Vis enkel innførsel

dc.contributor.authorOmeiri, Hanane
dc.contributor.authorHamaidi, Brahim
dc.contributor.authorLiu, Yiliu
dc.contributor.authorInnal, Fares
dc.date.accessioned2021-09-01T12:05:36Z
dc.date.available2021-09-01T12:05:36Z
dc.date.created2021-01-11T10:09:32Z
dc.date.issued2020
dc.identifier.issn0265-671X
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/11250/2772258
dc.description.abstractPurpose The purpose of this paper is to check the consistency of the IEC 61508 standard formula related to the average failure frequency (PFH: the probability of dangerous failure per hour) for a commonly used safety instrumented system (SIS) architecture in the process industry: 2-out-of-3 voting (2oo3), also known as Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR). Design/methodology/approach IEC 61508 standard provided PFH formulas for different SIS architectures, without explanations, assuming that the SIS puts the equipment under control into a safe state on the detection of dangerous failure. This assumption renders the use of classical reliability approaches such as fault trees and reliability block diagrams impractical for PFH calculation. That said, the consistency verification was performed thanks to a dynamic and flexible reliability approach, namely Markov chains following these steps: (1) developing the multi-phase Markov chains (MPMC) model for 2oo3 configuration, (2) deducing the related classical Markov chains (CMC) model and (3) deriving a new PFH formula for the 2oo3 architecture based on the CMC model and thoroughly comparing it to that given in the IEC 61508. Moreover, 2oo3 architecture has been modeled through Petri nets for numerical comparison purposes. That comparison has been carried out between the numerical results obtained from IEC 61508 formula, the newly derived formula, Markov chains and Petri nets models. Findings The newly obtained formula for 2oo3 configuration contains extra terms compared with the IEC 61508 one. Therefore, this latter formula induces an underestimated PFH results, which is dangerous from a safety point of view. This fact was corroborated by the numerical comparison. Research limitations/implications This paper does not consider the different configurations given in IEC 61508. Originality/value In our knowledge, no verification works have been conducted before on the IEC 61508 PFH formulas with shutdown capability. Therefore, the nonaccuracy of the PFH formula related to the 2oo3 has not been stated before. This paper proposes a new and more accurate formula.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherEmeralden_US
dc.titleVerification of the IEC 61508 PFH formula for 2oo3 configuration using Markov chains and Petri netsen_US
dc.typePeer revieweden_US
dc.typeJournal articleen_US
dc.description.versionpublishedVersionen_US
dc.source.journalInternational Journal of Quality & Reliability Managementen_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1108/IJQRM-09-2019-0305
dc.identifier.cristin1868632
dc.description.localcodeThis article will not be available due to copyright restrictions (c) by Emeralden_US
cristin.ispublishedtrue
cristin.fulltextoriginal
cristin.qualitycode1


Tilhørende fil(er)

Thumbnail

Denne innførselen finnes i følgende samling(er)

Vis enkel innførsel