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Institutional Trust in Sub-Saharan Africa

A Study of How Government Performance - Actual and Perceived - Affects Institutional Trust

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Abstract

A strengthening of citizens' legitimacy is of essential importance in Sub-Saharan Africa, since an undermining of legitimacy arguably poses a threat to regime stability. Political trust is an important measure of legitimacy, of which government performance is a significant source. This study analyzes how government performance, both in economic and political terms, affects changes in aggregated levels of institutional trust. The research question is twofold: "a) How does government performance explain decreases in institutional trust in Africa, b) and what implications does this have for democratic consolidation". The analysis relies on data from two successive Afrobarometer rounds: Round 4(2008/2009) and Round 5(2011/2013). A framework is constructed of how perceived- and actual government performance influence levels of institutional trust. Initially, a preliminary question was raised to map out trends in institutional trust between these rounds, and contrary to my expectations, the analysis do not show a major decline in levels of institutional trust. My findings show, especially on the individual level, that negative perceptions of government performance have a negative impact on institutional trust. Additionally, I find a connection between political government performance on country level and institutional trust, where low levels of democracy and democratic setbacks have a negative impact on institutional trust. I do not however, find a connection between countries' income levels and levels of institutional trust. In sum, results indicate that poor government performance has negative implications for democratic consolidation in Africa, but that there are still unanswered questions, which further studies including more semi- and non-democratic countries will most likely give more encompassing answers to.

Sammendrag

En styrking av folks legitimitet er spesielt viktig i Afrika sør for Sahara, delvis siden en undergravning av legitimitet utgjør en trussel mot regimestabilitet. Politisk tillit er et viktig mål for legitimitet, og som myndighetenes leveringsevne er en sentral kilde til. Dette studiet analyserer hvordan myndighetenes leveringsevne, både økonomisk og politisk, påvirker endringer i nivåer av institusjonell tillit. Problemstillingen er todelt: "a) Hvordan kan myndighetenes leveringsevne forklare nedgang i tilliten til institusjoner i Afrika, og b) hvilke implikasjoner har dette for demokratisk konsolidering". Analysen baserer seg på data fra to påfølgende Afrobarometer runder: Runde 4 (2008/2009) og Runde 5 (2011/2013). Et rammeverk blir konstruert hvor de faktiske- og oppfattede prestasjonene til myndighetenes påvirkning på nivåer av institusjonell tillit blir studert. Et innledende spørsmål ble reist for å kartlegge trender i institusjonell tillit mellom disse rundene, og i motsetning til mine forventninger, viser ikke analysen en stor nedgang i institusjonell tillit. Funnene mine viser, spesielt på individ nivå, at negative oppfattelser av myndighetenes leveringsevne har en negativ innvirkning på institusjonell tillit. I tillegg finner jeg en sammenheng mellom myndighetenes politiske leveringsevne på landnivå og institusjonell tillit, hvor lave nivåer av demokrati og demokratisk tilbakegang har en negativ innvirkning på institusjonell tillit. Jeg finner imidlertid ingen sammenheng mellom et lands inntektsnivå og nivåer av institusjonell tillit. I sum indikerer resultatene på at svak leveringsevne fra myndighetenes side har negative implikasjoner for demokratisk konsolidering i Afrika, men at det fortsatt er ubesvarte spørsmål, som videre studier som inkluderer flere semi- og ikke-demokratiske land mest sannsynlig vil gi mer helhetlige svar på.

Preface

The idea for this thesis came to me during my semester studying abroad at University of Cape Town last fall. During this period I got insight into South African culture and politics. I also had one of the founders behind Afrobarometer, Robert Mattes, as my lecturer. He introduced me to the Afrobarometer surveys. My interest in political participation in general, and my stay in South Africa especially, inspired me to write my thesis on Sub-Saharan Africa.

Months of intensive work on this thesis have been challenging, but also very motivating. I have learned a lot, and have realized how much more I want to learn about political science. It feels very satisfying that this thesis now is completed, and that I can finally call myself a political scientist. The five years I have been a student here in Trondheim have been very enjoyable, and will be a period of my life that I will look back on with a smile.

I will take this opportunity to thank all those who have helped me and supported me this spring. I especially want to thank my supervisor, Tanja Ellingsen, who has guided and helped me throughout this whole period. I also would like to thank Arild Bleksaune, who not only converted my datasets, but who also has answered methodological questions I have had. I would like to thank those who have proofread my thesis. A special thanks to my friend Karoline, who has been there for me in both highs and lows this spring. Also, I would like to thank my boyfriend, my family and the rest of my friends who always support me and brighten up my life.

On a final note, any remaining errors are solely my responsibility.

Anne Haugen Haagensen

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1. Introduction

In many ways, democratization results in hopes for increased political rights, civil liberties and economic progress (Catterberg & Moreno, 2006, p. 33). In Sub-Saharan Africa¹, some of these aspirations have recognizably been fulfilled, as much more countries are democratic, and several have improved in quality, compared to 20 years ago (Diamond, 2010a). Just last year, there were several positive incidents reflecting this development, such as the peaceful transition of presidential power in Nigeria, and the outspoken protests from leaders in East Africa against President Pierre Nkurunziza's intention to seek a third unconstitutional presidential term (Freedom House, 2015). Nevertheless, scholars such as Diamond (2010a, 2015) and Joseph (2010) are arguing that there is a democratic recession happening in several African countries: A decline in levels of freedoms, numerous reversals away from liberal democracies, and a lack of democratic consolidation. In addition, Diamond (2010b, p. 53) argues: "...poor governance, persistent corruption and stubborn personalism...so often continue to beset Africa's democracies".

What implications does this have? Huntington (1991, p.292) argues that when regimes fail to operate effectively, it could undermine state legitimacy. This is a concern, since securing legitimacy is especially important in Africa, and an undermining arguably poses a threat to state- and regime stability (Bratton & Chang, 2006, p.1061; Rotberg, 2010, p.9).

Since political trust is considered an important measure for popular legitimacy, this thesis studies the level of institutional trust in Africa (e.g.Hetherington, 1998; Miller, 1974; Newton, 2007). Overall, there are two main explanations as to what affects institutional trust: cultural and institutional theories (Mishler & Rose, 2001, p. 31). Institutional theories have gained a lot of influence over the years, and a number of scholars argue that government performance has an important influence on political trust (e.g.Citrin & Green, 1986; Hetherington, 1998; Hutchison & Johnson, 2011; Miller & Listhaug, 1990; Newton, 1999).

Based on the introduction outlined above, I chose to focus on institutional explanations, and thus this thesis sets out to study how government performance affects institutional trust in Africa. The research question addressed in this thesis is:

How does government performance explain decreases in institutional trust in Africa, and what implications does this have for democratic consolidation?

¹ Sub-Saharan Africa will be referred to as Africa for the duration of this thesis.

1.1 Research Aims and Objectives

Embedded in the research question, is the study of both political and economic government performance, i.e. the delivery of political- and economic goods. To establish the connection between institutional trust and government performance, I propose a framework for studying institutional trust in Africa where I combine macro-level indicators and micro-level indicators, characterized as actual and perceived government performance. It is becoming more common in political science to combine explanations on both levels (e.g. Hutchison & Johnson, 2011; Mishler & Rose, 1999, 2001). Nevertheless, few studies combine these approaches simultaneously in one model. This is somewhat problematic since government performance should be studied on both levels, and both indicators on both levels face obstacles (e.g. Beegle, Christiaensen, Dabalen, & Gaddis, 2016; Munck and Verkuilen, 2002, p. 28; Norris, 2011, pp. 192-203). I argue that by combining macro- and micro-level indicators, I am able to compensate for these obstacles to some extent. In sum, my framework distinguishes between *political* and *economic* performance, as well as *actual* (macro) and *perceived* (micro) performance.

Whilst not fully agreed upon, government performance is considered to affect state legitimacy, here measured by political trust, especially in newly democratized countries (e.g. Huntington, 1991; Lipset, 1959; Mishler & Rose, 2001, Norris, 2011). This appears to especially apply in Africa, where legitimacy according to Ndegwa (2001, p. 2) is strongly dependent on whether government extends political rights and provide economic goods. By studying how governments' performance affects levels of institutional trust, I wish to gain insight into how to avoid decrease in institutional trust levels. If governments can promote trust among their own citizens, state legitimacy will be secured to a larger extent than if they cannot promote institutional trust. Government performance is closely related to both political and economic conditions within a country, and therefore a contextual overview of Africa is presented early on in this thesis. To answer my research question, I rely on data from the two latest available Afrobarometer survey rounds: Round 4 and Round 5².

The dependent variable is institutional trust, which based on North's (1990, p. 4) broad definition refers to "... any form of constraint that human beings devise to shape human interaction". More precisely, I study people's trust in six core institutions: the President, the Parliament, the electoral commission, the local government, the police, and the courts.

² Round 6 is in its final stages of completion, but merged data was not available in the time that this thesis was written.

Generally, for a democracy to be consolidated, citizens have to develop a sense of appreciation towards formal institutions, and trust in these institutions is essential for a functioning democracy (Hetherington, 1998, p. 803; Stepan & Linz, 1996, p. 17).

Despite a growing amount of research on levels of institutional trust in Africa, few studies have yet to study levels of institutional trust over time. This is important, considering that research on popular legitimacy can gain insight as to whether democracy is in decline or not (Plattner, 2015, p. 6). Often, it is assumed that institutional trust is low and declining in Africa, but limited empirical evidence exists to establish this. Until recently, survey data from Africa has been quite limited, but this has changed due to releases from the Afrobarometer Network in the last fifteen years. I therefore took the opportunity to study levels of political trust between the two Afrobarometer rounds, and raise a preliminary research question as to whether there is an apparent decline in institutional trust in Africa.

My findings show there is rather a case of stagnation in levels of institutional trust in a majority of African countries between the rounds, since less than half of the countries have experienced declines in levels of institutional trust, and most noted declines are relatively small. In addition there are large country variations. Citizens in Nigeria have very low levels of institutional trust, whereas citizens in Mozambique have much higher levels of institutional trust. Results also show that political government performance is a strong cause for institutional trust, on both a macro- and micro-level. Economic government performance also matters, but here individual level indicators do a much better job in explaining levels of institutional trust. On a micro-level, it is evident that peoples' subjective perceptions of economic performance are significant in explaining trust, whereas a more objective perception of economic performance, lived poverty, is not.

1.2 Structure

In the next chapter, I outline important contextual characteristics that are important in order to grasp the conditions that African governments work under. In chapter three I present the main theoretical and empirical background for my research. Here, I argue why the dynamics and consequences of institutional trust is different in Africa compared to other regions. Furthermore, I outline the framework for this study, as well as the main hypothesis that is tested. In chapter four I present my data sets and research design, as well as an overview of the main dependent and independent variables. In addition, I discuss the quality of my research. In chapter five the analysis is presented, and it consists of three parts: 1) A

descriptive analysis to establish trends in levels of institutional trust between the rounds, and an empirical overview of the main independent variables. 2) An analysis to establish relationship between institutional trust and variables on a macro-level. 3) A multilevel analysis to establish causes of institutional trust on both a micro- and macro-level. In chapter six the main important findings of my research is discussed, and I elaborate on possibilities regarding future research.

2. The African Context

In this chapter, I outline the characteristics about the transitions undergone in African countries, as well as the political- and economical context. The “African context” referred to in this chapter, describes the context of the whole region, but in reality, this thesis is centered on only twenty countries due to the selection of countries from the surveys. Where beneficial to the analysis, I comment on the individual context of the respective countries explicitly³.

2.1 Decades of Reforms

A number of economic and political reforms were introduced worldwide in the late 20th century (Bratton, Mattes, & Gymiah-Boadi, 2005). These changes can be seen in relation to the major surge of democracy, identified by Huntington (1991, p. xiii) as “the third wave of democracy”. This wave started in 1974 (Huntington, 1991, p. 21). In the 90s, this democracy wave reached Africa, and more than half of the African countries were democratized during a ten-year period. The causes for these liberation reforms are compound, but could be said to be the result of both internal and external pressure (Joseph, 1997). Political leaders were forced to accept these reforms due to the mounting protests among citizens, as well as increasing pressure from international donors and creditors (Bratton et al., 2005, p. 15). Similar forces drove the economic reforms, and the pressure towards the authorities peaked when the ongoing African economic crisis reached its height in the late 1980s. This forced governments to accept economic changes as part of structural adjustment programs, such as loans provided by the World Bank and the Internationally Monetary Fund (Bratton et al., 2005, p. 20; Ndegwa, 2001, p. 7).

Most transitions from authoritarianism to democracy in Africa were very rapid; vast changes were implemented in a short amount of time. The new democratic regimes lacked set institutional pillars during these transformations, and consequently, a number of democratic institutions had to be introduced (Ndegwa, 2001, p. 6). The structures of these democratic institutions are still being settled in several African countries, and today, these formal institutions of democracy coexist with more informal institutions (Diamond, 2010b, p. 47).

³ The 20 African countries included in this study are Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.


2.2 Political Context

Prior to providing an overview of the political context in Africa, a conceptualization of democracy is necessary, which is a difficult task seeing that scholars define democracy differently (Diamond, 2002). Schumpeter (1976, p. 269) provides us with a minimalistic definition of democracy, which focuses on electoral competition, and can be seen in opposition to the liberal understanding of democracy (Diamond, 1996). A liberal democracy has been characterized by Dahl (1971, p. 7) to require two important dimensions: contestation and participation. Thus, in addition to universal suffrage and fair elections, there needs to be a certain degree of freedom (Norris, 2011, p. 48). Lipset’s (1959) definition of democracy can be regarded as useful and generally accepted:

...a political system which supplies regular constitutional opportunities for changing the governing officials. It is a social mechanism for the resolution of the problem of societal decision-making among conflicting interest groups which permits the largest possible part of the population to influence these decisions through their ability to choose among alternative contenders for political office. (Lipset, 1959, p. 71)

There are several ways of classifying regimes, but the common classification used for this thesis is: liberal democracies, electoral democracies and autocracies (Norris, 2011). Arguably, a liberal democracy comes close to Dahl’s (1971) understanding of democracy, and an electoral democracy is similar to Schumpeter’s (1976) understanding. As Norris (2011, p. 50) points out, electoral democracies are not autocracies “...nor do they meet the full conditions of political rights and civil liberties to qualify as liberal democracies”. Autocracies are repressive regimes where there are no elections at all (Norris, 2011). Norris (2011, pp. 48-50) favorably links these three classifications to Freedom House’s ratings of regimes: free, partly free and not free.

Figure 2-1: Development in country status based on Freedom House’s classification



In the last decade, levels of freedom have declined in Africa, and there has also been deterioration in several democratic institutions (Diamond, 2015, p. 159). This decline in

level of freedoms is noticeable in Figure 2-1. It shows that Freedom House classifies fewer countries as free and partly free, and more countries as not free in 2015 compared to 2005⁴. During this period there were nine reversals from electoral/liberal democracies to autocracies, and two reversals from liberal to electoral democracies. In the same period, there were only four transitions towards increased freedom, from autocracy to electoral democracy⁵.

Generally, many African democracies are considered to have low quality in terms of political competition, levels of freedom and system of law (Diamond, 2010a, p. xi). Bratton and Chang’s (2006, p. 1066) study shows that governance in Africa is weak compared to global standards. As illustrated in Figure 2-1, nine countries were classified as free, 20 as partly free, and 20 countries as not free in 2016⁶. The fact that so many countries are classified as only partly free and not free, could explain why a majority of Africans do not feel that they are provided with democratic institutions (Bratton, 2010, pp. 113-114).

Table 2-1: Overview of country status in 2015 based on Freedom House’s classification

FREE	PARTLY FREE	NOT FREE
Benin	Burkina Faso	Angola
Botswana	Comoros	Burundi
Cape Verde	Cote d'Ivoire	Cameroon
Ghana	Guinea	Central African Republic
Mauritius	Guinea-Bissau	Chad
Namibia	Kenya	Congo (Brazzaville)
Sao Tome & Principe	Lesotho	Congo (Kinshasa)
Senegal	Liberia	Djibouti
South Africa	Madagascar	Equatorial Guinea
	Malawi	Eritrea
	Mali	Ethiopia
	Mozambique	Gabon
	Niger	Gambia, The
	Nigeria	Mauritania
	Seychelles	Rwanda
	Sierra Leone	Somalia
	Tanzania	South Sudan
	Togo	Sudan
	Zambia	Swaziland
	Zimbabwe	Uganda
9	20	20

Note: The 20 countries included in this thesis’ sample are highlighted.

⁴ These figures are based on numbers from the year 2005 and 2015, and do not take into consideration changes that has occurred within this period. Raw data is collected from Freedom House (2005-2013) database available at <https://freedomhouse.org>.

⁵ In all of Africa, the countries that experienced declines in freedom between 2005 and 2015 were: Burundi, Central African Republic, Congo (Brazzaville), Djibouti, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Lesotho, Mali, Mauritania, Uganda. Countries that experienced freedom gains between 2005 and 2015 were: Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea, Togo, and Zimbabwe. Of the twenty countries included in the analysis, Lesotho, Mali and Uganda experienced declines in freedom, and Zimbabwe experienced gains.

⁶ Table 2-1 shows that a majority of the countries included in the analysis are classified as free or partly free.

Clientelism, corruption, and “Big Man” presidentialism are present in Africa, and are regarded as obstacles to democratization (Bratton, 2010, p. 105). The latter phenomenon can be understood in relation to what Prempeh (2010, p. 19) labeled “imperial presidency” in Africa, which means that presidents still have enormous power despite the introduction of democratic reforms. Overall, a number of regimes in Africa do not necessarily fit into classification described above, as several are identified as hybrid regimes. These regimes “... occupy a gray zone between democracy and autocracy” (Bratton & Chang, 2006, p. 1064; Diamond, 2002).


Despite the decline in freedom discussed above, there are positive outlooks as well. Empirical evidence show that most Africans support democracy, and believe that democracy is in their interest (e.g. Bratton et al., 2005, pp. 73-74; Diamond, 2015, p.153).

2.3 Economic Context

A recent World Bank report, *Poverty in a rising Africa*, claims that “...the narrative of Africa as a “growth tragedy” has shifted to one of Africa rising” (Beegle et al., 2016, p. 21). The report highlights positive developments in the last two decades, such as an increase in economic growth with of 4,5 percent per year, and a reduction in the poverty rate (Beegle et al., 2016, p. 21). There have also been improvements in several indicators that capture well-being, such as improvement in health and decline in violence (Beegle et al., 2016, p. 1).

However, the report also states that Africa is still experiencing large economic and social challenges. Generally, extreme poverty is a major problem in Africa. Due to a rise in population, there were 100 million more people living in extreme poverty in 2012 than in 1990 (Beegle et al., 2016, p. 3). Based on income levels, Africa is still the poorest region in the world (Beegle et al., 2016, p. 40).

Figure 2-2: Development in income status based on World Bank’s classification



As Figure 2-2 illustrates, there has been a positive trend in terms of income levels in the last two decades in Africa, since several fewer countries are low-income countries in 2014 compared to both 1995 and 2005⁷. From 2005 to 2014, there have been nine transitions from low-income to lower-middle-income, two transitions from lower- middle to upper-middle-income, and two transitions from upper middle income to high-income countries⁸.

In 2014, there were 26 low-income countries, 15 lower-middle-income countries, six upper-middle-income countries, and two-high-income countries in Africa⁹. Figure 2-2 shows that, except for Equatorial Guinea and Seychelles, all of the African countries are categorized as developing countries according to World Bank classifications¹⁰. Nonetheless, to categorize countries on the basis of income is very problematic, especially in Africa. This is partly due to the lack of available and reliable data (Beegle et al., 2016; Jerven, 2010).

Table 2-2: Overview of income status in 2014 based on World Bank’s classification of income groups

LOW		LOWER-MIDDLE	UPPER-MIDDLE	HIGH
Benin	Madagascar	Cape Verde	Angola	Equatorial Guinea
Burkina Faso	Malawi	Central African Republic	Botswana	Seychelles
Burundi	Mali	Congo (Brazzaville)	Gabon	
Central African Rep.	Mozambique	Djibouti	Mauritius	
Chad	Niger	Ghana	Namibia	
Comoros	Rwanda	Côte d'Ivoire	South Africa	
Congo (Kinshasa)	Somalia	Kenya		
Eritrea	Sierra Leone	Lesotho		
Ethiopia	South Sudan	Mauritania		
Gambia	Tanzania	Nigeria		
Ghana	Togo	São Tomé and Príncipe		
Guinea	Uganda	Senegal		
Guinea-Bissau	Zimbabwe	Sudan		
Liberia		Swaziland		
		Zambia		
26		15	6	2

Note: The 20 countries included in this thesis’ sample are highlighted.

⁷ Data was collected from World Bank (2008-2013) database available at <http://www.worldbank.org>.

⁸ In all of Africa, the countries that experienced gains in income between 2005 and 2014 were: Angola, Ghana, Kenya, Mauritania, Namibia, Nigeria, São Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sudan, and Zambia. Of the twenty countries included in the analysis, Ghana, Kenya, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, and Zambia experienced gains in economic development.

⁹ As illustrated in Table 2-2, most of the countries included in this analysis are categorized as low-income or lower-middle-income countries.

¹⁰ Developing countries have less than 12 735 \$ GNI per capita, i.e. not high-income countries (World Bank, 2016c).

3. Institutional Trust

In this chapter I present the main theoretical and empirical background for my research. In addition, I outline the framework for this study, as well as the main hypotheses.

3.1 State Legitimacy and Political Trust

According to Inglehart (1997, pp. 162-163), two factors are essential for a stable democracy: a trusting culture and legitimacy. Generally, political trust is linked to political support, and also to citizens' perceptions of regime legitimacy (Hetherington, 1998; Miller, 1974). Often, political trust is conceptualized as an indicator for political support at an institutional level (Norris, 2011, p. 44), which is the case for this study, and also as an indicator for state legitimacy (Levi, Sacks, & Tyler, 2009). Here, "state legitimacy" is understood in terms with Gilley's (2006, p. 500) definition as whether citizens perceive the state "...as rightfully holding and exercising political power". Newton (2007, p. 355) states: "Institutional confidence comes close to the concept of legitimation..." and thus correspond with Hutchison and Johnson's (2011, p. 738) definition of institutional trust: "...society's overall confidence in the political institutions that comprise the state".

Arguably, it is difficult to govern in a system without political trust, and in the long run, it becomes difficult for a regime to survive without a majority of its citizens offering political support (Hetherington, 1998; Miller, 1974, p. 951). Low levels of institutional trust are concerning: it tells us something is wrong in a democratic system (Listhaug & Wiberg, 1995, p. 299). The more trustworthy the government appears, the more likely it is that citizens will comply with government demands, such as taxes and policies (Levi & Stoker, 2000, p. 491). This can be seen in relation to Dalton's (2004, p. 165) argument: if citizens believe that the government acts in peoples' best interest, they will believe their actions to be legitimate, and thus that they should comply. Therefore, a strong distrust can undermine compliance, and make it difficult to govern (Levi & Stoker, 2000).

It is necessary to emphasize that scholars disagree on what position political trust has in a democracy, and there is a disagreement on whether low levels and decline in political trust is harmful for democracies (e.g. Dalton, 2004; Norris, 2011; Warren, 1999). This discrepancy can be seen as a consequence of fundamental difference of opinion. On the one hand, Hardin (1999, pp. 23-24) argues that it is sensible to distrust institutions, because citizens are not in a position to trust these institutions anyway. Miller (1974, p. 951) points out that growing distrust may lead to "...throwing the rascals out". On the other hand, there

are scholars such as Hetherington (1998, pp. 803-804), who argue that high levels of trust are good for any democracy, and without it, any problems in a democracy will worsen. In many ways, political trust is what Mishler and Rose (1997, p. 419) characterizes as double-edged: “Democracy requires trust but also presupposes an active and vigilant citizenry with a healthy skepticism for government and willingness, should the need arise, to suspend trust and assert control over government”.

Whilst acknowledging the double-edge characteristics of political trust, there is little doubt that political trust is of great significance in Africa. Much of the discussion on political trust is largely set within a Western context. In general, the concerns for eroding political trust and growing cynicism are greater in newer democracies than in more established democracies (Mishler & Rose, 1999; Norris, 1999a). Catterberg and Moreno (2006, p. 32) make a convincing argument when they state: “We contend that the decline reflects different dynamics and has differentiated effects in established democracies on the one hand, and in new ones on the other”. Echoing their argument, I argue that the causes and consequences of changes in political trust in Africa are different than in Western countries. In the following paragraphs, I present two main reasons for this argument.

First, declining and low levels of political trust cause concerns about the stability of the democratic system, because there is a link between political trust and democratic consolidation in newer democracies (Norris, 1999c, pp. 264-265). Mishler and Rose (1999, p. 79) argue that growing political support is essential in countries that are democratizing, and in new democracies in general. In Africa as well, Bratton and Chang (2006, p. 1080) highlight the importance of popular legitimacy. Moreover, opposite to western democracies, African countries have other close alternatives to democracy, both in terms of geography and time. As Ndegwa (2001, p. 2) points out: “...the authoritarian alternative is ever-present and more than a handful of elites may still view it as beneficial to their interests”. A number of African countries are still characterized by Freedom House (2016a) as autocracies. If neighboring democratic regimes collapse, the possibility of snowballing effects is present, i.e. that other regimes follow and collapse as well (Huntington, 1991, p. 293). In addition, since governors and the governed have autocratic alternatives fresh in memory, they are arguably likely to compare the new democratic system with a previous autocratic one (Ndegwa, 2001). As

argued by Citrin and Green (1986, p. 452), declines in trust “...improves the chances for reforms advocated by its antagonists”¹¹.

Second, political trust is not only linked to regime stability, but also to performance of the democratic system (Marien & Hooghe, 2011). As noted by several scholars, political trust fosters compliance with laws and regulations (e.g. Dalton, 2004; Hetherington, 1998; Levi & Stoker, 2000). Citizens’ compliance is of essential importance in Africa. As Norris (2011, p. 110) argues, these countries “...have not yet developed a deep reservoir of mass support and where government authority depends to a large degree upon voluntary compliance”.

3.2 Dynamics of Institutional Trust in Africa

Overall, we do not know much about the dynamics of political trust in Africa. A reason for this is that levels of institutional trust vary substantially across African countries, and it is thus difficult to establish patterns (e.g. Armah-Attoh, Gyimah-Boadi, & Chikwanha, 2007; Hutchison & Johnson, 2011; Lavallée, Razafindrakoto, & Roubaud, 2008). Another, and perhaps a more crucial reason, is that there is arguably a lack of research on political trust in Africa, because until quite recently, empirical data from Africa has not been available. Consequently, I find it difficult to make strong claims regarding political trust in Africa without taking uncertainties into account.

3.2.1 Trends in Institutional Trust

Whilst not fully agreed upon, there is a general notion and some empirical evidence that suggest that political trust is low and declining worldwide (Norris, 2011). Empirical evidence from Catterberg and Moreno (2006, pp. 45-46) well-known study of political trust in new and established democracies show that decline in trust were more apparent in new democracies than in established democracies. Within the African context, Lavallée et al.’s (2008, p. 4) empirical study indicates that Africans have low levels of trust towards institutions. Additionally, evidence from Bratton et al.’s (2005, pp. 241-242) study finds that most Africans have low opinions of their political leaders. Overall, there are several examples of specific declines in trust in African countries, such as the dramatic decline in institutional trust that Senegal witnessed in 2008. Based on Sall’s (2015, p.7) empirical evidence, it appears that this drop was mostly due to Senegalese’ negative perceptions of corruption

¹¹ I note that this argument was put forward in an American context, but I argue that the argument applies for the African context as well.

among officials, as well as the country's and government's economic situation and performance. Another example is the decline in institutional trust that Nigeria experienced between 2000 and 2005, which was explained by growing disappointment among citizens (Diamond, 2007, pp. 5-6). A third example can be found in a case study conducted by Freedom House in 2013 in South Africa, where they discovered that people were becoming more critical towards government (Booyesen, 2014, p. 30). Nonetheless, based on the empirical evidence available from Africa, there does not appear to be an overwhelming support for the notion that there is a decline or low levels of trust here. For instance, there are empirical evidence that indicate that Africans' trust in institutions was growing in the first half of the 2000 decade (Armah-Attoh et al., 2007, pp. 9-10; Lavallée et al., 2008, p. 4), and also that a majority of Africans have positive trust assessments of institutions (Bratton et al., 2005, p. 229).

From a theoretical perspective, new democracies are expected to have low and declining levels of political trust (Mishler & Rose, 2001). According to Diamond (2007, pp. 5-6), there exists a form of disillusionment in emerging and newer democracies, i.e. a growing discontent and disappointment. Opposed to more established democracies, Mishler and Rose (2001, p. 32) argue that one can expect low levels of political trust in new democracies, since these democracies will likely "...confront a variety of difficult problems linked to their political and economic transitions, yet they have little experience governing democratically". In addition, African countries did not have institutions to build on when democracy was first introduced to them. To some extent African countries appear to lack some of the same state capacities that strong states have, and thus have more difficulties in providing essential political goods, such as supply of security and freedom, rule of law and other political goods (Rotberg, 2010, pp. 3-4). In sum, partly based on empirical evidence and partly on theory, we can expect declines and low levels of political trust in Africa.

3.2.2 Government Performance and Institutional Trust

We know a lot about what influences political trust in general, and largely explanations for institutional trust can be divided into two theoretical approaches: cultural and institutional¹². Cultural theories are founded on the notion that political trust is caused by factors outside the political sphere, whereas institutional theories regard it as caused within the political sphere (Mishler & Rose, 2001, p. 31). In general, within political science, there is a strong link

¹² A more encompassing elaboration is presented in chapter 3.4.1.

between institutional capacity and political trust (e.g. Citrin & Green, 1986; Hetherington, 1998; Hutchison & Johnson, 2011). In state-centered theories, such as Rotberg's (2010) theory, a number of state capabilities are deemed important for political support, but generally, it is assumed that government capacity influences political trust from both an individual- and a state level (Mishler & Rose, 2001, p. 32). Economic performance is a favored indicator of government capability (e.g. McAllister, 1999), but government performance can also be measured in more political aspects as well (e.g. Mishler & Rose, 2001). Overall, there are a number of reasons why such performance-oriented indicators are especially important in explaining dynamics of political trust in Africa.

First, it seems reasonable to assume that characteristics of the African context will influence political trust. As already elaborated on, in terms of democratization and economic effectiveness, the majority of African countries are deemed weaker compared to other regions in the world. Often, governments in Africa are depicted as institutionally weak and with bad political leadership (e.g. Bratton & Chang, 2006; Ndegwa, 2001; Rotberg, 2010). Furthermore, negative depictions of the political and the economic situation appear to be reflected in Africans' attitudes¹³.

Second, it is central that African democracies can be depicted as relatively young. Ndegwa (2001, pp. 2-4) argues that legitimacy in African democracies hinges on the period after the initial transition to democracy, which can be referred to as the post-honeymoon period. At first, government can rely on goodwill, but then they must prove themselves. Catterberg and Moreno (2006, p. 3) points out that a decline in trust in new democracies is due to disillusionment. In these newly democratized countries, citizens will have high demands when evaluating the governments' performance. These demands are closely linked to the driving forces behind the transition, and also create new "...aspirations of civil, political, and economic rights" (Catterberg & Moreno, 2006, p. 33). Arguably, there are two forms of public goods that are particularly important in Africa: political goods and economic goods. 1) Political goods: regimes are judged on how they extend rights, and whether they are able to open up the democratic arena. 2) Economic goods: regimes are judged on how they manage economic recovery, and how they deliver compared to authoritarian regimes (Catterberg & Moreno, 2006; Ndegwa, 2001, p.2).

¹³ This argument is founded on findings from Bratton et al.'s (2005, p. 98) study that shows that for a majority of Africans, economic problems are considered to be the most important problem facing development, and findings from Bratton and Houessou's (2014) study that shows that most Africans are not satisfied with the workings of democracy in their country.

Third, performance-oriented approaches are arguably becoming increasingly important in explaining political trust. Newton (1999) argues that the basis of political trust is changing towards favoring performance oriented explanations in established democracies: “Whereas political trust was once based on social identities and ideological loyalties, and reinforced by personal ties and similarities ... it now seems to be more pragmatic, instrumental, and dependent upon second-hand political information and performance” (Newton, 1999, p. 179). Still, this argument is largely set within a Western setting. Nevertheless, there are indications that this phenomenon might be apparent in Africa as well. Empirical evidence from Catterberg and Moreno’s (2006) study indicate that changes in political trust in new democracies were influenced by dissatisfaction with government performance. In Africa, Bratton et al.’s (2005, pp. 277-282) extensive study shows that political attitudes in Africa are highly instrumental when they assess the extent of democracy, where citizens’ attitudes stem on how they perceive government’s performance. This is arguably supported in Mattes and Bratton’s (2007, p. 202) study, which suggests that for most Africans, political performance is important for their perceptions of the supply of democracy.

3.3 Conceptual Framework for Institutional Trust

Political trust is an ambiguous concept, which often leads to a number of difficulties with the concept in political science (Catterberg & Moreno, 2006, p. 33). Moreover, there are several concepts linked to political trust, such as democratic support, disaffection, political discontent, political alienation (e.g. Easton, 1975; Gunther & Montero, 2006; Norris, 2011). Thus I argue that a conceptual framework for political trust should be laid out.

A starting point is to begin with the general meaning of the word trust. Basically, trust is based on the conviction that others around us will look after us, and try to avoid causing us harm (Newton, 2007, p. 343). In addition, a distinction needs to be made between social and political trust. Social trust and political trust are closely linked, and these concepts are often used simultaneously (Newton, 2007). Nonetheless, in political science, it is important to make a distinction between these two types of trust. Whereas social trust is based on personal knowledge and set within a personal context, political trust is based on second-hand sources, and is set within the political context (Newton, 1999, p. 179).

To conceptualize political trust also means identifying the objects of trust, and then it useful to conceptualize trust in a broader framework: system support. Commonly, support refers to a person’s evaluative orientation towards an object, expressed either through

attitudes or behavior (Easton, 1975, p. 436). Citizen's support for the political system is a multidimensional concept, and therefore captures several concepts of support (Norris, 2011, p. 19). In his influential work, Easton (1975) makes a distinction between two forms of support: specific and diffuse. Specific support is directed towards authorities, and is based on peoples' satisfaction with performance or outputs of these authorities. Diffuse support is more generalized, and is based on more abstract feelings towards objects (Easton, 1975). Here, I make a cautionary note regarding this distinction, because as Hetherington (1998) argues, these two forms of support are closely linked. Easton (1975) identifies three objects of system support: the community, the regime and authorities. Norris (2011) further operationalises Easton's framework, so that instead of three objects of political support, she presents five, and these dimensions range from diffuse forms of support to more specific forms of support. This is the conceptualization this thesis relies on. The five dimensions are 1) national identities, 2) approval of core regime principles and values, 3) evaluations of regime performance, 4) confidence in regime institutions, and 5) approval of incumbent office holders (Norris, 2011, p. 25). This thesis centers on the fifth level: confidence in regime institutions, and encompasses trust in the President, the Parliament, the electoral commission, the local government, the police and the courts.

To define institutional trust, also termed institutional confidence, is not straightforward due to its many interpretations. Generally, scholars describe either affective aspects or evaluative aspects of political trust, but generally, confidence in institutions is based on a variety of different values and attitudes (Dalton, 2004, p. 8; Listhaug & Wiberg, 1995, p. 301). A well-known and useful definition can be found in Miller and Listhaug's (1990) definition of institutional trust:

Trust ... reflects evaluations of whether or not political authorities and institutions are performing in accordance with normative expectations held by the public...In brief, an expression of trust in government (or synonymously political confidence and support) is a summary judgment that the system is responsive and will do what is right even in the absence of constant scrutiny.
(Miller & Listhaug, 1990, p. 358)

This definition arguably fits an institutional approach to political trust, and reflects a role-oriented approach to trust, i.e. whether institutions' performance match the roles denoted by the citizens (Levi & Stoker, 2000). In this study, I rely on Miller and Listhaug's (1990) definition, but also find Levi and Stoker's (2000) definition worth mentioning. They present an additional definition that "... leaves trustworthiness undefined, open to the interpretation of the potential trustor" (Levi and Stoker, 2000, p. 499).

3.4 Government Performance and Institutional Trust– an Explanatory Model

Overall, there are several explanations as to what causes changes in institutional trust (Dalton, 2004). As already elaborated on, this thesis is set within the institutional approach, but still an overview of the main theoretical explanations is needed.

3.4.1 Main Theoretical Explanations

Cultural theories are founded on the notion that political trust is caused by factors outside the political sphere (Mishler & Rose, 2001, p. 31). This theory can be traced back to earlier theorists such as John Stuart Mill, who stressed the importance of social engagement and voluntary associations in democracies (Newton & Norris, 2000, p. 60). Here, political trust is seen a result of socialization and social experiences, shaped by deeply rooted norms and cultures (Mishler & Rose, 2001, p. 31). Peoples' experiences and life situations foster social trust (Newton & Norris, 2000, p. 60), thus according to Mishler and Rose (2001, p. 31), "...institutional trust is an extension of interpersonal trust, learned early in life, and, much later, projected onto political institutions, thereby conditioning institutional performance capabilities". Within this tradition, two explanations for a decline in political trust can be identified. One explanation sees a decline in trust as a result of people becoming more critical (Norris, 1999a). Here, Inglehart's (1997) theory is central, and he argues that a value change in post-industrial societies has led to people becoming more critical towards government and authorities. As citizens adopt postmodernist values, demands of political systems increase, and expectations become more difficult to fulfill (Inglehart, 1997, pp. 296-298). Another explanation is that of social capital, defined by Putnam (1995, p. 67) as "...features of social organization such as networks, norms, and social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit". The notion is that social interaction in modern societies, with less interaction within communities, promotes less social trust, cooperation and civic-mindedness. A decline in political trust is a result of a decline in civic engagement (Newton & Norris, 2000; Norris, 1999a, pp. 21-22).

Institutional theories, on the other hand, regard political trust as shaped by institutional performance, where the level of trust hinges on peoples satisfaction with government performance. It is founded on rational choice theory, where people will have a high level of institutional trust if they perceive the government performance as satisfactory, and lower levels if they perceive the opposite (Mishler & Rose, 2001, p. 31). Here, a decline in institutional trust can be seen as a consequence of citizens' dissatisfaction with performance

of governments (Miller & Listhaug, 1999, p. 204). This is either a result of citizens' direct experience with performance, or indirectly through people's expectations of that performance. This theoretical approach is also linked to another set of institutional explanations, which regards a decline in political trust as result of constitutional design. Based on Norris' (1999b, p. 226) elaborations, institutions are important determinants for political support. The argument is that peoples' support for the party in government, the level of democratization in a country, and the structure of the political system, all influence political support. In this thesis I focus on institutional performance, but the explanations outlined by Norris (1999b) are closely linked to explanations set within a performance-oriented approach.

3.4.2 Thesis Framework

Overall, this study is directed towards institutional explanations for changes in institutional trust, where a decrease in institutional trust is seen as a result of what people perceive as poor supply of government performance (Norris, 2011, p. 7). It is assumed that citizens' attitudes towards institutions are shaped by governments' ability to perform in the eyes of the citizenry (Miller & Listhaug, 1999, p. 205)¹⁴. In this thesis, I rely on Roller's (2005, p. 20) understanding of government performance as the evaluation of actions and outcomes of political actors. Thus, I adopt an institutional view on what affects institutional trust, but by doing so the importance of cultural theories in explaining political trust will not be ignored. These theories are closely linked, and both are deemed important in explaining levels of political trust (Mishler & Rose, 2001). I develop a framework for how government performance affects trust, and I do not include factors within cultural explanations, but measures are taken to account for these in the analysis.

Institutional explanations for changes in political trust can be measured on two levels: macro and micro. Macro-oriented explanations study the aggregate performance of government, whereas micro-oriented explanations study individuals' evaluations of government performance (Mishler & Rose, 2001, p. 32). Both orientations are significant, and a combination is favorable in terms of explaining peoples' attitudes. To capture political or democratic qualities it is recommended to combine elite/expert objective evaluations with public opinion surveys (Norris, 2011, pp. 190-192). Similar arguments can be put forward in terms of economic performance, where an important distinction should be made between

¹⁴ I note that here Miller and Listhaug (1999, p. 205) make a distinction between direct performance and peoples' expectations, and I argue that this distinction can be seen in association with the distinction between actual and perceived performance outlined in the upcoming framework.

economic reality and perception (McAllister, 1999). Moreover, a combination is arguably advantageous since both measurements face obstacles: First, public opinion surveys can be biased due to contextual factors that restrict or frame peoples' perceptions (Norris, 2011, p. 192). Second, expert assessments can be biased due to methodological and conceptual issues. In addition, there exist a number of possible indicators, and scholar do not agree on which indices that are correct to asses government performance (Norris, 2011, pp. 192-203). With this in mind, my framework includes both *actual* (experts opinion) and *perceived* (public opinion) performance.

In this framework, I make a distinction between political and economic government performance, i.e. the delivery of political goods and economic goods¹⁵ (Carter, 2011). I argue that this distinction can be seen in connection with Norris' (2011) distinction between process and policy performance. Process performance theories emphasize on the democracy working in countries, and by democracy workings I signify "...the intrinsic quality of democratic governance", i.e. the delivery of freedoms, political rights, and equality (Norris, 2011, pp. 190-191). Policy performance theories are centered on more instrumental aspects of government performance. Usually, these theories are centered on economic policies, but can also include other policy outputs and outcomes, such as social- and environmental policy (Norris, 2011, p. 202; Roller, 2005, p. 48)¹⁶. Acknowledging this distinction, my framework includes factors that relate both to economic- and social policies on the micro-level. Overall, my framework distinguishes between *political* and *economic* performance, and also between *actual* (macro) and *perceived* (micro) performance.

3.4.3 Political Performance

Within the institutional approach, an important cause of political trust is perceived to be governments' political performance, and is here seen in relation to process performance. Level of democracy/democratization is a central indicator for process performance (Norris, 2011, p.194)¹⁷. Democratization, according to Shin (2007, p. 261), "...refers to the process of transforming an authoritarian political system into a democratic system in which people influence government and government responds positively to their demands". The political context in Africa suggests that the delivery of political goods are highly relevant here: several

¹⁵ It is important to note that these two forms of performance are closely related and interlinks, and this distinction is made primarily for analytical purposes.

¹⁶ However, due to the scope of this study, I do not study these additional concepts.

¹⁷ Here, I note that authors, such as Mishler and Rose (2001) and Norris (1999b), use the term "level of democratization", but in this thesis I refer to this as "level of democracy".

countries are characterized as only partly or not free by Freedom House, several obstacles to democratization exist, and quality of democracy is depicted as low (Bratton, 2010, Diamond, 2010a).

3.4.3.1 Actual Political Performance

Overall, we can expect higher levels of institutional trust when governments can provide essential freedoms (Hutchison & Johnson, 2011; Norris, 1999b). The level of freedom in a country can be seen in association with the level of democracy in a country, where civil liberties and political rights are standard indicators for the level of democracy (Mishler & Rose, 2001, p. 47). Empirical evidence from Norris' (1999b) cross-country study shows that high levels of institutional trust are positively correlated with high levels of democracy. It is reasonable to assume that this will be the case, and even more so in Africa, where the delivery of political goods is a strong determinant for perceptions of democracy (Bratton et al., 2005, pp. 277-278; Mattes & Bratton, 2007). In post-transition countries, the delivery of freedoms is very important for citizens, because they expect there to be an increase in political freedoms compared to the past authoritarian regime (Catterberg & Moreno, 2006; Ndegwa, 2001). Therefore, the expectation is that lower levels of democracy have a negative effect on levels of institutional trust in a country, and the following general hypothesis is constructed:

Hypothesis 1: The lower the level of democracy within a country, the lower the level of institutional trust among its citizens.

A change in the level of democracy is likely to influence peoples' levels of institutional trust, because this would arguably affect their perceptions of government capabilities in delivering political goods. Considering the countries' authoritarian past, it can arguably be expected that Africans employ a retrospective view when it comes to the delivery of political goods, because they will compare the delivery of political goods that they are getting now to the ones they were getting before (Ndegwa, 2001). Empirical evidence from the African context suggests that institutional trust in Africa is affected by changes in level of democracy (Hutchington & Johnson, 2011). By assuming that in countries where people have experienced a decline in democracy over the last years, there will be lower levels of institutional trust, the following hypothesis is stated:

Hypothesis 2: Citizens living in countries that have experienced democratic setbacks have lower levels of institutional trust than citizens within countries that have not seen such setbacks.

3.4.3.2 Perceived Political Performance

In accordance with process performance explanations, it is expected that peoples' perceptions and experiences with democracy will affect their institutional trust levels. To capture Africans' perceptions of democracy, two important democratic qualifications are focused on in this study: 1) free and fair elections, and 2) freedom of speech, organization, and voting (Norris, 2011, pp. 190-191). With the history of previous African elections in mind, where many have experienced corrupt and fruitless elections, and many still do, the perceived quality of the last election will arguably be important for most Africans (Joseph, 2010, pp. 13-14). People also expect governments to provide essential freedoms, which were not provided under authoritarian regimes (Ndegwa, 2001). Empirical evidence from Mattes and Bratton's (2007) study highlight the importance of Africans evaluations of individual freedoms and honest elections when it comes to their attitudes towards democracy. The expectation is that when people have poor perceptions of own freedoms, they will trust institutions less, and the following hypothesis is framed:

Hypothesis 3: The lower an individual perceives own freedoms in their country, the lower is his/hers personal level of institutional trust.

Within institutional theories, corruption is regarded as an important cause of institutional trust (Mishler & Rose, 2001). Corruption is identified by Diamond (2007, pp. 6-7), as extremely harmful for political trust: arguing that it "...represent a betrayal of public trust". In this thesis, I measure perceived corruption in institutions, and the definition of corruption used is Transparency International's definition: "...the abuse of entrusted power for private gain" (Transparency International, 2015). In Africa, corruption is a prevailing problem, and a number of studies find that corruption weakens Africans' institutional trust (e.g. Armah-Attoh et al., 2007; Cho & Kirwin, 2007; Lavallée et al., 2008). Based on Rose and Shin's (2001, p. 342) study of 3rd wave countries, citizens in Africa are assumed to be aware of corruption in institutions. Overall, based on extensive previous research, the expectation is that the more

corrupt an individual perceives the institutions, the less that person will trust these institutions, and the following hypothesis is stated:

Hypothesis 4: The higher an individual perceives the level of corruption to be within their country, the lower is his/hers personal level of institutional trust.

3.4.4 Economic Performance

Institutional theories regard government's economic performance as a key determinant for institutional trust (Mishler & Rose, 2001). The overall expectation is that the delivery of policy outputs and outcomes, i.e. the delivery of economic goods, increase levels of institutional trust, and that a failure to deliver these decrease levels (Norris, 2011, p. 202).

3.4.4.1 Actual Economic Performance

A common approach within political science is to study how economic conditions within a country affect aggregate levels of political trust. The assumption is that favorable conditions increase levels of institutional trust, and poor conditions lower them (Dalton, 2004, p. 112). A common approach, which is employed in this study, is to use a country's national income as a policy outcome measure on a macro-level, but there are a number of indicators that could be employed (Norris, 2011, p. 205; Roller, 2005, p.41). The circumstances in Africa arguably suggest that economic conditions are especially significant here, as citizens have high expectations when it comes to economic performance in post-transition countries (Ndegwa, 2001), and poverty is a prevailing problem in African countries (Beegle et al., 2016). However, some of the empirical evidence contradicts the expected connection between national income and institutional trust levels. Dalton (2004, pp. 126-127) finds no clear causal relationship between economic performance measured in such objective terms and political support. In fact, both McAllister's (1999) and Hutchison and Johnson's (2011) study find that higher levels of GDP lead to lower levels of institutional confidence. Nevertheless, based on economic obstacles facing governments in Africa, as well as institutional explanations per se, it is assumed that poor economic conditions in a country brings with a lower the level of institutional trust, and the following hypothesis is stated:

Hypothesis 5: The poorer the country, the lower the levels of institutional trust among its citizens.

3.4.4.2 Perceived Economic Performance

Within the institutional approach, people's perceptions of the current economic situation in a country are presumed to affect their levels of institutional trust (Mishler & Rose, 2001). As Dalton (2004, p. 63) points out, a change in institutional trust is best captured by short-term response to economic conditions. Empirical research also indicates that the connection between economic performance and institutional trust is strongest at the individual-level relationship (e.g. McAllister, 1999). This last argument should be seen in relation to McAllister's (1999, p. 189) argument that people evaluate economic performance based on collective (sociotropic) criteria rather than individual (egocentric) criteria. This means that assessments of national economic conditions are more important than individual economic conditions. In Africa, Mattes and Bratton (2007) found that positive evaluations of the economic situation increased peoples' perception of the supply of democracy, which indicates that such collective assessments could have an effect on institutional trust here. Overall, negative perceptions of national economy are expected to have a negative effect on institutional trust, and the following hypothesis is stated:

Hypothesis 6: The more negative perception an individual has of the economic situation within their country, the lower is his/hers personal level of institutional trust.

Overall, within the institutional approach, it is assumed that how people perceive "direct" economic government performance affect their level of institutional trust. The assumptions are that favorable perceptions increase levels of institutional trust, and negative perceptions lower levels of institutional trust (Mishler & Rose, 2001). Empirical evidence from the African context appears to support this assumption. Hutchison and Johnson (2011) study shows that positive evaluations of government performance have a positive effect on institutional trust. In Mattes and Bratton's (2007) study, they find that when people have positive evaluations of economic policy performance, it increases their perceptions of supply of democracy. In sum, how people perceive government economic performance is assumed to affect their level of institutional trust, and the following hypothesis is stated:

Hypothesis 7: The more negative perception an individual has of their government's economic performance, the lower is his/hers personal level of institutional trust.

Despite the fact that political theory suggests that people judge economic performance from a collective rather than an individual perspective, certain contextual considerations need to be taken into account. Poverty is a prevailing problem in Africa, and most Africans' are unhappy about their current material life (Bratton et al., 2005, p. 223). Counter to notions of declining poverty due to a rise in GDP, empirical evidence from Afrobarometer Round 5 found that "lived poverty" persists in Africa, indicating that citizens in Africa frequently lack basic necessities (Dulani, Mattes, & Logan, 2013). In addition, there are large differences among citizens in African countries, where several groups are poorer and worse off than other groups (Beegle et al., 2016, pp. 110-111). In Africa, Hutchison and Johnson (2011) found a close link between well-being and institutional trust, which do suggest that also poverty and political trust are linked. Here, lived poverty is defined as citizens' perceptions and experiences of poverty (Dulani et al., 2013, p. 1). Thus, the prospect is that high frequencies of lived poverty cause lower levels of institutional trust, and the following hypothesis is framed:

Hypothesis 8: The more frequently an individual experiences poverty, the lower is his/hers personal level of institutional trust.


3.4.5 Political Performance versus Economic Performance

The debate on whether political or economic performance matter most for citizens' legitimization of state institutions has been raised in political science (Stepan & Linz, 1996). A favored explanation, in terms of explaining citizens' perceptions of legitimacy of the state, is that political goods are most important. Empirical evidence from Stepan and Linz's (1996) study on post-communist countries showed that the supply of political goods matters more than the delivery of economic goods. The argument is that in post-communist countries, people are able to separate between political and economic goods, and people are willing to accept a lag in economic development compared to political development (Stepan & Linz, 1996, p. 30). Evidence from Mattes and Bratton's (2007, p. 201) study suggest similar tendencies in Africa. They find that perceptions of political performance are more important for Africans' perceptions of both democratic supply and demand than economic considerations. Based on the empirical evidence, political government performance is assumed to be more important than economic performance in explaining levels of institutional trust, and a general hypothesis is framed:

Hypothesis 9: In terms of levels of institutional trust, the delivery of political goods matter more than the delivery of economic goods for citizens in African countries.

3.5 Overview of Framework

Figure 3-1: Framework illustration



In my proposed framework, illustrated in Figure 3-1, factors that affect institutional trust are divided into groups and levels. In the first level, government performance is divided into political and economic performance, and in the second level the quality of government performance is divided into actual and perceived performance. On the third level, both level of democracy and democratic setbacks capture actual political performance, and the level of GDP per capita in a country captures actual economic performance. Perceived political performance is measured by perceptions of corruption and freedom, and perceived economic performance is measured by peoples’ perceptions of the current economic situation in their country, perceptions of economic performance of government, and frequency of lived poverty.

4. Data and Methodology

In this chapter I summarize the main data sources, research design and variables employed for this research. I also elaborate on the quality of this research.

4.1 Data Sources

4.1.1 Afrobarometer

The dependent variable and the micro independent variables are collected from the Afrobarometer Network¹⁸. Afrobarometer is a research project aimed at measuring citizens in African countries attitudes towards a range of subjects. Since the beginning of Afrobarometer, with Round 1 in 1999, the number of countries included has increased to over 30 countries, and a total of six rounds have been completed (Afrobarometer, 2016). In this thesis, data from Round 4 and Round 5 are used. Round 5 covered 15 countries more than Round 4, but I do not include these additional countries in the research carried out for this study. The reason is that I wanted the same countries to be included from both rounds, partly to be able to compare trends in trust levels between these rounds, and this is further elaborated on in chapter 4.2. Thus, the 20 countries that are included in the analysis are Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The samples from Round 4 consist of 27,713 respondents, and 34,809 respondents from Round 5¹⁹, which makes the total number of respondents 62,522.

The data has been gathered from a sample of the population in each country. Afrobarometer uses a standard sample size for each survey, and the sample consist of approximately 1,200 or 2,400 cases from each country²⁰. The largest sample size is preferred when when societies are extremely heterogeneous . The sample is drawn from all citizens of 18 years old or older. They use random selections for the sampling, and also apply probability proportional to size of populations (PPPS) when sampling (Afrobarometer Network, 2011, p. 25). A fixed questionnaire is set for each survey round, which is then translated into different languages (Afrobarometer Network, 2011). Thus, the research is of naturalist design, which means that the interviewers try not to manipulate the data.

¹⁸ Raw data is collected from Afrobarometer's (Round 4/2008 and Round 5/2011) database available at <http://www.afrobarometer.org>. Questions are retrieved from codebooks from the survey rounds (Carter, 2010; Park, 2015), and will not be directly quoted in the following chapter.

¹⁹ The sample from Round 5 consisted of 51,587 respondents, but was reduced by excluding countries.

²⁰ See Appendix E Table 9 for information on size of samples.

4.1.2 Freedom House

Two macro variables are collected from Freedom House (FH), and these are: *level of democracy* and *democratic setbacks*²¹. In 1972 FH launched “The Comparative Study of Freedom”, which is an annual report that assesses the level of freedom in countries worldwide. Raymond Gastil developed the methodology where countries are rated according to their level of political rights and civil liberties, which then determines whether the country is categorized as either free, partly free, or not free. Political rights are measured according to the electoral process, political participation and pluralism, and the functioning of government. Civil liberties are based on freedom of expression, freedom of association, rule of law, and personal rights. Political rights and civil liberties are scored from 1 to 7, where 1 is a low grade and 7 is a high grade of freedom. The average of these ratings is used as the freedom rating, and determines the categorization of each country (Freedom House, 2016c)²².

FH has been used by a number of scholars over the years, and is considered to be an important source for measuring democracy (Norris, 2011, p. 46). Arguably, it is a reliable source of data because of its thorough methodology, and can be deemed trustworthy due to the size and quality of the rating process (Freedom House, 2016c). Nevertheless, to use the FH index to measure democracy is not without issues, and its usage has been the debated over the years²³. Nevertheless, seen in light of Munck and Verkuilen’s (2002, p. 28) argument that there are challenges with all existing democracy indices; it is difficult to provide an encompassing democracy indicator. Therefore, I rely on the FH indicator in this thesis, but notes that this is not a perfect indicator for democracy.

4.1.3 World Bank

World Bank data is used as a source for the countries’ GDP (Gross Domestic Product) per capita, labeled *GDP per capita*. It is used as the indicator for economic policy effectiveness at an absolute level (Roller, 2005, p. 41)²⁴. World Bank (2016a) describes GDP as “... the sum

²¹ Raw data is collected from Freedom House’s (2005-2013) database available at <https://freedomhouse.org>.

²² The exact ratings are: 1 to 2,5 for free, 3 to 5 for partly free, and 5.5 to 7 for not free (Freedom House, 2016c).

²³ Several authors voice skepticism towards FH, and have pointed out flaws with this democracy indicator (e.g. Giannone, 2010; Vanhanen, 2000). In addition, two noteworthy obstacles with this democracy indicator are worth mentioning: 1) There is no final consensus on how to classify or measure democracy, thus the measurements and results from FH can differ from other democracy indicators (Knutsen, 2010a, p. 19; Norris, 2011). For instance, in his article “Thinking About Hybrid Regimes”, Diamond (2002) categorized countries somewhat differently than FH. 2) On a more general note, FH has over the years been criticized for being systematically biased, favoring American interests and ideology (Steiner, 2012). Additionally, Giannone (2010) argues that FH’s methodology is neither neutral nor consistent.

²⁴ Raw data is collected from World Bank’s (2008-2013) database available at <http://www.worldbank.org>.

of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products". A large number of studies use data from the World Bank as an indicator for economic performance at a macro-level (e.g. Hutchison & Johnson, 2011; Norris, 2011).

Nonetheless, there is no consensus among scholars as to what is the most appropriate indicator for macro-level economic performance (Norris, 2011, p. 204). In addition, there are additional obstacles with basing government performance on income levels in Africa²⁵. Therefore, a cautionary note needs to be made regarding the use of GDP as an indicator for economic performance in Africa. Ideally, a larger range of economic macro-level indicators should be tested, but the scope of this study does not allow this. Therefore, I rely on GDP per capita, and include some additional measurements with PPP-adjusted GDP data.

4.2 Research Design

When establishing the thesis methodology, the first step was to determine the best research design for this study. Initially, the options were qualitative and quantitative methods. For the purpose of confirming established theories, which is the goal of this research, I found the quantitative method most appropriate, which means that I apply a deductive approach to the studied phenomena. In addition, this research method is a much-applied method in the study of political trust and democratic consolidation.

I conduct an analysis based on data gathered in two separate time intervals, Round 4 and Round 5, in 2008/2009 and 2011/2013 respectively. The decision to restrict the data to two rounds was due to limitations of the data from the previous rounds, which had fewer participating countries, and had more dissimilar questions to those used in Round 4 and Round 5. The chosen rounds were therefore used because they captured a sufficient number of countries with adequately similar questions. A total of 20 countries and two rounds are analyzed, and therefore the hypotheses are tested on 40 cases. The data is weighed according to size of population in each country.

I apply three types of analyses: 1) frequency analysis, 2) correlation analysis, and 3) multilevel analysis. The frequency analysis is conducted to provide an empirical overview of the variables, as well as establishing if there has been a decline in institutional trust between

²⁵ To use GDP as an indicator for macro-level economic performance in African countries is controversial. Beegle et al. (2016, p. 43) argue that there are several problems related to economic measurements in Africa, and also argue that the data needs improvements. Jerven (2010) is highly critical towards the use of GDP as an estimate of income in African countries, because it is "...difficult to distinguish the majority of African economies from each other on the basis of income levels" (Jerven, 2010, pp. 94-95).

the two rounds. The correlation analysis aims to untangle the relationship between the actual performance variables and institutional trust on an aggregated level. The multilevel analysis is applied in order to study how political and economic factors influence change in institutional trust, and I chose this approach for several reasons²⁶. The first is because the data is naturally clustered in countries, and because the dependent variable is influenced by variables on different levels (Hox, 2002, p. 175). In OLS (ordinary least squared), it is assumed that the observations are independent from each other (Skog, 2004). Since Afrobarometer uses random selection when sampling, I can assume that the respondents within different countries are independent from each other. However, I can assume that there are similarities between the 20 countries and across the two rounds. Therefore, the assumption that the respondents are independent from each other is not met in a multilevel analysis. But by adjusting for cluster structure, a multilevel analysis takes statistical dependence of data into account (Strabac, 2012, p. 207). In this analysis, I found that approximately 12 % of the variance in institutional trust was explained at a macro-level, and approx. 88 % was explained on the individual level²⁷. The finding that most of the variation is on the individual level is according to Strabac (2012, p. 213) common in social sciences, and therefore this was to be expected. Secondly, as put forward by Bickel (2007), a multilevel analysis is key in terms of contextual variation. Since African countries are very different in terms of political and economic environment, this type of analysis is most suitable. I apply a random intercept model, and thus measure the average effect for all countries. Therefore, I assume that the independent variables influence institutional trust the same in all countries, and thus eventual differences are only measured in the intercept. The variables are added gradually in different models: micro control variables first, macro variables second, and micro variables third.

To illustrate this approach, I introduce the equation for an empty model, which is a simple multilevel model without independent variables (Strabac, 2012, p. 211):

$$Y_{ij} = \beta_{0j} + u_{0j} + e_{ij}$$

Here, Y_{ij} is the value for the dependent variable for an individual in a country in either Round 4 or Round 5. β_{0j} is the total mean of the dependent variable, u_{0j} is the residual on level-2 and

²⁶ The analysis is not based on aggregated data only, because of the small number of countries. Basing the study on aggregated data only, would have been an interesting approach, and the potential for further research is vast considering this approach. I study the relationship between the actual performance variables and institutional trust on an aggregated level, but notes that it would have been fruitful to study the relationship between the perceived performance variables and institutional trust on an aggregated level as well.

²⁷ See Appendix B Table 1 and calculations.

e_{ij} is the residual at level-1. Then, a number of micro- and macro-level variables are introduced, and is illustrated by a model that includes both level-1 and level-2 variables:

$$Y_{ij} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 x_{1ij} + \beta_2 x_{2ij} \dots + \beta_n x_j + u_{0j} + e_{ij}$$

Here, the micro-level variables vary across both countries (j) and across individuals (i). The macro variables have a subscripted j to indicate that these variables vary across countries, and not individuals (Strabac, 2012, p. 216).

Overall, there are two central conditions that have to be fulfilled in order to use a multilevel analysis. Firstly, the dependent variable has to be continuous and normally distributed. This condition, strictly applies for the residuals, but as Strabac (2012, p. 207) argues, it is common to assume that this condition applies for the dependent variable. The dependent variable, institutional trust, is measured as a continuous variable, and this is shown in chapter 4.3. By analyzing the frequency distribution in the histogram against a normal distribution for this variable, the variable is shown to be almost normally distributed²⁸. However, I do not consider this very problematic, since the deviation is relatively small, and because with large samples, a small breach of this condition will have little impact on the results (Eikemo & Clausen, 2012, p. 145). Secondly, the highest level, which in this case is level two, must have a sufficient number of units. This analysis has 40 units, which strictly speaking could lead to some limitations and possible problems. Strabac (2012, p. 208) states that multilevel modeling with less than ten units is impossible. A rule of thumb in multilevel analysis should have at least 30 units, but as Hox (2002, p. 175) argues this could lead to biased results. He recommends 50 units when comparing countries, which is more than the number of units here, but not by a large margin.

In addition to these conditions, there are a number of statistical conditions that are similar to those of OLS-regression (Strabac, 2012, p. 208). The first is the condition of linearity, which means that the relationship between the dependent variable and the independent variables must be linearly proportional (Skog, 2004). I check for curvilinearity by including second-degree polynomials when this is appropriate, i.e. checking if there is a curvilinear connection between the variables²⁹. Secondly, there has to be absence of multicollinearity, which means that there cannot be a perfect correlation between the dependent variables, where the r (Pearson's r) should not be higher than 0.9 (Ringdal, 2007, p. 381), or as Skog (2004, p. 288) argues higher than 0.6 or 0.7. This condition is also fulfilled

²⁸ See Appendix C, Figure 1 for frequency distribution of the dependent variable.

²⁹ For *GDP per capita* there is some indication of a curvilinear relationship, and this is shown in chapter 5.3.3.

in this analysis³⁰. Thirdly, there cannot be any non-omitted variables, i.e. all relevant depended variables must be included in the analysis (Ringdal, 2007, p. 380). Introducing a number of control variables mitigates this uncertainty. Lastly, there is the issue of influential cases, where unusual values of independent variables can cause problems (Midtbø, 2012, pp. 115-119). I carry out tests to detect whether any unusual values are present in the datasets used, and additional measures are taken to compensate when this appears to be an issue³¹.

4.3 Dependent Variable

The dependent variable is *institutional trust*, and it is based on how much a respondent trust the different institutions within a country. Institutional trust is measured across six dimensions: the President, the Parliament, the electoral commission, the local government, the police, and the courts³². An issue that arose with the dependent variable was that some of the questions regarding political trust were not included in the questionnaire used in Madagascar in Round 5. To compensate for this I create an index based on the average of the alternatives answered, and make it a condition that the respondents had to have answered at least three of the six alternatives. More than 97 % of data satisfied this condition provided above. An average score is calculated for each respondent, and this procedure is carried out for further indexes as well. I have chosen to standardize the index to the same scale as the original scale used in the survey, but overall this index is a more detailed scale, with 37 categories between zero and three. Thus, *institutional trust* is measured on a continuous scale from 0 (least trusting) to 3 (most trusting). I have recoded the options “don’t know/haven’t heard enough”, “refused to answer”, and “missing”, as missing values³³.

To crate an index, where it is assumed that one measures the same underlying phenomenon, each of the variables included in the index must have the same values and the same questionnaire alternatives. This is the case for the variables included this index. A correlation matrix confirms my assumption that the variables are highly correlated, which in indicates high validity (Ringdal, 2007, p. 333). Cronbach’s Alpha (α), which measures the covariance between the variables, is calculated to be 0.84. This is higher then the recommended lower limit of 0.7 (Ringdal, 2007, p. 331). A principal component analysis

³⁰There is a relatively high correlation between level of democracy and perceived freedom, and this is elaborated on in chapter 5.3.1.

³¹ Some problems were detected with the variable lived poverty, and this is addressed in chapter 5.3.4.

³² See Appendix A for survey questions and alternatives for all the variables included in the analysis.

³³ This procedure is carried out for all the micro variables included in the analysis, and do not comment directly on this further in the chapter.

shows that an underlying factor explains the variance in the variables above the recommended level, and that the correlation between the variables and the factor is sufficient (Ringdal, 2007, p. 327)³⁴.

In this thesis, a more generalized form of political trust is measured, and I do not make claims against the effects on the different components of trust. In order to measure levels of institutional trust, I included only those institutions that were included in both survey rounds³⁵. In addition, I chose to exclude trust in political parties due to the fact that Afrobarometer surveys make a distinction between trust in the opposition and ruling party, and thus the respondents are not asked about trust in parties in general. The correlation matrix shows that the correlations are lowest for these components of political trust, and I argue that to include these variables in my dependent variable would decrease the validity of this variable. A possible critique to my operationalization regards the dimension “local government”, because the question in the questionnaire asks about trust in “Your Metropolitan, Municipal or District Assembly”. This question could relate more to what is characterized as trust in authorities (Norris, 2011, pp. 20-21). Nevertheless, because of Africa’s highly personalized system, persons are very important in the African context (Bratton et al., 2005, pp. 245-246). Therefore, I argue that this is an important component of institutional trust.

Some possible objections could be made regarding the distinction between performance and political trust. For instance, Bratton et al. (2005, p. 96) argues that there is an “...unclear differentiation between trust in political institutions and evaluations of government performance”, and thus questions how well citizens differentiate between evaluation and trust. Nevertheless, the survey question asks specifically about trust in different institutions, and not performance, and the problem is somewhat limited by this. My operationalization follows in the footsteps of other scholars that have adopted the same approach when studying political trust in new democracies (e.g. Hutchison & Johnson, 2011; Mishler & Rose, 2001). In sum, I argue that the dependent variable is valid.

³⁴ See Appendix D Table 3 for correlation matrix and Table 4 for factor analysis.

³⁵ In addition I have excluded trust in traditional leaders, the tax department, and the army, since these components were only included in either Round 4 or Round 5. Trust in traditional leaders is a dimension that would have been especially interesting to include, and can be seen in light of Logan (2013) argument that traditional leaders are important in Africa’s democratic systems. Nevertheless, my thesis is centered on formal institutions, and thus I find that my main research focus is still intact even though this dimension is excluded.

Table 4-1: Descriptive statistics for the dependent variable

	N	Min	Max	Mean	Std. dev.
Trust the President	59,728	0	3	1.86	1.09
Trust the Parliament	57,783	0	3	1.70	1.05
Trust electoral commission	56,303	0	3	1.63	1.10
Trust local government	56,837	0	3	1.57	1.06
Trust police	60,930	0	3	1.57	1.11
Trust court	59,197	0	3	1.83	1.03
Institutional trust	60,896	0	3	1.79	0.18

4.4 Independent Variables: Macro

The variable *level of democracy* is measured by the Freedom rating, which measures civil liberties and political rights on a scale from 1 to 7. I retrieve the data from the FH database. The surveys were not carried out at the same time in all participating countries, so the collected data is logged with the year that the survey was conducted in the respective countries (Freedom House, 2016a)³⁶. Because of its well-developed methodology, and the extensive use of the FH data, I regard it as an appropriate measurement to capture the level of democracy (Norris, 2011, p.46).

The variable *democratic setbacks* gives a measure if there has been an overall reduction in the level of freedom in the last three years prior to the survey date for each country. The variable is based on the FH rating, and I create a dummy variable to indicate whether there has been a negative change (1) or not (0). Initially, this variable was intended to indicate negative change only in the year prior to the year that each survey was conducted, but the rating did not reveal much change over the course of a year. Based on this, and my argument that some time should pass in order for people to register change in level of freedom within a country, I argue that this is a valid measurement of change in democracy.

The variable *GDP per capita* is measured by World Bank's data, and it is calculated in the current US dollar currency. The GDP data is extracted for the respective year that each survey was conducted in each country. GDP is calculated based on the gross domestic product for a country divided by the population (World Bank, 2016a). This data has been logarithmically transformed in order to compress the variable. An increase in the level of institutional trust for every dollar GDP per capita increases is not anticipated, but a boost in the revenues stream may have an effect. Due to the controversy regarding GDP measurement,

³⁶ See Appendix E Table 9 for information on survey dates.

I also employ an alternative calculation method. This calculation is called GDP per capita adjusted to PPP, where the gross domestic product is “converted to international dollars using purchasing power parity rates” (World Bank, 2016b). I include this method because it takes into account that prices vary across African countries (Knutsen, 2010b). In sum, similar to Knutsen (2010b, p. 19) operationalization, GDP per capita is calculated on either 1) marked exchange rates or 2) purchasing power parity (PPP) exchange rates.

4.5 Independent Variables: Micro

To capture *perceived freedoms* I create an index based on four Afrobarometer questions. The first is: “On the whole, how would you rate the freeness and fairness of the last national election...” The next three questions is based on the same overall question, and investigates participants’ view of how free they are to speak their minds, join an organization and vote for candidates that they generally support. The variable is reversed, so that it measures a negative perception of freedom, which reflects the research objective for this thesis³⁷. I have chosen to standardize the index to the same scale as the original scale used in the survey, and it is measured as a continuous scale where the values ranges from 1 (most free) to 4 (least free). To create such an index, the variables included have to measure the same phenomenon, which is arguably the case for all variables listed above. The variables have the same alternatives and internal order of values, and are thus possible to combine. A correlation matrix confirms that the variables are correlated, and Cronbach’s Alpha (0.73) is above the recommended level. A factor analysis verifies that the index fulfills the recommended requirements³⁸. I set the condition that the respondent has to have answered at least three of the four alternatives, and this leaves data based on 88.44 % of the respondents. This variable is arguably valid, as it captures people’s general perception of freedom in their own country.

To measure the variable *perceived corruption* I create an index with six variables, where the variables are based on the same overall question: ”How many of the following people do you think are involved in corruption ...” The components in the index are: the President, members of parliament (MPs), government officials, local government, police and judges. As with the other indexes, the same method of filtering is applied. The condition is that the respondent has to have answered at least half of the alternatives, which leaves 88.22 % of the responses as valid. The variables have the same number of values and direction, and

³⁷ In this thesis, I study causes of lower levels of institutional trust, and I argue that negative perceptions of freedoms capture this objective.

³⁸ See Appendix D Table 5 for correlation matrix, factor analysis and comments.

are thus possible to combine. As expected, the correlation matrix indicates significant correlation between the variables, and Cronbach's Alpha (0.87) is above the recommended level. A factor analysis shows that the index fulfills the recommended requirements.³⁹ I have chosen to standardize the index to the same scale as the original scale used in the survey, and it index is measured as a continuous scale where the values ranges from 1 (lowest) to 4 (highest). Bratton et al. (2005, p. 49) use a similar index in their study, and found that "The Afrobarometer index correlates quite well with Transparency International's (TI's) corruption perceptions index..." Based on this argument, and the calculations outlined above, I argue that this variable does capture people's perceptions of corruption of institutions well.

The variable *perceived economic situation* in country is based on a question from the Afrobarometer survey: "In general, how would you describe: The present economic condition of this country?" The variable is measured on an ordinal level. In line with previous argumentation, the order of the variables was reversed. I have recoded the categories to bad (0), neutral (1), and good (2), where good is the reference category. This is the same method employed by Mortensen (2013, p.33) in her master thesis, and I find her argument that this recoding is reasonable due to the difference between the original categories convincing. Overall, I argue that this is a valid measurement because it asks people to assess the economic situation directly.

The variable *perceived economic performance* is measured by an index, and it is based on the overall question "How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters..." The variable measures performance based on five dimensions: managing the economy, improving living standards of the poor, creating jobs, keeping prices down, and narrowing income gaps. I set the condition that the respondents have to have answered at least four of the five alternatives, which leaves 94 % of the responses as valid. The included variables are correlated, and Cronbach's Alpha (0.85) is higher than the recommended value. A factor analysis shows that the index fulfills the recommended requirements⁴⁰. Reflecting earlier argumentation, the order of the values is reversed, so that the values range from positive to negative. I have chosen to standardize the index to the original scale used in the survey, and it is measured as a continuous scale where the values range from 1 (most positive) to 4 (least positive). Here, the scope of the index is limited to

³⁹ See Appendix D Table 6 for correlation matrix, factor analysis and comments.

⁴⁰ See Appendix D Table 7 for correlation matrix, factor analysis and comments.

factors that relate mostly to economic policies. By creating an index, a more generalized perception of government economic performance is captured.

The variable *lived poverty* is an index based on the overall question “Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you or your family gone without enough...”. This index measures lived poverty based on five dimensions: food to eat, clean water, medical treatment, cooking fuel, and cash income. I create an index since the five questions arguably capture the underlying factor of poverty, an argument supported by Dulani et al. (2013) finding in their study. Calculations show that the variables are highly correlated, and that Cronbach’s Alpha (0.77) is above the recommended level. A factor analysis shows that the index fulfills the recommended requirements⁴¹. The index corresponds with the original scale used in the survey, but the scale used in the index is more detailed, and it ranges on a continuous scale from 0 (least frequently) to 4 (most frequently). Based on the argumentation above, and the fact that Afrobarometer uses this index in their study; strengthen the validity of my operationalization (Dulani et al., 2013).

4.5.6 Control Variables

It is not possible to control all influencing factors. However, some factors are regarded as highly relevant for political trust, and so these are accounted for. I control for the variable *interpersonal trust*. Based on cultural theories, interpersonal trust is believed to influence institutional trust (Mishler & Rose, 2001). As put forward by Newton (2007), there are several forms of social trust, but it is beyond the scope of this study to control for them all. Inspired by the approach of Mishler and Rose (2001)⁴², interpersonal trust is measured based on how much people trust people they know. I recode interpersonal trust into a dichotomous variable, registering either high or low interpersonal trust, where high is the reference category. I expect that when people have low interpersonal trust, they will also have low levels of institutional trust.

Support for democracy is considered to some extent, because this is a factor that could affect institutional trust, and it is also related to institutional explanations⁴³. I recode it as a

⁴¹ See Appendix D Table 8 for correlation matrix, factor analysis and comments.

⁴² Mishler and Rose (2001) base interpersonal trust on “people who you meet”, which arguably is quite similar to the question for the variable used in this study, which is “people you know”. Ideally, I would have liked the measurement to capture trust in fellow citizens, which is the same operationalization that Mattes and Bratton (2007) employ in their research, but this question was not included in Round 4.

⁴³ My argument is that in post-authoritarian regimes people’s trust in institutions also hinges on their perceptions of the previous regimes, and that this can affect how they perceive the workings of government and their trust

dichotomous variable, registering whether people think democracy is preferable or not. Mishler and Rose (1999, 2005) found that in Post-Communist regimes, people who supported authoritarian alternatives, were more likely to have less trust in institutions. Based on this empirical evidence and previous argumentation, I expect that people who do not think that democracy is preferable have lower levels of institutional trust.

In the analysis, *politically relevant ethnic group (PREG)* is controlled for, because ethnic fractionalization will most likely affect levels of institutional trust within a country. This explanation is rooted in cultural theories (e.g./Hutchison & Johnson, 2011; Mishler & Rose, 1997). I employ Posner's (2004) PREG indicator, where each country is given a rating based on the level of ethnic fractionalization, and it is measured on a scale from 0 (least fractionalized) to 0.99 (most fractionalized)⁴⁴. Initially, this index was developed to measure the effect that ethnic diversity has on economic growth in African countries. However, Hutchison and Johnson (2011) employed this measurement to control for ethnic diversity in a country when they studied individual trust in Africa. As numerous authors have pointed out, ethnicity is highly relevant in terms of political attitudes and participation in Africa (e.g.Cho, 2007; Diamond, 2010b; Eifert, Miguel, & Posner, 2010, Posner, 2007), In addition, Hutchison and Johnson (2011, p. 745) point out that it is important to control for ethnic diversity when studying the effect that state capacity has on institutional trust. Echoing arguments put forward by Cho (2007), I expect ethnic fractionalization to have a negative effect on institutional trust.

Standard socio-demographic variables are also used as control variables. In a worldwide study, Norris (1999b) finds that levels of institutional trust increase with education and age, and men are less trusting than women. Nevertheless, whether I can expect the same results in Africa are somewhat unclear, since both Hutchison and Johnson's (2011) findings and Armah-Attoh et al.'s (2007) findings suggest that institutional trust decreases with higher education, and they found no significant relationship between gender and trust. I also control for whether a person lives in an urban or a rural setting, because studies from Africa have found that people in urban settings are less trusting than people who live in rural areas (e.g.Armah-Attoh et al., 2007; Hutchison & Johnson, 2011). In sum, the socio-demographic variables *gender, age, education level, and urban/rural* are taken into consideration.

overall. This argument is derived from Mishler and Rose (1999, p. 93) argument "... that citizens may support a new regime not only for what that regimes has done but also for what it is not".

⁴⁴ Cape Verde is missing in Posner's (2004) data, and similar to Hutchison and Johnson (2011), I therefore employ Cho's (2007) value on this country. See Appendix F Table 10 for data.

4.6 Overview of Variables

Table 4-2: Descriptive statistics for dependent and independent variables

Variable	N	Min	Max	Percent value 0	Percent value 1	Mean	Std. dev.
Institutional trust	60,896	0	3			1.79	0.18
Perceived freedoms	55,297	1	4			1.63	0.66
Perceived corruption	55,159	0	3			1.35	0.65
Perceived economic situation	61,382	1	3			2.27	0.87
<i>Good</i>	61,382	0	1	71.95	28.05		
<i>Neutral</i>	61,382	0	1	83.15	16.85		
<i>Bad</i>	61,382	0	1	44.90	55.10		
Perceived economic performance	59,220	1	4			3.06	0.71
Lived poverty index	62,395	0	4			1.26	0.91
Level of democracy	62,522	1	6			3.42	1.38
Democratic setbacks	62,522	0	1	82.71	17.29	0.17	0.38
GDP per capita (log transformed)	62,522	5.42	9,00			7.04	0.93
PPP-adjusted GDP per capita (log transformed)	62,522	6.51	9.55			7.84	0.85
Politically relevant ethnic group (PREG)	62,522	0	0.71			0.40	0.24
Interpersonal trust	62,117	0	1	48.55	51.45	0.51	0.45
Support for democracy	58,751	0	1	76.68	23.32	0.23	0.42
Urban/rural	61,835	0	1	37.70	62.30	0.62	0.48
Education level	62,414	0	3			1.30	0.90
<i>No schooling</i>	62,414	0	1	81.23	18.77		
<i>Primary</i>	62,414	0	1	66.16	33.84		
<i>Secondary</i>	62,414	0	1	63.08	36.92		
<i>Higher</i>	62,414	0	1	89.33	10.67		
Gender	62,522	0	1	50.05	49.95	0.49	
Age	61,826	18	110			36.68	14.63
Valid N	50,066						

4.7 Quality of Research

The validity of the research can according to Skog (2004) be evaluated by four aspects: construct-, conclusion-, internal- and external validity. Commonly, validity is defined as whether or not we measure what we intend to measure, and it is affected by nonrandom errors (Carmines & Zeller, 1980, pp. 12-14).

The first, *construct validity*, concerns how well research is measured and registered (Skog, 2004, p. 89). With regards to the micro variables, each variable was argued to be valid in terms of what they were intended to measure in the previous chapter. Various calculations, such as the employed factor analysis, show that the indexes measure an underlying factor in line with my expectations (Ringdal, 2007). Overall, the inclusion of indexes arguably

strengthens the validity of this research, because then they capture a generalized form, and also multidimensionality, of each concept. In addition, one obtains *construct validity* if the samples are representative. Arguably, this is the case for the analysis carried out for this thesis, because the data is gathered from respondents that are selected using random sampling methods. There are several obstacles regarding surveys that are difficult to overcome, such as: respondents could misinterpret questions, or they could be misled by social desirability; responding the way they think you want them to respond (Ringdal, 2007, pp. 331-332). However, the measures taken by Afrobarometer to overcome these issues suggest that the data they collect is valid. The questionnaires are standardized and well constructed, and they are translated to respondents' own languages, and adapted according to political system, which arguably reduces likelihood for misunderstandings (Afrobarometer Network, 2011)⁴⁵.

As already elaborated on, there are several obstacles with the macro-level variables. A number of scholars are critical towards FH, and also disagree to some extent with their categorization and measuring. Additionally, it is problematic that the ratings hinges on a relatively small number of experts (Norris, 2011). Nevertheless, based on earlier argumentations, and seeing that the FH's democracy indicator has been employed by a number of researches, I regard the measurement as fit for purpose for the scope of this thesis (e.g. Hutchison & Johnson, 2011; Mishler & Rose, 1999; Norris, 1999b, 2011). Similar objections concern *GDP per capita*, and Jerven (2010) and others are skeptical towards the usage of GDP. By controlling for a similar measurement, and posing a strong cautionary note on this variable, I argue that the variable is valid.

To ensure *statistical conclusion validity*, i.e. avoid drawing incorrect conclusions about effects, I set the general significance level to $p \leq 0.05$, but the 0.1- and the 0.01-level are also noted (Skog, 2004, pp. 101-102). $P \leq 0.05$ means that I consider the connection statistical significant on a 5 % level (Ringdal, 2007, p. 241). Nevertheless, since there are abundant respondents at level-1 and so few units at level-2, some considerations should be made regarding the level of significance. The size of the sample is important here, because the larger the sample is the smaller margin of error becomes (Skog, 2004, p. 89). As Strabac (2012, pp. 218-219) points out, with so few units on level-2, the effects have to be quite large in order for these variables to have an effect. Therefore I regard hypotheses at level-2 as supported if they are significant at $p \leq 0.1$.

⁴⁵ Terms are adapted according to the appropriate term in respondent's own country, and this is specified in the codebooks for Round 4 and Round 5. For example, the head of government is referred to as President, Prime Minister, or both in the various countries (Carter, 2010; Park, 2015).

Internal validity is the causal direction between variable, and it is arguably strengthened by the control variables in the analysis (Skog, 2004, p. 107). Nevertheless, I have not controlled for all possible other explanations, and therefore there is no guarantee of internal validity.

External validity concerns whether results are generalizable (Skog, 2004, p. 113). This study is only valid for the 20 African countries included in the analysis, and cannot be generalized outside this context. Additionally, it is crucial to note that the countries that are included in these surveys should not be regarded as representative for Africa. As illustrated in Table 2-1 in chapter 2, the countries included in the analysis are more democratic than the ones that are left out. Based on the distribution of income countries in Table 2-2, this tendency cannot be said to apply for economic conditions. Nevertheless, Hutchison and Johnson's (2011, p. 743) argument that these countries have higher political capacity arguably implies a similar tendency. Overall, Bratton et al., (2005, pp. 54-55) and Hutchison and Johnson (2011, p. 743) argument is essential: these countries are regarded as more stable, populous and democratic than the rest of the African countries⁴⁶.

A relatively large number of respondents are filtered out due to the above-mentioned requirements for some of the variables. 11.56 % of all responses were eliminated for the *perceived freedoms*, and 11.78 % for *perceived corruption*, and 6.27 % for *perceived economic performance*. Nevertheless, considering the large sample size, these numbers are not found to remove validity. In addition, similar variables are used in in Mattes and Bratton's (2007) study, even though the percent of missing is about the same level.

Generally, *reliability* of research is defined as its ability to produce the same result every time, and it is affected by random errors (Carmines & Zeller, 1980, pp. 11-13). As to the reliability of the macro-level indicators, I refer to elaborations in previous chapters⁴⁷. Arguably, the micro variables gathered from Afrobarometer surveys should be considered reliable, because it is considered to be a reliable network, and it is employed by a number of scholars. In addition, they conduct extensive research both prior to and after surveys, they have thorough and extensive survey manuals, and they use various controls to filter the data (Afrobarometer Network, 2011). Nevertheless, it is impossible to avoid all random errors, such as coding- and interview errors, but that these appear to be avoided to a large extent due to Afrobarometer's precise completion of surveys.

⁴⁶ I note that these scholars are referring to earlier survey rounds, where fewer countries were included. Nevertheless, their arguments arguably apply for this thesis' sample as well.

⁴⁷ See chapters' 4.1.2, 4.1.3, and 4.4.


5. Analysis

The analysis consists of three parts: 1) A descriptive analysis where I describe trends in institutional trust between the two rounds, as well as an empirical overview of the main independent variables. 2) An analysis where I study how factors on a macro-level influence levels of institutional trust. 3) A multilevel analysis that measures how factors on both micro- and macro-level affect levels of institutional trust.

5.1 Part One: Empirical Overview

5.1.1 Trends in Institutional Trust

Figure 5-1: Overview of levels of institutional trust in Round 4 and in Round 5



In order to establish a trend in trust levels, I have compared mean levels of institutional trust for both rounds. This is part of my research objective, and I consider this a necessary task due to the conflicting arguments regarding trends in institutional trust in Africa. As shown in Figure 5-1, there does not appear to be a decline in institutional trust in a majority of African countries included in this analysis, which was contrary to my expectation⁴⁸. In total, only nine countries experienced declines in trust levels: Botswana, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Madagascar, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, and Tanzania. These declines could be a consequence of several factors, such as a failure among governments to perform in the eyes of the citizens. For example, Nigeria’s decline in institutional trust could be seen to support Diamond (2007) argument that there is disillusionment among Nigerians. It can also be seen, at least partly, in

⁴⁸ In addition, I studied whether there was a decline in terms of each institution separately, and the results were the same: not a definite decline in institutional trust in Africa.

correspondence with the decline in freedom that the country has experienced over the past decade, and their continuing struggles with corruption and entrenched authoritarian regimes (Freedom House, 2016b, p. 3). Additionally, Senegal's drop in trust between these rounds was, according to Sall (2015), mainly a result of citizens' perception of a corrupt government. Overall, eleven of these twenty countries demonstrate an increase in institutional trust, and the sizes of these increases differ between countries. To identify trends based on only two rounds is inadequate, and further studies over additional rounds are needed before an encompassing answer can be given.

It is rather difficult to determine whether there are low levels of institutional trust in Africa, since, as Listhaug and Wiberg (1995, p. 298) argues, it is almost impossible to set absolute standards for what is considered low levels of trust. A more fruitful approach is to compare countries, and as Figure 5-1 illustrates, there are large differences between countries. For instance, there are relatively low levels of trust in South Africa, and can be associated with results from Booyesen's (2014) study, which showed that South Africans are becoming increasingly critical towards institutions. In contrast, citizens in Mozambique have the highest levels of institutional trust, a connection that Alemika (2007) previously have found to be linked to positive perceptions of elections in Mozambique.

Overall, with regards to the question on whether there has been a decline in institutional trust between the two latest Afrobarometer rounds, the answer is that there does not appear to be a definite decline overall. This finding arguably contradicts Mishler and Rose's (2001) argument that one can expect low and declining political trust levels in newly democratized countries. Worth mentioning is also the fact that this result is based on different samples from the separate rounds, and therefore needs to be regarded with caution. Moreover, this conclusion is not complete, as the countries included in the analysis are not representative for Africa as a whole, and declines possibly exist in the countries that are not included. Based on the institutional approach, it is arguably more likely that these countries are experiencing decline and/or low levels of institutional trust, since socio-economic conditions in these countries suggest lower delivery of goods⁴⁹.

⁴⁹ In chapter 4.7, I elaborate on why conditions in the excluded countries are deemed worse than the countries included in the analysis. This arguably suggests that conditions are less favorable in terms of political and economic performance, i.e. delivery of political and economic goods, in these countries.

5.1.2 Empirical Overview of Actual Government Performance

Table 5-1: Overview of the actual political performance variables

Country	ROUND 4		ROUND 5	
	Level of democracy	Democratic setbacks	Level of democracy	Democratic setbacks
Benin	2.0	0	2.0	0
Botswana	2.0	0	2.5	0
Burkina Faso	4.0	0	4.0	0
Cape Verde	1.0	0	1.0	0
Ghana	1.5	0	1.5	0
Kenya	3.5	1	3.5	0
Lesotho	2.5	0	2.5	0
Liberia	3.5	0	3.5	0
Madagascar	3.5	1	4.5	0
Malawi	4.0	0	3.5	0
Mali	2.5	1	4.5	1
Mozambique	3.0	0	3.5	0
Namibia	2.0	0	2.0	0
Nigeria	4.5	1	4.5	0
Senegal	3.0	1	2.0	0
South Africa	2.0	1	2.0	0
Tanzania	3.5	0	3.0	0
Uganda	4.5	0	4.5	0
Zambia	3.5	0	3.5	0
Zimbabwe	6.0	0	6.0	0

Note: The level of democracy scale varies from 1 and 7, where low values indicate high levels of civil liberties and political rights, and high values indicate low levels of democracy. For democratic setbacks, value 1 indicates that there has been a decline in level of democracy during the three year prior to the survey conducted in each country, and the value 0 indicates that there has not been a decline in this period.

As illustrated in Table 5-1, there are vast differences in terms of the level of democracy between countries. In both rounds, Zimbabwe has the poorest rating, and this can be related to the reality that the country is not considered a democracy, where citizens face extensive restrictions in terms of rights and liberties (Freedom House, 2013b). In contrast, Cape Verde has the overall best rating, and has been characterized by Freedom House (2012) as “...a model for political rights and civil liberties in Africa in 2011”. Democratic setbacks are most frequent prior to Round 4, and indicate that declines in trust are most noticeable in the years prior to this round. For example, Mali’s large democratic setback was a consequence of a military coup in 2012 (Freedom House, 2013a).

Table 5-2: Overview of the actual economic performance variable GDP per capita

Country	ROUND 4	ROUND 5
Benin	0,795	0,799
Botswana	5,562	6,936
Burkina Faso	0,569	0,673
Cape Verde	3,698	3,766
Ghana	1,234	1,642
Kenya	0,939	1,185
Lesotho	0,827	1,159
Liberia	0,231	0,414
Madagascar	0,472	0,463
Malawi	0,308	0,270
Mali	0,614	0,660
Mozambique	0,500	0,565
Namibia	4,011	5,680
Nigeria	1,377	2,740
Senegal	1,095	1,051
South Africa	5,812	8,081
Tanzania	0,658	0,828
Uganda	0,459	0,656
Zambia	1,135	1,759
Zimbabwe	0,595	0,851

Note: GDP per capita is shown in 1000\$.


As illustrated in Table 5-2, GDP levels between countries differ widely. Upper-middle-income countries, such as South Africa, Botswana and Namibia have a much higher GDP per capita than countries in the lower income groups. Both rounds taken together, Liberia and Malawi have the lowest GDP per capita, reflecting why these countries, as well as several other countries, are categorized as low-income countries. Nonetheless, these numbers are not directly comparable, as they are largely country specific, and depend on measurements and evaluations. In this study, I do not measure changes in national economies, i.e. economic growth. However, I want to point out that a majority of the countries have experienced an increase in GDP per capita between the rounds, most notably Nigeria⁵⁰, which could indicate that several African countries were experiencing economic growth during this period.

⁵⁰ I note that the almost doubling of GDP per capita in Nigeria is mostly a result of a rebasing of Nigeria's GDP {Guest, 2014}.


5.1.3 Empirical Overview of Perceived Government Performance

In this section I illustrate the mean value for each of the perceived variables in Round 5, the decision to only illustrate this round being due to limited space.

Figure 5-2: Mean of perceived freedoms in Round 5. Figure 5-3: Mean of perceived corruption in Round 5



Note: Scale from 1 (most free) to 4 (least free).



Note: Scale from 0 (lowest) to 3 (highest). It shows perceived corruption among the President, MPs, government officials, local council, police, and judges.

As illustrated in Figure 5-2, levels of perceived freedoms vary somewhat across countries. Citizens in Zimbabwe have the worst perceptions (2.5), whereas citizens in Senegal have the most positive perceptions of the level of their own freedoms (1.2). Figure 5-3 shows that corruption also varies slightly between countries. In Nigeria, Mali, Liberia, and Kenya, people have the highest level of perceived corruption. For instance, Nigerians perceptions of their institutions as corrupt; appear to correspond with FH’s depiction of existing corruption in Nigeria (Freedom House, 2016b). In Cape Verde, Namibia, Malawi, and Botswana people have the lowest level of perceived corruption.

When comparing levels of perceived corruption and perceived freedoms to the values of *level of democracy*, it is clear that these correlate to some degree. For example, Nigeria and

Kenya score quite poorly in both types of indicators, whereas Botswana scores quite well.⁵¹ Nonetheless, there also exists a discrepancy, which I argue, supports my decision to combine both actual- and perceived factors in this analysis.

Figure 5-4: Frequency distribution in percent for perceived economic situation in Round 5




Figure 5-4 shows that perceptions of the perceived economic situation in each country vary profoundly. Citizens in Kenya have the poorest perception of all countries included, where 84 % perceive the economic situation as bad, standing in stark contrast to Namibia, where 63 % perceive it as good. By comparing numbers from this figure to GDP rankings in the same round, it is clear that there is a connection⁵². Namibians, for instance, perceive the economy as good, and is also third in GDP, compared to the 20 countries included. In the best ranking countries, South Africa and Botswana, citizens perceive the current economic situation as quite good. However, the connection is not encompassing. In Mozambique, citizens have quite positive evaluations, where 46 % perceive the situation as good and 32 % perceive it as neutral, but are still ranked among the worst in terms of GDP (17).

⁵¹ In Nigeria and Kenya, people evaluate freedoms on their country quite poorly (1.8), which arguably corresponds with FH’s score of Nigeria as 4.5 and Kenya as 3.5. In Botswana, people evaluate freedoms as quite good (1.3), and this also corresponds quite well with FH’s score of 2.

⁵² See Appendix H Table 11 for overview of rankings of countries based on GDP and PPP-adjusted GDP.

Figure 5-5: Mean of lived poverty in Round 5





Figure 5-6: Mean of perceived economic performance in Round 5



Note: Scale from 0 (least frequent) to 4 (most frequent) Note: Scale from 1 (most positive) to 4 (least positive)

Figure 5-5 shows that citizens in Senegal, Lesotho, and Burkina Faso are the ones that experience poverty most frequently, whereas citizens in Ghana and South Africa experience it the least frequent. By comparing numbers from this figure with Table 2-2 in chapter 2, there is a tendency of high frequency of lived poverty in low-income countries and low frequency of lived poverty in high-income countries. Nevertheless, the pattern is not clear. Frequencies of lived poverty are almost the same in Mozambique (1.3) and Botswana (1.1), but the first country is classified as a low-income country and the latter as an upper-middle-income country.

Figure 5-6 shows that citizens in Kenya, Lesotho, Uganda, and Nigeria, have the worst perception of governments' economic performance, whereas citizens in Botswana, Zambia, and Malawi have the best perceptions of performance. When comparing these results to levels of GDP per capita in a country, there does not appear to be a clear connection. For instance, citizens in Malawi rank their government's economic performance favorably at 2.8, but Malawi is still ranked lowest in terms of GDP levels (20). The lack of compliance is expected, since this indicator is arguably the most subjective economic government perception indicator.

When comparing the numbers from all the economic performance perception indicators against the levels of GDP in a country and World Bank classifications, peoples' perceptions of economic performance and actual performance only correspond to some extent. I argue that this supports my decision to include both types of indicators in this study.

5.2 Part Two: Testing Actual Performance Variables

In order to establish the connection between the macro variables and the dependent variable, I have analyzed the relationship between aggregated levels of institutional trust and the actual government performance variables. As expected, my analysis indicates a correlation between level of democracy and institutional trust ($r^2=-0.30$)⁵³, and this correlation was statistically significant at 10 % level. The r^2 has the expected prefix, as I expected a country with a higher freedom rating (less free) to have low levels of institutional trust. This is consistent with Norris (1999b) finding that countries with higher levels of democracy have higher levels of institutional trust. My analysis also shows a strong correlation between democratic setbacks and institutional trust ($r^2=-0.39$), and this was a statistically significant correlation at 5 % level. This is consistent with Hutchison and Johnson's (2011) empirical research, which found that a change in level of democracy influences levels of institutional trust in Africa. Thus, both Hypothesis 1 "The lower the level of democracy within a country, the lower the level of institutional trust among its citizens", and Hypothesis 2 "Citizens living in countries that have experienced democratic setbacks have lower levels of institutional trust than citizens within countries that have not seen such setbacks" are supported.

The analysis indicates a weak correlation between level of GDP per capita and aggregated levels of institutional trust ($r^2=-0.08$), but it is not statistically significant⁵⁴. The negative connection is somewhat surprising, although consistent with Hutchison and Johnson (2011), who also found a negative connection. One interpretation of this connection is that countries with higher levels of GDP per capita have lower levels of institutional trust, compared to countries with lower levels of GDP⁵⁵. However, since this was shown not to be a significant correlation, and contrary to my expectation, Hypothesis 5 "The poorer the country, the lower the levels of institutional trust among its citizens" is not supported.


⁵³ For Round 4 the correlation was weaker ($r^2=-0.27$) than for Round 5 ($r^2=-0.35$).

⁵⁴ For Round 4 the correlation was weaker ($r^2=-0.01$), than for Round 5 ($r^2=-0.17$).

⁵⁵ I controlled for a PPP-adjusted GDP per capita, and the results were almost the same: a weak correlation ($r^2=0.12$). For Round 4 the correlation was weaker ($r^2=-0.11$) than for Round 5 ($r^2=-0.13$).


The limited effect that the macro variables have on institutional trust becomes visible when the connection is fitted with a linear regression line, showing a very weak fit⁵⁶. Nonetheless, the graphs in Figure 5-7 and Figure 5-8 indicate that a lower level of democracy results in lower level of institutional trust, which is consistent in both Round 4 and Round 5.

Figure 5-7 and Figure 5-8: Institutional trust and level of democracy in Round 4 and Round 5



As illustrated in Figure 5-9 and Figure 5-10, the connection between institutional trust and GDP per capita is very weak. Based on these graphs, there is a small indication that higher level of GDP results in a lower level of institutional trust. Nevertheless, the two rounds differ, with a stronger indication of this relationship in Round 5 than in Round 4, where this is almost non-existent. The bad fit of the model and the inconsistency between the rounds arguably strengthens the notion that they are not connected.

Figure 5-9 and Figure 5-10: Institutional trust and GDP per capita in Round 4 and Round 5



⁵⁶ Here, I note that there is an indication of a negative relationship between PREG and institutional trust ($r^2 = -0.25$), but that this was not significant correlation. Lack of validity set aside, the results indicate that the more fractionalized a country is the lower the levels of institutional trust among the country's citizens. The connection is illustrated in graphs in Appendix G, Figure 2 and Figure 3.

5.3 Part Three: Multilevel Analysis

Before presenting the multilevel analysis, a few observations are worth addressing. Initially, I comment on estimations regarding an empty model. By employing calculations on an empty model, the results indicate that the fixed effects are 1.73. This means that the estimate average value of institutional trust is 1.73 on a 0-3 scale. To compare models, the N should be the same, which means that 50,066 respondents are kept, and thus 81.03 % of the original sample is included. For this sample, approximately 12 % of the variance is explained at country-year level, and approx. 88 % of the variance is explained on individual level⁵⁷.

I include variables in a step-by-step process by including them in different models. This allows me to consider the change in log likelihood (2ll) between the different models, and also employ an LR-test between them. As shown in Table 5-3, there is a decline in log likelihood between some of the models, which indicates that there has been a significant improvement for some of the models, but the improvement is less for the macro variables.

The analysis is also controlled for non-omitted bias, and here I comment on the results for the micro control variables⁵⁸. Model 1 contains only micro-level control variables, and the control variables explain approximately 6 % of the variance at the individual level⁵⁹. The model shows that most of the micro control variables had a significant effect on the dependent variables. There is not a lot of change in the control variables from Model 1 to Model 9, hence I do not comment on changes between models. The findings show that gender has no significant effect on levels of institutional trust. Consistent with Hutchison and Johnson's (2011) findings from their study of institutional trust in Africa, my results show that institutional trust increases with age, and that it decreases when one lives in an urban setting compared to rural, and also with higher education compared to no education. In line with the cultural approach, I find that interpersonal trust has a significant and strong effect on institutional trust (Mishler and Rose, 2001). This indicates that the level of institutional trust is low if the person also has low interpersonal trust compared to high. The large coefficient indicates that interpersonal trust is very important in terms of institutional trust.

⁵⁷ See Appendix B Table 2 and calculations.

⁵⁸ With regards to the robustness of this multilevel analysis, I have addressed the possibility of non omitted-variables bias, which occurs when a model leaves out important factors. In addition to the micro control variables, I also controlled for whether support for democracy could have an effect. Results from a regression analysis showed that this had a very limited effect, and I chose not to include this variable in my main models. In addition, I controlled for a variable on macro-level, the level of ethnic fractionalization in a country, and this is illustrated in Model 9 in Table 5-3. This did not have a significant effect on levels of institutional trust. A possible reason for this result could be the lack of variation in the countries included in the analysis.

⁵⁹ See Appendix B Table 2 and calculations.

Table 5-3: Multilevel models. Standard deviations are shown in parenthesis.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9
Constant	1.794*** (0.044)	2.055*** (0.108)	1.855*** (0.042)	1.568*** (0.317)	2.710*** (0.035)	3.412*** (0.034)	3.444*** (0.072)	3.570*** (0.210)	3.402*** (0.051)
Male	0.002 (0.007)	0.002 (0.007)	0.002 (0.007)	0.002 (0.007)	0.006 (0.006)	-0.002 (0.006)	-0.002 (0.006)	-0.002 (0.006)	-0.002 (0.006)
Age	0.001*** (0.001)	0.001*** (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)	0.001** (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)
Education level									
<i>Primary</i>	-0.075*** (0.011)	-0.076*** (0.011)	-0.076*** (0.011)	-0.075*** (0.011)	-0.062*** (0.010)	-0.059*** (0.010)	-0.059*** (0.010)	-0.059*** (0.010)	-0.059*** (0.010)
<i>Secondary</i>	-0.180*** (0.011)	-0.179*** (0.011)	-0.180*** (0.011)	-0.180*** (0.011)	-0.140*** (0.010)	-0.150*** (0.010)	-0.150*** (0.010)	-0.149*** (0.010)	-0.149*** (0.010)
<i>Higher</i>	-0.225*** (0.014)	-0.225*** (0.014)	-0.226*** (0.014)	-0.226*** (0.014)	-0.163*** (0.013)	-0.185*** (0.013)	-0.185*** (0.013)	-0.185*** (0.012)	-0.185*** (0.012)
Urban	-0.150*** (0.007)	-0.150*** (0.007)	-0.150*** (0.007)	-0.150*** (0.007)	-0.109*** (0.007)	-0.101*** (0.007)	-0.101*** (0.007)	-0.100*** (0.007)	-0.101*** (0.007)
Low interpersonal trust	-0.252*** (0.007)	-0.252*** (0.007)	-0.252*** (0.007)	-0.252*** (0.007)	-0.197*** (0.006)	-0.173*** (0.006)	-0.173*** (0.006)	-0.173*** (0.006)	-0.173*** (0.006)
Perceived corruption					0.382*** (0.005)	0.321*** (0.005)	0.321*** (0.005)	0.322*** (0.005)	0.322*** (0.005)
Perceived freedoms					-0.257*** (0.005)	-0.221*** (0.005)	-0.221*** (0.005)	-0.221*** (0.005)	-0.221*** (0.005)
Perceived economic situation									
<i>Neutral</i>						-0.063*** (0.009)	-0.063*** (0.009)	-0.063*** (0.009)	-0.063*** (0.009)
<i>Bad</i>						-0.127*** (0.007)	-0.127*** (0.007)	-0.127*** (0.007)	-0.127*** (0.007)
Perceived eco. performance						-0.256*** (0.005)	-0.256*** (0.005)	-0.256*** (0.005)	-0.256*** (0.005)

Lived poverty													
Level of democracy													
Democratic setbacks													
GDP													
PREG													
Valid N	50,066	50,066	50,066	50,066	50,066	50,066	50,066	50,066	50,066	50,066	50,066	50,066	50,066
Log likelihood	-54,929.99	-54,924.84	-52,924.15	-54,929.73	-50,494.04	-48,522.70	-48,518.91	-48,522.41	-48,522.41	-48,522.41	-48,522.67	-48,522.67	-48,522.67
Variance level-1	0.5233191	0.5233192	0.523319	0.5233191	0.4384963	0.4053288	0.4053288	0.4053288	0.4053288	0.4053288	0.4053288	0.4053288	0.4053288
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Variance level-2	0.0673093	0.0574101	0.0501606	0.0664473	0.0355962	0.0291051	0.0240022	0.0286795	0.0286795	0.0286795	0.0290611	0.0290611	0.0290611
	(0.015)	(0.013)	(0.011)	(0.015)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)

*Statistically significant at 10 % level.

**Statistically significant at 5 % level.

***Statistically significant at 1 % level.

Numbers display the regression coefficients, and these show the fixed effects for each country. Standards deviations are in parenthesis.

5.3.1 Actual Political Performance

In Model 2, *level of democracy* is added, and it has a statistically significant, negative effect on levels of institutional trust. This indicates that low levels of democracy are negatively related to institutional trust. Nevertheless, when perceived political performance factors are added in Model 4, the variable is no longer significant. This is partly a result of the existing correlation between *perceived freedoms* and *level of democracy* ($r^2=0.36$). Therefore, I did additional calculations for this model, which showed that, when divided into the FH categories, countries that were ranked not free had significantly lower levels of trust compared to countries ranked as free⁶⁰. In sum, it appears that the net effect of the level of democracy is overshadowed by the other micro variables, which was the case in Mishler and Rose's (2005) similar study. These results indicate that democracy level has some effect on institutional trust in a country, but that there might not be large enough differences between the countries⁶¹, and that individual factors capture most of the effect. Hypothesis 1 "The lower the level of democracy within a country, the lower the level of institutional trust among its citizens" is supported, but the connection between this variable and the individual factors are so close that when included in the same model the effect of level of democracy disappears.

The variable *Democratic setbacks* is introduced in Model 3, and results show that this has a statistically significant, negative effect on institutional trust. Similar to Mattes and Bratton's (2007) results, this suggests that citizens living in countries that have experienced a decline in level of democracy have lower levels of institutional trust compared to citizens living in countries that have not experienced this. In sum, hypothesis 2 "Citizens living in countries that have experiences democratic setbacks have lower levels of institutional trust than citizens within countries that have not seen such setbacks" is supported.

5.3.2 Perceived Political Performance

In Model 5, the perceived political performance factors are added. Results from an LR-test confirm that including these variables provides a significant improvement to the model. Overall, the results show that both *perceived freedoms* and *perceived corruption* have a significant, negative effect on levels of institutional trust. Consistent with Mattes and Bratton's (2007) finding, it appears that individual freedoms and elections are important determinants for political attitudes. My findings suggest that Ndegwa (2001) is correct when

⁶⁰ There was not a significant relationship when free and partly free were reference categories.

⁶¹ Echoing the argument previously put forward, these countries are considered more democratic than the rest of Sub-Saharan countries.

she contends that people in African democracies expect delivery of freedoms. It seems that when governments fail to deliver political goods, peoples' levels of institutional trust is low. Hypothesis 3 "The lower an individual perceives own freedoms in their country, the lower is his/hers personal level of institutional trust" is supported. As both Bratton et al. (2005), and other scholars have found before me, my results show that the perception of high levels of corruption in institutions are associated with low levels of institutional trust. Thus, Hypothesis 4 "The higher an individual perceives the level of corruption to be within their country, the lower is his/hers personal level of institutional trust" is supported.

To conclude, how democratic a country is on an aggregated level and perceptions of political performance are closely connected. They affect institutional trust separately, but as a whole, subjective perceptions of political performance are most important.

5.3.3 Actual Economic Performance

In Model 3, *GDP per capita* is added. The result is not significant, and an LR-test shows that it is not a significant improvement to add this variable to the model. Nonetheless, consistent with my expectation, but opposite of previous findings in chapter 5.2, it indicates that a higher level of GDP results in a higher level of institutional trust. In sum however, results do not reveal whether how poor a country is, has a significant effect on levels of institutional trust. Thus, results appear to support Dalton's (2004) argument that the connection between institutional trust and economic performance is strongest at the individual level. It might also be that the differences between the countries in terms of economic conditions are not large enough to result in differences across levels of institutional trust. The results are similar for a PPP-adjusted GDP⁶². In sum, Hypothesis 5 "The poorer the country, the lower the levels of institutional trust among its citizens" is not supported.


Additionally, when controlling for a non-linear effect, it is a significantly improvement to include a second-degree polynomial for GDP in Model 4⁶³. As shown in Figure 5-11, until the value of 7.12 (approximately 1,236 GDP per capita), the level of institutional trust decreases, and then it starts to increase⁶⁴. Based on this, it can be interpreted that the richest countries have higher levels of trust compared to the poorest countries. Nevertheless, this was not significant when other variables were added in additional models.

⁶² The results were similar for a PPP-adjusted GDP. See Appendix I Table 12 for multilevel models.

⁶³ A T test confirmed that it was a significant improvement on 10% level to include a second-degree polynomial.

⁶⁴ For the PPP-adjusted GDP, until the value of 7.97 (approximately 2,892 PPP-adjusted GDP per capita), the level of institutional trust decreases, and then it starts to increase.

Figure 5-11: Non-linear effect of GDP



5.3.4 Perceived Economic Performance

In Model 6 the perceived economic performance factors are added to the multilevel analysis. An LR-test confirms a significant improvement to the model was made through including these variables. The variable *perceived economic situation* has a significant negative effect on levels on institutional trust, and is consistent with McAllister (1999) finding that perceptions of national economic conditions are important institutional trust. If a person perceives the economic situation in a country as neutral or bad compared to good, then that person will have lower levels of institutional trust. Hypothesis 6 “The more negative perception an individual has of the economic situation within their country, the lower is his/hers personal level of institutional trust” is supported.

The variable *perceived economic performance* has a significant, negative effect on levels of institutional trust. My findings indicate that for Africans, economic performance is a strong determinant for institutional trust. This confirms my expectation that negative perceptions of economic performance weaken people’s trust in institutions. Therefore, Hypothesis 7 “The more negative perception an individual has of their government’s economic performance, the lower is his/hers personal level of institutional trust” is supported.

The variable *lived poverty* does not have a significant effect on the levels of institutional trust, which is contrary to my expectation. Considering previous results, this indicates that sociotropic, rather than egocentric criteria, are significant for peoples’ trust in institutions (McAllister, 1999). A possible reason for this result could be that there are so few people experiencing lived poverty in the sample, and thus that the phenomenon is not captured in the Afrobarometer survey. Even though the survey is supposed to be representative of a country as a whole, it is possible that there is an over-sampling of people not experiencing poverty, because these people have more steady addresses (e.g./Isaksson,

2010, p. 6). Hypothesis 8 “The more frequently an individual experiences poverty, the lower is his/hers personal level of institutional trust” is not supported⁶⁵.

5.3.5 Political versus Economic Government Performance

To test whether political or economic factors are most important in terms of institutional trust, I ran a multilevel analysis testing these factors separately, illustrated in Table 5-4⁶⁶. To evaluate the hypothesis, the results are interpreted directly, and the extent to which the dependent variable is explained by my independent variables is calculated⁶⁷.

Based on the results, it is clear that political factors are very important in explaining levels of institutional trust. As before, the results show that both perceived and actual political performance are strongly and negatively associated to levels of institutional trust⁶⁸. Results also show that only individual economic perceptions are significantly related to institutional trust, as the actual indicator of economic performance do not explain institutional trust. In terms of explaining the variance in institutional trust, political performance does a better job than economic performance. Level of democracy and democratic setbacks explain approx. 43 % of the variance at macro-level. The perceived political performance variables, including micro control variables, explain approx. 21 % of the variance at individual level. GDP per capita explains only approx. 11 % of the variance at macro-level, but it is not significant. The perceived economic performance variables, explains approx. 17 % of the variance at individual level. These results indicate that political performance is somewhat more important in explaining levels of institutional trust. Based on these results, Hypothesis 9 “In terms of levels of institutional trust, the delivery of political goods matter more than the delivery of economic goods for citizens in African countries” is supported.

⁶⁵ I tested whether it helped to transform the variable, but it was still not significant. I note that when perceived political factors were excluded from the model, *lived poverty* had a negative and significant effect on institutional trust. This is consistent with my own expectation and Catterberg and Moreno (2006) finding, and would indicate that lived poverty has a negative impact on institutional trust. Nonetheless, due to the results from the previous model (Table 5-3) and the small coefficient, I still consider Hypothesis 8 as not supported.

⁶⁶ I controlled for PREG, but there were no significant changes in the values in these models. Therefore I chose not to include it in these models. In stead I refer to Model 9 in Table 5-3 for model with PREG.

⁶⁷ This method is based on Jakobsen (2015, p. 23) lecture, where he proposes an alternative to R^2 in a simple regression: “In hierarchically structured data we can calculate an analogous measure by estimating both an empty model and a full model”. In these calculations I measure how much of the variance that is explained on the two different levels. See Appendix B Table 2 and calculations.

⁶⁸ As already discussed, *level of democracy* is not statically significant when perceived factors are introduced, indicating that subjective perceptions are most important when it comes to explaining levels of institutional trust.

Table 5-4: Multilevel models for political versus economic government performance

		POLITICAL		ECONOMIC	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Constant	1.794*** (0.044)	2.087*** (0.093)	2.744*** (0.077)	1.568*** (0.317)	2.849*** (0.274)
Female	0.002 (0.007)	0.002 (0.007)	0.006 (0.006)	0.002 (0.006)	-0.006 (0.006)
Age	0.001*** (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)	0.001** (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)	0.002*** (0.000)
Education level					
<i>Primary</i>	-0.075*** (0.011)	-0.076*** (0.011)	-0.062*** (0.010)	-0.075*** (0.011)	-0.073*** (0.010)
<i>Secondary</i>	-0.180*** (0.011)	-0.180*** (0.011)	-0.140*** (0.010)	-0.180*** (0.011)	-0.192*** (0.011)
<i>Higher</i>	-0.225*** (0.014)	-0.226*** (0.014)	-0.164*** (0.013)	-0.225*** (0.014)	-0.257*** (0.013)
Urban	-0.150*** (0.007)	-0.150*** (0.007)	-0.109*** (0.007)	-0.150*** (0.007)	-0.136*** (0.007)
Low interpersonal trust	-0.252*** (0.007)	-0.252*** (0.007)	-0.197*** (0.006)	-0.252*** (0.007)	-0.208*** (0.006)
Perceived corruption			-0.382*** (0.005)		
Perceived freedoms			-0.257*** (0.005)		
Perceived economic situation					
<i>Neutral</i>					-0.096*** (0.010)
<i>Bad</i>					-0.167*** (0.008)
Perceived eco. performance					-0.330*** (0.005)
Lived poverty					-0.024*** (0.004)
Level of democracy		-0.075*** (0.027)	0.002 (0.022)		
Democratic setbacks		-0.326*** (0.086)	-0.232*** (0.070)		
GDP				0.032 (0.045)	0.010 (0.039)
Valid N	50,066	50,066	50,066	50,066	50,066
Log likelihood	-54,929.99	-54,920.72	-50,489.19	-54,929.73	-51,826.79
Variance level-1	0.5233191 (0.003)	0.5233192 (0.003)	0.4384963 (0.003)	0.5233191 (0.003)	0.4623724 (0.003)
Variance level-2	0.0673093 (0.015)	0.0421479 (0.010)	0.0278477 (0.006)	0.0664473 (0.015)	0.0496171 (0.011)

5.4 Overview of Results

Table 5-5: Overview of supported and not supported hypotheses

	Hypotheses	Results
Hypothesis 1	The lower the level of democracy within a country, the lower the level of institutional trust among its citizens.	Partly supported
Hypothesis 2	Citizens living in countries that have experienced democratic setbacks have lower levels of institutional trust than citizens within countries that have not seen such setbacks.	Supported
Hypothesis 3	The lower an individual perceives own freedoms in their country, the lower is his/hers personal level of institutional trust.	Supported
Hypothesis 4	The higher an individual perceives the level of corruption to be within their country, the lower is his/hers personal level of institutional trust.	Supported
Hypothesis 5	The poorer the country, the lower the levels of institutional trust among its citizens.	Not supported
Hypothesis 6	The more negative perception an individual has of the economic situation within their country, the lower is his/hers personal level of institutional trust.	Supported
Hypothesis 7	The more negative perception an individual has of their government's economic performance, the lower is his/hers personal level of institutional trust.	Supported
Hypothesis 8	The more frequently an individual experiences poverty, the lower is his/hers personal level of institutional trust.	Not supported
Hypothesis 9	In terms of levels of institutional trust, the delivery of political goods matter more than the delivery of economic goods for citizens in African countries.	Supported

Table 5-5 shows the results of this analysis, and it illustrates that most of my hypotheses are supported. The exceptions are Hypothesis 5 and Hypothesis 8, which are not supported. In addition, Hypothesis 1 is only partly supported, since it was not significant when variables at micro-level were included.

6. Conclusions

The basis of this thesis was the following question: *How does government performance explain decreases in institutional trust in Africa, and what implications does this have for democratic consolidation?* In order to address this research question, a preliminary research question was raised, as to whether there is an apparent decline in institutional trust in Africa.

Overall, evidence from this thesis did not reveal a definite decline in institutional trust levels between the two rounds. Therefore, the premise of declining trust in Africa was partly incorrect. Embedded in this question, was whether there are low levels of institutional trust in Africa. This is a problematic evaluation, but with a strong cautionary note, levels appeared to be low in several countries. Nonetheless, based on this analysis alone, I cannot conclude whether there exist either declines or very low levels of institutional trust here. The reason is, as elaborated on in chapter 4.7, that the sample is not representative for Africa. Favorable political- and economical conditions do suggest, especially when considering the findings from this analysis, that political trust will be higher in the included 20 countries compared to the rest. To get a better understanding of the dynamics of institutional trust in Africa, I elaborate on the main objective of this research, which was how government performance affects institutional trust.

This study has shown that both perceived and actual indicators for political performance do a good job in explaining trust levels in Africa. If citizens live in countries that have low levels of democracy and/or have experienced democratic setbacks, then there would be lower levels of trust here. Also important is peoples' perceptions of political government performance, because the worse the perception of freedom and corruption an individual had, the lower that person's level of institutional trust would be. The negative effect that corruption had can be seen in relation to Armah-Attoh et al.'s (2007, p. 20) argument: "...most African citizens recognize corruption when they see it, condemn it as morally wrong, and seek legal redress against corrupt officials". As a whole, the subjective perceptions of political government performance mattered most for levels of institutional trust, which was to be expected considering Mishler and Rose's (2001) conclusion that institutional trust is best explained at the individual level.

My results also showed that perceived evaluations of government economic performance were significant in explaining levels of institutional trust, whereas the actual performance indicator was not. This suggests that how rich a country is, does not matter for how much a person trusts the institutions. Here, Miller and Listhaug's (1999, p. 207)

argument is worth mentioning, since as they argue, this indicator "...may reflect the relative wealth or economic prosperity enjoyed by each country more than government performance per se". This is a valid argument, and I agree that a country's income level is not a perfect indicator for an aggregate measure of government economic performance. Therefore, it might be that this indicator was not suitable to measure aggregate economic performance of government. Further results showed that poor assessments of the economic situation and economic performance of government within a country decreased individuals' levels of institutional trust. The arguably more objective perception of economic performance, lived poverty, had no relevance for how much a person trusts institutions. This indicates that subjective, rather than more objective perceptions of economic performance, was significant in explaining institutional trust.

Overall, my findings have shown that government performance is key to explaining peoples' trust in institutions, as citizens' trust in their core institutions was influenced by how well these are able to deliver goods. It seems that Newton's (2001) argument applies to citizens in African countries as well: people have an instrumentalist thinking. It also appeared that the delivery of political goods mattered more than the delivery of economic goods, and can be seen in light of Mattes and Bratton's (2007, p. 202) argument about Africa: "...how democracy works is just as or more important than what it produces." Nonetheless, this finding should be regarded with caution, since this is strongly influenced by the selected indicators.

The second part of the research question was to gain insight into how decreases in institutional trust affect democratic consolidation in Africa. Here, I rely on Schedler (1998) understanding of democratic consolidation⁶⁹:

I think we should return to the concept's original concern with democratic survival. We should restore its classical meaning, which is securing achieved levels of democratic rule against authoritarian regression. That means we should restrict its use to the two "negative" notions described above: avoiding democratic breakdown and avoiding democratic erosion.
(Schedler, 1998, p. 103)

The general finding that government performance matters for institutional trust, could lend support to Mishler and Rose's (1999, p. 79) argument that trust in new democracies are more volatile than in more established democracies. It is worrying that there is such a close

⁶⁹ According to Schedler (1998) there are several meanings of the term democratic consolidation, and in his article he lists five concepts: avoiding democratic breakdown, avoiding democratic erosion, completing democracy, deepening democracy and organizing democracy. His understanding of democratic consolidation is based the first two notions of democratic consolidation, characterized as negative conceptions.

connection between government performance and institutional trust; it lends support to Ndegwa's (2001) argument that legitimacy in Africa is dependent on government performance. This connection indicates that popular legitimacy is vulnerable in Africa, and implies that poor government performance is an obstacle to democratic consolidation in Africa. In the long run, such a close connection could create unfavorable conditions for governments, such as a lack of compliance, among citizens (Hetherington, 1998). Moreover, considering Huntington's (1991) argument about snowball effects, it is evident that a lack of consolidation in one country most likely will have negative impacts on other African democracies as well. Nonetheless, in order to give a comprehensive answer to this question, cultural explanations should be taken into account. Mishler and Rose's (1999, p. 79) argument above is founded on the notion that Africans are not socialized to support democracy, but this is an aspect that has only been partly controlled for in this analysis. Moreover, based on this study alone, I cannot determine if dynamics of political trust is alarming in Africa, since the countries included are not representative for Africa. On a strong cautionary note, it might appear that prospects of democratic consolidation is worse in the countries that are not included, considering that these countries are deemed less democratic. However, a larger sample is needed in order to give a more encompassing answer to this.

6.1 Implications of this Study

In order to address implications of my findings, I want to address three main limitations to this study. Firstly, as I have already elaborated on, the number of countries included in the analysis is relative small considering that there are 49 countries in all of Sub-Saharan Africa. I cannot determine, based on the twenty countries studied, whether the same trends and dynamics occur in the excluded countries. Secondly, I do not include alternative indicators for actual government performance. I recognize that additional indicators for democracy would have made a significant contribution to the study, because as Knutsen (2010a, p. 125) argues, "...ensure that our results are not driven by measurement error or other indicator-specific attributes". This applies to the actual economic performance indicator as well. Even though national income levels do not appear to matter for levels of institutional trust, alternative indicators could have an effect. For instance, McAllister (1999, p.197) have previously found that aggregated measures of unemployment had a negative effect on institutional trust. Thirdly, my focus has been on institutional theories, and not cultural theories, and I cannot

make any strong claims about these explanations. This is a disadvantage since government performance clearly is not the only factor that matters for institutional trust.

Overall, this study has demonstrated that governments can promote institutional trust by improving government performance. Echoing Mattes and Bratton's (2007, p. 204) arguments, good governance appears to be very important for citizens in Africa. Considering Diamond's (2015, p. 154) argument that international actors should work for consolidation in third wave democracies, an important objective for these actors should be to promote government performance. Overall, by promoting freedom and fair elections, as well as working against corruption, institutions can enhance trust among own citizens, which are similar conclusions reached by Mishler and Rose (2001). In addition, improving perceptions of the current economic situation within a country, managing the economy favorably, improving living standards for the poor, creating jobs, keeping prices down, and narrowing income gaps, will have a positive effect. If African governments are not able to increase perceptions of governments' performance, we can most likely expect lower levels of political trust in the future. In addition, it will become more challenging for governments to implement policies and processes, which in turn will worsen levels of institutional trust even more.

Improving government performance is a difficult task. Institutions in Africa are facing many political and economic obstacles, which arguably make it more difficult for these governments to perform effectively. Nonetheless, similar to Miller and Listhaug's (1999, p. 216) conclusion, I argue that citizens in Africa should be able to expect the delivery of certain goods, such as basic freedoms, absence of corruption, and a notion that governments' do what is best for their citizens.

6.2 Future Research

There are numerous possibilities regarding future research on institutional trust in Africa. Based on this study alone, I cannot generalize beyond the performance indicators included in this analysis. Therefore, I argue that it is fruitful to expand my framework by including other performance indicators on both the actual- and the perceived level. It is beyond the scope of this study to mention all of them, and therefore I limit myself to elaborate on some. As to political performance, it is clear that an expansion would be advantageous, because my operationalization of political performance is quite narrow. By including other measures, also retro- and prospective indicators, much insight can be gained. As to economic performance, it

is possible to include alternative indicators, and also expand beyond the mere economic sphere, such as environmental protection (Norris, 2011).

In many ways, the connection between actual economic performance and levels of institutional trust remains somewhat unanswered after this study, and I want to address two points. First, the negative, however weak, relationship between institutional trust and GDP shown in chapter 5.2, could lend support to the notion that increasing wealth also increases citizens' demands: The richer a country is, the more difficult it becomes for government to fulfill people's expectations⁷⁰. Second, the unclear connection could also be due to measurement errors, i.e. that GDP is not suitable to assess and compare African countries (Jerven, 2010). Within African countries there are large income differences, and thus economic prosperity may only favor a small group of citizens, whereas several groups still experience poverty (Beegle et al., 2016).

In this thesis, I only tested some aspects of cultural theories, and consequently I have not fully studied these explanations. In their well-known study, Mishler and Rose (2001) included both cultural- and institutional explanations. Even though they found most support for the institutional explanations, their approach arguably is a more solid approach to the study of political trust. Perhaps most importantly, even though I did not detect a connection between the ethnicity indicator and institutional trust in my analysis, a number of scholars argue that ethnicity is central in Africa (e.g. Diamond, 2010b; Eifert et al., 2010; Hutchison & Johnson, 2011; Posner, 2007). For instance, in her master thesis, Mortensen (2013) found that treatment of ethnic group had a significant effect on institutional trust in Africa. Furthermore, there exist empirical research that signify its relevance for institutional explanations, such as Easterly and Levine (1997) who showed that ethnic fragmentation were highly relevant for economic performance in Africa. In addition, scholars such as Diamond (2010b, p. 47), has pointed out that informal institutions in Africa draw on ethnic bonds.

Expanding the research reported here, the relationship between political and economic government performance is of high relevance. Gerring, Kingstone, Lange, and Sinha (2011, p. 1735) argues that arguments for the connection between regime type and economic outcome is growing. For instance, in his study, Knutsen (2013) showed that democracy had a positive effect on economic growth in Africa, and that democracy had an especially strong effect on

⁷⁰ However, results from the multilevel analysis in chapter 5.3 points in the opposite direction. Additionally, the apparent curvilinear connection between GDP and institutional trust implies that this connection only applies to a certain threshold.

growth when state capacity was low. Based on the elaboration above, I argue that this is an interesting relationship to investigate further.

Finally, the upcoming data from Round 6, allows for more non-democratic and semi-democratic countries to be included than I was able to in this study. Then, 17 additional countries can be studied: Algeria, Burundi, Cameroon, Cote D'Ivoire, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, Guinea, Mauritius, Morocco, Niger, Sao Tome, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Swaziland, Togo, and Tunisia (Afrobarometer, 2016)⁷¹. By expanding the sample with countries that are less democratic and who also have experienced more setbacks, the sample has more variation. This expansion makes it possible to detect more differences, especially on macro-level, and can detect trends in institutional trust in more countries and over a longer time. This would gain insight into the notion of low and dwindling institutional trust in Africa, and the prospects for democratic consolidation, to a much larger extent than I have been able to do in this study.

⁷¹ These include the excluded countries from Round 5, and the additional countries from Round 6.

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Appendices

Appendix A: Overview of Variables

Micro variables: Questions and alternatives from the Afrobarometer surveys are in italics.

Institutional trust	<p>Index.</p> <p><i>How much do you trust each of the following, or haven't you heard enough about them to say:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">- <i>The Parliament</i>- <i>The Electoral Commission of (country)</i>- <i>Your Metropolitan, Municipal or District Assembly</i>- <i>The Police</i>- <i>Courts of law</i> <p><i>0=not at all, 1=just a little, 2=somewhat, 3=a lot.</i></p> <p>It is measured on a continuous scale, where low values indicate low levels of trust and high values indicate high levels of trust in institutions, i.e. from 0 (least trusting) to 3 (most trusting).</p>
Perceived freedoms	<p>Index.</p> <p>1) <i>On the whole, how would you rate the freeness and fairness of the last national election, held in [year]. Was it:</i></p> <p><i>1=not free and fair, 2=free and fair, with major problems, 3=free and fair, but with minor problems, 4=completely free and fair</i></p> <p>2) <i>In this country, how free are you:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">- <i>To say what you think</i>- <i>To join any political organization you want</i>- <i>To choose who to vote for without feeling pressured</i> <p><i>1=not at all free, 2=not very free, 3=somewhat free, 4=completely free.</i></p> <p>The index is measured on a continuous scale, where low values indicate positive perceptions of own freedom and high values indicate negative perceptions of own freedom, i.e. from 1 (most free) to 4 (least free).</p>
Perceived corruption	<p>Index.</p> <p><i>How many of the following people do you think are involved in corruption, or haven't you heard enough about them to say:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">- <i>The President/Prime Minister and Officials in his/her Office</i>- <i>Members of Parliament</i>- <i>Government Officials</i>- <i>Elected Assembly men/women</i>- <i>Police</i>- <i>Judges and Magistrates</i> <p><i>0=none, 1=some of them, 2= most of them, 3=all of them.</i></p> <p>It is measured on a continuous scale, where low values indicate perceptions of low frequency of corruption and high values indicate perceptions of high frequency of corruption, i.e. from 0 (lowest) to 3 (highest).</p>
Perceived economic situation	<p>Item.</p> <p><i>In general, how would you describe: The present economic condition of this country?</i></p> <p><i>1=very bad, 2=fairly bad, 3= neither good nor bad, 4=fairly good, 5=very good.</i></p> <p><i>0= good, 1= neutral, 2 = bad.</i></p>
Perceived economic performance	<p>Index.</p> <p><i>How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven't you heard enough to say:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">- <i>Managing the economy</i>- <i>Improving the living standards of the poor</i>- <i>Creating jobs</i>- <i>Keeping prices down</i>- <i>Narrowing gaps between rich and poor</i>

	<p><i>1=very well, 2=fairly well, 3=fairly badly, 4=very badly.</i></p> <p>It is measured on a continuous scale, where low values indicate positive perceptions of government economic performance, and high values indicate negative perceptions, i.e. from 1 (most positive) to 4 (least positive).</p>
Lived poverty	<p>Index.</p> <p><i>Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you or anyone in your family gone without:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>Enough food to eat</i> - <i>Enough clean water for home use</i> - <i>Medicines or medical treatment</i> - <i>Enough fuel to cook your food</i> - <i>A cash income</i> <p><i>0=never, 1=just once or twice, 2=several times, 3=many times, 4=always.</i></p> <p>It is measured on a continuous scale, where low values indicate low frequencies of lived poverty, and high values indicate high frequencies of lived poverty, i.e. from 0 (least frequent) to 4 (most frequent).</p>
Age	<p>Item.</p> <p><i>How old are you?</i></p>
Gender	<p>It is measured on a continuous scale, from 18 to a 110.</p> <p>Item</p> <p>Answered by interviewer.</p> <p>0=female, 1=male.</p>
Education	<p>Item.</p> <p><i>What is the highest level of education you have completed?</i></p> <p><i>0=no formal schooling, 1=informal schooling only, 2=some primary schooling, 3=primary school completed, 4=some secondary school/ high school, 5=secondary school completed/high school completed, 6=post-secondary qualifications, other than university e.g. a diploma or degree from polytechnic or college, 7=some university, 8=university completed, 9=post-graduate.</i></p> <p>0=no schooling, 1=primary, 2=secondary, 3=higher.</p>
Urban/rural	<p>Item.</p> <p>Answered by interviewer.</p> <p>0=rural, 1=urban.</p>
Interpersonal trust	<p>Item.</p> <p><i>How much do you trust each of the following types of people: Other people you know?</i></p> <p><i>0=not at all, 1=just a little, 2=I trust them somewhat, 3=I trust them a lot.</i></p> <p>0=high, 1=low.</p>
Support for democracy	<p>Item.</p> <p><i>Which of these three statements is closest to your own opinion?</i></p> <p><i>1: Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government.</i></p> <p><i>2: In some circumstances, a non-democratic government can be preferable.</i></p> <p><i>3: For someone like me, it doesn't matter what kind of government we have.</i></p> <p>0= democracy preferable, 1= democracy not preferable.</p>
Macro variables	
Level of democracy	<p>Based on FH's rating which combines level of political rights and civil liberties. Measured on a 1-7 scale, where 1 indicates high levels of freedoms in a country, and 7 indicates low levels.</p>
Democratic setbacks	<p>Based on FH's rating, measuring whether there has been a decline in level of freedom over the three years prior to the survey. Measured as a dummy.</p> <p>0 = no change, 1 =change.</p>
GDP per capita	<p>Based on World Bank report on GDP per capita.</p> <p>Low numbers indicate low levels of GDP per capita, and high numbers indicate higher levels of GDP per capita.</p>
Politically relevant ethnic group	<p>Based on Posner's PREG. Measured on a 0-0.99 scale, from 0 (least ethnic fractionalized) to 0.99 (most ethnic fractionalized).</p>

Appendix B: VPC Calculations

Table 1: Variance for the net sample

	Estimate	Std. dev.
Variance level-1 residual	0.571	0.690
Variance level-2 residual	0.075	0.003

$$\text{VPC} = \frac{\text{Var}(u_0)}{\text{Var}(e) + \text{Var}(u_0)} = \frac{0.075}{0.075 + 0.571} = 0.1161$$

The results from an estimation of the empty model indicate that most of the variance in the model is explained on an individual level. The VPC (Variance Partition Coefficient) is 0.1161, and it is an estimation of the level of variance on level-2 (Strabac, 2012). By multiplying the VPC by a 100, I find that it is 11.61 %. This means that approx. 12 % of the variance is on country-year level, and approx. 88 % of the variance is on individual level.

Table 2: Variance for the valid sample

	Level-1 variance	Level-2 variance
Control variables	0.5233191	
Perceived political performance	0.4384963	
Perceived economic performance	0.4623724	
Actual political performance		0.0421479
Actual economic performance		0.0664473
Empty model	0.5542472	0.0745091

$$\text{VPC} = \frac{\text{Var}(u_0)}{\text{Var}(e) + \text{Var}(u_0)} = \frac{0.0745091}{0.0745091 + 0.5542472} = 0.1185 = 11.85 \%$$

For the empty model with valid N, approx. 12 % of the variance is on country-year level, and approx. 88 % is on individual level. Calculations below show the calculations for the different sets of indicators on level-1 (micro) and level-2 (macro).

$$R^2(\text{Level-1}) = \frac{\text{Var}(e)_b - \text{Var}(e)_m}{\text{Var}(e)_b}$$

$$R^2(\text{Control variables}) = \frac{0.5542472 - 0.5233191}{0.5542472} = 0.0558 = 5.58 \%$$

$$R^2(\text{Perceived political performance}) = \frac{0.5542472 - 0.4384963}{0.5542472} = 0.2088 = 20.88 \%$$

$$R^2(\text{Perceived economic performance}) = \frac{0.5542472 - 0.4623724}{0.5542472} = 0.1658 = 16.58 \%$$


$$R^2(\text{Level-2}) = \frac{\text{Var}(u_0)_b - \text{Var}(u_0)_m}{\text{Var}(u_0)_b}$$

$$R^2(\text{Level of democracy \& democratic setbacks}) = \frac{0.0745091 - 0.0421479}{0.0745091} = 0.4343 = 43.43 \%$$

$$R^2(\text{GDP}) = \frac{0.0745091 - 0.0664473}{0.0745091} = 0.1082 = 10.82 \%$$

Appendix C: Histogram of Institutional Trust

Figure 1: Frequency distribution of institutional trust. N=60,896



Appendix D: Overview of Indexes

Institutional Trust

Table 3: Correlation matrix for institutional trust

	1	2	3	4	5	6
1. Trust the President	1					
2. Trust the Parliament	0.61*	1				
3. Trust the electoral commission	0.54*	0.55*	1			
4. Trust the local government	0.44*	0.51*	0.44*	1		
5. Trust the police	0.43*	0.44*	0.42*	0.44*	1	
6. Trust the court	0.42*	0.46*	0.46*	0.42*	0.53*	1

*Significant at $p \leq 0.05$

The correlation matrix shows that the variables are correlated, and a significance test reveals that all these correlations are statistically significant on 5 % level. The mean correlation between the variables is 0.47, which is above Ringdal's (2007, p.333) recommended level of 0.3. The highest correlation is between the President and the Parliament (0.61), and the lowest correlation is between the court and the police and the remaining variables. Cronbach's Alpha is 0.84, which is above the recommended level of 0.7 (Ringdal, 2007, p. 331).

Table 4: Factor analysis of institutional trust

	Factor 1	Communality
Trust president	0.76	0.58
Trust parliament	0.80	0.36
Trust electoral commission	0.79	0.61
Trust local government	0.73	0.53
Trust police	0.72	0.52
Trust court	0.73	0.53
Eigen value	3.42	
Explained variance in percent	57.01	

The underlying factor explains 57.01 % of the variance in the six variables, which is higher than the recommended level of 50 %. The factor loadings show that the correlation between the factor and the variables are above the recommended level of 0.4. Communalities, which show how much of the variance in each variable that is explained by the factor, are almost the same (Ringdal, 2007, pp. 327-328). The communality for the component trust Parliament stands out, but I argue that this is not too problematic since the other recommendations are met.

Perceived Freedoms

Table 5: Correlation matrix and factor analysis for perceived freedoms

	Correlation matrix				Factor analysis	
	1	2	3	4	Factor 1	Communality
1. Freedom last election	1				0.41	0.17
2. Freedom of speech	0.22*	1			0.80	0.65
3. Freedom of organization	0.20*	0.59*	1		0.87	0.76
4. Freedom to vote	0.21*	0.51*	0.67*	1	0.84	0.71
*Significant at $p \leq 0.05$					Eigen value	2.28
					Explained variance in %	57.09

Cronbach’s Alpha is 0.73, and the mean correlation between the variables is 0.41. The underlying factor explains 57.09 % of the variance in the four variables, and the factor loadings are above 0.4. The communalities for freedom last election stands out, but echoing arguments made above, I argue that this is not too worrying since the other recommendations are met.

Perceived Corruption

Table 6: Correlation matrix and factor analysis for perceived corruption

	Correlation matrix						Factor analysis	
	1	2	3	4	5	6	Factor 1	Communality
1. Corruption the President	1						0.77	0.59
2. Corruption MPs	0.65*	1					0.84	0.70
3. Corruption government off.	0.56*	0.65*	1				0.83	0.69
4. Corruption local council	0.51*	0.62*	0.62*	1			0.80	0.64
5. Corruption police	0.43*	0.50*	0.55*	0.52*	1		0.74	0.55
6. Corruption judges	0.47*	0.50*	0.48*	0.47*	0.51*	1	0.72	0.51
*Significant at $p \leq 0.05$							Eigen value	3.69
							Explained var.	61.43

Cronbach's Alpha is 0.87, and the mean correlation is 0.52. The underlying factor explains 61.43 % of the variance in the six variables, the factor loadings are above 0.4, and the communalities are almost the same.

Perceived Economic Performance

Table 7: Correlation matrix and factor analysis for perceived economic performance

	Correlation matrix					Factor analysis	
	1	2	3	4	5	Factor 1	Communality
1. Managing the economy	1					0.77	0.59
2. Improving living standards... poor	0.64*	1				0.84	0.70
3. Creating jobs	0.50*	0.60*	1			0.80	0.63
4. Keeping prices down	0.44*	0.49*	0.51*	1		0.76	0.57
5. Narrowing income gaps	0.34*	0.57*	0.52*	0.57*	1	0.79	0.62
<i>*Significant at $p \leq 0.05$</i>						Eigen value	3.12
						Explained var.	62.33

Cronbach's Alpha is 0.77, and the mean correlation is 0.40. The underlying factor explains 62.33 % of the variance in the five variables, the factor loadings are above 0.4, and the communalities are almost the same.

Lived Poverty

Table 8: Correlation matrix and factor analysis for lived poverty

	Correlation matrix					Factor analysis	
	1	2	3	4	5	Factor 1	Communality
1. No food	1					0.75	0.56
2. No water	0.37*	1				0.68	0.47
3. No medical care	0.46*	0.44*	1			0.77	0.60
4. No cooking fuel	0.88*	0.37*	0.41*	1		0.68	0.47
5. No cash income	0.47*	0.32*	0.46*	0.34*	1	0.72	0.51
<i>*Significant at $p \leq 0.05$</i>						Eigen value	2.61
						Explained var.	52.14

Cronbach's Alpha is 0.77, and the mean correlation is 0.40. The underlying factor explains 52.14 % of the variance in the five variables, the factor loadings are above 0.4, and the communalities are almost the same.

Appendix E: Overview of Sampling

Table 9: Sample size and dates of fieldwork Round 4 and Round 5

Country	ROUND 4		ROUND 5	
	Sample Size	Dates of Fieldwork	Sample Size	Dates of Fieldwork
Benin	1200	June 23 - July 6, 2008	1200	Nov.16 - Dec. 06, 2011
Botswana	1200	Sept. 29 - Oct. 16, 2008	1200	June 30 - July. 11, 2012
Burkina Faso	1200	Oct. 6 - 21, 2008	1200	Dec. 3 – 12, 2012
Cape Verde	1264	May 20 -29, 2008	1200	Dec. 3 - Dec. 12, 2011
Ghana	1200	March 4 - 27, 2008	1200	May 8. - May 27, 2012
Kenya	1104	Oct. 29 - Nov. 17, 2008	2400	Nov. 4 2011 - 20, 2012
Lesotho	1200	Oct. 16 - Nov. 12, 2008	1200	Nov. 26 - Dec. 21, 2012
Liberia	1200	Dec. 9 – 31, 2008	1200	Jun. 24 - July 8, 2012
Madagascar	1350	June 11 - July 11, 2008	1200	March 7 - April 7, 2013
Malawi	1200	Oct. 10 - Nov. 25, 2008	2400	June 4 - July 1, 2012
Mali	1232	Dec. 15 – 31, 2008	1200	Dec. 16 2012 - Jan. 1 2013
Mozambique	1200	Dec. 6 - 24, 2008	2400	Nov 17 - Dec. 9, 2012
Namibia	1200	Oct. 24 - Dec. 3, 2008	1200	Nov. 19 - Dec. 18, 2012
Nigeria	2324	Oct. 24 - Dec. 3, 2008	2400	Oct. 29 - Nov. 30, 2012
Senegal	1200	May 19 - June 4, 2008	1200	Feb. 17 - March 20, 2013
South Africa	2400	Oct.27 - Nov. 23, 2008	2399	Oct. 20 - Nov. 30, 2011
Tanzania	1208	June 23 - July 12, 2008	2400	May. 28 - June 30, 2012
Uganda	2431	July 27 - Sept. 3, 2008	2400	Dec. 2 2011 - Feb. 27 2012
Zambia	1200	June 2 – 24, 2009	1200	Jan. 21 2012 - Feb. 8 2013
Zimbabwe	1200	May 9 - 23, 2009	2400	July 16 - July 30, 2012

Note: The numbers from Round 4 is an adaption of the table presented by the Afrobarometer Network (Little & Logan, 2009). I have added the details for Zimbabwe, since these were missing in the original table (Kerr, 2010). I have also changed the dates for Zambia, due to later corrections in the country specific codebook (Dulani, 2010). The numbers from Round 5 is an adaption from the codebook (Park, 2015).



Appendix F: Political Relevant Ethnic Group (PREG)

Table 10: Data for PREG Round 4 and Round 5

Country	PREG
Benin	0.30
Botswana	0.00
Burkina Faso	0.00
Cape Verde	0.00
Ghana	0.44
Kenya	0.57
Lesotho	0.00
Liberia	0.62
Madagascar	0.00
Malawi	0.55
Mali	0.13
Mozambique	0.36
Namibia	0.55
Nigeria	0.66
Senegal	0.14
South Africa	0.49
Tanzania	0.59
Uganda	0.63
Zambia	0.71
Zimbabwe	0.41

Appendix G: Correlation between Institutional Trust and PREG

Figures 2 and 3: Correlation between PREG and institutional trust for Round 4 and Round 5



Appendix H: GDP per Capita and PPP-adjusted GDP per Capita

Table 11: GDP per capita and PPP-adjusted GDP per capita in Round 4 and in Round 5

	ROUND 4				ROUND 5			
	GDP per capita		PPP-adjusted		GDP per capita		PPP-adjusted	
	Rankings	Value	Rankings	Value	Rankings	Value	Rankings	Value
Benin	11	0,795	12	1,784	13	0,799	12	1,762
Botswana	2	5,562	1	13,618	2	6,936	1	14,004
Burkina Faso	15	0,569	16	1,354	14	0,673	15	1,519
Cape Verde	4	3,698	4	6,041	4	3,766	4	6,148
Ghana	6	1,234	7	2,868	7	1,642	6	3,659
Kenya	9	0,939	8	2,390	8	1,185	8	2,670
Lesotho	10	0,827	10	2,041	9	1,159	9	2,384
Liberia	20	0,231	20	0,673	19	0,414	19	0,770
Madagascar	17	0,472	13	1,528	18	0,463	17	1,367
Malawi	19	0,308	19	0,685	20	0,270	20	0,750
Mali	13	0,614	14	1,480	15	0,660	16	1,466
Mozambique	16	0,500	18	0,853	17	0,565	18	0,992
Namibia	3	4,011	3	8,171	3	5,680	3	8,859
Nigeria	5	1,377	5	4,687	5	2,740	5	5,310
Senegal	8	1,095	9	2,172	10	1,051	11	2,193
South Africa	1	5,812	2	12,263	1	8,081	2	12,291
Tanzania	12	0,658	11	2,007	12	0,828	10	2,248
Uganda	18	0,459	15	1,472	16	0,656	14	1,666
Zambia	7	1,135	6	3,061	6	1,759	7	3,623
Zimbabwe	14	0,595	17	1,270	11	0,851	13	1,698

Note: GDP per capita is shown in 1000\$.

Appendix I: Models with PPP-adjusted GDP per capita

Table 12: Models with PPP-adjusted GDP per capita

	Model 4X		Model 7X	
Constant	1.617***	(0.384)	3.636***	(0.251)
Male	0.002	(0.007)	-0.002	(0.006)
Age	0.001***	(0.000)	0.001***	(0.000)
Education level ¹				
<i>Primary</i>	-0.075***	(0.011)	-0.059***	(0.010)
<i>Secondary</i>	-0.180***	(0.011)	-0.149***	(0.010)
<i>Higher</i>	-0.225***	(0.014)	-0.185***	(0.013)
Urban	-0.150***	(0.007)	-0.100***	(0.007)
Low interpersonal trust	-0.252***	(0.007)	-0.173***	(0.006)
Perceived corruption			-0.322***	(0.005)
Perceived freedoms			-0.222***	(0.005)
Perceived economic situation ²				
<i>Neutral</i>			-0.063***	(0.009)
<i>Bad</i>			-0.127***	(0.007)
Economic performance			-0.256***	(0.005)
Lived poverty			0.003	(0.004)
PPP-adjusted GDP	0.023	(0.049)	-0.029	(0.032)
Valid N	50,066		50,066	
Log likelihood	-54,929.92		-48,522.30	
Variance level-1	0.5233191	(0.003)	0.4053288	(0.003)
Variance level-2	0.0670649	(0.015)	0.0285196	(0.007)

¹ No schooling is reference category.

² Good is reference category.