

Elias Yitbarek Alemayehu

# Revisiting «Slums», Revealing Responses

Urban upgrading in tenant-dominated  
inner-city settlements, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

Thesis for the degree philosophiae doctor

Trondheim, February 2008

Norwegian University of Science and Technology  
Faculty of Architecture and Fine Art  
Department of Urban Design and Planning



**NTNU**

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## **Revisiting “Slums”, Revealing Responses**

Urban upgrading in tenant-dominated inner-city settlements,  
in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

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## **Abstract**

About eighty percent of Addis Ababa's settlements are considered "slum". The study examines the phenomenon of urban upgrading in tenant-dominated non-planned inner-city settlements of the city. It focuses on tenants' responses and spatial transformations. The phenomenon is investigated through the analysis of case studies located in three localities. The data are primarily collected through qualitative techniques supplemented by a quantitative technique. The investigation is carried out from the perspective in which upgrading is viewed as a process embedded in a dynamic context, rather than a de-contextualised static project. Based on the case studies analytical generalizations are made. The study found neither the theories that assert the non-responsiveness of tenants nor the ones that emphasize the sole role of tenure security explain the reality and the needs of tenant-dominated settlements. The relationship among improved property rights, legal frameworks and grassroots organizations are rather found to be central in both stimulating tenants' responses and curbing uncontrolled spatial transformations. The advantages of social network, connected to indigenous voluntary associations, are also found to be very instrumental in motivating and mobilising tenants. The study also found exclusion-right, in addition to the often emphasized use- and transaction rights of housing, as an important element, not only in unleashing the resources of low-income dwellers, but also in engaging them in upgrading processes. Equally important finding is the way the housing rights/values are manipulated to both avoid gentrification and sustain upgrading processes. Upgrading paradoxes, related to both uncontrolled spatial transformations and the need of the individual and the collective, are revealed and their possible remedy is indicated. The substantive findings are abstracted into generative themes, namely, triggers of change, trigger-based grassroots organizations and actors' relationships. A trigger-based upgrading process is suggested and recommendations are put forward that lead to a differentiated and flexible policy.

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## Abbreviations, local terms and general notes

### Abbreviations

AACA	Addis Ababa City Administration
AARH	Agency for the Administration of Rental Housing
ACORD	Agency for Co-operation and Research Development
CBD	Central business district
CBO	Community Based Organisation
CBISDO	Community Based Integrated Sustainable Development Office
EC	Ethiopian Calendar
EDO	Environmental Development Office
FGD	Focus group discussion
GHP	Grand Housing Programme
HB	Housing beneficiary
HIV/AIDS	Human immunodeficiency virus/Acquired immunodeficiency syndrome
IB	Indirect beneficiaries
IHA-UDP	Integrated Holistic Approach-Urban Development Project
IRIN	Integrated Regional Information Networks
KDC	<i>Kebele</i> Development Committee
KMTC	Kirkos Multi-task Co-operative
LDP	Local development plan
NGO	Non Governmental Organisation
n.p.	No page
ORAAMP	Organization for the Revision of the Addis Ababa Master Plan
RBE	Redd Barna-Ethiopia
REWA	Revolutionary Ethiopia Women Association
REYA	Revolutionary Ethiopia Youth Association
SACC	Saving and Credit Co-operative

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## Selected Local terms

<i>Birr</i>	Ethiopian currency
<i>Chika</i>	Mud and wood construction
<i>Dergue</i> (also spelled <i>Derg</i> )	Committee (in <i>Geez</i> , ancient language of Ethiopia)
<i>Ghibi</i>	Palace
<i>Iddir</i> (also spelled <i>idir</i> , <i>eddir</i> , <i>edir</i> )	Voluntary burial association
<i>Injera</i>	Ethiopian flat bread
<i>Kebele</i>	Local government, the smallest administrative unit
<i>Kefteгна</i>	An old administrative unit, one level higher than <i>kebele</i> (used during the dergue era)
<i>Ketena</i>	An old administrative unit, one level lower than <i>kebele</i>
<i>Lastic biet</i>	A makeshift shelter made of plastic
<i>Chereka biet</i>	Squatter house
<i>Saar biet</i>	Thatched-roofed hut
<i>Sefer</i> (also spelled <i>safer</i> )	Neighbourhood
<i>Woreda</i>	An old administrative unit, one level higher than <i>kebele</i>
<i>Yehebret suk</i>	Public or common shop

## General notes

- According to the Ethiopian naming system, for Ethiopians, first names are given in the citations of the text; while first names followed by father's name are given in the reference. In the reference, both first and father's names appear in full; for the easy identification of the author by both Ethiopians and other readers.
- Unless stated, the old naming of woredas and kebele is used.
- To protect the identification of informants, names are either abbreviated or they are referred using office positions.
- In translating sensitive documents particulars which can identify individuals are omitted, while enough information is included necessary for the study.
- All the pictures are taken by the author.
- The exchange rate of 1 USD is about 9 Birr.

## Summary

Addis Ababa is one of the cities in the world in which large proportion of their settlements are recognized as “slum”<sup>1</sup>. About 80% of the city’s settlements and housing units are considered slum. The majority of these settlements are concentrated in the inner-city. About 70% of the houses located in the inner-city are *kebele*<sup>2</sup> (government) owned. The *kebele* houses are generally single storey *chika* (mud and wood construction) houses occupied by a majority of low-income tenants. This study focuses on the phenomenon of urban upgrading in tenant-dominated inner-city settlements. The investigation of this phenomenon is carried out through three inter-related issues: 1) the characteristics of non-planned inner-city settlements and upgrading approaches, 2) actors’ relationship and tenants’ responses, and 3) the influence of upgrading on the spatial transformation of inner-city settlements. Below, the method used, the theories reviewed, the cases investigated and the findings revealed; in search of both the understanding of the phenomenon and its implication to theory, practice and policy, are summarised.

## Method and approach

The subject of urban upgrading is nothing new. In fact it is one of the vastly discussed issues of urban development. This study, however, has infused a fresh perspective into the subject 1) by considering upgrading as a process of open-ended spatial transformation, 2) by investigating the phenomenon through an adapted “actor oriented approach” and 3) by focusing on the often marginalised inner-city settlement’s tenants. When upgrading is viewed as a static, time-bound and linear project, with preplanned input-output

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<sup>1</sup> Owing to its associated connotations of squalor, filth and crime the use of the term “slum” was largely considered inappropriate and its use had been diminishing until the mid 1990s (d’ Cruz & Satterthwaite, 2005). As a result more neutral terms that depict the diversity of settlements and the potential of slum dwellers have been in use. Following the mid 1990s, however, the term slum was re-introduced in the development discourse and even gained more legitimacy as organizations formed by dwellers in some countries started to refer themselves as “slum dweller” organizations and federations, albeit responding to the governments who categorized their settlements as slums (ibid). In this study the terms “slum” and “non-planned settlement” are used interchangeably.

<sup>2</sup> Local government, the smallest administrative unit.

components, it is usually investigated as an evaluation study against set goals of the project itself. This is not the primary focus of this study. The interest is rather on the understanding of upgrading as a process, mediated by the responses of multiple actors, in a dynamic context. A multi-case study is used in order to understand this process focusing on tenants’ response and spatial transformations. The study examined upgrading processes undertaken in tenant-dominated inner-city settlements. The data was primarily gathered through qualitative methods supplemented by a quantitative method. It relied on both secondary and primary sources— semi structured in-depth interviews, focus group discussions, individual case histories, informal discussions, direct observations, audiovisual materials, mapping, and a questionnaire.

### **Core theories**

Despite the emergence of literature on the significance of rental tenure in recent years (See for example: Gilbert, 1992, 1997; Rakodi, 1995; Andreasen, 1996 and UN-Habitat, 2003b) and the indication that inner-city slums are not any more transitory rental places (Eckstein, 1990), theories thus far emphasized the upgrading of squatter settlements or owner occupied inner-city settlements. Even when efforts were made to upgrade settlements with mixed tenure, the target group in mind are, usually, homeowners rather than tenants. This bias has to do with the origin and development of the self-help theory (Turner & Goetz, 1967; Turner, 1967, 1972, 1976; Mangin, 1970) and the developing countries’ insistence on the policies of home ownership (Rakodi, 1995; Schlyter, 2003; Potter, 2004). Therefore, there is a major knowledge gap not only on how upgrading affects tenant-dominated settlements (Gilbert, 1992; Rakodi, 1995; UN-Habitat, 2003b) but also on tenants’ response in upgrading processes (Andreasen, 1996; Mitlin, 1997; UN-HABITAT, 2003b quoting Rohe & Stewart, 1996). Hence, the following two main questions are posed:

- ***In the context of statet ownership of land and housing, to what extent, why and how do tenants respond to upgrading processes?***
- ***How do upgrading processes affect spatial transformations in tenant dominated inner-city settlements of Addis Ababa?***



Descriptive theories of “slum” and upgrading approaches were also reviewed in order to lay a basis for the understanding of the characteristics of non-planned inner-city settlements, the arena upon which the upgrading processes were conducted. Based on these theories a context-related question that seeks to understand the inner-city context and the various upgrading approaches is posed:

- *What are the characteristics of the non-planned settlements (slums) and upgrading approaches in the inner-city of Addis Ababa?*

In addition to the above questions the study has also additional interest. Beyond the understanding of the phenomenon, it seeks to draw generative themes and lessons which could be useful in dealing with the multi-pronged challenges and problems of inner-city settlements. Hence, a fourth normative question is posed:

- *How can upgrading processes, which engender positive socio-spatial transformations, be set in motion in tenant-dominated non-planned inner-city settlements of Addis Ababa?*

## Case study

### Case-1: Kirkos

#### NGO-initiated, Kebele-based upgrading process

The Kirkos upgrading intervention was initiated by RBE in 1983 with a pre-set goal of improving the living condition of children through “integrated community development” and the establishment of a revolving fund. The intervention included components such as housing, micro finance and income generating units. The intervention was phased out in 1990 and was handed over to the *kebele* administration. Under the then *kebele* administration the project was mismanaged and it fell short of meeting the envisioned goals of RBE.

Later in 2001 self-initiated tenants of the RBE-built houses, started to mobilize the inhabitants under a re-established SACC. The central issue of this group was to transfer the ownership of the RBE- built houses from the *kebele* administration to the sitting tenants. They also wanted to take over the administration of the RBE-built income generating units.

In 2004, in a *kebele* public meeting it was decided that the *kebele* administration should hand over all the RBE built properties to the SACC. Following the decision that the SACC should take over and administer the RBE-built housing and facilities, the question of the privatisation of the housing component started to be pursued. The SACC’s request was based on a vague article included in RBE’s project agreement. About 80 % of the sitting tenants of the newly constructed houses (henceforth, housing beneficiaries) had the perception that they are the owners of the RBE-built housing. The rest of the *kebele* dwellers were in opposition to the claim of the housing beneficiaries (HBs). Their main argument was that the RBE-built houses and all the rest of the facilities were built to generate income for a revolving fund and not to be privately owned by the sitting tenants. Because of this resistance, which was backed by the *kebele* administration, the resolution of the claim for private ownership remained pending.

The SACC leaders were also legally challenged by the *kebele* that the purpose of a SACC is to give a service of micro-finance and not administer funds from income generating units. As a reaction to this the SACC members, in 2005 created a new organization known as “Kirkos 21/13 Dwellers’ Service Oriented, Multi-task Cooperative with Limited Liability” (*Kirkos 21/13 newariwoch hulegeb agelilot sechi halafinetu yetewesene hibret sera mahiber*). In addition to defying the legal challenge, the main purpose of this association was to administer the fund from the income generating units and the housing, and involve in similar businesses when necessary.

Though initially tenants’ response was declined as a result of the mismanagement of RBE’s intervention, later tenants responded based on their perceptions. However, their response to the upgrading process was selective in that they focused more on privatising the housing components rather than, for example, the implementation of the concept of the revolving fund. The tenants were innovative in developing mechanisms through which they can mobilize themselves to secure their perceived rights. Not to appear selfish, with the sole interest of owning houses, they had to reinstate many of the components of RBE’s project through the establishment of the SACC itself and the Kirkos Multi-task Cooperative.

With regard to spatial transformation both the HBs and IBs showed different trend toward spatial transformations. Initially, both groups were engaged in similar uncontrolled

housing transformations. The uncontrolled house-level alterations and extensions had immediate advantages such as acquiring more space and generating more income. It was, however, of disadvantage for the collective good and the quality of the overall settlement. After the SACC assumed the administrative responsibility of the housing and income generating units the HBs were restrained from uncontrolled transformations.

## **Case-2: Menen**

### **NGO-initiated, SACC-based, upgrading process**

The Menen upgrading intervention was initiated by RBE in 1988 with a similar goal, to that of Kirkos– “child-centred community development”. The new element added in Menen was the “policy of private housing ownership”. Thus in Menen’s case the RBE-established SACC was not only giving the service of saving and credit, but also serving as the mortgager of the housing component. The houses were mortgaged to the SACC with a goal of achieving private property deeds at the expiry of twenty years. Transfer of ownership rights before the expiry of twenty years was not allowed. The idea of privatisation, however, was never officially endorsed by the government. Notwithstanding this, the SACC and all the HBs had the perception that the houses belonged to them.

The lack of clarity regarding the tenure status of the HBs was a cause of constant tension and conflict between the *kebele* administration and the SACC. The *kebele* had been constantly complaining that it was losing income, which was supposed to be collected from the RBE built houses either in the form of rental fees or land and housing taxes. The option of paying rent was not in the interest of the HBs as they considered themselves potential owners. Their interest was to pay taxes, as owner-occupiers would do. In 2004, the demand of the HBs to pay land and house tax was accepted, which was a big step towards ownership of the houses. They were also given a promise, that they may get a communal property deed in the future. The HBs considered these promissory words as a stepping-stone towards their final goal of acquiring private property deeds.

The selective introduction of tenure change pertinent only to the HBs had divided the dwellers into two. This difference was manifested in the spatial transformation of the newly constructed houses of the HBs and the rest of the *kebele* housing of the indirect

beneficiaries (IBs). The SACC’s rules regarding transformation are respected by its members, as they collectively foresee a common goal of owning the houses. This restraint from engaging in uncontrolled transformation has resulted in a relatively better housing quality, at least at the cluster and settlement levels. On the other hand the IBs, despite the existence of rules prohibiting unauthorized transformation of the *kebele* housing, were engaged in uncontrolled extensions and alterations.

The key elements that influenced the spatial transformation of the Menen area were: 1) the introduction of the concept of private ownership (improved property right), 2) the establishment of the SACC as a central institution overseeing the process of privatisation, 3) The preference of women over men, 4) the existence of clear regulations between the SACC and its members regarding housing transformation, and 5) the type and layout of the newly constructed houses. Particularly the introduction of the concept of private housing ownership over twenty years time was the binding force for the members to stick together under the umbrella of the SACC and to simultaneously sustain the micro-finance service. It also motivated them not only to protect their housing from uncontrolled transformations which could be detrimental to the collective good, but also enabled them to respond to similar projects such as those initiated by the *kebele*.

### **Case-3: Kolfe**

#### **Local NGO-driven, *iddir*-based upgrading process**

The upgrading intervention in Kolfe was initiated by a local NGO (*Tesfa*), which is a coalition of 26 *iddirs*<sup>3</sup>. Its upgrading approach unlike the previous two cases was rather pragmatic. The initial goals were to improve the living condition of the elderly and victims of HIV/AIDS. Its components included health service for the elderly and HIV/AIDS victims, housing for the elderly in charge of HIV/AIDS orphaned grandchildren, Micro finance for all *iddir* members, school equipment support for orphaned children and relief assistance for the poorest of the poor. The income of *Tesfa* was basically sourced from the monthly 1Birr contribution of each of its members. The response of its members, of which the majority were tenants, was based on the need of both taking advantage of social

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<sup>3</sup> An indigenous voluntary burial association.

networking and augmenting the dwindling funds of *iddirs*. *Iddirs* have to extend financial support to families of the deceased. Therefore, individual *iddir* members had to support *Tesfa* in order to sustain the function of *iddirs*.

All the households assisted by *Tesfa* were tenants of *kebele* housing. Out of the 60 upgraded housing units 55 were governed by the agreement entered between *Tesfa* and the *kebeles* while the tenure status of five households was not clear. These were households relocated to an overspill area in newly constructed houses. Following their relocation they were not given a house number and had not been paying house rent, practically becoming legally “invisible”. They were engaged in a very fast unauthorised housing extensions and outbuildings. The transformation was so fast that in a matter of two years, side extensions, outbuildings and two layers of front extensions occurred.

In the case of *Tesfa* the scope of the physical upgrading and the related issue of spatial transformation, relative to the size of settlements, were not significant. Rather, the most important discovery in relation to Kolfe’s case is the way *Tesfa* was organized as a coalition of *iddirs* and its strong capacity of mobilizing dwellers, including tenants. *Tesfa* had succeeded in keeping the autonomy of individual *iddirs*, so that they could continue their traditional burial function, while at the coalition level it was acting as a local NGO to conduct development activities.

## **Main findings and implications**

### **Implications to theory**

#### *Characteristics of non-planned settlements and upgrading approaches*

- The description of slums as pockets within large non-slum settlements does not fully explain the inner-city settlements of Addis Ababa. In the case of Addis Ababa the non-slum settlements are rather pockets within large slums.
- The *kebele* housing, which dominates the inner-city settlements, was found to be a variant of the public sector housing system. It does not match to the public housing

sector, of other countries, designed and provided by governments and/or occupied by government or private employees.

- The study confirmed that there was a reversal of the spatial model theorized in the 1960s. The inner-city slums are not any more “places of despair” or temporary transitory accommodations. The stability of the dwellers is related to the history and development of the *kebele* housing, the extremely low rents and the level of tenure security the dwellers enjoyed.
- It is revealed that upgrading interventions designed and implemented as if they are static “projects” could in fact serve as triggers of open ended processes.
- It can be asserted that the lack of proper housing designs could contribute to the paradox between the need for more individual space and the collective good.
- The main feature of the upgrading approaches, practiced in the inner-city, is that they had either excluded or had limited scope in the upgrading of houses.

#### *Tenants’ motivation and responses*

- It can be asserted that the degree of collaboration among upgrading actors is dependent on the extent a trigger of change (an upgrading component that initiates a chain of actions) is of common interest to all concerned; and not whether the purpose is good. The more the dwellers foresee a higher individual benefit the more their response to the need for upgrading.
- Tenants were motivated to respond to the needs for the improvement of their settlements only when the status of their property rights was improved. Thus, generalizations such as “tenants do not invest for the improvement of their environment” do not hold true - they do invest, but it could be limited to their individual houses.
- Property right which secures or unleashes the use-value, the exchange-values and the exclusive right (or a higher number of these rights/values) has a better chance in stimulating the response of the dwellers.

- Taking into consideration the concept of emergent grassroots organizations (communities of interest) it was found that the tenants' organisations are effective when established with a specific link to a trigger of change.

#### *Upgrading processes and spatial transformation*

- It can be asserted that to the extent that an upgrading process includes improved property rights and flexible design, managed by emergent grassroots organizations; and to the extent that clear rules and regulation exist the chances of having positive spatial transformation, both at the individual and collective levels, is higher.
- If the focus is the mobilisation of community of interest, positive transformation may not necessarily depend on improved property rights. It may rather primarily depend on social-values, e.g. the advantages sought from *iddir* membership.

#### **Implications to practice**

- A trigger-based upgrading is suggested that calls for the need to focus, from the outset, on triggers of change that could attract dwellers to form communities of interest rather than spending energy on pre-planned integrated projects, with pre-emptive answers, and that visualize idealised/ cohesive communities.
- Emergent grassroots organizations (communities of interest) that mobilize themselves around a “trigger of change” were found to function incrementally by setting achievable progressive goals. Unlike the outputs of integrated projects that risk mismanagement, the incremental projects of the communities of interest that capitalize on triggers of change have more chance to set in motion a positive and uninterrupted process of change. The lessons learned indicate that unlike in the conventional project-based upgrading, a trigger-based upgrading process acknowledges the diversity and asymmetrical relationships of actors.

#### **Implications to policy**

- The findings call for a flexible and differentiated housing policy that includes the classification of the inner-city settlements, the exploration of innovative property

rights, the contribution of indigenous voluntary associations, flexible designs that mediate upgrading paradoxes, appropriate legal frameworks, responsive education of professionals and the dissemination of information and exchange of experience.

- An appropriate framework for the analyses of upgrading processes must consist of 1) triggers of change, 2) emergent grassroots organizations, 3) the recognition of the mutual determination that exists between the emergent grassroots organizations and other actors and 4) a differentiated and flexible policy that allows “inventive surprises” and emergence.
- Finally, the study suggests topics for further research issues including the role of the private sector in upgrading, the role of *iddirs* in local development, the investigation of the asymmetrical relationships within emergent grassroots organizations, the financing of upgrading, the relationship of land tenure and upgrading and the general policy issues.



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**PART-I: INTRODUCTION AND METHOD**



“I think it is somewhat arbitrary to try to dissociate the effective practice of freedom by people, the practice of social realities, and the spatial distributions in which they find themselves. If they are separated, they become impossible to understand. Each can only be understood through the other.”<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> Foucault (cited in Rabinow, 1991:246)

## CHAPTER-1: INTRODUCING THE STUDY

### 1.1. Motivation and relevance

Addis Ababa was founded as a village-like military encampment in the mid 1880s. It emerged with a layout fit for defence but without any formal city planning. In the years following its formative age a number of “master plans” were made to “modernise” it. However, the plans have had little or sporadic influence. The city, true to the spirit of its early formative age, has continued to evolve spontaneously. Inevitably, the defiance of the implementation of the master plans was not without consequence. It has greatly contributed to the multi-pronged challenges that are now prevalent in the city.

Following its formative age (mid 1880s-1930) the city has experienced three distinct government systems: capitalist-oriented (1930-1974), Marxist-oriented (1975-1991) and “free market”-oriented (1999-to date). During the two earlier regimes there was hardly any effort that could substantially change the socio-economic and physical condition of non-planned settlements. Little was also done long after the two regimes had gone. The long years of negligence has contributed to the current overwhelming backlog. Currently, it is estimated that 80% of the population of Addis Ababa is living in “slums”.

It was since the year 2000 that focused activities that address the massive challenge emerged. During this period, in a bid to bring about a fundamental change, the entire city government of Addis Ababa was dissolved and it was replaced with a temporary administration. This was followed by a radical restructuring and the decentralisation of the city’s administrative structure. It was then that some city wide action started to happen on the ground. The Grand Housing Programme (GHP) to build 50,000 houses annually, the Eco-city pilot projects in ten sub-cities, and the consolidation of Environmental Development Office’s (EDO) city-wide infrastructure development all started to roll, nudging Addis Ababa from its extended deep slumber. The focuses of these projects were to gradually replace dilapidated government owned (*kebele*) houses, to improve infrastructure, social and service facilities and to tackle both the backlog and new demand for housing which was estimated at 350,000 units. To this effect the construction of more

than 30,000 housing units was commenced during the 2005/2006 budget year. This long overdue awakening has triggered discussions among experts, academics and politicians regarding the various urban development approaches, local development plans and implementation mechanisms. The choice of the research subject and the inclination towards inner-city settlements were thus influenced by these discussions. Particularly the fact that the majority of the city's settlements were earmarked for upgrading and that almost all the major urban centres in the country were in a similar situation was enough motivation to focus on upgrading. According to the current Addis Ababa's master plan with the exception of the newly developed expansion areas, located in the city's fringes, the rest of the city is earmarked for upgrading and renewal. Further, the speed with which slums are growing globally and the fact that Ethiopia is one of the world's countries with the highest percent of its urban population living in slums were additional motivation for carrying out this research.

The study's focus on upgrading should also be seen in relation to other research on urban development in Ethiopia. The studies done so far are either not focused on upgrading or are impact assessments and evaluations of specific projects. For example, the research done at Norwegian University of Science and Technology have concentrated on user-initiated physical transformation of housing (Yonas, 2003 - MSc & Essayas, 2000 - PhD), land policy and its effects on socio-spatial patterns (Wubshet, 2002 - PhD), land and housing in the informal settlements (Gossaye, 2007; Mekonen, 2003; Kalkidan, 2001 - all MSc), the effects of city renewal on relocated households (Ashenafi 2001 - PhD), and the transformation of inner-city market areas (Heyaw, 2005 - PhD). Essayas and Yonas have investigated informal housing transformation with different types of housing in Addis Ababa. Essayas has studied why and how users transform formal housing, while Yonas has made similar investigation of renter-initiated transformation in low-rent public (*kebele*) housing. Wubshet has also focused on housing in relation to policies. He studied the impact of urban policies on the social and spatial patterns of housing. He mainly focused on expansion areas as these areas were expected to show the full impact of spatial policies. Gossaye's study was also about housing in the informal settlements. Kalkidan and Mekonen have described and analyzed some characteristics of urban sprawl and

uncontrolled city expansion. While Mekonen dealt with the impact of fringe expansion on the livelihood of farmers, Kalkidan studied the regularization and land transaction process of informal settlements. Ashenafi has studied the phenomenon of urban renewal and resettlement. He studied the impact of renewal on dwellers displaced from their original inner-city area. Heyaw has studied the physical transformation of inner-city market areas and the influence of users' reaction on the transformation. In addition to these, studies from other universities, those of Daniel (1998 - MSc) and Sebawit (2006 - MSc) can be cited. Both these studies can be categorized as evaluations and impact assessment of a single NGO, IHA-UDP's<sup>5</sup>, upgrading projects. From this it can be observed that the subject of upgrading, relative to the daunting challenge on the ground, did not get enough attention and was not addressed from the perspective from which this research is approached (See below). This research is, therefore, one more contribution towards, in the words of Røe (2007), "the atlas of urban research and challenges in Ethiopia".

## **1.2. The perspective from which the research is approached**

Settlement upgrading interventions are usually viewed as time-bound *projects*, rather than settlement transformation *processes*. It is important to emphasize that this study is not primarily interested in evaluating upgrading "projects" in terms of inputs and outputs *per se*. In fact, operational evaluations of two of the projects in the case areas have already been conducted (See RBE, 1994 and Pankhurst, A., 2004). Interventions are part of dynamic processes that cannot be fully explained by conventional project evaluations of beneficiary impacts that measure achievements against pre-set objectives. The study assumed that conventional project evaluations fail to highlight other more decisive components that emanate from the interaction between the project, the diverse actors and the context. The interest here is rather to understand transformation processes that are set in motion through catalyst interventions and draw lessons that could be applicable to practice and policy.

Similar departure from the convention but with different perspective was also made by Zetter and Hamza (1998). They considered three upgrading projects of the 1970s and

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<sup>5</sup> A local NGO: Integrated Holistic Approach – Urban Development Project (IHA-UDP).

1980s, but instead of project evaluation they used the concept of “interest mediation” to investigate the interplay between international policies and the interests of the state in the context of project-based community participation. See also Abbot (2004) for his portrayal of upgrading as a process of spatial transformation and Hamdi’s view that development is continuous. Hamdi (2004:130) stated:

We have...learned to accept that development is ongoing, not something we start. When we do intervene or are invited to disturb, we are in this sense a part of the development continuum. We join the process somewhere along the way and try to help it along with new ideas, new wisdoms, new technologies and new skills. We do this because development has been interrupted, not because it hasn’t started.

Similarly Long and Van der Ploeg (1994:79) asserted:

Intervention is an ongoing transformation process that is constantly reshaped by its own internal organizational and political dynamic and by the specific conditions it encounters or itself creates, including responses and strategies of local and regional groups who may struggle to define and defend their own social spaces, cultural boundaries and position within the wider power field.

These perspectives are based on the view that planned interventions go beyond the time – space frames, and are negotiated among responsive actors. Inspired by this the study investigates upgrading as an open-ended transformation process (the process approach to upgrading) taking into consideration the mutual determination of the involved actors (actor-oriented approach). The study assumes that the combination of the process approach to upgrading and an adapted actor oriented approach provides an unusual and informative medium through which important themes could be generated with implications to theory, practice and policy.

These premises have prompted the use of the term “response” as opposed to “participation”. In upgrading processes conducted in any type of settlement in general and in tenant-dominated ones in particular the response of the dwellers is crucial for setting in

motion a positive upgrading process. Generally, participation presupposes an external actor that frames the modes of participation and a local actor (“beneficiaries”) participating within the boundaries of a given framework. The external actor assumes and expects that the local dwellers will participate to meet idealised pre-set goals. Within this participatory framework the external actor also assumes that the community of the local dwellers is homogeneous and thus the need of the whole community can be known through the participation of their representatives. However, more often than not, reality is far from the assumptions of projects hinged on the concept of participation based on an external actor – the “framer” and internal actor – the “framed” (passive participators). On the other hand the concept of “response” in upgrading anticipates actors’ response based on the perception of the actor. It acknowledges the diversity of actors and the possibility of varied responses that are not necessarily in tune with the plan of external actors. It anticipates not only divergent interpretations of the external actor’s intentions, but also conflicting actions based on those interpretations.

### **1.3. Scope and limitations of the research**

The issue of non planned settlements involves a wide range of subjects including social, economic, spatial, legal and political aspects. These aspects in relation to a given context create phenomena that are inevitably very complex. Setting the boundary of a research project of a multi-pronged, complex subject with little locally based background material is challenging. It is, however, necessary to define a boundary in order to cope with the limited time available.

The purpose of the study is to understand the dynamics of upgrading in tenant dominated settlements and analyse its implications to theory, practice and policy. The central focus is to investigate dwellers’ responses in the process of settlement upgrading and their influence on spatial transformations. The premise is that unless dwellers respond proactively, to upgrading initiatives, upgrading processes are doomed to interruptions. In tenant-dominated inner-city settlements, this issue become even more contentious, as tenants are usually perceived non-responsive. To investigate this phenomenon tenant-

dominated “slum” areas with prior experience of intervention were revisited discovering some responses, hence the study’s title: “Revisiting ‘Slums’<sup>6</sup>, Revealing Responses”.

In dealing with the research question regarding the influence of upgrading on spatial transformation, spatial measurements of transformed houses were done to a very limited degree as this was connected to legality and fear of displacement. Informants were sensitive to having their house measured as they suspected that it could be a means to have them displaced. The fact that both periods of fieldwork (springs of 2005 and 2006) were done during and after the political unrest of May 2005 has also contributed to making residents to a certain degree inhibited towards enquiries. Officials, particularly at the local *kebele* level, were also not readily available because of the uncertainty and lull created in connection to the unrest. However, maximum effort was made to address this limitation through the use of alternative data.

The qualitative and quantitative data collected from the three case studies are not uniform. This is because of the diversity in context and the type of interventions conducted in each case. The Kirkos and Menen cases are of similar character and thus the information collected is similar. However, the information from the third case study – Kolfe, particularly the amount of quantitative data, differs from the other two cases.

Most of the statistics and projections used in describing the study’s background information such as urbanization trends, population, and housing condition should be read with caution. They are based on an official census carried out by the government back in 1994. In the case of Ethiopia soliciting accurate statistics is notoriously difficult. Informants usually respond based on their perception of the statistics’ purpose rather than giving correct information. This reality is exacerbated by the obsolescence of the 1994 census. Whenever available, however, recent statistical data produced by specific government

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<sup>6</sup> Owing to its associated connotations of squalor, filth and crime the use of the term “slum” was largely considered inappropriate and its use had been diminishing until the mid 1990s (d’ Cruz & Satterthwaite, 2005). As a result more neutral terms that depict the diversity of settlements and the potential of slum dwellers have been in use. Following the mid 1990s, however, the term slum was re-introduced in the development discourse and even gained more legitimacy as organizations formed by dwellers in some countries started to refer themselves as “slum dweller” organizations and federations, albeit responding to the governments who categorized their settlements as slums (ibid). In this study the terms “slum” and “non-planned settlement” are used interchangeably.



agencies and data acceptable and shared by many scholars are used. It should be noted that in May 2007 the Central Statistics Authority has conducted enumeration of survey for a new national census, but obviously too late for this study.

#### **1.4. The research questions**

The research questions are based on both theoretical and contextual rationales. On the theoretical side there are two main rationales. The first is the bias that emanates from theories of the urbanists of the 1960s and 1970s. These theories assume that newcomers consolidate themselves by moving from the inner-city's rental accommodations to the peripheral squatter settlements. This premise is one of the factors that led to the characterization of inner-city slums as transitional and temporary. Owing to this bias, greater focus, both in practice and academic discourse, has been made on the upgrading of peripheral squatter settlements and housing ownership at the cost of the marginalization of inner-city settlements and tenants. This has resulted in a knowledge gap regarding upgrading processes in tenant dominated settlements. The second theoretical rational is based on the debate, which emerged following the growing recognition of the importance of rental housing since the 1990s. It is the debate about whether tenants are responsive to upgrading processes or not. In addition to these there are rationales from the local context. The majority of the inner-city dwellers are tenants. Further in the inner-city due to the attractiveness and importance of space there is relatively greater "friction of space". Based on these theoretical and contextual rationales two main questions are posed:

##### *Main questions*

- ***In the context of state ownership of land and housing, to what extent, why and how do tenants respond to upgrading processes?***
- ***How do upgrading processes affect spatial transformations in tenant-dominated inner-city settlements of Addis Ababa?***

Further, upgrading processes have to be put into context if they are to be fully understood. Therefore, a research question relating to the characteristics of inner-city settlements and upgrading approaches is added:

*Context-related question*

- ***What are the characteristics of the non-planned settlements (slums) and upgrading approaches in the inner-city of Addis Ababa?***

In addition to the above questions the study has also additional interest. Beyond the understanding of the context, dwellers’ response and socio-spatial transformations it seeks to draw generative themes and lessons which could be useful in engendering positive changes. Hence, a fourth normative question is posed:


*Normative question*

- ***How can upgrading processes, which engender positive socio-spatial transformations, be set in motion in tenant-dominated non-planned inner-city settlements of Addis Ababa?***

## **1.5. Organization of the research**

The research is organized into five parts: Part-I, Introduction and Method; Part-II, Review of Theory; Part-III, Background Study, Part-IV, Case Studies; and Part-V, Findings and Implications. The first part introduces the whole research subject and the method used to tackle the research questions. The second part lays out the theoretical basis of the research. It prompts three of the four research questions; in line with the background study discussed in Part-III. The fourth normative research question is prompted by Part III-Background Study. The background study is used both to address the context-related research question and to serve as a backdrop to the normative question. The fourth part is the empirical data incorporating the three case studies. Part-V synthesizes the findings from each case and discusses their implication to theory, practice and policy. (See Fig. 1.1)

Fig. 1.1: Research design



Crq Context-related research question  
 Mrq Main research question  
 Nrq Normative research question

The five Parts are comprised of eight chapters. Chapter one introduces the perspectives from which the study is viewed, the motivation and justification for carrying out the research, its relevance to the challenge of the city of Addis Ababa, its place in relation to similar research on urban development and the focus of the research. Chapter two lays out and documents the method through which the research questions were tackled. Chapter three covers theories related to upgrading, inner-city settlements and tenants. It identifies knowledge gaps and theoretical debates. It also clarifies key concepts. Chapter four traces the origin and development of the context upon which the upgrading processes has been taking place. It discusses the characteristics of the inner-city settlements, its housing and inhabitants. It describes the role of upgrading actors and the type of upgrading approaches. Chapter five, six and seven are case studies that describe and analyse the evidence. Chapter eight distils findings from cross case analysis and synthesises it with the

findings of each case study. It converts the substantive findings into generative themes and discusses their implication to theory, practice and policy (See Table 1.1).

**Table 1.1: Thesis structure**

<b>Parts</b>	<b>Chapters</b>	<b>Topic</b>	<b>Contents in brief</b>
I	1	Introduction	<i>What?</i> Introducing the study
	2	Method	<i>How?</i> Research method and approach
II	3	Theory	<i>What is the knowledge basis?</i> Critical review of theory
III	4	Background study	<i>How is the context?</i> Origin and development of the socio-spatial context and city-wide background cases of upgrading
IV	5	Case 1: Kirkos	<i>What is the evidence?</i> Description and analysis of cases
	6	Case 2: Menen	
	7	Case 3: Kolfe	
V	8	Findings and Implications	<i>What are the findings?</i> Cross-case analysis, synthesis of findings and implications to theory, practice and policy

## **CHAPTER 2: METHOD**

### **2.1. Introduction**

Settlement upgrading is usually implemented in the form of projects to improve the condition of slums through one of the known approaches. The upgrading approaches often include predetermined principles and objectives. Hence, studies of upgrading projects are usually done in the form of evaluations by focusing on whether the project had achieved its predetermined objectives or whether the predetermined strategies for achieving the objectives were fully realized. Such evaluations consider the local dwellers and the context upon which the intervention is taking place as passive. However, in reality projects are embedded in dynamic contexts of multiple realities and diverse responses of various actors. During the implementation of upgrading projects a “mutual determination of internal and external factors and relationships” (Long & Long: 1992:20) takes place. The outsider-driven projects and their objectives are, more often than not, re-interpreted by the local actors to suit their own interests. Therefore, if we ignore this reality and focus on the evaluation of projects, as if they are static and linear, the results either “turn out to be echoes of the planners own words, of their own concerns and understanding”, (Villarreal, 1992:265) or lead to the conclusion that the project has failed.

As indicated in the Introduction Chapter, this study views upgrading as a “process” rather than a “project”. Based on this understanding the method used in analysing the upgrading process was inspired by the “actor-oriented approach”, which stresses the “detailed analysis of the life worlds, struggles and exchanges within and between specific social groups and networks of individuals” (Long & Long, 1992:38) (See also the Theory Chapter). This approach emphasizes the reality that the implementation of an upgrading project triggers and sets in motion a continuous process of transformation. The study tries to capture and understand this process of transformation by focusing on dwellers’ responses and spatial transformations. This perspective, in addition to the actor – context interaction, necessitates: 1) a concern for the way in which different social actors interpret new interventions based on their interests and 2) the analysis of how particular actors attempt to

create room for themselves in order to carry out their “projects” that may run contrary to the interests of other intervening parties (Long & Long, 1992, Long, 2001).

## **2.2. Choice of method**

Studying settlement upgrading by dissociating it from its real life context is virtually impossible. This study aims to understand the phenomenon of upgrading process in the inner-city settlements. Such a phenomenon assumes different lives depending on the specific context. The phenomenon is shaped by the context as the context is shaped by it. The consequence is a dynamic process, which owes its characteristics both to the character of the actors deriving the phenomenon and the nature of the context. In such circumstances there is no clear boundary between the phenomenon and the context and “the researcher has no control over actual behavioural events” (Yin 1994, p.13). Therefore, in order to deeply investigate and develop an explanation for this dynamic interaction, it becomes imperative to understand the phenomenon in relation to its context. For such kind of research *case study* is most appropriate (Yin 1994, Stake, 2006).

A case study can be designed as a single-case study (holistic) or multiple-case study (also known as multi-case study). These two types can further be subdivided into two groups based on the inclusion of a single unit of analysis (holistic case) or multiple units of analysis (embedded cases) (Yin, 1994). Multiple-case study is usually designed in two ways: for comparison purposes (ibid) or for a better understanding of a phenomenon, without comparing the cases but by extracting diverse or similar evidences from them (Stake, 1998). In this study both of these strategies are used. On the one hand, at the meta-level, the collective understanding of the selected cases is aimed at developing an insight into the phenomenon of upgrading processes in the inner-city settlements. On the other hand inter-case and intra-case comparisons are made to develop deeper and detailed understanding of the units of analysis. The relationship between the cases (unit of analysis) and the research questions is discussed in Section 2.5 - Data analysis.

### **2.2.1. How scientific is case study?**

The question regarding the “scientificness” of case study is better dealt with if discussed in relation to the philosophy of science. Philosophy of science is a very wide and complex subject. Any attempt at simplifying it risks the exclusion of diverse nuances. However, given the scope of this study and in the attempt of gaining clarity in a brief analysis, this section, at the risk of being minimalist, discusses the relationship between philosophy of science and case study.

In the 16<sup>th</sup> and 17<sup>th</sup> century scientific study was subject to ecclesiastical dogma, which claimed the monopoly of all knowledge and “truth”. This prompted a reactive stance on the part of scientists who largely considered religion as superstition or transcendental wish. They argued that understanding natural phenomena does not require the study of religion; rather what is needed is the study of empirically based experiments. Consequently, the scientific method of the natural sciences whereby each hypothesis is tested by experiments that anyone else can repeat and where new theories are built on old ones became the ideal for all researchers. It took the lead in establishing a method for a scientific enquiry based on positivism<sup>7</sup>. Until the emergence of hermeneutics<sup>8</sup> in the 19<sup>th</sup> century a determined effort was made to bring all fields of study, including those which involve human beings, such as economics, medicine, and psychology within this circle. According to Johansson (2004), positivism and hermeneutics are the main philosophical foundations for natural sciences and the humanities respectively.

Notwithstanding the claim of positivism, however, human beings are not objects responding unvaryingly to external interferences. Humans are complex, thinking beings, with feelings, emotions and motivations which cannot be observed by the mere five senses. Therefore any study of human beings as a group, or even of a human individual, presents

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<sup>7</sup> The characteristics of positivism are: 1) there is only one scientific method that can be applied for all scientific investigations, 2) the source for methodological standard for all the other sciences including the humanities are the exact natural sciences, particularly, mathematical physics and 3) individual cases, including human nature are, governed by hypothetically assumed general laws of nature and are explained causally (Johansson, 2004:3, See also Mo, 2003:13-27, for wider discussion,).

<sup>8</sup> Tries to understand the object of its study (human actions, events, etc.) through empathy, by recreating thoughts, feelings and motivations (Johansson 2004, See also Mo, 2003: 82-107, for wider discussion).

such a vast array of factors that it is impossible to understand with experiments and the five senses only. In line with this thinking, hermeneutics appeared as an anti-positivist philosophy. Contrary to positivism’s claim of “methodological monism” and the search for general explanatory laws, hermeneutics advocated a scientific inquiry with particular emphasis on the intrinsic nature of cases (ibid). The above mentioned two warring philosophies of sciences ultimately devolved into two main types of methods. The main foundation of natural science, positivism, resulted in quantitative method and the main foundation of humanities, hermeneutics, resulted in qualitative method.

The field of social science, which emerged in the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century as an independent discipline from the humanities, was a late comer. It had difficulties, at least in the early days, in developing its own method. Hence, social science research was done using either of the methods developed by its predecessors. Later with the dominance of logical-positivism<sup>9</sup> it inclined towards emulating the method of natural sciences in order to be “scientific” (Mo, 2003, Johansson 2005).

Peter Winch in 1958 argued that the logic of social science, which is based on motives and reasons, is essentially different from that of natural science, which is based on cause and effect (Mo, 2003). Following Winch’s widely disseminated attack on positivism and also the introduction of phenomenology<sup>10</sup> in the critique of positivism, the qualitative method started to be used as a scientific method by its own right.

However, it was only in the 1980s that researchers from the two camps (qualitative and quantitative) understood that one method is not necessarily better than the other; and that the choice of method should be dependent on the type of a research question (ibid). It increasingly became clear that there are questions which require statistical analysis and those which require the analysis of verbal and other evidences. Since then a growing number of research projects have emerged which merge both the quantitative and qualitative methods within one piece of research. A case study method, which grew from purely qualitative tradition in the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, now not only uses both qualitative and quantitative methods, but also has “developed in the direction of eclecticism

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<sup>9</sup> Also known as neo-positivism or later logical empiricism (Johansson, 2004:5)

<sup>10</sup> Apprehension of something through an understanding that goes beyond the five senses (Mo, 2003).



and pragmatism” (Johansson 2005). By favouring methodological appropriateness rather than alignment with a paradigm (Patton, 1990) case studies are now filling the method gap in the social sciences. It is this possibility of mixing methods which enables the portrayal of a phenomenon in the most realistic way, which prompted this study to use case study.

### **2.2.2. The role of theory in case study**

What is the role of theory in a case study? To what extent does case study employ theory to guide its studies? Creswell (1998) in trying to answer these questions observed that theory is used by case studies in three ways: 1) to guide the study in an explanatory way on the basis of theoretical prediction (citing, Yin, 1989), e.g. in a hypothetico-deductive research, 2) used toward the end of the study, in which the investigation is not initially positioned within any theory, rather the conclusions are compared with a theoretical perspective introduced at the end (citing, Asmussen and Creswell, 1995), e.g. in grounded theory, and 3) it might be absent from the study in descriptive cases (citing Stake, 1995), e.g. in ethnography. Further, Yin (1994) added two more roles of theory: 1) the use of theory for exploratory case studies in which it is used to indicate what is to be explored and why it should be explored and 2) the use of descriptive theory in describing case studies.

In this study theory was used in four ways, as descriptive, predictive, a rationale for explorative investigation and normative. The descriptive theories are related to the context-related research question which aims at the description of the characteristics of slums in Addis Ababa. The predictive theories are related to the first main research question which aims at forging insight regarding actors’ relationship and the tenants’ responses. The explorative theory is used in justifying the general need for exploring tenant-dominated inner-city settlements and in prompting the second main research question. The normative theories are related to the normative research question which aims at possible practice and policy recommendations.

Out of the above four uses of theory in case studies, the one which is usually criticised, is the predictive theory. The critique is that it would burden the researcher with preconceived ideas and assumptions. However, we should make a distinction between

“arriving with minds closed and arriving with an eye for what to look for” (Stake, 2006:30). Stake citing Malinowski stated:

Good training in theory, and acquaintance with its latest results, is not identical with being burdened with ‘preconceived ideas’. If a man sets out on an expedition, determined to prove certain hypotheses, if he is incapable of changing his views constantly and casting them off ungrudgingly under the pressure of evidence, needless to say his work will be worthless. But the more problems he brings with him into the field, the more he is into the habit of moulding his theories according to facts, and of seeing facts in their bearing upon theory, the better he is equipped for the work. Preconceived ideas are pernicious in any scientific work, but *foreshadowed problems* are the main endowment of a scientific thinker, and these problems are first revealed to the observer by his theoretical studies. (1922/1961/1984:9, italics original)

In line with this argument, in this study the predictive theories are used to guide the investigation and data collection techniques of the case study. It is also used together with the other types of theories to serve as a basis for analytic generalizations, reflected in Chapter 8: “Synthesis of Findings and Implications”.

### **2.3. Selection of cases**

Initially all the major upgrading projects conducted in the inner-city of Addis Ababa were identified as possible candidates for investigation. The candidate cases were:

- 1) *Kebele*<sup>11</sup>-driven upgrading conducted through out most of the *kebeles* in the inner-city,
- 2) Local NGO-initiated, CBO-based upgrading in *Woreda*<sup>12</sup> 03: *Kebeles* 30, 41, 42 & 43 (Teklehaimanot area),
- 3) NGO-initiated, *kebele*-based upgrading in *Woreda* 21, *Kebele* 13 (Kirkos<sup>13</sup> area)

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<sup>11</sup> Local government, the smallest administrative unit

<sup>12</sup> An old administrative unit next in hierarchy to the city level, comprising a number of *kebeles*. It was also known as *Kefteгна*.

<sup>13</sup> Also known as Cherkos

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upgraded by an international NGO, Redd Barna,

4) NGO-initiated, Saving and Credit Cooperative (SACC)-based upgrading in *Woreda* 11, *Kebele* 14 (Menen area), and

5) Local NGO-driven, *iddir*<sup>14</sup>-based upgrading in Kolfe area.

Later, during the reconnaissance visit of summer 2004, it became clear that understanding upgrading processes and dwellers' responses in tenant-dominated areas is closely related with the issue of property rights and the mobilisation of the dwellers. Thus, those cases, namely Kirkos, Menen and Kolfe which had relatively rich information regarding the issues under consideration were finally selected for investigation. The *kebele*-initiated upgrading and the Teklehaimanot upgrading were kept as background cases to give a general overview of upgrading conducted in the inner-city (See Background Study Chapter). Mention should also be made that Kolfe was included more for its rich information regarding dwellers' responses rather than the breadth of issues related to property rights. In selecting the final cases there were two main additional reasons: 1) the existence of variations of property rights and dwellers' responses in the areas, and 2) the possibility of deriving meaningful learning. Of course, the very characteristics of the phenomenon under investigation had also dictated some criteria for case selection:

- an area characterized as a slum
- occupants of the housing in the settlement of predominantly *kebele* tenants,
- the existence of an upgrading process, and
- location of the area in the inner-city<sup>15</sup>.

## 2.4. Key issues, sources of data and data collection techniques

The data was mainly collected through fieldwork, which was divided into three phases. The first phase was a reconnaissance visit. It was from 15 June up to 15 August, 2004. During this phase, the candidate case areas were visited, informants were contacted, and general

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<sup>14</sup> An indigineous voluntary burial association

<sup>15</sup> Due to the vast area covered by the Kolfe case some of its parts are located outside the approximate boundary of the inner-city. Even those located outside the boundary, due to close proximity to Merkato (the biggest market in Ethiopia), portray the characteristics of the inner-city.

background information was collected. The second and the third phases spanned five months each. They were conducted from 15 January up to 15 June in 2005 and 2006. During the second phase qualitative methods of data collection were used to collect evidence. Following the analysis of these data it became clear that some of the remaining evidence require quantitative method of data collection. Consequently, during the third phase in addition to pursuing the collection of evidence through the qualitative techniques eight weekends (sixteen days in a span of two months) were used in collecting data using questionnaire. The weekends were preferred as it was learned during the pilot testing that most of the household heads were available either on Saturdays or Sundays.

#### **2.4.1. Purposes of data collection**

The purposes of the data collected were to understand the key issues of the study highlighted below.

##### ***Characteristics of inner-city settlements and upgrading approaches:***

The origin and development of Addis Ababa, the influence of master plans on the inner-city housing, land and housing tenure and their influence on the current characteristics of inner-city settlements, the socio-economic and housing condition of the specific cases areas, the challenge of non-planned settlements, the characteristics of the upgrading approaches and processes as practiced in the city and the ongoing upgrading processes in the case areas .

##### ***Actors’ relationship and tenants’ responses***

The role of the various actors in the upgrading processes, relationship between actors, actors’ perceptions and interpretations of the upgrading approaches and processes, the rules and regulations governing the relationship between actors, the motivations for tenants to respond to upgrading processes and the mechanisms through which tenants are mobilized, the contribution of tenants in upgrading processes.

### ***Spatial transformations***

Housing and compound types, maintenance, extension and outbuilding; the management, control and maintenance of common spaces and issues of utility connection; generally, the influence of upgrading processes on spatial transformations at the levels of individual housing unit, block/compound/cluster and settlement. The investigation of the influence of upgrading on the spatial transformations covers the period just before the commencement of the upgrading processes, in each case area, up to the end of the second main fieldwork, spring 2006.

#### **2.4.2. Sources of data**

The main sources of data can be classified into four broad groups: 1) government agencies 2) grassroots organizations and NGOs, 3) individual dwellers, and 4) the physical environment under study. Each of these sources are discussed below.

#### ***Government agencies***

Government officials at the local, sub-city, city and national levels were approached. At the local level *kebeles* and their organs were major sources of data. Particularly the *Kebele* Development Committees<sup>16</sup> and the offices of the respective *kebele* managers were instrumental. At the sub-city level, the leaders of the environmental development teams of EDOs were interviewed. In the case of Kirkos the sub-city manager and his assistant were interviewed<sup>17</sup>. At the level of the city, the Office of the City Manager, the Town Planning Preparation and Inspection Department (former ORAAMP) were the main sources of data. Interviews were conducted and secondary sources were collected from the offices. At the national level the two main sources of data were the Ministry of Works and Urban Development and the Ethiopian Mapping agency. While the former provided recent studies on issues of urban development with focus on urban upgrading the latter provided aerial

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<sup>16</sup> Each *kebele* has this committee as one of its organs, which is responsible for mobilising the dwellers, raising local funds and prioritizing the needs of the dwellers for the purpose of development activities.

<sup>17</sup> The case of Kirkos included litigations and a court case. Hence, the view of the city manager and related documents were sought.

photos and maps of case areas (See Appendix-1A for the list of government agencies and the type of information collected).

#### ***Grassroots organizations and NGOs***

These are organizations established either by an external NGO or are self-initiated. Under these category the Kirkos and Menen SACCs, the Lideta’s CBISDO (Community Based Integrated Sustainable Development, Organisation) are included. Redd Barna-Ethiopia (RBE) as the initiator of the upgrading processes in Kirkos and Menen, *Tesfa* as a self-initiated local NGO driving the upgrading processes in Kolfe and IHA-UDP for the background study. (See Appendix-1B, for the list of NGOs and grassroots organizations and the type of information collected.)

#### ***Individual dwellers***

The individual dwellers have participated in different capacities. Five types of informants were distinguished: 1) gate keepers and guides, facilitating the smooth running of the fieldwork during interviews, the administration of the questionnaires and the mapping of the upgraded facilities; 2) key informants (persons who are very knowledgeable about the central issues of the study), providing lengthy and substantial information. The key informants include SACC and *kebele* officials also; 3) subjects for case histories; 4) informants in Focus group discussions (FGDs); and 5) respondents of questionnaires. (See Appendix-1C).

#### ***The physical environment***

The physical environment of the case areas by itself is a source of data. Most of the physical components such as: the housing type and condition; the type and condition of infrastructure, utilities, common spaces and social and service facilities, the layout of settlements and organization of space were generally amenable to direct observation.

### **2.4.3. Data collection technique**

#### ***Interviews***

*Semi-structured in-depth interviews:* This was used with the key informants and selected dwellers. Following Kvale (1996) the semi-structured interviews were conducted in such a way that a sequence of themes and suggested questions were prepared with flexibility to changes of sequence and forms of questions in order to follow up the answers given. (See Appendices 2A-2C, for sets of interview questions conducted with different types of informants.)

*Case histories:* The form of questions were similar to the semi-structured interview, except that in this case the subject was given more freedom and time to narrate his/her personal history in relation to the key issues of the study.

#### ***Focus group discussion (FGD)***

The emphases of the FGDs were on questions of the dwellers' common interest such as the maintenance and management of common spaces and facilities, the delimitation of boundaries in common spaces, encroachment on common spaces etc. It was interesting to note that, through the FGDs, it was possible to get more accurate responses as the subjects were cross checking and reminding each other of details.

*Asking questions using "natural" conversation:* This was mostly used with gate keepers and key informants while walking together in the case areas.

*Listening to other peoples conversation ("verbal observation"):* Attending ceremonial events as a guest and meetings held between actors, as a silent observer.

(Table-2.1 shows the type and number of interviewees and FGDs.)

#### ***Photographs***

Photographs, all taken by the author, were primarily used to capture spatial transformations including extensions and outbuildings. Two sets of official aerial photos, one set from 1984 and another one from 1994 were also acquired and interpreted in analysing spatial transformations.

**Table 2.1: Main types and number of interviewees**

Type of interview	Type of interviewees*	Kirkos	Menen	Kolfe
		No. of informants	No. of informants	No. of informants
Semi-structured in-depth interview and informal discussions	Key informants	3	2	2
	SACC/NGO officials	3	2	4
Case histories	Dwellers	5	7	10
FGD	Dwellers	1 FGD (of 5 dwellers)	1 FGD (of 6 dwellers)	-
Semi-structured, in-depth interview	<i>Kebele</i> officials	2	1	1
	Sub-city officials	2	1	-
	City officials	1		
	Federal level	1		

Some of the informants are approached more than once.

\*See Appendix 2D, for list of interviewees.

### ***Mapping***

During the reconnaissance visit it was learned that in all the case areas the upgraded housing and related facilities were not indicated on maps. Therefore, with the assistance of five graduating students of the Department of Architecture and Urban Planning of the Addis Ababa University, all the upgraded houses and related facilities and infrastructure including the maintained houses, newly constructed houses (both single and double storey), common facilities (kitchen, toilets, water stands etc.), social facilities (schools, clinic etc.), income-generating units and roads were identified and indicated on base maps. This was done in order to grasp the magnitude, proportion and physical distribution of the projects’ physical upgrading. The mapping work was started during the field work of 2005 and was terminated because of the then political unrest. It was finalized during the second fieldwork of 2006.



### ***Direct observation***

Outdoor and indoor activities, events and the spatial condition of the settlements were observed first hand on site. Most of the direct observation was done parallel to the administration of the questionnaires and the physical mapping of the upgraded settlements. While the employed assistants were engaged in interviewing and mapping, the researcher spent considerable time in direct observation parallel to the supervision of the assistants.

### ***Questionnaire***

The quantitative method, which was administered through questionnaire, was used to supplement the qualitative techniques of data collection. The qualitative techniques focused more on in depth investigations, while the questionnaire augmented these by focusing on breadth. The questions focus on four themes: 1) socio-economic condition of dwellers, 2) Tenure security and its indicators (connection to water, electricity, telephone, sewage etc.), 3) Maintenance and spatial transformation (at the house, compound, and neighbourhood levels), and 4) dwellers' involvement in upgrading initiatives. Five fresh graduates of the Department of Social Anthropology of the Addis Ababa University, with some experience in handling questionnaires, were employed as assistants to the researcher. (See Appendix-3: for the English translation of the questionnaire).

The questionnaire was administered by the assistants in the local language, Amharic. The assistants were trained in the overall administration of the questionnaire with special focus on reliability (that all respondents should be exposed to the same questions), the need to keep the exact wording and order of the questions. Pre-testing of the questionnaire was done by the researcher and some amendments were made. The questions were sequenced from more short and easy questions to more complex and general questions. Care was taken to avoid leading and vague questions. To have more precise answers, hypothetical questions (about the future) were not included.

In each of the case areas three groups of households were identified: 1) households in newly constructed houses (housing beneficiaries), 2) households in *in-situ* maintained houses (Indirect beneficiaries) and 3) households neither in the newly constructed houses and nor in the maintained houses (the rest of the *kebele* dwellers). The third group were

households which occupied houses in good condition at the time the upgrading projects were conducted. The total size of the households of all the three groups in each case area (736 households in Kirkos, 720 households in Menen and 4700 households in Kolfe) was too big for the administration of questionnaire. Therefore, based on one of the study’s emphasis, which is the issue of spatial transformation, a decision was made to focus on the first and second group, referred in the study as “housing beneficiaries (HBs)” and “indirect beneficiaries (IBs)” respectively. This screening brought down the number of households to 633, 433 and 65 in Kirkos, Menen and Kolfe respectively. The HBs and IBs became the basis for a stratified purposive sampling to facilitate comparison at the sub-group level. Based on the time frame set for the administration of the questionnaire 202 households in Kirkos, 200 households in Menen and 65 households in Kolfe were visited. Out of those approached 182 in Kirkos, 190 in Menen and 46 in Kolfe responded (See Table 2.2. for detail).

**Table 2.2: Purposive sampling**

		<b>Total no. of households</b>	<b>No. of households surveyed</b>	<b>Households surveyed (%)</b>	<b>No. of households responded</b>	<b>Response rate (%)</b>
<b>Kirkos</b>	<b>HBs</b>	292	102	34.9	102	100.0
	<b>IBs</b>	341	100	29.3	80	80.0
	<b>Total</b>	633	202	31.9	182	91.0
<b>Menen</b>	<b>HBs</b>	199	100	50.3	100	100.0
	<b>IBs</b>	234	100	42.7	90	90.0
	<b>Total</b>	433	200	46.2	190	95.0
<b>Kolfe</b>	<b>HBs</b>	5	5	100.0	5	100.0
	<b>IBs</b>	60	60	100.0	41	68.0
	<b>Total</b>	65	65	100.0	46	70.8

### **Documents**

In addition to the above data secondary sources, namely, proposals, reports, minutes of meetings, letters, evaluations of projects, government policies/ guidelines, newspaper articles, court case documents, contract agreements, government census, video recordings and maps acquired from the various actors in the case areas, government officials and libraries were also used in analysing the key issues under investigation.

**Table 2.3: Summary of key research issues and main methods of data collection**

<b>Data</b> <b>Key issues</b>	<b>Documents</b>	<b>Interview</b>	<b>Questionnaire</b>	<b>FGD</b>	<b>Direct observation</b>	<b>Physical Mapping</b>	<b>Photographs,</b>
Characteristics of inner-city settlements	•	•			•		•
Characteristics of upgrading approaches	•	•		•		•	•
Actors' relationship and tenants' response	•	•	•	•			
Spatial transformation		•	•	•	•	•	•

### **2.5. Data analysis**

The purpose of data analysis, in this study, was to make the bulk of data from the fieldwork amenable to the need of addressing the research questions. This involves the examination, categorization and tabulation of the evidence - both of the qualitative and quantitative data. In qualitative work there is no clear boundary between data collection and analysis (Stake, 1998). It is a process in which the researcher is constantly engaged in a chain process of data gathering and reflection. The reflections were not, however, limited by that of the fieldwork reflexive analysis. Most of the major systematic reflections and analyses were done after the completion of the fieldwork.

The general analytic strategy of the study was guided by the theoretical formulations and related research questions. The relationship between the context,

upgrading, tenants’ responses and space was expected to generate a complex, but coherent pattern. This called for a strict analytical approach called *pattern matching* (Yin, 1994, 2003). The main concept of pattern matching logic is either to compare empirically based patterns with theoretically predicted notions or to compare patterns across cases. In this study both of these methods were applied. Each case study report was subdivided into four main key issues derived from the research questions which were the manifestations of theoretical predictions and descriptions. The four key issues were: 1) the area and the people (context), 2) the upgrading processes, 3) actors’ interaction and tenants’ response, and 4) the upgrading processes and spatial transformation. Several pieces of information were filtered from the cases, at four levels, for comparison with the four key issues:

Level-1, *Same case analysis*: Information from the same case is analysed in comparison to the key issues, for example, sorting out some of the data from the Kirkos case in relation to the four key issues.

Level-2, *Inter-case analysis*: Information is analysed by comparing the three cases, namely: Kirkos, Menen and Kolfe, and in relation to the four key issues.

Level-3, *Intra-case analysis*: Here, the cases are subdivided into sub-cases, namely: HBs and IBs. Comparison is made between these sub-cases in relation to two of the four key issues: “dwellers’ response” and “spatial transformation”. This is done to further deepen the similarities and differences regarding these issues, which is also done at level-2.

Level-4, *Cross-case analysis*: At this level both the three cases and their sub-cases are compared in relation to the key issues.

By detailing the many similarities and differences of the cases and their sub-cases at the four levels better knowledge is acquired.

Further, within the umbrella of the major analysis strategy discussed above specific techniques, corresponding to the unique characteristics of some of the data, were also used. The data which required special attention were interviews and questionnaires. Most of the interviews conducted with key-informants and in the Focus group discussions (FGD) were recorded with digital recorder. This was possible because enough trust was developed with the key informants due to repetitive visits. It was also easy to use the recorder in FGDs as

individuals felt comfortable when it is done in a group – the “I am not alone” mentality. In the rest of the cases, where informants did not feel safe being recorded or the circumstances were not conducive, short hand notes were taken on the spot. Following the end of the interviews the notes were immediately expanded into their fuller versions. The recorded interviews were also transcribed as soon as possible, following each interview.

The technique used to analyse the interviews was based on Kvale’s (1996) method of analysis. Out of the five possible approaches for analysing interviews, recommended by Kvale, three were used: condensation– paraphrasing long interviews into succinct statements or shorter formulations; narrative– creating a coherent story out of the many happenings reported in an interview; and interpretation– recontextualizing of the statements within broader frames of reference. Applying condensation the interviews from the fieldwork were first cleared from unnecessary and redundant information and abridged formulations were made. These were then woven into the case study reports in such a way that they made coherent narrative. Finally, the narratives were made to correspond, as explained in the major strategy, to the predetermined research question-based topics.

With regard to the questionnaire data, it was first entered in SPSS programme, version-14. The same programme was then used to analyse the data. The analysis was focused on frequencies and cross-tabulations. The frequencies and cross-tabulations were done to examine distributions and the relationship between variables, respectively.

In addition to the analysis of interviews and questionnaires; maps, photographs, aerial photos and secondary written documents were interpreted in relation to the key issues of the research questions and were incorporated as part of the case reports.

## **2.6. Validity of the case study**

According Johansson (2005) triangulation is the most important technique of making the results of a case study valid. Triangulation is generally understood as “a process of using multiple perceptions to clarify meaning, verifying the repeatability of an observation or interpretation” (Stake, 1998). Particularly, in the context of developing countries where the dwellers’ *modus operandi* is permeated with ambiguity the use of triangulation becomes

not only a necessity but crucial. Ambiguity is usually used to reduce interpersonal confrontations, to muddle through difficult situations, and to save oneself from being cornered. In fact in the context of Ethiopia ambiguity is one of the deeply rooted cultural elements. Ambiguity, as expounded by Donald Levine (1965) in his classic book entitled “Wax and Gold”, can be said, is deeply rooted in the life style of the highland Ethiopians. It can be detected in the highly enjoyed and cherished form of Ethiopian poetry, *qene*. *Qene* is characterized by its *sem-enna werq* (wax and gold<sup>18</sup>) construction. The lines are composed in *Ge’ez*, ancient Ethiopian language, primarily for religious expressions. But, the wax and gold construction is also used in the working language, *Amharic*, both in the form of prose and poetry. It is a poetic formula in which words embody dual expression: the obvious expression of the word is called “wax” while the more or less hidden meaning is the “gold”. Wax and gold represents more than a principle of poetic expression. The ambiguity symbolized by the composition of wax and gold, for good or bad, dominates and permeates the Ethiopians’ way of life.

Informants were often not forthcoming and direct in answering questions. This created a multi-pronged challenge demanding, on the one hand sifting facts from ambiguous statements and on the other hand understanding the intended meanings. It also necessitated the need for the verification of the information through other methods.

The challenge is not only the informants’ ambiguous answers, but also the fact that the responses were dependant upon their perception of the interviewers’ identity. The respondent tries to assess what the inquirer might want to hear, or as to what he could potentially offer. For example, when my main supervisor, from Norway, briefly joined me in the field, informants’ discussions were tuned toward soliciting assistance. In Kirkos, at the office of the SACC, following our introduction, the officers immediately brought to our attention the court case they have with the *kebele*. They alluded as to whether we could influence the Sub-city administrative office, so that the case might be settled in their favour.

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<sup>18</sup> The wax and gold analogy came from the work of the goldsmith: the form of the jewellery is first engraved in a wax contained in a clay mould. When the molten gold is poured into the mould, the wax melts, producing the desired form of gold. Thus, encrypting a hidden message in a word or phrase is an ancient art of creating double meaning.

In Menen, while we were on a guided tour, a lady came running with a request to help in stopping the *kebele* from demolishing the community mill. In Lideta, while visiting the Home for the old, the manager of the facility was repeatedly hinting regarding the critical need for a sponsor. In Kolfe, following a briefing the programme officer intimidated his colleague to quickly prepare a project proposal as there was a guest from Norway. Prior to and after my supervisor's presence I had visited the case areas repeatedly. The tone and answers to similar questions had some differences.

Even getting a precise answer to questions which lead to numerical responses was at times difficult. To an apparently simple question regarding the family size, age of a person or monthly financial income it was common experience to hear fluctuating numbers during the same interview. Informants were also inhibited from giving accurate responses by some cultural aspects. In one instance, a daughter, who flirted with a boy ending up having an "unwanted" child, was not readily included as part of the household as she was considered as an embarrassment to the family. But as the interview progressed she gradually came into picture. The response to a question regarding income is, more often than not, either nil or very meager. At times the response is followed by tears of pain and sadness. However, after a while when asked about their expenses respondents were eager to enlist a number of regular monthly expenses they managed to settle. They did not see contradiction between saying "I have no income at all" and then enumerating a number of regularly settled expenses.

Nevertheless, such contradictions are interpreted as emanations from the need to emphasize the level of poverty they had to bear. In fact, usually, respondents preferred to appear at their best. They tried to keep a good image through dressing or the display of a piece of furniture such as a television, etc. The case of *BB* can be cited. He was always well dressed with a necktie. The researcher met him three times at the Home for the Old, located in Teklehaimanot (a background case). The third time was by appointment. He gave an interview, which was finalized by the visit to his home. The researcher asked him why he always wore a necktie. He proudly said "I am a follower of the Church of the Apostle. As a believer I have to always look neat and well dressed". The manager of the facility considers him very conversant, both with the history of the area and the Bible. And he lives up to it:


with his necktie, reading glasses, a bible in his hand, a pen in the outer pocket of his jacket, a characteristic hut, an umbrella in case it rains and a lunch box for carrying his daily food ration. The paradox was, however, his home doesn't live up to his image. In fact his home can be described a ramshackle lodge for the destitute. In addition to his wife, *BB* shares his double- roomed deteriorated rental house with two co-dwellers and additional night time lodgers. At their climax, some of these puzzling ambiguities and paradoxes reach the famous British philosopher, Bertrand Russell's paradox in which a person is given a piece of paper on which is written: "The statement on the other side of this paper is false." The person turns the paper over, and finds on the other side: "The statement on the other side of this paper is true."

This reality on the ground, therefore calls not only for triangulation through the use of various methods and data sources, but also the development of trust between the researcher and the informants. In this study data triangulation, use of different sources for the same unit of analysis, and method triangulation, use of different methods of gathering data about the same unit of analysis (Paton, 1987), were used to validate the results of the case study. Validity is here understood as "the extent to which an account accurately represents the social phenomena to which it represents" (Zetter & Sauza, 2000). Trust was developed with key informants and interviewees through 1) the use of respected and trusted mediators (gate keepers), 2) repetitive visits, and 3) the allocation of ample time.



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## **PART-II: REVIEW OF THEORY**



“...Preconceived ideas are pernicious in any scientific work, but *foreshadowed problems* are the main endowment of a scientific thinker, and these problems are first revealed to the observer by his theoretical studies.”<sup>19</sup>

(Italics original)

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<sup>19</sup> Stake (2006:30, citing Malinowski, 1922/1961/1984:9)

## **CHAPTER 3: CRITICAL REVIEW OF THEORY**

### **3.1. Introduction**

The phenomenon this research seeks to understand, as mentioned earlier, is upgrading processes in tenant-dominated, non-planned inner-city settlements (slums). This phenomenon includes three key concepts: “upgrading”, “tenants” and “slums”. In the subsequent sections these concepts are theorised under three sections:

In section-1, Slums and upgrading approaches, theories of slum and intervention approaches are reviewed with the purpose of understanding the main characteristics of slums and upgrading. This review prompts the context-related research question that leads to the investigation of the background of the phenomenon mentioned above.

In section-2, Upgrading and tenants, a theoretical debate as to whether tenants are responsive to upgrading processes is covered, leading to the first main research question.

In section-3, Upgrading and inner-city settlements, the origin, development and main assumptions of the self-help theory and its relationship to inner-city settlements is reviewed, prompting the second main research question that leads to the investigation of upgrading processes and their influence on the spatial transformation of the inner-city settlements.

### **3.2. Slums and upgrading approaches**

#### **3.2.1. Understanding Slums**

##### ***The notion of slum***

According to Benevelo (1980) the origin of slums is traced back to the mid 18th century industrial revolution and its technological advancements. He explained, the technological advancements coupled with new methods of communication had enabled natural population increase (as birth rates exceeded death rates) while attracting the fast movement of people

from rural to urban areas. The consequences of these new trends were, traffic congestion, squalor and filth that made the lives of the working class unbearable (ibid). The word slum which is derived from an old English or German word meaning a poorly drained place, was originally applied to describe the cheap rental housing of the working class (d' Cruz & Satterthwaite, 2005 citing Hoskins, 1970). Since then it has been associated with different connotations, often with derogatory meanings such as crime, apathy, fatalism etc. These layers of meanings attached to it over time and its representation of diverse settlements have made the term slum an imprecise notion. In an attempt to pin point its exact meaning, a number of operational and universal definitions have been formulated. Often the difference between the definitions is in their emphasis on social, physical, legal and other aspects of slums, or in their total exclusion of one or another aspect. For example, the UN-HABITAT (2003a) motivated by the idea of measuring slums, through quantifiable indicators, has developed an operational definition restricted to the physical and legal characteristics of slums. According to the UN-HABITAT, slum is characterized by inadequate access to safe water, sanitation and other infrastructure, poor structural quality of housing, overcrowding and insecure residential status. This definition, focusing only on net quantitative results, has largely ignored addressing the underlying causes of slums, such as the wider context of freedom in gaining capability; and specific social aspects, such as personal heterogeneities and resource distribution within a family.

However, this is not to suggest that a universal definition of slums, that precisely includes all its aspects and diversities, is possible. The extreme diversity of slum and the various connotations attached to it have made the term not only illusive, but also un-amenable to a universal definition. To make this worse slums are given various names in different countries and even in cities of the same country. For example, Latin American cities, well known for their squatter slums, have different local names for the term slum. In Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Paraguay, Venezuela, Mexico and Peru slums are known as *favelas*, *poblaciones callampas*, *precarious*, *tugurios*, *rancherios pobres* and *barrios de ranchos*, *colonias populares* and *barriads or pueblos juvenes*, respectively (Imperato & Ruster, 2003). In developing countries, to avoid the social stigma and threat of eviction that usually followed the labelling of a settlement as a slum; and partly, in search

of a more precise concept, many alternative terms have been used. For example: squatter settlement, shantytown, low-income settlement, spontaneous settlement, unplanned/ non-planned settlement, informal/non-formal settlement, tenement houses, deteriorated neighbourhoods and unregulated/uncontrolled settlements. In Addis Ababa, in the working language - Amharic, both officials and dwellers express slum as “*yedekemu betoch /seferoch*” (deteriorated houses or settlements), or *chereka biet* (squatter house) or *chika biet* (mud-built house). The terms slum could, with its derogatory connotations, be translated into Amharic as “*desassa*<sup>20</sup> *sefer*<sup>21</sup>” (See also Leslau (2004), Amharic - English – English - Amharic Dictionary in which slum is translated as “*desassa menoria*<sup>22</sup>”). The term *desassa* is usually used in conjunction to the term *gojo* (hut) as in *desassa gojo* to express misery or shanty. The preference of the phrase *yedekemu betoch* instead of *desassa sefer*, by both the dwellers and authorities, show that in the case of Addis Ababa the stress is more on the physical aspect rather than the socio-economic situation. This study, rather than attempting the difficult if not impossible task of defining the term slum, has focused on the theoretical discourse of slums in order to conceptualise the characteristics of the inner-city settlements of Addis Ababa.

Despite the hesitation to use the notion of slum, particularly on the part of academics, recently the term slum has re-entered the discourse of development. It has also gained more legitimacy as some communities prefer to be called “slum dwellers”, for example, as in a “federation of slum dwellers” (See d’ Cruz & Satterthwaite, 2005:7 and Hassan et al, 2005:18). This study, taking into consideration the history and development of the inner-city settlements in Addis Ababa (See Chapter 2 – Background Study), uses the terms “slum” and “non-planned settlement” interchangeably.

### ***Theories of slum***

One of the early authors who developed a descriptive theory of slums was Stokes (1962). He developed a conceptual model in which slums were characterised by the slum dwellers' attitude towards moving up the social strata. In his model, distinction was made between

<sup>20</sup> Squalid, sordid, shabby (Leslau, 2004).

<sup>21</sup> Settlement, neighbourhood

<sup>22</sup> Squalid residence – a phrase preferred by Leslau to translate the term slum.

slums of “hope” (or employable) and slums of “despair” (or unemployable). In making the distinction, the measurement was job-securing ability. The slums of hope and the slums of despair were viewed as homes for the in-migrant and the poor respectively. The theory portrayed slums as places where all the residents always aspire to move out for a better life.

In contrast, Marris (1981) depicted slums as places where people live in slums either by choice (failing to cope with the harsh business competition of the non-slum world) or for the opportunities the slums provide. While Stokes saw slums from the point of view of the slum dwellers’ psychological response to their environment, Marris viewed them as providers of opportunities and services. He suggested the following three characteristics as typical type of slums:

- A neighbourhood of small, poorly built houses, surviving within the inner-city, or intruded illegally into patches of public space, people living by small trade, crafts, casual labour, and manual work.... with strong internal organization providing both support and control.
- A neighbourhood of tenement housing with absentee landlords, people remaining poor, because the more fortunate move elsewhere, replaced by new immigrants attracted by the city’s opportunities.
- A similar neighbourhood of tenement housing where the inner-city is in decline, with many unemployed people dependent on public welfare. It is no longer overcrowded, but the vacancy rate and disintegration of social control makes it dangerous (Marris, 1981:64-5).

Marris’s theory tried to categorize slums into three homogeneous and neatly delineated models, while in reality slums can accommodate diversified social strata and can also be combinations of the single models. For example, in the slums of Addis Ababa it is not unusual to observe both the poor and the rich living side by side. Marris also viewed slums as if they were always relatively smaller in size than the rest of a given city. Again here the case of Addis Ababa can be cited, where the condition is rather the reverse. With about 80% of the city considered slum it is in fact the non-slum areas, which are pockets within the larger slums.

One of the relatively recent categorization of slums is by the UN-HABITAT (2003a). With a focus on the physical and legal aspects, the UN-HABITAT categorized slums into five spatial models based on: 1) origin and age, 2) location and boundaries, 3) size and scale, 4) legality and vulnerability, and 5) development stages. Each of these categories was then subdivided into variables that define the respective categories (See Table 3.1).

**Table 3.1: Categories of spatial types of slums**

1	<i>Origin and age</i>	<p>Historic city centre slums</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Original settlement, often separated from the more modern by its old defensive wall, a moat etc.</li> </ul> <p>Slum estates</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Deteriorated government built mass public housing</li> <li>• Employer built tied housing for workers</li> </ul> <p>Consolidating informal settlements</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Settlement built on informally subdivided and sold land, gaining recognition and acceptance overtime</li> </ul> <p>Recent slums</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Similar to the consolidated informal settlements but are newer and unconsolidated</li> </ul>
2	<i>Location and boundaries</i>	<p>Central</p> <p>Scattered slum islands</p> <p>Peripheral</p>
3	<i>Size and scale</i>	<p>Large slum settlements</p> <p>Medium-size slum estates</p> <p>Small slums</p>
4	<i>Legality and vulnerability</i>	<p>Illegal</p> <p>Informal</p>
5	<i>Development stages</i>	<p>Communities/individuals lacking incentive for improvements</p> <p>Slums with ongoing individual- and community-led development</p> <p>Intervention-led improved slums</p> <p>Upgraded slums</p>

Source: Adapted from UN-HABITAT (2003a:85)

The first category of the UN-HABITAT's spatial model "origin and age" does not fully explain the inner-city slums of Addis Ababa. It also missed two important observations in the categories regarding the "location and boundaries" and "legality and vulnerability". The category "location and boundary" has only three variables: "central",

“scattered slum islands” and “peripheral”. It implied the size of slums is (as indicated in the “size and scale category”) always smaller relative to the rest of the city. This problem is similar to that of the description depicted by Marris. It should have included a category indicating a situation where slums are the norm rather than the exception. The second omission of the UN-HABITAT’s model is in the variables under the category “legality and vulnerability”. It has only two variables “illegal” and “informal”. It assumed that all slums are either illegal or informal. But there are slums, which are formal (legal) or the combination of the formal and the informal as in the inner-city settlements of Addis Ababa.

### ***The challenge of slum***

Upgrading, which is one of the key themes of this study, presupposes that slums have problems and challenges. It inherently aims to improve the condition of slums. However, this does not necessarily mean that slum dwellers are helpless. Slums are also places of opportunities as depicted earlier by Marris and by the UN-HABITAT (2003a). The UN-HABITAT elaborated that many slums, unlike the popular imagination that they are “social wastelands”, are in fact originators of culture, “providers of livelihoods, social networks and a tolerable standard of living”. The UN-HABITAT also made an important observation that “poverty is the context within which slums are necessary and in the absence of which they might be replaced by better housing” (ibid:70), indicating that the challenge of slums and their improvement is closely linked with the eradication of poverty. The discussion below links slums with the issue of poverty, or rather as articulated in this study with the concept of inequality.

According to Kirby (1979:11), slum dwellers, non-slum dwellers and governments perceive slums differently. Prior to the emergence of the famous phrase, “squatters are not part of the problem but part of the solution” propagated by J. F.C. Turner and others, slums were widely seen by governments and the non-slum dwellers as problems or “anomalies - a disruption of the urban form and relationships” (Marris, 1981:68). Since the 70s, with the wide acceptance of Turner’s theory of self-help (See section 3.2.2), however, the slum discourse centred more on identifying specific problems of slums rather than the blanket labelling of slums as problems. In the recent discourse on slums, beyond the identification



of their specific problems, slums are rather discussed in relation to capability/entitlement deprivation, inequalities and their driving forces. Slums are viewed as the embodiments of inequalities engendered by both macro and micro forces. Below, Structural Adjustment Programme as one of the main macro-level forces is discussed followed by local inequalities.

*Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs):* In the 1980s, cognizant of the relationship between macro-economic strategies and the growth of poverty, particularly in developing countries, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank developed a strategy that is known as the Structural Adjustment Policies (SAPs). According to UN-Habitat (2001), the basic goals of SAPs were to restore the developing countries' balance of payments, increase their debt-service capacity, attract foreign investment and achieve economic growth by restructuring trade and financial flows. Actions included privatisation of state assets; the retrenchment of civil servants; the withdrawal of a wide range of subsidies on food, energy, transport and shelter; the introduction of cost recoverable prices for public services; the introduction of new taxes; and the reduction of government social expenditures. In short, "privatisation", "deregulation" and "decentralization" were the key goals (ibid).

Notwithstanding their goals, SAPs have been highly criticized. Concrete cases indicate that they have led to a serious deterioration of the living conditions of the poor, associated with increased unemployment and declines in the real minimum wage. There is now a consensus that the most vulnerable group has been the urban poor (Burgess & Carmona, 1997; UN- Habitat, 2001; Romaya & Rakodi, 2002; UN-Habitat, 2003). The report of the Structural Adjustment Participatory Review International Network (SAPRIN) (2002) has strengthened this consensus. It enumerated a number of the negative effects of SAPs. To mention but a few: laying off of workers, decreased wages, the increase in costs, the diversion of investment to consumption and non-productive activities. Based on these SAPRIN concluded that the effect of SAPs were the intensification and expansion of poverty and inequality.

On the other hand, the World Bank argued that the inequalities prevalent in the developing countries are rather the result of the lack of good governance manifested in the form of, for example, corruption on the part of governments. However, the counter-argument for this, usually, is that the argument of the World Bank is self-contradictory, because, good governance may require large and strong governments and not smaller governments as SAPs dictate. Nevertheless, there are also some good qualities of SAPs such as administrative decentralization that contributed to the general need of good governance.

*Local inequalities:* The UN-Habitat (2003a), in trying to answer the question of why people of a similar economic or social status choose to live together, had characterized slums based on location, societal organization and social constructs: location, referring to the tendency of the poor and the rich to locate themselves in areas of poor quality and high amenity respectively; societal organization, referring to ethnic and racial segregation designed to create spatial separation of classes; and social constructs, referring to the allocation of status to individuals. The analysis of the UN-Habitat, however, did not address the differential relationship among the poor and among the rich in their own respective groups. It treated them as if, for example, the poor were one homogeneous group.

Sen (1999), on the other hand, related inequalities to the asymmetrical relationships not only between classes or groups but also within families and different individuals. He discussed inequalities in terms of variables such as: unemployment, ill health, lack of education, social exclusion, tenure insecurity - generally, lack of well-being and freedom caused by "capability deprivation" - capability defined as "the substantive freedoms" a person enjoys "to lead the kind of life he or she has reason to value" (Sen, 1999:87). He emphasized: "personal heterogeneities" (e.g., age, gender and disabilities and the related ability of converting income into functionings), "environmental diversities" (e.g. location in flood or drought prone areas), "differences in relational perspectives" (e.g. gender and social roles), and "distributions within the family" (e.g. the existence of male preference in the allocation of resources) (ibid:88).

***The magnitude of the challenge***

*Rapid urbanization:* Urbanization is usually explained in terms of demographic changes. However, there are also other factors that contribute to the perception of urbanization. According to Kamete, Tostensen, et al. (2001), these factors are: “socio-cultural, demographic, economic, spatial and legal-administrative”. Among these factors the demographic explanation of urbanization is the most dominant. Demographic changes are increasingly caused by rural to urban migration, natural population increase and boundary redefinition of cities. The reasons for the rural to urban migration have been low agricultural productivity, poverty, war and natural disasters (ibid). In addition, it is always understood by migrants that the life of the city is better than any “developed village” (UN-HABITAT, 2004). Until recently it was this, rural to urban migration that was highly pronounced in the debate of the urbanization agenda. Supporting this, Burgess et al (1997) viewed the dramatic and rapid movement of population and resources from rural to urban as being the central issue in the general urbanization dialogue.

Under the pressure of rapid urbanization cities have expanded rapidly, annexing agricultural land and resulting in sprawl and in the creation of informal settlements. In the inner cities, with the absence of a mechanism to resolve the conflict between the need of residents to stay in proximity of their work places and the need of the business people to maximize profit, “friction of spaces”, land use transformation, over-crowdedness and severe shortage of basic services have been common. According to Kamete, Tostensen, et al (2001), it is now acknowledged that urban growth is irreversible. In 2001, 924 million people (about 30 % of world population) lived in slums. In the next 30 years the number of slum dwellers will be about 2 billion (UN-Habitat, 2003a). Virtually, all the population growth expected at the global level during 2000-2030 will concentrate in urban areas. The vast majority, 95%, of the population increase, forecast for the same period, will be absorbed by the urban areas of the less developed countries (ibid). Very soon, for every villager there will be two city dwellers (UN-HABITAT, 2004).

### **3.2.2. Understanding urban upgrading**

The types of slum upgrading practice that emerged in the 1960s and 1970s are generally associated with the theory of self-help. In order to keep the theory in perspective, first the modernisation theory that explains the ideological background that prompted the self-help concept is discussed. This is then followed by the discussion of the self-help theory itself and its derived intervention approaches.

#### ***Background of the self help theory***

*Modernisation theory:* According to Thorbecke (2000), modernization through economic growth was the dominant theory in the 1950s and 1960s. The theory was characterised by the dualism of the modern and the traditional. Any economic development and its related urbanization processes were seen as linear processes which should lead to the economic progress and ongoing modernization that was being achieved by the “West”. According to Burgess & Carmona (1997), the modernization theory saw the urbanization processes of both the developed and developing countries as similar, except that they were at different stages of a continuum. The traditional was imagined at one extreme end of the continuum and the modern at the opposite. With regard to the issue of slums, at the “traditional” end of the continuum the peripheral squatter settlements were placed (ibid). The squatter settlements, being considered as places of migrant peasants, were seen as forces holding back the progress towards modernization.

The reaction by most of the governments that were in favour of modernisation was, thus, either to ignore slums and deny them the required infrastructure and amenities, or eradicate them. Slum clearances of the 1960’s, which happened in Brazil, Nigeria and South Korea (Hardoy, 1989) can be cited. In some cases, slum clearances were followed by the provision of heavily subsidized public housing. Unfortunately, public housing, which in principle targeted the low-income group, more often than not ended up being allocated to middle and high-income people, its high cost being the main reason for missing its target. Coupled with the practice of slum clearances, the failure of public housing resulted either in creating additional slums on the fringes of cities where access to land was easier (UN-Habitat, 2003a) or in the return of evicted people back to where they have been living

(Marris, 1981). Hence it brought about an endless cycle of slums and their evictions. These experiences and the lessons learned from the Barriadas of Lima, Peru and other similar cities were the main empirical basis for John F. C. Turner and others to develop the self-help theory, discussed below.

### ***The theory of self-help***

The main contribution of the self-help theory was the shift from the slum clearance and the provision of housing to “acknowledging the freedom and ability of people to build”, in the terms of Hamdi (1995) - a shift from the “provider paradigm” to the “support paradigm”. According to Turner, the support paradigm and the provider paradigm are based on the understanding of the term “housing” as a verb and as a noun respectively (Turner, 1972, 1976). While “housing as a verb” indicates the housing process or activity, “housing as a noun” indicates product – a commodity (ibid). The provider paradigm saw housing as product comprised of quantifiable things such as, standards and materials. Professionals and officials within this paradigm, focusing on the standards and materials, have been engaged in slum clearances and at times in the ambitious attempt of housing provision. On the other hand the support paradigm emphasised on the process through which the housing is provided. According to the self- help theory this process includes “the elementary resources for housing – land, materials, energy, tools and skills” that “can only be used properly and economically by people and their local organizations...” (Turner, 1982:99).

Turner (1972:151) explained the activity of housing (housing as a verb) is difficult to conceive without including the “houses promoted, built or used”. The housing activity’s result – the “satisfaction or frustration of needs”, he further elaborated, is better measured by the performance of the housing (what it does) rather than by standards and materials. According to him, the performance of housing lies in its use-value – the relationships between actors and the “elements of housing action” rather than in its product itself (its market value/exchange value). In improving the condition of the low income people, he argued, the use value (process) must be given precedence over the exchange value (product). To enable this, he stated, economy should be understood as resourcefulness and not just productivity - resourcefulness implying getting the most from the least. Further, he

called for structural changes of authority to ensure that the low-income people have a degree of control of the housing resources and their use, which are important in releasing the human and material resources needed to bring about real changes. In the 1960s and 1970s Turner's ideas of self-help were taken up by the World Bank and were implemented in various countries to improve the housing condition of the low-income people (See section below – *Intervention approaches*).

But despite idealization of the self-help concept by numerous authors and its adaptation by the World Bank it was not accepted unanimously. The leading critic of Turner was the British geographer Rod Burgess. One of his important criticisms was on Turner's understanding on the relationship between use-value and exchange-value (Burgess, 1982). According to Burgess, Turner's "errors" are related to 1) "the misunderstanding of the relationship between utility (use value) and market-value (exchange-value)" and 2) "the denial of commodity status to 'self-help'...housing" or the identification of market value with the material aspects of a house only (ibid:59). He argued that a more adequate understanding of the "housing object" can only be arrived at through the analysis of the interpenetration between use- and exchange-value that recognizes:

- 1) the transformation of the self-help house into the commodity form by the producer himself;
- 2) the fact that one man's use-value can be another man's exchange-value and vice versa;
- 3) that a self-help house can be a very different commodity to the various interest groups operating in the broader urban market (ibid:61).

Unlike Turner and his followers Burgess located self-help within the wider economic context. He argued the determinant elements of the housing problem in developing countries should be sought not in technological or organizational systems – as Turner propagated, rather in the "commodity status of housing objects which are produced and exchanged in a society dominated by the capitalist mode of production" (ibid:86). The academic debate between Turner's and Burgess's key positions, though it was initially stimulating and has served to bring the housing plight of the low-income to the attention of wider audience, as observed by Mathey (1992), the debate somehow stopped in the 1980s

after it had become obvious that both positions had valid arguments. On the practical level even if all self-help's expected results are not achieved, given the present political and economic conditions, its various derived approaches have been implemented in different countries. The main ones are discussed below.

### ***Intervention approaches***

*Self-help and upgrading:* Following its adaptation by the World Bank, the concept of self-help was practiced in the form of upgrading in existing slums; and in the form of sites-and-services in unoccupied spaces- in both cases, with the emphasis on tenure security and infrastructure. Sites-and-services was later perceived as lacking the inherent character of becoming the basis for a sustainable housing delivery (Abbot, 2002) as it demanded vacant land and expensive infrastructure that was not always possible to provide (Werlin, 1999). It became increasingly clear that projects had to satisfy "affordability - cost recovery-replicability" criteria if they were to satisfy the quantity and quality of housing and services required for low-income people. Consequently, in the second half of the seventies, the emphasis shifted towards upgrading in the form of "integrated development projects", sometimes combined with sites-and-services. With this approach, though some projects in countries such as Indonesia and India succeeded, the demand for affordability and cost recovery often resulted in the expulsion of the poor.

By the mid eighties, with the emergence of the debt crises and SAPs, sites-and-services projects were phased out while upgrading continued to be practiced. The main characteristics of upgrading; which includes the improvement of infrastructure, social services, housing, tenure security and income generation; is that it is carried out with the aim of retaining the original dwellers. It can even be conducted by the dwellers themselves with or without the assistance of external actors. There are arguments for and against upgrading. First, let's see those arguments in favour. Martin (1983:53) identified four advantages of upgrading in that it preserves 1) existing economic systems and opportunities for the urban poor, 2) a low cost housing system, usually at advantageous locations, 3) a community, which has many social networks to safeguard the interests of the individual family and the group, and 4) upgrading has a relative advantage over disruptive relocations.

Relocation, which is generally associated with urban renewal, is considered socially disruptive. Usually the location being in a distant and much less favourable area results in higher transport cost and less access to informal employment opportunities (See Ashenafi, 2001, for fuller discussion on this).

In contrast, upgrading, despite its many advantages, was criticised for failing to reduce or stop illegal occupation, for resulting in voluntary and involuntary displacement, because better-off families tend to move attracted by the upgraded environment resulting in gentrification. According to Spence, Wells, et al. (1993) this is an inevitable consequence of the raised values of improved built environment. Upgrading was also criticized for its conflicting priorities, in which many upgrading projects demand mobilization of the energies and resources of low-income groups without considering their priorities; leading into lack of commitment and early failure (ibid). In addition to these, according to the UN-HABITAT (2003a), lack of integration of projects; lack of follow up with services and maintenance of facilities; lack of capacity of city government to enforce cost recovery; disappearance of governance structures, following the termination of projects; and generally, lack of sustainability was considered as main hurdles to upgrading schemes.

*Upgrading and tenure security:* With regard to tenure security, in upgrading processes, the approach which is commonly practiced is the provision of individual land titles. Researchers associated with the World Bank had argued that tenure security through private property rights leads to housing improvement (Jimenez, 1983; Friedman et al, 1988). Similarly, de Soto (2000) have been advocating the merits of private property titles in unleashing “dead capital” that could be used to improve the livelihood of the poor and their environment. Payne (2002) heavily criticized individual land titling in that it has not achieved the envisioned objectives. His criticism included the fact that individual land titling requires well-developed legal and financial infrastructure it ends up becoming expensive, resisting the absorption of the new urban poor. He also added that home ownership might also restrict labour market mobility, thereby increasing unemployment. He explained that individual land tenure should only be considered as the final goal, giving priority to intermediate tenure types. He elaborated that the perception of tenure security



varies among the poor, the middle-income, and the rich, thus the unnecessary provision of individual titles should be avoided.

*The enabling approach:* By the end of the eighties, according to Burgess & Carmona (1997) the failure of the “affordability – cost recovery – replicability” formula, which was promoted since the second half of the seventies, was generally recognized. In the nineties the concept of “enablement” was introduced, with the retreat of the state from welfare programmes under SAPs (Potter et al, 2004), mostly to achieve “cost recovery” and “replicability”. As the role of governments declined, NGOs started to serve as intermediaries between aid institutions and the grassroots.


In relation to slum improvement the objective of enabling approaches was primarily to build the capacity of slum communities so that they could participate and make decisions regarding the allocation of resources to economic, social, and spatial components of slum improvement. The implementation of this approach, however, has not been easy. To begin with, the intermediary role of the NGOs in “community” capacity building had a number of drawbacks. NGOs were criticized for benefiting themselves rather than local dwellers; for co-opting local leadership rather than empowering them; for emphasizing short-term projects, in favour of tangible outputs, rather than focusing on long-term processes; and for pre-empting capacity building by taking over decision making roles. Concomitant to these, the UN-Habitat (2003a) had a list of problems of the enabling approach: 1) it undermines the long established systems of local bureaucracies, which by their very nature are not flexible enough to accommodate “enablement”, 2) the fact that urban communities are complex and diversified makes the achievement of unity of thought and subsequent initiation for action very difficult, and 3) in the absence of unified communities, building capacity in terms of training, organizational assistance and financial help becomes difficult.

The critique of the UN-HABITAT emphasised the diversity of communities and the challenge it creates in the process of “enablement”. But it failed to recognise that the state is also as diversified as communities. The state apparatus, which is one of the major actors in upgrading processes, is not a monolithic unit (Nelson & Wright, 1995) operating in one direction and adhering to specific jobs. The state is rather a collection of different social

actors struggling in various social arenas. Migdal (2001:99-100), for example, argued that each part of the state at different levels consists of a force interacting with other parts of the state and other actors in society. Even the market, which is considered the third main actor alongside the state and communities, is not homogeneous. It is diversified into formal and informal markets (See Fig. 3.1).

Apart from the supra-national governing bodies, such as the United Nations and the European Union, the structure of the state apparatus in each country varies depending on its size and constitution. However, within a specific country and in relation to urban upgrading, one can mention three levels of administrative structures: the local, the intermediate and the central. Davidson (1993: 17-19) defined the three levels as 1) the local government, referring to the elected or appointed city or district government in direct contact with the population; 2) the state or provincial government, positioned between the local and central government, and at some distance from communities; and 3) the central government with a nation wide scope, often working through other levels of government agencies. In this study, even the local governments at the lowest level of the structure are viewed not as passive recipients and implementers of orders, but as active actors and transformers of upgrading interventions.

**Fig. 3.1: Comparison between idealized and real actor relationship**



Source: Adapted from Hamdi (2004:110-111)

***Classification of upgrading approaches***

Historically, two broad approaches to city improvement can be identified: the utopian and the pragmatic. Under the Utopian approaches, the works of the English Industrialist, Robert Owen (1817-1820) and that of the French writer, Charles Fourier's (1830-1850) can be mentioned. On the pragmatic side the most known are the work of Haussmann - the transformation of Paris implemented during 1851-1870, and that of Patrick Geddes in 1886 in Edinburgh, and later in 1915 in India. Geddes made some experiment on the physical upgrading of slums with due consideration to the existing fabric and by implication to its dwellers. His son Arthur Geddes quoted by Lanchester (1947:14-15) stated:

It was Geddes's personal awakening to the horror of Edinburgh's piled up slums that drove him to find out experimentally how to transform an old and long built neighbourhood....They [Geddes and his wife] set about to weed out the worst of the houses that surround them, and thus widening the narrow closes into courtyards on which a little sunlight could fall and into which a little air could enter upon the children's new playing spaces and the elders' garden plots. The best houses, on the other hand, were preserved.

Owing to this experience, in 1915, Geddes was invited to India in which he has done similar jobs that he preferred to call "careful surgery".

Following the advent of the self-help theory the most common classification has been between those practices conducted in new settlements and those in existing settlements (See Table 3.1). However, this is not the only way of classification of upgrading approaches, there are also other types. For example, Abbot (2002) established three categories of thematic classifications: physical infrastructure provision, community action planning and holistic (comprehensive) plan. While Huchzermeyer (in Abbot, 2002), based on the role of external actors, formulated two broad categories: externally designed comprehensive upgrading and support-based interventions.

**Table 3.2: Main types of upgrading and low-income housing initiatives**

<b>Context</b>	<b>Type</b>	<b>Main features</b>
New settlements	Sites plus development plan (and gradual implementation of services)	Settlements are planned and surveyed, lots allocated and occupied, infrastructure gradually implemented
	Sites and services	Mass production of serviced sites or serviced sites with basic starter housing in large schemes, usually in peripheral land
	Development of new housing	New infrastructure and housing units are built on vacant land
Existing settlements	Comprehensive Upgrading	Wide range of improvements involving different types of components according to a predefined plan. This is integrated upgrading undertaken in one go within a limited time-frame. It may include new housing units on available pocket lands for on-site relocation of dwellers
	Piecemeal upgrading	Improvements gradually added over long-term process but without an integrated and predefined development plan
	Technical assistance and credit for home expansion and improvement	Organized support for self-help housing efforts, may be combined with upgrading programmes

Source: Adapted from Imparato and Ruster (2003:32)

This section reviewed the understanding of slums and upgrading approaches. Understanding and articulating the characteristics of slums and upgrading approaches is critical to developing effective strategies of supporting positive transformations in slums. Therefore, the context-related research question, to which the answer will serve as a background to the main research questions, is formulated below:

- *What are the characteristics of the non-planned settlements (slums) and upgrading approaches in the inner-city of Addis Ababa?*

### **3.3. Upgrading and tenants**

The above research question is followed by the first main research question based on the debate about whether tenants are responsive to upgrading processes. But, before dealing with the issue of responsiveness the characteristics of tenants in relation to rental housing is discussed. The aim is to outline the diversity and type of rental housing as a background to the first main research question and the subsequent discussion on tenants' responses.

#### **3.3.1. Rental housing**

The diversity of rental housing is not amenable to simple categories. Nevertheless, there are some attempts of classification based on some aspects of rental housing such as, economics, the formal/informal discourse and the housing market. For example, Kemeney (1995: 33-36), based on the economics of rental housing, tried to classify rental housing into "cost renting" and "profit renting", irrespective of ownership of the housing. By cost renting he meant "rental housing...the rents of which cover only actual incurred costs of a stock of dwellings" while by profit renting he meant rental housing "the rents of which are largely or entirely unregulated and where the aims of the owners...is to maximize profits..." (ibid:34). According to Kemeney, owner-based classifications, such as private rental and public rental, are misleading as they give the connotation of "profit" and "non-profit" respectively, while in practice it could be the reverse.

Kemeney's classification is based on the experience of Europe and presupposes the formal sector. However, in developing countries, the informal sector is much more significant than the formal. In connection to urban lands, in the context of sub-Saharan African countries, Jenkins (2006:11-15) for example, questioned the validity of the formal sector at all. Rakodi (1995) tried to include both the formal and informal sector and the shades in between in classifying rental housing. She identified private formal-sector rental housing, inner-city subdivided buildings, purpose-built buildings for multi-habitation, public sector rental housing, and informal rental housing and its variations; such as housing constructed on land rented under illegal or traditional tenure forms, self-built housing for

occupation or rent occupied by tenants, ‘subletees’, sharers<sup>23</sup> and rent-free tenants<sup>24</sup>. To this classification can be added rooms or beds rented by the hour in boarding houses, cheap pensions, space to sleep rented at work or in public places or even in cemeteries (UN-Habitat, 2003b:25). The public sector rental housing, which is one of the main focuses of this study, is further subdivided. Schlyter (2005), discussing public housing in relation to housing systems, identified another variant. She recognised three housing systems: the market, the regulating market, the state controlled (ibid, referring Clapham 1995) and added one more based on her own finding the post colonial housing system. She characterised the post-colonial housing system as a small sector “state controlled housing tied to employment”. According to Schlyter, the “post-colonial state controlled system” is different from Clapham’s “state controlled” system in that it is tied to employment. Her finding was based on the case of Lusaka (Zambia) in which the rental housing were either built by employers for their employees or by the city council for private companies for them to house their employees (ibid). The UN-HABITAT (2003a) had also dwelled on the relationship between public housing and employees with additional comment on the fate of public housing. It stated:

in developing countries, the heyday of public rental was in the immediate post-World War II period when [...] accommodations for the new urban workers were needed [...] On ideological grounds, the stock of public housing in many countries has either been sold off [...] to existing tenants [...] or semi privatised into housing associations (ibid:106).

The discussion above does not explain the condition of *kebele* housing, because the *kebele* housing is neither built for urban workers nor privatised. This condition of *kebele* housing is assumed to have some influence on the characteristics of the tenants and their response in urban upgrading. The unexplained characteristics of *kebele* housing, coupled with the general marginalisation of tenants, have made the investigation of tenants’ responses in upgrading processes very important. It should also be emphasized that, in the

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<sup>23</sup> Separate households sharing a room

<sup>24</sup> Relatives, friends, married children of owner - occupiers etc.

context of Addis Ababa, the majority of the inner-city settlements are occupied by *kebele* (public) housing. Below the theoretical debate on the response of tenants in upgrading processes is presented.

### **3.3.2. Tenants response**

As indicated above, by the UN-HABITAT (2003a), since the 1980s, as part of the SAPs, public housing has been privatised in many countries, for example in Mozambique (Jenkins, 1990), Cuba (Hamberg, 1990), Nicaragua (Mathey, 1990), South Africa (Rakodi, 1995), South Korea (ibid, citing Ha, 1994), India (ibid, 1995, citing Wadhava, 1994), Zambia and Vietnam (Schlyter, 2005). The main rationale for the privatisation of public housing was to avoid subsidies and housing deterioration. According to Mitlin (1997), the general understanding regarding tenants is that they are either “invisible” or not motivated to participate in the improvement of their surroundings. Similarly, Andreasen (1996:360) stated, “...tenants remain unmotivated to invest the energy to improve the value of the property they do not own”. Put otherwise, “homeowners, unlike renters and landlords, have both an economic and a use interest in their properties” (UN-Habitat, 2003a:83, citing Rohe and Stewart, 1996:71), thus they are motivated in improving their housing. Researchers associated with the World Bank have also argued that tenure security through private property rights leads to housing improvement (Jimenez, 1983; Friedman et al, 1988). Similarly, de Soto (2000) prescribed the formalization of informal properties through the issuance of private titles as a panacea to ending the poverty of the majority of the people in developing countries and former communist countries. He argued, with titles and property laws, dwellers could use their houses as a security for credit to start or expand business, thereby improving both their livelihood and settlements. However, privatisation, more often than not,

has led to a process of segregation resulting in gentrification, whereby low-income people are removed from privatised neighbourhoods to less attractive areas or in ‘residualisation’, by which only low income tenants stay in the remaining public housing areas (Schlyter

2005, citing: Linneman et al. 1999, Zhou et al. 1996, Clapham 1995, Stanovik 1994; Payne, 2002).

Schlyter, based on her experience in Lusaka (Zambia) and Hanoi (Vietnam), showed that privatisation of rental housing was unfavourable for the low-income people. In Lusaka, the effects of privatisation were extensions and densification resulting in "over-crowdedness, lack of privacy and too many sharing facilities, such as toilet"; while in Hanoi the results at the level of individual apartments were good but at the level of blocks and common areas resulted in degradation (Schlyter, 2005:12-13). Payne (2002) confirming Schlyter's findings argued that other factors such as perceived tenure security through the passage of time or innovative and intermediate tenure forms, including informal types, as important for housing improvement and more conducive to the low-income people. He saw privatisation as the final stage of the tenure continuum.

In the above discussion there are broadly two contending assertions. On the one hand the argument that asserts tenants are not motivated in upgrading their housing and, thus, properties should be privatized; and on the other hand the argument that privatization does not benefit the low-income people. In addition to these there is a third view that states, despite the long held assumptions, tenants are motivated to improve their housing and surrounding. Eckstein (1990) based on her longitudinal case study of tenement housing, in the inner-city of Mexico, contended the assertion that tenants lack the incentive to involve in upgrading. She stated:

...tenants did not hesitate to invest in their rental units even when the apartments were ill equipped and in disrepair. The most typical home improvement was the addition of a mezzanine loft...In the late 1960s, many of the tenants also collectively financed and themselves painted the facades of their *vecindades* [one – and two storey tenements].... Such tenant-financed improvements discredit the contention that inner-city tenants lack the incentive to invest in upgrading their housing (Eckstein, 1990:169).

This study seeks to investigate these conflicting assertions by posing the first main research question:

- ***In the context of state ownership of land and housing, to what extent, why and how do tenants respond in upgrading processes?***



### ***Why “response” and not “participation”?***

In posing the above research question a deliberate use of the term “response” is made as opposed to the term “participation”, which is usually used in connection to upgrading processes. The discussion below explains why this preference was made.

Participation as related to planning and design, or more broadly to urban development, is often discussed in association with the involvement of a community in the planning and implementation of, for example, neighbourhood design, urban renewal or urban planning. In this way of thinking the focus is on how to create cooperation and partnerships between the users on the one hand and other stakeholders, such as professionals and government officials, on the other hand. In this regard, the concept of participation is often referred to as “community participation” - indicating that the community as the end user deserves more control of what is happening (Hamdi, 1995). In developing countries the introduction of community participation is traced to the sites-and-services projects that followed the general failure of the slum demolishing and housing provision of the 1950s and 1960s (ibid, 1995). Community participation was seen as a method through which the lessons from the self-help informal settlements can be transferred into projects, such as sites-and services.

Beyond planning and design and in its broadest sense, participation was defined as “...a process through which stake holders influence and share control over development initiatives and the decisions and resources which affect them” and its goal was “to reach and engage primary stockholders [marginalized poor people] in ways that were transformational...”(Nelson & Wright 1995:5, citing World Bank, 1994). The two key concepts were “stake holder” and “transformational”. According to Nelson and Wright (1995:6), the ideological bases of these concepts were derived from theories about “how society is organised and how it can be changed”: “society” signifying “stake holders” and “change” signifying “transformational”.

The concept of participation, through time, has acquired many layers of meanings and it may continue to do so. It is also often attached with buzz words, such as “partnership”, as in community participation (Hamdi, 1995), “stake holders”, as in the definition of the World Bank; and, “enablement”, as in the definition of the DFID (2000) - “enabling

people to realise their rights to participate in, and access information relating to, the decision making process which affect their lives”. Therefore, it is impossible to come up with one conclusive and definite definition. But despite its illusiveness, many authors agree that participation has types, which are usually expressed in terms of “ladders”- climbing from the least participatory to the most participatory (See, Fig. 3.2, Chambers’ collection of ladders). Each type of participation mentioned in the ladders presupposes 1) the relationship between actors, primarily between “outsiders” and “insiders”; and, 2) a share of control or ownership between the outsiders and insiders. A more comprehensive understanding of the types of participation can, therefore, be elicited if the ladders are combined with the roles and relationships of the actors and the degree of control each exercises (See Table 3.3).

**Fig. 3.2: Participation ladders: types and depth of participation**

Citizen control	Collective action	Self-mobilization
Delegated power	Co-learning	Interactive participation
Partnership	Cooperation	Functional participation
Placation	Consultation	Participation for material incentives
Consultation	Compliance	Participation by consultation
Informing		Passive participation
Therapy		Token participation or manipulation
Manipulation		
1	2	3

Source: Chambers, 2005:105 (referring: 1) Arnstein, 1967:217; 2) Adapted from Kanji & Greenwood, 2001:5 & 3) adapted from Vaneklasen with Miller, 2002:88)

**Table 3.3: Roles and relationships of actors**

Participation type	Outsiders' objective	Roles/ relationships		Control/ Ownership
		Outsiders'	Local people's	
Totalitarian	State political	Dictator	Complier	Outsiders'
Nominal	Superficial legitimization	Manipulator	Puppet	
Extractive	Obtain local knowledge or better planning	Researcher/ Planner	Informant	
Induced	Gain action through material incentives	Employer	Worker	
Consultative	Improve effectiveness and efficiency	Rational economizer	Collaborator	
Partnership	Share responsibility	Co-equal partner	Co-equal partner	
Transformative	Facilitate sustainable development by local people	Facilitator/ catalyst	Analyst/ actor/ agent	
Self mobilizing	Support spontaneous action	Supporter	Controller/ owner	Local People's

Source: Adapted from Chambers (2005:106) that draws from several sources, including the versions of Andrea Cornwall and Petty (1994, 1995b and those in Fig. 3.2)

The roles and relationships between the actors within the concept of participation, as mentioned earlier, presuppose 1) the involvement of a local community or marginalized people in a predetermined format of “participation”, 2) the homogeneity of the project initiator, e.g. the state/ NGOs, and the “beneficiary”, e.g. slum community. This view neglects the diversity and conflict of interest within the outsiders – project initiators, and the insiders – “beneficiaries” themselves.

Norman Long (1992, 2001, 2004), the ardent proponent of the “actor oriented – approach”, related the “participatory” outlook to the “structural models of development” that are hinged to neo-liberalism and neo-Marxism. He argued, though, neo-liberalism and neo-Marxism represented opposite ideologies both:

see development and social change emanating primarily from centres of power in the form of intervention by state or international interests and following some broadly determined

developmental path, signposted by 'stages of development' or by the succession of 'dominant modes of production' (Long & Long, 1992:19).

Neo-liberal theory stresses the trickle down concept from a developed sector to the less developed sector and neo-Marxism views development "as an inherently unequal process involving the continued exploitation of 'peripheral' societies" (ibid). From this the depiction of the concept of participation as a relationship between the powerful "outsiders" and passive "local people", follows.

In contrast to the concept of "participation", the concept of "response" not only anticipates the role of the local dwellers as active agents of change, but also recognizes the conflict of interests and possible diverse interpretations of given interventions. Despite the wishful thinking of the state and NGOs that the "beneficiaries" fit in within the project format and participate as required, "beneficiaries" usually reinterpret the intentions of the project and "respond" accordingly. Therefore, the use of the term "response" captures the complex reality of upgrading processes and their interaction with a context and its actors. This is based upon the epistemological standpoint which acknowledges that "knowledge emerges out of complex interplay of social, cognitive, cultural, institutional and situational elements" and that it is "always essentially provisional, partial and contextual in nature, and people work with a multiplicity of understandings, beliefs and commitments" (Long, 2004 citing Long and Long, 1992:212-213).

### **3.4. Upgrading and inner-city settlements**

#### **3.4.1. Spatial models and inner-city settlements**

During the late 1960s and the 1970s a spatial model that functionally related the peripheral squatter settlements and the inner-city slums was established. It was theorised that once residents had the economic means they move out and establish themselves in the peripheral squatter settlements. The urbanists of the 1960s and 1970s (See, for example: Abrams, 1964; Turner & Goetz, 1967; Turner, 1967, 1976; Mangin, 1970) also viewed peripheral squatter settlements as partial solutions to housing shortage and economic problems of the urban poor. Inner-city slums, on the other hand, were portrayed as temporary rental

accommodations and places of despair, in part because of the dilapidated physical fabric and in part because of the people who inhabited them. In the same vein, Stokes' (1962) model of slums (See section 3.2.1) also portrayed slums as places where all the residents always aspire to move out for a better life.

Eckstein (1990), based on her longitudinal research on Latin American slums, argued that there was a reversal of the spatial model resulting in the characterization of “squatter settlements of despair and inner-city slums of hope” – the reverse of the Stokes' model and the early assumption of the urbanists of the 1960s. However, even when, with the change of both spatial and social mobility models, recognition was developed regarding the stability of inner-city settlements, the depiction of inner-city slums as transitory rental places persisted (ibid). It should be noted, however, that during the last two decades, some researchers have tried to show the importance of rental housing (see for example: Gilbert, 1992, 1997; Rakodi, 1995; Andreasen, 1996 and UN-Habitat, 2003b).

The portrayal of inner-city slums as a transitory place of despair had its own consequences. When self-help housing was introduced in the 1970s to be implemented in different countries the focus were peripheral squatter settlements, marginalising inner-city tenants (Eckstein 1990). When efforts are made to upgrade settlements where the basic spatial, legal and socio-economic aspects are different from that of squatter settlements, the target groups in mind are usually a “family on a plot” (Mukhija, 2001) on a grid-iron layout settlement (Payne, 1989). Even when the tenure is of mixed type the target group are usually assumed to be home owners. This bias has primarily to do with the origin and development of the theory of self-help. The developing countries' insistence on the policies of home ownership (Rakodi, 1995; Schlyter, 2003; Potter, 2004) is also additional possible manifestation of the bias. Similarly, largely owing to the bias, literature is replete with discussions of upgrading activities undertaken in squatter slums, and owner occupied inner-city slums. However, there are major knowledge gaps as to how upgrading affects tenant-dominated inner-city settlements (Gilbert, 1992, Rakodi, 1995, UN-HABITAT, 2003b); hence, the second main research question:

- ***How do upgrading processes affect spatial transformations in tenant-dominated inner-city settlements in Addis Ababa?***

***Why the focus on spatial transformation?***

The inner-city is an arena where maximum conflict of interest is observed. Nowhere is spatial friction more felt than in the inner-city. On the one hand, investors are attracted by the existing, relatively developed infrastructure, amenities and dynamicity of the inner-city. On the other hand, dwellers want to stay in the inner-city as their livelihood is dependent on the social network built up over time; and attracted by the informal labour or services, only available in sufficient choice and variety in city centres. The state, depending on its political and economic interests, is also another actor that contributes to the pressure of inner cities. Though it is dependent on political agenda usually, the state wants to “modernize” the inner-city for a better efficiency, good image and income generation. According to Hardoy (1989) governments undertake slum clearance because of the need for sanitation, safety, redevelopment and “modernization” or image. Therefore, in the inner-city of developing countries there is a constant tension between the need of the government, the low-income people and the commercial developments. The urgent need of the actors’ involved and the tension, which is manifested in extensive spatial pressure, calls for a focus on spatial transformations.

Inner-city dwellers do not only resist externally-driven transformative forces, negatively affecting their livelihood but also engage themselves in the physical transformation of their housing and its surrounding. Why and how dwellers transform their houses was discussed by many authors (See for example: Tipple, 2000; Nguluma, 2003; and those specific to cases in Addis Ababa: Demissachew, 1998; Essayas, 2000; Yonas, 2003). The focus of this study is, however, as the research question indicates, on the investigation of the relationship between upgrading processes and spatial transformations.

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## **PART-III: BACKGROUND STUDY**



“Indeed, neoliberal capitalism since 1970 has multiplied Dickens’s notorious slum of Tom-all-Alone’s in *Bleak House* by exponential powers. Residents of slums, while only 6 percent of the city population of the developed countries, constitute a staggering 78.2 percent of urbanites in the least-developed countries; this equals fully a third of the global urban population.

“According to UN-HABITAT, the world’s highest percentages of slum-dwellers are in Ethiopia (an astonishing 99.4 percent of the urban population)...”<sup>25</sup>

(Italics original)

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<sup>25</sup> Davis, M. (2006:23). *Planet of Slums*. Verso, UK, USA.



## **CHAPTER 4: BACKGROUND STUDY**

### **4.1. Introduction**

This chapter situates the phenomenon of inner-city settlement upgrading in the context of Addis Ababa. It focuses on the influence of the city's origin and its successive master plans on the inner-city as this is the arena and context in which the activities have been occurring. In this regard it emphasizes four main issues: characteristics of inner-city settlements, upgrading actors, approaches and challenges. Owing to its coverage of the previous and ongoing upgrading activities in the city, the chapter can be viewed as a backdrop to the main case studies. It deals with various actors and their upgrading activities so that the research case studies can be understood as part of the interdependent city dynamics. Equal emphasis is also given to the prevalent challenges in upgrading the inner-city, prompting the normative research question.

The chapter has six sections. Section two deals with location, population trends administrative structure, urbanization trends and the main challenges of the country with focus on Addis Ababa. Section three deals with the origin and development of the old non-planned inner-city settlements, forging an insight into their influence on the current situation. Section four, based on the discussion on the preceding section, deals with the temporal and spatial delineation of the inner-city and its current situation. Section five discusses types of upgrading and the actors driving them with a focus on the government, NGOs and *iddirs*. Section six summarizes and highlights the challenge in upgrading the inner-city. The discussions in each section are also supported by definitions and clarification of key concepts such as civil society, NGO, CBO, *iddir*, informal and formal settlements.

## 4.2. Urbanization trends

Ethiopia is located in the horn of Africa and it covers an area of 1,133,380 square kilometres. After Nigeria Ethiopia is the second most populous country in Africa with a population of about 77 million<sup>26</sup>. Economically, it is one of the poorest countries in the world with per capita income of about 100 USD. Addis Ababa<sup>27</sup> is the capital city and the seat of the federal government. It is also the seat of the headquarters of various international organizations such as the African Union (AU) and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA). Addis Ababa is located at the geographic center of the country and covers 54,000 ha of land with an estimated population of 3.2 million<sup>28</sup>. Addis Ababa, being the commercial, industrial and service hub is a melting pot for the various people coming from all corners of the country. (See Fig. 4.1, for the location of Ethiopia and Addis Ababa.)

The administrative system of Ethiopia is structured in such a way that it has the federal government comprised of nine regional states and two chartered, autonomous cities. The chartered cities are Addis Ababa and Diredawa. Diredawa is the second largest city. The City of Addis Ababa has the dual status of both a city and a state. The Mayor is the chief executive of the city government. The second tier of the city government refers to the sub-cities. The city is divided into ten sub-cities with responsibilities of municipal and non-municipal services. The lowest tier of government is the *kebele*. Each sub-city has on average about ten *kebeles* under its jurisdiction. The structure discussed above is the current one; however, the city has passed through many administrative restructurings in previous years. At one point it was divided into 6 zones, 28 *woredas/keftagnas* and 284 *kebeles*. This was later changed into 10 sub-cities and 201 *kebeles* doing away with zones and *woredas*. Recently, the 201 *kebeles* were further merged into 99. The current administrative structure

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<sup>26</sup> According to CSA (1998:15), projected estimate for 2007

<sup>27</sup> Also spelled Addis Abeba.

<sup>28</sup> According to CSA (1999:266), projected high variant estimation for 2007. Various authors, however, put the estimation much higher, for example, Solomon & McLead (2004) at 3.5 million, Matheows (2005) at 3.4 million.

has thus 10 sub-cities and 99 *kebeles*<sup>29</sup>. Each sub-city and *kebele* administration has demarcated boundaries.

**Fig. 4.1: Location of Ethiopia and Addis Ababa**



Source: Google Earth, 2005.

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<sup>29</sup> With the recent restructuring of *Woreda* and *Kebele* boundaries, the naming of *kebeles* is changed. However, the thesis uses the old naming or commonly known names to be consistent with available documents.

Urbanisation in its modern sense is a recent phenomenon in Ethiopia. Like most developing countries, Ethiopia has a low level of urbanization. The level of urbanization is even lower than that of most African countries. In 2000, according to the UN-HABITAT (2001), the average level of urbanization for Africa was about 38 % while that of Ethiopia was about 18%<sup>30</sup>. However, the current urban population growth rate of Ethiopia, which is estimated at 5 - 6 % per year, is much higher than the growth rate of urban population worldwide. In 1984 there were 312 urban centres with a population of more than 2000, by 1994<sup>31</sup> this number had increased to 534 and currently there are 925<sup>32</sup> urban centres showing a rapid change of population distribution in the country.

The urban centres, which house about 18% of the population, are faced with a multitude of challenges; the main ones being rapid urbanisation and the housing problem that accompanies it, the ever-increasing nature of inner-city decay, urban sprawl, environmental degradation, inadequate infrastructure and utilities, inadequate health and educational services, HIV/AIDS pandemic and increasing unemployment and poverty. These urban challenges are extensively demonstrated in Addis Ababa because it houses about 26% of the urban population of the country, about 10 times as large as Direedawa, the second largest city, with a population of 340,000. Only ten cities in the country have population size of 100,000 or above.

### **4.3. Origin and development of the non-planned inner-city settlements of Addis Ababa**

Generally the slums of Addis Ababa can be categorized into three types:

- 1) Non-planned old inner-city settlements, dominated by *kebele* housing and occupied by tenants with some tenure rights.
- 2) Informal peripheral squatter settlements built on vacant land with little or no infrastructure and with uncertain or no tenure rights. These are locally known as *chereka biet* – literally, “moon house”, describing houses built over night (under the light of the

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<sup>30</sup> If calculated according to the projected estimates of CSA (1998) for 2007, the level of urbanization for Ethiopia is about 17% less than UN-Habitat’s estimate in 2000.

<sup>31</sup> The year the latest national official census was conducted

<sup>32</sup> Solomon, Matheows et al. (2004)

moon) to escape the control of the government. The peripheral informal settlements can further be divided into two. The first sub-group includes those small *chika* houses built by low income people, usually because of the lack of access of land through the formal process. Actually the name *chereka biet* was originally created to describe this kind of houses which could easily be constructed over night if not in few days. The second group includes houses built by middle and high income people either because of lack of access of land through the formal means or for speculative reasons. Land is usually bought informally from farmers and the houses could be of durable materials.<sup>33</sup>

3) Inner-city squatters with no tenure rights (*lastic biet*, literally plastic house: these are usually small pockets occupying parts of public parks, squares, vacant open spaces and as attachments to streets side fences. They are often inhabited by street children, destitute elders and beggars and sometimes dislocated families from the rural areas.

The interest of the study is on type one above, non-planned old inner-city settlements. The current condition and characteristics of these settlements is highly connected with the origin and development of Addis Ababa. In the sections below the influence of the origin of the city and its master plans on the inner-city settlements is discussed.

#### **4.3.1. The influence of Addis Ababa's origin and the successive master plans on the inner-city settlements**

##### ***The period from mid 1880s up to 1936***<sup>34</sup>

According to the UN-Habitat (2003a) in most cities of Africa and Asia that have pre-colonial and pre-industrial existence usually the original settlement is separated from the “modern” part of the city by a fortress like wall (e.g. in Lahore, Pakistan) or a moat, and often has a distinct name (e.g. *Kasbah*, in Morocco) or the old city (e.g. Old Delhi, India). Such neighbourhoods are distinguished by their mixture of grand residential buildings (sometimes in ruins), and open public spaces (ibid). Addis Ababa, which was established

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<sup>33</sup> For fuller discussion on this, see Kalkidan (2001), Masters thesis on Informal land transformation at the urban fringe of Addis Ababa

<sup>34</sup> The beginning of the brief Italian occupation

in the last quarter of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, was not only a pre-industrial city, but also it was established without a colonial model<sup>35</sup>. Unlike the African and Asian cities, that had pre-colonial existence, the old part of Addis Ababa does not fully show similar characteristics. A substantial part of the old inner-city is rather occupied by huge masses of non-planned settlements of single storied *chika* (mud and wood construction) houses. The inner-city manifests temporariness rather than permanency, and rather than occupying a limited and demarcated portion of the city it stretches through large tracts of land.

The background to the current layout and condition of the inner-city slums of Addis Ababa can largely be traced back to its formative age<sup>36</sup> of the city, which spanned from the mid 1980s<sup>37</sup>, the period the city was founded, up to 1917, the year the construction of the Ethio-Djibouty railway reached Addis Ababa. The city was founded by Emperor Menelik and his wife Empress Taitu. Empress Taitu had played an important role in choosing the current location of the city. Addis Ababa was the first urban centre which heralded permanence as opposed to the wandering capitals of former times. The city’s foundation is related to the movement of Emperor Menelik II and his army in the pursuit of expanding and consolidating territories. This phenomenon, referred by Mesfin (1976) as “political nomadism” had not started with the reign of Menelik. In Ethiopia, the rise and fall of capital cities had been tied to the movement of Emperors. For example, Almeida in the first quarter of the seventeenth century, observed:

“The Emperor’s camp is the royal city and capital of this empire. It deserves the name of city because of the multitude of people and the good order they observe in siting it...this is usually the same although those there have been hitherto have never lasted for many years. The Emperor now retires to one called Dancaz and it is nearly ten years since he chose it. Yet before, this same Emperor in thirteen or fourteen years had five or six other places in each of which he stayed for about two, three, or four times. This has always been the custom of this empire. When the emperor changes these places, you will usually see nothing in those he has left but meadows of Troia fruit. These changes are made so

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<sup>35</sup> Ethiopia as a country has never been colonized, except the brief occupation by the Italians in 1936 -1941.

<sup>36</sup> The “formative age”, is used here after Johnson (1974)

<sup>37</sup> Some authors put this date to 1886 while others put it in 1887.

frequently in the first place because it costs them little to build houses, as I shall explain directly, then because of his different wars, now against one enemy and now against another...” (Mesfin 1976:7-8, quoting Almeida in Becakingham, 1954)


Like his predecessors Menelik’s headquarters and military camps were set up following his movements. The first plan for Addis Ababa, known as “the Taitu- Menelik Development plan” was not more than a “blueprint of a military camp” (See Fig. 4.2). The camp was called a *sefer*, a term which is now commonly used to name neighbourhoods within the city. When the camp became more permanent the settlement was called a *ketema*, a term now used to indicate town or city. The noun “*ketema*” is probably derived from the root verb “*keteme*”, which indicates the end of a movement (See also Mesfin, 1976). Wherever the Emperor has, alongside his large entourage and army, made temporary encampment the area used to become his capital. Before the final settlement in Addis Ababa, according to Akalou (1976) four military camps (garrison towns) were used as capitals, namely: Ankober (1868-1876), Liche (1876-1882), Ankober and Debre-Berhan (alternatively) (1882-1884) and Entoto<sup>38</sup> (1884-1987).

Owing to the trend of “political nomadism”, in the early days the permanency of Addis Ababa was not a settled issue. According to Akalou (1976, citing Pankhurst, R. 1962), at one point Menelik had an intention of moving to Addis Alem. The narrative reports of foreign visitors were also replete with statements regarding the mobility of the capitals. For example, Count Gleichen, a visitor at the end of the nineteenth century predicted the inevitability of the movement of the capital elsewhere (Akalou, 1976 citing Gleichen, 1898). However, the prediction did not materialize; rather Menelik, before his death in 1913, achieved his power over most of the country and as a result Addis Ababa became the last city in the chain of wandering capitals.

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<sup>38</sup> Entoto is now part of Addis Ababa.

**Fig. 4.2: The Taitu-Menelik development plan**



Source: Adapted from Tekeste & Ceccareli (1986:n.p.)

To date, the emergence of Addis Ababa out of an inherently temporary garrison town has influenced the housing characteristics and type of construction. Addis Ababa’s early houses were built after the model of village houses (*saar biet*) - circular *chika* huts with thatched roofs. Unlike other old historical cities with pre-colonial existence, the houses and settlements were not meant to show monumentality and permanence. In the 1900s Merab (cited in Ottaway, 1976:36) described Addis Ababa as a city of some 60,000



inhabitants that looked more like an enormous camp than a city, with tents and *tukuls* (huts) dominating the landscape. He stated:

Aside from the market quarters and the *ghibi* [palace] compound, which have all the sadness of a city without having its splendour, one can say that the capital of Ethiopia is more countryside than city.

(See also Fig. 4.3)

The legacy of this humble start has still persisted. In 1994, of the total housing units 97% were non-storied (CSA, 1998) and 82% of the houses were built up of *chika*, (CSA, 1998). Currently, it is still estimated that the same proportion of houses are built of the non-durable *chika* construction (Mathewos, 2005).

The other phenomenon that shaped the characteristics of the non-planned inner-city settlements was the city's early morphology. According to Johnson (1974) the morphology of the city during the formative age was related, among other things, to the location of important places ("charged nodes") and the cultural traditions of the founders of the city. The centre of the original settlement was Menelik's palace located on a higher plateau surrounded by his immediate entourage (See Fig. 4.3). Next to the palace, churches, the compounds of the nobility, and the military leaders occupied important nodes. Surrounding these secondary nodes the followers of the military leaders settled around them regardless of the terrain and the availability of better location elsewhere. In the case of churches the clergy and other church servants inhabited their surroundings. Johnson observed circular concentric settlement patterns: 1) "clustered around a series of small nodes which are in turn clustered around larger main nodes" and 2) having "a series of radiating paths and routes connecting these nodes" (ibid: 84) (See Fig. 4.4).

Johnson added another important observation that the nodes, which appropriated big tracts of lands, were in turn located at a considerable distance from each other leaving huge open spaces in between. According to Johnson, these open spaces were used as additional camp sites, for pastures, crops, as market areas or occasional ceremonies. He attributed the nodes' consumption of the huge tracts of land and the distance between them to the concept

of distance and attachment to land ownership of the Amhara<sup>39</sup>. Levine (1965:54), expounding on the attitude of the Amhara culture regarding distance stated, “for him [the Amhara] a distance of two or three hours by foot is like the American’s trip to the corner drugstore”. The second cultural element, attachment to land ownership was related to the land tenure system. Basically, all of the land belonged to the Emperor; who according to his wish granted portions of it to the church, the nobility, and the military chiefs. The grantees usually were those holding the nodal locations. It was both the Amhara’s concept of distance and the land tenure system which, at that time, lent the city its characteristic of spaciousness and openness.

**Fig. 4.3: The old palace (Menelik’s palace) and its surroundings in 1919**




Source: Post card by Point Sur Point, Paris

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<sup>39</sup> At that time the dominant ethnic group in the country

Fig. 4.4: Early settlement pattern of Addis Ababa



Source: Adapted from Johnson, 1974:88

Following the formative age, the introductions of the Ethio–Djibouti railway and vehicles have led to the expansion of the city towards the southern part of the city (where the railway station was located) and to the provision of wider roads for vehicular traffic. With these advancements and through time more and more newcomers infiltrated the city and the large open spaces between the nodes started to be filled in. The city became more like a conglomeration of *sefers* surrounding the nodal centers – the house of the nobility or churches. Such densification between the nodes was not properly planned, it just happened. Owing to this non-planned development, in fact the phrase “shanty town” was used to describe Addis Ababa as early as the 1930s. It was stated:

Addis Ababa in 1930 rather resembled a shanty town...over the rolling hills, right up to the edge of the palace, bumbled a mass of mud huts, half of them thatched, half of them

covered in the garish, glinting new strips of corrugated iron which had begun to be so fashionable. There were still only one or two buildings of more than one story...

(Johnson 1976:268, citing Mosley, 1965:155).

The early morphology of Addis Ababa has also contributed to the present day mingling of the rich and the poor. This can be traced back to the network of dispersed nodes, which were occupied by the rich noble men surrounded by their poor followers. Hence, to date though the inner-city settlements are predominantly occupied by the low income people one can hardly say this is the ghetto of the under class and that is the gated city of the rich.


#### ***The period of the Italian occupation (1936-1941)***

In 1936 the Italians occupied Ethiopia and Mussolini, the fascist leader, dreamed of making Addis Ababa the capital city of the annexed territories of East Africa – the “new Rome”. Soon after the occupation, however, the Italian authorities in Addis Ababa felt that the city is not convenient for materializing the vision. Among the reasons given were the mountainous landscape difficult for transportation, the bad soil type requiring expensive building foundation and the challenge of expropriating land enough for a new city freed from every native traces (Pankhurst, R., 1986). In addition to these, security problem from the Ethiopian patriots fighting from the nearby forest of the Entoto Mountain was presented as a reason for the need of a change of capital city (Dandena, 1995 referring CIPIA, 1992). Despite the number of reasons given, however, the suggestion for the change of capital was not accepted by Mussolini. Consequently, a master plan was sought to reorganize and build the city. In preparation to the construction of the new city in May, 1936 proclamation was issued to stop the maintenance of the existing buildings and construction of new buildings in order to cut compensation expenses (op cit.).

Among the first proposals for Addis Ababa’s master plan was that of Le Corbusier, the famous French architect, presented to the Italian authorities in 1936. Le Corbusier’s sketch, which was derived from his concept of the “Radiant City”, took into consideration

neither the existing settlements nor the topography. It was a new city reflecting the colonial attitude of segregation between the native and European quarters (See Fig. 4.5). The authorities did not approve of the plan and thus it was not realized.

**Fig. 4.5: Le Corbusier's guideline sketch for Addis Ababa**




Source: Adapted from Tekeste & Ceccarelli (1986:n.p.)

In the same year, two Italian architects Guidi and Valle prepared a master plan for a new city to be juxtaposed on the old settlements. This plan was approved and its implementation was started in 1937. Similar to that of the Le Corbusier's this plan was also based on segregation (See Fig. 4.6). The original settlement of the “natives” was either left untouched or was subject to a clearance whenever viewed as a hurdle to the implementation to the layout of the European quarters. Traditional huts were cleared from the site of the European quarter and were replaced by modern housing and office blocks and the original meandering road network was replaced by a grid layout. The traces of these exercises can

still be observed in the areas commonly known as Casanchis (corrupted form of Case INCIS<sup>40</sup>) and Popolare<sup>41</sup> (Dandena, 1995 & Mathewos, 1999). Parallel to this in the western part of the city, adjacent to the “native city”, an extension area was planned with a grid layout. Based on this extension plan Merkato, which has now evolved to be one of the biggest markets in Africa, was constructed. The traces of this extension plan can also be found in some parts of the present Kolfe<sup>42</sup> area, in the vicinity of Merkato.

**Fig. 4.6: Master plan of Addis Ababa by Guidi and Valle**



Source: Adapted from Dandena (1995:43b, referring, Diamantini & Patassini, 1993)

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<sup>40</sup> Istituto Nazionale Case Impeiegati dello Stato)

<sup>41</sup> Istituto delle Case Economiche e Popolare

<sup>42</sup> One of the main case areas of this study is located in Kolfe.

***The period from 1942 up to the end of the imperial regime (1974<sup>43</sup>)***

The end of the Italian occupation in 1941 had also brought the implementation of the Italian master plan to a halt. Post Italian occupation up to the year 1974 the main master plans developed were that of the British architect Sir Patrick Abercrombie and the French architect Luis De Marien. While Abercrombie's plan remained largely unrealized, on the other hand De Marien's plan, though in an ad-hoc and sporadic manner, had been used in guiding the city.


Abercrombie's plan, which was prepared in the period of 1954-1956, unlike its predecessors not only had abolished the concept of segregation, but also was more of organic layout. It was based on two basic concepts: the neighbourhood unit as a basic organizing principle and a street network of radial and ring roads. It also proposed satellite settlements at Kolfe, Gerji and Mekanissa around the inner-city (See Fig. 4.7). With his death in 1957 the plan was left at the stage of a guideline and thus could not be implemented. In 1959, another British consultant, Bolton Hennessy and Partners, was commissioned to refine Abercrombie's master plan. Following the consultants' input, through time, some part of the proposed street layout and the satellite towns were implemented. However, the neighbourhood concept remained on paper lacking the financial and technical capacity to enforce the strict control and reorganization of space it entailed (Dandena, 1995).

In 1965, following the frustration by the failure of the Abercrombie / Hennesse plan, a French consultant by the name of Luis De Marien was invited. Similar to the plans of the Italian occupation this plan emphasized form and geometry rather than spatial planning. Thus Abercrombie's concept of neighbourhood unit was replaced by emphasis on axial layouts that visualized the city as a trade and political centre (See Fig. 4.8). Considerable part of the plan was implemented as its preparation coincided with the city's construction boom period (Mathewos, 1999).

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<sup>43</sup> A year when the imperial regime was toppled by a military junta, commonly known as the Dergue (Derg).


**Fig. 4.7: Abercombie's Master Plan of Addis Ababa**



Source: Adapted from Tesfaye, Berhanu, et al. (1987:10)



Fig. 4.8: Luis De Marien's master plan (1965)



Source: Adapted from Dendana (1995: 63a)

De Marien's plan, as was typical to all its predecessors, lacked a systematic evaluation of the socio-economic condition of the city ignoring or marginalizing the majority of the inhabitants of the mushrooming non-planned settlements. Particularly the land tenure system, similar to that of pre-occupation period, continued to be in favour of a few members of the royal family, the noble men and military chiefs. According to the 1961 land holding and ownership survey of the existing total land of the city: 9% was owned by the royal family, 12% was owned by the church, 12.7% was owned by government agencies and foreign embassies, and the rest 65.4% was owned by individuals (Tesfaye, et al., 1987). This shows a vast amount of land was in the hands of few landlords and the church. According to Wubshet (2002) the few land owners had been allocating some part of their lands to their followers on a lease basis. However, the land owners did not allow the lessees to legally register with the Municipality, obliging them to develop houses informally<sup>44</sup>.

According to Tesfaye et al., (1987) before 1957 special permission, from the king, was required in order to build a durable house. It was only after the first African summit, in 1963, and the establishment of international organizations that dwellers were allowed to build luxurious buildings of various functions along the main roads (ibid). Even then, despite the housing production that exceeded 4,000 units per year, during the period preceding the Marxist revolution of 1974, the Municipality rarely issued more than 500 permits per year (Solomon & McLeod (2004:11). Thus, with the passage of time the housing requirement of the increasing population was met by the production of informal rental houses. Consequently, just before 1974 about two thirds (Wubshet, 2002) of the housing in Addis Ababa was informally developed, substandard rental housing. In subsequent years, with the accelerated increase of population more and more open spaces were occupied by contiguous settlements still without any sort of planning intervention,

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<sup>44</sup> In this study the definitions given by Hansen & Vaa (2004) is adopted. Excluding the economic aspect, the "informal" settlement is defined as constituting of "extra-legal housing"; while the "formal" settlement is that "consists of the urban government and its agents, institutions and rules and regulations that over time have been introduced in order to control urban space ..." (ibid:7-8).

contributing to the formation of the present day congested non-planned inner-city settlements.

***The period from 1975 - 1991(post- revolutionary development)***

Following the revolution, the most important proclamation affecting urban housing was the proclamation 47/1975, known as “Government Ownership of Lands and ‘Extra’ Houses”. Through this proclamation, private ownership of land and houses for the purpose of renting was outlawed. All properties belonging to the crown and the church were nationalised, and the same happened to houses owned, but not personally used by individuals (“extra houses”). As part of the Marxist ideology, which favoured the poor, the rent of the nationalized houses was reduced by up to 50%. The government took the responsibility of administering urban land and extra houses and the construction of new housing. The administration and management of the nationalized houses were transferred to two organizations. Those with a rental value of less than 100 Birr<sup>45</sup> were put under the *kebele* administrations, while those more than 100 Birr were put under the Agency for the Administration of Rental Housing (AARH). The 1994 census showed that more than 40% of the city housing units were owned either by the city government or the AARH. Later as a result of the introduction of housing cooperatives and private housing construction, the trend gradually changed the public/private of 40/51 proportion during the Dergue, to the current 34/59 proportion (Mathewos, 2005).

Under the *kebele* administration the nationalized houses started to deteriorate. The main reasons for the physical deterioration of the *kebele* houses were the lack of proper management on the part of the *kebeles* and their inability to maintain the houses; the lack of motivation and capacity to collect rents; and the extremely low controlled rental fees, which made maintenance impossible. The other reason for the dilapidation of inner-city settlements emanated from the 1986 Master Plan of Addis Ababa that prohibited the upgrading of foundation-less *Chika* houses located in the inner-city. The Master Plan ambitiously envisioned the renewal of the whole inner-city settlements, consequently, discouraging their upgrading (See also section 4.6 of this chapter).

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<sup>45</sup> The exchange rate of 1 USD is about 9.00 Birr.

Through time within the formal *kebele* housing many informal activities evolved lending more spontaneity to the already non-planned settlements. The *kebele* authorities had generally a tolerant attitude towards tenants. Despite restrictions regarding unauthorised transformations of the *kebele* houses the majority of the tenants were defiant to the rules and they have been using all possible ways to add space to their units. Tenants could continue the occupancy of a house without paying rent for a number of years, particularly when it was known that they did not have a source of income. Use right could be transferred to siblings (by including children’s names in the *kebele* registry) and the control of who actually inhabited the house was very weak. Further, the sale of use-right (selling one’s right to use the *kebele* house), through illegal payments such as key money is not unusual though the magnitude of such practice is difficult to know, as such dealings are shrouded in secrecy. Tenants have also been taking advantage by sub-letting at market price. This practice is so common that tenants use the *kebele* houses in whatever way they think would generate income (See BOX-4.1, for example).

**BOX-4.1: *Kebele* tenants and subletting**

*AK* and his wife have been living in a double- roomed *kebele* house for more than twenty years. They have been renting one of the rooms to an elderly woman. In addition to subletting the room, they have also been renting a *kot* (wooden deck) for overnight. The rental double- decked bed was located within the couple’s bed room. The couple sleeps on the lower deck while the upper one is for rental.

***The current condition (1991-to date)***

In 1991, the Marxist regime was ousted and its centrally planned economy was replaced by a “free market”- oriented system. Despite the change of regime and economic system, however, both the state ownership of the nationalised land and housing continued. The *kebele* housing system, with all its characteristics, remained the same. However, mention should be made that the government had been entertaining the idea of privatizing the *kebele* houses. In fact in 1995, a proclamation No. 112/199 entitled “A proclamation to provide for the establishment of an office for the sale of government owned houses” was issued. The objective of the proclamation was to privatize government owned houses and pay

compensation to the former owners of the houses. Notwithstanding the issuance of the proclamation and the establishment of the office, however, the *kebele* houses remained public. The main reasons are attributed to the complex characteristics of the *kebele* housing itself coupled with the lack of institutional, legal and human resources to handle the case.

As mentioned above, the ownership of land also remained in the hands of the government. Public or state ownership of land was constitutionally declared. Article 40 paragraph 3 of the constitution stated:

The right to ownership of rural and urban land, as well as of all natural resources, is exclusively vested in the State and in the peoples of Ethiopia. Land is a common property of the Nations, Nationalities and Peoples of Ethiopia and shall not be subject to sale or to other mode of exchange.

Within the framework of government ownership of land, in 1994 the Addis Ababa City Administration (AACCA) issued urban land lease legislation. According to the legislation, land less than 75 square meters could be given free of lease charge, 75-175 square meters could be leased out at 0.50 birr per square meter per year and land above 175 square meters could be acquired by public tender rate payable over a 99 year period. Real estate developers were allowed 60- year lease terms and other ventures could be allocated leaseholds varying from 50 to 99 years. But the challenge was that the supply of land could not match the demand for land for housing. This has contributed towards the overcrowding of the existing inner-city settlements and the proliferation of informal settlements in the fringes of the city.

Currently, it is estimated that 80% of the population of Addis Ababa is living in slums, among other things, which are characterized by deteriorated physical structure, limited or no tenure rights, severe shortage of service and infrastructure facilities, problems of solid waste management, scarcity of amenities, infrastructure and open spaces. Of the total housing units 74% had toilet facilities out of which 63% use shared pits; and only 66% have water supply coverage (Mathewos, 2005).

## **4.4. The inner-city of Addis Ababa and *kebele* housing**

### **4.4.1. Delineating the inner-city**


Most of the theories of spatial types stem originally from Burgess’s (1925) “concentric Zones”, Hoyt’s (1939) “sector model” and others, collectively known as the “Chicago School”. Such models have been generally criticized for being static, failing to capture processes of change. Particularly with regard to the context of the cities of developing countries, they have been widely criticized for their generalizations and for restricting the discussion of interrelated issues by focusing on forms and function only. However some authors, inspired by them, have been trying to develop similar models for developing countries. For example, Potter, Binns, et al, (2004:402, referring Potter & Lloyd-Evans, 1998) have developed idealized models of urban form and structure for Africa, Southeast Asia, South Asian colonial, and Latin American cities. Though Potter et al., avoiding the generalisation for developing countries, tried to address regional diversity, still this level of diversity was not enough to capture the spatial forms of cities within the regions.

The model for Africa developed by Potter et al. was based on the characteristics of colonial cities. It has indigenous inner-city surrounded by concentric circles of non-indigenous cities with the slums located on the periphery. However, as discussed above the case of Addis Ababa does not fit in this model, for one thing Addis Ababa is not a colonial city and secondly the location of slums is not only limited to the fringes. Therefore, in this study the delineation of the inner-city is made based on the origin and development of Addis Ababa. In this study the area developed since the foundation of the city in the mid 1880s, up to the Marxist revolution of 1974, is considered the old non-planned inner-city. According to ORAAMP (2000a) the spatial type covers 6050 ha. This is approximated to the area covered within a radius of 4.5 Kms from the old center, Arada. This is more than 11% of the total 54,000 ha of the city and more than 36 % of the built area, which is 16,688 ha<sup>46</sup> (2005) (See Fig. 4.9).

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<sup>46</sup> According to ORAAMP (2000a) the built area of the city in 1999 was 14,672 ha. The same document based on the past trends projected the built up area for 2005 to be 16,688 ha. The built area, according the document

Fig. 4.9: The old inner-city of Addis Ababa



Source: Adapted from ORAAMP (2002a)

includes the areas occupied by “individual plots, fenced areas, roads, facilities like sport fields gathering places, parks etc.” (ibid:17).

#### 4.4.2. Kebele housing

The old inner-city, delineated in the preceding sub-section included Lideta, Kirkos, Arada, Addis Ketema and some parts of Kolfe-Keranio, Gulele and Yeka sub-cities<sup>47</sup>. The total number of *kebele* houses in Lideta, Kirkos, Arada and Addis Ketema (the first four in Table 4.1) is 90,177. This makes 66% of the total *kebele* houses, 136,330. Since parts of Kolfe-Keranio, Gulele and Yeka sub-cities are also located in the inner-city it can reasonably be estimated that the number of *kebele* houses in the inner-city is above 70% of the total *kebele* houses in the city. This shows that the inner-city contained a high concentration of *kebele* houses. The total number of *kebele* houses was 25.8 % of the total housing stock in the city, which is 527, 800 (Mathewos, 2005 citing AACA, 2004).

**Table 4.1: Number of *kebele* housing in Addis Ababa by sub-city<sup>48</sup>**

Name of Sub city	No. of <i>kebele</i> houses
Lideta	23,532
Kirkos	21,668
Arada	23,398
Addis Ketema	21,579
Kolfe-Keranio	6,715
Gulele	15,841
Yeka	10,459
Bole	3,539
Nefas silk-Lafto	4,130
Akaki-Kality	5,469
Total	136,330

Source: Adapted from a report document of the AACA's, Housing Agency, data collected January – March 2003.

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<sup>47</sup> Based on the current administrative structure of the city.

<sup>48</sup> Based on the current administrative structure of the city.



More than 82% of the *kebele* owned houses were rented below 30 birr per month (See Table 4.2). This indicates the low level of affordability of the dwellers and the poor housing conditions of the houses.

**Table 4.2: Kebele housing, amount of rent**

	Range of house rent in Birr					Amount unknown	Unknown, whether they should pay or not
	< 1 - 10	10.01 - 20	20.01 - 30	> 30			
<b>Percent</b>	63.92	11.28	7.01	16.67	3.40	2.19	

Source: Adapted from a report document of the AACA's, Housing Agency, data collected January – March 2003.

Regarding population only Arada, Addis Ketema, Lideta, and Kirkos, account for about 42%<sup>49</sup> of the total population. However since the delineation of the inner-city in this study included parts of additional sub-cities it can be said that the population in the inner-city was well above 42%, while the land it covered is only 11.2% of the total area of the city.

## 4.5. Upgrading actors and approaches in Addis Ababa

### 4.5.1. Upgrading actors in Addis Ababa

The main upgrading actors in Addis Ababa are civic societies and the state. Owing to its diverse conceptualizations the definition of civil society, and what type of organizations it includes or excludes is confusing. According to Tostensen, et al., (2001:13) civil society is “organized social activity located between the state and the private household (family) - regardless of the normative orientation”. In this regard the upgrading actors in Addis Ababa, such as NGOs, CBOs, *Iddir* coalitions and SACCs can generally be considered as civil societies. The definition of civil societies, however, by becoming so broad and by including a huge variety of associations as divergent as professional associations, religious societies and sport clubs, falls short of lending itself to the clarity of analysis or

<sup>49</sup> Based on information provided by the Addis Ababa city Administration

recommendation. Hence, under the general definition of civil societies, further operational definition of those actors which are practicing in Addis Ababa is proper. In the context of urban development, NGOs are defined as associations established to pursue developmental objectives on a non-profit basis while CBOs *iddirs* and SACCs are defined as organizations which are based on a group of people living or working together and who associate to pursue common interests. They are characterized by being local in focus, and being directly accountable to their constituents (Adapted from Davidson & Peltenburg, 1993:13-15).

The state is another major actor in urban upgrading. As discussed in the theory chapter, in this study, the various levels of the state apparatus are viewed not as passive recipients and implementers of a given policy; rather as active actors interpreting and responding according to their interest. This implies that the design and implementation of upgrading interventions takes place under an ongoing struggle not only between the state and NGOs, but also within the state apparatus itself.

#### **4.5.2. Upgrading approaches in Addis Ababa**


##### ***Government-driven upgrading***

*Infrastructure upgrading:* City wide infrastructure upgrading in Addis Ababa is mainly carried out by the Environmental Development Office (EDO) of the AACA and its agencies at both the sub-city and *kebele* levels. According to interviews with the heads of Kirkos and Lideta sub-cities' EDOs, the EDOs have their roots in 1993 when a Safety Net Task Force was established to rehabilitate the victims of Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs). The EDO leaders elaborated, the Task Force started the job of upgrading access roads and drainage lines with a budget of 900,000 birr allocated for all *kebeles* while simultaneously creating job opportunities for those affected by SAP's. They explained that a year later more budgets was allocated and the Safety Net Task Forces evolved into the Environmental Development Coordinating Task Force. In 1996 the Task Force was replaced by a Project Office. But it was only in 2000 EDO was duly established through a proclamation and was structured under the Trade and Industry Bureau. Until 2001 the Project Office activities included the construction of 674 km access roads, 401 km storm water drainage, 1,596 toilets, 678 communal water posts, and 74 small bridges;


creating employment opportunities for 41,197 persons of which 24,787 were women and 16,410 were men (EDO, 2003).

Following the establishment of EDO, the mission and activities of the office were reformulated and catch words such as “community-led development”, “participatory approach” and “developing sense of ownership” were included (See EDO, 2003: 3-4). The scope of its activity was also expanded to include the construction of schools, public libraries, health stations and market places (EDO, 2003). Following the decentralization of the city’s administration, the offices of the EDO were structured at three main levels: the city, the sub-city and the *kebele* (See Figures 4.10-4.12). The main implementing agencies for EDO’s vision and guidelines were the *Kebele* Development Committees (KDCs). The KDC was a ten member committee directly elected for a period of three years by the dwellers (General Assembly). Among other things, it was comprised of representatives of *iddir*, youth, women, the elderly and low-income dwellers. The KDCs have been working in collaboration with the Neighbourhood Development Committees, which were more intimate to the grassroots (See Fig. 4.12).


**Fig. 4.10: EDO structure at city level**



**Fig. 4.11: EDO structure at the sub-city level**



**Fig. 4.12: EDO’s structure at the *kebele* level**



Source: Fig. 4.11 & 4.12, adapted from EDO (2003)

The main source of funds for carrying out the activities of the KDCs was budget allocated from the government, which was matched by contributions from the dwellers. In some instances NGOs have also contributed towards the funds. The government has been allocating 70%, 55% and 40% of the cost in low income, middle income and high income areas respectively, while the dwellers were expected to match the remaining fund either in cash, in kind or labour. In subsequent phases, however, even in the low-income areas the dwellers were asked to increase their contribution. For example, by 2004 and 2005 dwellers were requested to contribute 65% and 75% respectively.

The KDCs in collaboration with dwellers have made a substantial headway in implementing large scale infrastructure. This is particularly visible in the stone dressing of access roads and drainage lines implemented in most of the inner-city settlements (See Figs. 4.13 & 4.14). The main drawbacks of this type of programme were, however, that the allocation of the matching fund was decided top-down. As a result, the dwellers felt some sense of imposition<sup>50</sup>. Consequently, it was hard for dwellers to feel a sense of ownership. This was manifested in the lack of upkeep and maintenance of the upgraded roads. Another problem observed was the low level of workmanship that affected the quality and hence the age of the infrastructure.

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<sup>50</sup> Interview with dwellers and professionals in Lideta, Kirkos, Arada and Gulele sub-cities.

**Fig. 4.13: Road under construction**



**Fig. 4.14: Upgraded roads**



*Urban rehabilitation programme (Eco-city):* Another government driven upgrading was the so called urban rehabilitation programme, commonly known as Eco-city. The Eco-city was a concept introduced following the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) or "Earth Summit" held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. The major outcome of the conference was a document known as Agenda 21 ("Agenda for the 21st Century") that primarily addressed the concern about the environment and social inequality prevalent throughout the world. The eco-city concept was introduced as one of the strategies of localizing Agenda 21. It aimed for a sustainable city by emphasising the balance between environmental, social and economic objectives through public, private and community partnership. Since 1992 the Eco-city has been implemented in various cities of the world. The localised Eco-city's objective in Addis Ababa was "to create better living environments that have long term sustainability through focused intervention" (Addis Eco-city TOR, 2003). Its specific aims were the improvement of sanitation, sewage disposal and solid waste management; the provision and upgrading of social services; the creation and maintenance of open spaces and green areas; the creation of income generating economic opportunities; and the provision of vehicular access and drainage lines (ibid).

The Eco-city was launched in Addis Ababa in 2003 in the form of projects in ten pilot *kebeles* with the idea of replicating them in the rest of the city. The organizational structure for the projects included a study team composed of a town planner, an economist and a sociologist. The study teams were working in collaboration of the respective *kebele* administrations and *kebele* dwellers (See Fig. 4.15: Organizational structure).


During the fieldwork, this researcher had the opportunity to follow up the planning and implementation of the Eco-city projects in Kirkos and Arada sub-cities by attending the various "stakeholder meetings" called by the respective study teams. In Kirkos the pilot *kebele* was *kebele* 21<sup>51</sup>, while in Arada it was *kebele* 04<sup>52</sup>.

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<sup>51</sup> According to the current naming of *kebeles*

<sup>52</sup> According to the current naming of *kebeles*

**Fig. 4.15: Organizational structure of the Eco-city projects**



Source: Adapted from Addis Eco-city: Terms of reference (TOR), 2003:16

One of the observations made was that the approaches followed by the study teams were not uniform. In Kirkos, it was more or less the conventional planning approach of Survey-Plan-Implement and Evaluate with the notion of “participatory, integrated planning approach” (AACA Kirkos sub-city, 2004:3). On the other hand in Arada the approach followed “plan, at the same time improvise”.<sup>53</sup>

The implementation of this approach was practically observed on the ground, in which parallel to the planning process of the project, action was taken to change an old cemetery into a clean and orderly place. Squatters had been living in the fenced cemetery compound of Arada’s St. George church. The squatters were living in both make-shift plastic “houses” and temporary shelters. The place had been a breeding ground and a hiding place for criminal activities. The squatters’ make-shift houses and the cemetery were bulldozed (See Fig. 4.16). The remains of the dead were reburied in a group cemetery while the squatters were made to occupy newly constructed *chika* houses (See Fig. 4.17). Further, parallel to the planning stage of the project pavement of pedestrian side walks was undertaken (See Fig. 4.18). Therefore, the principle of “plan and improvise” was

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<sup>53</sup> According to an interview with the co-ordinator of the study team.



implemented and the simultaneous processes were informing each other. It is too early to discuss the impact of the eco-city in terms of its influence on the process of spatial transformation, however, it may be stated that the projects were highly expert driven and that the *kebele* dwellers were expected to “participate” within the framework developed by the experts.

It should be noted that in the Eco-city projects upgrading of housing was not included. According to interviews with the study team leaders in both Kirkos and Arada, this was done to avoid wastage of resources as the revised master plan of the city envisages the renewal of the housing in the project areas.

**Fig. 4.16: The squatters and the cemetery being bulldozed**



**Fig. 4.17: Newly constructed houses for nearby relocation and mass grave for remains of bodies**



**Fig. 4.18: Side walk pavement**



*The Grand Housing Program (GHP) (popularly known as condominium housing):* This programme was primarily introduced to address both the daunting housing backlog and to replace dilapidated *kebele* houses. In 2002, the backlog only was estimated at about 230,000 housing units (ORAAMP, 2003). The programme had also set goals to replace 50% of the total 136,330<sup>54</sup> *kebele* houses. Therefore, the target was to build about 300,000 new housing units. The strategy for achieving this objective was by constructing 50,000 houses each year through the use of low cost construction technology and efficient use of land. The housing units were designed in low-rise blocks with some of them including shops at the ground level. A condominium regulation was issued in 2004 to facilitate the smooth management of the housing.

A pilot project of the GHP was launched in early 2004 and a mini-neighbourhood of 700 housing units including a commercial centre was completed. In 2005, following the pilot project, the construction of about 50,000 housing units was launched in sites located in the different *kebeles*. The programme was disrupted during the May 2005 elections and the unrest that followed in Addis Ababa. There were 31,756 units under construction in the 2005/2006 budget year.

The plan of replacing the *kebele* housing with the condominium housing was in a way an indirect privatization scheme of the *kebele* housing. The strategy was on-site

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<sup>54</sup> Data from AACA, Housing Agency

relocation of tenants from demolished *kebele* houses by making them the owners of the condominium houses through long term loans.

### ***NGO initiated upgrading***

The origin of NGOs in Ethiopia is related to the 1970s and 1980s extensive famine that affected much of the country. International NGOs intervened in an attempt to curb the crisis. While a strong presence of NGOs did not fit well with the then military regime's centralized Marxist state and scepticism towards "imperialist western organizations", the NGOs' assistance was accepted by the regime as a means of securing aid and international resources. Owing to the hostility of the military government towards the NGOs, however, NGOs activities were mostly limited to relief and rehabilitation. Only a few international NGOs and newly formed local NGOs were engaged in development. It was only after the overthrow of the military government in 1991, that the NGOs started to gradually change their focus from relief to development. During this period due to the relatively improved political and economic environment the number of NGOs saw tremendous expansion. Particularly more local NGOs started to emerge.

In Addis Ababa there were about 170<sup>55</sup> NGOs (by 2003) involved in various types of development activities. Out of these only about 15 (8.8%) were engaged in projects directly related to urban development out of which 9 were working in the inner-city. The low involvement of NGOs in urban development, particularly in the areas of housing, sanitation and water was likely due to the limited technical capacity of the NGOs in these areas (Thomas et al., 2000). Most are rather involved in areas related with women and children (ibid).

The approach of those which were engaged in urban development can generally be divided into two, sectoral and integrated. The sectoral focus on one aspect of urban development only, such as health, education, HIV/AIDS etc. and the integrated conduct intimately related components of urban developments, for example education, health and housing. Most of the NGOs involved in urban development claim that their activities are integrated. One of the widely known local NGOs working in the areas of urban upgrading

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<sup>55</sup> According to AACA's Civil and Social Affaires Office.

in an integrated manner is IHA-UDP (Integrated Holistic Approach Urban Development Project). It has been engaged in the upgrading of inner-city settlements since the 1980s. It can be said that IHA-UDP is one of the most known local NGOs in Addis Ababa for its upgrading activity both because of its long duration of time in the field and the amount of work it accomplishes. Relative to other projects its works are widely researched and documented (See for example Daniel, 1998, Sebawit, 2006). Below IHA-UDP’s upgrading activity in Teklehaimanot area is highlighted to give a feeling of what other NGOs have been doing beside the ones discussed in the next Case Study chapter.

Teklehaimanot is an area located in the inner-city of Addis Ababa adjacent to the greatest open market in Ethiopia – *Merkato*. The inhabitants of Teklehaimanot are mainly households headed by self-employed women and men with the lowest income. Redd Barna Ethiopia (RBE)<sup>56</sup> was involved in the upgrading of one *kebele* in Teklehaimanot – *Kebele* 41, from 1981-1986. Following phasing out of RBE’s intervention, the project was extended to three adjoining *kebeles* (*Kebele* 30, 42, 43) by IHA-UDP. The manager of IHA-UDP was an employee of RBE. After the phase-out of RBE’s project, she went abroad for her Masters degree in which she studied the RBE’s project with the objective of deriving lessons. Upon the completion of her studies she launched IHA-UDP and extended RBE’s project to the three adjoining *kebeles*. The four upgraded *kebeles* had a total of about 30,000 population.

IHA-UDP’s approach was claimed to include: “integration”, referring to the relationship between community development, health and physical upgrading; “holism”, referring to the inseparable needs of a whole person situated both at the family and community levels; “conscientization”, referring to the need for attitudinal change and human development; and “participation”, referring to the need of the involvement of the community to ensure sustainability (Jember, 1998<sup>57</sup>). IHA-UDP had no preference of a certain segment of society (ibid). It targeted the family as a whole and was engaged in three components: health, education and physical upgrading. Among other things: health centre,

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<sup>56</sup> RBE (Save the Children Norway) is an international NGO which is also responsible for conducting the upgrading projects in two of the case studies of this research.

<sup>57</sup> See also handout of IHA-UDP entitled “Introduction of Integrated Holistic Approach Urban Development Project (IHAUDP).

drop-in home for the old and various income generating activities were established. To enable the community to sustain the upgrading efforts, the community was organized up to the neighbourhood level. Community workers (*bicha lebash* or yellow girls, because of their yellow uniforms) were trained to bridge the activities between IHA-UDP and the community<sup>58</sup>.

IHA-UDP's project was phased out after seven years (1989-1996). All activities undertaken by the project were handed over to the community through the established Community Based Organisation, known as Community Based Integrated Sustainable Development Organization (CBISDO).

The main actors in Tekelehaimanot's upgrading processes were: International donor agencies, IHA-UDP, the local governments (*kebeles*) and the *kebele* dwellers. IHA-UDP was the driving force of the project. The attitude and response of *kebeles* was rather passive. The response was at most in the form of agreeing not to, for example, increase house rent or displace tenants post phase-out. IHA-UDP enjoyed wide support from international NGOs and donors and played a key role in channelling funds to the target group. Post phase-out funds were channelled through CBISDO. However, to a certain extent IHA-UDP remained as the main actor backing CBISDO by soliciting funds for the purpose of running the donor-dependent social facilities and their staff. This happened, because government agencies fell short of respecting their promises to mainstream the facilities such as the clinic, the drop in centre for the old, the youth and children programme, etc. and partly because of the government change in 1991 (Jember, 1998).

At the early stage of the project the involvement of the community through a structure that went down up to the neighbourhood level, namely, *yegurbetna buden* (neighbourhood group) was highly acclaimed. It even secured international recognition for being a good mechanism for reaching the grassroots and securing sense of belongingness. However, post phase-out, this structure only operated sporadically. It was the CBISDO that was left to oversee the IHA-UDP built social facilities and their staff through the alternative strategies of sustainability, namely: sponsorship and top up grant. There was no maintenance of the upgraded houses. The reason for the lack of maintenance was the failure

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<sup>58</sup> Interviews with former 'yellow girls', CBISDO officials and former Gurbetena committee leader

of the tenants to pay their monthly dues. Collected rent was supposed to be used for the maintenance of the housing. Post phase-out the ownership of the housing remained in the hands of the *kebele*, while the rent was agreed to be collected by CBISDO. According to the manager of CBISDO, there was no mechanism of enforcing the agreement of rent collection, hence the reason for failing to collect the arrears and maintaining the houses. Generally, while on the part of IHA-UDP the expectation was for the dwellers to develop a sense of ownership and sustain the projects, the response from the predominantly tenant population was not as envisioned.

### ***Iddir-initiated upgrading***

*The origin and development of iddirs:* Before going at length discussing the upgrading efforts of *iddirs*, a cursory review of the character and origin of *iddirs* and their relationship with successive governments would be required.

*Iddir*, which is basically a burial association, is found in all towns of Ethiopia. Out of the many types of *iddirs* (based on ethnicity, sex, age, residence and work place) the most dominant is Community *iddir*, which is the focus of this study. It is alternatively called *yesefer iddir* or *yekebele iddir*. It is formed by households living in the same neighbourhood (*sefer* or *kebele*) for the purpose of mutual support. Community *iddir* offers both financial and material assistance during burials; and only material assistance for weddings. These supports are of the utmost importance for the majority low-income *iddir* members. The material assistance includes: tent (temporary shelter), tables, chairs, and kitchen utensils for hosting *iddir* members. Community *iddirs* usually have space for their meetings and storage of materials. Members pay their dues regularly and are expected to attend meetings and participate in burials by accompanying the coffin, extending emotional support to the bereaved and offering food and drink to mourners. Culture dictates that the more a funeral is attended by as many people as possible the more the status and respect attributed to the deceased and bereaved. Therefore, it is not unusual for people to belong to more than one *iddir*.

In their present form, community *iddirs* usually have by-laws governing their activities. The by-laws generally include: the purpose of the association, titles and duties of

officers (at least, chairman, secretary, treasurer and auditor), membership fee and frequency of contribution, fines for non-compliance with rules of attendance of meetings and funerals. During earlier times, however, the bonding elements between fellow *iddir* members were faith, trust and love rather than mere laws (See for example, BOX – 4.2, for an archival by-law of an *iddir*)

*Iddir* started, in Addis Ababa, as exclusively ethnic, but later with the passage of time, in the 1950s, it became poly-ethnic (Fekadu, 1976). Both Fekadu and Mekuria (1976) associate the origin of *iddirs* with the Italian occupation of the 30s, necessitated by the need for mutual assistance by migrants displaced from rural areas. However, Pankhurst (2003) contended and presented evidence for the existence of *iddirs* before the Italian occupation. Among others he cited the cases of *Hibret Minch Yeqibir iddir* of 1909, and *Nebar Kolfe iddir* of 1917 (See BOX-4.3). Nevertheless, since the degree of their formalization is not clear, Pankhurst cautioned, there is need for further investigation and thorough historical research.

**BOX-4.2: Archival *iddir* bylaws**

“We the senior citizens of Kolfe *kebele*, by virtue of our God given duty, supported by our emperor, proud of our freedom, thankful to our sovereign God, united in love and adversity, living in joy and happiness; having Mr. Daba Duressa and Mr. Wolde-aregai Belete as our judges, have established an *iddir*, a source of unity and oneness, in the year 1941. Aspiring to live in the pleasure of our government, in the love of our country, shaped by the mould of peace, treading in the path of goodness; as Ethiopians, we have established it with our voice of love.” (Voice of *Tesfa*, 2002:13).  
(Translation mine)

The first attempt to engage *iddirs* in activities beyond their burial function was that of the Imperial government, in the late 1950s. The strategy was through the establishment of model centres comprised of a group of *iddirs*. However, it took another direction following the failed coup of 1966 against the Emperor in which, allegedly, the leader of *Mecha Tulema iddir* used the association for political motives (Mekuria, 1976). As a result, the government issued a new Associations Registration Regulation. Consequently, 27 associations were banned. Since then *iddirs* started to include in their by-laws that they do

not interfere in politics and are open to all - irrespective of age, sex, ethnicity and religion (Fekadu 1976, Pankhurst, A. 2003).

Notwithstanding the past experience, once again, in the beginning of the 70s, just before the fall of the imperial regime, the municipality of Addis Ababa attempted to organize *iddirs* into confederations in order to engage them in community development; and whenever needed to use them as instruments for counterbalancing political oppositions. However, since the leaders of the confederations were appointed government officials the attempt, lacking the support of the grassroots, remained superficial (Fekadu, 1976). During the period (1974-1991) of the Marxist government, *iddirs* were generally seen as reactionary forces incompatible to the communist ideology and the government's administrative structure (Pankhurst, A. 2003).

*Emerging upgrading activities of iddir coalitions:* Following the fall of the Marxist government, in 1991 there has been a renewed interest on the part of some NGOs and the government to extend the activity of *iddirs* beyond their main burial function. About 87% of the population of Addis Ababa are members of one or more *iddirs*. Currently, out of the 4007<sup>59</sup>, total number of *iddirs*, 962 (24%) participate in some kind of development efforts (Tenagne 2003). Coalitions initiated by ACORD<sup>60</sup> in Ferensai Legasion and Akaki areas, both located in the outskirts of the city and that of *Tesfa*<sup>61</sup>, located in Kolfe, can be cited.

The coalition of *iddirs* in Feransai Legasion was initiated in 1997 through the capacity building programme of ACORD. One of the programmes was to enable *iddirs* to establish and run their own Saving And Credit Cooperatives (SACCs). The Ferensai Legasion coalition comprised 17 *iddirs* each with their own SACC. In 2005 the coalition was able to establish and run a mill. It had also been participating in collaboration with ACORD in bridge building, installing of tap water for member households and road pavements<sup>62</sup>. Similarly, Akaki sub-city coalition of *iddirs* known as *Edget Behibret Yelimat*

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<sup>59</sup> Only 1947, most of them the community (*yewondoch*) *iddir* types, are registered and have legal personality (Mesfin & Social 2000).

<sup>60</sup> An NGO – Agency for Cooperation and Research in Development

<sup>61</sup> *Tesfa*'s upgrading is one of the cases studies in this study which is dealt in Chapter 7.

<sup>62</sup> Interview with coalition administrator and documents



*Mahiber* (Progress through Unity Development Association) was initiated by ACORD in 1999. It is a coalition of six *iddirs* each having their own SACC. In 2005 the coalition secured a licence from the Ministry of Justice to operate as NGO. It had a plan to focus on capacity building, education and HIV/AIDS<sup>63</sup>.

**BOX-4.3: The origin of *iddirs***

“...members of the Soddo Kistane who were engaged in handicrafts left the Gurage area and engaged in trade because of their extreme marginalisation as craft workers. They became involved in caravan trading bringing coffee, hides, wax and fat from the south and taking cloth and salt in return.

“In Addis Ababa they would spend the night with their pack animals and trade items in the Teklehaimanot and Gola Sefer areas. However, they were discriminated against and disliked in part due to the smell of their wares, and when one of them dies they could only bury him at night, and they could only get together in woods.

“On one such occasion they were arrested and imprisoned by the forces of Fitawrary<sup>64</sup> Habtegiorgis Binegde accused of meeting for subversive purposes. When they were brought before Fitawrary Habtegiorgis they explained that they were despised and met in secret in particular because of their problem with burial. So that others would not hear they would say in their language when a person died: *yebelo zemed motem, biddir yelebkewey?* Meaning: ‘when someone’s relative dies, is there not *biddir*?’ Fitawrary Habtegiorgis asked about *biddir* assuming they meant loans (since the term means loan in Amharic) and they replied that they had called helping the bereaved *biddir*.

“Fitawrary Habtegiorgis is said to have approved of them meeting for such purposes, giving them 5 silver Birr, suggesting that others should follow suit, and that the name should be *iddir* rather than *biddir*” (Pankhurst, A. (2003:15-16) quoting Hibret Minch Yeqiber *iddir* pamphlet)

According to Pankhurst, the term *iddir* presumably derives from the verb root *addere* “to spend the night” (ibid).

<sup>63</sup> Interview with coalition chairman and documents

<sup>64</sup> Old military title, leader of the front guard.

#### **4.6. Main challenges in the upgrading of inner-city of Addis Ababa**


The challenges in upgrading the inner-city settlements can be seen at the policy (“master plan”) level and at the implementation level. The policy challenges are closely related with the successive master plans of Addis Ababa. Here, of particular importance are the 1986 master plan and the 2002 revised master plan. The 1986 master plan envisioned two ways of tackling the challenge of inner-city settlements. The two aspects were the “upgrading and improvement of infrastructure and service” and the “upgrading and, when necessary, renewal of existing houses”. The master plan left the first aspect to be fully carried out by the government (Tekeste & Ceccareli, 1986:7.7). However in reality the government (*kebele*) had neither the managerial capacity nor the financial resources necessary to conduct the overwhelming task of infrastructure and service provision. Regarding the upgrading of the existing houses the master plan prohibited the upgrading of foundation less *chika* houses located in the inner-city (ibid:7.8). It ambitiously envisioned the renewal of the substantial part of the inner-city settlements, consequently, discouraging their upgrading. The majority of the *chika* houses are those owned by the *kebeles* and thus the master plans’ decision has greatly contributed to the current condition of the houses. The master plan could only be fully implemented if 75% of the city’s built-up areas was demolished and reconstructed (Dierig, 1999).

Relative to the 1986 master plan, the revised master plan, at least on its approach, had envisioned the need for partnership between the government, the private sector and civil societies to address the challenge of infrastructure. However, it lacks clarity when it comes to inner-city housing improvement. With the exception of the newly developed expansion areas the master plan has earmarked the rest of the city for upgrading and renewal. The majority of the city’s built area was assigned for upgrading while only the CBD was earmarked for renewal (See Fig. 4.19). The main drawback, however, is that the revised master plan has no clear policy guideline as to what to do with inner-city housing<sup>65</sup>.

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<sup>65</sup> Interview with AACA, Town Planning Preparation and Inspection Department head

Fig. 4.19: Map of Addis Ababa intervention areas



Source: Collected from AACA, Town Planning Preparation and Inspection Department, map prepared in 2003.

Regarding the implementation of upgrading it seems that, owing to the traces of the guideline of the 1986 master plan and the lack of clarity of the current one, there is a de facto understanding that the inner-city housing should not be upgraded as they will be subjected to future renewal. This attitude is strengthened with a recent ambitious attempt of the city government's Grand Housing Programme to gradually replace the *kebele*

housing. Thus, the local upgrading processes, such as the EDOs neighbourhood upgrading and the ECO-city initiative, to date, have mainly focused on the improvement of infrastructure, without dealing with houses. Only few NGOs, such as RBE and IHA-UDP, despite the limitations of the master plans, have muddled through the system and managed to include housing improvements, which is very limited in size relative to the magnitude of the challenge.

With regard to the upgrading of infrastructure the main challenges have been:

- Design, implementation and supervision: lack of standard design, skilled workmanship, and inadequate supervision
- Management and co-ordination: Lack of ownership and follow up of upgraded components affecting upkeep and maintenance, absence of co-ordination between various sectors of government agencies providing utility connections, inadequate co-ordination between the government and NGOs
- Dwellers’ response: lack of motivation, lack of grassroots organizations dedicated to upgrading, representing the dwellers
- Legal framework: the absence of legal framework clearly delineating the role and relationship of upgrading actors, the responsibility and “ownership” of upgraded facilities and financial administration

The above discussion had two purposes. On the one hand it described the characteristics of inner-city settlements and major upgrading approaches while on the other hand it highlighted the challenges of upgrading in the non-planned inner-city settlements. Therefore while the description of the characteristics serves in partly answering the context-related research question, the challenges prompt a normative research question stated below:

- ***How can upgrading processes, which engender positive socio-spatial transformation, be set in motion in tenant-dominated, non-planned inner-city settlements of Addis Ababa?***

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## **PART-IV: CASE STUDIES**



“The roof was almost non-existent; so much so, we saw the sun by day and the moon by night!”

*An interviewee describing the size of a hole on corrugated iron sheet roofing.*

“My kitchen is my factory!”

*A woman interviewee describing the importance of her make-shift kitchen in which she prepares injera for sale.*


“These days nobody is dying; for the past four months nobody died!”

*A herald (lefafi) of iddir complaining about shortage of income. He gets 10 Birr for each death, of an iddir member, he announces to the neighbourhood.*

## Introduction

Part IV includes the three case study areas: Kirkos, Menen and Kolfe. While Menen and Kirkos are located within the approximate 9 Kms diameter of the inner-city, Kolfe is partly within and partly outside (See Fig. 5.0).

**Fig. 5.0: Location of case areas**



The three cases have both similarities and differences. In Kirkos and Menen, the physical upgrading of housing was the major focus of RBE’s projects. In Kolfe, unlike the other two, the physical upgrading was considered on an equal basis with the rest of the components. It was undertaken to support activities related to the vulnerabilities related to an old age and the fight with HIV/AIDS. The upgrading was thus not area based; rather it followed the trail of those households which were in some way affected by HIV/AIDS, or were too poor or too old to support themselves. Consequently, the upgraded houses were not located in close proximity and in one area. They were dispersed in nine *kebeles*<sup>66</sup>, all located in *Woreda* 24 and 25 (Kolfe Keranio sub-city<sup>67</sup>). The scale of the upgraded houses relative to the area of the nine *kebeles* was very small. Therefore, identification of the housing components on base maps, similar to that done with the cases of Kirkos and Menen was not carried out. Relative to the size of the housing component the information one would get from such a map would not be worth the effort, as its scale would be too small to be of any importance.

Another different matter in *Kolfe* is that the majority of the target people were destitute elderly people. Though a questionnaire similar to that of Kirkos and Menen was administered, relative to Kirkos and Menen, the respondents were less responsive to the questions. This has to do mainly with old age, but also because of a low level of education and in some cases as a result of illnesses. Generally, respondents were in favour of telling their own stories rather than responding to the specific questions. To compensate this in *Kolfe*, compared to the other two cases, more in-depth interviews were conducted.

Each chapter is organized into five sections: 1) “the area and the people”, which describes the context and arena in which the upgrading has happened; 2) “the upgrading project”, which describes the upgrading actors, the upgrading approach and the project components; 3) “actors’ relationships and tenants’ response”, which investigates the actors’

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<sup>66</sup> Namely, *Woreda* 24, *Kebeles* 09 and 11; and *Woreda* 25, *Kebeles* 01, 02, 04, 05, 06, 07, and 08 (New naming: Kolfe Keranio sub city, *kebeles* 08/09, 10/11, 12 and 13/14).

<sup>67</sup> The Kolfe Keranio sub-city, commonly known as Kolfe, is located in the western part of the city. Under its jurisdiction it includes ten *kebeles* (according the current subdivision of *kebeles*) and it covers an estimated area of 6,510 hectares out of the total area of the city, 54,000 hectares. According to the local survey of the AACAA’s Urban Management Institute (2005), the sub-city’s population was about 280,000, which is 9.50% of the city’s population. The number of households in the sub-city was about 55,000. The survey indicated that the majority of the areas in the sub-city were considered slum.



perception and interpretation of the project and their subsequent responses with a focus on tenants; 4) “spatial transformation”, which investigates the influence of the upgrading process on spatial transformations; and 5) the “summing up” section in which the investigation in the preceding four sections are pulled together to seek answers to the research questions.



## **CHAPTER – 5: CASE-1: KIRKOS (*Woreda 21, Kebele 13*)**

### **NGO-initiated, *kebele* based upgrading process**

#### **5.1. The area and the people**

Kirkos is located in the central part of the city a few hundred meters from Meskel Square. One of the access nodes to the area is the juncture where the only railway in the city crosses the Debre Zeit road. The narrow street, which leads to the case area, runs between the Arategna Military Camp, on the left, and a row of temporary shops (*teletafi suk*) to the right. Driving deeper the street splits into two, flanking the case area in between. The side of the case area facing the fence of the military camp is lined by small shops, while the one facing the railway station, is lined by home based commercial activities, such as drinking houses, small kiosks, make-shift restaurants and *khat*<sup>68</sup> houses.

As in many inner-city settlements, the main streets surrounding the case area are places of multiple activities: men toiling in home-based workshops, children playing games, street vendors selling goods, youth idling, pedestrians and vehicles moving – all at the same time. Moreover, the streets are cluttered with street furniture: makeshift vending stands, game equipment, water points, mobile kiosks, shoe shine stands, extended verandas, stools and benches, mobile guard houses, open market stands, workshop equipment, overflowing garbage bins and electric poles with sagging wires. In the inner roads the scene is not that different, though the stuff is more domestic: flower vases, front gardens, makeshift hand wash-basins, kitchen sheds, laundry stands, drying laundry, storage places, and women doing laundry and cooking food, all camouflaged under the color of the dust.

The livelihood of the dwellers was associated with the Military Camp located in the neighbourhood. Inhabitants used to cater for the day-to-day needs of the soldiers. Thus activities such as home-based drinking houses were common. At the downfall of the Marxist regime in 1991, a significant proportion of the army was demobilised, resulting in high unemployment and a reduction at the same time in the income of sex traders and drinking house owners. The area became the habitation of many ex- soldiers and old

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<sup>68</sup> A leafy stimulant.

military pensioners. Kirkos was also known for its bazaar type market place, which is now replaced by a newly built shopping centre.

The population of *kebele* 13 was estimated at about 5600<sup>69</sup>. What is overwhelming, at any given street at any moment, is the number of children. The roads are packed with children, some running errands, some playing, some just crying, and some throwing stones chasing each other – oblivious of the danger to the passer by and unnerving the elderly. For the cynical, they are products of lust - the extension of people left with nothing but producing children, they call them “*felfela*” (worms). For the arrogant they are nuisance - scavenging the streets, they call them “flies”. But, for their parents they are potential capital, who will take care of them in old age. When parents are asked about how they will raise their children, their usual reply is the common adage ‘*be-edilu yadgal*’ (he will grow by his luck). There is in fact a widely circulating joke regarding the poverty in Kirkos and its high number of children:

Foreign guests were taken aboard a helicopter by a government official, for an excursion from above. Prior to the visit Kirkos, considered the worst slum, was covered with a giant, blue plastic sheet to hide it from view. In the middle of the excursion one of the guests asked, “What is that massive blue hip down there?” The official answered, “that is the aid food you sent us last month. It is covered to protect it from rain.” The guest added, “But I see some movements at the edges of the hip, what are they?” “They are worms,” responded the official – dubbing the “children moving in and out of the plastic”.

Looking down at the settlement from one of the balconies of the newly built shopping center, one can observe a dense settlement of single storied houses with rusted iron roofs, punctuated here and there by the RBE-built double storied blocks. The high density of the area is widely known, so much so, there is an anecdote circulating in the city, which goes, “if a cat climbs a roof top, then it has to cross the whole settlement before jumping down” – signifying the absence of space between houses. There is also another

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<sup>69</sup> According to the AACCA’s document on the recent *kebele* boundaries and their populations. The population was about 3000 in 1984 (CSA, 1987) and about 4000 in 1994 (CSA,1995).

anecdote regarding the over-crowdedness and weak strength of the *chika* houses, in which some of them seem to fall at the slightest push: “If an electric pole gets dismantled then hundreds of houses crumble, because they lean on each other with the last house leaning on the pole” - the domino effect.

However, because of the dense layout of the settlement there is a high degree of social intimacy and close mutual support between neighbours. Though Kirkos is generally considered by outsiders as one of the dangerous places in Addis Ababa, the dwellers in the case area do not readily agree. They claim that it is generally safe for both dwellers and outsiders. But they admit outsiders could be mugged if they venture to roam in the area during the night. Inhabitants seem to be governed by some unwritten social norms of good neighbourliness. For example, the bad guys do not attack residents of the area, even in the night. They do not want to be identified as bad guys in a neighbourhood where they are raised. Similarly, women living in the area generally do not openly practice prostitution. Most of the prostitutes are renters from other localities, and the same with their clients. The prostitutes stand in front of their doors, even in broad daylight, expecting clients. During the fieldwork when the “gate keeper”, who was accompanying the researcher, was asked why they are not afraid of HIV/AIDS he responded, "AIDS gives time, but hunger kills in three days".

The life in Kirkos can be perceived as lively and dynamic. The teeming and ambivalent streets can also be perceived as resilient spaces with the flexibility to absorb and accommodate a multitude of activities. On the other hand, Kirkos and its spaces can also be seen as breeding grounds of crime, lacking clarity of function and purpose, thus constraining the smooth running of the settlement. Either way, following each visit in the area, what keeps lingering in the mind are the multitude children, the delinquent junior youth, the contempt-wreathed faces of the idle youths, the expectant and questioning eyes of the passer by, with a picture of the narrow paved roads, crisscrossed by stretches of blowing drying laundry and defined by the RBE-built housing blocks.

For basic data on the housing and socio-economic condition of the respondents see Table 5.1 below.

**Table 5.1: Housing and socio-economic condition of the respondents**

(For each variable out of the total 184 respondents)		<b>Freq.</b>	<b>%</b>
Household head sex	Female	102	55.4
	Male	82	44.6
Household size, including dependants (The average household size for Addis Ababa is 5.1)	Below or equal to 5	107	58.1
	Above 5	75	41.9
Income (USD/ day) (Converted from 9 Birr/day or 270 Birr/month)  (Using UN’s 1USD/day criteria of poverty level)	Below 1	118	64.1
	Between 1 & 2	40	21.7
	Above 2	26	14.2
Source of income (Self employed indicates informal activity of meagre income)	Self employed	80	43.4
	Employed	103	56.0
	No income	1	0.5
Number of years in the house (Above 10 indicates stability)	Above 10	166	90.2
	Below 10	18	9.8
Floor area of house (excluding outdoor kitchen and toilet) (Square meters) (20 square meters, minimum area of a descent room required to accommodate a household)	Up to 20	130	70.6
	Above 20	54	29.4
Number of rooms (excluding kitchen and toilet)	1 or 2	172	93.5
	More than 2	12	6.5

## 5.2. The Kirkos upgrading project

### 5.2.1. Main upgrading actors

#### *Redd Barna-Ethiopia, background*

According to Myhren (1987) RBE's work in Ethiopia came into being in 1969 when it started a joint project, in the field of leprosy. The project started with Raedda Barnen<sup>70</sup> through the establishment of the Armauer Hansen Research Institute (AHRI) in Addis Ababa. In the mid 1970s RBE went operational in El Kere area of Bale, but was forced to terminate its work, due to the then Ethio-Somalia war (ibid). Following this RBE became a funding institution to other organizations (ibid).

In 1978, a World Bank's study identified eight *kebeles* in the city of Addis Ababa as the poorest of the poor. RBE, as member of the international coordinating committee, took the initiative to implement a settlement-upgrading project in one of the identified areas *Woreda 3 Kebele 41*- commonly known as Teklehaimanot (Jember, 1998). The project was commenced in 1981 and phased out in 1986<sup>71</sup> (Myhren, 1987). In 1983 RBE signed a second agreement with the city administration of Addis Ababa to undertake another upgrading project in *Woreda 21 Kebele 13* - Kirkos area, which was phased out in 1990. In 1987 Redd Barna – Ethiopia, henceforth RBE, offered assistance to do similar projects in other parts of Addis Ababa. The city administration forwarded a list of areas identified for upgrading. Out of the list provided RBE selected *Woreda 11 Kebele 14* - in the Menen area. This was accepted by the city administration making it the third of its type. RBE's final upgrading project (1989 – 1994) was in *Woreda 23, Kebele 14 and 16*, commonly known as Alert area. Alert is an area inhabited by a majority of ex- leprosy population. This project was initiated because of RBE's long-standing interest to fight leprosy with the support of AHRI (RBE, 1993b). This project was supposed to be the first, but due to the then prevailing attitude towards parts of the population of these *kebeles*, the project could not start until 1989 (ibid). According to an interview with RBE's representative in Addis

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<sup>70</sup> Swedish Save the Children

<sup>71</sup> This project was later extended to three adjoining *kebeles* by a local NGO, called IHA-UDP (See Background Study chapter).

Ababa the organization has currently moved its focus from urban areas and is engaged in the field of “alternative basic education for children” in the rural areas of the Amhara Region.

Out of the total four areas upgraded by RBE two were selected for this study: Kirkos and Menen (See Method chapter for case selection rationale). In both cases, along side RBE, the signatory of the projects was the AACCA. Its role is described below.

#### ***Relationship between RBE and the AACCA (Addis Ababa Municipality)***

According to the RBE’s Programme Department document (1991), the Kirkos project started following the project agreement signed between RBE and AACCA in July 1983. The document indicated that the request for the upgrading of *Woreda 21 kebele 13* was extended to RBE by the AACCA. The project agreement signed between RBE and the AACCA had twenty-two articles under five parts: 1) aims and objectives of the upgrading project, 2) governing laws, organizational structure and the relationship between the organs of both parties 3) obligations of the RBE 4) obligations of the Municipality and 5) general stipulations regarding evaluation and termination of the project (See Appendix- 4A, for full document). In part 3, “obligations of RBE”, the main role of RBE is delineated as the financier and manager of the project. Part 4, “obligation of the municipality”, puts the municipality as the main partner of RBE. It would provide protection of the “target group” from possible displacement, for example, by including an article that prohibits the municipality from increasing rent after the project is completed.

Though the municipality was the signatory of the project and in that way the main partner of RBE, the practical realization of the project was entrusted to the staff of RBE and the *Woreda 21, Kebele 13*.

To know the perception of the dwellers regarding the origin of the project, a Focus group discussion was asked how the project was started. *KM* said,

The reason for RBE to come to us was because the living standard of the area was extremely low. The houses were covered with leaking plastics and canvas. The children were sleeping on the street, the area was full of impoverished prostitutes...The then city council gave its



consent, saying ‘let the dirty be cleared, let this place be changed – as it appears now, it is not wanted’.

Another key Informant *HB*, who was then a member of the *kebele* administration had a more anecdotal view:

It could be a rumour, but we have been told, the representative of Redd Barna has selected *Woreda* 21, after studying the 25 *Woredas* of Addis Ababa from a helicopter [looking down from above]. Later, out of the 20 *kebeles* of *Woreda* 21, *Kebele* 13 was chosen by a lot.

For the FGD and many of the dwellers with whom the researcher had informal discussions, despite the passage of many years, RBE’s project was still fresh in their minds. Despite the different stories on the way the area was prioritized, the general perception was that the upgrading project was commenced because the area was one of the poorest localities in Addis Ababa.

#### ***The role of Woreda 21, Kebele 13 administration***

The *kebele*, as an agent of the city administration, was expected not only to assist the upgrading, as stipulated in the project agreement, but also to make sure that the dwellers under its jurisdiction understood the implications of the agreement entered between RBE and AACAA. Article 7 of the project agreement stated:

It is expected that the *kebele* Administration shall liaise closely with the Redd Barna project staff, and will be active in mobilisation of the *kebele* population. The office bearers of the *kebele* will have the responsibility of ensuring that the *kebele* population understands the implications of this agreement.

The *kebele*, at the initial stage of the project, had honoured the above article. According to an interview with the then member of the *kebele* administration, RBE was working in close collaboration with the *kebele* and its organs. He said,

He was called B.H. a top Redd Barna official. The *kebele* gave both to him and his secretaries an office...Redd Barna, upon its arrival, did not immediately start to demolish houses. They visited the houses of the poor and their children. They made the study together with the representatives of the *Kebele* officials, the REYA [Revolutionary Ethiopia Youth

Association], the REWA [Revolutionary Ethiopia Women Association], the Revolutionary Guard, and the residents. After making the study on which houses should be given priority, which souls should be saved first, they [Redd Barna] continued their job...

The *kebele*'s commitment in honouring RBE's requirements and goals, however, did not last to the end. The reasons for these are discussed in the subsequent sections.

### ***The role of the kebele dwellers***

Article 5 of the project agreement in delineating the responsibility of the dwellers stated:

Under the kebele executive committee and development committee the population of *kebele* 13 shall together with REDD BARNA undertake the planning of the project, establish the priorities between various options and actively participate in the implementation of such defined components. The participation in the implementation work is likely to be a combination of labour and matching of financial contributions from Redd Barna.

In addition to labour and financial contribution, at the initial stage of the project, the dwellers have also participated in the prioritisation of needs. The role of the dwellers in the prioritisation of options was described by key informant D.K. as follows.

When the organization [RBE] came they did not directly start their job. There were four *iddir ketenas*<sup>72</sup> under the main *kebele iddir*. The *kebele* was divided into four *ketenas*. The dwellers were organized under these four *ketenas*. *Ketena* 5, where my house is located, is a later addition. At first they [Redd Barna] did not start with the construction of houses. They brought children's clothing, then blankets. These were distributed to those in urgent need. But this was temporary. The dwellers, in each *ketena*, prioritised housing as the fundamental problem of the area, because many people were living in plastics. Then first the kindergarten was built followed by the housing.


From the above discussion it can be discerned that, during the project period, the main actors were: RBE and the *kebele* dwellers (See Fig. 5.1). We will later see how, post-

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
<sup>72</sup> Then, sub-units of *kebele*

phase out, the *kebele* dwellers were divided into two: those who occupied RBE built new houses (on-site or nearby relocation), henceforth “housing beneficiaries (HBs)’ and those whose houses were maintained in-situ, henceforth “indirect beneficiaries (IBs)”. The HBs were represented by a re-established SACC<sup>73</sup>. Therefore, post phase out, the City Administration of Addis Ababa, RBE, the *kebele* administration, the direct beneficiaries (SACC), and the IBs can be considered as the major actors of the upgrading project (See Fig. 5.2).

**Fig. 5.1: Relationship of actors during the project period**



**Fig. 5.2: Relationship of main actors, post-phase out**



<sup>73</sup> The RBE-established original SACC was suspended after the project phase out in 1997. It was officially re-established by self-motivated dwellers in 2002. The detail of the re-establishment of the SACC is discussed in Section 5.3.4.

## **5.2.2. Upgrading approach and project components**

### ***Upgrading approach***

According to the RBE’s Programme Department (1991) document, the underlying objective of RBE in sponsoring urban upgrading projects was to reduce “child vulnerability” and promote “family welfare”. The principles followed were to undertake “a sustainable integrated community development” activities with the “participation” of the dwellers. To achieve these, the strategy followed was through the integration of primary health, education, housing and income generation units. The concept of a revolving fund was also introduced to be sourced from the income generating units and the rent from newly constructed houses. RBE to meet its goals, during its stay in the area, managed to implement the project components discussed below.

*Housing and infrastructure:* During the project period (1983-1990) RBE built 202 new housing units in 26 double storey (G+1) blocks, 37 single storey (G+0) *chika* houses, 35 single storey (G+0) hollow concrete block wall houses, 23 new latrines with four compartments each and an assembly hall with office premises<sup>74</sup>. Further, 10 common water points were provided; major maintenance of 177 houses, 70 kitchens and 26 latrines, minor maintenance of 164 houses and pavement of roads was undertaken.

*Income generating units:* In addition to these, income generating units, such as a vegetable and fruit shop, a self help-food preparation centre, a youth girls’ doll production centre, two baking centres, a grinding mill, a recreation centre including butchery, a public shower with four compartments and traditional carpet production house were provided.

*SACC:* The SACC was established with a capital of 150,000 Birr; and its members were given training.

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<sup>74</sup> The assembly hall and the office rooms were for RBE’s own use during its tenure in the project area. Later it is discussed how these same premises became one of the sources of litigation between RBE and the *kebele* administration.

*Health and education:* A clinic, a kindergarten and two blocks of 16 classrooms within the compound of Felege Yordanos Elementary School were constructed.

During fieldwork, each of the project components discussed above was identified and located on a base map (See Fig. 5.3). By 1990 most of the project components were handed over to the *kebele* administration, except a few facilities. As per the project agreement the *kebele* was entrusted to administer the housing and its related income generating units. To enable the *kebele* to accomplish the project's goal a special bank account was established to deposit incomes. The *kebele*, in consultation with the dwellers, was expected to utilize the fund for more "community" development activities, through the concept of a revolving fund.

Just before the final handover of the project something dramatic happened. According to a then member of the *kebele*'s revolutionary guard:


During their [Redd Barna's] exit there was this guy, Mr. SM<sup>75</sup>, despite the handing over of all the houses ... to the residents; he refused to hand over this compound [then the offices of RBE and an assembly hall]. His plan was to rent it to a foreign organization. In defiance to his plan we broke the windows and doors and occupied the offices. When he came and saw what happened he was disappointed and reported the case to the Addis Ababa City Council. A representative of the City Council came. He assessed the situation and found out that the premises were rather appropriate for the *kebele* administration and its organs, such as the *kebele Ferd shengo* [local court], and REYA. Therefore, his statement was in favour of us. The police detained us for a couple of hours for breaking the office doors, but then we were released immediately. Mr. SM got disappointed and did not come back.

Therefore, the final phase-out stage was not amicably concluded. Since then the *kebele* administration started to mismanage the project. According to RBE's Programme Department's document (1991) the house rents of some of the newly constructed houses were increased to push out the intended target group. Houses and facilities remained without any maintenance resulting in fast deterioration. Generally the goals of the project were put into question. The document attributed the main causes to the lack of management capacity and commitment on the part of the *kebele* administration.

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<sup>75</sup> RBE's project manager

Fig. 5.3: Distribution of upgraded facilities



*The upgraded facilities were mapped on a base map during fieldwork.*

The replacement of the intended target group and the mismanagement of the facilities happened irrespective of Article 16 and 19 of the project agreement entered between the AACA and RBE, which were formulated to protect the target group from being pushed out. The articles stated:

Article 16: The Municipality will refrain from increasing house rents or taxes as a result of the embetterment of the house or infrastructures in the *kebele*, until such time that the income of the Community as a whole raised enough to make increased dues feasible.

Article 19: The Municipality is the Institution responsible for integration and institutionalisation of services and communal facilities created in the *kebele* during the project period.

### 5.3. Actors' relationship and tenants' response

#### 5.3.1. The beginning of the tenants' movement

In 1991, the Marxist government of Ethiopia was overthrown and in its place a new government was established. Since *kebele* leadership is a political office all former leaders were replaced. After some years of a lull, owing to the transition from the old to the new government, some efforts emerged bringing the problem of the project to the attention of the new officials. According to Aster Belay, a well informed resident of the area, however, no action was taken. In her interview with a newspaper<sup>76</sup> she said:

Though the aim of the RBE-built income generating units was to secure a sustainable development, the recreation centre and the mill have gone bankrupt and are rented to individuals. Even the income gained before bankruptcy is put in the account of the *yehebret suk*<sup>77</sup> (public shop), ...which is administered by less than ten members of a Trustee Committee. According to the project agreement the fund from the income generating units

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<sup>76</sup> Addis Lisan, weekly Newspaper published by the AACA, 1999 (22 *Tahisas*, 1992 E.C.), Title of column: "*kehezb andebet*" (Public Voice). Interview entitled: "Why is the project aimed at the development of the *kebele* dwellers' not productive?"

<sup>77</sup> Literally, "common shop". It can also be understood as "public shop", established in each *kebele* by the then Marxist regime with the objective of protecting citizens from the "exploitation" by merchants. Various day-to-day food items, including bread were rationed in these shops.

should have been deposited in a bank account established solely for the use of community development. This is the concern of the community. But it is not implemented. (Translation mine)

Likewise, the same newspaper based on an interview with another resident, Yimegnu Hailegiorghis, reported:

Yimegnu said, ‘the community has been objecting to the fact that the leaders of the past regime have deposited the fund from the income generating units, in the public shop’s account, in such a way as to have easy access for embezzlement’. She continued, ‘When the Dergue<sup>78</sup> regime was abolished this corrupted operation should have been stopped. But, since it has been continuing the income of the project is being embezzled and the [income generating] units are made bankrupt’. (Translation mine)

On the other hand, the secretary of Woreda 23 had presented another reason for the bankruptcy of the income generating units. In an interview he gave to a newspaper<sup>79</sup>, he said:

The income generating units went bankrupt because the centrally planned economy of the Marxist regime was replaced by a market economy and that they were not able to compete with private enterprises. Therefore, the *kebele* rented them to private individuals. But this does not mean that there could not be administrative problems.

Later a self-initiated group mostly constituted of the occupiers of the RBE-built houses, started to mobilize the inhabitants and started to strongly push questions regarding the RBE project. One of the key activists of this movement said:

The *kebele* did not provide the newly built houses to the targeted population. Most of the houses were distributed based on political affiliation and acquaintance. In fact RBE built 57<sup>80</sup>

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<sup>78</sup> The popular name of the overthrown Marxist military regime, from the ancient Ethiopian Gees language meaning committee.

<sup>79</sup> Addis Lisan Newspaper, 29 Tahisas, 1992 E.C. (December 1999 G.C.)



*chika* houses in order to accommodate some of the households evicted by the *kebele*. Following the disagreement [between the *kebele* and RBE] the *kebele* hijacked the project...The SACC was frozen, and the income generating facilities were put under the so-called *yehebret suk*'s Trustee Committee.

### **5.3.2. The termination of the payments of rental fees**

Notwithstanding the mismanagement of the project, the HBs were paying rental fees with the hope that the collected money will be used for a revolving fund. Until 1997 more than 300,000 Birr was collected and deposited in a closed account<sup>81</sup>. In 1998 the AACA issued a new regulation instructing all *kebeles* to deposit rental fees in a centrally administered account. The rationale of this regulation was to avoid discrepancies in the utilization of funds by having centrally collected funds and ensuring the judicious allocation of these funds in the form of budgets across *kebeles*.<sup>82</sup> This regulation was, however resisted and boycotted by the dwellers of the case area with the justification that their case should be seen in light of RBE's project agreement that stipulates the income derived from the houses should solely be used for the benefit of the *kebele* dwellers. Some of the HBs resumed the payment of the "rental" fees later in 2001 when the SACC was officially re-established and the RBE built properties were transferred to the SACC. But this time the HBs were paying with the perception that they would be the owners of the newly constructed houses in twenty years time (See subsequent sections for discussion on this).

### **5.3.3. The investigation committee and its findings**

In 2000, at the insistence of the self-motivated tenants and following the instruction of the AACA, an investigation committee named, "Public Affairs Temporary Investigation Committee" was established in a public *kebele* meeting. Its mandate was to investigate issues of the *kebele* administration in relation to the RBE-built projects. After three months of investigation, the committee came up with an eighteen page report. The report was

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<sup>80</sup> Did not tally with the quantity reported by RBE (1994), which is 37

<sup>81</sup> Interview given by Fasika Fekadu, then secretary of *kebele* 13, to Addis Lisan Newspaper, 29 Tahisas, 1992 E.C. (December 1999 G.C.)

<sup>82</sup> Interview given by Daniel Kibret, then secretary of *Woreda* 21, to Addis Lisan Newspaper, 29 Tahisas, 1992 E.C. (December 1999 G.C.)

extremely critical of the *kebele*'s handling of the RBE- project. It included details of corruption allegations, explicit with the names of individuals. It started by pointing out the deaf ear given by the *Woreda* and *Zone*<sup>83</sup> officials to the repeated grievances and appeals of the public. It gave a detailed financial account from 1980<sup>84</sup> up to 2000. These accounts include that of the *yehibret suk*, the suspended SACC, rent collected from RBE-built houses, and funds from the income generating units and social facilities. According to the report, by 19 January 2000, while the balance in the bankbook should have been 426,667.42 Birr, it was 413,472.12 Birr having 13,195.30 Birr unaccounted for. The investigation committee finalized its report by outlining a recommendation for further activities. It suggested the need for the re-establishment of the SACC and putting all the RBE-built houses, related facilities and income generating units under the administration of the cooperative. It emphasised that the leaders of the co-operative should be directly elected by the public and should be accountable to the public. (See BOX-5.1, for excerpts of the report.)

In 2000 the investigation committee went public about the alleged embezzlement of the funds. The committee's chairman gave an interview to a newspaper called *Eletawi Addis*. The heading of the interview was “An alleged 150,000<sup>85</sup> Birr is embezzled in *Woreda 21 Kebele 13*”. The newspaper citing Kuma Milko, the committee's chairman reported:

Though the *kebele* was open to embezzlement since the *derg*ue time, even now funds amounting to 13,195.30 Birr and 65,670 Birr are embezzled by the *kebele* administration and the [public shop's] trustee committee respectively. Generally, a total amount of 150,000 birr is embezzled during different periods. (Translation mine)

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<sup>83</sup> Then, administrative structure one level higher than the *Woreda* administration.

<sup>84</sup> This is before RBE started its project in the area. However, the committee had to start its investigation as of this year in order to include the accounts of the 'yehibret suk', which were later mixed with some accounts of the project.

<sup>85</sup> This amount does not tally with the committee's written report.

On the other hand, in the same newspaper, Gebregziabher Gebremariam, member of Zone 2 executive committee, responded to this allegation. Citing him, the newspaper reported:

Gebregziabher indicated, the Zonal administration thinks that the report of the investigation committee alone is neither legally credible nor shows the exact amount of the missing fund; therefore, we have asked for a professional auditor, and we are waiting until we get one from the City Administration. Gebregziabher added that the matter did not get a solution up to now because the embezzlement was started during the Dergue period and has now turned out to be a complex case. (Translation mine)

**BOX-5.1: Excerpts from the Public Affairs Investigation Committee's report**

Date: March 2000

1. The Public Affairs Investigation Temporary Committee's members' list and corresponding responsibilities:

[Names of seven persons and their responsibilities is listed]

2. The mandate of the Committee is to make investigation in connection to the *kebele* administration, the public shop (*yehebret suk*) and the RBE-built facilities

3. Number of meetings conducted by the committee: 8

4. Number of inventories conducted by the committee: 3

5. Number of letters issued: 5

6. Number of joint meetings conducted with concerned bodies: 9

7. Letters of complaint received from the public: 44

8. Oral information (tips) received from the public: 37

[Regarding the original RBE-established SACC]

The SACC had uncollected loans of 53, 974.54 Birr. The then SACC leaders, instead of trying to collect the loans they, opted to close down the cooperative. They wrote a letter to the National Bank<sup>86</sup> requesting for the dissolution of the SACC. This happened because 1) the SACC leaders were appointees of the *kebele* and they were not directly elected by the members and 2) the leaders themselves and their acquaintances had taken loans and thus the SACC's dissolution was done to avoid the settlement of their debts.

(Contd.)

<sup>86</sup> At the time all SACCs were under the control of the National Bank

[Regarding financial accounts]	
Rent collected from assembly hall & its premises	154,500.00 Birr
Income from kindergarten	28,618.00 Birr
Rent collected from RBE-built houses	116,006.55 Birr
Miscellaneous income	1,636.00 Birr
Balance received from previous administration	99,236.09 Birr
Bank interest	<u>79,663.28 Birr</u>
	Total 479,667.42 Birr <sup>87</sup>
Expenses	- <u>52,992.92 Birr</u>
Balance	426,667.42 Birr <sup>88</sup>
However, the balance in the bank account showed	413,472.12 Birr
Therefore, there was 13,195.30 <sup>89</sup> Birr unaccounted for.	
[Regarding the condition of the facilities and the way foreword]	
<p>The facilities which were built to bring about great social and economic change for the <i>kebele</i> dwellers have been under the control of few individuals and committees. As a result most of the facilities have been damaged and the few remaining ones have become the source of private income. The dwellers of <i>kebele</i> 13 have rather become observers of the feast (<i>yebey temelkach</i>). What we are witnessing is that the toilets have deteriorated and the dwellers are obliged to use potties. They are also obliged: to pay for kindergarten (originally, built to serve free of charge) to fetch distant water as some of the water points are not functioning.</p> <p>The solution for these is to re-establish the suspended SACC and put all the RBE-built properties and the financial account under it. The leaders of the new SACC, however, should directly be elected by the public. The newly elected leaders should give priority to the transfer of all the RBE-built facilities from the <i>kebele</i> to the SACC. This could be done through negotiations with the concerned government bodies.</p> <p>With regards,</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>Woreda 21 Kebele 13 Public Affaires Investigation Temporary Committee</i></p> <p style="text-align: center;">(<i>Translation mine</i>)</p>	

<sup>87</sup> There are some minor errors, the total should have been 479,659.92 Birr.

<sup>88</sup> It should have been 426,667.00 Birr

<sup>89</sup> It should have been 13,194.88 Birr

### 5.3.4. The re-establishment of the SACC and the transfer of the property

In 2001, the old SACC was formally re-established. Soon after its establishment the SACC asked the *Kebele* administration to hand over the RBE built facilities such as the housing, the assembly hall, the office building, the mill, the recreation centre, the public shower, the common water point, the women's self help centre, the clinic and the kindergarten. The *Kebele* refused to comply with the request of the SACC. The SACC, disappointed by the *kebele's* response, filed a complaint at the office of the Sub-city administration<sup>90</sup> reporting all the mismanagement occurred in connection to the properties (See Table 5.2 and BOX-5.2).

**Table 5.2: The condition of the income generating and service giving facilities**

Name of facility	Service type	Current condition
RBE-built office premises and assembly hall	Service giving and income generation	Doors were broken by former kebele leaders & were occupied. Assembly hall was rented to an NGO
Vegetable shop	Providing affordable service to the community & generate income	First it was put under the public shop and currently it is let for individual use
Self-help food preparation	Income generation for income-less women through the sale of food	Few individuals are deriving income by letting it
Doll centre	For the training of girls and income generation	Rented to an individual
Meat shop and recreation centre	Income generation	It was put under public shop. The whereabouts of its property are unknown and the rooms are rented for selling sand
Mill	Income generation	Formerly put under the public shop, currently utilized for private gain
Two baking centres with 18 electric stoves	Income generation for poor women through the sale of <i>injera</i>	The stoves are lost and the centres are closed
Water points and shower	Income generation	Out of nine water points and shower heads only one water point and one shower are functioning
Residential houses	Rent to own and income generation	Occupied by dwellers, but remained without maintenance and are deteriorating
SACC	Providing saving and credit service and administering the facilities	Re-established in 2001 following a suspension

Source: Report presented to the Kirkos sub-city administration (2003)

<sup>90</sup> Newly instituted level of city administration, which replaced the Zone, *Woreda /Keftegna*.

**BOX-5.2: Excerpts from the SACC's complaint and report**

Date: May 2003

To: Kirkos Sub-city Executive

Subject: Report regarding the loss incurred on both the RBE-built facilities and the income generated

....The *kebele* has violated the project agreement. Therefore, in presenting this report we are not looking for a negotiation or for you to mediate between us and the *kebele* administration. Rather we request that, following the necessary investigations of our submitted evidence, legal action be taken against the offenders and the RBE-built properties be transferred to us.

We hereby submit this cover letter including seven pages of attachments. We hope that the Sub-city administration, unlike the former *Woreda* and Zone leaders, would not shield the offenders. We would also like to respectfully request your office to consider the solutions suggested, at the end of the attachments.

With regards,  
[Signed]

[Attachment] Part 1

....Though, according to the project agreement, the income generated from the above facilities had to be put in a bank account for further utilization in community development, up to now nothing has been done to this effect and the income generated is left un-audited and unaccounted for....

Ideas for solution

Finally the dwellers, observing that the then authorities could not solve the existing problems, have taken the initiative to re-establish the SACC. They carried an election in the presence of the Cooperative Office's representative and the SACC was established in May 2001. The purpose of re-establishing the SACC is to enjoy privileges as that bestowed to similar cooperatives in *Woreda 11 Kebele 14* and *Woreda 23 Kebele 14 and 16*. We propose that, as per article three of our association, the facilities and income should be transferred to us from the *kebele*, because similar *kebele* dwellers have gained success through the same method.

May 2003

(Translation mine)

As a result of the complaints of the re-established SACC, the Sub-city administration formed a Committee to investigate the case. The report of the Committee was in favour of the SACC. Consequently, in 2004, in a *kebele* public meeting facilitated by the sub-city administration, it was decided that the *kebele* administration should hand over all the RBE built properties, except the assembly hall, to the SACC. A recorded video of the meeting shows the heated debate between the many conflicting interests of the *kebele*, the sub-city officials, the HBs, the IBs and the rest of the *kebele* dwellers. Finally the meeting was concluded in favour of the HBs, albeit with some conditions. Excerpts taken from the video give a glimpse of the meeting's atmosphere. The meeting moderator, a sub-city official said:

The sub-city executive committee had decided on the issue of the assembly hall. It should be under the control of the *kebele*, as are all the halls in other *kebeles*. The motion on the floor is should the housing and its related facilities be under a committee or under the association [SACC]?

A strong opposition and an emotional response from the audience followed:

As in the past, [administration] under *kebele*, under committee, under something else...as a matter of principle, we do not accept. We do not want to hear about it! We have seen *kebele*, we have seen committees. As with other places<sup>91</sup>, it should be under the association [SACC] ...There is an association, it is legal, it is established by proclamation, it can be audited. Let our brothers get job opportunities; let the destroyed latrines be reconstructed. In the name of God and government, let our rights be respected! The properties should be under one centre [the SACC] and should serve the public.”

Applause from the audience...

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<sup>91</sup> Here the speaker is referring the precedence created in the case of Menen discussed in the next chapter.

### ***The establishment of Kirkos Multi-task Cooperative***

The *kebele* leaders were not happy that the SACC has become in charge of the properties. At different occasions, they started to question whether the SACC has a legal ground for administering the funds from the income generating units, their argument being the SACC’s function is limited by law to providing micro-finance services only. Consequently, the SACC leaders reacted by developing a counter plan in order to circumvent the intentions of the *kebele* leaders. In 2004, the SACC members created a new organization known as “Kirkos 21/13 Dwellers’ Service Oriented, Multi-task Cooperative with Limited Liability” (*Kirkos 21/13 newariwoch hulegeb agelgelot sechi halafinetu yetewesene hibret sera mahiber*), henceforth KMTC. In addition to defying the legal challenge, according to the terms of agreement, its main purpose was to administer the fund from the income generating units and the housing, and to get involved in similar businesses when necessary. Dwellers are required to buy shares in order to become beneficiaries of the association (See BOX-5.3: for detail).

#### **BOX-5.3: KMTC’s terms of agreement**

[The terms of agreement of KMTC had 34 articles in 32 pages. Below are selected articles directly related to this study.]

##### 2.1. Purpose

2.1.1. On the basis of the principles and values of cooperatives, to plan and implement projects that could help in solving common problems and enhancing development through the mobilization of members of similar needs and goals.

2.1.7. To administer all RBE- built residential houses, service giving facilities and income generating units

##### 2.2. Activities

2.2.8. To consolidate and expand the RBE-built legal properties, namely the service giving facilities and income generating units

2.2.12. According to the project agreement [of RBE and AACA] to collect the cost estimation of the RBE-built houses and when necessary to construct new ones for the benefit of members.

(Contd.)



- 2.2.14. To provide mill service to the dwellers
- 2.2.15. To provide affordable recreational service
- 2.2.16. To provide common water points and shower service
- 2.2.17. To provide kindergarten service
- 2.2.18. To provide whole sale and retail shop service
- 2.2.19. To expand additional income generating activities

#### 4. Membership

##### 4.1. Criteria

4.1.1. A permanent resident of the old *Woreda 21 Kebele 13*

4.1.8. One who is not a member of similar association

##### 4.2. Application procedure

4.2.5. An applicant allowed for membership should pay both registration fee and the value of one share, within one month period

#### 24. Source of finance

##### 24.2. Share

24.2.1. A member should at least have one share

24.2.3. The number of shares will be 5000.

24.2.4. The value of one share is 50 Birr and a member should settle payment within 90 days since registration

#### 34. Approval of the terms of agreement

##### 34.1. Decision

The names listed below, above two third of the population of *kebele 13* and who are members of the KMTC, following a democratic discussion and in accordance to the proclamation 147/91, convinced that this will enable us to materialize our needs and goals, have on this day 29 November 2004 approved and signed this document.

34.2. Attached are full names and addresses of members

*(Translation mine)*

### **5.3.5. The question of private ownership of the newly constructed houses and the division of the *kebele* dwellers**

Following the decision that the SACC should take over and administer the RBE-built properties, a question of the privatization of the housing component started to be pursued by the SACC. The central issue was to transfer the ownership of the RBE- built houses to the beneficiaries. Therefore the SACC became a default representative of the HBs. On the other hand the IBs and the rest of the *kebele* dwellers were in opposition to the idea of ownership of the HBs. Their main argument was that the RBE-built houses and all the rest of the facilities were built to generate income for a revolving fund and not to be privately owned by the sitting tenants.

The basis for the SACC (HBs) to raise the question of private ownership was a contentious article included in an agreement made to establish a savings bank account. In 1983 in addition to the general agreement entered between the AACA and RBE another tripartite agreement was made between the two parties and the *Woreda 21 Kebele 13* regarding the establishment of a savings account. The document of the agreement specified that the income generated from RBE-built properties will be collected and put in a saving bank account, to be administered by the *kebele*. The purpose of the fund would be for post phase out maintenance and upkeep of the upgrading project. Article 3 of this agreement read:

When Redd Barna, in recognition of the need to alleviate the housing problem of the *kebele* dwellers, builds new houses; *until the cost of the houses is covered*, the monthly rent of the houses should be collected and put in the savings account... (Translation and italics mine)

The HBs, stressing the phrase “...until the cost of the houses is covered” initiated their claim for ownership of the houses. They argued that the article implies the principle of rent to own – that the ownership of the houses should be transferred to them, upon settling the expenses. They emphasized the point that it is only required of them to pay rent until the cost of the houses is covered.

On the other hand, the *kebele* and sub-city officials and the IBs argued that the interpretation by the HBs is flawed. They explained<sup>92</sup> that the overall agreement puts the post phase-out responsibility of administering the upgrading project and the savings account upon the *kebele* administration; therefore, it is up to the *kebele* (the government) to decide as to how best the RBE-built houses should be owned. They based their argument on the introduction part of the terms of agreement, which stated:

The need for exclusive source of funds is recognised since the capacity of the *kebele* is extremely low to maintain and sustain the public facilities provided by Redd Barna; and even when, post phase out, Redd Barna leaves the *kebele*, a savings account, which will be sourced from incomes derived from different services, should be established *to enable the kebele administration to take over* and provide any development activities and sustain the facilities, based on the public need, for the purpose of *kebele* development and community service, ...(translation and italics mine)

(See Appendix-4B: for full document in Amharic)

The IBs, supported by the *kebele* administration, went to the extent of mobilising a petition entitled: “Exposing the corruption and defective administration that are affecting the public, expecting positive response from an esteemed leadership<sup>93</sup>”. The petition dated January 2005 was filed in the mayor’s office. The petition’s four-page cover letter blames the SACC for “secretly” mobilising the occupants of the RBE-built houses through a false promise of securing property deeds. It also enumerates a number of administrative misdeeds and corruptions related to the funds of the SACC (See BOX-5.4).

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<sup>92</sup> In depth interview and documents from both *kebele* officials and IBs.

<sup>93</sup> “*Behezb lai yederese ye’astedader beleshunetena musenan selemasawok; endihum yebesal amerar melash magegneten yemeleketal*”.

**BOX-5.4: Excerpts from the petition of the IBs**

Date: January 2005

To: \_\_\_\_\_

Mayor of the Addis Ababa City Administration  
Addis Ababa

Subject: Exposing the corruption and defective administration that are affecting the public, expecting positive response from an esteemed leadership

....Based on the agreement entered between RBE and the AACA various facilities were provided for the low-income dwellers of the *kebele*....

It was arranged in such a way that the income generated from the properties would be put in a blocked bank account to be utilized, as deemed necessary by the public, for the socio-economic improvement of the *kebele* dwellers. However, the public money had been embezzled and the property was left to deteriorate by the then authorities. Following the fall of the *Derg* regime when the current government assumed power the *kebele* administration managed to deposit 500 thousand Birr, income generated from the properties.

Notwithstanding this,...few individuals emerged from the community claiming leadership of the previously suspended RBE-established SACC. They have secretly and selectively mobilized those dwellers living in the RBE-built houses [the HBs] disseminating false promise that they will manage to have the housing privatized and secure with property deeds. Excluding the rest of the *kebele* dwellers, a meeting of the HBs attended by the representatives of the Kirkos sub-city and the *kebele* 13 administration was then held in which the bank account of 500 thousand Birr and the RBE- built properties were handed over to the SACC.

Since then not only the rental fees, from the housing and income generated facilities, are not any more deposited in the bank account, but also it is not clear with whose signature the once blocked account is activated. The collected money is being dissipated. We have been repeatedly notifying this to the executives of the sub-city and the *kebele* administration. After a lengthy delay in a public meeting held in November 2004, attended by the leaders of the SACC and the dwellers, the government officials were sad to learn that a considerable amount of money has been withdrawn from the bank account for private use and that the facilities are being run as if they are private properties - that do not belong to the public.

(Contd.)

Particularly, the executive of the Kirkos sub-city regretted the mistakes made and promised that he will follow up the case and take appropriate action. However, so far no action has been taken against the SACC's leaders.<sup>94</sup> As a result the financial dissipation is continuing unabated....

Looking forward for quick solution,

With regards,

Signed for \_\_\_\_\_

Woreda 21, Kebele 13 dwellers

(Translation mine)

In February 2005, the Mayor's office sent the petition of the IBs to the office of Kirkos sub city for their immediate action and follow up. Following this the office of the Kirkos Sub-City established an advisory committee to study the case and come up with possible solutions. The ten member committee was constituted of the sub city executive chairman and his legal advisor, two from the Office for Cooperative Associations<sup>95</sup>, two members of the old RBE-established SACC (representing the IBs), two members of the newly re-established SACC (representing the HBs), one *kebele* dweller (supporting the view of the HBs) and another *kebele* dweller (supporting the view of the IBs).

The committee met four times within one month (March 2005) of which the first three meetings were spent mostly in trying to understand the whole process. The meetings were intermittently animated with litigations and counter litigations between the actors involved, specially, regarding the motive of the leaders of the new SACC<sup>96</sup>. On the one hand, the IBs kept blaming the HBs of conspiring to privatise the RBE-built houses, and on the other hand, the HBs justifying their activities. The minutes of the meetings also indicate that the leaders of the SACC were challenged regarding the mandate of the SACC - whether it is the jurisdiction of the SACC to administer income-generating activities.

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<sup>94</sup> According an interview with the SACC leaders auditors were assigned by the government to check on the alleged financial embezzlement. The auditor's report was that there was no money dissipated and that the SACC's book keeping was in order.

<sup>95</sup> This office is in charge of organizing SACCs and other similar cooperatives.

<sup>96</sup> Minutes of the Advisory Committee: 2 Megabit, 1997 Ethiopian Calendar (EC), 8 Megabit 1997 EC and 9 Megabit 1997 EC. (All during March 2005)

Nevertheless, it seemed that the SACC leaders were ready for this as they took pre-emptive action by establishing the KMTC.

The fourth meeting of the advisory committee was more focused. Its agenda included three important questions: 1) Who should administer the RBE-built income generating units? 2) Who is the owner of the RBE-built houses? and 3) What should be the goals of the SACC?

After a lengthy discussion there were two opinions. The opinion from the leaders of the SACC was that only the members of the KMTC should make the decision on the above questions. Leaders of the SACC pushed this motion because the SACC’s majority members are HBs. In opposition to this motion, the rest argued that, not only members of the KMTC, but also any dweller of the *kebele*, as a rightful stakeholder, should be invited to make the decision (See BOX-5.5: for excerpts of minutes). Though the minute does not indicate the final decision, since the majority were in support of the second motion it seems that the committee was in favour of calling all the *kebele* dwellers to make decisions on the questions posed above. In 2006, during the final fieldwork the researcher learned, from the executive manager of the Kirkos sub-city,<sup>97</sup> that the issue was pending largely owing to the political unrest, which started in 2005.

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<sup>97</sup> Interview

**BOX-5.5: Excerpts from the minutes of the advisory committee**

Meeting place, date and time \_\_\_\_\_

Present were: [Name list of ten committee members]

Agenda: The relationship between the SACC and the *kebele* administration

Mr. *AM* (a dweller in support of the IBs) said,

“I would like to bring to the attention of the *kebele* administration that a growing division among the *kebele* dwellers is being created and it needs remedy. However, for now, this committee should focus on:

- 1) What to do with the audit report?
- 2) Who should administer the [RBE-built] facilities?
- 3) Who is the owner of the RBE-built houses? and
- 4) What should the purpose of the SACC?”

Mr. *KM*, the SACC chairman, responding to some of the questions said:

“The SACC from the very beginning was established legally and has always been doing its business on a legal basis. Regarding the facilities, before we took over them there were weaknesses. But since we took over the facilities, unlike the former practices, there are no problems. Currently, a situation is created whereby the facilities have become self supporting. You might have been wrongly informed that there is embezzlement of the SACC’s funds<sup>98</sup>. The information’s circulation by itself is not a crime, but investigation should be made to find the truth.”

Following these, Mr. *LA* representative of the Office of Cooperatives posed a question: “Does the SACC have the legal ground to administer the RBE built houses and facilities?”

Mr. *MD* (SACC representative) responded:

“It was the stand of the SACC that these facilities should be treated in the same way as happened in other similar SACCs.<sup>99</sup> Because of this we made a month long study to formulate rules and we got it approved at the Office of Cooperatives. We are administering the houses and facilities according these rule and regulations.”

Mr. *LA* responded back:

“Your SACC was approved in our office in 2001 and you took over the properties in

(Contd.)

<sup>98</sup> Alluding to the complaint filed by the indirect beneficiaries (See BOX-5.4).

<sup>99</sup> Referring to the case of Menen, discussed next chapter

2003/04. How is it possible that you administer these properties with the rules approved prior to the take over? .... Besides, the agreement entered between RBE and the AACA does not include the SACC. I think this case has certain confusion.”...

[Here it should be remembered that the SACC has already established the KMTC in order to separate the functions of micro-finance and the administration of the properties]

Regarding the KMTC, Mr. *GZ* (a dweller in support of the IBs) on his part said, “The *kebele* dwellers have the right to know about their properties. The invitations for the founding meeting of the KMTC were only distributed to those living in the RBE-built houses [HBs].”

Mr. *KM*, “The facilities do not belong to individuals. They belong to all the *kebele* dwellers. We have established the KMTC since the properties can not be administered by the SACC. The houses are also administered by the KMTC. In fact currently it is this association which is legally administering the properties.”

Mr. *AM* interceded:

“But the main issue of this meeting is, notwithstanding of the past, as of now who should administer the properties?”

Responding to this question *KM* said:

“As I tried to explain earlier, the properties belong to all, but according to our rules and regulations, a dweller who wants to decide on the fate of the properties should first be a member of the KMTC. Just because one is a resident of the *kebele* does not entitle him to pass a decision on the properties.”

Mr. *MD* (SACC representative) added,

“Though the properties belong to all the dwellers the right to decide is bestowed on members only. Nevertheless, the right of a dweller to be a member of the KMTC is open so that he will have the power of decision.”

The rest of the committee members on their part said,

“It was not proper to exclude the rest of the *kebele* dwellers from deciding on their property. Each and every dweller of the *kebele* should be gathered in a meeting in order to decide on whose hand the properties should be. It should be done in accordance to the decision of the people.”

Meeting adjourned at \_\_\_\_\_.

(Translation mine)



### 5.3.6. Perceived ownership

The above discussion has illustrated that legally it was not yet clear who owns the RBE-built properties. In reality, however, despite the differing views, the occupiers of the houses had their own perception. To know about this the HBs were asked regarding the ownership perception. Out of the 102 respondents, 87 (85.2%) had perceived the SACC or RBE as the owner of the houses (See Table 5.2). Since RBE is no longer active in the area and the SACC is mainly constituted of the HBs it can be interpreted that 85.2 % of the HBs think that the newly constructed houses belong to them. Before the start of the upgrading project about 85% of the housing units in the case area were *kebele* owned. This is relatively high rate compared to the 32% (CSA, 1995) for the whole of Addis Ababa.

**Table 5.2: Distribution of respondents by perceived house owner type**

Type of perceived house owner	Freq.	%
<i>Kebele</i>	8	7.8
SACC / RBE	87	85.2
Private	6	5.9
Not clear	1	1.0
Total	102	100.0

### 5.3.7. Contribution of the SACC in upgrading

A letter written in 2005 by the SACC to the Office of the sub-city enumerates the contribution of the SACC in the development of the settlement. In addition to the micro finance services for its members<sup>100</sup>, it was reported: 1425.5 square meters of roads, 150.60 square meters ditch, 1 *chika* house (for a family of 5, who used to live in a makeshift plastic), 4 kitchens and 2 toilets were constructed. In a similar manner the report stated: 15 unemployed women were organized and given credit; support was given to 28 destitute

<sup>100</sup> About 400 households: 292 HBs and some households were simply interested in getting micro-finance services.

elders and 7 victims of HIV/AIDS; and school materials were provided to more than 20 orphans.<sup>102</sup>

### **5.3.8. The conflicting role of the AACA**

In the above discussion one of the main legal documents used both to initiate the upgrading process and for the HBs to claim housing ownership was the project agreement between RBE and AACA. Based on this agreement the dwellers and the *kebele* (as an agent of the AACA) have been making negotiations). At the city level, however a different situation is observed. The AACA, oblivious of its past agreements and local upgrading activities and negotiations, has been issuing development plans in direct conflict to the interests of the dwellers.

In-depth interview with key informants revealed that the dwellers are in constant fear of displacement. This fear was emanated from a revised master plan, which stipulated the passing of a major road, 40 meters wide, right through the case area (See Fig. 5.4). Phase one of the construction of the road, which did not affect the case area, is completed. The next phase, if continued, however, will displace a number of households from the case area.

Though the dwellers of the case area are not aware or are remotely informed, there is also a local development plan which envisions the displacement of the whole case area through urban renewal (See Fig. 5.5). In fact, according to interviews with the Kirkos sub-city manager, one of the main reasons for resisting the HBs request for housing privatization is because of the existence of such plans. The argument is if property deeds are issued the cost of compensation would be very high, in the event that they have to be displaced.


The proposals for the construction of the new by-pass road and the local development plan (LDP) do not exactly match with each other. As can be observed from

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<sup>102</sup> Letter, dated 01.19.1997 E.C. (September 2004), written from Kirkos SACC to Kirkos Sub-city Executive Office.


the figures the proposed road is a straight line in the LDP while it is slightly bent in Fig. 5.4. This further shows the uncoordinated work of the different departments of the AACCA resulting in sending conflicting signals to the dwellers and local government agencies.

**Fig. 5.4: Proposed road of the master plan overlapped over the case area**



Source: The AACCA

Fig. 5.5: Proposed local development plan



Source: The AACA

## 5.4. The upgrading process and spatial transformation

This section focuses on the influence of the upgrading process on spatial transformations. It investigates the relationship between the dwellers' responses and spatial transformations within the context of the upgrading process. This is done at three levels: at the levels of the housing unit, the compound (cluster) and the settlement.

### 5.4.1. Spatial transformations at the house level

#### *Housing types*

The housing units are the main component of the upgrading and are the basic elements of a block, a cluster or a settlement. They have lent the area a distinct character and had significantly transformed the physical space. Particularly, the double-storied blocks distinctly stand out, owing to their height and building material. They were carefully inserted in pocket sites, regained by demolishing dilapidated *chika* houses. Therefore, before elaborating on the issue of physical transformations first the housing types, which were created as a result of RBE's intervention, are discussed below. Including the maintained houses, there were five house types:

*A double storied block with a perimeter balcony:* The vertical connection between the ground floor and the upper floor is through a central staircase, with each household occupying a housing unit either at the ground or upper floor (See Fig. 5.6). The design rationale for the provision of the continuous large balcony is to provide the upper floor households with enough work space compensating the loss of direct contact with the ground. This housing type was the first and the only type constructed in the area. After its completion the then *kebele* administration complained that it was too "luxurious" for the low-income dwellers, mostly because of the perimeter balcony and the relatively bigger rooms. The *kebele* argued in favour of more quantity rather than few "luxurious" houses.<sup>103</sup> RBE complied with the desire of the *kebele* and developed a second type, presented below.

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<sup>103</sup> Interview with key informants

**Fig. 5.6: Housing type 1: A block with a perimeter balcony**



*A double storied block containing a number of housing units with each unit having its own internal wooden stair:* This time there were no balconies at all (See fig. 5.7). The idea of having individual internal stairs was for each household to enjoy direct contact with the ground. However, after some repetitions, this type was also found to be expensive, as it required a number of internal stairs for each housing unit within the same block<sup>104</sup>. Besides, some of the households who were allocated to this type of blocks started to informally sublet one of the rooms, but only at the expense of their privacy. If the upper floor is sublet, then the sublettee has to interfere with the ground floor in order to reach the upper floor. In addition to this the intermediate floor, being of wooden construction, transmits sound and even leaks water from the upper floor. Further, the *kebele* administration itself started to allocate two households in one housing unit resulting in over-crowdedness and lack of privacy (See BOX-5.6 for individual case history). Therefore, a third type was developed.

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<sup>104</sup> Ibid

**Fig. 5.7: Housing type 2 - Blocks with each housing unit having internal stair**



*A double storied block with an open external stair:* In this type a household occupies a housing unit either at the ground or upper floor. Unlike the previous type both the intermediate floor and the stair were made of concrete. The majority of the housing blocks are of this type. This type has a variant of a single external stair shared by two blocks connected through a bridge (See Fig. 5.9).

**BOX-5.6: Household in house type-2**

**Fig. 5.8: KB’s house**



KB’s household is one of the target group, which was allocated to House type-2. She occupied a single room of 10 square meters in the ground floor while the same area of the upper floor was occupied by another household. KB’s household of fifteen is probably one of the biggest sized households in the area. It included children, grandchildren and extended family members. The household has lived in the case area for 20 years. Before moving to this house the household was living in a *kebele* house which was demolished by the upgrading project and replaced by the new houses. The household members derive their income from odd jobs such as: washing clothes, shoe shining and the like.

Despite the meagre income KB has been paying from 15 – 30 Birr/ month for electricity, 2 Birr/month for *iddir*, and 10 cents/ bucket for water. She has also been paying 10 Birr monthly installment to the SACC. This installment has been paid to cover the estimated cost of the house with the hope of eventual private ownership. The two rooms which are connected by internal stair were originally designed for a single household. The housing unit had originally one external entrance door leading to both the ground room and the upper floor. Later, to secure visual privacy and avoid interference between the two households, an additional door, made of corrugated iron sheet, was introduced (See Fig. 5.8). But in a household of fifteen one can hardly have the door closed as the children would want to go in and out as frequently as one can imagine. Therefore, the door was kept open, during the day, and a curtain was placed to allow moving in and out without necessarily pulling it aside.



**Fig. 5.9: Housing type 3 and its variant: Blocks with open external stair**



*Single storied blocks of row houses:* These blocks were constructed in an over-spill area located in the adjacent *kebele* 14 to relocate households displaced from the case area during upgrading<sup>105</sup> (See Fig. 5.10 & 5.3 above).

**Fig. 5.10: Type 4: A single storey block of row houses**



<sup>105</sup> In this research, for the purpose of the study, these houses and their occupants are considered as part of the case area (*kebele* 13).

*Maintained houses:* These are existing *chika* houses, which were in a relatively better condition, during RBE’s intervention. They were only in need of some maintenance as opposed to complete demolition and reconstruction. The usual type of maintenance was the wall plastering and painting and the addition of roof over-hang to protect the wall from rain (See Fig. 5.11, in-situ maintained house located at the back of RBE-built common water taps).

**Fig. 5.11: In-situ maintained house**



***Maintenance and utility connection***

Almost all the respondents have been investing their money in the maintenance of their housing. With regard to the degree of involvement in maintenance there is no difference between the HBs and the IBs, which are 99% and 96.3% respectively (See Table 5.3).

**Table 5.3: Distribution by house maintenance, in both HBs and IBs**

Investment in maintenance	HB		IB	
	Freq.	%	Freq.	%
Yes	101	99.0	79	96.3
No	1	1.0	3	3.7
<b>Total</b>	102	100.0	82	100.0

In a similar manner, there have also been investments in the connection of utilities. For example, originally the water and electricity connections of the HBs were of shared type. Through time 33.3% and 79.4% of the water and electricity connections, respectively were changed to individual type (See Table-5.4). Therefore, it can be said that the detrimental effect of the ownership confusion was more on the block and settlement level rather than the house level.

**Table 5.4: Distribution by type of utility connection (HB)**

Utility connection		Freq.	%
Water access	Buying from neighbour	36	35.3
	Individual water meter	34	33.3
	Buying from common water tap	26	25.5
	Shared water meter	1	1.0
	Total	102	100.0
Electricity access	Individual electric meter	81	79.4
	Shared meter	18	17.6
	Tapping from neighbour	3	3.0
	Total	102	100.0

### ***Extensions***

As mentioned earlier, one of the aims of RBE’s revolving fund was to gradually replace the rest of the settlement by better housing types, similar to those illustrated above. However, as discussed earlier this has not materialized. Rather RBE’s project, followed by diverse interpretations and responses of internal actors, has influenced the settlement’s ongoing spatial transformation in a different direction. Through time, uncontrolled, user initiated housing transformations, in the form of alterations and extensions, became a norm. In principle, tenants of *kebele* housing are not allowed to do housing extensions or major alterations. They can only do maintenance of the housing, at their own expense, after securing permission from the *kebele*. Therefore, any transformation of *kebele* housing, except maintenance, is considered illegal. However, in practice tenants use many ways of circumventing this legal requirement, for example, by securing maintenance permission and then using it as a pretext for major transformation, or simply by bribing the *kebele*’s staff in charge of controlling “illegal” constructions.

Though the magnitude of the alterations, extensions and outbuildings undertaken in the area is generally observable, the respondents when asked about whether they have extended or modified their houses, mostly said “no”, only 49 (26.6%) households responded “yes”. However, this is considered a high rate of confirmation, taking into consideration the legally sensitive question. The major types of additions are either a room (29 households) or kitchen only (13 households). Minor alterations in the form of, such as, change of a roof material or a window and door opening were common. Relative to the HBs (13 houses) most of the uncontrolled extensions were done by the IBs (36 houses) (See Table 5.5)

**Table 5.5: Distribution by type of uncontrolled extension, comparison between HBs and IBs**

		HBs			IBs		
		Freq .	%	Valid %	Freq .	%	Valid %
<b>Extension type</b>	Room	4	3.9	30.8	25	30.5	69.4
	Kitchen	7	6.9	53.8	6	7.3	16.7
	Toilet	1	1.0	7.7	2	2.4	5.6
	Room & Kitchen	-	-	-	2	2.4	5.6
	Other	1	1.0	7.7	1	1.2	2.8
	Total	13	12.8	100.0	36	43.9	100.0
	No extension	89	87.3		46	56.1	
	Total	102	100.0		82	100.0	

Households extended their houses to alleviate immediate problems, such as lack of adequate space or shortage of income. In the context of government ownership of land, every open space adjacent to the houses is potential land for encroachment. At the individual household level the possibility of transformation can be considered as an advantage. However, dwellers were sometimes found to be victims of their own transformation activities, for example, when a drainage ditch is blocked and overflowing, burdened beyond its capacity (See BOX-5.7) or access to housing clusters is narrowed down by uncontrolled housing encroachments. A key informant HB, for example, related a story of how his neighbour was challenged to move out a coffin when a member of his household died some years ago. Since, the size of the access road was so narrow, they had to open the corrugated iron roof and pull out the coffin.

**BOX-5.7: Burdened drainage system**

*DE* is a single mother of two and a grandmother of three children. Her husband died fourteen years ago. She is a traditional cotton spinner and derives her income by providing yarns to weavers. She originally occupied a double-roomed housing unit in one of the single-storied blocks. Later, she extended a room and a kitchen. *DE* had influenza at the time of interview, which she attributed the cause to the stinking, stagnant water trapped in a blocked drainage ditch. The open ditch passes right in front of her door. She said, “every time it gets blocked, I am sick and tired of informing the *kebele* officials. It takes months before they fix it. The children are playing here and are getting sick day by day.”

***Factors contributing to uncontrolled housing transformation***

Some elements of RBE’s upgrading project and the responses followed by the various actors have to some extent contributed towards the observed uncontrolled housing transformations. The main ones are discussed below.

*The post phase out mismanagement of the upgrading project:* The fact that there was no proper final handover of the upgrading project and the fact that the then *kebele* administrations mishandled the project had at the time created some kind of feeling of lawlessness. This had given tenants the signal that they can also indulge in “illegal” activities. This was also aggravated by the administrative disruption created by the government change in 1991 that followed the project’s phase out in 1990.

*Confused ownership:* Earlier in this chapter it was illustrated how confusion was created regarding the ownership of the newly constructed houses, on the one hand the tenants perceiving private ownership and on the other hand the *kebele* insisting on its claim of ownership. This unsettled litigation has resulted in the lack of a responsible body that could control unauthorised housing transformations.

*Housing design:* The third element, which contributed to rapid uncontrolled housing transformation, was the absence of facilities such as kitchen and storerooms in the design of housing types. The focus of the design was to provide multi purpose rooms and common latrines. It did not take into consideration the need for a separate *chis bet* (traditional

kitchen) to accommodate firewood cooking practiced in low-income households. For example, all 36 households dwelling in the single storied row houses (house type-4) have at least extended a kitchen (See Fig. 5.12).

*Need of generating income:* Most of the time, extended rooms are used in generating more income to augment meagre earnings. On site observation and informal discussions with informants revealed that the majority of the households in the area use their houses as a source of income, for example, by running home based enterprises, selling *khat* (stimulant leaf), subletting rooms, and so on. However, partly due to the “illegality” of such activities and partly because of the culture of hiding incomes, out of the 184 respondents only 29 (15.8%) admitted utilizing their housing for deriving income (See Table 5.6).

**Fig. 5.12: Extensions at the house level on houses constructed at the overspill area (nearby relocation)**



**Table 5.6: Distribution by type of house function change**

<b>Function change</b>	<b>Freq.</b>	<b>%</b>	<b>Valid %</b>
Home based enterprise	12	6.5	41.4
Room letting	12	6.5	41.4
Other	5	2.7	17.2
Total	29	15.8	100.0
No function change	155	84.2	
Total	184	100	

#### **5.4.2. Compound and settlement level transformations**

##### *Maintenance*

Next to the level of the individual housing unit the next level is the semi-private spaces (compounds) shared by groups of households. Taking into consideration both the HBs and IBs the majority of the households have no compounds. Of those with compounds, 46.7% of the HBs and 57.1% of the IBs had invested in the maintenance of their compounds (See Table 5.7). There is low interest in contributing towards the improvement of the compound, relative to investments for the maintenance of individual housing units, discussed earlier.

**Table 5.7: Distribution by compound maintenance, comparison between HBs and IBs**

<b>Investment in compound Maintenance</b>	<b>HBs</b>			<b>IBs</b>		
	<b>Freq.</b>	<b>%</b>	<b>Valid %</b>	<b>Freq.</b>	<b>%</b>	<b>Valid %</b>
Yes	7	6.9	46.7	16	19.5	57.1
No	8	7.8	53.3	12	14.6	42.8
Total	15	14.7	100.0	28	34.1	100.0
No compound	87	85.3		54	65.9	
Total	102	100.0		82	100.0	



***Encroachment and outbuilding***

The fact that the majority of the households live without delineated compounds or in shared ones and the fact that land is state owned has also contributed to the outbuildings and encroachments to streets and common spaces. 141 (76.6%) of the respondents have no compound and 32 (17.4%) of the households share common compounds. Only 6% have a private compound. Out of those in shared and private compounds only 18 had fences. Most of the encroachments and/or outbuildings were manifested in the form of makeshift fences or erecting a structure in the middle of a common space (See Figs. 5.13 & 5.14). In comparison to the IBs more houses of the HBs are without compound (See Table 5.8).

**Table 5.8: Distribution by availability of compound, comparison between HBs and IBs**

Compound type	HBs		IBs	
	Freq.	%	Freq.	%
Shared	11	10.8	21	25.6
Private	4	3.9	7	8.5
No compound	87	85.3	54	65.9
Total	102	100.0	82	100.0

**Fig. 5.13: Encroachment towards street**



**Fig. 5.14: Outbuildings in a common space**



At the settlement level transformation was seen in terms of dwellers' motivation to engage in the maintenance of physical components or involvement in external actor-driven upgrading. When dwellers were asked whether they have ever taken initiative in upgrading the physical components of their immediate surrounding, 65.7% of the HBs responded yes, but only 54.9 of the IBs. Similarly when asked whether they have ever participated in *kebele*-initiated upgrading, 84.3% and 84.1% of the HBs and IBs, respectively responded yes. The almost similar degree of response to the *kebele* upgrading owes to the "mandatory" nature of contribution expected from dwellers. Though seemingly voluntary, in practice dwellers are required to contribute labour, cash or expertise. Nevertheless, the motivation for self initiated upgrading of the HBs is slightly higher than the IBs (See Table 5.9).

**Table 5.9: Comparison between HBs and IBs by response to settlement level upgrading**

Response to		HBs		IBs	
		Freq.	%	Freq.	%
Self initiated upgrading*	Yes	67	65.7	45	54.9
	No	35	34.3	37	55.1
	Total	102	100.0	82	100.0
<i>Kebele</i> - initiated upgrading	Yes	86	84.3	69	84.1
	No	16	15.7	13	15.9
	Total	102	100.0	82	100.0

\*In this particular question, upgrading expresses the upkeep and maintenance of the physical components of a settlement, such as roads and drainage ditches.

#### 5.4.3. The role of the SACC in curbing uncontrolled, detrimental transformations

Following the SACC's control of the housing and income generating units in 2002, the HBs were restrained from transforming their houses. For example, as can be observed in Fig. 5.12, households had been encroaching on open spaces with only one common space left.

After the SACC took over the administration of the RBE-built facilities, however, such uncontrolled transformations were curbed. For example, the remaining common space indicated in Fig. 5.12 was protected from the encroachment of the adjacent houses by the close follow up of the SACC<sup>106</sup>. This common space is now used for common social facilities, such as for the erection of temporary shelter at times of wedding or funeral (See Fig. 5.15, showing the same space being used for a funeral gathering). The SACC chairman said:

There were those without kitchens. It is because of this problem that they have done it previously. Some built with permission and some without permission... With or with out permission, what happened before has happened already. But, now, since the houses are ours<sup>107</sup>, generally we do not allow extensions.

**Fig. 5.15: Encroachment-protected common space used for funeral gathering**  
(Mourners were actually sitting in the tent at the time the picture was taken.)



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<sup>106</sup> In depth interview with H.B.

<sup>107</sup> Referring to the fact that the houses are now under the administration of the SACC (As far as the SACC members are concerned they believe that the houses belong to them).

## 5.5. Summing up

### 5.5.1. Actors' relationship and tenants' response

RBE had initiated the Kirkos upgrading project with the pre-set principle of “child-centred community development”. The objective was to create conducive spatial and socio-economic conditions for the development of children, through the integration of micro finance, health, education, income generating units, housing and infrastructure. This principle presupposed the existence of a coherent community, which shared common interests and goals. The state apparatus at the different levels was also considered not only as a homogeneous entity but also as the facilitator of the community's interests. However, as illustrated in the preceding sections, what actually happened was different. Neither the principle of “integrated approach” nor the objective of “child welfare” was materialized as envisioned by RBE.

RBE's intervention had rather stimulated diverse responses. The then *kebele* administration was cooperative until the time when the construction of the housing and the income generating units were complete. However, once the project was complete, the *kebele* officials went to the extent of breaking the doors and windows of RBE's project office, rushing to acquire it, lest it is given to the *kebele* dwellers. The *kebele* officials gave priority to political clientele over the need of the dwellers. Blinded by personal and immediate advantages, they mismanaged the whole project as illustrated in the preceding sections. Thus, contrary to the expectation of RBE that the *kebele* was there to facilitate and cater for the need of the dwellers, a member of the “target people” were marginalized.

Regarding the *kebele* dwellers, their involvement was not limited to the project period. After the phase out of the project, though initially their response declined as a result of the *kebele*'s mismanagement and the uncertainty created because of government change, later on they started to respond. The responses were on the one hand the HBs claiming housing ownership and on the other hand the IBs supporting the idea of the revolving fund, as envisioned by RBE. The HBs, motivated by the possibility of housing ownership, re-established the SACC and later the KMTC.

The HBs (originally, *kebele* tenants) in order to finally attain the goal of private ownership took on board the concept of the revolving fund, albeit in their own way. This was their strategy of winning the hearts of the government officials, so that they would not appear as a group of people solely interested in owning houses. To this effect the SACC willingly invested for the improvement of the settlement and participated in *kebele*-initiated upgrading efforts.

According to RBE's post phase-out evaluation, Kirkos upgrading project was characterized as a project which generally failed to meet its intended goals (RBE, 1991). This negative evaluation emanated from the viewing of upgrading projects as time-bound static activities flowing from an active external actor (in this case RBE) to passive internal actors (in this case the *kebele* administration and the dwellers). This view aimed to meet pre-determined project goals expecting internal actors to respond within a predetermined framework of "participation". It ignored the fact that projects are embedded in a context of complex realities with actors of diverse responses motivated by often-conflicting interests.

Despite RBE's negative evaluation, it can be said that the project, particularly the housing component, has been motivating the response of diverse actors. Particularly the HBs, stimulated by the housing component of the project, had invested tremendous energy and time to re-establish the SACC and the KMTTC; of course, based on their own interest and interpretation of the project. The SACC was very instrumental in mobilizing the HBs and in negotiating their perceived rights with the *kebele* administration and other government authorities. The main components of the upgrading project, which were at the centre of the litigations and negotiations, were the housing and the income generating units. These are related with the issues of property rights and the utilisation of funds. The aspiration for the private ownership of the housing and the claim of the funds from the income generating units were apparently the prime forces driving the HBs (represented by the SACC) in unleashing their response for upgrading process.

There were also two important factors related to the actors' responses: legal framework and political will. One of the root causes of the friction between the conflicting interests of the actors was the project agreement of 1983, which lacked clarity regarding both the post phase out housing ownership and the management of funds. Had the legal

provisions of this document been more clear the relationship between the actors could probably be less confrontational. The conflict between the actors was worsened by the then behaviour of the *kebele* administration and the high turnover of government officials including change of government. However, mention should be made that the willingness of the sub-city officials in addressing the plight of the HBs had played great role in the overall dynamics of the process.

### **5.5.2. The upgrading process and spatial transformation**

The project and its diversified responses, as illustrated earlier in this section, have influenced the spatial transformation of the settlement. The very physical component of the project: roads, income generating units, housing blocks and related facilities followed by the user-initiated transformations of these elements has changed the physical fabric of the settlement.

The user initiated transformations were viewed in terms of maintenance, utility connection, extensions and motivation for the improvement of the physical surrounding. Both the HBs and IBs, irrespective of their difference in their perception of housing ownership, have been investing in the maintenance and extension of the individual housing units. This might lead to the insight that, in the context of state ownership of land and housing, tenants invest their resources in the improvement of individual housing units. On the other hand, both the HBs and IBs have not been investing at a similar degree as that of in the individual houses. This signifies less interest in common spaces and facilities. At the settlement level, save the response to *kebele* initiated upgrading, the HBs showed a slightly higher level of interest in initiating improvements in their surroundings. This was even greater considering the activities of the SACC as the representative of the HBs. The HBs represented by the SACC and later by the KMTC have made more contributions towards the upgrading process and have also shown readiness for future engagement in the process of positive change. While the IBs continued to engage in uncontrolled alterations and extensions, the HBs were restrained, controlled by the SACC. The confusion regarding the

ownership of the housing and income generating units and the litigation thereof, however, have played a great role in limiting the potential of the HBs in the upgrading process.

In conclusion the key elements filtered out from the Kirkos upgrading process, with regard to the relationship between upgrading processes, dwellers’ responses and spatial transformation are: actors’ relationship, property rights, grass roots organization (SACC and KMTC), legal framework (the importance of project agreements and rules and regulations) and political will.



## CHAPTER - 6: CASE 2: MENEN (*Woreda 11, Kebele 14*)

### NGO-initiated, saving and credit cooperative based upgrading process

#### 6.1. The area and the people

Menen is part of the larger Sidist Kilo locality - one of the old settlements of Addis Ababa, located between the Entoto Mountain and the Old Palace. Both Entoto and the Palace are not only intimately associated with the foundation of the city, but also are areas on whose surroundings the early *sefers* (neighbourhoods) developed. Menen being part of these areas is characterised by its non-planned and spontaneous settlements, which are the main feature of most of the early *sefers*.

The case area, located in Menen, is spread on 15 ha. of land and is inhabited by an estimated population of seven thousand<sup>108</sup>. The area had assumed its name from the Menen High School which is in turn called after the late Empress Menen. In addition to the Menen High School the Addis Ababa University's main campus and Felege Yordanos Elementary School are also located in the vicinity of the case area. The triangular shaped case area is defined by a main street that runs up to Shiro Meda and two other secondary streets. In the inner part of the area roads carve their way meandering through the spontaneously located dwellings and irregular plots fed by smaller cul-de-sacs. Unless one walks on these smaller access roads it is not obvious that this area was once considered as one of the poorest.

The Menen SACC's office is the nerve center of the area. The SACC's secretary and her assistants, all women, have been working in the office since the inception of the upgrading project. They have vivid and very good information on the upgrading process. They have developed trust and a kind of family relationship with the SACC's members. During fieldwork most of the visits to the area had been started from the SACC's office either in search of documents or to conduct interviews. Following visits to the SACC's office, a typical scene on the roads is the relatively big villas of the rich dotting the otherwise *kebele* housing-dominated area. Most of the RBE-built double storied blocks are

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<sup>108</sup> According to the Addis Ababa City Administration's document on the recent *kebele* boundaries and their populations. The population was about 4000 in 1984 (CSA, 1987) and 5000 in 1994 (CSA, 1995).

concentrated in the central part of the area. They form a cluster of two to four blocks enclosing a common space. The in-situ maintained houses are also still noticeable with their plastered *chika* walls and extended roof overhangs.

Usually, the common spaces formed by the clusters are occupied by older women, young girls, and children. The women are always busy; washing laundry, pounding grains, making *injera* (Ethiopian flat bread), and at times preparing a coffee ceremony– friendly people, ready to cooperate and some even willing to pose for pictures. The young girls are busy helping their mothers in their daily chores, while harbouring their hopes and expectations in what the future may carry for them. With narrow opportunities to pursue formal education and earn a decent income, some expect to go abroad in search of a better life, some search for odd jobs, some attend skill-oriented short courses and a few are obliged to cross the line into a sex trade. The children play in the common spaces, away from the dangerous traffic and under the caring eye of their grandparents. The elderly and those who are ill sit in a corner of the common space enjoying the sun.

Despite the rugged roads and the stink from the drainage ditches, there is a sense of openness and tidiness inside the clusters. Except in some of the houses facing the main streets, it can easily be observed that the area is more of a residential place without much mix of commercial activities. After each visit the impression remained was of the various activities in the enclosed common spaces, the sense of hope and pride emanating from the house ownership, the modesty and cooperation of the usually women informants– and their dilemma between keeping appearances and complaining of problems. Women– toiling by day and by night, with modesty, hope and faith; to cope with their challenges.

The numbers also confirm that the majority of the respondents are headed by low-income women who stayed in the area for more than ten years (See Table 6.1: for basic data on the housing and socio-economic condition of the respondents).

**Table 6.1: Housing and socio-economic condition of the respondents**

For each variable out of the total 190 respondents		Freq.	%
Household head sex	Female	132	69.4
	Male	58	30.5
Household size, including dependants (The average household size for Addis Ababa is 5.1)	Below or equal to 5	110	57.9
	Above 5	80	42.1
Income (USD/ day) (Converted from 9 Birr/day or 270 Birr/month) (UN's 1USD/day criteria of poverty level)	Below 1	117	61.6
	Between 1 & 2	58	30.5
	Above 2	15	7.9
Source of income (Self employed indicates informal activity of meagre income)	Self employed	97	51.1
	Employed	99	47.9
	No income	2	1.1
Number of years in the house (Above 10 indicates stability)	Above 10	186	97.9
	Below 10	4	2.1
Floor area of house (excluding outdoor kitchen and toilet) (Square meters) (20 square meters, minimum area required to accommodate a household)	Up to 20	99	52.1
	Above 20	91	47.9
Number of rooms (excluding kitchen and toilet)	1 or 2	165	86.8
	More than 2	25	13.1

## 6.2. The Menen Upgrading Project

### 6.2.1. The origin of the project and the main upgrading actors

#### *Origin of the project*

Following the Kirkos upgrading the intention of RBE was upgrading *Woreda 23, Kebeles 13 and 14*, inhabited by ex-leprosy population. However, owing to the then attitude of the city officials the intention of RBE was kept in abeyance (RBE, 1993b); instead, the City

Administration, exercising its mandate of prioritising areas, provided RBE with a short list of *kebeles* for upgrading. In 1987, RBE mobilized its staff to assess whether the identified *kebeles* deserve assistance. Taking into consideration the objective of child-welfare *kebele* 14 was recognized as an area in need of immediate attention. Preliminary investigations revealed about 40% of the population of the *kebele* were children below 15 years of age (RBE, 1993a). Discussions conducted with *kebele* officials and dwellers also showed that the *kebele* deserved top priority (ibid).

Following the identification of the project area a project agreement was signed in 1988 between RBE and the AACA, similar to that signed in the case of Kirkos (See Appendix-4A). The year 1988 was largely spent in various preparatory activities. Topographic survey was conducted for outlining a major road network, an existing kindergarten was maintained and few of the *kebele* roads were improved (RBE, 1993a). In early 1989 the construction of the project office in the *kebele* itself was completed (ibid). According to RBE (1994) during 1988 and 1989, a socio-economic and physical survey of *kebele* 14 was also conducted. The purpose of the survey was to identify socio-economic and physical needs and to familiarize the project staff with the community. The survey had included assessment criteria, among other things, the deprivation of the dwellers with regard to the physical condition of the settlement. The survey result indicated:

Out of the total existing houses 13% were unsafe for habitation due to physical dilapidation and 46% of the houses required major maintenance. 92 households had no kitchen space. 214 households shared 92 kitchens (2.3 households per one kitchen). 86 latrines (47%) out of the total 182 were unsafe and unhealthy for use. In *kebele* owned houses, the ratio of latrines to households was 1:10. There was only one water tap for every 5.5 families. Access roads and drainage for run-off water was appallingly acute. There was scarcity of spaces. The available kindergarten lacked sufficient rooms to serve children. Mothers and children lacked basic health services (ibid: 1-2).


RBE's (1993a) document claimed that the dwellers were involved in need identification and planning. According to the document, the strategy followed was: 1) an

individual or a group of dwellers submit their request to the project office, 2) the office assesses the situation and states the type of work to be carried out, and 3) agreement is signed between the project office and the individual/group delineating the contribution of each party, for example, the individual/group and RBE to contribute labour and technical assistance respectively.


### ***Main Upgrading actors***

The composition of the main actors was similar to that of Kirkos, except that in Menen, an advisory committee was added. The advisory committee included the *kebele* chairman, the *Woreda* chairman, RBE's resident representative and the project administrator. Thus the main upgrading actors were the AACA, RBE, the *kebele* dwellers, the advisory committee and the *kebele* administration (the *kebele* was represented by its executive committee and the Kebele Development Committee (KDC)) (See Fig. 6.1). Later, in 1989 a SACC was established and since then it has been playing an active role (See Fig. 6.2).

**Fig. 6.1: Main upgrading actors during project period**



**Fig. 6.2: Main upgrading actors post phase-out**



### 6.2.2. Upgrading approach and project components

#### *Upgrading approach: the introduction of “housing privatization policy”*

During the initial stage of the project the upgrading objective was the same as that of Kirkos, i.e. promoting child welfare through integrated development initiatives and a revolving fund. However, later RBE introduced a new concept - a “policy for the privatisation of housing”. The purpose of this policy can be categorized into four parts: 1) to ensure tenure security and 2) to protect the original dwellers from gentrification, 3) to ensure continuity of the overall aim of the project, and 4) to make the target group house owners. The strategy of the policy for protecting the transfer of benefits, e.g. to the middle income, was by avoiding one-time handouts and by tying the benefits to a “matching input” principle. The subsidies were also made non transferable to a third party for 20 years, the age required for a child to support him/her self. The strategy was explained by RBE (1991) as outlined below:

- a) the housing beneficiaries (HBs) were required to be members of the SACC presupposing that the SACC was the financier of the housing,

- b) the HBs would pay a matching fund of the value of the house presupposing that they had borrowed money from the SACC for the construction of the housing,
- c) the SACC would be the owner of the housing until the HBs settle their loans and are given clearance from the SACC, and
- d) after the completion of payments, in twenty years, individual members would be given property deeds from the concerned government bodies.

The privatization policy was not part of the main project agreement signed in 1988 between the AACA and RBE. However, the concept was endorsed by the project's Advisory Committee in its meeting held on 21 September 1988 and later January 1993 (RBE, 1994). A final binding decision from pertinent higher authorities regarding the concept of the private housing proposal was sought but it never came (ibid).

### ***Project Components***

The project focused on three main areas of interventions: 1) housing and infrastructure, 2) micro-finance and income generation and 3) human resource development. The third area of intervention had been dealt with through the components of education (the provision of training) and health programmes. Each of these components is elaborated below.

*Housing and infrastructure:* The newly constructed housing units were the main component of the project. It included: 23 blocks of double storey houses comprising 199 units<sup>109</sup> (See Table 6.2), common kitchens and toilets, 550 meters fencing around blocks and 5 common water points. A major maintenance of 234 old houses, 140 old kitchens and 26 old latrines with 108 compartments was undertaken. An additional 44 new latrines with 148 compartments were also provided as part of the major maintenance. A shower house with four compartments, 4 common water points and 1 laundry stand were constructed to serve as a source of income for a kindergarten while a baking centre and 10 shops were

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<sup>109</sup> This quantity was according to an interview with the SACC's secretary. RBE (1993a) gave a quantity of 160 units in 23 blocks, and RBE (1994) gave a quantity of 198 units in 23 blocks. It seems, at a later stage of the project some of the double roomed housing units were allocated to two households instead of one, to accommodate more households.

provided from which the SACC can draw income (See Fig. 6.3, for the distribution of upgraded components).

**Table 6.2: Distribution of newly constructed houses by area**

Floor area (square meters)	Number of households
10 – 15	80
15 <sup>+</sup> – 20	48
20 <sup>+</sup> - 24	48
24 <sup>+</sup> - 28	22
Total	198

Source: extracted from RBE (1994)

RBE was also involved in the development of some infrastructure, with particular interest in improving the sanitary condition of the settlement. 1500 meters of foot paths, 1187.50 meters under-surface cement pipe drainage lines, 2015 meters open surface drainage ditches along access roads and 1400 meters of existing roads were paved.<sup>110</sup> In addition to these, 3 garbage disposal bins (solid waste collection) of municipal standard were provided for the whole *kebele*.


*SACC and Income generation (IG):* The SACC was established in 1989 with the aim of building the financial capacity of households. The founding members of the SACC were the poorest mothers of the “target group”. Initial seed capital of 9,063 Birr was granted by RBE and later 49,600 Birr was periodically added to expand its loan capacity. The management of the baking centre and the ten shops were eventually transferred to the SACC to generate income for the revolving fund. In 1989 the SACC started with 26 household members, currently it has 365 members. At its peak in 1993, just before the project phase-out the SACC had 475 members. The SACC membership included the potential house owners, henceforth, “housing beneficiaries (HBs)” and the dwellers in maintained houses, henceforth, “indirect beneficiaries (IBs)”.

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<sup>110</sup> The exact quantities of the construction work was extracted from RBE (1994)



Fig. 6.3: Distribution of upgraded components



The SACC secretary elaborating on the development of the SACC said:

The SACC started with a membership of 29 households, 26 female headed and 3 male headed. Until the date of the project phase out the membership grew to 475. Currently, the number of member households is 365; out of which 199 are the HBs. Out of these 199 households 189 are female headed while 10 are male headed.

Responding to the question regarding to the criteria for selecting the HBs, the secretary added:

The main focus of the project was on children below the age of fifteen. Therefore, mothers with children below age fifteen and with the lowest income were given priority. The existing houses were categorized into four: category A, houses in good condition; category B, houses with a need of minor maintenance; category C, houses for major maintenance; and category D, houses to be demolished. Priority was given for those from category D whose houses were demolished and to the co-habitants from category C. The signatories of the housing ownership agreement were women. Even if there was a male spouse it was the woman who was given the responsibility of signing. This is because it was believed that women are more responsible than their husbands. Men may decide to sell the houses just to spend money, risking the wellbeing of their children.

*Education:* To contribute towards the enablement of human resource development Tshehay Chora high school, located adjacent to *kebele* 14, was supported by constructing eight classrooms in extension, fully furnished, to be utilized by all the children of *kebele* 14. The management of the school constructed 2 classrooms and furnished them as a matching input. 500 children had been benefiting each year from the newly constructed 10 classrooms extension. The project also provided water lines with drinking taps and a play ground in the school compound. The existing kindergarten was also maintained and expanded with the construction of two additional classrooms, one open shade playroom and a provision of basic facilities. It was put under the Kindergarten Board to be financed from

the income of two grain mills, shower units, water points and a laundry. The Kindergarten had been providing pre-school education for 160 children each year.<sup>111</sup>

*Health:* 74 health facilitators, 109 health scouts and 4 sanitary guards were trained; sanitary committees and AIDS club were formed, information on HIV/AIDS was disseminated. Upon the completion of the upgrading project, the project premises were renovated and converted to a health centre, and were handed over to the Addis Ababa Health Bureau.<sup>112</sup>

### ***Hand over of property to the SACC***

The project was completed in December 1993. Unlike the case of Kirkos the newly built houses were handed over to the SACC, instead of the *kebele*. The hand over was made in three successive stages: in June 1994 and in December 1994 with memorandums of understanding, and again in December 1994 final legal handover agreement overruling the two preceding memorandums. RBE handed over to the SACC 23 double storied blocks, 58 kitchens with 160 compartments and 5 water stands.<sup>113</sup>

According to the handover agreement the SACC was responsible not only for the administration of the housing units and related facilities, but also for the collection of monthly payments from the housing and income generation units to insure the improvement of the livelihood of the community and specially that of the children and mothers. It was also entrusted with the task of ensuring the proper functioning of the kitchens, residential compounds and the ditches around the new houses (See Appendix 4-C, for full document in Amharic). 55% (472,000 Birr) of the housing construction cost was given as a grant while the remaining 45% (385,000 Birr) was expected to be collected from the HBs as a matching fund (RBE, 1994). The SACC was entitled to collect this fund (the 45%) from the HBs as monthly repayments for the purpose of the revolving fund.<sup>114</sup>

Once the SACC took over the “ownership” of the houses and related facilities it then signed an agreement with each of the HBs. The beneficiaries were poor mothers and

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<sup>111</sup> Interview with the SACC’s secretary, while the exact numbers are taken from RBE’s documents

<sup>112</sup> *ibid*

<sup>113</sup> Hand over agreement document (in Amharic) between RBE and the Menen SACC signed in 1994.

<sup>114</sup> Interview with SACC secretary

households who were found to be completely unable either to build a new house or improve the physical condition of their dilapidated houses (See Box-6.1: for examples of beneficiary types).

The terms of agreement between the SACC and the HBs was formulated in such a way that the target households had borrowed money from the SACC to construct new houses, and that they had agreed to pay back the estimated cost of the house on monthly instalments, in twenty years. Therefore, the SACC was made to act as a mortgager.

Article-1 of the terms of agreement entered between the SACC and the HBs stated:

[b]asically the objective for the construction of the new houses is to improve the existing environmental conditions and develop the livelihood of target households, specially, by fulfilling the basic requirements for a healthy and secure upbringing of children. It is through the cooperative/individual rent to own system of twenty years that these upgrading efforts can be accomplished.<sup>115</sup> (Own translation)

The agreement stipulated that the borrower had to settle the monthly payments on a regular basis. Failure to do so would initiate written warnings from the SACC. If the borrower failed, despite the warnings, then the case would be referred to the SACC’s arbitration committee. Following the decision of the committee if the borrower still failed, then the SACC would take back the house, to eventually deliver it to another applicant. Neither the SACC nor the borrowers were entitled to transfer a house or houses to a third party in the form of exchange, sale or to settle a debt. But if a borrower died, then the case would be administered according to the law of the country. It was forbidden to transfer a house in the form of collateral, gift, inheritance, exchange, or mortgage. The target is to secure a certificate of ownership upon settlement of the debt in a twenty years period. However, a borrower may settle the debt before the expiry of twenty years; but the certificate would only be issued after the expiry of twenty years from the date of occupation of the housing units. (See Appendix-4D for the format of the term of agreement in Amharic).

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<sup>115</sup> Legal document: agreement entered between RBE community Development project 4012 and *Woreda 11 Kebele 14* residents’ SACC, to hand over new houses, kitchens, residential compounds and water points

**BOX-6.1: Types of HBs**

*NM*: During the start of the upgrading she was a cook in one of the then Marxist government's military camps. It was a period where the government was recruiting youths for national military service to defend its last years in power from the then rebel groups, now in power. The recruitment was done for the campaign called “*ye’emat ager teri*” (literally, “mother country’s call”). *NM* said, “I left for the Tatek military camp, leaving my children behind. It was my first born daughter who was looking after her younger brothers and sisters. My salary was 60 Birr. As if it was a good salary, they even used to deduct 5 Birr/month for the campaign! If it were not for my neighbours, I would not get the Redd Barna house. They included me [as part of the target group], defending my absence saying, ‘it is for the sake of her children that she went to the campaign’.

*YS*: The 40-year-old *YS* started to cry when asked about her background. She regretted the fact that her years passed without much achievement. She and her two children and one grandchild lived in an upper floor of the RBE built houses. Despite her complaints and lamentation, her room was orderly and well furnished. She had been collecting 50 Birr per month, her deceased husband’s pension. She derived additional income by letting a room.

*FT*: At the time of the interview, *FT* was lying on a bed - tired and a bit sick. Her household included her son and her daughter’s family of four. Her son was an unemployed ex-soldier. Her two grandchildren attended public school, 5<sup>th</sup> and 10<sup>th</sup> grade. The household occupied one room with an area of 12 square meters (3m x 4m). *FT* generated income by letting a second room for 120 Birr per month. She had also her deceased husband’s monthly pension of 50 Birr.

*TT*, aged 65, came to Addis Ababa from Ziquala<sup>116</sup> in her childhood. Since her arrival in the city she had been working as a house maid for different households, including in the compound of princess Tenagne<sup>117</sup>. Following the military coup d’état, which overthrew the Imperial regime, *TT* became a janitor in the Ministry of Culture with a salary of 50 Birr/month. She retired after six years stay in her job with a small fraction of a retirement allowance. Her pension was later increased to 100 Birr per month. Her husband and three of her children, two sons and one daughter, had passed away; leaving five grandchildren all under her care. One of her grandchildren worked in a parking lot and the rest were children.

<sup>116</sup> A town located in the Northern part of Ethiopia

<sup>117</sup> Ethiopia’s last emperor Haileselassie’s daughter

The monthly amount of repayment of the housing loan was calculated at 1 Birr per square meters per month for twenty years. The area of the smallest housing unit was ten square meters (10 Birr/month) and the largest was twenty-eight square meters (28 Birr/month) and the repayment differed accordingly. The monthly payments were a little higher than what the HBs used to pay when they were in *kebele* housing. According to RBE (1994) the *kebele* rental fee was a minimum of five Birr/month and a maximum of 21 Birr/month. Out of the total 198 HBs 45% had been paying less than or equal to 5 Birr/month; 42.5% had been paying 6 Birr/month; 9.5% had been paying 21 Birr/month, while 3% the data was not known (ibid).

### **6.3. Actors’ relationship and tenants’ response**

#### **6.3.1. The SACC and its members**

Following the project phase out the SACC continued to focus on two main activities: micro finance and the privatisation of the housing. Corresponding to these it had two types of members: the HBs (199 households) and those who use the microfinance service only. Therefore, the SACC on the one hand had been representing the interest of the potential house owners while on the other hand running the micro finance service. It should be noted that post phase-out the number of membership dwindled from 475 to 365. All the 199 HBs continued their membership while 110 households dropped out. This shows that the main motivation for the SACC to stay functioning had been the policy of “private ownership”.

#### **6.3.2. The conflict between the *kebele* and the SACC (HBs)**

Despite RBE’s private housing proposal and the handover agreement the *kebele* administration was not clear regarding the ownership of the new houses. As mentioned earlier, RBE’s proposal of private ownership was never formally endorsed by government officials. This was a cause of constant tension between the subsequent *kebele* officials and the SACC. The *kebele* had been constantly complaining that it was losing income. The reason for the loss of income was that the government did not officially accept the proposed

housing tenure status. It is the duty of the *kebele* to collect rental fees from its tenants or land and housing taxes from owner-occupiers. However, the HBs were neither paying rental fees nor taxes. They could not do either of the options. The first option of paying rent was not in their interest as they considered themselves potential owners. They had been in favour of paying the taxes. In fact they had been repeatedly requesting the *kebele* to accept the payment of the required taxes<sup>118</sup>. But the *kebele* was reluctant to comply with the request as it implied the endorsement of the housing ownership. Informant S. said:

The *kebele* had even resisted accepting our offer to pay tax thinking that if they allow us pay then the houses would be ours. But, it was through the struggle of the Committee [SACC] that we were at last allowed to pay taxes. The Committee had to fight because its members themselves are beneficiaries.

### **6.3.3. The step towards “private ownership”**

The decision regarding the payment of taxes was made after a long bureaucratic process. The last and important step is discussed below.

The *kebele* wrote a letter to the Office of the Sub city’s Revenue Department seeking guidance regarding the RBE-built houses and the type and mode of payment. Based on the *kebele*’s request the head of the Revenue Department’s Office called a meeting to sort out the case. In this meeting which was held in 2004, in addition to the Department head, the head of the sub city’s legal section, the chief executive of *Kebele* 14, the chairman and the vice chairman of the SACC were present. This meeting was very crucial to the SACC. Though the agenda of the meeting was to choose the appropriate type of payment, its implication was far reaching. If it were decided that the HBs should pay rental fees, then the housing would be under the *kebele* ownership. On the other hand, if the decision were in favour of the payment of taxes, then this would be one step towards private ownership. Thus, the SACC’s representatives had to vigorously and convincingly argue to resolve the long-standing friction between the *kebele* and the SACC. According to the minutes of the

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<sup>118</sup> Interview with SACC secretary

meeting, among other documents, the SACC representatives based their argument on two main documents: the 1988 project agreement between RBE and the AACA and the 1994 hand over agreement between RBE and the SACC.

Part 1 of the project agreement with regard to the aims and objectives of the project enumerated,

- 1) The basic aim of the project is to improve the economic, social, physical and environmental conditions of low-income families and their children with active involvement of office-bearers and all members of *kebele* 14....
- 2) The objectives are to assist the target population in upgrading their present level to a level of prosperity, positive development and self reliance...<sup>119</sup>

Referring to the above objectives, the SACC’s representatives argued that the housing is considered as a means towards self- sufficiency, which can only be achieved if they would own it; and thus forcing them back to the status of “public tenants” would be contrary to the objectives of the enabling role of the housing. Most importantly, they argued that they have a legal handover document through which the transfer of ownership was conducted.

At the end of the meeting agreement was reached and minuted between the Sub city officials, the *kebele* official and the SACC officials that the SACC’s HBs should pay housing and land tax and not rental fees (See BOX-6.2, for excerpts of the minutes). Accordingly the SACC, on behalf of its members, paid the arrears of twelve years (1992 – 2004) to be refunded by the HBs on a monthly basis.

According to RBE and the SACC the HBs should get the property deed by 2012. Being aware that such processes might take years before materializing, the SACC initiated the process of getting the deed after they settled the tax arrears. They approached the Land Administration Office of the Sub-city to assess how the authorities would react to their request. The verbal response from the Office was that the HBs would not get an individual ownership certificate; instead they would be issued with a communal property deed. The

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<sup>119</sup> Project agreement document between the AACA and RBE signed 4 April 1988



SACC considered these promissory words as a stepping-stone towards their final goal of acquiring private property deeds, and were eagerly following it up.

**BOX-6.2: Excerpts from the minutes of the meeting held between the *kebele*, the SACC and the Sub-city's revenue Department**

Date: March 2004  
Place of meeting: \_\_\_\_\_  
Date of meeting: \_\_\_\_\_  
Present were:  
1. The Sub-city's Revenue Department head  
2. The Sub-city's Legal Section acting head  
3. Executive of *kebele* 03  
4. Chairman of Menen SACC  
5. Vice chairman of Menen SACC  
Absent:  
Representative of RBE was invited, but not present  
  
Agenda: Regarding the type and method of collecting income from the 199 RBE-built houses  
  
The meeting was commenced by hearing the report from the Sub-city's Legal Section acting head. He reported on the availability of evidence and legal documents:  
1) that the 199 houses, including common kitchens and latrines, were built for the women and children of the old *Woreda* 11 *Kebele* 14 by RBE based on an agreement of 1988 entered between RBE and the AACAA.  
2) that the properties were handed over from RBE to the SACC and that the HBs are required for a monthly payment, ranging from 10 Birr to 28 Birr, in order to own the house in 20 years time.  
The SACC leaders, after expressing that the report of the Legal Section is correct, said:  
'Based on this evidence what we should pay is housing and land tax and not house rent. In fact at one time in the past we were asked by the Finance Office to pay tax.  
  
*(Contd.)*

However, we did not pay to date because there was nobody explaining us regarding the procedures and modalities of payment. Now that favourable condition is created, we are ready to pay the taxes.’

The *kebele* chairman on his part gave a lengthy explanation that his office has been making a number of correspondences to find ways of securing the proper collection of income which is ought to be generated from the houses. He asked the meeting to reach into a common agreement.

The Revenue Department Head then requested the meeting to focus on the issue of the type of payment. He asked: ‘Is it house rent or land and housing tax that the SACC members should pay?’

The SACC leaders strengthening their previous position responded: ‘If we see the project agreement of RBE and the AACA, charging housing rent is not proper, because Part-1 of the agreement – under “Objective and Goals” states that the fundamental aim of the project is to improve the economic, social, physical and environmental condition of the low-income families and their children. Charging house rent does not match with this objective. Thus we should pay land and housing tax.’

....Following the explanation of the SACC leaders and after reviewing additional evidences, the meeting passed the decision below:

- 1) The SACC members should pay land and housing tax, calculated from the time they occupied the houses.
- 2) Regarding the request of the SACC leaders to pay the tax arrears in monthly instalments this should be arranged in consultation to the *kebele* administration.

Finally the SACC leaders requested the Sub-city’s Revenue Department head for his support in their future effort of securing property deeds. The Department head expressed his willingness that he will cooperate as far as his capacity allows.

Meeting closed at \_\_\_\_\_

*(Translation mine)*

### 6.3.4. From rental tenure to cooperative (communal) ownership

In 1988, just before the upgrading started, out of the total 652 houses (about 720 households) in the case area 468 (about 70%) were *kebele*-owned rental houses. The 468 *kebele* housing units were inhabited by 564 households, having 96 (17%) households as co-dwellers (RBE, 1994) (See BOX-6.3, Item-1, for an individual case illustrating the transformation of tenure from co-dwelling towards owning). By virtue of the upgrading intervention and its strategies the tenure of 198 households was changed from renting to mortgaged cooperative ownership (See BOX-6.3: Tenure transformation, Item-2).

#### BOX-6.3: Housing tenure transformation

##### 1. *SM*: From co-habitation to communal ownership

When their mother died *SM* and her sister were twelve and ten years old respectively. In their former *kebele* house they had four rooms shared by *SM*'s family and a co-dweller. Their house was demolished to build a road. When RBE was allocating rooms *SM* was asked for the number of rooms she can afford. She applied for two rooms. Since *SM*'s mother was deceased *SM*, being elder, had to represent the household. Unfortunately, for reasons she did not understand she was given one room only, which she described as “unfair”. On the other hand, she had been glad that they are not any more co-habiting with another household.

##### 2. *TG*: From tenancy in a dilapidated *kebele* house to communal ownership

Prior to moving to their current RBE-built housing, *TG* and her family used to live in a *kebele* owned house. Since the house was located lower than a toilet, when it rained it used to overflow and inundate her house – She expressed it as “engulfing flood”. The monthly rent for the *kebele* house was 6 Birr. As part of the upgrading project, it was demolished to give way for a newly constructed road. In 1991, *TG* and her five grandchildren moved to a double room in the ground floor. She let one of the rooms for 120 Birr per month to raise her income. The total area of both rooms is 23 square meters out of which she occupied 12 square meters (3 x 4). Her household shared a toilet with three other households and a kitchen with two households. She paid 26 Birr per month to the SACC out of which 23 Birr was the monthly housing installment and the remaining 3 Birr for saving. She had also been settling 158 Birr land tax arrears as a condition required to finally own the house.

### **6.3.5. The conflicting roles of the AACA**

It should be noted here, despite the tenure negotiations at the local level, the AACA had little understanding of what was going on. At the city level the understanding is that all houses constructed in upgrading projects through the demolishing of *kebele* houses are considered government houses<sup>120</sup>. For example, the local development plan developed at the municipality level envisaged a wide road to pass through the case area (See Fig. 6.4). Such plans are developed with the assumption that most of the houses in such localities are *kebele* houses, and hence their demolishing would not burden the government by having to pay compensations. Only one of the informants in an FGD was aware of the plan's existence. He said:

There is fear, there is a rumour that a big road is coming! A foundation was laid out to construct a big building, but they were told to stop because of the proposed road; and the construction was stopped.

## **6.4. The upgrading process and spatial transformations**

### **6.4.1. Spatial transformation at the house level**

#### ***Housing types***


The physical upgrading of the settlement was started by constructing temporary shelters on an open space that was used as a playground. The first batch of households from demolished houses was moved to the shelters. The demolished houses were then replaced by the construction of new blocks and the sheltered households were moved to these blocks. This procedure continued until the last blocks were built on the playground itself<sup>121</sup> (See Fig. 6.5 and Fig. 6.6, aerial map of 1984 compared to aerial map of 2002).

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<sup>120</sup> Interview with AACA's Town Planning Preparation and Inspection Department head.

<sup>121</sup> Focus discussion group


**Fig. 6.4: Proposed road of a local development plan overlapped over the base map of the case area**



**Fig. 6.5: Official aerial map, 1984**



**Fig. 6.6: Official aerial map 2002**



Source: Official Aerial photos, Ethiopian Mapping Authority

There was basically one type of housing block - a double storied block with an external stair. Each level contained four housing units. Households occupy a room or two, either on the ground or upper floor (See Appendix-5: Figs. A5.1 & A5.2). The open external stair leads to a gallery on the upper floor, which in turn leads to individual units. Two or more blocks were arranged to form clusters defining common open spaces (See Fig. 6.7). The variant of this type are twin blocks with a bridge sharing a common stair (See Fig. 6.8) or a stand alone block. The cluster types have relatively bigger common spaces shared by a number of households, while the linear and 'bridged' types have smaller compounds. The open semi-public spaces were used as children's playground, for doing and drying laundry, drying grains etc. Each block or cluster share single storied common kitchens and toilets built separately (See Fig. 6.9 and 6.10).

**Fig. 6.7: Clustered Blocks**



**Fig. 6.8: Bridged twin blocks**



**Fig. 6.9: Common kitchens**





**Fig. 6.10: Common latrines**



Since the double storey houses were a new type of houses introduced in the area, to know whether these houses are compatible with the way of life of the low income settlements questions were posed regarding this aspect. While most of the informants agree that generally the quality of the houses and related facilities are better relative to the *kebele* houses, they have mentioned disadvantages, such as: lack of privacy and the inconvenience of running commercial activities in the clustered layout, noise from upper floors, accessibility problems for the handicapped and the elderly living on the upper floors, the small room sizes and the inability to extend them etc. (See BOX – 6.4: Advantages and disadvantages).

**BOX-6.4: Advantages and disadvantages of the double storied blocks**

*FT*: “This house is good, the problem is it doesn’t have a private compound, it lacks privacy”, *FT* said. “Since our former house was located on a street side, I used to sell *tella* (local beer),” *FT* added. “Here, the location is not convenient to use the house for business, I tried to sell *kolo* (roasted grain) on the streets, but they [municipality] chased me.

I wish the house was on a street side. However, overall, it is better to gain income by renting a room in this house than selling *tella* in the old house.” *FT*, insisting on the problem of privacy “ after owning the house, the best thing to do is to sell it, I hate living this way always facing my neighbours; of course it would have been better if this house itself was located on a street side”

*TG*: In 1991, *TG* and her five grand children moved to the ground floor of a two storied Redd Barna built house. “I was given the rooms in the ground floor because I complained of my old age and illness. The disadvantage is that we are disturbed by the noise from the upper floor.”

*ZA*: She earns income by selling *kolo* and *injera* (Ethiopian flat bread). She also rents a room to augment her income. “Being young and having a house located on a street side was advantageous, I used to earn money by selling *tella* and as a sex trader, but now located inside the neighbourhood I only sell *injera*” she said.

Parallel to the construction of the new blocks, in-situ maintenance of category B and C houses that required minor and major maintenance, respectively was conducted. The type of maintenance was plastering the chika walls and adding roof overhangs to protect the walls from rain (See Fig. 6.11).

**Fig. 6.11: In-situ maintained house of the IBs**



***Maintenance and utility connection***

According to the SACC administrator almost all the HBs have made alterations to the interior of the housing in the form of maintenance. This was verified during in-depth interviews that were held in the homes of the HBs (See BOX-6.5: Maintenance). The type of changes included the division of rooms, the plastering and painting of walls and the addition of ceilings<sup>122</sup> in the upper floors. These types of minor changes were allowed provided that the household secures permission from the SACC.

Article 9-2 stated:

The Borrower is not allowed to change either the interior or exterior of the house without prior permission from the SACC.

The other type of change is regarding connection to utilities, such as water, electricity and telephone. All the 100 respondents (100%) had maintained their houses at least once. 41% had changed the originally shared water meter into private connections. 63% had changed the shared electric meter into individual connections (See Table 6.3 and 6.4 for details).

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<sup>122</sup> Originally the houses had no ceilings

**Table 6.3: Distribution by type of maintenance (HB)**

Type of maintenance	HB	
	Freq.	Valid %
Openings, partition wall and ceiling	23	23
External walls, openings, floor and ceiling	13	13
Partition walls and ceiling	11	11
External wall, partition wall and ceiling	10	10
Partition walls	10	10
Openings and partition wall	9	9
A combination of different parts of the house	34	34
Total	100	100%

**Table 6.4: Distribution by type of utility connection (HB)**

Type of utility connection		Freq.	%
Water access	Shared water meter	42	42.0
	Individual water meter	41	41.0
	Buying from neighbour	15	15.0
	Buying from common water tap	2	2.0
	Total	100	100.0
Electricity access	Individual electric meter	63	63.0
	Shared meter	33	33.0
	Tapping from neighbour	4	4.0
	Total	100	100.0

The main motivation for maintaining the houses and changing the shared utilities into individual connections emanated from the foreseen ownership of the houses. Additional motivation was the prevalent competition among neighbours - the mentality that

“I should not be less than my neighbour”. This same motivation was also informally mentioned by many of the informants as the key reason in having similar furniture. Similarly, because of the aspiration of finally securing housing ownership the SACC was motivated to participate in *kebele*-initiated upgrading. For example, in road pavement work the *kebele* contributed 70% of the expenses while dwellers contributed the remaining 30% in the form of cash and labour. According to the SACC’s secretary, the SACC contributed 11, 500 Birr in addition to the labour contribution of its members.

#### **BOX 6.5: Maintenance**

*TG*: “The iron sheet roof of our common kitchen had been leaking and the SACC maintained it, afterwards we pooled money and refunded,” *TG* said. Regarding the maintenance of the house, “the walls were made of [faire faced hollow concrete] blocks, but now we plastered and painted the interior. The upper part of the entrance door was half *maica* [translucent plastic sheet], but now we have changed it to metal; as the *maica* is breakable and may easily give way to thieves”.

Originally one water tap, installed as part of the upgrading project, was shared among neighbours, “now almost each household has its own water tap, the project water is stopped, people like us who still did not manage to have water connection still buy at 0.15 Birr per bucket. Electricity was shared one meter to four households. Two of our neighbours now have their own [electric] meters, so we are using one meter for two”.

*FT*: Regarding the upkeep and maintenance of the housing, *FT* said, “the [faire faced] wall used to bother us by harbouring bugs, then we plastered it. We [neighbours] clean the open common space every two weeks. The common kitchen and toilets are maintained by the organization [SACC], and then we contribute money and refund the expense”.

*WM*: “One’s own house is better than a *kebele*’s house. This is a house where we can educate and entertain our children. It is good for the poor. We live here in love and harmony blessing and thanking our government. I prefer this house to the old one, where the toilet was right behind. There was no place for erecting tents. Now we have enough space for a tent.” Tents are used to house cultural practices, such as a wedding, mourning a death, any festive activities or neighbourhood meetings where a number of people are gathered.

### **Extensions**

One of the elements that contribute to quick deterioration of housing settlements is spontaneous and uncontrolled alterations and extensions of housing units. With regard to housing transformations, there was significant difference between the HBs and the IBs. Almost no housing extension, outbuilding or major alteration was observed in the clusters of the HBs.

Only 2 out of the 100 (2%) respondents had extended their houses (1 room addition and another toilet addition). On the other hand in the housing of the IBs, where there was no strict control of transformation, 22 (24.4%) out of the 90 respondents admitted that they had transformed their housing, with the majority extending rooms (See Table – 6.5).

**Table 6.5: Distribution by type of extension, comparison between HBs and IBs**

Extension type	HBs			IBs		
	Freq.	%	Valid %	Freq.	%	Valid %
Room	1	1.0	50.0	14	15.6	63.6
Kitchen	-	-	-	4	4.4	18.2
Toilet	1	1.0	50.0	3	3.3	13.6
Room & Kitchen	-	-	-	1	1.1	4.5
Total	2	2.0	100.0	22	24.4	100.0
No extension	98	98.0		68	75.6	
Total	100	100.0		90	100.0	

The HBs, when asked what they would like to do regarding transformation if and when they acquire the ownership certificate, informants responded that they would extend more rooms. The reason given was the need for more space. But they all said that this could only be done if, for example, all the neighbours in a certain block agree. They were aware that extensions by individual households would lead to endless litigations owing to the interconnected design of the housing and its common spaces. Informant KA, who lived in an upper floor of a block, had a clear mental design. She said:

Once our ownership is confirmed I want to encourage my neighbours to see the possibility of extending all the upper floors by raising columns from the ground. Those on the ground floor can use our extension as their veranda or they can also add more rooms by enclosing the columns.

Similar responses were also given in the FGD:

We have signed not to make extensions for twenty years. Because of this nobody dares to extend. After twenty years we can make an agreement to lay foundations and extend our houses. It all depends on the attitude and capacity of the neighbours in a specific compound. If I extend my house [ground floor] without the consent of those in the upper floor they can easily sue me.... The kitchens are in common, the toilets are in common, six households share one kitchen. For example, even if the *kebele* brings another person and wants to extend a seventh kitchen, we do not agree. The Association (SACC) has its own governing rules and the *kebele* has its own. It cannot impose on us. Above all the leaders of our Association are very strong. They follow and stick to the rules.

#### **6.4.2. Spatial transformation at the levels of compound and settlement**

##### ***Maintenance and encroachments at the compound level***

Most of the compounds of *kebele* houses were either shared or lacked clear boundaries lending themselves for uncontrolled activities. Out of the 90 respondent IBs, 57 (63%) lived in shared compounds with 31 of them without fences. On the other hand the majority of the HBs 98% lived in shared compounds with 90% having fences. 61% of the HBs had maintained their compound out of which 82.5% was fence maintenance. Among the IBs, only 31 out of 90 (36.9%) participated in some kind of maintenance of their compounds (See Table – 6.6, for type of maintenance).

As in many *kebele* housing dominated settlements spontaneous and unplanned transformations were common in the compounds of the IBs. Informant *BS* said:

Provided there is money anybody is happy to extend in a *kebele* owned compound. If for some reason you complain, you are confronted with the usual statement, ‘it is none of your business, this is a government house’. My adjacent neighbors always throw their garbage just outside their doors. Every morning when I wake up I get sick. But, if I utter a word the outcome is quarrelling.

**Table 6.6: Comparison between HBs and IBs, distribution by type of compound maintenance**

Type of compound maintenance	HBs			IBs		
	Freq.	%	Valid %	Freq.	%	Valid %
Fence	52	52	82.5	19	21.1	50.0
Fence and Drainage ditch	6	6	9.5	-	-	-
Drainage ditch	4	4	6.4	4	4.4	10.5
Fence, Drainage ditch and floor surface	1	1	1.6	1	1.1	2.6
Floor surface	-	-	-	10	11.1	26.3
Fence and floor surface	-	-	-	2	2.2	5.3
Other	-	-	-	2	2.2	5.3
Total	63	63	100.0	38	42.2	100
No compound	2	2		6	6.7	
No maintenance	35	35		46	51.1	
Total	100	100.0		90	100.0	

***Involvement in settlement upgrading***

In order to bring about settlement level change, generally, dwellers are either motivated to initiate their own upgrading or are invited to “participate” in externally driven upgrading activities. In the case of Menen when dwellers were asked whether they had ever initiated upgrading activities, such as road construction, maintenance of a drainage ditch or the provision of service facilities, the response of the HBs was higher compared to that of IBs. This shows the stronger degree of motivation of the HBs. On the other hand, both the HBs



and IBs showed similar degree of participation in *kebele*-initiated upgrading. This is largely dictated by the mandatory nature of participation enforced by the *kebele* (See Table 6.7).

**Table 6.7: Comparison between HBs and IBs by response to settlement level upgrading**

Response to		HBs		IBs	
		Freq.	%	Freq.	%
Self initiated upgrading*	Yes	67	65.7	45	54.9
	No	35	34.3	37	55.1
	Total	102	100.0	82	100.0
<i>Kebele</i> - initiated upgrading	Yes	86	84.3	69	84.1
	No	16	15.7	13	15.9
	Total	102	100.0	82	100.0

\*In this particular question, upgrading expresses the upkeep and maintenance of the physical components of a settlement, such as roads and drainage ditches.

#### 6.4.3. The SACC's role in curbing uncontrolled transformations

As discussed earlier there were almost no extensions in the blocks of the HBs. This is because of the existence of the terms of agreement signed between the SACC and the HBs and the capacity of the SACC to enforce it. The agreement included articles regarding issues pertinent to the transformation of the housing. In the terms of agreement the HBs were referred to as “borrowers”. Article 9-1 totally forbids both extending and rebuilding of the house. It stated:

The borrower is forbidden, before or after the settlement of the debt, to extend a room or rebuild the house under any circumstances.

The terms of agreement had even made the planting of trees and the fencing of houses dependent on securing permission from the SACC. Article 9-3 stated:

The borrower is not allowed to plant a tree in proximity to the house, to develop a backyard garden or to fence the house without prior permission of the SACC.

## **6.5. Summing up**

### **6.5.1. Actors’ relationship and tenants’ response**

The Menen upgrading process, on the dwellers’ side, had two groups involved: the IBs and the HBs. Both these groups have benefited from the upgrading process, be it in the form of micro finance or from the improved housing, social and service facilities. However, post phase out what came out prominently was the activities of the HBs, which were undertaken under the administration of the SACC. The central motivating element for the HBs to sustain the SACC’s activities was the fact that the “housing privatization policy” was introduced. Here, it should be emphasized that despite the claim of RBE of integrated upgrading approach, at last, what attracted the dwellers were few specific components.

The two basic documents on which the upgrading process was based was the 1988 project agreement between RBE and the AACA and the 1994 project handover agreement between RBE and the SACC. Despite the government change in 1991 the 1988 project agreement has been serving as a basis for the SACC to claim the administration of the RBE-built properties and the ownership of the newly constructed houses. The ownership claim was, of course strengthened by the 1994 agreement. Irrespective of the lack of endorsement on the part of the government the HBs and the SACC were acting as if the houses were their own.

However, if it were not for the willingness of the office of the sub-city, the policy for the housing privatization could be reversed at any time, because there was no binding document which could force the government to honour the policy. The policy was introduced by RBE itself, and the project’s property was handed over to the RBE-established SACC – all an in-house activity. The only “green light” was that the policy was supported by the advisory committee, some of whose members were government officials. But, as its name indicates its power was only giving advice. Notwithstanding this, in 2004, the SACC’s persistent claim of ownership was met by the positive response of the Office of

the sub city. The convergence of the SACC's demand with the Government's recent introduction of the condominium housing seems one of the reasons which encouraged the officials to allow the SACC members to pay the land and housing tax. The condominium housing, which is part of the Grand Housing Programme of the government was introduced to "indirectly privatize" the *kebele* housing (See Local Context chapter). The fact that the SACC leaders were simultaneously HBs had also enabled the SACC to vigorously negotiate its interest with government bodies.

On the other hand it can be observed that if, for example, the government had officially endorsed the privatization probably the HBs would have been tempted to engage in informal sale of the houses. Therefore, it seems that the fact that RBE's privatization policy lacked the government's clear endorsement may have been a blessing in disguise contributing towards the avoidance of gentrification.

The preference for women in targeting the beneficiaries has also played a part in protecting the area from gentrification. The fact that 90% of the households in the newly constructed housing stayed in their allocated houses, for more than ten years, shows that the children were able to grow up in a better environment without being exposed to displacements. This may not have been the case if the houses were given to male household heads. In the context of Ethiopia, if a couple are divorced, it is usually the mother and children who suffer from being chased out of the home. By making the mother the potential owner of the house the project succeeded in having stable households. This was, of course strengthened by making the houses transferable only at the expiry of twenty years.

### **6.5.2. The upgrading process and spatial transformation**

The SACC was the key actor of the upgrading process. Its responsibility was not only to facilitate the HBs' private ownership but also to engage itself in "community development", beneficial to all the *kebele* dwellers. In this regard it has been giving saving and credit service for any dweller who was a member of the SACC, and has also been participating in the *kebele* initiated upgrading. However, it has not been proactive enough in using its revolving fund, which had been sourced from its income generating activities.

Spatially, the process of change of property rights has protected the area from detrimental transformations while on the other hand allowing the dwellers to maintain their houses. A comparison was made with the *kebele* owned housing in which filling in all the available open spaces was the rule of the game. The SACC has also been playing a significant role in the administration and maintenance of the common kitchens and common toilets. Further it has been effectively controlling the cleanliness of common spaces and the proper functioning of drainage ditches.

Out of the 190 respondents more than 60% earned less than 1 USD a day and more than 50% were self employed. This indicates that a sizable proportion of the dwellers are poor and dependent on the dynamics of the inner-city for their subsistence. However, inner-cities have big pressure owing from both the interests of the government and private developers. Except on central business district (CBD) area the government’s tendency is to promote upgrading and on site relocation. However, be it renewal or in-situ upgrading the one thing that has become clear is that the survival of the *kebele* houses (single storied mud and wood construction) is increasingly challenged - one simple reason is the ambitious desire of the government in changing the image of the city (See Local Context chapter). In this regard, unlike other upgrading projects, RBE’s introduction of the double-storied housing blocks, constructed with more permanent materials and more importantly with improved property rights could strike a balance on the one hand in satisfying the need of the *kebele* tenants to stay in the inner-city and on the other hand the need of the government to change the inner-city’s image.

The existence of a competent SACC as the trustee of the properties and the provision of rules regarding the maintenance and transformation of the housing has effectively controlled non-planned extensions and alterations. The legal frame work was just enough for the SACC to both secure the collective good and claim the housing ownership.

On the one hand, this has lent the area a better spatial quality, while on the other hand it had its own disadvantages. Some of the disadvantages mentioned by informants were: the inability of extending rooms to accommodate more household members or generate income. However, though households complained about the size of rooms they

fully appreciate the detrimental effect of individual and uncontrolled extensions. The evidence is that they all obeyed the rules regarding extensions. On the positive side, the relatively good quality of rooms and toilet facilities were mentioned. It should also be noted the pride and hope value of the beneficiaries that in a few years time they will likely secure communal ownership of their houses. In fact, it is this hope which has served as a prime driving force for the SACC leaders to work diligently and for the members to abide by the rules.

Therefore, in Menen's case the components summarised below were important in continuing a positive upgrading process:

- Property rights just enough to motivate tenants to engage in positive process of change. By "just enough" here it is meant neither perpetuating the existing rental housing tenure nor necessarily the provision of private property deeds.
- The establishment of a strong organization (in this case SACC) that could address the multi-pronged challenges of the inner-city dwellers. In the case of Menen the activity of the SACC was limited in its scope as its focus, (namely, housing "privatization") was not of interest to the other actors such as the IBs and the *kebele*.
- Clear rules and regulations (legal framework) that provides enough ground for the tenant organization to negotiate its rights with actors of divergent or conflicting interests.
- The preference for women to sustain initiated positive change
- The importance of political will in reducing the hurdles of the tenants in attaining their goals.



## CHAPTER – 7: CASE 3: KOLFE

### Local NGO initiated, *iddir* based upgrading process

#### 7.1. The area and the people

The Kolfe Keranio sub city, commonly known as Kolfe is located in the western part of the city. The area is a juxtaposition of many layers of history - layers accumulated since the foundation of Addis Ababa itself. Some of the layers had left recognizable traces. The Italians, during their brief occupation of the city in the 1930s had made their mark by creating settlements with grid street layout designed to inhabit “indigenous” people.<sup>123</sup> During the imperial regime the area had been used for putting beggars in camps in which through time the beggars and their children infiltrated the settlements contributing to the humble origin of the settlements<sup>124</sup>. In later years, similar to the rest of Addis Ababa, Kolfe went back to its spontaneous origin adding more unplanned layers to the grid-iron of the Italians. The recent major addition in Kolfe is the ring road, which has divided many of the originally contiguous settlements into two, putting some of the settlements inside the “ring” while almost cutting off the rest. Particularly, owing to their proximity to Merkato (one of the biggest markets in Africa), the settlements located within the limits of the ring road are busy with teeming streets. Currently, Kolfe is mostly associated with its lumber market (*atana tera*) and the sale of second hand clothing (*salvage*).

The Kolfe area was divided into 18 *kebeles* and it included 216 *iddirs* (ORAAMP, 2000b). Out of the total 216 *iddirs* 26 *iddirs*, located in 9 *kebeles*, constituted *Tesfa Mahiberawi Limatakef Mahiber* (Hope Social and Development Association). *Tesfa Mahiberawi Limatakef Mahiber*, hence forth *Tesfa*, is thus a coalition of *iddirs* functioning as a local NGO in upgrading the area. The 26 *iddirs* had 4,700 household members with a population of about 24,000.<sup>125</sup>

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<sup>123</sup> Interview with an elderly informant. See also Addis Ababa’s master plan, prepared by Guidi and Valle, discussed in the Background Study chapter.

<sup>124</sup> Ibid

<sup>125</sup> Interview, *Tesfa*’s Planning and Programming officer

Out in the streets the best place to have an overview of these vast settlements is the over fly pedestrian bridges of the ring road. Standing on one of the bridges one can see, on both sides of the ring road, half -cut houses partly demolished to build the ring road, keeping behind them a multitude of single storied houses with rusted metal roofs. Except for few buildings along side main streets most of the houses are *chika* houses in non-planned and spontaneous layouts, typical of the old neighbourhoods of Addis Ababa. To the West of the ring road the Italian originated grid layout settlement of rugged stone streets is visible.

*Tesfa's* upgrading, specifically the housing component is thinly spread in the nine *kebeles* mentioned earlier. The biggest contiguous collection of houses was one block of five newly constructed housing units located in the Winget<sup>126</sup> area. These houses were built adjacent to the fence of Abader Muslim School facing an existing cluster of single storied *chika* houses, sharing one water tap and four toilets.

*Tesfa's* office is located off a main street in the former office of *Woreda 25 Kebele* 08. In order to reach *Tesfa's* office one has to pass through a busy street typical of many other streets in the settlement. One of the characteristics of such street is the sounds with which they are permeated: tiny video/audio shops playing loud music, the *weyalas*<sup>127</sup> yelling, mad man shouting, vehicles hooting, people talking - all at the same time and place. One needs to walk half bent beneath the drying laundry while watching out for the rugged stone paved roads. After crossing one block you reach *Tesfa's* office. Another sound - this time it is from *Tesfa's* youth music band rehearsing in the assembly hall. They are trained by an ex-army colonel, who was himself a well known cellist. For that matter most of *Tesfa's* leaders are ex-army officers – male dominated, with no female in the leadership. Bearing upon the military background of some of the key leaders, no wonder, the office premises are well ordered and clean with labels on every office door. Here and there, the compound is crowded with the elderly, the HIV/AIDS victim, the poorest of the poor and the unemployed youth who come day in day out in search of some assistance.

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<sup>126</sup> Named after Winget School located in the vicinity

<sup>127</sup> Taxi conductors assisting the driver by collecting fares and calling out the destination of the taxi



The numbers also reflect the majority's meagre income and accommodation in small sized rooms. On the other hand unlike Kirkos and Menen the family size is small showing that the majority of the targeted households are the elderly, either living alone or with a spouse or with HIV-orphaned, a couple of grandchildren (See Table 7.1 for basic data).

**Table 7.1: Housing and socio-economic condition of the respondents**

(For each variable out of the total 41 respondents)		<b>Freq.</b>	<b>%</b>
Household head sex	Female	26	63.4
	Male	15	36.6
Household size, including dependants (The average household size for Addis Ababa is 5.1)	Below or equal to 5	30	73.2
	Above 5	11	26.8
Income (USD/ day) (Converted from 9 Birr/day or 270 Birr/month) (UN's 1USD/day criteria of poverty level)	Below 1	23	56.1
	Between 1 & 2	14	34.1
	Above 2	4	9.8
Source of income	Self employed	28	68.3
	Employed	6	14.6
	No income	7	17.1
Number of years in the house (Above 10 indicates stability)	Above 10	34	82.9
	Below 10	7	17.1
Floor area of house (excluding outdoor kitchen and toilet) (Square meters) (20 square meters, minimum area required to accommodate a household)	Up to 20	41	100
	Above 20	-	-
Number of rooms (excluding kitchen and toilet)	1 or 2	41	100
	More than 2	-	-

## **7.2. Tesfa’s upgrading activities**

### **7.2.1. Main actors**

#### ***The formation and development of Tesfa***

As mentioned earlier, *Tesfa* is a self-initiated coalition of *iddirs*. According to the founders of *Tesfa*<sup>128</sup> the coalition was initially started with the aim of assisting individual members who cannot afford the monthly *iddir* dues because of financial shortage. Those who cannot pay the *iddir* fee had been obliged to stop their *iddir* membership. Upon death of a family member the bereaved were left with no choice but to engage in street begging to cover burial expenses. Having seen such unfortunate situations, and having also in mind that *iddirs* should be involved in development activities, three *iddir* leaders came up with the idea of forming a coalition. Following consultation with individual members, *Tesfa* was formed in 2000 with a broader vision of tackling poverty. Up to May 2005, in a span of five years only, *Tesfa* had twenty-six member *iddirs* with more than 4700 households comprising a population of about 24,000. Each member *iddir* pays a membership fee of 200 Birr and 1 Birr from each individual member<sup>129</sup>. In most *iddirs*, an individual member pays a monthly fee of 10 Birr and 1 Birr to his/her *iddir* and *Tesfa* respectively. It is not unusual that a household is a member of more than one *iddir*. However, individual members register with *Tesfa* through one *iddir* only (See BOX-7.1: Examples of *iddir* membership). Membership into more than one *iddir* had to do also with widely held cultural aspects and religious belief. Culture dictates that the more people attend a funeral, the more the status and respect attributed to the deceased and the bereaved. A proper burial ceremony is also believed to have a positive effect in the “life after death”.

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<sup>128</sup> Interviews with *Tesfa*’s leaders

<sup>129</sup> Ibid

**BOX-7.1: Iddir membership**

1. *MB*'s household had been a member of three *iddirs*: Kolfe Genet *iddir*, Yewozader *iddir* and Selam Genet (*Hulegeb*) *iddir*. While Kolfe Genet and Yewozader are community *iddirs*, *Selam Genet* is a women's *iddir*. *MB* was one of the unemployed youths targeted for the assistance of *Tesfa*. Kolfe Genet *iddir* was the liaison between *MB* and *Tesfa*.

2. *BT*'s household had been a member of the Medhanie Alem (Holy Saviour) *iddir*, which is one of the strongest *iddirs* in the locality. The strength of the *iddir* could be attributed to the quality of its leaders. For example, the chairman (*Dagna*) of Medhanie Alem *iddir* had also been serving as the executive manager of *Tesfa*. *BT* was identified by her *iddir* as one of the poorest members. Accordingly, she was referred to *Tesfa* for assistance.

3. *TT*'s household had been a member of Gabriel *iddir* (named after St. Gabriel). She was grateful that she was targeted for the assistance by *Tesfa*. She also mentioned that she received four hundred Birr from her *iddir* when her husband died in 1994. This kind of assistance is extended for every member whenever such circumstances happen.


Generally, *iddirs* secure their legal personality by registering with the Addis Ababa city Administration. This registration enables them to hold meetings and run their day-to-day activities, but it doesn't enable them to function as NGOs. For example they cannot solicit money from external sources to carry out upgrading. NGOs can only secure their legal status after registering with the Ministry of Justice. In June 2000, *Tesfa* registered with the municipality of Addis Ababa, and in March 2002 with the Ministry of Justice (Voice of *Tesfa*, 2002). *Tesfa*'s registration with the Ministry, can be said, was a turning point as it enabled *Tesfa* to function in the capacity of an NGO.

**Tesfa's administrative structure and its relationship with member iddirs**

One of the unique characters of *Tesfa* is that it is run by its members and is accountable to its members. At its inception, *Tesfa*'s administrative structure was simple (See Fig. 7.1). It was, in principle, based on the idea that the coalition should be run by the leaders of member *iddirs*, who would link the grassroots with *Tesfa*. Thus, the leaders of member

*iddirs* were simultaneously members of *Tesfa*'s Board of Directors. For example, the chairman (*dagna*) of the *Kolfe Genet iddir*, and the chairman of *Nebar Kolfe*, were simultaneously the chairman of *Tesfa*'s Board of Directors and the public relation officer, respectively.

**Fig. 7.1: Administrative structure at the initial stage of Tesfa**




Source: Interview and “Voice of *Tesfa*”<sup>1</sup> (2002).

As the number of member *iddirs* started to grow it became administratively inefficient to have all the leaders of member *iddirs* in the Board, hence reduction of some of the Board members became important. The exclusion from the Board of some of the leaders, however, created a gap in the communication link. Therefore, a Council, composed of all the leaders of individual *iddirs*, was introduced between the General Assembly and the Board of Directors. This way, the grassroots convey their voice through the *iddir* leaders. The *iddir* leaders are simultaneously members of the Council and /or the Board of

Directors (See Fig. 7.2). Another way of communication is also the occasional meetings between Tesfa's management committee and *iddir* leaders (See Fig. 7.3).<sup>130</sup>

The military background of some of *Tesfa's* leaders has contributed to their capacity of mobilizing and managing large groups of people. In addition to that, being retirees and with enough private income had enabled the leaders to stay away from corruption and to usefully utilize the ample time they enjoy at their disposal.

**Fig. 7.2: Current administrative structure of *Tesfa***



Source: Extracted from the interview with the head of *Tesfa's* Planning and Programming Office

<sup>130</sup> The researcher had the opportunity of attending one of the meetings

**Fig. 7.3: Meeting of *iddir* leaders with *Tesfa*'s management committee**



#### ***Tesfa's relationship with other NGOs***

Throughout Addis Ababa, NGOs such as ACORD, Mary Joy Development and Support Organization, *Hiwot* HIV/AIDS Prevention Organization, CARE Ethiopia, HelpAge Ethiopia, Hope for African Children Initiative (HACI), Concern and DKT Ethiopia have been working in partnership with *iddirs* in various fields of development. Currently, there is an increase in the number of NGOs interested in collaborating with *iddirs*. The campaign against the spread of HIV/AIDS is the most notable intervention area that has enhanced the collaboration between *iddirs* and NGOs.

As mentioned earlier the income of *Tesfa* was basically derived from the monthly 1Birr contribution of each of its members. This contribution, however, is mostly consumed by the overhead expenses and running costs. Therefore, *Tesfa*, to meet its goals, had been intimately working with a number of NGOs among them: Agency for Cooperation and Research in Development (ACORD), Hope for African Children Initiative (HACI), CARE Ethiopia and HelpAge Ethiopia. For example, in partnership with HelpAge only, *Tesfa* was able to execute projects worth over 500,000 Birr.

### ***Tesfa's relationship with local governments***

*Tesfa* enjoys a relatively smooth relationship with both the sub-city and *kebele* administrations. The leaders of *Tesfa* are experienced retired civil servants and military officers. For example, the chief executive officer was a leader of a trade union and the board director was a police officer with the rank of captain. Therefore, they always made sure that bureaucratic requirements of the government are fulfilled and their activities are known. For example, the sub city and *kebele* officials had been invited as the guest of honour whenever there were events or celebrations related to *Tesfa's* activities. Besides, most of *Tesfa's* leaders are *iddir* leaders in their respective neighbourhoods. Hence they are well respected and highly regarded personalities. For example, *Tesfa's* chief executive officer was, at the same time the chairman of a *kebele's* development committee, elected by the dwellers to fill in the post. The fact that administration of *kebele* 08 gave *Tesfa* its evacuated office premises is also a manifestation of the good relationships.

Generally, both the sub city and *kebele* officials had positive attitude towards *Tesfa's* activities. For example, in an interview given to *Tesfa's* news magazine<sup>131</sup> the head of the Civil and Social Affairs Department of the Kolfe Keranio sub-city said:


Initially, my understanding regarding *Tesfa* was that it was simply a union of *iddirs* which tried to do some activities by mobilizing its members; it was only later that I grasped it was rather a social organization which operates as an NGO. From this point of view, we are supporting *Tesfa* not only morally, but also we are exchanging ideas so that there would be a shared vision.

In the discussion above it was shown that the initiator and driving force of the activities in Kolfe was *Tesfa*. Also discussed was the relationship of *Tesfa* with the member *iddirs*, NGOs and government bodies. Thus, the main upgrading actors can be considered: *Tesfa*, member *iddirs*, individual *iddir* members, international NGOs and to a certain degree the sub city and *kebele* administrations (See Fig. 7.4).

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<sup>131</sup> Voice of *Tesfa* (2004), 3<sup>rd</sup> year issue, No.2:8

**Fig. 7.4: Actors and their relationships in Kolfe’s upgrading**



### 7.2.2. Tesfa’s upgrading approach and project components

#### *Upgrading approach*

At the initial stage of *Tesfa*’s formation its aim was simply to assist the poorest elders among its members. Later, the challenge of HIV/AIDS started to gain focus as it started to affect *iddirs*. Low income settlements, such as Kolfe, being less hygienic, with limited access to health facilities are prone to increased deaths of HIV/AIDS victims. This has directly affected *iddirs*, as they have to extend money to every bereaved household. This has led to a sharp decrease of their funds. To remedy this, in addition to increasing members’ monthly contribution, *iddirs* are increasingly focusing on the prevention of HIV/AIDS (See BOX-7.2, for a report by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and Fig. 7.5 a cartoon depicting the alarming situation created by HIV/AIDS prevalence).



**BOX-7.2: Focus of Iddir on HIV/AIDS**


ETHIOPIA: Funeral associations - for the living as well as the dead

ADDIS ABABA, 22 November 2006 (IRIN<sup>132</sup>) - Support for Ethiopian families affected by the AIDS pandemic has come from an unexpected source - local funeral associations, known as *iddirs*....

"I used to hate the *iddirs* - they had the money to help the sick but did nothing," said Senait Tefera, 16, sitting beside her bedridden, HIV-positive mother. "They'd stigmatise people like my mother and wait for them to die before they offered support, but now that's changing and I'm glad." Senait's mother, Aster Astatka, looks far older than her 48 years, but thinks she would not be here at all if it wasn't for the help she got from her *iddir*. "I couldn't even walk into the hospital on my own," she said. The *iddir* has helped with money, home care and finding medical treatment, including the antiretroviral drugs that have given her a new lease of life.

Until recently, the burial societies were focused solely on providing for a member's funeral, and in much of Ethiopia that is still the case. However, a number of them, shocked by the mounting toll of AIDS on their membership, started looking at what they could do to tackle the problem.<sup>133</sup>

**Fig. 7.5: Cartoon on *iddirs* and the challenge of HIV/AIDS**



Source: Voice of *Tesfa* (2004:32) (Translation mine)

<sup>132</sup> Integrated Regional Information Networks

<sup>133</sup> United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian affairs  
[www.irinnews.org/PrintReport.aspx?ReportID=61627](http://www.irinnews.org/PrintReport.aspx?ReportID=61627)

Victims of HIV/AIDS are often active working adults. This group of people are gradually perishing in areas such as *Kolfe* leaving children under the care of grandparents who are often without any income. Therefore, parallel to its work on the prevention of HIV/AIDS, *Tesfa* had been dealing with the improvement of the living condition of HIV/AIDS orphaned children and their elderly grandparents. The strategies of *Tesfa* in tackling these challenges were through housing, health care, direct relief handouts, micro-credit and income generation. It can generally be said *Tesfa’s* approach was not ideologically based. It was rather pragmatic and incremental driven by the day to day needs of its members.

According to *Tesfa’s* Social and Development Department<sup>134</sup> the target groups were selected based on the criteria listed below:

- Grandparents who are raising HIV/AIDS orphaned children
- Bed-ridden elders without care giver
- Elders without any type of income
- Those living in dilapidated houses and who lack the capacity to upgrade it
- The poorest of the poor households (even if they are headed by non – elders)

(See BOX-7.3: Type of target group)

**BOX-7.3: Type of target group**

1. *BT*: One of the poorest of the poor

*BT*, a divorced woman, had four children: three sons and one daughter. She had also a sister who shared a room in the same house. The eldest of her children was a 17-year-old boy, while the youngest was a 10-year-old girl. *BT* derived her income from selling *injera*. Everyday, on average, she sold thirty *injer*as. Covering all expenses she earned a net income of two Birr per day, about 60 Birr per month. The household’s living expenses were much too high for *BT*, she couldn’t even afford to be a member of a church that incurred some expenses.

(Contd.)

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<sup>134</sup> Interview with the head of Social and Development Department

2. *TT*: Female headed household with orphaned children

*TT* came to Addis Ababa from a rural area during the reign of Emperor Haileselassie. Her husband died in 1994, and she was left all alone to head her family of nine: six children, two grandchildren and herself. Two of her children, the eldest and the third had passed away. Three of her children attend public school while another three had to quit their education, for lack of money. The two grandchildren attend *Kies Timhert Biet* (traditional, religious school). *TT* derived her income from selling *injera*, washing clothes and weaving. For example, by washing one batch of clothing she earns 12 Birr. Depending on the availability she keeps changing job types. Two of her children augment the income of the household. One son and one daughter worked in a tyre repair job and selling of *ambasha* (home made bread) respectively.

3. *GW*: Male headed household with one orphaned grand child

*GW*, age 75, and his wife *BK*, age 55, lived with their five children and one grandchild. They lived in a house, which was originally one room, and later partitioned into two. Two of *GW*'s daughters had a seasonal job in a coffee cleaning plant. *GW* migrated to Addis Ababa in his childhood. Since then his job was preparing mud for plastering *chika* housing. With the passage of time he grew weak and became the herald (*lefafi*) of his *iddir*. Whenever someone dies, he heralds the member's death calling the *iddir* members to attend the funeral. His announcement is accompanied by a trumpet's sound to catch the attention of the dwellers. This activity, owing to the increasing death frequency, has become part of the culture so much that a month hardly passes without the sound of the trumpet. In fact the painting of a herald with a horn is the signature symbol of *Tesfa*. It has been appearing in their posters, pamphlets and newsletters. *GW* gets 10 Birr for heralding one death. He complained: "These days nobody is dying, for example, the past 4 months nobody died. The payment is very small. Every time somebody dies, I have to wake up in the middle of the cold nights. It is only recently, after years of complaint, the *iddir* bought me this jacket". His wife used to work as a spinner (*fetay*), but not any more as she became sick. Throughout the interview she was complaining about her sickness.<sup>135</sup>

<sup>135</sup> During my second fieldwork in 2006 I learned that she died.

### **Upgrading components**

Since its official formation in 2000 *Tesfa*, in collaboration with like-minded NGOs, was able to undertake health care for the elderly and HIV/AIDS victims, in-situ upgrading and nearby relocation of households, micro-credit and income generation, direct relief handouts and the regular provision of funds and school equipment for orphans (See Table – 7.2, for details).

**Table 7.2: *Tesfa*'s activities**

Project components	Type of activity
HIV AIDS prevention and support	<p>Sensitising 5400 members of 26 <i>Iddirs</i> of the need of community care for orphaned and vulnerable children and HIV/AIDS affected families</p> <p>Training and workshops of awareness creation for 26 <i>iddir</i> leaders and other community representatives</p> <p>Psychological and social support for 50 grandparents in charge of orphaned and vulnerable children</p> <p>Education for 50 orphans and vulnerable children</p> <p>Training for 50 home-based facilitators,</p> <p>Training for 30 peer educators</p> <p>Support for 35 HIV/AIDS victims</p> <p>Strengthening anti HIV/AIDS counsels in 5 <i>kebele</i></p>
Housing	<p>Upgrading of 50 houses for grandparents with orphaned children</p> <p>Upgrading of 5 houses for households considered the poorest of the poor</p> <p>Construction of 5 new housing units for relocated poor households</p>
Micro credit and income generation	<p>Establishing saving and credit bank</p> <p>Providing seed money for 49 grandparent - headed households</p> <p>Skill training for 800 orphans and helping them secure jobs</p>
Health	<p>Eye cataract operation for some elderly persons</p>
Direct handouts	<p>Regular provision of clothing and school materials for 105 orphans</p> <p>Regular provision of school material for 400 orphans</p>

Source: Extracted from the information given by *Tesfa*'s administrator

*The housing component:* Based on the theme of this study the following discussion focuses on the housing component. The housing component in Table 7.4 above shows that in-situ upgrading of 55 housing units (See Fig. 7.6 and BOX – 7.4) and the construction of five housing units in an overspill area were undertaken. All the households assisted were tenants of *kebele* housing. According to a contract agreement between the respective *kebele* administrations and *Tesfa*<sup>136</sup>, the *kebeles* had agreed not to evict households from the upgraded houses as long as the household head is alive or his/her children are living in the house. The *kebeles* had also agreed not to increase house rent because of the upgrading. Since most of the target people were elders with orphaned children this agreement granted greater tenure security both for the elders and their children. It is not unusual for *kebeles* to force elder tenants to accommodate a co-dweller with the idea of transferring the house for the co-dweller upon the death of the elder tenant<sup>137</sup>.

**Fig. 7.6. Example of upgraded housing**



<sup>136</sup> Agreement format entitled: "Contract agreement entered between *Tesfa* Social and Development Association and *Kebele* '\_\_\_' regarding the upgrading of government housing for destitute elders."

<sup>137</sup> Interview with informants and the head of *Tesfa's* Social and Development Office

**BOX-7.4: Upgrading**

1. *BT*: “My kitchen is my factory!”

*BT*’s rental house had two rooms and a detached toilet and a kitchen. Prior to the maintenance undertaken by *Tesfa* the house was extremely dilapidated with corrugated iron sheet roofing patched with plastics. *Tesfa* upgraded her house and, annually, her children were provided school uniforms and equipment. In addition to these, monthly, the household was provided with 15 kilos of wheat, 1 litre of oil and 4 kilos of *fafa* (nutritious food). Owing to the shortage of budget on the part of *Tesfa*, *BT*’s kitchen was left without maintenance. *BT* had a plan to improve the kitchen by covering its roof with plastic. The condition of the kitchen was so bad it can only be described as a ramshackle. Notwithstanding this, *BT*, called this very kitchen “my factory” as she generated her income out of the sale of *injeras* baked in it.

2. *TT*: “the roof was almost non existent, so much so we saw the sun by day and the moon by night!”

*TT* had been living in a single roomed house with externally located toilet and kitchen. Prior to the upgrading the house was in a very bad condition. In fact it was so dilapidated that it was described by *TT*, “the roof was almost non existent, so much so we saw the sun by day and the moon by night! The toilet was made of *satera* (woven bamboo) and the kitchen of *madaberia* (plastic bags)”. *Tesfa*, in addition to the maintenance of the house had been regularly assisting *TT*’s children by providing clothing, school uniforms and equipment.

3. *GW*: *GW*’s *chika* house (mud and wood construction) was upgraded by *Tesfa*. *GW*, as he had the skill of preparing mud for construction, was commissioned by *Tesfa* to undertake the upgrading of his house and the house of one of his neighbours. He was paid 350 Birr. As part of the package of helping orphans, *GW*’s grandchild had been provided with a monthly ration of wheat, oil and *fafa* (nutritious food). They had also been provided clothing, school uniform and equipment, annually.

Out of the 60 upgraded housing units 55 were governed by the agreement entered between *Tesfa* and the *kebeles* while the tenure status of five housing units was not clear. The case of these five housing units is discussed below.

The five housing units are newly constructed houses occupied by relocated households. Originally these households were tenants of *kebele* housing. Following the government change of 1991 some of the *kebele* houses, which were unlawfully confiscated by the Marxist regime, were returned to the rightful owners. The five households were among the dwellers who were evicted as a result of the return of the *kebele* houses to their owners. Consequently, they became homeless and *kebele* 08 was obliged to shelter them in its compound. While some of them were housed in the back stage of the *kebele*'s assembly hall, the rest were placed in make shift shelters<sup>138</sup>. Following the new restructuring of the Addis Ababa city administration, *kebele* 08 and 02 were merged to form *kebele* 12 and the office of *kebele* 08 was moved to the premises of *kebele* 02. This movement left the premises of *kebele* 08 free, except the five households still there. The newly formed *kebele* 12, as an expression of its appreciation of *Tesfa*'s efforts, availed the premises of *kebele* 08 to *Tesfa* (See Fig. 7.7) with the condition that *Tesfa* constructs new houses for the five households. This arrangement was based upon a general cooperation agreement signed between *kebele* 12 and *Tesfa*. The agreement stipulated that *Tesfa* would use the former premises of *kebele* 08 for a five year period, renewable. Based on the agreement *Tesfa* constructed the houses and the five households were relocated in an overspill area but in the same *kebele* in 2004. In an interview with one of the households it was revealed that, following their relocation they were not given a house number and had not been paying house rent; thus practically they became legally “invisible” and without a clear tenure status.

The above discussion illustrated the main focus and activities of *Tesfa*. *Tesfa*'s projects, however, included additional activities, the most notable of which was job creation for unemployed youth (See BOX-7.5).

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<sup>138</sup> Interview

**Fig. 7.7: Former premises of Kebele 08, currently Tesfa’s Office**



**BOX-7.5: Unemployed youth**

*“...they keep saying wait and wait!”*

MB, 21 was desperately looking for a job. She learned about an announcement from one of the *iddirs* in which her household is a member. The announcement was for the recruitment of candidates to be trained in various skills. It was issued by *Tesfa* to be transmitted to concerned persons through member *iddirs*. The criteria were that the candidate should be a high school graduate and unemployed. MB fulfilled both the criteria and filed an application. *Tesfa* accepted three people from member *iddirs* and gave the candidates the opportunity to choose from among the fields of metal work, woodwork, tailoring and computer word processing. MB chose tailoring. She took a ten month course and was graduated in 2005 together with ten fellow trainees. The fee for the training was paid by *Tesfa*.

Out of the eleven trainees eight of them, with the assistance of *Tesfa*, organized themselves and established a company named *Beruh Tesfa* (bright hope) Tailoring Private Limited Company. MB has been the secretary of the company. The company’s first job was

*(Contd.)*



tailoring the dresses of those orphaned children who were under the assistance of *Tesfa*. In order for *Beruh Tesfa* to jump-start and enter into business, *Tesfa* extended to the association a loan of 5,320 Birr and eight tailoring machines. While the 5,320 Birr was a grant, the cost of the machines was expected to be paid back, in three years time on monthly installments. *Tesfa* was also assisting *Beruh Tesfa* by availing its meeting room to be utilized as their working place. MB said: “We have approached the *kebele* to give us a plot of land or a place where we can run our business. However the response is so far negative or they keep saying, wait and wait”.

### 7.3. The upgrading process and tenants’ response

In the cases of Kirkos and Menen the upgrading processes were initiated by an external NGO, RBE. Tenants’ responses in these areas were investigated in relation to RBE’s projects. Interventions were made by an external actor which stimulated a series of responses from the local actors. In Kolfe the relationship between a project intervention and responses is different. The projects were initiated by the dwellers themselves as a response to urban inequalities. Therefore, in Kolfe’s case the very projects initiated by the dwellers and the mechanism through which they had been tackling the inequalities are seen as tenants’ responses. The interest here is, thus to investigate why *kebele* tenants are in the first place interested in responding to urban inequalities and how their response affected spatial transformations. Out of the total 4,700 household members of *Tesfa* 4,015 (85.4%) are tenants (See Table 7.3 for detail).

**Table 7.3: Distribution of household *iddir* members by tenure type**

Tenure type	Quantity	Percentage
Public rental	3845	81.8
Private rental	170	3.6
Owner occupiers	685	14.6
Total	4700	100

Source: Social and Development Department of *Tesfa*

*Iddirs* on the one hand are criticised for failing to involve themselves in development efforts and on the other hand they are cautioned not to stretch themselves into development works, lest they would end up performing neither their burial function nor community development. The arguments for the first critique stress that *iddirs* are the most genuine, voluntary and independent associations; hence their involvement in development would result in achieving ownership and continuity. On the other hand the second critique emphasizes *iddirs*' lack of human and financial capacity to undertake and manage community development. The concern was that even if they develop capacity it would be replicating formal NGOs. This would be at the cost of sidelining their traditional burial function and losing their flexibility.

In recent years the formation of *iddir* coalitions for the purpose of area development is emerging in response to the above-mentioned critiques. The strategy is on the one hand, by keeping the autonomy and independence of member *iddirs* to curb the concern of losing their burial function, and on the other hand, by mobilising the resources of individual *iddirs* into a coalition to carry out development activities. To this effect there has been a growing interest on the part of NGOs, the government and some *iddirs* in establishing coalitions. Coalitions initiated by ACORD<sup>139</sup> in Ferensai Legasion (*Woreda 12 Kebele 06 and 22*) and Akaki (*Woreda 27 Kebele 08*) areas, both located in the outskirts of the city, and that of *Woreda 03 Kebele 31* initiated by the government in the inner-city can be cited (See Background Study chapter). However, these initiatives were not as successful as that of *Tesfa's* initiative in mobilizing dwellers. The main reason seems while *Tesfa* is a spontaneous and self-initiated coalition the others were initiated by external actors. *Iddir* members are generally resistant to external initiatives afraid of co-optation for causes contrary to their objectives. This fear is based on experiences that have occurred during the imperial and Dergue's regimes (See Background Study chapter). Therefore, it can be said that *Tesfa* is an initiative that exemplifies a strategy of mobilizing dwellers (in this case the majority of inner-city tenants) to unleash their potential for settlement upgrading without the fear of co-optation.

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<sup>139</sup> An international NGO

## 7.4. The upgrading process and spatial transformation

### 7.4.1. Spatial transformation at the housing unit level

#### *Housing types*

Unlike in Kirkos and Menen, in Kolfe both the newly constructed houses and the in-situ maintained were of single storey *chika* houses. The newly constructed were row houses (See Fig. 7.8) while the maintained houses were of typical *kebele* housing of various layouts, size and type (See Fig. 7.9).

**Fig. 7.8: Newly constructed houses**



**Fig. 7.9: Maintained houses**



***Maintenance and extension***

The households which were relocated in the overspill area had made substantial transformations in a very short period of time. During the fieldwork of 2005 there was only one extension of a room. In the second fieldwork of 2006 there were a number of room extensions (See Appendix-6: Figs. A6.1 – A6.9). The fact that they were not registered *kebele* tenants and that their tenure was not clear might have given them a relative freedom to make extensions and encroach on the open space. It seemed as if they were rushing to extend and gain as much as floor area before they get registered with the *kebele* and become legally “visible”, as extensions done post registration will be considered “illegal”.

The fact that the agreement between *Tesfa* and the *kebeles* had a provision for siblings to take over the rental house might have given extra confidence for the households

to invest money in extensions. Nevertheless, this is not to conclude that the dwellers were engaged in the housing transformations solely because of the lack of clarity in the status of property rights, because, some of the other target groups were also engaged in extensions. Out of the 41 respondents 7 (17.1%) admitted that they have made room extensions. Taking into consideration the “illegality” of the matter this number is considerably significant.

Regarding maintenance, out of the 41 respondents 28 (68.3%) had invested in the maintenance of some part of their upgraded houses (See Table 7.4, for details). Taking into consideration that the target group are destitute elders 70% is very high. The agreement made between *Tesfa* and the *kebele* administration, which strongly ensured their tenure security, had most likely encouraged them to invest in maintenance.

**Table 7.4: Distribution by type of house maintenance**

Type of maintenance	Freq.	Valid %
Floor	11	26.8
Roof	10	24.4
External wall, roof and partition wall	9	22.0
Ceiling	3	7.3
A combination of different parts of the house	9	22.0
Total	41	100%

#### ***Absence of design and spatial transformation***

*Tesfa's* organizational structure and staffing was devoid of any technical department in charge of the maintenance or design of new houses. The upgrading of the houses was overseen by the Social and Development department, staffed by one person and his assistant, both without any knowledge of the design profession. Thus both the maintenance of the dilapidated houses and the construction of the new houses were left to temporarily-hired semi-skilled professionals and daily labourers. Not surprisingly, the result was coincidental and of mediocre quality, which can quickly deteriorate and go back to the original dilapidated state. The justification given by *Tesfa* is financial shortage. However,

even with the available financial sources the involvement of trained design professional could contribute towards better planned and executed houses avoiding spontaneity and its repercussions.

#### **7.4.2. Spatial transformation at the cluster and settlement levels**

In addition to the extensions to individual housing units outbuilding in the common open space was also observed. The construction usually starts with make shift materials and it gradually changes to more permanent ones (See Fig. 7.10). The availability of relatively big common space adjacent to the housing units might have encouraged the encroachments and outbuilding. However, despite the freedom they enjoyed in extending their houses, they constantly complained about the problem of surface water drainage and risk of flooding<sup>140</sup>. Though this problem was basically the result of the original location of the housing block, it was getting worse as new rooms and kitchen extensions were made.

At the settlement level the spatial upgrading is thinly spread throughout nine *kebeles*. Visually, its impact on the physical fabric can hardly be observed. In the case of *Tesfa*, unlike *Kirkos* and *Menen*, the issue of housing was secondary. The demand of *Tesfa* was rather for the government to avail land, free of charge, to house its current and planned activities. The plans include the establishment of youth vocational training centre; HIV/AIDS focused health care centre and spaces for income generation such as the *Beruh Tesfa Tailors’ Association*. However, the government (at the level of the *kebele* and sub-city) has not been able to positively respond to this request.<sup>141</sup>

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<sup>140</sup> In depth interview

<sup>141</sup> Interview with *Tesfa’s* executive manager

**Fig. 7.10: Outbuilding in the common space**  
The picture was taken in May 2006



## 7.5. Summing up

### 7.5.1. Actors' relationship and tenants' responses

Owing to its spontaneous origin led by amateur volunteers, *Tesfa's* upgrading approach was more incremental. Initially the aim was to assist destitute elders who could not maintain their *iddir* membership but later, with more NGO partnerships, it included HIV/AIDS orphans and their grandparents. Some of *Tesfa's* strategies for the improvement of the livelihood of elder-headed households were through the upgrading of housing, the provision of micro-credit and medical services. These components were, however, not firmly designed in a mutually interdependent and integrated manner. They were rather delivered to various households as the need arose.

As one’s status is apparently measured by the number of people attending his/her funeral and the fact that there is a wide spread belief that proper burial ceremony might have a positive effect in the life after death have made the dwellers to respect their *iddirs*. Members were bound to respond to the call of *Tesfa* lest they risk expulsion from *iddir* membership and suffer social alienation. This had enabled *Tesfa* to run its function with relative ease. The fact that *Tesfa* was able to win the confidence of member *iddirs* and the membership reached to 26 within a short time has also largely to do with the fact that it was self-initiated without outside interference. The intensification of problems, among other things, the increase in deaths of HIV/AIDS victims was also one of the main reasons for motivating individual *iddir* members and *Tesfa*.

Equally important to the motivation for response was the strategy of response that is the establishment of the coalition of *iddirs* with a mandate of an NGO. It was a unique “formula”, which brought *iddirs* into the development arena without compromising their traditional function. It managed to keep the autonomy, identity and independence of member *iddirs* and it also curbed the concern that *iddirs* may lose their traditional burial function if involved in development activities. As a coalition and registered local NGO, it developed a better capacity to engage itself in upgrading activities. *Tesfa* is different from other coalitions (See Background Study chapter) in that it was self-initiated and is not merely a union of *iddirs* but a legally registered NGO supported by genuine and indigenous grassroots organizations (member *iddirs*). It was the initiator and the driving force of the projects undertaken in Kolfe. Though it had to enter into partnership with a number of NGOs, it remained as a focal organization working for and with the target group. In this case (compared to Kirkos and Menen) the way *Tesfa* evolved into a local NGO, its strong capacity to mobilize the dwellers and its built in administrative structure of reaching the most vulnerable is much more important than the type of the physical settlement upgrading.

### **7.5.2. The upgrading process and spatial transformations**

The governing principle regarding *kebele* houses originated as a result of the proclamation 47/1975, known as Government Ownership of Lands and ‘Extra’ Houses, in which all houses owned, but not personally used, by individuals were nationalised (See Background



Study chapter). As far as the federal and city level governments are concerned, *kebele* houses are considered the property of the government and *kebele* housing occupiers are considered as tenants. At these levels of administration the relationship between the landlord (government/*kebele*) and the tenants is governed by a standard format of contract agreement signed between *kebele* administrations and tenants. However, at the local level this is not the case. As illustrated in the Kolfe case, *kebeles* at their own discretion sign new agreements when negotiating upgrading activities. In Kolfe the agreement went to the extent of extending the use right of tenants to their siblings. This had strengthened the tenure security of the targeted households thereby encouraging them to invest in the maintenance and transformation of their dwellings.

Another issue in which the *kebele* acted out of its mandate is in allocating land. The mandate of allocating land is either that of the city government or the sub-city administration. However, In Kolfe the *kebele* administration allocated land for the newly constructed houses, albeit in flood prone area without any formal planning. This aspect therefore had its own influence in the spatial transformation.

The signing of agreement with respective *kebeles* to protect households' eviction was a good step; however, there was no mechanism put in place to control unauthorised transformations. As a result the households took individual, spontaneous initiatives in transforming their houses without taking into consideration the long-term collective good. On the other hand, it was demonstrated that the tenants were willing to invest their resources in the maintenance and extension of their individual houses. Further, *Tesfa* has the potential of improving the livelihood of its members provided that the government fully recognizes its positive role and comply with its demands such as the need for land.



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## **PART-V: FINDINGS AND IMPLICATIONS**



*Is the slum the enemy of the home?*

“...Put it this way: you cannot let men live like pigs when you need their votes as freemen; it is not safe. You cannot rob a child of its childhood, of its home, its play, its freedom from toil and care, and expect to appeal to the grown-up voter’s manhood. The children are our to-morrow, and as we mould them to-day so will they deal with us then. Therefore that is not safe. Unsafest of all is any thing or deed that strikes at the home, for from the people’s home proceeds citizen virtue, and nowhere else does it live. The slum is the enemy of the home. Because of it the chief city of our land came long ago to be called “The Homeless City.” When this people comes to be truly called a nation without homes there will no longer be any nation. Hence, I say, in the battle with the slum we win or we perish. There is no middle way. We shall win, for we are not letting things be the way our fathers did. But it will be a running fight, and it is not going to be won in two years, or in ten, or in twenty. For all that, we must keep on fighting ...”<sup>142</sup>

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<sup>142</sup> Jacob A. Riis (1902:9). *The Battle with the Slum*. New York Macmillan, Bartleby.com,2000  
[www.bartleby.com/175/](http://www.bartleby.com/175/)

## **CHAPTER-8: SYNTHESIS OF FINDINGS AND IMPLICATIONS**

### **8.1. Introduction**

At the outset of this study four research questions were posed; to recapitulate:

*Context-related question*

- ***What are the characteristics of the non-planned settlements (slums) and upgrading approaches in the inner-city of Addis Ababa?***

*Main research questions*

- ***In the context of state ownership of land and housing, to what extent, why and how do tenants respond to upgrading processes?***
- ***How do upgrading processes affect spatial transformations in tenant-dominated inner-city settlements of Addis Ababa?***

*Normative research question*

- ***How can upgrading processes, which engender positive socio-spatial transformations, be set in motion in tenant-dominated, non-planned inner-city settlements of Addis Ababa?***

The questions were followed by the investigation of the background study and the three cases each located in Kirkos, Menen and Kolfe. So far the analysis of the context and of each case has independently delivered some findings. In this chapter a cross case analysis is included to sift the findings which cut across two or more of the cases. Both the findings from the cross-case analysis and the individual cases are then synthesised and their implications to theory, practice and policy are discussed. The chapter is organised in three sections: 1) synthesis of findings and theory implications, 2) synthesis of findings and implications to practice and policy, and 3) further research issues.

## **8.2. Synthesis of findings and theory implications**

### **8.2.1. The characteristics of non-planned inner-city settlements and upgrading approaches**

#### *The characteristics of non-planned inner-city settlements*

The analysis of the background study has shown that Addis Ababa was not founded to function as a city; rather it was primarily established as a military encampment. This together with the dwellers’ way of life and construction technique that was derived from the countryside has greatly contributed to the present day condition of the inner-city settlements. Parallel to the Addis Ababa’s foundation the successive policies of the different governments regarding land tenure and property rights have also contributed to the emergence of *kebele* housing-dominated settlements.

Following Rakodi’s (1995) classification, the *kebele* housing can generally be categorized under public sector rental housing. But this categorization can be misleading. Both the *kebele* housing and the public housing of other countries are similar in that both often are owned by the state. However, owing to the origin and development of the settlements, the *kebele* housing has some differences from the public sector housing of other countries. In most countries such as Zambia, Vietnam, Thailand, Nigeria, South Korea, China and India the public sector housing is either employer provided or is formally designed and constructed by the government (See Theory chapter). Unlike these countries, in Ethiopia the *kebele* housing, as described in the Background Study, is neither planned and built by the government nor is tied to employment. Therefore, it can be asserted that the *kebele* housing is a variant of the public sector housing system, which can be termed as “non-planned public sector housing”. This may be considered as an additional housing system to those listed in the theory chapter, namely: the market, the regulating market, the state controlled and the state controlled housing tied to employment.

A related finding is regarding the size of the settlements and the vulnerability of the dwellers. The study found that the investigated inner-city settlements were large in size and were predominantly occupied by low income households. In the description of Marris (1981) the slum type of “small sized neighbourhoods with poorly built houses” partly

explains the inner-city settlements of Addis Ababa. The majority of the *chika* houses are “poorly built” but the size of the neighbourhoods is not “small”. The description of the UN-Habitat (2003a), beyond size and the condition of the houses, has included other important categories such as: origin and age, location and boundaries, legality and vulnerability and development stage. While some of the variables explaining these categories describe the inner-city settlements of Addis Ababa others do not. For example, the category “legality and vulnerability” described slums as if they are always “illegal and informal” while in the case areas it was found that the *kebele* housing have through time evolved into the combination of formal and informal. Adapting the UN-Habitat’s (2003a:85) categories of spatial types and based on the data from the case areas a spatial type for the inner-city slums of Addis Ababa is developed (See Table 8.1.)

**Table 8.1: Description of the spatial type of the case areas**

1	<i>Origin and age</i>	Old settlements dominated by deteriorated formalised informal houses ( <i>kebele</i> housing)*
2	<i>Location and boundaries</i>	Central
3	<i>Size and scale</i>	Large slum settlements
4	<i>Legality and vulnerability</i>	Combination of formal and informal, predominantly occupied by legal tenants with a degree of tenure security*
5	<i>Development stages</i>	Upgraded slums with ongoing community and /or government*-led development

\*Descriptions added based on the findings of the study

Another finding in relation to the characteristics of inner-city settlements is regarding the mobility of the dwellers. The study confirmed Eckstein’s (1990) observation that there was a reversal of the spatial model theorized in the 1960s, and that inner-city slums are not any more “places of despair” or temporary transitory accommodations. The majority of the tenants in the case areas have been living in their respective localities for more than ten years. This was contrary to the spatial models theorized by Stokes (1962) and Turner (1967) in which the inner-city tenants often aspire to move out of the “slums of despair” to the “peripheral squatter settlements of hope”. The stability of the dwellers is

related to the history and development of the *kebele* housing, the extremely low rents and the level of tenure security the dwellers enjoyed.

***Characteristics of upgrading approaches***

According to the classification of upgrading of existing settlements discussed in the Theory chapter, the upgrading approaches of Kirkos and Menen can be classified under “comprehensive upgrading”, while that of Kolfe under “piecemeal”. One of the main critiques on comprehensive upgrading, by Spence, et al. (1993) was that the mobilisation of the energies and resources of the low-income people, without considering their priorities, leads to lack of commitment and early failure. Similarly, the concern of UN-HABITAT (2003a) was the general lack of sustainability (understood, here, as continuity) of interventions. It is true that comprehensive upgrading tend to include many elements with the justification of interlinkage. But the inclusion of pre-planned and uncalled for elements, as stated by Spence, et al. and as witnessed in Kirkos and Menen, leads to lack of commitment. However, the success and continuity of upgrading, as stated by Spence et al., does not necessarily depend on the consideration of priorities; because this may not necessarily lead to a continued commitment. It is rather dependent, as observed in the case areas, on identifying a component that could trigger a chain of actions. In this regard, below, some of the idealised assumptions of upgrading approaches, as practiced in Addis Ababa in general and in the case areas in particular, are discussed. Further, additional characteristics of the investigated upgrading approaches such as paradoxes observed and the hesitation of the need to improve *kebele* houses and their influence on the approaches are discussed.

*Idealised assumptions of the upgrading approaches and the reality:* Both the government- and NGO-initiated interventions were based on the assumption that there exists a cohesive community that will positively respond to the initiatives, simply because the aims are good. With this assumption, EDOs went to the extent of demanding mandatory contributions from the dwellers. The other assumption, which is more to do with the NGO-initiated interventions, is the claim of “integrated” upgrading. Here reference is made to IHA-UDPs



claim of “integrated and holistic” and RBE’s similar claim of “integrated, child-centred community development”. Not only these, they also assumed that eventually the “communities” would take over of the “projects” and ensure continuity.

However, in the cases of RBE's interventions what occurred in reality was far from the assumptions. The dwellers, rather than repeating similar projects, took the housing object (the end result of the “projects”) as their starting point for subsequent activities. The house component became a starter of subsequent actions or in the words of Hamdi (2004), a “trigger of change”. Therefore, it can be said that what RBE thought of as a project output had become a “trigger” for pursuing an open ended upgrading process. Particularly, the Kirkos project was evaluated by RBE itself as a failure. But as demonstrated in this study it has rather served as a starter of other projects and as a basis for the emergence of development-oriented organizations – the SACC and KMTC.

The key outcome of the triggers of change was thus the fact that they created an imperative for the dwellers to act collectively. The grassroots organizations<sup>143</sup> in the case areas were not pre-emptive organizations. They were rather the results of the triggers of change; hence in this study they are referred as trigger-based, emergent grassroots organisation. In Kirkos, the self-established SACC and the KMTC, in Menen the Menen SACC and in Kolfe *Tesfa’s* coalition of *iddirs* are all emergent grassroots organizations established out of necessity. They came into existence to consolidate the benefits engendered by the triggers of change. They can also be considered as emergent communities in which dwellers mobilized themselves into an organised society to pursue their interest. In this regard they can be referred as “communities of interest”.

*A paradox in a dynamic context:* The investigation of the upgrading processes in the case areas has demonstrated the existence of a paradox between the need for individual house extension and the collective good. In Kirkos and Kolfe the dwellers were relatively free to extend their houses. By doing so they were able to generate more income and satisfy the need for larger space. However, these uncontrolled extensions were not conducive to the

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<sup>143</sup> By grassroots organisation, here it is meant an organisation constituted and led by the local dwellers for the primary benefit of the same.

collective good. On the other hand, in Menen unauthorized extensions were effectively controlled and the overall settlement was in a better condition. However, the fact that the dwellers were law abiding had a negative effect, at the individual level. They were stuck, at least for twenty years, in limited rooms despite the need for more space and income generation. In the case of Kirkos and Menen, the house designs did not consider future needs. They were not flexible enough to accommodate the future need for expansion. In Kolfe, the upgrading approach has not included any design or planning element, at all. They were constructed by semi-skilled persons without any drawings. Therefore, it can be asserted that the lack of proper housing designs, as a full-fledged part of the upgrading approaches, has greatly contributed to the paradox.

*Upgrading without houses:* The improvement of dilapidated houses is one of the main components of upgrading processes. Unlike the usual practice, however, in the case of Addis Ababa the upgrading of existing houses was not included in the government-driven upgrading approaches, described in the Background Study chapter. The EDOs' neighbourhood upgrading and the ECO-city projects were intended to upgrade the inner-city settlements save the existing houses. Parallel to these the GHP's plan was, instead of upgrading the existing houses, to replace them by multi-storeyed condominium houses. The exclusion of the houses from being upgraded is mainly attributed to the ambitious plans of the previous master plans and the current “master plan's” ambiguity regarding the fate of the existing inner-city houses. In the absence of a clear housing policy the upgrading approaches are simply driven by the lingering traces of guidelines of outdated master plans and the current master plan's blanket labelling of intervention areas without details. On the contrary the NGO-initiated upgrading processes of IHA-UDP, RBE and *Tesfa*, despite the blurred guidelines to exclude inner-city houses, had all included the improvement of houses. Nevertheless, in the absence of clear housing policy (that includes upgrading) and standards and planning rules that emanate from such policies, their efforts were beset by fear of displacement and lack of professionalism, co-ordination and questions of ownership. Therefore, it can be asserted that one of the main characteristics of the upgrading in the

inner-city of Addis Ababa is the exclusion of the upgrading of inner-city houses by the government or, in the face of uncertainty, a limited intervention by NGOs.

### **8.2.2. Relationship between actors and tenants' responses**

#### ***Relationship between actors***

In the above discussion, how communities of interests have emerged in the case studies and their influence on upgrading was highlighted. The emergence of a community of interest, however, does not mean that the upgrading process will proceed smoothly. Other actors could emerge with divergent or conflicting interests to that of trigger-based, emergent grassroots organizations (development-oriented actors). In Kirkos, within the same locality there was the community of resistance of the IBs that mobilized itself to oppose the claim of the HBs. Further, the *kebele* administration was another actor that was opposing the cause of the HBs, for its own interest. The prevalence of conflicts of interests, however, is not limited within the boundaries of a given local community. For example, the AACA is an external actor which has been spreading a lingering fear of displacement among the dwellers of the case areas through its local development plans. On the other hand, in Kolfe there was relatively good collaboration both within the locality and with outside actors such as NGOs. One of the main reasons for this was the fact that the main trigger of change was the issue of HIV/AIDS. Fighting HIV/AIDS is a common interest to all the actors: to *Tesfa*, to its partner NGOs and the government. The lesson from this is that the more the trigger of change is of common interest to all concerned actors the more collaboration could be forged. Therefore, it can be asserted that the degree of collaboration among actors is dependent on the extent a trigger of change is of common interest to all concerned; and not whether the purpose is good i.e., effective partnerships begin with a discovery of a trigger of change that is of common interest.

#### ***Tenants' responses***

One of the central issues regarding tenants' responses was to investigate the extent and characteristics of the responses in the improvement of non-planned settlements. The second related aspect was to know why and how the tenants were stimulated to invest their time,

energy and resources in upgrading. The discussion below synthesises the findings regarding these issues and discusses their implications; whenever applicable comparisons, between the HBs and IBs, are made.

*Motivation of tenants:* In Kirkos and Menen the HBs’ response to upgrading was primarily driven by the sheer desire of ultimately securing the housing ownership. They were not viewing the housing for its use-value only. They were also thinking of it as a future asset with increased property value that could be sold at a profitable price if and when the need might arise. Thus, its exchange-value was also at stake. The anticipated increase in exchange-value of the newly constructed housing has thus contributed to motivating the HBs to both abide by the rules and regulations of the respective SACCs and to positively respond to upgrading initiatives and invest in maintenance. Let alone the HBs, the fact that the majority of the IBs of the three cases have also invested in the maintenance of their individual houses showed that the tenants were generally willing to dedicate their energy and resources (See Table-8.2).

**Table 8.2: Comparison between Kirkos, Menen and Kolfe, distribution by house maintenance**

Maintenance		Kirkos		Menen		Kolfe	
		Freq.	%	Freq.	%	Freq.	%
HBs	Yes	101	99.0	100	100.0	4	80.0
	No	1	1.0	-	-	1	20.0
Total		102	100.0	100	100.0	5	100.0
IBs	Yes	79	96.3	88	97.8	24	66.7
	No	3	3.7	2	2.2	12	33.3
Total		82	100.0	90	100.0	36	100.0

On the other hand the breadth and depth of the HBs’ involvement was greater. In the case of *Tesfa*, the motivation of its members in pursuing their cause has to do with two main issues: 1) the risk of being expelled from *iddir* membership, thus denial of support

(advantages of social network); and 2) the increase in the number of deaths of HIV/AIDS victims. What was at stake was, therefore, mutual support and the funds of the *iddirs* affected by the rate of HIV/AIDS inflicted deaths.

The higher degree of response of Kirkos’ and Menen’s HBs and Tesfa’s *iddir* members shows that the more the dwellers foresee a higher individual benefit the more their response to the need for upgrading (See Table – 8.3). They responded to the needs for upgrading of their environment to the extent that they perceived a benefit of some value to them.

**Table 8.3: Comparison between HBs and IBs by self-initiated upgrading**

Self –initiated upgrading		HBs		IBs	
		Freq.	%	Freq.	%
Kirkos	Yes	67	65.7	45	54.9
	No	35	34.3	37	51.1
	Total	102	100.0	82	100.0
Menen	Yes	50	50.0	40	44.4
	No	50	50.0	50	55.6
	Total	100	100.0	90	100.0
Kolfe	Yes	5	100.0	16	44.4
	No	-	-	20	55.6
	Total	5	100.0	36	100.0

Three conflicting basic theoretical assertions were presented regarding the involvement of tenants in upgrading processes: 1) Tenants do not contribute to the improvement of their surroundings, or dwellers can only contribute to the improvement of their surrounding if they are owner occupiers, 2) Tenants have the incentive to invest in upgrading (Eckstein, 1990) and 3) Tenants contribute to upgrading as long as there is some kind of tenure security.

Andreasen (1996) indicated that tenants lack motivation for the improvement of their houses and their surroundings. This was found partly true. Here distinction is made between getting motivated in investing at the level of the individual house and the higher goal of contributing to the betterment of the overall settlement. The findings from the case studies indicate that the IBs were motivated to invest in their individual houses. This partly contests Andreasen’s assertion. But on the other hand the fact that they were not equally motivated to invest in their surroundings, in the sense of contributing for the collective good, confirms Andreasen’s concern regarding the betterment of the overall settlements. The point is that tenants were motivated to respond to the needs for the improvement of their settlements only when the status of their property rights was improved. Thus, generalizations such as “tenants do not invest for the improvement of their environment” do not hold true - they do invest, but it could be limited to their individual houses.

The above finding that tenants do invest in their individual houses confirms the findings of Eckstein (discussed in the Theory chapter). What is clear from Eckstein’s finding is that the tenants were involved in the improvement of their individual houses. Eckstein, however, did not elaborate on the continuity of their responses and the need for addressing the multi-pronged challenge that involves more than the improvement of individual houses. This study, on the other hand, has revealed the key elements required to stimulate and sustain dwellers responses in the upgrading of both their individual houses and their surroundings.

Payne (2002) argued that tenure security is a key element for unleashing the resources of dwellers in the improvement of their surrounding. In the context of Addis Ababa (state land and housing ownership) it is generally believed that there is a degree of tenure security. As mentioned earlier it is also true that tenants invest in their immediate houses. However, tenure security alone was not enough in committing tenants to long term involvement. It was the improved property rights combined with other factors that enabled them to sustain their responses and engage in the positive transformation of their surroundings.

Property rights include use right and transaction right. These rights, based on their degree of formality, are in turn related to the use- and exchange-value of a house.

Considering a continuum, informality without property rights, at the one end, would entail suppression of the use- and exchange-value (transaction right) while private ownership deeds, at the other end, would unleash both the use and exchange-values. In the theory chapter, in relation to Turner's position on self-help, it was discussed that when it comes to low-income housing and its upgrading much emphasis was given to its use-value. This was criticized among others by Burgess (1982) in favour of the understanding of housing in terms of the "dialectical interaction" between the use- and exchange-value and the full recognition of a house as a commodity. The contention of Burgess was confirmed in the study that the use-and exchange-values were both at work in motivating the dwellers. In addition to this one of the important findings of this study is the discovery of, what is temporarily termed, exclusive-right. Exclusive-right, here, is used to express the right to prohibit others from exercising control over a property. While use-right and transaction-right of a property bestow one the benefit of use-value and exchange-value, respectively; exclusive right bestows the entitlement to exclude other actors. In addition to the use- and exchange-rights, exclusive-right was found important in understanding tenants' motivation for responding in upgrading processes.

The discovery of the exclusive-right is based on the analysis of the realities of the case studies in which different actors claimed the ownership of the housing component. Particularly in Kirkos and Menen the question as to who had the right (entitlement) to exclude the other actors was crucial in setting in motion the interrupted upgrading processes. The exclusive-right was manifested both at a group and household levels. At the group level it was manifested in the struggle among the HBs, IBs and the respective *kebeles* for lack of clarity of the exclusive right over the RBE-built properties. At the household level it was manifested in the form of preference of women over men, for example, in Menen the fact that women were entitled to exclude men over the potential house ownership. But this is not to say that the use- and exchange value were of less importance. The use-value (what it does – the performance of the housing) was important in all cases, for example in generating income through letting a room. In Kirkos and Menen the exchange-value of the houses that could be cashed in, upon securing property deeds, was the additional motive for the HBs in continuing the interrupted upgrading processes. In

Menen the use-value, the exchange-values and the exclusive right were interacting with relatively better clarity. In Kirkos only the use-value and, to some extent the exchange-value, was interacting while in Kolfe only the use-value was at work. The insight gained is that a property right which secures or unleashes a higher number of the above mentioned rights/values has a better chance in stimulating the response of the dwellers.

*Mechanism of responses:* Parallel to the motivations what was equally important was the mechanisms through which the dwellers were made to commit themselves to related upgrading activities. In Menen, the fact that the houses were made non-transferable for twenty years has enabled the SACC to continue providing micro finance services and involve itself in *kebele*-initiated upgrading. In Kirkos, the fact that the SACC managed to take over the administration of the properties, and that it had in its hands the unsettled issue of ownership (that include transaction- and exclusive right) have contributed to keeping the SACC alive and, at least in providing micro-finance services.

Andreasen (1996) has argued that the formation of tenants’ organizations was not given due attention with the justification that they may not have much effect in settlement upgrading. Even when available, Gilbert (1990) argued that tenants’ organizations in general do not seem to have played the same significant role as in squatter associations and neighbourhood groups. Taking into consideration the concept of emergent grassroots organizations the ineffectiveness of tenants’ organisations would not be surprising, as they usually are pre-existing – not established with a specific link to a trigger of change.

In the discussion below the influence of the above identified themes on spatial transformations will be elaborated.

### **8.2.3. Influence of upgrading processes on spatial transformations**

In the theory chapter it was discussed that the upgrading theories of the 1960s were mainly based on empirical observations of peripheral squatter settlements that were developed on a grid-iron layout (Payne, 1989) and a “family on a plot” housing type with reasonably large plot sizes (Mukhija, 2001). The influence of the self-help theory on the marginalization of tenants and inner-city slums was also discussed. Further it was indicated that self-help’s



implication had gone to the extent that when upgrading projects were implemented in tenant dominated areas it was with owner-occupiers in mind. This study, by including a research question regarding the influence of upgrading processes on tenant-dominated settlements, was able to identify key themes of the upgrading processes that played important roles in the transformation of the case areas, thereby deepening our understanding of upgrading processes in tenant dominated inner-city settlements.

The upgrading processes in all of the case areas were investigated with the full recognition of the responses of the different involved actors. The relationships both among the actors and between the actors and upgrading interventions have inevitably influenced spatial transformations. Each of the cases had their own main actors whose interaction shaped the respective upgrading processes. In all cases the actors were taking decisions depending on their specific interests irrespective of the initial goal of the upgrading interventions. Incoherence of decisions and actions taken at different levels within the state apparatus, and between the state and the other actors had their own influences in the spatial transformations. In Kirkos, the *kebele's* mishandling of the project and the response of the self-established SACC; in Menen, the strength of the Menen SACC and its strong capacity to negotiate with city officials; in Kolfe, despite the relatively smooth relationship between *Tesfa* and the *kebele*, the *kebele's* indifference to recognizing the relocated households, had all influenced the spatial transformations.

Further, the planning and focus of the upgrading approach in each of the case area has influenced the spatial transformation in its own way. In Kirkos the divergent and conflicting interests of the actors and the focus of the RBE's project in the housing use-value only had manifested itself in rampant uncontrolled transformations. This was aggravated by the lack of clear legal provisions (terms of agreement), absence of an effective implementing organization and the *kebele's* incapacity to enforce general planning rules. Thus, both the HBs and the IBs have been involved in uncontrolled housing extensions and outbuildings. Similar situation was also observed in the case of Kolfe (See Table 8.4). It was only Menen's HBs that were restrained from unauthorized transformations. While the IBs were engaged in transformations, the HBs were not (See Table 8.5). This is due to the presence of clearly outlined rules regarding transformation.

But the mere existence of rules was not enough. It required an able implementing organisation, the Menen SACC.

**Table 8.4: Comparison between Kirkos and Kolfe by house extension\***

House extension	Kirkos				Kolfe**	
	HBs		IBs		HBs	
	Freq.	%	Freq.	%	Freq.	%
Yes	14	13.7	35	42.7	5	100.0
No	88	86.3	47	57.3	-	-
Total	102	100.0	82	100.0	5	100.0

\* Admitted by dwellers. However, it was visually observed that there was much higher level of extensions.

\*\*The housing extension of the IBs is not included because the maintenance of the houses was completed in 2004. Hence, it was too early for extensions to happen. Though the houses of the HBs were also completed at about the same time their condition, however, was different.

**Table 8.5: Comparison between the HBs and the IBs by house extension (Menen)**

House extension	HBs		IBs	
	Freq.	%	Freq.	%
Yes	2	2.0	22	24.4
No	98	98.0	68	75.6
Total	100	100.0	90	100.0

In Menen, the HBs have been respecting the rules because they were part of a trigger-based, emergent grassroots organization which has been pursuing the benefit that can be gained from housing ownership (exchange value). Similarly, in Kirkos, the detrimental housing transformations were curbed following the SACC’s take over of the RBE built houses. On the other hand, where there was no hope of ownership i.e. in the

cases of the IBs there were uncontrolled housing transformations. Therefore, the hope for acquiring improved property rights or the perception of private housing ownership (improved use- and exchange-value) has played a key role in curbing uncontrolled housing transformations.

In Menen, the fact that the HBs were not allowed to transform their houses prior to the acquisition of the property deed, in the short term, had a negative effect. Households, particularly those in single rooms, were stuck in that they could not add a room with the increase of family size or the need to generate more income. This is mainly due to the rigid design of the housing. But, at the block and settlement levels the prohibition of transformation had contributed to the collective good of the dwellers. Shared useful common spaces, access roads and the overall quality of the cluster and neighbourhoods remained in a very good condition. These had also contributed to the sense of pride of the dwellers, who were always happy to show off their orderly and clean clusters. Nevertheless, the fact that the housing design was either rigid (in Menen and Kirkos) or left to be coincidental (in Kolfe) has either constrained the expansion need of the dwellers or has contributed to spontaneous extensions.

At the settlement level, in Menen and Kirkos, the upgrading interventions had significant impact. The pavements of access roads, use of durable construction materials, and provision of housing and social facilities have lent the settlements a distinct feature. The RBE built housing and facilities were easily identifiable. Since the houses were double storied and constructed with fair-faced hollow concrete blocks they were different from the rest, which are generally single storied *chika* houses. Kirkos being relatively denser than Menen lacked open common spaces. The new houses were built on pocket lands or on demolition; therefore they lacked a principle of organization and open spaces. In Menen, on the other hand, most of the newly constructed houses were built around common spaces forming a cluster of three or four blocks. In Kolfe since the upgraded houses were scattered throughout nine *kebeles*, at the settlement level the spatial impact was not noticeable.

Earlier in relation to tenants' response it was emphasized that a property right which unleashes a higher number of housing values has a better chance in stimulating responses. In addition to this of equal importance was the mode in which the interactions of these

values were formulated and their relationship with the other elements of the upgrading processes. The values’/rights’ mode of interaction, here, refers to the way the values were manipulated, for example, in the case of Menen the freezing of the exchange-value for a twenty year period and the way this is synchronized with the use-value of the housing and the exclusive right of the women. The “relationship with the other elements” refers to the administration of the values by the emergent organizations, the use of flexible design and the legal framework required in managing the relationship. Thus, it can be asserted that to the extent that an upgrading process includes improved property rights and flexible design, managed by emergent grassroots organizations; and to the extent that clear rules and regulation exist the chances of having positive spatial transformation, both at the individual and collective levels, is higher. On the other hand, if we just consider the mobilisation of community of interest, without focusing on housing and spatial transformation, positive transformation may not necessarily depend on improved property rights. It may rather primarily depend on social-value – the advantages sought from *iddir* membership, such as in the case of Kolfe. (See Table 8.6, for a summary of the preceding sections).

**Table 8.6: Summary of actors' relationship, dwellers responses and spatial transformation**

	Kirkos		Menen		Kolfe	
	HBs	IBs	HBs	IBs	HBs	IBs
<b>Triggers of change</b>	Housing	No	Housing	No	Advantages of social network & HIV/AIDS (for both HBs & IBs)	
<b>Property rights unleashed</b>	Use-right, Vague transaction right & Vague exclusive right	Use-right	Use-right, Transaction right & Exclusive right	Use-right	Use-right	Use-right
<b>Dwellers' response</b>	Emergent grassroots organization	SACC & KMTC	No	SACC	No	Coalition of <i>iddirs</i> (for both groups)
	Spatial transformation	Uncontrolled transformation curbed at a later stage	Uncontrolled transformation both at the individual and collective levels	No uncontrolled transformation	Uncontrolled transformation both at the individual and collective levels	Uncontrolled transformation both at the individual and collective levels
<b>Actors</b>	With divergent & conflicting interests		With less conflicting interests		With common interest	

### 8.3. Synthesis of findings and implications for practice and policy

#### 8.3.1. Implications to practice: towards trigger-based upgrading processes

Integrated upgrading projects such as those implemented by RBE are often practiced with the justification that the challenges of the poor are often interlinked and thus main components such as housing, health, education and income generation should be tackled simultaneously. RBE's upgrading projects in Kirkos and Menen were conducted with this framework. However, upgrading has not been well served by prescriptive integrated

projects. One of the main challenges of integrated projects is that they require well developed institutional structure and a local community with solidarity and social cohesion. In non-planned low income settlements both are usually absent. Thus, as witnessed in Kirkos, and to a lesser degree in Menen, RBE’s projects fell short of meeting the preset objective of ensuring the welfare of the children. On the other hand, post phase out the dwellers made a selective choice of the housing component and continued the upgrading processes albeit in an incremental way.

The basic characteristic of triggers of change is that they have the potential for initiating a chain of activities – the ripple effect. In Kirkos, the interest in the housing ownership (trigger of change) was followed by the formation of the SACC. The SACC has then managed to secure the property transfer from the *kebele*. Parallel to this it started micro-finance services and has contributed towards the settlement’s physical upgrading. Latter, in its efforts to circumvent legal challenges and to further pursue various upgrading activities, the SACC leaders established the KMTC. In Menen, the SACC has managed to successfully cater for micro-finance services and work towards securing the private ownership of the properties. It was also instrumental in controlling unauthorised spatial transformations and in collaborating with the *kebele* administration in infrastructure development. In Kolfe, *Tesfa’s* upgrading from the outset was incremental. Achievable goals were set progressively. Initially, *Tesfa’s* activities were related to securing the burial provisions of the destitute elderly. Then the focus shifted to include HIV/AIDS, the root cause of the dwindling funds of the member *iddirs*. This was consolidated by assisting the elderly (for example, through the upgrading of their houses and the provision of health facilities) which were the care takers of HIV-orphaned grandchildren. Continuing “doing the doable” and learning by doing *Tesfa* later started assisting the orphans by providing school uniforms, food rations, and cash handouts.

From these experiences it can be asserted that emergent grassroots organizations (communities of interest) that mobilize themselves around a “trigger of change”, in reality tend to function incrementally by setting achievable progressive goals. This way, unlike the outputs of integrated projects that risk mismanagement, the incremental projects of the communities of interest that capitalize on triggers of change have more chance to set in

motion a positive and uninterrupted process of change. The lessons learned indicate that unlike in the conventional project-based upgrading, a trigger-based upgrading process should acknowledge the diversity and asymmetrical relationships of actors and it should focus on process approach to project design, implementation and learning (Table 8.7 compares the design of conventional projects with that of trigger-based upgrading process)

**Table 8.7: Comparison between conventional projects and the implication of the lessons learned from the case studies**

	<b>Conventional projects</b>	<b>Trigger-based upgrading process</b>
<b>Assumptions</b>	Idealized pre-emptive community	Emergent grassroots organizations
	Patron – client (beneficiary) relationship	Multiple actors with the possibility of mutual, divergent or conflicting interests
	Partnership and participation just because the purpose is good	Mutual responses based on common interest
<b>Planning</b>	Time-bound	Open ended process
	Everything has to have an answer	Learning by doing
	Static, compartmentalized components	Dynamic nontext, multiple realities, and continuity
	Integrated pre-planned project	Incremental process
	Idealized goals	Pragmatic progressive goals

Second column, adapted from Hamdi (2004) and the third column converges, to some degree, with his assertions (ibid).

Literature is replete with recommendations in favour of community-based upgrading. The concept of “community” as used in the “community based upgrading” should be challenged as to whether it is an “emergent community” or an imagined homogeneous community. An emergent community, as mentioned earlier, presupposes the precedence of “triggers of change” while an imagined community is based on the usual belief that local dwellers share similar values and concerns. However, in the urban setting the dwellers usually have divergent interests and asymmetrical relationships both internally and with external actors. What the study demonstrated is that “communities with shared

vision” rather tend to emerge following triggers of change. Therefore, an upgrading activity does not become successful just because it is “community-based”.

In the late nineteenth century Ferdinand Tönnies (1988) theorized that in the development of systems of culture, communities invariably move from a period of *Gemeinschaft*, where shared experience and likeness are most important, toward a period of *Gesellschaft*, where individuals exist in isolation from each other. In the second type of relationship there is a strong sense of competition, collaborations are contractual, and monetary values prevail. Such a progression has been observed by others as well. This was also confirmed in the case studies in which it was demonstrated that dwellers were only organized into a community of interest when they envisioned the possibility of individual benefit.

Therefore, communities most likely do not mobilize their resources and energy just because the agenda and goal of the upgrading is “good”. That is why conventional upgrading projects often “fail”. They assume a *Gemeinschaft* type of community in which all its members rally behind the good purpose of the project. What the study showed is that communities committed to upgrading processes apparently emerge, as mentioned earlier, when they are convinced that the benefits outweigh the energy and resources spent. The implication of this is that it is better to focus, right from the outset, on triggers of change that could magnetize dwellers to form communities of interest (emergent grassroots organizations) rather than spend time on pre-planned integrated projects with pre-emptive answers and that visualize imagined communities.

### **8.3.2. Implications to policy**


The study demonstrated how critical the grassroots people are in analyzing their situations and how effective they are in finding solutions. It showed that a rich knowledge can be gained from small micro level processes. These localised processes can be designed to produce more long-term, strategic impact. Policies are the means through which these processes could be made to have deeper and wider influence. To this effect policies that recognize and effectively explore the capabilities and resources of the dwellers, both actual



and potential, should be formulated. However, as witnessed in the case studies the local governments, far from encouraging and facilitating these capabilities, are rather resisting them clinging to the old role of control. Therefore, the next step is to develop a policy which incorporates this potential and suggest operational mechanisms which can institutionalize the process.

Based on the findings of this study an appropriate framework to analyse upgrading processes must consist of 1) triggers of change, 2) emergent grassroots organizations, 3) the recognition of the mutual determination that exists between the emergent grassroots organizations and other actors and 4) a differentiated and flexible policy that allows “inventive surprises” and emergence. Among the themes, at the initial stage, the triggers of change are of the utmost importance. However, once the process starts to roll a dynamic relationship develops among all the themes (See Fig. 8.1). As an analytical framework, this is likely to be more robust in explaining the success or failure of the process of change and in suggesting appropriate policy responses. Below, some recommendations for policy formulation starting from the more specific to the more general are outlined.

**Fig. 8.1: Themes of a trigger-based upgrading process and their interaction**



***Settlement classification***

The study has shown that the *kebele* housing is a variant of the commonly known public housing with some of its own unique characteristics. It also highlighted that the size of the *kebele* housing-dominated inner-city settlements is rather large, and that they are not pockets within non-slum areas. Despite these, however, the current government-driven upgrading practices in Addis Ababa are either excluding the upgrading of inner-city houses (majority, *kebele* houses) or are providing blanket solutions, such as GHP’s condominium housing. Similarly, the NGO-initiated upgrading interventions have been limited in scope for the lack of clarity regarding which area is earmarked for what kind of intervention, and whether the improvement of houses is included. Therefore, classification of settlements, in consultation with all concerned actors, that appreciates both the magnitude and the diversity of non-planned settlements, is greatly needed. Such classification among others should take into consideration physical attributes, tenure status, legality and vulnerability, which are essential for any intervention. The results of such classification would be useful for earmarking settlements for upgrading. This would relieve dwellers from the lingering fear of displacement emanating from the vague and ambitious assertions of politicians and planners which usually give the impression as if the whole inner-city is going to be renewed.

***Property rights: Between renting and owning***

One of the main difficulties of public housing has been its management and maintenance – this has been observed in the case of *kebele* housing and the public housing of several other countries. To get rid of the administrative problems as well as the subsidies it required many former socialist countries and some other countries had opted for privatization. However, in the theory chapter, based on the experience of countries that privatized their public sector housing, it was discussed that privatization was not generally in favour of the low-income people. The same can be said in connection to the titling of land. With regard to land titling one of Hernando de Soto’s critic, Gravois (2005), in his essay entitled, “Hey, Wait a minute: The Conventional Wisdom Debunked. The de Soto Delusion”, observed:

It turns out that titling is more useful to elite and middle-income groups who can afford to bother with financial leverage, risk, and real estate markets. For very poor squatters in the inner-city – who care most about day-to-day survival, direct access to livelihood, and keeping costs down – titles make comparatively little sense. These poorer groups either fall prey to eviction or they sell out, assuming they'll find some other affordable pocket of informality that they can settle into. The problem is, with titling programs on the march, such informal pockets are disappearing fast. So, the poor sell cheap or are evicted, then can't find a decent new place to settle, losing the crucial geographic advantage they once had in the labour market<sup>144</sup>.

To avoid such circumstances this study, based on the experience of Menen and Kirkos, recommends an intermediate option – a property right between renting and owning with the final goal of issuing private property deeds. As illustrated in the case of Menen this was possible by freezing the transaction-right for twenty years while unfolding the full potential of the use- and exclusion-right of the HBs. In this kind of arrangement however the role of an organization or a co-operative (run by the dwellers themselves) that temporarily owns the housing is of crucial importance. In the case of Kirkos and Menen, these co-operatives were the respective SACCs.

Here one could raise a question, if after some period of time, the dwellers are going to be issued private deeds aren't they ultimately ending up being victims of gentrification? The answer is, most probably, no; because, as illustrated in the case of Menen, the cooperative ownership right of twenty years has been insulating the settlements from the commercial housing market. During this period both the RBE- and government-initiated intervention are improving the settlements allowing the housing and "land" value to increase toward parity with the surrounding real estate market. Then, after the expiry of the twenty years time the members of the co-operative may get individual property deeds. By taking these incremental steps the dwellers can be protected from the shock of immediate gentrification. (The recommendation in this section is fully discussed in Elias, 2007).

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<sup>144</sup> Gravois, J. (2005). Washingtonpost, Newsweek Interactive Co. LLC. [www.slate.com/id/2112792/](http://www.slate.com/id/2112792/)

***The role of voluntary indigenous associations in scaling up***

The upgrading activities of the grassroots organizations, NGOs and the government so far are of limited coverage. There is an obvious need for achieving scale. In this regard the potential of *iddir* coalitions could be tapped (Elias, 2005), because the coalitions are based on widespread existing institutions. The strategy to achieve scale, however, should not be by expanding one coalition. For example, *Tesfa* is a coalition of 26 *iddirs*. If the membership remains open it can be expected that more and more *iddirs* would be interested to join. However, this could have its own drawback. If the membership of *iddirs* under *Tesfa* is not limited both in terms of spatial coverage and numbers, then its management capacity could be challenged. Besides, the more the area covered and the more membership, the more the risk that *Tesfa* may lose its intimacy and thus trust from inhabitants. The confidence in the leadership of the coalition is built on the personal neighbourliness among the leaders and inhabitants.

Therefore, the viable way could be through the establishment of as many manageable coalitions as possible. This can lead to a horizontal network of coalitions sharing experience with each other. Existing coalitions, such as *Tesfa*, may serve as pilot activities from which others can learn. A caution should be observed, however, in initiating *iddirs* to establish a coalition. Based on their past experience with former governments, *iddirs* are sceptical towards initiatives coming from the government, lest they be co-opted or exploited in the pretext of development partnership. Therefore, rather than a direct interference the role of the government could be that of creating enabling atmosphere, for example, easier legal procedures, facilitating acquisition of land etc. Similar paths could be followed with NGOs. They may play the role of facilitator without creating a sense of dependency. The potential of grassroots initiated projects in scaling up was also observed by d’Cruse & Sathertwaite (2005:69); they stated:

Pilot projects are often criticized for never moving beyond the pilot phase. When designed and implemented by external agencies this is often the case. But if they are planned within city-wide processes involving urban poor organizations, they become centres of experiment and learning that also serve as precedent and catalyst for action elsewhere. Observing the

first pilot projects can encourage other poor groups to start a savings group, to develop their own survey, to undertake a project – because they see people like them designing and implementing them.

It should be noted also that the establishment of a network of institutions that are trigger-based and agents of change is only one component for scale. There are additional components, which should be in place to achieve scale, among others political will, clarity of policies, institutional organization and financial readiness of city government.

### ***The role of design in mediating upgrading paradoxes***

The investigation of the cases has shown that design was not properly used as one of the tools in the upgrading of the settlements. In all the case studies the physical upgrading was carried out without cluster and settlement level design and planning studies. In Kirkos and Menen the focus was on the design of single house types while in Kolfe there was no design. Even when there was the design element, the designs were carried out the conventional way. The architect assumes that he knows everything and provides finished drawings, while in upgrading projects “participatory design” could have been more appropriate. By involving the “target group” in the design process more appropriate designs could be produced. Otherwise the result, more often than not, is the creation of static/rigid houses that are not responsive to the progressive demands of households. In this study households were either stuck in small sized rooms (the case of Menen) or were at liberty in satisfying their expansion needs in uncontrolled manner (the cases of Kirkos and Kolfe). The paradox was that at the block and settlement levels in Menen the overall housing condition was better than in Kirkos and Kolfe. This paradox could have been mediated had the designs taken into consideration households’ future incremental needs. It should be emphasized, however, the issue is not only about giving design and physical planning their right full position, but also about the training of professionals. It is not enough to call for flexible designs but the methods of achieving them should be dealt right at the source of the design professionals– in schools. The section below elaborates issues regarding the education of professionals.

### ***Education of professionals***

With the emphasis of the trigger-based upgrading process on the need of recognizing all actors (including the dwellers), as potential active agents of change, the training of experts needs overhauling. The need for differently educated professionals and change of mind set becomes of paramount importance. Students must learn to recognize the interests and contributions of the various emerging actors. Efforts should be made to improve four important components in the education of development practitioners, namely: training, curriculum, research and the development of teaching materials. Regarding training, instructors and students should make conscious effort in promoting context-specific curriculum or at least to adapt what they have learned abroad to the local context. It seems necessary that instructors should make efforts to enable students to develop modesty and empathy so that they may appreciate the role of every actor.

Concerning research currently, there is very little research on urban development except in cases when the government or NGOs commission some tasks to individual experts. The result of such operational research projects is simple assessment reports that will not be published. In fact there has been very little production of publishable material. Therefore, a mechanism should be sought by which university staff could be engaged in research areas which may benefit all sectors of the urban society, particularly the majority of the urban poor. The third component is the issue of curriculum. Despite the many revisions of curriculum witnessed in recent years (at least in the Department of Architecture and Urban Planning of the Addis Ababa University<sup>145</sup>) the issue of informal settlements and housing is still treated marginally. In a country where 70-80 percent of the population are living in non-planned settlements the issue of urban upgrading, housing etc. should in fact be central.

Fourth, at present the teaching materials available are mainly based on the context of developed countries. Textbooks and journals found in the libraries of the schools in many developing countries come from the developed world. It is contended here that, though research outputs on developing countries are increasing, they are still produced with paradigms that guide development in the developed world; hence their relevance is limited.

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<sup>145</sup> The home base of the researcher

Therefore, to break this vicious circle a conscious effort should be made in encouraging out-of-the-box contextual research. It is hoped also that as more researchers get engaged in context-based research, the local collection of teaching materials may gradually become visible parallel to the already existing ones. This will create a healthy environment where students could make comparisons of urban situations in different cultures. In conclusion, it is through a well studied interdependence among curriculum, professional training, research and teaching materials and methods that new findings regarding the urban challenge could easily be disseminated and implemented (For fuller discussion on the education of professionals and the urban challenges see Røe, 1985, 1995; Wubshet and Elias, 2006).

#### ***Legal framework and political will***

In Kirkos and Menen one of the main instruments for their post phase out responses were the RBE's project agreements. These legal documents had served in enabling the grassroots organisations in negotiating with the government agencies. In Kirkos, though the agreement was initially overlooked by the then *kebele* administration, later it served as a key document for acquiring the RBE-built properties. However owing to the vagueness of the agreement there were pending litigations. In Menen the agreements were relatively clearer making the tenants' response less challenging. In Kolfe, *Tesfa's* registration in 2000 with the AACA and in 2002 with the Ministry of Justice was the legal basis that enabled it to function as NGO and hence respond to the need for upgrading.

The current political will in upgrading the inner-city settlements is expressed in terms of the launching of various projects such as the EDO's infrastructure development, the ECO-city project and local development plans. Each of the programmes is done with specific Terms of References which do not emanate from an overarching legal framework. Therefore, political will by itself is not enough. It should be reflected in the country's overall legal and regulatory framework. The role of the government at the local level should largely be that of enabling that facilitates the smooth running of grassroots initiatives. For example, if *kebele* administrations could improve their role from that of control to that of facilitation the SACCs and *iddir* coalitions could easily be engaged in consolidating and expanding their upgrading initiatives. The government should facilitate

and create conducive legal and administrative conditions for the emergence and development of grassroots organizations that are able both to respond and to weigh the pressures from various actors and competing policy objectives to ensure equity.

***Upgrading processes and the need for an “urban resource centre” (URC)***

Currently in the case of Addis Ababa there are many upgrading activities on the ground, for example, among many others the infrastructure focused upgrading of the EDOs, the Eco-city projects conducted by sub-city offices, the local development plans of the Town planning and Inspection Department (formerly ORAAMP), the condominium housing of the AACA’s GHP and the various projects of NGOs, including the ones investigated in this study can be mentioned. What is lacking, however, is a system that is put in place to facilitate learning and the exchange of information and experience from all these processes. This could contribute, among others, towards scaling up and the avoidance of redundant efforts. It should be emphasised that URC’s are not mechanisms of co-ordination of initiatives, which are often cumbersome and unrealistic given the complexities prevalent on the ground. They are rather a hub for information exchange, learning and activism. Therefore the establishment of URC’s similar to that of Karachi founded by Arif Hassan (See BOX-8.1) is recommended.

***Housing policy and flexibility***

Reflecting the extremely fluid characteristics of the non-planned settlements, policies that incorporate the themes of the above discussed recommendations must be flexible, pragmatic and ready to incorporate whatever works. This requires simple bureaucracies and decision making structures and few rules. They should, according to the findings of this study, be flexible enough to respond to change and uncertainty reflecting the spontaneity and “inventive surprises” on the ground. They should be “enabling” rather than prescriptive - not idiosyncratic policies which set their own goal and plan to achieve it, rather policies that enable the experiences on the ground. Put otherwise, what is needed is a more differentiated set of policy options which reflect the different programmes which are already in practice.



**BOX-8.1: URC Karachi**

“The Urban Resource Centre is a Karachi-based NGO founded by teachers, professionals, students, activists and community organizations from low-income settlements. It was set up in response to the recognition that the planning process for Karachi did not serve the interests of low- and lower-middle-income groups, small businesses and informal sector operators and was also creating adverse environmental and socioeconomic impacts. The Urban Resource Centre has sought to change this through creating an information base about Karachi's development on which everyone can draw; also through research and analysis of government plans (and their implications for Karachi's citizens), advocacy, mobilization of communities, and drawing key government staff into discussions. This has created a network of professionals and activists from civil society and government agencies who understand planning issues from the perspective of these communities and other less powerful interest groups. This network has successfully challenged many government plans that are ineffective, over-expensive and anti-poor and has promoted alternatives. It shows how the questioning of government plans in an informed manner by a large number of interest groups, community organizations, NGOs, academics, political parties and the media can force the government to listen and to make modifications to its plans, projects and investments. Comparable urban resource centres have also been set up in other cities in Pakistan and also in other nations.” (Hassan (2007:275))

#### **8.4. Further research issues**

The subject of non-planned settlements is multi-pronged and too complex to handle through a single study. This study has covered issues regarding the characteristics of inner-city settlements and upgrading approaches, upgrading actors' relationship and tenants' response and the influence of upgrading on spatial transformations. Obviously, these are not the only key issues of inner-city upgrading. Therefore, below some suggestions, for further research, are made to indicate uncovered related key issue/s, or themes that could take a step further the subjects covered in this study.

*The role of the private sector:* The main actors involved in the upgrading of the case studies were the state, the local dwellers (“communities”) and NGOs. One potential actor, which had no active involvement in the case studies, was the private sector. Because of this

its response was not investigated. However, it is well known that, along side the government and the “community”, the private sector (market) is one of the pressure groups interested in intervening in the inner cities. Usually, the private sector intervenes in the inner-city looking for developed infrastructure and market opportunities. It would be useful to investigate as to what kind of role the private sector plays in inner-city upgrading and whether a win-win situation could be created between the interests of the private sector and that of the local dwellers who usually prefer to stay in the inner cities.

*Iddirs as a basis for local development:* the study has demonstrated that some *iddirs* are becoming the bedrock of coalitions that are registered as local NGOs. This has enabled them to engage themselves in development activities without compromising their traditional burial functions. *Iddirs* have potential to serve as a basis for city wide development efforts. However, given the history of *iddirs* and their relationship with governments, to what extent could *iddirs* be used as a basis for local development? What does it take to make them effective agents of development? (See also the following research issue for concerns raised in connection to *iddirs*.)

*Asymmetrical relationships within emergent grassroots organizations:* Emphasis was made in the study that local communities are not homogeneous. Based on this reality investigations were carried out that showed how different types of communities emerged within the same locality and how these communities influenced the upgrading processes. However, even emergent communities such as communities of interest hide a number of asymmetrical relationships of power based on aspects such as gender, social status, age, income level and various types of entitlements. Particularly regarding “traditional” organizations such as *iddir* the usual concern is their difficulty in automatically transforming or expanding their area of operation into development activities; and even if they manage to do so that they would be affiliated with a specific group of people based on class, religion and gender (Davidson,1993:38). In this vein, some concern was also expressed by d’Cruz & Satterthwaite (2005) that grass-roots organizations could be trapped in divisive “clique” formation unless guarded against this. Therefore, a research question could be posed to investigate the role of these aspects and their influence on upgrading processes.

*Financing:* The experience of the case studies and that of the EDO's has shown that dwellers, however limited, can make contributions both in the form of cash and kind. In initiatives that seek to provide affordable houses, however, the costs of the houses are far greater than the meagre income of the majority of the dwellers can afford. In this regard investigation on mechanisms through which the poor could afford decent housing is crucial. One possibility is through micro-finance. But this mechanism, important as it is in building the financial capacity of the poor, it is increasingly seen as a mechanism that only satisfies the short term needs of the poor. How far is this true? If this is true, what other long term financing mechanisms, different from the conventional banking system, could be created? In this regard, what is role of NGOs in assisting the poorest of the poor and the destitute living in extreme poverty?

*Land tenure and upgrading:* The investigation of this study was carried out with the consideration of a given context, a state ownership of land. Within this context more emphasis was made on the housing tenure and its relationship to upgrading processes. Similarly, investigation could be carried out that focuses on the advantages and disadvantages of state land ownership in relation to upgrading.

*Upgrading policy:* The current practice of upgrading is guided by sporadic and frantic guidelines, terms of references and project agreements specific to particular projects. These initiatives are good as far as they are working on the ground. However, the initiatives at some level should be able to inform policies that delineate legal framework, financial administration, institutional structure and actor relationships which are important for the enablement of further initiatives and the consolidation of existing ones. Therefore, research which documents the existing pragmatic guidelines and which investigates their pros and cons is imperative in order to suggest possible policy framework that has a built in flexibility for both getting informed and informing the many ongoing upgrading processes.



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## **APPENDICES**



## Appendix 1: Source and type of information collected

### Appendix-1A: Information from government institutions

Name of institution	Information collected	Analysis
<b>Federal level</b>		
Ministry of urban development and housing	Documents on urban related policies	Background study
Mapping authority	Aerial photos from different years	Case studies: Spatial transformation
Office for the sale of government houses	Proclamation on the sale of government houses	Background study: <i>Kebele</i> housing
Central statistics Authority	Statistics related to urbanization and housing	Background study: Urbanization trends and housing condition
<b>City level</b>		
AACA, Town Planning Preparation and Inspection Department	Maps and documents on urban upgrading and interview	Intervention areas, upgrading manual, growth trends of Addis Ababa
AACA Trade and Industry Development Bureau Environmental Development Office	Documents on EDOs' activities	Background study: Government initiates upgrading
AACA Information and culture bureau	Backdated newspapers and magazines	Background study and case studies
AACA Housing agency	Recent Statistics on <i>kebele</i> housing	Background study: housing condition
AACA Land Administration Authority		
AACA Urban management Institute	Documents on the condition of inner-city settlements	Case studies: existing housing and infrastructure condition
<b>Sub-city level</b>		
Kirkos, Gulele (Menen), Kolfe,	Documents and interviews	Case studies

Arada, and Lideta Sub-city offices	Documents, interviews, and workshops	Background study: Government-initiated upgrading
<b>Kebele level</b>		
<i>Kebele 13 (Kirkos), Kebele 14 (Menen) and Kebele 08 (Kolfe)</i>	Documents and interview (in the case of Kirkos only)	Case studies

### Appendix-1B: Information from NGOs, SACCs and *iddir* coalitions

Name of Organization	Information collected	Analysis
RBE	Documents and interview	Case study
Kirkos SACC leaders		
Menen SACC leaders		
Tesfa’s leaders		
IHA-UDP and CBISDO	Documents and interviews	Background study for NGO-initiated upgrading
ACORD-Ethiopia	Document	Background study: <i>Iddir</i> -initiated upgrading
<i>Addis Fana (Ferensai Legasion) iddir coalition (Woreda 12 Kebele 22)</i>	Document and interview	
<i>Akaki-Kaliti sub-city Iddir council chairman and Yedget Behebret Development Association Manager</i>	Document and interview	
<i>Woreda 03 Kebele 31 (Lideta sub-city kebele 11) iddir coalition chairman</i>	Interview	



**Appendix-1C: Information from dwellers**

<b>Informants</b>	<b>Information collected</b>	<b>Analysis</b>
Gate keepers in all cases	Interview (informal discussion)	Cases study
Selected key informants in all cases	Semi-structured interview	
Selected household heads in all cases	In-depth interview (Case history)	
Selected groups <i>kebele</i> 13 (Kirkos), <i>kebele</i> 14 (Menen)	FGD-interview	
Respondentshouseholds in all cases	Questionnaire	

## **Appendix-2: Interviews**

### **Appendix 2A: Questions for in depth interview with household heads, key informants, and FGDs**

- Personal history and key events including income and expenses, household size, length of household residency
- Availability and access to basic service such as school and clinic
- SACC or *Iddir* membership and relationship
- Tenure security, property right and perception of ownership
- Maintenance of house and common facilities
- The management and control of common spaces
- House extension and encroachment and their impacts

### **Appendix 2B: Questions for semi-structured interview with Kirkos and Menen SACC leaders and *Tesfa*'s leaders**

Origin and development of the SACC or *Tesfa*

- Activities and purpose
- Membership criteria
- Basic statistics on the number of members and their level of income, education etc.
- History of the upgrading process
- Tenure security, house ownership and property rights
- Criteria for the selection of “target group”
- The availability of legal framework (rules and regulations) and their implementation
- Relationship with government bodies, NGOs and your constituent members
- Maintenance of common properties and common spaces, procedure and responsibility
- Uncontrolled housing transformation control mechanism
- Involvement and contribution to upgrading initiatives
- Future plans

### **Appendix 2C: Questions for semi-structured interview with sub city and *kebele* leaders of the case areas**

- Statistics on demography, the quantity and type of houses and facilities, classification of households by housing tenure, classification of houses by function
- The minimum and maximum house rent, regularity of payment
- Housing and infrastructure maintenance: responsibility and procedure
- Subletting, extension and encroachment
- Ways of enforcing rules and regulations (implementation)
- Attitude of people towards rules and regulations
- Gap between rules and reality
- Utility connection and maintenance (water, electricity, sewage, telephone): procedure and responsibility
- Regarding *kebele*-initiated upgrading and the response of the dwellers
- The relationship between the *kebele*/sub-city administration and the SACCs /*Tesfa*

### **Appendix 2D: List of Interviewees**

- Ministry of Urban development and Housing Research Unit Head
- AACA, Town Planning Preparation and Inspection Department head
- Kirkos SACC chairman
- Kirkos SACC vice chairman
- Kirkos sub-city manager
- Kirkos sub-city Environmental Development Team leader
- Kirkos sub city, *kebele* 13-14 (Old *Woreda* 21, *kebele* 13) manager
- Kirkos sub city, *kebele* 13-14 (Old *Woreda* 21, *kebele* 13) Local Development Committee
- Menen SACC administrator
- Menen SACC assistant to the administrator
- *Woreda* 11, *Kebele* 14 (Menen) manager
- Gulele (Menen) sub-city Land administration head

- *Tesfa’s* executive director
- *Tesfa’s* administrator
- *Tesfa’s* Programme department head
- *Tesfa’s* Social section head
- *Woreda* 03 *Kebele* 31 (Lideta sub-city *kebele* 11) *iddir* coalition chairman
- Lideta sub-city (Teklehaimanot) Environmental Development Team leader
- Lideta sub-city (Teklehaimanot) Social and Civil Affairs Office Team leader
- CBISDO secretary (*Woreda* 03 *kebele* 30,41,42,43 or Lideta sub-city *kebele* 09/10)
- Joint Neighbourhood Group (*yetamera gurbetena buden*) chairman of *Woreda* 03 *kebele* 30,41,42,43 (extension of the IHA-UDP initiated upgrading)
- Akaki-Kaliti sub-city *Iddir* council chairman and *Yedget Behebret* Development Association Manager
- *Addis Fana* (Ferensai Legasion) *iddir* coalition (*Woreda* 12 *Kebele* 22 and 06 or Yeka sub-city *kebele* 01/02) secretary

#### **Attended meetings /workshops related to the study**

- Kirkos sub-city *Kebele* 03 and 20 ECO-city project presentation
- Arada sub-city *Kebele* 04/05 ECO-city project presentation
- Kolfe joint meeting between *Tesfa’s* leaders and the leaders of member *iddirs*  
*Tesfa’s* annual meeting with “target people”

#### **Libraries visited in Ethiopia**

- AACA Policy Study and Planning Commission Documentation Centre (A number of documents and maps were collected)
- Christian Relief and Development Agency (CRDA) library

### Appendix-3: Questionnaire

1. Household identification

Sub-city \_\_\_\_\_ Kebele \_\_\_\_\_ House No. \_\_\_\_\_ (New)  
Woreda \_\_\_\_\_ Kebele \_\_\_\_\_ House No. \_\_\_\_\_ (Old)

2. Household head, sex

1) Male \_\_\_\_\_ 2) Female \_\_\_\_\_

3. Number of years in the house

1) Below 5 years            2) From 5 to 10 years            3) From 11 to 15 years  
4) From 16 to 20 years    5) From 21 to 25 years            6) above 25 years

4. If there are co-dwellers (*debal*), then how many?

1) 1            2) 2            3) 3            4) Above 3

5. Household size, including dependants and co-dwellers

1) 1            2) 2            3) From 3 to 5            4) From 6 to 8            5) Above 8

6. Household's monthly average income in Birr

1) Below 270            2) 271 – 540            3) 541 – 1000  
4) 1001 – 1500            5) Above 1500

7. Source of income

1) Government            2) Private            4) Non-Governmental organization  
4) No income            5) Other \_\_\_\_\_

8. Function of house

1) Residence only            2) Both residence and commercial    3) Other \_\_\_\_\_

9. Floor area of house in m2 (excluding outdoor kitchen and toilet)

- 1) Up to 10      2) 11 - 20      3) 21 - 30  
4) 31 - 50      5) 51 - 70      6) Above 70

10. Number of rooms (excluding kitchen and toilet)

- 1) 1      2) 2      3) 3      4) Above 3

11. Owner of house, pre-upgrading

- 1) Kebele      2) NGO      3) SACC  
4) Private      5) Other \_\_\_\_\_

12. Owner of house, post upgrading

- 1) Kebele      2) NGO      3) SACC  
4) Private      5) Other \_\_\_\_\_

13. Mode of occupancy

- 1) Public rental      2) Private rental      3) Mortgage (Loan)  
4) Owner occupied      5) N.G.O. rental      6) Other \_\_\_\_\_

14. If rental, amount of monthly rent in Birr

- 1) Below 5      2) 6 - 10      3) 11 - 20  
4) 21 - 30      5) 31 - 50      6) Above 50

15. Has the monthly rent ever be increased?      1) Yes      2) No

16. Do you regularly pay your monthly rent?      1) Yes      2) No

17. If "no" to Q.16, then why not?

- 1) Financial shortage    2) Other \_\_\_\_\_

18. Have you totally stopped paying your monthly rent?

- 1) Yes    2) No

19. If “yes” to Q. 18, then number of years since you stopped paying?

- 1) Less than 1 year    2) 1 – 5 years    3) 6 – 10 years  
4) 11- 15 years    5) Above 15 years

20. If “yes” to 18, reason for stopping paying rent?

- 1) Shortage of income    2) Following upgrading by NGO  
3) The owner has never asked me to pay    4) Other \_\_\_\_\_

21. To whom do you pay rent / loan?

- 1) Kebele    2) Private    3) SACC    4) NGO  
5) Other \_\_\_\_\_

22. Availability of contract between owner and tenant?    1) Yes    2) No

23. If “yes” to Q. 22, then was there a change of contract after upgrading?

- 1) Yes    2) No

24. If “yes” to Q.23, what type of change?

- 1) The land lord shall not evict the tenant  
2) The land lord shall not increase rent because of the upgrading  
3) Upon the death of tenant, the contract can be transferred to the heirs of tenant  
4) All of the above    5) Other \_\_\_\_\_

25. Has the house ever been maintained (post upgrading)    1) Yes    2) No

26. If "yes" to Q. 25, which part?

- 1) External walls      2) Roof      3) Openings  
4) Floor              5) Partition walls   6) Ceiling      7) Other \_\_\_\_\_

27. If yes to Q. 25, who maintained the house?

- 1) Kebele              2) NGO              3) SACC  
4) Iddir              5) Tenant            6) Other \_\_\_\_\_

28. Post upgrading, was there house extension or modification?

- 1) Yes      2) No

29. If "yes" to Q. 28, what type?

- 1) Room addition                              2) Kitchen addition  
3) Internal room addition, both horizontal and vertical (*Kot*)   4) Toilet addition  
5) Other \_\_\_\_\_

30. Had the function of the house (fully or partially) been changed post upgrading?

- 1) Yes      2) No

31. If "yes" to Q.30, what type of change?

- 1) Partially, opening commercial activity                      2) Renting a room  
3) Other \_\_\_\_\_

32. Water connection

- 1) Individual water meter                      2) Shared water meter  
3) Buying from common water tap              4) Buying from a neighbour  
5) other \_\_\_\_\_

33. Telephone service

- 1) Private      2) Public      3) Kiosk  
4) None              5) From neighbour (receiving only)      6) Other \_\_\_\_\_



34. Sewer connection

- 1) Municipal system      2) Open ditch      3) Pit latrine (Septic tank)

35. Electricity connection

- 1) Individual electric meter      2) Shared electric meter  
3) Taping from a neighbour      4) None      5) Other \_\_\_\_\_

36. Kitchen

- 1) Private within house      2) Private within compound  
3) Shared within compound      4) No Kitchen

37. Toilet

- 1) Private within house      2) Private within compound  
3) Shared within compound      4) Public toilet      5) No toilet

38. Compound

- 1) Private      2) Shared      3) No compound

39. If the answer to Q. 38 is “shared”, then does the compound have fence?

- 1) Yes      2) No

40. If the answer to Q. 38 is “shared”, then whose responsibility is the management, control and maintenance of the compound?

- 1) Tenants      2) Kebele      3) N.G.O  
4) SACC      5) Other \_\_\_\_\_

41. If the answer to Q. 38 is “private” or “shared”, then has the compound ever be maintained?

- 1) Yes      2) No

42. If the answer to Q. 41 is "yes", then what type of maintenance?

- 1) Floor surface                      2) Fence  
3) Surface drainage                4) Other \_\_\_\_\_

43. Have you ever participated in *kebele* initiated upgrading?    1) Yes    2) No

44. If "yes" to Q. 43, then in what form? Contributing:

- 1) Money            2) Labour            3) Other \_\_\_\_\_

45. Have you ever participated in NGO/*Iddir* initiated upgrading?    1) Yes    2) No

46. If "yes" to Q. 45, then in what form? Contributing:

- 1) Money    2) Labour    3) Other \_\_\_\_\_

47. Have you ever taken an initiative by yourself or together with your neighbours in upgrading your settlement?

- 1) Yes    2) No

48. If "yes" to Q. 47, then what type of upgrading?

- 1) Roads                      2) kitchen and toilets                      3) Housing  
4) Drainage ditches                      5) Other \_\_\_\_\_

49. If "yes" to Q. 47, then in what form? Contributing:

- 1) Money    2) Labour    3) Other \_\_\_\_\_

50. The impact of the upgrading on your livelihood

- 1) Positive impact

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2) Negative impact

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
3) No impact


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Appendix-4: Terms of agreements


Appendix 4A: Project agreement between AACA (Municipality) and RBE







PART 2: PRINCIPLES AND ORGANIZATION

- 4) The Project shall be carried out in accordance with the laws of Ethiopia and the rules and regulations governing the MUNICIPALITY of Addis Ababa.
- 5) Under the Kebelle Executive Committee and Development Committee, the population of Kebelle 13 shall together with REDD BARNA undertake the planning of the project, establish the priorities between various options and actively participate in the implementation of such defined components. The participation in the implementation work is likely to be a combination of labour and matching of financial contributions from REDD BARNA.
- 6) A Project Administrator, who will manage and coordinate the project, shall be employed by REDD BARNA, together with the required professional staff. The REDD BARNA staff shall give advice on planning and implementation and provide education and training through organized courses and on-site demonstrations.
- 7) It is expected that the Kebelle Administration shall liaise closely with the REDD BARNA project staff, and will be active in mobilisation of the Kebelle population. The Office bearers of the Kebelle will have the responsibility of ensuring that the Kebelle population understand the implications of this Agreement.
- 8) A Project Advisory Committee, composed of the following, shall be established:
  - The Kebelle Chairman
  - The Kefetegna Chairman
  - The Resident Representative of REDD BARNA
  - The Project Administrator of REDD BARNA
  - The Chairman of ICC
  - A second member of the Executive Committee of ICC.
 The Advisory Committee shall meet not less than 4 times a year, with a mandate of extending advise to the Project.



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- 14) In view of the non-availability of office accommodation within the Kebele the MUNICIPALITY shall ensure that REDD BARNA-ETHIOPIA will be given a plot of land for building the required office premises, within Kebele 13.
- 15) The MUNICIPALITY shall indemnify REDD BARNA and its personnel and hold them harmless against any liability, suits, actions, demands, damage, injury to persons or property, or any act or omission performed or made in the course of their duties. This provision excludes any criminal liability and pertains only to civil damage that arised in the implementation of the Project.
- 16) The MUNICIPALITY will refrain from increasing house rents or taxes as a result of the embetterment of the houses or infra-structures in the Kebele, until such time that the income of the Community as a whole raised enough to make increased dues feasible.
- 17) The MUNICIPALITY shall undertake to assign staff on a full time basis to draw up exsiting site plan and road network for the Kebele. This must be completed within three months after the signing of this Agreement. After a further six months the MUNICIPALITY shall undertake to have completed reparation and preparation of vehicular access roads within the Kebele according to its Site Plan.
- 18) The MUNICIPALITY shall try to avoid any new regulations relevant to the Project area that may off-set the Project objectives. However, any new regulations applied within the City will have the same effect in the Project area.
- 19) The MUNICIPALITY is the Institution responsible for integration and institutionalization of services and communal facilities created in the Kebele during the Project period.

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PART 5: GENERAL

20) An evaluation and re-appraisal of the Project will be undertaken by the Project Advisory Committee at the end of each year. The report of the Committee will be circulated to the concerned parties.

21) This Agreement will enter into force when duly signed by both parties. It can be terminated by either party upon six months written notice.

22) If any dispute arises relative to the interpretation of this Agreement, there shall be mutual consultations between the parties with the view of securing a successful realization of the Project's aims and objectives.

IN WITNESS THEREOF THE UNDERSIGNED, BEING DUELY AUTHORIZED THERETO BY THE RESPECTIVE PARTIES, HAVE SIGNED THE PRESENT AGREEMENT:

Addis Ababa, Day: 29 Month: July Year: 1983

For, and on behalf of  
REDD BARNA:

For, and on behalf of  
the MUNICIPALITY OF ADDIS ABABA:



**Appendix 4B: Terms of agreement between AACA, Woreda (Keftegna) 21, Kebele 13 (Kirkos) and RBE**

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 በረዳባርና ዕርጻ ታይቶ የሚያገናኘውን የሕዝብ አገልግሎት ተገባብሮ ማገድ  
 ለዘላቂ ተግባር ለማድረግ ለዚህ ተገባር በገንዘብ ቁጠባ የሚያገለገል ራሱን የገለጸ  
 የገንዘብ ምንጭ ማስፈለግ ታያቸው ረዳባርና የፕሮጀክት ዘመን ለከፍተኛ  
 ከቀበሌው ስለተቀረጸ በጎሳ የቀበሌው ስለተጻፈ ተረካብ ለሚገኝ የሌላውን  
 ተገባር ለዘላቂ አገልግሎት ለመስጠት እንዲችል ከሌሎች ስጦት የገንዘብ  
 ቁጠባ ሂሳብ ተክፍተው ሌላ ሌላ አገልግሎት የሚገኘው ገቢ ለገንዘብ ምንጭ  
 በሕዝብ ፍላጎት ላይ በመሠረት መገንዘብ ለቀበሌው ሌላውን ለሕብረተሰብ  
 አገልግሎት ለመስጠት እንዲችል የቀበሌውን የፕሮጀክት ስለተጻፈ የሚከተለውን  
 ጠያቂነት ለድርገቱ።

በሌላው አጠቃላይ

1. በቤት ሥራና የገንዘብ ቁጠባ ለገደብ ስጦት የቀበሌው ሂሳብ ተክፍተው በቀበሌ  
 13 ለሕዝብ በረዳባርና የፕሮጀክት ተወካይ ጥያቄ ፊርማ ለገንዘብ ምንጭ  
 ላይ ይሆናል።
2. በረዳባርና ዕርጻ ታይቶ ድጋፍ በቀበሌው ፅንፈት ከሚቋቋም የገቢ ምንጭ ድር  
 ድቶች የሚገኝ ገቢ ሁሉ በዚህ የቀበሌ ሂሳብ ፅንፈት ይጠራቀማል።
3. ረዳባርና የቀበሌውን ነጥሪ ሕዝብ የቤት ችግር በመገንዘብ ይህን ችግር  
 ለማቃለል ባለው ሰዓት መሠረት ለህገ ቤቱ ለሠራ ከቤቶች የሚገኘው  
 የወር ኪራይ ከየተሰበሰበ ለቤት ሥራ የወጣው ወጪ ተክፍተው እንዲሰጥ  
 ድረስ በዚህ በሚከተለው የቀበሌ ሂሳብ ተክፍተው ይሆናል።

የቤት እድገትን በሚመለከት ረገድ ረዳባርና የቀበሌውን ስለተጻፈ የገንዘብ  
 ሂሳብ እንዲረድም በመመለስ እድገት የሚያስፈልጋቸውን የሕዝብ ጠያቂነት ሰጣ  
 ተያይዞ የገለጸ ገቢ ላይ የሆኑ ቤቶችን ሲያደሱ ገንዘብ ወጪ ሁሉ  
 ይጠይቃል ይህም ከፍተኛ ቁጠባ ሂሳብ ፅንፈት ይጠራቀማል።

በለወጧ ለወሰንገጅ

1. ከዚህ የቁጠባ ሂሳብ የግወጣ ማና ጥውጦ ወጪ በቀበሌው ለቁጠባና በረድባርና የፕሮጀክት ተወካይ ጥያቄ ፈርግ በቻ የግወጣ ሲሆን ገንዘቡ የግድለት የልግነትና የሀገራገሎት ዕቅድ ለስድስት ወር በሕዝቡ ፍላጎት ላይ የተሠረዘው ሆኖ ስለሆነ ታምናሽት የቀበሌው የአመራር አካላት የቀጠና ተጠሪዎች የጉረቤት ተጠሪዎችና የጋራ ጉረቤት ተጠሪዎች ተከፋይ ሲሆኑት በብባባ ጋወብ ስን ስለሰጡ።

የረድባርና ፕሮጀክት ተወካይ ድጋጽ የመስጠት መብት ባይኖረው በዚህ ሰባ ሰባ ተከፋይ ሆኖ ሃሳብ መስጠት ይቻላል።

ሆኖም የረድባርና ፕሮጀክት ተወካይ ቀጥሎ በተዘረዘረት ምክንያቶች የታዘቡትን ዕቅዶች ድጋጽ ሳይሰጥባቸው ላይ ተሰላጥኖ ይቻላል።

- 2.1 ዕቅድ ስፈርጉ የቀበሌ ነዋሪ ባያቀፍ ለጥቂቶች ጥቅም የታዘቡ ስህነ
- 2.2 ዕቅድ በጥቅም ሆኖ በተዘጋጠመ መንገድ የቀበሌውን ልዩነትና ስህነ ገደብ ዘቅተኛ ላይ ያሉትን ሰዎች የሚያጠቃም ስህነ
- 2.3 ዕቅድ ለቀበሌው ነዋሪ አስፈላጊ ስህነ መሠረታዊ ገልጋሎቶች ለሰጠ የታዘቡት ዕቅድ ስህነ

ቀጥተኛ

- 1. ከሌላ ሌላ የቀበሌ ስገልገሎት የሚሰጠውን ገቢና አጠባባቢ የሚጠቀሙ የቀበሌው ቀጥተኛ ስገልገሎት ላይ የረድባርና ተወካይ ይሆናሉ።
- 2. ይህ ስገልገሎት ማና ጥውጦ የዕለት ገቢ ስኛ ስኛ ቀን በቁጠባው ሂሳብ ገቢ መሆኑን ያረጋግጣል።
- 3. በየሀገራገሎቱ ከፍተኛ ያሉትን የሂሳብ ሠራተኞች ለስጋታም ሆነ በድንገት ሂሳባቸውን የመጠቀሙ መብት ስለሌላ።
- 4. በገንዘብ የተፈቀዱ ሲኖሩ ለወጣጡን ተቀጣጥሮ ለዚህ ገባዓ ሪፖርት ያቀርባሉ።
- 5. በአጠቃላይ ማንኛውንም ሆነ በጥላቻነት የሂሳብ ገደብ ሲደርስ ተጠያቂውን ሠራተኛ መርምሮ በሥራ ለገደብም ሆነ ለገንዘብ ስርዓት ለገደብደብ ሪፖርት ያቀርባሉ።

በለከፍተኛ 21 ቀበሌ 13 የቀበሌ 13 ለቁጠባ

በረድባርና ሲት የጸያ [403 የከተማ ልዩነት ፕሮጀክት የፕሮጀክት ተወካይ

**Appendix 4C: Handover agreement between RBE and Woreda 11, Kebele 14 (Menen)**


በረድባርና ሊት የጽያጽ ነብረተሰብ ለግት ፕሮጀክት 4012  
 ስና  
 የወረዳ 11 ቀበሌ 14 ነዋሪዎች የቁጠባና የብድር የሀብረት ሥራ ግህበር፣  
 ለዲብ የቤት ክፍሎች፣ ወጥ ቤቶች የመኖሪያ ገቢዎች የውጋ መቀኝ ቦታዎች፣  
 ለመሰጠትና / ለመቀበል የተደረገ ስምምነት

መገደርደሪያ፣  
 ረድባርና ሊት የጽያጽ የግህበር ዊና ሊከናወኑ ለግት ፕሮጀክት በቀበሌ 14  
 ክፍተት 11 / ለሁጉ ወረዳ 11/ ለግዛ ሄድ በመጋቢት 26 ቀን 1980 ዓ.ም  
 ከሌዲብ ለባባ ግዛጋኝ የገባ ስለሆነ ኗ

ረድባርና ሊት የጽያጽ ፕሮጀክት 4012፣ ለወረዳ 11 ቀበሌ 14 ነዋሪዎች  
 የቁጠባና የብድር የሀብረት ሥራ ግህበር የገንባታ ሥራ ለከፍተኛ በተለያዩ  
 ደብዳቤዎች ለግዛይ ነት ለዲብ የቤት ክፍሎች የገንባታ ሥራ ስራ ለገዳለ፣  
 በያመ ት የሰጠ ስለሆነ ኗ

በአሁኑ ጊዜ ሕጋዊነት ያለው ስምምነት ማድረግና መፈራረም ለስፈላጊ በመሆኑ፣  
 ስለዚህም፣ ከዚህ ቀጥሎ በጥ ተብሎ በግሙራው በረድባርና ሊት የጽያጽ፣ ከዚህ  
 ቀጥሎ ተቀባይ ተብሎ በግሙራው በወረዳ 11 ቀበሌ 14 ነዋሪዎች የቁጠባና  
 የብድር የሀብረት ሥራ ግህበር መካከል ከዚህ በፊት የተጻፉትን የሰጠታ ደብዳቤዎች  
 ሁሉ በመተካት ዛሬ ታህሳስ 22/1986 ዓ.ም በግዛተሉት የውል መገደርደሪያዎችና  
 ሁኔታዎች መሠረት ይህን ስምምነት ፈርመዋል፡፡

ለንቀጽ ለገዳ ፣ የሰጠታው ዓላማ፣  
 የሌዲብ ቤቶች ክፍሎች በመሠረት የተከሰቱት ዓላማ በቀጥታ ተጠቃሚ ለሆኑት  
 ቤተሰቦች በተለይም ለሕጻናት የቀረቡት ተጨባጭ የሰብሳቢ ሁኔታዎች የሕጻናትና  
 ጤና ለስተዳዳሪ የለበተዳደገ መሠረታዊ ፍላጎቶች ለስፈላጊ ምንደረኝ ጠብቀው  
 ለገዳገባሉ ለማድረግና፣ ቀጥሎም ተጠቃሚ የሆኑትን ቤተሰቦች ሕይወት ለማሳደግ  
 ገቢን ፣ ይህም የግዛባ ጥረት ለከፍተኛ የሚቻለው በሀብረት ሥራ/ በገል  
 ብ20 ዓመታት የተወሰኑ ተከታታይ ክፍያዎች ለግዛይ ነት በኪራይ ሽያጭ ዘዴ  
 ለሥራር ቤቶችን በመገዛት ነው፡፡



አንቀጽ ሁለት የሰጠታው መጠን ፣

ሰኞ ለ198 ቤተሰቦች 58 የወጥ ቤት ክፍሎች ያሏቸው ከ160 የወጥ ቤት ዕቃዎች ግብዓቶችና 13 የመኖሪያ ገቢዎችና 5 የውሀ መቅጃ ስጦታዎች ጋር 23 የሕንጻ ሰብሰቦች /ብሉክስ/ አበርክቷል፡፡

አንቀጽ ሦስት የአዲሶች የቤተ ክፍሎች የሥራ ስጦታ

አዲሶች የቤት ክፍሎች የተሰረዙ በወረዳ 11 ቀበሌ 14 ነው፡፡ በቀበሌ ስጦታዎች የተመረጡት የፍጥ ስጦታዎች ፣ ለገንባታ ሥራ ባዳ ስጦታ በመኖሪያ ነው፡፡

አንቀጽ አራት ገንባታ

ሰኞ የአዲሶች ቤተ ክፍሎች አስፈላጊ የገንባታ ሥራ 22 ባለሁለት ፍቅ የሕንጻ ሰብሰቦችና /ብሉክስ/ ባለ አንድ ፍቅ የሕንጻ ሰብሰቦች /ብሉክስ/ በግድረገ ሥራው ስኬታማነት፡፡ ሁሉም የሕንጻ ሰብሰቦች 58 ወጥ ቤቶችና 13 የመኖሪያ ገቢዎች ያሏቸው ናቸው፡፡

አንቀጽ ስምስት የተቀባይ ገዳታዎች

1. ተቀባዩ በዚህ ስምምነት የሚከተሉት ገዳታዎች አሉ፡፡

ተቀባዩ ፣

1. አዲሶች የቤት ክፍሎችና መገልገያዎችን ያስተዳድራል፤ እንደዚህም የወር የብድር ተላብኮ ክፍያዎች መሰብሰባቸውንና የሂሳብ ቁጥጥር መደረጉንም ያረጋግጣል፡፡
2. በቀበሌ የሥራ አገልግሎት የተገኙትን ተላብኮ ክፍያዎች ወለድ ሌሎች ገንዘቦች በጠቅላላው የሀብት ሰጪ የኑ ሁኔታ በተለይም የሕንጻናትንና የሰጠውን የኑ ሁኔታ ለማሻሻል ይጠቀሙታል፡፡
3. ወጥቤቶች የመኖሪያ ገቢዎች በአዲሶች ቤተ ክፍሎች አካባቢ የፍላጎት መውረጃዎች ማሳደግን ከገብ ለማድረስ በተከከለ መሆናቸውን ያረጋግጣል፡፡
4. እንደዚህም ቀሪ አገልግሎቶች ባሉ አንዳንድ ያደርጋል፡፡

አንቀጽ ስምስት የዚህ ስምምነት ክፍሎች

በቤት ሰብሰቦች /ብሉክስ/ እና በቤት ቁጥር ፣ በቀጣይ ተጠቃሚ ለሆኑ ቤተሰቦች የተሰጡት አዲስ የቤት ክፍሎች ዘርዘር ፣ የዚህ ስምምነት አካል ነው፡፡

አንቀጽ ሰባት ውድቅ የሆኑ ሰነዶች

ሰኞ ፣ ለቀበሌ በዚህ በፊት ያሰጠው ደብዳቤዎች /1/ ቀን 10/10/76 ተጠቃሽ ቁጥር ፒ. 4012/22/92 የሆነው ፣ /2/ ቀን 22/04/86 ጻዕተ ምህረት ተጠቃሽ ቁጥር ፒ. 4012/253/93 የሆነው ፣ በዚህ ስምምነት ተከትሎ፡፡













## Appendix-5: Floor plan of the newly constructed houses (Menen)

Fig. A5.1: Single rooms






Fig. A5.2: Double rooms




## Appendix-6: Housing transformation in Kolfe

**Fig. A6.1: Floor plan, extension of house units 4 and 5**



**Fig. A6.2: Front extension of housing unit number 4**  
(Also indicated on the floor plan above).

Note the well shaded common space.  
Picture was taken in March 2005




**Fig. A6.3: Lateral extension of housing unit number 5.**


A metal door was also fixed replacing an original wooden door.

According to the interview with the household head the reason for the extension was big family size requiring larger space.

Picture was taken in March 2005



**Fig. A6.4: Floor Plan, extension of house units 1, 2 and 3**




**Fig. A6.5: Front extensions of housing units 1, 2 and 3**  
The picture was taken in April 2006.



**Fig. A6.6: Lateral extension of housing unit 1, under construction.**

The picture was taken in April 2006.



**Fig. A6.7: Completed extension of Housing unit-1.**

The tree adjacent to the extended house was cut.

The picture was taken in May 2006.



Fig. A6.8: Floor plan, second layer of extension housing unit 2




Fig. A6.9: Second layer of extension of housing unit-2.  
The picture was taken in May 2006



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## Postscript

Following the review of the thesis, valuable comments were received from the Adjudication Committee. The comments include issues regarding: the utilisation of case histories in relation to knowledge generation, the influence of “inter-household dynamic” such as age and sex on tenants’ response, the relationship between public ownership of land and tenants’ response, and the bold assertions made that tend to make generalisations.

The comments, whether debatable or not, are seriously taken into account. In fact, I agree with most of the comments and I believe that more could be done in that line. In consultation with my advisor few amendments were made in relation to the comment regarding “bold assertions”. While those assertions made in connection to analytical (theoretical) generalisations were maintained, some assertions that tend to generalise to other cases were modified so that they could give space for further investigation (See p. 166, par. 3, line 11; p. 232<sup>146</sup>, par. 1, line 1 & 2; and p. 256<sup>147</sup>, par. 2, line 1& 5). Few minor editorial corrections, including spelling and page set up were also made. As a result the pagination starting from p. 206 is updated.

I take this opportunity to thank the members of the Adjudication Committee for their input that contributed both towards this thesis and the continuous learning process.

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<sup>146</sup> Review document (submitted to Adjudication Committee) p. 231

<sup>147</sup> Review document p. 254