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dc.contributor.authorWyller, Truls
dc.date.accessioned2019-12-05T08:55:38Z
dc.date.available2019-12-05T08:55:38Z
dc.date.created2019-01-18T20:50:03Z
dc.date.issued2019
dc.identifier.issn0044-3301
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/2631868
dc.description.abstractI argue that the question 'Is there a life after death?' should be put aside as meaningless; the reason for this has nothing to do with materialism or physicalism, however. On the contrary, it is a consequence of temporal idealism: Man's metaphysical quest for a meaning of death cannot be satisfied by dreams of an afterlife and should be substituted by the question 'If time is a human phenomenon, then what is it like to be dead?' My point of departure is a letter of Albert Einstein's regarding the distance between things in space–time as a way of coming to terms with human finitude and mortality. Contrary to this view, far from revealing the temporal distance between things, death arguably means the collapse of any experienced duration or temporal extension beyond the present Now.nb_NO
dc.language.isoengnb_NO
dc.publisherVittorio Klostermannnb_NO
dc.titleTime, Death, and Durationnb_NO
dc.typeJournal articlenb_NO
dc.typePeer reviewednb_NO
dc.description.versionacceptedVersionnb_NO
dc.source.journalZeitschrift für Philosophische Forschungnb_NO
dc.identifier.doi10.3196/004433019827167654
dc.identifier.cristin1660738
dc.description.localcode© 2019. This is the authors' accepted and refereed manuscript to the article. The final authenticated version is available online at: https://doi.org/10.3196/004433019827167654nb_NO
cristin.unitcode194,62,70,0
cristin.unitnameInstitutt for filosofi og religionsvitenskap
cristin.ispublishedfalse
cristin.fulltextpostprint
cristin.qualitycode2


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