Short Paper: An Update on Marked Mix-Nets: An Attack, a Fix and PQ Possibilities
Peer reviewed, Journal article
Accepted version
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Date
2020Metadata
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- Institutt for matematiske fag [2384]
- Publikasjoner fra CRIStin - NTNU [37563]
Original version
10.1007/978-3-030-54455-3_26Abstract
Marked mix-nets were introduced by Pereira and Rivest as a mechanism to allow very efficient mixing that ensures privacy but at the cost of not guaranteeing integrity. This is useful in a number of e-voting schemes such as STAR-Vote and Selene. However, the proposed marked mix-net construction comes with no proof of security and, as we show in this paper, does not provide privacy even in the presence of a single corrupt authority. Fortunately, the attack that we present is easy to prevent and we show several possible ways to address it. Finally while the original marked mix-net paper worked with ElGamal, we identify conditions that the adopted encryption scheme should satisfy in order to be appropriate for a marked mix-net. This opens the possibility of building marked mix-nets based on intractability assumptions which are believed to hold in the presence of a quantum computer.