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## Xenophobic Actions in South Africa

*A Quantitative Study of South Africans' Likelihood of Taking Part in Xenophobic Actions*

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## Abstract

Despite the wish for a non-segregated nation after the transition to democracy in 1994, xenophobic attitudes and actions continue to be prevalent in South Africa. African foreigners being chased from their homes, having their businesses burned to the ground, and even being shot, stabbed and burned to death are all evidence of xenophobia remaining a powerful force in the country. This thesis studies what factors can explain why some South Africans are likely to go as far as to take part in these actions. The main contribution of this thesis is that I focus on xenophobic *actions*, in order to differentiate between the dimensions of xenophobia. By using a quantitative regression analysis I find that individual factors like race, job scarcity and ethnic discrimination all have an influence on the likelihood of taking part in xenophobic actions in South Africa in 2011. The black/African part of the South African population is more likely to take part in xenophobic actions than white. Those who view foreigners as a competition for jobs, as well as those who have felt discriminated against by the state based on their ethnicity, are also more likely to the partaking of the hostile actions directed towards African foreigners.

## Sammendrag

Til tross for ønsket om en ikke-segregert nasjon etter overgangen til demokrati i 1994, fortsetter xenofobiske holdninger og handlinger å eksistere i Sør-Afrika. Afrikanere som blir jaget fra hjemmene sine, får brent ned bedriftene sine, og til og med skutt, knivstukket og brent i hjel er bevis på at xenofobi fortsetter å være en mektig makt i landet. Denne masteroppgaven ser på hvilke faktorer som kan forklare hvorfor noen sørafrikanere tar del i slike handlinger. Det største bidraget til dette arbeidet er at jeg fokuserer på xenofobiske *handlinger*, for å kunne skille mellom dimensjonene av xenofobi. Gjennom å bruke en kvantitativ regresjonsanalyse, finner jeg at individuelle faktorer som rase, jobbmangel og etnisk diskriminering, alle har en effekt på sannsynligheten for å ta del i xenofobiske handlinger i Sør-Afrika i 2011. Den svarte/ afrikanske delen av den sørafrikanske befolkningen har større sannsynlighet for å ta del i xenofobiske handlinger enn hvite. De som ser på utlendinger som en konkurranse på jobbmarkedet, samt har følt seg diskriminert av staten på grunn av deres etnisitet, har større sannsynlighet for å ta del i fiendtlige handlinger rettet mot afrikanske utlendinger.



## Preface

This thesis marks the end of my time on the five-year teacher program at NTNU, with an integrated masters degree in political science. It has been a valuable and exciting time, where I have been able to work with subjects of great interest, but it has also challenged me. In relation to this thesis, I will like to thank some people that have helped me through the process.

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Any remaining errors are solely my responsibility.

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# 1 Introduction

The first non-racial democratic election in South Africa took place in 1994, and marked the end of over three centuries of colonialism, segregation and white minority ruling (Eriksen, 2016). The new democratic government focused on tolerance and inclusiveness, as well as the importance of human rights (Adjai & Lazaridis, 2013, p. 192). New priorities were made to minimize the ethnic imbalance (Davenport & Saunders, 2000), and South Africa became a desirable destination for immigrants. The expectations of the people were high and they believed that the new democracy would bring a great change for the marginalized poor, and an end to a segregated nation (Adjai & Lazaridis, 2013, p. 193). *Ubuntu* was one of the key concepts of the democratic transition, and was viewed as the counterpart of apartheid, representing reconciliation, community and togetherness. The goal was to create a united South Africa (Eriksen, 2016, p. 148).

Today, despite the wish for a united and equal nation, xenophobia has taken a dominant role in South Africa (Eriksen, 2016). Xenophobia is an ambiguous and debated term, but is mostly used to describe fear or hatred of things or people that are foreign or strange (Dictionary.com, 2016). In South Africa we have witnessed this fear or hatred evolving to harmful attacks: tires are set alight, streets are barricaded, shops are torched, people are shot, stabbed and burned to death, and Zimbabweans, Mozambicans, Somalis, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis are driven away from their homes and businesses by mobs (Wilkinson, 2015). These actions differ in terms of intensity and severity. However, they have one thing in common: they are all types of behavior that involve acting on prejudicial attitudes. So, why do some people participate in these forms of actions, leaving millions of migrants in fear for their lives? What is it that makes someone prone to take part in xenophobic actions directed towards foreigners? Based on these concerns, this thesis aims to examine the following research question:

*What makes some South Africans likely to go so far as to take part in xenophobic actions?*

There are many factors calling for greater attention to the xenophobic actions taking place in South Africa: 1) Xenophobia has often been treated as an ambiguous term, without really addressing its different dimensions and intensity-levels, 2) The lack of empirical research in



the African continent, 3) The growing intensity of the attacks, and 4) The South African government neglecting the issue.

Afrobarometer, the African-led series of national public attitude surveys (Afrobarometer, 2016), found that more than one out of ten South African individuals in the time period 1997-2011 answered that they would be “very likely” to take part in actions to prevent foreigners from moving into their neighborhood or operating a business in their area (Krönke, 2015). It is highly unlikely that all of the respondents saying they would be likely to take part in xenophobic actions actually have. However, it raises the concern that the violent attacks have the potential to become more widespread. At the very least, the data imply that a considerable minority would have approved of the xenophobic actions of others. Even though the percentage of respondents willing to take action in order to prevent foreigners from moving into their neighborhood (32 percent in 2011), and prevent them from operating a business (two percent in 2011) has decreased since 2008 (Krönke, 2015), the xenophobic attacks are still prevalent and need to be studied.

This thesis’ main contribution to the academic field of ethnic conflict studies is that I look explicitly at likelihood of taking part in xenophobic *actions*, whereas the majority of the literature on xenophobia has focused on attitudes.

In order to do so I apply relevant theory from large-scale ethnic conflicts to study of willingness to take part in hostile actions or not. More than being a consequence of having xenophobic attitudes, I argue that South Africans are prone to take part in xenophobic actions when they feel threatened due to a strong sense of ethnic security dilemma. The ethnic security dilemma comes about as a result of a combination of identity, frustration and opportunity as outlined by Ellingsen (2000) and function as my overall theoretical framework. In doing so, this thesis aims to contribute to the knowledge of an issue that will presumably continue to impact millions of lives in the “rainbow-nation”<sup>1</sup>.

## 1.1 Structure of Study

This thesis consists of four main chapters accounting for theory, research design and data, empirical analysis and a conclusion. Chapter 2 consists of the theoretical framework of the thesis. In the first part of the chapter I present theory on xenophobia, as well as an overview of the xenophobic evidence in South Africa. In light of this I discuss the distinction between

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<sup>1</sup> A term used by former Archbishop Desmond Tutu to address the unity in the nation based on its multicultural characteristic (Adjai & Lazaridis, 2013, p. 194).

xenophobic attitudes and actions. I apply Allport's (1954) scale of intensity to be able to discern the different dimensions of prejudicial actions. In the second part of the theoretical framework, I look at what creates xenophobic attitudes and actions, through the use of a constructivist perspective, as well as theory on ethnic security dilemma. In order to study what incentives can result in a perceived ethnic security dilemma, I use Ellingsen (2000) and Gurr's (2000) propositions on mobilization of group conflict. These propositions function as structuring devices allowing for a discussion of the element of opportunity, collective incentives and group capacities, and their effect on the perceived ethnic security dilemma and thus likelihood of taking part in xenophobic actions. Finally, these are presented in hypotheses. On the ethnic security dilemma, I argue that an increased feeling of this phenomenon, and thus an increased fear, will affect the likelihood that one would take part in xenophobic actions. Based on the theoretical discussion of ethnic security dilemma and propositions for group mobilization, I derive two sets of hypotheses concerning the relationship between ethnic security dilemma and the likelihood of taking part in xenophobic actions: one set concerning ethnicity and the other concerning frustration.

Research design, data and operationalization of variables are presented in Chapter 3. I argue that the opportunity factors lie implicitly in the case of South Africa, and present the remaining factors that can explain the likelihood of taking part in xenophobic actions in two clusters: 1) Ethnicity, which consist of ethnic identity and race, and 2) Frustration, consisting of three different measurements of relative deprivation, job scarcity and ethnic discrimination. In Chapter 4, I present the empirical analysis, in order to test my hypotheses regarding the likelihood of taking part in xenophobic actions. This is done through bivariate and multivariate regression analysis. In the analysis I find that factors like race, job scarcity and ethnic discrimination all have an influence on the likelihood of taking part in xenophobic actions in South Africa. Lastly, Chapter 5 summarizes the thesis and its main empirical findings. In addition, I discuss the potential for future research on the topic of xenophobic actions.



## 2 Theoretical Framework

In this chapter I present possible explanations for why xenophobic actions occur in South Africa. In order to construct such explanations I outline a theoretical framework on xenophobia and what generates xenophobic actions. Based on theoretical contributions I finally present testable hypotheses regarding factors that can explain the likelihood of taking part in xenophobic actions.

### 2.1 Xenophobia

#### 2.1.1 Defining Xenophobia

Despite its widespread usage, xenophobia remains an ambiguous term. Xenophobia originates from the Latin words *xenos* and *phobos*, respectfully meaning “strange” and “fear of”. The dictionary definition is therefore “an unreasonable fear or hatred of foreigners or strangers or of that which is foreign or strange” (Dictionary.com, 2016). The use of similar terms such as ethnocentrism, nativism, xeno-racism, anti-immigrant prejudice and immigration-phobia in order to explain the same phenomenon highlights the conceptual vagueness of the term (Crush & Ramachandran, 2009).

Political scholars have attempted to conceptualize xenophobia in a number of ways. Nyamnjoh (2006, p. 5) defines it as an “...intense dislike, hatred or fear of Others”. It has also been viewed as “hostility towards strangers and all that is foreign” (Stolcke, 2002, p. 28), and “fear of difference embodied in persons or groups” (Berezin, 2006, p. 273). Even though the various approaches all accept that xenophobia is a set of attitudes and practices concerning people’s origins, the work done on the topic is often incomparable due to the strong contextual focus (Misago et al., 2015), and the term becomes widely open for interpretation.

The target group of this form of prejudice varies in the different definitions. Whereas some argue that it is directed towards non-citizens, others feel it is towards ethnic minorities. Another element of confusion is how the term relates to racism. It is often described as *new racism*<sup>2</sup>, which, according to Adjai and Lazaridis (2013, p. 192), is discrimination of the “other”, based on the other’s ethnicity or origin. This is different from *old racism*, which referred to discrimination based on a race (biological group) that was different from your

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<sup>2</sup> New racism represents a “shift in racism, from notions of biological superiority, to exclusion based on cultural and national differences” (Ibrahim, 2005, p. 164).

own. The feeling of threat is a key element to understanding this form of racism. According to Wieviorka (1995) racism is no longer based on domination, but rather exclusion and sometimes even destruction of races, due to a perceived threat. For this reason, Adjai and Lazaridis (2013, p. 193) argue that one can draw parallels between new racism and xenophobia due to the shared outcomes of the perception of threat, exclusion and discrimination of others based on their cultural origin, in addition to the implementation of policies to tighten immigration controls. Yet, other scholars on the other hand argue that xenophobia needs to be distinguished from racism, since it, unlike racism, is a biological reaction to strangers (Crush & Ramachandran, 2009). International Labour Office (ILO), International Organization for Migration (IOM) and Office of the United Nations High Commissioners for Human Rights (OHCHR) (2001) attempt to create some clarity in the relationship between racism and xenophobia by arguing that while racism implies distinctions based on difference in physical characteristics, xenophobia designates behaviors based on the perception that others are foreign to the community or nation.

By conceptualizing xenophobia only as an attitude, it leaves little room for effects or consequences of such a mind-set. This can be considered misleading. Xenophobia in South Africa is not restricted to a dislike or fear of foreigners (Harris, 2002), but includes “intense tension and violence by South Africans towards immigrants” (Tshitereke, 1999, p. 4). In order to create a clear distinction between xenophobic attitudes and actions, I find Allport’s (1954, pp. 14-15) scale of intensity to be a suitable framework, as it accounts for the different degrees of prejudicial actions. The following stages of prejudice are ranked from the mildest to the strongest:

- 1) *Antilocution* is the mildest degree of prejudice, and consists of talking about the hostile attitudes with other people.
- 2) *Avoidance* is when the prejudice is more intense, and individuals avoid members of the group they dislike. An important notion here is that the burden of withdrawal rests on the bearer of the prejudice, and he or she does not directly inflict harm upon the disliked group.
- 3) *Discrimination* is when the bearer of prejudice takes a detrimental action. He or she actively excludes all the members of the disliked groups from certain spheres in the society. Segregation is an example of discrimination that has been institutionalized.
- 4) *Physical attacks* occur when prejudicial emotions are heightened to a degree that might result in acts of violence, or semi-violence. This form of intensification can lead

to acts of violence or semi-violence. The xenophobic attacks in South Africa would be in this category, with the instances of chasing, violence, house burning and killing

- 5) *Extermination* is the strongest degree of expression of prejudice, and consists of pogroms, lynching and massacres. One of the most well-known examples of this is Hitler's genocide program directed towards the Jews.

This five-point scale directs our attention to the great range of activities activated by prejudicial attitudes. Even though many individuals would never move from antilocution or avoidance, it is important to keep in mind that activity on one level makes it easier to transition to a more intense level of prejudice (Allport, 1954, p. 15).

Another scale relevant for this thesis is Van Stekelenburg and Klandermans (2013) four-stage model of action mobilization. In this model the mobilization happens through four steps: 1) The individual sympathizes with cause, 2) The individual is informed about the mobilization, 3) The individual is motivated to participate, and 4) The individual moves from intentions to actual participation.

As for prejudice and xenophobia in general, there are bound to be different degrees of xenophobic actions. South Africa has been a victim of prejudice on all levels of the scale, and the actions examined above are of the more extreme nature. In this thesis I wish to address all xenophobic prejudice that includes behavior, and not simply attitudes. In other words, I wish to focus on the third, fourth and fifth stages on Allport's (1954) prejudice scale: discrimination, physical attack and extermination. This implies also looking at why individuals move from intentions to actual participation, seen in light of Van Stekelenburg and Klandermans' (2013) model.

It is important however, to keep in mind that the attitudes are essential for the actions to take place, and to be able to explain why people behave the way they do. Individuals who view the attitude object as highly important, or with attitudes that has been formed through direct experiences, are more likely to act in accordance with these attitudes (Fazio & Zanna, 1978; Krosnick, 1998; Regan & Fazio, 1997). Attitudes can exist without behavior, but behavior cannot exist without attitudes.

For the purpose of this thesis, I adopt ILO, IOM and OHCHR's (2001) definition of the term as, "attitudes, prejudices and behavior that reject, exclude and often vilify persons, based on the perception that they are outsiders or foreigners to the community, society and

national identity”<sup>3</sup>. I argue that ILO, IOM and OHCHR (2001)’s definition is sufficient for the purpose of this research, due to the fact that it includes behavior, and does not exclusively account for the attitude-dimension of the phenomenon. In other words, it accounts for xenophobic actions, not just xenophobic attitudes. Earlier research has mainly focused on the first part of the definition, namely attitude and prejudice. I argue that this is not a sufficient approach when studying the xenophobic actions taking place in South Africa. By treating all forms of xenophobia as one united phenomenon of hostile attitudes, one is not able to grasp the underlying factors that can explain the horrid actions taking place. Assuming that everyone with xenophobic attitudes are likely to take part in actions that are motivated by hostility and prejudice, will be a false assumption. I argue that it is necessary to differentiate between the various dimensions of hostility and prejudice, in order to understand and explain what actually causes xenophobic actions.

### **2.1.2 Correspondence Between Attitude and Actions**

The correspondence between attitudes and behavior is no longer taken for granted by social psychologists (Hillesund, 2015), and the issue has been debated for decades. Wagner and DeFleur (1969) present three distinct views in this tradition, calling them 1) *The postulate of consistency*, 2) *The postulate of independent variation*, and 3) *The postulate of contingent consistency*.

In *the postulate of consistency* there is a focus of measuring attitudes through the use of standardized scales. This line of research assumes that evaluating verbal attitude provides a valid ground for predicting if people will take actions. The second view, *the postulate of independent variation*, argues that due to a system of variables, there is no reason to assume that attitudes and behavior are consistently related<sup>4</sup>.

A great number of studies have been released that challenge the previous two postulates, a view which Wagner and DeFleur (1969) has labeled *the postulate of contingent consistency*. The main argument of this view is that the previous studies done in the field have not been able to provide sufficient explanations of ways in which attitudes and actions are linked. In this third postulate, interactional concepts such as group membership, norms, roles,

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<sup>3</sup> This definition is used by a number of other theorists (e.g. Adjai & Lazaridis, 2013; Crush & Ramachandran, 2009; Davis, 2009).

<sup>4</sup> Merton (1949) provides a good example of the second postulate. In his theoretical analysis between prejudice and discrimination, he marks a gap between creed and conduct. The theory argues that this gap is a result of the following three variables: first, the cultural creed honored in cultural tradition and enacted into law; second, the beliefs and attitudes of individuals in terms of the principles of the creed; and third, the actual practices of individuals with reference to it.

subcultures and reference groups are presented as plausible conditions, which can modify the relationship between attitudes and actions. It is clear that an adequate theory on attitude must take into account situational variables, which alters the relationship between attitudes and actions.

Wagner and DeFleur (1969) conclude that neither the postulate of consistency nor the postulate of independent variation are justifiable. A number of intervening variables influence the likelihood of actions by persons with given attitudes. The situational variables tested for in their work are social constraint, how other people might react to the actions, and social distance, status- position and role expectations in a social relationship. Other studies have used Wagner and DeFleur's (1969) theory to address the failure of studying attitudes to predict behavior, and to argue that the context in which attitude operates is a complex phenomenon which needs attention (e.g. Blasi, 1980; Ajzen & Fishbein, 2005). However, Wagner and DeFleur (1969) argue that these situational variables and their influence on actions still need to be studied. This research aims to respond to this need and investigate a number of factors that are expected to influence the likelihood of people becoming involved in xenophobic actions. This is presented in more detail in section 2.3. However, before going into details about these factors, a short background on South Africa and xenophobia is needed.

### **2.1.3 Xenophobia in South Africa**

As argued by Neocosmos (2010), in order to understand xenophobia in post-apartheid South Africa, one needs to draw out the history of the connection between the politics of resistance and apartheid state politics. Ever since the "Atlantic slave trade" lasting from 16th to the 19th century, South Africa has been a nation of white power, segregation and race discrimination (Eriksen, 2016, p. 23). The segregation evolved to a new level with the introduction of apartheid in 1945. Even though the apartheid was rooted in earlier laws, it made segregation a more aggressive approach, and made it a part of the law (South African History Online, 2016). While apartheid represented separation of races on a general basis, it meant white domination and black subordination in South Africa. The segregation was not only in terms of economy and labour, but did also play an enormous role in the cultural and ideological life of South Africa. Numerous laws were passed during the 1950s, in order to enforce racial separation and thus an unequal social order. *The Poulation Registratin Act*: demanding all citizens to register by race, *Group Areas Act*: extensive forced relocations of certain races to



change a city's social geography, and *the Reservation of Separate Amenities Acts*: placing signs with "White people only!" in parks, on beaches, at the movie theatre and restaurants, to name a few. These new laws resulted in thousands of South Africans protesting and taking part in civil disobedience. However, the apartheid economy had many flaws, and the opposition grew, both nationally and internationally (Eriksen, 2016, pp. 100-102).

When South Africa finally became a democracy in 1994, with Nelson Mandela as leader, the difficult task of political normalization begun. The Constitution of 1996 grants equal rights independent from skin color, religion, sex or sexual orientation. South Africa's new constitutional work proved to be one of the most liberal-democratic in the world, and in the Bill of Rights it was written that human rights also includes the right to health, a place to live, water and work (Eriksen, 2016, p. 149). The hopes were high among the South African people. According to a study published by the Southern African Migration Project (SAMP) in 2004, the African National Congress (ANC) government utilized a somewhat aggressive nation-building project in order to overcome the divides of the past. An unexpected result from this was the growing intolerance towards outsiders (Crush & Pendleton, 2004).

Despite the transition to democracy, research shows that xenophobic attitudes have been widespread across South Africa since the end of apartheid (Necosmos, 2010). Verbal abuse directed towards foreigners is sadly a quite familiar sight on the South African streets (Crush & Ramachandran, 2009). Regardless of the idea of a rainbow-nation, there is evidence that intolerance has increased after apartheid. People's opinions of foreigners from other African countries do not comply with the discourse of "pan-Africanism<sup>5</sup>", held by the elites and middle-class in South Africa. This discourse consists of viewing people from other African countries as comrades who functioned as supporters during the liberation struggles (Kersting, 2009, p. 16).

The xenophobic attitudes evidently have been higher in South Africa than other African countries (Mattes et al., 1999). These attitudes seem to be rooted in the perception that foreigners are to blame for the higher levels of crime, disease, corruption and high levels of unemployment (Valji, 2003). Krönke (2015) finds that greater than 20 percent of the South African population approved of the government deporting all foreigners, regardless of their legal status.

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<sup>5</sup> Ndlovu- Gatsheni (2011, p. 405) defines "pan-Africanism" as "an ideology that emphasises the unity of the continent and all the people of African descent resident outside Africa".

Incidents of xenophobic actions directed towards fellow Africans have along with xenophobic attitudes, been a reality in South Africa since the early 1990s. Like xenophobia itself, the xenophobic actions consist of different dimensions, which vary in intensity and seriousness. While some of the actions are just verbal, like name-calling and harassment, others are more physical and violent: beating, torture, chasing people from their homes, burning down shops and killing. Naturally, it is the actions that are more intense and violent that has gained the most media coverage. A report from Human Rights Watch shows how immigrants from Mozambique, Malawi and Zimbabwe living in townships<sup>6</sup> in Gauteng were physically assaulted over several weeks in 1995. The assailants, consisting of armed gangs, were looking for undocumented migrants and taking them to the police in order to “clean” the township of foreigners, as they were blamed for increased crime, sexual attacks and unemployment (Kaminju, 2008). The attacks escalated in brutality during the first decade of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Foreign Africans were chased from their homes, shops and businesses owned by foreigners were burned down and a great number of people lost their lives. In the past, the xenophobic outbreaks had been relatively momentary and connected to particular geographical areas. The attacks of May 2008 were different, as the attacks that started in Alexandra, rapidly spread throughout the country (Hadland, 2008). The violent attacks resulted in 60 deaths, a great number of migrants left injured, tens of thousands of foreigners left their homes and numerous foreign-owned properties were completely damaged (Crush, 2008). The xenophobic attacks continued to shock the country in the years that followed. In April 2015, a number of nation-wide xenophobic attacks took place. Many believed that Zulu King Zwelithini fueled the attacks when he publicly stated that foreigners should pack up and leave the country (Times Live, 2015). As a response to the attacks, several thousands of people marched in protest against the deadly attacks, carrying banners saying “We are all Africans” (Arab News, 2015).

The latest xenophobic attacks getting widespread media coverage in South Africa took place in Grahamstown in October 2015, which displaced more than 500 people and destroyed more than 300 shops and homes (Van Rensberg et al., 2015). African foreigners continue to live in fear, and have received warnings that new attacks are to be expected. According to Mkumba (2016) a message has been circulating on the messaging app “Whatsapp” warning

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<sup>6</sup> Township are unformal residents in South Africa, populated by economically disadcantaged South Africans and foreigners, created by apartheid government in order to segregate the population (Eddo-Lodge, 2013).

foreigners about violent attacks in the near future. The following citation is from a part of the message:

“They (The South Africans) are now organising another system of chasing all Foreigners in their country after Easter holiday this year of 2016, so please let’s all Foreigners prepare on ourselves because this system is now going to happen all over in South Africa not only in Durban. Send this message to every Foreigner before that time so that we can all get enough time to prepare and get ready for any attack. Please we are family let’s alert others [sic].”

Despite the evidence of the growing xenophobia in South Africa, the government has mainly ignored the problem (Crush & Ramachandran, 2009). The attacks of 2008 were characterized as criminal, and were, according to President Mbeki, not xenophobically motivated (The Presidency, 2008). As a result, the constantly increasing xenophobic trends across the nation were neglected, leaving the South African people worried about the future of their nation.

## **2.2 What Generates Xenophobic Attitudes and Actions?**

### **2.2.1 Earlier Focus**

The individual-level analysis of hostility between groups within a society has throughout history described the authoritarian personality (1940s-1950s), different forms of racism (1970s-1980) and alienated cultural and personal stereotypes (1990s). What all of these models have in common is that they rely on the individual’s conflict between the personal and the social, in other words between what they believe, want or feel and the appropriate responses. An alternative to this is a contextual level of analysis (Fiske, 1998, p. 360). Contextual explanations of hostility between groups began in the 1940s with the contact hypothesis and then were followed by Allport’s (1954) analysis of categorization and contact in social contexts in the 1950s. Since Allport’s (1954) focus on a naive and irrational individual-level hostility being the core of the problem, much work has been conducted in order to address changes in racial attitudes. The work conducted in the 1990s mixes categorization and situational goals, and focuses on interaction in light of a social context. Stereotyping, prejudice and discrimination is here driven by social structure (Fiske, 1998, p. 364).

## 2.2.2 Limitations of Earlier Focus

Even though some analysts argue for a significant underlying tolerance dimension organizing racial attitudes and behavior (Sears et al., 1979; Kleinpenning & Hagendoorn, 1993), they have mainly focused on case studies, examining demographic correlation of attitudes and concerns about discrimination and assimilation processes (Bobo & Hutchings, 1996). Earlier research on individual-level prejudice has in general seen little need to distinguish attitude dimensions and components (Harding et al., 1954). It is thus reasonable to argue that they have not sufficiently differentiated between attitudes and actions.

For these reasons, I undertake research on xenophobia that highlights the different dimensions of hostility, especially focusing on actions. As argued by Misago et al. (2015, p. 17) I characterize any form of action that “mobilizes and exploits differences based on spatial, linguistic, or ethnic origins as xenophobic”. In order to study what actually generates xenophobic actions I use the concept of the ethnic security dilemma. This line of theory has been used to explain conflicts of great intensity, like civil war (e.g. Kaufmann, 1996).

The concept has traditionally not been used to explain prejudicial actions<sup>7</sup>, more specifically xenophobic actions, which I will do in this thesis. Even though the situation in South Africa cannot be compared to a civil war, one is able to draw parallels between the different degrees of conflict. I therefore find it reasonable to use the concepts from the ethnic security dilemma- theory to explain xenophobic actions and the motivation behind. Since there is no vast line of research studying xenophobic actions, I propose that using theory from other forms of ethnic violence is a good approach. Although I might use different terms in this thesis referring to the incidents in South Africa, like hostile behavior and ethnic violence, my intention is always to explain xenophobic action.

Based on the theory, I argue that an increased feeling of an ethnic security dilemma, and thus an increased level of fear, can lead to xenophobic actions. When different ethnic groups live side by side in a society their social interactions do not necessarily result in conflict. What activates ethnic conflicts however, is how strongly one feels a sense of ethnic security dilemma, and thus an increased level of fear. The moment the perceived ethnic security dilemma reaches a certain level of intensity, and one feels directly threatened, the likelihood of xenophobic actions is great. In order to see what individual factors can explain

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<sup>7</sup> Dyrstad, Ellingsen and Rød (2015) is an exception.

such a dilemma, I use Ellingsen (2000) and Gurr's (2000) explanatory factors of why and how an ethnic group mobilizes in a situation of conflict.

### **2.2.3 Ethnic Security Dilemma**

In its broadest sense, "security dilemma" is a term that is directed towards the state of anarchy (Lake & Rotchild, 1998). Lake and Rotchild (1998) explain how in times of anarchy, the states must, through self-help, maintain and perhaps expand their military capabilities in order to provide their security. When other states feel threatened by this, they might also expand their capabilities, which results in a spiraling competition and hostility. The dilemma thus results from two sides not being able to observe one another, and know the intentions of the other party.

Recent studies have shown that the conceptual framework of the security dilemma can be useful when looking at ethnic conflicts within states. Posen (1993) provides us with a realist's perspective and extends the ethnic security dilemma from international relations to the study of ethnic conflicts. He describes the dilemma as mutual vulnerability and fear between ethnic groups, which can result in competition for control over government. When groups in divided societies seek security there is a motivation to break with the state or obtain control over it.

As this paradigm develops, there is a growing concern for the security of an ethnic group. Xu (2012) addresses how societal security is seen as a crucial element for ethnic minorities, which is related to the protection of group identity (language, religion, customs etc.). This means that the survival of an ethnic group is rather dependent on a guarantee of continual practice and a sense of group cohesion, instead of military strength and economic power. In other words, it is the ethnic group's *perceived* conditions of the security dilemma that matter the most, not the actual conditions (Xu, 2012). The majority of the literature conducted on the security dilemma consists of qualitative analyses, focusing on case studies (e.g. Kaufman, 1996; Roe, 2002). As already addressed, it is important to acknowledge that the security dilemma in this line of literature traditionally has been used to explain large-scale ethnic conflicts. Few attempts have been made to provide a quantitative analysis of how the security dilemma can explain different forms of ethnic violence, and I assert that my work responds to this need.

The security dilemma provides us with a tool in order to gain an understanding of situations where one or several competing parts have incentives to use force preventively. I

will, as did Lake and Rotchild (1998), use the term to address these specific incentives. When these incentives are strong, the security dilemma comes into play. In fear that the other party might take their place, a group has the incentive to strike first. As with international relations, ethnic relations might transform a former peaceful group into participants of violence as they seek their own safety (Lake & Rotchild, 1998). The police and media laying blame on immigrants for the increasing crime in South Africa (Irin News, 2010) could be seen as an explanatory factor of an increased ethnic security dilemma. Based on the literature about the security dilemma, both in terms of international relations and ethnic conflicts, my argument is that a perception of an ethnic security dilemma will significantly affect xenophobic violence and other forms of xenophobic actions.

#### **2.2.4 Theoretical Perspectives on Ethnicity-Conflict Nexus**

How this ethnic security dilemma occurs depends on what theoretical perspective one uses. Ellingsen (2011) provides a review of the various theoretical perspectives in the ethnicity-conflict nexus, presented as the *primordialist*, *instrumentalist* and *constructivist*.

The *primordialist* perspective argues that ethnic and religious<sup>8</sup> differences can be a source of frustration and conflict in and of itself. Ethnicity is viewed as deeply-rooted attachments to ancestral and historical ties, and function as the main source of identity<sup>9</sup>. In a world where people affiliate with certain groups, a perception of “us” and “them” is created, and the primordialists would argue that prejudice is an inevitable outcome. The much studied “biocultural hypothesis”, where xenophobia is seen through visible differences or otherness, in other words, in terms of cultural differences and biological factors (Harris, 2002), fits this line of thought.

The *instrumentalist* perspective on the other hand argues that ethnic differences alone are not sufficient for causing conflict (Ellingsen, 2011, p. 87). Identities are created as a basis of a collective action by the elites, when clear competitive advantages are attached to a certain identity (Carment, 1993; Lake & Rotchild, 1998). Therefore, ethnic conflicts could have developed due to other reasons, such as socio-economic or political differences. Smith (1996, p. 446) states that instrumentalists view ethnicity as “as instrument for other ends”, while primordialists see it as ceaseless “givens of the human condition”.

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<sup>8</sup> My focus is on the ethnic perspective of the theory, not the religious perspective.

<sup>9</sup> Huntington's (1996) famous *Clash of Civilization* is a theoretical example embracing the *primordialist* perspective.

In an attempt to bridge the previous two theories, the *constructivist* view argues that one must combine the preexisting ethnic divisions and the “greedy” political entrepreneurs in order to mobilize groups to violence (Ellingsen, 2011, p. 88). Gurr (2000) argues that social and political context leads to changes in the perception of common identity. While constructivists agree with the primordialists that identities are social constructions, they believe that those identities are subject to change. There is no doubt that ethnicity matters (e.g. Horowitz, 1985). However, the *constructivist* view has gained a great deal of academic consensus, and is also the point of departure in this work. My argument is that identity and contrasting identities are important, but not sufficient to explain why some people participate in xenophobic actions. In light of the *constructivist* view I will look at what individual factors affect the degree of perceived ethnic security dilemma, and thus increases the likelihood of taking part in xenophobic actions.

### **2.3 What Generates the Ethnic Security Dilemma?**

In order to see which individual factors cause a mobilization of ethnic group conflicts, and thus might lead to an ethnic security dilemma, I use Gurr’s (2000) theory as a framework<sup>10</sup>. Here, the following questions are raised; in what circumstances do ethnic groups mobilize in order to defend or promote collective political interests? And what are the factors that determine the form, intensity and the persistence of these actions? *Ethnopolitical action* is herein defined as “any organized activity in pursuit of the group’s objectives, beginning with mobilization, the process by which people are recruited into movements” (Gurr, 2000, p. 69). The participation can take various forms, and includes conventional politics, collective actions such as strikes and demonstration, as well as rebellion. Worth noting here is that while Gurr (2000) talks about collective and organized mobilization, xenophobic actions are not a collective act in the same way as the political actions he speaks of. It takes less of a collective element to rebel on the streets than organize a political revolution. However, I argue that the xenophobic actions have a collective nature in that frustrated people come together to take action, and I therefore draw parallels between the different forms of action, in terms of collectivity.

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<sup>10</sup> Ellingsen (2000) does also account for factors leading to mobilization of ethnic group conflicts, and will therefore also be included in the theoretical framework.

Four propositions are given by Gurr (2000) in order to provide answers to the fundamental questions about the mobilization of ethnic group conflicts; *ethnocultural identity*, *collective incentives*, *group capacities* and *opportunities*.

All of the factors are important to include when addressing the mobilization of ethnic group conflicts. I have however only included data on the first two propositions in my analysis, *ethnocultural identity* and *collective incentives*. These explanatory factors are clustered into two groups: *ethnicity*, consisting of ethnic identity and race, and *frustration*, consisting of relative deprivation, job scarcity and ethnic discrimination. I also argue that there are certain underlying factors that go beyond the individual concerning mobilization, which I have choose to call *opportunity*.

### **2.3.1 Opportunity**

The latter two of Gurr's (2000) propositions, *group capacities* and *opportunities*, are combined in this section, in what I will call "opportunity". This section considers factors that go beyond the individual: factors concerning the ethnic group and the state. If I were to include these factors in my analysis, I would have to look at different countries and look at the state over time. I do however argue that even though these factors are not included in my analysis, they lie implicitly in the case: South Africa and its historical and political context. I therefore choose to start by accounting for the underlying factors that can affect mobilization of ethnic group conflicts, before I proceed to the individual factors.

*Group capacities* concerns the ethnic group itself, and argues that the chance of participating in political action is greater when the cohesion and mobilization of an ethnocultural identity group is significantly high (Gurr, 2000). A perceived collective identity, as well as awareness of common interests, is crucial preconditions for mobilization (Gurr, 2000, p. 75). An often-used strategy of ethnopolitical organizations is to develop a sense of common interest, done by applying frames that incorporate symbols of grievance and shared identity. The aggressive nation-building project of the African National Congress (ANC), as a means to overcome social divisions of the past, can in a way be seen as an example of this. An unanticipated result of this project is a growth in intolerance towards outsiders. The redefinition of who is qualified to obtain a South African citizenship has created a "new other"; the "foreign" and the "non-citizen" (Crush & Pendleton, 2004).

The historical context of South Africa is crucial in order to understand the social structures of the contemporary society and the relationships between the different social and



racial groups, and thus to understand the degree of cohesion and mobilization of the ethnocultural identity of the different South African groups. Throughout history, South Africa has been characterized as a deeply divided society, with exclusion firmly established in the nation (Adjai & Lazaridis, 2013, p. 193). Peberdy and Crush (1998) and Harris (2001) are some of the theorists who have addressed how the history of colonialism, segregation and apartheid has remained relevant in contemporary legislation in South Africa, and can therefore explain the hostility expressed by the South Africans towards other African immigrants. Based on the clear social divisions that have characterized the history of South Africa, it is reasonable to believe that it has resulted in perceived collective identities and interests throughout the ethnic groups in the society, which increases the chance of participating in political action for some of the groups.

The proposition called *opportunities* relates to the state, and argues that the chance of opportunity within the group's political environment can increase the chance of achieving group objectives through political action. The translation of identity, incentives and capacity into ethno-political action is a complex process, and is dependent upon the political and cultural context. The concept of *political opportunity structure* addresses the factors external to a group that affects decision-making about how to approach objectives. Gurr (1970, p. 112) argues that frustration is not enough to create rebellion. For violence to break out, an opportunity needs to be present.

The distribution of economic and political rights is largely dependent on characteristics of the political regime. The more unequal this distribution is, the larger the frustration (Ellingsen, 2000, p. 235). Hegre et al. (2009) found in their study on civil war in Liberia that war events were more frequent in the richer part of the country. In this way, opportunity seemed to gain more support as a possible explanation for conflict than relative deprivation theories. However, Hegre et al. (2009) argue that the weakness of the Liberian government make it challenging to distinguish between the two explanations. This suggests that the characteristics of the political regime might also affect the opportunity for mobilization. Ellingsen (2000, p. 235) problematizes that the more restricted the regime is, the greater is the frustration, but also the less the opportunity.

A well-known theoretical notion when it comes to the relationship between democracy and political violence is that democracies are less prone to experience conflict and political violence. According to Gurr (1993, p. 137) "the calculus of communal action in democracies favors protest over rebellion". Despite the fact that democracies accept different dramatic

forms of political participation, they make discrimination on the basis of elements such as ethnicity, race, language and religion less likely by providing the citizens with civil and political rights (Ellingsen, 2000).

Based on the report of Freedom in the World 2016<sup>11</sup>, conducted by the Freedom House, South Africa is labeled “Free”, as opposed to “Partly Free” or “Not Free” (Freedom House, 2016). The democratic South Africa is however far from flawless. The Human Rights Watch’s *World Report* from 2012 (p. 165) states that the country “continues to grapple with corruption, growing social and economical inequalities, and the weakening of state institutions by partisan appointments and one-party dominance”. As South Africa is seen as an inspiration to other nations after its liberation from apartheid, people are raising concerns of what is happening to the democracy (Beck, 2012). The flaws of the democracy can have an explanatory power in terms of xenophobic actions, due to its inability to sufficiently respond to the violence. Although characteristics of the regime is not included in my analysis, it is important to take into account, as all forms of political violence is a result of a combination of fear, different interests and underlying conditions, as well as misguided state politics (Ellingsen, 2000, p. 231).

### **2.3.2 Ethnocultural Identity**

As the opportunity-factor will always have an effect, and will always function as a background for ethnic relations, I now proceed to the individual factors of the analysis. Gurr’s (2000) first individual proposition is that the greater the significance of the ethnocultural identity, the greater the chance is for defining interests in ethnocultural terms and therefore easier to mobilize towards action. The ethnocultural identity is based on shared heritage, cultural traits and history. The salience of the ethnocultural identity is, according to Gurr (2000, pp. 68-69), dependent on three factors: the degree to which they differ in terms of culture from other groups in their society, the degree to which they are advantaged/disadvantaged in relation to other groups, and the intensity of their past as well as ongoing conflicts with other groups in the society and the state in itself.

Human beings are social by nature. In order to cope with a complex social world, people divide their social environment into categories, and place themselves into one of the groups. Gurr and Harff (1994) argue that a common identity is needed in order for a group to mobilize, and identities can thus be seen as a function in order to establish a framework on

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<sup>11</sup> Evaluates the state of freedom in 195 countries and 15 territories during the year 2015 (Freedom House, 2016)

how we place ourselves in relation to others. Østerud (1994) explains identities as both relational and contextual, in the sense that they are based on relations and perceptions of community and belonging. People affiliate with certain groups not only because of motivational factors, but for cognitive reasons as well, like subjective feelings of control and certainty (Yzerbyt & Demoulin, 2010, p. 1028). A failure to keep secure and stable identities can thus be perceived as a highly serious threat, and therefore cause defensive actions (Bloom, 1990).

### *2.3.2.1 Ethnic National Identity*

The concept of identity is characterized by different meanings and usages within and between the different theoretical disciplines in social science (Stryker & Burke, 2000). One distinction I would like to address is the distinction made between ethnic and civic nationalism (Gellner, 2006), in order to account for my first measurement of ethnicity: ethnic identity. In the ethnic perspective people are included on the basis of criteria such as religion, language or an assumption of shared kinship. In civic nationalism the inclusion is based on loyalty to political ideas and institutions and a shared history. Ethnic identity is particularly conflict prone due to the focus on fundamental factors that are often perceived as more important than the territorial boundaries (Ellingsen, 2000, p. 229). Much research is done on the relationship between national identity and attitudes towards foreigners, and the majority of the work comes to a common conclusion that there is a positive relationship between the ethnic national identity and xenophobia (e.g. Hjern, 1998; Medrano & Koenig, 2005).

Ethnic identities are reinforced by social interactions, and provide the identities a wider range of meaning. Ethnic groups tend to have significant norms of exclusion. When people interact with other individuals within their social environment, ethnic groups often become politically significant. These ethnic groupings "...tie their differences to affiliations that are putatively ascriptive and therefore difficult or impossible to change" (Horowitz, 1985, p. 147). Unstable social foundations are consequently established by strategic interactions between groups, and therefore create an environment for ethnic conflict. When the state is actually or potentially affected by weakness and lack of legitimacy, and the security dilemma begins to take hold, both political entrepreneurs and ethnic activists can create severe polarization within multiethnic societies. Social polarization again increases the potential for violence (Lake & Rotchild, 1998).

Although South Africans have achieved a near consensual agreement that the legally defined political community is appropriate, race and ethnicity remain important facets of social identity (Mattes, 2002). One would thus likely believe that South Africans, who still feel a stronger sense of ethnic national identity than a civic national identity, will have stronger norms of exclusion, and thus be more likely to take action in order to keep African immigrants out of South Africa. Based on this theory, it seems plausible to assume that the stronger a person feels about his or her ethnic national identity, the stronger sense of ethnic security dilemma and the greater the possibility is to take part in xenophobic actions.

**H1:** *South Africans who feel strongly about their ethnic national identity are more likely to take part in xenophobic actions than those who do not feel strongly about their ethnic national identity.*

#### 2.3.2.2 Race

Race and language are two significant dimensions of similarity or dissimilarity in South Africa (Duckitt et al, 2005), introducing the other ethnic factor, race. The increasingly economic inequality between the rich and the poor in South Africa is highly connected to racial lines (Adjai & Lazaridis, 2013). In 2006, the Southern African Migration Project found evidence that of those respondents who were in a low-income group, 79 percent were black while only 29 percent were white (Crush, 2008). The institutionalized racism from the apartheid era has left lasting effects on the nation (Davis, 2010, p. 26). Unequal power relations are still evident, as white South Africans continues to be more privileged than black South Africans (Adjai & Lazaridis, 2013; Eriksen, 2016).

The history of the black population in South Africa is one of oppression and inequality. It is probable that they would be more prone to feel a sense of ethnic security dilemma, and as such possess a higher level of frustration and fear. When studying the xenophobic trends in South Africa from 1997 to 2011, Afrobarometer found that black respondents were more likely to take action against immigrants than white respondents (Krönke, 2015). Based on the theory and research regarding race and race-inequality, I expect to find that the black/African portion of the South African respondents will be more likely to take part in xenophobic acts.

**H2:** *Black South Africans are more likely to take part in xenophobic actions than white South Africans.*

### **2.3.3 Collective Incentives**

The second individual proposition presented by Gurr (2000) is that when members of an ethnocultural identity group share significant incentives, they are more likely to participate in ethnopolitical action. These incentives can be categorized in three types: anger about losses suffered in the past, the fear of losses in the future and hopes and expectations of relative gains. One can argue that these incentives are shaped by their interactions with other groups, as well as the state, through the prism of the extent of their disadvantages, loss of political autonomy throughout history and whether force has been used in order to maintain their status as subordinate (Gurr, 2000). I have chosen to consider these elements as measurements of frustration.

#### *2.3.3.1 Relative Deprivation*

The notion that frustration can lead to aggression must be seen in relation to the term “relative deprivation”, which can be defined as “..the subjective feeling of discontent based on the belief that one is getting less than one feels entitled to” (De la Rey, 1991, p. 40). A favored explanation of political violence is presented by Gurr (1970, p. 24) as frustration resulting from a perceived discrepancy between the conditions people believe they are entitled to and those they believe that they are actually able to attain. This discrepancy can arise by reference to an abstract ideal, one’s own past situation, or a reference group.

The literature on the connection between political and economic worries and the focus on intergroup threat as a mean of frustration is constantly increasing (e.g. Allport, 1954; Bodhan, 1948; Douglas, 1995; Duncan, 2012; Green, Glaser & Rich, 1998). Group prejudice, as all other forms of hostility, can be viewed as a reaction to an internal process- the feeling of frustration. A growing sense of frustration can thus lead to aggression (e.g. Bodhan, 1948; Davies, 1962; Gurr, 1970). One way of understanding this process is that frustration often produces a form of apathy based on the feeling that there is nothing that can be done to resolve the problem. Aggression begets action, which can function as a form of relief from the helplessness, and is enhanced by a sense of purpose and achievement (Douglas, 1995, p. 115). The theory of relative deprivation thus provides an explanation as to why collective motivation can result in violent conflict, and I expect to find that the feeling of relative deprivation and thus a perception of ethnic security dilemma can trigger participation in xenophobic actions.

**H3<sub>a</sub>:** *South Africans who feel relatively deprived in general are more likely to take part in xenophobic actions than those who do not feel relatively deprived in general*

Many have attempted to theorize the concept of relative deprivation, and one of the most notorious contributions to the frustration-aggression hypothesis is Dollard et al. (1939). They argue that aggression is a predictable outcome of frustration, and that all of the behavior that is of aggressive character presumes frustration. Since then, several contributions have been made to develop the hypothesis further (e.g.; Davies, 1962; Davis, 1959; Gurr, 1970; Stouffer et al., 1949).

Davies's (1962, p. 6) theory about the "J-curve" explains how increasing expectations, followed by recession or a leveling of expectations, can lead to an increased gap between expectation and outcome. The gap is called a J-curve of the need satisfaction and revolution, which can cause frustration and mobilization. Gurr (1970) supplements with the argument that frustration does not by itself create conflict, but when it reaches a certain intensity level and persist for a long time, in addition to being a consequence of a feeling that a group deserves more than it is actually getting, it can lead to violence (Gurr, 1970).

As discussed in the introduction of the thesis, South Africa's transition to democracy was followed by a high expectation from the people of a new and better future (Davenport & Saunders, 2000). The disappointment of these expectations not being fulfilled can explain some of the frustration among the South African people. Based on this disappointment it seems plausible to assume that the South Africans who feel they have less than they should have compared to the past are more frustrated, feel a higher sense of ethnic security dilemma, and thus more likely to take part in xenophobic acts.

**H3<sub>b</sub>:** *South Africans who feel relatively deprived compared to their own situation in the past are more likely to take part in xenophobic actions than those who do not feel relatively deprived compared to their situation in the past.*

Relative deprivation has become a widespread term in sociological research, explaining how an individual's reference to a group sets value standards by comparison (Gurr, 1970, p. 24). Pillay (2008) notes that it is not exclusively deprivation that leads to hostility towards foreigners, but the feeling of being deprived in relation to a reference group, which can be

defined as “an in-group that is warmly accepted, or a group in which the individual wishes to be included” (Allport, 1954, p. 36). Horizontal inequality theory has shifted the attention from inequalities between individuals to inequalities between groups, and addresses how it can create collective resentment that promotes the mobilization of rebel fighters (Hillesund, 2015, p. 76). These horizontal inequalities can be viewed as a special case of relative deprivation, where the perceived discrepancy is based on reference to another identity group (Hillesund, 2015, p. 77).

Cederman, Weidmann and Gleditsch (2001) argue that it is through group comparison that horizontal inequalities transform into grievance. According to Cederman, Gleditsch and Buhaug (2013, p. 38-44) there are four conditions that underpin the transformation: 1) Well-defined identity groups, 2) Intergroup comparison based on scarce resources and conflicting goals, 3) The evaluation of an unjust status quo, and 4) The attribute of blame.

Østby’s (2008) theory on horizontal inequalities argues that the chance for ethnic violence increases when social and economic differences coincide with ethnic differences. Great differences in resources can lead to the marginalized group feeling discriminated, or the people with more resources feeling scared of losing their goods (Tadjoeddin et al., 2001). However, for grievances created by horizontal inequalities to transform into actual participation one needs to consider whether the collective action problems can be overcome. Here, opportunity factors play a significant role in the mobilization process. It is thus argued that horizontal inequalities should be conceptualized as the intersection of opportunity and grievances theories (Østby, 2008, p. 145).

Even though the transition to democracy in 1994 led to a formal end of discrimination, it did not eliminate inequalities. South Africa has become more unequal than it was under the apartheid. The increasing inequalities are partly a result of the privatization of public services, such as water and electricity. This means that public goods have been turned into private goods and services that can be bought and sold in a market. South Africa currently has a greater income-inequality than any other country in the world (Eriksen, 2016), while the 20 percent of the poorest population accounted for about five percent of the collective consumption in 2011, 20 percent of the richest were responsible for over 60 percent (Statistics South Africa, 2014). The polarized contradictions within the country are mirrored in Pillay’s (2008, p. 94) discussion of “class inequality as a systematic problem of uneven development”. The unemployment rate is disturbingly high among black South Africans, and estimated even

higher for young people, who are responsible for most of the xenophobic violence (Abdi, 2011).

As a result, a great number of the poor in South Africa are excluded from the post-apartheid political disbursement, as the daily dangers they are witnessing are related to the dangers they faced under apartheid. It is therefore not shocking that some of the members in this group continue to resort to violence, a tool that was normalized under the apartheid regime. These members remain segregated from power; residentially, culturally and economically. When this context of communal crisis is the fundamental contact between migrants and poor citizens in the informal sector, ethnic violence can occur (Abdi, 2011).

Based on the theory on relative deprivation and the current state of inequality in South Africa, I expect to find that the people who feel deprived of goods in relation to other groups in the society will have a stronger sense of ethnic security dilemma and be more likely to act on their hostile attitudes towards immigrants.

**H3<sub>c</sub>:** *South Africans who feel relatively deprived compared to other South Africans are more likely to take part in xenophobic actions than those who do not feel relatively deprived compared to other South Africans.*

#### 2.3.3.2 Job Scarcity

Studies done on ethnic intolerance have often tended to focus mainly on the individual characteristics of people, and not on the surroundings of the individual (Strabac & Ringdal, 2008). However, in social psychology one key assumption is the importance of outgroup competition, perceived fear and threat in the development of negative attitudes towards outgroups (Dyrstad, Ellingsen & Rød, 2015, p. 6), related to the fear of losses in the future. In relation to this, job scarcity functions as a second measurement of frustration.

Strabac, Listhaug and Jakobsen (2011) account for a theoretical approach to group-conflict that consists of theories stating that interethnic hostility is a result of competition for scarce resources. The resources can be political, economic or symbolic, and the competition can be real or simply perceived. Theories of the functional relations between different groups often address competition as a source of conflict and intergroup prejudice. *Realistic group conflict* theory talks about how perceived group competition over resources results in efforts to prevent the other groups from accessing the resources (Bobo, 1983). In this theory fear and



the notion of threat increases the hostility level between ethnic groups and this creates a risk of ethnic conflict (Quillian, 1995; Gibson, 2006).

*The instrumental model of group conflict* combines realistic group conflict theory and social dominance theory. This model argues that resource stress, threat due to the perception of limited access to desired resources, and recognition of a plausible competitive outgroup results in perceptions of group competition over resources. This will automatically lead to the perception that the more another group has, less will be available for one's own group. Thus, as a response one strategically tries to remove the source of competition (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2010, p. 1092). The fear of being dominated by ethnic strangers is a common source of ethnic conflict according to Horowitz (1985, p. 188).

Throughout history we have witnessed a "tendency to find groups of aliens" who can be blamed for society's ills, and different groups have at been singled out as the "social scapegoat" (Hudson, 1993, p. 22). The *scapegoat hypothesis* explains xenophobia as something that happens when native-born populations direct their anger and frustration, as a result of whatever hardship they are going through, towards foreigners (Duncan, 2012, p. 107). Green, Glaser and Rich (1998, p. 82) state that "...frustrations attendant to economic downturns produce aggressive impulses that are directed at vulnerable targets, such as minority groups, even when these groups bear no actual or perceived responsibility for economic decline". Since immigrants are perceived as threats to education, jobs, housing and health care (Crush, 2008; Morris, 1998), scapegoating can be viewed as a displacement of threat. Scapegoats are socially weaker, more vulnerable, minority groups who make easy targets because of their already marginalized status (Crush & Ramachandran, 2009, p. 42-43).

Despite the different causal mechanisms in the "competition for scarce resources" theories, the indicators about relevant variables explaining the ethnic intolerance are quite similar. Viewed at the individual level, a person who is exposed to severe economic competition from other ethnic groups is expected to be more hostile towards foreigners than one who is protected from competition. This group of which such an individual is a member includes those with a weak position in the labor market and a low income. At the group level, the phenomena regarding political representation and economic distribution are of importance for the aggregate levels of ethnic hostility, as is the size of the various ethnic groups, the level of development of the society, and the history of ethnic relations (Strabac, Listhaug & Jakobsen, 2011).

Since unemployment is such a widespread problem in South Africa, earning a living is presumably a great concern for many of the citizens. In 2011 about 25 percent of the South African population was unemployed (Statistics South Africa, 2015). Crush and Ramachandran's (2014) research shows that more than 60 percent of all respondents in their study felt that migration was the source of unemployment for South African citizens, and an increasing number of 67 percent of the people argued that foreign nationals use up resources in the country (Crush, 2008, p. 29). It is worth noting that there exist a disconnection between perception and reality in terms of foreigners as an "economic threat". International migrants only account for four percent of the South African working population, in addition to mainly taking jobs in the informal sector and jobs that the locals are not willing to take (Eddo-Lodge, 2013). However, as already argued by Xu (2012) it is the perceived conditions of the ethnic security dilemma that matter the most, not the actual conditions.

The increase of migrants, as a consequence of the shift towards a democratic state, and the growing number of foreign Africans in the most deprived informal settlement has made the choices of scapegoat quite convenient (Davis, 2010, p. 14). The migrants are then viewed as an important source of the high unemployment rate.

Based on the literature and research done on group competition, as well as the job scarcity in South Africa, I expect to find that the perception of foreigners stealing jobs from the natives will increase the ethnic security dilemma and thus the likelihood of participation in actions in order to get rid of the competition.

**H4:** *South Africans who view foreigners as a competition for jobs are more likely to take part in xenophobic actions than those who do not view foreigners as a competition.*

#### *2.3.3.3 Ethnic Discrimination*

Whether or not one's ethnic group has been discriminated against by the state constitutes a third and final measurement of frustration. Horowitz (1985) argues that one of the most important dimensions when studying ethnic conflicts is the severity of division. Experiences with colonialism and conflicts following the end of the colonial era, as well as the lack of a salient supra-ethnic identity are all elements that create a higher intensity of ethnic conflict in African countries. While relative deprivation can be seen as a measurement of economic horizontal inequality, ethnic discrimination is in this thesis considered a measurement of political horizontal inequality.

Gurr (2000, p. 71) argues that essentially all ethnonationalists, national minorities and native people have been independent of external control and felt some loss of political autonomy. The greater the loss of autonomy, and the more recently it occurred, the greater the likely effect of persistent grievances and hopes for restoration.

One cannot study South Africa without taking the history of slavery and apartheid politics into account. The apartheid politics was used in order to make sure that a great part of the South African population maintained their status as subordinate, which according to Gurr (2000) plays a crucial role in shaping the groups incentives. The general principle is that the use of force against people who think the use of force is unjust may inspire fear and caution in the short run but at the same time provokes resentment and enduring incentives to resist and retaliate (Gurr, 2000). Since the apartheid-regime ended as late as 1994 and the black population lost a great part of their autonomy, it is reasonable to assume a presence of resentment and hopes for restoration.

Several studies also indicate that people who have been exposed to violence have increased feelings of hatred and revenge (Dyrstad, Ellingsen & Rød, 2015; Halperin, 2008). Since violence can be seen as a legacy of apartheid (Vogelman & Simpson, 1990), it is reasonable to assume that people who have been victims of violence in the past, might harbor feelings of hatred, and thus be more likely to resort to violence. It is worth mentioning that bad experiences in the past can also produce a contradicting result. The war-weariness argument by Levy and Morgan (1986) explains how those who were hit hardest by conflicts can be those who are most opposed to a new conflict evolving.

However, based on the history of South Africa, seen in light of theory by Horowitz (1985) and Gurr (2000), I find it reasonable to expect to find that feeling of one's ethnic group being unfairly treated by the government, might lead to frustration, which then might lead to one's participation in xenophobic actions.


**H5:** *South Africans who have felt discriminated against by the state based on their ethnicity are more likely to take part in xenophobic actions than those who have not felt discriminated against by the state.*

## **2.4 Summary of Theoretical Argument and Hypotheses**

As shown in Figure 1, my theoretical argument intends to explain how an increased feeling of ethnic security dilemma can lead to partaking in xenophobic actions. In order to see what

individual factors lead to a perceived ethnic security dilemma, I use Gurr’s (2000) mobilization-theory as a framework. Explanatory propositions of the mobilization of group conflicts are presented. By clustering the individual explanatory factors into two groups, I look at how ethnicity and frustration can affect the perceived ethnic security dilemma. While ethnicity is accounted for by theory on ethnic identity and race, frustration consists of theory on relative deprivation, jobs scarcity and ethnic discrimination. The theoretical framework also shows how opportunities concerning the ethnic group itself and the state can affect the perceived ethnic security dilemma and the mobilization of group conflict. Since these factors are beyond the individual and concerns factors that are bound to have an effect, it has dashed lines and another color in Figure 1. Testable hypotheses are presented throughout the chapter, and summarized below.

**Figure 1 Theoretical Expectation Model**



## **Hypotheses**

- H1:** South Africans who feel strongly about their ethnic national identity are more likely to take part in xenophobic actions than those who do not feel strongly about their ethnic national identity.
- H2:** Black South Africans are more likely to take part in xenophobic actions than white South Africans.
- H3<sub>a</sub>:** South Africans who feel relatively deprived in general are more likely to take part in xenophobic actions than those who do not feel relatively deprived in general.
- H3<sub>b</sub>:** South Africans who feel relatively deprived compared to their own situation in the past are more likely to take part in xenophobic actions than those who do not feel relatively deprived compared to their situation in the past.
- H3<sub>c</sub>:** South Africans who feel relatively deprived compared to other South Africans are more likely to take part in xenophobic actions than those who do not feel relatively deprived compared to other South Africans.
- H4:** South Africans who view foreigners as a competition for jobs are more likely to take part in xenophobic actions than those who do not view foreigners as a competition.
- H5:** South Africans who have felt discriminated against by the state based on their ethnicity are more likely to take part in xenophobic actions than those who have not felt discriminated against by the state.

### **3 Research Design and Data**

In the previous chapter I presented a theoretical framework for xenophobia and possible explanations for taking part in xenophobia actions. In this section I intend to explain and defend my choices about how I have tested the hypotheses above. First I account for some of the choices that have been made concerning the research design, and then I present the dataset. I then proceed by presenting the operationalization of the dependent and the various independent variables. Finally, I evaluate the validity and reliability of the applied data, discuss methodological challenges and account for how the empirical analysis is conducted.

#### **3.1 Research Design**

In order to consider my hypotheses as supported or not I have collected data from a specific case: South Africa. Since I want to study what actually triggers people to partake in xenophobic actions, I must look at a large number of respondents, the likelihood of them acting on their xenophobic attitudes, and what affects this type of behavior. The respondents' willingness to take part in xenophobic actions in South Africa in 2011 will therefore function as the population for my quantitative research.

In order to organize my cases for analysis I will use a naturalist design, meaning I will not interfere in the situations I wish to study. Ideally I should analyze the cases over time (longitudinal) to be able to see the changes in partaking in xenophobic actions. However, because some of the relevant questions on which my study relies on are not included in several of the rounds, I will not be able to do this. I will therefore look at likelihood of xenophobic actions at the same point in time.

The research design is based on a micro-level of analysis, as I intend to test arguments about behavior of individuals. I have chosen a level of analysis that is micro, since it makes it possible to study the individual factors that affect the perception of an ethnic security dilemma, and thus partaking in xenophobia actions. In this sense, it fits my line of argument. Since I want to find out what affects the likelihood of taking part in xenophobic actions, a quantitative research method suits my intentions. As argued by Moses and Knutsen (2007), a quantitative method is suitable for testing hypotheses or theories that you cannot directly observe.

There are a number of statistical conditions that I must take into account when performing a logistic regression analysis. A first condition is that of linearity, which means

that there has to be a linear connection between the dependent variables and the independent variables (Skog, 2004). I control for curvilinearity by including second-degree polynomials when expected<sup>12</sup>. Another condition is that the residuals have to be independent of each other (Skog, 2004). Since Afrobarometer uses random selection sampling and fulfill this condition, I do not consider it as a problem. Lastly, there cannot be a perfect correlation between the independent variables, in other words, there has to be an absence of multicollinearity (Ringdal, 2007; Skog, 2004). This condition is also taken into account and fulfilled in the analysis<sup>13</sup>.

## **3.2 Data**

In order to test my hypotheses I use data provided by Afrobarometer. I apply the latest available data on South Africa included in the 5<sup>th</sup> round conducted in 2011. Afrobarometer is a pan-African and non-partisan research network, which performs public attitude surveys in more than 30 countries in Africa. The subjects included in the survey are governance, democracy and economic conditions, in addition to other related issues (Afrobarometer, 2016).

### **3.2.1 Sample and Data Collection**

Afrobarometer applies a national probability sample system designed to bring about a representative sample, and gives every adult citizen an equal opportunity to be included in the studies. By using a random selection method and a sampling system with probability proportionate to population size, Afrobarometer argues that a representative sample is in place. The population includes all citizens age 18 and older, with those living in institutionalized settings excluded. The sample size from South Africa is 2,400 cases, with a margin of sampling error of only +/-2.0 percent at 95 percent confidence level (Afrobarometer, 2016).

The design used for sampling in this data set is “clustered, stratified, multi-stage, area probability sample” (Afrobarometer, 2016). The area stratification used in the survey reduces the likelihood of certain social groups being excluded from the sample. Therefore, Afrobarometer sometimes purposely oversamples specific politically significant populations within a country to make sure the size of the group is large enough to be analyzed (Afrobarometer, 2016).

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<sup>12</sup> None of the included second-degree variabls did however prove to be significant.

<sup>13</sup> The correlation test between all the variables is included in Appendix A.

### 3.3 Operationalization of Variables

In the following section I will account for the operationalization and the coding of the variables used in my research. I start by providing a description of how xenophobic actions are measured. Next, I describe how the independent variables are operationalized, including the control variables. Finally, descriptive statistics about all of the variables is provided.

#### 3.3.1 Xenophobic Action

There are several questions included in Afrobarometer that addresses xenophobic attitudes, for example: trust in foreigners. However, in order for me to test my hypotheses, it is crucial that I distinguish actions from attitudes when I choose my dependent variable. An operational definition is needed in order to understand how the concept can be empirically measured. One way of measuring whether people will take part in xenophobic actions or not is to see how likely they are to take part in certain scenarios. I therefore assume that the respondents who say they are “likely” to take action are also those who are most likely to partake in xenophobic actions. Afrobarometer uses the following question<sup>14</sup> “How likely is it that you would take part in action to prevent people who have come here from other countries in Africa from: 1) Moving into your neighborhood? 2) Operating a business in your area?” In the analysis I will combine the two parts of the question, both “Moving into your neighborhood” and “Operating a business in your area”, and treat them as one factor. I have thus created an additive index that measures the willingness to take part in xenophobic actions<sup>15</sup>. Since the question explicitly addresses the behavior-dimension of xenophobia, and the index accounts for two different scenarios of xenophobic action, I assert that it is a good measurement of the phenomena and it suits my intentions within this study.

The answering alternatives measure the degree of likelihood to take part in these actions. I have recoded the index into a dichotomous variable, which I have labeled *XENOPHOBIC ACTION*, with the following values:

0 = Not likely to take part in xenophobic actions

1 = Likely to take part in xenophobic actions

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<sup>14</sup> All the question in this analysis are collected from the questionnaire of Afrobarometer Round 5 (Afrobarometer, 2011).

<sup>15</sup> The scale has a Cronbach’s  $\alpha$  of 0,89, which indicates a reliable scale. See Appendix B for details.



### 3.3.2 Independent Variables

#### 3.3.2.1 *Ethnic National Identity*

Gellner (2006) provides a conceptual definition of ethnic national identity as a feeling of belonging on the basis of criteria such as religion, language or an assumption of shared kinship. The operational definition will be based on the following questions included in Afrobarometer; “Let us suppose you had to choose between being a South African and being a (ethnic group). Which of the following statements best expresses your feeling?”. I argue that this question measures the principle of ethnic national identity in a sufficient way, since the respondents have to make a priority concerning their national identity. However, the measurement is not ideal since it does not allow for multiple identities. I have chosen to dummy code the variable into the dichotomous variable *ETHNIC IDENTITY*, so that the respondents are either given the value 0) Civic national identity or 1) Ethnic national identity, the later functioning as a reference category.

#### 3.3.2.2 *Race*

In order to see whether what kind of race you belong to affects a person’s willingness to take part in xenophobic action, I have included *RACE* in my analysis. The respondent is able to place him or herself into a category. After some adjustments<sup>16</sup> the categories included in the variable are: 1) Black/African, 2) White/European, 3) Colored/ Mixed Race, and 4) Asian. This is a categorical variable, and will be analyzed at a nominal level.

#### 3.3.2.3 *Relative Deprivation*

De la Rey (1991, p. 40) gives us a conceptual definition of relative deprivation; “the subjective feeling of discontent based on the belief that one is getting less than one feels entitled to”. In order to empirically measure this concept in a sufficient manner, and since there is no single question directed exclusively at relative deprivation, I have chosen to include three different variables consisting of questions concerning the respondent’s living conditions and reflection around this matter. This way I am able to capture different elements of perceived relative deprivation: in the respondents’ current situation, in comparison to their situation in the past and in comparison to other groups. The first question is “In general, how would you describe your own present living condition”? The original answering alternatives

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<sup>16</sup> I combined the two categories “East Asian” and “South Asian” into one Asian-category.

are ranged from “Very bad” to “Very good”. I have chosen to call this variable *LIVING CONDITION (G)*, as it measures *general* perceived state of living condition. The second question measuring relative deprivation is “In general, how do you rate your living conditions compared to other South Africans”? This variable is labeled *LIVING CONDITION (T)*, as it relates to living conditions over *time*. The respondents are then able to rate their perceived living conditions in relation to others from “Much worse” to “Much better”. Lastly is the question “Looking back, how do you rate your living conditions compared to twelve months ago”? As with the previous question, the respondents are able to rate their conditions from “Much worse” to “Much better”. This variable is given the label *LIVING CONDITIONS (H)*, as it measures perceived *horizontal inequalities*. I have turned the values of all three variables so that 1 represent a low degree of relative deprivation, while 5 represents a high degree of relative deprivation.

An alternative would have been to include these three variables in an index, and create a scale of perceived relative deprivation. However, since none of the variables then proves to be significant and the Cronbach’s  $\alpha$  is too low in order for me to consider it reliable<sup>17</sup>, I test for the effect of the three living conditions- variables separately.

#### 3.3.2.4 Job Scarcity

In relation to this topic, I want to see whether the feeling of competition over scarce jobs can explain the likelihood to take part in xenophobic actions. The question addressing this goes as follows: “...please tell me whether you disagree or agree? Foreigners should not be allowed to live in South Africa because they take jobs and benefits away from South Africans”. I argue that this question measures whether foreigners are perceived as competition for jobs in a sufficient way. The respondents are able to range their level of agreement. I have recoded the variable *JOB SCARCITY* so that it has three values; 1) Disagree, 2) Neither Agree Nor Disagree, and 3) Agree.

#### 3.3.2.5 Ethnic Discrimination

Since being discriminated against by the state based on your ethnicity and the loss of political autonomy can create frustration (e.g. Gurr, 2000; Horowitz, 1985), I have included the

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<sup>17</sup> See Appendix B for details about the Cronbach’s  $\alpha$  and the scale.

following question “How often are .....s(R’s Ethnic Group) treated unfairly by the government?”. The respondents are then able to answer 0) Never, 1) Sometimes, 2) Often, and 3) Always. I will keep this original coding, and use “Never” as the reference-category in my analysis. The categorical variable *ETHNIC DISCRIMINATION* will thus be analyzed at an ordinal level.

### **3.3.3 Control Variables**

There are multiple factors that might affect the likelihood of taking part in xenophobic actions, and unfortunately, because of restrictions in terms of time and space, I will not be able to control for all of them. However, I will control for some of the ones I find most relevant based on earlier work: level of trust, education, age, gender and rural or urban setting. This will make the analysis more accurate, as it ensures that the other variables do not get an erroneous level of significance.

It is worth looking at whether people who generally have a hard time trusting others, will be more likely to take part in xenophobic actions, especially due to the complex history of South Africa. This can reflect previous bad experiences, for example during the apartheid era, which can make them more open to taking part in prejudicial actions. The variable *TRUST* is based on the question “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you must be very careful in dealing with people?”. The respondents can choose between 0) Must be very careful and 1) Most people can be trusted, which makes this a dichotomous variable, and will be analyzed thereafter. I will however reverse the coding and switch the places of 0 and 1, so that the value 1 represents mistrust.

The notion that education can contribute to improved understanding and openness towards immigrants, and decrease an antagonistic attitude and actions towards others, is something that has been addressed and confirmed in earlier empirical work (e.g. Billiet, Maddens & Beerten, 2003; Lewin-Epstein & Levanon, 2005). The categorical variable *EDUCATION* measures the respondents reported level of schooling as a response to the question: “What is the highest level of education you have completed?”. I have recoded the variable so it consists of four education-categories: 1) No schooling, 2) Primary, 3) Secondary, and 4) Higher.

Controlling for the effect of standard socio-geographic factors like age, gender and place of residence will also strengthen the quality of the work. *AGE* measures the age of the respondents at the time of the interview, and is also something I wish to include in the

analysis. Since the variable includes an absolute zero, it will be analyzed at a ratio-level (Lærd Statistics, 2013) and kept in its original form.

The dichotomous variable *GENDER* is also included as a control variable. While Afrobarometer gives male the value of 1, and female the value 2, I choose to recode the variable, so that female is given the value 0, and male 1.

Lastly, I will control for the respondent's demographic situation. The variable *URBAN* is measured with the interviewers answer on whether he or she lives in an urban or a rural setting. Afrobarometer gives rural the value of 1, and urban the value 2, I have recoded the variable, so that rural is given the value 0, and urban is given a value of 1<sup>18</sup>.

### **3.4 Reliability and Validity**

It is useful to look at reliability and validity when evaluating the quality of the data. Reliability presumes replicability, and that the data is measured without errors. In other words, it accounts for how the survey is conducted, and if the survey truly reflects the situation (Ringdal, 2007). Validity however accounts for whether the indicators of the analysis measure the intended phenomenon, and whether they fit the theoretical concepts.

Whether or not the data is reliable is often an issue of interpretation. For the purpose of my work, I find the data provided by Afrobarometer to be quite reliable and trustworthy, especially due to their transparency about the methods used in collecting the data. In the Afrobarometer the respondents are collected through randomized methods and it uses a high number of selection in order to secure representation (Afrobarometer, 2016). By creating indexes that combines several questions and indicators, a higher degree of reliability is ensured and it can reduce measurement errors (Hellevik, 2009). In this way I strengthen the possibility of measuring underlying factors of the phenomenon. The level of detail and thoroughness of the data collection and publication indicated that there is a high level of reliability. I have also decided to rely on the data for practical reasons, concerning the availability of data on African countries.

The degree of validity of data is a debated issue in the quantitative research field. Xenophobia is not easy to measure, and interpretation will thus be a necessary tool when choosing variables. Likelihood of taking part in xenophobic actions can therefore not be estimated with the same certainty as other more tangible issues.

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<sup>18</sup> An overview of the coding (both original and dummy) of all the variables included in the analysis is included in Appendix C.

A possible weakness with this research is that even though my intentions are to explain why some people take part in xenophobic actions, I have no guarantee that those who say they are *likely* to take part in order to prevent African foreigners from moving into their neighborhood and opening a business in their area, actually would go as far. In addition, this only measures some of the possible xenophobic acts, and does not exclusively take the use of violence into account, which is sadly a large part of the South African xenophobic actions. Since Afrobarometer does not provide follow-up questions so that the respondents can specify their actions, it remains unclear where on the spectrum of possible actions they would place themselves. Krönke (2015) problematizes this; For example, would people think of rallying their neighbors or actually be willing to personally attack foreigners? However, since there are no questions that directly measure partaking in xenophobic action, I argue that by looking at the respondents' willingness to take part in certain xenophobic scenarios I am able to reach a certain understanding of what underlying factors can explain such forms of prejudicial actions.

Some measures have been made in order to strengthen the validity of the data. The numbers are weighted and all the missing values are removed. I also make sure that the variables I wish to include in the analysis do not correlate too much. In addition I examine whether any of the variables have such a low number of observation as to be troublesome. Including variables with such a few observations might affect the quality of the analysis.

The validity of the work is reduced by systematic measuring errors (Ringdal, 2007). As with all other research work, there are certain limitations to the data used here. To strengthen the transparency of the work, I will therefore address some of the concerns regarding the data that can come across as troublesome in the analysis, in light of Hjern's (1998) study.

The first problem I would like to look at is the framing of the questions used in the questionnaire, which can be a great influence on the answers given by the respondents. This will always be a possible limitation in studies regarding attitudes. A second possible limitation about the data is the problem of social desirability. When studying sensitive topics like xenophobia, we will most likely be faced with respondents answering what they feel is the right answer or the accepted answer in their society, which might lead to underestimation of the actual strength of likelihood of taking part in xenophobic actions (Hjern, 1998, p. 338). One might also look at it the other way around; as already addressed I have no way of truly knowing whether the people who answer that they are likely to take part in xenophobic actions, actually would go so far.

To ensure *statistical conclusion validity*, in other words avoid drawing incorrect conclusions about effects or correlations, I set the significance level at  $p \leq 0.05$ , but I also comment on a 0.01 and 0.1 level (Skog, 2004, p. 101).

Regarding external validity, in other words whether you can generalize or not (Ringdal, 2007) it will be possible to generalize at an individual level. This is because the results are statistically significant and grounded in theory. It will however not be possible to generalize the results to any other countries, due to the contextual differences. Despite all possible validity problems, and assuming reasonable reliability of the data used, I believe that they address the phenomenon I wish to study in a sufficient manner and they correlate with the intentions of this study.

### **3.5 Statistical Method**

In order to answer the different issues, I have applied bivariate and multivariate analysis and statistical tests. In this section I will account for the analytical approach leading to the findings in this research.

Since my dependent variable is dichotomous, consisting of only two values, the most appropriate statistical method is a logit regression (Midtbø, 2012). A logit regression predicts the probability of an event occurring, and will thus model how different factors included in my analysis will affect the probability of a person taking part in xenophobic actions. The regression coefficient can be interpreted as the effect of the X variables on the probability that  $Y=1$ , more accurate, the changes in the logit as a consequence of one units change on the independent variable. The coefficients are thus estimated by maximum likelihood estimation (Ringdal, 2007). The logit model is specified as:

$$L = \ln [P / (1-P)] = \ln \varphi = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_1 + \beta_2 X_2 \dots etc$$

The statistical program STATA, version 14, is used as a tool of analysis. I choose to use this program as it is developing to be the preferred statistical program among leading research societies all around the world (Midtbø, 2012).

### **3.6 Data Summary**

In order to test the constructed hypotheses my data consists of one dependent variable, xenophobic action, and several explanatory independent variables, in addition to relevant control variables. Descriptive statistics for all the variables included in the analysis is presented in Table 1.

**Table 1 Descriptive Statistics of All Variables**

<b>Variable</b>	<b>N</b>	<b>Min</b>	<b>Max</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>Std.dev</b>	<b>Value=1</b>	<b>Value=0</b>
Xenophobic Action (likely=1, not likely= 0)	2,345	0	1	0.37	0.482	36.8	63.2
Ethnic Identity (ethnic=1, civic=0)	2,178	0	1	0.85	0.279	8.5	91.5
Race	2,398	1	4	1.59	0.891		
- Black/African	1,252						
- White/European	304						
- Colored/mixed	284						
- Asian	83						
Living Condition (G)	2,391	1	5	3.03	1.235		
Living Condition (T)	2,357	1	5	3.12	.916		
Living Condition (H)	2,362	1	5	3.16	.997		
Job Scarcity	2,376	1	3	2.05	0.923		
- Disagree	770						
- Neither nor	260						
- Agree	893						
Ethnic Discrimination	2,116	0	3	0.67	0.936		
- Never	1,128						
- Sometimes	466						
- Often	190						
- Always	139						
<b><i>Control variables</i></b>							
Trust (no trust=1, trust=2)	2,344	0	1	0.83	0.375	83.1	16.9
Education	2,396	1	3	2.74	0.521		
- No schooling	76						
- Primary	355						
- Secondary	1,207						
- Higher	285						
Age	2,361	18	95	39.21	16.059		
Gender (m=1, f=0)	2,399	0	1	0.49	0.501	49.9	50.1
Urban (urban=1, rural=0)	2,399	0	1	0.67	0.469	67.4	32.6


# 4 Empirical Analysis

In this chapter I present the empirical analysis. First I provide an empirical overview of the dependent variable. I then present and interpret the results of the regression analysis. In order to establish a broad picture of the effect of all the variables separately, I conduct a bivariate regression, looking at the bivariate relationships between xenophobic actions and the independent variables. I then proceed with multivariate regressions, where I incorporate all the independent variables, including the control variables. The hypotheses are tested consecutively. I then account for and discuss the results of the regression models. Finally I present an overview of the tested hypotheses and provide a short summary of the findings.

## 4.1 Empirical Overview

Before I present the results of the analysis, I provide an empirical overview of the dependent variable *xenophobic action*. In Figure 2, I account for the likelihood of taking part in actions in order to prevent African foreigners from living and operating a business in your area, before I show the likelihood of taking part in xenophobic actions when the indicators are combined in an index.

**Figure 2 Likelihood of Taking Part in Various Xenophobic Actions. Shown in Percentage**



*Based on data from Afrobarometer, Round 5 (2011)*

The blue columns in Figure 2 show the South African respondents’ likelihood of taking part in actions in order to prevent people who have come to South Africa from other African




countries from moving into their neighborhood. We see that the majority of the respondents of about two thirds claim to be not likely to take part in these forms of actions. While 33 percent said that there was no likelihood at all of them taking part, 35 percent gave a little more moderate responds, claiming to be not likely<sup>19</sup>.

Even though this constitutes the majority of the respondents, a significant remainder of one third claims to be, to some degree, likely to take part in actions in order to prevent other Africans from living nearby. A disturbing 12 percent responds that they would be very likely to take part in actions, while 20 percent claims to be likely. The mean response is however 2.89, which is closest to “not very likely”.

The red columns in Figure 2 show the likelihood of taking part in actions in preventing African foreigners in South Africa from operating a business in your area. These findings are quite similar to those accounted for above. Similarly to the previous case, about two thirds of the respondents answered that they were not likely, with a majority of 35 percent responding “not likely at all”. An equally high number of respondents are however to some degree likely to take part in these actions, with 15 percent of these being “very likely”. The mean response is almost the same here, 2.85, approaching “not very likely”. Since the two questions show approximately similar results, I find it the most practical to combine the two, and treat it as one phenomenon.

**Figure 3 Likelihood of Taking Part in Xenophobic Actions. Shown in Percentage**



*Based on data from Afrobarometer, Round 5 (2011)*

By looking at the two previous questions combined I am able to see the likelihood of South African respondents taking part in xenophobic actions. As reflected in the figures above,

<sup>19</sup> The numbers are rounded up to the closest whole number.

Figure 3 reveals that while almost two thirds are not likely to take part in xenophobic actions (63 percent), a worrying 37 percent claim to be likely. The mean response is 0.37, which is leaning more towards “not likely”, than “likely”.

## **4.2 Results**

In order to determine what explains a person’s likelihood of taking part in xenophobic actions, I have conducted a bivariate regression analysis. I start with the control variables, and then add the independent variables, one by one to be able to analyze if the different factors contribute significantly to the models as well as what effect they have. Table 2 account for the bivariate relationships between the dependent variable and all the independent variables used in the analysis, including the control variables. In Model 1, the control variables effect on xenophobic action is presented. In models 2-6, each independent variable is added separately, in order to test their effect on the dependent variable. Each model is commented on and interpreted individually.

## 4.2.1 Bivariate Regression Analysis

In this section I account for the bivariate regressions between the explanatory variables included in the analysis and the likelihood of taking part in xenophobic actions. This way I can establish a broad picture of the separate effect of each variable included in the analysis.

**Table 2 Bivariate Regressions, 2011**

<b>Variable</b>	<b><math>\beta</math></b>	<b>S.E</b>	<b>Sig.</b>	<b>Exp. (<math>\beta</math>)</b>	<b>N</b>
<b>Ethnic Identity</b>	.047	.159	.768	1.048	2,131
<b>Race</b>					
- Black/African	.449	.121	.000***	1.567	2,344
- Colored/Mixed	-.156	.164	.340	.855	2,344
- Asian	.674	.224	.003**	1.963	2,344
<b>Living Conditions (G)</b>	.033	.035	.354	1.033	2,338
<b>Living Conditions (T)</b>	.109	.047	.020**	1.115	2,336
<b>Living Conditions (H)</b>	.016	.043	.706	1.016	2,312
<b>Job Scarcity</b>					
- Neither nor	-.179	.142	.207	.836	2,325
- Agree	.632	.094	.000***	1.881	2,325
<b>Ethnic Discrimination</b>					
- Sometimes	-.147	.112	.187	.863	2,069
- Often	.007	.154	.965	1.007	2,069
- Always	.579	.173	.001***	1.784	2,069
<i>Control variables</i>					
<b>Trust</b>	.233	.118	.049**	1.262	2,285
<b>Education</b>					
- No schooling	.447	.235	.058*	1.563	2,342
- Primary	.209	.150	.163	1.233	2,342
- Secondary	.029	.124	.813	1.029	2,342
<b>Age</b>	-.002	.003	.492	.998	2,307
<b>Gender</b>	.079	.086	.356	1.082	2,345
<b>Urban</b>	.043	.092	.637	1.044	2,345

*Note:\*\*\* sig. at 0.01 level, \*\* sig. at 0.05 level, \* sig. at 0.1 level*

The bivariate analyses shown in Table 2 tells us that contrary to what one might expect from the theory on ethnic national identity (e.g. Hjern, 1998; Medrano & Koenig, 2005) arguing that there is a positive relationship between the ethnic national identity and xenophobia, the variable is insignificant. The bivariate findings therefore do not support my first hypothesis stating that those who feel strongly about their ethnic national identity are more likely to take part in xenophobic actions.

Race does on the other hand prove to be statistically significant. Table 2 shows that the black/African group as well as the Asian group are more likely to take part in xenophobic actions than the respondents categorizing themselves as white. This is in line with my expectations based on South Africa's history of racial inequalities, and seen in light of Østby's (2008) theory on horizontal inequalities. These findings thus support my second hypothesis about black South Africans being more likely to take part in xenophobic actions than white South Africans.

When measuring relative deprivation, the bivariate analyses reveal some varied results. Present living conditions in general have a positive but insignificant effect on xenophobic actions, and I therefore find no support for the first hypothesis about relative deprivation, arguing that a sense of relative deprivation in general leads to an increased likelihood of taking part in xenophobic actions. However, when the living conditions are specified as living conditions compared to a year ago, it becomes significant. The coefficient is positive which means that those who feel that their living conditions are worse than a year ago will be more likely to take part in xenophobic actions than those who feel their living conditions has changed for the better. This is supported by Davie's (1962) "J-curve"- theory, arguing how an increased gap between expectation and outcome can lead to frustration and mobilization. I can therefore consider my second relative deprivation- hypothesis as supported, stating that feeling relatively deprived compared to own situation in the past can lead to likelihood of participation in xenophobic actions. Another element in relative deprivation is a person's own status compared to others. Despite Pillay's (2008) argument of deprivation in relation to a reference group, living conditions compared to others is not significant. Despite the variable being positive as expected, I do not find support for my last hypothesis measuring relative deprivation, arguing that perceived horizontal inequality increases the chance to take part in xenophobic actions.

Job scarcity does prove to be statistically significant. These findings are in accordance with the *instrumental model of group conflict*, arguing that resource stress, here the resources being jobs, can result in perceptions of group competition over the resources. The response to this perceived group competition might be to remove the source of competition (Dovidio & Gartner, 2010). The bivariate findings do in this way support my fourth hypothesis, saying that viewing foreigners as a competition for jobs increases the likelihood of taking part in xenophobic actions. The bivariate findings also show that the probability of being likely to take part in xenophobic actions for people who view foreigners as a competition over jobs and

benefits is actually about 90 percent higher than for people who do not view foreigners as a competition.

Ethnic discrimination is also statistically significant. Those who feel that their ethnic group has always been unfairly treated by the government, have almost 80 percent higher odds to take part in xenophobic actions than people who have never been treated unfairly. These findings are in accordance with the theoretical arguments presented by Horowitz (1985) and Gurr (2000), and support my last hypothesis, arguing that those who have felt discriminated against by the state based on their ethnicity are more likely to take part in xenophobic actions.

As for the control variables, only one proves to be statistically significant: trust. This is in line with my expectation based on the assumption that those who have a hard time trusting other people will be more likely to take part in xenophobic actions. This seems plausible given the complex history of South Africa, in which those who have had bad experiences with others are more open to take part in prejudicial actions. The remaining control variables, education, age, gender and whether you live in an urban or rural setting proved to be insignificant in my bivariate analysis.

#### **4.2.2 Multivariate Regression Analysis**

In order to reach robust conclusions about the relationship between my explanatory variables and the likelihood of taking part in xenophobic actions, they must be tested in multivariate regression models. First I account for the coefficient of each variable included in the analysis, and whether they are statistically significant or not. The findings are presented in three clusters: control factors, ethnicity and frustration. I then report the probability, through odds ratios, for the significant variables in the final model.

The multivariate analyses are conducted in six steps. Model 1 tests whether the control variables are associated with the likelihood of taking part in xenophobic actions. I then proceed by adding the independent explanatory variables one by one: ethnic identity, race, relative deprivation, job scarcity and ethnic discrimination, which are presented in Model 2 – Model 6. The hypotheses are considered supported or not supported, as the connected variable is included in the regression.

**Table 3 Multivariate Regression, 2011**

	<i>Model 1</i>		<i>Model 2</i>		<i>Model 3</i>		<i>Model 4</i>		<i>Model 5</i>		<i>Model 6</i>	
	$\beta$	S.E	$\beta$	S.E	$\beta$	S.E.	$\beta$	S.E.	$\beta$	S.E.	$\beta$	S.E
<b>Trust</b>	.194	.126	.195	.126	.233*	.127	.229*	.127	.239*	.129	.236*	.129
<b>Education</b>												
- No schooling	.632**	.269	.631**	.269	.486*	.281	.523*	.284	.506*	.288	.549*	.289
- Primary	.335**	.169	.335**	.169	.285	.185	.298	.188	.289	.190	.309	.191
- Secondary	.146	.140	.147	.140	.091	.149	.106	.149	.054	.152	.067	.152
<b>Age</b>	-.003	.003	-.003	.003	-.001	.003	-.001	.003	-.002	.003	-.002	.003
<b>Gender</b>	.138	.095	.138	.095	.139	.095	.147	.096	.141	.097	.139	.097
<b>Urban</b>	.142	.105	.142	.105	.214**	.109	.205*	.109	.221**	.111	.223**	.111
<b>Ethnic Identity</b>			-.039	.166	-.026	.169	-.033	.169	-.105	.173	-.197	.176
<b>Race</b>												
- Black/African					.339**	.158	.362**	.159	.325**	.162	.319**	.164
- Colored/mixed					-.346*	.194	-.329*	.195	-.388**	.198	-.443**	.199
- Asian					.723***	.258	.696***	.261	.678***	.264	.584**	.267
<b>Living Conditions (G)</b>							-.007	.046	-.006	.046	.017	.047
<b>Living Conditions (T)</b>							.090	.057	.105*	.058	.106*	.058
<b>Living Conditions (H)</b>							-.077	.056	-.059	.056	-.057	.057
<b>Job Scarcity</b>												
- Neither Nor									-.183	.159	-.195	.160
- Agree									.595***	.104	.609***	.105
<b>Ethnic Discrimination</b>												
- Sometimes											-.121	.120
- Often											.212	.169
- Always											.628***	.197
<b>Constant</b>	-.863***	.224	-.863***	.224	-1.189***	.267	-1.232***	.306	-1.498***	.316	-1.498***	.320
<b>Log likelihood</b>		-1271.819		-1271.791		-1271.630		-1254.793		-1232.089		-1224.722
<b>Pseudo R</b>		0.0049		0.0049		0.0051		0.0182		0.0360		0.0418
<b>N</b>		1,923		1,923		1,923		1,923		1,923		1,923

Note: \*\*\* sig. at 0.01 level, \*\* sig. at 0.05 level, \* sig. at 0.1 level

#### 4.2.2.1 Control Factors

The first step in my multivariate regression analysis is to test the effect of the control variables, as it enables me to see whether they explain a significant part of my dependent variable. The only control variable that proves to be statistically significant in Model 1 is education. This model shows that respondents with no schooling and primary schooling have a higher likelihood of taking part in xenophobic actions than those with higher education, both significant at a 0.05 level. However, in the third model we can see that adding race to the regression makes education insignificant. While having a primary level of education loses all its significance, the significance of having no schooling has subsided to a 0.1 level, and remains insignificant throughout the remaining regression analysis. By running a correlation test between the variables, I am able to see that the correlation between race and education is significant and positive, which can explain why education lost its significance when adding race into the model<sup>20</sup>. Based on these findings, the models cannot support a negative relationship between education and likelihood of taking part in xenophobic actions, which is a contradiction to earlier empirical work (e.g. Billiet, Maddens & Beerten, 2003; Lewin-Epstein & Levanon, 2005).

Trust<sup>21</sup>, age and gender also do not seem to influence the likelihood of taking part in xenophobic actions, and remains insignificant throughout the models. The last control variable, urban, is insignificant in the first two models, but becomes significant when adding race in Model 3. This can be explained by a positive and significant correlation between the two variables (.282). A negative correlation between two of the variables measuring relative deprivation<sup>22</sup> and urban can explain why urban loses its significance in Model 4. However, it becomes statistically significant when adding job scarcity and ethnic discrimination. This supports that living in an urban setting increases the probability of a South African taking part in xenophobic actions, in contrast to living in rural settings. An explanation for this might be the informal settlements that are placed in the urban areas, as well as a more expanding job market. The findings from Model 1 thus indicate that all of the control variables, except rural or urban setting, can be excluded as significant explanations for why some South Africans take part in xenophobic actions, and I can proceed to by independent variables.

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<sup>20</sup> The regression does not show a significant result for interaction effect between education and race

<sup>21</sup> When including race in Model 3, trust becomes significant at a 0.1 level. However, since I operate with a 0.05 level, I do not consider the control variable statistically significant for my analysis

<sup>22</sup> Living Conditions (G) (-.089) and Living Conditions (H) (-.082)

#### 4.2.2.2 Ethnicity

Based on theory arguing for a positive relationship between ethnic national identity and xenophobia (e.g. Hjerm, 1998; Medrano & Koenig, 2005), I proposed in the theoretical part of this work that a feeling of ethnical belonging could be linked to the likelihood of taking part in ethnic motivated violence. I further hypothesized that having a strong ethnic national identity is important when determining whether you are likely to take part in xenophobic actions or not. In the following section I test these assumptions, by using the measurement of ethnic national identity.

Model 2 includes the variable ethnic, the dummy for degree of ethnic or national identity, as well as the control variables. The model shows that there is no significant difference between the respondents who have a strong ethnic national identity and those with a civic national identity when it comes to likelihood of taking part in xenophobic actions. Additionally, the coefficient is negative which is quite contrary to my expectations. This can be interpreted as an indication that South Africa has developed a strong sense of civic national identity (e.g. Mattes, 2002). Ethnicity continues to be negative and insignificant throughout the multivariate analysis, even when the remaining explanatory variables are included. The findings from the multivariate analysis do not support Hypothesis 1, claiming that *South Africans who feel strongly about their ethnic national identity are more likely to take part in xenophobic actions than those who do not feel strongly about their ethnic national identity.*

In the theoretical part of the thesis I also hypothesized that black South Africans would be more likely than white South Africans to take part in xenophobic actions. I test this assumption by using the measurement of race. When including it in my analysis, I find a significant relationship between the variable and the likelihood of taking part in xenophobic actions. While both black/African and Asian responses reveal a positive effect on the likelihood of taking part in xenophobic actions, colored/mixed responses display a negative interaction. However, since the significance between colored/mixed and xenophobic actions is just on a 0.1 level, I am not able to establish a clear relationship between the two. It is only when adding job scarcity in Model 5 that all of the three groups become truly significant in my analysis. They all remain significant in the final model. I am thus left with findings that indicate that black/African South Africans, as well as Asian South Africans, are more likely to take part in xenophobic actions than white South Africans, which functions as the reference group in the analysis. The respondents who are colored/mixed are however less likely to take part in xenophobic actions than white respondents. These indications are strengthened by the



history of the black and Asian South African population. Since the historical background of the Asian South Africans is not included in the theoretical framework I will now devote some attention to it.

Most Asian descendants, which constitutes about 2.5 percent of the South African population (Statistics South Africa, 2012), were brought to the African continent as slaves and indentured laborers (Tourism KwaZulu-Natal, 2014). During the apartheid the Asian part of the South African population faced severe discrimination and was exposed to a numerous racist policies. The classification of the Asians as well as their legal status has been a gray area, characterized by confusion. The Asian population has often been lumped together with other racial groups and has been denied post-apartheid benefits given to other non-white groups (Cancaves, 2008). After the end of apartheid, a great deal of Asian South Africans, especially those from China, came to South Africa in order to explore greater economic opportunities (Park, 2012). My argument about job scarcity can thus explain why the Asians are more likely to take part in actions<sup>23</sup>, as they are in competition for jobs.


Based on the findings from the multivariate analysis I am able to consider Hypothesis 2 *Black South Africans are more likely to take part in xenophobic actions than white South Africans* as supported. It is however important to acknowledge that the explanatory power of the variable race in relation to xenophobic actions goes beyond this hypothesis. Although not included in any of the hypotheses in this research, whether you are Asian or colored/mixed has a significant impact on the likelihood of taking part in prejudicial actions. These findings are in accordance to Krönke's (2015) findings when looking at the development of xenophobia in South Africa from 1997 to 2011.

Several of the variables are significantly correlated with race: ethnic identity, living conditions (T), ethnic discrimination, education, age and urban. However, when controlling for interactional effect there is only one interaction that shows a significant outcome, and that is the interactional effect between race and living conditions (H). The effect the living conditions compared to others, has on the likelihood of taking part in xenophobic actions is less significant for the black/African group, than for the other racial group. The explanation for this remains unclear, and needs to be studied further. The interactional effect between race and living conditions versus others is shown in Figure 4.

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<sup>23</sup> When tested there is however no significant interactional effect between race and job scarcity.

**Figure 4 Interactional Effects between Race & Living Conditions (H)**



#### 4.2.2.3 Frustration

Based on relative deprivation- frustration theory (e.g Allport, 1954; Bodhan, 1948; Douglas, 1995; Duncan, 2012; Green, Glaser & Rich, 1998), I proposed in the theoretical framework that a feeling of relative deprivation could be linked to the likelihood of taking part in ethnic motivated actions. Model 4 includes the three variables that function as a measurement of relative deprivation. The first variable, general living conditions, is surprisingly insignificant throughout the multivariate regression analysis. The coefficient is even negative in Model 4 and 5. The findings therefore do not support Hypothesis 3<sub>a</sub> *South Africans who feel relatively deprived in general are more likely to take part in xenophobic actions than those who do not feel relatively deprived in general.*

Living conditions in terms of time is the indicator that is closest to being significant when it comes to relative deprivation. In Model 5 and 6 the variable is significant at a 0.1 level and positive, which indicates that those who feel that their living conditions has decreased in quality have a higher likelihood of taking part in xenophobic actions, than those who do not feel this way. However, since this research operates with a higher significance level, the findings of the multivariate regressions do not support Hypothesis 3<sub>b</sub> *South Africans who feel relatively deprived compared to their own situation in the past are more likely to take part in xenophobic actions than those who do not feel relatively deprived compared to their situation in the past.*

Living conditions versus other peoples living conditions did as the first relative deprivation variable prove to be negative though insignificant. This is contrary to what one might expect based on Pillay's (2008) argument about deprivation leading to hostility when it is in comparison with reference groups. I am thus not able to find support for Hypothesis 3c *South Africans who feel relatively deprived compared to other South Africans are more likely to take part in xenophobic actions than those who do not feel relatively deprived compared to other South Africans*. Since the results show no significant correlation between any of the three indicators of relative deprivation and xenophobic actions, I am not able to confirm that South Africans who feel relatively deprived are more likely to take part in xenophobic actions.

Although the findings do not support significant correlation between relative deprivation and xenophobic actions, an interesting discussion is what kind of relative deprivation is perceived as the worse by the South African people; feeling relatively deprived in your current situation, feeling relatively deprived compared to your own situation in the past or feeling relatively deprived compared to other groups. Based on the findings in both the bivariate regression, where living conditions progress was significant, and in the multivariate regressions, where the indicator was by far the closest to being significant, one can assume that the South African respondents find that the form of relative deprivation which creates most frustration, is being relatively deprived compared to your own situation in the past. This can be seen in light of the expectations that grew after South Africa became a democracy, and those expectations not being fulfilled, which can explain some of the frustration leading to xenophobic actions. This is mirrored in Davie's (1962, p. 6) "J-curve"-theory.

Earlier in the thesis I proposed that viewing foreigners as a competition for jobs could lead to participation in xenophobic attacks, seen in light of the instrumental model of group conflict (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2010). I test this assumption through the measurement of job scarcity. When adding job scarcity in Model 5, a significant relationship between the variable and the dependent variable is revealed. The coefficient is positive (.595), which indicates that agreeing with the statement that foreigners should not be allowed to live in South Africa because they take jobs and benefits away from South Africans, can have a positive effect on the likelihood of taking part in xenophobic actions, compared to those who disagree. These findings are in accordance with the instrumental model of group conflict (e.g. Dovidio & Gaertner, 2010). The variable remains significant in Model 6, when ethnic discrimination is included, and the coefficient increases some (to .609). I do therefore not find support for

Hypothesis 4 *South Africans who view foreigners as a competition for jobs are more likely to take part in xenophobic actions than those who do not view foreigners as a competition.*

Another finding worth mentioning when adding job scarcity is the increase in Pseudo  $R^2$ , which goes from being 0.0182 in Model 4 to 0.0360 in Model 5. This indicates that job scarcity has a significantly high explanatory power in the analysis<sup>25</sup>.

Based on theory by Horowitz (1985) and Gurr (2000), as well as the history of South Africa, I proposed that having felt discriminated against by the state could be linked to the likelihood of taking part in xenophobic action. The last variable included, ethnic discrimination, is significant and positive in the multivariate model, which points to a positive relationship between discrimination based on ethnicity and likelihood of taking part in xenophobic actions. The respondents who have always felt unfairly treated by the government, have a higher probability of taking part in xenophobic actions than those who have never felt unfairly treated. Those who feel that they have sometimes and often been unfairly treated do not seem to have a significantly higher likelihood of partaking in xenophobic motivated actions. The correlation between ethnic discrimination and likelihood of taking action is supported by theorists such as Horowitz (1985) and Gurr (2000). The findings in the analysis support Hypothesis 5 *South Africans who have felt discriminated against by the state based on their ethnicity are more likely to take part in xenophobic actions than those who have not felt discriminated against by the state*, and I can therefore assume that political horizontal inequality plays a significant role in determining whether one is likely to take part in xenophobic actions or not.

A significant correlation between ethnic discrimination and race is revealed when running a correlation test<sup>26</sup>. I have therefore tested to see if there is any interaction effect between the feeling of having been unfairly treated by the government and what race one belongs to. The interaction effects are however insignificant.

#### 4.2.2.4 Odds Ratios

In this section I present the odds ratios for the significant variables in the final model consisting of all the dependent variables, including the control variables. The odds are

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<sup>24</sup> Although Pseudo R does not provide us with an equally sufficient impression of the explanatory power as  $R^2$  does in linear regression, I choose to comment on it.

<sup>25</sup> The likelihood-function tells us the likelihood of getting the exact same dataset as we have (Skog, 2013, p. 255). By including job scarcity the log likelihood decreases from -1254.793 to 1232.089.

<sup>26</sup> Shown in Appendix C.

interpreted as the change in odds for a positive outcome on the dependent variable, likelihood of taking part in xenophobic actions (Y=1) associated with a one unit increase in the independent variable, with all other variables remaining constant.<sup>27</sup>

**Table 4 Odds Ratios in the Final Model**

	<i>Model 6</i>
	<b>Exp (β)</b>
<b>Trust</b>	1.266
<b>Education</b>	
- No schooling	1.731
- Primary	1.362
- Secondary	1.069
<b>Age</b>	.998
<b>Gender</b>	1.149
<b>Urban</b>	<b>1.250</b>
<b>Ethnic identity</b>	.821
<b>Race</b>	
- Black/African	<b>1.367</b>
- Colored/mixed	<b>.642</b>
- Asian	<b>1.793</b>
<b>Living Conditions (G)</b>	.983
<b>Living Conditions (T)</b>	1.112
<b>Living Conditions (H)</b>	.994
<b>Job Scarcity</b>	
- Neither nor	.823
- Agree	<b>1.839</b>
<b>Ethnic Discrimination</b>	
- Sometimes	.886
- Often	1.236
- Always	<b>1.875</b>
<b>Constant</b>	<b>.224</b>
<b>Log Likelihood</b>	-1224.722
<b>Pseudo R</b>	0.0418
<b>N</b>	1,923

*Note: Bold represents significance at 0.05 level or more*

The odds ratios in Model 6 show that the respondents who live in urban settings are 25 percent more likely to take part in xenophobic actions than those who live in rural settings. Concerning race, the South African respondents who are colored or mixed are 36 percent less likely than the reference group, white respondents, to be partaking in xenophobic actions. While the Asians are a surprising 79 percent more likely than whites to take part in xenophobic actions, the black/African respondents are 38 percent more likely. Those who agree that foreigners are in competition for jobs and benefits, and thus should not be allowed to live in South Africa, have 84 percent greater odds of being likely to take part in these

<sup>27</sup> The odds ratios for all the six models is included in Appendix D.

actions than those who do not agree with this statement. The variable with the greatest odds ratio is however ethnic discrimination. Those who have always felt unfairly treated by the government are 88 percent more likely to take part in xenophobic actions than those who have never felt unfairly treated.

**Table 5 Summaries of the Hypotheses**

Hypotheses	Supported	Not supported
<b>H1:</b> South Africans who feel stronger about their ethnic national identity are more likely to take part in xenophobic actions than those who do not feel strongly about their ethnic national identity.		X
<b>H2:</b> Black South Africans are more likely to take part in xenophobic actions than white South Africans.	X	
<b>H3<sub>a</sub>:</b> South Africans who feel relatively deprived in general are more likely to take part in xenophobic actions than those who do not feel relatively deprived in general.		X
<b>H3<sub>b</sub>:</b> South Africans who feel relatively deprived compared to their own situation in the past are more likely to take part in xenophobic actions than those who do not feel relatively deprived compared to their situation in the past.		X
<b>H3<sub>c</sub>:</b> South Africans who feel relatively deprived compared to other South Africans are more likely to take part in xenophobic actions than those who do not feel relatively deprived compared to other South Africans.		X
<b>H4:</b> South Africans who view foreigners as a competition for jobs are more likely to take part in xenophobic actions than those who do not view foreigners as a competition.	X	
<b>H5:</b> South Africans who have felt discriminated against by the state based on their ethnicity are more likely to take part in xenophobic actions than those who have not felt discriminated against by the state.	X	

## 5 Conclusions

With the transition to democracy in 1994, the hope for a new and improved South Africa followed. The expectations of the people were high as they hoped that democracy would mean a great change for the marginalized poor, which amounted for a large majority of the population, as well as an end to a segregated nation. Even though the transition led to the formal end of discrimination by the government against its people, it did not manage to eliminate inequalities, as South Africa is constantly becoming more unequal (Eriksen, 2016). This inequality is especially evident in the disturbingly high unemployment rate among the black South Africans. There has also been an increase in xenophobic attitudes and actions among the population. Since the end of apartheid, violent attacks have been directed towards African migrants: shops are torched, people are killed and thousands of African foreigners are driven away from their homes and businesses. The horrific attacks have left the nation in shock, millions of foreigners fearing for their lives, and raises the question of whom is likely to take part in this sort of action, and why.

Afrobarometer found that more than one out of ten South African individuals in the time period 1997-2011 answered that they would be “very likely” to take part in actions in order to prevent foreigners in moving into their neighborhood or operating a business in their area (Krönke, 2015). There have been many assumptions on the motivation behind taking part in these forms of action. The intention of this thesis was therefore to study what factors make some South Africans likely to take part in xenophobic actions. What is their motivation? And who are these people? In light of these concerns the thesis aimed to answer the following question: *What makes some South Africans likely to go so far as to take part in xenophobic actions?*

In order to find out what affects the likelihood of taking part in xenophobic actions the analysis tested two clusters of explanatory factors: ethnicity and frustration. My theoretical argument was that an increased feeling of an ethnic security dilemma increases the likelihood of taking part in xenophobic actions, and that ethnicity and the feeling of frustration plays a significant role in the perceived feeling of ethnic security dilemma. I also argued that the nature of the ethnic group, as well as the governance by the state, here called *opportunity*, plays a significant role in the mobilization of group conflict.

Despite the theory arguing for a positive relationship between ethnic national identity and xenophobia, ethnic identity was not significant in the analysis. The results do however show that there is a significant relationship between race and likelihood of taking part in



xenophobic action. Black/African and Asian respondents are more likely than white to take part, while colored/mixed are less likely. These results imply that race is an important variable factor when looking at xenophobic actions.

However, with the *constructivist* viewpoint as a base, I argued that ethnicity and ethnic differences alone were insufficient for explaining xenophobic actions. The question then became what other individual factors could explain one's taking part in various forms of xenophobic actions. In line with frustration-aggression theory, I argued that when people feel frustrated about their own situation, they are more prone to take action. It is unrealistic to measure all possible reasons for frustration. This thesis has however covered some of the explanations that I considered highly relevant in the South African context: relative deprivation, job scarcity and ethnic discrimination.

In light of the relative deprivation theory, three measures of relative deprivation were used in this thesis: present living conditions, present living conditions compared to the past and living conditions compared to other South Africans. None of these proved to have a significant effect on the likelihood of taking part in xenophobic actions, and I could therefore not confirm that economic horizontal inequality plays a significant role in xenophobic actions. The results of the analysis did however show that the factors that had the highest effect on the likelihood of participation were viewing foreigners as competition for scarce jobs and the feeling of having been unfairly treated by the government, in other words political horizontal inequalities. Whether one lived in a rural or urban setting also had an impact. The likelihood of taking part in xenophobic actions increases when living in an urban setting, which is reasonable since most of the competition for jobs and other resources is in the bigger cities.

These are all elements that arguably strengthen the perception of an ethnic security dilemma and fear, and the findings thus support my overall argument: the greater the feeling of an ethnic security dilemma, the more likely to take part in xenophobic actions. This is in line with the *constructivist* viewpoint, in that ethnic differences do not in itself explain xenophobic actions, as argued by the *primordialist* viewpoint, but must be combined with other factors: opportunity to mobilize, and the feeling of frustration and threat.

## **5.1 Value Added and Future Research**

A limited amount of quantitative research has been conducted on the issue of xenophobic action in South Africa, and my work responds to this gap. This thesis contributes to the theoretical field of xenophobia by using relevant theory from large-scale ethnic conflicts, as I

argue that one could draw parallels between different conflicts regardless of the size and intensity-level. By applying the theory of ethnic security dilemma, one is able to see how perceived fear and frustration can affect partaking in actions. I also argue that the xenophobic actions taking place in South Africa is an important issue to study, as conflicts on the African continent have a tendency to gain less attention in the Western world.

Most importantly, I have demonstrated that in order to grasp the different dimensions of xenophobia, one must distinguish attitudes from actions. I argue that one cannot simply explain the different dimensions with a standardized measurement. I have in light of this concern demonstrated that it is in perceived threat that the likelihood of taking part in xenophobic actions has its roots. The feeling of frustration and fear, along with the race to which one belongs, are all factors that trigger a person to move from attitude to actually taking action.

There are a number of ways to broaden our knowledge of xenophobic actions. In this last section of my thesis, I will account for some of them. First of all, it would be interesting to see whether Round 6 of Afrobarometer will show similar result, once the data becomes available. However, my main suggestion to future research is to continue to distinguish actions from attitudes. The research would benefit to look at questions like: When do attitudes turn into actions? Is it the same people who score high on attitudes that score high on likelihood to participation? Or do the respondents who say they are likely to take part in xenophobic actions possess certain qualities that the respondents with simply strong xenophobic attitudes do not possess? One way of finding answers to these questions is to compare likelihood of xenophobic actions with xenophobic attitudes.

Another point to broaden our knowledge is to improve data quality on the dependent variable. More research is needed to identify partaking in xenophobic actions. In my research I am not able to distinguish whether or not the respondents are *truly* likely to take part in xenophobic actions. This creates an important uncertainty that needs to be clarified by improved data. To be certain that those who argue to be likely actually would, or in worse case has taken part, another type of study and data is needed. It would however be interesting to study.

The results from a single case study cannot be generalized across other countries and cases with any degree of certainty. Future study should see if a perceived ethnic security dilemma might increase the likelihood of xenophobic actions in other countries as well, or if

this is a particular finding in South Africa<sup>28</sup>. Cross-country comparison is thus another useful point of departure. In regards to the element of opportunity, an interesting approach would be to look at different degrees of democracy, to see what effect this has on the likelihood of taking part in xenophobic actions.

In summary, this thesis finds that the perceived ethnic security dilemma has a positive effect on the likelihood of taking part in xenophobic action. However, it does not say anything about how the xenophobic actions can be prevented. A suggestion for future research can thus be to study what measures are necessary in order to prevent partaking in these hostile actions. Looking at other countries, where the government has taken xenophobic actions most seriously and worked towards a society where the majority of foreigners do not fear for their lives, can provide us with knowledge about what measures can be put in place.

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<sup>28</sup> Studies on horizontal inequality increasing the risk of internal conflict are highly relevant here. See for example Hillesund (2015), Cederman, Weidmann & Gleditsch (2011) and Østby (2008).

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# Appendices

## Appendix A Correlation Between All Variables

	Xenophobic Action	Ethnic Identity	Race	Living Conditions (G)	Living Conditions (T)	Living Conditions (H)	Job Scarcity	Ethnic Discr.	Trust	Education	Age	Gender	Urban
<b>Xenophobic Action</b>	1.000												
<b>Ethnic Identity</b>	-.004	1.000											
<b>Race</b>	<b>-.053</b>	<b>.123</b>	1.000										
<b>Living Conditions(G)</b>	.013	.037	-.031	1.000									
<b>Living Conditions(T)</b>	.038	<b>.054</b>	<b>.085</b>	<b>.377</b>	1.000								
<b>Living Conditions(H)</b>	-.009	.008	-.044	<b>.470</b>	<b>.340</b>	1.000							
<b>Job Scarcity</b>	<b>.134</b>	.043	-.029	-.020	<b>-.051</b>	-.039	1.000						
<b>Ethnic Discr.</b>	.044	<b>.167</b>	<b>.224</b>	<b>.059</b>	<b>.069</b>	<b>.053</b>	-.021	1.000					
<b>Trust</b>	.037	.044	.029	.015	.039	.024	.008	.015	1.000				
<b>Education</b>	<b>-.052</b>	.022	<b>.071</b>	<b>-.194</b>	<b>-.115</b>	<b>-.212</b>	-.043	.036	-.014	1.000			
<b>Age</b>	-.007	.043	<b>.213</b>	.021	<b>.074</b>	.029	.0137	<b>.047</b>	.001	<b>-.198</b>	1.000		
<b>Gender</b>	.033	.009	-.003	.014	-.028	.015	.002	.017	.031	.043	-.019	1.000	
<b>Urban</b>	.015	.013	<b>.282</b>	<b>-.089</b>	.023	<b>-.082</b>	.032	<b>.067</b>	-.005	<b>.209</b>	<b>.144</b>	<b>.019</b>	1.000

*Note: Bold represent significance at 0.05 level or more*

## Appendix B Reliability Analysis of Indexes

### B1. Action Index, Reliability Analysis

#### Correlation Matrix

	<i>Neighborhood</i>	<i>Business</i>
<i>Neighborhood</i>	1.000	
<i>Business</i>	0.7985	1.000
N of cases=	2.345	
Mean correlation =	0.799	
Chronbachs $\alpha$ =	0.888	

The reliability analysis shows that the included indicators have a satisfactory correlation with the index on over 0.7, which is over the required 0.4. The reliability of the scale should be over  $\alpha = 70$ , and is thus confirmed here.

### B2. Relative Deprivation Index, Reliability Analysis

#### Correlation Matrix

	<i>Living Conditions (G)</i>	<i>Living Conditions (T)</i>	<i>Living Conditions (H)</i>
<i>Living Conditions (G)</i>	1.000		
<i>Living Conditions (T)</i>	0.4747	1.0000	
<i>Living Conditions (H)</i>	0.3639	0.3494	1.000
N of cases=	2.346		
Mean correlation=	0.396		
Chronbachs $\alpha$ =	0.663		

The reliability analysis shows that the scale has a mean correlation on almost 0.4 and the reliability of the scale is on almost 0.7. Since the shown values are lower than preferred when creating an index, I choose to treat the variables as separate in the analysis.

## Appendix C Overview of Coding of Variables

<b>Name</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Original coding</b>	<b>New coding</b>
<i>Xenophobic Action</i>	Likelihood of taking part in xenophobic actions (Dependent variable)	The index consist of two variables: likelihood of taking part in actions to prevent other Africans from 1) Moving into your neighborhood, 2) Operating a business in your area. Both variables are coded: 1) Very likely, 2) Likely, 3) Not very likely, 4) Not likely at all	The two variables were combined in order to create an index representing the likelihood of taking part in xenophobic actions. The scale was then dummy-coded to a dichotomous variable, with the following values: 0) Not likely (reference category), 1) Likely
<i>Ethnic</i>	Feeling of ethnic or national identity (Independent variable)	The variable was originally coded: 1) I feel only (ethnic group), 2) I feel more (ethnic group) than South African, 3) I feel equally South African and (ethnic group), 4) I feel more South African than (ethnic group), 5) I feel only South African.	The variable was dummy coded into a dichotomous variable so that 3, 4, 5 are given the value 0) Civic (reference category), while 1, 2 is 1) Ethnic
<i>Race</i>	Race (Independent variable)	The variable was originally coded: 1) Black/African, 2) White/European, 3) Colored/Mixed, 5) South Asian, 6) East Asian	The variable is dummy coded. It now consist of the following values: 1) Black/ African, 2) White/European (reference category), 3) Colored/Mixed, 4) Asian
<i>Living Conditions (G)</i>	Present living conditions in general (Independent variable)	The variable was originally coded: 1) Very bad, 2) Fairly bad, 3) Neither good nor bad, 4) Fairly good, 5) Very good	The variable is dummy coded, and the values are turned. It now consist of the following values: 1) Very good, 2) Fairly good, 3) Neither good nor bad, 4) Fairly bad, 5) Very bad
<i>Living Condition (T)</i>	Present living conditions compared to twelve months ago (Independent variable)	The variable was originally coded: 1) Much worse, 2) Worse, 3) Same, 4) Better, 5) Much better	The variable is dummy coded, and the values are turned. It now consist of the following values: 1) Much better, 2) Better, 3) Same, 4) Worse, 5) Much worse
<i>Living Conditions (H)</i>	Present living conditions compared to other South Africans (Independent variable)	The variable was originally coded: 1) Much worse, 2) Worse, 3) Same, 4) Better, 5) Much better	The variable is dummy coded, and the values are turned. It now consist of the following values: 1) Much better, 2) Better, 3) Same, 4) Worse, 5) Much worse

<i>Job Scarcity</i>	Feeling of competition from foreigners for jobs (Independent variable)	The variable was originally coded: 1) Strongly disagree, 2) Disagree, 3) Neither agree nor disagree, 4) Agree, 5) Strongly agree	The variable is dummy coded. It now consists of the following values: 1) Disagree (reference category), 2) Neither agree nor disagree, 3) Agree
<i>Ethnic Discrimination</i>	Ethnic group treated unfairly by government (Independent variable)	The variable was coded: 0) Never, 1) Sometimes, 2) Often, 3) Always. The original coding is kept in the analysis, and 0) Never is used as a reference category	
<i>Trust</i>	Level of general trust (Control variable)	The dichotomous variable was originally coded 0) Must be very careful, 1) Most people can be trusted	The variable is dummy coded. The values are turned, so that 0= Trust (reference category) and 1= No trust
<i>Education</i>	Level of education (Control variable)	The variable was originally coded: 0) No formal schooling, 1) Informal schooling only, 2) Some primary schooling, 3) Primary schooling completed, 4) Some secondary school, 5) Secondary school completed, 6) Post-secondary qualifications, 7) Some university, 8) University completed, 9) Post-graduate	The variable is dummy coded. It now consist of the following values: 1) No schooling, 2) Primary, 3) Secondary, 4) Higher (reference category)
<i>Age</i>	Age per 2011 (Control variable)	Continuous variable (18-95 years)	
<i>Gender</i>	Gender (Control variable)	The dichotomous variable was originally coded 1) Male, 2) Female	The variable is dummy coded. It now consist of the following values: 0) Female (reference category), 1) Male
<i>Urban</i>	Urban or rural setting (Control variable)	The dichotomous variable was originally coded 1) Urban, 2) Rural	The variable is dummy coded. It now consist of the following values: 0) Rural (reference category), 1) Urban

## Appendix D Odds Ratio for the Multivariate Regression

	<i>Model 1</i>	<i>Model 2</i>	<i>Model 3</i>	<i>Model 4</i>	<i>Model 5</i>	<i>Model 6</i>
	<b>Exp (<math>\beta</math>)</b>	<b>Exp (<math>\beta</math>)</b>	<b>Exp (<math>\beta</math>)</b>	<b>Exp (<math>\beta</math>)</b>	<b>Exp (<math>\beta</math>)</b>	<b>Exp (<math>\beta</math>)</b>
<b>Trust</b>	1.214	1.216	1.262	1.258	1.271	1.266
<b>Education</b>						
- No schooling	<b>1.881</b>	<b>1.879</b>	1.626	1.687	1.659	1.731
- Primary	<b>1.397</b>	<b>1.397</b>	1.330	1.347	1.335	1.362
- Secondary	1.157	1.158	1.095	1.112	1.056	1.069
<b>Age</b>	.997	.997	.999	.999	.998	.998
<b>Gender</b>	1.148	1.148	1.149	1.158	1.151	1.149
<b>Urban</b>	1.152	1.153	<b>1.238</b>	1.228	<b>1.247</b>	<b>1.250</b>
<b>Ethnic identity</b>		.961	.973	.968	.901	.821
<b>Race</b>						
- Black/African			<b>1.404</b>	<b>1.436</b>	<b>1.384</b>	<b>1.367</b>
- Colored/mixed			.707	.719	<b>.678</b>	<b>.642</b>
- Asian			<b>2.061</b>	<b>2.006</b>	<b>1.971</b>	<b>1.793</b>
<b>Living Conditions (G)</b>				.993	.994	.983
<b>Living Conditions (T)</b>				1.093	1.111	1.112
<b>Living Conditions (H)</b>				.926	.942	.994
<b>Job Scarcity</b>						
- Neither nor					.833	.823
- Agree					<b>1.814</b>	<b>1.839</b>
<b>Ethnic Discrimination</b>						
- Sometimes						.886
- Often						1.236
- Always						<b>1.875</b>
<b>Constant</b>	<b>.422</b>	<b>.422</b>	<b>.305</b>	<b>.292</b>	<b>.224</b>	<b>.224</b>