dc.contributor.author | Haines, Thomas Edmund | |
dc.contributor.author | Pereira, Olivier | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-09-06T10:47:24Z | |
dc.date.available | 2021-09-06T10:47:24Z | |
dc.date.created | 2021-01-11T11:02:19Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2020 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 0302-9743 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/11250/2773710 | |
dc.description.abstract | Marked mix-nets were introduced by Pereira and Rivest as a mechanism to allow very efficient mixing that ensures privacy but at the cost of not guaranteeing integrity. This is useful in a number of e-voting schemes such as STAR-Vote and Selene. However, the proposed marked mix-net construction comes with no proof of security and, as we show in this paper, does not provide privacy even in the presence of a single corrupt authority. Fortunately, the attack that we present is easy to prevent and we show several possible ways to address it. Finally while the original marked mix-net paper worked with ElGamal, we identify conditions that the adopted encryption scheme should satisfy in order to be appropriate for a marked mix-net. This opens the possibility of building marked mix-nets based on intractability assumptions which are believed to hold in the presence of a quantum computer. | en_US |
dc.language.iso | eng | en_US |
dc.publisher | Springer | en_US |
dc.title | Short Paper: An Update on Marked Mix-Nets: An Attack, a Fix and PQ Possibilities | en_US |
dc.type | Peer reviewed | en_US |
dc.type | Journal article | en_US |
dc.description.version | acceptedVersion | en_US |
dc.source.journal | Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS) | en_US |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1007/978-3-030-54455-3_26 | |
dc.identifier.cristin | 1868723 | |
cristin.ispublished | true | |
cristin.fulltext | postprint | |
cristin.qualitycode | 1 | |