Abstract

In the last decades, several corrupt, authoritarian, and autocratic regimes have fallen. New states and democracies have emerged by a variety of means. How a transition occurs have significant impact on the success or failure of democratic reform. But the notion that democratization processes are potentially dangerous and may lead to conflict has made scholars warn policy makers about optimism as regard to democracy promotion. This thesis examines the relationship between regime change and violent and nonviolent campaigns. The direction of the causality between the two is still an open issue in the democratic civil peace literature. The inclusion of lagged regime change variables, and nonviolent campaigns are novel contributions to the field of the democratization-conflict linkage. The empirical evidence of this thesis suggests that there is a relationship, but that it is more often conflicts that cause regime change, rather than regime change being a trigger for conflicts. Further, it seems that nonviolent campaigns is better at achieving its goals and ensure democracy and civil peace.

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List of Abbreviations

NAVCO	Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
MDF	Magyar Demokrata Fórum (Hungarian Democratic Forum)
GDR	German Democratic Republic
OF	Občanské Fórum (Civic Forum)
MOSOP	Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People
KANU	Kenyan African National Union
ČSSR	Czechoslovakian Socialist Republic
VPN	Verejnosť Proti Násiliu (Public Against Violence)
U.S.	United States of America
PARREG	Regulation of Political Participation
PARCOMP	Competitiveness of Political Participation
XCONST	The Constraints on Chief Executive
XROPEN	The Openness of Executive Recruitment
XRCOMP	The Competitiveness of Executive Recruitment

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1. Introduction

"It is never easy to convince those who have acquired power forcibly of the wisdom of peaceful change." (Aung San Suu Kyi, 1996)

The worldwide struggle for democracy has gained increased prominence in international affairs, and the growing international discourse about democratization is not only a theoretical exercise. In the last decades, dozens of corrupt, authoritarian, autocratic, one-party, and military regimes have fallen. Multinational states and colonial systems have receded and new states have emerged. Dictatorships have collapsed and new states and new democracies have risen by a variety of means. Karatnycky and Ackerman (2005) argues that far more often than is generally understood, the parties in resistance movements is broad-based, nonviolent civic resistance, which employs tactics such as boycotts, mass protests, blockades, strikes, and civil disobedience to de-legitimate authoritarian rulers and get rid of their sources of support (Karatnycky and Ackerman 2005, 2). How a transition from authoritarianism occurs and the types of forces that are engaged in pressing the transition have significant impact on the success or failure of democratic reform. Democracy promotion has appeared together with democracy itself. It was through democracy promotion that Ancient Athens became aware of the concept of diverse forms of governance, the uniqueness of its own form, and the possibility to change or choose among them (Huber 2015, 7). In the 20th century, democracy promotion came back in a systematic manner when the United States abandoned its policy of isolation and entered the stage of world politics. The United States can indeed be seen as a first-generation contemporary democracy promoter since its policies and experiences have influenced and shaped democracy promotion politics of later generations of democracy promoters through direct as well as indirect influence (Huber 2015, 11).

Mansfield and Snyder (2005) suggest that democratization processes may trigger violent periods. They draw on Huntington´s (1968) argument that democratization implies mass mobilization and the latter may trigger violence if the political institutions are not prepared to accommodate this level of participation.

Mansfield and Snyder (2005) has been disproven, mostly on theoretical grounds, but Cederman et al. (2010) also claim that there is a link between civil wars and democratization. Although they argue that these are quite robust results, they stresses that further, disaggregated, actor specific and process-tracing analysis will be needed in order to put their findings on a firmer empirical position (Cederman et al. 2010, 387).

1.1 Research Puzzle

To investigate the democratization-conflict linkage I use multinomial logistic regression combined with simple logistic regression. The dataset is combined of the NAVCO 2.0 data on violent and nonviolent campaigns from 1945 through 2006, and the Polity IV data measuring democraticness and regime change. This provides the necessary data to investigate the hypotheses regarding the democratization-conflict linkage. I include a model with lagged regime change variables to examine the direction of the hypotheses. By lagging these variables one year, this can help reveal if there is a relationship when the democratization process happened prior to the conflict. In addition to the statistical analysis, I look at some cases that can provide some examples of the possible directions in this linkage. These cases are merely indications, and are not sufficient to make assumptions of general tendencies.

Regime change in this context entails transitional processes of the political regime. In this thesis, I address both democratization and autocratization. There is still controversy concerning the possibility that democratization processes may trigger political violence. This is an area in the research that still needs some clarifications. In addition to the danger of democratization, Cederman et al. (2010) claim that autocratization also can induce civil wars. To investigate this further, I include autocratization processes to the analysis.

The purpose of this thesis is not to explain what the causes for conflict are, but simply to explore the possibility that regime change is one of them. This is an issue in the field of conflict research that is still debated, and the inclusion of nonviolent campaigns is relatively new in this context. The impetus of this thesis is to bring some new insights to the study of regime change as a trigger for both violent and nonviolent campaigns.

The research on the democratization-conflict linkage has focused on violent conflicts, as has the field of conflict research in general. In this thesis I seek to explore the possibilities of nonviolent campaigns, as these types of conflict seems to be better at achieving its goals and ensure civil peace and democratization (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011, 7). Thus, conflict in this context refers to both violent and nonviolent campaigns.

I investigate nonviolent tactics as the preferable choice in the processes of political change (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011, 7). If regime change is a dangerous period that potentially can lead to conflict, which measures can be taken to make this transition as safe as possible? Hegre et al. (2001) find a curvilinear relationship between the level of democracy and the outbreak of civil war. Many democratization processes do not result in complete transitions, but remains in the mid-range of the democracy scale. This is a dangerous place being stuck in; as such anocracies are disproportionately affected by civil wars (Hegre et al. 2001, 34). This stresses the importance of a complete transition, but also a safe transition. Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) find that the chances of civil peace and democracy is almost twice as likely when the opposition uses nonviolent tactics rather than violent.

Thus, my research question can be formulated as follows:
Research Question: Does variation in form of regime change explain variation in the risk and form of social unrest?

My overall findings indicate that there is a link between democratization, and both violent and nonviolent campaigns. I also find a relationship between autocratization and violent campaigns. As regard to the direction of this relationship, I am not able to confirm that regime change necessarily lead to conflict. The model with lagged regime change variables is not significant. Thus, I do not find evidence that regime change trigger conflict, neither violent nor nonviolent. The results of my analysis put Cederman et al. (2010) findings into question, and emphasize the importance of lagging the regime change variables to ensure that the regime change occurs prior to the conflict. Lagging the variables may have some disadvantages, and it can be difficult to get significant results because it is a rigid method, but it is a way of

helping determine the direction of the causality. The case study indicates that most nonviolent campaigns probably resulted in democratization, rather than the other way around. However, there are examples of democratization processes that have led to the onset of nonviolent campaigns. Further, I find that the likelihood of experiencing nonviolent campaigns decreases the more democratic the country is. For violent campaigns, the Polity variable is not significant, which means that the likelihood of violent campaigns is identical for democracies and autocracies when the other variables are held constant. I find a curvilinear relationship between democraticness and conflict for violent campaigns, previously mentioned by several scholars (e.g. Hegre et al., 2001; Gleditsch et al., 2009). This variable is merely a control variable, and was removed form the models, as it did not affect the results to a significant degree.

1.2 Definitions

There is lack of consensus on the meaning of democracy. This thesis adopts a definition of democracy that fits into the Schumpeterian tradition and relies on the ideas of Robert Dahl. Dahl (1971) has developed widely accepted and used criteria for classifying a country as democratic. His definition has significantly affected the conceptualization of democracy in the field of quantitative research on democracy (Doorenspleet 2005, 14). In order for a government to continue over a period of time to be responsive to the preferences of the citizens, all full citizens must have unhindered opportunities to formulate their preferences. They must have the opportunity to signify their preferences to their fellow citizens and the government by individual and collective action. Then, they must have their preferences weighed equally in the conduct of the government, that is, weighted with no discrimination because of the content or source of their preference (Dahl 1971, 2).

Like most studies of regime change, this thesis uses Polity scores to operationally define regime types. The Polity Index is a 21-point scale, form -10 through 10. Countries with scores higher than 5 on the Polity scale is considered democratic. Countries with scores lower than -5 on the Polity scale is considered autocratic. Countries with scores between -5 and 5 are considered anocratic.

The notion of authoritarian government is often used as a synonym for non-democratic government. Linz´s (1964) analysis of authoritarianism excludes both totalitarianism and traditional systems. He defines political systems as authoritarian if they are:

> "…political systems with limited, not responsible, political pluralism, without elaborate and guiding ideology, but with distinctive mentalities, without extensive nor intensive political mobilization, except at some points in their development, and in which a leader or occasionally small group exercises power within formally ill-defined limits but actually quite predictable ones." (Linz 1964, 255)

This definition points to four distinctive elements. First, the presence of limited political pluralism. According to Linz (1964), this is the most distinctive feature of authoritarianism. The limits vary in degree, form and target among the regimes. The crucial point is that some groups are not controlled by the regime and indeed have some political influence. Second, the absence of elaborate and guiding ideology. Linz (1964) acknowledges that ideology is not unknown among authoritarian regimes, but any such ideology is not used for guiding the regime. An authoritarian regime has merely a distinctive mentality, which is more emotional than rational (Brooker 2009, 26). Third, the absence of intensive or extensive political mobilization throughout most of the regimes history. Political mobilization occurs in the early stages of some authoritarian regimes. They may be considerable and indeed very intensive movements (Brooker 2009, 26). Fourth, a leader or occasionally small group exercises power within formally ill-defined limits but actually quite predictable ones. Even when the regime´s leader may seems to be absolutist, in practice this power is exercised within a predictable framework rather than in a random manner (Brooker 2009, 26).

Despite the frequent use of the term anocracy, there is little clarity about what an anocratic state really is. The literature has adopted two prominent accounts of anocracy. The first describes anocracy as "a regime that mixes democratic with autocratic features" (Fearon and Laitin 2003, 81). The second definition is conceptually more precise and defines anocracy as "a regime that permits some means of participation through opposition groups behavior but that has incomplete development of the mechanisms to redress grievances (Regan and Bell 2010, 748).

Anocracies can be described as flawed democracies, but they have afflicted by a wide and complex range of flaws. First, they may be related to suffrage limitations. Second, to sovereignty limitations. Third, to systemic weaknesses. Fourth, to shrinking that involves the misuse of public powers to influence elections. Fifth, to semi-competitive elections that are difficult to distinguish from those of disguised dictatorships (Brooker 2009, 233).

The process of democratization does not mean that the dictatorship´s resigning and that this produces full and consolidated democracy. The end result of the democratization process may instead be an anocracy. The resignation of a dictator will be a democratization in the minimal sense of involving or leading to democratic or anocratic elections (Brooker, 2009, 197). Sørensen (1993) refers to the process of democratization as change toward more democratic forms of rule. He divides this process in three phases:

> "The first phase involves the breakdown of the nondemocratic regime. In the second phase, the elements of a democratic order are established. During the third phase, consolidation, the new democracy is further developed; eventually, democratic practices become an established part of the political culture." (Sørensen 1993, 158).

In this thesis, regime change is operationally defined as a change in the Polity indicators, either towards democracy or towards autocracy.

Autocratization refers to regime change in the opposite direction than democratization. Autocratization is the governmental structures where the different agencies is replaced by a concentration of the supreme power in the hands of one man or a group who are uncontrolled from a free and unrestricted public opinion. The supreme power exercises absolute power over the executive, legislative, and executive branches of government (Korenica and Doli 2009, 3). According to Lowenstein (1935), the elites rationalize autocratization with the presumption that they represent the majority of the people. This empowers even further the autocratization process.

For many, nonviolence connotes passivity or neutrality. However, as Mahatma Gandhi, Martin Luther King Jr. and numerous others have emphasized, this is a

misunderstanding. Nonviolence is a civilian-based form of struggle that employs social, economic, and political forms of power without resorting to violence or the threat of violence (Nepstad 2011, xvii). Chenoweth and Cunningham (2013) define nonviolent resistance as:

> "…the application of unarmed civilian power using nonviolent methods such as protests, strikes, boycotts, and demonstrations, without using or threatening physical harm against the opponent. Civilians challenging the state through nonviolent struggle employ irregular political tactics, working outside the defined and accepted channels for political participation defined by the state." (Chenoweth and Cunningham 2013, 271).

In this thesis, campaigns are the units of analysis. A campaign is a series of observable, continuous, purposive mass tactics or events in pursuit of a political objective. Campaigns are observable, meaning that the tactics are overt and documented (Chenoweth and Lewis 2013, 416).

Violence is defined by Christensen (2010) as:

> "…the direct or indirect infliction of injury on someone or something by some agent; and, "injury" here refers to a continuum of harm, damage, or hurt to someone against his or her will or in some other way contrary to the recipient´s interests, raging from that which is immediately life-threatening, through different degrees of debilitation, suffering, and loss, to a point of insignificance in the thwarting of desires." (Christensen 2010, 32).

Violent resistance is a form of political contention and a method of exerting power that operates outside normal political channels. In this thesis, I am concerned with violent strategies used by nonstate actors. These strategies are exhibited in three main categories of unconventional warfare: revolutions, plots, and insurgencies. Both violent and nonviolent campaigns seek to take power by force, though the method of applying force differs across the different types of resistance (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011, 13).

1.3 The Democratic Civil Peace

In recent years, many western democracies have adopted strategies in their foreign policies that emphasize the promotion of democracy. The fostering of democracy has

been an explicit goal of the European Union´s foreign and security policy since the early 1990s. Then, scholars started suggesting that the process of regime change could be inherently dangerous. Transitions are periods of great instability where old elites feel threatened in their positions of power and may at times resort to violence to avert regime collapse. If regime change frequently engenders violent conflict, then the policies of western democracies could actually worsen the situation instead of aiding it (Daexecker 2007, 527-528).

Since 1945, most wars have occurred within, rather than between states, and most of these wars have taken place in the former colonies of the imperial powers. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the violence in these postcolonial states is among the most pressing problems in world politics, even as we experience a unique period of peace among the former colonizers. In this context, several theorists argue that there is a "democratic peace" evident within this class of wars as well (e.g. Krain and Myers 1997). They maintain that the presence of democracy in these states reduces their likelihood of experiencing civil war. If the democratic peace theory is applicable to relations within states such that democracy reduces the likelihood of civil wars, there should be a democratic civil peace for the most civil war-prone states – the postcolonial states (Henderson 2002, 103).

When Mansfield and Snyder (1995) proposed that democratization could be a violent process, it inevitably initiated a controversial debate in the literature. While several scholars supported Mansfield and Snyder´s view (e.g. Hegre et al. 2001), a number of others have been more critical of its validity, especially on methodological grounds (e.g., Enterline 1996; Gleditsch and Ward 2000; Vreeland 2008). Today, there is still no scholarly consensus.

The pacifying effect of mutually democratic relations does not guarantee that the path to stable democracy runs smoothly. With respect to civil wars, several studies find evidence that intermediate levels of democracy may provoke conflict (e.g. Hegre et al. 2001). However, the indicators used in these studies are typically static measures of regime types that have recently been criticized for various data-related reasons relating to serious endogeneity and measurement problems (e.g. Gleditsch et al. 2009;

Vreeland 2008). Cederman et al. (2010) try to overcome these problems by systematically testing the argument that democratization causes civil war based on a novel method that finds patterns of regime change in the adjusted Polity data over a variable number of years. This allows for a more flexible way of finding directional changes in governance indicators than is possible with rigid lag structures (Cederman et al. 2010, 378). Nevertheless, I argue that the lack of a lagged model questions their findings. This is because it is difficult to determine the causality when the data measures regime change and conflict the same year.

1.4 The Comparison of Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns

There are some clear theoretical reasons why successful nonviolent resistance leads to fewer civilian casualties and higher levels of democracy after the conflict than does successful violent resistance (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011, 60). Although violent insurgents may seek to establish a democratic order, doing so will be difficult under circumstances of constant violent threat from regime holders. Because the insurgents use violent methods to succeed in gaining power, there will be fewer inhibitions against the use of violent methods to maintain power. The capacity to do so may only increase. Thus violent insurgency sometimes works; the long-term consequences leave much to be desired. As for nonviolent campaigns that succeed, it is likely these successes will become reference points for those particular societies and nonviolence will be regarded as an effective method of transforming conflicts (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011, 61).

A reason for believing that popular protest can be an efficacious means of inducing transitions to democracy is the emergence in recent years of a substantial amount of comparative research indicating the general efficaciousness of nonviolent mass action in promoting political change (Johnstad 2010, 465). Sharp´s *Waging Nonviolent Struggle* (2005), and Schock´s *Unarmed Insurrections* (2005) demonstrate the viability of popular protest in a broad range of situations, among them struggles for democratization. Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) even make a statistical comparison between violent and nonviolent strategies and find the latter twice as likely to succeed as the former. When the goal is regime change, nonviolent campaigns are almost three times as likely to succeed.

Generally, scholars have eschewed the systematic comparison of the outcomes of violent and nonviolent movements. There are several good reasons why social scientists have avoided comparing the dynamics and outcomes of nonviolent and violent campaigns, including their relative effectiveness. First, the separation of campaigns into violent and nonviolent for analytical purposes is problematic. Few campaigns have been purely violent or nonviolent, and many resistance movements have had violent and nonviolent periods. Still, it is possible to distinguish between different resistance types based on the actors involved and the methods used. Scholars have identified the unique characteristics of these different forms of struggle (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011, 16). Second, scholars of security studies seem to have eschewed the study of nonviolent action because nonviolent action is not typically viewed as a form of insurgency or asymmetrical warfare (Schock 2003, 6). Groups deliberately adopting nonviolent tactics are commonly understood as doing so for moral or principled reasons (Howes 2009, 149). The serious study of strategic nonviolent action has waned since the end of the Cold War, and has received little attention despite decades of scholarship on the subject (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011, 17).

Despite the challenges associated with studying this subject, Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) argue that the theoretical and policy implications of the research questions regarding nonviolence is too important to avoid. Investigating why movements succeed and fail is important for the entire contentious politics research.

1.5 Outline of the Thesis

Following this introduction, chapter two will go more into detail on the theoretical framework that I use. The theoretical arguments for the democratic peace, from Immanuel Kant to recent scholars are presented. Krain and Myers (1997) find that the democratic peace theory also is applicable to intrastate wars as well as interstate wars. This opens for the notion of a civil democratic peace. Recent scholarly debate has been concerned with that democratization increases the risk of conflict. Thus, regime change and the likelihood of experiencing conflict are examined. A section about democraticness, and the temporal dimension follow. The theory of nonviolent resistance and civil war is presented with a following section on the strategic choice

of tactics the opposition may use. The last section in chapter two presents the hypotheses of this thesis.

Chapter three describes the methodology of the thesis, with a section on the research design, where the use of multinomial logistic regression models in addition to simple logistic regression is explained. A description of the dependent variables, which originate from the NAVCO 2.0 dataset, follows. Then, the independent variables, which originate from the Polity IV dataset, are described. The control variables, which originate from Gleditsch´ Expanded Trade and GDP data, are also explained. Last, a section of the methodological limitations of the thesis follow.

Chapter four introduces the empirical evidence of the thesis. The first section concentrates on regime change as a potential trigger for conflict. The following section elaborates on democraticness as influence on conflict-proneness. Last, some remarks about the findings of the control variables. Chapter five presents several cases of countries that have experienced regime change and conflict. This is to illustrate, and provide additional support for the hypotheses of the thesis. Chapter six includes a discussion, where the empirical evidence, the cases, and the theory is intertwined. The link between regime change and conflict is deliberated upon with previous research in mind. Last, some concluding remarks and implications for further research follow.

2. Theoretical Framework

In this chapter on the theoretical framework, I will present some of the theoretical arguments for the democratic peace and its historical context. Further, the democratic civil peace theory is investigated. Then, regime change, hereunder democratization and autocratization, are explored. The democratic continuum is outlined with focus on the potential troublesome condition in the mid-range of the polity-scale, namely anocracies.

The theory of nonviolent resistance and civil war is presented with a historical context. Then, violent and nonviolent campaigns are described. Further, the levels of explanations concerning nonviolent resistance are explored. A section on the strategic choice of tactics follows. Last, the hypotheses of the thesis are presented.

2.1 The Democratic Peace Theory

In the *Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch* (1795), Immanuel Kant listed several conditions that he thought necessary for ending wars and creating a lasting peace. They included a world of constitutional republics by establishment of political community. Kant´s essay in some ways resembles modern democratic peace theory. Kant describes the second condition essential for durable peace:

> "“No state having an independent existence – whether it be great or small – shall be acquired by another through inheritance, exchange, purchase or donation”. For a state is not a property *(patrimonium),* as may be the ground on which its people are settled. It is a society of human beings over whom no one but itself has the right to rule and to dispose. Like the trunk of a tree, it has its own roots, and to graft it on to another state is to do away with its existence as a moral person, and to make of it a thing." (Kant 1795, 4)

Kant speaks of republican, *Republikanisch* (not democratic), states, which he defines to have representative governments, in which the legislature is separated from the executive. The essay does not treat republican governments as sufficient by themselves to produce peace. Freedom of emigration and a league of nations are necessary to deliberately enact his six-point program. Kant claims that republics will be at peace not only with each other, but are more peaceful than other forms of government in general (Kant 1795, 10).

Joseph Schumpeter´s *Sociology of Imperialisms* (1919) made a coherent and sustained argument concerning the pacifying effects of liberal institutions and principles. Schumpeter saw the interaction of capitalism and democracy as the foundation of liberal pacifism, and he tested his arguments in a sociology of historical imperialisms. He defined imperialism as “an objectless disposition on the part of a state to unlimited forcible expansion” (Schumpeter 1919, 6). Schumpeter explains liberal pacifism quite simple by stating that only war profiteers and military aristocrats gain from wars. No democracy would pursue a minority interest and tolerate the high costs of imperialism.

In *The Third Wave* (1991), Samuel P. Huntington explains the third wave of democratization as the fifteen years following the end of the Portuguese dictatorship in 1974, when democratic regimes replaced authoritarian ones in approximately thirty countries in Europe, Asia, and Latin America. In other countries, considerable liberalization occurred in authoritarian regimes. Overall, the movement toward democracy was a global one (Huntington 1991, 25).

According to Maoz and Russett (1993), the recognition of the democratic peace is probably the most significant products of the scientific study of world politics. The argument consists of two parts of equal importance. First, democratic states are in general about as conflict- and war-prone as nondemocracies. Second, over the last two centuries, democracies have rarely clashed with one another in violent or potentially violent conflict, and have virtually never fought one another in a full-scale international war (Maoz and Russett 1993, 624). Gartzke (2007) suggests that it is capitalism, and not democracy that leads to peace. Although one must be cautious in questioning the body of evidence as large as that on the democratic peace, economic liberals have long seen in free markets and prosperity the potential to discourage conflict (Gartzke 2007, 180). The collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s gave new motivation to the investigation of domestic determinants of international relations. Today, political revolutions is being attempted in the Middle East, much because policymakers believe that peace can be promoted through regime change. Gartzke (2007) questions the democratic peace with caution, but states that

democratization implies increased tensions among democracies, while free markets and development lead nations closer together (Gartzke 2007, 182).

Mansfield and Snyder (1995) state that a world where more countries were mature, stable democracies would be safer and preferable for the United States. However, countries do not become mature democracies overnight. A democratization process is typically a rocky transitional period, where democratic control over foreign policy is partial, where mass politics mixes in a volatile way with authoritarian elite politics, and where democratization suffers reversals. In a transitional period of democratization, countries become more aggressive and war-prone, and they fight wars with democratic states (Mansfield and Snyder 1995, 5). Mansfield and Snyder (1995) find statistical evidence that democratizing states are more likely to fight wars than mature democracies or stable autocracies. Reversing the process of democratization will not reduce the risk. Regimes that are changing toward autocracy, including states that revert to autocracy after failed experiments with democracy, are also more likely to fight wars than states whose regime is unchanging (Mansfield and Snyder 1995, 6).

Current theories of the democratic peace focus on the constraining power of political institutions, culture, or international trade. If instead democracies were much less likely to disagree about each other´s policies, then we would expect them to seldom fight regardless of whether they are constrained from acting on conflicts by institutions, culture, or other factors. While previous research on the democratic peace has been careful to construct statistical models of opportunity, the physical obstacles nations face in engaging in war, research has failed to incorporate "willingness". That is the psychological incentives nations have to overcome obstacles in pursuit of their objectives (Gartzke 1998, 1).

Many democratization efforts fail to result in complete transitions and get stuck in the middle range of the democracy scale. Such anocracies are disproportionately affected by civil wars (Hegre et al. 2001, 34). The inclusion of an explicit measure of regime-type change, namely the number of days since the last change, Hegre et al. (2001) is able to assess the effect of democratization and autocratization. They find that regime change increases the likelihood of civil war. They fail, however, to find any

significant difference between effects of democratization and autocratization. Gleditsch (2002) considers how the level of democracy affects the outbreak of civil wars while controlling for the direction of changes and their extent. The findings confirm that anocracies are the most conflict-prone. Gleditsch (2002) also finds that the changes themselves may lead to conflictual situations. The empirical evidence regarding the direction of regime change does not support the claim that autocratization or democratization enhances the potential for conflict (Gleditsch 2002, 187). Gates et al. (2006) suggests that there are two stable equilibriums. The first is the democratic type, which is characterized by executive recruitment through regulated, open, and competitive elections. It also has executive parity with a parliament or other political body, and it has open and competitive participation. The second is the autocratic type, which is characterized by executive recruitment through regulated, but closed executive recruitment. It has unconstrained executive authority and has extremely restricted noncompetitive participation (Gates et al. 2006, 896). A polity that is neither a democratic type nor an autocratic type is an inconsistent polity. These polities come in several varieties. Gates et al. (2006) find that consistent democracies are considerably more stable than consistent autocracies. They also find that the difference between institutional consistency and institutional inconsistency is important in terms of explaining political stability, perhaps even more than explanatory variables such as level of economic development, economic growth and political neighborhood. This is particularly true when it comes to democracies. This demonstrates the need to disaggregate the institutional components of different political systems. Distinctions that are simple dichotomous between democracy and nondemocracies are misleading (Gates et al. 2006, 906).

These studies rely on the Polity Index as their main measure of democracy. This indicator can be problematic when it comes to civil war. Specific codes of the component indicators are related to the outbreak of civil wars. Given that these codes often bias the overall score toward anocracy, many of the insights concerning the link between democracy and civil war have to be regarded as questionable (Cederman et al. 2010, 378). Vreeland (2008) demonstrates that the curvilinear effect of democracy shown in the study of Hegre et al. (2001) disappears if the problems with the Polity Index are corrected. The curvilinear fails to appear when other democracy indicators are used. Gleditsch et al. (2009), however, present new evidence that confirms the

non-linear effect in several model specifications. The potential problematic components of the Polity Index are discussed in section 3.5.2.

2.2 The Democratic Civil Peace

Many studies of the democratic peace examine the effect of current domestic political structures on war participation. Explanations of the democratic peace focus either on the existence of norms that assist the peaceful resolution of conflicts or the structural features of democracies that make decision makers more cautious in the use of force. These include both formal institutional constraints on the executive decision to declare war and various electoral mechanisms that enhance the dependence of executive leaders on popular approval. Contested elections increase the executive leader´s sensitivity to political risk since they may call into question the tenure of the ruling authorities (Ward and Gleditsch 1998, 52). Well-established democracies may not fight one another, but an unstable process of democratization or transition toward a fragile democracy need not necessarily imply that a country becomes immediately more peaceful. Smooth transitions from low to high levels of democratic governance are the exception, not the rule (Lichbach 1984, 77).

Krain and Mayers (1997) uncovered a negative relationship between democracy and civil war. They argue that their findings indicate that the democratic peace theory is applicable to intrastate wars as well as interstate wars. Rummel (1997) found evidence that democracy reduces intense violence within states. He concludes that the democratic peace theory was relevant to the domestic sphere, as well. Just as evidence in favor of a democratic civil peace was being uncovered, new findings indicated that the relationship between regime type and intrastate war was more complex than first understood. For example, several scholars argued that the conflict-dampening impact of democracy was not linear. The result was that an "autocratic peace" was just as likely as a "democratic peace" (Henderson 2002, 105). Henderson´s (2002) findings challenge the democratic civil peace for postcolonial states. He finds that anocracies are the most conflict-prone. A counterargument to the democratic civil peace theory derives from Huntington (1968), and states that political decay and instability occur when popular mobilization outpaces political institutionalization. Therefore, one may posit that it is not the regime type that is associated with civil war, but the degree of

institutionalization with more institutionalized states less prone to civil war and less institutionalized states more prone to civil war (Henderson 2002, 118).

The "third wave of democratization" has raised hopes for a more peaceful world. The democratic peace theory suggests that the spread of democracy will promote a decline in interstate warfare, but does democratization also lead to civil peace? The democratic civil peace refers, thus, to a constellation where simultaneously the basic features of democracy are maintained – which requires a certain amount of political stability – and socio-political conflict does not escalate into the systematic, collective and lethal use of violence. Hence political destabilization and the escalation of socio-political conflict have to be contained (Wolff 2009, 1000). Considerable research has examined how regime type or the level of democracy relates to domestic conflict. Much of the research focuses on the result that anocracies have a higher propensity for civil conflict. Another stand of research focuses on how changes in a regime lead to conflict. Is the greater propensity for violence in anocracies equivalent to the finding that states in political transition experience more violence? (Hegre et al. 2001, 33). Compared to well-established democracies or autocracies, anocracies have a higher hazard of civil war, as do regimes just emerging from a political transition. Anocracies may be more prone to civil war because they have more recently undergone political change. Whether a high risk of civil war is due to level of democracy or regime change is difficult to determine because the two factors overlap. If both factors are relevant, it will be expected to be an inverted U-shape, even when controlling for the time since regime change (Hegre et al. 2001, 42). Hegre et al. (2001) argue that the inverted U-shape defines the relationship between democracy and civil war. They find that regime change strongly increases the probability of civil war in the short run, but regime change alone does not explain the higher level of civil war in anocracies. According to Hegre et al. (2001) the two factors are partly overlapping, yet complementary.

The quantitative research on the relation between regime type and domestic peace generally confirms the existence of a democratic civil peace. Democratic regimes are more stable than others and – at least in the long run – less vulnerable to large-scale violence and civil war. At the same time, they are less affected by rebellions and revolutions from below, as well as by political repression and international killings

from above. Democracies both allow discontent to be expressed and they have mechanisms to handle it. The relationship between democracy and domestic peace can be summarized in two mechanisms of democratic stabilization and pacification that together effectively mitigate socio-political conflict (Wolff 2009, 1000).

Following Dieter Senghaas, the democratic civil peace can be understood as a political process that is nonviolent and aims at preventing the use of force. This is a process, which through communication and compromise produces the conditions that social groups can live together without mutually threatening their existence, their sense of justice or the interests of members so seriously that they regard it necessary to resort to violence (Wolff 2009, 1000). The notion of a democratic civil peace implies that democracy constitutes precisely such a political process of "the civilized – i.e., the nonviolent – resolution of unavoidable conflict" (Senghaas 2004, 28).

2.3 Regime Change

In *The Old Regime and the Revolution* (1856), Alexis de Tocqueville points out that "revolutions do not always come when things are going from bad to worse… Usually the most dangerous time for a bad government is when it attempt to reform itself." (de Tocqueville 1856, 182). The initial high level of uncertainty and unrest caused by a regime change will gradually diminish as protesters abandon their aspirations or find ways to obtain part of what they want within the new regime. In the case of democratization, new and more open institutions take root and promote a peaceful resolution of domestic conflict. As time passes, these become more entrenched, and the likelihood of regime failure decreases. The pattern is similar for autocratization. As repressive institutions strengthen, the effect of the regime change is less destabilizing, and therefore less likely to generate political violence (Hegre et al. 2001, 34).

Huntington (1991) finds that political violence is frequently coupled with democratization. Such changes are unlikely to occur without serious conflict, especially in countries with different ethnic minorities. Communal groups in liberalizing autocracies have substantial opportunities for mobilization, but such states usually lack the institutional resources to reach the kinds of accommodation typical of established democracies. When authoritarianism collapses and is followed by

ineffectual efforts to establish democracy, the period of relative anarchy is ripe for ethno-national or ideological leaders who want to organize rebellion (Hegre et al. 2001, 34). Political change, whether in the form of democratization or autocratization, can create instability. The loss of legitimacy by the regime induces dissatisfied groups to struggle against it. If the direction of change is toward autocracy, the deconsolidation of political institutions also implies increasing repression. Repression by a regime without well-developed political institutions is likely to promote civil violence (Hegre et al. 2001, 34).

Snyder (2000) proposes that during the early phases of the democratization process, two conditions favorable to the beginning of civil conflict emerge: political elites exploit rising nationalism for their own ends to create divisions in the society, and the central government is too weak to prevent the elite´s polarizing tactics. More generally, democratization increases the risk of civil conflict by creating several credible commitment problems (Savun and Tirone 2011, 234). During regime transitions, political actors "find it difficult to know what their interests are, who their supporters will be, and which groups will be their allies or opponents" (Karl 1990, 6). The weakening of state authority combined with uncertainty in the environment increases the sense of insecurity that comes with democratization. This insecurity is particularly acute among minority groups who feel unprotected in an environment of emerging institutions, opportunistic elites, weak state authority, and rising nationalism (Savun and Tirone 2011, 235). Weingast (1998) argues that during fundamental political changes in a society, institutions are typically weak and everything is at stake. This implies two things. First, the mechanisms limiting one ethnic group from using the state apparatus to take advantage of another are not effective. Institutions cannot credibly commit to protect the state apparatus from being captured by any group to exploit the other. Second, since the stakes are high during regime change, the critical threshold probability that breeds violence based on fears of victimization is particularly low (Weingast 1998, 191).

Mansfield and Snyder (1995) argues that threatened elites from the collapsing autocratic regime, use nationalist appeals to compete for mass allies with each other and with new elites. In these circumstances, the likelihood for war increases due to the interests of some of the elite groups, the effectiveness of their propaganda, and the

incentive for weak leaders to resort to prestige strategies in foreign affairs in an attempt to enhance their authority over diverse constituencies. Transitional regimes, that is both democratizing and autocratizing, share some common institutional weaknesses that make war more likely (Mansfield and Snyder 1995, 20).

2.3.1 Democratization

Democratization is used as an umbrella term for the process of regime change from authoritarian or totalitarian rule to the rooting of a new liberal democracy. Democratization is multidimensional simply because the functioning of liberal democracies is multidimensional. It involves not merely the creation of new rules and procedures, but also the societal level as well as intermediary linkages and interactions between different levels, especially elite-mass relations. It may, furthermore comprise other dimensions that have some influence or direct effect (Pridham 2000, 17). Whitehead (2002) argues that democratization is complete when all significant political actors accept that the electoral process has become the only option for reallocating public office. Democratization is best understood as a complex, long-term, dynamic, and open-ended process. It consists of progress towards a more rule-based, more consensual and more participatory type of politics (Whitehead 2002, 27).

The “third wave” transitions in Eastern Europe were complex political processes involving a variety of groups struggling for power and for and against democracy and other goals. The three crucial interactions in the democratization processes were those between government and opposition, between reformers and standpatters in the governing coalition, and between moderates and extremists in the opposition. In all transitions these three central interactions play some role (Huntington 1991, 121). During transformations, those in power in the authoritarian regime take the lead and play the decisive role in ending that regime and changing it into a democratic system. The line between transformations and transplacements is fuzzy, and some cases might be legitimately classified in either category. According to Huntington (1991) transformations requires the government to be stronger than the opposition. Consequently, transformations have occurred in well-established military regimes where governments clearly controlled the ultimate means of coercion vis-à-vis authoritarian systems that had been successful economically, such as Spain, Brazil,

Taiwan and Mexico. The leaders in these states had the power to move their countries toward democracy if they wanted to. In every case the opposition was weaker than the government. The people best situated to end the authoritarian regime were the leaders of the regime – and they did (Huntington 1991, 125).

Huntington (1991) defines a wave as a group of transitions from non-democratic to democratic regimes that occur within a specified period of time, and that significantly outnumber transitions in the opposite direction during that period of time. The presumption is that some kind of snowball effect occurs as a function of transnational influences or interactions, and of geographical proximity. Huntington (1991) elaborated on what he called contributory factors in waves, including a demonstration effect, which in other contexts has been termed contagion, diffusion, and emulation (Huntington 1991, 100). In the past, such notions have been treated in the transitions literature as background conditions, but this is a phenomenon that may play some active part in democratization. Particularly important in the recent wave has been the expansion of global communications and transportations, thanks to which the image of "a worldwide democratic revolution" (Huntington 1991, 102) has become a reality in the minds of political and intellectual leaders in most countries in the world. On the other hand, what this approach is lacking is a clear handle on estimating cause and effect in terms of developing external-internal interactions (Pridham 2000, 9). Talk of "waves" of democratization, of the emergence of democracy as an international norm, and of promoting democracy, suggests both that democratic practices can passively diffuse and that they can be actively and consciously spread. But if international effects are widely accepted, only recently have they been systematically investigated (Brown 2011, 239).

2.3.2 Autocratization

Daxecker (2007) suggests that states experiencing autocratization is more prone to experiencing conflict since unstable transitions increase the uncertainty about the state´s foreign policy preferences, and do not allow elites to accurately estimate the behavior of autocratizing states. States that experience democratization, on the other hand, is expected to have decreased conflict propensities (Daxecker 2007, 544). Hegre et al. (2001) argues that political change, in both directions, can create instability. If the regime is moving towards autocracy, the deconsolidation of political

institutions also implies increasing repression. Repression by a regime without developed political institutions is likely to promote civil violence. The high levels of uncertainty and unrest caused by regime change will gradually diminish as protesters abandon their objectives or find new ways to obtain what they want within the new regime. As repressive institutions strengthen, the effect of the regime change is less destabilizing. Therefore, it is less likely that the new regime will generate political violence (Hegre et al. 2001, 34).

Cederman et al. (2010) argues that autocratization can induce civil wars, but that its impact is more immediate than that of democratization. After a democratization process, the democracy does not become stabile until the power can be shifted peacefully from the government to the opposition. Autocratization, on the other hand, presupposes relatively quick popular demobilization. During autocratization processes, political violence often erupts if already politically mobilized citizens oppose the closure of the political space (Cederman et al. 2010, 379). Although Mansfield and Snyder (1995) investigate interstate war, some of their findings is interesting also in relation to civil conflict since the basic theoretical arguments applies equally well to intrastate conflicts (Cederman et al. 2010, 378). Mansfield and Snyder (1995) claim that the aftershock of failed democratization is one of the factors explaining the link between autocratization and conflict. They speculate that transitional regimes, both democratizing and autocratizing, share some common institutional weaknesses that make conflict more likely. In some cases, the link between autocratization and conflict reflects the success of a ruling elite in using nationalist formulas developed during the period of democratization (Mansfield and Snyder 1995, 20). Some wars of autocratization can be understood as wars of failed or prevented democratization. The autocratizing ruler´s foreign policy is either a tool that helps him to overcome the political stalemate of the democratizing regime, or it grows out of ideas that have risen in the political context of the preceding period of democratization (Mansfield and Snyder 1995, 35).

2.4 The Democratic Continuum

The combination of democratic and autocratic institutions in the same polity creates a difficult mix. Collapsing a multidimensional concept such as democracy into a single dimension limits the understanding of the workings of specific political institutions.

Creating a simple dichotomous democracy/autocracy distinction is even worse (Gates et al. 2006, 894).

Regan and Bell (2010) describes anocracy as a complex category encompassing many variants of possible institutional arrangements. The critical aspects of anocracy involve the degree of institutional openness, the openness of pathways to participation, and the constraints on political recruitment. Vreeland (2008) states that under pure dictatorship, opportunities to organize are too limited and the probability of successful collective action is low. Pure democracy presents the possibility for peaceful collective action, while anocracies are caught in the middle. Dissidents are allowed to organize, but nonviolent collective action may be too restricted to be effective (Vreeland 2008, 401). There is, as mentioned, insufficient clarity as to whether the risk is associated with the process of regime transitions or with specific political institutional characteristics of these regimes (Regan and Bell 2010, 747).

Gates et al. (2006) argues that regimes break along lines of institutional consistency. Although, not conceptually identical, the category of institutionally inconsistent regimes is conceptually convergent with how anocracies are labeled. What makes an ideal autocracy stable is an institutional arrangement that hinders competing elites access to political power. An ideal autocracy concentrates power in the hands of the executive, thereby restricting the potential challengers access to channels of political power. Without access to such channels or an institutional base, the expected costs of challenging an autocratic regime outweigh the expected benefits of capturing the narrow base of power. This exclusion stabilizes the political system. The system is self-enforcing in that an autocrat´s interest in maximizing and prolonging authority serves to sustain the autocratic political institutions (Gates et al. 2006, 895). The same motivation regarding maximization of the current and future power and authority serves to maintain stability in an ideal democracy as well. Democratic institutions ensure that power and authority are diffuse, thereby making the costs of accepting the defeat and the expected gains from the next election exceed the expected gains from challenging the regime. There is more to gain in the long run by preserving the power-diffusing democratic institutions than by undermining or challenge them. Hence, the system is self-enforcing. Institutionally inconsistent political systems are not self-enforcing. Authority is not sufficiently diffuse to ensure that the democratic

process is not challenged. Elites in such a system are tempted to gain more power for themselves and thereby compete with one another, creating an inherently unstable system. Unlike ideal autocracies, anocracies lack the degree of concentration of power and authority that provides stability. But power is sufficiently concentrated to induce groups or individuals to challenge the executive`s authority in order to grab power. Also, unlike ideal democracies, anocracies lack the incentives for individuals to work to maintain a system of democratic institutions. In this way, anocracies are not self-enforcing (Gates et al. 2006, 895). Anocracies comes in several varieties – one in which the executive is elected and constrained, but public participation is suppressed or restricted. Another in which the executive is elected through broad political participation, but with limited authority, and still another in which executives are recruited by designation or ascription and are unconstrained, but participation is institutionalized (Gates et al. 2006, 896).

The degree of democratic commitment or time since democratization may be important for explanations emphasizing the role of norms as well as institutions. It is likely that some time may have to pass before democratic norms or informal institutions become sufficiently well established to have the effect of inhibiting conflicts. Political instability, and change in general, are often considered to be associated with increased likelihood of conflict, and with possible subsequent escalation, and war involvement. Rapid democratization may bring about weak regimes unable to established effective control and political order. While these regimes may be less repressive and permit greater political freedom than their precursors, they also are subject to instability and attempts by challengers to seize power. Political instability and disorder may even encourage attacks from other countries (Ward and Gleditsch 1998, 53).

Hegre et al. (2001) argues that new regimes increase the risk of civil war when controlling for the level of democracy. There might, however, be differences between small changes and large changes. They find that a small degree of democratization in an autocracy is assumed to have the same effect as a small degree of democratization in an anocracy. A large degree of autocratization is associated with the largest change in risk of civil war. When controlled for the regime type toward which the change leads, there is no significant difference between the effects of democratization and

autocratization. The risk of civil conflict after regime change is greater for the shorter than the longer period (Hegre et al. 2001, 42).

Nonviolent campaigns are associated with higher levels of membership, even when controlled for population size. Over space and time, large nonviolent campaigns are also associated with higher likelihood of success than small campaigns (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011, 39). The mobilization advantage of nonviolent campaigns might have an effect on the break out time of the campaign. It is easier for people to participate in a nonviolent campaign than a violent one. Fewer people would risk being harmed in a violent campaign than participating in a peaceful protest. The response from the regime is crucial for how the campaign evolve. If the campaign is met with violence, the participants will probably defend themselves, and a nonviolent campaign can become a violent one. The likelihood of being met with violence is greater in an autocracy than in an anocracy or a democracy, since autocracies normally do not allow popular protest (Cunningham 2013, 294). However, in this thesis the observations are measured yearly, and do not capture small variations in break out points between the two resistance tactics.

2.5 The Theory of Nonviolent Resistance and Civil War

The most violent century of political conflict in human history, the 20th century, was also the century in which nonviolent resistance was transformed from a relatively unorganized, spontaneous, and non-strategic phenomenon to an organized, collective, and strategic method of struggle. Gene Sharp wrote:

> "…For the many forms of military struggle and overall conceptual tool has long existed, and this itself may have contributed to the detailed attention which wars have received. Attention to war has included historical and strategic studies which could help future wars. But until very recently, nonviolent action has had no comparable self-conscious tradition. Such a tradition would probably have brought attention to many of these neglected struggles and might well have provided knowledge to be used in new cases of nonviolent action." (Gene Sharp 1973, 73)

A self-conscious tradition in the analysis of nonviolent resistance has emerged and is making headway. Scholarly analysis of nonviolent struggle is producing consequential social scientific knowledge as well as knowledge that may be useful to activists (Schock 2013, 287). Sharp´s theory intended to have wide applicability to

problems of liberation, international aggression, and internal usurpation in all parts of the world, especially conflicts that involve fundamental principles such as “the independence and self-respect… or people´s capacity to determine their own future” (Sharp 1973, 3). Nonviolent action has a place in struggles over fundamental principles, especially in cases of repressive state power. Nonviolent action “makes it possible for people to realize their political potential and to struggle to control their own destinies, even against ruthless enemies well equipped with machinery of violence” (Sharp 1973, 4). Sharp formulated a simple theory of power with two main actors: “rulers” and “ruled”. The rulers derive their power from the consent of the ruled. Sharp defines political power as “the totality of means, influences, and pressures, including authority, rewards, and sanctions, available to achieve the objectives of the power-holder, especially institutions of government, the state, and groups opposing either of them” (Sharp 1978, 27).

2.5.1 Violent Campaigns

The theoretic literature on civil war has postulated a variety of explanations for why governments and insurgents may resort to violence. According to Chenoweth and Stephan (2011), the violent strategies are exhibited in three main categories of unconventional warfare: revolutions, plots (or coups d’état), and insurgencies, which differ according to the level of premeditated planning, protractedness, and means of overthrowing the existing order (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011, 13). Some researchers emphasize the role of grievances as the underlying motives for insurgencies or protests (e.g. Buhaug, Cederman and Rød 2008; Gurr 1970). Others stress the conditions that can help facilitate mobilization among potential insurgents. This includes the role of private benefits from conflict, and the role of state strength in increasing the costs of protests and preventing potential insurgents from initiating in violent action (e.g. Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Fearon and Laitin 2003). The lack of freedom, political rights, and opportunities for political participation can on the one hand be seen as an obvious cause of grievances. This may motivate for the resort to violence against the government. This suggests that there should generally be a greater potential for conflict under autocratic regimes. However, many have argued that democracies have greater opportunities for groups to pursue their goals by nonviolent action (Gleditsch and Ruggeri 2010, 301). Davenport (1995) argues that autocracies are likely to respond to mass political behavior against the state with harsh

repression. Countries with political openness may find it difficult to respond forcefully to violent conflict. Furthermore, since regimes that have high repressive capacity may be better at deterring conflict, the relationship between degree of democracy and the risk of conflict will be non-linear and non-monotonic (Gleditsch and Ruggeri 2010, 301). This is because of the countervailing influences of declining repressiveness and greater opportunities for nonviolent action.

2.5.2 Nonviolent Campaigns

Nonviolent resistance is a method ordinary people can use to pursue a wide variety of goals, from challenging dictators to seeking territorial self-determination. There are some difficulties with labeling one campaign as violent and another as nonviolent. In some cases, both nonviolent and violet campaigns exist simultaneously among competing groups. Alternatively, often some groups use both nonviolent and violent methods of resistance. It is, nevertheless, possible to characterize a campaign as principally nonviolent based on the primacy of nonviolent resistance methods, and the nature of the participation in that form of resistance (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011, 12). Nonviolent groups are using tactics that are outside the conventional political process, such as voting, interest group organizing, or lobbying. Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) characterize violent resistance as a form of political contention and a method of exerting power that, like nonviolent resistance, operates outside normal political channels. While conventional militaries use violence to advance political goals, in this case the concern lies on the use of unconventional violent strategies used by nonstate actors (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011, 13).

Scholars of social movements and revolution have assumed that political action falls along a continuum from conventional political action to nonviolent resistance to violent resistance. When goals cannot be attained through institutional channels, then challengers adopt nonviolent protests. If that is not effective, then violence is adopted. There is an assumption that violent and nonviolent resistance may be complimentary. The civil resistance tradition rejects the assumption that there is a natural escalation from nonviolent to violent resistance or that nonviolent resistance is situated on an ordinal continuum between conventional politics and violence. It is assumed that there are no special contexts where only violence can be mobilized and effective (Schock 2013, 282).

In the last few decades, however, inspiration for most of those taking part in resistance has almost certainly come primarily from other recent examples of people power. In some cases veterans of one campaign offer information and tactical advice directly, and analysis of the range of nonviolent methods available and strategic considerations in planning unarmed resistance has also been disseminated to some movements in recent decades. But the most likely inspiration for many protesters is simply news of the widely reported and photographed examples of people power in different areas of the world. In the past few years, as the internet has developed, the role of personal blogs, Facebook, and Twitter have become together with the nature and implications of various kinds of official, external, international support and unofficial, transnational solidarity (Carter 2012, 17-20).

2.5.3 Levels of Explanations

The theory of nonviolent resistance can in some way explain the mass protests and movements against regimes and other targets. According to Oberschall (2007), there are two levels of explanation, the macro and the micro level. Both of them are important, and the feedback between micro and macro variables is at the core of the dynamics of confrontation. The context is exclusion from the polity. A larger number of the population has no political access, and they want it. They therefore challenge the political officials by non-conventional actions rather than conforming or seeking private remedies. (Oberschall 2007, 27).

Oberschall (2007) describes four dimensions of analysis that describe the necessary conditions of challenge at the macro-level. First, discontent and dissatisfactions about basic life-conditions are widely experienced – hardship, corruption, lack of freedom – and the usual ways of seeking relief are denied, or do not work. Second, beliefs, values, and ideologies filter and frame the dissatisfactions, transform them into grievances against the regime, and promise to solve these problems. For instance, corruption is not a personal flaw of some leaders, but is rather endemic and only another regime or form of government can stop it. Third, the capacity to act collectively exists. Such as freedom to organize, civil society, access to means of mass communication. Fourth, political opportunity, such as divisions in the regime and the like, which increases the probability that the goals and demands of the protest

will be achieved because of weakness in the target. The absence of even one of these dimensions makes challenge difficult and unlikely. However, the success depends as well on the regime and on the dynamics of the confrontation (Oberschall 2007, 28).

At the micro-level, Oberschall (2007) states that people have to decide whether or not, when, and how to participate in the challenge. Their decision depends not only on how dissatisfied they are, whether they have an anti-regime ideology, and so on. It rather depends on their perceptions and expectations of the number of other people joining the challenge and its chances of success. The micro-theory is an application of the rational actor model for collective action under uncertainty (Oberschall 2007, 28). There are five variables that characterize choice under uncertainty for achieving a collective good. First, the value placed on the goals of the challenge, on the collective good. Second, a challenger´s estimation of the probability of obtaining those goals, the probability of success. Third, the challenger´s expectation of the number of other participants in the challenge. Fourth, the selective incentives or personal benefits from participation, such as solidarity with peers, future leadership, an activist identity, which cannot be obtained by free riding. Fifth, the expected costs of participation, such as arrest, injury, opportunity costs (Oberschall 2007, 29).

2.6 The Strategic Choice of Tactics

Protests and direct action have received only limited attention in research on democratization and autocratic stability. Macro-level explanations emphasize structural social and economic factors such as income or education as underlying social conditions of democracy. This perspective generally plays less attention to agency or events that promote transitions. Micro-level explanations of transitions explicitly highlight the role of actors, often emphasizing their relative autonomy from social and economic conditions (Celestino and Gleditsch 2013, 386).

Direct action from below can come in many different types, and there are strong reasons to expect that the specific strategies or type of direct action used can influence outcomes. Democracy could in principle come about through violent revolts overthrowing dictators. The defeat of autocratic governments in civil war has tended to bring about new autocratic regimes, and the most significant challenges to autocratic governments weakened by conflict are often from aspiring autocrats.

Violent resistance impose costs on the state by leading to loss of life, expenditure of resources, disruption of normal economic activity, and potentially challenging the legitimacy of the state. Nonviolent resistance is also designed to make disputes costly for states. Mass protests, hunger strikes, and sit-ins all work to undermine the legitimacy of the state. So, why do some groups choose nonviolent resistance and others violence? While both violent and nonviolent resistance can be used to impose costs, they require different types of mobilization. One of the key differences that emerge from the literature on nonviolence is the importance of numbers of people. A lone suicide bomber can impose large costs on the state by attracting attention to the cause, killing civilians or state personnel, and creating a sense of fear in the populace. Successful nonviolence requires a greater number of participants than violence (Cunningham 2013, 294). Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) argues that once mobilization begins, a nonviolent campaign has wider appeal than a violent one, thereby enlarging the personnel base and bringing more assets and resources to the fight against the state opponent. Skeptics to this view may argue that violent insurgencies provide immediate results – such as loot, prestige, score settling, or territorial gains – that give them more appeal than nonviolent resistance. Despite this, Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) have found strong evidence suggesting that nonviolent campaigns have been, on average, more likely to have a larger number of participants than violent campaigns. The average nonviolent campaign has over 200,000 members – about 150,000 more active participants than the average violent campaign (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011, 32-33). The direction of the regime change might be a determinant in choosing tactics. A change from a closed society to a more open one will reduce the level of intolerance with the state´s inability to provide the people´s rights and demands. If the change is towards a more closed society, public expectations will have declining tolerance towards the regime (Regan and Bell 2010, 750). This may imply that people will be more willing to take extreme measures in the struggle for their rights and future prospects. While a change towards a more democratic polity can inspire people to use their newly gained right of expressing themselves, a change in the other direction might create the incentive to defect from the consolidation process, and even lead to violent revolt (Regan and Bell 2010, 750).

2.7 Hypotheses

To assess the relationship between regime change, and nonviolent and violent campaigns, I formulate several hypotheses. The null hypothesis is that the probability of violent and nonviolent campaigns is identical in a democratizing state, an autocratizing state, and a regime with no change, when they have the same level of democracy as the regimes that do experience change.

Cunningham (2013) states that when effective institutional channels exist, groups are more likely to use them than when they are weak or ineffective. The state´s regime type may also have an effect. Democracies generally provide greater opportunity for aggrieved groups to seek redress through conventional political channels. Therefore, democracies are likely to be more responsive to citizen demands and grievances than non-democracies. Celestino and Gleditsch (2013) argue that dissent in general tend to make dictatorships less stable. However, the prospects for transitions to democracy and new autocracies vary systematically depending on the main means used in a campaign. Celestino and Gleditsch (2013) expect nonviolent campaigns to be more likely to lead to succeeding transitions to democracy rather than new autocratic regimes. This is due to the nonviolent campaign´s ability to mobilize, and the barriers to participate decreases. Sharp (1973) suggests a theory of direct political action based on "withdrawal of dissent", where all governments ultimately are sensitive to widespread non-participation and refusals to obey orders. Initial protest can serve to highlight the extent of dissatisfaction with a regime and encourage greater participation and defections.

Cederman et al. (2010) claim that there is a strong effect of democratization on the outbreak of internal conflict while controlling for the influence of incoherent regime types and regime instability. Huntington (1968) argues that democratization implies mass mobilization and that this may trigger violence if the political institutions are not prepared to accommodate this level of participation.

According to Celestino and Gleditsch (2013), nonviolent action is expected to be generally more effective in undermining dictatorships than violent conflict, precisely because of its ability to mobilize larger numbers of people, and decreasing barriers to

participation, increasing the prospects for successful repression, and elite defection (Celestino and Gleditsch 2013, 388). Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) also support the fact that nonviolent campaigns have a participation advantage over violent insurgencies, but they acknowledge that nonviolent campaigns are not guarantied to succeed simply because they are nonviolent. Celestino and Gleditsch (2013) argue that transitions to democracy are more likely under specific triggers, such as nonviolent direct action, and favorable transnational contexts, such as a greater number of democratic neighbors (Celestino and Gleditsch 2013, 386). The distinction between violent and nonviolent direct action matters for the likelihood of transitions to democracy and the prospects for new autocratic regimes when dictators fall (Celestino and Gleditsch 2013, 388).

Nonviolent campaign´s ability to mobilize larger number of people may be due to their expectations for the future. Change toward an open society will reduce the level of intolerance concerning the state´s inability to provide the people´s demands. A condition for democratic consolidation is that groups or parties should hold expectations that they in the near future will have the opportunity to take part in governance. Without these expectations for the future, groups will have the incentive to defeat from the consolidation process, and if sufficiently divisive, this can lead to open revolt (Regan and Bell 2010, 750). Violent conflict typically produces negative long-term social, economic, and political consequences in the polities where it occurs. Several historical examples seem to substantiate that successful violent insurgencies will result in stunted economic and political development because of recurring civil war. Successful nonviolent campaigns can also impose costs on society, but they are typically not as devastating in social, political and economic terms as those produced by violent conflict (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011, 206). We can expect that engaging in conventional politics will be less costly than using irregular politics, be it violent or nonviolent. Mobilizing a mass nonviolent campaign requires convincing individuals to abandon their daily activities and participate. When states respond to irregular tactics with violence, this can lead to even greater costs (Cunningham 2013, 294).

The democratic civil peace theory states that new and more open institutions promote a peaceful resolution of domestic conflict. Democracies both allow discontent to be expressed and they have the mechanisms to handle it through the institutions. This

opens for the use of nonviolent campaigns to a larger extent. The fear of state repression also decreases as the state become more democratic. Since the participation barriers are lower for nonviolent campaigns, this tactic may attract more people, and the campaign has grater opportunities to succeed (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011, 39).

Hypotheses H1a and H1b test if democratization is a trigger for conflict. With the democratic civil peace in mind, it is expected that people to a larger extent participate in nonviolent campaigns than violent insurgencies as both their expectations for the future and their opportunities to participate improves.

The first hypothesis is divided in two, and tests if democratization has a decreasing effect on civil war, and if it has an increasing effect on nonviolent campaigns.

> H1a: Democratization decreases the probability that a country experiences violent campaigns.
> H1b: Democratization increases the probability that a country experiences nonviolent campaigns.

Cederman et al. (2010) states that both democratization and autocratization increase the probability of civil war onset. This relies on the assumption that the causal mechanisms linking democratization and autocratization to civil war onset are similar, if not identical. Regime instability can be operationalized in different ways; some of these measures imply that changes, both towards more democracy and towards more autocracy, increase the likelihood of civil war onset in a country. The stability of governance structures should also influence the perceptions about the chance of success in using conventional politics to achieve their goals. When regimes are stable, they are more likely to have effective institutional channels that groups can use. Politically unstable regimes lack these effective channels, and groups are less likely to view conventional politics as a viable strategy (Cunningham 2013, 295). In general, it is expected that engaging in conventional politics will be less costly than using irregular tactics, either violent or nonviolent. The decision to resort to violence will hinge on the actor´s vulnerability to attacks from the other party to the conflict. This will not be symmetric for the government and the rebel side in a conflict (Cunningham et al. 2009, 294). Gleditsch (2002) argues that the level of democracy

affects the outbreak of civil wars while controlling for the direction of changes and their extent. His findings confirm that anocracies are more prone to conflict. In addition, he is able to demonstrate that the changes themselves may lead to conflictual situations.

Democracies do not become stable until power can be shown to shift peacefully from the government to the opposition. Autocracies, on the other hand, presuppose relatively quick popular demobilization. During such process, political violence often erupts if already politically mobilized citizens oppose the closure of the political space. Violence may also be an integrated part of the new regime´s attempts to silence the opposition (Cederman et al. 2010, 379). On the same notion as with democratization, Regan and Bell (2010) argues that when the changes in regime characteristics move toward autocratization, people´s expectations for future participation in the political institutions are degraded and incentives for factional politics are increased. With little opportunity for groups outside the government to achieve their policy objectives, the incentives for mobilization and civil war are increased. There is a different effect on the willingness to take up arms when it is toward political openness than when it is toward increasing constraints. The first of these, we might think of as a positive transition that keeps future expectations alive. The second, a form of negative transitions that sets expectations in conflict with political achievements (Regan and Bell 2010, 750). Therefore, it is expected that the probability for civil war is increased when the political environment is moving towards autocracy. The probability for nonviolent campaigns are expected to be decreased because these kinds of resistance tactics are usually illegal, and are either quickly repressed or the situation escalates when the regime resort to violence. Even if both regime change processes are conflict-prone, they should differ in terms of their dynamic effects. The second hypothesis is divided in two and examines if autocratization has an increasing effect on civil war, and if it has a decreasing effect on nonviolent campaigns.

> H2a: Autocratization increases the probability that a country experiences violent campaigns.
> H2b: Autocratization decreases the probability that a country experiences nonviolent campaigns.

In addition, it is expected that there might be an interaction effect between regime change and the level of democracy when the regime change happens. Compared to established democracies or autocracies, anocracies have higher likelihood of conflict, as do regimes that emerge from political transition (Hegre et al. 2001, 34). Hegre et al. (2001) state that they cannot determine whether a high risk of civil war is due to the level of democracy or regime change, because they overlap. Hegre et al. (2001) find that regime change increases the likelihood of civil war in the short run. The higher level of civil war in anocracies, on the other hand, is not solely explained by regime change. The two factors are overlapping, but also complementary. I do not include separate hypotheses to test the relationship between level of democracy and conflict, but models with interaction effects between democratization and polity, and between autocratization and polity are included.

3. Methodology

In this section I will present the research design of this thesis. The dataset I use is constructed from several datasets and a description follows. The dependent variables, the independent variables, and the control variables are described. Limitations to the analysis are also discussed. In this thesis, I examine a large dataset with the goal of finding general tendencies among regime change and conflict. Thus, I mainly use quantitative time-series research methods. In addition, I look at some cases to better understand the direction of the causality between regime change and conflict. I consider the use of mixed methods as an advantage, since quantitative methods in this case is insufficient when it comes to determining direction of the causality, mainly because the data is measured yearly and therefore is not accurate enough.

3.1 Research Design

I am using multinomial logistic regression to examine the possible trigger effect regime change has on violent and nonviolent campaigns. The dependent variable *Resistance Method* is coded with three categories. This makes it possible to compare nonviolent and violent campaigns, as consequences of regime change. I will also use a simple logit model to test the other two dependent variables: *Violence* and *Nonviolence.* These are used to test the resistance methods separately.

In this thesis, the main dependent variable *Resistance Method* has three categories: 0=peace, 1=nonviolent campaigns, and 2=violent campaigns. One could argue that there is a meaningful sequential order where a value is indeed 'higher' than the previous one. If this is the case, one could use the ordered logit regression[1]. An argument against using ordered logistic regression in this thesis is that the distance between peace and nonviolent campaigns is not necessarily the same as the distance between nonviolent and violent campaigns. Another reason not to use ordered logit is

[1] Campbell and Donner (1989) conclude that although there is a risk of inappropriately employing an ordinal model, there is a benefit to be obtained from the correct application of an ordinal model. When a dependent variable is ordinal, inclusion of ordinality in the model to be estimated should improve model performance. If ordinality is indeed the case, it will be evident in the parameters estimated by the usual, or unordered, models. However, harm can be done by employing an ordinal procedure when the ordinality assumption is not correct (Campbell and Donner 1989, 587).

that I will not be able to compare nonviolent and violent campaigns because the ordered logit only gives one table. Since the main focus in this thesis is the comparison between nonviolent and violent campaigns, I choose to run a multinomial logistic model.

The multinomial logistic model is an extension of generalized linear models allowing for an estimation of an unordered categorical response. Unlike the ordinal model, unordered categorical response values have no order. The multinomial probability distribution is an extension, or can be regarded as a more general form of the binomial distribution, but instead of assessing the odds one category or level compared to another, the multinomial model tests the probability or risk of being in a given category or level compared to other categories. The relationships are thought of as relative risk ratios (Hilbe 2009, 385). Multinomial logistic regression is used to predict categorical placement in, or the probability of category membership on a dependent variable based on multiple independent variables. Multinomial logistic regression is a simple extent of binary logistic regression that allows for more than two categories of the dependent variable. Like binary logistic regression, multinomial logistic regression uses maximum likelihood estimation to evaluate the probability of categorical membership (Starkweather and Moske 2011, 1). To run a multinomial logistic model, a reference category is chosen from the categories of the dependent variable. The estimated coefficients are relative to the reference category (Kwak and Clayton-Matthews 2002, 406). In this thesis, the category peace is chosen as reference category.

In a simple logistic regression that contains a dichotomous dependent variable, the coefficient represents the effect of a unit change in the independent variable on the natural logarithm of the odds of either nonviolent or violent campaigns. In multinomial logistic model, the coefficients and their exponential transformations that yield the odds ratios are always relative to the reference category (Kwak and Clayton-Matthews 2002, 406).

3.2 The Dependent Variables

The dependent variable in this analysis is based on the Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes (NAVCO) 2.0 dataset. The NAVCO 2.0 data project is an

attempt to provide data to understand the causes, dynamics, and outcomes of nonviolent mass campaigns. The NAVCO 2.0 dataset focuses on campaign-year, and contains yearly data on 250 nonviolent and violent insurrections between 1945 through 2006 (100 nonviolent and 150 violent). These campaigns constitute the full population of known cases between 1945 through 2006 that held maximalist goals of overthrowing the existing regime, expelling foreign occupations, or achieving self-determination at some point during the campaign (Chenoweth and Lewis 2013, 416).

The main dependent variable of this analysis is the method used in the campaign, called *Resistance Method.* This variable originates from the NAVCO 2.0 dataset and measures campaigns as events. I have recoded this variable into onset data. This helps prevent the results from being affected by an ongoing conflict. Violent campaigns are coded = 2, nonviolent campaigns are coded = 1, and years with no campaigns are coded = 0. This is the reference category, as the focus in this analysis is the years with violent or nonviolent campaigns. The total N is 9392.

The variables *Violence* and *Nonviolence* are used in the separate, logistic models. This is dummy variables with two categories: 1= violence/nonviolence, and 0= no campaign. These variables are also recoded into onset data. The total N for both variables is 9392. In the separate models I use a simple logistic regression. This is an additional test, and it has some advantages over the multinomial models. For instance, they capture the years with both violent and nonviolent campaigns in the same year. With the *Resistance Method* variable and multinomial logistic models, these cases are collapsed to the highest value, namely violent campaigns. This is because violence is considered the most serious incident.

A campaign is a series of observable, continuous, purposive mass tactics or events in pursuit of a political objective. Campaigns are observable, meaning that the tactics used are overt and documented. A campaign is continuous and lasts anywhere from days to years, distinguishing it from one-off events or revolts. Campaigns are also positive, meaning that they are consciously acting with a specific objective in mind, such as expelling a foreign occupier or overthrowing a domestic regime. Campaigns have discernable leadership and often have organizational and operational names, distinguishing them from random riots or spontaneous mass acts (Chenoweth and

Lewis 2013, 416). Analyzing campaigns rather than events or organizations allow us to capture the broader spectrum of collective activists as a whole. As well as the intra-organizational coordination processes necessary for collective action. In terms of political importance, campaigns are the most consequential units of analysis. Protest events alone rarely threaten the stability of regimes, and social movements are not always interested in overturning the system within which they operate.

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for the Dependent Variables

	Obs.	Mean	Std. Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Resistance Method	9392	0.0415247	0.2618312	0	2
Violence	9392	0.0143739	0.1190329	0	1
Nonviolence	9392	0.0129898	0.1132361	0	1

3.3 The Independent Variables

The NAVCO 2.0 dataset is merged with the Polity IV dataset. The Polity IV dataset provides variables on regime change and regime authority. The Polity IV project continues the Polity research tradition of coding the authority characteristics of states in the world system for purposes of comparative, quantitative analysis. The Polity project has proven its value to researchers over the years, becoming the most widely used resource for monitoring regime change and studying the effects of regime authority (Marshall and Jaggers 2007, 1). Although, there are some potential problems associated to researching civil war with the democratization and autocratization variables in the Polity IV dataset, I still choose to use this data as indicators of regime change (see discussion in section 3.5.2).

To enable an assessment of the effects of regime change, periods of democratization and autocratization need to be identified. The *Democratization* variable is coded from the Polity 2 variable in the Polity IV dataset, and identifies cases where there has been a change in the Polity scale from last year to current year (t-1). The variable is a dummy with two categories: 1= change towards democracy, and 0= no change. The total N is 7448, and the number of missing is 1448. In the second model I use a lagged version of the variable, called *Democratization Lagged.* This variable has a lag of one year, and measures the change from the year before last to previous year (t-2). The total N is 7776 and the number of missing is 1616. In the third model I use a

variable called *Democratization03*. This variable measures the change during the last three years (t-3 to t). The total N is 7944 and the number of missing is 1448. The missing observations are mainly small countries that do not have observations in the Polity Index. In these cases the dependent variables are coded = 0. The missing observations are not considered a problem since the total N is relatively large, and because these countries are not considered especially conflict-prone. They being left out of the analysis will therefore not affect the outcome to a significant degree.

The *Autocratization* variable is also obtained from the Polity IV data. This variable is coded the same way as the *Democratization* variable, although it identifies cases where there has been a change in the Polity scale towards autocracy. This variable is also a dummy with two categories: 1= change towards autocracy, and 0= no change. The variable measures a change in the Polity scale from last year to current year (t-1). The total N is 7944 and the number of missing is 1448. In the second model I use a lagged version of the variable, called *Autocratization Lagged*, which has a lag of one year, and measures the change from the year before last to previous year (t-2). The total N is 7776 and the number of missing 1616. In the third model I use a variable called *Autocratization03.* This variable measures the change during the last three years (t-3 to t). The total N is 7944 and the number of missing is 1448. These variables should provide a good range of the likely time span from regime change occurs to a conflict should be expected.

The *Polity* variable originates from the Polity IV data and is a modified version of the original Polity variable. *Polity* facilitates the use of the Polity regime measure in time-series analyses. It modifies the combined annual Polity score by applying a simple treatment, or "fix," to convert instances of "standardized authority scores" to conventional Polity scores (Marshall and Jaggers 2007, 15-16). The Polity variable features a scale from -10 through 10, where -10 indicates perfect autocracy, and 10 indicates perfect democracy. The variable is lagged to solve the problem of endogeneity in the Polity measure. The total N is 7944 and the number of missing is 1616.

I have included two interaction effects in the analysis. The interaction effects are between *Democratization* and *Polity,* named *Interaction DemocPolity,* and between

Autocratization and *Polity,* named *Interaction AutocPolity*. The interaction effects are included in all models except the base models. The total N is 7757 for the interaction effects without lag and the interaction effects with three-year span, and 7776 for the interaction effects with one-year lag.

3.4 The Control Variables

The two control variables *Population* and *GDP per Capita* are collected from Kristian S. Gleditsch´ Expanded Trade and GDP Data. I have restricted the selection of control variables to a minimum consisting of logged and lagged indicators of country population and GDP per capita. The total N for both variables is 8449 and the number of missing is 943. Although the interpretations vary in the literature, these variables have consistently turned out to be robust explanatory factors in quantitative civil war studies (Hegre and Sambanis 2006, 512). I also control for temporal dependence by including an indicator for peace years since the last civil war or nonviolent campaign, together with cubic spline functions. Gleditsch´ Expanded Trade and GDP Data start its observations in 1950. The missing observations are therefore the years between 1945 and 1950.

Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for the Independent Variables

	Obs.	Mean	Std. Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Democratization	7944	0.0624371	0.2419629	0	1
Autocratization	7944	0.0383938	0.192157	0	1
Democratization Lag	7776	0.0619856	0.2411449	0	1
Autocratization Lag	7776	0.0387088	0.1929126	0	1
Democratization 03	7944	0.138721	0.345677	0	1
Autocratization 03	7944	0.0881168	0.2834826	0	1
Interaction DemocPolity	7757	-0.1472219	1.534538	-10	9
Interaction AutocPolity	7757	0.0230759	1.085137	-9	10
Interaction DemocPolity Lag	7776	0.0807613	1.454974	-9	10
Interaction AutocPolity Lag	7776	-0.1475051	1.211298	-10	9
Interaction DemocPolity 03	7757	0.0274591	2.36091	-10	10
Interaction AutocPolity 03	7757	-0.2209617	1.871355	-10	10
Population	8449	8.449268	2.118018	1.791759	14.06613
GDP per capita	8449	8.296368	1.219479	4.888995	13.3570
Polity	7776	0.0048868	7.512303	-10	10
Year	9392	1980.091	16.90656	1945	2006
Peaceyears	8240	14.66845	15.00587	0	61
Peaceyears Nonviolence	9392	20.35605	15.85757	0	61
Peaceyears Violence	9392	18.03439	16.29463	0	61

3.5 Limitations

In this section I will elaborate on some potential research problems in this thesis. I will start with the obstacles and limitations associated with studying nonviolence, then take a closer look at the polity scale, which has proven problematic in the research of civil war, and then examine the case of endogeneity and reversed causality.

3.5.1 Researching Nonviolence

There are certain problems in researching nonviolent resistance. Studies on nonviolent resistance are daunting because of concerns about underreporting. Although all studies on conflict suffer from underreporting, the problem with studying nonviolent resistance may be particularly acute because of the lack of attention to such issues in the open media. Media is the most common source of information for data collection. Media has traditionally focused on violent resistance, which has left researchers to gather information from primary sources, such as eyewitness reports, on-ground interviews, and surveys (Chenoweth and Cunningham 2013, 274). Because of norms of neutrality in the field, scholars typically eschew topics that connote activism. Others may see the study of violence as more interesting or more of a priority given the state of the world. However, recent studies show that nonviolent resistance is neither passive nor weak. More conflict researchers take nonviolent resistance seriously and engage in rigorous empirical research on its causes, dynamics, and outcomes in an attempt to bridging the divide between violent and nonviolent resistance (Chenoweth and Cunningham 2013, 274).

Some may be concerned that the sample is biased toward successful campaigns. Campaigns that are crushed in their infancy, and therefore fail, will not be included in the NAVCO 2.0 dataset. However, this is true for both armed and unarmed campaigns. Unknown failed nonviolent campaigns are necessarily omitted from the dataset, just like unknown failed violent campaigns. There are many campaigns that never starts among violent campaigns too, so a similar underreporting bias exists within the study of violent civil conflict. The dataset´s creators warns that when using the NAVCO 2.0 dataset, researchers should qualify findings as applicable only to major campaigns with maximal goals and a high level of sustained participation over

time. Empirical findings should therefore not imply that claims of universal validity with respect to all types of contentious politics (Chenoweth and Lewis 2013, 420).

3.5.2 The Polity Index

In researching civil war and the democratic peace, the Polity scale is a useful tool. The Polity measure is an index composed of five variables. If a country scores low on all five components, it is considered authoritarian. A perfect democracy has a score of 10 on all five components. According to Fearon and Laitin (2003), about 45 per cent of the observations have a score greater than 5 and about 35 per cent have a score less than -5. This leaves about 20 per cent somewhere in the middle. The countries with such middle scores are suspected by many to be particularly susceptible to civil war.

The five components are: Constraints on Chief Executive (XCONST), Competitiveness of Executive Recruitment (XRCOMP), Openness of Executive Recruitment (XROPEN), Competitiveness of Political Participation (PARCOMP), and Regulation of Political Participation (PARREG) (Marshall and Jaggers 2007, 15). According to Gleditsch and Ward (1997), variation in XCONST accounts for more variation in the overall index than any of the other components. This component can independently explain civil war. The competitiveness of executive recruitment (XRCOMP) component measures "how institutionalized, competitive and open are the mechanisms for selecting a political leader" (Marshall and Jaggers 2007, 49). The openness of executive recruitment (XROPEN) refers to degree to which "the politically active population has an opportunity, in principle, to attain the position through a regularized process" (Marshall and Jaggers 2007, 20).

These three measures, which deal with the recruitment and constraints of the chief executive, are reasonable variables to use when testing hypotheses about the relationship between political regime and civil war. None of them are explicitly defined by political violence or civil war. According to Vreeland (2008), the same is not true when it comes to the remaining two components. The two measures of political participation are the Competitiveness of Political Participation (PARCOMP), which denotes "the extent of government restriction on political competition" (Marshall and Jaggers 2007, 68), and the Regulation of Political Participation (PARREG), which refers to "the degree of institutionalization, or regulation, of

political competition" (Marshall and Jaggers 2007, 68). PARCOMP ranges from repressed to competitive, but what does the middle capture? The coding "not applicable" in the component PARCOMP "is used for politics that are coded as unregulated, or moving to/from that position" (Gurr 1989, 14). "Unregulated", in turn, "may or may not be characterized by violent conflict among partisan groups" (Gurr 1989, 12). This definition is problematic for the study of civil war because some instances of civil war are explicitly coded here. Yet, even more troublesome is the definition of PARCOMP = 1: "Factional Competition: Polities with fractional or factional/restricted patterns of competition" (Gurr 1989, 14).

> "There are relatively stable and enduring political groups, or "fractions", not necessarily elected – but competition among them is intense, hostile, and frequently violent. Extreme factionalism may be manifested in the establishment of rival governments and civil war." (Gurr 1989, 12).

Using this variable to test the relationship between regime and civil war is synonymous to tautology. Lagging this variable may not solve the problem because the threshold of violence used to define civil war may not be consistent across measures. The PARREG variable has similar problems. Ranging from -2 to 0, political participation may be regulated, unregulated, or something in between. Civil war is explicitly coded PARREG = -1. This variable is coded with respect to transitions. According to Vreeland (2008), even the lagged version of this variable is problematic for the study of civil war. It might be instability in a country before a conflict breaks out, and this instability can provide a bias towards civil war in the Polity data. Although this may be a serious problem, I consider a lagged version of the variables to deal with the most serious problems. Therefore, they are sufficient for the purpose of this analysis.

3.5.3 Endogeneity

Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) have some concerns about endogeneity in their study. These concerns also apply to this analysis, and are worth a closer look. The selection effect is a concern that Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) raise. This is the probability that violent campaigns are unsuccessful because they emerge under the most difficult circumstances where success is highly unlikely. Thus the choice of resistance method is determined by the situation under which the resistance emerges: if success is judged

to be unlikely or other methods have failed, then violent resistance is a choice of last resort – and is by extension a last-gasp effort in an already fruitless situation (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011, 76).

In this analysis there are some potential problems of endogeneity. There is a possibility that there is a reversed causality, and that violent and nonviolent campaigns are the cause of regime change, as well as the other way around. To examine this problem, I include a lagged version of the democratization and autocratization variables in the second set of models. It is likely that some time will pass after the regime change before a conflict erupts. By lagging the regime change variables one year, it is possible to test for conflicts the following year after regime change. This method helps clarify the relationship between regime change and conflict, as the lagged model only test the relationship between regime changes that happened prior to the conflict. This is, however, a rigid method that makes significant results more difficult to obtain. I assess the risk of erroneous conclusions too high if I do not use a lagged model.

4. Empirical Evidence

This section introduces the main findings of the analysis. This thesis uses country-level regression analysis covering the time period from 1945 through 2006. As the dependent variable *Resistance Method* is multinomial with three categories: peace, nonviolent campaign, and violent campaigns, the models in Table 3 are of multinomial logistic regression. In Table 4 and 5, the dependent variables are *Violence* and *Nonviolence*. As these are conventional binary variables, the model is of ordinary logit type.

The multinomial regression analysis is divided in three sets of models. The first set contains regime change variables without lag, the second set has regime change variables with one year lag, while the third set has regime change variables measuring a three year span. Every set has three models: a base model, and two models with interaction effects. The interaction effects are between *Polity* and the regime change variables, *Democratization* and *Autocratization*, respectively. The simple logistic models are structured the same way as the multinomial models.

4.1 Regime Change as a Trigger for Conflict?

In base model 1.1 in Table 3, both of the regime change variables are significant for violent campaigns, both at 0.01 level. The effect is positive for both variables. The separate logit models also confirm that both directions of regime change have a positive effect on the likelihood of experiencing violent campaigns. This result supports my hypothesis H2a, that autocratization increases the likelihood of experiencing violent campaigns. With regard to hypothesis H1a, that democratization decreases the likelihood of experiencing violent campaigns, it seems that the direction of the causality is reversed, and that democratization also increases the likelihood of experiencing violent campaigns. Democratization increases the likelihood of violent campaigns by 2.6% compared to counties without democratization for year 2000, *Peaceyears* set to one year, and all other variables are set to mean. Autocratization increases the likelihood by 1.8% compared to countries without autocratization for year 2000, *Peaceyears* set to one year, and all other variables are set to mean. This implies that regime change, in either direction, increases the likelihood of violent campaigns. This supports Gleditsch` (2002) claim, that changes themselves might lead to conflict.

Table 3: Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns Onset Explained by Regime Change, 1945-2006

	Model 1.1		Model 1.2		Model 1.3		Model 2.1		Model 2.2		Model 2.3		Model 3.1		Model 3.2		Model 3.3	
	Non-violence	Violence	Non-violence	Violence	Non-violence	Violence	Non-violence	Violence	Non-violence	Violence	Non-violence	Violence	Non-violence	Violence	Non-violence	Violence	Non-violence	Violence
Democratization	1.745***	1.257***	1.732***	0.748*	1.746***	1.254***												
	(0.286)	(0.309)	(0.301)	(0.438)	(0.286)	(0.309)												
Autocratization	0.809	0.974***	0.808	0.951***	0.706	0.828**												
	(0.521)	(0.368)	(0.522)	(0.365)	(0.523)	(0.419)												
Democratization Lag							-0.055	-0.022	-0.631	-0.019	-0.048	-0.021						
							(0.478)	(0.433)	(0.573)	(0.433)	(0.478)	(0.432)						
Autocratization Lag							-0.247	0.397	-0.242	0.398	0.202	0.456						
							(0.594)	(0.404)	(0.594)	(0.402)	(0.595)	(0.542)						
Democratization 03													1.164***	0.967***	0.988***	0.795***	1.171***	0.990***
													(0.277)	(0.284)	(0.291)	(0.308)	(0.278)	(0.286)
Autocratization 03													0.134	0.677**	0.143	0.694**	0.352	0.897***
													(0.402)	(0.304)	(0.402)	(0.306)	(0.437)	(0.319)
Interaction DemocPolity			-0.005	-0.120*					-0.181***	-0.009					-0.057	-0.080*		
			(0.037)	(0.066)					(0.062)	(0.089)					(0.036)	(0.048)		
Interaction AutocPolity					-0.054	0.122*					0.135	0.0141					0.060	0.101**
					(0.049)	(0.067)					(0.105)	(0.083)					(0.059)	(0.048)
Population	0.495***	0.210***	0.496***	0.206***	0.495***	0.208***	0.462***	0.206***	0.459***	0.206***	0.461***	0.206***	0.482***	0.206***	0.479***	0.201***	0.482***	0.204***
	(0.077)	(0.055)	(0.077)	(0.054)	(0.077)	(0.054)	(0.084)	(0.056)	(0.083)	(0.056)	(0.084)	(0.056)	(0.079)	(0.057)	(0.079)	(0.056)	(0.079)	(0.057)
GDP per capita	0.166	-0.268**	0.165	-0.283**	0.164	-0.256**	0.141	-0.299**	0.136	-0.299**	0.144	-0.298**	0.176	-0.257**	0.169	-0.266**	0.181	-0.235**
	(0.108)	(0.115)	(0.108)	(0.117)	(0.109)	(0.116)	(0.118)	(0.121)	(0.118)	(0.121)	(0.118)	(0.122)	(0.111)	(0.117)	(0.110)	(0.117)	(0.111)	(0.118)
Polity	-0.087***	-0.020	-0.086***	-0.010	-0.085***	-0.028	-0.092***	-0.023	-0.087***	-0.022	-0.095***	-0.023	-0.095***	-0.022	-0.082***	-0.006	-0.099***	-0.036*
	(0.019)	(0.016)	(0.021)	(0.017)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.017)	(0.019)	(0.017)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.017)	(0.021)	(0.018)	(0.020)	(0.019)
Year	0.010	-0.016**	0.010	-0.015**	0.010	-0.017***	0.014	-0.010	0.014	-0.010	0.013	-0.011	0.009	-0.018***	0.010	-0.017***	0.009	-0.018***
	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.010)	(0.006)	(0.010)	(0.006)	(0.010)	(0.00651)
Peaceyears	0.095	0.224*	0.095	0.233*	0.094	0.221*	0.034	0.233*	0.036	0.233*	0.032	0.233*	0.075	0.225*	0.083	0.232*	0.076	0.225*
	(0.116)	(0.127)	(0.116)	(0.128)	(0.116)	(0.127)	(0.113)	(0.129)	(0.113)	(0.129)	(0.113)	(0.129)	(0.118)	(0.131)	(0.119)	(0.131)	(0.118)	(0.129)
Constant	-30.79*	27.72**	-30.80*	25.91**	-31.07*	28.65**	-37.11**	16.73	-37.49**	16.70	-36.42**	16.82	-29.22	30.67**	-30.56	28.62**	-28.66	31.56**
	(18.34)	(12.63)	(18.49)	(12.71)	(18.43)	(12.73)	(17.53)	(13.46)	(17.51)	(13.49)	(17.39)	(13.33)	(18.91)	(12.73)	(19.02)	(12.68)	(18.95)	(12.85)
Pseudo Log-Likelihood	-912.40794		-910.3549		-910.54366		-955.17049		-953.75026		-954.35231		-923.01051		-920.05572		-920.26599	
Observations	7,238		7,238		7,238		7,252		7,252		7,252		7,238		7,238		7,238	

Notes: Cubic splines included, but not shown. Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 4: Violent Campaigns Onset Explained by Regime Change, 1945-2006

	Model 4.1	Model 4.2	Model 4.3	Model 5.1	Model 5.2	Model 5.3	Model 6.1	Model 6.2	Model 6.3
Democratization	1.210***	0.715	1.207***						
	(0.303)	(0.435)	(0.302)						
Autocratization	1.023***	1.001***	0.879**						
	(0.367)	(0.366)	(0.411)						
Democratization Lag				-0.016	-0.016	-0.014			
				(0.420)	(0.420)	(0.419)			
Autocratization Lag				0.500	0.501	0.554			
				(0.404)	(0.403)	(0.539)			
Democratization03							0.944***	0.784***	0.966***
							(0.270)	(0.288)	(0.272)
Autocratization03							0.736**	0.752**	0.947***
							(0.306)	(0.308)	(0.318)
Interaction DemocPolity		-0.115*			-0.003			-0.072	
		(0.067)			(0 .089)			(0.047)	
Interaction AutocPolity			0.122*			0.013			0.099**
			(0.065)			(0.082)			(0.048)
Population	0.234***	0.229***	0.232***	0.240***	0.240***	0.240***	0.230***	0.223***	0.228***
	(0.057)	(0.057)	(0.057)	(0.057)	(0.057)	(0.057)	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.059)
GDP per capita	-0.301***	-0.317***	-0.288**	-0.338***	-0.338***	-0.337***	-0.286**	-0.299***	-0.265**
	(0.112)	(0.114)	(0.113)	(0.120)	(0.120)	(0.121)	(0.113)	(0.115)	(0.115)
Polity	-0.015	-0.005	-0.023	-0.016	-0.016	-0.017	-0.017	-0.002	-0.030
	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.020)
Year	-0.013*	-0.012*	-0.013**	-0.007	-0.007	-0.007	-0.014**	-0.013**	-0.014**
	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Peaceyears	0.272***	0.276***	0.275***	0.291***	0.291***	0.291***	0.270***	0.270***	0.272***
	(0.076)	(0.077)	(0.077)	(0.076)	(0.076)	(0.076)	(0.077)	(0.078)	(0.077)
Constant	19.98	18.19	20.62	9.353	9.345	9.423	22.63*	21.38*	23.39*
	(12.73)	(12.87)	(12.75)	(13.77)	(13.79)	(13.68)	(12.70)	(12.73)	(12.71)
Pseudo Log-Likelihood	-482.30794	-480.46663	-480.58686	-498.68351	-498.6825	-498.6726	-484.19312	-482.58347	-481.91212
Observations	7,238	7,238	7,238	7,252	7,252	7,252	7,238	7,238	7,238

Notes: Cubic splines included, but not shown. Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 5: Nonviolent Campaigns Onset Explained by Regime Change, 1945-2006

	Model 7.1	Model 7.2	Model 7.3	Model 8.1	Model 8.2	Model 8.3	Model 9.1	Model 9.2	Model 9.3
Democratization	1.827***	1.832***	1.827***						
	(0.274)	(0.296)	(0.273)						
Autocratization	0.796	0,796	0.709						
	(0.514)	(0.516)	(0.519)						
Democratization Lag				0.046	-0.534	0.054			
				(0.475)	(0.566)	(0.475)			
Autocratization Lag				-0.270	-0.263	0.228			
				(0.589)	(0.589)	(0.591)			
Democratization03							1.254***	1.094***	1.260***
							(0.262)	(0.284)	(0.263)
Autocratization03							0.070	0.084	0.333
							(0.395)	(0.396)	(0.422)
Interaction DemocPolity		0.001			-0.178***			-0.050	
		(0.035)			(0.063)			(0.035)	
Interaction AutocPolity			-0.049			0.144			0.069
			(0.050)			(0.103)			(0.058)
Population	0.534***	0.534***	0.533***	0.507***	0.504***	0.507***	0.527***	0.523***	0.528***
	(0.070)	(0.070)	(0.070)	(0.073)	(0.073)	(0.074)	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.072)
GDP per capita	0.236**	0.236**	0.235**	0.180	0.174	0.182	0.240**	0.236**	0.245**
	(0.105)	(0.105)	(0.105)	(0.112)	(0.112)	(0.112)	(0.106)	(0.106)	(0.106)
Polity	-0.091***	-0.091***	-0.089***	-0.095***	-0.090***	-0.098***	-0.099***	-0.087***	-0.103***
	(0.019)	(0.022)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.011)	(0.020)	(0.022)	(0.021)
Year	0.010	0.010	0.010	0.014	0.014	0.014	0.009	0.010	0.009
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.01)
Peaceyears	0.273***	0.273***	0.272***	0.232***	0.229***	0.233***	0.268***	0.269***	0.270***
	(0.073)	(0.073)	(0.073)	(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.071)
Constant	-33.34*	-33.31*	-33.56*	-39.64**	-40.01**	-39.05**	-31.84	-33.39	-31.43
	(20.06)	(20.23)	(20.12)	(19.45)	(19.39)	(19.38)	(20.43)	(20.55)	(20.53)
Pseudo Log-Likelihood	-427.15855	-427.15817	-427.03224	-455.12435	-453.7907	-454.20863	-436.10266	-435.29977	-435.6194
Observations	7,238	7,238	7,238	7,252	7,252	7,252	7,238	7,238	7,238

Notes: Cubic splines included, but not shown. Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

For nonviolent campaigns *Democratization* is significant at 0.01 level. *Democratization* has a positive effect, which means that regime change towards democracy increases the likelihood of nonviolent campaigns by 0.4% compared to countries without democratization for year 2000, *Peaceyears* set to one year, and all other variables are set to mean. *Autocratization* also indicates a positive effect, but fails to reach statistical significance. The separate logit models confirm these results. This entails that change itself as a cause for conflict only replies to violent conflict. Only democratization is a trigger for nonviolent campaigns. These results does, however, support hypothesis H1b, that democratization increases the likelihood of experiencing nonviolent campaigns.

To compare the size of the predicted probabilities of conflict-proneness with and without regime change, I have included the predicted probabilities of experiencing conflict in relation to population size. For nonviolent campaigns, countries with a population size one standard deviation above the mean increases the likelihood by 0.2% compared to countries with a population size that is one standard deviation below the mean. For violent campaigns, countries with a population size one standard deviation above the mean increases the likelihood by 1% compared to countries with a population size that is one standard deviation below the mean.

The regime change variables in the first model are not lagged, which means that the regime change and the conflict take place the same year. This makes it difficult to interpret the direction of the causality. Since I find that regime change indeed has an effect on both nonviolent and violent campaigns, this might suggest that there is an immediate effect, but it may also suggest a case of reversed causality. This entails that conflict has a positive effect on the likelihood of regime change.

In an attempt to deal with potential problems of reversed causality and endogeneity, the second set of models has lagged regime change variables. For nonviolent campaigns, neither *Democratization Lagged* nor *Autocratization Lagged* is significant. This result may indicate that the causality of my hypotheses is wrong. The first set of models tests the immediate effect. The lagged models, on the other hand, tests if regime change the year before has an effect on the likelihood of nonviolent

campaigns, and it seems that it do not. If regime change has an effect on the likelihood of nonviolent campaigns, this effect is immediate.

In Table 3, neither of the regime change variables is significant for violent campaigns. This implies that if regime change has an effect on the likelihood of violent campaigns, like for nonviolent campaigns, the effect is immediate. Since the results from the lagged variables fail to reach statistical significance, there is an imminent risk that the direction of the causality in my hypotheses is reversed. Previous research (e.g. Chenoweth and Stephan 2011) argue that mobilization, especially for violent campaigns takes some time, and that one would observe an effect on the model with lagged variables.

Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) argue that once the mobilization to a conflict begins, a nonviolent campaign has wider appeal than a violent one. It thereby enlarges the personnel base of the nonviolent campaign, and brings more assets and resources to the fight. Thus, a large personnel base does not necessarily mean an instant result. It is often argued (e.g. Breckenridge 1998; Fanon 1961) that violent insurgencies provide immediate results, and that this give them more appeal than nonviolent campaigns. Beyond the prospects of achieving political objectives, the potential to obtain material payoffs from resistance leaders, to seize territory and weapons, to gain control over lucrative extractive industries, trade, and trafficking routes, to inflict casualties, or to exact revenge, are factors that may attract some recruits to violent resistance (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011, 32). Despite its supposed appeal, the resort to violence is rare at both individual and group levels and therefore may not have the allure that some theorists ascribe to it (Collins 2008, 20). Physical, informational commitment, and moral considerations tend to give nonviolent campaigns an advantage when it comes to mobilizing participants, which reinforces the strategic benefits to participation (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011, 32). Chenoweth and Lewis (2013) suggest that nonviolent and violent campaigns emerge in very different types of countries. Violent campaigns seem to emerge where resistance is “easy”, whereas nonviolent resistance is emerging where resistance is supposedly “difficult”. This reveals that nonviolent campaigns are emerging under quite favorable circumstances from a mobilization perspective, challenging many assumptions about the supposed ineffectiveness of nonviolent resistance against durable authoritarian regimes

(Chenoweth and Lewis 2013, 422). Although, nonviolent campaigns are persistently associated with higher levels of membership, even when controlled for population size, it is difficult to say if this also means that nonviolent campaigns break out on an earlier point than civil wars. This should perhaps suggest that violent campaigns would use longer time on gaining a solid personnel base and put the plan into action. From the results in this analysis, this does not seem to be the case. Both nonviolent and violent campaigns either erupt during the same year as the regime change, or the direction of the causality is reversed.

The third set of models has regime change variables with a three-year time span. *Democratization03* is significant for both nonviolent and violent campaigns on 0.01 level. For both of them, the effect is positive, which indicates that regime change towards democracy increases the likelihood of nonviolent and violent campaigns. Because this variable also includes changes during the year of the observed conflict, it may complicate the interpretation, and the direction of causality remains unclear. *Autocratization03* fail to give significant results for nonviolent campaigns, but is significant on 0.05 level for violent campaigns. The effect is positive, which indicates that autocratization increases the likelihood of experiencing violent campaigns.

These three sets of models seem to support my hypotheses H1b and H2a. The first and third set of models show evidence for that democratization increases the likelihood of nonviolent campaigns, and that autocratization increases the likelihood of violent campaigns. It also indicates that democratization increases the likelihood of violent campaigns, which is the opposite of my hypothesis H1a. I am not able to confirm that autocratization has an effect on the likelihood of nonviolent campaigns. The second set of models fails to give any evidence for that regime change has an effect on neither nonviolent nor violent campaigns. As an additional test, I run the models with only one of the two regime change variables. Because these variables are mutually exclusive, there might be a problem of multicollinearity. The results are equivalent to the model containing both regime change variables, so the original model is kept. The model with separate regime change variables is found in Table A1 in the appendix. A multicollinearity test is found in table A2 in the appendix. These findings do not necessarily correspond with the previous research (e.g. Cederman et al. 2010; Mansfield and Snyder 1995). The inclusion of a lagged model reveals that

neither democratization nor autocratization is significant. Cederman et al. (2010) argues that their method find patterns of regime change in a flexible way without lag structures (Cederman et al. 2010, 378). The findings of the democratization-conflict linkage are vulnerable to endogeneity issues (Däubler 2006, 83). I argue that these lag structures are crucial in determining the direction of the causality, and that models without lag is insufficient as evidence for that regime change increases the likelihood of experiencing conflict.

4.2 Democraticness as Influence on Conflict-Proneness

I have included the variable *Polity,* which represents the Polity Index. A square term for Polity, called *Polity Squared,* was also included. This was to test for a curvilinear effect. *Polity Squared* is merely a control variable, and as it might contribute to problems of multicollinearity in the models with interaction effects, this variable was removed. A table with *Polity Squared* is found in Table A3 in the appendix. Several scholars have found evidence for such a formulation when it comes to civil war (e.g. Hegre et al 2001; Gleditsch 2002; Cederman et al. 2010). Hegre et al. (2001) find in their empirical study a curvilinear relationship between the level of democracy and the outbreak of civil war. They argue that many democratization efforts fail to result in complete transitions, and get stuck in the mid-range of the democracy scale. Such anocracies are disproportionately affected by civil wars. Gleditsch (2002) also confirms that anocracies are the most conflict-prone, but in addition, he is able to demonstrate that the changes themselves may lead to conflictual situations.

For nonviolent campaigns, the *Polity* variable is significant and the effect is linear and negative. This indicates that the likelihood of experiencing nonviolent campaigns decreases the higher the Polity score. For violent campaigns, the Polity variable is not significant. This indicates that the likelihood of violent campaigns is identical for democracies and autocracies when the other variables are held constant.

According to Regan and Bell (2010), people´s expectations for their future opportunity will lead to greater public investment in that future. When there is a change from a closed towards a more open society, this will reduce the level of intolerance associated with a state´s initial inability to provide for, or accommodate the people´s demands (Regan and Bell 2010, 750). Change in political institutions that

reflects movement from open political access toward a more constraining set of institutions will have the opposite effect on expectations and therefore on levels of political stability. Public investment will be grounded on expectations about future returns on investments (Wantchekon 2004, 21). Although, I am not able to confirm this when it comes to violent campaigns, this argument seems to be applicable to nonviolent campaigns. As democraticness increases in a country, the likelihood of experiencing nonviolent campaigns decreases. Hence, it is reasonable to consider the country´s starting point on the Polity index. The conflict-proneness should rely on where the country is located on the Polity index before the regime change, and where it ends up.

The *Polity* variable and the interaction effects can help find evidence for that the level of democracy has an effect on conflict-proneness. I have included interaction effects between *Democratization* and *Polity* and between *Autocratization* and *Polity.* This is to test if the level of democracy has an effect on conflict-proneness. Previous research (e.g. Hegre et al 2001; Gleditsch 2002; Cederman et al. 2010) has found evidence that there is a curvilinear relationship between the Polity index and the proneness to conflict. This entails that a democratization process in an authoritarian regime increases the likelihood of conflict. If the country already is in the mid-range of the Polity index, a democratization process will decrease the likelihood of conflict. Däubler (2006) argues that the more democratic countries are during transitions, the less likely they are to experience conflict. He emphasizes that a model, which estimates the effects of conflict on democracy, must not neglect the prewar level of democracy (Däubler 2006, 84).

In model 1.2 in Table 3, the interaction term *Interaction DemocPolity* is negative, but do not reach statistical significance for nonviolent campaigns. For violent campaigns, the interaction term is negative, and is significant at 0.1 level. Democratization increases the likelihood for violent campaigns, but a higher score on the Polity scale decreases this likelihood. This supports Däubler (2006), as it seems that the level of democraticness has an effect on the likelihood of experiencing violent campaigns. In model 2.2, the interaction term is for the one-year lag. For nonviolent campaigns, the *Interaction DemocPolity* is negative and significant at 0.01 level. Democratization increases the likelihood of violent campaigns, but the higher score on the Polity scale,

the likelihood is decreased. *Democratization Lagged* is not significant, but the level of democraticness seems to have an effect on the likelihood of violent campaigns. Model 3.2 contains the year without lag, and the results are the same as in model 1.2.

In model 1.3 in Table 3, the interaction term *Interaction AutocPolity* is negative, but is not significant for nonviolent campaigns. Nor is *Autocratization*. There is therefore no evidence for an effect of democraticness on the likelihood of nonviolent campaigns. For violent campaigns, the interaction effect is positive, and significant at 0.1 level. Autocratization increases the likelihood of violent campaigns, and *Interaction AutocPolity* shows that the effect of autocratization is even more increased with a lower score on the Polity index. Model 2.3 with interaction effect with one-year lag is not significant for either of the resistance methods. Model 3.3 contains the three-year span, and the results are the same as in model 1.3. The results of the interactions show weak effects, and it is difficult to confirm that democraticness has a substantial effect on the likelihood of conflict. The models of the separate logit models support the findings in the multinomial models.

It is difficult to interpret multinomial logit coefficients directly, since the coefficients indicate the effect of a covariate on the log odds of a specific outcome over the baseline outcome. However, the effect of a covariate on the overall probability of an outcome ultimately depends on how the covariate affects the other possible outcomes. That an outcome becomes more likely over the reference outcome with higher values of a covariate does not necessarily imply that an outcome becomes absolutely more likely, as the covariate may increase the likelihood of other outcomes even more (Celestino and Gleditsch 2013, 394).

To provide some illustrations of the implied predicted probabilities from the result in Table 3, Figure 1, 2, 3, and 4 display margins plots of the likelihood of violent and nonviolent campaigns with and without regime change. Figure 1 and 2 is generated from Model 1.2 in Table 3, while Figure 3 and 4 is generated from Model 1.3 in Table 3. Figure 1 show that the Polity score has minimal effect on violent campaigns, as the line without democratization is almost horizontal.

Figure 1: Violence and Democratization with Interaction Effect (Interaction DemocPolity)



Figure 2: Nonviolence and Democratization with Interaction Effect (Interaction DemocPolity)



Figure 3: Violence and Autocratization with Interaction Effect (Interaction AutocPolity)



Figure 4: Nonviolence and Autocratization with Interaction Effect (Interaction AutocPolity)



A change in polity, on the other hand, increases the likelihood of experiencing violent campaigns. This regards primarily for non-democracies, since the two lines with confidence interval is overlapping of positive polity values. Figure 2 show similar results. The destabilizing effect of democratization is largest for non-democracies, but there is also a gap in conflict-proneness for democracies. Figure 3 and 4 show, in general, a higher likelihood of experiencing conflict if the country is also experiencing regime change. The trends are similar for all of them; the likelihood of experiencing conflict is decreased when the Polity score is high. Thus, the interaction effects do not seem to be especially strong for neither democratization nor autocratization.

I run a likelihood ratio test on the simple logit models to test the difference between the models without interaction effect and the base model. Table 6 displays the test, which indicates that the inclusion of interaction effect do not improve the models. *Democratization* is no longer significant in Model 4.2 in Table 4. The regime change

variables are probably influenced by multicollinearity of the interaction effects. The likelihood ratio test implies that the Base Model has the best fit. Thus, these results are the most reliable.

Table 6: Likelihood Ratio Test for the Separate Models (Table 4 and 5)

	LR chi2(1)	Prob > chi2
Model 4.1 nested in Model 4.2 (Violence)	3.68	0.0550
Model 4.1 nested in Model 4.3 (Violence)	3.44	0.0636
Model 7.1 nested in Model 7.2 (Nonviolence)	0.00	0.9779
Model 7.1 nested in Model 7.3 (Nonviolence)	0.25	0.6152

4.3 Control Variables

When it comes to the findings of the control variables, the results of *Population* correspond with previous research (e.g. Fearon and Laitin 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 2004). The same goes for *GDP per capita* for violent campaigns, while for nonviolent campaigns, the results are generally weak. *Population* is significant for both resistance methods in all models, at 0.01 level. It indicates positive effects, which means that a larger population provides an increased likelihood of experiencing both violent and nonviolent campaigns. That a large population increases the chances of conflict is a result that repeatedly has been confirmed by scholars. At least since Thomas Robert Malthus (1798), it has been argued that a lager population size increases a country´s risk of suffering from civil conflict. Collier and Hoeffler (2004) find that the risk of civil war is proportional to a country´s population, and Fearon and Laitin (2003) finds robust evidence pointing towards that countries with larger population size is exposed to a higher risk of intra-state war. In Chenoweth and Lewis´ (2013) replication of Fearon and Laitin´s (2003) study, the only determinant violent and nonviolent campaigns share in common is population size. This is also consistent with the results of this analysis.

GDP per capita indicates a positive effect on nonviolent campaigns, which means that a higher GDP per capita gives an increased likelihood of nonviolent campaigns. This result, however, is not significant in any of the models. For violent campaigns, on the other hand, *GDP per capita* is significant in all models, at 0.05 level, and has a negative effect. This indicates that poor countries have increased likelihood of violent campaigns. Buhaug (2006) finds that GDP per capita is inversely related to conflict propensity. States with higher GDP per capita seems to be better at maintaining

conflicts at low casualty levels. Cunningham (2013) also find support for greater state capacity, measured by GDP per capita, decreases the chance of civil war, but do not find a significant result for nonviolent campaigns. She claim that the different effect on civil war and nonviolence might suggest that stronger states are more effective at repressing violent opposition than nonviolent mobilization. Additionally, Celestino and Gleditsch (2013) find that GDP per capita may marginally reduce the odds of transition to new autocracies.

Peaceyears is included in the models, together with cubic spline functions, as a control for temporal dependence. The variable is not significant in any of the models for nonviolent campaigns. For violent campaigns, *Peaceyears* is significant at 0.1 level and has a positive effect. It seems that time might have a healing effect, like Collier and Hoeffler (2004) find in their study; that time since last conflict seems to have substantial effects, and that time heals. This may reflect the gradual decline of rebellion-specific capital, and hence an increasing cost of rebellion, or the gradual erosion of hatred (Collier and Hoeffler 2004, 589).

These results indicate that there is a relationship between democratization and violent and nonviolent campaigns, and between autocratization and violent campaigns. At first glance, the results seem to correspond with Cederman´s et al. (2010) findings. Nevertheless, since the lagged model is not significant, and I therefore cannot with confidence determine the direction of the causality, I am not content with this conclusion. In the next chapter, I introduce a qualitative case study, as I find this helpful in the investigation of the direction of the causality. I look at some of the observed conflicts in the dataset to establish in which order the incidences takes place.

5. Cases

In this section I will present some cases that illustrate how, and in which order democratization and conflict has occurred in various countries. The empirical evidence in the analysis indicates that there is a link between democratization and conflict. The causality, however, is difficult to interpret since the lagged model is not significant and the model without lag contains Polity data measured on a yearly basis. The model without lag suggests that democratization and conflict is linked, but only when it happens the same year. There is from the statistical evidence no way of knowing which incidence happened first. A study of some of the conflicts in the data might help with the interpretation of the causality, and reveal potential patterns. The focus of these case examples will be on nonviolent campaigns, although violent campaigns are also briefly discussed.

A brief overview of the conflicts in the data denotes an overweight of nonviolent campaigns leading to democratization. Nevertheless, there are cases of democratization leading to nonviolent campaigns. The main focus in the following section will be on what McFaul (2002) terms the 4th wave of democracy in Eastern Europe in the 1980s and 1990s. Some cases outside Europe are also discussed for a global perspective. A list of all the incidences with conflict and regime change the same year is found in Table A4 in the appendix.

5.1 Introduction to the Cases of Nonviolence

Mikhail Gorbachev has received much of the credit for the collapse of the authoritarian East European regimes. Rush (1993) claims that Gorbachev´s economic policy hastened the downfall. While one cannot ignore Gorbachev´s role, his actions alone are not enough. First, a model that explains the collapse of the Soviet-type system must consider the factors that made it possible for him to come to power, the factors that encouraged him to launch his reforms, the reasons for their failure etc. Second, explanations that focus on Gorbachev´s decisions to “let go” Eastern Europe cannot explain why this policy induced the regimes and opposition in the satellite countries to react differently (Saxonberg 1997, 16). The lack of civil society has been mentioned as a reason why change in the Eastern Europe was not possible. After 1989, suddenly, it has been in vogue to claim that the emergence of a civil society was the cause, or at least one of the major causes of the collapse. Weigle and

Butterfield (1992) claim that civil society in all of the Eastern European countries went through several stages. These countries experienced an emergent civil society that would quickly mobilize to overthrow the weakened Communist regimes. Saxonberg (1997) argues that such hypotheses cannot explain the differences in the process of change. Instead, they must exaggerate the similarities of the countries to the point of making no distinction between the several hundred dissidents who were active in Hungary when the regime began contemplating negotiations and the millions of demonstrating Czechs and Slovaks who forced their Politburo to resign after one week. Saxonberg (1997) argues that Poland and Hungary experienced negotiated "institutional compromises" with the opposition, while neighboring East Germany and Czechoslovakia experienced nonviolent revolutions (Saxonberg 1997, 1). These are great examples of the different possibilities of the direction of the causality between democratization and conflict. Saxonberg´s (1997) classification is consistent with my analyses. Both Hungary and Poland are examples where democratization emerged before the conflict, while East Germany and Czechoslovakia experienced nonviolent campaigns before democratization occurred.

5.1.1 The Solidarity Movement in Poland

During the Brezhnev years, Western observers generally believed that the Soviet-bloc countries were extremely stable. The Polish leader, Edward Gierek, also shared this view. To his surprise, a strike broke out at the Lenin Shipyard when he announced a price hike in 1980. Although the strike leader announced that the strike had ended after their wages had increased, his colleagues kept striking in solidarity with other workers who had not received a similar wage increase. Thus was *Solidarność* (Solidarity) born (Saxonberg 1997, 3). The union signed the historic Gdańsk accords with the Communist regime. For the first time in the history of the Soviet bloc, workers received the right to strike and the right to form free trade unions. One-and-a-half years, and two Communist general secretaries later, martial law was declared, and *Solidarność* leaders were arrested and the independent union was banned. In 1988, waves of strikes broke out again, but they did not develop into the mass mobilization of 1980-1981. The emerging worker unrest was worrisome enough to remind the regime that it did not have enough legitimacy to carry out tough measures to get the economy back in balance. This led to the proposal of the "round table" discussion with various social and working circles (Janowski 1992, 163), which

eventually was enough to call off the strikes. The round table negotiations led to semi-free elections. In the June 1989 elections, the Communists did not win a single seat in the senate. In the lower *Sejm,* they only took their pre-allotted seats. After this, the "allied" parties began acting like autonomous organizations and decided to build a government with *Solidarność* (Saxonberg 1997, 4).

5.1.2 The Pro-Democracy Movement in Hungary

In the same month as the semi-free elections took place in Poland, trilateral talks began in Hungary between the Communists, opposition parties, and other interest groups. During the 1970s, János Kádár´s brand of "goulash socialism" was relatively successful, and Hungary had the highest quality consumer goods in the Soviet bloc. At the start of the 1980s, however, the country faced a mounting debt crisis, declining investments and lowered real wages. To deal with the worsening situation, the regime devised a series of economic reforms. As hard currency debt continued to rise and hyperinflation loomed, the reforms failed to alleviate the problems. The population began losing confidence in the regime. However, no significant strike movement emerged. Nor did any nationwide, mass anti-government demonstrations arise (Bruszt 1990, 366). Taking advantage of the new climate caused by Gorbachev´s policies, the Hungarian reform Communists became increasingly vocal. In February 1989, the Central Committee went against the general secretary and passed a resolution calling for the creation of a multi-party system. Contrary to popular belief then, the Hungarian rather than the Polish Communist leaders were the first to advocate competitive elections openly (Saxonberg 1997, 5). In contrast to the Polish accord, the agreement in Hungary provided for completely free elections. During the election campaign, the major parties took increasingly anti-Communist stance, and the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF) formed a government with several small conservative parties, sending amongst others, the reform Communists into the opposition (Saxonberg 1997, 5).

5.1.3 The Pro-Democracy Movement in East Germany (GDR)

The GDR, under the conservative regime of Erich Honecker, was by Westerners considered the most stable of the Soviet-bloc countries. This regime was bent on preventing any reforms or experiments. Although the economic situation worsened in the 1980s, the General Secretary Honecker insisted on continuing along the neo-Stalinist path. Thus, he maintained tight control over the ideological, political, social,

and economic spheres of society. Nevertheless, peace, environmental, civil rights, and women´s groups began to emerge during the early 1980s. The Honecker regime anticipated that Gorbachev´s *glasnost* might spread to the land of stability and orthodoxy. Instead, the neo-Stalinists embarked on a "re-ideologization" campaign (Saxonberg 1997, 6). As it became increasingly clear that Honecker would not reconsider his policies, citizens began looking for ways to escape, for example to Hungary, where the reformist Communists had began negotiating with the opposition. Increasing demonstrations against the Honecker regime resulted in the Politburo announcing the resignation of General Secretary Honecker (Saxonberg 1997, 6). The new General Secretary, Egon Krenz, was unable to develop a policy that would put the population at ease, as increasing numbers of people began attending demonstrations and leaving the country. The entire cabinet and the Politburo resigned and citizens were able to travel freely. Once the wall came tumbling down, the Communists were never able to retake the initiative, and elections were announced. Hans Modrow formed a new government, the opposition was legalized, Krenz resigned, and a Round Table was established as the effective government (Saxonberg 1997, 7).

5.1.4 The Velvet Revolution in Czechoslovakia (ČSSR)

Up to the mid 1960s, the Czechoslovak Communists were even more orthodox than their East German neighbors. After two decades of suffocation, reformers came to power in 1968. During the "Prague Spring" independent organizations blossomed as critical voices spread throughout the country. Later that year, Warsaw Pact tanks tramped over the growing society. Gustáv Husák became general secretary, and at first, he gave hopes that some reforms would continue. But he later announced a policy of "normalization". The new leadership fired more researchers and silenced more cultural personalities than in any other period in the Czechoslovak history. When Miloš Jakeš replaced Husák as general secretary in 1987, the situation did not change much. However, there were some signs that they were losing their tight grip on society. Several large demonstrations took place in 1988. Although, the first demonstrations were met with tear gas, truncheons, and water cannons, they became increasingly daring. The rulers suddenly lay down their guard and allowed the first unofficial demonstration in almost two decades. Several demonstrations followed, but were again met with the government´s hardline policy. A general strike eventually led

to the resignation of Prime Minister Ladislav Adamec. A new government was quickly formed in which *Občanské Forum* (OF or Civic Forum) and its Slovak sister *Verejnosť proti násiliu* (VPN or Public Against Violence) provided the majority of ministers (Saxonberg 1997, 8).

5.1.5 The Ogoni Movement in Nigeria

Most of the cases where democratization led to nonviolent campaigns took place in Europe in the late 1980s. However, there are some examples outside Europe. The Ogoni movement against government and corporate exploitation in Nigeria in the 1990s is one. After a countercoup, which brought Ibrahim Babangida to power in the summer of 1985, Babangida raised the idea of a return to democratic government in 1986, as a way of dealing with the legitimacy crisis. The Babangida government´s political task was to restore administrative norms, to restore faith in central government, to reformulate the rules of the political game, and to establish mechanisms for greater reciprocity between the civic realm of ordinary Nigerians and the public realm controlled by government officials. The program was implemented in 1989 (Chazan 1989, 334). In the 1980s, the Nigerian government severely damaged the environment of its southern region with extensive oil production and other economic activities. The Ogoni movement was founded by Ken Saro-Wiwa and began as a struggle against the exploitation of natural resources of Ogoniland by Shell Oil Company and the Nigerian State. In 1990, the Ogoni leaders signed the *Ogoni Bill of Rights.* The Bill called for:

> "political control of Ogoni affairs by Ogoni people, control and use of Ogoni economic resources for Ogoni development, adequate and direct representation as of right for Ogoni people in all Nigerian national institutions and the right to protect the Ogoni environment and ecology from further degradation." (Ogoni Bill of Rights 1990, 1).

The Bill was presented to General Babangida, and the *Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People* (MOSOP), a nonviolent action group, was formed. However, the central government arrested and executed the chief leader of the Ogoni movement, and violently suppressed the Ogoni support base (Chenoweth 2011, 83). The Babangida regime failed to produce the promised civilian government for Nigeria, but the democratization program offered opportunities to various interest groups to once again rise fundamental but previously suppressed issues related to the nation (Osaghae 1995, 325).

5.1.6 The Struggle Against the Moi Dictatorship in Kenya

Kenya´s struggle against the Moi dictatorship is an example of a nonviolent campaign that led to democratization. After president Jomo Kenyatta died in 1978, his vice president Daniel arap Moi became the new president. Although he was first considered a tolerant leader, it did not take long before he started tightening his control over Kenya´s security forces and eventually passing a constitutional amendment establishing his own party, *Kenyan African National Union* (KANU), as the only legal political party. Hence Kenya moved from being a de facto one party regime to a de jure one (Nepstad 2011, 98). These changes led to resistance, especially amongst the Kikuyu and Luo, which had been driven out of power by president Moi. The Kenyan economy declined in the early 1980s, and the opposition grew even larger. Moi escalated the use of repressive tactics, including torture, and limited negative information about the government. The resistance against the government accelerated in 1988 after the death of the political dissident Peter Karanja. The conflict reached its heights in 1990 as pastor Njoya called on Kenyans to emulate East Germany´s recent nonviolent revolution. Several of the elites broke ties with Moi. The international community also sided with the opposition´s call for human rights and multiparty elections. The end of the Cold War meant that the United States was now willing to put some power behind its demand for civil liberties and democratization. Since Kenya was no longer needed as a strategic ally in the struggle against communism, U.S. politicians were making aid donations contingent on measurable democratic progress (Nepstad 2011, 103). Moi was faced with a choice between making political concessions or face a downward-spiraling economy and mounting resistance. In December 1991, Moi announced that he would legalize oppositional parties and hold multiparty elections in 1992. Although he went through with the election, he remained in power until 2002 (Chenoweth 2011, 88).

5.2 Introduction to the Cases of Violence

The cases above are all examples of nonviolent campaigns. In the following section, I briefly take a look at some violent campaigns that took place the same year as a regime change. Some of the violent campaigns are also influenced by the fall of the Soviet Union, but instead of nonviolent resistance, these campaigns turned violent. When the Taliban revolt broke out in Afghanistan, the country was already war-torn and lacked institutions to ensure a safe transition after the Soviet Union´s withdrawal.

The same problem occurred in Cambodia, when they abandoned their monarchy. They did not have stable institutions to ensure peace and democracy. Instead, the Khmer Rouge led the country into civil war and genocide. Romania was influenced by the democratization processes in Eastern Europe, but did not succeed in the path of nonviolence, like many of the other democratizing states did. Romania´s leader was eventually removed by a violent revolution.

5.2.1 The Romanian Revolt Against the Ceauşescu Regime

The democratization processes and the fall of communism in Eastern Europe also influenced Romania. Unlike many of the other Eastern European Communist countries, Romania had a single powerful leader much of its time. Nicholae Ceauşescu came to power in 1967 and almost immediately began to pursue politics in opposition to the mainline Warsaw pact. He created an autocratic communist system, which led to a difficult time in the period of reform that brought about the end of the Communist system in Eastern Europe. Initial nonviolent attempts to remove Ceauşescu in the late 1980s were unsuccessful, resulting in violent revolution to unseat the communist government (Chenoweth 2011, 70). Compared to the abovementioned cases from the Eastern European democratization processes in the late 1980s and early 1990s, Romania´s democratization turned violent. Romania faced a mixture of military opposition, internal revolt within the party, and quickly spreading popular uprising (Brooker 2009, 218). The events in Romania contrasted with the swift, bloodless and essentially peaceful overthrow of the Communist regime in, for instance, Czechoslovakia. The same is true of Romania´s subsequent attempts to transform its economic and political systems (Light and Phinnemore 2001, 1).

5.2.3 Afghan Taliban Revolt Against the Government Regime

Another example of violent campaigns the same year as democratization is Afghanistan in 1992. When the Soviet invasion ended, the country was left devastated and both the economy and the population were depleted. The trained and armed mujahedeen, who had fought off the Soviets, overthrew the weak central government in Kabul. This resulted in a bloody civil war. One of the violent militias, composed of Islamic students who practiced a reactionary form of Islam, began to take control over the country. They called themselves *Taliban*, and received significant backing from various Muslim states, as well as the support form other radical Islamic organizations, such as *Al Qaeda*. They were able to defeat many of the less organized militias, and in

1996 they captured Kabul. The *Taliban*, then, formed an Islamic government of Afghanistan (Chenoweth 2011, 116). There was no substantial democratization process in Afghanistan, but the *Taliban* was able to take control because of the power vacuum that arose after the Soviet invasion, and succeeded in their goal of creating an Islamic state. This emphasizes the importance of level of democracy at the time the conflict breaks out. When the Soviets left, there were not sufficiently stable institutions to take over power, and therefore led the country further into civil war, and to training of Islamic fighters for new central Asian states and elsewhere around the world (Ferguson 2003, 8).

5.2.4 Cambodian Khmer Rouge Revolt Against the Government

The Cambodian Khmer Rouge revolt against the government in 1970 is another example of power vacuum leading to violent campaigns. The Cambodian Head of State, Prince Norodom Sihanouk was removed after a vote in the National Assembly in 1970. Cambodia was no longer a monarchy, and *The Khmer Rouge*, a Marxist-aligned Cambodian ethnic group, led a radical movement. They launched a mass revolt against the new Cambodian government and the pro-American Lon Nol. *The Khmer Rouge* used both traditional Communist thought as well as Cambodian tradition, and gathered followers under the promise of returning Cambodia to its former glories, and removing foreign presences. *The Khmer Rouge* defeated the Cambodian government and instituted a Communist regime that committed genocide and other crimes against humanity during its reign (Chenoweth 2011, 133).

Brooker (2009) argues that when democratization occurs in countries with a weak state rather than a collapsed state, the failings of the state may prevent full democratization and in one sense actually preserve non-democratic rule. The people subject to local non-democratic rulers will not benefit greatly from democratization at the central level if this fails to remove their local tyranny. Removing a dictator may facilitate the rise of local dictatorships in tribal, religious or armed forces, who have little to fear from an elected central government that lacks the state capacity to enforce the will of the people (Brooker 2009, 232).

6. Discussion and Concluding Remarks

This last chapter intertwines the empirical findings, the case study, and previous research. I will go through the evidence in this thesis with Cederman´s et al. (2010) article in mind, as regard to their warnings about democratization processes. Perhaps is the threat of conflict after regime changes not as severe as previously assumed? Hence I will examine possible safe paths to democracy. The chapter finishes with some concluding remarks.

Transitions to democracy have occurred with surprising frequency. Since 1974, which according to Huntington (1991) was the beginning of the "third wave of democratization", many authoritarian regimes have ended. Scholars have greeted the increasing number of democratizations with delight, intense attention, and theoretical puzzlement. It seems as there should be a parsimonious and compelling explanation of the transitions, but the explanations proposed have been confusingly complicated, careless about basic methodological details, often more useful as description than explanation, and surprisingly inconsistent with each other. The basic problem faced by analysts is that the process of democratization varies enormously from case to case and region to region. Generalizations proposed have failed either to accommodate all the real-world variation or to explain it (Geddes 1999, 117).

The fall of communism and the rise of new democracies in Eastern Europe in the late 1980s and the early 1990s has largely been analyzed by the democratization literature as part of a common "wave" of democracy. McFaul (2002) even call it the 4th wave of democracy. Wood (2000) challenges the negative predictions on the efficacy of nonviolent campaigns. He claims that they only hold true for a specific period of modern history. The "third wave" of democratization occurred in Latin America and southern Europe in the wake of military rule. These were mainly cases of elite-led democratization, in contrast to the transitions in Eastern Europe and Africa, where popular protest played a significant role (Wood 2000, 16). Contrasting patterns of mobilization and bargaining across Eastern Europe reveals differences in the process of democratization that cannot be explained in terms of the temporal cluster of events. These cases challenge the literature on contentious politics, which remains limited by assumptions of Western parliamentary systems in which its theories were developed, such as the respect for rights of association, guarantee of civil liberties, electoral

responsiveness of political representatives, and the role of the media as an independent watchdog upon governments (Glenn 2003, 105). Saxonberg (1997) argues that Poland and Hungary experienced institutional compromise when the Soviet Union dissolved. This is because the impetus for change came from the elites, who initiated negotiations with the opposition over the shape of the new institutions. East Germany and Czechoslovakia experienced revolutions because the impetus for change came directly from mobilization of a broad-based opposition engaged in non-accepted means of mass collective action, which brought about systemic change that changed both the political and socio-economical system.

Even if the Nigerian regime failed to produce the civilian government they had promised, the democratization efforts made by General Babangida, opened for new opportunities to interest groups to rise fundamental issues that previously had been suppressed. In Kenya, on the other hand, resistance against the government arose from the repressive tactics of the Moi dictatorship. The fall of communism in Europe had impact in the former colonies. Kenya was no longer needed as an ally against communism, and the international community increasingly sided with the opposition. This eventually enabled the multiparty elections in 1992.

More recent examples of nonviolent revolutions, which are not included in the dataset, are the democratization processes in the Arab countries and Ukraine. The Arab Spring started with the self-immolation of a Tunisian fruit vendor in December 2010. This first appeared as an isolated act of protest against local authorities, but quickly, this incident gained broader significance since it was followed by a series of demonstrations that challenged the autocratic regimes (Campante and Chor 2012, 167). In the beginning of the Arab Spring, the demonstrations and protests had the characteristics of nonviolent resistance. In the longer term, many of the movements failed in their demands for democracy and human rights, and was overtaken by civil war.

In the 2004 presidential election in Ukraine, the Orange Revolution spread across the country and brought Viktor Yushchenko to power. In 2010 Viktor Yanukovych became president, but the people initiated demonstrations against Yanukovych´s regime. They were relatively successful and the costs were low. However, the

situation escalated, and the regime used violent means to crush the demonstrators. Many people lost their life in the clashes between Yanukovych regime and the demonstrators. Eventually, this led to the annexation of the Crimea by the Russian Federation in 2014. Both Ukraine and the Arab counties are examples of relatively recent nonviolent campaigns with promising prospects, which escalated into civil wars. The opposition´s chances of succeeding in their goals would be much higher if they continued with nonviolent strategies. It is, however, difficult to ensure that a campaign remain nonviolent, especially when the regime encounters the opposition with violence (Dahl 2014).

The empirical evidence in this thesis suggests that there is a link between democratization and both violent and nonviolent campaigns. There is also evidence of a link between autocratization and violent campaigns. However, the results from the multinomial and the simple logistic analyses are rather unclear when it comes to the causality. The model with one-year lag fails to give significant results for neither democratization nor autocratization. This might imply that the direction is the opposite of what my hypotheses suggests. Because the Polity data is measured yearly, it is difficult to determine if the results indicate instant outbreaks, or if the causality is reversed. The cases discussed above suggest that the causality goes both ways, although the majority starts with a conflict, which later results in democratization. This brings doubt to the confirmation of my hypotheses. The results of my analysis assumingly supports hypothesis H1b, that democratization increases the probability of nonviolent campaigns, and hypothesis H2a, that autocratization increases the probability of violent campaigns. The analysis suggests that hypotheses H1a, that democratization decreases the probability of violent campaigns, in fact is opposite. This implies that democratization has an increasing effect on both resistance tactics. The analysis is, however, unable to confirm the causality because the lagged model is not significant. Since the majority of cases also are in favor of the opposite direction, I cannot with confidence confirm these hypotheses.

Cederman et al. (2010) claim that their hypotheses links civil war to democratization, and to some extent to autocratization. They argue that these two processes appear to be driven by distinctive logics that operate in different speeds. Democratization requires some time for mobilization to produce civil wars, while the collapse of

democratic rule is generally associated with more or less instant outbreaks of political violence. In case-based efforts to trace the casual mechanisms that potentially connect democratization and conflict in selected regions, Cederman et al. (2010) state that democratization indeed can trigger conflict by altering the incentives and opportunities of political actors (Cederman et al. 2010, 387). Cederman et al. (2010) conclude with cautions against exaggerated optimism as regards the success of democratization projects, and that policymakers need to consider the path to democracy carefully in settings that could trigger conflict.

In my analysis, the first set of models seemingly supports the findings of Cederman et al. (2010). Democratization has indeed a link to both violent and nonviolent campaigns, and autocratization also has a link to violent campaigns. Like Cederman et al. (2010), I have included a set of models with a tree-year span, which also confirm this result. The problem with these findings is that the causality is difficult to interpret. In an attempt to clarify the direction of the causality, I have included a set of models with one-year lag. Significant results in this model would strengthen the assumption that democratization leads to conflict. Since I am not able to get any significant results in this model, Cederman et al.´s (2010) findings becomes questionable. They use area experts to explore the precise links between democratization and conflict, and found evidence for this. Nevertheless, their statistical evidence might be insufficient because they lack a lagged model. A replication of their study with the inclusion of a lagged model show that the regime change variables fail to give significant results when they are lagged by one year (see Table 5 and 6 in appendix). The statistical findings need to be considered, and thoroughly examined in relation to the case studies, but this example emphasizes the importance of using the lag function. The lagged model in my analysis is perhaps not even detailed enough. Preferably, I would use Polity data measured monthly. This would provide more reliable results when it comes to estimating the causality issue. I find that there is a relationship between regime change and conflict, but this relationship disappears when the regime changes are lagged by one year. The yearly measure of regime change is limiting because it is difficult to determine when the regime change happened compared to the conflict. The case study provides some insights to the issue, but is not sufficient to make assumptions about general patterns of the democratization-conflict linkage.

6.1 A Safe Path to Democracy?

If democratization increases the risk of conflict, it creates a dilemma for external democracy promoters as well as for the countries that consider undertaking democratization. Is there a way to move towards democracy without facing the perils of democratization? Scholars of intrastate conflict have shown that credible commitment problems facilitate the outbreak of civil conflict (e.g. Fearon 1998; Lake and Rothchild 1996). Savun and Tirone (2011) claim that democracy aid can decrease the risk of conflict by mitigating the severity of commitment problems prevalent during the early phases of democratization. Democracy assistance programs help transitioning states not only strengthening their key political institutions, but also empower nonstate actors. Functioning political institutions increase the central government´s ability to credibly signal its intentions to opposition groups and make future promises to the society. External electoral assistance programs to support democratic transitions provide additional credibility to the promises made by the state. The empowered civil society organizations can monitor the state´s actions and thereby reduce the centralization of power and fears about the state´s intentions. Savun and Tirone (2011) find empirical evidence that democratizing countries that receive high levels of democracy aid are less likely to experience civil conflict than those that receive little or no democracy aid. They argue that although democracy assistance programs may not be a perfect substitute for regional organizations, they can act as a complement or a less expensive alternative to the legitimization and validation functions of regional organizations in their efforts to smoothen the thorny aspects of the democratization process (Savun and Tirone 2011, 243).

According to Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) nonviolent campaigns have been more successful at achieving higher and more diverse participation than violent insurgencies. Domestic mobilization is a more reliable source of power than foreign sponsorship, which most violent insurgencies must seek to pursue their ends. They also argue that large-scale participation often translates into tactical and strategic advantages, as the mass withdrawal of cooperation forces the regime to capitulate to the campaigns demands. The ability of nonviolent campaigns to mobilize a higher number of participants with a more diverse array of skills, abilities, and perspectives explains why they have been so successful at activating local mechanisms of change in their societies, including shifts in loyalty from the regime to the resistance and the

ability to make regime repression backfire (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011, 61). According to Chenoweth and Stephan (2011), nonviolent campaigns have been successful in almost 60% of regime change disputes, whereas violent campaigns have succeeded in under 30% of the cases (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011, 9). In Chenoweth and Stephan´s (2011) sample, about one in four violent campaigns have succeeded overall, but these cases are likely to lead to the recurrence of civil war within ten years of the end of the campaign. Nonviolent campaigns, on the other hand, are much less likely to be succeeded by violent civil wars, at least in the ten years following the end of the campaign. Short-term strategic victories achieved by violent campaigns usually do not translate into democracy or civil peace. Success of nonviolent campaigns, on the other hand, is more likely to produce these long-term outcomes. In fact, the long-term effects of failed nonviolent campaigns are more favorable to democracy and civil peace than the long-term effects of successful violent campaigns (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011, 202). If the causality indeed is the opposite of what my hypotheses suggests, and that conflicts lead to democratization, Chenoweth and Stephan´s (2011) strong empirical evidence indicates that the tactic of choice should be nonviolent. This is especially true when the objective of the campaign is regime change (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011, 9).

6.2 Conclusions

The goal of this thesis is to find general tendencies about the relationship between regime change and conflict. The results suggest that there is a relationship between the two, but the main concern remains unclear. The results do not provide the necessary evidence concerning the direction of the causality. The results from the regression analysis speak for either an instant effect of conflict after regime change, or the direction of the causality is reversed. The case analysis is not comprehensive enough to provide generalizations, but points in the direction of the reversed causality assumption.

I find that the Polity score has minimal effect on violent campaigns. A change in Polity score, on the other hand, increases the likelihood of experiencing violent campaigns. The destabilizing effect of democratization is largest for non-democracies, but there is also a gap in conflict-proneness for democracies. The likelihood of experiencing conflict is higher if the country is also experiencing regime change. The

likelihood of experiencing conflict is decreased when the Polity score is high. Thus, interaction effects do not seem to be especially strong for neither democratization nor autocratization.

This thesis contributes to the field of regime change and conflict studies with new findings, with the inclusion of nonviolent campaigns. Nonviolent action is increasingly included in conflict studies, and is seen as an important factor to improve understandings of the changing global landscape (Chenoweth and Cunningham 2013, 272). Nonviolent action is considered to be nearly twice as effective than violent insurgencies, in the pursue of both democracy and liberal peace (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011, 7), and deserves attention in the democratic civil peace literature.

This thesis also includes lag structures in an attempt to reveal the direction of the causality between regime change and conflict. I consider the use of lag structures as a methodological improvement from previous research on this issue. Cederman et al. (2010) speaks for cautions against optimism as regard the success of democratization projects. I argue that this conclusion is too pessimistic, based on the limitations in their analysis. The path to democracy is potentially dangerous, and analysts and policymakers should consider settings that could trigger conflict, but the statistical evidence points in the direction of conflict being a trigger for regime change rather than the other way around. The benefit of using mixed methods becomes evident, as the statistical analysis is inadequate in determining the direction of the causality. The case study in this thesis is not extensive enough to make generalizations, but provides an indication. The overall impression is that campaigns, both violent and nonviolent, can result in regime change. The goal of such campaigns is often increased human rights and greater autonomy. As almost 60% of the cases of nonviolent campaigns seem to succeed when regime change is the goal (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011, 9), it is evident that such campaigns can be triggers for regime change.

6.3 Further Research

Regime change can trigger democratization, but this remains a somewhat open issue. Further research is needed on this topic, and it should focus on determining the direction of the causality, and seek to establish a scholarly consensus regarding this issue. A further investigation on this issue should use observations measured monthly.

This will make the analysis more precise and give some clarifications to the direction of the causality between regime change and conflict. More research is also needed on whether it is regime change itself, or if it is being in an intermediate polity that provides the increased likelihood of experiencing conflict.

The research on nonviolent action is also a great and interesting challenge in the future research. Nonviolence is on the rise in conflict-studies, and there are a lot of unexplored topics for researchers to investigate. Nonviolence is no longer only seen as a tactic adopted for moral or principled reasons, but is actually becoming a self-conscious tradition that, according to Chenoweth and Stephan (2011), can contribute to civil peace and democracy that will last. Research questions regarding nonviolence can give scholars insights and clarifications in the search for peaceful and stable societies.

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Appendix

Table A1: Model 1.1 with Regime Change Variables Separate

	Nonviolence	Violence	Nonviolence	Violence
Democratization	1.704***	1.184***		
	(0.285)	(0.305)		
Autocratization			0.499	0.823**
			(0.523)	(0.363)
Population	0.489***	0.203***	0.464***	0.201***
	(0.0764)	(0.0544)	(0.0825)	(0.0545)
GDP per Capita	0.156	-0.289**	0.125	-0.290**
	(0.110)	(0.115)	(0.114)	(0.117)
Polity	-0.0845***	-0.0163	-0.0906***	-0.0233
	(0.0185)	(0.0163)	(0.0181)	(0.0158)
Year	0.00946	-0.0172***	0.0153*	-0.0126**
	(0.00938)	(0.00627)	(0.00905)	(0.00628)
Peaceyears	0.0933	0.218*	0.0356	0.193
	(0.116)	(0.128)	(0.113)	(0.126)
Constant	-29.54	29.90**	-40.33**	20.94*
	(18.45)	(12.45)	(17.66)	(12.42)
Pseudo Log-Likelihood	-916.11358		-937.87354	
Observations	7,238		7,238	

Robust standard errors in parentheses. Cubic splines included, but not shown.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A2: Tolerance Test of Multicollinearity

	Tolerance (1/VIF)
Democratization	0.847545
Autocratization	0.967936
Population	0.963164
GDP per capita	0.698577
Polity	0.735720
Year	0.881698
Peaceyears	0.778290
Interaction DemocPolity	0.836355
Interaction AutocPolity	0.959853

Table A3: Model 1.1 with Polity Squared

	Nonviolence	Violence
Democratization	1.597***	1.007***
	(0.292)	(0.303)
Autocratization	0.730	0.841**
	(0.521)	(0.361)
Population	0.506***	0.241***
	(0.0749)	(0.0592)
GDP per Capita	0.228**	-0.158
	(0.114)	(0.124)
Polity	-0.0846***	-0.0209
	(0.0196)	(0.0196)
Polity Squared	-0.00807*	-0.0147***
	(0.00429)	(0.00433)
Year	0.00729	-0.0192***
	(0.00970)	(0.00623)
Peaceyears	0.0832	0.224*
	(0.116)	(0.128)
Constant	-25.66	33.11***
	(18.99)	(12.29)
Pseudo Log-Likelihood	-903.51523	
Observations	7,238	

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A4: Cases with Democratization or Autocratization and Violent or Nonviolent Conflict Onset the Same Year

Country	Year	Regime Change	Type of Conflict
Guatemala	1954	Autocratization	Violent
Guatemala	1996	Democratization	Nonviolent
El Salvador	1977	Autocratization	Nonviolent
Panama	1987	Autocratization	Nonviolent
Venezuela	1958	Democratization	Violent
Guyana	1992	Democratization	Violent
Peru	1980	Democratization	Violent
Peru	2000	Democratization	Nonviolent
Bolivia	1952	Democratization	Violent
Paraguay	1947	Democratization	Violent
Chile	1973	Autocratization	Violent
Chile	1983	Democratization	Nonviolent
Argentina	1973	Democratization	Violent
Poland	1980	Democratization	Nonviolent
Hungary	1989	Democratization	Nonviolent
Czechoslovakia	1968	Democratization	Nonviolent
Czechoslovakia	1989	Democratization	Nonviolent
Croatia	1999	Democratization	Nonviolent
Yugoslavia	1997	Democratization	Violent
Romania	1989	Democratization	Violent
USSR	1990	Democratization	Nonviolent
Senegal	2000	Democratization	Nonviolent
Niger	1991	Democratization	Nonviolent
Ivory Coast	2002	Autocratization	Violent
Liberia	2003	Democratization	Violent
Sierra Leone	1991	Democratization	Violent
Congo Brazzaville	1997	Autocratization	Violent
Uganda	1966	Autocratization	Violent
Tanzania	1992	Democratization	Nonviolent
Ethiopia	1974	Democratization	Violent
Zambia	2001	Democratization	Nonviolent
South Africa	1990	Democratization	Nonviolent
Madagascar	1991	Democratization	Nonviolent
Algeria	1992	Autocratization	Nonviolent

Sudan	1985	Democratization	Nonviolent
Iran	1979	Democratization	Violent
Lebanon	1975	Autocratization	Violent
North Yemen	1948	Democratization	Violent
North Yemen	1962	Democratization	Violent
South Yemen	1986	Democratization	Violent
Afghanistan	1978	Democratization	Violent
Afghanistan	1992	Democratization	Violent
Tajikistan	1992	Autocratization	Violent
Kyrgyzstan	2005	Democratization	Nonviolent
China	1966	Autocratization	Violent
China	1976	Democratization	Nonviolent
South Korea	1960	Democratization	Nonviolent
South Korea	1987	Democratization	Nonviolent
Myanmar	1988	Democratization	Nonviolent
Nepal	1990	Democratization	Nonviolent
Nepal	2006	Democratization	Nonviolent
Thailand	1973	Democratization	Nonviolent
Thailand	1992	Democratization	Nonviolent
Cambodia	1970	Democratization	Violent
Laos	1960	Autocratization	Violent
Philippines	1983	Democratization	Nonviolent
Indonesia	1959	Autocratization	Violent

Table A5: Onset of civil war as explained by regime-type change.
Replication of Cederman et al. (2010)

	Model 10.1: Base Model	Model 10.2: Base Model excluding observations with missing Polity values
Democratization	1.018***	1.070***
	(0.342)	(0.347)
Autocratization	0.948**	1.037**
	(0.441)	(0.440)
Population	0.213***	0.243***
	(0.0592)	(0.0629)
GDP per Capita	-0.364***	-0.371***
	(0.0691)	(0.0716)
Year	0.0171***	0.0190***
	(0.00514)	(0.00535)
Peaceyears	0.0235	-0.0327
	(0.0918)	(0.0970)
Constant	-38.25***	-42.34***
	(10.22)	(10.61)
Pseudo Log-Likelihood	-759.40256	-698.97396
Observations	5,824	5,723

Robust standard errors in parentheses. Cubic splines included, but not shown.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A6: Onset of civil war as explained by regime-type change.
Replication of Cederman et al. (2010) with lagged regime change variables.

	Model 11.1: Base Model, lagged.	Model 11.2: Base Model excluding observations with missing Polity values, lagged.
Democratization Lag	0.513	0.554
	(0.361)	(0.363)
Autocratization Lag	-0.974	-0.901
	(1.021)	(1.030)
Population	0.197***	0.226***
	(0.0640)	(0.0676)
GDP per Capita	-0.358***	-0.364***
	(0.0714)	(0.0735)
Year	0.0190***	0.0211***
	(0.00520)	(0.00541)
Peaceyears	0.0511	-0.00575
	(0.0919)	(0.0975)
Constant	-41.91***	-46.36***
	(10.33)	(10.73)
Pseudo Log-Likelihood	-751.551	-691.76713
Observation	5,780	5,679

Robust standard errors in parentheses. Cubic splines included, but not shown.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1