists and sympathisers decided to join the work of the reconstruction of the country. Although they did not engage directly in politics, they hoped to influence the shape of society through active participation in public institutions.¹⁴⁹ On the other hand, the communists often preferred a 'loyal' non-party expert for a post over an outspoken socialist or communist who might criticise the leadership and challenge the Party line. As the economic historian Witold Kula observed in 1947, in his parable of the contemporary situation presented as correspondence between two Roman citizens after the Christianisation of the Empire:

*We find it easiest to agree and work with people with whom we share opinions. For the Christians [i.e. communists –AWH] it is the opposite. They can co-operate excellently with those they consider to be pagans [i.e. political opponents- AWH], but they cannot abide to have in their midst, nay, are willing to persecute those among their own who differ from them in opinions on matters that seem secondary to us. A heretic is worse than a pagan, to put it their way.*¹⁵⁰

Warsaw was where economists acted out their roles as experts, advisors and policymakers, as it was here that the headquarters of all central authorities from government and ministries to the Central Statistical Office and the National Bank were to be found. Consequently, it was from here that economists were dispatched to take part in international economic organisations and negotiations. Oskar Lange and Michał Kalecki, for instance, worked as

¹⁴⁸ See for instance Oskar Lange who did not return to his *alma mater* but settled in Warsaw, or another graduate from Kraków, Włodzimierz Hagemajer who worked at the Central Statistical Office in Warsaw.

¹⁴⁹ See Kersten on the arguments used by those siding with the National Democratic Party on entering and trying to influence cultural and state agencies, local and central government, etc. Kersten, Krystyna, 1991. *The Establishment of Communist Rule in Poland, 1943-1948*, 1. edition 1984 ed. Berkeley: California University Press. pp.206-207

¹⁵⁰ The text was written in 1947 but was published only in 1958 Kula, Witold, 1958. Gusla. In W. Kula (ed.) *Rozważania o historii*. Warszawa: PWN. pp.234-235

Polish representatives at the United Nations, while S. Rączkowski and J. Drewnowski took part in negotiations with the USA and the international banks.¹⁵¹

The single most important economic policy institution was the Central Planning Board, and it employed a great number of economists.¹⁵² Established in the autumn of 1945, it was to prepare economic plans and co-ordinate the work of ministries. The story of the Central Planning Board allows us to follow the evolution from the relatively liberal years of 1945-1947 to the abrupt political turn in 1948, which brought about a change in economic policy as well as in higher education and research. It also tracks the evolution, form and extent of the interaction between academic and applied economists and the new Communist regime.

The leadership of the Central Planning Board was entrusted to Czesław Bobrowski.¹⁵³ Bobrowski's qualifications for the job of planner-in-chief were his "etatist" stance on the role of the state and planning before the war, his work in the Polish-Soviet trade agency Sovpoltorg in Moscow in the 1930s (where he came into contact with Soviet planning), and lastly his work in Britain during the last phase of war, where the Government in Exile had worked on a plan for post-war reconstruction. On taking office, he recruited staff from among his former associates in the intervention-oriented "Gospodarka Narodowa" circle and opened the door to several graduates from the Main School of Commerce, who in the meantime had joined the PSP. Starting out in ruined Warsaw, it required tremendous energy and effort to design the Three-year Plan of Reconstruction. Underlining the fact that his was not an isolated case, Bobrowski described his own workload as follows:

¹⁵¹ **Stanisław Rączkowski (1912-2006)** economist, student of E.Taylor. After the war he briefly worked at Poznań University but his principal academic workplace was the Main School. He also worked in the CPB and then the National Bank. Not member of any party.

¹⁵² The Central Planning Board, Centralny Urząd Planowania, it is best known by its Polish acronym, the CUP, which is even used in some English translations. I shall refer to it as the CPB.

¹⁵³ Czesław Bobrowski returned to Poland in 1945 and joined the PSP, and was co-opted into the Party leadership on his appointment to the Central Planning Board. Bobrowski, Czesław, 1985. *Wspomnienia ze stulecia* Lublin: Wydawnictwo Lubelskie.

I got into work at 8 a.m., ate my lunch at my desk, and left the office at midnight. Petitioners whom I had not managed to receive during the day discovered that I ate my supper at the 'Polonia' restaurant at around midnight, so hunted for me there. It sometimes happened that on leaving the office at midnight, I asked a director to prepare a case for the morning. (This was made simpler by the fact that some lived in the office.) ... Of course this style of work could not continue indefinitely. I recall, however, that even in the summer of 1946 President Bierut phoned me at the office, scandalised by the fact that not all ministers worked on Sundays.¹⁵⁴

The Central Planning Board was directly under the authority of the Council of Ministers, and was tasked with formulating economic plans, co-ordinating the work of institutions involved in economic policy-making, and processing the necessary information. Executive power lay with the ministries, notably the powerful Ministry of Industry and Trade, which was directed by the Communist Party's undisputed leader in economic policy matters, Hilary Minc.

The Three-year Plan of Reconstruction (1947-1949), the main achievement of the CPB, aimed to increase industry's share of the GNP, to attain 1938 levels of consumption, and to reconstruct the energy and transport sectors as rapidly as possible.¹⁵⁵ Based on drafts prepared during the war by a team of Polish economists in London, the Three-Year Plan adopted a pragmatic stance.¹⁵⁶ Using economic tools from what later came to be termed 'bourgeois' economics, it favoured indicative planning, and displayed a fair amount of creativity and innovation. This was planning with close kinship with what was being undertaken in Western Europe, and quite removed from the Soviet-style Six and Five-year Plans that were to follow.

Bobrowski objected to any identification of the Central Planning Board with PSP economic policy, and noted that the PSP leadership was neither especially interested in economic matters nor likely to support the Central Planning Board against PWP-dominated ministries.¹⁵⁷ What mattered was that the CPB was perceived (not only by its rivals, but also by historians) to be an agent of the Socialist Party¹⁵⁸. By placing a heavy emphasis on the

¹⁵⁴ Ibid. pp.161-162

¹⁵⁵ Jezierski, Andrzej & Leszczyńska, Cecylia, 1999. *Historia Gospodarcza Polski* Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Key Text.p.402 quoting from Stankiewicz, T. *Działalność inwestycyjna państwa w Polsce w latach 1945-1947*. Warszawa 1993.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid.p.402

¹⁵⁷ The reasons for Bobrowski's refusal to be fully identified with the PSP are unclear, but it has to be noted that the political context of the 1980s and his continued advisory functions within the regime might have played a part. Bobrowski, Czesław, 1985. *Wspomnienia ze stulecia* Lublin: Wydawnictwo Lubelskie. p.156

¹⁵⁸ According to data provided by 1998. *Walka o Losy Centralnego Urzedu Planowania. Konferencja Historyczna PTE*. Warszawa: Polskie Towarzystwo Ekonomiczne., among the leadership and departments heads there were nine members of the PSP, four members of the PWP and five non-party employees. Bobrowski, who refuted such charges, claimed without giving names that from the group of the 20 most important employees, the largest group (half) was formed by non-party employees, and that the socialists had only one party member more than the communists. Bobrowski, Czesław, 1985.

need for a strong co-operative sector to co-exist with the nationalised and private sectors it came to be identified with the so-called tri-sector economy. The CPB was also seen as a proponent of a gradual and more consumer-friendly path to industrialisation, dubbed “the Polish Way”. However, the consumption-orientated nature of the Three-year Plan should not be overestimated. It was more a consequence of the lack of food, clothing and other basic consumer items, than of any decision to avoid investment in industry. Evidence suggests that if the Central Planning Board had been allowed to continue its activities it too would have devoted more attention and resources to industrialisation, though hardly on such a scale and at such a speed as that adopted under H. Minc’s direction.¹⁵⁹ In addition, the Three-Year Plan had itself been the result of a compromise between the PSP and the PWP, between Bobrowski and Minc, and so not devoid of the latter’s imprint.¹⁶⁰

The post-war surge of energy, the opportunity to work in one’s chosen profession, the sense of performing a deeply-needed and appreciated public service, and a well-functioning and inspiring team of experts, all combined to make the Central Planning Board years an experience its workers would look back on with great nostalgia. This nostalgia was only enhanced by the sudden and unexpected demise of the CPB will be the subject of the next chapter.

Conclusion

Polish economics before the war was characterised by several vibrant communities who displayed great openness towards international developments in their discipline. While university economics still had some way to go in terms of gaining an institutional base independent of legal studies, there were grounds for optimism. Economists had vigorous professional associations, specialised journals and dynamic research institutes at their disposal. The destructive effect of the war changed Polish economics in a number of ways. The loss of highly-qualified scholars and talented students, the physical destruction of several academic institutions, the dispersal of established communities, and the interruption of most professional activity and training, all made a great impact. Economists emerged from the war years exhausted, shattered by grief yet energised by the urgent needs of reconstruction.

Wspomnienia ze stulecia Lublin: Wydawnictwo Lubelskie. p.160 Kowalik, Tadeusz, 1980. *Spory o ustrój społeczno-gospodarczy w Polsce 1944-1948*. Warszawa: NOW.

¹⁵⁹ Bobrowski, Czesław, 1985. *Wspomnienia ze stulecia* Lublin: Wydawnictwo Lubelskie, Kaliński, Janusz, 1995.

Gospodarka Polski w latach 1944-1989. Przemiany strukturalne. Warszawa: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Ekonomiczne.

¹⁶⁰ Jezierski, Andrzej & Leszczyńska, Cecylia, 1999. *Historia Gospodarcza Polski* Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Key Text.p.396

The first post-war years were ones of great mobility for economics, both intellectually and in terms of geography and hierarchy. The great gaps created by wartime loss of life had to be filled either by migration from other institutions or by the advancement of junior researchers. The early post-war era saw also the establishment of a national professional association, the PEA, which boosted professional cohesion among economists in the various regions. We should also bear in mind that regional and institutional bonds were in many cases strengthened by the shared experiences of co-operation in clandestine wartime education, and in the later efforts to reconstitute scattered communities and reorganise higher education and research under conditions of great privation and sacrifice.

Polish economics was evolving to the rhythm of the changing political and social realities of post-Yalta, post-war Poland. This turn of events was manifested in the content of articles published at the time, in widespread participation in government agencies, and in the adjustment of the education of economists to match the new tasks of economists in a planned economy. Control over the discipline remained firmly with established, hierarchical and reputation-based organisations. The old professoriate continued to determine the curriculum, evaluate research, define relevant problems for study, and find suitable methods to solve them.

As far as influence on policy-making is concerned, these years were a time of hope and excitement for economists, especially for those interested in planning.¹⁶¹ Through their alliance with the socialists and with positions on the Central Planning Board they were able to influence economic policy directly, by drafting the Three-year Plan. The profession profited from the fact that the leading economists had good contacts with the political leadership, and access to scarce resources, as reflected in the restoration of a historic house in a prestigious part of the capital for the use of the PEA.

While socialist economists were an integral part of the academic establishment, there was a great distance and few links between established and Marxist-Leninist theoretical economics. Hardly any of the few economists adhering to the Communist Party pronounced publicly on economic matters, and when they did, they tended to do so in their own party press and

¹⁶¹ Jan Szczepański claimed that the Polish pre-war intelligentsia easily adapted to the new conditions of post-war life, and played an important role in the reconstruction taking on important managerial and administrative positions. Kowalik responded that this cannot be said of economists, especially the majority of those working at universities, whose liberal views made such an adaptation difficult. He went on, however, to show how there was little euphoria in their support to traditional liberal approaches, and to list the evidence of interest and even growing fascination with planning. Kowalik, Tadeusz, 1992. *Historia ekonomii w Polsce 1864-1950*. Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy imienia Ossolińskich .pp.283-284

periodicals rather than in fora for academic discussion. PWP members in the CPB avoided confrontation and discussion, and the editor of *Ekonomista*, the leading journal on economics, found it difficult to recruit contributors from among Marxist-Leninists. This gave rise to the illusion that the discipline would not necessarily have to come into any closer contact with the agitprop sector, and that concepts of Marxian economics would be applied by established practitioners at their discretion, to the extent that they found it appropriate, and in ways that they considered compatible with the ruling standards for academic research.¹⁶² This was an illusion soon to be dispelled.

¹⁶² On the PWP members' behaviour in the CPB, see Drewnowski, Jan, 1979. "The Central Planning Office on Trial: An Account of The Beginnings of Stalinism in Poland." *Soviet Studies*, XXXI, 23-42.

POLISH ECONOMICS AND MARXISM-LENINISM, FIRST ENCOUNTERS

After two years of cautious optimism, 1948 opened on a different note for Polish economists. For two years they had focused on the reconstruction of the national economy and academic institutions, but now, for first time, they were confronted by Marxist-Leninists who, on behalf of the Communist Party (PWP), condemned outright their methods and approaches.

In Chapter 1 we saw how economists adopted different stances towards the new regime. Some withdrew from political involvement and concentrated on academic pursuits, while others became involved in advising on economic policy. The latter's close ties to the political establishment, notably to the Socialist Party, had opened the way both for wider funding of the discipline and to gaining influence over economic policy. During 1948, however, these strong links to the PSP became a liability rather than an asset. Economists became embroiled in the ruthless political struggle between the PWP and the PSP, and found themselves on the losing side. Following the Soviet leadership's decision to bring the countries east of the Iron Curtain into line, and the establishment of the Kominform in September 1947, the PWP stepped up the pressure on its socialist coalition partners. Economic doctrines supporting policy options other than Soviet-style planning and collectivisation came under fire. The year closed with the annexation of the socialist party by the PWP, ending a period of relative political and cultural plurality. Although the PWP's plans for radical change in higher education and science had been delayed pending the resolution of the socialist problem, nevertheless that year the Party took its first steps towards the goal of control over the discipline of economics.

In fact for most economists 1948 spelt the end of many hopes and illusions. Established economists lost their influence over policy-making (which was from this moment jealously guarded by the top communist leadership) and also their control over channels of publication

(now under the jurisdiction of the PWP-sponsored Marxist-Leninist economists). This chapter will examine how the intense struggle between socialists and communists affected the way the established economists and Marxist-Leninist economists related to each other by investigating the unfolding of their first confrontations in two arenas: a two day discussion over economic policy and economic methods at the Central Planning Board; and the pages of the journal *Ekonomista*.

The Central Planning Board debate

During the course of a heated debate which lasted from the 18th to the 19th of February 1948, the leadership of the Central Planning Board was accused of basing its plans on erroneous calculations, and its employees were attacked for their adherence to ‘bourgeois’ economics.¹⁶³ The atmosphere of the meeting was such that arrests and show-trials seemed to its participants to be a possible outcome. Luckily for the individuals involved, no dramatic events followed. However, the institution did not survive the ordeal. The chairman of the CPB was forced to resign immediately, and the work of the agency was taken over by a new Planning Commission presided over by Hilary Minc.

Historians often mention this debate as an important step in the PWP’s subjugation of the socialist party. It is important for this study because the economists who had formulated and supported CPB economic policy were removed from power, together with the Socialist Party. Also, this was the first direct attack on the economic thought and policies inspired by and resting on the platform of mainstream, neo-classical economics. Finally, it exhibited all the

¹⁶³ The Central Planning Board debate was recorded in shorthand and a protocol was issued in a limited number of copies. Prof. Tadeusz Kowalik reports having had access to the entire document in the 1950s, but only excerpts have been published by Jędruszcak as the whereabouts of the complete document are not known. Kowalik, Tadeusz, 1980. *Spory o ustrój społeczno-gospodarczy w Polsce 1944-1948*. Warszawa: NOW. There are three published witness-accounts of the debate: Drewnowski, Bobrowski, W. Brus, 'From revisionism to pragmatism: Sketches to a self-portrait of a "reform economist".' in Reform and transformation in Eastern Europe. Soviet-type economics on the threshold of change., eds. J. M. Kovács and M. Tardos (London 1992), 136-142. This last item was based upon an interview with Bobrowski, conducted by Tadeusz Kowalik. The transcript of this taped conversation provides further interesting information as it was not subject to the same degree of auto-censorship as the book. Tadeusz Kowalik was at the time a political persona non grata, so his participation in the process is not openly acknowledged in the published book. Tapes and transcripts are lodged in the Special Holdings Section of the Library of the Warsaw School of Economics. I am obliged to Professor Kowalik for providing this lead. The debate has also been the subject of historical studies Kaliński, Janusz, 1977. *Plan Odbudowy Gospodarczej 1947-1949*. Warszawa: KiW, Kowalik, Tadeusz, 1980. *Spory o ustrój społeczno-gospodarczy w Polsce 1944-1948*. Warszawa: NOW, Kersten, Krystyna, 1991. *The Establishment of Communist Rule in Poland, 1943-1948.*, 1. edition 1984 ed. Berkeley: California University Press. and in the source anthology, which comprises the material from the CPB discussion, Hanna Jędruszcak also wrote a thorough introduction on the subject. Jędruszcak, Hanna (ed.) (1983) *Wizje gospodarki socjalistycznej w Polsce 1945-1949. Początki planowania. Materiały źródłowe*. Warszawa: PWN. Finally there are materials from a conference devoted to the debate organised by the PEA on its 50th anniversary in 1998, at which Drewnowski, Szyr and Kowalik were present. 1998. *Walka o Losy Centralnego Urzędu Planowania. Konferencja Historyczna PTE*. Warszawa: Polskie Towarzystwo Ekonomiczne.

characteristics of the stalinist model “debates” in cultural and academic life that had emerged in the 1930s and, that came in particular to dominate Soviet intellectual life in the immediate post-war era. According to Jan Drewnowski, who was then director of the CPB’s Department of long-term planning:

The character and importance of the CPB trial did not lie exclusively in the content of the criticism directed against the planning methods. Equally important was the way in which the debate was conducted and the whole atmosphere of the meeting. The trial of the CPB was the first full-scale presentation of the Stalinist mode of public life in Poland. For the first time we were told that modern economic science should be called ‘bourgeois economics’. Equally, it was the first time the terms ‘non-Marxist’ or ‘anti-Marxist’ were used in public debate as labels which automatically ‘disqualified’ opposing arguments without the need to examine their content. For the first time, too, quotations from Marx, Lenin and Stalin were used out of context as magic formulae guaranteeing victory in debate. Also for the first time the Soviet Union was used as a model which must be blindly followed. As the debate unfolded, the impression became quite unreal. Clearly formulated arguments met with a blank wall of deliberate misunderstanding and planned hostility.¹⁶⁴

Before we turn to the question of how the communists established the ‘wall’ Drewnowski describes, or try to assess the validity of his interpretation of the CPB debate, we need to look into the political rivalry between the communists and the socialists.¹⁶⁵

1947 was a year when many were unsure about what to expect and how to react to the swiftly-evolving context. The increasing chill in relations between the Western Allies and the Soviet Union eclipsed the question of democracy in Poland on the international agenda. At home, the year started with the January election’s aggressive campaign and rigging of results. In September 1947 several activists from the Polish Peasants’ Party were put on trial. Soon after that, the leader of the PPP, S. Mikołajczyk, fled Poland, fearing for his life. The only non-socialist political alternative, the PPP, was thus eliminated from the political scene. The Communist Party (PWP), a disciplined organisation characterised by militaristic rhetoric and revolutionary zeal, could now turn on the last potential source of alternative policies, the socialist party. The PSP had always enjoyed a much greater following than the communists,

¹⁶⁴ To avoid confusion, I have replaced the Polish acronym for the CPB used in Drewnowski’s article (CUP) Drewnowski, Jan, 1979. “The Central Planning Office on Trial: An Account of The Beginnings of Stalinism in Poland.” *Soviet Studies*, XXXI, 23-42.

¹⁶⁵ Krystyna Kersten’s excellent work provides a firm foundation for any political/social history of the period 1943-1948. I have also used several volumes of the concise, but orderly and easily accessible series “Dzieje PRL”. Kersten, Krystyna, 1991. *The Establishment of Communist Rule in Poland, 1943-1948*, 1. edition 1984 ed. Berkeley: California University Press, Garlicki, Andrzej, 1993. *Stalinizm* Warszawa: Wydawnictwa Szkolne i Pedagogiczne, Paczkowski, Andrzej, 1993. *Zdobycie władzy 1945-1947* Warszawa: Wydawnictwa Szkolne i Pedagogiczne.

and since 1944 the PWP had taken great care to exert control over its rival. After the war the PSP was reactivated under a leadership that was approved and controlled by the PWP. Prominent socialist activists who tried to organise an alternative socialist party (PPS-WRN), or to remain independent from the communist-controlled PSP, were arrested in April 1947.¹⁶⁶ Yet as old members re-enlisted and voters of now-forbidden parties flocked to the only remaining alternative to the PWP, the PSP once more became less pliable. The mass of the membership was all for pushing for greater independence from the PWP, whilst the PWP called for a union of these two workers' parties. The merger became the pivotal issue in Polish politics.¹⁶⁷ An enforced unification could have been a more efficient way of demonstrating the power of the communists, as happened in Bulgaria and Hungary in the early months of 1948, but the PWP opted for a softer approach which would allow it to absorb the legitimacy of the socialist party.

To begin with, the PWP concentrated on securing political control over Poland. The PSP and PPP were thus initially allowed to exercise a measure of influence over economic policy, and over education and research, to mention the areas most relevant for this study.¹⁶⁸ Once its hold had been secured, however, the PWP endeavoured to extend its control to new areas, and in the summer of 1947 it made its first bold move in economic policy. A campaign to eradicate private enterprises, shops and crafts, which became known as the 'battle for trade', was orchestrated by the Minister of Industry and Trade, Hilary Minc.¹⁶⁹ The socialists opposed the campaign but were unable to prevent it, as it was swiftly implemented through administrative measures. Relations between the Central Planning Board and the Ministry of Industry and Trade were deteriorating,¹⁷⁰ and it was now unavoidable that there would be confrontation between the communist and socialist visions of the Polish economy and models for modernisation.

At the same time, tension in international relations was mounting, as were the number of signs indicating that the Soviet leadership was aiming for stricter control of its zone of influence.

¹⁶⁶ Paczkowski, Andrzej, 1993. *Zdobycie władzy 1945-1947* Warszawa: Wydawnictwa Szkolne i Pedagogiczne. p.75

¹⁶⁷ Kersten, Krystyna, 1991. *The Establishment of Communist Rule in Poland, 1943-1948.*, 1. edition 1984 ed. Berkeley: California University Press. pp.157-165 (Polish ed.)

¹⁶⁸ Jezierski and Leszczyńska point out that even in the first postwar years economic policy was the result of a compromise between the PWP, represented by Hilary Minc and PSP represented by Bobrowski, Jezierski, Andrzej & Leszczyńska, Cecylia, 1999. *Historia Gospodarcza Polski* Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Key Text.p.396

¹⁶⁹ Kersten, Krystyna, 1991. *The Establishment of Communist Rule in Poland, 1943-1948.*, 1. edition 1984 ed. Berkeley: California University Press, Kaliński, Janusz, 1995. *Gospodarka Polski w latach 1944-1989. Przemiany strukturalne.* Warszawa: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Ekonomiczne.

¹⁷⁰ Bobrowski, Czesław, 1985. *Wspomnienia ze stulecia* Lublin: Wydawnictwo Lubelskie.pp.189-190

The announcement of the Truman Doctrine in March 1947 was followed by Poland's rejection, under Soviet pressure, of Marshall Plan aid, and the establishment of the Kominform in September.

In this atmosphere of mounting pressure on both the domestic and the international fronts a Congress of the Polish Socialist Party was held in Wrocław in December 1947. The discussions and resolutions at this Congress demonstrated that resistance to a merger was still strong among socialists, whose rank and file were well aware that they had much broader support from Polish society than did the communists. They refused to resign themselves to communist domination simply because the PWP was backed by the Soviet leadership and by Soviet forces stationed in Poland – including a Security Police co-operating closely with the NKVD. The PWP understood from the resolutions passed at the Wrocław Congress that they had to increase the pressure they were exerting, for at some point in the last weeks of 1947 the PWP leadership decided that the Central Planning Board would serve as the decoy for an attack on the Socialist Party. Soon afterwards a treaty signed in Moscow in January 1948 marked the formalisation of economic co-operation and the co-ordination of economic policies within the Soviet Block. This development changed the parameters of Polish economic policy and reduced the possibility of a 'Polish Way'. As Minc's deputy Eugeniusz Szyr announced during the CBP debate:¹⁷¹

We have signed an economic treaty with the Soviet Union, a treaty with Czechoslovakia, treaties with a whole range of countries. Each of these treaties means that we have to start establishing the economic future of Poland at once, and we have entered a critical phase in this matter.

It means that the system and duties which were under the jurisdiction of the Central Planning Board have disappeared, a crisis has arisen, and we have entered a phase in which the establishment of genuine planning, not just playing with numbers, is the fundamental problem. Today, ministry, inter-ministry, and supra-ministry policies are not important. Today the important thing is the brain of planning in Poland.¹⁷²

¹⁷¹ **Eugeniusz Szyr (1915-2000)** holding secondary education, he joined the Polish Communist Party in 1934, the French Communist Party in 1936, and the PWP in 1944. Fought in the Spanish Civil War under Karol Świerczewski; after the Second World War which he spent in concentration camps in France and Algeria and from 1943 in the Soviet Union, returned to Poland. From 1945 to 1946 director of the department of economy in the Ministry of Industry. At the time of the debate, Vice-minister of Industry and Trade. 1949-1954 vice president and from 1954 to 1956 the president of the Planning Commission. Moldawa, Tadeusz, 1991. *Ludzie władzy, 1944-1991* Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Państwowe PWN, p. 431, also see Strzeszewski's account in Torañska, Teresa, 1997. *Oni*, new revised ed. Warszawa: Świat Książki. p.180.

¹⁷² Jędruszcak, Hanna (ed.) (1983) *Wizje gospodarki socjalistycznej w Polsce 1945-1949. Początki planowania. Materiały źródłowe*. Warszawa: PWN. The Central Planning Board debate: The speech of Vice-Minister of Industry and Trade Eugeniusz Szyr: 19.02.1948.

Eugeniusz Szyr not only announced a reorientation of economic policies but made it clear that the turnaround would be so radical that the existing structures would not be able to accommodate it. The communist leaders considered that CPB had become outdated.

The aim of the PWP's attack on the CPB was two-fold: to accelerate the merger of the two parties by intimidating central socialist politicians; and to seize the initiative in economic policy-making from the Central Planning Board.¹⁷³ With hindsight, Bobrowski realised that he had been made a scapegoat. Minc and the PWP leadership needed to dissociate themselves from anything which was turning out to be a 'misconceived' economic policy in the new political climate, and they also needed to blame someone.¹⁷⁴ In January 1948 Minc revealed to a mutual friend that the conflict between him and Bobrowski was not personal but ideological. Bobrowski relates that upon being told this, he immediately asked the PSP leadership's permission to resign. He could not work with a hostile Minc. Rather than letting him step down, to his surprise the PSP leadership told him they would defend him, and so he stayed on.¹⁷⁵

It is important to stress that a large number of participants in the debate were unaware of many aspects of the political context. This is true not only for the socialists and the Central Planning Board employees, but also for their opponents. Unbeknown to Bobrowski, in early January 1948 the PSP Central Committee received a memorandum from the PWP, criticising the work of the Central Planning Board, and announcing its intention to reject both the CPB's legislative proposal for a national economic plan for 1948, and its newly-established co-ordination scheme. The PWP leadership called for an inter-party discussion and announced an alternative to the CPB's proposal in the form of an economic plan for 1948 prepared by Minc's Ministry of Industry and Trade.¹⁷⁶

¹⁷³ Kowalik, Tadeusz, 1980. *Spory o ustrój społeczno-gospodarczy w Polsce 1944-1948*. Warszawa: NOW. p.89

¹⁷⁴ Bobrowski, Czesław, 1985. *Wspomnienia ze stulecia* Lublin: Wydawnictwo Lubelskie. Minc's prominent role in economic policy has been attested to by Werblan, Andrzej, 1991. *Stalinizm w Polsce* Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Fakt.

¹⁷⁵ It would appear that the communication between the friend (Ludwik Grosfeld) and Minc took place during Minc's trip to Moscow (15-27 January 1948), during which Minc aimed to negotiate a long-term economic treaty between Poland and the Soviet Union. What transpired during these meetings is not known, but it seems clear that Stalin put pressure on both the PWP and the PSP to accelerate their merger and the sovietisation of Polish politics. Bobrowski, Czesław, 1985. *Wspomnienia ze stulecia* Lublin: Wydawnictwo Lubelskie, Kersten, Krystyna, 1991. *The Establishment of Communist Rule in Poland, 1943-1948*, 1. edition 1984 ed. Berkeley: California University Press. p.190-191 Kowalik reports that Minc destroyed his detailed notes from the discussions with Stalin in March 1968. Kowalik, Tadeusz, 1980. *Spory o ustrój społeczno-gospodarczy w Polsce 1944-1948*. Warszawa: NOW. p.35

¹⁷⁶ 07.01.1948: *Memorandum w sprawie błędnych metod opracowania planu gospodarczego na 1948 r. Przez CUP*. The letter was probably sent on January 14th. Jędruszczak, Hanna (ed.) (1983) *Wizje gospodarki socjalistycznej w Polsce 1945-1949. Początki planowania. Materiały źródłowe*. Warszawa: PWN. p.560-565

The most obvious person to conduct the defence of CBP was Oskar Lange, the PSP's highest authority on economics. Unfortunately, Lange was at that time attending a UN meeting and the best he could do was to prepare a paper in response to the accusations.¹⁷⁷ In it he vigorously defended the Central Planning Board and the economic soundness of their work. According to Kowalik, the memorandum contained a minor error, despite Lange's erudite and thorough analysis, and was for this reason downgraded from being the official PSP position in the debate as originally intended, to being a private opinion.¹⁷⁸ Another possible reason for its demotion was the fact that the uncompromising defence of the CPB went against the interests of the PWP, which was an uncomfortable position to be in for those in the PSP leadership who were loyal to their coalition partner. According to the testimony of Jan Drewnowski, he and Adam Rapacki were charged by the PSP leadership with co-ordinating Bobrowski's defence at the upcoming discussion meeting. To Drewnowski's surprise and dismay, the PSP Central Executive Committee delayed appointing the main speaker until the last minute. Then the man in question, Tadeusz Dietrich, prepared a speech which appalled Drewnowski with its incompetence, and its leniency towards the PWP position. It was not the energetic defence Bobrowski needed, so Drewnowski and Rapacki resolved they would have to speak up at the meeting themselves.¹⁷⁹

The 'attacking' group was formed from a mix of high-ranking politicians and lower-level PWP activists with varying claims as to their level of interest and competence in economics.¹⁸⁰ This was their first apparation as Marxist-Leninist economists, and their debut in the presence of the established economists. While much can and will be said about their criticism of the views and methods of the CPB economists, there is little we can say about the stance of the Marxists-Leninists representing the PWP. They spent their time criticising their opponents, rather than presenting their own views on economics. What was apparent,

¹⁷⁷ Ibid. 1948, not earlier than January 7th: Oskar Lange comments on the Memorandum on the erroneous approach to establishing an economic plan for 1948 by the Central Planning Board.

¹⁷⁸ Kowalik, Tadeusz, 1980. *Spory o ustrój społeczno-gospodarczy w Polsce 1944-1948*. Warszawa: NOW. p.81-2

¹⁷⁹ Drewnowski, Jan, 1979. "The Central Planning Office on Trial: An Account of The Beginings of Stalinism in Poland." *Soviet Studies*, XXXI, 23-42.pp.26-27 Dietrich was later to take Bobrowski's position as the head of the Board. Kowalik, Tadeusz, 1980. *Spory o ustrój społeczno-gospodarczy w Polsce 1944-1948*. Warszawa: NOW.

¹⁸⁰ The sources differ slightly on the composition of the attacking group, but agree on who were the principal critics. It we include all mentioned by all sources it consisted of: Hilary Minc (Minister of Industry) and his brother Bronisław Minc (CPB employee), E.Szyr (H.Minc's second in command)W.Brus, (editor of the economic section of Nowe Drogi) S.Jędrzychowski (vice minister of Maritime affairs), B.Blass, Z.Wyrozembski, Cz. Nowiński, M.Popiel (CPB employee), S. Żurawicki, W.Bienkowski, L.Rzendowski, A.Wang. 1998. Walka o Losy Centralnego Urzedu Planowania. *Konferencja Historyczna PTE*. Warszawa: Polskie Towarzystwo Ekonomiczne., Bobrowski, Czesław, 1985. *Wspomnienia ze stulecia Lublin*: Wydawnictwo Lubelskie., Kowalik, Tadeusz, 1980. *Spory o ustrój społeczno-gospodarczy w Polsce 1944-1948*. Warszawa: NOW., Jędruszczak, Hanna (ed.) (1983) *Wizje gospodarki socjalistycznej w Polsce 1945-1949. Początki planowania*. *Materiały źródłowe* Warszawa: PWN.

however, was their close links with the agitprop sector in terms of the adoption of ideological rhetoric and argumentation, and their subordination to the Party line (as defined by the Party leadership at any given moment). Even on such a flimsy basis it is clear that this brand of Marxism-Leninism differed strongly from the Marxism which had inspired influential Polish social scientists since the turn of the century.¹⁸¹ They also differed from their opponents in terms of the cultural norms which underlay their political and scientific debates. The PWP economists considered the attack on the PSP via the Central Planning Board to be within the limits of those means that were necessary and permissible in the service of a greater good, as defined by the Party leadership. A revolutionary outlook and obedience to the Party leadership was characteristic of this disparate group of PWP economists. The only available source describing the viewpoint and role of the economists enlisted by the PWP leadership to take their part in the debate is the published testimony of Włodzimierz Brus.¹⁸² According to him, these economists were not informed about the political aims of the manoeuvre, which is indicative of the stance of the Party leadership towards its own experts. They were treated as tools, not partners, and although the 'tools' willingly agreed to the aims and means deployed, this episode illustrates how the PWP leadership was from the start unwilling to include anyone from outside the closest circle of leadership in the decision-making process.

The meeting itself was held on February 18th and 19th. On both days, the discussions started in the afternoon and went on until midnight, before an audience consisting of the leaderships of both parties, ministers, economists, and employees of the Central Planning Board, ranging in numbers from 120 at the beginning to 60 persons towards the end. As it was organised as an inter-party meeting, the non-affiliated employees of the Central Planning Board were excluded from the discussion, tilting the balance in favour of the PWP.

¹⁸¹ Marx's ideas were debated and served as inspiration for important scholars such as the sociologist Ludwik Krzywicki and Edward Lipiński.

¹⁸² Brus, Włodzimierz, 1992. From revisionism to pragmatism: Sketches to a self-portrait of a "reform economist". In J.M. Kovács & M. Tardos (eds.) *Reform and transformation in Eastern Europe. Soviet-type economics on the threshold of change*. London: Routledge, 136-142. p.375-6

"At the time I was basically convinced of the correctness of this criticism and took an active part in the debate, the final stage of which was rather unexpectedly lifted to the level of the leaderships of both parties involved – PPR (Polish Workers' Party – communist) and PPS (Polish Socialist Party) in February 1948. (...) This concise and subjective account of the "CUP debate" is not intended to create the impression that I shared only the theoretical communist positions while objecting to the political aims at the time; I had no objections to the latter when they finally became clear to me. The point which I want to make here is that those who were drafted as experts on economic matters were never told of, let alone asked to express their views on, the real issues at stake."

The accusations against the Central Planning Board centred on two points, the first being the adopted practice of including services in the national product, which was stigmatised as ‘bourgeois’ and false:

*Not only is it erroneous in economic terms, but it is also clearly a class-hostile method. It aims at the reduction of the role of the working class in the creation of the national income, and at the representation of the profits of parasitical social layers as a contribution to the national income.*¹⁸³

The other issue was the new scheme for the internal co-ordination of the plan. This brainchild of Bobrowski and his co-workers was designed to track the implications of the modification of one parameter for other parts of the plan: according to Bobrowski, they had been trying to invent Leontieff’s input-output tables.¹⁸⁴ The PWP criticism seemed to him to have been founded on a lack of goodwill, or on a misunderstanding. Hilary Minc claimed there was a subordination of production to consumption in the CPB’s plans, something to which the PWP strongly objected. In Bobrowski’s explanation, the problem would not have arisen if the paper the schemes were written on had not been flat but cylindrical, as the idea of the co-ordination scheme was to connect the end with the beginning. The ‘hierarchy’ criticised by the PWP had not been seen as such by the CPB staff.¹⁸⁵ However, behind these two secondary issues (on which the disagreement was not in fact as great as the PWP made it appear) loomed the question of whether Poland could continue to elaborate its own conception of economic planning.

*The force of the plan consists in its being deeply scientific, and based on the principles of marxism. Only that can be the force of the plan, and only the scientific method of establishing the plan can be decisive. Furthermore, the force of the plan is that it is not merely a programme that provides orders (nakaz) and predictions. The force of the plan is that it transforms an idea into a real force, moving the working masses, and that through the intermediaries of political parties, trade unions and the Peasant Mutual Union it mobilises the whole nation in the struggle to fulfill and exceed the plan.*¹⁸⁶

¹⁸³ Jędruszczak, Hanna (ed.) (1983) *Wizje gospodarki socjalistycznej w Polsce 1945-1949. Początki planowania. Materiały źródłowe*, Warszawa: PWN. 07.01.1948: *Memorandum w sprawie błędnych metod opracowania planu gospodarczego na 1948 r. Przez CUP*. (Memorandum on the matter of the erroneous methods of establishing an economic plan for 1948 by the Central Planning Board.) p.561

¹⁸⁴ As Bobrowski notes in his memoirs, Leontieff had already done this but the economists at the CPB were not aware of his work. Bobrowski, Czesław, 1985. *Wspomnienia ze stulecia* Lublin: Wydawnictwo Lubelskie.p.197

¹⁸⁵ Czesław Bobrowski, transcript of interview by Tadeusz Kowalik. Biblioteka SGH/Zbiory specjalne/Taśmy prof. Bobrowskiego

¹⁸⁶ Jędruszczak, Hanna (ed.) (1983) *Wizje gospodarki socjalistycznej w Polsce 1945-1949. Początki planowania. Materiały źródłowe*, Warszawa: PWN. The Central Planning Board debate: The speech of Vice-Minister of Industry and Trade Eugeniusz Szyr: 19.02.1948. p.600

The PWP's vision of planning as explained by Szyr was quite different from how planning was conceived of in Bobrowski's CPB.

After speeches by H. Minc and Dietrich, which failed to introduce anything more than the contents of the document handout, the PWP began an efficiently organised campaign with a series of concerted speeches.¹⁸⁷ Party discipline ensured that the PWP group was well-coordinated and cohesive. They had also enlisted the support of some socialists,¹⁸⁸ which eventually allowed them to claim that the socialists had agreed with the PWP stance. The central PWP ideologue Jakub Berman was present at the debate, and while he did not take part in the discussion, it seems likely that he supervised the PWP attack.¹⁸⁹ It is worth noting that the leadership of both parties was present but did not take part directly. Direct confrontation between the leaders of the ruling coalition was undesirable. The power struggle would instead be played out in a staged altercation between lower-ranking troops. This situation brings to mind a chess game where silent players move their pawns over the board.

Oskar Lange had concluded his paper with the words: "...the aggressive tone of the memorandum (...) creates the impression that this is a case of looking for trouble rather than for a constructive discussion."¹⁹⁰ However, despite these premonitions, no-one seems to have been prepared for the aggressive and hostile attack that characterised the meeting. Instead of addressing its critique directly to the chairman, the PWP chose to attack the intermediate layer of department heads: Drewnowski, who was responsible for long-term planning, and Greniewski, who headed the coordination scheme.¹⁹¹ This choice took Drewnowski and Rapacki, who were responsible for the preparation of the defence, completely by surprise.

¹⁸⁷ The sources differ slightly on the composition of the attacking group, but agree on who the principal critics were. If we include all those mentioned in all sources it consisted of: Hilary Minc (Minister of Industry) and his brother Bronisław Minc (CPB employee), W. Brus, (editor of the economic section of *Nowe Drogi*), S. Jędrychowski (vice minister of Maritime Affairs), B Blass, Z. Wyrozemski, Cz. Nowiński, M. Popiel (CPB employee), S. Żurawicki, W. Bieńkowski, L. Rzendowski, A. Wang. 1998. *Walka o Losy Centralnego Urzedu Planowania. Konferencja Historyczna PTE*. Warszawa: Polskie Towarzystwo Ekonomiczne., Bobrowski, Czesław, 1985. *Wspomnienia ze stulecia* Lublin: Wydawnictwo Lubelskie., Kowalik, Tadeusz, 1980. *Spory o ustrój społeczno-gospodarczy w Polsce 1944-1948*. Warszawa: NOW., Jędruszczak, Hanna (ed.) (1983) *Wizje gospodarki socjalistycznej w Polsce 1945-1949. Początki planowania. Materiały źródłowe*. Warszawa: PWN.

¹⁸⁸ T. Dietrich, W. Jastrzębski, K. Dąbrowski

¹⁸⁹ Jakub Berman was present at the meeting both days. Bobrowski, Czesław, 1985. *Wspomnienia ze stulecia* Lublin: Wydawnictwo Lubelskie. p.193

¹⁹⁰ Jędruszczak, Hanna (ed.) (1983) *Wizje gospodarki socjalistycznej w Polsce 1945-1949. Początki planowania. Materiały źródłowe*. Warszawa: PWN. Oskar Lange p.656

¹⁹¹ In addition to Drewnowski and Bobrowski, the following spoke up in defence of the Central Planning Board, but primarily in self-defence: K. Sokołowski (one of the 'Gospodarka Narodowa circle', a member of PSP, and vice-director of the CPB), H. Greniewski ('GN-circle', PSP, deputy director of CPB), Z. Surzycki (PSP, CPB employee), W. Hagemajer (PSP, Central Statistical Office). The list of champions of the CPB is completed by Prof. Edward Lipiński (PSP, director of the Institute for National Economy, Prof. At Main School of Commerce, director of Bank Gospodarstwa Krajowego) Kowalik, Tadeusz, 1980. *Spory o ustrój społeczno-gospodarczy w Polsce 1944-1948*. Warszawa: NOW. pp.81-95

They were also taken aback by the range of issues raised, as the list of PWP complaints was much broader than had been intimated by the initial memorandum. Shortly afterwards, challenges were made not only to minor points within specific proposals but to the entire economic policy orientation that the PSP and the CPB stood for. Criticism was expanded from specific methods of calculation used by the CPB to the legitimacy of non-soviet economics as such. As the attack was broadened, so attempts to defend became more difficult.

Those who responded to this extensive criticism had been personally targeted and needed to defend themselves, before being able to help others. Drewnowski attests that he had planned to help Bobrowski, but following W. Brus' vehement critique of his book, he had to improvise his own defence. Brus claimed Drewnowski's work was an example of the detrimental influence of 'bourgeois' economics on the work of the CPB.¹⁹² Since the personal attacks were made in the context of political murders and show-trials, they made very powerful impressions. With them the PWP group introduced an atmosphere of fear and a level of aggression unfamiliar to both the socialists and the academics present.

Bobrowski wanted to defend the CPB and its employees, but was granted the right to speak only at the very end, on the second day. Until that time he was only once allowed to respond directly to an accusation. Due to the serious nature of the alleged crime, Bobrowski was allowed to explain himself, at Gomułka's direct intervention, when he was accused of using CPB publication channels to spread anti-Soviet information.¹⁹³ Since the error for which Bobrowski was held accountable had been committed by one of the PWP's own people, recommended to Bobrowski by Minc, the matter was quickly dropped, to Bobrowski's great relief. However, this incident left a sense of threat hanging in the air.

Rapacki made an effort to defend the CPB, but it had little impact, as he was neither part of the Central Planning Board, nor of the inner circle of power that straddled the boundary between the PSP and PWP. At the beginning of the discussion he objected to the broadening of the discussion topics, and the personal attacks, an intervention which was met with an

¹⁹² At that time W. Brus was editor of the economic section of the Party ideological journal *Nowe Drogi*, wrote propaganda leaflets in the series "*Soldiers Library*" for the Army, and worked on an economics doctorate under Edward Lipiński's supervision. ASGH/ Włodzimierz Brus' personal folder

The book which Brus criticised during the CPB discussion was: Drewnowski, Jan, 1947. *Próba ogólnej teorii gospodarki planowej*. Warszawa: Trzaska, Evret i Michalski.

¹⁹³ The accusation, made by B. Blass, touched on the publication in CPB sponsored journal of a review of a book that spoke of the Soviet labour camps. The employee responsible was in February 1948 no longer employed at the CPB. He had been included in Bobrowski's staff on H. Minc's recommendation. Bobrowski, Czesław, 1985. *Wspomnienia ze stulecia* Lublin: Wydawnictwo Lubelskie, p.193

ambiguous response from the PWP.¹⁹⁴ His second intervention, at the very end of the second day, was made in a bitter and ironic tone, as he realised that the case was lost. Hagemajer, of the GUS, tried to clarify what appeared to the socialist economists to have been a misunderstanding by the accusers of technical practices and constraints resulting from the absence of reliable, comparable data. However, in the face of the silence of the PSP leadership, there was little that sympathisers from other institutions could do to help.

Since he had not been allowed to conduct his own defence, Bobrowski clung to the PSP leadership's promise to defend him. The leader of the Socialist party, Cyrankiewicz, however, appears to have abandoned all illusions of postponing the unification with the PWP to some distant date, or of avoiding it altogether.¹⁹⁵ Whether he took an active part in setting up the debate in order to persuade reluctant party-colleagues, or merely abandoned the defence of a hopeless case, remains an open issue. When push came to shove, Cyrankiewicz did not speak up. Those like Drewnowski who expected him to throw his weight behind the Central Planning Board and the socialist economic programme in his concluding speech, were sadly disappointed.

The debate made it clear that the PWP wanted to take over economic policy, and that the PSP could not and would not stop it. We shall now look in more detail at those aspects of the debate that are directly relevant to our inquiry into the discipline of economics. Since the central element of the new economic course was the introduction of Soviet-style planning, there was no room for either the 'old' CPB or the economic theories upon which its work was founded.

Szyr launched the attack on neo-classical, or in his words 'bourgeois' economics, by describing the current situation in the discipline as sharply divided into two polarised tendencies.

*We have in present-day economics literature in Poland and in economic journals an obvious conflict between two theories and two world views in political economy, and also in concrete and detailed questions, and no-one can deny in Poland that this is so.*¹⁹⁶

¹⁹⁴ Both Gomułka and H. Minc responded to Rapacki's intervention, the former seeing nothing wrong in the way discussion was running, and the latter emphasising the need to concentrate on organisational issues. Kowalik, Tadeusz, 1980. *Spory o ustrój społeczno-gospodarczy w Polsce 1944-1948*. Warszawa: NOW. p.83

¹⁹⁵ Syzydek, Eleonora & Syzydek, Bronisław, 1996. *Zanim zostanie zapomniany* Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Projekt. p.140-141

¹⁹⁶ Jędruszczak, Hanna (ed.) (1983) *Wizje gospodarki socjalistycznej w Polsce 1945-1949. Początki planowania. Materiały*

Szyr's description of the situation contrasts with the claim presented by the disciplinary establishment in the first 1947 issue of *Ekonomista* that "*the development of theory in economics has reached such a stage that we can today freely speak of the absence of 'schools' in economics*".¹⁹⁷ In fact, Szyr was not so much describing an already-existing situation as creating it. In his intervention he redefined the boundaries and the 'fault-lines' of the discipline by imposing the PWP's definition of 'good economics'. This redefinition touched on several aspects of the discipline: the type of scientific discourse, the international orientation of the discipline, and the role of economics in economic policy-making. He was assisted by other PWP speakers who made use of aggressive propaganda vocabulary to attack CPB economists for being 'bourgeois', a label which had not previously been used.

Control over scientific language was a key to control over the content and method of the discipline. This is because the choice of concepts, definitions and models reflects the ideas in economics that they express. Edward Lipiński objected to the PWP group's frequent use of ideologically charged expressions in the discussion of the content and quality of economic ideas. To this Szyr retorted:

Comrade Professor Lipiński talked here with biting irony about the issue of flashing about the terminology "revolutionary", "counter-revolutionary", "reactionary" etc. This irony was quite subtle, but I got the point.

[Prof. Lipiński: There was no irony.]

*...we must use revolutionary language for the masses. It is understood, that among ourselves we could use another language. We fought and fight still so that there will be one language among us and for the masses.*¹⁹⁸

From his position as rightful representative of the oppressed, Szyr re-cast Lipiński's demand for a language of economics controlled by professional academic economists as an elitist project, and as such to be condemned. Szyr justified the use of propaganda language by claiming that anything else would be an insult to the workers, the masses. Nevertheless, his manner of expression indicates that he felt uneasy facing an academic authority such as Lipiński. His response is tinged with something akin to an inferiority complex, creating an impression of awkwardness in the positioning of the Party intelligentsia, drawn as they were

Źródłowe. Warszawa: PWN. The Central Planning Board debate: The speech of Vice-Minister of Industry and Trade Eugeniusz Szyr: 19.02.1948. p.587-8

¹⁹⁷ Editorial manifesto published in 1947 *Ekonomista*, 1

¹⁹⁸ Jędruszcak, Hanna (ed.) (1983) *Wizje gospodarki socjalistycznej w Polsce 1945-1949. Początki planowania. Materiały źródłowe.* Warszawa: PWN. The Central Planning Board debate: The speech of Vice-Minister of Industry and Trade Eugeniusz Szyr: 19.02.1948. p.591

in two directions by their wish to be acknowledged as professional while remaining loyal to the “proletariat”.

If we look past Szyr’s justification of the introduction of ideology into the scientific discussion, however, the real issue at stake was not whether the ‘masses’ would be offended by the economists’ continued use of their specialist disciplinary discourse. Language and power being inextricably linked, the heart of the matter was that no groups outside the PWP leadership could be allowed to define the agenda or the concepts underlying policy decisions. Economists could not be allowed to maintain a professional language of their own that could escape the control of the PWP’s chief ideologues. Despite the protests voiced during the debate, professional language started an evolution towards newspeak. Words that were originally neutral were now given strong connotations, euphemisms abounded, and ready-made formulas from the communist political vocabulary were repeated endlessly. The practice of name-calling was introduced, until then considered a breach of academic decorum: ‘counter-revolutionary’, ‘bourgeois pseudo-science’ and even ‘fascist’ were to become the staple fare of scientific discussions and publications. These rhetorical devices were applied in such a way as to force the reorganisation of the discipline into a battle between Marxist-Leninist and ‘bourgeois’ economics, an “us against them” setting which reflected the rising animosities and polarisation of the international situation. From a political perspective, the bonds with Anglo-Saxon economics that had been restored by Polish economists after the war were no longer an asset. Szyr presented the labels ‘American’ and ‘English’ as being highly objectionable:

*When I open “Planned Economy” (...) people in authority, working in hands-on planning, write long pieces that are built upon the school of neo-capitalistic economics of apologetic character. This means they try to defend imperialism and capitalism in its final stage. Of course they do so with plentiful hedging: that there is the land reform in Poland, that there is the nationalisation of the means of production. Nevertheless, in a systematic and consequent way terminology, opinions and methods of calculation of the national product, are transferred from the English language to the Polish language. And it is a fact, that in a whole number of official publications we find, unfortunately, a terminology taken directly from the English and American school of economics...*¹⁹⁹

Szyr also went into the issue of control over the content of scientific publications. In his eyes publications in Poland were the domain of the PWP: to him simply “our press”:

¹⁹⁹ Ibid. The Central Planning Board debate: The speech of Vice-Minister of Industry and Trade Eugeniusz Szyr: 19.02.1948. p.587-8

It is clear, that from our point of view, we need finally to break with this practice - that in our press and publications an ideology foreign to us and theories foreign to us are propagated and broadcast. This is a matter which is independent of the results of this discussion. We had to deal with the following case: there was a shortage of paper, and in the Economic Committee [the government committee co-ordinating economic policies – AWH] the Central Planning Board was to present a proposal on which books should be printed. And what happened? 90% of that literature was by English and American economists, Keynes (sic!) and others, and was presented as the most appropriate literature for the Polish consumer at a time of acute paper shortage.²⁰⁰

Szyr wanted the PWP to assume control over scientific publications, to use this control to stop the flow of western literature into Polish economics, and instead to reorientate firmly in the direction of the Soviet Union. From there his intervention turned into an attack on economics and related disciplines for hindering progress through criticism of political initiatives, notably the recently launched Stakhanovite movement (June 1947):

As soon as we say “development of work competition” suddenly there is a whole range of scientific interventions: Physiology of work, and the scientific work organisation, and all the great guns are rolled out to prove: - careful with the work competition, for you will exhaust the worker. When we talk of exceeding the plan, we hear: -these are people who do not understand the precision of scientific work, be careful about exceeding plans, for you will make more car wheels than cars. For these cases a whole literature was written during the time of the first 5-year plan in the Soviet Union. If there were such facts there, then we will use the opportunity to avoid them now. The criticism in itself is not right I believe, because it can provoke anxiety – not among us, but among the working class.²⁰¹

Social scientists were denied the right to criticise policies on the grounds that the general public might “worry”. What the public was to be denied was expert assistance in any critical assessment of government policies. In the PWP’s patronising view the working class did not need to think critically about the Party, for it would always choose what was best for it.²⁰² The authorities, on the other hand, did not need the opinions of Polish social scientists because from the Soviet experience they already knew all there was to know. Szyr’s message to economists was that the new regime no longer required the kind of services they had been providing. Independent and public criticism of the policies of the regime was no longer called

²⁰⁰ Ibid. The Central Planning Board debate: The speech of Vice-Minister of Industry and Trade Eugeniusz Szyr: 19.02.1948. p.587-8

²⁰¹ Ibid. The Central Planning Board debate: The speech of Vice-Minister of Industry and Trade Eugeniusz Szyr: 19.02.1948. p.590-1

²⁰² See the work of P. Kenney on PWP and later PUWP relations with the working class. Kenney, Padraic, 1996. *Rebuilding Poland: Workers and Communists, 1945-1950.*

for; in fact it would not even be tolerated. Inferring from this statement a dismissal of the usefulness of ‘bourgeois’ economics, Lipiński reacted thus:

*We want the right to analyse, we want the right to research, in the name of the service of socialist construction. (...) In developing economic research and critically outlining certain objectives we do not want to let ourselves be pushed towards the opposite side of the barricade.*²⁰³

Lipiński had good reason to be concerned. The area beyond the barricade being erected by the PWP was reserved for enemies of the state. If some of those present had missed the danger of such a development, he spelled it out, protesting:

*Comrade Szyr said: do not play at economic science, take everything (...) that Soviet Russia and Yugoslavia have created, and be content that you are fulfilling your scientific mission (...) I must say, humble ranks of economists such as those in Poland, (...) understand their mission quite differently and, as far as means and forces allow, have set themselves the aim of co-operating in the grand undertaking of constructing a socialist economy. (...) The construction of socialism cannot proceed without critical thought, or without the development of scientific analysis.*²⁰⁴

Lipiński fought for the existence of economics in Poland using rhetorical devices designed to match the tastes of the communist participants. So did other defenders of the CPB, a fact which Kowalik interpreted as an indicator of the discipline’s weakness in the face of the PWP attack. Rather than being an admission of defeat, I believe the fact that economists who sided with the CPB during this discussion used Marxist vocabulary and Soviet-friendly rhetoric reflects their realisation of the importance of enabling communication with the new decision-makers.

Lipiński demanded work conditions under which scientific activity would continue to be possible, and a place in society where economics could contribute to the development of the country. When Lipiński referred in his response to Szyr to sections of Soviet history which included purges and show-trials, he made it clear that Polish economists were well aware of what Soviet political culture had in store for intellectuals.

²⁰³ Quote after Kowalik, Tadeusz, 1980. *Spory o ustrój społeczno-gospodarczy w Polsce 1944-1948*. Warszawa: NOW, p.86

²⁰⁴ Quoted after Kowalik, Tadeusz, Year. Intervention in panel debate. In: Pte, ed. eds. *Walka o losy Centralnego Urzedu Planowania w 1948 roku*, Warszawa: PTE. p.46

*We all know, just as comrade minister Szyr does, what went on in Soviet Russia, what the history of the development of economic ideas was, we know all about certain deviations, about the ideas of Bazarov, Bogdanov, the conjuncturalists, that turned out to be hostile to the construction of the socialist system in Russia. In remembering these events and referring to my intervention, Comrade minister Szyr somehow wanted to point out that what is hidden here is pseudo-socialism.*²⁰⁵

The Soviet regime had a history of intervening politically in the discipline, and Szyr's announcement that the PWP would follow the Soviet example was a reason for concern.

Why was it Lipiński who presented the strongest defence of the CPB? After all, he did not even work there.²⁰⁶ It would appear that Edward Lipiński was attempting to defend the discipline of economics. As chief editor of *Ekonomista* and president of the national association of economists, he was well-qualified to act as the representative of the profession. His lengthy period of activity in the socialist movement, his wartime role as organiser of clandestine education, and his history of firm opposition to anti-semitism before the war, combined to provide him with the necessary political capital in the post-war political landscape. Throughout the years of the People's Republic, the communists found it extremely difficult to tell Edward Lipiński to stop talking, and he on his part never showed any inclination to do so. His aim was to bridge the yawning chasm that was now appearing between western economics and Marxism-Leninism, an endeavour I shall return to in the second part of this chapter.

The PWP's recipe for success was seemingly simple: to use propaganda language, to ignore protests, and to refuse to understand any arguments formulated in neo-classical economic terms. The explanations of Drewnowski, Hagemeyer and Bobrowski were brushed away as 'technicalities'. The absence of ideologically-laden rhetoric on the CPB side was interpreted

²⁰⁵ Quoted after Kowalik, Tadeusz, 1980. *Spory o ustrój społeczno-gospodarczy w Polsce 1944-1948*. Warszawa: NOW.p.86 A great number of Soviet economists perished during the purges, and their views were condemned. Stankiewicz, Waclaw, 1998. *Historia myśli ekonomicznej* Warszawa: Polskie Wydawnictwo Ekonomiczne.p.521-525 The economists mentioned by Lipiński were from the group of "old bolsheviks" who were gradually removed from positions of power and influence by Lenin and then Stalin. Vladimir Alexandrovich Bazarov (1874 - 1939) joined the Bolsheviks in 1904 and produced a Russian translation of Das Capital between 1907 and 1909. Before 1917 his most important works were philosophical, and his key associate was Alexander Bogdanov (1873-1928) who in 1918 became a professor of economics at the University of Moscow and director of the newly-established Socialist Academy of Social Sciences. Bogdanov was condemned in a show-trial, and Bazarov turned to research on blood transfusions and died following a failed scientific experiment. Source: <http://www.answers.com/topic/vladimir-alexandrovich-bazarov> and http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alexander_Bogdanov accessed 16.05.2007 The term "conjuncturalists" probably refers, among others, to Nikolay D. Kondratyev (1892-1938?) who lost his position as director of the Institute for the Study of Business Activity in 1928 following his critique of Stalin's collectivisation policy, was arrested in 1930, sentenced to an eight year sentence in 1931 and to death in 1938. Kondratyev, Nikolay D. (2007). In Encyclopædia Britannica. Retrieved September 24, 2007, from Encyclopædia Britannica Online: <http://search.eb.com/eb/article-9045995>

²⁰⁶ According to Bobrowski, Lipiński's support warned him greatly because it was unexpected; there were no close bonds between them. Bobrowski, Czesław, 1985. *Wspomnienia ze stulecia* Lublin: Wydawnictwo Lubelskie. p.192

in a report to the PWP Central Committee by Jędrychowski as weakness, and as demonstrating an absence of opinions on the part of CPB economists and their supporters. Revealing his own stance, he referred to his opponents as “ideologues”. A “*wall of deliberate misunderstanding and premeditated hostility*” (to use Drewnowski’s phraseology) had certainly been erected by the PWP.

Bobrowski asserted in his memoirs that before the CPB discussion he had already been aware that the real distribution of power was such that the CPB could not continue without the permission of the PWP, which could veto any important decision made by the CPB. From this came the desperate efforts to reach an agreement, to negotiate some room for manoeuvre, and to find space for scientific practice and constructive criticism on the part of the ‘defenders’ of the CPB and established economics.

The PWP also had the advantage of the element of surprise. It seems that only some on the CPB-socialist side (such as Cyrankiewicz) knew what to expect, while some (such as Lipiński). were quick to read the situation correctly. However many, including those responsible for the organisation of the CPB’s defence, Drewnowski and Rapacki, were unprepared for what was to come, unable to see the greater political game, and were thus outmanoeuvred. Bobrowski himself was disorientated and unsure how to act during the meeting.²⁰⁷ It is difficult in retrospect to evaluate the extent to which fear influenced those under attack. Lipiński’s reference to the fate of Soviet economists during the stalinist purges clearly indicates that at least part of the audience was fully aware of the political mechanisms of the system. With the statement, “*One cannot hold false opinions and have a false world view in such institutions as the Central Planning Board, without influencing the latter’s work...*”,²⁰⁸ Szyr was in fact accusing all the employees of the CPB, at a time when arrests for ‘sabotage’ of economic enterprises were common. What went on at this meeting could well have been the prelude to a political show-trial, and the realisation of this danger, in conjunction with feeling startled, could well have paralysed the socialist economists, and stopped them from doing and saying what they might have wished.

It is possible to point out a number of details in the preparation for and conduct of the debate that demonstrate the PWP’s political skill in manipulating their opponents and negotiating the

²⁰⁷ Ibid.p.194, 199

²⁰⁸ Jędruszczak, Hanna (ed.) (1983) *Wizje gospodarki socjalistycznej w Polsce 1945-1949. Początki planowania. Materiały źródłowe*. Warszawa: PWN. The Central Planning Board debate: The speech of Vice-Minister of Industry and Trade Eugeniusz Szyr: 19.02.1948. p.590

best possible position in the argument for themselves. Firstly, the PWP secured the collaboration of the PSP leadership in keeping the plans and content of the discussion from Bobrowski and not allowing him to defend the CPB. In this way the PWP ensured that their view would be backed by some socialists. They also arranged for Hilary Minc to deliver the concluding words of the debate. An atmosphere of pressure and fear was created that was designed to break down the CPB and the socialists' defence. The discussions dragged on for hours into the night, there were interminable accusatory speeches, and even elements of 'good cop – bad cop' routines: vicious attacks from lower-ranking communists were met with rebukes from the PWP leadership, and, after coordinating the attack on Bobrowski, Berman showed concern for Bobrowski's well-being by driving him home and putting him to bed.²⁰⁹ Bobrowski was confused by these ambiguous signals, and this hesitation made him hold back from defending himself too vehemently. He may have thought that not all of the Central Planning Board was yet a lost cause.

Most importantly, the PWP broke the fundamental rule that the participants in a debate should feel safe about voicing any arguments they considered to be valid. The sense of outrage present in the testimonies of those attacked is in great part the result of this transgression. Even the attacking PWP members were aware of this, and Jędrychowski had to defend the tenor of the debate:

*It could be said that certain errors and exaggerations may have been made on our part, and that these could have led to discussants saying, "The PWP members are attacking us" or, "Now I am on the operating table". These exaggerations arose from a certain feverishness in the discussion, but apart from that the discussion did not have such a character, and towards the end there was a series of interventions, that clearly stated the necessity of carrying out a break with the past, and that the methods of planning applied by the Central Planning Board were false, were bourgeois.*²¹⁰

The admission that the PWP group got carried away should be seen in relation to testimonies revealing that even H. Minc showed his disapproval of some of the more 'heated' attacks during the meeting.²¹¹ This admission, however, was also the end of PWP's concern. Jędrychowski was not about to admit that fear of the repressive apparatus affected the discussants. Instead he alleged that no defence of the relevance of and right to use 'bourgeois'

²⁰⁹ Bobrowski, Czesław, 1985. *Wspomnienia ze stulecia* Lublin: Wydawnictwo Lubelskie. p.193

²¹⁰ Jędruszcak, Hanna (ed.) (1983) *Wizje gospodarki socjalistycznej w Polsce 1945-1949. Początki planowania. Materiały źródłowe*. Warszawa: PWN.p.639. Stefan Jędrychowski's speech to the PWP CC, 25.05.1948.

²¹¹ Kowalik, Tadeusz, 1980. *Spory o ustrój społeczno-gospodarczy w Polsce 1944-1948*. Warszawa: NOW. p.88

economic methods was attempted, thereby deliberately ignoring Lipiński's intervention. As the victor, Jędrychowski felt entitled to rewrite history; he belittled the opposition and made the arguments of his own team appear to be even more forceful and superior. According to him, H. Minc's speech was a "brilliantly tempestuous attack" while Rapacki's intervention was "buffoonery". His report made the CPB and socialist opposition seem lacking in determination and conviction.

The reported attitude of the attacked socialist economists continued to provoke emotional debate even fifty years after the event. Drewnowski's claim that the CPB economists defended their institution and established economic theories in a cohesive and determined manner has been challenged by T. Kowalik on the basis of his reading of the protocol of the debate. Kowalik argued he could not see any defence.²¹² Instead he expressed disappointment with the socialists for not defending their vision. This interpretation profoundly upset Drewnowski, who saw in it an allegation of cowardice and an acceptance of stalinism.²¹³ I see no reason to doubt Drewnowski's assertion that there was indeed a desire to defend the Central Planning Board and the legitimacy of applying western economic theories and methods to the new socialist economy. Drewnowski himself acknowledged the failure of this defence, so the controversy with Kowalik boils down to whether all that could be done was in fact done.

Szyr's redefinition of the discipline explains in part the surprise expressed by Drewnowski in the quote on page 61. Those who arrived at the meeting thinking that they represented a cohesive profession were told by PWP politicians that this was not the case. Their discipline was a stage in a struggle between 'bourgeois' and Marxist-Leninist economics. Those who saw themselves as members of a profession defined by mutual recognition were shocked by the political appointment to the status of "economist" of individuals who had no formal education and training as economists, and were aghast at finding their argument overwhelmed by the propaganda slogans proclaimed by the latter. In his intervention (amply quoted above),

²¹² Kowalik (1980) p.93: "(...) during his discussion not one of the participants defended any of the concepts which made up his model [i.e. the socialist economic program –awh]. If we look away from the intervention of Lipiński quoted above on the topic of the fate of economics and certain economists, we can see that no-one stepped forward with even a veiled criticism of the existing Soviet system. (...) From his perspective, not only Bobrowski, but all socialists, including Lipiński and Rapacki – that is, the authors of the boldest statements, spoke as ones vanquished, as ones who already assumed that more general matters, matters of system or model, were doomed. So they did not touch upon these areas, and in their interventions created an impression of fundamental agreement with their accusers."

²¹³ Stalinism is not capitalised in this text as I follow the usage established by Kenney and Connelly. See Connelly, John, 2000. *Captive University: the Sovietization of East German, Czech, and Polish higher education, 1945-1956* Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. p. xi

vice-minister Szyr had spoken on behalf of the regime, laying down the line for the relationship between the profession and the governing bodies. Rather than the sugar-coated version of their grand role in the new system that the PWP would later offer economists, Szyr had blatantly stated that Soviet experience would replace native economic research. He made it clear that if economists wanted to avoid a 'lock-out' they should cease their criticism of Government policies.

Overnight Bobrowski found himself in the limbo of political disgrace: "... on February 20th, I came to the CPB as I had done every day. The phenomenon that I now am familiar with: not one single phone call, not one visitor, was new to me then."²¹⁴ Clearly, the news of Bobrowski's fall from power had already spread widely through political and economic circles, and the signals concerning the reorientation in economic policy had already reached other institutions. The dismantling of the Central Planning Board also meant the disbanding of the team working there. In the weeks following the debate, the PSP and non-party employees were fired or moved to lower posts. Some would never again have positions of this calibre. Drewnowski's claim that the CPB debate marks the start of stalinism in Poland is not generally acknowledged.²¹⁵ If we look at it from the more limited perspective of the history of Polish economics, however, it is not difficult to see Drewnowski's point that the CPB debate marked the beginning of something new.

During the CPB debate the economists' control over methods and research problems was challenged by people with neither academic degrees nor authority from within the profession. Marxist-Leninist economists claimed authority in all scientific discussion, on the basis of two assertions. *Primo*, power and class relations permeate society and economy and so the 'bourgeois' economists' claim that their arguments rested on objective knowledge was invalid. *Secundo*, only Marxism acknowledges the fundamental role of the power relations in society and takes the side of the oppressed masses, which makes Marxism the only truly

²¹⁴ Bobrowski, Czesław, 1985. *Wspomnienia ze stulecia* Lublin: Wydawnictwo Lubelskie. p.197 It may be noted that some years later, with the coming of the Thaw, Hilary Minc would find himself in the same position. See Torańska's interview with his wife Julia Minc in Torańska, Teresa, 1997. *Oni*, new revised ed. Warszawa: Świat Książki.. Bobrowski, once he returned to Poland and regained an influential position, renewed his acquaintance with Minc in 1956, partly out of sympathy with the then ailing Minc, and partly out of respect for the latter's intelligence. Bobrowski, Czesław, 1985. *Wspomnienia ze stulecia* Lublin: Wydawnictwo Lubelskie. p.168

²¹⁵ Bobrowski considered it was blowing up the importance of the debate out of proportion, while Kowalik argues that elements of stalinism were in evidence before this, and that public debates openly challenging communist ideas continued even after February 1948. In addition, the version of Minc's conclusion that was made public mentioned no-one by name and represented the debate as a friendly gathering. Kowalik points out that as the debate was not made fully public it had a limited impact on the Polish society. Kowalik, Tadeusz, 1980. *Spory o ustrój społeczno-gospodarczy w Polsce 1944-1948*. Warszawa: NOW. pp.94-95 Czesław Bobrowski, transcript of interview by Tadeusz Kowalik. Biblioteka SGH/Zbiory specjalne/Taśmy prof. Bobrowskiego

scientific ideology in the eyes of Marxist-Leninists. What established economists regarded as a neutral method of analysis was, according to the Marxist-Leninist, merely a hostile and false ideology in disguise. The logic of 'everything is politics' made it difficult to uphold the boundary between the 'internal' scientific and 'external' political spheres. In turn, the abolition of this boundary undermined the autonomy of the discipline, and also the professional economists' control over what could be classed 'good science'.

The PWP's move against the CPB did not immediately bring down the old, established economic profession hierarchies. The senates of the academic schools, the editorial boards of scholarly journals, and the boards of professional associations all continued to function. The attack on the CPB only started the process through which Marxism-Leninism would take its hegemonic position in the discipline. The next battle for control over economics would be for control over the journal *Ekonomista*.

The evolution of *Ekonomista* in 1948

The three volumes of *Ekonomista* published in 1947 reflect the response of established economists to the challenges of reconstruction in a new political setting, as well as to recent developments in economic thought. In 1948 the journal became the scene of a confrontation between three trends, as established Western-oriented economics was challenged by two competing brands of Marxism-Leninism: PWP-sponsored, Soviet-oriented political economy, and a moderate 'eclectic' version aiming at a synthesis of both Marx's concepts and neo-classic economics. While these alternative tendencies were being debated on the pages of *Ekonomista*, however, political developments tilted the balance towards the Marxist-Leninist economists. Their competitors were successively silenced and the debate closed.

During the first post-war years (1945-1947), higher education and research did not figure among the PWP's primary concerns. The conquest of political power, the establishment and stabilisation of control over a disorganised and reluctant society, occupied most of the Party's attention. Instead of alienating a group that enjoyed high status and a great deal of respect in Polish society, the PWP mostly left the academic world alone. During the same period economics profited from the profession's close contacts with economic policy making. Both these circumstances were about to change, as the PWP turned its attention to the submission of the PSP and of all scientific life. As we have already seen in the example of the CPB debate, the tension between the PWP and the PSP was affecting PSP-dominated economic policies, including the status of economic theories underlying these policies.

By the end of 1947 the liberal and pluralistic content of *Ekonomista* was out of tune with the political situation. New developments were quickly perceived and acted upon by the editorial board.²¹⁶ As was evident from his interventions at the CPB debate, Lipiński was not fully unprepared for what he encountered at the there, and was quite aware of the dangers for the discipline that would follow from the deterioration in PSP-PWP relations. With the Socialist Party losing power, the future of economics came to depend solely on its representatives' ability to negotiate successfully with the PWP. Some time in late 1947 or early 1948 *Ekonomista*'s editor Edward Lipiński took steps to ensure that the 'contract' upon which the concession to publish *Ekonomista* was founded was still valid. Based on what he said in a discussion in February 1953, we know that he contacted the leaderships of both the socialist and communist parties to ask for help in organising co-operation between Marxist-Leninist economists and the *Ekonomista*.²¹⁷ Lipiński reported in 1953 that the response was polite but ineffectual, as no Marxists-Leninist economists were allotted to work for *Ekonomista*. In order to make *Ekonomista* appear to be open to trends favoured by the PWP, Lipiński had to do the work himself, searching out articles in Soviet journals and having them translated, as well as writing on Marxism-Leninism and Soviet economics.²¹⁸ His contacts in the PWP leadership assured Lipiński that:

*...this was a point at which it was not in the interests of the party to alter the profile of 'Ekonomista' completely, and at this stage of development – he said – “we will still tolerate the utterances of bourgeois economists.”*²¹⁹

Several things can be deduced from this piece of information. Firstly, we learn that the PWP leadership accepted and (actively but not publicly) sanctioned the continued existence of 'bourgeois' tendencies within the discipline. Secondly, it is a rare clue as to the nature of the

²¹⁶ According to Kersten the first meetings where PWP started to plan a more offensive policy towards higher education and research were held in the spring. Kersten, Krystyna, 1991. *The Establishment of Communist Rule in Poland, 1943-1948*, 1. edition 1984 ed. Berkeley: California University Press.p.380

²¹⁷ AAN/ANS/5/44 *Stenographic report of the discussion held at the Institute for the Training of Scientific Cadres to honour and assess the import of Stalin's work on economic problems under socialism, 27.02.1953-01.03.1953*, pp.45-55, 68-75
Lipiński stood up to defend *Ekonomista* and his activity as its editor. The reason the issue of *Ekonomista* came up, was that Stalin's total turnabout in the matter of the existence of general economic laws meant that the border against 'bourgeois' economics had to be redrawn. This was what Żurawicki tried to accomplish through a new interpretation of the history of Polish economic thought. I shall return to this discussion in a later chapter. In 1953 Lipiński was uncertain about the exact date, and so it is possible these moves were made either directly before the planned CPB discussion, or even after when the reorientation of the PWP policy had become apparent. However, his interventions during the CPB debate indicate he was well informed about the situation in advance. Unfortunately neither the PEA collection at AAN nor Lipiński's papers in the PAN Archive contain any material on this question.

²¹⁸ Lipiński's claim that no articles from Marxist-Leninists were available for publication in *Ekonomista* is corroborated by the fact that no-one contradicted it when he presented it in the above quoted discussion in 1953. Given the nature of that discussion we could assume that his opponents would have done so if they had a basis for doing so.

²¹⁹ AAN/ANS/5/44, *Stenographic report of the discussion held at the Institute for the Training of Scientific Cadres to honour and assess the import of Stalin's work on economic problems under socialism, 27.02.1953-01.03.1953*, p.74 Lipiński did not reveal the identity of this interlocutor, but stressed that it was the person who held the authority to make such a decision.

relationship between an editor of scientific journals and the PWP. Thirdly, it is a possible explanation for Lipiński's worries about the plans that the PWP had for the discipline and the journal, if it is the case that he remembers the PWP politician's statement correctly.

The important process of recruiting and selecting contributions from among the submissions, and the necessary adjustment of the profile of each issue to the political situation, remain obscured by a lack of appropriate sources. Did the mid-winter consultations undertaken by Lipiński evolve into a regular practice? Did the PWP Central Committee continuously supervise work on the composition of *Ekonomista*, or was some lesser activist installed as a watchdog? If so, who set down the limits of manoeuvre for the editor, when, and in what terms? If not, how did he collect the information necessary to make this assessment himself? How much independence did he have in relation to the PEA's governing bodies? These questions must await further research, preferably based on not one, but several scientific journal editors' experiences. I will relate my findings, but what I have found in my archival searches is too fragmentary to answer these questions fully.

Ekonomista 1948:1

The first issue of 1948 already bore initial signs of change. Prepared previously, but appearing just after the CPB debate, it opened with a reprint of a Soviet article: J.A. Kronrod's "*Basic issues in Marx and Lenin's theories of production under capitalist and socialist systems*".²²⁰ This article introduced new concepts by discussing Marx and Lenin's ideas, and by revealing new patterns of political behaviour. On the very first page Kronrod respectfully referred to a Stalin quote: "*In order to live, one needs food, clothes, shoes, fuel for heating, shelter, etc. and to obtain these goods, one must produce them.*"²²¹ The quote surprises by a banality worthy of an elementary school assignment, though here it was presented as the basis for a discussion on production theory. Also, no more references were made to Stalin, as the author was concerned with Marx's economic thought. The function of the Stalin quote was clearly to ensure the political correctness of the piece, a practice which represented a radical departure from the traditions and practice of Polish scholarship, or at any rate of *Ekonomista*. Kronrod's

²²⁰ Kronrod, J. 1948 „Zasadnicze zagadnienia teorii Marksa i Lenina dotyczące pracy produkcyjnej w ustroju kapitalistycznym i socjalistycznym” *Ekonomista*, 1

²²¹ Kronrod, Jakow (1912-1984) specialised in the theory of reproduction and took part in the discussion on the law of value in socialism. The article was published in *Izvestia Akademii Nauk SSSR - Otdelenie Ekonomiki i Prawa*. (1947:1) and was translated into Polish by Lipiński. More on the later publications of Kronrod can be found in Stankiewicz, Waclaw, 1998. *Historia myśli ekonomicznej* Warszawa: Polskie Wydawnictwo Ekonomiczne. p.528, Stalin J. in "O dialektycznym i historycznym materializmie" *Zagadnienia Leninizmu*. quoted in 1948 *Ekonomista*, 1, p.3

example told Polish economists to pay symbolic homage to the political patron and then proceed to business.

The entire 1948:1 issue appears to have been set up according to this philosophy. The editorial board made a bow in the direction of the PWP by publishing Kronrod, and continued in the old vein.²²² *Ekonomista* still contained contributions from eminent 'bourgeois' economists such as Edward Taylor and Waclaw Fabierkiewicz.²²³ The most important discussion centred on the work of Józef Zagórski. Supervised by E. Lipiński, the study examined how the tools of neo-classical economics could be applied to socialist economy and planning.²²⁴ The main part of the discussion was dominated by an exchange of polemic between representatives of the academic establishment, whose articles contained no references to Marx or any Soviet economists' work. M. Orłowski's article, for instance, contained references to Schumpeter, Holtrop, Wicksell, Petty, Cantillon, Keynes, and E. Bark.²²⁵ Cz. Strzeszewski, a professor at the Catholic University in Lublin, discussed the latest developments in the theory of production, referring to names like Taylor, Pigou, Raynaud, Calmette, Byé, Witkowski, Bordas, and Hayek.²²⁶ Furthermore there were many reviews of foreign (mostly western) literature, as well as a bibliography of works published since 1939 listing page after page of western economists' works.²²⁷

On the whole the 1948:1 issue appears to have been only slightly influenced by the political tension building up between the PWP and the PSP. However, there were difficulties behind

²²² Editor: E. Lipiński, Secretary: Jerzy Jędruszek. Editorial committee: A. Krzyzanowski, E. Lipiński, E. Taylor, S. Zaleski. Executive committee: S. Zaleski, J. Drewnowski, W. Hagemeyer, S. Rączkowski, K. Secomski, J. Zagórski. The issue was printed by Spółdzielnia Wydawnicza "Wiedza" in Łódź.

²²³ **Waclaw Fabierkiewicz (1891-1967)** was before the war active in the PSP, docent at the Free University's section in Łódź where he taught political economy. During the war he was active in clandestine teaching, escaped from a transport heading for the Concentration Camp in Majdanek. After the war he became professor (prof.nadzw.) of Łódź University. Removed from his position in 1948, worked at Textile Institute. Reinstated in academic position in 1958. Tych, Feliks (ed.) (1987) *Słownik biograficzny działaczy polskiego ruchu robotniczego E-J*, Warszawa: Książka i Wiedza.

²²⁴ Zagórski, Józef, "Zysk konkurencyjny" *Ekonomista* (1947:1); "Koszty krancowe a produkcja optymalna" *Ekonomista* (1947:2); „Techniczna koncepcja kosztów a optimum produkcji” *Ekonomista* (1948:1); Oyrzanowski, Broniław „Koszty krancowe a produkcja optymalna .Uwagi na temat artykułu Jozefa Zagórskiego” *Ekonomista* (1948:1)

The discussion had commenced in earlier issues and was based on Zagórski's doctoral thesis, excerpts of which were published in *Ekonomista* in 1947, now available in the 'PTE library' series. In issue (1948:1) Zagórski responded to Wakar's review of his book and in another article Oyrzanowski gave his comments on Zagórski's work. *Ekonomista* (1948:1), Stankiewicz, Waclaw, 1998. *Historia myśli ekonomicznej* Warszawa: Polskie Wydawnictwo Ekonomiczne.p.573-574

²²⁵ Orłowski, Mirosław, 1948. "Uwagi o szybkości pieniądza". *Ekonomista*.

²²⁶ Strzeszewski, Czesław was between 1946 and 1949 dean of the Lublin Catholic University's Department of Law and Socio-economic sciences. Strzeszewski, Czesław, Ibid."Problem czasu w sprawie wydajności zmiennej".

²²⁷ Waclaw Fabierkiewicz engaged in polemics with Witold Krzyzanowski, and when discussing the work of M. Polanyi related the theories of the latter to Keynes'. Fabierkiewicz, Waclaw, „Czy może być mowa o specjalnej teorii usług” *Ekonomista* (1948:1) Edward Taylor reviewed the work of Szykaruk-Sulmicki, who worked on concepts from Keynes' theory of employment, and responded to the rather unsuccessful attempts at self-defence by another author he had reviewed earlier. Taylor, Edward, "Szykaruk, Paweł" and "Odpowiedz recenzenta" in *Ekonomista* (1948:1)

the scenes, as the first source to mention the censorship of *Ekonomista* indicates. In a letter to the PEA central board sent before this issue appeared, Professor Taylor asked:

(...) could *Ekonomista* be censored in Warsaw, despite being printed in Łódź? If so, would it be better to print it in Warsaw? Provincial censors will tend to delete items without any justification or understanding, as was lately the case with the review of Dr. Szykaruk's work.²²⁸

The review he referred to appeared in the 1948:1 issue, so it is clear that this issue was subjected to censorship, and that the censors did delete parts of the original text. While it is possible to read this quote as an indication that this was not the first occurrence of this kind, as he appears to speak of censorship as an accepted fact, the sources I have found on this subject are too scarce to make it a certainty.

At this stage, rather than direct pressure, it was the general political context, and anticipated future developments, that motivated the editor of *Ekonomista* to introduce Soviet economic theory into the journal. His decision to compromise at a time when some still hoped this could be avoided must have been the result of a conscious decision. Lipiński's openness towards the PWP paid off in 1953, just days before the death of Stalin, and at the darkest moment of the stalinist Polish era. At a Party gathering convened to celebrate the wisdom of Stalin's pamphlet *Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR*, Lipiński was able to argue convincingly that the absence of Marxist-Leninist articles from the journal in these early years was a result of the Marxist-Leninist economists not submitting writings, rather than of any deliberate obstruction on the part of *Ekonomista's* editorial staff. In 1953 he was even able to go on the offensive, and to make the audience laugh at his opponents on several occasions during his speech:

²²⁸ AAN/PTE/157 PTE ZG dział programowy. Działalność wydawnicza PTE. Sprawozdania. Korespondencja (1948-1949) Letter from Edward Taylor to the Central board of the PEA (ZG PTE), written in Poznan 9.1.1948
Szykaruk-Sulmicki, Paweł (1909-1980) completed a doctorate in Freiburg (Switzerland) during the war. On his return to Poland he worked at the CPB and later the National Bank, while lecturing at Poznań University. As we shall see later, in 1958, according to Drewnowski, he ran into problems and was denied an approval (nostrification) of his doctorate in Poland, so that the work he had submitted as a habilitation was only counted as a doctorate. Drewnowski, Jan, 1990. "Autobiografia naukowa". *Kwartalnik Historii Nauki i Techniki*, 35, 451-489, Gazda, Zbigniew, 1998. *Słownik biograficzny ekonomistów polskich od XIII wieku do połowy wieku XX*. Kielce: Wyższa Szkoła Pedagogiczna im. J.Kochanowskiego w Kielcach.

It is evident to all that I have no intention of defending 'Ekonomista', that erstwhile 'Ekonomista'. It was certainly a journal featuring bourgeois articles (in 1946 and 1947). It featured such articles because no others existed. (...) The editorial board of "Ekonomista" published different articles at the time. Among others it published an article by Professor Skrzywan, crying bitter tears as it did so. Professor Żurawicki wonders how that article could have appeared so freely [bezkarnie-literally 'without punishment'-AWH] and that no one responded. I wonder as well.

I wonder why Professor Żurawicki did not then come forward with a critique. Why he did not write an article on that topic, why did he allow such things to happen freely [bezkarnie], and why it did not enter his head that he should write and fight with all his force? "Ekonomista" was open to everyone, and it invited marxist economists in. But Professor Żurawicki did nothing.²²⁹

Lipiński's allegation that the editors had been 'crying bitter tears' over the publication of this article in 1947, which could be read as a disavowal of his former actions and opinions, calls for an explanation. The gist of Skrzywan's argument in the article was that economists should resist the temptation to pursue planning and other forms of interventionist policies, while Lipiński was among those economists positive about planning (although not about the Soviet version of it). What is significant is that when the article was accepted for publication (in late 1947 for the first part and early 1948 for the second) the fact that an economist's opinions differed from those of the journal's editor was not a reason to bar him from publication.²³⁰

Ekonomista 1948:2

In April, after the PSP had agreed to an acceleration of the unification process, the PWP lifted some of the pressure. Kersten states that "*After forcing the Socialist leaders to agree to accelerate the process of merging the parties, the Communists decided to, as Cyrankiewicz put it, unite the party 'by using heads and not asses.'*"²³¹ The speed-up could seem to be a poor deal given the support the PSP enjoyed in Polish society, but a good deal when compared to the way the socialist parties were merged with the communist parties in other

²²⁹ AAN/ANS/5/44, *Stenographic report of the discussion held at the Institute for the Training of Scientific Cadres to honour and assess the import of Stalin's work on economic problems under socialism, 27.02.1953-01.03.1953* pp.72-73

A look at *Ekonomista's* tables of contents show just how biting this remark was. Żurawicki published his first piece in that journal (a review) in the (1952:3) issue.

²³⁰ **Skrzywan, Waclaw (1898-1956)**, a statistician, worked at Lipiński's Institute of Business Cycles and Price Research before the war, deported to Auschwitz in 1940, and gained his doctorate in 1945 at Toruń University where he was then employed as a docent. He was made extraordinary professor in 1949. Trzynadalski, Jan (ed.) (1980) *Uczeni Wrocławscy*, Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich. The article in question was: "O podstawowych twierdzeniach ekonomii c.d." *Ekonomista* issue 3-4, 1947, p.179 He wrote: "... planned activity is the dream of many economists; that is why we search for the dynamic equilibrium just as we searched for the philosophical stone in former times, forgetting that the greatest tragedy is that of the dream fulfilled..."

²³¹ Kersten, Krystyna, 1991. *The Establishment of Communist Rule in Poland, 1943-1948.*, 1. edition 1984 ed. Berkeley: California University Press.p.435

People's Democracies during these months. After the tension at the CPB debate in the winter, in spring there was a slight relaxation. Hence, although in the next issue of *Ekonomista* (1948:2) the steady progress of the Marxist-Leninist presence and influence was evident, it did not size up to the threat of the elimination of 'bourgeois' economics made at the CPB debate.

In the issue submitted for printing in July 1948, a "censors' code" was added to the technical information inside the jacket, indicating that the censorship mentioned by Taylor did not only continue but became regulated and organised.²³² Given that censorship was now an established practice, it is as interesting to see who was no longer able to publish as to discover which articles actually appeared. The principal proponents of liberal neo-classical economics, such as Krzyżanowski, Taylor, and Zaleski, found themselves barred from access to the journal. This was not a temporary silence but the start of an absence that was to last until the reversal of the Marxist-Leninist monopoly in 1956.²³³ Throughout 1948, however, all three continued to sit on the Publications' Section committee of the Scientific Council of the PEA which supervised *Ekonomista*. In May the Section decided to honour Adam Krzyżanowski's fortieth anniversary as a professor in *Ekonomista's* 1948:3 issue. This plan was not realised, but its existence indicates that the economists sitting in central PEA bodies at that point still felt they were masters of their journal.²³⁴

Compared to the 1948:1 issue, the accent had now moved from a discussion of *how* to apply the tools of western economics to a socialist economy, to one of whether importing such elements into Soviet marxist economics was desirable or possible. An important mover behind a 'western-marxism' (later termed 'eclectic') option was Edward Lipiński. In his article, after presenting an overview of Soviet economists' views on economic laws, he concluded by raising, "...the problem of the critical importing by socialist marxist economics of some of the tools of work and methods of analysis established by bourgeois science over the course of a long evolution."²³⁵ In addition to Lipiński's article, one of his students –

²³² In addition to information like the names of the editor - E. Lipiński, and of the Editorial secretary - Jerzy Jedruszek, the inside of the jacket informs us that this issue was printed by the same printer as those of 1947, and that the number of copies was still 3,100. The final piece of information, the date when the issue was finished and signed over for printing (10.07.1948), is followed by a code:- D-030036, which looks like the code of the censor responsible for this publication. (1977-1978) *Czarna Księga Cenzury PRL*, London: Aneks.

²³³ The next issue (1948:3) carried the last review (Stiegler) signed by Edward Taylor.

²³⁴ APAN/PTE/54, *Protocol of meeting held by Publications Section of the Scientific Council of the PEA*, 29.05.1948.

Prof. A. Krzyżanowski was not present at that meeting, in fact he was not present at any of the meetings held by the section in 1948 for which protocols are to be found in the archive.

²³⁵ Lipiński, Edward, 1948. "Notion of Economic Laws in Soviet Science". *Ekonomista*.

Lipiński used this article as an introduction to an anthology of Soviet economists published late in 1948. Kowalik has

Zagórski – continued to discuss this problem. There was also the translation of an article by the British communist and economist M. Dobb, who argued for the application of Marxism to the analysis of not only the past but also the present, as well as a review of the French communist Charles Bettelheim's book "*La planification Soviétique*" which exhorted the virtues of Soviet planning. The choice of westerners as representatives of Marxism alongside Kronrod serves as a reminder that Marx's ideas exerted a great attraction over intellectuals on both sides of the rapidly-descending iron curtain.²³⁶ In the political context of 1948, however, its main significance was that it presented alternatives to a Marxism-Leninism controlled by the PWP and ultimately by the Soviet leadership.

Proponents of 'western' Marxism also met Marxists-Leninists to discuss the issue in person. A series of twelve discussion seminars was organised with the support of the Ministry of Education. The proclaimed aim was to establish the definition of a socialist economic model and to explore the conflicts and complementarities of neo-classical and Marxist-Leninist economics. The perspective of these seminars resonates with what E. Lipiński was trying to promote in *Ekonomista*.²³⁷ Neo-classical economists who did not support planning or did not have strong socialist or communist credentials were being stamped as 'bourgeois' by the PWP, and were refused the right to participate in public discussions, so Lipiński's open and western-oriented Marxism was becoming the only alternative to a PWP-controlled and Soviet-inspired interpretation of economics. The PWP, however, did not show much interest in any search for common ground, or attempt to build bridges between the established discipline and their own version of Marxism-Leninism.

After their forceful charges at the CPB debate, the PWP needed to keep up their 'offensive'. Based on an analysis of *Ekonomista's* 1948 issues, it seems that each issue was allotted to one

established that the text was submitted for revision at the last moment. The last sentence of Lipiński's introduction was panted over, as the passage had become too controversial. This fact was established on the basis of an author's (unedited) copy, Kowalik, Tadeusz, 1992. *Historia ekonomii w Polsce 1864-1950*. Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy imienia Ossolińskich . p.284-5. The passage deleted by censors is identical to the last passage of the article published in *Ekonomista* (1948:2) and quoted above, showing how rapidly Lipiński's stance was becoming unacceptable.

²³⁶ Maurice Dobb's article was a reprint of a piece first published in *The Modern Quarterly* 1947/48 Vol. 3, pp.5-21. It was translated into Polish by E. Lipiński's assistant Helena Tatar-Zagórska. In his conclusion he countered criticisms made against Marxism-Leninism that it neglected nationalism; he did this by referring to the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia as countries led by Marxist doctrines in which the problems of nationalism had been solved (sic!).

²³⁷ The seminars were held at the Main School of Commerce from October 1947 to May 1948. According to Drabińska, from 1947 on the Ministry of Education and the Party organisation at the Main School of Commerce sought to strengthen their position by supporting initiatives from Marxist staff. Drabińska, Danuta, 1993. *SGPiS w latach forsownych przeobrazen społeczno-gospodarczych Polski 1949-1956*. Warsaw School of Economics. p.67-68. Given the small numbers of PSP and especially PWP members in academic institutions, it is likely that E. Lipiński was central in the organisation of these seminars, probably with the participation of other members of the PSP and PWP at the Main School, such as J. Drewnowski and J. Hochfeld. It may be that some of the articles concerned with Marxist and Soviet economic thought that he published in 1948 originated from these seminars.

PWP-comrade responsible for the Marxist-Leninist presence in the journal.²³⁸ This arrangement is reminiscent of the CPB debate, where the attack had been planned by the political HQ and each 'party-soldier' was assigned his section of the 'front'.²³⁹ First out was B. Minc, who joined in the on-going debate on Zagórski's work on the theory of competition, and accused Zagórski of disregarding Marx's definition of the same.²⁴⁰ In Minc's article, references to western economists (Chamberlin, Robinson) were only made to show who was wrong. In B. Minc's view:

*"Neither the vulgar school of economics which presents an apology for competition, nor the Keynesian or left-Keynesian schools, are able to provide a scientific analysis of the phenomena of monopoly and competition. Both these phenomena appear at the base of contradictions in capitalism, and contribute to an exacerbation of these contradictions. Dominant capitalist monopolies intertwined with "free competition" are characteristic of the decaying stages (fall) of capitalism."*²⁴¹

He concluded, "*Dr. Zagórski's book proves that it is impossible to construct a "general theory of competition" by using the marginal and rejecting the marxist method.*"²⁴² Having dealt with Zagórski, Minc moved on to combat Catholic visions of economic planning in a review of the work of K. Turowski:²⁴³

*"... it is appropriate here to state that the system proposed by K. Turowski has nothing to do with a planned economy, and that his theories are a collection of views taken from papal writings (encykliki) and pre-war fascist corporatist ideas, to which the demagogy of the English Labour Party has been added."*²⁴⁴

The intensity of the attacks was making it difficult for those who differed from the PWP's appointed economists to publish their ideas, even if censorship let them through. The dangers of expressing ideas which could at the next moment be condemned by the political leadership, would be demonstrated in the case of agricultural economics. In an article based on a report commissioned by the regional agency responsible for local planning, Professor

²³⁸ I would seem this was B. Minc in issue (1948:2), L. Rzendowski in issue (1948:3), and Z. Wyrozebski in (1948:4).

²³⁹ See the quote from Brus, Włodzimierz, 1992. From revisionism to pragmatism: Sketches to a self-portrait of a "reform economist". In J.M. Kovács & M. Tardos (eds.) *Reform and transformation in Eastern Europe. Soviet-type economics on the threshold of change*. London: Routledge, 136-142. p.375 in footnote 182 page 66.

²⁴⁰ **Bronisław Minc (1913-)** economist, brother of Hilary Minc. Studied economics at Jagiellon University, completed his doctorate at the Main School in 1948. Worked at the Central Planning Board, went on to become professor of economics and longtime director of the Workshop of economics at the Polish Academy of Science.

²⁴¹ Minc, Bronisław, 1948a. "O konkurencji i metodach jej badania". *Ekonomista*.p.141

²⁴² *Ibid.*p.141

²⁴³ **Konstanty Turowski (1907-1983)**, a school friend of Cardinal Wyszyński, studied economics at Lublin Catholic University. The book under review was published in 1947, and its subject was catholic conceptions of planned economies: *Gospodarka planowa w koncepcji katolicko-społecznej*.

²⁴⁴ Minc, Bronisław, 1948b. "(Turowski, Konstanty) Gospodarka planowa w koncepcji katolicko-społecznej". *Ekonomista*.

Wincenty Styś argued for a modernisation of agriculture which would maintain close links with the established structure of family holdings.²⁴⁵ He discarded both the English and the Danish types of modernisation as being unsuitable for Polish conditions. "Neither can we follow the Soviet pattern," he added. "In Poland the PKWN Manifesto (the political programme of the Lublin Government), and pronouncements by qualified representatives of the Government, demonstrate unanimous approval of the principle of individual holdings in agriculture."²⁴⁶ Styś's views were shared by others. Later in the same issue, another authority on the field of agricultural economics, A. Żabko-Potopowicz, gave Styś's book on the modernisation of agriculture a positive review. This harmony in the opinions of the scientific establishment and the regime would not last.

Ekonomista 1948:3

Between the publication of the 1948:2 issue in July and the 1948:3 issue in November, there was another decisive turn of political events. The breakdown of relations between Stalin and Tito was augmented on the domestic scene by a conflict between the PWP Politburo and Secretary-General Gomułka. The latter opposed the growing tendency towards the homogenising of the satellite states, and of increased control from Moscow. Gomułka called for a 'Polish way' to socialism and absorbed PSP slogans of 'socialism and independence'. Stalin's men in Poland, Berman, Bierut and Hilary Minc, however, responded promptly by removing Gomułka from power and announcing that the Soviet example would now determine the course of Polish economic policy, notably by launching the collectivisation of Polish agriculture despite repeated promises to allow private ownership of land. Also, during condemnation of Gomułka's 'deviation' at the infamous PPR August plenum, signs of a revision of the PWP's policy in higher education and science appeared in Bierut's speech:

²⁴⁵ **Wincenty Styś (1903-1960)** economist, before the war in Lwów where he studied and conducted research. Did further studies abroad with at Rockefeller Foundation fellowship in 1932-34. W. Styś conducted research on family farms in Galicia. After 1945 he worked at Wrocław University. Trzynadalski, Jan (ed.) (1980) *Uczni Wrocławszy*, Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, Urban, Stanisław, 1986. *Z Husowa po berla rektorskie : Wincenty Styś--człowiek, uczony, działacz społeczny* Warszawa: Ludowa Spółdzielnia Wydawnicza,.

²⁴⁶ Styś, Wincenty, 1948. "Problems of Mechanization in Agriculture". *Ekonomista*.p.49

*The weakness of Marxist-Leninist propaganda in the party went with a tolerance of ideological confusion amongst the party intelligentsia, leading to the neglect of a marxist perspective on problems of literature, art, science (...) This situation had an especially negative effect on the cultural offensive within our party, which slowed down, and continues to affect the work of our higher education institutions, where non-Marxist, pseudo-scientific ideological premises still dominate, especially in the domain of the humanities.*²⁴⁷

The period of 'mild revolution' was coming to an end, and as the remnants of political opposition were removed, the attention of the Party leadership could now be devoted to new areas.

Since the last issue (sometime between July and November) changes had been made in the running of *Ekonomista*. Although his title was unchanged, Edward Lipiński no longer bore full responsibility for the journal. An "Editorial Collegium" had been instituted,²⁴⁸ and on the inside of the journal's jacket it was proclaimed in large print that *Ekonomista* was now "edited by the Editorial Collegium" with Lipiński's position as editor being announced further down the page in small print. The composition of the new Editorial Collegium was made public in issue 1949:3: E. Lipiński, B. Minc, W. Trąmpczyński, and Z. Wyrozemski.²⁴⁹ B. Minc and Z. Wyrozemski were the most active Marxist-Leninist authors in *Ekonomista* in 1948, and represented PWP interests in the Editorial Collegium from mid-1948 onwards. The changes in *Ekonomista* were followed by radical alteration of the membership of the board of the Polish Association of Economists. While the 1948 board was still recruited from among the founders of the PEA, in 1949 the board was expanded to include several from the group representing the PWP at the CPB debate, the Marxist-Leninist economists'.²⁵⁰

²⁴⁷ Bierut's speech quoted in Kochański, Aleksander (ed.) (1998) *Posiedzenie Komitetu Centralnego Polskiej Partii Robotniczej 31 sierpnia - 3 wrzesnia 1948 r. Stenogram. Stalinowskim kursem.*, Pultusk, Warszawa: Wyższa Szkoła Humanistyczna w Pultusku

Naczelną Dyrekcją Archiwów Państwowych. p.41-42

²⁴⁸ I have not found any documents which could shed light on who made this change or when and how. Nor have I information as to the composition of the Editorial Collegium in its first year.

²⁴⁹ **Witold Trąmpczyński (1909-1982)** was a representative of the established professional economists, but was considered to be loyal by the PWP, retaining the post of director of the Central Bank. He was a founding member of the PTE, student of E. Taylor (docent), director of the National Bank of Poland, and he had acted as head of the Komisja Rewizyjna and approved the PTE's accounts since 1945.

²⁵⁰ From 1945 to 1947 the composition of the PEA board was unchanged: Edward Lipiński, Stefan Zaleski, Witold Krzyżanowski, Zygmunt Filippowicz, Kazimierz Secomski. In 1948 two new members replaced Zaleski and Krzyżanowski Konstanty Dąbrowski (PSP) and Stefan Jędrychowski (PWP), while E. Lipiński, Z. Filippowicz and K. Secomski continued. In 1949 the number of members went from 5 to 11 and former PSP members were in the majority: Edward Lipiński, Konstanty Dąbrowski, Stefan Jędrychowski, Włodzimierz Hągemejer, Bronisław Blass, Jan Drewnowski, Zygmunt Filipowicz, Oskar Lange, Bronisław Minc, Adam Rapacki, and Stanisław Rączkowski. Orłowska, Janina & Orłowski, Tadeusz, 1987. *Zarys Historii Polskiego Towarzystwa Ekonomicznego. W stulecie społeczno-zawodowego ruchu ekonomistów w Polsce.* Warszawa: PTE.

The 1948:3 issue contained only three articles, where five had been the rule previously.²⁵¹ In issue 1948:2 the exclusion of scholars who were not considered loyal and 'progressive' had created a vacuum. The new Editorial Collegium clearly found it difficult to find articles for publication now that the majority of contributors had been rejected, and Marxist-Leninist articles were not forthcoming in numbers sufficient to fill the gap.

An article by Leon Rzendowski, an official involved with the PWP's agricultural policy, was brought in because of the re-orientation of this area.²⁵² The decision to start collectivisation was to be announced and explained, and its opponents criticised. Rzendowski's article in *Ekonomista*, a critique of views presented in the last issue by W. Styś, was part of a campaign to inform on the new party line in this matter.²⁵³ The critique was conducted in a level, almost friendly tone. Rzendowski noted that Professor Styś wrote his piece before the PWP made its U-turn on the issue of collectivisation, and avoided *ad hominem* arguments and aggressive rhetoric.²⁵⁴ However, the publication of Styś's article in issue 1948:2 (signed off for printing in July) has overtones of a cat-and-mouse fight.²⁵⁵ The decision on collectivisation had already been taken by the Politburo in June, but had not yet been made public.²⁵⁶ It seems that Styś's article was allowed to appear in an issue from which many other 'bourgeois' economists had already been banned, so that Rzendowski could criticise it.²⁵⁷ Whether premeditated or merely coincidental, the publication of Styś's article provided the PWP with a demonstration piece. The practice of allowing selected representatives of the 'bourgeoisie' to publish their views simply in order to subject them to authorised criticism is reminiscent of what was being done in other fields, for instance in the case of the philosophers Tatarkiewicz, Kotarbiński and Adujkiewicz.²⁵⁸

²⁵¹ Edited by Editorial Collegium, Editor E. Lipiński, Editorial Secretary Jerzy Jedruszek. The same printer was used as for the last issue. 3000 copies. "Signed for print 19.11.1948 - D-034027"

²⁵² **Rzendowski Leon (1915-1997)** an agricultural engineer before the war. A PWP member who held important positions in PWP agricultural policy organs. After the CPB debate he became director of the agricultural section of the CPB, and in 1950 vice-minister of agriculture.

²⁵³ Rzendowski, Leon, 1948. "Problems of agricultural economy". *Ekonomista*. A footnote revealed that Rzendowski's article was part of a bigger work, sections of which had appeared in *Nowe Drogi* (nr.8) The references in this article are to Lenin and Marx.

²⁵⁴ It is impossible to ascertain whether it was unease about such tactics, personal bonds or Rzendowski's personal style that kept the critique mellow.

²⁵⁵ Styś, Wincenty, 1948. "Problems of Mechanization in Agriculture". *Ekonomista*. This article was commissioned by the Regionalna Dyrekcja Planowania Przestrzennego (Regional Centre for Local Planning) in Wrocław. Styś estimated that industrialisation and urbanisation would lead to a workforce shortage in agriculture, thereby increasing the need for machines. His main argument was that Poland should not follow the examples of England, Germany, Denmark or the Soviet Union but retain family-farms as the basic structure.

²⁵⁶ Garlicki, Andrzej, 1993. *Stalinizm* Warszawa: Wydawnictwa Szkolne i Pedagogiczne.p.15, 44-45

²⁵⁷ H. Minc was party to the policy-reversal and his brother B. Minc was active in *Ekonomista*, so it does not seem far-fetched to surmise that the latter was well informed.

²⁵⁸ Connelly, John, 1996. "Elite Social Science Training in Stalinist Poland." *Minerva*, 34, 323-346.

Articles which were controversial from a PWP point-of-view were still accepted, but they were now given commentaries that signalled the divergence between the views of the author and the approved editorial line. This is important, because it means that the opinions of the authors were now measured against a standard of truth that was defined by an as yet unnamed higher authority, and implemented by the Editorial Board.²⁵⁹ Aleksy Wakar's article on Soviet foreign trade was accompanied by a commentary stating that the Editorial Board (Redakcja) did not share Professor Wakar's view that Soviet foreign trade was monopolistic.²⁶⁰ Zagórski's article on the origins of capitalism was also accompanied by a rider, and the editorial comment announced that responses to both articles were being prepared by PWP economists.²⁶¹

A final, key novelty in this issue of *Ekonomista* was the publication of a detailed summary of a report from a meeting in the Institute of Economics at the Soviet Academy of Science, held shortly before the CPB debate.²⁶² The report provided the Polish scholars with insights into the institutional politics of Soviet science and relayed news of the massive critique raised against the Institute of World Politics Economics and its leader E. Varga, and the Institute of Economics – both of which were merged and placed under the leadership of K. W. Ostrovitianov.²⁶³ Critics claimed that the work of the two institutes before the merger was marred by “*anti-marxist errors*” and that it had failed to fulfil the plan for 1947. Publications by its employees were criticised, as in, “*the author [P. T. Masłow] distorts marxist methodology, dealing with it in the spirit of bourgeois economists.*”²⁶⁴ In this debate the impetus for criticism came not from scholars, but from party periodicals such as *The Bolshevik* and *Pravda*. The scholars’ criticisms followed *Pravda*’s, not the other way around. One of Varga’s colleagues, who had earlier supported him, now retracted publicly:

²⁵⁹ In the post-war issues, one such note had appeared, in connection with the controversy over a review authored by E. Taylor, to which the author in question (A. Tokarski) objected strongly. The Editor's note then stated that both the defence and the response were published, but that the Editor considered that Tokarski had not addressed the criticism voiced by Taylor. It did not however go so far as pronouncing on the correctness of the views of any of the parties, merely on whether the same questions had been addressed.

²⁶⁰ Wakar, Aleksy, 1948. "International Trade in Soviet Union". *Ekonomista*.

Wakar, Aleksy (1898-1966), habilitated at the Main School of Commerce, joined the PPR and was appointed rector of the ANP (Academy of Political Science).

²⁶¹ Zagórski, Józef, Ibid. "Origin of the capitalist system". "Because the deliberations of Dr. J. Zagórski caused doubts of a theoretical nature, the Editorial Board considers the article to be a discussion piece. In connection with this it will publish the work of Z. J. Wyrozembski in the next issue, and this will counter the theses of Dr. Zagórski. By the Editorial Board." Zagórski's references in this article were to: Marx, Sombart, Day, Dobb, Clark, Edgeworth, Robinson and Childe.

²⁶² "Nowe zadania Instytutu Ekonomicznego Ak.Nauk ZSRR", *Ekonomista* (1948:3) summary of a report printed in *Iswiestia Akademii Nauk - Otdielenie Ekonomiki i Prawa* (1948:3), translated into Polish by Jerzy Jedruszek.

²⁶³ For a recently published study of this controversy see Pollock, Ethan, 2006. *Stalin and the Soviet Science Wars* Princeton, N.J. ; Oxford: Princeton University Press.

²⁶⁴ "Nowe zadania Instytutu Ekonomicznego Ak. Nauk ZSRR", *Ekonomista* (1948:3) In my translation I have retained the Polish spelling of Russian names as they appeared in *Ekonomista*.

W. A. Maślennikow admits that during the discussion of Varga's book, he defended it instead of making a wide critique of the book's false premises. He explains that this was due to the influence of Varga's authority.

However Maślennikow now says that he has understood his own errors and fully agrees with the critique of Varga's book on the pages of the daily Prawda.²⁶⁵

The language and form of the debate were alien to the norms observed by the Polish scholars. The motives behind the inclusion of this report are unclear, and the effects it had on *Ekonomista's* readership among the established economists even more so. The report gives such a grim picture of academic infighting interfused with politics that it is difficult to avoid a feeling that the publication might have been as much a warning as a shining example, depending on one's perspective. No doubt it provided the Polish public with an interesting insight into the way academic culture was functioning in the Soviet Union.

Ekonomista 1948:4

The weeks preceding the Unification Congress in December 1948 culminated in the PWP's final propaganda campaign, which was followed by arrests and political trials targeting both the PPP and the PSP. Although the Polish United Workers' Party was in theory a free union of equal partners, in practice it meant the annexation of the PSP. From now on controversial subjects in Polish politics would be discussed within a centralised, disciplined party which banned all organised differences of opinion, whether inside or outside its confines. The last 1948 *Ekonomista*, approved for printing in January 1949, after the Unification Congress, marks the end of the evolution from a pluralist to a monopolist discipline. The 1948:4 issue no longer accommodated advocates of a 'western Marxism', as this was now condemned as "eclecticism", or a perversion of the true doctrine.

For the first time *Ekonomista* opened with quotes from Marx and Lenin, followed by an editorial studded with footnotes referring to the 'great four' (Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin).²⁶⁶ The editorial provided a redefinition of the goals of the discipline and of its methods. Everything was now linked to recent political events and the new role of the discipline in 'the construction of socialism'. The permission to use 'bourgeois economics', a term which included all approaches except the Marxist-Leninist one, granted to Lipiński by the PWP only a year before, was withdrawn. The editor of *Ekonomista* had publicly to proclaim:

²⁶⁵ "Nowe zadania Instytutu Ekonomicznego Ak. Nauk ZSRR", *Ekonomista* (1948:3) p.73.

²⁶⁶ Issue 1948:4 was edited by the Editorial Collegium, Editor E. Lipiński, Secretary Jerzy Jędruszek. Other information on the jacket included: Print: Spółdzielnia Wyd. "Prasa" (3000 copies) "Signed off for printing 31.1.1949 - D-019255"

*We reject bourgeois economic science, because it is a class science, apologetic, searching for measures to salvage capitalism.*²⁶⁷

The bridges to western economics were now burning. Lipiński had to give up his most cherished idea, that of a marriage between western tools and socialist policies. The redefinition of the tasks of the discipline and its role in society had also become important. It was now discussed in terms of *'partyjność'* (its subordination to the policy defined by the Party leadership) while at the same time a central role in conscious, planned development and modernisation was being promised to the discipline.

Science is a means for knowing the world with the goal of controlling it, subjecting it to human will, changing it, acquiring tools for the harnessing of the blind forces of nature... Science has to serve that construction. That is the sense of the 'partyjność' of science, and 'partyjność' thus understood gives science a new sense of dignity and import, flowing from the conscious co-operation in the greatest deed in mankind's history.

*(...) The science of economy, if it merely schematised accomplished fact, would lose its historical sense, for; its final goal is the co-creation of reality, the solving of problems raised by the development of life.*²⁶⁸

Although the debate over the possibility of combining neo-classical and Marxist-Leninist economics was closed, Lipiński had not given up completely. He still strove to make the best of the situation. Something of the achievements of western economics might still be used: *"In concordance with Lenin's approach, we reject the general economic theory, but not its practically applicable results."*²⁶⁹ He also argued that orthodox Marxism-Leninism did not preclude discussion, supporting his case with quotes from Lukács, Stalin and Lenin, and elaborating on the intellectual challenges and passion for knowledge demanded of the truly Marxist-Leninist researcher.

The content of the journal reflected that of the editorial. The condemnation of views deemed unorthodox took on a new, more personal and menacing tone in the belated response to Zagórski's article penned by Wyrozembski. Directed at both Zagórski and Wakar, it was more than a personal attack: it was the final shot at 'bourgeois' economics, and the last time that the PWP's economists deigned to engage in a debate with their opponents. From now on the debate would be replaced by unidirectional critiques.

²⁶⁷ Editorial, (Signed: The Editor) in *Ekonomista* (1948:4) p.17

²⁶⁸ Editorial *Ekonomista* (1948:4) p.9

²⁶⁹ Editorial, (Signed: The Editor) in *Ekonomista* (1948:4) p.17

At the CPB debate Lipiński had refused to be relegated to the ‘other side of the barricade’, to the cold, silent political vacuum from which his and other economists’ voices would no longer be heard. A large proportion of his colleagues now found themselves there, but a few, Lipiński among them, had so far escaped it. Their symbolic capital – the prestige they continued to enjoy in Polish society – made holding on to them worthwhile for the PUWP. They were not trusted by the PUWP to hold much power, as true loyal Marxists-Leninists were. Lipiński clearly no longer controlled the *Ekonomista*, and would soon lose control over his department at the Main School.²⁷⁰ As with other ‘progressive’ scholars in the middle category between ‘bourgeois’ and Marxist-Leninist, he had to be seen to be endorsing the PUWP line. Antoni Żabko-Potopowicz, a professor of Agricultural Economics, who had endorsed Styś’s preference for individual holdings, modified his style of writing, references and conclusions. His article on “Problems of class differentiation in villages” referred to Marx, Lenin and Stalin, and other Soviet authors. The only reference to a westerner was to a British work entitled “Why farmers are poor.”²⁷¹ Lipiński and Żabko-Potopowicz’s articles served as illustrations for readers that the Party not only demanded the disappearance of ‘bourgeois’ economists, but also absolute obedience from the ‘progressive’ scholars it graciously allowed to retain some influence.

²⁷⁰ AAN/PTE/20 *Sprawozdanie Zarządu Głównego PTE 10.06.1956-27.05.1958* p.25

The report of the Main Board of the PEA for the years 1956-1958 mentions work undertaken with the aim of restoring the PEA’s control over the composition of the editorial board of *Ekonomista* and over the content of the journal. The report does reveal who controlled it. Nor did PEA in 1956 control the economy of *Ekonomista*, PWN took care of the financial aspects of publishing.

²⁷¹ Żabko-Potopowicz, Antoni, “Zagadnienia rozwarstwiania się wsi.” *Ekonomista* (1948:4) Some references were made to Marx, many to Lenin and Stalin and other Soviet authors, and only one to a westerner, a Briton, Rochester, whose article was entitled “Why farmers are poor.”

Table 1: Authors contributing to Ekonomista more than once 1947-1953


Author	1947	1948	1949	1950	1951	1952	1953	Entries	Articles
Bolland, Stefan	1		1					2	1
Fabierkiewicz, Waclaw		3						3	0
Hagemejer, Włodzimierz	2							2	0
Iwaszkiewicz, Waclaw	1		2					3	0
Nowicki, Józef	2	2	3					7	1
Oyrzanowski, Bronisław	1	2						3	1
Rawita Gawroński, Zygmunt	1	1						2	0
Skrzywan, Waclaw	2							2	2
Strzeszewski, Czesław	1	1						2	0
Taylor, Edward	2	2						4	2
Vielrose, Egon	1	1						2	1
Zagórski, Józef	4	4	1					9	4
<i>Dobb, Maurice</i>	1	1					1	3	3
Lange, Oskar	1		1		2		2	6	6
Lipiński, Edward	1	2	1	2	3	3	3	15	11
Secomski, Kazimierz	2	1			2	1	1	7	7
Wakar, Aleksy	1	2			1			4	2
Żabko-Potopowicz, Antoni		2	1	1		2	1	7	3
<i>Bettelheim, Charles</i>			1				1	2	2
Bialer, S.							2	2	1
Brus, Włodzimierz			1	2	1	2	1	7	6
Dietrich, Tadeusz			1	2				3	3
Fedak, Z.		1		1				2	0
Fiszel, H. & Kagan, A.						1	2	3	1
Górski, Janusz							3	3	1
Grodek, Andrzej *				1	1		1	3	3
Jędrychowski, Stefan			1	1	1			3	3
Kuziński, Stanisław						1		1	0
Łychowski, Tadeusz			3		1	1		5	4
Minc, Bronisław		2	2	1	1	2	1	9	6
Orthwein, Kazimierz					1	1		2	0
Piekarczyk, Stanisław						2		2	0
Pohorille, Maksymilian				1			2	3	2
Rakowski, Mieczysław					1	1		2	1
Śleszyński, Aleksander				1	1			2	1
Sokołow, D.						1	1	2	2
Stachewiczowa, Krystyna		1	1					2	2
Tepicht, Jerzy					1		1	2	0
<i>Varga, Eugeniusz</i>			1	1				2	0
Wyrozembski, Zygmunt Jan	1*	2	1					4	3
Zawadzki, Józef					4	4	1	9	7
Żurawicki, Seweryn						2	1	3	0

Changes at the journal manifested themselves in the composition of its contributors. The work of thirty-nine Polish economists was published in the 1947 and 1948 issues. Only three among them, (Fedak, Wyrozembski and Bronisław Minc) can be classified as Marxist-Leninists. For another thirty one of this group there would be no more publishing opportunities before the onset of the Thaw in 1956. A few (five) still appeared in 1949, but then disappeared from the journal's pages. We find the same tendency if we look more closely and examine only those authors who made more than one appearance in the journal. Of these fourteen, eight were not published again until 1956. The group of economists barred from access to publication included prominent members of the discipline such as Adam and Witold Krzyżanowski, Edward Taylor, Wincenty Styś and Stefan Zaleski.²⁷² Some personal continuity was maintained as five established economists (O. Lange, E. Lipiński, K. Secomski, A. Żabko-Potopowicz and A. Wakar) continued to be published. This continuity did not include the style and content of their work; the vocabulary, choice of topics and approaches, and literature references were all different from their earlier texts.

²⁷² Among the fourteen authors with more than one entry, the following disappeared from the pages of the journal: S. Bolland, J. Nowicki, B. Oyrzanowski, Z. Rawita Gawroński, W. Skrzywan, Cz. Strzeszewski, E. Vielrose, and J. Zagórski. We have of course to take into account the possibility that they could but did not want to publish, but only in the case of B. Oyrzanowski does this seem to be an option (in 1952 he appears as member of the editorial board of *Ekonomista* which must have meant he held a measure of political trust). Others among the fourteen were: the PWP's Wyrozembski, and the five authors mentioned above who continued to publish.

Witold Krzyżanowski (1897-1972) obtained his habilitation in Wilno in 1930 and became professor of economy at the Catholic University in Lublin. After the war he settled in Kraków as professor (prof.zw.) of economics.

Table 2: Number of articles and reviews in *Ekonomista*



A review of the contents of *Ekonomista* over several years illustrates the transformation of the journal as well as its subsequent development. I shall return to discuss these figures in Chapter 5. What matters for the moment are the first post-war volumes of *Ekonomista*. There we can observe a decrease in the number of articles, which was caused by the transition to Marxist-Leninist domination of the journal between 1947 to 1949. From 1948 there was also a dramatic fall in the number of reviews, which reflects both the cutting of the bonds with western scholarship and a decrease of scholarly output in Poland. After the difficult year of 1948, the editorial board of *Ekonomista* settled into its new groove, producing very thin issues composed of Marxist-Leninist contributions. In 1949, the places of those who were no longer allowed to publish were taken by new authors. The type of text that was being written after 1948 also changed, and *Ekonomista* increasingly came to resemble the PWP ideological periodical *Nowe Drogi*, which was in turn inspired by Soviet publications. *Ekonomista* was now involved in all the grand propaganda campaigns: in 1949 one of the issues was devoted to the celebration of Stalin's seventieth birthday, while another was devoted to the new constitution. The content was dominated by reprints and summaries from Soviet publications, while contributions from Polish economists were limited to those by a small group of trusted comrades. Most of these new names are the same as those of the PWP group which appeared

at the Central Planning Board discussion: W. Brus, T. Dietrich, S. Jędrychowski, and B. Minc.²⁷³

Conclusion

The CPB debate had shown economists that the communist regime would no longer accept their active role in policy making. Now, the gradual transformation of *Ekonomista* into a journal mirroring the ideological standard-bearer *Nowe Drogi*, charged with the transmission of political messages, made it clear that economic theory would also be subjected to the needs and preferences of the regime.

The dramatic turn in the political situation heralded by the establishment of the Kominform, and completed by the merger of the socialist and communist parties, changed the relationship between economists and the regime. Discretion over important decisions was reserved for the Soviet leadership in matters of international policy and the overall direction of development, and left to the Polish communist leaders in most other matters. The margin of freedom of action for other actors, individual or collective, was radically restricted in the period 1949-1955.

²⁷³ They were joined by M. Pohorille and T. Lychowski, the former being from the PWP economists group, and the latter having previous links to the pre-war *Gospodarka Narodowa* circle around Bobrowski.

THE TAMING OF THE CHAIR,
ECONOMICS IN HIGHER EDUCATION 1948-1950

In 1951 the PUWP proclaimed a “breakthrough” on the “science front”, congratulating itself on having put an end to the reign of “bourgeois professors and their legitimisation of the capitalists’ exploitation of the proletariat”.²⁷⁴ The aim of the next two chapters is to investigate how and to what extent the PUWP effected such a “breakthrough”. The reform of training in economics at institutions of higher education will be focussed on first, and in the next chapter I will deal with political attempts to redefine the content of research. When analysing the reform of higher education I shall concentrate on measures aimed at reducing the power of chair-holding professors, and then look in greater detail at the changes introduced in the Main School of Commerce.

From 1948 onwards, the amount of accessible sources relating to higher education increases considerably. While scarcity of documentation has been the main problem so far, from now on the immediate visibility of institutions such as universities, ministries, and party organisations, and the extensive documentation produced by their bureaucracies, poses a methodological challenge. Although most available documents were produced by such institutions, we should not forget less noticeable collectivities, such as the professional and disciplinary communities of economists. Even the one-person institution of the academic chair deserves more attention. At the same time, while the sources from the first post-war years are in many ways scarce and unevenly distributed, there is at least a range of communist, socialist and academic perspectives on the developments of this short period. From 1948 sources tend to give only the official communist version and it becomes

²⁷⁴ This claim was made both in speeches at the First Congress of Polish Science and in internal party documents such as the memo written by Petrusiewicz (AAN/237/XVI-10 p.55) I am here paraphrasing rather than quoting directly.

increasingly difficult to document alternative views and attitudes. Despite a conscious effort to counteract this bias, Party matters will dominate the subsequent chapters in terms of numbers of documents discussed and the length of the narrative. This does not mean that they were more important than the view of individual scholars. However, to create a more balanced narrative I would need many more private sources (letters, diaries) than I have at my disposal.

The primary objective of universities and other institutions of higher education was to provide an institutional framework for the instruction and examination of students. Professors from different disciplines collaborated to ensure funding, and to organise both teaching and the general administration of their academic institutions. However, the other important function of these institutions, research, was seldom a collective enterprise. It was the domain of the professorial chair, the *katedra*, the true foundation of Polish scholarship. Scholarly achievement was judged by peers who were not always members of the same institution. Inasmuch as knowledge creation was concerned, the basic institution was the individual chair, while the disciplinary community provided the framework which took care of communication and evaluation of new knowledge.

Polish professors personified the power of their *Katedry* so strongly that the individual character of their prestige overshadowed the institutional aspects of their Chairs. A common narrative of PUWP dealings with Polish academia focuses on the fate of individual professors, and treats each case as an instance of the political persecution of an individual person. The modification of the institution of the Chair had wide ranging consequences even after the original cohort of professors had been removed from their positions. It affected the distribution of power in academic institutions and changed the role of the professor from that of an absolute monarch to one of a subordinate state official.

Professors had quasi-papal status, deciding what to teach, how to teach and who their successors should be. Once appointed, the chair-holder remained professor even after his death.²⁷⁵ The power of the Chair, however, depended on more than the institutional position of its incumbent, as it was also a function of his scholarly authority. Finally, chair-holding professors inspired the respect upon which the social prestige of academic institutions was based. After the war their prestige was also enhanced by the halo of wartime resistance. The

²⁷⁵ As far as the interwar period is concerned, the most thorough treatment of the discretionary powers and the conditions of professors is to be found in Baranowski, Krzysztof, 1981. *Kadra naukowa z zakresu dyscyplin społecznych w II Rzeczypospolitej* Łódź: Uniwersytet Łódzki.

PUWP was by 1948 in control of the State apparatus, and so changes which could be introduced by decree posed no great difficulty. Many aspects of the discretion of the Chair could indeed be modified by administrative reorganisation. However, the prestige of the professors, and hence their influence, could not be easily done away with, nor transferred to the Party. I shall argue that this made the power of the chair the main obstacle to Party control over science.

By late 1948 communist control of Polish society had left few reaches of society free of the direct presence of Party officials. The academic year of 1949/1950 was the period when the PUWP concentrated on bringing about the transformation of universities and other institutions of higher learning. Extensive reforms were introduced quite suddenly, and in order to implement change the PUWP relied on administrative measures and decrees which were then formalised *ex post* in a new law on universities promulgated in 1951. Without doubt, this was the most dramatic and radical upheaval that Polish academic institutions had ever experienced in peace time. However the elaborate and ambitious nature of the communist leadership's strategies and goals should not deter us from questioning their achievability, since from 1948 onwards, despite building up a bureaucratic machine to control and direct science, the PUWP faced great challenges.

The PUWP's efforts to deal with the power of the Chair will be the main focus of the first part of this chapter. The middle section will be devoted to a preliminary assessment of the centralised and many-layered Party organisation - the structure which aspired to take over the powers wrested from the old professorial caste.²⁷⁶ Finally, to address the question of how relations between the established scholars and the Marxists-Leninists who were imposed on their institutions by the Party evolved in this first and crucial phase, I will look in greater detail at the Main School of Commerce, which in the academic year of 1949/1950 underwent far-reaching changes in its staff and study programmes.

Communist ambitions and goals

Communists considered social sciences, and economics in particular, as an important tool in their efforts to transform society.²⁷⁷ The political economy of socialism was identified by

²⁷⁶ Regrettably research on the Party organisation has not yet thrown up any studies of the Division for Science of the PWUP Central Committee or of its regional, local or institutional agencies. The closest we come is Fijałkowska's study from the 1980s on cultural policies and which also covers the activities of the Division of Science. Fijałkowska, Barbara, 1985. *Polityka i twórcy (1948-1959)*. Warszawa: PWN.

²⁷⁷ While announcements to that effect were common in contemporary political statements in Poland, the focus on social

Party ideologues as the scientific foundation of the economic policy of the regime. The road towards Utopia was to be staked out by Marxist economists, meaning that particular efforts would be made to transform economics into a ‘Marxist-Leninist science’.

*The science of political economy has a particularly strong importance in the socialist system. Under socialist conditions the economy is transformed from the sphere of the activity of blind natural forces into the sphere of conscious, planned human activity. Conscious planned direction over the totality of the national economy multiplies many times the capacities of man to control and utilise the forces of nature.*²⁷⁸


The PUWP sought control over all aspects of scholarship, from the political ideas of the youngest research assistant, the criteria for the evaluation of research, and the choice of problems and the methods to solve them, to the anointment of the coryphées of each discipline through the distribution of state prizes. To put it briefly, they wanted to be everything and do everything in science.

With idealist zeal, a strong sense of legitimacy, and utopian goals, the main assets of the communists in their efforts to incorporate science and higher education into the nascent political and societal order were strong determination and a willingness to carry out harsh and unpopular measures. The principal obstacle was the conservative outlook of Polish academic communities and the virtual absence of self-declared communists among the ranks of professors.

sciences was evident even in the early years of the Soviet regime and continued to dominate the Soviet attitude to the issue after the Second World War. Fitzpatrick, Sheila, 1979. *Education and Social Mobility in the Soviet Union 1921-1934* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Pollock, Ethan, 2006. *Stalin and the Soviet Science Wars* Princeton, N.J. ; Oxford: Princeton University Press.

²⁷⁸ Brus, Włodzimierz & Pohorille, Maksymilian, 1951. *Zarys ekonomii politycznej socjalizmu. Skrypt wykładów.*, 2nd ed. Warszawa: PWN. p.7

Table 3: PUWP membership among staff in higher education institutions ²⁷⁹



The table is constructed on the basis of data gathered by the PUWP, so even if the reliability of the figures were to be questioned, it still gives us a picture of what the Party's leadership knew about the situation. In 1949, only fifty eight out of 708 professors belonged to the PUWP. It is important to note that many PUWP professors had originally started out in the socialist and not the Communist Party. Interestingly, the figures from 1949 show the result of the first round of the PUWP's pro-active staffing policy in academic institutions, and very little headway was made over the subsequent four years. Even at the height of stalinism in Poland, the PUWP's presence in academic spheres remained minimal.

The extent of the professors' influence, and their lack of submission to party discipline, were the reasons why the PUWP concentrated on reducing their power. In December 1949, Education Minister Skrzyszewski identified and explained the main challenge facing his Party: "... I shall not hide from you the fact that at the bottom of this lie political tendencies (...) in the present situation; each professor is the master and commander of his chair and

²⁷⁹ AAN/KC PZPR/237/XVI-12, p.101 „Wzrost kadry naukowej w szkołach wyższych podległych Ministerstwu Szkolnictwa Wyższego z uwzględnieniem przynależności do PZPR w/g danych z grudnia 1949 i z grudnia 1953 r.”

Figures as of December 1949 and December 1953. (Full professor – Assistant professor – Docent – Independent scientific staff member on contract (k.s.p.n) – Adjunct - Assistant)

The document also provides calculations of percentages of PUWP members in each category for 1949 and 1953: Full professors 5.1%-7.5% , while at the same time their total number declines; Assistant professors 11.2% - 13.7%; Docents 2.0%-5.7%; Independent scientific staff on contracts 18.5%-24.2%. The average for all independent scientific staff was calculated at 12.3%-1.0%. The average for ancillary scientific staff (adjunct to assistant) was 7.3% - 12.5%.

I have included the data pertaining to junior researchers (in the statistics called ancillary scientific staff), but these should be interpreted with caution, as many were too young for membership of the Party and were instead members of the Union of Polish Academic Youth and from 1950 the Polish Youth Union (ZMP). Also, note that the category of deputy professor (z-ca prof.) was included in the independent scientific staff category (non-tenured positions).

can do and say whatever takes his fancy (...) ²⁸⁰ The PUWP worked towards its goals through the intermediary of two institutions: the Ministry of Education (from April 1950 the Ministry of Higher Education and Science) and the PUWP party organisation. The Ministry had been operative from 1945, and communist control over its policies had gradually increased, until by 1948 it was fully subordinated to the communist leadership. The PWP and PSP party organisations only had token presences in academic institutions before a PUWP organisation network was established from late 1948 onwards. As for the relations between the Ministry and the Party organisation, there is little evidence of significant conflicts or differences of opinion even during Czesław Wycech's (PPP) time as Minister, and even less after Skrzyszewski's (PWP) return to the ministry. Other than the substitution of the Government by the Politburo as the highest authority, the role of the ministry bureaucracy as such does not seem to have been significantly altered. Ministry bureaucrats continued to implement political decisions regarding higher education and research, meaning that established patterns of interaction and negotiation between the academic institutions and the state may not necessarily have been changed. A novelty in these relations was the establishment of a party organisation which had active local cells at all academic institutions, an issue we shall return to. First, it is important to provide some basic information about the so-called reforms implemented by the Communist regime from 1949, which amounted to the abolition of the teaching of economics at Polish universities.

“Reform” of academic economics

The universities of Łódź and Toruń, and the Lublin Catholic University, were the first to experience the onset of reform. Their chairs in economics were abolished by ministerial decrees in September 1948.²⁸¹ In March 1949, lectures considered politically unsuitable at Poznań University were suddenly cancelled by the Ministry. From the start of the following semester, no new students were admitted to economics. The decree ordaining the closure of the study programme in economics was dated October 1949, which tells us that while decisions about the changes may have been made earlier, they were promulgated at the last

²⁸⁰ AAN/RG-18/III, quoted after Hübner, Piotr, 1992. *Polityka naukowa w Polsce w latach 1944-1953. Geneza systemu*. Wrocław: Ossolineum. pp.490-491 Minister of Education Stanisław Skrzyszewski's speech on 17.12.1949 before the Council of Higher Education and selected guests: politicians, rectors, state prize laureates and representatives of academic societies. **Stanisław Skrzyszewski (1901-1978)** educated at Jagiellon University (1924) member of the Polish Communist Party from 1924, PWP from 1944. Member of CC PUWP 1948-1959, Minister of Education 1944-1945, 1947-1950, Minister of Foreign Affairs 1951-1956. Moldawa, Tadeusz, 1991. *Ludzie władzy, 1944-1991* Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Państwowe PWN.

²⁸¹ Rozporządzenie Ministra Oświaty 27.09.1948 Gazda, Zbigniew, 1988. *Reorientacja polskiej akademickiej myśli ekonomicznej w latach 1945-50*. p.220

moment. Staff and prospective students were informed when the new academic year was already under way. Poznań University's Department of Political and Economic Studies was gradually phased out as students who had enrolled in previous years graduated and left. Modifications were made to their study programmes: for instance, the subject of the political economy of socialism replaced sociology. Parallel measures were implemented at other universities, leaving no masters or doctoral programmes in economics outside Warsaw. In one brisk move an unprecedented centralisation of the discipline was enforced. For the next seven years the study of economics outside Warsaw was restricted to the undergraduate education provided at Economic Colleges (*Wyższe Szkoły Ekonomiczne*).

During debates about the future shape of research and higher education in Poland after the war, the Main School of Commerce also contemplated plans for reform. In 1948/49 a proposal was made under the aegis of the rector, A. Grodek, to divide the school into two departments, one of general economics and the other of the economics of enterprises. The aim was to provide future economists with a broad education, by enabling them to gain a general understanding of economic processes.²⁸² Grodek's plans were not realised. Instead, in the autumn of 1949, the Main School of Commerce was radically reorganised, and inaugurated under a new rector as the Main School of Planning and Statistics. According to Brus, Hilary Minc played a central role in the formulation of the restructuring plans for the Main School, with decisions being made in closed fora, over which no economists with links to the School had any influence.²⁸³

We shall return to the Main School later, to investigate how it fared under its new name. The situation of other centres of economics can be summed up as a state of paralysis, which in

²⁸² Drabińska, Danuta, 1993. *SGPiS w latach forsownych przeobrazen społeczno-gospodarczych Polski 1949-1956*. Warsaw School of Economics. p.375-6

²⁸³ AAN/ KC PZPR 237/XVI/27 pp. 2-3 Projekt uchwały Biura Politycznego Polskiej Zjednoczonej Partii Robotniczej o upanastwieniu S.G.H. i zmianie na Szkole Głównej Planowania i Statystyki.

Dz.U. 1949 nr.48 poz.368: Dekret z dnia 16 sierpnia 1949 r. o przekształceniu Szkoły Głównej Handlowej w Warszawie na Szkołę Główną Planowania i Statystyki w Warszawie.

Documents relating to the nationalisation and transformation of the Main School of Commerce in Warsaw suggest that the decision was prepared by the Central Committee apparatus and sanctioned by the Politburo, then passed by the Government. It seems that the group of Marxist-Leninist economists (especially trained in Moscow for the task of taking control over the Main School) witnessed some of the process behind the reform, but had only marginal influence. According to information supplied by W. Brus during an interview I conducted with him in 2001, the only evidence of their influence was the suggestion by Wyrozembski that the first part of the name, 'Main School' should be kept on account of tradition. It is possible some other members of this group played a more active part than Brus, but no available evidence supports that. We also need to consider the timing, as the designation of that group and their stay in Moscow took place only a few weeks before the transformation of the Main School. To my knowledge, none of them had held prominent positions in the decision-making organs of the PUWP. A.W. Haugstad interview with Włodzimierz Brus, Oxford 2001

time would lead to atrophy. A few professors remained, but subsisted in marginal subject areas, isolated from students and publication opportunities.

The decision by the central PUDP leadership to close down 'bourgeois' economics at universities and to start building up Marxist-Leninist economics at the Main School represented only a fraction of the changes introduced at academic institutions during this period. It may seem a little beside the point to devote time to the evolution of the discretionary powers of Chairs, now that no influential chair-holder were allowed to continue teaching and research, but Chairs did continue to exist, both at the Main School and in the universities. We should not content ourselves with simply stating that they lost their influence; we should also try to find out how this happened.

The power of the Chair

Ever since Polish universities had in the nineteenth century adopted a form influenced by Austrian universities, a university chair had been the basic unit. Only chair-holding professors had a vote in the department council and university senate, and they were therefore the masters of the institution. Assistants and adjuncts were ranked beneath the professors, their *de facto* employers, and were subordinated to their authority.²⁸⁴ The professors also reinforced each others' influence through cohesive social bonds and shared cultural norms, as demonstrated by J. Connelly in his discussion on the importance of the academic "milieu" (*środowisko*).²⁸⁵ The power of the chair consisted of several elements. It was a position for life and hence not subject to any sanctions. This guaranteed the individual professors' discretion over the choice of topics and methods of research, as well as over the content of lectures and study programmes. As a result of their evaluation of student work, individual professors also exerted control over the academic standards demanded, and through their employment of assistants they influenced academic recruitment. Finally, professors evaluated the scientific output of their students and peers. Reputation control was concentrated in the hands of academic department councils, made up of professors. Before the war ministerial approval had been a formality, and even when, exceptionally, conflict arose, the power of the Ministry had been negative: it could only deny a chair for political reasons, without

²⁸⁴ Baranowski, Krzysztof, 1981. *Kadra naukowa z zakresu dyscyplin społecznych w II Rzeczypospolitej* Łódź: Uniwersytet Łódzki.

²⁸⁵ See Chapter 9 "The Meaning of Milieu" in Connelly, John, 2000. *Captive University: the Sovietization of East German, Czech, and Polish higher education, 1945-1956* Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

questioning the scientific competence of the candidate.²⁸⁶ Generally, the right to identify qualified candidates for university Chairs had been firmly in the hands of professors.

The communist challenge to the power of the Chair targeted three central aspects of professorial power: firstly, the admission of candidates to the rank of professor; secondly, decisions about teaching and research; and thirdly, the evaluation of students' performance, and recruitment to junior research positions.

To consider these problems only as a struggle for power would be to neglect their far-reaching consequences for knowledge production. The result of a controversy over a promotion or the content of a lecture series was more than a gain or loss of power for a given individual or group, and the outcome had a direct effect on the criteria for excellence and relevance in the discipline, and on the kind of knowledge about economic processes that would be generated by scholars.

Deciding who was to sit in the Chair

The indignant impatience with professorial independence that is apparent in the quote from Strzeszewski's speech was voiced publicly only after the decisive political battles (between the PPP and the PSP, and the 'rightist-nationalist deviation') had been won and the communist reform process had been launched. Previously, in the years between 1945 and 1948, communist rhetoric on the professoriate had been more cautious, and moves made in these years had been much less conspicuous. A purge of the professoriate, or a radical restriction on the discretion of the Chair, would have been seen as a declaration of war, and thus not easily undertaken before the communists had strengthened their general position.

During this first phase, the PWP implemented measures which aimed to include new scholars sympathetic to the regime among chair-holders. The Ministry could propose its own candidates for academic posts, while the President of the Republic was granted the right to appoint professors for two years, and was only required to hear the opinion of the relevant faculty council.²⁸⁷ Shortcuts in academic career paths were created, as a presidential decree even made it possible for candidates without a habilitation to be appointed to a professorship.

²⁸⁶ See Chapter 1 of Baranowski, Krzysztof, 1981. *Kadra naukowa z zakresu dyscyplin społecznych w II Rzeczypospolitej* Łódź: Uniwersytet Łódzki. Jacewski, Bohdan, 1978. *Polityka naukowa państwa polskiego w latach 1918-1939* Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich Wydawnictwo PAN.

²⁸⁷ Decree dated 16.11.1945 „O zmianie przepisów dotyczących szkół akademickich i stosunku służbowego profesorów i pomocniczych sił naukowych tych szkół.” Hübner, Piotr, 1992. *Polityka naukowa w Polsce w latach 1944-1953. Geneza systemu*. Wrocław: Ossolineum. p.146-148

Further decrees were passed to make it possible to appoint individuals lacking formal scientific qualifications. The use of academic titles, such as that of ‘contracted professor’ and ‘deputy professor’, which did not require the same qualifications as ‘full’ professors, became increasingly frequent.²⁸⁸ Flexibility was invoked in support of another element of this decree, which also targeted the established professors, namely the President’s right to move professors from one institution to another. This measure was to become immensely unpopular, forcing whole families to move or to endure long-distance commuting at a time when public transport and infrastructure was still only slowly recovering after the war.²⁸⁹

These measures affected the power of the Chair in several ways. Firstly, the independence of the chair-holder from political pressures was undermined, both by the abolition of immunity from personal consequences arising from controversial opinions, and through the introduction of professors who owed their promotion to Party or Ministry patrons. The professors’ control over the selection of new chair-holders and over the definition and assertion of required qualifications was also diminished. Political merit could now replace the scientific qualifications recognised by the established academic hierarchy.

Having made the introduction of Party-loyal scholars into academic institution possible, the PUWP started looking more closely at the established academic staff. In general, it used three categories when evaluating the attitudes of professors and junior scholars towards the regime: unredeemable reactionaries; neutral but reliable, or progressive fellow travellers; and true Marxist-Leninists. There were many shades within this scale, and differentiation of the hues of the political auras listed here was a major preoccupation.

Some professors of the older generation, like A. Krzyżanowski and Taylor, had throughout long careers expressed opinions that could in no way be reconciled with a Communist regime. They felt the pressure bearing down upon them as soon as the Communist regime had stabilised its power base. In their cases, the opportunities for deals or reconciliation with the regime were not only precluded by divergence of opinion and avoidance of situations which would demand compromises with the scholars’ beliefs, but also by the fact that the logic of

²⁸⁸ Ibid. p.147-148 While they are commonly seen as a communist invention, both deputy and contracted professors existed already before the Second World War in Poland. Baranowski writes that deputy professors were appointed for the period of one year in cases when no applicants with habilitation presented themselves. Deputy professors did not participate in faculty councils or senates and were at some universities not allowed to supervise doctoral theses. They were expected to habilitate as soon as possible but there were cases of scholar employed as deputy professors for several consecutive years. The category of contracted professor was used for temporary employment of foreigners. Baranowski, Krzysztof, 1981. *Kadra naukowa z zakresu dyscyplin społecznych w II Rzeczypospolitej Łódź*: Uniwersytet Łódzki. pp.187-8

²⁸⁹ On professor forced to commute, see Connelly, John, 2000. *Captive University: the Sovietization of East German, Czech, and Polish higher education, 1945-1956* Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. p.137

the regime's militaristic propaganda rhetoric demanded results. Toppling obscure docents was not enough: illustrious heads had to roll. It seemed that at least one major economics figure in each academic centre was pilloried by the PUWP as an unredeemable sinner, an enemy who had to be excluded. These included Professor Wincenty Styś in Wrocław, Edward Taylor in Poznań, Adam Krzyżanowski in Kraków, Waclaw Fabierkiewicz in Łódź, and Stefan Zaleski in Warsaw. Their lectures were cancelled, they were banned from teaching, and then moved to other departments or even institutions, or forced to retire.

From 1949-1950 the PUWP undertook "verification", a comprehensive check-up on the political affiliations of academic staff.²⁹⁰ Everyone, from professors to assistants, was subjected to scrutiny of their past careers, family background and political sympathies. A verification of the political stance of junior staff was prepared and carried out locally, whereas the verification of professors was directed by the PUWP and implemented by the Ministry of Education.²⁹¹

I have not come upon any sources suggesting that economists were victims of political murder after Katyń. Several economists were imprisoned, but from the available information it is not possible to establish whether their scholarly activities were the reasons behind their arrests.²⁹² For the most part, repressive measures were relatively mild, and their degree depended on one's classification within the three categories. Scholars regarded as reactionary risked the

²⁹⁰At the meeting of rectors and deputy rectors in February 1950, Krassowska called for more vigorous 'verification' measures.

Fik, Marta, 1989. *Kultura polska po Jalcie. Kronika lat 1944-1981*. London: Polonia. pp.133-134.

²⁹¹ There is uncertainty concerning where exactly the decisions were taken. While Suleja uses the term 'centrally', which would imply the Central Committee Science Division or the Politburo, according to Drabińska decisions regarding Main School staff were made in the Warsaw Regional Committee. Drabińska refers to information obtained in an interview with Z. Morecka. However, Morecka was at that time pursuing her studies in Moscow and it is therefore difficult to evaluate the reliability of that information. I have found traces of Regional Committee activity gathering opinions about Professor Grodek, which could have been used in the verification process, but I would place my bet on Suleja's version, with decisions about Chairs being taken above Regional Committee level. APMW/KU SGPiS 214/III-1 (1949-50) Protokół of meeting on 11.1.50, Suleja, Teresa, 1995. *Uniwersytet Wrocławski w okresie centralizmu stalinowskiego, 1950-1955*. Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego. Drabińska, Danuta, 1993. SGPiS w latach forsownych przeobrazen społeczno-gospodarczych Polski 1949-1956. Warsaw School of Economics. p. 127 Bauer, Romuald (ed.) (2004) *Księga SGH. Pracownicy i absolwenci - kto jest kim?*, Warszawa: Dom Wydawniczy Elipsa.

²⁹² The first victim of Soviet repression among Polish economists was Kraków docent Janusz Libicki, who was killed during the Katyń massacre. After the war, the nature of the repressive system was such that often even the victims and their families were unable to say why they were arrested. This is the case both for W. Hagemeyer, who according to information provided by his son Krzysztof Hagemeyer was arrested in 1949/1950 and detained without charge for about a year and a half, and for Prof. Aleksy Wakar. The latter came to Poland in the early 1920s, so was treated as a 'white' Russian immigrant, not a Polish citizen. He was arrested on the street in August 1952, handed over to the NKVD, and then spent three years in the Gulag. ASGH/ Aleksy Wakar personal file
Other economists and employees of the Main School who were arrested included: Warsaw University Prof. Stanisław Gorzuchowski (geography), who died in prison, and lecturers Aleksander Grużewski, Wiesław Chrzanowski, Kazimierz Studentowicz, Tadeusz Przeciszewski, Zbigniew Heidrich and Józef Zagórski. "Jubilatka. Zbliża się 100-lecie SGH" <http://www.sgh.waw.pl/ogolnouczeni/100lat/Jubilatka> accessed 26.08.2005 Drewnowski mentions also Andrzej Swiecki, and Antoni Wilder 1998. *Walka o Losy Centralnego Urzedu Planowania. Konferencja Historyczna PTE*. Warszawa: Polskie Towarzystwo Ekonomiczne.

loss of their jobs. Bans on teaching and transfers to Chairs considered less important by the PUWP were used to discipline ‘progressive’ scholars who either showed too much independence or were not considered trustworthy for other reasons. Marxist-Leninist scholars were on occasion expected to perform self-criticisms (*samokrytyka*) and demonstrate their readiness to follow the Party line in publishing texts such as eulogies of Stalin. From what I have come across in my studies of economists, the highest form of punishment for them was expulsion from the Party and the subsequent loss of the right to use the appellation Marxist-Leninist.²⁹³

The individual hardships of professors who experienced different forms of pressure or repression have already been dealt with in biographies and collections of students’ and professors’ reminiscences, where the focus is often on the identification of the victims of repression.²⁹⁴ At the Main School, for instance, Drabińska reports that four people lost their jobs.²⁹⁵ Lately, attention has shifted towards a discussion of the severity of the Polish purge of scientific institutions. Connelly has argued, based on a solid comparative study, that the case of the Polish professors is an illustration not only of the limits of the PUWP’s revolutionary zeal in the sphere of culture, but also of its ability to implement radical change. Furthermore, the Polish case, when compared with other countries in the Soviet sphere of influence, can be characterised as a “mild” purge.²⁹⁶ No doubt the study of the frustrating and sometimes traumatic individual experiences of Polish scholars is important. However, if we perceive what happened exclusively as repression of individuals, we will miss how these measures targeted not simply individuals but the institution of the chair which provided professors with

²⁹³ Jan Drewnowski, once a central personality in the CPB and in diverse science policy organs, was expelled from the Party in 1950. The loss of his position as director of the part-time study programme at the Main School and that of professor at the Łódź Economic College (WSE) left him with the very low basic salary of a professor, without the additional incomes from teaching. Odd lectures at the Technical University of Warsaw (Politechnika) and translations were the only extra sources of income he could find until the onset of the Thaw. Drewnowski, Jan, 1990. "Autobiografia naukowa". *Kwartalnik Historii Nauki i Techniki*, 35, 451-489. A revised edition is posted on <http://www.pte.pl>, accessed 18.12.2007. p.20

p.18

²⁹⁴ We should also be aware that nowadays this tendency is further exacerbated by the propensity of former students to elevate “their” professors to the prestigious category of political martyrs of the Communist regime. Knakiewicz, Zenobia (ed.) (1997) *Byli wśród nas. Wspomnienia i biogramy. 70 lat Akademii Ekonomicznej w Poznaniu, 1926-1996.*, Poznań: Akademia Ekonomiczna w Poznaniu., Urban, Stanisław, 1986. *Z Husowa po berla rektorskie : Wincenty Styś--człowiek, uczonec, działacz społeczny* Warszawa: Ludowa Spółdzielnia Wydawnicza., Strużycki, Marian & Kamiński, Marek B. (eds.) (2004) *Leon Koźmiński. Patron Wyższej Szkoły Przedsiębiorstwa i Zarządzania.*, Warszawa: Wyższa Szkoła Przedsiębiorczości i Zarządzania im L. Koźmińskiego. and others.

²⁹⁵ Professor J. Loth’s economic geography chair was disbanded, and the lectures of J. Makowski (international law) cancelled. Two lecturers without tenure lost their jobs: Prof. E. Dąbrowski and deputy professor S. Janczewski (who had lectured on the now obsolete topic of shares). Drabińska, Danuta, 1993. *SGPiS w latach forsownych przeobrazen społeczno-gospodarczych Polski 1949-1956.* Warsaw School of Economics. p.135

²⁹⁶ Connelly, John, 2000. *Captive University: the Sovietization of East German, Czech, and Polish higher education, 1945-1956* Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

control over their disciplines. There were no massive and spectacular dismissals of professors; what took place was rather a radical circumscription of their powers.

From gilded throne to crowded bench: ‘collective chairs’

Returning to the December 1949 speech, we see that Minister Skrzyszewski went beyond identifying professorial independence as a political problem. Addressing the issue of the limited number of Party members in academic institutions, and using the militaristic idiom favoured by the communists, he claimed:

“...since we have a limited number of such chairs and such people, it is necessary to deploy these people in an appropriate manner: it is necessary to conquer the decisive posts, the strategic posts in our science, and it is to that end that the collectives and institutes will work.”²⁹⁷

By “the decisive posts, the strategic posts” Skrzyszewski meant professorial chairs. The positions of rectors and deans had been “conquered” three months before this speech was given, and the difficulty of having rectors and their teams oversee and control the work of all the professors was already becoming apparent.²⁹⁸ The ‘collectives and institutes’ referred to measures devised to further erode the power of the Chair: firstly the merger of several chairs into a ‘collective chair’, and secondly the subordination of chairs (both single and collective) under the direction of a larger formation – the institute. The collective chair was seen as an intermediary step towards the organisation of all chairs into institutes, a final step which had to wait until all academic chairs were under PUWP control.

Czesław Nowiński,²⁹⁹ rector of the Main School of Planning and Statistics, enthused over these reforms as follows:

²⁹⁷ AAN/RG-18/III quoted by Hübner, Piotr, 1992. *Polityka naukowa w Polsce w latach 1944-1953. Geneza systemu*. Wrocław: Ossolineum.p.490-49.1 Minister of Education Stanisław Skrzyszewski’s speech on 17.12.1949

²⁹⁸ We shall return to this in more detail towards the end of this chapter.

²⁹⁹ **Czesław Nowiński (1907-1981)** completed a doctorate in law at Wilno University in 1934, joined the PWP in 1946 when he also was appointed Vice-minister of Trade and Approvisation. Was the first rector of the Main School appointed, not elected, in 1949. Continued in the post until 1952. Drabińska, Danuta, 1993. *SGPiS w latach forsownych przeobrazen społeczno-gospodarczych Polski 1949-1956*. Warsaw School of Economics. pp.367-370

“Comrades, I can inform you that we are this year moving forward far more boldly than even I previously imagined. Thanks to the resolute intervention of the Ministry and of comrade Pawłowski among others, we are moving towards the formation of collective chairs. [... here he lists collective chairs planned for the Main School – AWH...]. Such chairs are emerging, headed by chair-directors with much greater competences than those of the previous leadership of the chair groups (zespoły).”³⁰⁰

Nowiński made explicit the aim of the measure: the installation of ‘collective chair directors’ directly above the professors, with mandates to make day-to-day decisions about teaching, research, the selection of assistants and other such matters. Collective chairs were particularly useful in situations where it was not easy to remove the established professor and replace them with candidates who were politically more suitable but academically less qualified. Such was the case with Edward Lipiński, holder of the chair of political economy at the Main School of Commerce (now the Main School of Planning and Statistics). Lipiński’s activity as Chief Editor of *Ekonomista*, and his public interventions in favour of a version of Marxism that did not fit with the prevailing Party line, made him enemies. However, due to his track record of socialism and wartime resistance, as well his involvement in a web of former students stretching across the Party (of which he was also member), he was difficult to remove outright. Drabińska suggests that Lipiński was allowed to continue at the Main School because he was supervising the doctoral theses of PUWP economists.³⁰¹ The solution chosen was to ban him from teaching and move him into a collective chair of which not he but his doctoral student Włodzimierz Brus was made director.³⁰² What qualified Brus to become his academic supervisor’s superior was the fact that he had studied political economy in the Soviet Union during the War, and had worked as editor of the economic section of the communist ideological journal *Nowe Drogi*. Analogous situations also existed elsewhere, for instance with the collective chair of Planning. There, Drewnowski, who held the title of ‘extraordinary professor’, was superseded by Bronisław Minc, who was merely a “deputy professor”, but who was regarded as being far more reliable politically.³⁰³

³⁰⁰ AAN/KC PZPR 237/XVI/109 *Wydział Nauki i Szkolnictwa Wyższego* “Referat tow. Nowińskiego na zebraniu partyjnej organizacji profesorów SGPS z dn. 25.IX 50 (skrócony stenogram)” p.19

³⁰¹ Lipiński supervised the doctorates of W. Brus, B. Minc, Z. Wyrozebski, M. Pohorille and J. Zawadzki, all of whom we shall be hearing more of, as they constituted the lion’s share of the group of PUWP economists sent by the Party to reform the Main School in 1949. Drabińska, Danuta, 1993. *SGPiS w latach forsownych przeobrazen społeczno-gospodarczych Polski 1949-1956*. Warsaw School of Economics. s.142 (based on information provided by Irena Kostrowicka)

³⁰² *Skład osobowy i spis wykładów, SGPiS 1950/51*. SGPiS, Warszawa 1950

W.Brus was “z-ca prof., mgr.”, meaning he was appointed to the makeshift post of deputy professor before he obtained his doctorate in 1951. Edward Lipiński was “profesor zwyczajny” – full professor.

³⁰³ He was however the younger brother of Hilary Minc – the Minister of Industry, then chairman of the Planning

What was the status of a professor within a collective chair? He no longer decided on lectures, or even about his own research. Planning was introduced, so that both teaching and research were now to be conducted according to plans drafted at the Planning Commission, far above the heads of the ‘collectivised’ professors. The new directors of collective chairs held considerably less power over their own teaching and research, and that of their ‘employees’, than single chairholders had held only a few months earlier.

Decisions about teaching

The traditional institution of habilitation included a public lecture and defence which, once approved by the academic establishment, resulted in the ‘*veniam legendi*’ or ‘right to lecture’. An unalienable aspect of this right was discretion over the content of the lecture. After 1945, Polish professors encountered a gradual increase in political pressure that aimed to restrict the exercise of this right when the topic of the lecture turned to new political taboos such as Polish–Soviet relations. In 1947, following heavy criticism of the political perspective in his lectures on colonial policies, Jerzy Loth, a professor of economic geography, felt obliged to redesign his course, and turned to the subjects of natural resources and industry in the USSR. Despite his willingness to adapt, his lectures were cancelled and his Chair abolished in 1949.³⁰⁴ In Poznań, Edward Taylor later related the cancellation of his lectures thus:

*With the decree of March 12th 1949, Nr. IV SH-3287/49, the Minister of Education pronounced the lectures in economic subjects in Sections I, II and III to be non-compulsory, and not part of the exams to be taken at the end of 1948/49 “due to the non-adjustment of the content of lectures on political economy to the Polish planned economy”. ...*³⁰⁵

A ban on teaching was widely applied from 1949. In fact, the PUWP leadership decided to cancel all lectures in subjects related to political economy, save those which received approval from the central authorities. It is important to remember that in the summer of 1948, before the merger of the communist and socialist parties, the conflict between the ‘national road to socialism’ and ‘stalinist’ factions had radically restricted the room for ideological manoeuvre for party members. Although ‘eclectic’ and creative efforts (especially those of socialists) had been accepted up to this point, from the autumn of 1948 strict adherence to the

Commission and the absolute number one person in Poland as far as economic policy was concerned at the time.

³⁰⁴ Drabińska, Danuta, 1993. SGPiS w latach forsownych przeobrazen społeczno-gospodarczych Polski 1949-1956. Warsaw School of Economics. P.129

³⁰⁵ Biuletyn ze Zjazdu Koleżeńskiego i Sesji Naukowe Ekonomistów Absolwentów UAM, Poznan 1960, Edward Taylor’s testimony p.18 quoted after Gazda, Zbigniew, 1988. Reorientacja polskiej akademickiej myśli ekonomicznej w latach 1945-50.

Party line was demanded. As the consequences of deviation from the narrow path of orthodoxy were demonstrated in the political show trials of the time, so the principle of ‘better safe than sorry’ came to be applied in that area of economics that was considered to be an integral part of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine – political economy. The director of the Central Committee Science Division, biologist Kazimierz Petruszewicz, reported to his superiors in 1951:

The overwhelming majority of lectures in political economy that had been given in a totally false manner were cancelled, and the right to teach this subject was granted by the Ministry only to those persons who could guarantee a Marxist perspective. Hence, lectures in political economy were held only in a few higher-level schools. In the current academic year a revolutionary breakthrough has been achieved on this front. In all academic schools the following ideological subjects have been introduced on the basis of a permanent programme for the first year and a temporary programme for later years: the foundations of Marxism-Leninism and political economy.³⁰⁶

Petruszewicz further stated that since all students had to attend these courses, lecturers in these subjects would now become the most numerous group of teachers in higher education. This offered a possible solution to the problem of the low proportion of PUWP members among academic staff. For the time being, Petruszewicz had to concede that a majority of those who lectured on the ‘Foundations of Marxism-Leninism’ were not employed in academic institutions but in the Party apparatus, the press, the state administration and suchlike institutions. Lecturers in political economy on the other hand, were mainly employed in academic institutions, and although they had received a crash course in Marxism-Leninism arranged by the Ministry in Otwock, few among them were PUWP members.

The category of ‘persons who guaranteed a Marxist perspective’ as defined by the PUWP Central Committee, did not simply exclude obvious ‘reactionaries’ such as Taylor or potential ‘progressives’ such as Styś. Many PUWP members were deemed unworthy of involvement with the subject. E. Lipiński, professor of political economy at the Main School since before the war, was banned from teaching in 1949, and only after 1952 was he allowed to teach the history of economic thought. While it is possible to explain this individual case with reference to Lipiński’s outspokenness and frequent critiques of official party policies, even politically docile scholars, like Oskar Lange, found themselves barred from teaching political economy.

³⁰⁶ AAN/KC PZPR/237/XVI-10 p.1-3 “Notatka dla Sekretariatu KC w sprawie nauczania przedmiotów ideologicznych w szkołach wyższych” According to the archive’s description of the folder, this material dated from 1951.

It would seem that their socialist past disqualified them from being proper Marxists-Leninists. The PUWP leadership chose not to make use of the well-qualified and experienced group of economists in academic positions, since these were of PSP and not of PWP extraction. Instead the PUWP preferred to establish their own presumably more loyal and orthodox cadres. In the summer of 1949, as the result of a Politburo decision, a group of PUWP economists was sent to Moscow for two months, to study at the Plechanov Institute. This group was to become the ‘marxist spearhead’ at the Main School of Commerce.³⁰⁷

Political economy was endowed with an exalted status by PUWP rhetoric, and it was soon to become an obligatory subject for all students in higher education and, in conjunction with the subject “The Foundations of Marxism-Leninism”, the ideological core of academic teaching. Preparations for the creation of the new academic subject of political economy only started in 1949. In formal terms, it was the Ministry of Education which supervised work on the new national curriculum and study programme in political economy. In practice, the task was delegated to those PUWP economists who had been sent to Moscow for two months to acquaint themselves with Soviet political economy. W. Brus and M. Pohorille used the information and experience they had gathered in Moscow to work out a programme for teaching the political economy of socialism at university level.³⁰⁸ Sanctioned by the Ministry, this programme was very explicit, and provided a detailed outline for the entire lecture series in political economy. The introductory lecture, entitled “The subject of political economy”, was scheduled to be presented over a four-hour period. The lecturer was obliged to present the following issues:

The subject of political economy. The production of goods - the basis of human society. The forces of production and the relations of production. The modes of production. Class and the class struggle.

Five basic types of relations of production. Transition from one type to the next by way of revolution. Political economy - a historical science.

³⁰⁷ According to information provided by W. Brus, besides himself the group included Kazimierz Owoc, Ludwik Pawłowski, Maksymilian Pohorille, Józef Zawadzki, Seweryn Żurawicki, and Zygmunt Jan Wyroczemski. A.W. Haugstad interview with Włodzimierz Brus, Oxford 2001

³⁰⁸ ASGH/ Włodzimierz Brus personal file /12.11.1952 “Autorecenzja niektórych prac” manuscript, signed by W. Brus „Według potrzeb. Z prof. Maksymilianem Pohorille rozmawia Jacek Poprzeczko” *Polityka* issue 27, 6.07.1985
Maksymilian Pohorille (1915-) before the war leftist youth activist, spent the war in the Soviet Union, taught economics at Szczecin Economic College (AH).

Political economy as the economic explanation of laws governing the development of social production from lower to higher levels. Political economy as the economic explanation of the necessity of a socialist revolution and the dictatorship of the working class. Communism as the highest and most progressive mode of production compared to all the preceding modes.

Dialectical and historical materialism and political economy.

*The methodology of political economy. Unity and difference in production, distribution, exchange and consumption. The primacy of production. The historical character of the laws of political economy.*³⁰⁹

Centralisation of control over curricula and teaching programmes was a measure already recommended by Lenin as a way of using the services of ‘non-Marxist’ lecturers, and ensuring that they taught in an ideologically correct manner.³¹⁰ The programme detailed each lecture sequence for the ninety hours of the course. Combined with a standardised curriculum, it left little freedom for lecturers in their presentation of the material. With this programme at hand, even the least knowledgeable local party official could verify that what was being taught conformed with the wishes of the authorities. The effort to ensure a centrally-controlled and uniform transmission of the Marxist-Leninist credo did not end there. Over the next academic year (1949/1950), Brus and Pohorille applied their material in lectures at the Main School, and the manuscripts from these lectures were published in the form of a textbook on the political economy of socialism.³¹¹ Revised teaching material was needed, not only for this subject area but also for several others, such as national economic planning and specialised branches of economics, and the expedient of publishing manuscripts of lectures was adopted there too. Evidence from the Main School shows that heavy workloads, temporary solutions and much haste were the order of the day, and that measures to ensure the quality of the work were planned but not always realised. For instance, the principle that lecture-notes should be reviewed and edited before they were published had to be abandoned, as reliable reviewers could not find time for it. The local Party cell (the Basic Party Organisation) at the Main School tried to limit the amount of potential political and

³⁰⁹ AAN/MSzW/1668/pp.3-32 Organizacja toku studiów uniwersyteckich w roku akademickim 1950/51. Ekonomia. Program wykładów.

³¹⁰ S. Fitzpatrick, after M. N. Pokrovsky, ‘What Lenin was for our higher school’ Pravda, 27.01.1924 Fitzpatrick, Sheila, 1979. *Education and Social Mobility in the Soviet Union 1921-1934* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p.69

³¹¹ The textbook in political economy co-authored by Brus and Pohorille appeared before the Soviet textbook in this subject, which had been delayed again and again because of changes in official views on political economy. Brus, Włodzimierz & Pohorille, Maksymilian, 1951. *Zarys ekonomii politycznej socjalizmu. Skrypt wykładów.*, 2nd ed. Warszawa: PWN. On the difficulties of publishing a Soviet textbook on political economy, see Pollock, Ethan, 2006. *Stalin and the Soviet Science Wars* Princeton, N.J. ; Oxford: Princeton University Press.

ideological misconceptions by making one trusted comrade read all the manuscripts.³¹² These published lecture-manuscripts later served as the basis for national textbooks.

Attending courses in Marxism was made obligatory for all academic teachers, from assistants to professors.³¹³ One assistant reported that in 1948/49 she attended a course in Marxism for assistants from the Main School and then in 1949/50 a course organised by the Ministry of Education for professors and assistants.³¹⁴ Two documents prepared by the Central Committee Science Division in concert with the Institute for Training of Scientific Cadres entitled “A list of the topics of which knowledge is required by assistants” and “Reading list, obligatory for assistants”, give some idea of the content of these courses. The list of topics was more or less a copy of the table of contents of the *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Bolsheviks: Short Course*, to which had been added topics from the history of the Polish communist movement. The list of obligatory literature contained 58 items, starting with the works of Marx, passing through a long list of texts by Stalin, and ending with speeches and articles by Polish communist leaders.³¹⁵

To sum up, the professors’ control over teaching was undermined by the PUWP from 1948/1949 onwards. Since the Party organisation had only limited human resources at its disposal, however, some discretion over the transmission of knowledge was retained by professors. The degree of Party control depended on the ideological relevance of the subject at hand. A greater amount of attention and resources was given to the subject of the political economy of socialism, while improvisation and confusion, as well as a dearth of lecturers, meant that PUWP officials tolerated the fact that lecturers considered to be lacking in Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy could have contact with students during classes devoted to less ‘ideological’ topics. This loophole was in some cases used by professors to uphold their independence. For instance, students later reported that Edward Lipiński’s lectures on the history of economic thought, and Leon Koźmiński’s lectures on the ‘techniques of trade’, allowed these teachers to initiate small, trusted groups of advanced students and assistants into the realms of ideas,

³¹² AAN/KC PZPR 237/XVI/109 *Wydział Nauki i Szkolnictwa Wyższego SGPiS*, Pp.3-5 Letter from Executive Committee of the Basic Party Organisation of the Main School of Planning and Statistics to the PUWP CC Science Division, 18.12.1950. Signed Romana Zawadzka, (1st Secretary of the Executive Committee BOP PUWP).

³¹³ The task of organising ideological education was first given to the Polish Youth Union (ZMP) and later to the trade unions. Suleja, Teresa, 1995. *Uniwersytet Wrocławski w okresie centralizmu stalinowskiego, 1950-1955*. Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego.

³¹⁴ AUW/K1228/personal file of Mgr. Helena Tatar -Zagórska-Hagemejer: *Życiorys* (CV) dated 1.10.1950 The course organised by the Ministry was held at Otwock, and Soviet economists were brought in to lecture. AAN/KC PZPR/237/XVI-10 p.1-3 “Notatka dla Sekretariatu KC w sprawie nauczania przedmiotów ideologicznych w szkołach wyższych” According to the archive’s description of the folder, this material was from 1951.

³¹⁵ AAN/KC PZPR/237/XVI-10 p.46-49, folder dated 1951.

approaches and methods that could not be included in closely-monitored lectures on the political economy of socialism.³¹⁶ Control over teaching had been one of the mandates that made up the total power of the chair. In practice, professors did retain some influence over teaching. However, the chair's sovereign authority over this area was abolished the moment that the Ministry started issuing decrees that interfered with the competence of individual chairs to determine the availability and content of particular lectures.

Recruitment

Another element of the power of the chair was the professors' customary right to choose their assistants. Although such appointments were theoretically subject to approval by collegiate authorities, in fact professors were reluctant to interfere in each others' business. For young scholars an assistantship was a means of supporting themselves while working on a thesis, of keeping in touch with the discipline, and of establishing a special relationship with a patron-professor. For professors, assistantships offered a way of preparing and influencing succession to their chair.

As young people are generally open to change and radical ideas, the communist leaders naturally enough placed their hopes on students. The PUWP also devoted much attention to junior scientific staff, and one source was explicit about their influence on younger students:

*The existence of ancillary scientific staff (...) has always been an important factor affecting the formation of a student's political, social and scientific opinions. The role of ancillary scientific staff increases strongly as new forms of students' work organisations, based on Soviet patterns, are introduced.*³¹⁷

Seen in this light, the low share of party members among junior research staff apparent in Table 3 (page 105) was a challenge to the PUWP and its aim of educating students in a strictly Marxist-Leninist world-view.

³¹⁶ Helena T-Z-Hagemejer's intervention at the Second Convention of Economists in June 1956

³¹⁷ AAN/KC PZPR/237/XVI-100, pp.53-55 Proposal for the recruitment of ancillary scientific staff prepared by the Inter-institutional Council of Academic Schools, attached to a letter from J. Noskówna (Warsaw RC Propaganda division) to Petruszewicz (director of CC Science Division) dated 21.2.1950. "For consideration and possibly application".

Table 4: Overview of junior scientific staff's political affiliations in late 1949.³¹⁸

National total of junior staff (asst - adjunct)	2665	100%
- of them PUWP members	195	7.3%
Number of assistants in 7 Warsaw schools	1187	100%
Total of affiliated assistants in Warsaw, thereof:	133	11.2%
- PUWP members	70	5.9%
- Members of the Union of Polish Academic Youth	63	5.3%

The percentage of affiliated junior researchers was 7.3% in December 1949 and reached 12.5% in 1953. While these figures did not include membership of the Union of Polish Academic Youth (ZAMP) controlled by the PUWP, there is a document which provides a clue as to the portion of students affiliated with the PUWP through the ZAMP.³¹⁹ The figures cited there are based upon an investigation into seven academic schools in Warsaw in 1949/1950, and show that only 11.5% of junior staff had the desired political affiliation.³²⁰ This low figure is at odds with the presumed greater propensity of younger people to become involved in radical political programmes such as Marxism. It is only 0.3% higher than that for assistant professors, and much lower than that for junior researchers (the 'independent scientific staff on contracts'), the juniors staff members' immediate elders in the academic hierarchy. The best explanation for the conservative outlook of assistants and adjuncts is the fact that they were recruited by professors. Also, in terms of their backgrounds, junior staff did not conform to the PUWP's stated aims of including more children of peasants and workers in higher education and research. Professors naturally preferred the well-read students with an intelligentsia background to peasants' and workers' children fresh from special preparatory courses designed to deal with their lack of secondary education.³²¹

The first breach in the professors' control over the recruitment of junior staff had already been made in 1945, when a decree gave the Ministry of Education the right to appoint assistants.

³¹⁸ National figures based on AAN/KC PZPR/237/XVI-12, p.101

Warsaw figures based on AAN/KC PZPR/237/XVI-100, pp.53-55

³¹⁹ The Union of Polish Academic Youth (Związek Akademicki Młodzieży Polskiej) was created in 1948. Between 1948 and 1950 it was an autonomous part of the Polish Youth Union, whereupon it was fully integrated into the Polish Youth Union (ZMP). Build up upon the pattern of the Komsomol, in academic institutions the ZAMP and later the ZMP had the task of ensuring the ideological education of students and junior academic staff. Representatives also had a say in the admission of new students and the employment of junior academic staff. For the sake of simplicity I shall not specify whether it is still the ZAMP or the ZMP that we are dealing with, and refer only to the ZMP, that is, the Polish Youth Union.

<http://portalwiedzy.onet.pl> accessed 13.11.2007

³²⁰ AAN/KC PZPR/237/XVI-100, pp.53-55

The sources specify that 70 were PUWP members and 63 belonged to the Union of Polish Academic Youth (ZAMP)

Also, note that the total figure for assistants in Table One is not very far from the total for Warsaw provided in this document.

³²¹ On the opposition of professors and fellow students against students with worker background, see Connelly, John, 2000.

Captive University: the Sovietization of East German, Czech, and Polish higher education, 1945-1956 Chapel Hill:

University of North Carolina Press.pp.224-248

However, the figures in both tables show that this was not enough. Presumably, ministry officials were too far removed from the actual processes of candidate selection to make any significant impact. Thus the first efficient measure that the ministry made was the political screening, known as the ‘verification’ of all junior staff, and the discontinuation of the contracts of those who failed to pass. Suleja reports that at Wrocław University thirty of the 379 ancillary staff were removed in the ‘verification’ process. Activists from the Polish Youth Union, who later evaluated their own efforts in the ‘verification’ campaign in Wrocław, complained that the results were very uneven.³²² They suggested that this was because thorough preparations had not been made in all departments. It was the Polish Youth Union which took care of the preparations, while decisions were taken by a Commission for the Verification of Ancillary Scientific Staff, composed of representatives of the University (rector, deans and administrative directors), the local party cell (BPO), The Democratic Professors’ Clubs, trade unions, and the Polish Youth Union. Within this commission, the interests and opinions of the radical Polish Youth Union clashed with those of the professors, and Polish Youth Union activists complained that the professors and rector had made their situation difficult. PUWP professors had sided with their colleagues rather than with party comrades, and even after the Ministry had approved the Polish Youth Union’s list, the rector and other professors intervened successfully to save assistants from being dismissed, and the rector had even gone to Warsaw to present the matter at the Ministry personally. The tension between a Polish Youth Union eager for change and professors protecting their assistants became so great that the Ministry had to send a delegation to Wrocław to douse the flames.³²³ Suleja’s short account of these events does not answer all the questions about how the verification had unfolded or why some sections of the University were more successful than others in protecting their assistants. What is clear enough, however, is that the removal of less than ten percent of junior staff, even if followed by replacement with candidates affiliated to the Party or the Polish Youth Union, still left the Party very far from ensuring that the majority of assistants were loyal communists.

Meanwhile, at the Main School of Planning and Statistics, the verification also gave variable results in different sections, but here the differences appear to be closely related to how relevant a given chair’s topic was to communist ideology. Thus, all assistants were dismissed

³²² It was only prepared thoroughly at the Department of Medicine; at other departments the changes made had been very small. Suleja, Teresa, 1995. *Uniwersytet Wrocławski w okresie centralizmu stalinowskiego, 1950-1955*. Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego. p.176

³²³ Ibid. p.178-9

from Chairs of Political Economy (there were two collective chairs) while other chairs saw lesser changes. The least ideological of them, Accounting, retained all its assistants.³²⁴ Just as in Wrocław, professors at the Main School tried to mitigate the severity of the purge of young economists. Drabińska reports that in 1948/49, Grodek, the rector of the Main School, was aware of the planned verification and acted in concert with Aleksy Wakar, the professor of Political Economy. Grodek suggested that Wakar's gifted assistants change specialities, and the direction in which they moved indicates which sub-disciplines were perceived as being 'less ideological'. Edward Lipiński's son Jan left Political Economy for Planning, while others went to Statistics (W. Sadowski), Accountancy (T. Peche), and Trade Organisation and Technique (J. Kurnal).³²⁵ Edward Lipiński, the other professor of Political Economy, lost his two assistants, Z. Sadowski and Helena Zagórska-Hagemejer. Both were popular with their students but failed to pass the Ministry's verification.³²⁶ The minutes of a meeting of the Main School PUWP executive committee show that the Ministry demanded Z. Sadowski's removal on the grounds that he had been active in the rightist resistance movement (NSZ) during the war. The minutes also show that he was defended by two of the recently-installed, handpicked, Moscow trained PUWP economists, whose leverage in this affair was in fact very limited. Their efforts could not prevent both assistants from being dismissed from their posts, even when, as Brus remembered, they argued that the move would be very unpopular with the students and that from a political point of view this would lessen the popularity of the PUWP at the school. Their only achievement was that a job was found for Z. Sadowski at the Main School library. We are then left with the paradox that established professors in Wrocław and at the Main School were sometimes able to negotiate the continuation of the careers of their students, while the apparent new masters of the field, the directors of the chairs of political economy, failed to be heard.

³²⁴ Drabińska, Danuta, 1993. SGPiS w latach forsownych przeobrazen społeczno-gospodarczych Polski 1949-1956. Warsaw School of Economics. pp.138-139

³²⁵ All stayed in the discipline and later went on to have successful careers in economics.

³²⁶ The question of how, and with the participation of which agencies, the Ministry prepared its lists, has not been studied. Given the nature of the information which formed the basis of the decisions, the security police may have been involved in the process, something which would account for the failure of the patronage of local party members.

Zdzisław Jan Sadowski (1925-) economist. According to information provided by Sadowski during interviews in 2001 and 2005, he served a one-year prison sentence on a charge of political conspiracy against the regime in 1946/47. The reason, he believes, was not directly related to his activities during the war, but to the fact that he participated in an independent student organisation (Bratniak) which came to the attention of the Security Police because many of its activists had been Scout Instructors. E. Lipiński's patronage was vital in making it possible for him, with a prison past, to pursue an academic career. After Lipiński was moved to the University, Sadowski followed him there as an assistant. A.W. Haugstad interview with Zdzisław Jan Sadowski, Warsaw 2000

Helena Zagórska-Hagemejer (1921-2001) had studied with Lipiński during the war, and completed her Masters thesis under his supervision in 1948. She also later worked as his assistant at the University. AUW/K1228/personal file: Życiorys (CV) dated 1.10.1950

Disposing of junior researchers who did not fit the PUWP's ideological and political criteria could easily have been the end of the matter. After all, most (and in time all) chairs would be in the hands of PUWP's trusted cadres, and their professors would implement Party decisions, such as those regarding the proportion of workers and peasants among junior researchers, and their political views. However, in late 1949 the PUWP pushed the matter on by designing an elaborate proposal which aimed to deprive the institution of the chair of its former "sovereignty" regarding the recruitment of future researchers and academic teachers.³²⁷ Drafted by a committee that in early 1950 brought together representatives from all academic institutions in Warsaw, the proposal suggested investing the local Party organisation with the right to suggest and approve candidates for assistant jobs. The Party and the Polish Youth Union were to conduct a broad recruitment campaign among their members, and then present the candidatures to the professor in question.

*The principle that the candidate for assistantship should discuss the matter with the professor in question is retained; however, the cases of the candidates suggested by the Party and the Polish Youth Union are discussed with the professor by the Party representative responsible for the campaign in the department. It is important to attend to the necessity of displaying a tactful manner when conducting this conversation.*³²⁸

Professors were still allowed to suggest their own candidates and to have a role in the recruitment, but the School Party Committee would have the final say.³²⁹

The professors' discretion was further diminished when regulations on "the socialist work discipline" were applied to students. Disciplinary boards controlled by local party officials could override professors, punishing or even excluding any students found lacking in political credentials by PUWP and Polish Youth Union watchdogs. The links between a professor and his students were weakened, inasmuch as the former's influence and power over the latter and their conduct was strongly restricted. The good opinion of professors was no longer enough to secure academic success, and the chair now no longer controlled recruitment to the discipline.

³²⁷ AAN/KC PZPR/237/XVI-100, pp.53-55. The inter-institutional council (visible on ill.4) gathered representatives of the BPOs of academic institutions in Warsaw. The language of this proposal contrasts with other party documents from this period – both at BPO and CC level, in being written in a clear and intelligent prose.

³²⁸ AAN/KC PZPR/237/XVI-100, pp.53-55

³²⁹ The decision would depend on the opinions of candidates furnished by the professor, the Polish Youth Union (ZMP) Organisation and the School PUWP Committee, all outnumbering the professor. AAN/KC PZPR/237/XVI-100, pp.53-55


The Party organisation in academic institutions

The main beneficiaries of the powers lost by chairs were not the new Marxist-Leninist professors who would now take their places, but the emerging Party organisation. Our knowledge about this new structure, about how it functioned and how it interacted with its academic host institutions and the scholarly communities, is restricted. The part of the Central Committee apparatus which is most relevant to this study, Science Division, has not yet been the subject of research. Some studies of the activities at lower levels or in Regional and Local Party Committees have been made, but none of them happen to deal with academic institutions.³³⁰ Fijałkowska's pre-1989 work on cultural policies provides some useful information, but its main focus is on art and culture, and science and scholarship are treated only marginally.³³¹

³³⁰ See Kula, Marcin (ed.) (1997) *Komitet Wojewodzki ogniwem władzy ludowej*, Warszawa: Instytut Studiów Politycznych PAN, Instytut Historyczny Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, Tymiński, Maciej, 2001. *PZPR i przedsiębiorstwo. Nadzór partyjny nad zakładami przemysłowymi 1956-1970*. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo TRIO. Some institutional histories written before 1989 also include chapters on the activities of the local party cell, as is the case for instance in the history of Poznań University. Zakrzewski, Zbigniew (ed.) (1976) *Akademia Ekonomiczna w Poznaniu 1926-1976*, Warszawa - Poznań: PWN. However, none of the institutional histories written after 1989 and dealing with important centres of economics in this period treat this aspect in depth or make use of archival sources left by the local party organisation.

³³¹ Written in the relatively mild climate of the 1980s, Fijałkowska's book provides much interesting material, despite its outward political correctness. Fijałkowska, Barbara, 1985. *Polityka i twórcy (1948-1959)*. Warszawa: PWN.

III. 4: Party organisation in higher education 1949-1952.³³²



The set-up of the Party organisation has been charted by Fijalkowska and the above diagram is based on her presentation. At the bottom came the Basic Party Organisation (BPO), which grouped together all Party members working in a given institution. The BPO reported to a district committee, which again was supervised by a Town Committee reporting to the Regional Committee (RC)³³³ and finally through that to the Central Committee (CC).³³⁴ This

³³² Based on *Ibid.* This illustration does not show the levels of Town or District Committee. Although these existed, and were a formal part of party science and higher education organisation, they hardly ever played a significant role.

³³³ The Regional (county) Committees had their own sections responsible for education, propaganda and so on, just as the CC did. In theory science belonged to the education or propaganda sections. In practice little attention was paid to matters of science and higher education in the RC, as concerned reports from the CC Division show.

KC PZPR 237/XVI/25/pp.34-37: „Informacja o pracy Komitetu Warszawskiego na odcinku szkolnictwa wyższego”. Signed T.Bratkiewicz, 1950

many-layered hierarchical structure was supplemented by horizontal inter-institutional Councils and a Central Council. Impressive as this structure looks, the question arises as to what extent it functioned and how far its activity brought the results the Party leadership was expecting from it. My own archival investigations into sources relating to the first phase of their activity (1948-1952) from the Central Committee, the Regional Committee in Warsaw, and the Basic Party Organisation of the Main School, indicate that the levels between the BPO and the Central Committee hardly functioned as far as science and higher education were concerned. Absence of evidence of activity at the intermediate levels, and repeated complaints formulated by the Central Committee Science Division both support this claim. It would appear that until 1952 this imposing structure existed only on paper.

Basic Party Organisations were invested with the task of controlling institutions in which Party members were an unpopular minority. I shall turn later to the tasks and concerns of the BPOs as revealed by archival material from the Main School of Planning and Statistics, but for the time being it will suffice to point out some of the challenges inherent in the BPOs' work, as perceived when they were criticised and reorganised in 1952, only a few years after their creation by the PUWP leadership. In order to address the principal problem, that is, the poor Party presence in academic institutions, all party members employed in more than one institution were instructed to make the academic BPO their primary party cell. This would of course do nothing to improve the overall number of Party members, but would mean that more people would turn up at academic BPO meetings. The 1952 Orgburo resolution also criticised the internal organisation of the BPOs, which had been divided into sections covering academic staff, students, and administrative and technical staff.³³⁵ Moreover, departments where there were no scholars with Party membership would not be represented at meetings in the BPO academic staff section. In 1952 the Party leadership also became aware that scholars had encountered problems in combining academic and party work. Consequently the Orgburo proposed to limit the length of meetings and party work to five hours weekly, a proposal which implies that many party members devoted more than one day a week to Party work.

³³⁴ The original terms in Polish: Podstawowa Organizacja Partyjna, Komitet Uczelniany, Komitet Dzielnicowy, Komitet Miejski, Komitet Wojewódzki, Komitet Centralny. Note that Warsaw was an exception, being a Region of its own, so there was no Town Committee, but instead the Komitet Warszawski held RC rank.

³³⁵ KC PZPR 237/XVI/33/ pp.31-33: August 1952 "Uchwała Sekretariatu Biura organizacyjnego KC PZPR w sprawie struktury organizacji partyjnych na wyższych uczelniach"
The argument used to justify internal BPO organisation was that this set-up made it difficult to link party work to the daily running of the chairs and institutes, and masked the Party's weakness in or absence from some departments.

At the level above the BPO, the Regional Committee (RC) education and propaganda section, there is little evidence of any ideological supervision of BPO work. RC officials working with academic institutions spent most of their time dealing with student-related matters, from housing and canteens to recruitment and employment.³³⁶ They also failed efficiently to channel upwards information about the situation in their constituencies. In December 1950 the CC Science Division complained to the First Secretary of the Warsaw PUWP about the situation in the capital:

For some time, the Propaganda, Education and Culture Division of the Higher Education Section in the Regional Committee has been doing badly. (...) We informed the Comrade Secretary about this some time ago, but alas, to this day no change for the better has taken place. The result is that the Science Division (of the CC – AWH) is less informed about the situation at the academic schools in Warsaw than about those in the most remote centres. Very often we have to contact the School Committees directly, as the RC does not usually respond to our letters. The RC Higher Education Section does not control the situation at the academic schools, and does not control the work of the BPOs, but leaves them to fend for themselves.³³⁷

This quote shows that the problems at RC and BPO level had consequences for the work of the Central Committee's Science Division, established in 1948.³³⁸ All the problems encountered by the bottom and middle levels of the Party organisation meant that instead of the elaborate five-layered cake (*Schwartzwaldtorte*) outlined in the diagram, the situation between 1949 and 1952 resembles more the kind of chocolate cake you might find at children's parties, a dry BPO sponge cake with a colourful but randomly-scattered CC topping.

³³⁶ I have consulted the archival collection of the Warsaw Regional Committee held by the Warsaw State Archive and housed in the Otwock section. However, neither the folder on Party work at academic schools (APMW/PZPR/KW/714) nor that with material pertaining to the Main School (APMW/PZPR/KW/716) contains any material from the early 1950s. The protocols of the RC Executive Committee in late 1949, that is during the first hectic months following the extensive reform of higher education, show traces of RC activity in selecting and approving the candidate for the post of Secretary of Warsaw University BPO, but no other traces of RC activity in higher education could be found. (APMW/PZPR/KW/153) Furthermore, there is no mention of the role and activities of the Regional Committee in the letters from the Main School to the CC Science Division held in the CC archival collection at the Archiwum Akt Nowych.

³³⁷ AAN/KC PZPR/ 237/XVI-100 p.1 Letter from M. Kowalczewski at the CC PUWP Science Division to the First Secretary of the Warsaw Committee of the PUWP (the Warsaw RC was frequently just called the Warsaw Committee.) Date 14.12.1950.

³³⁸ Directly attached to the CC Secretariat and subject to supervision by those at the utmost height of the power pyramid, it was overseen by Politburo member Edward Ochab between 1948 and 1952, then for a short period by Berman (1952-1954) and then once again by Ochab. Biologist Włodzimierz Petruszewicz was the first director (1948-1952) along with Zofia Zemankowa. Zemankowa alternated between several roles during her time at the Division (1948-1959), from 'senior instructor' to director, and appears both to have provided the division with continuity and to have infused it with orthodoxy on the Party line. Between 1955 and 1959 there was a series of reorganisations throughout which the division was alternately merged with and separated from the sectors of culture and education. From 1960 the situation stabilised, until in 1968 it became the Science and Education Division, under the leadership of Andrzej Werblan-Janowski, Włodzimierz & Kochański, Aleksander, 2000. *Informator o strukturze i obsadzie personalnej centralnego aparatu PZPR* Warszawa: PAN ISP.

The CC Science Division's internal memos, and the reports submitted to the leadership, have been my principal source,³³⁹ and they give a picture of an agency with grand ambitions but limited means. The task of the Division was to supervise Party organisation and State agencies active in academic institutions, and inform the Party leadership about the situation in this sector.³⁴⁰ The CC's Science Division oversaw appointments to important academic positions,³⁴¹ and their reports also tell of proposing and approving people for a variety of roles, from students travelling to the USSR, to editorial boards, and the higher echelons of the Ministry of Higher Education.³⁴² The division also oversaw the verification campaigns, and controlled the activities of the Central Qualifications Committee, as well as committees responsible for the evaluation and employment of university and academic school graduates. In 1953 work was also progressing towards the establishment of a register of all scientists.³⁴³ From their own reports, it seems that Division apparatchiks spent most of their time on student-related work such as recruitment, the selection of students for trips and further study in the USSR, and the distribution of accommodation. International scholarly contacts were also a central task for the Division. All in all, there was hardly any aspect of scientific activity that the CC's Science Division did not consider its business. However, according to their own reports, the Division was chronically under-staffed, overworked, burdened with time-consuming report-writing, and suffering from the lack of a well-functioning secretariat.³⁴⁴ In the first years, several positions were constantly vacant. Economics, however, was given

³³⁹ Since one important function of the reports was to prevent, or respond to, criticism from above, it is not surprising that they were by turn triumphant and plaintive. This feature greatly undermines the reliability of these reports. Moreover, as they are written in rigid and formal organisational jargon, the reports are not explicit about the measures used. Typical expressions include "helping" or "providing guidance and assistance", but leave us guessing as to how that was done.

³⁴⁰ This description of the tasks of the Science Division was included in the annual report covering the period from September 1950 to December 1951. AAN/KC PZPR 237/XVI/4 *Wydział Nauki i Szkolnictwa Wyższego, Sprawozdania z pracy Wydziału, 1950-51*. pp.2-7

³⁴¹ There is lack of precise information, but analogy with the CC's Culture Division suggests that from the early 1950s decisions on all leading positions had to be approved by the Division Fijalkowska, Barbara, 1985. *Polityka i twórcy (1948-1959)*. Warszawa: PWN. s.164. For this she refers to AAN/KC PZPR/237/XVIII-23

³⁴² Whilst this raises the issue of nomenklatura, I have not been able to find documents indicating that formalised lists of nomenklatura-bound positions were systematically used. This system was in Poland formalised on a later stage. Paczkowski, Andrzej, 2003. *System nomenklatury*. In A. Paczkowski (ed.) *Centrum władzy w Polsce*. Warszawa: Instytut Studiów Politycznych PAN, 115-140.

³⁴³ AAN/KCPZPR/237/XVI/4/*Sprawozdanie Wydziału Nauki za okres od 20.II do 28.II.1953 r.*/pp.59-60

³⁴⁴ Barbara Fijalkowska, who has focused her research on the CC Culture Division, reports that the division was overloaded due to the extreme demand for reports for the top leadership. My archival research confirms that the same was the case with the Science Division. AAN/KC PZPR/237/XVI-4 Fijalkowska, Barbara, 1985. *Polityka i twórcy (1948-1959)*. Warszawa: PWN.

The turnover of staff was considerable, and qualifications fell short of the ambitious aim of combining party competence with an active participation in scientific life. A one-year party school was established to remedy this. That a one-year course was considered a prospect for improvement is perhaps the most eloquent indicator of the level of staff competence. In January 1951, three years after the establishment of the Division, the director, Petruszewicz, berated his staff for working too little compared to other Divisions and for signing letters on behalf of the Division without proper authorisation. He pointed out the chaos in the secretariat, the lack of clear distribution of tasks, and responsibilities, and the dearth of clear directives as to what kind of decisions the Division was to take, and into what depth of detail they should go. AAN/KC PZPR 237/XVI/1 *Wydział Nauki i Szkolnictwa Wyższego "Protokół z zebrania Wydziału Nauki KC PZPR z dnia 16.1.1951*.

priority and Zemankowa, the vice-director of the Division, dealt with discipline from 1950 to 1952, and probably subsequently as well. From 1953 onwards Division work gradually gained momentum, but the advent of the Thaw saw the passing of their zenith in that decade, and instead of growing, the power of the CC's Science Division declined. After 1955, with the Party in crisis, the collegial academic bodies reclaimed control over their institutions and disciplines – a shift in power which occurred at the Party bureaucracy's expense. Then from the early 1960s the Party apparatus reasserted its power, backed by an efficiently-organised bureaucracy. It is quite possible that the impact of the Party organisation on academic activity was as great or even greater in the 1960s than before; however, Party ambitions never regained the level of the early 1950s.

In the first years of the Division's activity, the disparity between resources and ambitious goals led to strong variations in control over academic institutions. The highest echelon of the leadership intervened directly in times of crisis, but on the whole local party officials were left to their own resources. There is some evidence of those direct and personal interventions of the kind that leave little trace in documents: from informal meetings with and telephone calls to local party representatives and rectors, to the participation of CC representatives in discussions at local BPOs. Using such methods, the Division may have managed to make its presence felt in academic institutions, yet there is quite a distance between such a presence and systematic control over the sector. It is important to stress that despite the fact that the system did not work as well as intended, both the CC's Science Division and the local party secretaries and their aides made a great impact on the institutions in their charge.

The Main School of Planning and Statistics

The marginalisation of university economics strengthened the relative position of the Main School. The former private business school was to become the leading centre in research and education in economics.

*The forge for cadres for the planned economy, the forge for young scientific cadres, the centre of progressive economic science in Poland – that is what the Main School of Planning and Statistics in Warsaw is to become.*³⁴⁵

³⁴⁵ This definition of the goals of the 'new' Main School was published in the 1950/51 booklet containing lecture plans and a staff list. 1950 *Skład osobowy i spis wykładów na rok 1950/51*, Szkoła Główna Planowania i Statystyki, Warszawa: Szkoła Główna Planowania i Statystyki, p.6

The choice as new rector of Nowiński, a legal scholar who had recently turned to Marxist-Leninist philosophy, suggests that initial plans were for the Main School to become a hub of Marxist-Leninist economics and ideology. From this ideological centre, scores of trustworthy lecturers in political economy were to emerge, enabling the launch of new research institutions and ensuring the teaching of political economy to students of all disciplines. The task which came to dominate the Main School's activities during the following years, and which displaced research, was that of producing specialists for the expanding planning bureaucracy.³⁴⁶ To make this possible, the organisation of the School was modified. At the behest of the Politburo, the Main School was divided into four sections specialising in planning in industry, planning in trade, planning in finance, and statistics. Students were to choose a narrow specialisation which would prepare them for work in a specific branch of the planned economy, such as transport, housing or industry. The number of specialisations gradually increased, reaching a peak in 1953/54, when they could be counted in tens.³⁴⁷ A draft for a Politburo resolution, prepared by the PUWP CC Science Division in co-operation with the Ministry, provides two reasons for why this organisational solution was chosen:

*(...) specialisation and diversification are greater in a planned economy than in a capitalist economy, where everything is based on the principle of trade. This leads to the need for a radical and decisive reorganisation of economic and social education leading to specialisation in institutions of higher learning.*³⁴⁸

By choosing a structure modelled on the Gosplan division of the economy into branches, Polish Party officials at both lower and high levels were demonstrating their commitment to the Soviet example, demonstrations which had been prescribed ever since the repudiation of the 'national way to socialism' in mid 1948. This organisational solution also offered a method for dealing with the lack of trustworthy Marxist-Leninist scholars.

*The specialisation of institutions of higher learning is on the one hand justified by greater specialisation and diversification in the planned economy as mentioned above, and on the other hand by the fact that it is easier to conquer a specialised higher school, for instance through the leadership of relevant ministries, connections to practice, etc. ...*³⁴⁹

³⁴⁶ The main thesis of Drabińska, who studied the history of the Main School during the period of the communist transformation, is that teaching displaced all other activities. Drabińska, Danuta, 1993. SGPiS w latach forsownych przeobrazen społeczno-gospodarczych Polski 1949-1956. Warsaw School of Economics.

³⁴⁷ Ibid, p.82

³⁴⁸ AAN/ KC PZPR 237/XVI/27 pp.7-9

³⁴⁹ AAN/ KC PZPR 237/XVI/27 pp.7-9

The fact that students would now be channelled directly into specialisations that prepared them for work in corresponding Planning Commission departments and Ministries would make it easier for these agencies to influence the education of their future workers. This arrangement would compensate for the fact that practically all PUWP members with economics training and experience had been sucked up by the State and Planning Commission bureaucracies. Now some of them could be leased out to teach their narrow specialities, and lists of lecturers active at the ‘new’ Main School show that this was indeed the case. The radical break with the former organisation, and also with the reforms envisioned by Grodek, made it easier to circumvent the established academic hierarchy. Lectures by unsuitable professors became superfluous, while PUWP-loyal specialist-bureaucrats were drawn in.

The reformed Main School harboured rivalries and conflicts. There was conflict between the old staff and the new, as the reforms had practically dispossessed the cohesive group of established Main School staff. The latter’s hard feelings were exacerbated by the arrogance with which Marxist-Leninist scholars had entered the institutions. There was also potential for the Main School to become the scene of rivalry between the economic and agit-prop sectors of the Party bureaucracy. Péteri affirms the existence of such a conflict in Hungarian economics in the same period.³⁵⁰ The economics of planning was the domain of Hilary Minc and the Planning Commission, while political economy was dealt with in the agit-prop sector directed by Jakub Berman. How would these two powerful sectors co-operate within the reformed Main School? In fact, as we shall see, they hardly had time to disagree, as they did not stay together for long. As is implied by the name “*Mincówka*” (the popular appellation for the reformed Main School in these years) it was the demands of Minc’s planning bureaucracy that prevailed. Shortly after this, however, all those new responsibilities under Berman’s jurisdiction at the Main School were removed to a fresh institution, the Institute for Training of Scientific Cadres. This was attached directly to the PUWP CC, and took charge of both ideological training and the development of theoretical Marxism.

Plans and practice, students and research

For the new rector of the Main School, the first priority was to produce graduates for the hungry planning apparatus. After one year of the new order, at the beginning of the 1950/51

³⁵⁰ Péteri, György, 1998b. Controlling the Field of Academic Economics in Hungary, 1953-1976. In G. Péteri (ed.) *Academia and State Socialism. Essays on the Political History of Academic Life in Post-1945 Hungary and Eastern Europe*. New York: Atlantic Research and Publications.

academic year, he evaluated the School's progress and challenges in a speech given to party professors.³⁵¹ Achievements were now measured against the demands placed on the school by the Planning Commission. The Six-Year Plan had decreed that the Main School of Planning and Statistics should deliver approximately 5,000 students between 1950 and 1955. Not only were the numbers prescribed, but also the relative distribution between specialisations in industry, commerce, finance and statistics, and even the percentages of students expected to fail their exams. The confrontation of these expectations with reality was not easy. Figures quoted by Nowiński reveal serious problems with those first-year students who had enrolled at the reformed Main School on the basis of new recruitment policies favouring worker and peasant origins. Meeting the Plan's demand for 5,000 graduates in six years meant that the school would have to allow about 830 economists to graduate each year. Although the school had exceeded the Ministry's directive by accepting as many as 900 students, only 848 were actually enrolled in the autumn of 1949. Of these, only 668 were admitted to the spring term examinations and their results indicated that only 600 would pass into the second year. As further losses had to be expected during the third year, the target of 830 per year was becoming a distant one.

Given these numbers, it is not surprising that only 2,500 students left the Main School of Planning and Statistics with diplomas in their pockets in the period 1950-1955.³⁵² Whilst this was an important increase compared to the interwar years, the number of graduates was a mere 50% of the original plan, hardly a success in a political setting where over-performance in a Stachanovite spirit was called for.³⁵³ Moreover, even to reach this more modest goal, the quality of education had been sacrificed so greatly that the level of competence among the graduates was far below original expectations. Nowiński admitted as much to his colleagues:

*The fact is that to a large extent we had to lower the level of the exam requirements. The general level of the students' knowledge was so unsatisfactory that we had to choose between a general massacre and a lowering of standards.*³⁵⁴

³⁵¹ AAN/KC PZPR 237/XVI/109 *Wydział Nauki i Szkolnictwa Wyższego*, pp. 6-23: "Referat tow. Nowińskiego na zebraniu partyjnej organizacji profesorów SGPiS z dn. 25.IX 50"

³⁵² Chodakowska, Janina, 1981. *Rozwój szkolnictwa wyższego w Polsce Ludowej w latach 1944-1951* Wrocław: Ossolineum. p.148

³⁵³ Drabińska mentions that the planned targets were scaled down to a more realistic level, disguising the embarrassing failure to reach the original targets. Drabińska, Danuta, 1993. *SGPiS w latach forsownych przeobrazen społeczno-gospodarczych Polski 1949-1956*. Warsaw School of Economics.

³⁵⁴ AAN/KC PZPR 237/XVI/109 *Wydział Nauki i Szkolnictwa Wyższego*, pp.6-23: "Referat tow. Nowińskiego na zebraniu partyjnej organizacji profesorow." SGPiS z dn. 25.IX 50"

The quality of instruction suffered from the scarcity of competent and experienced lecturers approved by the PUWP. The new students were less equipped to excel at exams than earlier cohorts entering the Main School, both on account of their peasant and worker backgrounds, and because their primary education had been disrupted by the war and they still had to cope with difficult material conditions. According to Drabińska, teaching improved in time, so the difficulties described by Nowiński in 1950 gradually subsided; but recruiting enough students would become increasingly difficult.

Tensions: old staff and newcomers

How was the ‘fist of revolution’ (the group of Moscow-trained deputy professors introduced into positions of power at the Main School) received by the ‘old’ Main School academic staff? How did they interact, and how did they view each other? In one of several interviews I conducted with W. Brus, a newcomer at the Main School, he recounted an occasion which he remembered vividly, and which was most probably the inauguration ceremony of the ‘new’ Main School at which H. Minc was honorary guest. The staff and students were gathered in the great auditorium, waiting for the school leadership to enter in full academic apparel and splendour. There was no marked reaction to the entrance of the new marxist rector Nowiński, a legal scholar with no former ties to the school, but at the entrance of the former rector and now pro-rector Andrzej Grodek, all those present rose and applauded him.³⁵⁵

Party membership at the ‘new’ Main School in 1949/50 was decidedly above the national average for academic institutions. Half of the professors were PUWP members, but most had come to their membership via the Socialist Party.³⁵⁶ Socialist sympathies were so common that, reportedly, when A. Wakar chose to join the PWP rather than the PSP in 1945, his colleagues could not understand his choice.³⁵⁷ Among the junior staff, 24 of the 56 were PUWP members. This group was divided, since all deputy professors bar two were members,

³⁵⁵ A.W. Haugstad, interview with Włodzimierz Brus, Oxford 2001

³⁵⁶ Professor party members were: J. Drewnowski, O. Lange, E. Lipiński, E. Makowski, Cz. Nowiński, A. Wakar, A. Weryha Drabińska, Danuta, 1993. SGPiS w latach forsownych przeobrazen społeczno-gospodarczych Polski 1949-1956. Warsaw School of Economics.

³⁵⁷ According to a student of A. Wakar, prof. Janusz Beksiak, Wakar’s decision was influenced by his experience of the Russian Revolution in 1917 and his conclusion that the PWP was going to win the struggle with the PPP and the PSP. It was generally believed that this decision was his undoing. As a rare PWP academic, he was appointed rector of the Academy of Political Sciences (ANP), later renamed Main School of Foreign Trade. In that position, the argument went, he attracted too much personal attention, and a close examination of his past by the PUWP and the security services led to his arrest and deportation to the USSR in 1952. The real reason behind the arrest was not clear even to Wakar himself. Possible reasons that have been suggested include his brief spell in the medical corps of Denikin’s army and a mix-up of names. A.W. Haugstad, interview with Janusz Beksiak, Warsaw 2000, Beksiak, Janusz & Al., Et, 1997. Materiały z konferencji Wakarowskiej, 7.12.1996. *Roczniki Kolegium Analiz Ekonomicznych*. SGH, Warszawa: KAE SGH.

while only four of the 18 lecturers belonged to the PUWP. The high percentage of PUWP members among Main School professors does not mean that the newcomers were able to fit easily into the established order. The old staff at the Main School were closely bound together, most of them having spent nearly all their careers there. The cohesion of the established staff could well have posed difficulties if the newcomers had entered the institutions 'legitimately', which was hardly the case here. At the CPB debate, where newcomers had been pitted against 'old' Main School staff, a chasm had already emerged between PUWP members of PSP origin and those backed by the PWP. The Main School had been nationalised suddenly, along lines which radically differed from those thought up by the established Main School staff. This had led to the dismissal of several senior economists, a purge of young talent, and the displacement from influential positions of those who up till then had considered themselves the legitimate leaders of the institution, and this had created much resentment and bitterness over thwarted careers. Many among the 'old' staff blamed the newcomers for the way the transformation was carried out, and disapproved of the institution's new approach, which stressed the quantity rather than the quality of graduates, and left no time for research. Witnesses testify that there was hardly any communication between the political economy section, staffed by newcomers, and the domestic trade section, where 'old' staff were in the majority, and that the sections lived separate lives under the same roof. Any staff homogeneity apparently indicated by the high PUWP membership was misleading: there were two distinct and polarised groups.

An interesting source on the newcomers' views of the situation upon arrival can be found in the report of the executive of the local party committee two months into the first academic year of 'the marxist offensive'. In this report both the successes and the problems were laid out for the inspection of the CC Science Division.³⁵⁸ Among the successes, the local PUWP activists included the fact that 64% of the 824 students who enrolled that year were of worker or peasant origin, and that, by November, 600 of these new students belonged to the Polish Youth Union, and 80 to the Party proper. The leaders of the Main School party cell further congratulated themselves on having successfully drawn up and implemented a schedule of lectures and study programmes, and on having helped students with housing and material needs. Despite this, these successes were followed by a list of the problems that the Party

³⁵⁸ AAN/KC PZPR 237/XVI/109/ *Wydział Nauki i Szkolnictwa Wyższego*, "Report of the Executive Committee of the Basic Party Organisation of the Main School of Planning and Statistics" Signed: 2nd Secretary Zawadzka, Romana, 25.11.1949. pp.1-2

faced. The school party committee's interpretation of these troubles was symptomatic of the political atmosphere of the time, and merits an extensive quote.

The setting-up of a standard-bearing Marxist school has undoubtedly provoked a deliberate, organised and hostile reaction, which will in all likelihood continue to increase. The weakness of the youth organisations, especially of the Union of Polish Academic Youth opens up the possibility of infiltration by the enemy into our area. Alongside the systematically-selected group in the 1st year, there are the 2nd and 3rd year groups, the majority of which belong to an alien class. Their presence at the school creates exceptionally fertile ground for all kinds of hostile actions, and for the drawing of the worker-peasant youth (even those in the ZAMP) towards hostile elements. This creates the need for swift and decisive action to strengthen the youth front and establish particular vigilance in this section.³⁵⁹

The local activists in the Polish Youth Union had so far failed to reach the majority of students, who did not take part in any activities, or display any inclination to demonstrate ideological commitment. The older students in the second and third years were worse than uninterested, they were described as “*hostile and reactionary elements*”. The interpretation of the local PUWP was an exact reproduction of the interpretation of the international and domestic situation drawn up by their superiors: the ‘marxist offensive’ had provoked the enemy forces to launch a ‘counter-offensive’. The report lists four ways in which this ‘counter-offensive’ manifested itself. Firstly, students openly engaged in religious activities on school premises and demonstrated their adherence to the Catholic Church, drawing crosses on the walls of the seminar rooms, giving out information with ‘clerical content’, and organising prayers in the dining hall. Secondly, the report notes the existence of an anti-semitic campaign, consisting of derogatory remarks and graffiti. In particular, the report refers to a list scribbled on the wall in a toilet identifying some of the lecturers teaching the second year as Jews. The third element of the “counter-offensive” was expressions of allegiance to the old Main School of Commerce, seen for instance in students wearing their “SGH” pins. The inauguration of the new academic year at the new Main School of Planning and Statistics was mentioned as another example of the “*apotheosis of the Main School of Commerce*”. The last element of the ‘counter-offensive’ was “*the deliberate undermining of the authority of the school’s leadership*”. Indeed, senior students did not recognise the authority of the new

³⁵⁹ AAN/KC PZPR 237/XVI/109/Wydział Nauki i Szkolnictwa Wyższego, “Report of the Executive Committee of the Basic Party Organisation of the Main School of Planning and Statistics” Signed: 2nd Secretary Zawadzka, Romana, 25.11.1949. pp.1-2

school leadership, and the sentiments of the old staff were no warmer, although they acted more cautiously.

The report conveys a high degree of concern about matters which in other contexts might have been seen as trivial. All symptoms of a lack of acceptance of and submission to the 'new reality' on the part of the old staff and student body were taken very seriously in this report. That the communist leadership should lose sleep over graffiti in the toilets or students wearing their old school pins can be read as evidence of a high level of insecurity, social alienation and stress. It is obvious that references to this issue created a sense of unease among Polish citizens who had been classified by the Nazis as Jews (regardless of their personal attachment to the Judaic religion). The report, however, was first and foremost a political statement, and only incidentally a possible indication of the state of mind of the author and her comrades. Communist propaganda readily identified all its political opponents as fascists and anti-semites, as the writer of the report was undoubtedly aware. Allegations of anti-semitism in this report served to create a negative view of the 'old' Main School of Commerce, while the juxtaposition of the stereotypes 'Communist Jew' versus 'Anti-Semite Catholic' allowed the authors of the report to pose both as defenders of Jews and as victims, while the catholic students reproached for their religious practices were cast in the role of reactionary, organised racists. The strong bias of this report precludes any judgement about the true attitudes of the Main School's staff and students to Jews as based on the other sources retrieved and used for this study.³⁶⁰ Nevertheless, this document gives a glimpse of how political and cultural stereotypes played a part in the redefinition of the disciplinary landscape of economics. To reinforce the division into 'bourgeois' and Marxist-Leninist economists, officially based on different choices of problems and methods, stereotypes from the agit-prop tool-kit were applied.³⁶¹

³⁶⁰ While the students involved in catholic practices are reported to have participated in activities that involved groups, the extent of the anti-semitic incidents is not specified, apart from mentioning remarks and graffiti, which could have been the work of many students or just one or two. Information about the conditions of Jewish students at Main School in the interwar years can be found in Mróz, Maria Wanda, 1994. *Działalność dydaktyczna Wyższej Szkoły Handlowej - Szkoły Głównej Handlowej w latach 1915-1939* Warszawa: Szkoła Główna Handlowa. See Brus' account of the difficulty of gaining admission for Jewish students and the atmosphere at the Main School compared to the Free University in Brus, Włodzimierz, 1993. "The Bane of Reforming the Socialist System". *Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review*, 187, 363-405.

³⁶¹ While it would seem that to some extent both parties subscribed to the catholic-communist division, the long history of this pair of stereotypes makes it particularly difficult to disentangle the layers of interpretation and the ascriptions of identities. The polarisation which started in these years has been complicated by the events of 1968, when a Jewish identity was again ascribed to academics and made the basis of a purge. The present Polish political landscape has also had an effect on how the situation in the early 1950s is portrayed in contemporary witness accounts. The unwillingness to 'confess' anything which in today's post-communist, 'lustrationist' environment could be construed as evidence of 'collaboration' with the Communist regime, reinforces the tendency to subscribe to these time-worn stereotypes. While explicitly anti-Semitic attitudes are virtually absent from academic contexts in which statements about the history of the discipline are made

Among the ‘old’ Main School staff, strong bonds still existed, and new students continued to be assimilated into the ‘old’ community, although that would only become apparent from 1956. According to the testimonies of students who witnessed these years, the ‘old’ Main School staff managed to maintain pockets of relative freedom. Scholars now barred from prominent positions came together with students from politically ‘dubious’ backgrounds. One example was the Internal Trade Section at the Main School, headed by the ‘old’ Main School graduate Koźmiński.³⁶² These groups were able to serve as fora for discussions of banned Western economics.³⁶³

All in all, the transformation of the Main School had created a situation where the ‘old’ staff felt powerless, where the newcomers faced a hostile environment, and where demanding employers called for results it would take a miracle to produce.

The ITSC threat

As for research and theory development, the ‘new’ Main School was unable to profit from the abolition of university economics, as practically no research was conducted at the Main School between its transformation in 1949 and the coming of the Thaw.³⁶⁴ This development was not the result of a plan, but of a combination of conditions. To begin with, the specific intellectual climate of these years was not conducive to critical thinking. The demand that research should be Marxist-Leninist and loyal to the political leadership virtually excluded established economists with ‘bourgeois’ pasts from this area, and from publication. The newcomers, on the other hand, struggled with their lack of qualifications and research experience, and with the increasing secrecy surrounding economic data. What is more, the rapid expansion of student numbers completely swamped those academics still allowed to teach, leaving them little or no time for research. Indeed, the demand for lecturers was such that teaching duties were even assigned to individuals whom the responsible party functionaries deemed to be ‘unsuitable’.

(I have not come across any), we might note the tendency to underline catholic identity in former-student reminiscences from these years. (I was a catholic – ergo I was not collaborating with the Communist regime.) Among economists, this is achieved through reference to methodological preferences. (‘I always believed in Western economics, even when paying lip-service to Marxism’).

³⁶² Strużycki, Marian & Kamiński, Marek B. (eds.) (2004) *Leon Koźmiński. Patron Wyższej Szkoły Przedsiębiorstwa i Zarządzania*. Warszawa: Wyższa Szkoła Przedsiębiorczości i Zarządzania im L. Koźmińskiego.

³⁶³ Zaręba, Janusz, 1985. *Reforma w testamencie : rzecz o Oskarze Langem*, 1.ed. Warszawa: Młodzieżowa Agencja Wydawnicza. p.134

³⁶⁴ In her unpublished doctoral thesis, Danuta Drabińska argues that teaching dominated the activities of the Main School in the period she studied. Drabińska, Danuta, 1993. *SGPiS w latach forsownych przeobrazen społeczno-gospodarczych Polski 1949-1956*. Warsaw School of Economics.

In addition to the hostile atmosphere and numerous initial problems, it soon turned out that the Party and Ministry's concentration on the Main School of Planning and Statistics was to be of short duration. What now followed was the establishment of a series of Higher Schools of Economics (WSE), based on the old Economic Colleges, with some being created in towns taken over from Germany. By 1950 there were ten WSEs with varying specialisations. The hardest blow to the future of the Main School as the principal 'forge' of Marxist-Leninist social scientists, however, was the establishment of the Institute for Training of Scientific Cadres (ITSC). In November 1949, just months after the 'take-over' of the Main School, the key Party functionaries dealing with higher education, and Adam Schaff, one of the most active ideologues, discussed the need to concentrate the Party's forces on ideologically significant social science subjects.³⁶⁵ From the perspective of the Main School leadership, however, such targeting would mean a dispersal of the PUWP's scarce human resources in Marxist-Leninist economics.

Following decisions taken at a Politburo meeting in January 1950, the new institution opened in October that year.³⁶⁶ The ITSC was attached directly to the PUWP CC and run by Adam Schaff, who started a vigorous campaign to carve out resources for his new fiefdom. As a result, the majority of Marxists-Leninists sent to Moscow by the Politburo in the summer of 1949, in preparation for their work at the 'new' Main School, were now moved from the Main School to the ITSC. In his article on the ITSC, Connelly looks at why Schaff was successful; I would like to concentrate on why Nowiński failed to protect the Main School from a loss of strategic resources.³⁶⁷ After all, he had the advantage of having taken up his position first.

Drabińska draws a deeply sympathetic portrait of Nowiński, but portrays a man disliked and alone, unable to engage his colleagues at the Main School, or even those from PWUP, in a positive way.³⁶⁸ Documents from the CC Science Division throw some additional light on Nowiński's position in the Party, and if indeed there was a contest between the newly-founded ITSC and the Main School, then the capacities and influence of their respective patrons would have been important. In September 1950, the Warsaw University BPO wrote to Edward Ochab, the Central Committee Secretary, demanding that the Party deal with the

³⁶⁵ Adam Schaff (1913-) graduate of Lwów University, studied political science in Paris, joined the Communist party (KPP) in 1936. During the war he studied Marxist philosophy in the Soviet Union. After the war he lectured at the Party School and was made professor of philosophy at Warsaw University.

³⁶⁶ Connelly, John, 1996. "Elite Social Science Training in Stalinist Poland." *Minerva*, 34, 323-346.

³⁶⁷ Ibid.

³⁶⁸ Drabińska, Danuta, 1993. *SGPiS w latach forsownych przeobrazen społeczno-gospodarczych Polski 1949-1956*. Warsaw School of Economics. pp.366-367

‘problem of Nowiński’ as a matter of urgency. The main areas of complaint were his attitudes to the Soviet Union before the war, his avoidance of teaching duties at the University, and his behaviour towards comrades on the executive committee. Following this complaint Nowiński had to submit a self-criticism or ‘*samokrytyka*’ (18 typed pages) at a meeting held at the CC Science Division. Among other things he had to admit that in his pre-war comparative study he had found strong similarities between the Soviet and Nazi legal systems. In line with the genre of ‘*samokrytyka*’, Nowiński condemned all such work undertaken before 1948 as “*devoid of scientific value and politically harmful*”.³⁶⁹ His repentance must have been accepted, for he continued as rector of the Main School for two more years. The whole affair was dealt with confidentially, and I have not come across any evidence that any aspect of the case was disclosed outside the room. Yet among those present at the meeting was Adam Schaff. The available sources do not allow us to draw any conclusions as to who had pushed for this ‘*samokrytyka*’, or why, but it is clear that Nowiński’s past and this affair must have affected both his ability to defend the Main School and his credentials for the task of controlling the centre of ideological training and research in political economy.³⁷⁰

The move of the centre of ideological gravity away from the Main School of Planning and Statistics was soon felt. In December 1950 the Party secretary complained that the situation had deteriorated drastically:

*The school is experiencing serious staff difficulties at a time of considerable growth ... due to the departure of a large group of comrades, who have been directed to undertake other important work. Thus comrades Brus, Pohorille and Zawadzki are primarily occupied in the Institute for Training Scientific Cadres. Żurawicki has been called to the Main School of Foreign Service and the Institute for Training Scientific Cadres, and Pawłowski to the Ministry of Science and Higher Education. Hochfeld is very busy at the Main School of Foreign Service, J. Rzendowski has fallen seriously ill, etc...*³⁷¹

Żurawicki was supposed to hold the chair of political economy in the part-time study programme, but was busy at the ITSC. One of the effects of this was that his job fell to someone who was in the words of the school party secretary, “*unprepared for such a*

³⁶⁹ AAN/KC PZPR/XVI-16 p.20

³⁷⁰ According to Drabińska, Nowiński was deeply disappointed that it was the ITSC and not the Main School which became the Polish version of the Institute of Red Professors. Drabińska, Danuta, 1993. SGPiS w latach forsownych przeobrazen społeczno-gospodarczych Polski 1949-1956. Warsaw School of Economics. p.370

³⁷¹ KC PZPR 237/XVI/109 *Wydział Nauki i Szkolnictwa Wyższego, SGPiS*. pp.3-5 Letter from Executive Committee of the PUWP BOP at the Main School of Planning and Statistics in Warsaw to CC PUWP, Science Division, 18.12.1950. Signed by 1st Secretary of the Executive Committee of the BOP PUWP Romana Zawadzka. There is a handwritten comment on the letter, “Com. Zemanek. This must be dealt with directly” which was probably made by Petruszewicz.

responsible job, being a graduate of the bourgeois school of economics, and, what is more, an active (*praktykujący*) catholic".³⁷² Drewnowski, whom the document now referred to as 'citizen' not 'comrade', was running the part-time study programme despite the fact that the school's party secretary now described him too as "*a politically unsuitable person*". This description is not surprising considering he had just been expelled from the PUWP. Things got worse as Julian Hochfeld soon moved to the University following a bitter conflict with rector Nowiński, who in his turn also stepped back due to ill health and (according to Drabińska) disappointment over failing to reach his goals as rector of the Main School.³⁷³ Nevertheless, it should be noted that the efflux from the Main School of Planning and Statistics to the ITSC might also have been augmented by the personal preferences of the staff. The work conditions and opportunities to do research offered by Schaff were more appealing than the overwhelming teaching load at the Main School. Furthermore, at the ITSC Marxist-Leninist scholars were among their own, in isolation from the hostile audience of the 'old' Main School staff and students.³⁷⁴

In summing up the experiences of the Main School, I would first like to emphasise the amount of energy expended by many of those concerned, and the extreme levels of stress that both the old and new staff members experienced in this period. Secondly, even here, where the PUWP had concentrated its forces to ensure the transformation of existing institutions, there is ample evidence of continuity, both in terms of the staff and of the community spirit and ethos of the 'old' Main School of Commerce. Contact between the 'old' and 'new' staff was for years kept to a minimum and integration seems to have gained momentum only after 1956.

³⁷² KC PZPR 237/XVI/109 *Wydział Nauki i Szkolnictwa Wyższego, SGPiS*, pp.3-5 Letter from Executive Committee of the PUWP BOP at the Main School of Planning and Statistics in Warsaw to CC PUWP, Science Division, 18.12.1950. Signed by 1st Secretary of the Executive Committee of the BOP PUWP Romana Zawadzka.

The person referred to was Adjunct Józef Nowicki.

³⁷³ Oskar Lange was appointed as the next rector.

³⁷⁴ On working conditions at the ITSC, see Connelly, John, 1996. "Elite Social Science Training in Stalinist Poland." *Minerva*, 34, 323-346, Bińko, Beata, 2001. Skąd przychodzili dokąd zmierzali... aspiranci pierwszego rocznika IKKN KC PZPR. In T. Szarota (ed.) *Komunizm. Ideologia, system, ludzie*. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo NERITON, Instytut Historii PAN.

Conclusion

How successful was the PUWP's transformation of higher education? There is no doubt that the regime achieved a great deal. For economics, the changes introduced between 1948 and 1950 meant that graduate studies in economics were abolished in university departments, apart from the Main School and, from the autumn of 1950, the ITSC. All prominent representatives of 'bourgeois' economics were removed from influential positions, including those with PUWP membership cards in their pockets.

The question arises, however, as to why the PUWP stopped short of full success. Why did it allow for the tenuous but real continuity of 'bourgeois' economics by continuing to employ scholars whom the Party did not trust? John Connelly points to the enormous prestige that professors held in Polish society. This made them awkward opponents for the communists, who would have preferred the prestige to rub off on themselves rather than to be held against them. Letting "unsuitable" scholars survive on meagre pensions, isolated from students and research opportunities, was not seen as problematic by Polish communists, argues Connelly, as they felt confident that time would work for them, and that there was enough time.³⁷⁵

Secondly, several Polish economists were scholars with unquestionable socialist and anti-fascist backgrounds, such as Oskar Lange and Edward Lipiński. In the face of a massively anti-soviet and anti-communist society, the PUWP could not afford to waste such allies, even if they could not be trusted with the teaching of ideologically-sensitive subjects.

Forbidding activity by established economists had been the easy task, and one for which the repressive Communist regime was well equipped, but when it came to creating new structures there was a wide distance between ambitions and implementation. The problems reported by the Science Division are at odds with the generally-accepted view that the Party quickly established a far-reaching degree of control over academic institutions. In fact, the activities of the Party organisation in this first period were characterised a lack of structure, a failure to implement systematic control, and weak communication between the different levels of the hierarchy. Furthermore, it seems that it was not the 'visible' structures of the Party organisation that had the strongest impact on academic institutions, but the 'invisible' direct interventions of influential Party officials. Control was not based on a bureaucratic management of science and higher education through established channels with clear task

³⁷⁵ Connelly, John, 2000. *Captive University: the Sovietization of East German, Czech, and Polish higher education, 1945-1956* Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

divisions and responsibilities; it was the result of a series of ad hoc personal interventions. This interpretation can account for the gap between the perception among non-party academics as to who wielded power on the one hand, and documents and testimonies from the Party side on the other. The usual view, which prevails among economists even today, is that it was the new Marxist-Leninist professors who decided on the careers of non-party scholars, and who were generally responsible for the transformation of the discipline. Instead, both documentary and interview evidence indicates that although they were the executors of party policy, the PUWP's trusted scholars were mostly foot soldiers in the Party system, with important decisions being taken in higher quarters. The upper circles of the Party leadership were inaccessible not only to non-party academics, but even to the Marxists-Leninists perceived by their peers to be the incarnation of power.

From being undisputed masters of Polish science, ruling as kings of their own domains, commanding the loyalty of hand-picked research students, judging new contributions and evaluating reputations along with their peers, chair-holding professors were reduced to subordinate positions. They were subjected to the whims of young loyal party iconoclasts equipped with centrally-formulated and approved plans for lectures and curricula. Authority based on the recognition of education and research output by one's peers was replaced with party recognition of political loyalty, ideological orthodoxy and organisational merit.

However, professors were not altogether stripped of authority or opportunity to influence. They retained some of their former powers, the loyalty of some of their students and colleagues, and pockets of private liberty. Although their losses as a group and as individuals were considerable, it was important that this tenuous continuity existed, as in the longer term it would allow economists to construct narratives of continuity that bridged the difficult stalinist years. The power taken from chairs was sluiced into the Party organisation, and more research is called for in order to establish a precise picture of how power was distributed and transformed within that many-layered structure. There was, however, a portion of authority which remained with the old professors, and it may be the key as to why PWUP failed to gain full control over academic institutions. This authority was based on symbolic capital, which Bourdieu affirms is not easily transferred or transformed. The material presented in this chapter suggests that although administrative power succeeded in transforming the nature of the institutions (including that of the Chair), it failed to reach its goal of full control over the field of economics.

Since two more chapters will be devoted to economics in the stalinist era, it is necessary to stress that a critical assessment of the PUWP's work in the field of economics was not part of contemporary public discourse. In fact, none of the problems mentioned in this chapter hindered the PUWP from proclaiming triumphantly in a speech made at the First Convention of Economists that its goal of a new order in higher education in economics had been reached; an event which will be central to the next chapter.

The establishment of the Main School of Planning and Statistics opened up a new stage in the development of higher education in economics. A school was created which aimed to educate cadres for our planned economy, in contrast to the practices of the old higher schools of commerce that were structured according to outmoded capitalist patterns. The teaching programme was based on Marxist-Leninist methodology, and the structures and programmes of the courses (patterned on the Soviet schools of economics) were adapted to the needs of the practices resulting from a planned economic management.³⁷⁶

³⁷⁶ Brus, W., 1951 "O stanie nauk ekonomicznych w Polsce" *Ekonomista*, 1, p.35

Chapter 4

REMOULDING ECONOMICS,
THE FIRST CONGRESS OF POLISH SCIENCE 1950-1951

By 1950 the reform of higher education had revolutionised teaching and curricula, and professors too had been called upon to re-orient their research towards Marxism-Leninism. However, few at this time believed that any transformation could have been accomplished by the limited number of improvised courses in Marxist-Leninist political economy organised between 1948 and 1950. There had been little change either in the norms of academic conduct or in the way scholars selected research areas and methodologies. Since there were insufficient numbers of economists whom the Party felt it could trust, a way had to be found to convert those scholars whom it at least considered to be “progressive”. The cadres of the Central Committee Science Division wanted to “mobilise” scholars to accept and actively pursue the goals of the regime. It was to this end that a gathering of representatives of all academic disciplines, the First Congress of Polish Science, was organised in Warsaw in the summer of 1951.

III. 5: The festooned exterior of the Warsaw Polytechnic, where the Congress was held.³⁷⁷



One of the intentions of the Party leadership at this time was to demonstrate its commitment to science by organising this widely-publicised and lavishly-funded event. In return, by participating in the tightly scripted performance, scholars would lend prestige to the regime. 1,800 participants joined the proceedings: scientists, foreign delegations, Party and Government officials, stachanovite workers, and teachers, and they all listened to solemn speeches and attended a grand banquet hosted by the prime minister on the last day.³⁷⁸ The deliberations of the Congress concluded with the creation of the Polish Academy of Science (PAN), modelled upon the Soviet Academy of Sciences, and destined to initiate a new era in Polish science by introducing planning to research.

However, the aims of the Congress went beyond the desire to enhance the regime's legitimacy by association with prestigious professors. Propaganda dominated the Congress itself, but during the preparations for the event, other key measures were implemented in an attempt to remedy the lack of "Marxist-Leninist science" in Poland. As part of these preparations, the history of the discipline was rewritten to suit the new dominant theory, the place of economics among other social sciences was redefined, and the structure of the discipline was modified by the introduction of a new hierarchy of sub-disciplines. The Congress was to create conditions where a Marxist-Leninist critique could be performed from a position of authority, and not, as had been the case previously in debates and journals, from a challenging position. It was to be

³⁷⁷ ADokMech/13442-8 „I Kongres Nauki Polskiej. Przed Politechniką” CAF-Dabrowiecki

³⁷⁸ In 1951 the mathematician Hugo Steinhaus noted in his diary: "Towards the end of June I was at the so-called Congress of Polish Science. It was a great fair with free food, gifts in the form of leather briefcases, books, coloured pencils and diverse speeches." Steinhaus, Hugo & Zgorzelska., Aleksandra, 1992. *Wspomnienia i zapiski* London: Aneks. p.407

a crowning ceremony, marking the beginning of the reign of Marxism-Leninism in scholarship.

The main target of the “mobilisation” measures was the preponderance of scholars classified somewhere in between the agit-prop sobriquet extremes of ‘reactionaries’ and ‘spearheads of the Marxist revolution’. The preparations for the Congress served as rehearsals where the ‘progressive’ scholars were drilled in the new norms of behaviour valid in Marxist-Leninist science: they had to be shown that the official version was not to be challenged. Congress preparations involved an important element of psychological pressure, as scholars were under the threat of an imminent ending of their careers if they refused to demonstrate their allegiance through public self-criticisms (*samokrytyka*) and eulogies of Stalin and Lenin. Through such means scholars were initiated into Marxist-Leninist science and assigned their places and roles in the new hierarchy. The manner of their enrolment would have important consequences for their identification with and support of the regime’s science project.

The archival sources relating to the First Congress of Polish Science yield a more systematic and complete set than those of the Party apparatus.³⁷⁹ This chapter focuses on documentation pertaining to meetings where discussions connected with economics took place. While discussions inside the PUWP (particularly those at the top level, where decisions were taken) are not well documented, this is not the case for many of the meetings at lower levels. Particularly interesting are the transcripts of Section and Sub-section meetings as well as discussions at conventions of economists, which were recorded in shorthand and transcribed.

As for scholarly literature on the Congress, this has been the subject of a monograph by Piotr Hübner, who has studied the role of the Congress in supplying the means of implementation for the PUWP’s science policy.³⁸⁰ His main thesis is that despite contemporary official claims that the Congress was a democratic institution which expressed the will and interests of scientists, it was in reality directed and controlled by the top ranks of the PUWP. He claims it served to subordinate research to political control and to the needs of a planned economy. Hübner devotes much space both to the historical evolution of general science and scholarship congresses in Poland, first in the inter-war years, and then throughout the rapidly changing political landscape of the first three post-war years, when different political groups each had

³⁷⁹ Congress documents are held in the Archive of the Polish Academy of Science, unlike the PUWP collection, which was subjected to political manipulation when lodged at the Party HQ, and rationalisation upon its transfer to Archiwum Akt Nowych, Congress material appears to remain arranged as it was when put away in the early 1950s.

³⁸⁰ Hübner, Piotr, 1983. *I Kongres Nauk Polskiej jako forma realizacji założeń polityki naukowej państwa ludowego*. Wrocław: Zakład narodowy imienia Ossolińskich.

their own concepts and objectives when it came to national congresses of science and scholarship. The main body of this analysis is in fact devoted to the structure of the Congress organisation. While Hübner's work provides necessary background information on Congress apparatuses and organisation, it addresses different questions from those asked in this chapter.

The PUWP's strategy

The Politburo defined what the Congress was to achieve, and how it was to do this:

II. The aims and tasks of the Congress

The basic goal behind the convocation of the Congress of Science is: to draw the masses of hesitant Polish scholars closer to the present social reality, to mobilise them to meet the needs of the life of the nation as regards the Six Year Plan, and to isolate decidedly reactionary elements, mainly through the preparatory activities of the Congress. The Congress should activate our scientists, provoke a major shake-up of Polish science and push Polish science in the direction of Marxist science. In certain disciplines, it should cause an ideological breakthrough. The Congress of Science should oppose the cosmopolitan tendencies in Polish science, connect with the traditions of progressive Polish science and create a bond with the experiences and accomplishments of Soviet science.

III. Methods of implementation

1. In the preparatory period, resulting mainly from congress actions, an increase in activity in the scientific movement should take place, and our ideological offensive should be conducted in the following directions: ...

2. Under the pressure of our offensive, ideological fermentation should increase, and should accelerate the split among scientists. It will reveal and isolate decidedly reactionary elements and attract to us the decisive majority of scientists because of:

a) the connection of science with real life, and the active inclusion of scientists in the work of realising the Six Year Plan;

b) an emphasis on the peaceful and progressive role of science;

c) an understanding and acknowledgement of the need to plan scientific research activities.³⁸¹

This text was adopted by the Politburo in June 1949, before the inauguration of the first 'reformed' academic year, meaning that the PUWP leadership was simultaneously dealing

³⁸¹ Quoted after Ibid. p.79

with the transformation of both higher education and research. The PUWP hoped to compensate for the lack of Marxist-Leninist scholars, apparent in the difficulties encountered by the Party in academic institutions, by enrolling 'progressive' scholars in academic communities to support their policies, and by isolating 'reactionary elements'.

This document reveals how the Politburo, and the CC apparatus which undoubtedly prepared this text, planned to attract non-communist scholars. The Communists assumed that academics would want to contribute to economic growth by participating in the Six Year Plan. They also felt confident that scholars could be persuaded that the communist system would create better conditions for researchers, and that the application of rational planning would make more resources available. In addition to economic motivation, they also planned to appeal to feelings, firstly to the desire for peace, a most urgent and universal feeling during these years, and secondly to national pride. We may note that in this text 'science' was in most cases preceded by the adjective 'Polish'. By contributing to the communist project, scholars would be making a contribution to Polish national culture.

The primacy of ideology and loyalty to Party policy was more than a slogan. The PUWP was imposing both a new balance of power and a new mode of negotiation, where ideological arguments and the political will of the PUWP overruled all others. The preparations for the Congress educated scholars in the new rules for communication with the political elite. The organisation of the Congress of Science followed the logic of "democratic centralism", the principle of organisation upon which the PUWP was founded. The objective was the establishment of a transmission belt which would efficiently convey the decisions of the Party leadership to the rank and file scholars. Democratic centralism meant that whenever the Party leadership decreed a substantial change in policy, it was conveyed down the hierarchical ladder. Officials at each level had to demonstrate that they had mastered the new orthodoxy and were able to apply it to their areas. The importance and novelty of the Congress lay in democratic centralism being applied to scholarly communities in Poland for the first time.

Overseeing the preparation and execution of the Politburo's decision was the Congress Executive Committee, which created its own apparatus in the form of a permanent secretariat, just as the PUWP CC had done. Most of the work was carried out by the Presidium, led by biologist Jan Dembowski,³⁸² who was assisted by geographer Stanisław Leszczycki³⁸³ and

³⁸² The group leading this work remained stable, despite the changing names of the top organ (Organisation Committee, Presidium). Ibid. Pp.89-99

biologist Włodzimierz Michajłow.³⁸⁴ Representing the Ministry of Higher Education and Research were Henryk Golański³⁸⁵ and Eugenia Krassowska; and last but not least came the director of the PUWP CC Science Division, Kazimierz Petruszewicz.³⁸⁶ The over-representation of biologists is related to the Lysenko affair, which made biology the ideological *dernier cri* in academic circles. Participation in these debates provided an opportunity for biologists to prove their '*partyjnosc*', or loyalty to the ideological orthodoxy. Meanwhile, by elevating right-thinking biologists the PUWP leadership could demonstrate to their Kremlin superiors that they had understood the importance of the Lysenko campaign.

The Congress of Science was preceded by over a year of information-gathering on the state of each scientific discipline, an analysis of these data, and discussions on plans for future developments. The Vice-Minister of Higher Education and Science, Eugenia Krassowska, responsible for ensuring that the Congress would produce the results stipulated by the Politburo, stressed the importance of the preparations:

*... the centre of gravity in the totality of the work of the Congress lies in the preparatory work. That should be understood to mean that the Congress will be only an exposition of work accomplished. The primary working unit of the Congress is the Sub-section, and the Section report constitutes the sum of the results achieved in the work of each Sub-section.*³⁸⁷

If we concentrate on the case of economics, three distinct stages can be discerned: firstly, the preparations behind closed doors; secondly, a national convention of representatives of economics; and thirdly the propagation of the national convention's decisions and 'teachings'

³⁸³ **Leszczycki, Stanisław Marian (1907-1996)** 1945-1947: assistant professor (prof.nadzw.) of Anthro-geography at UJ; 1948-70; professor of economic geography at Warsaw University. Deputy to the Sejm 1945-1949; Vice-minister of Foreign Affairs 1946-1950; from 1948 member of Main Council for Science and Education. Leszczycki, Stanisław M., 1991. "Autobiografia". *Kwartalnik Historii Nauki i Techniki*, 36, 1-54.

³⁸⁴ **Michajłow, Włodzimierz (1905-1994)** in 1946 he was deputy director of Department of Reform of Education and Upbringing at the Ministry of Education Kocharński, Aleksander (ed.) (2001) *Protokoły posiedzen Sekretariatu KC PPR 1945-1946*. Warszawa: Instytut Studiów Politycznych PAN

Wyższa Szkoła Humanistyczna w Pultusku.

³⁸⁵ **Golański, Henryk (1908-1995)** electrical engineer, PWP and later PUWP member, Vice-Minister of Industry (and Trade) 1945-1949, Vice-Minister of Light Industry 1949-1950, Vice-minister of Higher Education and Research 1950-59. Dudek, Antoni, Kocharński, Aleksander & Persak, Krzysztof (eds.) (2000) *Centrum Władzy. Protokoły posiedzen kierownictwa PZPR. Wybór z lat 1949-1970*. Ibid.: ISP PAN. Moldawa, Tadeusz, 1991. *Ludzie władzy, 1944-1991* Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Państwowe PWN.

Eugenia Krassowska (1910-1986) teacher, member of Democratic Party (Stronnictwo Demokratyczne) from 1945. Studied and worked at Wilno University, Vice-minister of Education 1946-1950, Vice-minister of Higher Education and Research 1951-1956

³⁸⁶ The Congress Executive Committee took an active part in the disciplinary discussions in the Sections, and its secretariat prepared and oversaw the preparations for the Congress.

³⁸⁷ APAN/IKNP/128, „Protokół Posiedzenia Sekcji Nauk Ekonomicznych I KNP” 21.3.50 p.167

to the whole profession by way of regional conferences. Only after this did the widely-publicised and closely-choreographed public ceremony, the Congress itself, take place.

Redefining the discipline

Even before the process of preparing for the Congress commenced, important changes were made in the discipline of economics. As the framework of using Sections and Sub-sections for Congress work had already been determined, the place of economics among other disciplines was now re-defined. Initially, the organisers of the Congress had given economics its traditional place, as one among several sub-sections of the Humanities Section, but following discussions in the PUWP and in Congress, economics ended up being promoted to a position independent of other social sciences and humanities. The final grouping was as follows:

1. Social Sciences and Humanities
2. Economics
3. Mathematics, Physics and Astronomy
4. Energy and Electrical Engineering
5. Machine Construction and Mechanical Technology
6. Engineering and Construction Sciences
7. Chemistry and Chemical Technology
8. Earth Sciences
9. Biology and Agricultural Sciences
10. Medical Sciences

Economics was not the only discipline whose status was elevated through being singled out as a section, in contrast to its traditional position in university departmental organisation. The division into sections allowed for more attention to be paid to natural and technical sciences, at the expense of humanities, which were now amassed in a single section. In a country where humanities had up till now been the ‘big brother’, dwarfing natural and technical sciences in terms of numbers of both students and staff, this amounted to a revolution. Representatives of the natural and engineering sciences had campaigned for such a revision since before the

war.³⁸⁸ For economics, however, it may be argued that the elevation exceeded the ambitions of its practitioners, whose goal of gaining full independence from legal studies had been rather more modest. This revision of the established hierarchy of disciplines opened up an opportunity for interest groups which drew their support from interpretations of the Marxist-Leninist ideology. Congress organisers saw “*a fluidity of opinions as to the structure, division, content and even the terminology*” of specific sub-disciplines.³⁸⁹

As economics was upgraded, another disciplinary group was downgraded, from being a ‘Production Methods and Organisation’ Section in the first draft to being a sub-section in the Economics Section. The discussions leading up to the decision to exchange Economics for Organisation Studies in the Congress hierarchy throw some light on PUWP ideas about the role of economics in relation to other social sciences and to Marxist-Leninist ideology. The claim of Organisation Studies to be a distinct discipline was examined at a Party conference in October 1949.³⁹⁰ It seems that the decision in favour of the Economics Section was taken following a conference organised by the CC Science Division and attended by the directors of both the Economics Sub-section and the Production Methods and Organisation Section, at which the two lobbies and their patron politicians confronted each other. Those for allowing Organisation Studies its own section were Golański, Jastrzębski and Epsztejn.³⁹¹ Their opponents, arguing for the subordination of Organisation Studies to an Economics Section were Jędrychowski, Lange and Blass.

The supporters (of the Production Methods and Organisation Section- awh) are of the opinion that new methods for the organisation of socialist work, and especially socialist competition (współzawodnictwo) and socialist rationalisation (racjonalizatorstwo), occupy such an enormous part of the process of production that they demand separate focus and attention, something that can be expressed tangibly through a separate report at the Congress plenum.³⁹²

³⁸⁸ See Rolbiecki on the interwar efforts of those from the fields of natural and technological sciences to promote the status and funding of their disciplines. Rolbiecki, Waldemar, 1990. *Geneza Polskiej Akademii Nauk (1930-1952)* Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, Wydawnictwo PAN.

³⁸⁹ APAN/IKNP-118, p.14 “Notatka organizacyjna”

³⁹⁰ AAN/KC PZPR/237/XVI/1 p.1-6

³⁹¹ **Jastrzębski, Wincenty (1885-1977)** member of PSP, later of PUWP. Participated in the October Revolution and in the organisation of the first economic plans for metal industry of Petrograd from 1918, where he also published a pioneering work on the application of scientific work organisation in socialism. He continued work with these subjects on his return to Poland. Vice-director of the Business Cycle and Price Institute in 1929, appointed vice-minister of Treasury in 1930 and Vice-minister of Social Welfare in 1934. In France during the war, appointed vice-minister of communication on his return to Poland in 1945, vice-minister of Treasury from 1948 (later of Finance). Jędruszczak, Hanna (ed.) (1983) *Wizje gospodarki socjalistycznej w Polsce 1945-1949. Początki planowania. Materiały źródłowe*. Warszawa: PWN, p.8 Tych, Feliks (ed.) (1987) *Słownik biograficzny działaczy polskiego ruchu robotniczego E-J*, Warszawa: Książka i Wiedza, pp.678-680

³⁹² APAN/IKNP/II- 128/ „Protokół Posiedzenia Sekcji Nauk Ekonomicznych I KNP, 21.3.50”, pp.167-169

This quote comes from one of the first meetings of the Economics Section in March 1950, where the future of the Production

It was thanks to the argument that Organisation Studies had a particularly important role in a socialist economy that these lobbyists almost managed to outflank the economists. For Economics the separatist tendency of the Organisation Studies supporters constituted something of a threat, as it could have entailed the diversion of important resources that were coming in from industry-related ministries. It is likely that this was the motive behind the strong opposition on the part of Economics representatives to Organisation Studies being classed as a distinct discipline.³⁹³ On the other hand, it may have been the audacity of the Organisation Studies lobby that emboldened economists to fight for an independent Section. Organisation Studies scholars were not alone in their disappointment at being placed under the tutelage of economists. Statisticians too, as we shall see, were upset that their subject was not treated as a discipline in its own right, and also challenged the idea that their place was with economics, rather than mathematics.

Although the arguments which allowed Economics to prevail over Organisation Studies are not quoted in the protocols from these meetings, it is clear from the course of action chosen, and from later statements, that the ideological import of economics, and of political economy in particular, was judged to be superior to that of organisation studies.

*The basis of all economic science is political economy, which constitutes an inherent part of the science of Marxism-Leninism.*³⁹⁴

Changes were also made to the inner structure of economics, with a range of specialist branches of economics being introduced. We have already looked at this development in Chapter Three, as it was applied to study programmes and the structure of the Main School. The inspiration and justification for this new arrangement was traced to Soviet practice:

Methods and Organisation Section was sealed.

³⁹³ APAN/IKNP/II- 128/ „Protokół Posiedzenia Sekcji Nauk Ekonomicznych I KNP, 21.3.50”, pp.167-169

The documentation of the composition of the two groups in this conflict is incomplete, but on the side pushing for a separate section for Economics, we find Lange backed by Jędrychowski and Blass, while the Production Methods and Organisation lobby features Ilja Epsztejn, director of the newly-founded Main Work Institute, supported by vice-minister Jastrzębski and vice-minister Golański. The central role of the PUWP in this discussion is suggested by both by the presence of party officials at decisive meetings, and the fact that meetings were held in CC PUWP offices.

³⁹⁴1951. *Stan i zadania nauk ekonomicznych w Polsce. 1-szy Kongres Nauki Polskiej*. Warszawa: PWN, p.145

During the period of the existence of Soviet power, a great diversification of economic sciences has taken place, especially in the domain of the study of socialist industry and agriculture. Alongside political economy, a range of economic disciplines has taken shape, with the aim of studying the different branches of our national economy (industry, agriculture, the distribution, etc.). This diversification in economic science reflects the deep processes of specialisation and division of labour which are occurring in our national economy and which reflect the tempestuous growth of productive forces. It is undoubtedly a positive phenomenon.³⁹⁵

The Section of Economics was divided into seven and then nine sub-sections, of which eight would eventually be active. The final ordering of the sub-sections was the result of several revisions. To show what changes were made, the rank held by the different sub-sections at an early phase in April 1950 appears in brackets.

1. Political economy and planning	[1]
2. Economics and organisation of industry and work	[2]
3. Economics of agriculture	[4]
4. Economics of trade	[5]
5. Finance	[6]
6. Statistics	[7]
7. Economics of construction and communal housing	[3]
8. Economics of international trade	[-]
9. Industry and transport (inactive)	[-] ³⁹⁶

The list reflects the order of priority. “Political economy and planning” was placed first, and was then followed by increasingly specialist ‘branch’ disciplines. The number of professionals involved in each sub-section varied. The Sub-section of Trade represented a large number of scholars, while the Sub-section of Industry and Transport atrophied, because it was impossible to find the dozen experts needed to make it operational. It is important to realise that the above-mentioned list of sub-divisions does not reflect the situation in economics in early 1950, rather the PUWP plans for the discipline.

³⁹⁵ K. Ostrowitianow quoted by W. Brus during the deliberations of the Economics Section at the First Congress of Polish Science 30.06-01.07.1951, published in: *Stan i zadania nauk ekonomicznych w Polsce. 1-szy Kongres Nauki Polskiej*. PWN, Warszawa, 1951, p.144 after Ostrowitianow, K. in *Woprosy ekonomiki*, nr.8, 1948, p.69

³⁹⁶ The International Trade and Industry sub-sections were created later. Industry and Transport was originally grouped with Construction and Communal housing, then moved away to form a new sub-section. However, due to the impossibility of finding staff, Industry and Transport never functioned, and was subsequently abandoned. All desirable candidates were much too occupied by work on the Six Year Plan.

Once the PUWP-controlled Congress leadership was satisfied with the framework, the next step was to choose the right people to sit in the various sections and sub-sections. The selection of Congress participants was an opportunity for the PUWP to come a step closer to the aim of changing the composition and hierarchy of economics, an opportunity, however, which was fraught with difficulties. The first challenge was to find a balance between the aim of converting the ‘hesitant masses of Polish scholars’ as the Politburo put it, and the need to control the discussions and conclusions. Conversion could not happen in absentia, meaning that ‘progressive’ scholars had to be present in important numbers, while control of discussions demanded a strong, loyal supporters’ contingent. The head of the PUWP CC Science Division therefore explained to members of the Economics Section why the Party was taking such trouble, and why it was important to draw large numbers of scholars into the work of the Congress:

Petrusewicz: (...) After all, what we want is not just having these theses written, having one person produce an appropriate text. Really, that is the least of our aims. If it had been so, we would have selected the sixty people from all over Poland we consider to be the best for the Congress of Science. They would have sat down together for two months, written the theses, held the Congress and the matter would have been settled. But exactly, this is not what this is about, this is about having the broadest possible masses of scientific workers discuss the theses and add their comments.

It is about, having them criticise these theses, understand them. Based on the example of their own disciplines they should understand what is being repeated ad nauseam, i.e. the issues of reactionarism and cosmopolitanism on the example of their own disciplines (...) that they should show how our research work has been burdened by cosmopolitanism, for it is known that undoubtedly the work of nearly all scientific workers has been burdened by cosmopolitanism to some degree.³⁹⁷

Another issue at the forefront of Party and Congress officials’ minds was ensuring that scholars would accept the Congress as their own. The officials were concerned about the legitimacy of the Congress as a scholarly enterprise, and about its credibility when it came to speaking on behalf of the scientific communities. Stefan Żółkiewski, who supervised Polish studies on the PUWP’s behalf, felt confident that he would be able to strike a balance between Marxist-Leninist control over the Polish Studies Convention, and the need for it to be accepted by the majority of scholars. In a letter to Petrusewicz he wrote:

³⁹⁷ APAN/IKNP/118 “Stenographic report from the general meeting of Economics Section held on 06.07.1950” pp.18-112

*The convention will not be completely Marxist. We will introduce a couple of speeches by 'honourable' professors. However, on the basis of the present composition of the main board of the A. Mickiewicz Literary Society, we can decide on the character of the Convention. Therefore, we will not admit any speeches that are ideologically foreign to us, and the Convention will be a demonstration of our ideology as regards Polish studies. (...) Despite the fact that the Convention will be in the hands of our people, it will represent the majority of Polish studies scholars, of whom not one famous representative will be absent.*³⁹⁸

Żółkiewski claimed that he could both secure control over the event while admitting scholars whose political and ideological attitudes were not considered trustworthy, and make sure that the majority of scholars would accept the legitimacy of the Convention to speak on behalf of their discipline. Further on in the letter, however, Żółkiewski revealed he was aware that established authorities in the field might snub his event, but he dismissed them as marginal and hopeless cases: “*Only a very few obstinate reactionaries, such as Pigoń and Górski, might refrain from coming.*”³⁹⁹ The sources at my disposal do not allow me to conclude whether the PUWP leadership was seriously concerned that scholars might follow their ‘old’ leaders into a massive boycott. It is not clear whether those invited to take part in congress-related activities were free to refuse the invitation. The repressive political atmosphere of these years leads me to suppose that the PUWP ensured that scholars did not feel free to express their dissatisfaction with the Congress. In April 1950, shortly after the creation of the Economics Section, a meeting protocol recorded a motion on the part of Edward Lipiński, proposing to replace the chairman in Sub-section One, Lipiński himself.⁴⁰⁰ It appears that he was attempting to resign from his post, but the decision was postponed, and in fact Lipiński remained chairman until the end of Congress. Sources are silent on Lipiński’s motives, and on the reasons why his resignation was not accepted. If this was a protest action, the Congress authorities ensured that it was thwarted and hushed up.⁴⁰¹ No opportunities for demonstrative boycotts were created. An examination of the lists of economists invited to the Economists’

³⁹⁸ KC PZPR 237/XVI/37 Wydział Nauki i Szkolnictwa Wyższego, Wytoczne, oceny, protokoły zjazdów: 1949-50, p.1-4, Letter from Stefan Żółkiewicz (director, Institute for Literary Studies) to Petrusiewicz (director, WP CC Science Division)

³⁹⁹ KC PZPR 237/XVI/37 Wydział Nauki i Szkolnictwa Wyższego, Wytoczne, oceny, protokoły zjazdów: 1949-50, p.1-4
Unfortunately the sources at my disposal do not reveal whether Pigoń and Górski attended the convention.

⁴⁰⁰ APAN/IKNP-128, p.156

⁴⁰¹ See Hübner’s report from the discussion in some of the Sections at the Congress itself, where things had slipped out of the Congress authorities’ control, only to be hushed up in the official reports. Hübner, Piotr, 1983. *I Kongres Nauk Polskiej jako forma realizacji założeń polityki naukowej państwa ludowego*. Wrocław: Zakład narodowy imienia Ossolińskich. pp.154-159

Convention held the following year reveals that the ‘reactionary’ economists, such as E. Taylor and A. Krzyżanowski, were not invited to this event.⁴⁰²

The selection of the trusted and loyal PUWP contingent that would sit on different bodies in the Congress was riddled with other problems. Even here, the PUWP leadership faced the issue of loyalty and reliability, as the PUWP population was even at that point already a rather motley crew: from old communists who had experienced Stalin’s extermination of the KPP⁴⁰³ before the War and veterans of the Spanish Civil War, to a mix of loyal and resentful socialists and new members on the lookout for career opportunities. Things were far from calm within the Party, but these undercurrents were not the subject of open discussion in Congress-related fora. What was openly discussed was the Congress organisers’ efforts to balance ‘praktycy’ and academics.

The terms ‘praktyk’ and ‘praktyka’ translate as practitioner and practice (or praxis in Marxist terminology). They were frequently used in the discussions of economics, and are central to the relationship between the established scientific communities, the PUWP leadership, and Party and government officials. For Marx, “praxis” denoted action, the opposite of philosophical speculation, with a focus on material production as the most fundamental characteristic of human society.⁴⁰⁴ The terms ‘praktyka’ and ‘praktyk’ came to Poland via Russian ‘newspeak’, where they had acquired new connotations. Nikolai Krementsov, who has studied these in the Soviet scientific context, gives the following description of the Russian equivalent of ‘praktyka’:

Practicality (praktichnost’) – one of the characteristic traits of ‘Soviet’ science and an identification of ‘ours’. Derived from practice. Antonyms: practical sterility, fruitless theorizing, academism.

Practice (praktika) – the “dialectical” opposite of theory; meant “the practice of socialist construction” that must lead and direct the theory. In science, this meant that practical work (say, in agriculture) must lead and direct research (in agricultural science) (...)

*Theory and practice (teoriia i praktika) – a motto from the early 1930s and widely used thereafter.*⁴⁰⁵

⁴⁰² AAN/PTE/6, p.41-54

⁴⁰³ The Communist Party of Poland (KPP), dissolved on Stalin’s orders in 1938. The majority of its leaders and activists perished in the Gulag.

⁴⁰⁴ Definition of “Praxis” based on H. Lefebvre, from *The Sociology of Marx*, London: 1968, in *The Penguin Dictionary of Sociology*, 3rd ed. (1994)

⁴⁰⁵ Krementsov, Nikolai, 1997. *Stalinist Science* Princeton: Princeton University Press. *Appendix A: Stalinist Scientific*

In the Poland of the early 1950s, being a ‘practitioner’ meant implementing under the PUWP’s leadership policies aiming at revolutionary societal and economic changes. The actual occupations of those described as ‘*praktyk*’ ranged from minister to factory manager, but Party officials too were included.⁴⁰⁶ Economics had always been characterised by close links between scholars and the professionals employed in business and administration. The concept pair “theory and practice”, however, was not just a new way of expressing this fact. It allowed the PUWP to discredit both the established profession and individual scholars. Professional economists were not ‘*praktyk*’ unless they had been enrolled by the PUWP in work on the Six-Year Plan. Work in private business or in the pre-war state apparatus was collusion with capitalism, not ‘*praktyka*’. The PUWP claimed that the qualifications of established economists in academic positions were outclassed by experience gained in constructing a new revolutionary economy, as this provided a more fruitful and instructive source for the “creative development of Marxism-Leninism” than a career at an academic institution. The juxtaposition of ‘theory’ and ‘practice’ provided a justification for the devaluation of the qualifications of professional economists and the replacement of ‘bourgeois’ theoreticians by politicians and economic administrators boasting a closer tie to ‘*praktyka*’.

Nevertheless, an over-heavy reliance on ‘*praktycy*’ had its dangers. It could empty the Congress of academic character and endanger the aim of changing the way knowledge was produced by scholars.

*Minister Jędrzychowski once more defined the tasks of the Congress, and on this basis expressed fear about the appropriateness of the engagement in the workings of the Congress of an excessive number of workers, activists and leaders in practical economical life. The danger is that the supervision of reports by leading directors of economic agencies, and not by professional scientists, could distort and consequently annihilate the aims of the Congress.*⁴⁰⁷

The goals the PUWP had set for the Congress were contradictory. There was a conflict between a wish for the conversion of the majority and a reluctance to allow this non-Marxist group to dominate the discussions. A stronger presence of PUWP-loyal participants would have provided control but could have undermined both the potential for conversion and the

“*Newspeak*”: *A Glossary*, p.297-8

⁴⁰⁶ See lists of guests invited to the First Convention of Economists.

⁴⁰⁷ APAN/IKNP/128, p.167 Protokół posiedzenia Sekcji Nauk Ekonomicznych, 21.03.1950

academic character of the Congress. To see how these dilemmas were resolved in practice, we can look into the documents that detail the invitations to the Convention of Economists in 1950. More than 300 people were listed, in six separate lists.⁴⁰⁸ The first list contained representatives from Parliament and the State Council, and thirteen ministers and fourteen vice-ministers from economy-related ministries and other state agencies. Also included in the list of high-level state officials were nine directors of CC Divisions and their deputies from the PUWP CC.⁴⁰⁹ List “B” was composed of high-ranking bureaucrats from ministries and other central state agencies, co-operatives and banks, and editors of important periodicals and journals. The contingent of those expressly invited from without academic institutions thus comprised 83 names. Then came 57 ‘praktycy’ who had participated in Congress work in the sub-sections and who were therefore included in a list of participants in the preparations (list “D”), which featured another six vice-ministers and ministers. Only 29 of them accepted their invitations: for instance, only three of the eleven members of the sub-section of statistics announced their presence.

Lists “C” and “E” contained a total of 179 professors, lecturers and assistants, and reflected the already-altered academic landscape described in Chapter Three. Here too were many ‘praktycy’, disguised as academics thanks to their contracts for specialist lectures, but there were very few scholars whose professorial titles pre-dated the rush of politically-motivated promotions. My count yields only nine ‘old’ professors.⁴¹⁰ Several famous economists were not invited, while others appear to have been invited originally, to have accepted their invitations, but not to have been counted as participants. Among those not invited we find professors who had already been forced to retire, or who had seen their chairs removed and lectures cancelled: Edward Taylor, Adam and Witold Krzyżanowski, Stefan Zaleski, Adolf Tokarski and Waław Fabierkiewicz. Wincenty Styś and Feliks Młynarski had originally been invited and had accepted their invitations but, in the end – for unknown reasons – did not attend.⁴¹¹

⁴⁰⁸ AAN/PTE/6, p.40-54

⁴⁰⁹ List A: “Representatives of the Highest State Offices” AAN/PTE/6, p.41-42

⁴¹⁰ Oskar Lange, Edward Lipiński, Aleksy Wakar, Marian Nadobnik, Jan Zdzitowiecki, Stefan Rosiński, Antoni Żabko-Potopowicz, Andrzej Grodek and Jerzy Lubowicki. AAN/PTE/6, p.45-48

⁴¹¹ Marks on the lists indicate responses, and handwritten numbers on the left indicate a final count of participants. AAN/PTE/6, p.40-54

Feliks Młynarski (1884-1972) professor of economics first at the Main School of Commerce and later at Jagiellon University. Specialised in finance and monetary policy, held many influential state positions in the 1920s such as Deputy director of the Polish Bank, and dept.director at the Ministry of Treasury.

The list of docents and older assistants (41) was supplemented by a list handwritten by W. Brus with a large batch (29) of aspirantura students from the recently-opened Institute for Training of Scientific Cadres. This Institute's leadership also mobilised their students, and made sure they all attended.⁴¹² Meanwhile younger academics from other institutions appear to have been carefully screened – only nine of the above fifty adjuncts and older assistants at the Main School of Planning and Statistics were invited. Even if those included in other lists are added, the count of junior economists from outside the ITSC ends at fifteen. It would seem that the eldest generation and the youngest were most thoroughly screened, while the middle generation was the target of the missionary efforts.

Discussions in Sections and Sub-sections

The aim of the Congress preparations, as stated by the Politburo, was to enable and provoke discussions that would lead to a breakthrough for Marxism in all disciplines. How was this aim realised?

The task of the sub-sections was to gather information, to set up problem-groups, and to commission discussion papers addressing questions relevant for an evaluation of the current state of affairs, and for plans for future research. In the course of the discussion and revision of the drafts of problem papers, sub-sections were to carry out three tasks: firstly, to produce reports containing critical analyses of the situation in their respective fields; secondly, to consider how to implement research planning in their particular disciplines; and finally to prepare a list of the most important topics to be dealt with by scholars over subsequent years. The Section provided the framework for the co-ordination of the Sub-sections' efforts. The Section executive committee, and the Executive Committee of the Congress, called plenum meetings where Sub-sections reported on their work and were instructed on their future course, and also held extra meetings with the heads of Sub-sections whose work was deemed less than satisfactory.

Oskar Lange, the president of the Economics Section, had the rare combination of both scholarly and political authority, as he was an internationally-renowned economist and a member of the PUWP Central Committee. The vice-presidents were politicians, with seats in Parliament and top positions in the Planning Commission. In addition, Stefan Jędrychowski was a member of the PUWP CC, and Franciszek Blinowski was vice-director of the CC

⁴¹² They are all counted as participants on the list. AAN/PTE/6, p.53-54

Economic Division.⁴¹³ The important post of secretary (referent) of the section, with the task of preparing drafts of reports for discussion, went to Włodzimierz Brus. The remaining seats in the Economics Section were filled with ‘practitioners’, that is, state and party functionaries. This pattern was followed in the composition of most sub-sections: a co-operative progressive scholar with a respected academic record at the head, and a trusted Marxist-Leninist in the decisive position of secretary.

Presiding over the Political Economy and Planning Sub-section was Edward Lipiński.⁴¹⁴ He was seconded, or rather supervised, by the vice-president B. Minc, now employed at the Planning Commission (PKPG), and the referent, W. Brus. Four other members hailed from the Moscow-trained ‘spearhead of revolution’ group at the Main School. To this already-strong PUWP contingent were added one veteran communist activist and two individuals about whom little is known, but who may have been representatives of the Polish Youth Union (ZMP). (They certainly did not come from the academic establishment.) Besides Lipiński, only one person with an academic record and a socialist rather than communist background was admitted to this subsection: J. Drewnowski. The intention to break with the field’s past is clear. This sub-section was to produce the chief condemnation of the entire body of ‘bourgeois economics’: the theory, the premises, the methods and the research practices.

I will concentrate on two meetings: a general meeting held in July 1950 which brought together representatives from all sub-sections, the leadership of the Economics Section, and representatives of the Congress Executive Committee; and a meeting in the Political Economy and Planning Sub-section in late September that same year, recorded in an extensive protocol. The problems raised at these meetings can tell us something about the way the new relationship between scholars and the political, budget-controlling authorities was formed and negotiated. How did academics present the problems and needs of their sector, and what was the response on the part of the representatives of the regime? Equally interesting is the evolution of the discussion, including as it does the struggle for control over the discussion agenda and the style and dynamic of the debate.

⁴¹³ Blinowski was also keeping a close eye on the Main School of Planning and Statistics, attending the meetings of its School Committee. APMW/KU SGPIS 214/III-1 *Protokoły posiedzeń Egzekutywy POP PZPR w SGPiS 1949-50*

⁴¹⁴ Judging both from the composition and the work of the sub-section, it is puzzling that planning was added to political economy, especially since a much larger contingent of representatives of the Planning Commission was to be found in the sub-section devoted to industrial economics.

At the general meeting in July, after each sub-section had presented the achievements it had made in the two months since the beginning of their work, W. Brus (secretary of the Section) gave a critical assessment of most of the sub-sections. Only three sub-sections were praised for their efforts, and these were the ones which had based their work on ministerial research institutes (agrarian, labour organisation and trade). Those who were criticised admitted that they had not had time to do all that had been asked of them, and claimed that the criticism was unjust because it disregarded the severe problems the sub-sections were contending with. In Chapter Three, we looked at some of the social tensions produced in meetings between the new and old hierarchies from the perspective of the newcomers at the Main School. In the verbatim transcripts of the sub-sections' discussions we can catch a glimpse of something similar. How to criticise scholars double his age, who had been professors for decades, seems not to have been obvious or easy for the 28-year old Brus. Even with the backing of the PUWP and the Congress authorities, he felt he had to excuse and justify the sharpness of his critique:

*I submit my conclusions to the discussion and I am aware that they are sometimes sharply formulated. Let them be an exaggeration, in the words of Stalin, who said, on bending a stick, "Sometimes it is necessary to bend a stick too far." In my opinion, it is necessary to "bend the stick too far" to stimulate discussion and work.*⁴¹⁵

Lipiński patronised Brus, reminding all present who was the Master and who was the student: "Despite the fact that I have the fond feelings of an old teacher towards Professor Brus, his report provoked a sensation of disappointment in me..."⁴¹⁶ Professors and ministers disregarded Brus's authority, refusing to submit humbly to his criticism. Indeed they mounted quite an opposition, as the following excerpt from an interchange between Brus, Kaczorowski, and Kurowski illustrates:⁴¹⁷

⁴¹⁵ APAN/IKNP/118 p.71

⁴¹⁶ APAN/IKNP/118, p.77

⁴¹⁷ **Kaczorowski, Michal (1897-1975)** economist, member of PSP then PUWP. Minister of Reconstruction 1945-1947, chairman of the Central Statistical Office 1946-1949, moved then over to scholarly work and was the organiser and director of Institute of Housing (until the 1970s) and of the Institute of Urban Architecture and Architecture. Dziewoński, Kazimierz, 1979. *Michal Kaczorowski : człowiek i dzieło* Warszawa: PWN, Moldawa, Tadeusz, 1991. *Ludzie władzy, 1944-1991* Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Państwowe PWN.

Leon Kurowski (1907-) doctorate at Wilno University before the War; 1945-1953 professor at Toruń University, 1949-1984 Prof. of financial law at Warsaw University; Prof. at Main School of Planning and Statistics 1951-1962; member of Economics and Business Studies Section of Rada Szkół Wyższych established in 1946; vice-minister of Treasury 1945-1950; vice-minister of Finance 1950-1951. Was not member of any party. Moldawa, Tadeusz, 1991. *Ludzie władzy, 1944-1991* Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Państwowe PWN. Kolarzowski at www.racjonalista.pl/kk.php/s,4759 accessed 31.06.2006;

Prof. Kaczorowski: I have some doubts, however, as to the charge of objectivism, as far as the choice of topics is concerned

Prof. Brus: It is not about the choice, but the approach. The choice is correct.

Prof. Kaczorowski: I am sorry but I have not said a word about the approach. And I shall venture to tell you, Professor, that what you reported on the results of the work of the Sub-section of Agrarian Economics, and about which you were so enthusiastic, was equal to what I myself submitted. (...)

Vice-minister Kurowski: (...) The accusations regarding other sub-commissions were not always grounded. (...) Suffice it to say that if one reads Professor Orłowski's remarks attentively, one will know that such accusations should not be addressed to the Finance Sub-section..

Prof. Brus (...) Suffice it to say that if one had listened attentively to what I was saying you would know that such accusations were not made. Vice-minister Kurowski: As far as the theses formulated by Professor Brus are concerned, these were mostly reminders of things that are known to us, such as the issue of the sharp formulation of ideological problems, and the issue of the relationship with the Six Year Plan. Here one must agree with the position of Professor Lipiński, that reminding us about these matters is a waste of time.⁴¹⁸

The response of the sub-sections' representatives to the critical assessment of their work formulated by Brus was not what the congress leadership had wished for. The first to respond on the PUWP's behalf was J. Zawadzki, a member of the Political Economy Subsection and one of the Marxist-Leninist economists.⁴¹⁹ He stated that Brus's critique was correct and should be submitted to. The representatives of the Congress central leadership, Golański, Leszczycki and Petruszewicz, then took turns to express their dissatisfaction both with the work done and with the reactions to the criticism, and Petruszewicz gave a long speech in which he first he addressed the style of discussion:

(...) this reaction, applied just now by Professor Lipiński and Professor Kurowski, has the characteristics of an attempt to explain everything away. (...) It appears to me that the effort of explaining things away is not necessary here, for many things, even everything, can be explained, giving rise to the saying "to explain everything, is to forgive everything." But this saying has nothing to do with the principles of Marxism, for it has grown out of the principles of Christian ethics, not Marxist ones, and is wholly alien to us Marxists.⁴²⁰

⁴¹⁸ APAN/IKNP/118, p.18-112: Stenographic report from the general meeting of Economics Section held 06.07.1950

⁴¹⁹ **Józef Zawadzki (1905-)** after the war he worked in PWP party schools, lecturing on the political economy of socialism at the Main School, worked from 1954 as professor of economics at Warsaw University.

⁴²⁰ APAN/IKNP/118, p.18-112: Stenographic report from the general meeting of Economics Section held 06.07.1950

By describing the logic behind Lipiński's and Kurowski's responses as "Christian", Petruszewicz was refusing to take notice of any reasonable attempts on their part to identify potential for improvement. Instead, he was creating a potential conflict between the Marxist discussion style that was fit for true scientists, and an unscientific, unconstructive 'old' style. As an example, he held up the situation in the Humanities Section and among younger staff at the Medical Academy.

Petruszewicz: (...) I would even say that the situation is worse than in the Humanities Section. After all, a discussion did get going there, and became lively and sharp, and the participants at that meeting began to admit to a series of things, began to accuse each other, while here it was said that the accusations that have been set forth should not be repeated, because that bores us, because that takes up our time. (...) Professor Zawadzki's characterisation is right, that so far in the work of the Section one can spot only objectivism, eclecticism, the drive toward making inventories and encyclopaedism, but no class approach, no party-minded attitude to science. (...) Professor Brus spoke of drawing youth into our work and discussions, to which Professor Kurowski responded with great outrage. (...) as far as I can tell, the convention of young medics was at a higher level than all the conferences of professors of medicine, not only from an ideological perspective, but from the perspective of the sharpness of the formulation of problems, and the perspective of the political, class orientation of problems. (...) for three days they fought, for three days they leapt at each others' throats. Truly, at none of the other meetings where the 'grown-up' professors were speaking have I ever heard these problems formulated so well, or so politically.⁴²¹

Another important theme was the competition for the right to speak on behalf of the dominant Marxist-Leninist position. It was becoming clear that only those who could claim a Marxist-Leninist identity would wield power, so it became necessary for anyone with any hope of continued influence over the discipline to ensure that he was defined as one of the 'we' group in power. Lipiński responded with indignation when Brus questioned his and the other subsection members' competence as Marxists-Leninists:

Professor Brus' reminders bear on fundamental, elementary, abc-like matters which are obligatory for every Marxist, and all the ideological issues that need to be combined with praxis – it is not proper to remind us too often, for these matters are basic and we should already have digested and absorbed them completely.⁴²²

Lipiński had presided over a transformation of *Ekonomista*, had edited an anthology of Soviet economists' writings, and had been through the ordeal of *samokrytyka* in front of the Main

⁴²¹ APAN/IKNP/118, p.18-112: Stenographic report from the general meeting of Economics Section held 06.07.1950

⁴²² APAN/IKNP/118, p.18-112: Stenographic report from the general meeting of Economics Section held 06.07.1950

School party organisation.⁴²³ His report on the work of his subsection at the start of the meeting shows that he considered himself to be well within the 'we' of the Marxist-Leninist position.

*Lipiński: (...) I took part in a seminar organised for the new recruits – but there were older ones as well, and there I observed something: only a few individuals had learned or got near to the correct concept of the new Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist method of economic research, to the Marxist-Leninist Stalinist approach to the consideration of specific problems. The objectivist point of view still prevails, as does some sort of search for quantitative solutions. Despite long discussions and great efforts on the part of the teaching staff, the majority of these students had not managed to understand what our approach to scientific problems consists of.*⁴²⁴

After this first intervention, in which Edward Lipiński spoke as one of the Marxists-Leninists, he was pushed into a defensive position. When Lipiński was denied his Marxist-Leninist credentials by the Marxist-Leninist scholars who spoke on behalf of the Congress authority, and thus on behalf of the PUWP leadership, he became a passive object of evaluation, not someone who could be an active Marxist-Leninist protagonist, able to evaluate the level of others' Marxism-Leninism, as he had done in the quote above. The same trend continued two months later, at the September 22nd meeting of the Political Economy and Planning Subsection. On the agenda was a problem paper appraising *Ekonomista*, written by J. Zawadzki.⁴²⁵ The minutes of the discussion provide an example of how PUWP Marxist-Leninist scholars responded to Petruszewicz's calls for a 'sharp and courageous' discussion. The debate over the merits of *Ekonomista* turned into a discussion about Lipiński and the efforts he had put into in 'improving' the journal's ideological profile. On the whole, interventions were critical, with only a few comments to the effect that the editor of *Ekonomista* had worked hard to rectify the lack of Marxism-Leninism in himself and the journal, but "was not quite there yet".⁴²⁶ No-one defended Lipiński directly, and many of the discussants came up with their own suggestions as to the direction *Ekonomista* should take. Grodek wanted more material on higher education, while Pohorille wanted the journal to address the "masses". The objections raised by the Marxist-Leninist professors Wyrozembski,

⁴²³ APMW/ PZPR/2705 KU SGPIS 214/III-1/ *Protokoły posiedzeń Egzekutywy POP PZPR w SGPiS 1949-50*, p.20: Minutes of meeting of the Executive Committee of the BOP of the Main School of Planning and Statistics held on 27.11.1949.

⁴²⁴ APAN/IKNP/118 *Stenographic report of the general meeting of the Economics Section held on 06.07.1950*, p.18-112

⁴²⁵ My source here are minutes of the discussion, not the problem paper itself. APAN/IKNP/II- 128/pp.181-184/22.9.50

⁴²⁶ APAN/IKNP/II- 128/ *Protokół posiedzenia Podsekcji Ekonomii Politycznej i Planowania Gospodarki Narodowej 22.9.50*, Brus and Wyrozembski's interventions. p.182/

Minc, Brus and Zawadzki, however, paled in comparison with the criticism voiced by two members of the Political Economy and Planning Subsection unknown to me:⁴²⁷

Mgr. Zatorski: The need for a sharp critique of Ekonomista is more than urgent, our economic literature lacks a combative political party language, and there is a tendency to separate economic and political issues from one another. (...)

*Mgr. Nowik: It is necessary to have a self-critical discussion of the articles that have appeared; the authors should do this themselves. (...) In order to move science forward it is necessary to clear the way, and build new things, there should be no returning to the old ones.*⁴²⁸

In Lange's intervention one can sense an indirect defence of *Ekonomista* and Lipiński, as he praised the evolution of the journal and expressed the hope that the evaluation report would show more of "the ideological development of economics, ... the broadening of the Marxist approach, because bourgeois economics does grab hold of questions"⁴²⁹ Notwithstanding Lange's apparent attempts to turn the discussion away from a critique of Lipiński towards questions about the general development of the discipline, criticism of named individuals was the order of the day. Indeed, quite a period of time was also devoted to a critique of Zawadzki and to the form of the report. Nearly all participants urged Zawadzki to be more critical and sharp, and his prose was criticised for being too journalistic in style, and for lacking authority, quotes from Stalin and Engels, and precise references to the examples used. B. Minc, whose article was criticised in Zawadzki's report, deemed it 'unconvincing' and lacking a Marxist-Leninist base, while Wyrozembski found it too unsophisticated:

*(...) the critique of certain articles makes too vulgar an impression, which lowers the tone of Professor Zawadzki's remarks. There should be more precision in the examples cited.*⁴³⁰

Reservations were even voiced about the organisation of the Zawadzki report, which had consisted of a critique of a limited number of articles that had appeared some time before. Marxist-Leninist economists showed that their commitment to criticism also included their own comrades, and that they had already assimilated the debating techniques prescribed by

⁴²⁷ Mgr. stands for Magister, the equivalent of a Master degree. Edward Nowik published an article in *Nowe Drogi*: Nowik, Edward, 1949. "The sources of the military strength of the USSR". *Nowe Drogi*. No further information has been found regarding his or Aleksander Zatorski's education or institutional affiliations,

⁴²⁸ APAN/IKNP/II- 128/ *Protokół posiedzenia Podsekcji Ekonomii Politycznej i Planowania Gospodarki Narodowej* 22.9.50, pp.181-183

⁴²⁹ APAN/IKNP/II- 128/ *Protokół posiedzenia Podsekcji Ekonomii Politycznej i Planowania Gospodarki Narodowej* 22.9.50, p.182

⁴³⁰ APAN/IKNP/II- 128/ *Protokół posiedzenia Podsekcji Ekonomii Politycznej i Planowania Gospodarki Narodowej* 22.9.50, pp.182

the PUWP. This critique of *Ekonomista*, or a revised version, was later published in *Nowe Drogi*.⁴³¹ Since I have not been able to locate the draft submitted by Zawadzki to this meeting, it has not been possible to evaluate how far the criticism influenced the published text. Controversy over the evaluation of *Ekonomista* did not end there, and we shall consider its 1953 sequel in the next chapter.

Returning to the general meeting in July 1950, Lipiński, Kaczorowski and Kurowski had not only contested the conclusions of Brus's critique, but had also used the occasion to inform the leadership of the Congress on the important shortcomings and problems their sub-disciplines struggled with, calling on them to help to solve those deemed most urgent. Representatives of several sub-disciplines asked for the establishment of new research institutions. Lipiński criticised the quality of research training, and claimed that the composition of the Section was too homogeneous to allow for genuine discussion. Sub-section discussions, however, did function as sounding boards for clarification, on which the postulated problems would be acknowledged by the PUWP and Congress authorities, and which in the end would be denied. One important problem, raised by Lipiński but ostensibly ignored by the Petruszewicz, was the effect the repressive and aggressive debating style was having on the production of scholarly publications. Explaining why so few good Marxist-Leninist articles appeared in *Ekonomista*, Lipiński said:

*People do not have time [for writing], but I suspect that some avoid writing on purpose, on the assumption that it is always dangerous, and that while writing one might slip. (...) I think that the last article by Stalin, and the passage on the necessity of struggle and criticism, will aid us in overcoming these kinds of inner hindrances.*⁴³²

The appeal to Stalin refers to a passage in a recently published article on linguistics, where Stalin condemned the monopoly of one theoretical school in that discipline. Lipiński expressed the hope that this would be the start of a more liberal development. Although this would turn out to be far too optimistic, Lipiński did demonstrate that he had understood the central premise of the new system; that innovation could only originate from the highest echelons, and that the sole way to overcome local party bosses was to appeal to even higher ranks.

⁴³¹ Zawadzki, Józef. 1950. "O właściwy kierunek rozwoju "Ekonomisty"". *Nowe Drogi*, 205-220.)

⁴³² APAN/IKNP/118 *Stenographic report of the general meeting of the Economics Section held on 06.07.1950*, pp.81-82

In his response to Lipiński's concern that fear was paralysing scholarly production, Petruszewicz denied the existence of such problems: he had seen no such fear, he said.⁴³³ Not long afterwards, however, in a report written for the Politburo in 1951, he too expressed concern about fear among scholars, although for a different reason. Petruszewicz was worried that fear worked against the goals PUWP had set for the Congress. He had by then observed that the pointed discussions that the PUWP wanted to provoke among scientists were made difficult by fear: "*some scientists expressed the reservation that they will not discuss anything, because they fear that repressive action might be taken against them (dismissal, suspension etc.)*"⁴³⁴ He added that wherever 'deeper and more courageous' discussions had taken place, the aim of "segmentation" (*rozwarstwianie*) of the professors had been reached, and economics was mentioned among the disciplines where this objective had been achieved.⁴³⁵ For Petruszewicz, fear was a problem inasmuch as it made scholars hold back from criticism of each other.

In the course of the Section and Subsections discussions, the Congress authorities actively sought to introduce a discussion style hereto unknown in scholarly contexts in Poland. This style included the practice of self critique (*samokrytyka*), a change of rhetoric, and the imposition of PUWP political taboos and agendas. Congress preparations aimed at making scholars understand the necessity of adjusting to the PUWP's politicised communication style: "*economists have to tune themselves to the general pitch*" as Grodek put it.⁴³⁶

While discussions in the general Section and Political Economy and Planning Subsection meetings concerned the entire discipline, the work of other Subsections was more limited in scope. By introducing new categories and hierarchies for the sub-groups in economics, the regime hoped to modify the discipline, in order to reflect its own priorities. We now need to consider what strategies were deployed to ensure Marxist-Leninist control over different sub-groups in the discipline.

The constituencies of the Sub-sections of Agrarian Economics and Trade Economics were well-established and well-populated. With these communities, the PUWP used a strategy analogous to the disarming of opposition parties, by establishing communist-controlled factions or subsidiaries. The reform of these sub-disciplines was carried out using state

⁴³³ APAN/IKNP/118 *Stenographic report of the general meeting of the Economics Section held on 06.07.1950*, p.100

⁴³⁴ Quoted in Hübner, Piotr, 1983. *I Kongres Nauk Polskiej jako forma realizacji założeń polityki naukowej państwa ludowego*. Wrocław: Zakład narodowy imienia Ossolińskich. p.123

⁴³⁵ Quoted in *Ibid.* p.122-123

⁴³⁶ APAN/IKNP/128 p. 187 Protokół Podsekcji Ekonomii Politycznej i Planowania Gospodarki Narodowej, 30.05.1950

research institutes as the basis for the new Marxist-Leninist orientation in the field. The third sub-section belonging to the group of research-institute-based sub-sections is that of Organisation Studies, as already discussed.⁴³⁷ Its case differs from both the trade and the agrarian economics communities, in that it was building on fresh ground, as no strong group of scholars or institution had previously existed in Organisation Studies. The Industry and Work Organisation Sub-section faced no competition and had no large group of established scholars to be controlled and criticised. Having secured an institutional base, it would suffice for it to make a show of activity and submit its report.

The Agrarian Economics Sub-section was dominated by employees of the Institute of Agrarian Economics,⁴³⁸ which had been set up as recently as January 1950. It had begun its activities as the Bureau of Studies at the CC Agrarian Division, and had been given a central role in the transformation of teaching in agricultural colleges.⁴³⁹ Given that agrarian problems were a well-established area involving numerous specialists in several universities and higher schools, the absence of any economists with academic positions in this sub-section amounts to an attempt to establish from scratch a new research group to deal with the problems of agrarian economics. It is difficult to say much about the activities of this Sub-section, for despite the favourable verdict it received in Brus's speech at the general meeting of the Section in July 1950, there are few traces of its activities in the sources. An explanation is provided in Lange's final comments at the general meeting in July 1950, when he referred to the three sub-sections with research institutes:

⁴³⁷ 2. The Industry and Labour Organisation Subsection of was chaired by W. Jastrzębski (Ministry of Finance), I. Epsztejn, and two more representatives from Epsztejn's institutional stronghold, the Main Institute of Work. A strong contingent from the Planning Commission (5) was joined by representatives of the Heavy Industry and Mining ministries and other state agencies concerned with work. The small and provincial academic contingent (3) appears to have carried little weight. For full list of names, see in Appendix.

⁴³⁸ 3. Agriculture Sub-section: chaired and dominated by representatives of the Agrarian Economics Institute (7), this sub-section was first of all concerned with the recently-begun collectivisation. The strong contingent of academic institutions (5), the Higher Education and Science Ministry, and the journal "Polish Peasant", spoke of concerns about education and propaganda in this field. Also present were the centres for policy-making in agriculture, the Agriculture and Land Reform Ministry (2), the Planning Commission (2) and Main State Farms Union. No-one who had openly questioned collectivisation was present in the sub-section. For full list of names, see in Appendix.

⁴³⁹ It was then merged with two reformed research institutes, Wydział Ekonomiki Rolnej PINGW and Dział Rolny Spółdzielczego Instytutu Naukowego

Lange: (...) in this case, it is not that these Sub-sections work better; only the institutes work well, and these Sub-sections profit from the ready-made work of the institutes. This is the case of Agrarian Economics. I must say, and here I disagree with my colleague Brus, that this subsection does virtually no work at all. The best proof of this is that no-one [from the Subsection- AWH] came today. After all, the Subsection does not maintain contact with the Presidium of the Section, so it is impossible to see anyone or make an appointment with anyone.⁴⁴⁰

Business economics had traditionally held a central position in the discipline, but in the new socialist economic order, this was lost. Unlike the case of agriculture, it was no longer a burning political issue, after nationalisation and the ‘battle for trade’ had eradicated legal private business. Furthermore, the difficulty of combining domestic and international trade led to the creation of a sub-section devoted to foreign trade, leaving the Trade Sub-section to deal purely with domestic problems. Incidentally this meant that the politically sensitive issues of international trade were removed from the Sub-section, reducing somewhat the PUWP’s urgent desire to control it. Compared with political economy and agriculture, trade was graded as requiring less political and ideological control. That seems to be the reason why the Trade Sub-section and that of Agricultural Economics were not treated in the same way.⁴⁴¹ There was an important similarity though: a central, Party-controlled research institute was set up early in 1950, and given a central role in the Sub-section. The Scientific Institute for Research on Trade and Communal Eating did not dominate the Sub-section, as it had only two representatives there. The impact of the Institute, however, was very strong in terms of which problems in trade economics were defined as core activities. To make trade economics more ideologically relevant it was to be coupled with the very communist idea of ‘communal eating’ (replacing cooking at home with meals in canteens), and work to provide plans for the rational distribution of goods. One of the first tasks of the Institute was to plan the network of shops in Nowa Huta. From working on problems of market and demand, the focus of economics of trade shifted towards providing tools to make consumers fit into the planned economy.

⁴⁴⁰ APAN/IKNP/118, Stenographic report of the general meeting of the Economics Section held on 06.07.1950, p.111

⁴⁴¹ 4. Trade Sub-section: headed by L. Koźmiński, a scholar with leftist sympathies from the younger generation, trained in ‘bourgeois’ economics and chaperoned by T. Dietrich - a socialist who had proved his loyalty to the PUWP in the CPB debate. The referent was, as in other sub-sections, taken from the ‘fist of revolution’ group. The two representatives of the Institute for Scientific Research on Trade and Communal Eating were to form the basis of a reorientation of trade studies towards new problems and a Marxist approach. Educational institutions in Warsaw, Poznań and Katowice were represented, but were outnumbered by the large contingent of ‘praktycy’ representing state agencies concerned with trade. For full list of names, see in Appendix.

In addition to the reduction of the political relevance of trade, the Trade Sub-section also differed from the Agricultural Economics Sub-section in that its presidium and other members were very active. This sub-section excelled in fulfilling its Plan: travelling to all institutions that taught trade economics; commissioning and submitting problem papers; organising a national conference; and organising discussion meetings. The question arises as to whether this diligence was a calculated strategy, or a consequence of the fact that since neither its head Professor Koźmiński, nor any other members belonged to the core of fully-trusted Marxist-Leninist economists, they did not suffer from an overload of functions and positions, and were thus able to find time for Sub-section work. It is also possible that Koźmiński was making sure that the Sub-section conformed meticulously to the demands of the Section and Congress leaderships, in order to shield trade economics from excessive criticism.

At the general meeting of the Section in July 1950, the sub-sections of Political Economy and Planning, Statistics, Finance, and Trade were defined as being the ‘rear-guard’. The Economics Section’s leadership called the representatives of these Sub-sections to extra meetings, in order to remedy the situation. In addition, separate conferences were planned for Statistics and Trade in order to put these communities on the ‘right’ track. Trade responded to the criticism by conscientiously carrying out the directives, and appears to have succeeded in convincing the Congress leadership that it was making a genuine effort. The case was different for the Statistics and Finance Sub-sections.

The strange case of Finance and Statistics

The composition of the sub-sections of Statistics and Finance suggests that in their cases the stress was placed on the modification of existing structures. To control these disciplinary communities, the communist authorities did not deem that they had to establish rival research centres, for they already had a hold over the National Bank of Poland and the Central Bureau of Statistics.⁴⁴² Furthermore, it seems that demand for genuine expertise and experience in statistics and finance was so strong that a number of non-party, bourgeois economists were included in their ranks.

⁴⁴² These two central institutions still await their historian. The best existing source on the National Bank of Poland is the memoirs of one of its employees, A. Ivanka. The GUS had an exhibition during the celebration of the 75th anniversary of the institution, and the material from the exhibition was published, with some articles, but no detailed historical account has been published. Ivanka, A., 1964. *Wspomnienia skarbowca 1927-1945* Warszawa, 1993. *Główny Urząd Statystyczny 1918-1993. 75 lat GUS, 200 lat statystyki polskiej* Warszawa: Wyd. GUS.

Both these sub-sections received similar ratings during the evaluation of their work at the general meeting of July 1950, when Finance and Statistics were criticised for their lack of a properly ideological approach to their work. To quote the protocol: *“The Subsection of Statistics was presented with the charge of limiting its preparatory work to narrow formalism and technicalism.”*⁴⁴³ Translated from ‘newspeak’, that meant an absence of ideological orientation. The main task of the sub-sections was to formulate a critical review of research in their respective areas, but the PUWP wanted this criticism to be based on ideology, while “formal and technical” responses meant that the number rather than the political outlook of scholars was noted. Despite their similarity in July 1950, the paths of these two Sub-sections diverged. Statistics continued to implement a ‘formalist and technical’ strategy throughout the Congress process, and to insist that ideology was not compatible with statistical analysis. The Finance Sub-section, on the other hand, produced a thorough ideological assessment which criticised most of the prominent ‘old’ economists and was the most ideological of all the sub-section reports. Given their similar starting points, this difference is intriguing.

Finance was a touchy subject for the communists. The flow of money associated with capital, profit, and everything a communist must abhor, continued to be of importance. Control of the currency, currency exchange, and of the banking and insurance systems, was a complex task for which neither Marx nor Lenin could provide sufficient guidance. Looking at the list, we see a large body of experts in finance that the regime needed as badly as they needed to control them.⁴⁴⁴ This desperate requirement for expertise probably explains the presence of several experts with ‘bourgeois’ pasts.

For several weeks after the general meeting in July, the Sub-section members were too busy elsewhere to have time for Congress work. In fact, when the Extraordinary Meeting between Congress leaders and the presidium of the Sub-section of Finance was held in October 1950, only Kurowski attended. He no longer defended the Sub-section or promised amendments.⁴⁴⁵ How could he have done so? Neither his nor the other presidium members’ pressing duties were likely to lessen. Indeed, Trąpczyński, in addition to the presidency of the National Bank,

⁴⁴³ APAN/IKNP/128, *Protocol of meeting held 28.07.1950 attended by presidiums of the Section and the Sub-section of Statistics*. p.51

⁴⁴⁴ Finance Sub-section was headed by Witold Trąpczyński, the president of the National Bank, student of Professor Taylor, who was seconded by Bronisław Blass, another participant in the CPB debate (on the PWP side). Members included representatives of: the National Bank (3), Ministry of Finance (2), and Ministry of Treasury (1). The academic contingent (5) was divided between younger supporters of the PUWP and older staff. For full list of names, see in Appendix.

⁴⁴⁵ APAN/IKNP-128 “Protokół wspólnego posiedzenia prezydiów Sekcji Nauk Ekonomicznych i Podsekcji Finansów, 5.10.50”

had recently also joined Kurowski as vice-minister of Finance. The Sub-section was neither holding the extensive discussions expected by the Congress leadership, nor carrying out any of the eight tasks specified by the Section presidium. The Finance Sub-section did not organise any conferences for the mass of finance economists, as the Sub-sections of Trade and Statistics did. Its members even failed to attend the conference on financial law organised by the Law Sub-section.

The remarkable absence from the October meeting of M. Orłowski, the Secretary of the Sub-section, was explained by his trip to the Soviet Union. The initial reluctance to accept ideological criticism, and the later admission that Sub-section members did not have time for Congress work, suggests that the final report of the Finance Sub-section was the work of its secretary. This text excels in aggressive newspeak rhetoric, and there is frequent use of terms like ‘cosmopolite’ and ‘pseudo-scientific’, terminology only occasionally appearing in other sub-sections’ material. The accusations of cosmopolitanism were also made about economists identified by name, a practice which was either partially or totally avoided by other sub-sections. To illustrate what was the ‘right’ and what was the ‘wrong’ approach, individual economists’ work was drawn in as examples. Jędrychowski and Żurawicki were praised, the former for his doctorate on financial planning in the USSR, and the latter for a book review, while the loyal socialist Dietrych was shown partially to be erring by committing the sin of ‘eclecticism’. At the ‘reactionary’ end of the scale were Krzyżanowski, Fabierkiewicz, and Młynarski.⁴⁴⁶

Cosmopolitanism is still noticeable in more-or-less cloaked form in a line of interventions by representatives of our science in 1950. A classic example is the activity of the Polish Academy of Letters. In a PAL report, Vol.51/1950/nr.6, p352 we read that member of the Academy F. Młynarski presented and discussed his own work on “The modification of Irving Fisher’s equation”. A summary of the paper, sent out in 1951, testifies to the fact that at least as late as 1950 in the Kraków community, there were cases of isolation from progressive, Marxist financial thought, cases of living on in the sphere of bourgeois doctrine, and not the most updated [bourgeois doctrine] at that.⁴⁴⁷

The most striking information in this quote is perhaps not the ideological condemnation of Fisher, but how recently the Kraków economists had found it possible and advisable to engage in such obviously politically incorrect activities. The sub-title of the report filed in the

⁴⁴⁶ APAN/IKNP-18 “Referat generalny Podsekcji Finansów. 6th version.” March 1951

Others singled out for criticism were Ignacy Czuma, Zdzisław Morawski, and Czarkowski.

⁴⁴⁷ APAN/IKNP-18 “Referat generalny Podsekcji Finansów. 6th version.” March 1951

archive was “Sixth Version”, suggesting that Orłowski’s drafts were repeatedly criticised (most probably by Congress leaders, as Sub-section members had no time to do this).

The Statistics Sub-section was unusual in that with one exception its contingent of ‘*praktycy*’ came from a single institution, the Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS), which had a considerable tradition of continuity among its personnel. The leadership of the sub-section was composed of present and former, even pre-war, presidents and vice-president of the CBS. To this were added at least two other employees of the CBS; four representatives of academic institutions, including the famous mathematician Hugo Steinhaus; and one representative of the Ministry of Higher Education and Science. The secretary, Professor Dr. A. Weryha, was a PUWP member and a fully qualified statistician.⁴⁴⁸

While the political context affecting PUWP policy towards agricultural economics was that of collectivisation, for statistics it was the secrecy surrounding statistical information in all communist countries.⁴⁴⁹ Difficulties in teaching and research caused by secrecy, and insecurity regarding what should be kept secret and what could be discussed openly, were key topics in the subsection’s discussions.⁴⁵⁰

The amount of ideological jargon in the Finance Sub-section report is remarkable when read in isolation. When compared with the material from the Statistics Sub-section, the contrast is even more striking. In the report drafted by the statisticians (and I have to assume that the drafts filed in the archive were the final drafts submitted by the subsections) it is difficult to find any PUWP influence on the rhetoric or vocabulary, and the criticism by the sub-section of the discipline was hardly a critique. No names were mentioned, and the only people to receive a critical assessment were the opponents of the use of advanced mathematics in the discipline.

⁴⁴⁸ **Weryha, Aleksander (1894–1971)**, statistician and mathematician. He worked mainly on problems of insurance and the theory of statistics. 1946–55 professor of statistics at the Academy of Political Sciences, Main School of Foreign Service and Main School of Planning and Statistics. Professor at Warsaw University between 1955 and 1966.

Steinhaus had noted in 1951: “...Weryha, a former National Democrat (statistician) and Volksdeutsch, presently a Party member, has fallen from favour. (His behaviour as chairman of the conference of statistics in Wrocław in the spring caused a scandal. He took the liberty of disqualifying my and Marczewski’s presentations ex praesidio, after the discussion had ended.)” Steinhaus, Hugo & Zgorzelska., Aleksandra, 1992. *Wspomnienia i zapiski* London: Aneks.p.407. While further information on the fate of Weryha is not available, the PUWP is known to have used German and National Democrat backgrounds to ensure compliance, Piasecki being the best known example.

⁴⁴⁹ See chapter “The Politics of Statistical Information and Economic Research in Communist Hungary, 1949-1956” Péteri, György, 1998a. *Academia and State Socialism. Essays on the Political History of Academic Life in Post-1945 Hungary and Eastern Europe*. New York: Atlantic Research and Publications.

⁴⁵⁰ APAN/KNP – 128 p.52 Protocol of meeting of presidiums of Economics Section and the Statistics Subsection held 28.07.1950 Representing the Planning Commission, Jędrychowski promised the boundaries of secrecy would soon be clarified. If they were, it was on the side of secrecy. No statistical yearbooks were published until 1956.

The deficiency of statements and publications devoted to mathematical methods in statistics, caused perhaps by the disorientation provoked by an erroneous interpretation of statistical discussions in the Soviet Union, has been overcome. Some of our statisticians (albeit recruited among economists who did not understand mathematics and were unable to apply its methods in concordance with the principles of dialectical materialism) were ready to see in these discussions a call for a 'crusade' against mathematical methods in general and in statistics in particular.⁴⁵¹

Related to this was a conflict over the interpretation of the Soviet example, and how it should be followed in Polish statistics. It is remarkable that the interpretation championed by the young challengers was dismissed by the Sub-section report. As the report pointed out, the Congress leadership could not have been totally against the inclusion of mathematics-oriented statistics within the scope of the sub-section, since one of the members appointed to it was the renowned mathematician Hugo Steinhaus. Oskar Lange, who held a chair in statistics at the Main School and who presided over the Section, was also in a position to exert some influence and protection.⁴⁵²

Without more information on the history of the Central Statistics Bureau, it is very difficult to provide a conclusive explanation for the apparent success of the statisticians in repelling the Congress authorities' efforts to introduce ideological rhetoric and Marxist-Leninists into their discipline. Elements explaining the specific development of statistics might be effective patronage, and a trade-off where established statisticians offered expertise, loyalty, and secrecy, demanding in return that they retained their autonomy in intra-disciplinary matters. Did they manage to persuade the PUWP leadership that both parties would be better off if they agreed that statistics was classified as a non-ideological discipline? The information provided by the Congress archive files does not provide adequate evidence. At the final session of the Congress, Statistics was criticised on behalf of the PUWP for having failed to produce an ideological breakthrough. Nor was Statistics unaffected by ideological purges. It would be naive to imagine that the PUWP leadership would allow the CSB to operate independently of its control.

On the other hand, we cannot know whether or not the agit-prop language of the finances subsection was the result of a deliberate strategy, rather than passivity. Did the 'old' experts in

⁴⁵¹ APAN/IKNP/18, p.181

The original text is written in archaic spelling (publikacyj, dyskusyj) and is characterised by the absence of newspeak even when evoking Marxism.

⁴⁵² Lange was at that time member of the Central Committee of the PUWP as well as a prominent member of the Parliament. Moldawa, Tadeusz, 1991. *Ludzie władzy, 1944-1991* Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Państwowe PWN.

finance let the PUWP-appointed referent, fresh from his journey to the Soviet Union, have his way in the report, avoiding further criticism and gaining some room for manoeuvre? Was there an understanding that outward compliance would pay off in terms of influence? We still know very little about the way the PUWP interacted with professional communities in which it did not have a majority presence. Studies of the political and social histories of both the CSB and the NBP may in time allow us to answer more questions. Still, the different trajectories of the economists specialising in trade, finance and statistics suggest that their fate was shaped by various factors: the political relevance of their specialist knowledge; different strategic choices; access to resources such as time and qualified practitioners; and patronage and political alliances.

The last two sub-sections that should be mentioned briefly were the Construction and Communal Housing Sub-section⁴⁵³ and the International Trade Sub-section. Both were, so to speak, on the margins of the discipline, the former overlapping with engineering and architecture, and the latter with trade and the study of international relations. Both these sub-sections arose from the re-organisation of the discipline into narrow specialisations, rather than from any ideological crusade against strong 'bourgeois' academic communities. They had been put together as an afterthought and were manned by their respective ministries and the Planning Commission. In many cases their members were already members of other subsections, and thus demonstrate the limits of the resources the PUWP was able to muster.

Before we leave the area of Congress preparations that were made in the sub-sections, we need to look into how far the ambitious and elaborate processes had indeed been carried out. There had already been indications of problems with members of the sub-sections delivering what had been ordered by the Congress leadership, and in extension by the Politburo. Table 5 lists the activities relating to problem papers (reports), discussions and participants in the Economics Section.

⁴⁵³ The Construction and Communal Housing Sub-section was dominated by the Planning Commission and institutions related to construction such as the Housing Construction Institute and the Construction Industry Ministry.

Table 5: Sub-section activity as reported to the Congress Secretariat and the Politburo.⁴⁵⁴

Sub-sections of the Economics Section	Reports	Problem groups	Meetings	Conferences	Members	Associates
Political Economy and Planning	11/11	-	6/8	1	11	-
Industry and Work Organisation	42/29	6	5/7	1	15	30
Agrarian Economics	-/2	-	-	-	18	-
Trade economics	14/13	5	10/12	1	14	190
Finance	10/4	-	10/11	-	11	7
Statistics	8/23	-	12/14	2	11	12
Construction Economics	20/10	-	5/27	-	13	60
Economics of Foreign Trade	-/1	-	-/7	-	11	-

In fact many of the planned tasks were never carried out. Despite the impressive statistics assembled by the Congress Secretariat, a close analysis of the work of the subsections and Section reveals so many major shortcomings that claims of successful mobilisation need to be regarded with scepticism. According to a report dated as late as mid February 1951, the Trade Subsection had formally registered seven problem papers at the organisational office of the Congress of Science, another five had not yet been sent over, and three had been promised but not delivered. The problem papers were supposed to be the basis for the synthesising report from each sub-section, and in turn to provide the basis for the general Section report. However, fewer than half of them were ready at the time the final grand synthesis was made public at the First Convention of Economists. Worse still, in late August 1951, well after the Congress of Science itself, the Trade Sub-section had to answer for its failure to deliver six

⁴⁵⁴ Hübner, Piotr, 1983. *I Kongres Nauk Polskiej jako forma realizacji założeń polityki naukowej państwa ludowego*. Wrocław: Zakład narodowy imienia Ossolińskich. p.114-116

Hübner's table is based on two different reports, one prepared for internal use by the Secretariat of the Congress, and one sent by the CC Science Division to the Politburo. Although they cover the same period, the two reports do not always conform, and when two figures are cited, the first is from the internal Congress report and the second from the Party report.

problem reports, and among the authors who had not delivered there was a high percentage of bureaucrats. There are testimonies and pieces of evidence from throughout the process showing that participants did not give a high priority to the preparation work for the Congress of Science. The Trade Sub-section held a conference shortly before the First Convention of Economists, at the end of November 1950. As with the problem reports that had come as “mustard after dinner”,⁴⁵⁵ the timing of the conference, merely two weeks before the First Convention of Economists, meant that there could be no time for the incorporation of the results of this conference into the material for the First Convention of Economists. The notorious statisticians held their conferences even later. Overall, the sequences and timing of the various stages and types of preparation indicate that the process was not an orderly procession of evaluations and discussions at successive levels. After the First Convention of Economists, most of the sub-sections’ activities ended, as the main weight of Congress activities shifted towards dissemination of the final report.

Stalin’s contribution to the social sciences

Before we look at the First Convention of Economists, it is necessary to interrupt the narrative of the preparations for the Congress of Polish Science with an account of another important event that occurred in the process of redefining economics to match the PUWP concept of a Marxist-Leninist science. This was the December 1950 conference devoted to Stalin’s article on linguistics: the article Edward Lipiński was appealing to when he called for tolerance of different opinions during a meeting in the Economics Section in July that year. Apart from the assertion that scientific debates required freedom of expression, the only other part of Stalin’s intervention which was relevant to economics concerned the position of science in the base-superstructure relationship.

⁴⁵⁵ Expression ascribed by Biliński to P. Lortsch, quoted in a report from a meeting of heads of sub-sections evaluating the progress of their work. Lortsch argued that starting work on the sub-section reports before the ‘referaty problemowe’ were available would reduce the importance of the latter, turning them into ‘musztarda po obiedzie’ (as meaningless and out of place because of the delay, as having mustard served after dinner)

III. 6: Conference devoted to Stalin's article on linguistics, Warsaw 04.12.1950.⁴⁵⁶



From the left: J. Berman,
K. Petruszewicz, F. Fiedler,
A. Schaff, A. Rapacki,
and J. Dembowski.

Ethan Pollock, who has studied Stalin's interventions in science, argues that while the motive behind Stalin's intervention (in a debate on the linguistics theories of Nicolai Marr in June 1950) was to strengthen the scientific communities' claim to discretion over what went on in scholarly debates, the effect was the opposite. Pollock goes on to wonder whether Stalin himself was aware that he was exacerbating the problem he wanted to cure. The reception given to this intervention in Poland allows us to observe how Party ideologists used Stalin's statements to support the message they considered to be the most urgent – the priority of ideological authority over scientific authority.

Following the publication of Stalin's article, a conference was organised by the ITSC on December 4th 1950, in cooperation with Nowe Drogi. The aim was to discuss the importance for scientific disciplines of Stalin's most recent text. Invited to the solemn occasion were "the Party's ideological front workers" and scholars representing philosophy, linguistics, economics, law, history, the theory of literature, psychology, art theory, and musicology. There, from his position at the centre of the presidium table, Adam Schaff officially de-fused Stalin's potentially disruptive statement about the importance of free critical discussion in the development of scientific disciplines. The following excerpt is from a report on the conference printed in the main party daily Trybuna Ludu:

⁴⁵⁶ ArchDokMech/11297-6 "Sesja naukowa Stalin o jezykoznawstwie. Sala Rady Państwa, prezydium" photo: CAF-Dabrowiecki. 04.12.50

*Stressing the meaning of Stalin's words that "no science can prosper and develop without a clash of opinions, without the freedom to criticise" the speaker shows that this statement not only has nothing in common with ideological liberalism, as the vulgarisers of Marxism would have this thesis interpreted, but on the contrary presumes there will be a hard struggle with hostile ideologies. "We must remember," the speaker states, "that in relation to bourgeois ideology we are obliged to hold fast to the principle of unconditional struggle against the enemy; of hostility towards any hostile, reactionary ideology; and of the hastening of the victory of the only consistently progressive and consistently scientific ideology – Marxism. That is the only correct path in the development of science and societal progress."*⁴⁵⁷

Oskar Lange was assigned the task of defining the limits of creative interpretation of the Marxist canon. The message was as clear as it was simple: only Lenin and Stalin had the necessary qualifications needed for this task; everything else was decried as 'revisionism'. 'Eclecticism', as understood in the economics context as an effort to combine elements from western and Soviet economics, was especially condemned.⁴⁵⁸

The task of the next speaker, Brus, was to discuss the implications of Stalin's re-definition of language for economics. While language had until then been considered to be part of the superstructure, and hence subject to alteration following changes in the base, Stalin had now said that it was neither part of the superstructure nor of the base. The question arose as to whether the same could be said for science: could it be detached from ideology? Were there elements in it which could transcend the division between capitalist and socialist science? A most uncomfortable question, given that since 1948 much of the Party's energy had been expended on driving home the message that science under socialism was not compatible with capitalist science. Pollock draws attention to a number of issues where Stalin's intervention brought more confusion than clarity over the relationship between science and ideology. While Schaff and Lange proclaimed that Stalin's call for creative and free discussion of Marxism meant that no such thing should be contemplated by mere mortals, Brus avoided the difficult but interesting implications of the re-definition of the status of language mentioned above. Instead he focused on what economics should cover.

⁴⁵⁷ Trybuna Ludu 9.12.1950 p.8 "Przebieg sesji naukowej poświęconej pracom towarzysza Stalina o językoznawstwie." The intervention of Adam Schaff.

⁴⁵⁸ Trybuna Ludu 9.12.1950 p.8 "Przebieg sesji naukowej poświęconej pracom towarzysza Stalina o językoznawstwie."

The Stalinist definition of the base and superstructure and their mutual relations brings total clarity to the issue of the nature and extent of economic sciences. Economic sciences, by studying the economic base, deal with the social relations of production, relations between humans, making them clearly different from the technical sciences. Hence the important deduction regarding the necessity of struggle against a narrow technical orientation (technicyzm) in economic science, against any abstraction from division into classes, the class struggle, etc. The Gomulkiist conception of supporting the “good farmer” in agriculture, (in practice the kulak), was an example among us of this kind of false, restricted attitude to one of the cardinal problems of agrarian politics in Poland.⁴⁵⁹

The definition of the subject of economics as the study of relations between humans may appear to be based on a degree of common sense. However, in this context its political and socially-related aspects would receive all the attention, at the expense of natural resources and technology. Political economy was to concern itself with ideology and economic policies, the former providing the correct approach, and the latter the empirical data, along with opportunities for the application of theoretical studies. Their main focus would be economic policies rather than any economic processes conceived of as being autonomous of the will of the policy-makers. *“Underestimating the role of states and parties in the direction of economics – that is the greatest error that economic science can commit under the conditions of the construction of socialism.”⁴⁶⁰* In short, macro-economics, or political economy, was to deal with ideology and the study of political decisions, and micro-economics would concentrate on specialist technological production issues. Branch-economists were now to concentrate on the economic and technological issues of a single sector: transport, housing construction, dairy production or industry, and to avoid generalisations that would intrude into other sectors. This re-definition of the topic and aims of the discipline was given maximum authority by the political establishment: it was derived directly from the words of Stalin, and was announced in the hall where cabinet meetings usually took place in the presence of the highest Party and State leadership. In the picture (Ill.6), in addition to Berman, one of the three key PUWP leaders, we can clearly distinguish at the bottom of the frame the characteristic profile of Prime Minister Cyrankiewicz.

The Conference on Stalin and Linguistics was held less than a week before the First Convention of Economists. This means that on the day the Convention was opening the report

⁴⁵⁹ Trybuna Ludu 9.12.1950 p.8 “Przebieg sesji naukowej poświęconej pracom towarzysza Stalina o językoznawstwie.” Extracts from W. Brus’s speech.

⁴⁶⁰ Trybuna Ludu 9.12.1950 p.8 “Przebieg sesji naukowej poświęconej pracom towarzysza Stalina o językoznawstwie.” Extracts from W. Brus’s speech.

from the Stalin Conference had already appeared in the papers, spelling out the accepted limits of criticism, the conditions for creative thought, and, last but not least, what the discipline was to study. Indeed, there was nothing left for the economists assembled at the Convention to discuss. What could they contribute now that Stalin had spoken and the Party had interpreted his Word? Scholars played the part of the “*party’s ideological front workers*”, as the *Trybuna Ludu* termed them. Their new, subordinate relationship to the regime had been demonstrated not only to economists but also to the wider public.⁴⁶¹

The First Convention of Economists

The Convention held in Warsaw in December 1950 was assembled to approve the Section’s final report for the Congress. The preparation of the Convention was a joint venture between the Congress administration⁴⁶² and the Polish Economics Association. In a letter from Brus, the secretary of the Section, to the Central Committee (CC) Science Division, the distribution of responsibilities and control is clearly spelt out:

The practical direction of the organisation of the convention rests in the hands of Professor Lipiński and the Board of the PEA, although it is formally comrade Lange who heads the Economics Section. Comrades B. Minc, Pohorille and Brus, and also comrade Jędrychowski, take part in the preparations of the content as much as possible. It seems that the Science Division ought to select a group of (preferably three) party people to be responsible for the Convention, and especially its ideological-political aspects (speeches, preparation of at least a couple of discussion interventions, the exhibition of the history of economic thought in Poland, etc.)⁴⁶³

The real power rested with a cluster of people from different but relevant institutions who held collective responsibility for the process, and who answered to the CC Science Division, and in the last resort to the Politburo. The Polish Economics Association and Lipiński were left with the task of arranging the refreshments and hiring someone to mind the cloakroom.

With the advent of the Convention of Economists, the work of the Congress changed character and direction. Although it had involved a great number of people, the process had not been made public up until this point. Despite the many short cuts taken, the main task of the preparations – to produce a synthesised evaluation of the discipline using a Marxist-

⁴⁶¹ Trybuna Ludu 9.12.1950

⁴⁶² A great number of agencies had a say in the organisation process: the Ministry of Higher Education, the Orgburo of the Congress of Science, the Presidium of the Economics Section, the Political Economy Sub-section, and finally the PEA.

⁴⁶³ KC PZPR 237/XVI/37 Wydział Nauki i Szkolnictwa Wyższego, Wytyczne, oceny, protokoły zjazdów: ... ekonomistów, 1949-50 p. 25-29. Letter or memo (notatka) from W. Brus (handwritten) to Tow. Zemankowa. 22.9.1950

Leninist perspective – had been fulfilled. The focus now turned to the dissemination of the final evaluation, with this second part of the Congress procedures being as elaborate as the first. While the Section Report was the summit of a gradual progression from bottom to top, the second part of the process went the other way. It started centrally, at the top, with a First Convention of Economists, and continued with repetitions of the central Convention in the other cities.

One important achievement of the Congress in Economics was a radical re-interpretation of the discipline's history. To illustrate the 'new past', an exhibition was organised during the First Convention of Economists under the title "*Progressive economic thought in Poland – an exhibition of prints*" in the Polish Economics Association's House of the Economist where the Convention was being held.⁴⁶⁴ The preparation of a script for the exhibition had been allocated to A. Grodek, a recognised authority on the history of economic thought. He was not trusted to do it alone, however, and a comrade from the Institute for Party History was also seconded, with the results being approved by the censor's office. The script allows us to take an imaginary tour of the exhibition.⁴⁶⁵ All the quotes from the exhibition in the following discussion are taken from this document.

The visitors were greeted with a Stalin-quote on the wall: "There are different social ideas and theories. There are old ideas and theories that (...) slow down the development and progress of society. There are also new progressive ideas and theories, that (...) facilitate the development and progress of society." The visitor then proceeded to a presentation on economic thought. On display in the chronologically-arranged showcases were portraits of scholars who had addressed economic issues from the fifteenth century onwards. This section opened with Renaissance thinkers from whom ideas compatible with Stalin's vision could be extracted: for example, anti-clericalism, economic centralisation, condemnation of aristocratic privileges, and opposition to the exploitation of the peasantry. Thus even Copernicus could be included as a proto-Marxist. Visitors moved between glass boxes filled with portraits of scholars, books and prints, and commentaries pointing out the 'progressive essence' of their ideas. Over their heads, suspended above pictures of Polish economists in glass showcases, hovered quotes from Stalin, Lenin, Bierut and Marx, with the great four being the guides who provided the commentary on Polish economics. The treatment of the eighteenth century for

⁴⁶⁴ AAN/PTE/6 pp.108-124

⁴⁶⁵ AAN/PTE/6 „Katalog napisów” pp. 116-121

instance, was placed under the patronage of Lenin, who admonished: “We should not forget that in the period in which the representatives of the Enlightenment and the eighteenth century were writing... all questions came down to the struggle against serfdom and its remnants.” Since Lenin had already said that all economic issues during the eighteenth century concerned serfdom, what remained now was to show that Polish scholars were following in Lenin’s direction. Scholars who had spoken up against serfdom and the feudal order were duly noted for doing that. There is a marked change when the exhibition’s narrative reaches the Marxist era. After the proud presentation of a Polish adherent of the classical school who had the honour of being the only Polish economist to be quoted by Marx, the exhibition focused exclusively on the burgeoning Polish communist movement. No other trend was presented, be it scientific or political, meaning that the main part of Polish economic thought was totally ignored. Since it was not possible to find communists in academic positions, someone had to be found to fill the empty spaces that came after the historical and neoclassic schools. Some of those chosen as representatives of Polish communist economic thought may come as a surprise. The romantic national bard Mickiewicz was included, with the short commentary: “Pronounced his socialist views in lectures and articles on literature.” Further along, and relevantly, the leftist sociologist Ludwik Krzywicki was reclaimed as ‘progressive’ economist. ‘Progressive’ meant not fully Marxist-Leninist, so Krzywicki was honoured by being included but also criticised:

Ludwik Krzywicki (1859-1941). A prominent scientist, economist and sociologist, he was a participant in the workers’ movement in first part of his active life. He attracted considerable merit in the area of the propagation of Marxism in Poland, and fought against agrarian and co-operative ideas. However, the later evolution of Krzywicki’s ideas, which moved progressively away from Marxism and the workers’ movement, proves that he did not grasp the revolutionary essence of Marxism.

Quotes from Lenin, Bierut and the Communist Manifesto predominated in the final section, with increasing focus on political issues. The conclusion of this progress through the history of Polish economic thought was a PUWP programme-statement:

*The people's democracy, in developing towards socialism, has ... to incorporate the grand products of progressive creators from all sections of Polish culture; it has to create a link to the progressive, humanist and democratic traditions existing in our culture, and create a link with the periods of progress in the national culture, that were durably linked with the struggle of the progressive forces of the Polish nation against backwardness.*⁴⁶⁶

Polish scholars had long presented their activities as making an important contribution to the national cause. The novelty was the combination of Marxism, an internationalist creed, with an appeal to nationalism through pride in the cultural heritage. While it may not have figured on the Politburo's list of ways to attract scientists, we might recall that in the text of the Politburo decision to hold the Congress, the marriage of Marxism-Leninism and nationalism were clearly apparent. The exhibition may have been important in that it presented to the public the sections of the past that the PUWP sanctioned, but its omissions were as important as that which it did show. Most of what had until then been mainstream economics was ostracised by the new historians of the discipline. The biased selection of scholars included in the exhibition was amplified through the selective and simplified presentation of their work. There could be no future for 'bourgeois' economics in Poland, as it had now had no past. Once the old professors had died it would disappear, leaving no trace. The excision of all heritages save the Marxist, a practice introduced in the exhibition, was repeated in texts and verbal presentations during the Convention.

Sub-sections were custom-made to encourage and control discussion with the objective of uncovering and criticising opinions that diverged from the central party line. During the public part of the Congress – both the First Convention of Polish Economists and the Congress deliberations in 1951 – discussions were no longer desired. If any unexpected discussions did emerge during Convention or Congress proceedings, they would have been hushed down, and will not be visible in the official account. The central focus of the Convention was the meticulously planned presentations.

⁴⁶⁶ AAN/PTE/6 „Katalog napisów” p. 120

Table 6: Speakers and topics during the First Convention of Polish Economists⁴⁶⁷

Lange, Oskar	Key-note address
Brus, Włodzimierz	On the state of economics in Poland
Tepicht, Jerzy	Some problems in the struggle for a socialist transformation of the countryside
Dziewicka, Maria	The social structure of the countryside in the mid-western region
Minc, Bronisław	On the efficiency of investment in socialist economy
Secomski, Kazimierz	Issues of efficiency of investment in socialist economy
Lipiński, Edward	The Physiocrats in Poland
Grodek, Andrzej	The state and key tasks of the history of economic thought in Poland
Jędrzychowski, Stefan	On the tasks of economics in Poland in connection with the Six Year Plan

The key-note speech by Lange which opened the Convention was stilted and full of ready-made formulae from the newspeak lexicon. Lange had been given a seemingly prestigious position, but he was not given space to present his research or ideas. The eight presentations covered only three topics (agricultural policy, the efficiency of investment, and the history of economics), which is surprising given that work had been conducted in eight sub-sections. It has to be said of the speakers that despite the presence of four economists whom the ‘old’ establishment would recognise, it was the Marxist-Leninist economists hand-picked by the PUWP who addressed the key issues.⁴⁶⁸ Only one of these presentations made a lasting impression; the final, synthesised report of the Economics Section. It was the central document on economics prepared under the auspices of the PUWP.

According to Brus’s testimony, the report was a collective work by the sub-section, with direct interventions from Petruszewicz, who demanded harsher formulations and a sharper ideological tone. It was nevertheless delivered in first person singular mode, and was perceived and remembered by the economists who witnessed it as ‘Brus’s speech’: an accusation against established economists made on behalf of the PUWP.

Expressions and rhetorical devices borrowed from the vocabulary of propaganda were frequently used. One example was defamation by association. It was claimed that pre-war Poland, was capitalist and thus fascist, so it followed that pre-war economics was capitalist

⁴⁶⁷ All the speeches were printed in *Ekonomista* (1951:1)

⁴⁶⁸ AAN/KCPZPR/237/XVI-33, p.11 The only exception was K. Secomski, who represented the Planning Commission. The speakers on the history of economic thought had pre-war records in economics. The presence of Lipiński had been the object of controversy, but Brus argued successfully for the inclusion of his academic supervisor. This suggests that there were conflicting forces within the Party, some pushing for a more radical ideological line, excluding all participants except those most loyal, and others more concerned with the legitimacy of the undertaking in the eyes of the academic community.

and fascist. Another example of overspill from propaganda rhetoric was the appearance of accusations of ‘cosmopolitanism’ in economics when the anti- cosmopolitanism campaign started, and its disappearance as the campaign came to an end. The use of derogatory and vulgar vocabulary when describing opponents in an academic setting was at odds with the prevailing norms of behaviour among Polish scholars. A cultivated, elaborate and flowery language had been the intellectual elite’s contribution to the Polish national identity during the Partition period, and the aggression and assumed plebeianising of newspeak was perceived as vulgar; it shocked and offended. While Marxist-Leninist rhetoric was by that time familiar to the audience, and had been used by PUWP’s supporters at the CPB debate two years earlier, the use of such language in an academic setting, before an audience of scholars, still made a strong impression.

The report opened with an exposition of the geopolitical and ideological backdrop to the assessment, stressing the importance of the great systemic changes in economics that had taken place since 1945. Triumphalist claims were made about economics, mirroring the depiction of the Utopia accomplished in socialist realist art and propaganda. Brus then went on to announce that the criterion for the evaluation of Polish economics would be the degree to which Marxism-Leninism was applied, and added that, “*the complete bankruptcy of bourgeois pseudo-science, no matter what forms or names it takes, is today, in the light of praxis, more evident than ever.*”⁴⁶⁹ The report stressed Marxism’s claim to be the exclusive prism for the assessment of other disciplinary positions.

It was the inherent superiority of Marxist theory that provided the argument as to why it should dominate the discipline. For loyal Party members it was an article of faith, but for non-believers it would take history to prove it. The central argument for convincing the “hesitant masses of scientists” was the assertion that science was not apolitical, and that it had never been and would not ever be so. From that followed the conclusion that official science in a capitalist order had been capitalist, and therefore an enemy to social justice, and that this ‘bourgeois’ science had no right of existence in a socialist country.⁴⁷⁰ ‘Bourgeois’ economics was unsuited to the study of socialist economics and was irrelevant to the needs of contemporary society.

⁴⁶⁹ Brus, Włodzimierz: “O stanie nauk ekonomicznych w Polsce” *Ekonomista* nr.1, 1951, p. 10

⁴⁷⁰ Brus’s report attacked those who claimed that science was apolitical, asserting that this was only a mask. Economics Professors mentioned as using the apolitical argument were: Taylor, Młynarski, Fabierkiewicz, Rosiński, and Zakrzewski Brus, Włodzimierz, 1951. “O stanie nauk ekonomicznych w Polsce.” *Ekonomista*, 8-46. pp.9-46

After the announcement of the primacy of Marxist ideology, political logic demanded that what followed next would be an assertion of the role of the PUWP leadership:

*In the works of Bolesław Bierut and other leaders of the Party and the Government, in the reports and decrees of the First Congress of the PUWP and the plenary meetings of the CC, and in our economic plans, especially in the Law on the Six Year Plan, the basic problems in our economics were posed and solved in a scientific manner. The workers in Polish economic science thus received invaluable help and a firm basis for their scientific and research activities, ...*⁴⁷¹

The CPB debate, discussed in Chapter Two, was quoted as an example of how economists had received help and guidance from PUWP politicians.

Only then did the report turn to the issue of the new roles and possibilities that the regime offered economists. Quoted as evidence of PUWP commitment were: the establishment of a separate section of economics in the structuring of the First Congress of Science, which had secured a privileged place for the discipline among other sciences; the establishment of a network of institutions of higher education devoted to economics; and the plans for new university departments and research institutes. Finally, the promise held out by the PUWP was that the superiority of Marxist doctrine would open new theoretical perspectives for the discipline:

*At the same time, even the limited experience we have in pedagogical and research work shows that a reliance on Marxist-Leninist theory opens entirely new possibilities and extremely wide new horizons to economist researchers. Only Marxist-Leninist economic science allows economists truly to know and hence also to transform reality, allows them truly to connect with the practice of socialist construction and to add their input to this construction.*⁴⁷²

The report asserted that the regime had not only promised to place economics at the centre of policy making (it would ‘forge a strong link between theory and practice’) but had also offered the planned economy as an experimental laboratory for economists.⁴⁷³ Passing on to the evaluation of economics, Brus presented a sober picture:

⁴⁷¹ Ibid..11

⁴⁷² Ibid.p.43

⁴⁷³ Lange, Oskar, Ibid."Zagajenie". 3-7. p.6

*It would be wrong to claim that our special centres of economic science have made no achievements. It is not so, and we note clear and considerable successes at a number of teaching or research institutions, especially lately. Nonetheless, the overall balance of work we bring to the Congress of Economists and the First Congress of Science is not auspicious, and is very far from corresponding with the possibilities and tasks to be dealt with.*⁴⁷⁴

This claim was substantiated with examples from Sub-section reports, and with the reminder that no economists had yet received a State Prize. Also read out was a list of the topics and questions that should have been addressed and solved by economists, but had not been.⁴⁷⁵ Next, Brus turned to the past, regretting the active suppression, by Western-fixated bourgeois economics, of the “progressive traditions” – meaning the communists, and those segments of Polish cultural life which had been included in the new hall of fame after careful examination and trimming:

*However, during the rule of big capital, and land-ownership, especially in the inter-war period, progressive economic thought in Poland was pushed underground. On the surface, in university chairs and research institutes, was the undivided rule of a vulgar apology for the capitalist system –pseudoscientific, bourgeois political economy, which directly served the interests of the exploiters.*⁴⁷⁶

Another accusation brought against ‘bourgeois economics’ was that it lacked originality. It was claimed that Polish economics before the Marxist-Leninist reforms had comprised mere copies of foreign ideas.⁴⁷⁷ The diversity of the field in the inter-war period was ascribed to the fact that different western theories were followed, creating division among national scholars.⁴⁷⁸ There was a nationalistic resonance to this charge: Polish ‘bourgeois’ economics had failed society not only by helping the capitalists to exploit the masses, but also by not contributing to national glory. Economists selected to represent ‘bourgeois’ economics were: Taylor, Młynarski, Zaleski, Rosiński, Barciński, Zagórski, Drewnowski and Rączkowski. They had to endure a humiliating public denigration of their professional qualifications, and were then admonished and asked to repent and expiate their methodological sins in public:

⁴⁷⁴ Brus, Włodzimierz, *Ibid.* "O stanie nauk ekonomicznych w Polsce." 8-46.p.13

⁴⁷⁵ *Ibid.* pp.14-15

⁴⁷⁶ *Ibid.* p.16

⁴⁷⁷ *Ibid.* pp.9-46

⁴⁷⁸ Actually the term used was not schools, but the diminutive “szkółki”, which in this case has a derogatory effect.

“It should also be expected of a number of scientists who have recently been under the influence of bourgeois economics that they express their current position through a self-critical relating of their own errors and a sharp critique of the contemporary apologists of imperialism.”⁴⁷⁹

The report then worked its way systematically through all the sub-sections, extracting examples of what was now considered to be bad research. In Organisation Studies, for instance, economists who had used Fredrick W. Taylor and Henry Ford were chastised for failing to base their work on the “new character of our socialist enterprises and the new attitude to work”. In industrial economics, A. Skowroński was accused of writing too little about Soviet industry compared to his coverage of Western countries, of failing to refer to Marx or Soviet science,⁴⁸⁰ and of masking his adherence to old ideas by using “declarative formulations about the achievements of Soviet science (.....) as ‘camouflage’”. The latter was an increasing problem, according to the speaker.

To all this was added the accusation which had cost Socrates his life, the charge of corrupting young people, which was laid at the doors of academic institutions active before 1949. The accusation was based on the results of an analysis carried out by young Marxist-Leninist economists, who had looked at 933 Masters theses submitted between 1946 and 1949 in Warsaw, Kraków, Poznań, Wrocław, and Szczecin; an estimated two thirds of the total.⁴⁸¹

“The hostile bourgeois methodology limited the development of research in Poland, directed it onto false tracks, corrupted many honest and gifted young researchers, and led to a waste of time and effort. In a number of cases we can undoubtedly talk of a conscious damage aimed at the systemic foundations of our state. In the case of some institutes, a closer look at their ‘achievements’ raises the suspicion that they simply aimed at an accelerated production of reactionaries with scientific titles.”⁴⁸²

The Poznań University economics seminar led by Professor Taylor (and later by Rosiński) was criticised for having as many as fifty per cent of students working not on Marx but on such scholars as Keynes, Wicksell, Walras, Schumpeter, and Say. What was even more grave, Brus added, was that these theses were not even critical of the ‘bourgeois’ economists they handled. At the Main School of Commerce, the audience was told, only two of 165 Masters

⁴⁷⁹ Brus, Włodzimierz, 1951. "O stanie nauk ekonomicznych w Polsce." *Ekonomista*, 8-46. p.18

⁴⁸⁰ Instead Skowroński's references were to Stigler, Heydel, Lemann, Zaleski, Kuznets, Taylor, Schmalenbach, Adamiecki etc. Ibid. pp.9-46

⁴⁸¹ In the report, Brus acknowledged the help of assistants from the Political Economy Department at the Main School of Planning and Statistics. The reports of the Sub-sections of Agrarian Economics and Trade Economics were also used in the analysis. Ibid. pp.9-46

⁴⁸² Ibid. p.31

theses had the economic conditions of the Soviet Union as their subject, while what was in fact being studied even included the Congo, Cameroon and Nazi Germany.⁴⁸³ The condemnation of the situation in higher education justified the closing down of all of the above-mentioned study programmes, a reform which was, in the words of the report, “a turning point in the struggle for the right direction in economic sciences in Poland”⁴⁸⁴ Things would be different from now on: the Main School and the new Higher Schools of Economics, it was announced, had been given the task of delivering 14,000 graduates of economics during the Six Year Plan. In Chapter Three we have already seen some of the problems caused at the Main School by the drastic expansion in student numbers needed to meet this ambitious target. The authors of the report were particularly well aware of the fact that the principal challenge in higher education was the lack of qualified academic teachers, and though the report encouraged the “bold” promotion of young cadres to academic positions, it was admitted that it was still necessary to use the ‘old’ variety. The report defined the PUWP’s policy and plans thus:

The general policy of the Party and the Government towards scientific cadres has been reflected in the reform of higher education in economics. All honest, valuable workers among the old scientific cadres have been given full opportunity to exert their creative abilities. A substantial number of the old scientific cadres have lately been through a significant and positive evolution. The task is to deepen this evolution and complete it, while decisively cutting off all those who openly or secretly persist in holding on to old bourgeois positions.

This can only be attained through a sharp and uncompromising struggle against all manifestations of a bourgeois world view and against all forms of expression of this view in economics, through a more extensive use of the appropriately-tested weapon of critique and self-critique than has so far been the case. This applies especially to sector economics (ekonomiki szczegółowe) where in some cases bourgeois economists ousted from chairs in political economy try to ‘take refuge’.⁴⁸⁵

The last sentence in particular has a threatening ring, for economists who had previously held chairs in political economy had been moved to less ideologically sensitive areas, where they were now being told that they should not feel safe. It is also clear that the inclusive and open

⁴⁸³ Others academic supervisors criticised for supervising and accepting ‘incorrect’ works included: Fierich, Młynarski, Dederko, Paszkiewiczowa, Schram, Staniewicz, Inglot, Szubert, and Dąbrowski. Ibid. pp.9-46

⁴⁸⁴ Ibid., p.34

⁴⁸⁵ Ibid.p.37

attitude to 'old' staff declared here is at odds with the picture revealed by examination of the staffing policies and verification campaigns discussed in Chapter Three.

Finally, the report assessed the research capacities and activities of the research institutes. Only the three research institutes connected with sub-sections were said to show potential in economics research.⁴⁸⁶ The institutes attached to ministries were dismissed as un-coordinated, with little capacity in economics, and no visible scientific production.

As a conclusion, the last part of the report was devoted to the enumeration of what were considered to be positive and promising trends that would allow Marxist-Leninist economics to overcome any difficulties:

*As a result of this ideological offensive, led under the aegis of the Party, we can mention a number of considerable successes that will create a favourable climate for the development of centres of economic science.*⁴⁸⁷

As proof of the success of Marxist-Leninist economics, the audience was informed of the number of 'classics' and translations from Soviet scientific literature published, and reminded that the "shattering of the *gomułkowszczyzna*" (the rejection of the national way to socialism policy fronted by Gomułka in the summer of 1948) had introduced "clear perspectives". Further evidence of success lay in the fact that the Party Schools had organised courses in the political economy of socialism for the administrative, educational and economic apparatuses. Help from the Soviet Union, by way of Polish economists' journeys there and visits from Soviet economists, was mentioned as being very important, but no numbers were quoted to substantiate this claim. Once more the need to overcome the "last vestiges of hostile, bourgeois, so-called theories" was asserted and admonitions were repeated that this could only be achieved through reliance on the "weapons of criticism and self-criticism" and the "ingenious directions" given by the classics of Marxism-Leninism, especially Stalin's work on linguistics, and the experiences of Soviet science. Now that it had completed the operation of dethroning established economics and proclaiming the supremacy of PUWP-sponsored Marxist-Leninist economics, the report ended with a quote from Bierut and a battle cry: "We are not and do not want to be 'neutral' towards the struggle for socialism in Poland, or towards the battle against imperialism, the battle for peace and freedom on an international

⁴⁸⁶ The three institutes were the Institute of Agricultural Economics (IER), Instytut Naukowo-Badawczy Handlu I Żywnienia Zbiorowego, Główny Instytut Pracy. The Institute of Foreign Relations, and the Central Statistical Bureau, which also did some research relevant to economics were not assessed. The report implied that this is due to a lack of information on their activities, which is not surprising given the secret nature of their work. Ibid. pp.9-46

⁴⁸⁷ Ibid.p.32

scale.” Now this message had to be spread nationwide: first through *Ekonomista*, where the proceedings of the Convention were published, and then through provincial replicas of the Convention.

Provincial show-trials

Regional conventions were organised in all the major academic centres of economics: Kraków, Poznań, Katowice, Wrocław, Łódź, Sopot and Szczecin. Each followed the same pattern, and all but one were held on the same day, March 18th 1951.⁴⁸⁸ Common ingredients were the reading-out of a local version of the ‘Brus report’ analysing the local economists, and of the text on the tasks of economics in the Six Year Plan. In each place there were also attacks directed at professors who heretofore had been leading ‘bourgeois’ economists, demanding of them a public confessions of their ‘sins’. The local party functionaries who were employed to criticise and chastise the erring economists used more aggressive and propagandist language than had been heard in Warsaw. The difference may be accounted for by the fact that outside Warsaw there were no Marxist-Leninist scholars, and the task of criticising local economists was shouldered by Party officials without academic experience.

The regional conferences were conceived of as being closer to ground level, and to local economic problems, and therefore focused on concrete examples of how academic economists should participate in the economic development of the region, with reports on co-operation with factories or farming co-operatives. In the well-established industrial centre Katowice, for instance, where academic economics was only starting up, these practical issues dominated the discussion.

The only stenographic report I have found from a regional conference is from Wrocław. It provides detailed information about the public accusation of Professor Styś, his ‘*samokrytyka*’, and the critical discussions about his efforts. The document makes for a gripping read, as it conveys the desperate position of the professor, standing alone, and accused in aggressive terms of being an enemy of the regime. His attempts to balance the need to prove his loyalty and goodwill with that of retaining his dignity are vividly realised. Styś’s speech certainly did not conform to the communist idea of a ‘*samokrytyka*’; he did not

⁴⁸⁸ APAN/IKNP/148, p.1 On March 18th 1951 conferences were held in Kraków, Poznań, Katowice, Wrocław, Łódź, and Szczecin. The exception was Sopot, where a two-day conference was held earlier, 3-4.03.1951.

even accuse himself, but instead explained his motives and actions. Indeed ‘*samokrytyka*’ in Professor Styś’s edition was not so much a self-criticism as an accusation against his critics.

According to the official report sent to Warsaw, the regional conference in Poznań stimulated interest in Marxism among those who had “vacillated”, and showed that some of the older professors were unable to adopt Marxism.⁴⁸⁹ The way this report mimics the aims defined by the Congress leadership almost word for word suggests that it was more a reflection of centrally-issued targets than of what had really transpired in Poznań. Indeed, according to one report, the audience in Poznań had demonstratively supported the professor under attack, and even the official report notes that of the 120 economists attending nearly half left after the break.

The personal attacks brought in made within the framework of regional conferences in March 1951, and on other occasions, introduced an atmosphere of fear which was not at all conducive to creative research or scholarly discussions. The practice of public shaming through obligatory *samokrytyka* put the targeted scholars – and their friends, students and co-workers – under unprecedented psychological stress, creating lasting resentment. The personal wounds and grudges caused by this practice would heal very slowly, if ever. One long-term effect was to introduce a chasm between the challengers and the establishment under attack, which would later be a hindrance in the integration of Marxist-Leninist economists into the traditional academic establishment.

Throughout the period 1948 to 1950, the PUWP-sponsored attacks were aimed primarily at individuals rather than at theories, conclusions or research results. This choice underscored the breach between the two positions, suggesting that they could have no common language and no dialogue. This also meant that ‘bourgeois economics’ was not so much defined by its content as by its practitioners. Adherence to the current Party policy was the definition of correctness, and no other external, unchanging principles formed the basis for where the line was drawn between friend and foe. Thus, although the lists of Marxists-Leninists and ‘bourgeois’ economists remained generally stable from 1947 to 1956,⁴⁹⁰ amendments could be made when needed. Aleksy Wakar, for instance, was re-defined from Marxist to ‘enemy’,

⁴⁸⁹ APAN/IKNP-148, p.264-265 Notatka sprawozdawcza z przebiegu konferencji ekonomistów w Poznaniu. Signed: Z.Tomaszewski, date: 20.03.1951

⁴⁹⁰ In the evaluation of economics made for the First Congress of Polish Science and first given publicly by Brus at the First Convention of Economists in December 1950: examples of ‘bourgeois’ works and scholars included: Taylor, Mlynarski, Zaleski, Rosiński, Barciński, Zagórski, Drewnowski, and Rączkowski. Brus, Włodzimierz, 1951. "O stanie nauk ekonomicznych w Polsce." *Ekonomista*, 8-46. pp.9-46

even earning the label ‘fascist’ after his arrest and extradition to the NKVD in 1952.⁴⁹¹ When the ‘Party Line’ changed, criticism of individuals was used to clarify which statements, positions or perspectives would now be condemned or redeemed. These fluctuations were noticed and invoked by those few who dared. When Wincenty Styś was forced to perform a *samokrytyka* at the regional conference in Wrocław, he spent much time arguing that the same kind of economics that he now was being criticised for had not only been tolerated by the Party, but had even been encouraged in him only a short while before. Responsibility for past actions that did not conform to the present party line applied to party-members too, as the case of Nowiński illustrates. However, while both Professor Styś and rector Nowiński had to perform a self-criticism, the latter was kept secret. His humiliation was performed in front of party comrades, not in public. Also, having gone through the Party’s purgatory, he continued to enjoy Party patronage, and was allowed to keep his post of rector. Styś, on the other hand, was isolated from research and students and contaminated with the stench of being an enemy of the Party.

The grand finale: the Congress

There is not really very much to say about the final stages of the Congress process. The Economics Section session at the Congress itself, held in the presence of a number of Soviet economists, was stiff and pompous and brought forth nothing new.⁴⁹² In the final document published by the Economics Section, the authors not only claimed that Marxist-Leninist economics was the heritage of all ‘progressive’ thinkers throughout history, as in the exhibition,⁴⁹³ but also boasted of recent achievements which consisted solely of the economic policies of the Communist Party. The final list of sub-sections differed from what it had been during the preparatory stages. Finance and Statistics were now downgraded and put at the end of the list, and Communal Housing was dropped altogether. The report states that although both Communal Housing and the Economics of Industry and Transport were considered important for the national economy, no one was to be found working on them. The final evaluation of economics was negative:

⁴⁹¹ Wakar personal folder held by the ASGH contains Wakar’s own account of his arrest and deportation. Also consider Wyrozembski’s intervention on March 1st in 1953 during a discussion on Stalin’s next publication when responding to an intervention by Zurawicki, who had put him in the same group as ‘bourgeois’ economists, argued: “It was I who took the stand against Wakar, the enemy of our People’s Poland who had stolen in under the guise of a Marxist!” AAN/ANS/42-44

⁴⁹² The Soviet economists present were Professors Niekrasov, Osadko, and Romanchenko. In addition, the Austrian professor Prager.

⁴⁹³ „Referat Sekcji Nauk Ekonomicznych” in Stan i zadania nauk ekonomicznych w Polsce. I Kongres Nauki Polskiej. (PWN, Warszawa, 1951) p.130

*In the assessments done by the different sub-sections there are regrettably very few items that could be called achievements in the field of research. There are some publications by the Institute of Agrarian Economics at the end of 1950 (carbon copied), some statistical studies (especially the calculation of the national income for 1947), a dozen or so more substantial theoretical articles, and finally, some books. Among these one should mention the work of Bronisław Minc, Problems of national income, which in itself is not devoid of numerous deficiencies. That is about all that can be included in the column “scientific production” in economics. (It is clear that we have not taken into consideration the number of worthless, false works written in the spirit of bourgeois economics and published in the years 1945-1949.)*⁴⁹⁴

It should also be noted that the final report overrode some sub-section reports – notably that of Statistics. Where the sub-section had failed to oblige with a radical criticism of statistics, it was ‘corrected’ in the main report.

Conclusions on the Congress process

Piotr Hübner’s main thesis is that there was a gap between the officially-stated aims and structures of the Congress and the real aims of the regime. Hübner’s work in the 1970s and 1980s was informed by the desire to strip the propaganda varnish off the history of communist science policy. While the motives and aims of the PUWP are interesting, it is the effects of the Congress that are of the most importance in this investigation of the evolution of the discipline of economics. My study leads me to conclude that the effects of the Congress differed from both the announced and the secret ambitions of the PUWP.

If we take as the basis for the evaluation of success the aims stated in the Politburo decision to organise the Congress, it was to a large extent a failure. The work of the Congress did little to mobilise academics to take an active part in the communist modernisation project. Despite the impressive numbers presented by the Congress secretariat, few economists took an active part in the sub-section’s activities, and neither this work nor the grand, carefully-choreographed conventions and gala sessions reveal any mobilising effect. Some assumptions in the Politburo decision were correct, such as the willingness of scholars to participate in the reconstruction of the economy, and that economists would find the argument of the

⁴⁹⁴ “Referat Sekcji Nauk Ekonomicznych” in *Stan i zadania nauk ekonomicznych w Polsce. I Kongres Nauki Polskiej*. (PWN, Warszawa, 1951) p.130

‘connection of science with life’ appealing. However, the appeal associated with active participation in the reconstruction of the country and its modernisation in fact worked independently of the Congress preparations and the grand final sessions, and had been informing the choices and the activities of economists ever since 1945. This was also the case for the appeal of the idea of contributing to Polish national culture.

The Congress process forced people to take part, however reluctantly, in discussions of the situation in their discipline. They were also forced, by the nature of the political process, to form a consensus behind a conclusion which was far removed from their earlier perception of the situation described, and which was to an extent in conflict with their professional interests. Partly despite their own wishes, they were enlisted to support and legitimise a radical reappraisal of their discipline. It is impossible to give a precise figure of the number of economists involved in Congress work. Each sub-section of the Economics Section had between eleven and eighteen members, amounting in total to 108 people actively involved in the first stage of the process. In addition to this, the sub-sections commissioned problem-paper writers, and so involved more people in their work. The Congress secretariat, eager to show their efficiency, placed the total of economists involved in the preparatory phase of the First Congress of Polish Science at 407,⁴⁹⁵ The gap between the 108 and the 407 figures can be explained by the inclusion of the participants at the Convention of Economists in December 1950, and at the regional conferences in the latter sum.

The PUWP had sponsored the extensive Congress process in order to establish a new hierarchy, where their chosen and trusted people would propagate exactly the kind of Marxism-Leninism that the PUWP leadership and the key authorities in the Kremlin asked them to do at any given moment. This led to the emergence of a double hierarchy, since the ‘old’ economists did not lose their authority in their own and their students’ eyes – a fact which was not very visible in 1950 but which would become apparent in 1956. Many, most probably the majority of practitioners, continued to consider the entrance of the Marxists-Leninists into their field to be an usurpation of power, and their presence in chairs and other positions of power to be illegitimate.

An examination of the different stages and levels of Congress work, from sub-section discussions, through the first central Convention, then regional conventions and the final

⁴⁹⁵ Hübner, Piotr, 1983. *I Kongres Nauk Polskiej jako forma realizacji założeń polityki naukowej państwa ludowego*. Wrocław: Zakład narodowy imienia Ossolińskich, p.114

Congress, shows that the issues of control, conversion and representation were all solved differently. The composition of sub-sections was strictly controlled, but ensured at least a token representation of established communities. It also varied strongly according to the sub-discipline: Political Economy was placed under special surveillance; Agriculture and Work Organisation were based in already-established rival Marxist-Leninist research institutes to the exclusion of the 'old' agricultural economists; Trade and Statistics were dominated by established communities; and new specialisations like Transport Economics were dominated by 'practitioners', as there was hardly any academic base to draw upon. Centralised control ensured that the critiques and conclusions presented at the First Convention, before a carefully-screened audience, adhered to the directives set by the Congress leadership along guidelines formulated by the Politburo. At regional conventions, the representatives of 'bourgeois' economics formed the majority of the academic audience, but were not allowed by the Congress organisers to have decision-making powers. Instead these meetings became arenas for staged personal attacks on prominent economists.

Lastly, the structure of the discipline was much affected by its fragmentation into small, specialised compartments. It entailed the separation of political economy from empirical and technical issues, and introduced a division of labour where theory became firmly linked with ideology and empirical problems were sent out to 'sector' economics. The next chapter investigates the development of Polish economics after the Congress.

A BRAVE NEW WORLD? MARXIST-LENINIST ECONOMICS 1951-1955

After the tumultuous re-ordering of the scientific disciplines which culminated in the First Congress of Science of mid 1951, academic life gradually settled into new routines. Scholars attended a succession of May Day parades and agit-prop meetings where they “spontaneously” voted for motions in support of Soviet efforts to promote world peace, and the omnipresent propaganda newspeak soon lost any sense of originality.⁴⁹⁶ In May 1950 one professor noted in his diary:

The fire engine does not leave the main building of the Polytechnic. Its ladder is constantly used for hanging up and taking down slogans, flags and banners. No-one knows any longer if these are for a festival of peace or friendship, a work competition, or some other tragic buffoonery.⁴⁹⁷

III. 7: Meeting of the Union of Polish Youth at the Main School of Planning and Statistics⁴⁹⁸



⁴⁹⁶ The studies of Suleja and Kupiecki extensively document the introduction and extent of communist political ceremonial into the public and the academic domains. Kupiecki, Robert, 1993. *Natchnienie milionów. Kult Stalina w Polsce, 1944-1956*. Warszawa: Wydawnictwa szkolne i pedagogiczne, Suleja, Teresa, 1995. *Uniwersytet Wrocławski w okresie centralizmu stalinowskiego, 1950-1955*. Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego.

⁴⁹⁷ Steinhaus, Hugo & Zgorzelska, Aleksandra, 1992. *Wspomnienia i zapiski* London: Aneks. p.395: Diary entry dated 29.05.1950

⁴⁹⁸ <http://www.shg.waw.pl/ogolnuczelnianie/100lat/Jubilatka> accessed 26.08.2005

Stagnation and dogmatism became the trademarks of academic life. Fear permeated daily life – fear of a new ‘hot’ war, of informers, of accusations and sudden arrests. We need to examine what kind of scholarship emerged under the domination of ‘Marxism-Leninism’, and what became of the PUWP’s promise to create a better-performing, better-funded discipline of economics.

Policy-makers at the time proclaimed that the Soviet experience was the inspiration for the changes introduced into Polish higher education and science. This assertion has been much debated by historians, and while a majority agrees that it was between 1950 and 1954 that ‘stalinisation’ was most pronounced, no consensus seems to exist as to the definition or the extent of that phenomenon.⁴⁹⁹ What ‘stalinism’ consisted of in the Polish academic context, and how it related to the Soviet ‘blueprint’, still needs to be examined. In a study tracing the development and functioning of Soviet science published in 1997, Kremontsov based his definition of a “Stalinist Science” on two characteristics: the overlapping of party and scientific institutions, and the inability to resolve the conflict in priorities between ideology and science.⁵⁰⁰ These two characteristics were very pronounced in the Poland of the early 1950s. Since Chapter Three has already broached the issue of the overlap of party and state in academic institutions, discussion in this chapter will focus on the conflict between ideological and scientific authority in Marxist-Leninist economics, and in particular on how this conflict affected scientific communication and reputation control.

Marxist ideology placed science at the very centre of its world view: it was because Marxism was scientific that it was the only true ideology. Yet neither Soviet nor Polish communists openly recognised the potential for conflict between scientific truth and doctrinal truth. Ethan Pollock argues that by 1948 leading Soviet party officials were aware that both the development of scientific disciplines and the ability to provide innovative results were constrained by ideological rigidity. The Kremlin was in fact unable to decide who should have the last word when research results clashed with dogma – the Party, or scholars. Stalin’s interventions in linguistics and political economy, Pollock argues, were intended to support scholars.⁵⁰¹ A brief look at how Stalin’s articles were brought into play in Poland confirms

⁴⁹⁹ For a discussion of the different views on stalinism among Polish historians, see Andrzej Friszke’s contribution “Polish Communism in Contemporary Debates” in World Congress for Central, East European, Studies & Kemp-Welch, A., 1999. *Stalinism in Poland, 1944-56 : selected papers from the Fifth World Congress of Central and East European studies, Warsaw, 1995* Basingstoke: Macmillan. pp.144-157

⁵⁰⁰ Kremontsov, Nikolai, 1997. *Stalinist Science* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

⁵⁰¹ Pollock, Ethan, 2006. *Stalin and the Soviet Science Wars* Princeton, N.J. ; Oxford: Princeton University Press.

that the effect was the opposite of that intended: PUWP ideologues used them to reinforce the supremacy of Party-controlled ideology in the social sciences.

The third aspect of the ‘stalinist’ years in Polish economics which deserves exploration is the co-existence of the Marxist-Leninist and pre-existing hierarchies. The Marxist-Leninist position dominated the field by controlling resources, publication outlets, education, recruitment, and reputation control. By claiming to be the only scientific method, Marxism-Leninism denied all other economic schools the right to be delineated as part of the discipline. Marxists-Leninists insisted on their exclusive right to define the boundaries of the discipline, a right given by the political leadership. So from the Marxist-Leninist point of view, the discipline now consisted solely of the Marxist-Leninist position, to the exclusion of everything else, which was now termed ‘bourgeois’ economics. However, if we conceive of the field of cultural production as being defined by the mutual acceptance of its practitioners, the Marxist-Leninist view loses validity. In fact, economists classed by Marxists-Leninists as ‘bourgeois’ were not only present, but constituted the majority. This majority was aware that in Western countries non-Marxist approaches continued to dominate the discipline, and they persisted in considering ‘capitalist’ science to be acceptable. While some wished to use certain elements and techniques of ‘capitalist’ science to reinforce Marxist-Leninist science, others went much further, considering Marxist-Leninist science to be mere propaganda, and denying it the status of scientific knowledge. Thus the discipline of economics was split into two factions, each refusing to acknowledge the other as a legitimate area of the field. However, daily intercourse at academic institutions, and some degree of shared experiences and background, ensured that there were points of contact between individuals occupying the ‘dominant’ and ‘inferior’ positions in the field. Bourdieu argues that positions within a field of cultural production influence each other even when they are making a point of their non-cooperation.⁵⁰² There are few sources that reflect the perspectives of the silent ‘bourgeois’ economists, as contemporary reports are virtually non-existent. Yet despite the fact that in this chapter non-Marxist professors may appear to be a nearly extinct species, their continued presence and influence becomes clear once we appreciate what transpired among economists once the silence was broken in 1956.

This chapter opens with an overview of the new, post-Congress and post-reform situation within the field of economics, followed by the case study of a Marxist-Leninist debate on

⁵⁰² Bourdieu, Pierre, 1993. *The Field of Cultural Production*. New York: Columbia University Press.

economics. The last and most extensive part of the chapter is devoted to an investigation of the activities of the Central Qualification Committee (CQC).

A discipline divided

The reform of higher education had re-shaped the institutional landscape in economics. The new organisation provided for a more even distribution of economic colleges throughout the country, thereby easing access to undergraduate studies. Yet graduate studies were closed down in most places, resulting in a radical centralisation of research training. On an institutional level, the PUWP appeared so far to have been successful in carrying out its will. However, subsequent changes in the institutional landscape of economics reveal that the PUWP's ambitious plans were disrupted by a lack of scholars considered trustworthy by the cadres responsible for the political clearing of all candidates for important positions. The creation of the Institute for the Training of Scientific Cadres (ITSC) had already strained the PUWP economists' ability to cover all the important positions. As the heads of the different institutions vied for scarce resources, institutional rivalries appear to have gained in strength.

The success of the new colleges depended on their ability to attract qualified staff. This was relatively easy for colleges that had been solidly established on the basis of the well-run business colleges of Poznań and Kraków, where human resources from the now-closed university economics departments could also be brought into play. In addition, the colleges in Sopot and Katowice were able to continue to rely on co-operation with active maritime and coal industry centres. Yet before 1949 these four most vibrant institutions had aspired to step through the portals of the academic club by offering doctoral studies, ambitions which were now frustrated. As doctoral programmes were closed down, and replaced by the new *aspirantura* programmes leading to a *kandydat nauk* degree offered at the Main School of Planning and Statistics and the ITSC, the provincial academic centres now had to send their students to Warsaw to complete their training. They now neither received funding and positions related to graduate training, nor controlled course formation and theses topics, nor were able to offer protection to their students, whose fate would be decided by the faculty of other institutions.

The ITSC, this hot-house established to create a new Marxist-Leninist elite in social sciences, was by design set apart from the academic community in general. According to Sitek, it was

an intellectual ghetto where isolation reinforced the bonds among its graduates.⁵⁰³ In all other academic institutions, however, the new Marxist-Leninist staff had to co-habit with a majority of non-Marxist academic and administrative staff, as well as with their students. Many testimonies dwell on the animosity with which the newcomers were treated. Drewnowski recalled the conditions at the Main School thus:

The old staff of the School and the PUWP newcomers constituted two separate, mutually alien societies – maintaining only professional contacts.

(...) on receiving the news of Stalin's death the members of the old staff (probably over 150 people) openly expressed their joy in conversations among themselves, and related scornfully how a "comrade" started crying in the office when receiving the news. No repression followed, because PUWP members were never told of this behaviour. This division into old and new of the staff of the Main School of Planning and Statistics started to fade only during Professor A. Grodek's rectorship, after October 1956.⁵⁰⁴

Generally "professional" contact is considered to be the appropriate level of interaction at a workplace, but for the 'old' Main School staff who had formed a tightly knit community even before the war, and who had grown used to sharing their meagre bacon allowances, tilling the garden to produce vegetables, and facing harsh war and post-war realities together, "professional" was the equivalent of an ice-front. In some cases the division lines coincided with those of the institutional organisation, with the sections devoted to political economy now controlled by 'PUWP newcomers', while at the Domestic Trade Department, Koźmiński was able to create an 'oasis' for those students and staff with politically-questionable views and curricula vitae.⁵⁰⁵ In the specific context of the early 1950s, when a joke about Stalin could cause serious problems, the conditions for the discussion of economic problems using 'bourgeois' concepts and methods, and for asking critical questions about economic policy, could only exist in private or semi-private circles of trusted colleagues and students. Of necessity difficult to document, such private 'oases' continued to exist until 1956, when they could resume public activity. It seems that professorial patronage allowed the creation of semi-public spheres that escaped the Party organisations' powers and control mechanisms. As

⁵⁰³ Sitek, Ryszard, 2000. *Warszawska szkoła historii idei. Między historia a terażniejszoscia*. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo naukowe Scholar. p.58

⁵⁰⁴ Drewnowski, Jan, 1990. "Autobiografia naukowa". *Kwartalnik Historii Nauki i Techniki*, 35, 451-489. I am quoting from the revised edition posted on <http://www.ptc.pl> and accessed 18.12.2007. p.20

p.16

⁵⁰⁵ See the testimonies of L. Koźmiński's students testimonies in Strużycki, Marian & Kamiński, Marek B. (eds.) (2004) *Leon Koźmiński. Patron Wyższej Szkoły Przedsiębiorstwa i Zarządzania*. Warszawa: Wyższa Szkoła Przedsiębiorczości i Zarządzania im L. Koźmińskiego.

with Koźmiński at the Main School, when Edward Lipiński was moved to Warsaw University after being demoted from the chair in political economy at the Main School, he was allowed to engage with the less ideologically-vital subject of the history of economic thought, and was also able to find employment for some of the assistants who had been sacked from the Main School for political reasons. Using the cloak of historical studies, he was also able to continue teaching selected and trusted students about Ricardo, Pareto and other western economists, and ensured that the Polish Economists Association's house and library in Warsaw remained a venue open to economists who had lost access to other academic institutions.

The actual rate of establishment of new institutions in economics was in stark contrast to the ambitious promises made at the Congress of Science. This delay is not difficult to explain, given the limited number of Marxist-Leninist scholars, or to put it differently, the continued unwillingness of the Party leadership to extend the boundaries of the Marxist-Leninist group. Despite the resolutions passed at the First Congress of Polish Science, no Institute of Economics was established under the auspices of the new Academy of Sciences. Only a small unit, a 'workshop' (*zakład*) was set up under the direction of Hilary Minc's younger brother Bronisław. The potential of the PAN Institute of Economics for conflict with existing institutions is readily discernible in the Congress resolution. The PEA and Lipiński would lose what vestiges of control they had over *Ekonomista*, as it was to become the journal of the planned Institute. The ITSC had secured the position of ideological leader of higher education in the social sciences, but would now have to yield it to the PAN Institute once the Congress resolution became operational. Such a plan could not have gone down well with the ITSC's director, the astute Adam Schaff. I would not be surprised if an investigation into the institutional rivalries between the ITSC and PAN confirmed Schaff's involvement in the decision to scale down economics under the auspices of the PAN. Later efforts on the part of B. Minc to obtain the promised upgrade of his unit to an institute were countered by the CC Science Division. Zemankowa argued that a concentration of resources was needed in the Political Economy Department at Warsaw University, established in 1953. Perhaps the PUWP had learned a lesson, having overstretched their human resources in Marxist-Leninist economics with the establishment of the ITCS shortly after the transformation of the Main School. In any case, the CC Science Division now concluded that there were not enough personal resources available for the simultaneous expansion of two new economic centres in

Warsaw.⁵⁰⁶ Regrettably, I have not found any more information on this case, so the question remains open as to how and why the aspirations of Warsaw University were realised instead of and at the expense of the PAN's promised expansion.

After the Congress of Science, the ideological orientation of *Ekonomista* became more pronounced. Few articles appeared that had not been approved by the PUWP as being Marxist-Leninist, or at least neutral. From 1952 modifications were made in the traditional composition of its issues, articles, reviews, notices, and bibliographies, and *Ekonomista* became more similar to the Party's ideological journal, *Nowe Drogi*, which in turn was patterned on Soviet journals. The most significant alteration was the introduction of political editorials and reprints of speeches made by party and state officials. *Ekonomista* now joined the rest of the press in following the rhythm of the communist liturgical year, celebrating the ideological campaigns which accompanied Stalin's seventieth birthday, the anniversaries of the October Revolution, elections, and Party congresses. A typical issue would now open with the text of a speech by Bierut to the Party Congress, reprinted in respectful italics to distinguish it from the lowly matter of the scientific discussions that followed. The role of the Party leadership as the economists' guide was demonstrated in each issue.

Communist modifications were made both to well-established religious practices observed by the majority of the population, such as Christmas, and to the rituals of more limited communities such as those of scholars.⁵⁰⁷ At academic institutions this meant that traditional gatherings such as those at the start of the academic year were now clad in communist apparel. The PUWP also made sure that new celebrations of their own making were added. These were often meant to mark the finalisation of some collective effort, such as the publication in Polish of the Third Edition of Marx's *Capital (Volume 1)* in June 1951, or to honour an anniversary the PUWP considered to be important. That was the case with the celebrations of Stalin's seventieth birthday by the entire Soviet block, and the commemorations of Copernicus in 1953, and Mickiewicz in 1955. While the motivation for the celebrations of Stalin need no explanation here, the commemorations of Copernicus and Mickiewicz were related to the exhibition on economic thought organised for the First

⁵⁰⁶ AAN/ KCPZPR/237/XVI/8 Letter from Z.Zemankowa (vice-director of the CC Science Division) to Jakub Berman, date 4.11.1953.

⁵⁰⁷ Suleja, Kupiecki, M. Kula, *Religiopodobny komunizm* (Kraków 2003), 178.

Convention of Economists in 1951. All such efforts attempted to reinterpret the national cultural heritage by presenting it as leading up to communism.⁵⁰⁸

According to the plan formulated at the First Congress of Science, research was to take place primarily at the PAN Institute and the ministerial research institutes. The reality was that PAN was not sufficiently equipped to launch large scale projects, while the research institutes attached to the ministries lacked academic competence and were being kept busy with commissions from the ministerial bureaucracies. The First Congress had also announced the introduction of research planning. In my archival searches I have not found any material suggesting systematic planning of research before 1960. The only exception in the early 1950s was the ITSC, the model institution as far as planning was concerned. There, topics and specific tasks were assigned by plan to individual employees of the chair of political economy, and targets and production time limits were set.⁵⁰⁹ The ITSC also detailed a list of 260 topics for *kand. nauk* theses, which were to serve as guidelines for other institutions. The role of planning in research would increase from the late 1950s.⁵¹⁰

In academic institutions, teaching and administrative duties were heaped on the small number of Marxist-Leninist economists, with disastrous results for their research output. It should also be mentioned that very few, if any, of the economists trusted by the PUWP had experience in conducting research. The thin issues of *Ekonomista*, and in particular the absence of new books worthy of review, were symptoms of this problem. Reviews reappeared as a regular feature from the end of 1951, but on a much smaller scale than before (only one or two per issue). Based on an analogy with the situation in Soviet science during the same period, it also seems possible that extended procedures for the reviewing and clearing of works in and for publication delayed the Marxist-Leninist output of books.⁵¹¹ Stamping down on non-Marxist scientific production had been a success, but so far Marxist-Leninist economists had been unable to fill the vacuum thus created.

⁵⁰⁸ Economists were active in the Copernicus commemoration, since he had written on economic questions. See the monograph of Lipiński, Edward, 1955. *Poglądy ekonomiczne Mikołaja Kopernika* Warszawa. Also see the discussion in *Ekonomista* in 1952 and 1953 issues.

⁵⁰⁹ AAN/ANS/5/79 "Katedra Ekonomii Politycznej. Ramowy plan pracy naukowej na okres 1951-1953." 1.11.1951. Signed W. Brus

⁵¹⁰ A preliminary investigation into the archival collection of the Polish Academy of Science's Workshop of Economics, suggest that systematic planning was then under way in the 1960s, and that PAN had assumed the co-ordinating role it had been originally designed to fill.

⁵¹¹ Pollock details the many stages of consultations and controls a scholarly publication had go through in the Soviet Union in the same period, and the backlog of publications which followed. It is possible an analogue tendency was also affecting Poland. Pollock, Ethan, 2006. *Stalin and the Soviet Science Wars* Princeton, N.J.; Oxford: Princeton University Press. p.194.


It would seem from its actions that the Bierut regime did not want the now-reformed and Marxist-Leninist scholars to conduct research in economics, and that Hilary Minc was happy to run the show with the aid of his own bureaucracy. The active steps taken to suppress criticism also suggest that the political leadership did not hanker after independent and critical economic analyses. In the Party organisation, economics was the domain of the ideological not the economic authorities. What funds the regime spent on economic expertise did not go to academic institutions, but in all probability to the Planning Commission's bureaucracy, and possibly to some other agencies like the Central Statistical Bureau and the National Bank of Poland. The ITSC received funds for the training of ideologues, and the Main School and regional Colleges received funds for the training of planning apparatus and management staff.

In his study of Hungarian economists, Péteri argues that the reform efforts initiated after Stalin's death in 1953, the New Course, brought a renewed stress on reliable statistics and analyses.⁵¹² It is likely that an analogous process also took place in Poland, although the sources on which this study is based do not shed light on this subject. Brus mentions that for him opportunities to study economic developments at first hand only opened up at that time.⁵¹³ Poland did not have an institution equal to István Friss's Institute of Economics, and compared with Hungary, Poland lacked a strong academic research institution with good links to management and policy-making experts. It would probably take a study of the materials of the Central Statistical Bureau, the National Bank, and the Planning Commission to ascertain whether the New Course policies had any significant effect on Polish economics.

⁵¹² "New Course Economics: The Field of Economic Research in Hungary after Stalin, 1953-1956" in Péteri, György, 1998b. *Controlling the Field of Academic Economics in Hungary, 1953-1976. In G. Péteri (ed.) Academia and State Socialism. Essays on the Political History of Academic Life in Post-1945 Hungary and Eastern Europe.* New York: Atlantic Research and Publications.

⁵¹³ In particular he referred to an investigation of the overall tax-burden on farmers. Brus, Włodzimierz, 1993. "The Bane of Reforming the Socialist System". *Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review*, 187, 363-405.p.378

Table 7: Articles and reviews as compared with other texts appearing in *Ekonomista*.⁵¹⁴



What could be published by economists in the early 1950s is made clear in the contents pages of *Ekonomista*. The table above illustrates two striking features of *Ekonomista* in this period. Firstly a dramatic peak in 1952-1953 of texts that were neither original articles nor reviews, and secondly, a slow but steady increase in the number of articles, here not regaining a level comparable with 1948 until 1953, and only gaining speed with the advent of the Thaw.

The slow increase of output in the form of articles did not entail any surge of creativity among Marxist-Leninist economists. Many of the texts collated under the heading “articles” in the tables of content were not scholarly articles as such but information on the Congress, on the tasks of Economic Colleges, or on conferences recently held. The 1950 and 1951 issues drew on the preparations made for the First Convention of Polish Economists, and on Congress work in general. Thus one of the three 1951 issues was entirely filled with the interventions made at the First Convention, and a report on the discussion. Many articles were written by politicians and expounded on current economic policies; others were by economists taking on ideological subjects. The implementation of the Six-Year Plan was the dominant theme of the former, and the application of Stalin’s precepts and Soviet experiences to the Polish economy was the main concern of the latter. Reprints of contributions from Soviet scholars and reports from their discussions were not counted as “articles” but held apart as a category in their own right. In 1950, each issue had on average two or three texts written by or based on Soviet

⁵¹⁴ The figures for this diagram are based on a count of positions mentioned in the tables of content of *Ekonomista* and are here given by year for articles and reviews against all text positions. 1947:34/37, 1948:35/43, 1949:23/31, 1950:23/30, 1951:30/30, 1952:30/68, 1953:37/88, 1954:35/57, 1955:45/61, 1956:51/69.

scholars' work. A different practice was initiated from the first issue in 1952, when political texts were separated out from the category of articles. The 1952 and 1953 issues opened with one or more political and ideological articles: reports from Party Plenums or speeches given by prominent party or state functionaries. While the political texts in the 1950 and 1951 issues dealt with economic problems, and appear to have been customised for *Ekonomista*, those in 1952 and 1953 were of a more general nature, with every major Party statement, speech or decision now being presented as of direct relevance to the discipline. The issue commemorating Stalin's death (1953:1) contained seventeen pages of official announcements and condolences. *Ekonomista* strongly resembled the ideological organ of the Party, *Nowe Drogi*. New sections were introduced into the journal, such as "Consultations", where an authority on ideology would give the correct assessment of some issue, and "From the life of science", which was the counterpart of *Nowe Drogi's* section "From the life of the Party". The year of 1954 brought with it the initiation of the "New Course", another revision of *Ekonomista's* profile. The political interventions were now removed from their prominent place at the start of each issue and once more made directly relevant to economics. The situation changed noticeably in 1955, in terms of both the number of authors and the number of contributions. A new generation of economists entered the scene, and in the last issues of that year economists even engaged in a discussion on the relationship between consumption and accumulation. Stalinism was coming to an end on the pages of *Ekonomista*.

'Stalinist' discussion in economics

One autumn day in 1952, Zdzisław Sadowski was walking down the street towards the university campus as usual. Edward Lipiński's young assistant, who had spent a year in a prison on charges of conspiracy against the regime, and had been evicted from his post as assistant at the Main School in 1949, had finally found a refuge at Warsaw University under Lipiński's wing. To Sadowski's surprise, the Marxist-Leninist professor Józef Zawadzki crossed the street to join him. Conscious of the precariousness of his employment at the University, Sadowski observed Zawadzki's approach with apprehension. Fear turned into surprise, however, when Zawadzki initiated a friendly discussion on economics in which he said things that were quite the opposite of what his position on the subject had been up till then.⁵¹⁵ This reversal concerned the question of whether economic laws in a socialist society could function independently of the will of the central planners. The official position had held

⁵¹⁵ A.W. Haugstad, interview with Zdzisław J. Sadowski, Warsaw 2000

that the only economic laws to work under socialism were those consciously applied by the political leadership, i.e. the economic Plan. Zawadzki had been one of those hammering in the message and guarding the dogma.⁵¹⁶ Sadowski's astonishment lasted only until Stalin's article "*The Economic problems of socialism in the USSR*", was published in Poland a few days later.⁵¹⁷ Stalin himself had occasioned the reversal of Zawadzki's opinions:

*Some comrades deny the objective character of laws of science, and of laws of political economy particularly, under socialism. They deny that the laws of political economy reflect law-governed processes which operate independently of the will of man. They believe that in view of the specific role assigned to the Soviet state by history, the Soviet state and its leaders can abolish existing laws of political economy and can "form," "create," new laws. These comrades are profoundly mistaken.*⁵¹⁸

While Stalin's ideas had been formulated following debates which had gone on for years among Soviet economists about the draft of a textbook on political economy, it seems that only with the publication of Stalin's text were the Polish Marxist-Leninist economists thrown into turmoil. The Soviet discussion, amply documented and analysed by Pollock, had not been a public one, and there is no way of telling how much the Polish economists knew about it. What is clear, however, is that Stalin's intervention raised many difficult issues. Firstly, the Marxist-Leninist economists and Party ideologues had to deal with the fact that Stalin's statements proved every single loyal Marxist-Leninist wrong. Since the Marxists-Leninists had attacked 'bourgeois' economics with the assertion that only they had access to scientific truth, it was particularly embarrassing to be reprimanded by the supreme ideological authority. During a discussion held in 1953, where Marxist-Leninist scholars were invited to debate the import of Stalin's work, even party members could not hide their wonder at why

⁵¹⁶ As far back as 1947, the editorial manifesto of the first post-war *Ekonomista* spoke of an investigation into the existence of laws in planned economies as being a central issue in the near future. Several 'bourgeois' economists tried to address this question and were harshly criticised by the Marxist-Leninist economists.

⁵¹⁷ "The Economic problems of Socialism in the USSR" was published in the Soviet Union on October 3, 1952. The Polish translation appeared promptly in *Nowe Drogi*. It is not clear whether the time difference in learning about Stalin's opinions on the existence of objective laws under socialism from Zawadzki was due to the short period between the Soviet version and the Polish version, or whether Zawadzki was informed of the discussions surrounding the revision of a textbook in political economy that went on in Moscow. The conversation could therefore have taken place just before 3 October, or between 3 October and the publication of the Polish translation of Stalin's text in the October issue of *Nowe Drogi* (1952:10). When Stalin's remarks on economics were published, they were followed by an exegetic article in *Ekonomista* signed by Adam Rapacki, by now a member of the Politburo.

⁵¹⁸ J. V. Stalin: *The Economic problems of socialism in the USSR*. "Publisher's note: the present English translation of J. V. Stalin's Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R. is a reprint of the text given in the English pamphlet published in Moscow, 1952. Changes have been made according to other English translations of the pamphlet." Prepared © for the Internet by David J. Romagnolo, djr@marx2mao.org (May 1997) (Corrected and Updated August 2000) <http://www.marx2mao.com/Stalin/EP52.html> accessed: 29/10/2002

Party economists had been so wrong for so long, since they had the infallible tool of Marxism-Leninism at hand:

Comrade Konopka: It is simply impossible to understand that those who follow the thoughts of Marx, who said that his science was first of all critical and revolutionary, commit errors in such numbers. (...) why people of the stature of Ostrowitianow, the director of the Institute of Economics, the eminent economists Leontieff and a whole number of others have erred, and why all have erred in the same way (...) Why such illustrious individuals among us as comrade Brus, as comrade Zawadzki, as comrade Pohorille, have committed the same errors. (...) What is perplexing is that whole groups of individuals in exposed, high positions committed the same errors (...) that only our leader, our teacher and guide, who has to think of everything, must think about detailed theoretical issues and correct errors.⁵¹⁹

The newly established Marxist-Leninist hierarchy was under threat of de-stabilisation, since the reigning Marxist-Leninist economists, such as W. Brus, B. Minc and J. Zawadzki, who had been using their politically-sponsored scholarly authority to propagate the current communist position on political economy, were now open to attack. Criticised for having previously failed to understand what Stalin now explained to them, B. Minc, W. Brus and J. Zawadzki all submitted ritual *samokrytyka*.

While party ideologues and economists were wondering how to deal with these new developments, the Party organisation knew how to react. Based on the Soviet example and earlier domestic experiences, a procedure was already in place for what to do when Stalin said something of relevance for science,⁵²⁰ just as happened in 1950, following Stalin's article on linguistics, when conferences were organised to discuss his contribution to economics. It is worth noting that in the Soviet Union the Party's reaction to Stalin's publication was immediate, and Pollock relates that the campaign to promote and discuss Stalin's article took place in the very month following its publication. In Poland, however, in the case of both the linguistics and the economics articles, the PUWP took several months to organise the reception to Stalin's message. It is possible that this reveals something about the distance

⁵¹⁹ AAN/ANS/5/44, Scientific session devoted to the work of J. Stalin *Economic problems of socialism in the USSR* (27.2.-1.3.1953) p.144

Konopka Antoni (1900-1963), before 1939 a member of the Communist Party and a lawyer defending communists. After the war, assistant professor (prof.nadzw.) in 1947. Organised the T. Duracz Law-school and was its first rector. Worked as professor of political economy at Politechnika Śląska w Gliwicach, (-1948), Wyższe Kursy Administracji przy Prezydium RM, Spółdzielczy Instytut Naukowy (-1949), WSE Łódź (-1951), University of Łódź (-1953). Became a member of the PUWP in 1956. Tych, Feliks (ed.) (1978) *Słownik biograficzny działaczy polskiego ruchu robotniczego A-D*, Warszawa: Książka i Wiedza.

⁵²⁰ Pollock, Ethan, 2006. *Stalin and the Soviet Science Wars* Princeton, N.J. ; Oxford: Princeton University Press. p.210

between the Soviet and Polish party apparatuses, and about the level of information and involvement given to Polish communists in the Soviet debates.

III. 8: Solemn scientific session of the Polish Academy of Science, devoted to Stalin's "Economic problems of socialism in the USSR". 17.04.53 Speaking: J. Chałasiński⁵²¹



The official conference celebrating Stalin's text on economics, as depicted in the photograph, was a public event held in the Parliament chamber and reported in the press. It was the same type of tightly-scripted and controlled public meeting as the First Convention of Economists and the Congress of Science. However, just as the Congress was prepared behind closed doors, so too, before the public Stalin session, there was a preliminary conference at the CC Institute for Training of Scientific Cadres (27.02.1953 to 1.03.1953). This conference gathered Marxist-Leninist scholars representing economics, history and philosophy,⁵²² and opened on February 27 with presentations by Z. Modzelewski, W. Brus, R. Werfel and S. Ignar.⁵²³ On the second day there was a general discussion, followed by division into disciplinary sections. In the economics section J. Zawadzki and O. Lange gave the opening presentations, and these were then followed by a discussion which continued into the next day.⁵²⁴ The discussion

⁵²¹ ADMech/29071-1: Uroczysta sesja naukowa PAN poświęcona pracy J.Stalina "Ekonomiczne problemy socjalizmu w ZSRR". 17.04.53, CAF, fot. Dąbrowiecki

⁵²² AAN/ANS/5/ Sesja naukowa poświęcona pracy J.Stalina - «Ekonomiczne problemy socjalizmu w ZSRR» (27.2.-1.3.1953) folders nr.42, 43, 44

⁵²³ **Stefan Ignar (1908-1992)** economist, studies at Poznań University, active in the peasant youth movement „Wici”, Assistant professor at Main School of Agriculture (SGGW) from 1949.

Zygmunt Modzelewski (1900-1954) economist, studied in Paris, member of Polish Communist Party, French Communist Party, PWP and PUWP. Polish ambassador to the Soviet Union in 1945, Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs 1945-1947, Minister of Foreign Affairs 1947-1954, rector of ITSC 1951-1954.

Roman Werfel (1906-2003) editor in chief of *Nowe Drogi* (1952-1955) *Moldawa*, Tadeusz, 1991. *Ludzie władzy, 1944-1991* Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Państwowe PWN.

⁵²⁴ AAN/ANS/5/42, There was also a section for philosophy and history

sounds similar to a large bar brawl: while this simile might appear disrespectful, the spectacle was not for the tender-hearted. Reading the stenographer's report of the discussion, one cannot avoid noticing the high level of emotional involvement, from laughter caused by ironic and sarcastic remarks to expressions of warm affection and even of frustration and aggression. Firstly, Żurawicki attacked Lipiński during a discussion of the history of the discipline to which I shall shortly return. Lipiński answered back and won some points by making the audience laugh with him at Żurawicki. Then Kielski launched himself at Wyrozembski and others, so that Bialer decided to assist Wyrozembski, before Zawadzki stepped in to support Kielski in his critique of Wyrozembski, who then at last got the chance to speak up for himself and attack others. Next, Pohorille hit out at Wyrozembski for pursuing Brus and himself, while some comrades repeatedly tried to calm the situation and keep the discussion to its intended subject. Of the 23 interventions, I cannot see more than three that could be said to have been free from personal attack or self-defence and directly relevant to the subject at hand, namely the role of economic laws in socialist economies. Most interventions reeked of personal conflict and rancour, and were full of foul rhetorical tricks, such as the distortion of others' opinions and the use of quotations taken out of context. All in all, the transcript of the discussion provides a good guide to the conflict lines within Marxist-Leninist economists, but reveals that not much was said about the theory of the political economy of socialism. There was, however, an interesting discussion on the history of economics.

Stalin's intervention meant that not only did the present hierarchy of the discipline need review, as its major figures were shown to have erred over fundamental questions, but that the past had to be re-examined. Those among the 'honoured fore-fathers' of the discipline who now turned out to have been in the wrong were chastened and those who had earlier been condemned for what now became the orthodoxy were rehabilitated. History was a means of control of the present. Seweryn Żurawicki's revision of the history of the discipline, which aimed to create a cohesive Marxist-Leninist past to match the Party line of the day, was important for the reception of Stalin's work, but was unexpectedly contradicted by Edward Lipiński, who refused to sanction it. Lipiński objected to the claim that *Ekonomista's* transformation was caused by J. Zawadzki's critical article from two years earlier.⁵²⁵ Lipiński's version, and the one which fits with the actual content of *Ekonomista*, was that the

⁵²⁵ This article was the result of the problem paper commissioned by the Political Economy Subsection in preparation for the First Congress of Polish Science, and was discussed in an earlier chapter. Zawadzki, Józef, 1950. "O właściwy kierunek rozwoju "Ekonomisty"". *Nowe Drogi*, 205-220.

re-orientation of the journal towards Marxism had occurred before 1950, and had been the work not of the PUWP's Marxist-Leninist economists, but of established scholars. In his capacity of chief editor, Lipiński had invited Marxist-Leninists to publish in *Ekonomista* in 1947, but they had been passive, and failed to submit papers that could be published.⁵²⁶ He even dared to draw the audience's attention to the fact that the Party line had been different at that time. He revealed that he had contacted the PUWP leadership, and was told that "at this stage" the Party accepted the publication of 'bourgeois' articles.⁵²⁷

To interpret this polemic it is necessary to look beyond the fact that no-one challenged Marxism-Leninism's claim to be the only possible and desirable alternative for economics. Nothing else was possible in the 1953 context, and it would be wrong to interpret Lipiński's intervention as a submission, because even then, in the last days of Stalin's life, and of the stalinist epoch, he continued to fight on. The main issue was control over the definition of Marxism. Was there only one true Marxist dogma, defined by the central leadership in Warsaw on the basis of precepts from Moscow? Was the correct definition of a Marxist someone who adhered at all times to the current party line, or was it someone who was fluent in Marx's work, who shared the commitment to social justice, and who employed his or her critical senses, as Lipiński would have it? By representing their 'bourgeois' and 'eclectic' economist opponents as incapable and unworthy of any dialogue, Marxists-Leninists were trying to reinforce their claim to a monopoly over the discipline. In 1953 Lipiński continued to oppose a polarised vision in which the Marxists-Leninists were seen to have faced hostile reactionaries. He reminded all those concerned that there had been a desire on the part of the *Ekonomista* staff to engage in a constructive dialogue. By doing this he implicitly challenged the central PUWP leadership's monopoly over the definition of who and what was Marxist in the past as well as in the present.

The discussion at the Stalin session illustrates that Marxist-Leninist economists had at their disposal a politicised rhetoric perfectly suited to attacking enemies both outside and inside the Party ranks, but unsuited to analysis or inspiring exchanges of ideas. The second important observation is that, as Krementsov and Pollock found in the Soviet case, in 'stalinist' economics the paradigm shifts did not originate in the inner dynamics of the discipline, but

⁵²⁶ Lipiński's version is in line with the findings presented in Chapter Two, where we saw that the transformation of the content of *Ekonomista* was introduced gradually, and that a decisive change had taken place by the end of 1948.

⁵²⁷ AAN/ANS/5/42, Sesja naukowa poświęcona pracy J.Stalina - «Ekonomiczne problemy socjalizmu w ZSRR» (27.2.-1.3.1953) Lipiński's intervention in the discussion on 28.02.1953 pp.73

were induced by the decisions of the political leadership.⁵²⁸ Marxist-Leninist economists were given neither the resources nor the freedom they needed to formulate and develop an economic theory of socialism. Instead they were made slaves to the Party line. Nor were they let anywhere near -making on economic policy. The promised access to the planned economy as a laboratory for experimental economics was not opened up, and even access to data on economic development and plans was not given to those outside the inner circles of decision-makers and the top levels of the planning bureaucracy.

The politics of academic promotions

Hardly any reader will need an explanation of the importance of decisions regarding evaluation of scholarly work and academic promotions. Likewise the fact that an evaluating body's composition, preferences and outlook may have serious implications for the judgements they pass on scholarly output needs no further comment. More to the point, perhaps, is the question of how the sum of such individual decisions on the merit and relevance of scholarly work affect the discipline as a whole. The sociology of science accords much importance to the processes of reputation control in science. For Richard Whitley, sciences are "*reputational communities around particular goals and conceptual approaches*", and the control of reputation is a central task of scientific disciplines.

*The sciences form a subset of professional organizations, what might be termed reputational organizations. That is, they are systems of work in which practitioners control the way in which work is carried out and the goals for which it is carried out in the light of the particular beliefs and purposes of the reputational community of which they are members.*⁵²⁹

Likewise, Pierre Bourdieu stresses the importance of mutual evaluation by knowledge-producers as a key element of his definition of the field of cultural production.⁵³⁰ Reputation control is the process through which the qualification of individuals in and the value of their contributions to the discipline are evaluated. In academic institutions this process is carried out through the conferment of degrees, titles and positions. Control over access to publication, especially as far as prestigious journals are concerned, is also part of the reputation control process. Since I have not found source materials which might shed light on the process of

⁵²⁸ Kremontsov, Nikolai, 1997. *Stalinist Science* Princeton: Princeton University Press, Pollock, Ethan, 2006. *Stalin and the Soviet Science Wars* Princeton, N.J. ; Oxford: Princeton University Press.

⁵²⁹ Whitley, Richard, 1982. The establishment and structure of the sciences as reputational organizations. In N. Elias, H. Martins & R. Whitley (eds.) *Scientific Establishments and Hierarchies. Sociology of the Sciences a Yearbook*. Dodrecht: D.Reidl Publishing Company. p.315

⁵³⁰ Bourdieu, Pierre, 1993. *The Field of Cultural Production*. New York: Columbia University Press.

selection and evaluation of the material published, I shall limit the discussion to the subject of control over academic titles and degrees. The importance of reputation control extends far beyond decisions about individual contributions and careers. It is the vehicle which maintains and modifies the intellectual goals of the discipline. It concerns the definition of limits and variations within the knowledge area acknowledged to be part of a discipline, and sanctions or rejects ways in which problems are selected and research methods applied.⁵³¹

In the context of Polish economics in the early 1950s, it is not the universal difficulties of peer-review that call for our attention, but the question of the presence, form and extent of political discrimination. How did the scholars vested by the Party with discretion over allocations of academic degrees and titles deal with the dilemma of the political as opposed to the scholarly merit of the candidates? Did their views on the matter evolve, and how did the solutions they adopted affect Polish economics?

The University Law of 1933 gave the Minister and the President the right to influence appointments to the title and position of professor, an opening which would be readily used by the post-war regime. Lower titles and degrees were awarded by the collegiate bodies of academic institutions. In the immediate post-war years (1945-1947) the need to re-stock the depleted ranks of professors and lecturers led to numerous promotions, allowing a new generation to arise with the blessing of the old professoriate. Doctorates and habilitations were still in the gift of academic institutions, and their recommendations for appointments to chairs formed the basis of Presidential decrees. The President, however, could and did use his powers to promote candidates backed by the communists. From 1948, the intensity of communist interference in reputation control gradually increased, as illustrated in Chapter Three. However, there is still much we do not know about the extent or form of this interference, the reactions of academic institutions, or the role of the Council for Higher Education (*Rada Główna do Spraw Szkół Wyższych*) which had advised the President on professorial appointments. The demanding task of gathering information on promotions in the first post-war years still awaits its scholar. It would require the analysis of data dispersed in the archival collections of universities, the Ministry, and political parties, and such a study would preferably encompass more than one discipline. It has not been in my power to conduct such a study within the framework of this work, and so in order to gain some insight into the

⁵³¹ Whitley, Richard, 1982. The establishment and structure of the sciences as reputational organizations. In N. Elias, H. Martins & R. Whitley (eds.) *Scientific Establishments and Hierarchies. Sociology of the Sciences a Yearbook*. Dordrecht: D.Reidl Publishing Company.

evolution of reputation control before 1953, I have concentrated on the control of publications, notably an analysis of the content of *Ekonomista*. The Central Qualification Commission produced documentation on academic promotions which offers an opportunity to study reputation control through the awarding of academic degrees and titles.

The 1951 University Law formalised *ex post* the establishment of a new order in academia, and established a Central Qualification Commission, with the task of approving or discarding candidates for degrees proposed by the universities. The activities of the CQC had repercussions for all disciplines, and its workings deserve more attention than has been its share. I have found no literature indicating that the Polish CQC material has been studied.⁵³² This source material is extensive and varied, and I have found especially interesting the fact that during some periods the discussions in the Commission's sections were stenographed and transcribed. Today these documents provide a unique view of the arguments and considerations taken into account in the evaluation of candidates for degrees.⁵³³

Where the law of 1933 left all titles and degrees below the professor to the discretion of academic institutions, from 1951 all degrees above Master (mgr.) were subject to centralised approval. The CQC's mandate was to confer the scientific titles of ordinary and extraordinary professor and docent as well as the new higher degrees of *kand. nauk* and *doktor nauk*, which replaced the doctorate and the habilitation respectively. It was formally introduced in the new Law on Higher Education and Researchers of 15.12.1951.⁵³⁴ The CQC was mainly concerned with the control of promotions above the level of doctorate, but it also supervised the work of the qualifying commission for junior scientific staff. Like its precursor the Council for Higher Education, the CQC was attached directly to the Government, but unlike the Council, the CQC also had the authority to take final decisions, and had a wider jurisdiction, including the approval of *kand.nauk* degrees and the awarding of docent titles.

The PUWP expected the Marxist-Leninists who had been offered rapid promotion to excel in both teaching and research. The Marxist method, considered to be the only truly scientific way, would guarantee their success. It was also expected that this Marxist-Leninist avant-

⁵³² On the Hungarian equivalent of the CQC, the Scientific Qualifications Committee (Tudományos Minősítő Bizottság), see chapter "Controlling the Field of Academic Economics in Hungary, 1953-1976." in Péteri, György, 1998b. Controlling the Field of Academic Economics in Hungary, 1953-1976. In G. Péteri (ed.) *Academia and State Socialism. Essays on the Political History of Academic Life in Post-1945 Hungary and Eastern Europe*. New York: Atlantic Research and Publications.

⁵³³ The Central Qualification Commission material is located within the Ministry of Higher Education collection at the Archiwum Akt Nowych in Warsaw.

⁵³⁴ Ustawa z dnia 15.12.1951 o szkolnictwie wyższym i o pracownikach nauki. *Dziennik Ustaw RP*, nr.6 poz. 38, pp.57-63

garde would be followed by an army of young researchers educated in the reformed institutions and recruited from worker and peasant classes. However, the CQC material shows that during the stalinist years only a handful economists achieved the *kand. nauk* degree and no *doktor nauk* were awarded by the CQC to economists.⁵³⁵ In addition, the number of new assistant professors and full professors created remains low compared with the number of chairs now directed by ‘deputy professors’. The lack of upward academic movement in the stalinist years becomes even more conspicuous when contrasted with the veritable explosion of promotions after 1956.

From 1944, and on a regular basis, the Party appointed trusted individuals to academic positions, thus interfering in reputation control, a task which under the pre-war regime had been the domain of disciplinary communities. “Professor” had up to then meant a highly-qualified expert whose authority and competence were vouched for by the academic establishment. The regime’s interference changed this situation. Since the candidates chosen by the Communist Party seldom had the necessary academic qualifications, the established meaning of the title “professor” was gradually undermined. The CQC members faced this dilemma on many occasions when evaluating candidates on the basis of political capital earned through loyal service to the Party, and academic capital earned through scientific output. I suggest examining the activities of the CQC with the following two problems in mind: the failure to confer a substantial number of academic promotions; and the attitudes of those scholars appointed by the PUWP to oversee the establishment of a Marxist-Leninist hierarchy in social science towards the dilemma of prioritising between political and scientific merit.

At the first plenum meeting of the of the CQC on April 29th 1953, Adam Rapacki,⁵³⁶ Minister of Higher Education and a member of the Politburo, instructed CQC members on the criteria they were to use to accord promotions.⁵³⁷ The speech concerned two priorities: obtaining more qualified scientists for the national economy; and ensuring the highest level of

⁵³⁵ Based on the CQC decisions published in *Życie Szkoły Wyższej*, 14 economists achieved the *kand.nauk* degree, while no *dr.nauk* have been found. This does not include data for students who took their degrees in the Soviet Union.

⁵³⁶ Adam Rapacki was the leader of the CQC ex officio as the Minister of Higher Education. He was at that time also a member of the Politburo.

⁵³⁷ AAN/MSzW/2761/ Centralna Komisja Kwalifikacyjna dla Pracowników Nauki. Informator “Kryteria oceny działalności, dorobku i rozwoju naukowego kadry naukowej.” 1953. This source is not a manuscript of the speech, but a version about CQC edited for use in the ‘Informator’. It alternates between a synopsis of the speech and direct quotes from it. Although ideological concerns and newspeak could have been present in the parts that were cut down, it seems unlikely from the tone of the direct quotes.

qualification. The candidates for promotion had to display both scientific output that satisfied the demands of the relevant level, and the ability to increase that output. The only other requirements mentioned were honourable pedagogical and moral records. The message was packaged in neutral language which contrasted strongly with the recent high tide of propaganda and newspeak that had followed Stalin's death in March, and even contrasted with Rapacki's speech at the conference for academic institution rectors held four weeks before.⁵³⁸ There was no mention of ideological motives and no newspeak rhetoric. On the face of it, Rapacki was describing a system of traditional reputation control modified only in that the final stages of the accreditation would be undertaken at national level. The change was justified by the alleged low level of the old doctorate and habilitation degrees: the level and prestige of the new *kand.nauk* and *dr.nauk* was to be much higher. However, even if Rapacki did not say so in this 1953 speech, the message as to what constituted the basic elements of good Marxist-Leninist work had been fully communicated to all concerned during the First Congress of Science. The more neutral language of Rapacki's speech was not enough to bring about a change of course and it remains an open question whether it was intended or understood to try to do so. Furthermore, in this context it is not surprising that the issue of a candidate's party membership was not mentioned in the Section's discussions until 1956. However, discussions in 1956 and thereafter made it clear that the criterion of 'communist' had always been at the back of the minds of the section members. The ideological neutrality of the new central organ for reputation control was nullified by the widespread screening of candidates along political criteria, and through the extensive use of an article in the new University Law which allowed for exceptions from the formal requirements for promotion.

As it is not the activities of the CQC as such but their effects on the discipline of economics that are the subject of this inquiry, I will concentrate on the work of the four sections of the CQC which were devoted to the social sciences.⁵³⁹ Before a candidature for promotion was brought under discussion in the Section, it had already made its way through a number of stages. The initiative to propose a promotion lay with the collegial academic body, the school

⁵³⁸ According to Bińko Polish communist leaders were reluctant to engage in the New Course policy and had to be prodded along by their Soviet counterparts. She dates the first signals that some kind of changes on the PUWP's part were contemplated to the 9th Party Plenum held in October 1953. Bińko, Beata, 1995. "Partia wobec "Odwilży". Wyniki kwerendy archiwalnej w poszukiwaniu początków rewizjonizmu: 1954-1955." *Kultura i Społeczeństwo*, 39, 95-106.pp.96-97 Kupiecki has analysed the cult of Stalin in Poland and argues that the rhetoric and ritual expressions that made up this cult peaked in the spring of 1953. Kupiecki, Robert, 1993. *Natchmienie milionów. Kult Stalina w Polsce, 1944-1956*. Warszawa: Wydawnictwa szkolne i pedagogiczne.p.196 For Rapacki's speech at the conference for rectors 30.03 – 01.04.1953 see Hübner, Piotr, 1992. *Polityka naukowa w Polsce w latach 1944-1953. Geneza systemu*. Wrocław: Ossolineum.p.618 and Fijałkowska, Barbara, 1985. *Polityka i twórcy (1948-1959)*. Warszawa: PWN.p.264

⁵³⁹ Law, history, economics, philology, philosophy, pedagogy, psychology, and art studies.

senate, or with the department council. The seemingly important role of the scientific practitioners was restricted by the influence of the local party committee, and of the rector. The latter, appointed by the Ministry and invested with far-reaching powers, could and in some cases did intervene to stop, launch, or moderate the proposal being voted on by the school senate.⁵⁴⁰ A positive decision there moved the case on to the Ministry of Higher Education, where once the bureaucrats had examined the case and decided whether the degree proposed by the school was justified, it was forwarded to one of the four CQC sections. After passing through the discipline sections and the Praesidium, the final decisions were taken in CQC Plenum meetings.

My only source on what the selection of candidates looked like at the level of the Ministry comes from an exchange during a discussion on candidates from the Higher Schools of Economics (WSE) at a meeting of the CQC Social Science Section in September 1954. There, the representative of the Ministry of Higher Education commented on the situation in this way:

The schools have sent in 66 applications for scientific titles, out of which we have qualified 21 as eligible. The situation is that even if we give at least one person in each economic school a scientific title, we will still have problems with recruitment. If a school does not have 1-2 docents, then there will be no recruitment at all, with the result that we may have to close the schools down. We have another 23 applications that came in after the deadline and which have not been processed. We might pass 4-5 of them on to the CQC with positive recommendations. So, for the over two hundred scientific workers employed in economic schools, this will give us about 30 (persons with scientific titles). If we add the 12 that are already there, that is forty-odd. That will not even be 20% with scientific titles.⁵⁴¹

Here, we learn that the Ministry disqualified two thirds of the candidates proposed for promotion by the Higher Schools of Economics, established in 1950 on the basis of the old Business Colleges (*Akademia Handlowa*). The new schools were a variable group. Some profited from the proximity of economics at local universities, while others were established *ab initio* and without older academic institutions in the vicinity from which they could draw experienced staff. Also, all Higher Schools of Economics had experienced an abrupt expansion of student numbers after the reforms. This rapid expansion of the numbers of institutions and students explains the dramatic lack of well-educated economists, as only

⁵⁴⁰ This comes through in the discussions of the CQC Social Science Section.

⁵⁴¹ AAN/MSzW/2781/p.181, CQC: Stenographic report of the meeting in Sekcja Nauk Społecznych 6.09.1954

twelve of the 200 scientific employees of the higher schools of economics had the title of docent or above. Source material held in the CQC collection does not allow us to conclude whether the Ministry's rejections were motivated by political criteria, or if schools in desperate need for docents and professors had put forward candidates who lacked scholarly qualifications.

Having touched on the role of the Ministry of Higher Education in the selection of candidates for promotion, we cannot avoid looking in the direction of the CC Science Division. While, based on the power distribution between Party and State agencies, we can assume that the CC Science Division controlled the work of the CQC, sources illuminating this relationship are scarce. Besides traces of a consultation on the composition of the CQC reviewer corps with the CC Science Division, I have only found one important piece of evidence: a monthly report on the Division for April 1954, which mentions that the officials of the Division had completed: "*Control of the work of the CQC on the verification of scientific titles and the role of the party organisations within it, based mainly on the experience of the Main School of Agrarian Economy.*"⁵⁴² This suggests that the candidate's local party organisation had an active role in the reputation control and promotions process, but it does not tell us much more than that. How thorough this control was, what corrections the CC Division introduced, and what conclusions its officials deduced from their findings, the report does not say. The extent and nature of this influence, and of any variations or exceptions, remain unanswered. This quote mentions the verification of academic staff titles and positions which was carried out locally, in the institutions, under the aegis of the CQC. It could be the reason why it took the CQC so long to get started on dealing with the candidates for new titles.

Faced with the challenge of establishing control over the distribution of scientific titles and degrees, the PUWP applied solutions it had already successfully implemented in other areas. The first solution was centralisation. Previously, decisions about academic promotions were taken in academic institutions, where PUWP representatives were at best represented but were not in a position to dominate the process. With the CQC, the PUWP was able to place power over these decisions in the hands of a collegium of hand-picked Marxist-Leninist scholars. Secondly, as the Party organisation was gradually extended to cover all institutions, the Party could also oversee the early local stages of the selection and evaluation of candidates for

⁵⁴² AAN/KCPZPR/237/XVI/178/p.5: "Sprawozdanie z pracy Wydziału Nauki KC za miesiąc kwiecień." 21.05.1954

promotion at academic institutions through the activity of the local BPO. Centralisation also meant that decisions taken at the centre would affect the practice of the academic institutions: the choices made by deans and rectors in proposing promotions. The chairman of the CQC Social Science Section, Jan Wasilkowski, explained the role of the CQC to his colleagues as follows:⁵⁴³

*(...) the role of the CQC cannot be reduced to one where it should evaluate and assist those seeking a scientific title. Its role is greater, and the CQC should above all influence the work at universities and scientific institutions. We do not have any other way of influencing the leadership of higher schools. (...) That the leadership of a scientific institution should draw a lesson from a given example is far more important than the fate of one or other kandydat nauk thesis or the fate of the candidate for a title.*⁵⁴⁴

The CQC was provided with a mandate to intervene directly in the institutions by sending out inspection teams. Whether the CQC did so, however, remains to be seen. I have not succeeded in finding anything on the CQC inspection teams, no details on what exactly they were to examine or even whether they were ever sent out to the institutions in question. The only source available on them consists of lists of names and institutions that were to be covered by the inspectors.⁵⁴⁵

The legitimacy of the CQC depended on its composition, since the accumulated scientific authority of the body conferring a degree or title reflects on the prestige of the titles it confers. In the first years of the CQC's activity, the dilemma of choosing scholars whom the PUWP trusted to watch over the ideological purity of the field, and who were also respected by the majority of scholars, was solved in exactly the same way as during the Congress of Science. After 1956, the situation would change considerably, as we shall see in the next chapter.

⁵⁴³ **Wasilkowski Jan** (1898-1977), legal scholar. Professor at Warsaw University from 1937, rector 1950-1952. Member of PAN from 1952. 1948-1950 judge. 1956-1967 First President of Highest Court. Co-creator of the legal system of the People's Republic, leader of the Codification Commission which prepared the codes passed in the 1960s. Wielka Interaktywna Encyklopedia Multimedialna <http://wiem.onet.pl/wiem/00f88d.html> accessed 27.02.03

⁵⁴⁴ AAN/MSzW/2782/ CQC: Stenographic report of the meeting in Sekcja Nauk Społecznych 20.12.54. p.331

⁵⁴⁵ AAN/MSzW/2781 Wykaz zespołów wizytacyjnych CKK, pp.41-44

Table 8: Economists in the CQC Social Science Section 1953-1960.⁵⁴⁶

	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960
Lange, Oskar								
Brus, Włodzimierz								
Zawadzki, Józef								
Lipiński, Edward								
Brzoza, Anatol								
Drewnowski, Jan								
Łychowski, Tadeusz								
Secomski, Kazimierz								
Waszak, Stanisław								

In fact the solution was identical, as the two economists who came into the section for social sciences, Oskar Lange and Włodzimierz Brus, were the same pair who had been trusted with the most prominent positions during the Congress of Science.⁵⁴⁷ Józef Zawadzki joined the team in 1954, after he himself had received a professorial title from the CQC. Among these three, only Lange had a list of academic merits which could command the respect of non-Marxist economists.⁵⁴⁸ Brus, at only 33, was by far the youngest member of the Section. In 1954 the ages of the other section members ranged from 44 to 67, with a majority being well into their fifties. While Lange was very often absent, and rather passive when present, it seems Brus gradually built up sufficient confidence and competence to make his judgements accepted in the discussions of the Section.

The decisions were taken by majority vote, but the majority of the Social Science Section were not economists. The problem this presented for any given discipline was voiced by a member of the CQC Technology Section, J.L. Jakubowski, in his letter of resignation in 1956:

⁵⁴⁶ Data for the table found in AAN/MWS/2780a

⁵⁴⁷ Decisions about the composition of the CQC were discussed by the Ministry of Higher Education and the Central Committee Science Division, and formally approved by the President.

⁵⁴⁸ Oskar Lange's reputation had been established in the USA, as no Polish university in the interwar years, save the private and leftist *Wszchnica*, had offered him a job, despite his undisputed qualifications. It has been argued that this was because of his leftist orientation. However, the general lack of positions and the ensuing standstill of an entire generation of young academics, should also be taken into account.

(...) to my mind the qualification system adopted by the Sections is not right. The qualification ought to be based on a detailed evaluation conducted by professionals in a given branch of science, who know perfectly the qualifications of the candidate. At present this is not the case, and when they vote in the Section, the majority of voters does not know about the scientific output under discussion and are not competent to judge it. This has led to a large disparity in the decisions, something that has been extremely critically received out in the field.⁵⁴⁹

In the Social Science Section, sociologist Józef Chałasiński, an eternal dissenter, raised this problem on more than one occasion, protesting that his vote had to be based solely on the opinion of the person presenting the case in the section.⁵⁵⁰ The structure and practice of the discipline sections in the CQC combined to concentrate the effective power to shape decisions in the hands of a few representatives of economics in the discipline section.

⁵⁴⁹ AAN/MSzW/2780a/p.406/05.11.1956/ Letter of resignation from the CQC of Prof.Dr.inz.J.L. Jakubowski, member of the Technical Sciences Section.

⁵⁵⁰ AAN/MSzW/2782 CQC: Stenographic report of the meeting in Sekcja Nauk Społecznych 16.10.1954, p.20

Table 9: Composition of the CQC Section of Social Sciences 1953-1955. ⁵⁵¹

Entry year	Name	Discipline
1953	Brus, Włodzimierz	Economics
	Lange, Oskar	Economics
	Arnold, Stanisław	History
	Łowmiański, Henryk	History
	Majewski, Kazimierz	History
	Manteuffel, Tadeusz	History
	Wyka, Kazimierz	History of literature
	Śliwiński, Stanisław	Law
	Wasilkowski, Jan	Law
	Chałasiński, Józef	Sociology
1954	Zawadzki, Józef	Economics
	Jabłoński, Henryk	History
	Stefan Kieniewicz	History
	Kula, Witold	History
	Biliński, Bronisław	Language and literature
	Klemensiewicz, Zenon	Language and literature
	Stieber, Zdzisław	Language and literature
	Strelcyn, Stefan	Language and literature
1955	Leśnodorski, Bogdan	History
	Budzyk, Kazimierz	Language and literature
	Burda, Andrzej	Law
	Ajdukiewicz, Kazimierz	Philosophy
	Frizhand, Marek	Philosophy

The Social Science Section was dominated by historians from the outset. Through gradual extensions, literature and language-related disciplines became the second biggest group, pushing law and economics aside. In 1953, when the Social Science section was first put together, it consisted of only ten scholars. However, from 1953 onwards, the Section grew steadily every year, reaching 23 members in 1955.⁵⁵² Only three of the 23 were economists. Frequently, only one of the economists was present at a meeting, meaning that the procedure of voting by majority gave non-economists the deciding voice. In most cases the opinion of the person presenting the case was not challenged or questioned, and the majority of the other

⁵⁵¹ AAN/MSzW/2780A/pp.173-174

⁵⁵² AAN/MSzW/2780A/pp.173-174

section members seldom voiced any opinions on the merit of the cases presented. There was a grey zone, however, as representatives of neighbouring disciplines, who felt at least partially qualified to evaluate the work submitted, could influence the decisions concerning economics. Discussion records reveal that legal scholars and historians in particular (Arnold and Kula were economic historians) took an active part in the discussion of candidates from economics. Notably, in the first period of the CQC's activity (1954-1956), the chairman of the section, the legal scholar Wasilkowski, often took an active part in the evaluation of the economists presented for promotion. I believe his activity reflected the influence of the Praesidium on the work of the Section, as well as Wasilkowski's experience in the Law Faculty of Warsaw University, where he had taken part in the evaluation of the work of economists.

In many cases, a candidature appeared on the Section's agenda several times. The Section often decided that they wanted another reviewer to look at the matter, or needed to consult the Praesidium, or simply had no more time for discussion. By adding up the times that economists' cases were on the agenda, I have arrived at a total of 290 occasions between 1954 and 1960. In 261 of these I have information on the name of the person presenting the case, and on the basis of this data, presented in Table 10, we can form some impressions of who was setting the tone of the discussion.

Table 10: Economists presenting cases before the CQC Social Science Section ⁵⁵³

Year	Lange	Brus	Zawadzki	Brzoza	Drewnowski	Secomski	Lipiński	Waszak
1954	12	14	1					
1955		20	1					
1956		23	8			2		
1957		10	16	5	8	17	1	12
1958		1		2	10	7	1	14
1959			4	5		7	5	3
1960			2			4		
Total	12	68	32	12	18	37	7	29

In the first half of the period we can note the dominant position of Brus, and the disappearance of Lange, who after 1954 was either abroad or busy elsewhere. Occasionally CQC reviewers were invited to present the candidates they had reviewed at the Section

⁵⁵³ Based on data compiled from stenographic reports and minutes of Social Science Section meetings held in AAN, MSzW collection

meetings. Both Brus and Secomski presented cases at Section meetings at times when they were not members, but in fact the presentation of nominees by non-members happened relatively seldom.⁵⁵⁴ A major shift in the composition occurred after the crisis of 1956, when both Lange and Brus resigned, and six new economists were elected into the Section. In the second era of the CQC's existence the distribution was much more even, and the presence of several economists had the effect of making less decisive the views of both the person presenting the case and of the representatives of other disciplines.

Reviewers

There was nothing in the publicised structure of the CQC which made it obvious that the traditional channels of evaluation would no longer form the basis of decisions. Indeed the establishment of the CQC did not in itself affect the established channels for reviewing. Despite the fact that the opinion of the Party organisation and the Ministry on the political suitability of the candidate was important, the reviews of the scholarly output of the candidate would continue to be the core of the application. As they sat down to evaluate the candidatures, the members of the Section had in their folders not only the opinions of reviewers appointed by the academic institution, but also the opinion of an expert appointed by the CQC. In the first period (1954-55) this latter was given absolute priority. Other reviews were usually dismissed as unreliable and 'polite' (*grzecznościowe*), an expression which implied that they contained flaws caused by local loyalties bordering on corruption and nepotism. In the Social Science Section discussions, the opinions of the CQC experts were presented as being reliably objective, because of their non-participation in these 'corrupt' networks. In the first years, outbursts against 'polite' reviews were the speciality of the section leader, Jan Wasilkowski.

*Wasilkowski (Leader): (...) we often have totally incredible and opportunistic university professors, who qualify works that are absolutely worthless, politically damaging and wrong. They present candidates - even for assistant professorships - who do not deserve any scientific title. This especially comes through at the Praesidium. We do not conceive the role of the CQC as a factory of scientific titles and scientific degrees, but as a certain institution that has an influence on the level of work at the universities and other higher schools and scientific institutions.*⁵⁵⁵

⁵⁵⁴ Between 1954 and 1960, 14 case discussions were presented by economists who were not members of the Section. B. Minc and M. Orłowski were the only ones to appear several times.

⁵⁵⁵ AAN/MSzW/2782/ 20.12.54/p.332

It is clear that the creators and leaders of the CQC did not trust academics to be sufficiently critical of each other, and it was no doubt possible to find examples where mutual interests caused reviews to be biased. Wasilkowski, for instance, repeatedly denounced the fact that two people presenting themselves for a promotion could review each other. However, regardless of the sincerity of the accusers and of whether the critique was justified, there is no doubt that this argument was used to legitimise the usurpation of power over academic promotions by the CQC.

How did Marxist-Leninist scholars plan to avoid the problem of ‘polite’ reviews themselves? They claimed that the Marxist spirit of criticism would purify the discipline. In December 1954, when discussing the *kand.nauk* degree of a graduate of the CC Institute for Training Scientific Cadres,⁵⁵⁶ Brus argued that ‘polite reviews’ were not given in the CC Institute for Training Scientific Cadres, because a critical spirit prevailed there.⁵⁵⁷ Given a ready supply of truly Marxist, revolutionary spirit there could by definition be no problems. The background for Brus’ assertion that the problem of “polite reviews” did not exist at the ITSC was Wasilkowski’s irritation with a *kand.nauk* thesis from that institution which, he claimed, was the seventh thesis from the ITSC of which he disapproved. Among other aspects, he criticised the work for using propaganda rhetoric, which he thought inappropriate in a scholarly work. Clearly, lecturers at the CC Institute for Training Scientific Cadres, and the scholars present in the CQC Social Science Section, differed on what were the attributes of a good Marxist-Leninist thesis. Wasilkowski’s statements later in the same discussion show that the CQC used its power to reprimand the CC Institute for Training Scientific Cadres for the excessively political and propagandist style of their students. The demand for a combination of a high level of scientific quality with political appropriateness caused difficulties to a Party which already struggled with a severe deficiency of academically-accredited party members. Subsequent developments would show which of the following would prevail: the need for large numbers of Marxist-Leninist scholars with academic titles, or the need to ensure the prestige of the titles and degrees handed out by the CQC by promoting only truly gifted and productive Marxist-Leninist scholars.

The success of the CQC in establishing a new reputation system depended on the ability to muster expert opinions, based not only on sound scholarly knowledge, but also on the new

⁵⁵⁶ The Institute for Training Scientific Cadres had by that time changed its name to the Institute for Social Sciences, but had undergone no major changes and was still attached to the Party Central Committee. I shall continue to refer to it as the ITSC.

⁵⁵⁷ AAN/MSzW/2782 CQC: Stenographic report of the meeting in Sekcja Nauk Społecznych, p.332

political guidelines. The list of proposed reviewers who were to provide the Social Science Section with opinions on candidates for promotion provides us with an overview of the new dominant Marxist-Leninist group in economics. The new judges of the quality and relevance of research in political economy were: Maksymillian Pohorille, Józef Zawadzki, Maria Dziewicka, Zenon Tomaszewski, Józef Okuniewski, Bronisław Oyrzanowski, Zygmunt Narski, and Jan Mujżel.⁵⁵⁸ With the exception of statistics, where long-standing authorities were represented, and the presence of a small contingent from the ‘old’ Main School staff,⁵⁵⁹ the list mostly consists of people who had no history of publishing in *Ekonomista*, and had not held any academic positions prior to 1949. Only four of 37 reviewers in economics were professors, (two of them were the statisticians), and several on the list had no higher degree than Master (mgr.).

CQC reviewers were not necessarily Party members, but had been cleared by the PUWP. Local Party cells (BPO) and the CC Science Division continually evaluated the political and ideological standing of ‘scientific workers’, and in December 1952 an internal report by the CC Science Section commented on the progress of lecturers in political economy who had recently attended a study conference. Three of the proposed CQC reviewers, Okuniewski, Mujżel, and Oyrzanowski, were lauded for showing great progress and promise, but others were criticised for ‘falling behind’.⁵⁶⁰ Since the final preparations for the launch of the CQC were taking place at approximately the same time, there is reason to assume that there was a relationship between this positive rating and the inclusion of their names on the list of candidates for CQC reviewers.

Decision-making

When the CQC finally commenced work in 1954, many applications had been kept waiting for some time. In the first batch of candidates, there is no record of any discussion.⁵⁶¹ the candidatures of deputy professors M. Pohorille and J. Zawadzki, both directors of chairs of political economy, and of J. Tepicht, the head of the Institute of Agrarian Research, were considered to be uncontroversial, and all three became assistant professors in March 1954.

⁵⁵⁸ AAN/MSzW/2781/pp.21-25 Lista kandydatów na rzeczoznawców Sekcji Nauk Społecznych Centralnej Komisji Kwalifikacyjnej.

⁵⁵⁹ AAN/MSzW/2781/pp.21-25. The Main School veterans were Grodek, Koźmiński, Secomski, and Rączkowski.

⁵⁶⁰ AAN/KCPZPR/237/XVI/4 /pp.38-42 “Sprawozdanie Wydziału Nauki za okres od 1. do 10.XII.1952 r.” by Z.Zemankowa

⁵⁶¹ AAN/MSzW/2781 The only documentation on the 20.03.1954 plenum meeting is a list of names and titles accorded with the information that the stenographic report is missing. p.46

The section then went to work on the less obvious cases, and the first gush of appointments slowed to a trickle. On numerous occasions decisions over the case put forward to the section was postponed, as the members of the Section found it impossible to make up their minds on the basis of the material presented. In some cases they considered the question of the absence of documentation to be crucial, while in other instances the Section member presenting the case disagreed with the reviewers of the candidate, and the case was sent back with a request for further reviews. Thus the total number of cases treated in 1954, including repeated treatments of the same candidate, amounted to 59, but only 20 final decisions were made. After 1954, the postponements decreased, but some cases still dragged on over several years.

Table 11: Degrees and titles awarded to economists by the CQC in its first three years.⁵⁶²




Table 11 shows the final decisions on the awarding of titles and degrees to economists as approved by the Praesidium and made public. The pre-eminence of the docent title and the slow progression of the *kand. nauk* calls for an explanation, since the PUWP had abolished the former with the 1951 law, and introduced the *Aspirantura* programmes, which were to produce *kand. nauk* degrees instead of doctorates and *doctor nauk* degrees instead of docent titles. Economists, along with economic engineers, were granted extra time, in the form of a later deadline for the presentation of old-style doctorates for a habilitation.

The aim of the flexible transition from the old doctorate-docent system to *kand.nauk-dr.nauk* was to increase the number of economists with docent titles and thus hasten the creation of professorships. The deadline for the submission of docent applications based on doctoral theses of the old type was set for June 1956, with the result that docents were continually

⁵⁶² Based on official communiqués of the CQC published in *Życie Szkoły Wyższej*.

appointed in economics throughout the stalinist years. Since the first *kand.nauk* was defended in 1954, there was hardly any time for the emergence of candidates for the new *doktor nauk* before the advent of the Thaw, when the old degrees were re-introduced. As a result, only two economists were ever awarded the *doktor nauk* degree in Poland.⁵⁶³ We may also note that only one full professorship was ever granted, but only well after the onset of the Thaw.⁵⁶⁴

To understand the effects of the CQC's work we need to address the extensive practice of evading the criteria for the award of scientific titles and degrees, which the CQC had supposedly been created to prevent. In fact, exceptions from the newly-established standards and requirements soon became the rule, and were used to promote politically desirable candidates who lacked scientific achievements.

The 1951 Law on Higher Education and Researchers had made way for exceptions to the standard requirements for the titles of docent and professor.⁵⁶⁵ Among the promotions decreed in the period 1954-1956, a total of 31% were made with reference to Article 49/3, which allowed that in some cases the scientific output requirement could be omitted. For decisions taken in 1954, the share of exceptions was as high as 44%. These figures would be even higher if *kand.nauk* degrees, to which Article 49/3 did not apply, were excluded. The 1955 discussion on whether or not to accord the title of assistant professor to the rector of the Kraków Higher School of Agriculture (WSR) may serve as an illustration here.⁵⁶⁶ This discussion took place at a time when the consequences of giving priority to political merit over scholarly qualifications were already making themselves felt. Even the CQC's own reviewers had agreed that rector Kubica's scientific output did not qualify him even for a docent title, far less for an assistant professor title.⁵⁶⁷ Brus objected that this was not a case where the use of Article 49/3 was appropriate, and stated that, considering what was known about the candidate's scientific output, an assistant professorship was too much. The representative of the Ministry, however, insisted on an assistant professorship using Article 49/3:

⁵⁶³ Information based on the official lists of degrees awarded by the CQC. Both these degrees were awarded after 1955.

⁵⁶⁴ It was awarded to Kalecki, who then returned to work in Poland.

⁵⁶⁵ Article 49§3 in the Univeristy Law of 1951. After the revision of the Law in 1956 it was known as article 56§3.

⁵⁶⁶ The Higher School of Agriculture was created in 1953 on the basis of the Department of Agriculture and the Department of Forestry of the Jagiellon University. http://www.ar.krakow.pl/arkr/info/historia_50_lat.htm accessed 14.05.2007

Dr. Józef Kubica (1906-?) AAN/MSWiN/katalog I have not accessed the personal folder the catalogue entry refers to.

⁵⁶⁷ Please note that the objective merits of the candidate in question cannot be established on the basis of the information in the discussions and documents quoted here. The CQC reviewers might have disregarded any of the candidate's scientific production that was more than three years old or politically questionable. Their assessment was geared towards 'good Marxist-Leninist science' not 'good science'.

Director Bobrowski: The scientific output of Rector Kubica has been evaluated differently by different scholars. I would not like to go into details here as to whether this output is [enough] for an assistant professor or not. In any case, considering his job, his position as rector, we as the Ministry would beg that the Central Qualification Commission should accord him the scientific title of assistant professor using article 49 paragraph 3. Considering his very good leadership of the school, and his achievements in getting the school to an appropriate level, something that is not too easy in the Kraków milieu – because of that we would ask that Dr. Kubica be accorded the title of assistant professor based on article 49, point 3. For us, his organisational successes and his merits as a good cadre [zasługi kadrowe] are important.⁵⁶⁸(...)

Professor Brus: I still oppose this kind of method. I suppose that a positive proposal for the scientific title of docent would also need to include his cadre and organisational merits. (...) We have already had cases where rectors have been positively evaluated, but have not been given any titles, because there was not any foundation for that.⁵⁶⁹

The exchange between Brus and Bobrowski continued in the same vein, while Wasilkowski intervened to point out that according to the 1951 law, one did not need a professorial title in order to hold the position of rector. Subsequently, he and Brus agreed that the matter should be sent on to another reviewer. The representative of the Ministry was not satisfied by this and made a final effort of persuasion, thus provoking other members of the Section to intervene.

Director Bobrowski: We do realise that Dr. Kubica does not have the scientific basis for assistant professor. However we also realise that due to the conditions in which the school finds itself (because of the situation of the school in Kraków, where the school is not treated as a being on an academic level), in the Kraków milieu there is an especial problem with scientific titles, and besides, there is the issue of getting this school to a certain level, especially since it is evolving in a good direction.⁵⁷⁰

⁵⁶⁸ AAN/MSzW/2783/17.01.1955/pp.33-37

⁵⁶⁹ AAN/MSzW/2783/17.01.1955/pp.33-37

⁵⁷⁰ AAN/MSzW/2783/17.01.1955/pp.33-37

Professor Kula: I cannot take a stand in this matter, but I am disturbed by the argument. What emerges is a vicious circle, the source of which originates in the understanding of a certain hierarchy found within the Ministry, because there are cases where someone is a very good rector and so one wants to make him into a scholar. The supplementary arguments from the school's point of view, which I heard a moment ago, appear to me to be counter-arguments, as the way to raising the authority of the school in the Kraków milieu is not though honour-giving. This method of acquiring authority for the school - by according a scientific title based on the opinion of the Ministry - does not to appear advisable to me.⁵⁷¹

After this discussion no one voted to award Kubica the title of assistant professor. The case was sent on to the Praesidium with a unanimous decision that a docent title was the highest title appropriate, even based on Article 49/3. However, the case then took on a different direction. The Praesidium must have overruled the Section, because twelve days later the Plenum approved an assistant professor's title based on Article 49/3. This case remains the most flagrant example of the Praesidium over-riding the section's decision that I have found. It should serve as a reminder of the limits of CQC power.

The Kubica discussion also reveals that while there had been no controversies in the Section at the beginning of CQC activities, by early 1955 a fault line had appeared between the Ministry and the Praesidium on one side, and the scholars in the Social Science Section of the CQC on the other. They differed on the question of precedence between merit-based and political criteria for promotion. Furthermore, as Kula's discussion with the representative of the Ministry showed, there was no agreement on what course to pursue in order to remedy the low proportion of professors loyal to the Party. The Ministry's strategy was aimed at ensuring that the individuals who had been placed in influential academic positions with political backing had titles corresponding to their level of power. This strategy was considered by members of the Section to be ill-conceived. The latter were aware of the futility of imposing political will within the merit-based regime prevalent in professional and academic life. It is also noteworthy that the 'old' academic community in Kraków continued to make itself heard. Ministry officials were not only aware of its opinions, but acted on the assumption that it was a force to be reckoned with.

The PUWP strategy for domination over social sciences pre-supposed that the Marxist-Leninist scholars introduced into academic positions with political backing would, with the

⁵⁷¹ AAN/MSzW/2783/17.01.1955/pp.33-37

Party's help, educate a new generation of Marxist-Leninist scholars combining political and academic credentials. The CQC was thus dealing with two different sets of candidates: the 'older' cadres who were already in influential academic positions but who needed a matching title, and the 'young', who were supposed to acquire excellent political and scholarly qualifications during the *Aspirantura* leading to a *kand.nauk* degree. The necessity of differential treatment of the generations was discussed in November 1954:

*Leader [Wasilkowski –AWH]: We must separate the old and the new cadres strictly. We treat the old cadres mildly: if someone works as a scientific worker for a number of years, if he has a doctoral degree and has something on the level of a kandydat thesis in his work, then we unconditionally accord a docent title, because we have an inverted chronology: first he was an autonomous worker, and only then did he achieve something ...[that could be considered to be of scientific merit – AWH]"*⁵⁷²

The young scholars, on the other hand, were expected to go in for a *kand. nauk* degree, even if they had already started their work on a doctoral thesis. Those from the middle generation, referred to as '*stare kadry*', already held positions in academia. Some of them were able to produce a piece of work that qualified them for a promotion, but in many cases the candidates had no new work that could be considered equivalent to a *kandydat* thesis. It was primarily for them that Article 49/3 had been set up and employed.

The extensive use of exceptions was established through practice, and evolved through precedents. It was thus not entirely comprehensible even to those handling it. I shall take the liberty of presenting several extensive passages from the CQC stenographic report of a meeting on 22nd October 1955, as it demonstrates the tone of discussion in the Section, the strong clashes of opinion, and the lack of consensus on what were the fundamental problems of the CQC:

⁵⁷² AAN/MSzW/2782/13.11.1954/p.180/Discussion of a title for Dr. M. Frank

Professor Brus: (...) I would like to say something that I have brought up a number of times, and which in the case of the economists still awaits a solution. Firstly, there is the matter of Article 49. Here we have a total confusion of concepts. For example, Professor Minc states in one of the propositions that the author does not have any work corresponding to a kandydat thesis, so he asks the CQC to use Article 49, which states that it is possible to accord an academic title to a person who does not have the formally required degree, but has a certain amount of scientific output. That is clear. But here the situation is the opposite, the person has different degrees, only he has no scientific output, and on this basis one wants to use Article 49. I would like to declare that I will give a negative opinion of all propositions of this kind, because I believe that this is a total confusion of concepts; that when a person does not have any scientific output one begins to apply an interpretation that is totally in opposition to the spirit of the law.⁵⁷³

It is revealing of the lack of clarity of CQC work that after nearly two years of activity, and after numerous meetings in which candidates had been discussed, it was still necessary for the chairman of the Section to present an explanation of how the Praesidium had decided to interpret the law. This tells us something about the prevalent uncertainty about norms and standards.

Leader[Wasilkowski –AWH]: A short explanation. This matter has been discussed on a number of occasions in the Praesidium and the Plenum, and three ways of applying Article 49 have been laid down. Firstly, there is the classic case, mentioned by Professor Brus, of this basic case when someone does not have the academic degree, but has produced some works. Then we take into account only one work on the kandydat level. Second case: someone has a degree, but does not have a single work that answers the requirements. Then we take the totality as a basis, or we can treat several works as a substitute for a kandydat thesis. In that case there can be either a master's or a doctoral degree – that is of no consequence.

Finally, the third eventuality, when someone does not possess a great scientific output, but has very considerable organisational merits in the sphere of scientific research. Here, most often, one takes into account older professors who could not demonstrate such output, especially over the last few years, but who have great organisational merits. This is in abbreviation the point r/ - for retired, because it is most often applied to elderly persons. We have solved this problem in these three ways. That there are excesses is clear.⁵⁷⁴

⁵⁷³ AAN/MSzW/2784/ 20.10.55/pp.226-229

⁵⁷⁴ AAN/MSzW/2784/ 20.10.55/pp.226-229

Professor Śliwiński: This has been troubling me for some time too. Everyone passes through Article 49. In my opinion, basically for Article 49 Law 1 (sic!) a candidate must have the scientific and moral qualifications, and the results of scientific work. It appears to me that if someone has no scientific qualifications, and has no work to show for himself, then organisational merits cannot suffice on their own. That is what the law says. Then, there are the directives of the CQC, which is not the same thing, because they are only directions, advice, therefore they can in some cases be disregarded. For example, when there is no kandydat thesis in the three year period, but he can show us a number of older works, smaller ones, and he has scientific qualifications. (...)⁵⁷⁵

Professor Śliwiński treats us to a legal scholar's take on the issue. It is interesting that he points out the difference between the law and the internal directives of the CQC. It is clear that the latter, with its rule insisting on the presentation of a thesis-sized work completed within the previous three years, introduced discrimination against candidates who had done their research before the Party 'offensive' in academic institutions. At the meeting, this intervention was followed with one by Brus, who continued his criticism by pointing out the consequences of the current practice.

Professor Brus: I would like to direct attention to the following circumstance: we have lately had to deal with the applications of graduates [magistrów] among the economists. That is an interesting phenomenon. The result of our policy is that the aim of making people pass the kandydat nauk degree has been reduced to a minimum. All these three cases [that he is presenting at this meeting – AWH] concern graduates, people who have very dubious scientific output, with a master degree, without a doctorate, without passing the kandydat nauk. This is happening on a mass scale.⁵⁷⁶

In practice the CQC had created a short-cut to both docent and professorial titles for candidates who could muster the support of the Party organisation. It is important to note that the Party had on the one hand invested in the establishment of a new research training programme, the *Aspirantura*, and on the other made it possible for students to avoid it altogether. The low figures for the total production of *kand.nauk* degrees ceases to surprise in the light of this information. Wasilkowski's defence is singularly schizophrenic. While agreeing with both Śliwiński's and Brus's criticisms, he tried at same time to uphold the Praesidium's interpretation of the law.

⁵⁷⁵ AAN/MSzW/2784/ 20.10.55/pp.226-229

⁵⁷⁶ AAN/MSzW/2784/ 20.10.55/pp.226-229

Chairman: I just wanted to add that I agree with what Professor Śliwiński has been saying, that organisational merits alone cannot be taken into account, because that would lead to the distortion of the academic titles. But the thing is, sometimes the scientific output is small or non-existent, but there are organisational merits. This concerns people with merit, who have lengthy work experience. Professor Brus's remarks are right, we need to clarify our position, in case we bring about a situation where the docent title will not give scientific competence.⁵⁷⁷

Professor Brus: I understand the matter in this way: that if there is a doctorate of the old type then we apply the normal scientific requirements. And if there is a magister then we should apply especially high demands, but here we have the opposite situation.⁵⁷⁸

Professor Budzyk: It appears to me that our "quarrel" is very much to the point and very timely, because I see that in the wider field a marked devaluation of degrees and titles has taken place. These are alarming matters, on which there is on purpose often no talk in public. If the problem of a marked sharpening of demands could have been raised.....⁵⁷⁹

Professor Brus: (...) Basically, the allocation of academic titles through the exception procedure is coming to an end, because there are no new proposals, with the exception of the pedagogues, who are coming in.

Professor Biliński: It is not ending. But the deputy professors [z-ca prof. – AWH] do not concern us.

Professor Budzyk: That is not so. I am convinced that the fact that the title of deputy professor has been devalued is a result of our work, and that we have brought about a devaluation of degrees and titles. Our actions have been too unclear and liberal and reflect on this matter. (...)⁵⁸⁰

The exposition on the three different cases where the use of Article 49/3 was considered to be correct by the Praesidium was not received without objections. The members of the Section feared the consequences of exceptions: the devaluation of degrees. No efficient solutions to the problem were presented, as the Chairman accepted the critique but ultimately pleaded to continue the practice of making exceptions. The hope expressed by Brus in his last quote, that candidatures demanding the use of Article 49/3 were about to end, as they were part of the

⁵⁷⁷ AAN/MSzW/2784/ 20.10.55/pp.226-229

⁵⁷⁸ AAN/MSzW/2784/ 20.10.55/pp.226-229

⁵⁷⁹ AAN/MSzW/2784/ 20.10.55/pp.226-229

⁵⁸⁰ AAN/MSzW/2784/ 20.10.55/pp.226-229

transitional revolutionary measures which would soon be over, was not shared by his elder colleagues.

As early as during the first year of fully-fledged CQC activities, the end of the revolutionary transition was expected to be imminent.

Wasilkowski (Leader): (...) From what Professor Jabłoński has been saying, it appears that this work is incomplete. It lacks any use of archival materials. Some things have been omitted. We say that the political line is correct. But it would be completely absurd and probably practically impossible if the political line of a kandydat thesis from the Institute of Social Sciences, which is an adjunct of the Central Committee, should be represent an incorrect political line. As has been said by Professor Żółkiewski, the problem is that works that are politically correct do not have the appropriate scientific level. I do not believe that one should prolong this period, the period in which if a work were politically correct, then we would have to avert our eyes from the scientific aspect. That stage was necessary, but it is has passed. There is the very important matter of not applying the criteria for a certain stage at a later stage.⁵⁸¹

Even for Wasilkowski, who had argued for the importance of an instrumental approach to promotions and to awarding titles, there was a ‘normality’ to return to. The Kubica case and the reference to the ‘present stage’ in the quote above show that CQC members did not necessarily consider the practice of exceptions and political promotions to be something acceptable in the long term. Despite the fact that in 1954 there were already voices claiming that the period where special arrangements were necessary for reforming Academia was over, article 49/3 continued to be used extensively to circumvent the requirement of scientific output. At the same time, the great hopes invested in the potentially cathartic effect of the introduction of Marxism-Leninism into academia did not last very long. PUWP science policy officials and scholars had pinned their hopes on a revolutionary ethos, which was expected to cleanse the review system of unhealthy networks of loyalties and of the influence of established scholars. We may recall Wasilkowski’s rage against ‘polite’ reviews and the expectation that the un-corrupted marxist reviewers of the CQC would do better. Here follows another excerpt from the discussion in October 1955:

Professor Brus: And another thing. There is a view that not only can one not rely on the reviews from the schools, but also to a certain degree one cannot rely on the reviews sent in by our specialists. More and more often they take on a polite character. (...) These occurrences are daily.

⁵⁸¹ AAN/MSzW/2782/p.321/20.12.1954/ Discussion of kand.nauk degree in history for M.Turlejska.

Voice: I too have a case like that.

Leader [Wasilkowski- AWH]: Me too.⁵⁸²

The problems caused by the extensive use of Article 49 Point 3 for the promotion of ‘politically correct’ candidates did not recede. Rather, as we shall see in the last chapter, from 1956 onwards the entanglements increased.

Leniency for candidates who had the favour of the Party was coupled with the meticulous observation of all formal requirements in the cases of candidates who were not deemed to be politically desirable. Firstly, in order to be eligible for a promotion to docent or professor, the candidate had to be an already-accepted cog in the academic system, which meant successfully passing the ‘verification’. The lack of a job meant no promotion. In order to qualify for promotion to docent or assistant professorship a candidate had to present a politically-acceptable work ‘of a quality comparable to a *kand. nauk* thesis’. A Three Year Rule also applied to the evaluation of the scientific output of the candidate, by which all older works were excluded.⁵⁸³ This meant that in 1953/54, when the CQC was starting work, candidates were only rewarded for work submitted since 1949. This exclusion of earlier works was the instrument used in the rejection of candidates with ‘bourgeois’ attitudes. The formal procedure also prevented people with docent titles but without a *kand.nauk* on their CV from proceeding to an assistant professor’s post.⁵⁸⁴ As for doctoral degrees, the candidates for *kand. nauk* went through a thorough political screening before admittance to the *aspirantura* programme.

A closer study of candidates whose formal qualifications were in order, but whose careers were restricted by the CQC, is possible in the case of the Kraków economists whose candidatures were presented to the CQC in 1954.⁵⁸⁵

⁵⁸² AAN/MSzW/2784/ 20.10.55/pp.226-229

⁵⁸³ AAN/MSzW/2782/ CQC: Stenographic report of the meeting in Sekcja Nauk Społecznych 16.10.1954/ p. 181

⁵⁸⁴ AAN/MSzW/2780a/p.406/05.11.1956/ Letter of resignation from the CQC of Prof.dr. inż. J. L. Jakubowski, member of the Technical Sciences Section.

⁵⁸⁵ Stefan Bolland (b.1910), Wiktor Boniecki (b.1918), Eugeniusz Garbacik (b.1913), Bronisław Oyrzanowski (b.1913)

Table 12: The procedure of the application of Kraków economists in the CQC:

	Year	Proposed title	Title awarded
<u>Bolland, Stefan</u>	1954	Asst. Prof.	Case postponed
	1954	Asst. Prof.	Docent
	1957	Asst. Prof.	Asst. Prof.
<u>Garbacik, Eugeniusz</u>	1954	Asst. Prof.	Case postponed
	1954	Docent	Docent
	1957	Asst. Prof.	Asst. Prof.
<u>Oyrzanowski, Bronisław</u>	1954	Docent	Case postponed
	1954	Docent	Docent (art.49/3)
	1957	Asst. Prof.	Asst. Prof.
<u>Boniecki, Wiktor</u>	1954	Docent	Case postponed
	1954	Docent	Case postponed
	1954	Docent	Case postponed
	1956	Docent	Case postponed
	1957	Docent	Docent

These four, Bolland, Garbacik, Boniecki, and Oyrzanowski, were among the 21 applicants from a higher economic school which had not raised the objections of the Ministry. All belonged to the Kraków school of economics, and before the war had been considered to be among the most promising young economists there. The fact that the Rockefeller Foundation had awarded Garbacik a fellowship in 1947 (which he was not free to accept) shows that he was a capable and promising economist by Rockefeller standards. Following the abolition of economics at the university, their base was the Kraków Higher School of Economics. In the opinion of their institution and the Ministry, Bolland and Garbacik were qualified for an assistant professor title, and Oyrzanowski and Boniecki for docent. Table 12 shows the date when the case of each candidate appeared on the agenda of the Social Science Section of the CQC. In 1954, when their candidatures were first presented, the Section postponed all decisions. At the next meeting both Bolland and Garbacik's applications were reduced by the Section from assistant professorships, and they were only granted docent titles. The treatment of the two candidates for docents diverged, as Oyrzanowski did receive his title and Boniecki did not. The explanation behind the difference probably lies in the fact that Oyrzanowski had received a positive evaluation from the CC Science Division for his lectures in political

economy, and had been appointed as CQC reviewer. Even so, he was not passed through the normal procedures but through the exception, Article 49/3, suggesting that his submitted work had been dismissed, and that only Party patronage had saved his case. Boniecki apparently lacked backing in the PUWP, and in addition the CQC's appointed expert, Mirosław Orłowski, had written a highly critical evaluation of his work:

This work is typical of bourgeois economics; it is weighed down by bourgeois habits. It is characterised by cosmopolitanism, formalism. (...) The approach is idealistic. The author of this central work, for which he received his doctoral degree, looks at these phenomena using the categories of bourgeois and even reactionary economics such as found in Krzyżanowski, Rybarski, etc.⁵⁸⁶

The reviews were seldom quoted in the discussions, since the participants had them on paper, but based on what is accessible, it seems this sample was a supreme version of how many ideological buzz-words could be fitted into one text. Boniecki was able to obtain promotion only after 1956.

Despite the revelations of the above quote, the general impression is that agit-prop vocabulary was not actively used in the context of Section work. Moreover, an interesting finding in the CQC discussions, confirming an impression formed during the study of the Congress of Science material, was the persistence of 'civilised manners' in the relations between Marxist-Leninist scholars. These included, for instance, the predominance of traditional forms of address such as '*panie profesorze*' documented in the stenographic reports, and the continued reliance on the traditional academic ideals of 'civilised' behaviour as opposed to the 'revolutionary style'. There was a marked absence in Congress and CQC source-material of the use of 'comrade', 'citizen' or the plural form 'you', associated with communist culture and the Russian language. In exclusive party member venues like the Stalin Conference at the ITSC, on the other hand, communist forms of address, aggressive debating techniques, a high emotional level, and demands for self inculcation, were very prominent.

Conclusion

Why was it that a system that had been introduced in order to secure the Marxist-Leninist character of science was presented to the public in neutral terms, and avoided agit-prop rhetoric? (As, for instance, in Rapacki's inauguration speech.) My first thought was that in

⁵⁸⁶ AAN/MSzW/2781/CQC: Stenographic report of the meeting in Sekcja Nauk Społecznych 27.06.1954 /p.75

order to ensure the legitimacy of the new organ, the political authorities chose to refrain from ideological rhetoric in acknowledgement of the fact that a massively non-Marxist academic congregation would not respect an ideological set-up. If this was the case, it is evidence of: the necessity of relying on an acquisition of legitimacy through association with the old system: a demonstration of the Polish Communist regime's incomplete breach with the past, and of its failure to establish a fully-fledged 'party-loyal' science. Alternatively, the failure to reach the goal of a science wholly merged with ideology may reflect efforts on the part of PUWP science policy-makers to accord some autonomy to scholars. This effort was in any case limited to official speeches and the wording of the law; it is clear that the practices of the CQC were ultimately subject to the demands of the Party organisation, and even the voice of the trusted Marxist-Leninist scholars in the Section was disregarded. Sincere as the talk of the prioritisation of excellent academic records in all degree and title candidates might have been, the persistence of a schizophrenic approach to merit had far-reaching repercussions on scholarship. In the Polish context, where the establishment of a system inspired by Soviet science was very recent, the persistence of a formally neutral system maintained the idea that a 'normal' situation in academia was one of political non-intervention into scientific reputation control. What was in the Soviet context primarily an internal contradiction of the Stalinist science system was differently interpreted in Poland, where it was construed as the conflict of Western (or traditional Polish) scholarship with Soviet forms. Furthermore, the discrepancy between theory and practice became an embarrassment for the authorities once the political regime entered a crisis in 1956, and it was publicly denounced.

Behind the neutral facade, reputation control institutionalised with the establishment of the CQC was a tool for political control over economics. The efficient system of discrimination over candidates who lacked the backing of the Party made the prospects of non-Marxist scholars bleak. The research they had accomplished before the Marxist-Leninist takeover did not count in the CQC's evaluation of their merits. On the other hand candidates who had the good opinion of the Party were granted exceptions from the demand for scholarly output. Academic degrees became rewards for political accomplishments in the PUWP's service.

The repressive nature of the regime made it far more successful in the suppression of unwanted activities than in the promotion of desired activities such as the creation of Marxist-Leninist research and training programmes. The examination of the source material covering discussions among Marxist-Leninist economists and among their colleagues from other social sciences indicates that the Party's insistence on the primacy of ideology – a dogmatic

ideology defined and controlled by the political leadership – was blocking the path to a creative and productive Marxist-Leninist science. The debates organised to discuss Stalin's article on economics, and the material from the work of the CQC, demonstrate different aspects of the Marxist-Leninist scholarly life. The seminar organised by the ITSC shows how scientific discussions within a party-science context obeyed the cultural norms of communist intra-party debate. The confidential discussions in the CQC setting give us an opportunity to examine what public discussion could not show, the Marxist-Leninist scholars' evolution towards the view that Marxist science should first be scientific and only secondly party-minded (*partyjna*). Marxist-Leninist economics comes through as characterised by intellectual stagnation, destructive internal rivalry, and the inability to establish the superiority of scholars over the political leadership in the peer-review processes.

The stenographic reports of the discussions of the CQC Social Science Section allow us to observe the evolution of the group of Marxist-Leninist scholars hand-picked by the PUWP to control the establishment of new hierarchies in social sciences. Their discussions on the merits of candidates for academic degrees and titles show how the conflict between primacy of party and scientific merit criteria was played out in the Polish context. In the beginning, the attitudes they expressed towards reputation control were founded on the belief that they were living in a period of revolutionary transition, and that extraordinary means were justified, as the revolution demanded sacrifice for the benefit of a better future. Initially there was not much discussion about the candidatures for promotion, as all members of the Section accepted the *force majeure* of the revolution. The fact was, their own recent promotions would not have been so swift had the established hierarchy not been challenged. By endorsing the demand that scholarly output had to be Marxist-Leninist (as defined by the PUWP) in order to merit promotion, they had yielded control of the overall intellectual goals of the discipline to the Party leadership. Gradually, however, they grew concerned about the nature of the transitional measures, and the fact that these had seemed to take a permanent hold. In the Kubica discussion we saw that when Section members attempted to stand firm on their conviction that political merit did not compensate for an absence of scholarly output, they found that they were powerless, and that the state and party bureaucracies combined were able and determined to overrule them. These experiences and the ensuing dissatisfaction played a part in the emerging pressure for liberalisation and decentralisation of power following Stalin's death, which will be the main theme of the next and last chapter of this study.

Those silent players, the 'bourgeois' economists, were more important than their scant representation in this chapter may suggest. In spite of extensive political sponsorship, Marxist-Leninist economists remained in a minority. This affected both their impact on non-Marxist scholars and students, and the reverse; the established milieu's impact on them. These beneficiaries of political promotion were always only too well-aware of the opinion the majority held of their aptitude: with the advent of the Thaw, incidents of students treating the deputy professors with unmasked contempt became common. For Marxist-Leninist economists the bonds with the Party were a source of both empowerment and constraint. For the others, the Party's interference constituted nothing but constraint. The breach caused in the field by the arrival of a Marxist-Leninist segment was maintained throughout the first half of the decade. The re-integration of Polish economics only became possible in 1956, following the momentous changes in the regime's policies.

THE TIME OF THE ECONOMISTS 1956-1960

In 1956 the Marxist-Leninist monopoly over economics crumbled under the impact of a sudden liberalisation in culture and politics – the Thaw – and the wall of silence and fear that had isolated Marxist-Leninists from other scholars gave way. For the second time in less than a decade, and at some speed, the field of economics underwent a profound transformation.

The Thaw⁵⁸⁷ is commonly understood as being the reversal of a trend which had seen the central Party leadership assume increasingly tight control over all aspects of political and societal life. It affected all the areas where stalinist regimentation and centralisation had prevailed. There was a thaw in culture, where dogmatic socialist realism was abandoned; a thaw in the judicial system, with amnesties for political prisoners; a thaw in the Party organisation, with the ‘rehabilitation’ of individuals expelled during the purges of the early 1950s; and a relaxation of censorship, allowing for the expression of a wide range of critical opinions. This last aspect of the Thaw will be the main concern of this chapter. The Thaw, and the events of 1956 in particular, have attracted a great deal of attention in Polish and international historiography.⁵⁸⁸ The relaxation in tension between the Superpowers, and the changes in Soviet policy regarding the countries within its zone of influence, will therefore

⁵⁸⁷ Although the term “Thaw” (originating in the title of a 1954 novel by Ilja Erenburg) is fairly common in Polish historiography and literature, the events surrounding 1956 are most often referred to as the “Polish October” or just “October”. The term was first used as the title of the front page article by R. Turski and W. Lasota in the October 28th 1956 issue of *Po Prostu* Kuron, Jacek, 1990. *Wiara i wina. Do i od komunizmu*. Warszawa: Niezależna Oficyna Wydawnicza. Biblioteka Kwartalnika KRYTYKA, p.124. “Polish October” refers to events surrounding the 8th Party Plenum in October, when the threat of Soviet invasion was deflected by Władysław Gomułka, whose return to power had been greeted by enthusiastic, chanting crowds. I prefer to use “Thaw” to denote a long-term tendency in political and social development, rather than that of “October”. Besides its narrower chronological reference, the term “Thaw” also denotes the spirit of those exciting days, the hopes for far-reaching reform, and a sensation of freedom and hope which quickly took on mythical and symbolic dimensions, as the hopes were dashed.

⁵⁸⁸ Fik, *Kultura polska po Jalcie. Kronika lat 1944-1981*, Machcewicz, Paweł, 1993. *Polski rok 1956* Warszawa: Oficyna Wydawnicza “Mówia Wieki”, Władysław, 1994. *Pazdziernik 56* Warszawa: Wydawnictwa Szkolne i Pedagogiczne, Bratkowski, Stefan (ed.) (1996) *Pazdziernik 1956. Pierwszy wylom w systemie. Bunt, mlodosc i rozsadek.*, Warszawa: Prószyński i S-ka, Kersten, Krystyna (ed.) (1997) *Polska 1956 - próba nowego spojrzenia*, Warszawa: Instytut Historii PAN, Polskie Towarzystwo Historyczne, Instytut Studiów Politycznych PAN.

provide a significant backdrop, but will remain in the background, as will the iconic events of 1956, when demonstrations became street riots in Poznań in June, and in October cheering crowds carried Gomułka to power, and the threat of Soviet military intervention was warded off

To understand how the Thaw affected economists, we need first to direct our attention towards general developments in Poland, and the internal party struggle. Tracing the origins of ‘revisionism’, Beata Bińko argues that the Polish communist leaders came under pressure from the Soviet Union, where modification of stalinist policies was proceeding at a faster rate.⁵⁸⁹ Soviet pressure, not domestic developments, triggered the proclamation of a “New Course” and the first, cautious moves towards liberalisation of cultural policies made by the Polish regime in 1953 and 1954. In the meantime, problems facing the regime were piling up: popular dissatisfaction resulting from the policy of investing aggressively in heavy industry at the cost of investments in agriculture and consumption on the one hand,⁵⁹⁰ and on the other hand increasing intra-party criticism, fuelled both by the scandal following a Radio Free Europe broadcast of a Secret Police colonel’s confessions, and by the appearance of cautious but strongly resonant critical articles in the domestic press.⁵⁹¹ With no clear ‘line’ from Moscow to follow, and with no obvious solution to Poland’s economic problems available, the PUWP split into ‘reformist’ (‘revisionist’), ‘orthodox’ (Stalinist) and ‘centrist’ factions.⁵⁹² The USSR leadership was at that time heavily fissured, allowing different PUWP factions to seek out patronage among the rival Soviet leaders. Adding to the confusion was the issue of succession after Khrushchev’s repudiation of Stalin’s legacy, and the death of Bierut:⁵⁹³ Indeed, in the spring of 1956, the dissemination of Khrushchev’s “Secret Speech” in Poland set off a chain reaction leading to a temporary breakdown in Party control.⁵⁹⁴ The most

⁵⁸⁹ Bińko, Beata, 1995. "Partia wobec "Odwily". Wyniki kwerendy archiwalnej w poszukiwaniu początków rewizjonizmu: 1954-1955." *Kultura i Społeczeństwo*, 39, 95-106.

As for “revisionism” Bińko accepts the definition provided by L. Kołakowski. According to the latter “revisionism” was a term used by the Party leadership and Party ideologues to stigmatise anyone who attacked the various Marxist-Leninist dogma from a Marxist position. In general “revisionism” was used about democratic and rationalist tendencies. Kołakowski, Leszek & Falla, P. S., 1981. *Main currents of Marxism : its origins, growth and dissolution*, Paperback ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

⁵⁹⁰ Kaliński, Janusz, 1995. *Gospodarka Polski w latach 1944-1989. Przemiany strukturalne*. Warszawa: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Ekonomiczne.

⁵⁹¹ Błazyński, Zbigniew, 1986. *Mówi Józef Światło, za kulisami bezpieki i partii*. London: Polska Fundacja Kulturalna, Fik, Marta, 1989. *Kultura polska po Jalcie. Kronika lat 1944-1981*. London: Polonia, Władysław, Wiesław, 1994. *Pazdziernik 56* Warszawa: Wydawnictwa Szkolne i Pedagogiczne.

⁵⁹² The orthodox faction is commonly known as the Natolin group because of their meetings at the Natolin palace. Their opponents were not organised in any way, and the name attached to this formation, “*Puławska*” refers to the street in which many of the prominent reformers lived.

⁵⁹³ Kemp-Welch article provides a good overview of the situation. Kemp-Welch, Tony, 1996. "Khrushchev's 'Secret Speech' and Polish Politics: The Spring of 1956". *Europe-Asia Studies*, 48, 181-206.

⁵⁹⁴ While the gradual leaking of the content of Khrushchev’s speech has been the subject of much unconfirmed speculation,

immediate and spectacular result of this breakdown was an increased freedom of expression, which had a direct effect on social sciences. In the course of a stormy debate at the Second Convention of Economists in early June, Marxist-Leninist economists lost their hold over the discipline. A series of bold and highly critical interventions allowed the 'bourgeois' economists, condemned to silence and obscurity since 1949, to reclaim their places as legitimate players in the field. PUWP control over the field, and over the distinction between 'scientific' and 'unscientific' knowledge, also evaporated.

If we consider the Thaw from the perspective of the Marxist-Leninist academics, it is apparent that at this time they were under pressure from several quarters. To start with, their political patrons began showing signs of division and weakness, which motivated a search for an alternative basis of power. The challenge of transforming into symbolic, academic capital the cruder political currency which had allowed the protégées of the Party to attain high positions in the academic hierarchy was not an easy one. As expressions became widespread of criticism of the Marxist-Leninist monopoly in economics, and of the competences and academic credentials of Marxist-Leninist economists, the Marxist-Leninist academics found themselves alone, without political backing, having to confront not only their unpopularity with the non-Marxist majority, but also the lack of recognition for their academic merits. To put it plainly, they faced the problem of how to hold on to their professorial chairs, as candidates with better formal qualifications now reclaimed them. Potentially, a shift towards greater autonomy for scientific communities could mean that they would lose much or all of their influence. It would be one-sided to omit the fact that the transcripts of discussions in the CQC from as early as 1955 display the Marxist-Leninist scholars' growing dissatisfaction with the continued interference of the Party bureaucracy. A reduction in the ideological component of their professional lives would not have been unwelcome to many scholars. Brus, for example, gave as a partial motive for leaving the ITSC for Warsaw University the extra work burden that obligatory participation in agitation and political campaigns placed on the staff and students of that institution.⁵⁹⁵

there is no doubt as to the fact that in Poland, the full text of the speech soon made its way onto the black market. In his interview with Torańska, Warsaw Party chief Staszewski claims that the Soviet leadership sent one copy to the Polish Politburo, which had it translated so that all CC member might read it. The Polish version was printed in several copies (kilkadziesiąt might mean anything between twenty and hundred) which were numbered and sent to all CC members, RC secretaries and their deputies. Staszewski then personally ordered the printing of an additional 15,000 copies, while re-using the numbers of the original series. He names western journalists to whom he personally delivered copies. He also noted that the employees of the press undoubtedly made their own copies for sale. Torańska, Teresa, 1997. *Oni*, new revised ed. Warszawa: Świat Książki.pp.226-228

⁵⁹⁵ A.W. Haugstad, interview with Włodzimierz Brus, Oxford 2001

Another element which weakened the attachment of Marxist-Leninist scholars to the Party was the continued presence of an alternative. Connelly has argued that throughout the stalinist years, Marxist-Leninist academics and cultural-policy cadres had felt the strong pull of the 'old' academic culture.⁵⁹⁶ In the freer atmosphere of 1956, Marxist-Leninist scholars were able to compare the aggressive, ideologically-oriented and politically-subordinated Marxist-Leninist science they had helped to install with the example set by still-active, erudite "progressive" professors of the old school, and with the memory of academic autonomy and prestige they kept alive. Those among them who were gifted, and had an openness of spirit which had been chafing under the dogmatic academic regime of the early 50ties, now wondered if they would not be better off if they metaphorically let go of their red communist ties to don the old-fashioned professorial mantles instead. This change of cultural preferences and repertoires chimed with the political evolution of the supporters of the 'revisionist' faction. Some of the Marxist-Leninist intellectuals abandoned their Party-soldier ethos and embraced that of the independent thinker and social and political critic. Many of them adopted a 'traditional' scholarly identity, and placed priority on academic rather than party interests. This opened the field to the emergence of new relationships and the reconfiguration of previous alliances, while relations between the field of economics and the larger field of politics were also renegotiated. An alliance of Marxist-Leninist revisionists and the non-Marxist academic majority now allowed the academics to reclaim a number of the discretionary powers they had lost since 1948. Professors in the department councils and academic senates once again took the decisions about employment and promotions, approved doctorates, and ruled over the content of teaching.⁵⁹⁷ Those who had lost their chairs in the early 1950s were returned to their positions. Political censorship of scholarly work was no longer exercised, and contacts with Western scholarship were re-established.

The efforts of the PUWP to promote the establishment of a new hierarchy of reputations in economics, which would have included the criterion of conformity with standards of political orientation defined by the Party, were also affected by rising open criticism. The rivalry between two sets of hierarchies (one based on the pre-1948 world of scholarship and upheld in private communication by non-Marxist scholars, the second based on the appointments

⁵⁹⁶ Connelly, John, 2000. *Captive University: the Sovietization of East German, Czech, and Polish higher education, 1945-1956* Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.pp.153-156

⁵⁹⁷ The senate of the Main School for instance ruled that the lecture programs decreed by the Ministry were no longer valid and that each Chair should now elaborate new programs for discussion by the councils of departments (Rady Wydziałowe) ASHG/ Senat SGPiS, Protokół nr. 2/473 15.11.1956

made by the President the CQC and on the instructions of the PUWP and the Ministry) soon came to a head. As the ideological legitimacy of political promotions crumbled, the two hierarchies confronted each other. The realisation that the system was not producing competent students, and that research was not developing, served to undermine the new order. Even among those who had profited from the new ideologically and politically-inspired measures, there was a strong sense that the PUWP definition of Marxism had been too narrow, the price of its imposition had been too dear, and that this had led to the unjust exclusion of many valuable and talented scholars. Even in its weakened state, however, the Party was not going to permit the exclusion of its protégées. It was difficult to correct the situation without incurring the wrath of those who would become stripped of their authority in the process. This dilemma formed the backdrop for the long and heated debates in the late period (1956-1960) of CQC activity.

Paweł Machcewicz argues that the crowds who took to the streets in Poznań, Warsaw and elsewhere in 1956, shared with the revisionist Party intellectuals only the negative goal of condemning stalinism.⁵⁹⁸ Academic institutions, however, present us with the possibility of exploring a setting where the revisionists came into close contact with the non-Marxist majority, and agreed on a minimum programme of common interests which would allow for reform of the sector. This exercise in co-operation between a leftist intellectual elite capable of addressing the regime in its own language, and the majority anti-communist, academic, professional and creative elites.

The economic crisis following the Six Year Plan became impossible to conceal in the new open climate of expression, but only the popular dissent expressed in the Poznań riot finally forced the Party leadership to make a public show of willingness to reform the economy. The economists' bargaining power was enhanced by the new demands for their expertise and their ability to infuse plans for a new economic policy with legitimacy. The return of economists to active participation in the drafting of reforms and in the analysis of the economic situation made 1956-1960 a radically different period. It was "the time of the economists".

⁵⁹⁸ For a discussion of the width of the division between the reformist intellectuals who considered themselves to be Marxists, and the anti-communist, pro-religion oriented crowds on the streets of Poznań and other towns, see Machcewicz, Paweł, 1997. "Intellectuals and Mass Movement, Ideologies and Political Programs". *Contemporary European History*, 6, 361-382.

Thaw – origins and early phase

It is difficult to date the start of the Thaw, and although it is possible to argue that Stalin's article on economics in 1952 was the first sign for economists, the first indications of a thaw in the period 1953-1954 did not dominate the overall picture. The death of Stalin had no immediate effect; indeed it brought about a heightening of the tone of propaganda rhetoric, as shown by Kupiecki in his study of the Stalin cult in Poland.⁵⁹⁹ Fijałkowska argues that from 1953 the sharpened rhetoric had already been accompanied by a relaxation of control over culture,⁶⁰⁰ and indeed Marta Fik's chronicle of culture cites numerous events from 1954 which support the view that literature and art were at the forefront of the Thaw.⁶⁰¹ In 1955 the International Youth Festival, held in Warsaw in August, brought a gust of fresh air after years of drab isolation. Intellectual circles were in uproar following Ważyk's publication of "*A poem for adults*" that same month, and after the Party leadership's crackdown on the author and editor that ensued. Though the restriction on free expression relaxed, it is difficult to detect outward signs of any Thaw among economists at this time, although the economists involved in confidential discussions within the Central Qualification Committee's Social Science Section were affected by the changing climate, and the resulting shift in the opinions and loyalties of the CQC members who controlled the distribution of indicators of academic reputation, would be very important in the months to come. Other parts of the academic system were also experiencing a gradual relaxation. Drabińska notes tendencies towards making new critical assessments of the reform of higher education in the Party leadership at about the same time.⁶⁰² In December 1954, Drewnowski, once classed an undesirable person and removed from all positions after his expulsion from the Party, was appointed to the board of the Polish Economic Association,⁶⁰³ and Wakar was released from a Soviet labour camp and allowed to return to Poland and take up academic work.⁶⁰⁴

The earliest public evidence of a new climate in social sciences is a debate on the subject of the barriers hindering the development of humanities and social sciences. This involved among others the sociologist Chałasiński and the Institute for Training of Scientific Cadres

⁵⁹⁹ Kupiecki, Robert, 1993. *Natchnienie milionów. Kult Stalina w Polsce, 1944-1956*. Warszawa: Wydawnictwa szkolne i pedagogiczne.

⁶⁰⁰ Fijałkowska, Barbara, 1985. *Polityka i twórcy (1948-1959)*. Warszawa: PWN.

⁶⁰¹ Fik, Marta, 1989. *Kultura polska po Jalcie. Kronika lat 1944-1981*. London: Polonia.

⁶⁰² Drabińska, Danuta, 1993. *SGPiS w latach forsownych przeobrazen społeczno-gospodarczych Polski 1949-1956*. Warsaw School of Economics.

⁶⁰³ Drewnowski, Jan, 1990. "Autobiografia naukowa". *Kwartalnik Historii Nauki i Techniki*, 35, 451-489.

⁶⁰⁴ ASGH/ AleksyWakar personal file

director Schaff.⁶⁰⁵ It also illustrates the Party's equilibrist efforts to open doors while remaining in control. Although publication of the polemic could not have taken place without the sanction of the political authorities, CC officials called a special meeting of 'Party professors' to monitor and manage Party intellectuals' reactions. Quoted here is the CC Science Division's report for November 1955 relating to that meeting, penned by the seasoned Party official Zemankowa:

The comrades basically took a correct attitude to Chalasiński's position. There were, however, tendencies to underestimate the achievements in our social sciences over the last few years and to identify the Party as the cause of the difficulties in their development.

Economists (Brus) indicated that the main cause of the shortcomings was the matter of the secrecy about statistics and the "unsolved" problem of the role of scholars in the development of social sciences if the main direction is set by the party (...)

While taking up the matter of a number of fundamental errors in our science, the comrades only perceived their own decisive role in overcoming these errors very weakly.

The meetings helped the comrades to see where their task lay in the struggle for the development of science and the need for initiative and ideological offensives in all fields of science.⁶⁰⁶

Since this was a report for the central leadership, it is not surprising but still worth noting that there was a consistent refusal to assume any responsibility for the shortcomings of the Party science policy that rank and file Party intellectuals were reporting. Party intellectuals and the Party bureaucracy were going in different directions. While Zemankowa felt the need to ensure a 'proper' reaction and to enthuse Party academics with revolutionary zeal, both Brus's intervention, as reported in the above quote, and other sources indicate that within the group which had been the PUWP's spearhead in academic institutions, there were those who increasingly resented being told what to think. How could the Party present a united front against the non-Marxist academic majority, indeed against society in general, when its own intellectual elite was showing signs of independent and critical thought? The attempted

⁶⁰⁵ Fik, Marta, 1989. *Kultura polska po Jalcie. Kronika lat 1944-1981*. London: Polonia. P.220. The debate ran in *Przegląd Kulturalny*, nr. 39 (J. Chalasiński), nr.43 (L. Kolakowski), nr.77 (A. Schaff), and W. Bienkowski (13.10.55) On Chalasiński's relationship to the Party, see Kłoskowska, Antonina, 1995. "Bunty i służebność uczonego". *Kultura i Społeczeństwo*, 39, 57-68.

⁶⁰⁶ AAN/KCPZPR/237/XVI/178/pp.75-76 "Sprawozdanie Wydziału Nauki KC za m-c listopad 1955 r." Signed Zofia Zemankowa 12.12.55

balancing act of the Party leadership and the bureaucracy, allowing as it did only selective criticism and careful monitoring of reactions to this, was a distinctive feature of the months preceding the spring of 1956, and over time proved impossible to achieve. The divisions between one faction pushing for more open policies and reforms, and another ‘orthodox’ group interested in the maintenance of the *status quo*, were already undermining the unity of the ‘Party line’.

The controlled criticism of the early Thaw phase, and the cautious reforms discussed by the Party elites in the Soviet Union and Poland in 1954 and 1955, began to change pace and form after the 20th Party Congress on February 25th 1956, when Khrushchev gave his “Secret Speech” denouncing Stalin. To this was added a succession crisis in the Polish Communist Party, following the death in Moscow on March 12th of Poland’s “little Stalin”, Bolesław Bierut.⁶⁰⁷ In early March the content of Khrushchev’s speech became known in Warsaw, creating confusion and consternation in party ranks. We need to examine how these political events affected economists, and will begin by using the medium of a stenographic report to observe how the Party leadership tried to deal with the new developments. On March 29th, a meeting of higher education sector Party functionaries working at institutional to regional committee level,⁶⁰⁸ was opened by the director of the CC Culture and Science Division, Stefan Żółkiewski,⁶⁰⁹ who set out to give a summary of the “Secret Speech”. It should be noted that Żółkiewski belonged to the reformist wing of the Party, the loose ‘*Puławska*’ faction supported mainly by Party intellectuals.⁶¹⁰ The participants in the meeting were

⁶⁰⁷ The first Polish CC meeting after Bierut’s death was held on March 20th, when Edward Ochab was elected First Secretary, in the presence of Khrushchev. Paczkowski, Andrzej, 1998. *Pół wieku dziejów Polski 1939-1989* Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN. p.298

⁶⁰⁸ The meeting was organised by the newly-merged CC Culture and Science Division. The list of participants included the secretaries of the basic party organisations at higher schools, deputy directors of the Regional Party Committee’s Education Division, party members from the Ministries of Higher Education and of Health, and leaders of the Polish Youth Union, in order to inform them of the situation. If things went according to plan, there were nearly 200 people present. AAN/KCPZPR/237/XVI/209, p.90

⁶⁰⁹ **Stefan Żółkiewski (1911-1991)** Studied at Warsaw University before the War, joined the PWP in 1942, editor of journal “Kuznica” (The Forge), charged with the introduction of Marxism into Polish studies and founding director of Institute of Literary Studies. He was, among other things a member of the PUWP CC from 1954. Deputy professor at Warsaw University, ordinary professor from 1954, held leading positions in social sciences within the Polish Academy of Sciences in the years 1952-1955. Identified with the pro-reform Puławska faction. When, Żółkiewski had sent a letter to the Secretariat on March 17th asking permission to arrange a meeting of those in the Party actively working with higher education on March 23rd, he had also expressed the wish that someone from the Party leadership be present to open and sum up the discussion. This wish was not granted, and the meeting was delayed for another week since, as a handwritten annotation on the letter shows, the proposed meeting was not authorised until March 21st. AAN/KCPZPR/237/XVI/209, p.8 Letter from S. Żółkiewski, director of the PUWP CC Division for Science and Culture to the PUWP Secretariat, dated 17.03.1956.

⁶¹⁰ Ślabek relates that Jordan classified Żółkiewski as one of the ‘orthodox’ revisionists, however self-contradictory that may sound. Jordan thus described revisionists who were pushing for reforms but accepting of the Party’s ultimate authority to determine the boundaries of criticism and change. Oskar Lange was put into the same category. Discussed in Ślabek, Henryk, 1997. *Intelektualistów obraz własny 1944-1989*: Książka i Wiedza.

already familiar with the content of Khrushchev's speech, so a summary might appear superfluous, but this was how the Party leadership had dealt with problems before. For comparison, we may look back to the way the Party responded to Stalin's potentially disruptive comment in his article on linguistics, where he had stated that free critical discussion was necessary in the sciences. In 1951 a large scale campaign had been staged not only to disseminate Stalin's words, but also in order to make sure that the message that the Party had authority over science was placed before anything else, and that the freedom mentioned by Stalin only applied within the limits set by the Party leadership. It seems that faced with the explosive contents of the Secret Speech, the Central Committee tried to pull off a similar act. Żółkiewski's task would then have been not so much to inform his audience, as to provide an authoritative interpretation of the "Secret Speech". In translating the opening paragraphs of his speech I have tried to retain an impression of the confused structure and spelling of the original:

Comrade Żółkiewski : (...) I will try to repeat with my own words the content of the speeches at the XX Congress, the content of the speech of comrade Khrushchev, and so the material and documents that the comrades know in original versions (...)

Dear comrades, we are most of all under the impression of those historical truths,⁶¹¹ that we got to know about - the errors and distortions of the actions of our parties, the activity of comrade Stalin, they reach deep and I do not know if there is anyone present in this room who would be able at this moment to relate completely, to explain all questions. Well, each of us is after all looking into his conscience, each of us is examining not only how this happened, but is examining his relationship to these matters, is going through great difficulties, is trying exactly to understand these contradictions that were this measure, and a whole range of facts, so really I have to look on these matters from my own perspective. Therefore I cannot answer many questions, a series of why, that the comrades bear in their consciousness, answer them in my talk, maybe the discussion can do more for us.⁶¹²

How could Żółkiewski, an experienced politician, sound so disoriented? Two possible reasons come to mind. Firstly, it is possible that Żółkiewski had personal difficulties in dealing with the revelations of persecutions and their implications for the legitimacy of communism. Many party members went through severe personal crises when the crimes and atrocities of the

⁶¹¹ The term "historical truths" is my interpretation of the original document. The precise spelling in the document would translate as "historical laws", but I believe it more likely that a typo changed "prawd" (truths) into "praw" (laws).

⁶¹² AAN/KCPZPR/237/XVI/209/pp.2-3 "Narada w Wydziale Nauki i Kultury dnia 29.III.1956" The stenogram transcript of Żółkiewski's intervention covers over 40 pages, and the last part may not have been recorded.

system became public knowledge. Some faced the facts for the first time, others realised that what they had taken for isolated incidents had formed part of systematic repression. An investigation into the attitudes and reactions of Party members to the information on the stalinist terror, conducted by sociologist Renata Tulli, documents how profoundly many of them were affected.⁶¹³ Secondly, the confused opening paragraphs of the speech reflect the hierarchical Party's dilemma in handling criticism of its former top leadership by the present top leadership. Żólkiewski comes through as extremely unsure of how to deal with the issue of the causes of the 'cult of personality' and 'deviations from party justice', the most explosive question raised by Khrushchev's revelations. (His request to have a senior member of the leadership present at the meeting may have been partly motivated by this insecurity.) In his speech he failed to provide an explanation of why these many transgressions of the Party's own principles could have taken place. He devoted little time to this question (four pages of the stenogram) and was extremely evasive on the subject, invoking the specific historical circumstances and achievements of the regime.

After the fumbling beginning, however, Żólkiewski warmed up, and continued to speak with gusto for a long time. To provide an authoritative response to the "Secret Speech" he had to step into the role of critic himself. This was necessary for at least two reasons: firstly, to avoid being classified as someone responsible for the present situation; and, secondly, in order to maintain control over the criticism. He therefore quickly abandoned the question of the disastrous effects of the 'deviations' and the 'cult of personality', instead dispensing advice on how these could be corrected. He painted a picture where an inactive youth union and bureaucratically-minded party officials were doing more harm than good in academic institutions. He accused the local party cells of unnecessarily alienating scholars who could develop Marxist science in an original way, while supporting conformists who readily declared unwavering loyalty. He did not hesitate to point out that party members were not regarded as the best, most erudite scholars, thereby admitting the Party's failure to overwrite pre-existing hierarchies and values. Making scholars, students and the general public accept the Party's decree that 'their' scholars were better than others because they were "true

⁶¹³ Tulli, Renata, 1995. "Przesłanki adaptacji intelektualisty partyjnego do stalinizmu". *Kultura i Społeczeństwo*, 39, 81-93. The published article is a chapter of the unpublished doctoral thesis Tulli submitted in 1963 at Warsaw University. Wondering why so many people who already knew what was officially admitted by Khrushchev experienced genuine shock, Tulli examined the relationship between previous knowledge about repression and transgressions and the effect of the revelations. She found a pattern where older comrades who knew more about the transgressions, but trusted and identified with the Party, were profoundly shaken, while although some of them knew less in advance younger activists behaved with a greater sense of distance and were less affected.

Marxists” had been difficult. What Żółkiewski now revealed, speaking on behalf of the Party leadership, was that even Party members doubted the superiority of Marxist-Leninist scholars. Being a loyal party member was not enough, and there were other criteria to be met in order to claim a high place in the scientific hierarchy. He went on to say that the Party organisation had destroyed the climate of friendly and constructive scholarly debates, that research was not thriving, and that students were not being taught to think for themselves. Żółkiewski blamed these deplorable facts on dogmatism, which he understood as the mistaken application of the right principles. He also dwelt on the successes of the socialist camp, notably on the international situation, which since the relaxation of the tension between the superpowers was in his view favourable to the socialist camp. According to Żółkiewski, the interest shown in socialism by India, Burma and some African countries was a proof of the success of socialism and the reason why the Party could undertake its overdue spring cleaning. In his conclusion there was no doubt as to the future course: the Party organisation needed to mobilise, defeat dogmatism, and then go on to fulfil its potential.

The postulates for change that Żółkiewski based on this analysis of the situation were contradictory and cautious, revealing a determination to maintain stability while initiating the necessary developments. Żółkiewski demanded that the Party officials cease making “excessive” interventions into science, whilst at the same time ensuring that Marxism should retain its leading role. There were faint signals in his speech that the insistence on the monopoly of Marxism in social sciences and culture was under re-consideration. Works by non-Marxists should not be feared or kept from students, Żółkiewski said, and the Party only needed to ensure that the difference between the valuable and the reactionary parts of their contributions be made clear to the young. To illustrate how this could be done, he brought Sartre into his exposé of the role of the communist intellectuals, showing where Sartre was right and where he erred. The content of the Marxism, so strictly regimented since 1948, was also now open for change, and Żółkiewski called for a return to a ‘pure’ Marxism, one that was up for discussion.⁶¹⁴ Żółkiewski advocated a change in accent, rather than a definitive solution to the conflict between ideological and scientific control of knowledge production. This change of accentuation was in fact to be very important, and would set off developments which within a short space of time would transform social sciences in Poland.

⁶¹⁴ AAN/KCPZPR/237/XVI/209/p.81 “Narada w Wydziale Nauki i Kultury dnia 29.III.1956” Stenographic report.

The discussion which followed displayed the difficulties of controlled criticism to the full. One speaker warned that openness in the media was already eroding the Party's ideological monopoly, and another raised the question which Żółkiewski had carefully avoided; that of his and other Party officials' personal responsibility for the present state of affairs. The intervention of a representative of the Polish Youth Union (ZMP), exemplified the consequences of the Party's loss of control over the information flow caused by the leaking of Khrushchev's speech.

...when we gathered the members of the Warsaw academic school and academic department ZMP boards on Friday last week [March 23rd - AWH] and read Khrushchev's speech out to them, we did that with a certain feeling of doing something bold by reading Khrushchev's speech to a group of about 100 people. And in fact at that time Warsaw and other parts of the party active in the town districts were being informed relatively more slowly. So, we were doing this, in a certain sense taking a courageous step - in our perception at least, and, by the way, with certain attempts to stop this bravery of ours on the part of these or those instances Then on Friday these students attacked us. We thought that it was a massive entrance, they: "You're only telling us now? We read this on March 17th and 18th, maybe not in such an extensive form, in The Times." So it turns out that our boldness was met with a kind of very sharp criticism from the students, the active ZMPs, (...)⁶¹⁵

This quote shows activists at a low level taking their own decisions despite opposition from their superiors. It may be they were able to do so because of encouragement or outright support from higher quarters, or their youthful impatience alone may have driven them.

If we compare the dates quoted by the Polish Youth Union representative with those in Żółkiewski's letter (dated March 17th) requesting permission to hold this meeting, it seems likely that the impetus for the session was the fact that news of Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin had reached Western media. Due to the delay of the central leadership in authorising Żółkiewski's meeting, the Youth Organisation representatives had to meet students who had been already fully informed of the essence of the "Secret Speech" by Western media, without instructions from the CC Culture and Science Division on how to deal with the situation.⁶¹⁶

⁶¹⁵ The grammar and spelling in this quote reflects the original, which is full of misspellings, odd punctuation and repetitions. AAN/KCPZPR/ 237/XVI/209/p.81.

⁶¹⁶ Reuters was the first to report on Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin, see the testimony of their Moscow correspondent Rettle, John, 2006. The secret speech that changed world history. *Observer*. <http://observer.guardian.co.uk/world/story/0,,1718125,00.html> Guardian Unlimited. Rettle recounts how he raced the New York Time correspondent to get the news out of the Soviet Union first. The New York Times published the first article by Harrison E. Salisbury revealing the content of the speech on March 16, 1956 with the title "Secret Khrushchev Talk on Stalin 'Phobia' Related" on pages 1 and 6. In Great Britain the story first appeared in the *Observer*.

As it transpired, the students had heard the Western media's version of events before receiving the digested PUWP form. The more privileged ITSC students had access to the foreign press, but Radio Free Europe broadcasts provided a similar function for others. Other interventions in the discussion also indicated that the Party's delay in disseminating the news not only undermined its monopoly on information, but also its grip on interpretation, as people heard the news from Western media and turned up at party meetings with critical questions. It is clear that in the spring of 1956 the PUWP was losing control over the information flow in Poland⁶¹⁷, and over the Party apparatus itself, as even low-level Party and Polish Youth Union activists were beginning to display initiative. The political situation was more open than it had been for several years, and the increasingly free discussions of 1956 brought with them opportunities to change power relations within the field.

“Young Turks”

The evolution of the relationship between the state and the press in Poland has always attracted considerable attention,⁶¹⁸ particularly during the events of 1956. Control of public communication had been the key element in the establishment and maintenance of the “Marxist” monopoly in economics. The re-emergence of arenas for open debate in 1956 was bound to affect the discipline. According to Leftowicz-Curry:

*...the media system went through a period of rapid expansion from 1954 to 1957. Sporadic publications became weeklies. Beginning with student and intellectual periodicals like *Po Prostu*, *Student*, *Nowa Kultura*, *Przegląd Kulturalny*, and *Życie Gospodarcze* and ending with the dailies, the press went from being dry, dull, and conservative to being major voices in liberalization filled with popular, critical and sensational articles. Staffs were changed. Political appointees were pushed out. In their place, journalists with writing skills and flair were hired.⁶¹⁹*

⁶¹⁷ Paczkowski, Andrzej, 1998. *Pół wieku dziejów Polski 1939-1989* Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN. p.299

⁶¹⁸Perkal, Jakob, 1986. Polityczna historia prasy w Polsce w latach 1944-1984. In I. Lasota (ed.) *40 lat władzy komunistycznej w Polsce*. London: Polonia Book Fund, s.151-185.; Władyka, Wiesław, 1989. *Na czołowiec. Prasa w październiku 1956 roku*. Warszawa: PWN.; Koziel, Andrzej, 1991. *Studium o polityce prasowej PZPR w latach 1948-1957* Warszawa: Uniwersytet Warszawski.; Curry, Jane Leftwicz, 1990. *Poland's journalists: professionalism and politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.; “Prasa w Polsce Ludowej” Mysliński, Jerzy, 1988. Prasa w Polsce Ludowej. In E.A. Jerzy Lojek (ed.) *Dzieje prasy polskiej*. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Interpress. K. Persak provides a thorough and up-to-date review of the literature and sources covering the evolution of the press from 1956 to 1961 in his recently published study of the notorious “Holland case”. Journalist, sociologist and ITSC graduate Henryk Holland died in 1961 following a fall from the window of his apartment during a search by the Security Police. Persak undertook the ambitious task of solving a case which has been the subject of widespread speculation for 45 years. Persak, Krzysztof, 2006. *Sprawa Henryka Hollanda* Warszawa: Instytut Pamięci Narodowej.

⁶¹⁹ Curry, Jane Leftwicz, 1990. *Poland's journalists: professionalism and politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p.50

The student journal *Po Prostu* has become a symbol of the activating of young intellectuals and the appearance of many young journalists and editors.⁶²⁰ In economics too a new generation emerged: the graduates of the *Aspirantura* programmes at the ITSC and the Main School, and the few who had completed their studies in the Soviet Union. In time their youth and idealism led them to go further in their criticisms than the moderate revisionists' like Żółkiewski. The "Young Turk" economists would play a radicalising role in public discussions,⁶²¹ which took place principally on the pages of *Życie Gospodarcze* (Economic Life).

In a study of attitudes to communism among intellectuals, Henryk Słabek points out that in 1955 and 1956 the Party was ready to accept public criticism as long as it was performed by its supporters. Marxist writers and artists, the Party leadership insisted, should retain a privileged position in culture and science.⁶²² The Party leadership tried to contain and harness the criticism, by joining the critics, as we saw Żółkiewski do, while attacking violently any outsider who dared to voice unauthorised criticism. The problem was that the credibility of Żółkiewski and other Party intellectuals as critics was not very great, since many of them had held high-profile positions in the Party apparatus throughout the early fifties. Searching for a vent for the criticisms, and in order to bolster its failing sense of legitimacy, the Party turned to its young. Who could be better qualified to overhaul political economy than the graduates of the Institute for Training of Scientific Cadres? In the spring 1956 a group of young economists on the lookout for a platform which could allow them to take part in the budding reform process was granted control over *Economic Life*. *Economic Life* had started out as a periodical addressing economists working in the state bureaucracy. Up until the spring of 1956 it had been a drab journal dominated by uncritical and unimaginative compilations of figures, and had been only slightly affected by the Thaw. The decision taken by the editorial board in December 1955 to adopt a less aggressive, stiff rhetoric meant that *Economic Life* was merely catching up with the developments in other media, and was by no means the locomotive of criticism.⁶²³ Led by thirty-year-old ITSC graduate Tadeusz Kowalik, the new

⁶²⁰ Among other things, the editorial staff of *Po Prostu* inspired the creation of discussion clubs for young intellectuals all over the country; although it is the Warsaw club, named for its location in Crooked Circle Street in the Old Town, that is best known. Jedlicki, Witold & Instytut, Literacki, 1963. *Klub Krzywego Kola Paryż: Instytut Literacki*.

⁶²¹ The group was referred to as 'Young Turks' by one of its members, T.Kowalik. A.W. Haugstad, interview with Tadeusz Kowalik, Warsaw 2000

The original Young Turks were the reformist movement which ended the sultanate of the Ottoman Empire in 1909 and initiated the modernisation and industrialisation of Turkish society. www.britannica.com accessed 26.02.2007

⁶²² See Chapter 6 in Słabek, Henryk, 1997. *Intelektualistów obraz własny 1944-1989: Książka i Wiedza*.

⁶²³ 1956. „Po naradzie z czytelnikami Życia Gospodarczego Warszawie “ *Życie Gospodarcze*, 1, pp.11-13

team which took over in the spring swiftly transformed *Economic Life* from an anonymous quarterly into a popular weekly. *Economic Life* became the main arena for debates on economic policy and reforms, as well as for the discussion of problems pertaining to the discipline and profession of economists.

The new team took over at a moment when censorship had practically ceased to function. Wiesław Władyka, who has studied the history of the press in 1956, argues that critical publications were continually pushing the limits of acceptable criticism, and since the public assumed that whatever was published was done with permission, each new critical article shifted those limits and generated further criticism, a process which for the moment the Party was unable and unwilling to halt.⁶²⁴ While the publication in August 1955 of Ważyk's poem describing the appalling reality of forced industrialisation had cost the editor his job, (but not the author's, and both had retained their party cards), much more overt criticism was published in the spring of 1956 without any apparent reaction from the Party leadership.

On the front page of the first 'new' issue (June 1956) was a manifesto entitled "Our position" and signed by 31 young economists.⁶²⁵ Their background was mainly in political economy at academic institutions, and in work in the planning apparatus. Many had passed through the CC ITSC *Aspirantura* programme, where they had experienced a strange regime which combined a strong focus on ideology with access to unorthodox sources such as foreign journals and the works of Trotsky.⁶²⁶ Published immediately before the start of the Second Convention of Economists, the manifesto was explicit in its desire to affect the agenda of the discussion at that forum. The content of the manifesto deserves attention as it was the first public assessment of the situation in the discipline, and the first suggestions for remedies were made in it.

The young economists' impression of the discipline was catastrophic: "*For a considerable period of time there has been total stagnation in economic theory.*"⁶²⁷ They described the scientific output of the stalinist years as exegeses, generalities, narrow studies and quotation-

⁶²⁴ Władyka, Wiesław, 1994. *Pazdziernik 56* Warszawa: Wydawnictwa Szkolne i Pedagogiczne. P.35

⁶²⁵ 1956. "Nasze stanowisko. Z okazji II Zjazdu Ekonomistów Polskich" *Życie Gospodarcze*, 11, (6.06.56), p.1-2

The signatories (most were between the ages of 30 and 35) were in alphabetical order: Andrzej Brzeski, Artur Bodnar, Alojzy Chlebowczyk, Henryk Cholaj, Maria Ciepiewska, Henryk Dunajewski, Henryk Francuz, Bogusław Galeski, Bohdan Gliński, Zbigniew Grabowski, Tadeusz Jaworski, Władysław Juraszyński, Tadeusz Kowalik, Zygmunt Kozłowski, Władysław Krencik, Zygmunt Knyziak, Stefan J. Kurowski, Kazimierz Laski, Mieczysław Mieszczanowski, Wadim Mietkowski, Zofia Morecka, Jan Niegowski, Marian Ostrowski, Józef Pajestka, Antoni Rajkiewicz, Adam Runowicz, Eugeniusz Rychlewski, Władysław Sadowski, Michał Stalski, Bogdan Szulc, and Edward Wiszniewski.

⁶²⁶ Connelly, John, 1996. "Elite Social Science Training in Stalinist Poland." *Minerva*, 34, 323-346.

⁶²⁷ 1956. "Nasze stanowisko. Z okazji II Zjazdu Ekonomistów Polskich" *Życie Gospodarcze*, 11, (6.06.56), p.1-2

mania, and they deplored the lack of publications with theoretical ambitions. They also demanded freedom of discussion and publication, access to information, and the establishment of a large institute of economics at the Polish Academy of Science (PAN). The young economists compared the situation they were witnessing with the promises to the discipline given by the regime during First Congress of Science events in 1950-1951. Other disciplines, they noted, had proper research institutes within the PAN structure, while economics had mere 'ateliers' with only a few employees.

The authors of the manifesto had first-hand experience both as students and as teaching assistants, and they expressed their dissatisfaction with the way higher education in economics had worked for the past several years. They had experienced teaching devoid of critical approaches and independent reflection, and students had been left to learn formulae and quotations from the classics of Marxism-Leninism. They drew attention to the fact that economics was failing to attract gifted students, or even enough students to fill the plan quotas, a problem caused by uninspiring study programmes.⁶²⁸ As for research education, several of the signatories had passed through the *Aspirantura* programme but had nothing positive to say about it. Instead they called for more stress on the thesis, a reduction in exams and the size of the curriculum, and the decentralisation of decisions about programmes to schools and even to chairs. It is a measure of the unpopularity and poor reputation of the *Aspirantura* education system that those holding the new *kand. nauk* degree declared openly against its retention and for reinstatement of the doctorate. The 'Young Turks' were also concerned by the lack of job opportunities, and criticised the widespread practice by the elder generation of holding of two posts. They called for the definition and protection of the title of economist, and the reservation of positions in the planning apparatus for holders of this title.

Furthermore, they challenged one of the cornerstones of the new order, the alleged close relation between theory and economic policy. They claimed that despite the promises made to the discipline in 1950-1951, economists had been reduced to being apologists for economic policy, deprived of influence on its formation. The "Manifesto" called for research programmes that would investigate the efficiency of such areas as production, investment, and international trade, as well as for the continuation of the ongoing investigation into economic laws (especially the law of value), economic incentives, and the law of distribution according

⁶²⁸ See Drabińska on the crisis in fulfilling the Plan. Drabińska, Danuta, 1993. SGPiS w latach forsownych przeobrazen społeczno-gospodarczych Polski 1949-1956. Warsaw School of Economics. pp.76-80

to input. Lastly they called for urgent start to work on a long-term economic development plan, and for the inclusion of economic science in this work. All this, they wrote, was needed in order to attain the goal of a unified theory of the political economy of socialism which could provide the basis for reform of the economy. Their conclusion was that economists had been pushed aside from their advisory functions, institutions of higher education were not fulfilling their task satisfactorily, and the production of knowledge had come to a stand-still. Both the profession and the discipline of economics were declared to be in crisis.

The Second Convention of Economists

The decision to summon a convention of economists was taken by the main board of the Polish Economic Association in the first trimester of 1956, and prepared at a time when events were outpacing most responses. While the First Convention had been an integral part of the Congress of Science preparations, there is no reason to doubt that this time the autonomous decision of the PEA was central to the convening of the Second Convention of Economists, which was to become a turning point for the discipline. The most important event at the Convention was the challenge to the monopoly that the Marxist-Leninist economists held over influential positions and economic knowledge production. One of the most radical critics stated, “*No monopoly can turn a false thesis into a true one, and true theses do not need a monopoly.*”⁶²⁹

At the 1950 Convention, there had been about 200 hand-picked guests, and the event was carefully scripted. In 1956 things took a different turn from the start. The organisation committee was swamped by requests for access cards, and, being unwilling or unable to withstand the pressure, decided to move to a venue which could accommodate as many as 800 participants.⁶³⁰ This also meant moving the assembly of economists from the Palace of Culture, ‘Stalin’s gift to Poland’, to the main hall of the Planning Commission, a modification motivated by practical considerations, but one that chimed in nicely with one of the main postulates presented by economists at this Convention: that the discipline be moved away from the domination of ideology and closer to influence over economic policy. Among the

⁶²⁹ The quote from Kurowski’s intervention at the Second Convention of Polish Economists held in June 1956 comes from p.132 of the full transcript of the discussion produced by the PEA in a limited number of bound copies. AAN/PTE... According to the testimony of one participant, J. Z. Sadowski, Kurowski was the star of the show, because he was the first speaker to cross the planned limits of the debate and, for many points, formulated the most far-going postulates. See Sadowski’s speech opening a seminar commemorating the 50th anniversary of the Second Convention, and organised by the PEA. http://www.pte.pl/243_konferencje_pte.html accessed 18.12.2007

⁶³⁰ AAN/PTE/7 “Sprawozdanie z II Zjazdu Ekonomistów Polskich” p.20

participants were also 'old' economists such as Edward Taylor, who was observed during the breaks surrounded and celebrated by young economists.⁶³¹ Their mere attendance represented a departure from the concept of economics as it had been defined at the 1950 Convention.

On June 7th 1956 the Second Convention of Economists opened just as the First Convention in 1950 had done, with a speech by Oskar Lange.⁶³² The official programme featured presentations by Lange, Lipiński, B. Minc, Brus and Kalecki, intertwined with discussions and social events. Lange's opening speech did not advertise any great changes; indeed his speech was even more 'newspeak' dominated than the one he had made at the First Convention in 1950. He praised the achievements of the discipline, and listed both the numbers of students who had graduated and the names of the academic institutions devoted to economics. The dissonance with the already-published Young Turks' "Manifesto" was glaring. Lange had recently come back from a six-month stay in India, and had clearly not registered the extent of the changes that had taken place during this time. During the discussion which followed, he was accused of delivering a speech which belonged to what was now a closed chapter in history. Even Edward Lipiński, who had been much better placed to keep up with the changes, and who had at the last moment changed the topic of his presentation from the history of mercantilist thought to "Economic laws and the subject of political economy", was forced to improvise. In addition, although Lipiński was the first to attack Lange for his conservative speech, and to challenge Stalin's opinions on economics, he too was scolded by discussants for speaking in a 'torpid manner'. Meanwhile, Brus met with approbation for being the only speaker to volunteer to take on responsibility for the present condition of the discipline. In his presentation, he made his first public steps towards a revisionist position.⁶³³ Not everyone decided to join the critics' camp. Even when he saw the criticism that Lange faced, Bronisław Minc went ahead with the presentation he had planned beforehand.⁶³⁴ However, few in fact spoke from an 'orthodox' position, and the audience responded negatively to their interventions. Michał Kalecki, only recently re-settled in Poland, opted for a presentation which, with its analytical, abstract, 'pure' economics, was inspiring as well as shocking.⁶³⁵ It made a great impression on the youngest generation of

⁶³¹ A.W. Haugstad interviews with Jan Mujżel, Warsaw 2000 and Włodzimierz Brus, Oxford 2001

⁶³² Oskar Lange's intervention, "Current problems of economic science in Poland" was published in 1956, *Ekonomista*, 5, pp.3-16

⁶³³ Brus, Włodzimierz, 1956 "On the role of the law of value in socialist economics *Ekonomista*, 5, pp.71-95

⁶³⁴ Minc, Bronisław, 1956 "Problems in the socialist theory of reproduction". *Ekonomista*, 5, pp.43-60

The speakers had submitted their papers in advance for distribution among the audience. Minc did not try to change his topic and therefore his speech conformed with the text that had been distributed.

⁶³⁵ Kalecki, Michał, 1956, "The dynamics of investment and national income in socialist economics." *Ekonomista*, 5, pp.61-

economists, who knew only the PUWP “Marxist” version of political economy, and for whom this was a first glimpse into analytical, mathematical economics. Economics in Kalecki’s version appeared to be an intellectually-challenging discipline which could give rise to original and inspiring perspectives, instead of being a mere transposition of dogmatic ideology to the subject of economics.

Discussion – reconfiguration of the field

The programmed presentations indicated that changes were under way in economics, but it was in the discussion that the important developments occurred, as economics again became a discipline embracing several different positions. After several years of a monopoly where even the dominant position was restrained in its development and differentiation by political control, resuming an open discussion was difficult and confusing. The long absence of an unrestrained debate had led to the blurring of positions. Who now was a Marxist-Leninist, how many kinds of Marxist-Leninist could exist, and what did it mean to be a ‘bourgeois’ economist?

The split of the Marxist-Leninist position into orthodox and revisionist wings, which had been visible in the discussion of Stalin’s article in 1953, now also became apparent to the non-Marxist public. What for the economists was diversification of their field was a problem from the PUWP’s perspective, as it could no longer rely on a single front against ‘bourgeois’ economics. The problem was growing even more serious, however, as the PUWP was losing control over “Marxism”. During the debate all participants described themselves as Marxists, stretching the label so widely that it ceased to have any meaning at all. One argument over the issue of who was ‘really’ a Marxist and who had the right to invoke Marxism to support his or her position took place between H. Hagemajer and M. Rakowski.

M. Rakowski⁶³⁶ (...) currently one often speaks under the banner of Marxism, and people who do so have nothing in common with Marxism. In such interventions, according to the speaker, one should count Mgr. Hagemajer’s speech.⁶³⁷

The ‘Young Turks’ succeeded in the sense that the discussants at the Convention agreed with the criticism launched in their *Economic Life* “Manifesto”. They were also widely noticed, for

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Strong reactions to *Kalecki’s presentation* are noted by Stankiewicz, Waclaw, 1998. *Historia myśli ekonomicznej* Warszawa: Polskie Wydawnictwo Ekonomiczne.p.579, and such was also the personal experience of Jan Mujżel related to me in interview (Warsaw, 2000).

⁶³⁶ The economist Mieczysław Rakowski should not be confused with the better-known politician Mieczysław Franciszek Rakowski.

⁶³⁷ 1956, “Dyskusja na II Zjeździe Ekonomistów Polskich” *Ekonomist*, 5, p.110

not only had they published their position in advance, they were also very active in the discussion. On the other hand, if they had expected to establish themselves as a coherent group and as the most radical critics, then they too failed to gain control over the situation. They were outdone by several speakers in terms of radicalism during the discussion. One of these critics was Stefan Kurowski, who had originally been one of the signatories of the 'Manifesto', but was promptly and publicly ostracised from the "Young Turk" group for his radical stance, in a brisk demonstration of the precarious unity of this formation.⁶³⁸ Also, if their political patrons had hoped to pre-empt criticism, they found they had only fuelled it. The discussion had slipped from the grasp of the organisers. Lange's biographer relates that there were voices in the Praesidium calling for discipline in the discussions, but Lange reacted strongly and ensured that no such action was taken.⁶³⁹

Among the 'bourgeois' economists, there were different reactions to this new openness and eager criticism, as performed by yesterday's loyal PUWP Marxist-Leninists. Several 'old' economists took an active part in the discussion, but not all. Taylor, who was present, did not speak in public. According to the testimony of Drewnowski, not all were willing to believe in the sincerity of the critics:

The speeches only slightly let one understand that some changes might be possible in economic thinking. But the discussion on each of the following days of the Convention became more bold and astonishing. One heard Stalinists who for years had fought every sign of independent thought, now proclaiming the need for freedom of research. (...) I must admit it all seemed to me to be one great masquerade. I did not believe in such a change of convictions on the part of those who had destroyed economics in Poland. I did not take the stand during the Convention.⁶⁴⁰

The experiences of the preceding years had created a gap between those in and those out of power which could not be swiftly closed.

⁶³⁸ Following S. Kurowski's intervention, Józef Pajestka stepped in to clarify what the group behind the Manifesto had meant and which were S. Kurowski's own ideas. AAN/PTE/7 "Sprawozdanie z II Zjazdu Ekonomistów Polskich" p.113-136, 296-302

Stefan Kurowski (1923-) studied at Łódź University (mgr. 1949), worked at the Planning Commission 1949-1953, Workshop of economics at Polish Academy of Science (1955-1968).

⁶³⁹ Zaręba, Janusz, 1985. *Reforma w testamentie : rzecz o Oskarze Langem*, Wyd. 1. ed. Warszawa: Młodzieżowa Agencja Wydawnicza. p.151

The presidium consisted of the leadership of the PEA, the invited speakers and the chairmen of the regional branches: E. Lipiński, O. Lange, Z. Filipowicz, W. Brus, B. Minc, M. Kalecki, W. Boerner (Wrocław), M. Frank (Katowice), A. Grabski (Łódź), W. Krzyżanowski, H. Michniewicz (Gdańsk), H. Paszkowski (Kielce), H. Romanowski (Lublin), J. Rutkowski (Szczecin), Z. Zakrzewski (Poznań) see "Dyskusja na II Zjeździe Ekonomistów Polskich" *Ekonomista* (1956:5) p.96

⁶⁴⁰ Drewnowski, Jan, 1990. "Autobiografia naukowa". *Kwartalnik Historii Nauki i Techniki*, 35, 451-489. I am quoting from the revised edition posted on <http://www.pte.pl> and accessed 18.12.2007. p.20

The majority of discussants at the Second Convention denounced the atrophy of the discipline, complaining about excessive centralisation and the monopoly of a minority over research and publications. All the aspects pertaining to the discipline, from the definition of its core interests, through problems in education and research, to influence over management and economic policy, were examined critically in the discussion.

The definition of the subject of study of economics established at the 1950 Convention claimed that economics consisted in the study of social relationships, thus focusing on the political and social aspects of economic processes. Following the challenges in Lipiński's presentation, the prevailing definition was criticised as being too narrow, and was blamed for the neglect of a range of problems, such as efficiency of investments and prices, which had formed part of the discipline prior to its Marxist-Leninist redefinition. A new definition was suggested: the subject of study should be the relationship between people and the material world.⁶⁴¹

The criticism of higher education in economics launched by the *Economic Life* team was continued and expanded upon during the discussion. Andrzej Brzeski argued that the lack of a proper instruction had resulted in "Columbusism", by which he meant that facts and ideas well known in classical economics were now being re-discovered by people who lacked instruction in 'bourgeois' economics. Helena Hagemajer claimed that the only students to have received an education worthy of the name during the previous few years were those studying the history of economic thought under Edward Lipiński. She spoke on behalf of another group which had seized the chance to be heard for the first time in public – the repressed younger generation of 'bourgeois' economists whose career prospects had gone from promising to abysmal in 1949.⁶⁴² While they lacked the backing of the Party apparatus, their asset was the approval of the 'old' professoriate and their fluency in both western and Marxist-Leninist economics. Hagemajer's vitriolic attack on the qualifications of the "Young Turks" made it clear that the latter would meet with competition from other younger economists. Their claim to influence within the discipline, which they seem to have taken for granted when editing their 'Manifesto', was weakened by the return of the 'bourgeois' economists to the fold. The same would of course be the case for the older generations.

⁶⁴¹ See among others Lipiński's presentation and Kurowski's discussion intervention. AAN/PTE/7 "Sprawozdanie z II Zjazdu Ekonomistów Polskich" pp.72-136

⁶⁴² She had lost her job at the Main School, finding sanctuary with E. Lipiński after he was moved to the University. Her husband, economist Włodzimierz Hagemajer, spent one and a half years in prison without charges being pressed, but his work at the Central Statistical Office was probably related to his arrest.

Several speakers complained that individual researchers had too little discretion over their work, and that decisions about academic positions, titles and publications were taken by a small group of Warsaw-based Marxist-Leninist economists. The disagreement between those who like W. Styś, Z. Fabierkiewicz and S. Kurowski advocated ‘absolute freedom’, and those represented by B. Minc, Władysław Sadowski and M. Rakowski, who spoke of a “limited freedom”, reflected their positions in the existing power distribution. It also re-opened the confrontation, suspended in 1948, between the traditional rhetoric of Polish academics calling for “absolute freedom” in research and teaching, and the PUWP-sponsored claim that everything was political. A. Brzeski stated that “*freedom of science on the basis of Marxism*” would lead to an exchange of opinions among the adherents of only one school of thought, and inevitably to the atrophy of critical engagement.⁶⁴³ However, there were no efforts made on the part of even the most radical participants to claim the freedom to challenge openly the superiority of socialism over capitalism or the adherence of Poland to the Socialist Block.

*The speaker [H. Hagemajer – AWH] considers it is obvious that the principle of freedom of science in socialism cannot include the freedom to utter anti-socialist statements, and that barren polemic with a standpoint which probably none of us wants to defend can only hinder the progress of creative research.*⁶⁴⁴

Even “absolute freedom” was understood as having some limits. Minc ended his speech on the second day with an ambivalent pronouncement that Marxists did wish to undertake discussions with those opposing Marxism, but “*to give bourgeois vulgar economics rights equal to those of Marxists, is something that history teaches us cannot be done and should not be done ... Marxists are for freedom of research (wolność nauki), but only for such freedom of research as unconditionally serves Socialism*”.⁶⁴⁵

Prior to the Convention the young Warsaw economists had condemned the excessive centralisation of the discipline, which was suffocating the academic communities beyond the capital. The “Manifesto” stated that economists outside Warsaw were disfavoured in terms of access to statistical data and publication outlets, and pointed out the need to decentralise the study of economic theory. Things were changing, for if we look at the Convention we find that all those presenting papers were indeed from Warsaw, but the geographical distribution

⁶⁴³ Summary of Andrzej Brzeski’s intervention in 1956, “Dyskusja na II Zjeździe Ekonomistów Polskich” *Ekonomista*, 5, p.103-104

⁶⁴⁴ Summary of Helena Hagemajer’s intervention in 1956, “Dyskusja na II Zjeździe Ekonomistów Polskich” *Ekonomista*, 5, p.110

⁶⁴⁵ Summary B.Minc’s intervention in 1956, “Dyskusja na II Zjeździe Ekonomistów Polskich” *Ekonomista*, 5, p.105.

of discussants was already more even, at least among the professors.⁶⁴⁶ During the discussions, economists from the provinces no longer needed Warsaw economists to voice their complaints. A young economist from Wrocław, Popkiewicz, described the discipline as being ruled by a ‘clique’ in Warsaw, and protested against their monopoly of research training, publishing, and research programmes. ‘Old’ professors from outside Warsaw, such as Styś and Fabierkiewicz, also made their grievances heard. Witold Krzyżanowski claimed that Kraków was particularly disfavoured as it had no institution devoted to economics, no university department, and no forum for debate or channel of publication. In the resolution adopted at the end of the Convention, economists called for an even and “just” distribution of all kinds of institutions: scientific associations, publishing houses, and economic and cultural authoritative organs, in order to allow the whole country to evolve both economically and academically.

Adjusting the history of the discipline

During the First Convention in 1950, the changes taking place in the discipline’s orientation and hierarchy were reinforced by the exhibition, with its visual effects (decorations, slogans and portraits) and reinterpretation of the history of the discipline. Whilst the Second Convention broke away from the stalinist style of orchestrated public gatherings, this session too, as the organisers were well aware, was an occasion where the public image of the discipline could be modified, and where a change of power relations within the field could be communicated and socially enacted. The commemoration of the 15th anniversary of the death of Ludwik Krzywicki was intended to symbolise the reorientation. Edward Lipiński gave a commemorative address which can serve as a gauge of the extent of change:

*Comrades! It is today 15 years since the death of Ludwik Krzywicki. Unknown to the younger generation, he was a great scientist who had an enormous influence on Polish science. The efforts to lessen this importance have not succeeded. Let us honour him ...*⁶⁴⁷

When Krzywicki was mentioned in the new official version of the history of Polish economics presented at the exposition at the First Convention in 1950, it had been with a commentary pointing out what the PUWP then considered to be the grave errors in his approach to Marx’s ideas. In 1956 he was not only rehabilitated, but was even hoisted into the

⁶⁴⁶ Among the younger speakers, Warsaw dominated. This is not surprising considering it was economically much easier for Warsaw dwellers to attend, and since the Economic Life group had been mobilised in advance.

⁶⁴⁷ 1956, “Dyskusja na II Zjeździe Ekonomistów Polskich” *Ekonomista*, 5, p.118

position of patron saint of the discipline. The choice of a scholar whose main body of work was in sociology calls for an explanation. Why did the Polish Economic Association not pick an economist: Władysław Zawadzki or Adam Heydel if the honour was to be accorded only posthumously; Adam Krzyżanowski or Edward Taylor if being at an advanced age was enough? The choice of Krzywicki shows that, despite the admission that ‘bourgeois’ economics could be selectively and cautiously studied, it remained important to signal the economists’ commitment to Marxism. The novel aspect was that economists could now claim the right to choose what kind of Marxism they wanted to pursue. Krzywicki had shown considerable interest in Marx’s work, and in issues of social justice, but he was not a dogmatic stalinist or even a communist. With his elevation, the right to a freer interpretation of Marxism was sanctioned by the PEA leadership, and was confirmed by the assembled economists as they voted for a resolution calling for the publication of Krzywicki’s collected works, and for a renaming of the Main School of Planning and Statistics as the Ludwik Krzywicki Main School of Economics.⁶⁴⁸

Engaging in the act of rehabilitating a scholar condemned by the PUWP during the stalinist years in fact provided economics with the status of a victim of stalinism. Such a status was becoming a crucial symbolic capital element in a political climate where the main dividing line was now drawn between the perpetrators of stalinism and its victims, as seen in Żółkiewski’s attempts to join the victims’ and critics’ side. The idea of renaming the Main School also signalled a change in the internal power balance in favour of the pre-1949 staff. A new name would have publicly expressed a change in identity for the School, from the stalinist- and Planning Commission-subservient institution for “Planning and Statistics” to an academic, autonomous Krzywicki “School of Economics” which could also pose as a victim. It is important to note that the proposed name change was not made, and that the Main School retained “Planning and Statistics” in its name until 1991.

Lipiński’s address, quoted above, was held on the last day of the Convention, allowing him and the rest of the PEA leadership ample time to modify any draft version to match the mood of the audience and the political situation.⁶⁴⁹ It is therefore interesting that the speech opens with “Comrades”, a form of address usually reserved for use between Party members. It may

⁶⁴⁸ Szkoła Główna Ekonomiczna im. Ludwika Krzywickiego. 1956, “Uchwała II Zjazdu Ekonomistów Polskich w sprawie uczczenia pamięci Ludwika Krzywickiego.” *Ekonomista*, 5, p.152

⁶⁴⁹ As to the choice of L. Krzywicki, I assume that it was made before the Convention, but I have not found mention of it in the PEA files with documentation on the organisation process.

appear paradoxical that this term should have been used, given that the use of ‘comrade’ had been omitted by party members on many previous occasions, and replaced by traditional forms of address such as ‘honoured professor’. However, the use of ‘comrades’ makes sense if one considers that the principal message Lipiński wished to convey in his address was of the desire for a more open-ended Marxism, and for a more inclusive policy towards economists who had been kept outside over the previous years. By applying it to a congregation which included such obvious non-members as Taylor, Lipiński was negating the division into Party-scholars and others. The operation was made easier by the fact that term used for comrade in Polish, “*towarzysz*”, is not exclusive to communist or even socialist jargon. It can also be used of anyone sharing in hardships or struggles: a comrade in arms, a fellow traveller, or a partner. (The practice of using it as a form of address rather than a description, however, was peculiar to socialist and communist movements.) Finally, in a striking demonstration of the ease with which Polish academics returned to their previous mode of expression and left behind their stalinist personas, when the time came for Lange to make the closing remarks, he changed his rhetoric totally and cast off the constraints of newspeak. It was as if a completely different person was talking.

If the choice of Krzywicki shows how far the organisers of the Convention had judged it wise to stretch the line in claiming autonomy from political considerations, then the unofficial homage paid to Taylor was a clear transgression of that carefully-drawn line. The unease it caused is reflected in a protocol from the PEA board meeting summing up the Convention:

In the discussion President Lipiński (...) declared that an opinion exists to the effect that an organisation has appeared with the aim of mobilising “old” economists for the Convention. Moreover he made allusions to the existence of “traces of a certain action on the margins, a partisan action with a strange political character.” (...)

*Colleague Rączkowski declared that the opinion mentioned by the Chairman [i.e. Lipiński – AWH] about the Convention is not right. The atmosphere at the Convention bore testimony to the fact that the major part of the participants stood for a socialist economy, and young economic cadres set the tone at the Convention. Certain reactions in the audience were caused by factual objections among the young cadres, for example, in the reaction of the audience to the interventions of Minister Dietrich and citizen Rakowski. The speaker declared that rumours spread about the alleged appearance of reactionary elements at the Convention are incorrect and harmful, because they are untrue...*⁶⁵⁰

What could have been behind the “rumours” which so upset the PEA board, and who had spread them, and where? The mere appearance of ‘old’ economists at the Convention and the fact that they took to the stand with lengthy, possibly prepared interventions may have been enough to cause concern. The document does not specify the origin of the rumours, but it is not difficult to identify the group which felt most threatened by the reappearance of ‘old’ economists on the scene. While disillusioned Marxist-Leninists with a reformist bent could see them as potential alliance partners (although they did not have to), orthodox Marxist-Leninists had nothing but trouble to anticipate from their return. I am, however, at a loss to explain the obscure reference to *‘partisan action of a strange political character’*. While it remains unclear, the import of this passage is that the PEA board had to deal with a confusing and diversified constituency – a contrast to the ‘clear’ picture of the early 1950s, with its repressed ‘reactionaries’ and triumphantly unified Marxist-Leninist position.

Effects of the Thaw in academic institutions

In academic institutions, the Thaw resulted in a step back from what had turned out to be the most unpopular changes introduced in the early fifties. The Party’s local and central organs stopped interfering, and the collegial academic bodies, the faculty councils, and the school senates, regained control over appointments, teaching programmes and degrees. These changes were perceived as a return to ‘normality’ and ‘justice’, and were applauded by the majority of scholars as well as by students. The University law was amended in 1958 to reflect the changes made spontaneously in 1956, as academic institutions had reverted to exerting the powers they had held prior to 1949.

When students returned after the summer of 1956, they found that their academic institutions had been transformed. Scholars who had been moved away from their core areas were

⁶⁵⁰ AAN/PTE/19:Dział Organizacyjno-Prezydialny, Posiedzenia Zarządu Głównego i Prezydium Zarządu Głównego/Protokół nr.1 22.6.56/pp.s.139-142

allowed to take up their former subjects and to assume positions of authority. Students could now attend lectures by Taylor and Adam Krzyżanowski, and could learn about Keynes and Western economics. Oskar Lange was finally allowed to teach political economy. He no longer had to hide his knowledge of ‘western’ economics, and gave a lecture series which was immensely popular.⁶⁵¹ At the Main School, Drewnowski, who had been reduced to earning his living by translating and occasional lecturing, now became professor, and was made dean. In Łódź, Fabierkiewicz was re-admitted to a chair, and in Wrocław Styś returned to his former occupation. In Lange, Bobrowski, Brus and Lipiński, Warsaw University’s Department of Political Economy could now boast of a staff with competence in both Marxist-Leninist and ‘western’ economics, as well as with experience in policy making. At the Main School, one group of young economists gathered around Michał Kalecki, and another around Aleksy Wakar, who had been released from a forced labour camp in the USSR. Provincial centres started expanding and gaining momentum once more. For those young economists whose careers had slumped in the past due to their failure to meet the ideological and political demands of the Party organisation, the return to influence of the ‘old’ staff meant new opportunities. At least a portion of those who had hoped to pursue academic careers in economics before 1949 were now drawn back and allowed to undertake or resume doctoral studies and habilitations.

The students who enrolled in doctoral programmes in 1956 caused the number of doctorates in economics to rocket over the next few years. While 33 doctorates were defended in 1959, in the next year the figure nearly quadrupled (1960:121) and remained at a high level in 1961, with 81, and in 1962, with 91. This gives a total of 326 new doctors in four years, which is an enormous increase compared to the fourteen *kandydat nauk* degrees awarded between 1954 and 1957. The number of habilitations awarding the degree of docent also increased, although not quite as spectacularly. From 1954 to 1957 there were 49 docents, and from 1960 to 1963 there were 62.⁶⁵² The tide of complaints about recruitment problems in economics subsided.

The Main School produced over a third of the 329 doctorates between 1958 and 1963.⁶⁵³ It was followed by the Economic Colleges (WSE) in Kraków, Poznań and Sopot each

⁶⁵¹ Ref. interview Sadowski/Brus/Kowalik with AWH

⁶⁵² Habilitations in economics 1960:9, 1961:18, 1962:24, 1963:11, total of 62. Numbers based on data published in *Katalog rozpraw doktorskich i habilitacyjnych Warszawa: PWN*. vol. 1958-1961, 1962, 1963.

⁶⁵³ Among the doctorates announced in *Katalog doktoratów i habilitacji* for the years 1958 to 1962, 120 out of a total of 329 were submitted at the Main School of Planning and Statistics. *Ibid.*

contributing about 40 doctorates. The Katowice and Wrocław Colleges lay a step behind, with about 20 doctorates each. Among the universities, only Warsaw's Department of Political Economy produced a significant number of doctors (33). Kraków and Poznań Universities' law departments and the Warsaw Polytechnic had less than five graduates each in these years. Not only did research students produce many new theses, but previously inactive academic staff also took up writing. The result was a resurgence of publications in the form of both books and articles which now filled the pages of *Ekonomista* and *Economic Life*.

Last but not least, the isolation from the West ended that year. In 1955 a delegation of French economists visited Poland, and in June 1956 a group of British economists travelled around the country.⁶⁵⁴ In fact, the British stumbled into demonstrations and shooting in Poznań, thereby receiving a rather more acute impression of the Polish economic and political crisis than could have been expected.⁶⁵⁵ The Rockefeller and Ford Foundations established contact, and extended fellowship programmes that allowed young Polish scholars to study in Western academic institutions. Polish economists became popular consultants on economic policy for third world countries such as India, Egypt, Iraq, Ghana, and Algeria, and those whose contact with Western scholarship had ceased in 1948/1949 could now travel, receive books, and entertain visitors. To give an impression of the changes I will quote from Drewnowski's autobiographic sketch:

In September 1956, the PEA sent a delegation consisting of over ten people to the Congress of the International Economic Association in Rome. This was my first trip abroad since the visit to Geneva in October 1948. For the second trimester of the academic year 1956/57 I was invited by University of Manchester as Simon Visiting Professor. I spent February and March of 1957 there. In June of 1957 I took part in a PEA delegation to a convention of Yugoslav economists in Zagreb and in a trip round Yugoslavia arranged by the hosts for this delegation. In September 1957 I took part in a Polish-British seminar in economy and sociology organised by the London School of Economics under the auspices of UNESCO, and in June of 1958 in a seminar on the subject of theory of capital organised by the International Economic Association at Corfu, Greece⁶⁵⁶.

⁶⁵⁴ My informations on the visit of the French economists comes from AMSZ/8 /631/48 Wycieczki i podróże 1954-1955. Plans and reports from the visit of 14 French economists in Poland 7-20.12.1955. pp.2-65

The visit of British economists was recorded in AAN/PTE/20 Sprawozdanie Zarządu Głównego PTE 10.06.1956-27.05.1958

⁶⁵⁵ One of the British participants on the trip, Peter Wiles, published his account of the events Wiles, Peter J.D., 1957.

"Changing Economic Thought in Poland". *Oxford Economic Papers*, 9, 190-208. One of the group's Polish guides, Stanisław Rączkowski shared his vivid recollections with me during an interview conducted in Warsaw in 2000.

⁶⁵⁶ Drewnowski, Jan, 1990. "Autobiografia naukowa". *Kwartalnik Historii Nauki i Techniki*, 35, 451-489. I am quoting from the revised edition posted on <http://www.pte.pl> and accessed 18.12.2007 pp.20-21

While economists who had started their careers before 1948 resumed their old contacts, for many Marxist-Leninist economists this would be a first opportunity to see and study western economies and scholarship. However, they had some serious reading to do before they could converse with Polish ‘non-Marxists’ and Western economists. Kalecki’s lecture at the Second Convention demonstrated the existence of not only a linguistic but also a methodological gap between Marxist-Leninist economists and the West. The formalised, mathematically-oriented economics he presented must have been as incomprehensible to a Marxist-Leninist political economist as to a contemporary historian, though the area would hardly present any problems to present-day economists.

The Thaw and reputation control

I have already mentioned the increase in the number of doctoral degrees and habilitations after 1956, but the effects of the Thaw on reputation control merit more attention. We left the Social Science Section of the CQC in 1955, when it was finally beginning to function smoothly: that is, in terms of its efficiency in making decisions, of the number of candidates processed, and of the number of times each case was discussed. However, an analysis of discussions within the Section reveals that the efficiency of the CQC work in 1955 concealed severe conflicts inside the CQC, as well as problems caused by the effects of the CQC’s “rule of exceptions”.

In 1957, the effects of the Thaw were fully felt, and the numbers in Table 13 show unprecedented achievements in all categories: the greatest number of candidates, the longest discussions over cases, and the highest number of rejections of candidatures. The subsequent stabilisation of the situation lasted until the point when the CQC was dissolved and the final four candidates were transferred to the body which replaced the CQC.

Table 13: CQC treatment of economics: 1954-1960.⁶⁵⁷

	Cases	Candidates	Negative decisions
1954	59	41	
1955	23	22	4
1956	46	42	6
1957	73	56	9
1958	42	40	5
1959	37	33	4
1960	9	7	4
1957-1960	161	114	22

The 1951 University Law was amended in 1958, and many of the novelties introduced in reputation control were reversed. We may recall that the competences of the CQC included the allocation of the titles of professor, *doktor nauk* and *kandydat nauk*. Because of the extension period allowed for economists, CQC also approved docents. After 1956 both *doktor nauk* and *kandydat nauk* programmes were replaced with the traditional doctor and docent degrees, and the right to accord these degrees was restored to academic institutions.⁶⁵⁸ Despite the general assumption that the CQC would be dismantled soon after 1956, it continued operating until 1960, although now in a very different climate. Final decisions on professorial titles were moved to the Government and a new Central Qualification Commission was created under the aegis of the Polish Academy of Science in 1960.

Measures which had been introduced to make Polish science more like Soviet science were abandoned. All *kand.nauk* degree holders were granted the right to the 'old' doctoral degree, and *dr.nauk* holders became docents. The now publicly-infamous '*zastępcza profesora*' (deputy professor) title was replaced with that of '*docent etatowy*' (docent in permanent

⁶⁵⁷ The figures in this table are based on a count of a manual count of cases of economists referred to by stenographic reports of the CQC Social Science Section. Due to possible errors and omissions they should only be regarded as a indication of a trend. AAN/MSzW/2781-2787

⁶⁵⁸ "Ustawa z dnia 5.11.1958 o Szkołach Wyższych." *Dziennik Ustaw RP*, nr.68 poz.336, pp.859-872

position), and the condition that the holder should be in possession of a doctorate degree was added.⁶⁵⁹ A great number of ‘deputy professors’ who merely had Masters degrees (mgr.) risked losing their positions unless they supplemented their qualifications; a measure which no doubt stimulated the rush of doctorates in the following years. By making the graduates from the *aspirantura* programmes in the ITSC and the Soviet Union indistinguishable from graduates with ‘old fashioned’ doctorates and habilitations, the distinction between the Party-sponsored scholars and others became blurred. This meant a volte-face in the Party’s policy regarding earlier plans for the creation of its own elite. The policy between 1948 and 1955 had aimed at ensuring that the new Marxist-Leninist scholars should be clearly distinguished by different diplomas and qualifications from those not approved or backed by the Party. The measures adopted from 1956, on the other hand, aimed to blend the Party intellectuals in with other scholars.⁶⁶⁰

For the CQC Social Science Section, the confrontation with the now-vociferous non-Marxist scholars following the Thaw meant that their practices were liable for revision. The influence of the non-Marxist scholars on the work of the CQC now changed in character and importance. References to opinions circulating “in the field” abound in the Section discussions, especially from the second part of 1955 onwards. The members of the CQC Social Science Section felt their position to be increasingly difficult, as they were identified with the decisions of the CQC and burdened with the responsibility for its failings. Complaints concerned the centralisation of decisions, the uneven treatment of candidates perceived as equals in their milieus, and delays. By the end of 1955, the Social Science Section members were admitting to each other that the activities of the CQC had led to a devaluation of the degrees and titles it controlled. It is important to recall that, unlike bureaucrats, they faced their critics daily, and that there was no institutional or social distance between themselves and their ‘subjects’. Over time, as the sense of freedom of expression increased, there was a proliferation in the number of recriminations and grievances voiced and transmitted to the Section members, and the Section members’ sensitivity to this criticism grew. Concern over the impact of decisions perceived as unjust to individuals and communities appears to have weighed more heavily on the members than the more abstract problem of the devaluation of the prestige of academic titles and degrees.

⁶⁵⁹ “Ustawa z dnia 5.11.1958 o Szkołach Wyższych.” *Dziennik Ustaw RP*, nr.68 poz.336, pp.859-872 art.144/1-2 and 1947/3.

⁶⁶⁰ The ITSC itself lost its position and influence. See Connelly on Schaff and Żółkiewski’s certainty that given time their new elites would take over the academic communities. Connelly, John, 1996. “Elite Social Science Training in Stalinist Poland.” *Minerva*, 34, 323-346.

At the first meeting of the CQC after the Second Convention of Economists in June 1956, Brus made clear his realisation that the majority of economists did not back him, and that he was no longer willing to shoulder the workload or the responsibility alone.

Brus: ... In addition, the situation is that the decisions of the Section are sometimes based on the opinion of the person presenting the case. For instance, within the field of economics, no one else comes to the meetings and so I often make the decision single-handedly. There are two things: not only does the Section have an enormous agenda, but also the person presenting a case does not have the time to study it. Basically this means doing bad work. There are huge complaints about each one of us; each one of us is hated. The Section ought to be expanded.⁶⁶¹

In addition, the call for a renewal of the composition of the CQC, too intimately identified with all that now came under criticism, was central in the resignation letter of Jakubowski, a member of the CQC Technical Sciences Section. Other CQC Sections also struggled with the same kinds of problem:

In my opinion, under its present composition and management the Central Qualification Committee has fulfilled its mission, and it is urgent that people proposed directly or indirectly by the totality of scientific workers should take up work in it. My opinion is further strengthened by the fact that in the body of the CQC there are people whose prestige is not acknowledged by scientific workers.⁶⁶²

Wasilkowski, Lange and Brus resigned from their functions in the CQC in 1956. Wasilkowski and Lange justified their resignations by citing health problems and lack of time, while Brus argued that it was now the moment to bring new people into the Section. Lange and Brus were replaced by Edward Lipiński and Jan Drownowski, and the Section was extended to include another four economists: K. Secomski, S. Waszak, T. Łychowski, and A. Brzoza.⁶⁶³ To have a solid group of economists actively participating in the work of the Section meant that the candidatures of economists would now be discussed by those from their discipline.

Before the Thaw, the task of allocation of academic titles was complicated by a conflict between the political demand for loyal Party academics and the academic demand for scholarly qualifications. The fact that many exceptions were made to these qualitative and merit-based requirements resulted in the systematic application of double standards, through

⁶⁶¹ AAN/MSzW/2785/ CQC: Stenographic report of the meeting in Sekcja Nauk Społecznych 23.06.56/ p.244

⁶⁶² AAN/MSzW/2780a/p.406/05.11.1956/ Letter of resignation from the CQC Section for Technical Sciences of prof.dr.inz.J.L. Jakubowski.

⁶⁶³ **Stanisław Waszak (1906-1974)** at the time of his appointment he was deputy professor at the chair of statistics of the Economic College (WSE) in Poznań.

which party activists received special treatment and non-party applicants encountered special hindrances. In 1956-1957 a number of appeals against decisions made in previous years were judged in favour of the applicant. This is clearly demonstrated in the last part of the saga of the candidates from Kraków discussed in the previous chapter. Three assistant professorship candidatures (*prof.nadzw.*) were scaled down by the Section, and one was refused the title of docent. In 1956 their cases were re-opened, and in 1957 the original, higher-ranking titles proposed by their home institutions were accorded to all four.

Kraków and Poznań, the largest centres of economics outside Warsaw, had represented a threat to the Warsaw-based Marxist-Leninist economists even during the 'lean years' of 1949-1955. From the Second Convention onwards, they returned to prominent positions in the discipline. If the 'Young Turks' faced competition from Lipiński's students, the Poznań and Kraków communities also posed a threat, housing as they did a number of economists with all their scholarly qualifications in order and now awaiting a rapid acceleration in the progress of their careers.

The promotion of Kraków economists somewhat optimistically proposed in 1954 was effected only after 1956. The economists from Poznań took a much more cautious approach, refraining from sending cases to Warsaw and the CQC until they felt completely secure that they had a good chance of being accepted. It is very difficult to document actions that were not undertaken, but according to the testimony of the Poznań economist Wilczyński, the school authorities held his promotion back during the early 1950s, apparently because they could not secure a positive review of his work from Brus. Considering the workload Brus had to contend with, and the fact that the work in question was not within his speciality, his non-acceptance of the task of reviewing this particular case cannot alone be proof of conscious discrimination. It was however part of a system where the Poznań WSE authorities rightly perceived that, without the goodwill of the individuals at the summit of this highly centralised system, a thesis written under the supervision of Professor Edward Taylor would not stand a chance.⁶⁶⁴

After the appointment of Stanisław Waszak to the Section, the Poznań group recognised that things had changed, and in 1957 the junior Poznań faculty cases were finally heard. They serve as a good illustration of the strange, ambiguous regime which followed 1956, and they

⁶⁶⁴ My information about this case comes from interviews with Wilczyński and Brus respectively. As the case was never sent over to the CQC, I have not had access to any archival material corroborating or contradicting their statements. A.W. Haugstad interviews with Włodzimierz Brus (Oxford 2001) and Waclaw Wilczyński. (Poznań 2000)

show how by 1958 the Section had become acutely aware of the reactions to their decisions in the field, and had started to pre-empt anticipated responses. Three candidates for the docent title from Poznań appeared simultaneously before the Section in March 1958. Dr. Jankowiak's candidature was heard first, and was passed after a long discussion, followed by the case of Dr. Wierzbicki. When this candidature met resistance, Waszak argued as follows:

Professor Waszak: Among these three, we have here Jankowiak, Smoliński, and Wierzbicki at our local school; we place Wierzbicki at the front, despite the paradox that he could appear to be weak in production, especially compared with Jankowiak. Without doubt, intellectually Wierzbicki really is someone at the school. He has a certain deficiency, which causes an arrhythmia in his work, namely he is suffering from a serious lung disease. Besides, he is an extremely shy person, he knows the proper order of things, and despite my urging him to submit the work that he is now preparing, he has begged me not to present it here. It is an unfortunate coincidence that this trio has appeared today, and that one has already been dealt with – I can tell how opinion at the school works.⁶⁶⁵

Arguments in favour of Wierzbicki were that among Poznań economists he was held in the highest esteem of all the candidates, and that he refused to mislead by for example adding unfinished work to his list of merits. It was enough to have his candidature considered. There are some unanswered questions, however. If Wierzbicki did not want to include his unfinished work, why was his case placed on the CQC's agenda at this stage? Why did he not wait until he had finished? Was it because the Poznań school authorities feared that the changing political climate might make it dangerous for him to postpone his case? We are reminded that while the CQC discussions provide us with a great deal of information, they hardly allow us to pass fair judgement on the actual merit or motives of the candidates and their academic patrons.

Discussion of the third candidate was delayed, as yet another reviewer had to be called upon. At the next meeting, however, Waszak continued his offensive:

⁶⁶⁵ AAN/MSzW/2787/20.03.1958

Professor Waszak: This procedure is beginning to alarm me, for some things must be considered not only from our point of view, but also from the point of view of the school. There was a group of three. Two have been passed. We did not look into them, i.e. we accepted the output as it was, we trusted the reviews we had on the table. Now here we decided for an additional review. This additional review is here, and is positive. And again we are in doubt and want to postpone the matter. The nature of the matter, it is difficult to treat this as a very important argument, but it needs to be said: those two non-Party candidates (i.e. Jankowiak and Wierzbicki – AWH) were passed, this one is a Party member. Oh, but I already see the excuses I will have to formulate, why it is that those two others were passed, and this one not...⁶⁶⁶

Finally, as with Wierzbicki, Waszak also added that another piece of work was under way – one he had seen and could vouch for, and the third candidate was approved by the Section. The significance of Waszak's reference to the political affiliation of the candidate is ambiguous. It has the sound of a veiled threat, or was at least a reminder to the members of the Section that decisions which could appear to be at the discrimination of PUWP members could have unpleasant consequences. A month had gone by since the previous meeting, where the two non-party Poznań economists had been passed, a month during which Waszak may have already received some hints from the Party organisation at home that they would not accept such a decision. After all, the reviews had been positive, and the source does not mention the reasons why the Section wanted to postpone the matter yet again: there may have been a mundane wish to end a long meeting, or misgivings about the quality of the work. It is also unclear as to whom Waszak feared he would have to address his excuses if Smoliński was not passed. I do not think he was referring to his fellow scholars; after all, he had already made it clear that from the 'school point of view' the favourite candidate was Wierzbicki. More likely therefore is that the excuses would be addressed to the local party organisation, either at the school or in the regional committee. While the 1956 events had upset and immobilised the Party organisation, by 1958 it was up and running again, and well capable of protecting and promoting the interests of party members vis-à-vis the academic establishment. Waszak did not intimate that his position would be intolerable, rather that it would be awkward and unpleasant. He evoked the spectre of the local guardians of political orthodoxy at the institution, and reminded the Section members that their decisions were not only being watched and judged by scholars in their disciplines, but also by the political authorities. It is uncertain whether it was this particular argument or an appeal for the equal treatment of all

⁶⁶⁶ AAN/MSzW/2787/24.04.1958/p.190

three cases which made the Section pass a decision rather than further delay the case. What we know for sure is that Waszak, clearly a skilled player, had felt that the political argument was worth using, and through careful planning had succeeded in obtaining solutions for his protégées. The way in which he first pushed through the candidate who had the strongest dossier, and then used this as a lever to promote the candidate he argued was the most gifted, and finally the one with the best political credentials, is either due to pure luck or to an extremely well-prepared case. I lean towards the latter view, but rather than being a compliment to Waszak's negotiation skills, the significance of this episode is that it shows how dependent the outcome was on the goodwill and commitment of the person presenting the case. Prior to 1956, the absence of representatives from the provincial communities had placed candidates from outside Warsaw in a disadvantaged position. Waszak's performance shows that by 1958 the Poznań economists knew the Warsaw political-academic landscape well enough to manoeuvre within it successfully. By comparison, the Kraków candidates who tried their luck in 1954 and 1955 found themselves without supporters in the Warsaw Marxist-Leninist milieu. The radically different political climates of 1954 and 1958 account for much of the difference, but we should also consider the fact that the Kraków academic community was regarded with particular suspicion by the Communist regime.⁶⁶⁷ It had proved to be the most resistant to the 'new reality' of communism, and had continued to refuse legitimacy to the Marxist-Leninist newcomers and to honour the 'old' reputation hierarchy. The Poznań economists, on the other hand, had many links with people in central positions in the capital, and were much more closely integrated into the political elite in Warsaw. A number of Edward Taylor's students, such as Trąpczyński, the director of the National Bank, retained bonds with their old milieu and could provide information on and protection from those in influential positions in the central state administration.

Does Smoliński's case suggest continued favouring at the CQC of candidates endorsed by the Party? The sources used here do not allow us to draw such general conclusions, but an analogy with the pre-1956 period would suggest that discrimination against ideologically-controversial candidates still took place at lower levels, in academic institutions, and at the Ministry. Drewnowski, who was dean of the Main School at the time, recounts how, despite his best efforts, the career of a candidate with a 'difficult' political record was set back. Szykaruk- Sulmicki's doctorate, defended in Switzerland during the War, was not

⁶⁶⁷ Connelly, John, 2000. *Captive University: the Sovietization of East German, Czech, and Polish higher education, 1945-1956* Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

acknowledged by the committee established for the purpose by the faculty, forcing him to submit his habilitation work as a doctoral thesis.⁶⁶⁸ For Drewnowski, this 1958 case was the call that announced that the Thaw was over.

Also worth noting from discussions in the post-1956 period is that the Section now chose to trust the majority of the reviewers, in contrast to the first period of CQC activity, when all positive reviews were dismissed if the CQC expert alone was against them. Lastly, an internal decision by the CQC in 1958 stated that henceforth even in cases where the exception article was applied,⁶⁶⁹ the candidate had to hold a doctorate or *kand.nauk* degree. From what I have seen, the decision was upheld in the case of economists, and no more rapid promotions from master to docent occurred. However, based on the source material from the CQC, it would seem that there was no clear re-drawing of the lines. Despite evidence that the prevailing view among academics was that scientific merit alone should be the basis for reputation distribution, public pronouncements endorsed by political authorities to the same effect are hard to find.

There was no immediate dissolution of the CQC or any public repudiation of its former practice. A public admission that degrees were often awarded for political rather than scientific merit would have tainted all degrees dispensed by the CQC, and would have required a new 'verification' of all these degrees and titles. That could not happen without the political leadership's firm and public commitment to a reform of reputation control, yet an official statement that ideology and Party matters would now take second place in the evaluation of scholars and their work was not forthcoming. Even during the hey-day of freedom of expression in mid 1956, suggestions that the Party should abdicate from its position as the leading force in all spheres of social and political life, bar the Catholic Church, was outside the limits of the possible. Hence, the pretence was outwardly sustained that academic quality had been the key criterion all along, that it had always co-existed with ideological merit, and that no conflict need appear between these two. Without a public political abdication from interference in research and reputation control, the best the academic communities could hope for was that scientific merit would have precedence over questions

⁶⁶⁸ Drewnowski, Jan, 1990. "Autobiografia naukowa". *Kwartalnik Historii Nauki i Techniki*, 35, 451-489. Quote from the revised edition posted on <http://www.pte.pl> and accessed 18.12.2007 p.22

⁶⁶⁹ The 'exception' article was not abolished with the reformualtion of the Law on Universities, but was renamed Art.56/3. "Ustawa z dnia 5.11.1958 o Szkołach Wyższych." *Dziennik Ustaw RP*, nr.68 poz. 336, pp.859-872

of the political suitability of the candidate and his work. The confusion about the criteria for promotion in economics, and also no doubt in other social sciences, did not end in 1956.

The Marxist-Leninist scholars' novel propensity for blending in with the majority created new conditions for reputation control. By the late 1950s Party members were omnipresent in academic institutions, allowing the Party to rely on them to exert the necessary 'vigilance' and to hinder ideologically hostile candidates. Nevertheless, this was not a foolproof system, and it allowed for a greater proportion of 'politically unreliable' but talented and skilled scholars to 'slip through' than had been the case before 1956. Individual attitudes grew in importance, as one loyal party scholar in a faculty could be enough to block all or most unsuitable candidates there, while party members who placed scientific considerations above their membership cards could create oases where only academic merit counted. Such a strict division into 'party loyal' and 'scientific merit' oriented scholars certainly applied in some cases, but some academics chose whether the scientific merit or the political argument suited their current particular or institutional interests. When he perceived this could help him succeed in achieving a candidate's promotion, Waszak did not refrain from mentioning the political capital of his candidate, even while making it clear that he did not consider this argument to be relevant to the discussion. B. Minc, who according to Drewnowski was instrumental in holding Sulmicki back by refusing to accept his Swiss doctorate, employed and protected several young economists with politically questionable views and CVs at his own Atelier and later Institute for Economics at the Polish Academy of Science.⁶⁷⁰

An interesting example of the workings of the post-1956 reputation distribution system is the 1963 habilitation of Stefan Kurowski, the bold speaker at the Second Convention, which I am tempted to mention despite its falling outside the chronological boundaries of this study. The study "*Historical process of economic growth*" was written under B. Minc's tutelage and accepted by him and a committee of Main School professors as a habilitation thesis. However, according to Gadomski, selected quotes were brought to the attention of Gomułka. This resulted in the habilitation being redrawn, and the Main School and the Polish Academy of Sciences being accused of harbouring counter-revolutionary forces in Gomułka's speech at the 13th PUWP CC plenum in July 1963.⁶⁷¹ The cause of the fracas was that Kurowski had

⁶⁷⁰ Among others S. Kurowski was employed there, and later T. Kowalik.

⁶⁷¹ Gadomski, Witold, 2002, "Splątane ścieżki profesora", *Gazeta Wyborcza* (12-13.01.2002), p.18
APMW/PZPR/KW/716 Archival documents reveal the reaction of the Party. During a meeting of the Basic Party organisation of the Main School held on 9.07.1963 individual scholars who had approved Kurowski's habilitation thesis were held accountable. The Council of the Department of Finance and Statistics where the thesis had been defended was obliged to

used analyses of historical data on iron and steel production to argue that the socialist economy would never catch up with or overtake capitalism. Kurowski's case was used by the PUWP to redraw the line of how far the scholars could be allowed to ignore the needs and priorities of the political leadership. The political implications of Kurowski's thesis are obvious – it offered scientifically-founded proof that socialism was inferior to capitalism. Given what we know about Gomułka's inflexible intellectual character and stubborn adherence to the idea that the PUWP's rule and Soviet tutelage were the only things which kept Poland safe from fascism and German revisionism, as well as his auto-didact's scepticism towards intellectual elites, it is tempting to ask how anyone, let alone B. Minc, could think that this study would be rewarded with a degree without a political row ensuing. Had they not read the work closely enough to realise what Kurowski was saying? Did they believe that there would be no repercussions as long as these opinions were restricted to the limited readership of economic monographs? If so, was such an assumption based on experience? Had studies that were potentially equally politically controversial already slipped through, and had Kurowski just been unlucky enough to be noticed?⁶⁷² 1963 is mentioned by Z. Landau as one of the moments when the screw was tightened in cultural policy, just as the last reformist, liberal cultural periodicals were being closed down. Kurowski's case could then also have been part of such a campaign, but more research is needed before more than sketchy suggestions can be formulated.

The Time of the Economists

In 1956 Bobrowski returned from the exile which had followed his demise in the CPB, and labelled the period which then began "The time of the economists".⁶⁷³ While not denying the importance of the changes within the discipline and the academic institutions which have so far been the subject of this chapter, it should be pointed out that it was not these that he was referring to. The Second Convention had seen the start of the 'model debate', an important series of discussions on the state of the economy and on ways of improving it. With the establishment of the Economic Council, economists were once more invited to offer advice on

hold a meeting to criticise Kurowski's work and the BOP was to organise a meeting to check on the ideological content of other thesis which were being submitted.

⁶⁷² Myśliński points out that the level of control and permissiveness correlated with the extent of distribution of a given medium. That which from 1956 could pass muster in publications with limited readerships such as *Ekonomista*, could not pass in the more widely read weekly *Polityka* and even less the dailies. Lojek, Jerzy, Myśliński, Jerzy & Władysław, Wiesław, 1988. *Dzieje prasy polskiej* Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Interpress.

⁶⁷³ The expression was used in a lecture given at the Sorbonne in 1961 Source: RFE report located in Herder Press archive. "The time of the economists" had been preceded in his view by "The time of the organisers" during his own chairmanship of the CPB in the first years after the War and "The time of the technocrats" between 1949 and 1955.

policy-making. For a brief period, from 1956 to 1958, economists became central protagonists in the nation-wide debate on the state of the economy and on its necessary reforms. Kowalik, then editor of *Economic Life*, later described the genesis of the Economic Council and the beginning of the model debate at the Second Convention thus:

*The dome of the Planning Commission's building formed a lid upon a veritable cauldron, in which various well-cooked or raw reform projects were prepared, for example, about the establishment of a Social Inquiry Commission, an Economic Council, etc., but where above all accusatory speeches were made.*⁶⁷⁴

Both the 'model debate' and the activities of the Economic Council were of immense importance to economists, both within and outside academic institutions.

The 'model debate'

The liberalisation in early 1956 led to the re-emergence of public discussion of economic policy. Economists were active participants in the discussions on the social costs of the 'hyper-industrialisation' and performance of the economy.⁶⁷⁵ The economic debate started rather later than those in other areas, such as literature. I believe that this relative tardiness of the Thaw among economists cannot be fully explained by Suleja's observation that many academics were cautious in the early stages of the liberalisation, and unwilling to risk their positions,⁶⁷⁶ recalling only too well how closely the political and scholarly aspects were intertwined in the Central Office of Planning debate of 1948. As long as the political leadership was unwilling to allow criticism of the economic policy, the economists' debates could have no momentum. Despite the fact that the national economy faced serious problems, there was no haste on the part of the PUP leadership to engage in controversial discussions over their economic policy. During the spring of 1956, *Economic Life* was overhauled, the Second Convention was convened, and the first ideas on the need for a body of experts to advise on economic reforms were taken up. It was in June 1956 that the 'time of economists' began, because the explosive discussions at the Second Convention were followed by an eruption of social discontent in Poznań, with disgruntlement triggering a revolt under the banner of "bread and freedom". According to Kaliński, despite some statements in late 1955 that indicated a greater awareness of the social consequences of intensive industrialisation,

⁶⁷⁴ Tadeusz Kowalik, 1966, "Trzy listy i kilka wspomnień o Oskarze Langem" *Polityka*, 41 (8.10.1966)

⁶⁷⁵ The term was used by B. Rumiński in the CC discussion of economic policy in July 1956, and quoted by Kaliński, Janusz, 1995. *Gospodarka Polski w latach 1944-1989. Przemiany strukturalne*. Warszawa: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Ekonomiczne, p.80

⁶⁷⁶ Suleja, Teresa, 1995. *Uniwersytet Wrocławski w okresie centralizmu stalinowskiego, 1950-1955*. Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego.

there was no sign of any serious attempt to alter economic policy until the Poznań revolt.⁶⁷⁷ Public debates and criticism, and the explosion of social unrest in other cities in addition to Poznań, finally brought the economic crisis to the forefront of the attention of both the leadership and newly-awakened public opinion and the press.

The focus of the analysis in this section is the economic debate that ran in the periodicals, these being read by a much wider public than *Ekonomista* or other scholarly journals.⁶⁷⁸ The lion's share of this debate was printed in *Economic Life*, with some responses in *Po Prostu*, and, after its abolition, in *Polityka*. We can divide the debate into roughly two phases, relating firstly to what was published in the press during the summer following the Second Convention, and secondly to the work of the Economic Council (EC). There appears to be some controversy as to the relative importance of these two stages. According to Bobrowski:

*As for economic matters, despite the rather large number of individual reflections, the period before October did not bring any precise or rich formulations. These were to appear only as a result of the work of the Economic Council.*⁶⁷⁹

However, the historian Kazimierz Kloc observes that during this period (June 1956-January 1957), a crystallisation of three reform alternatives took place. Bobrowski's bias in favour of the work of the Economic Council is explained not only by his role as the *primum mobile* of the EC, but also by the fact that he had returned from exile only in November and had not been present during the first part of the debate. Also, considering his experience, and his strong preference for policy-making over academic pursuits, it is safe to assume that for him reform measures were more important than a pluralistic and varied debate would be for scholars who had been cut off from such opportunities for several years. From the perspective of the discipline of economics and its practitioners, I will therefore side with Kloc in his focus on the press debate. We may also note that the debate occurred before the turning of the liberalisation tide in October. The Economic Council, on the other hand, was active during the period when the Party leadership gradually regained control and started the process of disciplining the cultural, political and scientific spheres.

Kloc's analysis of the press debate leads him to identify three groups. At one extreme were those making far-reaching proposals for movement towards markets and competition in the

⁶⁷⁷ Kaliński, Janusz, 1987. *Polityka gospodarcza Polski w latach 1948-1956*. Warszawa: KiW. p.79-83

⁶⁷⁸ In Poland, the cultural monthlies and weeklies have traditionally been the scene of debates on culture, society and politics. Mysliński, Jerzy, 1988. *Prasa w Polsce Ludowej*. In E.A. Jerzy Lojek (ed.) *Dzieje prasy polskiej*. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Interpress. p.174

⁶⁷⁹ Bobrowski, Czesław, 1985. *Wspomnienia ze stulecia* Lublin: Wydawnictwo Lubelskie. p.233

economy, the 'value wing' (*wartosciowcy*). The most prominent among them were S. Kurowski, J. Popkiewicz and A. Brzeski, who had made their public debuts at the Second Convention. According to Kloc they:

*...proposed to base the economic mechanism on independent enterprises maximising profit. The central plan would have a co-ordinating or corrective function. ... In sum this was a proposal to reconstruct a market system, with practically all of a market system's institutions and law, but without the reversion to private ownership of means of production. Workers' committees were to take the place of the private owner, thereby guaranteeing the socialist character of the economy.*⁶⁸⁰

According to Kloc, those opposing the value wing reproached it for inconsequence and a paucity of solutions to the issues of capital flow, and to the lack of incentives for the workers' councils to make investments. Kloc also concludes that this was an option that met with sharp criticism from the majority of economists and politicians, and that it was marginal and never seriously considered. However, the existence of the 'value wing' is significant when seen from the perspective of this study. The mere possibility of voicing such ideas and of having them published in a widely-read weekly, and the fact of being met with constructive criticism rather than denigration and ridicule, is central to an understanding of the developments in economics. The majority of the reformers coalesced around the idea of the combination of a market and a planned economy. Kloc distinguishes two groups in their midst, based on an interpretation of their views on how a reform plan was to be drawn up. He places Lange and Brus in the 'model group', as their approach was to work deductively on a total plan of reform. The other faction consisted of 'realists', represented by Bobrowski and Kalecki, who were more cautious about suggesting radical measures and total solutions. There were of course those who defended the existing system and resisted the proposed changes. Their voices were not often heard in the academic and public debates, but constituted a decisive force in the economic policy institutions.⁶⁸¹ The debate shows that the overwhelming majority of economists wanted change. This is not surprising given the economic difficulties that were made public during that year, and their previous lack of access to the formulation and discussion of the Six Year Plan. In essence, economists were resuming their usual business: commenting on economic development; assessing problems; and discussing possible

⁶⁸⁰Kloc, Kazimierz, 1997. "Rady robotnicze kontra socjalizm rynkowy". *Polska 1944/45-1989*, 3, 119-136. p.127

⁶⁸¹ Ibid. p.129

solutions.⁶⁸² It was not merely a hypothetical discussion, as prominent economists were invited to participate in the new advisory body, the Economic Council.

For an understanding of the evolution of the field of economics, the content of the ideas under discussion is less important than the fact that discussions were taking place, that opinions were being exchanged, and that attempts at finding compromises and solutions were being made. It was crucial that all those who wished to do so could take part in the debate, and that no-one would seriously deny the right of others to express opinions. The 'Marxist-Leninist' versus 'bourgeois' duality lost its relevance as the difference of opinions on other issues became significant. Economists were now able to choose sides without the dictates of the Party organisation, and to sort themselves into groups with shared ideas and concerns.

The Economic Council

At the Second Convention, the economists broadcast the fact that they were not being consulted or even informed about economic policy, and it was claimed that in enterprises they were paid and heeded less than the engineers. The Six Year Plan had been formed, modified and carried out without any public debate or consultation of economists in academic positions. Worse still, economists working on related issues had not been granted access to information about the Six Year Plan, nor about the Five Year Plan that was now under way, because of the extensive secrecy of data. The central role that political economy had been promised by the Party in the early 1950s had not materialised.

There was some delay between the proposal being formulated at the Second Convention and the establishment of the Council. Representatives of the PEA formally submitted the proposal to Prime Minister Cyrankiewicz on August 23rd,⁶⁸³ and in November the prospect of leading the Council was held out to Bobrowski, precipitating his decision to return to Poland.⁶⁸⁴ According to Bobrowski, there was some bickering about who was to lead the new Council, which ended with a compromise resulting in a group of five vice-presidents.⁶⁸⁵ Bobrowski

⁶⁸² For more on these discussions, see Stankiewicz, E. Łukawer, *Z historii polskiej myśli ekonomicznej 1945-1995*. (Warszawa : 1996), J. Kleer, 'Teoria przemocy jako podstawa analizy gospodarki socjalistycznej.' *Ekonomista*, 1-2 (1995), 107-119.

⁶⁸³ "Ekonomiści u Premiera Cyrankiewicza" *Trybuna Ludu*, 24.08.1956, nr 236

⁶⁸⁴ During the summer of 1956, impressed by the book on the Yugoslav economic model and by a certain aura of victimhood from the Central Office of Planning debate, the young economists from *Economic Life*, had written to Bobrowski calling on him to return. Kowalik, Tadeusz & Hausner, Jerzy, 2000. *Polscy Ekonomisci w Swiecie* Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN.p.284

⁶⁸⁵ President: Oskar Lange;

Vice-presidents: Czesław Bobrowski, Włodzimierz Brus, Michał Kalecki, Edward Lipiński, Edmund Pszczółkowski, Kazimierz Secomski,

Members: Stefan Barcikowski, Władysław Bieńkowski, Franciszek Blinowski, Stanisław Bretsznajder, Stanisław Cieślak,

and Cyrankiewicz's original idea was that Bobrowski would be the president, but he readily accepted Lange as the formal president of the council on the condition that he would be the executive leader. Eventually, since the idea that Lange and Bobrowski, both former socialists, should dominate the Council was not acceptable to the Party, the top level of the group was extended with five more vice-presidents. Bobrowski explained the political leadership's readiness to invest him with authority as being in expiation for 1948, when he was forced to resign from the CPB. The composition of the leadership of the Economic Council reflects the political confusion of the autumn of 1956. According to Bobrowski, Brus was included in the group as the guardian of the orthodoxy, which is surprising since by that time he was already turning towards a revisionist stance. The presence of Lange, Kalecki and Lipiński speaks of the concern that the body should have a high level of academic competence, but despite the fact that this is considered to be the most liberal period of the decade, there was never any mention of non-socialist economists being included, nor was any academic economist based outside Warsaw invited.

In the presentation of the 35 members in the press we can discern a tendency to stretch the label of "Economist" and "Professor" by including Stefan Jędrychowski, Julian Kole, and Franciszek Blinowski, who were all key members of the Party economic policy team. Only one person represented the Party leadership, the young and dynamic CC secretary Edward Gierek. To the public, the EC was presented as an expert body, not a Party-controlled one. However, in his autobiography, Bobrowski speaks of the composition of the group in quite different terms: one fifth were CC members and one fifth had a technical or engineering background, leaving only three fifths of professional economists. Nevertheless, the economists were in the majority, and were able to determine the agenda of the Council. The level of attention the EC received in *Economic Life*, with weekly reports and interviews, reflected the interest it aroused among economists. Even daily papers carried extensive coverage of the Economic Council. On the one hand, following the drought of the previous years, the general public showed a greater thirst for information on economic matters. The second explanation is that the EC was used by the regime to bolster its public image, by advertising that it was now willing to take advice from key experts in economics and was

Felicjan Dembiński, Jan Drewnowski, Roman Fidelski, Edward Gierek, Lucjan Horowic, Stefan Jędrychowski, Julian Kole, Stefan Królikowski, Bolesław Krupiński, Józef Kulesza, Stanisław Kuziński, Aleksander Laskowski, Jerzy Olszewski, Bronisław Oyrzanowski, Józef Pajestka, Antoni Rajkiewicz, Stanisław Rączkowski, Stanisław Szwalbe, Eugeniusz Szyr, Jerzy Tepicht, Jan Topiński, Witold Trąpczyński, Andrzej Zalewski. 1957 "Rada Ekonomiczna" *Życie Gospodarcze*, 5, (03.02.1957), p.1

planning extensive changes in the economic system. Proof for this thesis is the way the EC was ignored and left to wither away once the regime had regained control over the Party apparatus and society at large.

The Council started its work in January 1957, and combined the functions of a research institution with those of an advisory body. Bobrowski supervised a permanent secretariat, to which he recruited gifted young economists, including people whose careers had been blocked for political reasons.⁶⁸⁶ His was confident that there was a real chance that the reforms might succeed. His own reflections on the power base of the council, and his position in the political game, reveal him as a reality-oriented and competent politician. He stressed the importance of his personal relations with Cyrankiewicz, which were very good, and with Gomułka, which were tolerable initially before Gomułka ceased to listen to anyone outside his narrow circle of trusted workers. His ability to communicate and co-operate with politicians became legendary among economists. If Bobrowski found it impossible to co-operate with a politician, it was said, it meant that that person was unable to work with or listen to anyone. However, Gomułka, who stayed in power until 1970, turned out to be of that rare variety, and in the 1960s Bobrowski found himself advising the Algerian Government and teaching at Warsaw University instead.

The lack of reliable data, after years of misinformation and secrecy in statistics, made the assessment of the state of the economy one of the primary tasks for the Council. Extensive (200-page-long) reports were published yearly for three consecutive years, without any interference from the economic policy leadership or the censoring authorities.⁶⁸⁷ Using the information processed by the Council, its commissions worked on proposals for reform. The Commission for Economic Models and Policy, led by Lange, was central in this work. The result of these deliberations, "*Theses of the Economic Council*" was published in May 1957.⁶⁸⁸ This document contained the sketch of a new economic model. It was hoped that this would be the start of a constructive debate with the political leadership, and enable further work towards a deeper analysis of the situation and of possible reform measures. The authors of the *Theses* wished to install an economic system capable of continual, gradual adjustment to changing economic conditions. The *Theses* were presented to the Government, and the

⁶⁸⁶ Some of them later became professors: S.Broniewski, R.Cheliński, M.Ostrowski, M.Perczyński, Z.Sadowski Bobrowski, Czesław, 1985. *Wspomnienia ze stulecia* Lublin: Wydawnictwo Lubelskie. p.242

⁶⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, pp.241-242

⁶⁸⁸ 1957 „Tezy Rady Ekonomicznej w sprawie niektórych kierunkow zmian modelu gospodarczego” *Życie Gospodarcze* 22, (02.06.1957), pp.1-2

members of the Council hoped for a rapid response. While the EC had been at work, however, the political climate in the country had evolved in a direction which none of the reform-eager economists welcomed. The freedom of the press had been curtailed, and those linked with the pre-1956 direction of the economy had been returned to power.⁶⁸⁹ Time went by, and no reaction to the Theses from the authorities was forthcoming. Prime Minister Cyrankiewicz is reported to have said off record that the Government was neither for nor against the proposed changes, and the proposals were never applied. This dashed all hopes for a decisive role in policy formation for economists with academic backgrounds. Instead, the superficially-reformed Planning Commission remained in control. The liberal climate gradually evaporated and by 1960 the publication of the Council's analyses of the state of the economy was discontinued. There is no clear date for the end of the Economic Council's work, as it was left to wither away from 1960 onwards, and was only formally dissolved some years later.⁶⁹⁰

The decision of the 7th Plenum of the PUWP CC in July 1956 was that the goal of the 1956-1960 Five Year Plan would be the improvement of living standards. Nevertheless, Kaliński argues that the economic adjustments of the plan never went beyond the already-initiated attempt to balance the economy and increase the standard of living. The party leadership was not able or willing to make the radical changes this would involve, and continued along the track laid down in the early 1950s. Bobrowski's own reflections on why the EC economists failed to convince the decision-makers that thorough reforms were necessary are worthy of attention. He realised in retrospect that the abstract form of the advice given, and the academic language of the *Theses*, could not have appealed to Gomułka. Focused and concrete measures would probably have had more luck. Bobrowski also regretted the absence of a more explicit critique of the command economy, which could have convinced decision makers of this area's disfunctionality, but he noted that even among the economists of the time there were those who hoped that computers could be the solution to the problem of the information overload in central planning. Also, with the benefit of the experiences of the early 1980s, he deplored the fact that the *Theses* did not appeal to the general public, and had no

⁶⁸⁹ Hilary Minc never returned to active political life after 1956, but his second in command Eugeniusz Szyr returned to an executive position at the renamed Planning Commission. The ironic saying of the time, according to W. Brus, was "the new is returning". A.W. Haugstad interview with Włodzimierz Brus in Oxford, 2001

⁶⁹⁰ In addition to Bobrowski's account of the work of the Economic Council in his autobiography, I am relying on the testimony provided to me by Włodzimierz Brus in several interviews (Oxford 2001), and the material concerning the Council published in the press. Bobrowski, Czesław, 1985. *Wspomnienia ze stulecia* Lublin: Wydawnictwo Lubelskie.

slogans or easily-communicable messages which could have brought general pressure from Polish society to bear on the decision-makers.⁶⁹¹

The failure to encourage any reform of the economy should not overshadow the intellectual legacy of the EC. It was an active forum for discussion and inspired several participants to publish the ideas they had developed during their work there. Moreover, Czechoslovakia and Hungary too were considering economic reforms, and when the Polish regime decided to put the reform proposals of the EC in the bottom drawer, the ideas and publications of the Polish Economic Council were received with interest in these countries. What is more, work in the permanent secretariat and on tasks relating to the preparation of analyses and reports provided opportunities for young economists to work in an inspiring environment and in close contact with empirical material. This was a refreshing change for those who had gone through the ideology-heavy education of the early fifties, and was a new opportunity for those who had been denied career opportunities for political reasons.

There were also some other channels of participation open to economists in this period, but these fared no better than the Economic Council. Kalecki, for instance, worked on a committee for long-term planning in the Planning Commission from the second half of 1957, hoping to contribute to the future direction of economic development. Just as was the case for the *Theses* of the Economic Council, the plan for 1960- 1975 was the subject of lively discussion among economists, but also, just as in the case of the Economic Council proposals, it was never put into practice. Instead, it was condemned by the 12th Party Plenum in October 1958, when E. Szyr submitted it to an ideological critique reminiscent of the Central Office of Planning discussion of 1948.⁶⁹²

The model debate was stifled not only by the non-response to the *Theses* document, but also by the gradual restriction of critical discussions in the press on the performance of the economy, and on economic policies. In 1957 the critically-minded staff of *Economic Life* encountered increasing problems with censorship. We can see some evidence of these conflicts on its pages. When texts were barred by the censors, empty columns needed filling, but rather than taking in a text conforming to the desires of the political leadership, the staff of *Economic Life* tried to communicate with their readers by other means. When I was reading through the paper, I noticed that in several issues the same photograph of a smiling young

⁶⁹¹ Ibid. p.252

⁶⁹² Kaliński, Janusz, 1987. *Polityka gospodarcza Polski w latach 1948-1956*. Warszawa: KiW. p.99

woman thinning seedlings appeared.⁶⁹³ An illustration of someone pulling out unwanted plants to replace a text pulled out by censors: how much of a coincidence could this be? Even without a metaphoric reading, the repetition of the optimistic message of the photo and the caption, and its contrast with the struggling economy, communicated to readers who were used to reading between the lines that the editor and journalists were being forced to be more optimistic than they felt. *Economic Life* did not have many illustrations on its pages, but there was another one which appeared oddly out of place, a photo of a shop selling canned produce. In Polish ‘*konserwa*’ is a colloquial term for ‘conservative forces’, in case the readers needed a hint as to who was hindering the appearance of critical material. However, these games with the censors could not last in a context of increasing Party control.⁶⁹⁴ In October 1957 *Po Prostu* was closed down, and the decision upheld despite student riots which lasted five days and cost two lives (79 demonstrators and 95 militia men were wounded).⁶⁹⁵ The editorial board of *Economic Life* was purged and the chief editor, Kowalik, was dismissed. To make things clear, Gomułka publicly condemned ‘excessive’ criticism:

*We will not allow anyone to spit on socialism, on our system, on the great accomplishment [...] We cannot allow the spreading of confusion, in which the so-called social-cultural periodicals with similar tendencies as the weekly “Po prostu” especially excelled [...] the time has come for choices. Journalists and commentators have to choose: for the party or against the party, for socialism or against socialism.*⁶⁹⁶

Conclusion

The legacy of the Economic Council for economists was a disappointment, as Gomułka’s regime proved incapable of engaging in a discussion on economic reform, and reverted to the now well-tried mechanisms of the command economy. Frustrated at home, Polish economists found some solace in the end of their isolation from neighbouring countries. Their ideas on reform of a socialist economy were published and received with interest in countries where

⁶⁹³ The first appearance of the girl with the salad was on 10th March 1957 on the front page of issue nr. 10 of *Economic Life*, with the caption “Nowalijki... Nowalijki... Nowalijki...” *Nowalijki* means the first fresh vegetables available in spring. The second time (nr.12, 24.03.57) the picture appeared on the last page and while the first time the picture might have had a mere decorative function, now the caption read “Nawalijki... Nawalijki... Nawalijki” - a play with words combining the original ‘nowalijki’ with ‘nawalić’ – a colloquial term for something not working. Two weeks later, the girl with the salad was back, now with the original caption (p.6, nr.14, 07.04.57). In issue nr.25 (23.06.57) in a humour section, a notice informed that several readers had reacted to the repeated appearance of the girl with the salad, but offered neither apologies nor explanations.

⁶⁹⁴ *Po Prostu* editors described their efforts to work their way around the censors’ decision in Bratkowski, Stefan (ed.) (1996) *Pazdziernik 1956. Pierwszy wylom w systemie. Bunt, mlodosc i rozsadek.*, Warszawa: Prószyński i S-ka.

⁶⁹⁵ Persak, Krzysztof, 2006. *Sprawa Henryka Hollanda* Warszawa: Instytut Pamięci Narodowej. p.38

⁶⁹⁶ Gomułka, W. *O naszej partii*, Warszawa: 1968, pp.346-348, quoted after Machcewicz, Paweł, 1995. *Władysław Gomułka*, Wyd. 1. ed. Warszawa: Wydawnictwa Szkolne i Pedagogiczne.p.52

economic reforms were being actively pursued, notably Czechoslovakia and Hungary. Political leaders in developing countries also proved to be more interested in their advice than Gomułka. Throughout the 1960s, Polish economists made an industry out of expertise exports, working in developing countries. Pulsations from international scholarship were increasingly felt, both in the form of literature and personal experience, as Ford fellowships and internships in international organisations became accessible.

Marxism continued to play an important role in Polish economics for another three decades, but it was quite different from the Marxism-Leninism of the early 1950s. The heretofore outwardly monolithic Marxist-Leninist position had imploded into a bitter opposition between 'orthodox' and 'revisionist' economists, and Polish Marxist-Leninist economics after 1956 also became open to the influence of other schools of thought. Disillusion with the regime's willingness to involve economists in policy-making on the one hand, and a strengthening in autonomy over research, teaching and reputation control on the other, opened up the way for the integration of Marxists and the majority of non-Marxist scholars. This integration proved difficult, and probably fell short of reconciliation. There was no hearty embrace, but more importantly there was no longer any question of refusing to consider the other party as a rightful occupant of the same field of economics. The persistence of disagreements and ill-feeling was not the only reason that the re-integration of economics was difficult. As non-Marxist scholars were allowed to resume their places in their disciplines, they brought back into scholarly public discussion their views on all of their colleagues' relative positions in the disciplinary hierarchy, based on merit judged according to the standards of western mainstream economics. The hierarchy established by Marxist-Leninist scholars and the hierarchy quietly upheld by 'bourgeois' economists had co-existed between 1949 and 1955, but had been kept separate. In 1956 they collided. Whenever a new position needed to be filled, or a new article or doctoral thesis needed to be evaluated, economists had to negotiate which set of standards would take precedence.

As for the autonomy of scholars, the situation first improved in 1956 and then gradually deteriorated again. The positive point was that despite the restrictions which became marked from late 1957 on, the level of repression and control that had been present in the social sciences before 1956 did not return. The 1960s present a quite different picture from the early 1950s, though not necessarily a very cheerful one, as the aggressive determination to prevail of the early 1950s was replaced by subtler but persistent pressure. Conflicts over appointments to academic positions and the right to publish politically-controversial research

results multiplied. This led Tadeusz P. Rutkowski to argue that the term “the small stabilisation”, which is frequently used to characterise the 1960s in Poland, does not fit the relationship between the regime and scholars, since the tension between them increased throughout the decade.⁶⁹⁷

⁶⁹⁷ Rutkowski, Tadeusz Paweł, 2006. "Niestabilna stabilizacja. PZPR wobec nauki (1956-1960)". *Przegląd Humanistyczny*, 55-69.

CONCLUSION

The story of Polish economists does not end here, as in fact most of the protagonists of this narrative still had years of productive work before them. Several lived to see the tables within the discipline turn again in the early 1990s, when mainstream economics once more became the dominant orientation among scholars, and formed the basis for the Polish student curriculum. The upheavals experienced by Polish scholars and the rest of Polish society in the 20th century form a long list, but the fifteen-year post-war period stands out, due to the frequent disturbances of educational and scholarly activities. It was in this period between 1945 and 1960 that the calamity of war and regime change was followed by not one but two fundamental re-orderings of the hierarchy in economic science.

This study has covered four distinct periods. The first, between 1945 and 1947, was dominated by the autonomous restitution of scholarly activity after the Second World War. From 1948, the intervention of the Communist regime divided Polish economics into 'bourgeois' and Marxist-Leninist segments, and placed the latter in control of all influential positions. In 1956, as the Party withdrew from active science policy in order to deal with more urgent problems, the monopoly of Marxism-Leninism crumbled, and non-Marxist scholars were readmitted to positions of influence in the discipline, leading to the establishment of new alliances which straddled the Marxist-Leninist / 'bourgeois' division. The fourth period, which began in 1957 and lasted well into the 1960s, was characterised by a more pluralistic discipline, and a new type of relations with the political regime.

To summarise the main themes of this study, the predominantly harmonious collaboration seen in the reconstruction of the national economy, and of academic institutions, in the first post-war years, demonstrated that the regime and economists were quite able to co-operate with each other. The impulse to destroy this state of affairs, which had been a promising one for professional economists, came from events on the international stage. After the Soviet

leadership decided to initiate a policy of tighter control and uniform 'sovietisation' of its satellite states in late 1947, the parameters for economic policy changed, as did those for the roles of economists. Communist leaders no longer wished to work with the established economic professionals and academic hierarchy; instead they made moves towards introducing their own trusted economists into the discipline. The first meetings between economists and Marxists-Leninists, notably at the Central Planning Board debate in 1948, took the form not only of political but also of cultural confrontations between Polish academic traditions and a 'revolutionary' communist ethos. There and then, the established economists understood that they faced an ambitious and ruthless opponent in the competition for influence over economics. What followed first was a period of gradual increase in the demands of the regime and of increasingly defensive moves on the part of academic institutions and individual scholars. In late 1948, having dealt with the Socialist's claims to influence, the Communist Party was ready to concentrate on science, so that by 1949 nearly all the professors of economics found themselves dispossessed of their former functions and powers. They were replaced with hand-picked supporters of the communist leadership, who were installed in key positions in academic institutions. In the course of a few months the composition of the upper reaches of the disciplinary hierarchy, as expressed by occupation of chairs, boards of journals, and professional associations, had undergone a profound alteration. Involving breaches of established procedures for academic promotion as they did, these brusque changes did not tend to gain general acceptance. Most scholars not only resented their personal demotions, and the closure of or restrictions in their career opportunities, but also privately refused to accept the new hierarchy. Censorship and fear of repression ruled out public protest. For a large portion of the occupants of the field of economics a period of silence and inactivity began in 1949 that was to last until 1956. However, although their influence was radically reduced, it is important to note that most of the established scholars stayed on at academic institutions. For the newcomers, the Marxist-Leninist economists, the early fifties were a time of severe teaching overload, time-absorbing propaganda work, and ideological debates where the margins for critical and creative thought were minimal. Hardly any research was carried out or published during those years. Allocation of positions and honours in the discipline was subject to political approval, and consequently the significance of academic titles and degrees was eroded. They no longer recognised the scholarly competence of the candidate, but now measured current political capital. In addition, the regime's demand to maintain secrecy regarding economic matters, and the Party leadership's unwillingness to allow critical scrutiny of their policies, was stifling economists' discussions

about the current state and future development of the economy. The regime had empowered its handpicked Marxist-Leninist scholars, but had left them little freedom in or influence over their work.

For their part, the Marxist-Leninist scholars had only accepted the reduced autonomy for scholars as a temporary measure. They were willing to defer demands until the political and social revolution was secured, but as time went by, some of them grew increasingly impatient with interference in their work by the political leadership and Party apparatus. Stalin's confirmation of the existence of objective laws in socialist economies, published in 1952, followed by his death soon thereafter, initiated a gradual relaxation of ideological control, supported and driven forward by a contingent of reform-minded Marxist-Leninists. The Thaw eventually eroded the Party's control to such a degree that even non-Marxist scholars reclaimed their positions and their right to public expression. The status quo established in 1949 relied so heavily on a strong and active political regime that the crisis experienced by the Party in 1956 promptly resulted in a re-ordering of the field of economics. Once more, renegotiations were needed both on the composition of and the relative positions within the discipline, and concerning its relationship to the regime.

Economists jumped at the opportunity to criticise the situation in their discipline and profession publicly, and, realising that no-one was going to stop them, scholars then took matters into their own hands. Academic institutions reverted to pre-1949 methods for running their business, and recalled professors and scholars who had been ousted six years earlier. Some Marxist-Leninist scholars lost their positions, or resigned, but most of those who had gained positions in 1949 stayed in place. With the Party showing much less vigour in academic matters, they had to fend for themselves, and to find ways of working with the non-Marxist majority. For economists, the events of 1956 were the start of an uneasy co-habitation of old and new, between scholars trained in 'western' economics and those schooled in Marxism-Leninism (this latter category now including revisionists and orthodox Marxists-Leninists). The Party bureaucracy soon recovered from the shock, and increasingly from late 1957 set out to reclaim its influence over economics. The late 1950s and the early 1960s were periods of continuous conflicts and negotiations between scholars and apparatchiks. The initiative of the Economic Council, which had raised economists' hopes of re-establishing their influence over economic policy, soon withered in the face of Gomułka's aversion to taking advice from academics. The party leadership neither trusted nor inspired the loyalty of Polish leftist intellectuals, disappointed as the latter were by the narrow margin of autonomy,

and lack of room for critical thought and discussion. Consequently a significant portion of them turned away from the regime and several protagonists of this study, as well as their students, became well-known as a result of their participation in the emerging opposition.

The findings of this study as regards the Party's role in economic science and the effect of its policies may appear contradictory. On the one hand we have evidence of the weakness of the PUWP in academic institutions. On the other hand, while Party policies were not always successful, and some of the results of their actions were unintended, they were strongly felt by scholars, and had a visible effect on the quality and amount of knowledge production.

The Party's weakness in academic institutions was related in the late 1940s to the lack of scholars trusted by the Party leadership, and from around 1956 to former Party intellectuals turning critical of the regime, and forming what could be called a 'revisionist' opposition. At the same time, while other scholars were removed from influential positions and from subjects considered to be central to Marxist-Leninist ideology, only a few were expelled from academic institutions. Party-loyal scholars were ever in the minority in their work-places, except at the ITSC. To this we have to add: the lack of conviction displayed even by the communist elite regarding the sagacity of a transfer of all Soviet experiences onto Polish soil; a certain measure of faulty organisation; inefficiency; incompetence; and inter-institutional conflict.

Despite these handicaps the PUWP managed to bring about many changes which were keenly felt by scholars. The Party was not omnipotent, and its organisation was not always efficient, but the effects that PUWP policies had on scholarly communities were numerous and weighty. For a start, there was isolation from international scholarship and from access to empirical data and publishing outlets; the disappearance of arenas for unconstrained discussion; and heavy centralisation of teaching and research, which petrified the development of regional academic centres. To this we have to add that a whole generation of young, upcoming researchers was prevented from taking scientific degrees, and spent time on futile exegesis of ideological texts or broadcasting Party propaganda. Finally, some of the key effects of Party policies on scholarship appear to have been unintended. Neither the erosion of the prestige of academic titles, the slump in scholarly publications, nor the decline of the popularity of economics among students, was something the PUWP leadership had wished for.

The findings of this study suggest that when it comes to the question of the means that the Party chose to apply to academic institutions and scholars, it relied heavily on bureaucracy to compensate for the small number of loyal scholars. The Polish Communist regime failed to engage scholars or to mobilise them to follow the ideology of Marxism-Leninism, and in fact the PUWP dominated scholarship through administrative control, not ideological leadership. The local Party organisations, whose role it was to provide ideological guidance to scholars in their working places, actually ruled through administrative measures. The central Party apparatus too relied heavily on the state bureaucracy.

If we look at the outcome of the regime's policies from the perspective of the declarations made in the late 1940s, when the PUWP launched an activist science policy, it is clear that the professed aim of making economics the foundation of economic policy was never realised. In early stalinist Poland, the economic policy decision-makers, led by Hilary Minc, never considered allowing public discussion of their policies, and did not wish to receive expert advice from beyond the ramparts of the top economic authority strongholds. Instead, political economy was made to serve the needs of the agit-prop sector, by supplying propaganda about the regime's successes and through justifying unpopular measures. The close links between theory and practice, which formed a central PUWP slogan for economics, never materialised; rather, statistical data was classified, with scholars employed in academic institutions having no access to it, and economists working in the planning apparatus unable to publish analyses of the data they worked with. The Party leadership and its chief ideologues expended a great deal of energy in attempting to make social science scholars follow the 'line' of the regime to the last detail. Even after the Soviet leadership had proclaimed the New Course in 1953, the Polish Communist regime preferred to maintain strict control over the discipline of economics rather than to encourage independent critical studies which would have yielded a more reliable picture of the economy. The Polish regime demonstrated no evidence of its alleged commitment to economics, or of its will to base economic policies on scientific knowledge, and was clearly unwilling to allow public discussion of policy, or to ask for or listen to expert academic advice through public channels. What appeared on the visible surface of stalinist public life was the predominance of the need for ideological control and "purity".

Scholars' responses to the Communist regime's demands and promises varied. If we look back at 1945, the majority started out by offering their co-operation, hoping for an alliance through which post-war reconstruction could be undertaken. The political climate then grew increasingly chilly, and we saw some economists withdraw from public life as soon as they

understood that PUWP would not accept their council, as in the case of Taylor and Krzyżanowski, when invited to participate in the work of the Central Planning Board. Others, especially the socialist economists like Drewnowski and Lipiński, continued to hope for influence, and worked to find a compromise or deal with the communists. A substantial number of scholars were willing to give Marxism a chance, on condition that they would be granted the freedom to interpret and apply it to their research as they chose, and to blend it with other ideas. Depending on their political and intellectual outlooks at that time, Polish economists differed in their willingness to accommodate the regime's call for a re-orientation of scholarship. In February 1948, after the PUWP spectacularly refused to compromise by sharing power over scholarship with anyone but the most trusted Marxist-Leninists, the majority of Polish economists appear to have slumped into a state of utter disappointment and passive depression. The PUWP had effectively divided the disciplinary community by elevating its protégées to power and denying academic positions and influence to the rest. The economists' influence over this situation and over their own positions in the new set-up was minimal. Important decisions were taken by people who could in no way be counted as peers of equal academic standing. Between 1948 and 1955 censorship was used actively to prevent expression of unorthodox ideas, and the margin of freedom that the regime offered to scholars was so narrow that it left no room for their responses. However, despite the notorious difficulty of documenting silence and passive resistance, it is clear from the sources available that a large number of scholars paid mere lip service to the regime, all the while holding on to their own values, and to their own ideas about scholarly practice and its relationship with politics and society.

The Marxist-Leninists started out by offering their services to the Party unconditionally, but then gradually transferred loyalty to their new academic institutions, so that their identity shifted from the role of propagandist to that of scholar. Contemporary witnesses and later observers of the events of June 1956 were struck by the sudden burst of energy, criticism and optimism that manifested itself during the Second Convention of Economists. Economists responded with alacrity to the opportunity to express their opinions and to take over the reins of their discipline, and it seemed that the initiatives pointed in two directions. Firstly, economists were eager to mend the lack of links with economic policy-making, and were determined to make themselves heard on the subject of the reform of the economy. Secondly, they stressed the need to re-assert their control over academic institutions, journals and professional associations. This meant a return to a peer-review-based disciplinary community,

and when scholars who had been removed from their positions for political reasons were called back by their colleagues, the old and new hierarchies came into open confrontation, and ways had to be found to accommodate the former 'bourgeois' and the Marxist-Leninist scholars within the collegial bodies of academic institutions. After the radical division of economists into 'haves' and 'have-nots' in 1949, the regime's politicians left the scholars to sort out the situation themselves: new friendships and alliances were then formed, notably between revisionist economists and the old leftist professors who had sided with the Socialist Party, and these formed a bridge over the chasm introduced in 1948.

How did the evolution of economics in Poland during the early 1950s compare with developments in countries where communist regimes had supported the establishment of Marxism-Leninism in the social sciences? With the benefit of Connelly's comparative examination of the higher education policies of stalinist regimes in the DDR, Czechoslovakia and Poland, we can see that the latter stands out as the country where the Communist regime was the least determined and the least successful in transforming academic life. The room for manoeuvre of Polish communists, Connelly argues, was limited by the status of the old cultural elites. The Polish Communist regime coldly calculated that it could not afford to alienate a group which enjoyed so much prestige, and ultimately proved rather hesitant when it came to using its repressive apparatus against professors.

The situation of Hungarian economists provides a good comparison, offering both similarities with and contrasts to the Polish situation. Péteri explores several types and phases of relations between the regime and academia, and does so by focusing, among other things, on three aspects of the situation in economics: the restriction of access to statistical information, the evolution of Marxist-Leninist economists from "party soldiers" to "professional economists", and the separation of agit-prop economics from empirical economics.⁶⁹⁸ In his discussion of the evolution of Hungarian economics into a "partitioned bureaucracy" where political economy was separated from empirical and policy-oriented economics, Péteri argues that an alliance was forged between research economists and the political elite, in the New Course era that began in 1953. This alliance created viable conditions for the development of empirical research, and allowed Hungarian economists to establish a distance between themselves and

⁶⁹⁸ Péteri, György, 1998b. Controlling the Field of Academic Economics in Hungary, 1953-1976. In G. Péteri (ed.) *Academia and State Socialism. Essays on the Political History of Academic Life in Post-1945 Hungary and Eastern Europe*. New York: Atlantic Research and Publications.

the ideology and propaganda that dominated the theoretical area of the discipline.⁶⁹⁹ Gradually, they came to stress professional standards, and loyalty to their academic peers, rather than to the Party organisation.

Did this tendency apply to Poland? Whilst the contexts of ‘Stalinist’ science in Poland and Hungary bore several similarities, there were also important differences.⁷⁰⁰ The most important were to be found in the relative ‘balances of power’ of legitimacy and prestige between the ‘new’ and ‘old’ scholars. In Hungary the ‘old’ academic establishment had been tainted by its endorsement of the Horthy regime, and the communist ‘Gleichschaltung’ involved a thorough purge of ‘old’ economists from academic institutions. In Poland the prestige of the Polish professors had grown, due to their sacrifices and contributions in the resistance movement and clandestine higher education. Most of them stayed on in positions at academic institutions, even if they lost much their influence. The New Course did not seem to have had as prompt or strong an effect on Polish politics as in Hungary. While Rákosi was replaced as prime minister by Imre Nagy in 1953, in Poland the old leadership stayed on, stemming criticism in party ranks as best they could. Based on what CQC sources reveal about social scientists in general, there is a certain parallel with Hungary in the latter’s search for ways to escape the tight embrace of dogmatic ideology. For Polish Marxist-Leninist scholars, however, it was not empirical studies that offered a way out of ‘party loyalty’, as they were in fact not given many opportunities to pursue such research before 1956. In Hungary the dynamic economics research institute at the Academy of Science, led by István Friss, was central to the formation of the ethos of professional economists, and in the protection of reform economists against agit-prop control. In Poland, there was no comparable institution, and it fell to the ITSC to be the place where young, gifted Marxist-Leninists won their intellectual emancipation. Many ITSC graduates joined the vocal reformist wing of the Party from 1955. A ‘reformist’ ethos thus emerged that was detached from any professional identity, and the young Marxist-Leninists now put on a critical intellectual mantle, resembling

⁶⁹⁹ Bockman, whose study has its focus on the heyday rather than the origin of reform economics, corroborates Péteri’s findings on this matter. Bockman, Johanna K., 2000. *Economists and social change: Science, professional power, and politics in Hungary, 1945-1995*. University of California.

⁷⁰⁰ Whilst the different sections of the Soviet block were sealed off from each other in the early fifties, Polish and Hungarian economists enjoyed some communication during this period, meaning that there could have been exchanges of experiences and ideas on how to deal with the dilemmas of party vs. scholars’ interests and authority. According to information provided by W. Brus, COMECON had an advisory body of economists which served as a rare forum for meetings across borders within the Block. He himself used it to make contact with East German and Hungarian economists (Kolmajer, Benary, Behrens, G. Péter) A.W. Haugstad interview with Włodzimierz Brus, Oxford 2001

the type of intelligentsia with a mission to lead the nation that had strong antecedents in Polish culture. Political revisionism rather than professional reformism was the result.

Another point of difference between the Hungarian and Polish cases is that of continuity. While *Közgazdasági Szemle* was closed down between 1949 and 1955, *Ekonomista* kept going, with Lipiński always its editor. Hungarian economists from the old regime were dismissed, but the ‘old’ staff of the Main School in Warsaw maintained enclaves of private liberty despite the presence of Marxist-Leninists, as did scholars in other institutions. In fact, notwithstanding their removal from influential positions as heads of departments and chairs, ‘old’ scholars had been retained by most universities in the vicinity of their institutions, and were recalled as soon as it became possible in 1956. Both in terms of institutions and personnel, Polish economics maintained a tenuous but real continuity, a continuity which, in part, was based on the cohesive social fabric of the scholarly “milieu” (*środowisko*) described by Connelly.⁷⁰¹ In the case of economists, we must also mention the role played by the ‘old’ professors, who sympathised with and were interested in Marxism, and enjoyed respect in both ‘camps’, thereby allowing Marxist-Leninist economists to establish relationships with representatives of the ‘old’ academic establishment. Lipiński and Lange, among others, were central in providing not only a personal but also an intellectual and scholarly continuity within Polish economics. Finally, we come to the difficult question of how the Polish economists may have affected the Communist regime. Compared with their counterparts in Hungary, the Polish economics scholars were failures, and after 1948 their influence on economic policies was hardly significant. While the prestige of Polish professors protected them, and enabled them to maintain both personal and intellectual continuity in their disciplines, none of these brought Polish economists the trust or confidence of the Communist regime’s inner circles. Their influence was restricted to displays of opposition to the regime, which had no tangible effect while the regime felt strong enough to ignore them.

Loren Graham has argued that we might use the case of Soviet science to test how science works under extreme conditions.⁷⁰² A case in point could be just that transfer of discretion over a wide range of scholarly activities (research, teaching, evaluation of achievements, recruitment) from collegial bodies of scholars to political organs that was carried out by the

⁷⁰¹ Connelly, John, 2000. *Captive University: the Sovietization of East German, Czech, and Polish higher education, 1945-1956* Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

⁷⁰² Graham, Loren R., 1998. *What have we learned about science and technology from the Russian experience?* Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press.

Communist regime in relation to Polish economics. If we use it as a test-case for discerning how much discretion scholars need in order to fulfil the basic functions of knowledge production, evaluation and transmission, what will it tell us? In the period 1945-1948, we note that a significant number of economists actively sought a closer involvement with politics: they clearly believed this would improve their situation. In the next period, 1948-1955, the Communist regime promoted the introduction and elevation to influential positions of scholars whose loyalty it trusted, and extended its control to all areas of scholarly activity. In practice, Marxist-Leninist science meant that the Party leadership defined the content of Marxism-Leninism, leaving even Marxist-Leninist scholars with virtually no freedom or discretionary powers. During this period the level and content of scholarly discussion and production plummeted, and many students deserted the discipline. Increasingly, in intra-party fora the situation in scholarship was judged to be critical. The level of direct intervention in scholarly activities established by the regime the early 1950 did not provide conditions conducive for knowledge production. On this basis we may conclude that Polish economics between 1949 and 1955 is an example of a scientific organisation which had too little discretion over its activities to fulfil the task of knowledge production.

Did the Polish regime realise this; did they draw the same conclusion and act upon it? It is evident that by 1955 protagonists in and close to the Party leadership realised the existence of the problem and of the need to address it. Before any planned relaxation of the Party's hold on scholarship occurred, however, the turbulence of 1956 resulted in the return of discretionary powers to academic institutions and collegial bodies. The fact that the Party accepted such a development at this point tells us that it was unable to deal with it, but it does not tell us what it wished for instead, or whether the Party leaders had understood the need to delegate more discretion to scholars in order for the sector of higher education and research to function well. It is only by examining the activities of the Party from 1957 into the 1960s, a period which extends beyond the chronological limits adopted by this study, that these questions might be answered, and this is an enquiry that is yet to be made. Only a tentative proposition is possible here: the Party never returned to the practices that prevailed prior to 1956. Based on the testimonies of economists active in these years, it seems that different levels of control were applied to the subject of political economy as taught to all university students. Different controls were also applied to what economists were allowed to say to the general public, and to what they could say in publications with low print runs that were only distributed to specialists. Students who had to study the subject of political economy during these years

agree that it was dogmatic and boring, and that no-one paid any attention to it. A scholar who did pay attention, however, and who analysed a number of textbooks of political economy, asserted that “the degree of absorption of Western literature is surprisingly high, in spite of scanty references to in bibliographies and footnotes.”⁷⁰³ If Nuti is right, then throughout the 1960s Polish students were schooled in what western economists considered to be modern economic techniques, but were unaware of the fact, due to the ideological packaging. These two examples illustrate the difference between the situations preceding and following 1956. What we still do not know is whether this was because the Party leadership had learned the lesson that too much control incapacitates scholars, because a large number of its loyal scholars had deserted the cause of interventionist science policy, or if there were other reasons for this difference between early the 1950s and the 1960s.

Further studies of academic communities could also tell us more about the genesis of the opposition movement in Poland. By studying economists we can see that scholars of both ‘bourgeois’ and Marxist-Leninist persuasion realised that they had common interests. Despite the resentment and distrust between them caused by the revolutionary measures introduced in the early 1950s, they managed to form an alliance which allowed them to reclaim control over academic institutions and scholarly activity. Furthermore, throughout the late 1950s and 1960s they showed they were able to unite against the interventions of the Party apparatus. The new post-1956 scholarly community, divided and conflicted as it was, nevertheless presents us with a unique situation in the Polish context. If we consider Machcewicz’s argument that in 1956 a chasm separated the demands of the predominantly anti-communist society and the criticisms and desires of the vocal Marxist reformist elite, then Academia is a rare case where these two orientations came into contact.⁷⁰⁴ In academic life, revisionists and non-Marxists interacted. They listened to each other, and even agreed on a minimum programme of common interests, building the basis for an opposition which could translate the demands of the non-Marxist society into a language which could be understood by the regime. This may prove to have been the first rehearsal of an alliance between leftist intellectuals and the predominantly anti-communist wider Polish society which would give rise to an opposition movement that in the 1980s shook the foundations of communist power, not only in Poland but in the entire Soviet block.

⁷⁰³ Nuti, Domenico Mario, 1973. "The Political Economy of Socialism. Orthodoxy and Change in Polish Texts". *Soviet Studies*, 25, 244-270.

⁷⁰⁴ Machcewicz, Paweł, 1997. "Intellectuals and Mass Movement, Ideologies and Political Programs". *Contemporary European History*, 6, 361-382.

APPENDIX

COMPOSITION OF THE SECTION OF ECONOMICS AND ITS AND SUB-SECTIONS OF THE FIRST CONGRESS OF POLISH SCIENCE

Presidium of the executive committee of the First Congress of Polish Science

Leszczycki, Stanisław	
Petrusewicz, Kazimierz	CC Science Division
Golański, H.	Vice-minister of higher education
Michajlow, Włodzimierz	

Section of economics

president	Lange, Oskar	Main School of Planning and Statistics
vice-president	Jędrychowski, Stefan	State Commission of Economic Planning
vice-president	Blinowski, Franciszek	State Commission of Economic Planning
referent	Brus, Włodzimierz	Institute for Education of Scientific Cadres

1. Sub-section of political economy and planning

president	Lipiński, Edward	Main School of Planning and Statistics
vice-president	Minc, Bronisław	State Commission of Economic Planning
referent	Pohorille, Maksymillian	Party School/ Main School of Planning and Stat.
	Brus, W.	Institute for Education of Scientific Cadres
	Drewnowski, J.	Main School of Planning and Statistics
	Wyrozembski, Z.J.	Main School of Planning and Statistics
	Zawadzki, Józef	Main School of Planning and Statistics
	Zurawicki, Seweryn	Main School of Foreign Service
	Konopka, Antoni	Łódź
	Zatorski, Aleksander	
	Nowik, Edward	

2. Sub-section of industry and labour organisation

president	Jastrzebski, Wincenty	Ministry of Finance
vice-president and referent	Epsztejn, Ilja	Central Bureau of Statistics
	Bienkowski, Stan.	Krakow Higher School of Economics
	Bigeleisen-Zelazowski, Bronisław	Main Institute of Work
	Blinowski, F.	State Commission of Economic Planning
	Buch, Wiktor	State Commission of Economic Planning

Chmielewski, Czesław	State Commission of Economic Planning
Ferski, Andrzej	State Commission of Economic Planning
Fidelski, Roman	Ministry of Heavy Industry
Guzicki, Stanisław	Main School of Foreign Service
Kozłowski, Władysław	Polish Norm Committee
Lesz, Mieczysław	Vice-minister of Mining
Niereński, Jerzy	
Skarbiński, Michał	Łódź polytechnic
Szechter, Ozjasz	Central Council of Trade Unions
Taniewski, Ludwik	Central Institute of Work Protection
Wang, Adam	State Commission of Economic Planning
Zbichorski, Zygmunt	Main Institute of Work

3. Sub-section of agriculture

president	Tepicht, Jerzy	Institute of Agrarian Economics
vice-president	Rzendowski, Leon	State Commission of Economic Planning
Referent	Tomaszewski, Zenon	Institute of Agrarian Economics
	Brzoza, Anatol	CC PUWP
	Czerniewski, Konstanty	State Commission of Economic Planning
	Dąbrowski, Kazimierz	Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reform
	Dziedzic, Franciszek	Institute of Agrarian Economics
	Dziewicka, Maria	Institute for Education of Scientific Cadres
	Galaj, Dyzma	Higher School of Agriculture in Olsztyn
	Gotowiec, Marian	Higher School of Agriculture in Olsztyn
	Grosz, Irena	Editor of "Polish Peasant"
	Ignar, Stefan	Main School of Agriculture
	Kaltenberg, Piotr	Ministry of Higher Education and Science
	Kuźniński, Stanisław	Institute for Education of Scientific Cadres
	Manteuffel, Ryszard	Institute of Agrarian Economics
	Pol, Ludwik	Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reform
	Rabinowicz, Maks	Main Union of State Farms
	Stoliński, Feliks	Institute of Agrarian Economics
Wielburski, Ryszard	Institute of Agrarian Economics	
Zawadzka, Zofia-Janina	Institute of Agrarian Economics	

4. Sub-section of trade

president	Koźmiński, L.	Main School of Planning and Statistics
vice-president	Dietrich, T.	Ministry of interior trade
referent	Pawłowski, L.	Main School of Planning and Statistics
	Bitterowa, Cecylia	Institute for Scientific Research on Trade and Collective feeding
	Boczar, K.	Institute for Scientific Research on Trade and Collective feeding
	Ehrlich, Emil	Higher School of Economics in Katowice
	Grosfeld, Ludwik	Chamber of Foreign Trade
	Iwaszkiewicz, Edw.	State Commission of Economic Planning
	Jampel, Wilhelm	Ministry of interior trade
	Krynicky, Janusz	Main School of Foreign Service
	Kubicz, Waclaw	

Lychowski, T.	Polish Institute of International Affairs
Marszalek, Leon	Central Union of Co-operatives
Zakrzewski, Zbigniew	Poznań Higher School of Economics

5. Sub-section of finance

president	Trapczyński, W.	National Bank of Poland, Ministry of Finance
vice-president	Blass, Br.	Ministry of Finance
referent	Orłowski, M.	Main School of Foreign Service
	Drozniak, Edward	Ministry of Finance
	Kurowski, Leon	Ministry of Treasury
	Lubowicki, Jerzy	Univeristy of Warsaw
	Siebeneichen, Alfred	National Bank of Poland
	Skrzywan, St.	Main School of Planning and Statistics
	Szymański, Wład.	National Bank of Poland
	Wojciechowski, Edw.	Higher School of Economics in Łódź
Zurawicki, Seweryn	Main School of Foreign Service	

6. Sub-section of statistics

president	Szulc, Stefan	Main School of Planning and Statistics
vice-president	Padowicz, Zygmunt	Central Bureua of Statistics
vice-president	Szturm de Sztrem, Edward	Main School of Foreign Service
referent	Weryha, Al.	Main School of Foreign Service
	Hagemejer, W.	Central Bureua of Statistics
	Gruzewski, Al.	Main School of Planning and Statistics
	Oderfeld, J.	Polish Norm Committee
	Olekiewicz, M.	Lublin State Univeristy
	Romaniuk, K.	
	Rudnicki, Kazimierz	Ministry of Higher Education and Science
	Steinhaus, Hugo	Wrocław University

7. Sub-section of construction and communal housing

president	Secomski, K.	State Commission of Economic Planning
vice-president	Karczorowski, Michal	Institute of Housing Construction
Referent	Jaworski, Kazim.	State Commission of Economic Planning
vice-president	Babiński, Czesław	Ministry of Construction Industry
	Goryński, Julian	ZOR
	Bartnicki, Marian	State Commission of Economic Planning
	Dyzewski, Aleksander	Politechnic of Warsaw
	Dziewoński, Kazimierz	State Commission of Economic Planning
	Esse, Feliks Teodor	Institute of Construction Technique
	Kaczmarkiewicz, Ludomir	
	Litterer, Wanda	Institute of Housing Construction
	Przestepski, Władysław	
	Toeplitz, Kazimierz Leon	State Commission of Economic Planning

8. Sub-section of international trade

president	Grosfeld, Ludwik	Chamber of Foreign Trade
vice-president and referent	Łychowski, Tadasz	Polish Institute of International Affairs
vice-president	Prawin, Jakub	National Bank of Poland
	Siebeneichen, Alfred	National Bank of Poland
	Drewnowski, Jan	Main School of Planning and Statistics
	Gall, Stanisław	Chamber of Foreign Trade
	Kotlicki, Henryk	Ministry of Finance
	Rączkowski, Stanisław	National Bank of Poland
	Wiszniewski, Jerzy	Main School of Foreign Service
	Wyrozembski, Zygmunt	Main School of Planning and Statistics
	Zieleniewski, Jan	

LIST OF INTERVIEWS

Interviews conducted by Aleksandra Witzak Haugstad with:

Prof. Janusz Beksiak (1929-) 30.06.2000 in Warsaw

Prof. Tadeusz Kowalik (1926-) 11.07.2000 and 29.07.2000 in Warsaw

Prof. Waclaw Wilczyński (1923-) 13.07.2000 in Poznań

Prof. Jan Lipiński (1918-) 01.08.2000 in Warsaw

Prof. Stanisław Rączkowski (1912-2006) 02.08.2000 in Warsaw

Prof. Jan Mujżel (1923-2006) 24.08.2000 in Warsaw

Prof. Zdzisław Jan Sadowski (1925-) 03.08.2000 and November 2003 in Warsaw

Prof. Kazimierz Secomski (1910-2002) 09.12.2000 in Warsaw

Prof. Włodzimierz Brus (1921-2007), eight sessions between February and May 2001 in Oxford

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Zarząd Główny w Warszawie 1945-1967*

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- **6 I** Zjazd Ekonomistów Polskich (8-10.12.1950), 1950-51
- **7, 8, 9 II** Zjazd Ekonomistów Polskich (7-10.6.56), 1956
- **26** Działalność Sądu Koleżeńskiego przy PTE, 1961-1967
- **54** Organizacja i działalność Sekcji Wydawniczej Rady Naukowej PTE, 1947-48
- **55** Studium Prawno-Ekonomiczne z Szczecinie - likwidacja, 1956-63
- **62** Sprawozdania z działalności PTE, 1949-1956

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- **151** Zjazd Ekonomistów Morskich 1-3.03.1957,1957

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- 237/V/547 Liczebność partii, Nomenklatura kadr, odwołania od wydaleń z partii, praca
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- 237/XVI/4 Sprawozdania z pracy Wydziału . 1950-51
- 237/XVI/5 Notatki i wnioski Wydziału Nauki w sprawie: - wzmocnienia kadr Wydz. Nauki. - usprawnienia pracy Wydz. Nauki, - utworzenia wydziałów oświaty i nauki w KW- Projekt uchwały BO - w spr. utworzenia Wydz. Oświaty i Nauki KC. 1952-53
- 237/XVI/8 Notatki w sprawie powołania Zakładu Badan Ekonomicznych PAN. 1950-53
- 237/XVI/10 Notatki dla Sekretariatu KC w sprawie nauczania przedmiotów ideologicznych na wyższych uczelniach, ... 1951
- 237/XVI/12 Notatki dot. ... sytuacji na wyższych uczelniach warszawskich w okresie rekolekcji i po śmierci Stalina...1953
- 237/XVI/20 Notatka dot. objęcia stanowisk kierowniczych na wyższych uczelniach. ... 1949-51
- 237/XVI/25 Sprawozdania, notatki oraz informacje instruktorów i towarzyszy delegowanych w teren - woj. Szczecin, Warszawa, Wrocław. 1949-53
- 237/XVI/27 Uchwała BP w sprawie Kongresu Nauki. Projekt uchwał PB w sprawie: zmiany SGH na SGPiS utworzenia Akademii Handlu Zagranicznego; wyższego szkolnictwa ekonomicznego; nauki rolniczej. ... 1949-52
- 237/XVI/33 Uchwały Sekretariatu BO w sprawie ... Zjazdu Ekonomistów...1950-52
- 237/XVI/37 Wytyczne, oceny, protokoły zjazdów: ... ekonomistów. 1949-50
- 237/XVI/38 Zjazdy i konferencje naukowe: ... ekonomistów, ekologow...1951
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Dept. Studiów Ekonomicznych,

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- **1637** Kurs ekonomistów w Moskwie 24.9.-17.12.1951 Sprawozdanie, 1952
- **1638** Organizacja szkolnictwa wyższego ekonomicznego w ZSRR. Sprawozdanie z podróży służbowej. 1955

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- **1930** 5-letni plan badań naukowych na lata 1961-1965 Ekonomia. Protokół, referat, zestawienia, wykaz tematów i dyscyplin, tezy do dyskusji, wnioski., 1961
- **1961** Pracownicy katedr ekonomii politycznej zatrudnieni na uniwersytetach. Zestawienia, notatki służbowe. 1961-62

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- **2688** Organizacja toku studiów wyższych. Projekty tez do wykładów, programy nauczania Ekonomii Politycznej, wnioski, 1952, 1954

Dept. Kształcenia i Doskonalenia Kadr,

- **2692** Konferencje i seminaria dla kierowników, wykładowców i asystentów katedr ekonomii politycznej. Tematyka, tezy referatów, referaty, bibliografia. 1954

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- **2780a** Członkowie CKK. Projekt uchwały Rady Ministrów, protokoły posiedzeń Sekcji Rady Głównej Szkolnictwa Wyższego, wykazy imienne, opinie, nominacje, odwołania..., 1956-57

- **2780b** Rzecząowacy CKK. Zasady pracy, wykazy imienne, nominacje, podziękowania, pokwitowanie, korespondencja. 1952-56
- **2782** Posiedzenia Sekcji Nauk Społecznych - od 16.10. do 20.12.1954. Programy, stenogramy, listy obecności, 1954
- **2781** Posiedzenia Sekcji Nauk Społecznych - od 17.8.53. do 24.9.1954. Regulaminy pracy, programy, protokoły, stenogramy, listy obecności, 1953-54
- **2783** Posiedzenia Sekcji Nauk Społecznych - 1955 r., od 17.1. do 12.5.55. Programy i stenogramy, 1955
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- **79** Plany pracy katedry 1950-57
- **91** Tematyka seminariów i referatów protokoły i ocena seminariów (1950-1955)

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- 18 Korespondencja w sprawach koordynacji prac Sekcji i Podsekcji
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- 164 Wykaz zebrań sekcji i podsekcji
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- 171, 172 Korespondencja dotycząca prac Podsekcji.
- 173 Referaty pomocnicze, tematy, tezy, wykazy prac seminaryjnych
- 174, 175 Korespondencja dot. przedkongresowych prac Podsekcji oraz okólniki.
- 192, 193 Kartoteka nazwisk i adresów osób biorących udział w pracach Sekcji i Podsekcji
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Po Prostu. Tygodnik studentów i młodej inteligencji.

Polityka

Trybuna Ludu. Organ KC PZPR.

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