Paper-based electronic voting
Abstract
In this thesis, we present two paper-based electronic voting systems Prêt-à-Voter and Demos. We describe these in the same systematic way with new examples. Furthermore, we implement RSA cryptosystem in Prêt-à-Voter. Then, we contribute with an informal analysis of what is required both in practice and in the technical part of Demos. We present how the bulletin board must be constructed and in the analysis of the commitment scheme we propose a new way to generate the commitment key strengthening the verifiability and privacy of the system. Finally, we show how the verifiability of Demos is dependent on the practical and technical elements analysed. In specific, we show how the randomness in the voting phase contributes with entropy to the sigma-protocol of ballot correctness. For a general analysis of Prêt-à-Voter and Demos this thesis should be read together with the thesis of Anna Testanière.