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Unraveling EU-Turkey Relations

A qualitative analysis of motivations and obstacles behind Turkey´s failed accession process.

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Norwegian University of
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Abstract

In 2018, The European Union stopped negotiations in Turkey´s accession process to join the union. This decision came despite Turkey being the EU´s longest-standing candidate country and continuous promises of Turkish accession. Their relationship has become one of the most complicated in recent history, and the thesis aims to examine the causes by asking how we can account for the continually turbulent relationship between the two actors.

To account for the relationship, the thesis aims to address two objectives. Firstly, it investigates what has motivated both parties in their foreign policy towards each other by utilising three logics of political action: The Logic of Consequences (acting according to expected utility), the Logic of Appropriateness (acting according to appropriate behaviour), and the Logic of Moral Justification (acting according to morally accepted principles). In doing so, the thesis provides a valuable contribution to the existing literature. It tests the three logics explanatory power to other nations when they have previously been used mainly in the context of EU enlargement. Concluding that only two logics, the Logic of Consequences and the Logic of Appropriateness, have explanatory power, the thesis makes its second contribution – arguing that the Logic of Moral Justification is irrelevant in defining the EU-Turkey relationship. The second objective is to examine the main factors explaining the failure of Turkey to join the EU, concluding that human rights and democracy, the situation in Cyprus, and cultural clashes hold the most explanatory power.

To address these objectives, the thesis will conduct a qualitative case study analysis with elements of process tracing, as the thesis aims to understand the historical trajectory of the EU-Turkey relationship from the 1950s until Turkish accession negotiations ended in 2018.

Sammendrag

I 2018 avsluttet den Europeiske Union (EU) forhandlingsprosessen med Tyrkia om å bli medlem av unionen. Denne avgjørelsen kom til tross for at Tyrkia har vært EU´s lengst stående kandidatland og deres kontinuerlige løfter om tyrkisk medlemskap. Forholdet mellom EU og Tyrkia har utviklet seg til et av de mest kompliserte i nyere historie, og denne masteroppgaven undersøker årsakene til dette ved å redegjøre for det stadig turbulente forholdet mellom de to aktørene.

I redegjørelsen av dette forholdet tar oppgaven for seg to formål. Først undersøkes det for hva som har motivert begge parters utenrikspolitikk ovenfor hverandre ved å anvende tre logikker for politisk handling: «Logic of Consequences» (handling etter konsekvenser), «Logic of Appropriateness» (handling etter forventet oppførsel), og «Logic of Moral Justification» (handling etter moralsk aksepterte prinsipper). Ved å gjøre det gir oppgaven et verdifult bidrag til eksisterende litteratur ved at den tester de tre logikkenes forklaringskraft til andre nasjoner når de tidligere har blitt brukt hovedsakelig i sammenheng med utvidelsen av EU. Oppgaven konkluderer med at bare to av logikkene, Logic of Consequences og Logic of Appropriateness, har forklaringskraft, og gir dermed sitt andre bidrag til – argumentet for at Logic of Moral Justification ikke er relevant i definisjonen av EU-Tyrkia forholdet. Oppgavens andre formål er å undersøke hovedfaktorene som forklarer hvorfor Tyrkia ikke har blitt medlem av EU, og konkluderer med at problemer med menneskerettigheter og demokrati, situasjonen på Kypros, og kulturforskjeller har den største forklaringsmakten.

For å oppnå disse formålene vil oppgaven gjennomføre en kvalitativ casestudieanalyse med elementer av prosessporing, ettersom oppgaven tar sikte på å forstå det historiske forholdet mellom EU og Tyrkia fra 1950-tallet til forhandlingsprosessens slutt i 2018.

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Abbreviations

AKP	Justice and Development Party
CFSP	The Common Foreign and Security Policy
CSDP	The Common Security and Defence Policy
EC	European Communities
ECSC	European Coal and Steel Community
EEC	European Economic Community
EU	European Union
Euratom	European Atomic Energy Community
LoA	Logic of Appropriateness
LoC	Logic of Consequences
LoMJ	Logic of Moral Justification
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
US	United States

1 Introduction

1.1 Introducing the topic

Since the beginning of the late 1950s, the relationship between Turkey and the European Union (EU) has been characterised by several ups and downs (Yurttaş & Şekercioğlu, 2018, p. 18). Turkey first applied for an association with the European Economic Community (EEC) 64 years ago in 1959, and the relationship between the EU has evolved into one of the most complicated and interesting in EU history (Turhan & Reiners, 2021, p. 1). Today, Turkey is the EU's longest-standing candidate country, with 24 years since the confirmation of Turkey´s candidate status (Turhan & Reiners, 2021, p. 8). Through several events during the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, the relationship has gone from showing a strong Turkish pull towards Europe and the EU to a more distant and irritated Turkish stance. This shift is often explained as grounded in Turkey´s frustration during negotiations with the EU (Ulusoy, 2016, p. 393).

As this thesis will show, the relationship between the EU and Turkey has not developed in a clear, linear path but rather a complex one featuring many stop-and-go cycles (Turhan & Reiners, 2021, p. 2). There have since the beginning been several phases of progression and rapprochement, but also just as many periods of regression and indifference. These ups and downs have been dominated by stagnation and slow-moving developments but also by dynamic changes (Turhan & Reiners, 2021, p. 2). As a result, EU-Turkish relations have, as Turhan and Reiners wrote:

> "[…] been followed by periods when the actors drifted apart in non-concerted action – before new developments reminded them of the need to jointly manage their interdependence, and, eventually, of their commonalities" (2021, p. 2).

After 2018, however, these tendencies have stagnated and been replaced by a more divergent relationship. In other words, in newer times, the two actors have moved further away from each other and from the possibility of Turkey becoming an EU member state (Turhan & Reiners, 2021, p. 2-3). This became evident in 2018 when the EU concluded that "Turkey has been moving further away from the European Union and […] no further chapters can be considered for opening or closing" (Turhan & Reiners, 2021, p. 3).

When looking at the turbulent relationship between the two actors, it is interesting to investigate what motivates both parties in their foreign policy towards each other. Human and political action is motivated by several reasons, including expected utility, appropriate rules of behaviour, and mutually recognised morals and justice (March & Olsen, 2013, p. 17: Piedrafita & Torreblanca, 2005, p. 35). Within the EU´s enlargement policy, several theories have been utilised, including three ways in which foreign policy can achieve legitimacy: the Logic of Consequences (LoC), the Logic of Appropriateness (LoA) and the Logic of Moral Justification (LoMJ). Within the LoC, action is driven by calculations of consequences (March & Olsen, 1998, p. 949). Within the LoA, action is

driven by appropriate behaviour within a specific community (March & Olsen, 2013, p. 3). Lastly, within the LoMJ, actions are driven by a set of principles that are morally acceptable and mutually recognised (Sjursen & Smith, 2013, p. 127).

The three logics serve as the theoretical framework of this thesis. As March and Olsen described, these are perspectives of how human action, political action included, is to be interpreted (2013, p. 3). Foreign policy is a part of political action, which is the area the thesis will mainly focus on. Therefore, the three logics will be referred to as logics of political action for the remainder of the thesis.

It is also important to mention that the EU we know today went through its development faces during the 1900s. The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was established in 1951, followed by the EEC and European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) in 1957. With the Merger Treaty came the merging of these three Communities, and the European Communities (EC) came into force in 1967 before eventually being replaced by the EU with the Maastricht Treaty in 1993 (European Union, n.d. a: European Union, n.d. b: European Union, n.d. c). Unless directly specified, the term "European Union" refers to the European integration project as a whole.

1.2 Research questions

The thesis examines the relationship between the EU and Turkey in light of Turkey´s EU membership application. One broad question and two sub-questions will guide the research. The main research question will help to examine the details of the EU-Turkey relationship by asking what has led to it becoming one of the most complicated in recent history (Turhan & Reiners, 2021). Therefore, the main research question will be

> *(1) How can we account for the continually turbulent relationship between the EU and Turkey?*

However, this is a broad question. Therefore, two sub-questions have been included in this research to clarify better and limit the scope of this study. First, the thesis aims to discover what has motivated the EU´s and Turkey´s foreign policy towards each other from the 1950s to the 2010s. When learning their motivations, the thesis will utilise three logics of political action to see which of these three has been the most dominant in how the two actors operationalise their foreign policy. These three logics are the Logic of Consequences (LoC), the Logic of Appropriateness (LoA) and the Logic of Moral Justification (LoMJ).

Moreover, the period from the 1950s to the 2010s is examined because this is the period containing the modern relationship between the two actors. The 1950s had the first event that would eventually lead to Turkey´s EU membership application – the Turkish application for associate membership to the EEC in 1959 (Turhan & Reiners, 2021, p. 1). The 2010s marked the freeze in the membership negotiation process between the EU and Turkey, with a statement from the EU in 2018 (Turhan & Reiners, 2021, p. 3). With that in mind, the first sub-question of the thesis is:

> *(a) Which of the three logics of political action, identified in the international relations literature, have dominated the EU´s and Turkey´s foreign policy towards each other from the 1950s to the 2010s?*

Moving on, to better grasp the complexity of the EU-Turkey relationship, the thesis will investigate the most important events and arguments as to why Turkey has yet to become an EU member state. Despite being the union´s longest-standing candidate country, with the acknowledgement of its status in 1999, negotiations were a tortuous process that has led Turkey no closer to accession (Turhan & Reiners, 2021, pp. 8, 15: Akşin, 2007, p. 318). Utilising the contextual framework, the thesis will also give an answer to a second sub-question:

> *(b) How can we explain the failure of Turkey to join the EU?*

1.3 Methodology

This section aims to explain the methodological choices that have been taken in order to answer the research question(s). The main research question of the thesis sets out to understand what has motivated both the EU and Turkey´s foreign policy towards each other. Furthermore, the sub-question aims to examine the main explanatory factors as to why Turkey has not become a member state yet. To answer these, this thesis will conduct a qualitative case study analysis of the EU-Turkey relationship. Additionally, there will be elements of process tracing, given the thesis´ attempt to understand the historical trajectory of this relationship.

Qualitative research allows for collecting in-depth information, where a relatively complete account of the case can be achieved (Burnham, Lutz, Grant & Layton-Henry, 2008, pp. 40, 66). In a case study, one can focus on a policy area, community or event over a period of time and study it in depth (Burnham et al., 2008, p. 63). In this thesis, the case is the EU-Turkey relationship which will be explored in depth over a 70-year time period. This approach is closely associated with historical study (Burnham et al., 2008, p. 64), which fits the research questions for this thesis. To provide a broader impact than merely being e detailed account of a case, it is often necessary to include a strong theoretical dimension (Burnham et al., 2008, p. 64). Scholars have argued that conducting a case study without a theoretical framework may provide a description without meaning (Meyer, 2001, p. 331). This consideration has been taken with this thesis, with its inclusion of the three logics of political action.

The usefulness of conducting a case study for this analysis is that previous literature on EU enlargement has used the same method (Piedrafita & Torreblanca, 2005: Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2002: Sjursen & Smith, 2013). The additional motivation for this research design is theoretical, as the thesis aims to explore whether historically explored EU enlargement theories, here; the three logics of political action can also be relevant in explaining other actors´ motivations.

Additionally, this thesis will have elements of process tracing, as it gives greater attention to the description of history as a key contribution (Collier, 2011, p. 823). Process tracing is a fundamental qualitative analysis tool that examines the evidence to be analysed in light of research questions (Collier, 2011, p. 823). David Collier defines process tracing as a tool for "[…] drawing descriptive and casual inferences from diagnostic pieces of evidence […]" (2011, p. 824) that "[…] inherently analyses trajectories of change and causation […]" (2011, p. 823). Elements of this will be found in the thesis, as it attempts to understand the historical trajectory of the EU-Turkey relationship by describing events.

The sources used in this thesis consist primarily of secondary and tertiary sources, such as books and journal articles, as it gives great attention to the description of the history. Some books utilised in this research are Stephan Keukeleire and Tom Delreux´s *The foreign policy of the European Union* (2022) and Sina Akşin´s *Turkey: From Empire to revolutionary republic* (2007). These two have been very useful sources for this thesis's historical information. Additionally, the thesis relies heavily on journal articles written by historians in the fields of EU-Turkey relations and EU and Turkish foreign policy. One author in particular that stands out is Meltem Müftüler-Baç, as the thesis draws on information from much of her research on the EU-Turkey relationship.

There are several factors which limit the study. One limitation can be found in the potential weakness of conducting a qualitative case study, in that it comes at the expense of being able to make generalisations (Burnham et al., 2008, p. 40). Meaning that when concluding that the logics of political action can be explanatory to Turkish foreign policy in addition to EU foreign policy, the thesis cannot generalise it to say that they will for sure also explain the foreign policy of other countries.

Another limitation of this thesis can be found in the chosen time period. The decision to research the period from the 1950s to the 2010s was made in the interest of grasping the extent of the EU-Turkey relationship. The ECSC and the project of European integration were formed after World War 2, and the newly established Turkish Republic began its westernisation in the 1950s by joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in 1952 and applying for associate membership to the EEC in 1959 (Mango, 2005, p. 20: Turhan & Reiners, 2021, p. 1). Therefore, what this author describes as the "modern EU-Turkey relationship" began with these events and is a fitting start in this research. The end of the period in the 2010s, specifically in 2018, was chosen due to the EU´s statement that no further negotiations in the Turkish accession process to join the EU would open (Turhan & Reiners, 2021, p. 3).

There are, however, limitations to this decision. The thesis will draw on the more significant events and trends by researching a more extensive time period. It will not look at the evolution of their relationship on a micro level. To do that, the thesis would have had to choose a much smaller time period. The decision to structure it this way is because, for this specific thesis, it is more important to look at the whole picture.

1.4 Outline of the thesis

The thesis is structured into six chapters. Chapter 2 will be a literature review, where the thesis will explore previous research on the topic of EU-Turkey relations and the three logics of political action. The three logics are the Logic of Consequences, the Logic of Appropriateness and the Logic of Moral Justification, and they will be applied in the thesis analysis. Additionally, this chapter will describe this thesis´ contribution to this field of study. Chapter 3 is the contextual framework which will provide a historical description of significant events leading up to the complex EU-Turkey relationship of today. Chapter 4 is an analysis where the three logics of political action are applied to discover how these have dominated the EU´s and Turkey´s foreign policy towards each other in the past seventy years. Chapter 5 is a discussion of the findings where the thesis will answer the research questions and reflect on limitations as well as ideas for future research. Finally, chapter 6 concludes the thesis by providing a summary of the main findings and thoughts on the future of the relationship.

2 Literature review

In this section, the thesis will review the existing literature and scholarship on the EU´s and Turkey´s foreign policy, the relationship between the EU and Turkey and the three logics of political action. This literature review will show the contribution of this thesis to an otherwise heavily researched relationship, which will be the theoretical framework presented in a later chapter. First, the section will present some of the main features that previous scholars highlight of the EU´s and Turkey´s foreign policy, followed by a review of the literature on the EU-Turkey relationship. Moving on, the existing scholarship on the three logics of political action will be explored. Finally, this section will point at some gaps in the literature and how the thesis contributes to filling some of them.

2.1 EU foreign policy

EU foreign policy began evolving with the establishment of the ECSC after the Second World War and especially with the creation of the EEC in the 1950s (Keukeleire & Delreux, 2022). Since then, scholars have continued investigating and researching it as it evolved through the years, and the development of EU foreign policy has attracted increasing academic attention from scholars within international relations, European studies, economics and more (Gstöhl & Schunz, 2021, p. 1: Carlsnaes, 2004, p. 1). Keukeleire and Delreux define EU foreign policy as follows:

> "[…] the area of EU policies directed at the external environment with the objective of influencing that environment and the behaviour of other actors within in, in order to pursue interests, values and goals" (2022, p. 1).

In the existing literature, four different parts of EU foreign policy especially stand out: The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the external dimensions of internal policies and external action (Keukeleire & Delreux, 2022, p. 11-12). In the discussion of the EU´s political action towards Turkey, external actions prove important in this thesis. The EU´s external action consists of economic cooperation with third countries, external trade policy, humanitarian aid, development cooperation, international agreements and sanctions (Keukeleire & Delreux, 2022, p. 12). Just as important is EU enlargement, described by scholars as a very large part of its foreign policy (Sjursen & Smith, 2013, p. 126).

Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier define EU enlargement as "[…] a process of gradual and formal horizontal institutionalism" (2002, p. 500). Being a substantial part of EU foreign policy, it is also described by some scholars as the EU´s most powerful tool in dealing with its immediate neighbourhood (Keukeleire & Delreux, 2022, p. 228). One part of this is to achieve the main goal of the continent, which is peace and stability across Europe. Another is that by offering countries the incentive of membership, the EU can transform the political, social and economic structure of these countries to align them with EU structures (Keukeleire & Delreux, 2022, p. 228-229). Even though enlargement has been an essential part throughout all of the EU´s history, its salience increased after the Cold War. Consequently, the EU has transformed from an exclusively Western

organisation into one representing the entire continent (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2002, p. 500).

2.2 Turkish foreign policy

Turkish foreign policy has been tightly knitted and strongly affected by its current government, and the power struggles on the world stage, as previous scholars have pointed out (Mango, 2005: Haugom, 2019: Akşin, 2007: Hale, 2013). Murinson argues that the main sources that have defined Turkish foreign policy over the years are the historical experiences of the Ottoman Empire, the nationalist Kemalist revolution leading to the creation of the Turkish Republic in 1923, western orientations expressed in its policy of modernisation and Europeanisation, and finally, the suspicion of foreign powers (2006, p. 945). This not including its foreign policy in recent times, where Taş explains how foreign policy under Erdogan has been dominated by activism to extend the country´s role in the Middle East (2022, p. 722).

These elements can be found in other literary works as well, highlighting the thoughts of Professor Ömer Taspinar. According to his studies, one can identify three strategic visions for Turkey and its place in the international order, which again have affected its foreign policy (Haugom, 2019, p. 209). These three are "Kemalism", which characterised Turkish foreign policy in the period between 1923 and the end of the Cold War, "Neo-Ottomanism", a vision that emerged in the late 1980s and was eventually superseded by the third vision, "Turkish Gaullism", which emerged when President Erdogan came to power in 2014 (Haugom, 2019, p. 209-210: Murinson, 2006). Kemalism got its name due to its connection to the foreign policy and security outlook of the Republican elite and characterised Turkish foreign policy until the end of the Cold War (Haugom, 2019, p. 209: Murinson, 2006). Neo-Ottomanism influenced Turkey´s foreign policy from the end of the Cold War up until 2014 and was characterised by utilising ties to the former Ottoman Empire in order to construct a new national identity and translating it into foreign policy (Haugom, 2019, p. 209: Murinson, 2006). With Erdogan elected President in 2014 came Turkish Gaullism, combining elements from the two previous strategic visions (Haugom, 2019, p. 209-210).

The three strategic visions and how they affected Turkish foreign policy throughout history will be explained further in the contextual framework when outlining Turkey´s political action in the different decades.

2.3 The EU-Turkey relationship

The EU-Turkey relationship refers to "the totality of interactions within the international system" (Turhan & Reiners, 2021, p. 2) and is a topic that has gained much attention from scholars. In general, a significant amount of research on the EU-Turkey relationship focuses on its turbulent path towards potential Turkish EU membership (Ulusoy, 2016: Turhan & Reiners, 2021: Müftüler-Baç, 2017: Nas & Özer, 2017). The general trend in the literature, especially highlighted by Ebru Turhan and Wulf Reiners, is how the two actors have gone through several periods of both phases of progression and regression (2021, p. 2). Evolving from Turkey´s application for an association with the EEC in 1959 up until the EU´s statement in 2018 saying that no further negotiation would continue in Turkey´s accession process to join the EU, their relationship is considered by most

scholarships on this topic as one of the most complicated in EU history (Turhan & Reiners, 2021: Müftüler-Baç, 2017: MacMillan, 2018). Recent literature that has focused on this complex relationship presents an overall argument that despite its rocky road, Turkey moved closer towards democracy and Western norms until President Erdogan came to power in 2014 (Haugom, 2019: Müftüler-Baç, 2017).

The EU-Turkey relationship is important because of how it impacts its neighbouring countries as well as the international arena (Turhan & Reiners, 2021, p. 2), and has been researched through many lenses in the past, including the politics surrounding human rights issues, the Cyprus problem and Turkish democratisation (Rumford, 2001: Müftüler-Baç & Güney, 2005: Keyman & Düzgit, 2007).

Furthermore, the literature reviewed in this section has used different research methods. Most have relied heavily on previous literature on the topic. Some studies draw on interviews and/or speeches, as Meltem Müftüler-Baç did in her research on in-depth interviews conducted with EU and Turkish officials in 2013, 2015 and 2016 (2017, p. 416). Many studies are theory-based. One example is Dimitris Tsarouhas and his research applying liberal intergovernmentalism, concluding how it is a useful theory in comprehending the dynamics between the two actors (2021, p. 57). Another example is how Senem Aydın-Düzgit and Bahar Rumelili analysed excising literature on constructivist approaches to the EU-Turkey relationship (2021, p. 63). However, to this author's knowledge, existing literature has not applied the three logics of political action to this relationship.

2.4 The three logics of political action

According to Helene Sjursen and Karen Smith, there are three approaches or logics for examining the legitimacy of foreign policy (2013, p. 127). These are 1) the Logic of Consequences, rooted in theories of rational choice; 2) the Logic of Appropriateness, rooted in institutional theories; and 3) the logic of Moral Justification, rooted in the theory of the communicative action (Sjursen & Smith, 2013, p. 127: Dewulf, Klenk, Wyborn & Lemos, 2020, p. 1: Piedrafita & Torreblanca, 2005, p. 34). These three have been researched by previous scholars either separately or together, and often in the context of EU enlargement (Piedrafta & Torreblanca, 2005, p. 29).

With foreign policy being a part of political action, this is what the thesis refers to when discussing political action. As Sjursen and Smith state in `Justifying EU foreign policy: the logics underpinning EU enlargement´, the EU´s enlargement policy is considered a very large part of its foreign policy (2013, p. 126).

With that in mind, the following section will provide an overview of the previous research on the three mentioned logics that will represent the theoretical framework for this thesis. Through this overview, the thesis will define the logics and provide examples of how the EU and Turkey operationalise through them. The examples regarding EU foreign policy are selected from previous research but seeing how this theoretical framework has not been applied to Turkish foreign policy; the thesis will give an example connected to its foreign policy actions towards the EU, which will additionally be explored in greater detail in the analysis. Table 1 shows an overview of the definitions of the three logics and examples of what events and policies operationalise the EU and Turkey through each of the logics.

Table 1: The three logics and how the EU and Turkey operationalise through them.

The Logics of political action	EU	Turkey
The Logic of consequences (LoC): Decisions are based on calculations of future consequences.	Eastern enlargement: geopolitical interests (respect as an international actor), security interests (stabilising the continent) and economic interests (increase of trade).	Bringing Turkish forces to Cyprus in 1974: protecting security interests by keeping control of energy routes.
The Logic of Appropriateness (LoA): Decisions are based on appropriate behaviour in a community/identity.	Eastern enlargements: Building a common European identity.	Westernisation in the 1950s: Acting according to European values to achieve legitimisation of their "Europeanness".
The Logic of Moral Justification (LoMJ): Decisions are based on principles that are morally acceptable and mutually recognised.	Eastern enlargement: pressure from member states to begin negotiations with all candidates at once because it was the morally just thing to do.	No example is highlighted in this thesis. See Chapter 5: Discussion for more on this.

Source: Author´s own compilation

2.4.1 The Logic of Consequences

The Logic of Consequences, or consequentiality, has its roots in rational choice theories such as neo-realism and liberalism (Piedrafita & Torreblanca, 2005, p. 32), and the criteria identifying this logic is utility (Sjursen & Smith, 2013, p. 127). Aligned with these theories, the focus of this logic is that actors on the international stage are rational. They will seek to develop policies that allow them to maximise their interests. Therefore, utility refers to actors' efforts to find efficient solutions to concrete dilemmas or problems (Sjursen & Smith, 2013, p. 127). On reaching agreements, actors will define their preferences and act according to them in an environment where bargaining is the most common procedure to resolve disputes between them (Piedrafita & Torreblanca, 2005, p. 32). In other words, "[…] decisions are taken based on the anticipation of the future effects of current actions" (Dewulf et al., 2020, p. 2).

To achieve legitimisation, policymakers will try to achieve an efficient solution to the given problems (Sjursen & Smith, 2013, p. 127). The assumption is that the policymakers accomplish this by assessing the costs and benefits, and possible outcomes, of the different choices. Then they make the choice that best highlights their interests and preferences and has the best consequences (Sjursen & Smith, 2013, p. 127: March & Olsen, 2013, p. 5).

To make these decisions, four key questions are asked: What actions are possible, what future consequences might follow from each alternative, how valuable are the consequences associated with each of the alternatives, and how is a choice to be made among the alternatives in terms of the values of their consequences? (March, 1994).

Examples of actors following this logic are seen in twentieth-century democracies, especially European welfare states. These states often embrace results and effectiveness, believing that their community shares interests and objectives rather than rules and principles (March & Olsen, 2013, p. 18).

One example of an event where the EU operationalised through the LoC was the Eastern enlargement in 2004. According to this perspective, the decision to enlarge was regarded as a combination of promoting the interest and preferences of its member states and an efficient solution to the situation in the East (Piedrafita & Torreblanca, 2005, p. 36). Three main interests stood at the centre of the EU´s decision to proceed with the eastern enlargement. First was geopolitical interests, highlighting how the EU would gain greater clout as a global geopolitical actor in the eyes of other superpowers once enlargement was successfully concluded (Piedrafita & Torreblanca, 2005, p. 36-37). Second was security interest, pointing out how stabilisation in the eastern borderlands would make illegal immigration more manageable and decrease national conflict (Piedrafita & Torreblanca, 2005, p. 36-37). Third was economic interest, where the argument was that increased trade and capital flows would contribute to a better EU economy. The larger market would be enhanced by the supply of cheaper but qualified labour and cheaper resources, eventually strengthening European competitiveness in the world market (Piedrafita & Torreblanca, 2005, p. 36-37). Therefore, from a geopolitical, security and economic perspective, EU enlargement can be seen as a decision taken through the LoC.

As for Turkey, one example where its foreign policy showed a dominance of the LoC can be found in the 1970s when Turkish forces landed on Cyprus. One reason was to protect the Turkish Cypriots, but another was based on securing their interests. Cyprus is located along energy routes, and it was the view of the Turkish government that their security interests would be compromised if they were to lose the island to enemy powers (Ulusoy, 2016, p. 395: Mango, 2005, p. 21). In this case, Turkey acted in accordance with protecting their interests, a clear example of the LoC. More on this example will be investigated further in the contextual framework and analysis of the thesis.

2.4.2 The Logic of Appropriateness
According to the Logic of Appropriateness, actors not only consider what is best for them in the decision-making process but also consider what is expected of them (Piedrafita & Torreblanca, 2005, p. 33). Within this logic, political action is driven by appropriate behaviour, and rules are followed because they are seen as expected, natural and rightful (March & Olsen, 2013, p. 3). The criteria that identify this logic are values. It refers to the idea of the `good life´, where actors fulfil the obligations encapsulated in an identity or a specific community – like the EU or a particular EU member state (Sjursen & Smith, 2013, p. 127: March & Olsen, 2013, p. 3). Facing politics, actors follow what they define as normal, right and true in their community without only considering consequences or expected utility (March & Olsen, 2013, p. 3).

Policy is legitimised through the reference to what is considered appropriate given the community´s conception of itself (Sjursen & Smith, 2013, p. 127). To explain, the actor's rationality will depend on the identity of the community it belongs to. Drawing from the

explanation of Piedrafita and Torreblanca, actors are imagined following rules that associate particular identities with particular situations, and the criteria for action rely on values stemming from a cultural context (2005, p. 33-34). The goal of the decision-making process will therefore be to develop and protect the sense of `we-ness´ and build a shared identity (Piedrafita & Torreblanca, 2005, p. 34).

This goal can also be seen in the EU´s eastern enlargement process. Even though it has been argued that enlargement happens because of a trade-off of particular interests, one can also see other actions in the process that respond to the LoA (Piedrafita & Torreblanca, 2005, p. 44). In several instances, EU actions appear to be motivated by shared values and a common identity rather than efficiency and promotion of interests. Three actions in particular show this tendency (Piedrafita & Torreblanca, 2005, p. 44). First, building a special relationship between the EU and Central Eastern European countries was the appropriate decision in the aftermath of the Cold War. The goal was then to build a collective identity and shared values in Europe. Second, the value-based arguments´ relevance in the decision to enlarge refers to the idea that the EU was responsible for East Europe and that the union must do more than anyone else. Third, how accession negotiations began with all candidates at the same time, although some failed to meet the criteria, in order to preserve the EU´s self-image of being a club for all Europeans and excluding some from negotiations would go against that (Piedrafita & Torreblanca, 2005, p. 44-46). Therefore, from a common identity and value-based perspective, EU enlargement can be seen as a decision taken through the LoA.

The dominance of the LoA can also be seen in Turkey´s foreign policy in the 1950s. It was the goal of Turkey to move away from the former Ottoman Empire systems and towards Europe and the West. The Turkish government's choices at that time were in many ways made to achieve "European legitimisation". Their wish to act according to European identity and values can be argued to be motivated by the LoA. (Akşin, 2007, p. 254: Turhan & Reiners, 2021, p. 1).

The term "logic of appropriateness" has overtones of morality. However, scholars such as James March and Johan Olsen point out that "[…] rules of appropriateness underlie atrocities of action, such as ethnical cleansing and blood feuds, as well as moral heroism" (2013, p. 4). So, even though actors follow what is "true" or "right", this is true or right to their specific community or identity. Therefore, actions within this logic do not guarantee either moral acceptability or technical efficiency (March & Olsen, 2013, p. 4).

Nevertheless, the logic is viewed as relevant. There have been events in recent history, like the EU´s eastern enlargement, where the result has been demands for ethical rules and an ethos of responsibility. The EU is one actor where foreign policy is often based on legal institutions and rules, but it's not without an obligation to act based on expected behaviour within the European community (March & Olsen, 2013, p. 18).

The logic of consequences and the logic of appropriateness often clash in political action. For instance, a component of democratic governments is to balance the tensions between the different demands. The reason is that actors, politicians especially, are likely to be held accountable for both the consequences and the appropriateness of their actions (March & Olsen, 2013, p. 17). One dilemma, which March and Olsen point out, is that:

> "[…] proper behaviour sometimes is associated with bad consequences and improper behaviour is associated with good consequences. […] they achieve desirable outcomes

through methods that they recognise as inappropriate. Or, they follow prescribed rules and procedures at the cost of producing outcomes they recognise to be undesirable" (2013, p. 17-18).

This clash will be exemplified further in the analysis, where the thesis will provide an overview of which of the logics dominated the EU´s and Turkey´s foreign policy from the 1950s to the 2010s. The thesis will show how both logics can influence foreign policy at the same time, and an actor's actions can show tendencies of both.

James G. March and Johan P. Olsen have focused heavily on the Logic of Appropriateness in their work. In their article "The logic of appropriateness" from 2013, they define the logic before elaborating on its place in democratic settings and amongst other logics (March & Olsen, 2013, p. 3). In an earlier article, "The institutional dynamics of international political orders", March and Olsen also researched the LoC in addition to the LoA (1998). The two logics are included in research about international dynamics and political orders (March & Olsen, 1998). The definition and examples of the LoC and the LoA given by March and Olsen will be important in the theoretical framework of this thesis.

2.4.3 The Logic of Moral Justification

As for the Logic of Moral Justification, it is a lesser-researched logic as it is a reasonably new approach (Piedrafita & Torreblanca, 2005, p. 34). Some scholars that have included it in their research are Sonia Piedrafita and José I. Torreblanca (2005) and Helene Sjursen and Karen Smith (2013), where both articles utilise all three logics. Whereas Piedrafita and Torreblanca look at each of the logics´ explanatory powers in the EU´s decision to enlarge, the selection of candidates as well as the negotiation process (2005, p. 29), Sjursen and Smith utilise the logics as a way to justify EU foreign policy (2013, p. 126).

The logic of moral justification is based on the theory of communicative action (Piedrafita & Torreblanca, 2005, p. 34). The criteria that identify this logic are rights, which refers to a set of principles that are morally acceptable and mutually recognised (Sjursen & Smith, 2013, p. 127). In this approach, decision-making is based on what is the right thing to do (Piedrafita & Torreblanca, 2005, p. 35). The goal is to establish a fair system of cooperation founded on democratic procedures for decision-making and on fundamental rights (Piedrafita & Torreblanca, 2005, p. 35).

Rather than being based on motivational factors such as interests (LoC) and values (LoA), the focus in this logic is placed in the setting where different actors agree upon certain norms and principles with the absence of coercion (Piedrafita & Torreblanca, 2005, p. 34). According to Piedrafita and Torreblanca, actors try to seek consensus on two matters when deciding on a collective communicative process (2005, p. 34). First are factual matters, that is, the actual situation and the cause-and-effect relationships between the goals and the means. Second are the normative matters, referring to which principles or norms apply under given circumstances and should guide the decision (Piedrafita & Torreblanca, p. 2005, p. 34).

With that, the policymakers achieve legitimacy through justice rather than efficiency or identity. In other words, a policy is legitimised when the principles can be recognised as just by all parties, regardless of their interests, cultural identity, or perceptions of the `good life´ (Sjursen & Smith, 2013, p. 127). From this perspective, it is necessary to find

a political action or position that can be justified universally. To test that, one would need to see whether an action is considered fair by all parties involved and if they are able to agree upon a shared understanding (Sjursen & Smith, 2013, p. 130).

To better describe the logic, one can look at the example of EU eastern enlargement, similar to the two previous logics. The argument is that the justification of the enlargement process has been more moral than economic, seeing that all actors accepted that enlargement would be good for the EU in the long term even though it would be costly in the short term (Piedrafita & Torreblanca, p. 2005, p. 49). So, when setting the timing for the negotiations, policy options were discussed in terms of factual and normative matters in addition to cost/benefits to the EU (Piedrafita & Torreblanca, p. 2005, p. 49). This became clear with the Commission's initial decisions to only start negotiations with half of the candidate countries. Following that, several member states challenged the decision, highlighting how it was undermining peace and stability in Europe instead of strengthening it. This reaction resulted in the decision to begin negotiations with all candidates simultaneously, which was viewed as the most just solution. In the end, the member states had imposed a policy change by challenging the factual and normative basis of the existing policy with principles that all member states could recognise as just (Piedrafita & Torreblanca, p. 2005, p. 50).

As for exemplifying with Turkey, the thesis has found that in its foreign policy towards the EU, its government's action has not been dominated by this logic. That is not to say that it does not apply to Turkish foreign policy in general, merely not in its foreign policy towards the EU. The arguments behind this will be explored further in the analysis and discussion of the thesis.

The three logics are different perspectives on how political actions, foreign policy and enlargement included, are to be interpreted (March & Olsen, 2013, p. 3). A later analysis will show how they can explain the EU´s and Turkey´s points of view and actions throughout the years. One theoretical difficulty is that when describing a political action, it is challenging to deny the overall importance of one and also inadequate to rely exclusively on only one of them. The legitimacy of enlargement is based on all three; benefits of enlargement, the values which the EU promotes and the fairness that the EU applies these values (Piedrafita & Torreblanca, p. 2005, p. 53). As the example above with Eastern enlargement showed, the influence of all three logics can be found in one single event. It is therefore important to note that this thesis´ analysis will describe which of the three logics has dominated the actors´ foreign policy throughout the years but makes no attempt at completely excluding the others in the process.

Before analysing which of the logics have dominated the EU´s and Turkey´s foreign policy, it is important to give an outline of the milestones that have helped form the complicated EU-Turkey relationship. The following chapter will provide a historical background of all significant events between the two actors in the past 75 years and describe what has motivated the two actors´ foreign policy towards each other.

Overall, previous scholars have conducted some research on the three logics of political action, either separately or together, in the context of EU enlargement. However, there has to this author´s knowledge, not been conducted any research where the three logics are applied to actors other than the EU. Therefore, the contribution of this thesis will be looking at the EU-Turkey relationship through a new lens with the three logics of political action. In doing so, the thesis tests the three logics´ ability to explain the foreign policy of other actors than the EU. The thesis concludes that the LoC and the LoA can explain

the motivations for both the EU´s and Turkey´s foreign policy towards each other. The analysis will show, however, that the LoMJ have not been dominating for either of the two actors in how they operationalise their foreign policy towards each other. This fact is the second contribution to the literature. One can argue that the LoMJ is not applicable to this relationship, as they rarely agree upon what is just and moral. This argument will be explored further in the analysis and the discussion of the thesis.

3 Contextual framework

This chapter will provide a contextual framework that will help give an account of the EU-Turkey relationship. An analysis of these events will be in the following chapter. When presenting the EU´s and Turkey´s foreign policy towards each other, the chapter is structured into two main sections, beginning with the EU´s foreign policy actions towards Turkey, followed by Turkey´s foreign policy actions towards the EU. To provide a better overview, these two sections are structured into three time periods. The first involves background information essential to understanding the actors´ actions towards each other. The second is a time period from the 1950s, when the modern EU-Turkey relationship began, to the 1980s. The third period is from the 1990s, with the confirmation of Turkish EU membership candidate status, and until the negotiations freeze in 2018 (Turhan & Reiners, 2021, p. 3, 15).

3.1 The EU´s foreign policy towards Turkey

3.1.1 Background

The beginning of European integration, and thus its foreign policy, began immediately after the Second World War (Keukeleire & Delreux, 2022, p. 4). On one side, the Western countries were experiencing tensions with the Soviet Union, eventually leading to an arms race between the East and the West. On the other side, due to the process of European integration and the process of transatlantic cooperation (NATO), the economic and political structures of European countries were so intertwined that the threat of military conflict between them declined immensely (Keukeleire & Delreux, 2022, p. 4). With the Marshall Plan of 1947 and the Schuman Declaration of 1950, several European countries and the United States (US) launched a successful foreign policy in post-war Europe with the United States. This was heavily based on a free market economy, democracy and the rule of law. The European integration process also played a massive part in this development (Keukeleire & Delreux, 2022, p. 44-45).

So even though this was only the beginning of what would eventually become the European Union, and there was not yet an official EU foreign policy, the integration of Europe and the foreign policy of the individual countries was a peace project (Keukeleire & Delreux, 2022, p. 4).

When discussing the EU-Turkey relationship, one cannot exclude the relationship between Europe and the Ottoman Empire. The idea of European identity at that time was defined partly in terms of what it was not (Müftüler-Baç, 2000, p. 25). The concept of Europeanness was said to be described as "civilised" Europe, and non-Europeanness was described as "barbaric" non-Europe (Müftüler-Baç, 2000, p. 25-26). So, with the rise of the Ottoman Empire, it was seen by some as dangerous for Europe because they represented all that was excluded from the European identity: barbaric and a threat to civilisation (Müftüler-Baç, 2000, p. 27). Especially highlighted in this argument is the fact that Europe was mainly Christian, and the Ottoman Empire was Muslim (Müftüler-Baç, 2000, p. 27). Their relationship changed with the decline of the Ottoman Empire,

especially with the new Turkish Republic of 1923 and their goal of eliminating all aspects of the Ottoman system (Müftüler-Baç, 2000, p. 28). However, in arguments against EU-Turkey cooperation, politicians have drawn comparisons between the Ottoman Empire and modern Turkey (Joseph, 2006, p. 11-12).

3.1.2 1950s – 1980s

In 1950 came the Schuman Declaration, where the goal was two-folded: economic development and the continuation of the peace project that began in the years after the Second World War. Thus, the ECSC was established due to the belief in a rule-based international order – the constant theme in EU foreign policy (Keukeleire & Delreux, 2022, p. 46-47). At the same time, several Western countries helped create NATO, another move in the overall peace project (Keukeleire & Delreux, 2022, p. 47).

The first truly external dimension in EU politics came with the creation of the EEC through the Rome Treaties of 1957 (Keukeleire & Delreux, 2022, p. 50). This is where the modern relationship between the EU and the Republic of Turkey began, with the Turkish application for association with the EEC in 1959 (Turhan & Reiners, 2021, p. 1).

Additionally, Turkey has played a part in Western and European alliances since the early 1950s, including memberships in NATO and the Council of Europe (Müftüler-Baç, 1997, p. 3). According to Müftüler-Baç, Europe defines Turkey´s role in these alliances as a buffer against the Soviet Union (1997, p. 3). Therefore, including Turkey in European cooperation was viewed as the solution to the problem with the Soviet´s mission in the East (Müftüler-Baç, 1997, p. 3).

Having evolved into an international actor, the EEC signed important bilateral trade agreements with third countries such as Turkey in the early 1960s (Keukeleire & Delreux, 2022, p. 50). With Turkey´s application for association with the EEC in 1959, the Ankara Agreement of 1963 was viewed as a potential step towards full membership (MacMillan, 2018, p. 5). With the signing of the agreement, the president of the EEC Commission, Walter Hallstein, said the following words:

> "Turkey is a part of Europe. […] Turkey is to be a full member of the Community. This wish, and the fact that it is shared by us and our Turkish friends alike, is the strongest expression of our community of interest (Nas & Özer, 2017, p. 1).

Political factors proved more important than economic factors in the negotiations, seeing that Turkey was economically not really eligible for membership (Aybey, 2004, p. 22). One political argument explaining why Turkey gained an associate membership was that Europe needed a buffer against Soviet expansion, which gave cooperation with the Turkish a clear function (Müftüler-Baç, 2000, p. 29). Another argument points to the fact that Europe needed a workforce in the reconstruction of the continent after the War, which was why the free movement of workers in Europe was included in the Agreement (Aybey, 2004, p. 22).

The EU´s involvement in Cyprus dates back to the early 1960s when Britain applied to become a member in 1961 and when both Turkey and Greece became Associate members of the EEC in 1962-63 (Müftüler-Baç & Güney, 2005, p. 281). Being a strong economic dependence between Britain and Cyprus at the time, Cyprus was brought into

the orbit of the EEC, leading to a Cypriot wish also to establish economic ties with them (Müftüler-Baç & Güney, 2005, p. 283). Despite the brewing political problems, the EEC offered Cyprus full membership in 1962, along with the British membership application. These negotiations stopped in January 1963, however, when French President Charles de Gaulle vetoed the British application, seeing that Cyprus became sort of a package deal with Britain (Müftüler-Baç & Güney, 2005, p. 283).

The union´s second round of involvement in the Cyprus conflict came in the 1970s, with British accession in 1971 and the Association Agreement with Cyprus in 1973 (Müftüler-Baç & Güney, 2005, p. 284). A miscalculation by the EEC was that since the Association Agreement with Cyprus was an economic agreement, it would not have political ramifications. This mistake became evident when Turkey landed in the north in 1974, and the island was divided in two (Müftüler-Baç & Güney, 2005, p. 284).

The Cyprus conflict was part of what made the EU unsure about Turkey in the 1970s. Additionally, Turkey was subject to international and domestic changes that often clashed with protecting and promoting human rights, which had become a core value for the EU (Cerami, 2011, p. 20). Domestically, Turkey faced violent religious and political conflicts, dissatisfaction with Western foreign policy and growing national sentiments, which were all explanatory factors for why the EU-Turkey relationship became troubled towards the end of the 1970s (Cerami, 2011, p. 20).

During the 1980s, the same events and domestic troubles still affected the EU-Turkey relationship negatively. These included the problems of human rights and democracy, cultural clashes and the situation surrounding Cyprus (Ulusoy, 2016, p. 397). Human rights and democracy are essential parts of the EU-identity, and all applicants are expected to share the same values, which is an area that causes a lot of friction with Turkey (Rumford, 2010, p. 93). Several EU members have also had reservations due to cultural clashes, allowing Greece to play a gatekeeping role (Ulusoy, 2016, p. 397). Initially, the situation in Cyprus was treated as a bilateral conflict between Turkey and Greece. However, Greece´s accession to the EU in 1981 turned the union from an observer to a key actor (Turhan & Reiners, 2021, p. 12). Therefore, when the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus declaration came in 1983, the relationship with the EU worsened, making the conflict one of the most critical obstacles when Turkey applied for membership in 1987 (Ulusoy, 2016, p. 397).

Another obstacle to Turkey´s application process has been the several coups against Turkish governments, including one in 1980 (Turhan & Reiners, 2021, p. 14). Coups such as this one have acted as a "break" in EU-Turkey relations, showing the weakness of the democracy (MacMillan, 2018, p. 5) and how the military could easily take control over domestic politics (Turhan & Reiners, 2021, p. 14). When democracy was finally reinstated, the union formally lifted its suspension of relations with Turkey in 1986, leading to Turkish application for full membership the following year (MacMillan, 2018, p. 5). Even though Greece was the only member state in formal opposition to Turkish membership, the application was eventually rejected in 1990. The decision was based on Turkey's continuing economic and political instability (MacMillan, 2018, p. 5).

3.1.3 1990s – 2018
EU foreign policy during the 1990s, especially the second half of the decade, was influenced by an aim to support long-term structural changes in third countries to promote a more favourable international environment (Keukeleire & Delreux, 2022, p.

59). In doing so, they sought to spread the economic, societal and political structures that characterised the union itself, including a free market economy, human rights, democracy and peaceful resolutions of conflict (Keukeleire & Delreux, 2022, p. 59).

A part of this is the EU´s enlargement project. The Treaty of the European Union state that it will not exclude anyone from membership as long as they are committed to the EUs main principles: democracy, freedom, protection of human rights and the rule of law (Dudley, 2020, p. 527). In 1993, the leaders of the EU member states established a broad framework of conditions that aspiring member states must fulfil before joining the union. The framework known as the Copenhagen Criteria has served as a guide to determining accession eligibility (Dudley, 2020, p. 527). Economically, aspiring member states would have to abandon economies of central planning and establish a functioning free market economy. Politically, they would have to establish democratic institutional structures characterised by protecting human rights and the rule of law (Dudley, 2020, p. 527).

In 1990, the Greek administration of South Cyprus applied to become a member state of the EU in the hope that it would be a catalyst for unifying the island (Müftüler-Baç & Güney, 2005, p. 286). Even though it seemed like a positive incentive for both sides to resolve the conflict, the politics that followed made sure of another result. During negotiations, the EU accepted information from the Greek Cypriots without verifying it with the Turkish Cypriots, which in turn led to a deeper Turkish mistrust towards the EU. Despite this, the decision came in 1994 to include Cyprus in the enlargement (Müftüler-Baç & Güney, 2005, p. 286).

In addition to the Cyprus problem, politicians pointed out several other reasons for the tension between the EU and Turkey. It has been the view of some, especially Christian Democrat politicians, that Turkey is not a part of Europe and stating that the EU have Christian, humanitarian and cultural values that Turkey does not have (Rumford, 2010, p. 95). This prejudice against Turkey as a Muslim country has been more than evident, one example being statements made by Luxembourg´s Prime Minister Jean-Claude Juncker at the Luxembourg Council. With a statement claiming that Turkey was guilty of human rights abuses for which its leaders bear direct responsibility, Junker upset the Turkish by saying that "such a country could not sit down at the EU table" (Rumford, 2010, p. 95).

In October 1999, a report published by the European Commission recommended that Turkey be considered as a full membership candidate (Rumford, 2010, p. 96). However, they also made it clear that at that time, Turkey did not meet the Copenhagen Criteria, especially stating that:

> "There are serious shortcomings in terms of human rights and protection of minorities. Torture is not systematic but is still widespread and freedom of expression is regularly restricted by the authorities" (Rumford, 2010, p. 96).

The report came before the decision reached in Helsinki the same year, where the conclusion had four main components regarding Turkish candidacy (Rumford, 2010, p. 96). First, Turkey was formally recognised as a candidate country on the basis of the same criteria as other candidates; second, they would be included in Community

agencies and programmes; third, Turkey would seek political assistance in the area of human rights; and fourth, they would receive coordinated pre-accession assistance (Rumford, 2010, p. 96).

At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the world faced several security threats and military challenges that helped shape EU foreign policy (Keukeleire & Delreux, 2022, p. 62). Events including the terrorist attack in the U.S. in 2001, the Western invasions in Afghanistan in 2001 and 2003 and terrorist attacks in Madrid and London in 2004 and 2005 renewed fears about weapons of mass destruction (Keukeleire & Delreux, 2022, p. 62). All in all, the dramatic events of the early 2000s impacted the EU towards a highly military-focused foreign policy (Keukeleire & Delreux, 2022, p. 63).

The second half of the first decade of the century was influenced by the EUs most significant foreign policy act to date. While attempting to adapt to the changing international environment and recent events, the EU welcomed ten Eastern and Central European counties plus Malta and Cyprus (Keukeleire & Delreux, 2022, p. 64). By contributing to the transformation and stabilisation of the region, the EU strengthened the security on the continent, which was rewarded in 2012 when the union was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize (Keukeleire & Delreux, 2022, p. 65).

Enlargement also went further east, granting Turkey its accession candidacy status in 1999 (Turhan & Reiners, 2021, p. 15: Nas & Özer, 2017, p. 1). The EU´s motivation for including Turkey in the union was economic and strategic. On the one side, Turkey´s large market, its potential as an area for investment and its mineral wealth made for the economic argument. On the other side, its army, as well as its location as a bridge to Central Asia, the Caucasus and the Middle East, made for the strategic argument (Akşin, 2007, p. 318).

The 2010s were a time characterised by uncertainty and instability, as the EU faced several new crises that led to challenges for its foreign policy (Keukeleire & Delreux, 2022, p. 67). During this decade, the EU faced a financial crisis, followed by the refugee crisis, a growing terrorist threat, and the rise of anti-EU sentiments in several member states, eventually leading to Brexit. Altogether, they questioned the European integration project and its principles of democracy, peace and prosperity (Keukeleire & Delreux, 2022, p. 67). The European financial crisis followed the global financial crisis, and due to the poor and at times slow response from the EU´s side, some began to believe that the union had lost some of its credibility and legitimacy (Keukeleire & Delreux, 2022, p. 67-68).

As an attempt to deal with the refugee crisis, the EU made a controversial deal with Turkey in 2016. The aim was to reduce the number of refugees crossing the EU´s borders by stopping the smuggling of people across the Mediterranean (Keukeleire & Delreux, 2022, p. 68). This deal resulted from internal political pressure from several member states, who had in the years of 2015-2016 suffered from several terrorist attacks across the continent (Keukeleire & Delreux, 2022, p. 68).

Another goal of the EU in the early 2010s was stabilising its neighbouring countries and leading them towards a movement of liberal democratisation. But the EU´s European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) has become encircled by an "arc of instability" (Keukeleire & Delreux, 2022, p. 70). The EU were not successful in stabilising its neighbouring regions, as developments there resulted in a situation even further away from the objectives and values that characterise the union (Keukeleire & Delreux, 2022, p. 70). One example of

this trend is the EU´s relationship with Turkey. Accession negotiations have been formally ongoing since 2004. However, there has been and continues to be a growing antagonism between the two actors that question Turkey´s NATO membership and the overall likelihood of them becoming an EU member state (Keukeleire & Delreux, 2022, p. 72). Public opinion surveys in several member states did show that people were disturbed by the idea of welcoming Turkey into the EU, even before negotiations began (Mango, 2005, p.228). For that and many other reasons, the EU has been unsuccessful in developing a constructive dialogue with Turkey and integrating them into European structures, despite the long relationship with them dating back to the 1950s (Keukeleire & Delreux, 2022, p. 72).

Today the relationship with Turkey has turned into a divergent one where there is a lack of trust between both parties (Turhan & Reiners, 2021, p. 3). The EU and several member states have started to see that Turkey has moved further away from the union's core values and view them as an unreliable, unpredictable and hostile neighbour (Turhan & Reiners, 2021, p. 3). The accession process has come to a stance, with only three negotiation chapters opened since 2011. Despite the refugee deal of 2016, Turkey´s accession was put on pause in 2018 when the Council issued a statement saying that "Turkey has been moving further away from the European Union and […] no further chapters can be considered for opening or closing" (Turhan & Reiners, 2021, p. 3).

3.2 Turkey´s foreign policy towards the EU

3.2.1 Background

With the creation of the Turkish Republic in 1923, with Mustafa Kemal Atatürk as its first president, they aimed to eliminate the old aspects of the previous Ottoman system (Müftüler-Baç, 2000, p. 28: Mango, 2005, p. 17). Religion as the legitimising factor was replaced by legitimisation through new institutions, and the arbitrary rule was replaced by the rule of law (Müftüler-Baç, 2000, p. 28). As a rationalist (Mango, 2005, p. 17), Atatürk was adamant about making Europe accept the new Turkey´s "Europeanness", and the Turkish government made several changes to achieve that (Müftüler-Baç, 2000, p. 28). These reforms were all efforts that aimed at creating a modern state at a level of contemporary civilisation (Müftüler-Baç, 2000, p. 28-29), where Atatürk himself once stated that "is there any people which in its quest for civilisation has not turned to the West?" (Mango, 2005, p. 18).

With the new Republic of Turkey and its first president came what Taspianar explained as the first of three strategic visions: "Kemalism" (Haugom, 2019, p. 209). This vision got its name for its connection to the security and foreign policy outlook of the old Republican elite and characterised foreign policy in Turkey until the end of the Cold War. The focus of this period was preserving national security and independence, whether that meant neutrality during the war years or moving closer to the West both economically and politically (Haugom, 2019, p. 209). Overall, security considerations formed the centrepiece of Turkey´s post-war political and diplomatic relationship with the West (Aybey, 2004, p. 21).

The Kemalist vision became even more evident with Atatürk´s successor, Ismet Inönü, whose main priority was safeguarding Turkey´s independence, integrity and economic progress during the Second World War and the Cold War (Mango, 2005, p. 19). Thanks

to receiving American aid through the Truman Doctrine in 1947, President Inönü could keep attending to the country´s security and economic well-being (Mango, 2005, p. 19). In 1949, Turkey became a member of the Council of Europe, increasing their overall security in the post-war environment (Akşin, 2007, p. 243-244). Both initiatives showed a clear step towards the West, democracy and capitalism (Mango, 2005: Akşin, 2007).

3.2.2 1950s – 1980s

The Republic of Turkey had its first free elections in May 1950, where the Republican People´s Party was replaced by the newly founded Democrat Party (Mango, 2005, p. 19). The Democrats relied heavily on American support, which became institutionalised in 1952 when they joined NATO (Mango, 2005, p. 20). This was an essential achievement in foreign affairs, as it confirmed Turkey´s position in the Western alliance (Akşin, 2007, p. 254). Turkey´s NATO membership can be viewed as a step towards stronger national security, which was the main focus of the Kemalist strategic vision characterising this time period. Additionally, Turkey applied for an association with the EEC in 1959 (Turhan & Reiners, 2021, p. 1), where economic problems were the immediate reason (Aybey, 2004, p. 21). This incorporation into Western European security and financial arrangements after the Second World War seemed to give Turkey the European legitimacy that it sought (Müftüler-Baç, 2000, p. 29).

Around the same time, the question of Cyprus arose. The history of Turkey and Cyprus can be traced back to when the Ottomans conquered the island in 1571 for its strategic position in the Mediterranean (Ulusoy, 2016, p. 394). Eventually, though, they lost Cyprus after a power struggle with the British (Ulusoy, 2016, p. 294). After the Second World War, Cyprus was still of critical significance in the superpower competition in the Eastern Mediterranean (Ulusoy, 2016, p. 394). From 1954 onwards, Cyprus found itself on the Turkish political agenda again. Being originally sued for control by Greece, Turkey began making their own claim on the former British colony (Akşin, 2007, p. 256). Then on 6. September, a Turkish newspaper reported a bombing on former president Atatürk´s house, which was responded to by several attacks and pillages in thousands of Greek churches, businesses and homes (Akşin, 2007, p. 256). Since these events took place simultaneously, the suspicion was that they had been planned. A Greek court found that the 6/7 September incident was an example of the use of illegal force by the state (Akşin, 2007, p. 256-257).

In 1959 the Republic of Cyprus emerged with a divided sovereign status based on mutual trust between Great Britain, Greece and Turkey as guarantor power and the Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Similar to that of Berlin after the Second World War, the formula offered to Cyprus by the British required friendship between all involved (Ulusoy, 2016, p. 294-295). This would prove to become a problem with the independence of Cyprus in 1960 (Ulusoy, 2016, p. 394-395).

The political tension in Cyprus increased with its independence in 1960 (Ulusoy, 2016, p. 395). Despite their independence, the British kept its two sovereign bases on the island, ultimately leading to the Greek and Turkish Cypriots distrusting their former coloniser. At the time, a senior British diplomat stated that "Neither the Greek nor the Turkish Cypriots much liked the situation they found themselves in following the settlement, and neither felt any sense of ownership of or loyalty towards it" (Ulusoy, 2016, p. 395). Tensions arose, and ethnical clashes between the Turkish and Greek Cypriots increased, leading to Turkey withdrawing from the partnership in the mid-1960s (Ulusoy, 2016, p. 295).

The early 1960s also included major domestic changes for Turkey. On May 27, 1960, there was a coup in Turkey, overthrowing the Democratic Party (Akşin, 2007, p. 264). The reasons include, among others: its autocratic conception of democracy that did not recognise the rights of opposition parties, and its attitude of being above the law, as exemplified by the 6/7 September incidents (Akşin, 2007, p. 266). Even though this coup resulted in a very liberal constitution, the conduct of foreign policy became more difficult (Mango, 2005, p. 20). In the 1950s, foreign policy had been comparatively simple, but by the 1960s, it became clear that NATO could not cover all national interests. Turkey had a greater need for economic aid than the Americans and their allies were willing to give (Mango, 2005, p. 20-21). One solution to this problem was Turkey´s association agreement with the EEC, resulting in the Ankara Agreement of 1963, where the president of the Commission at the time, Professor Walter Hallstein, stated that "Turkey is a part of Europe today (Mango, 2005, p. 21).

The rest of the decade was followed by a continuation of Europe´s influence on Turkish politics (Mango, 2005, p. 21). Economic planning, parliamentary democracy, the separation of powers, and checks and balances on the executives – all principles that came from the West. This was also the case in foreign policy, with the idea of combining the membership of alliances with the pursuit of national interests outside of them (Mango, 2005, p. 21). Through Westernisation, Turkey came closer to preserving its national interests, proving how Kemalism also influenced Turkish foreign policy during the 1960s.

The Cyprus conflict came to a head around the mid-70s when Turkey brought force to the northern part of the island in 1974 with a promise to protect the Turkish Cypriots during a military coup against the Cypriot president, Archbishop Makarios (Ulusoy, 2016, p. 395: Mango, 2005, p. 21). The Turkish intervention divided the island in two, and all attempts at peace negotiations or restoration of the Cypriot constitution since then have failed, leading to the island still being separated to this day (Ulusoy, 2016, p. 395). In addition to its promise to protect the Turkish Cypriots, the significance of Cyprus is in its strategic geographical location along the energy routes. Losing Cyprus to an eventual enemy power could pose a security threat, proving that the Kemalist view of national security still dominated Turkey´s foreign policy (Ulusoy, 2016, p. 395).

In April 1987, Turkey applied for full membership in the EEC, undeterred by the fact that the application had few chances of success (Mango, 2005, p. 22). The application was rejected in 1989, stressing how problems regarding both the economy and politics were the reason for it (Turhan & Reiners, 2021, p. 6; Akşin, 2007, p. 292). While the Turkish economy suffered from unemployment, inflation, etc., the political problems included problems with democracy, human rights violations unresolved issues with Greece about Cyprus (Akşin, 2007, p. 292).

With regard to the Cyprus situation, in 1983, a unilateral declaration of independence of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus was recognised by Turkey (Turhan & Reiners, 2021, p. 6). However, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is not recognised by other countries or actors, even to this date (Akşin, 2007, p. 276). The question of Cyprus triggered nationalist feelings in Turkey, turning it into a tool of hard power, and has therefore been described as affecting not only Turkey´s foreign policy relations but also its democracy (Ulusoy, 2016, p. 396).

The end of the 1980s marked the end of the strategic vision of Kemalism for Turkey. In this period, Turkey´s main focus was to preserve national security, interests and

independence by following the lead of the West (Haugom, 2019, p. 209). Even though Turkey would continue with its Westernisation in the following decades, other elements became just as important for the Turkish government in foreign policy.

3.2.3 1990s – 2018

Throughout the 1990s, several economic and political crises shook Turkey, and a large part of the elite saw EU membership as a way out of it, despite the recent rejection in 1989 (Ulusoy, 2016, p. 398: Turhan & Reiners, 2021, p. 6). This led to some divisions within the Turkish elite. However, the pro-democratic forces and the argument to attempt to comply with the membership criteria eventually resulted in a gradual reform process (Ulusoy, 2016, p. 398). Despite public opinion and debates within the EU, relations with the EU deepened because of it, which moved Turkey closer to accomplishing its two foreign policy goals: economic development and westernisation (Ulusoy, 2016, p. 398).

Therefore, despite an economic crisis at home and the recent rejection of Turkey´s application, the Turkish managed to persuade the EU that both political and economic reforms were pending implementation, eventually leading to the EU-Turkey Customs Union of 1996 (Mango, 2005, p. 23). This was the very first time this had been agreed between the EU and a non-member (Mango, 2005, p. 23), and it was said to be a step for Turkey towards full membership (Akşin, 2007, p. 300).

The late 1990s saw the beginning of the second strategic vision in Turkish foreign policy, according to Taspinar (Haugom, 2019, p. 209). This new vision, "Neo-Ottomanism", characterised political action up until 2014 and was built on reconnecting with countries that once belonged to the Ottoman Empire and Turkey´s potential as a political and economic powerhouse in its own neighbourhood (Haugom, 2019, p. 209). As Haugom describes it, "Neo-Ottomanism is about constructing a new national identity and translating it into foreign policy by using historical, cultural, and religious ties to former Ottoman territories" (2019, p. 209).

The new government, with Necmettin Erbakan as prime minister, had a strong religious focus. Despite the recent deepening of the EU-Turkish relationship, Erbakan often expressed his dislike for the West while at the same time acknowledging that it would be too much of a difficult task to change the structure of Turkish foreign policy completely (Akşin, 2007, p. 301-303). He had an idea, however, to develop a Muslim common market or a Muslim military alliance and succeeded in creating what was called the D-8 organisation. Initially, he wanted it to be called the M-8 organisation, which included major Muslim countries. Egypt, however, was unhappy about creating a religion-based group, and the "M" was therefore changed to "D" for development (Akşin, 2007, p. 303). The first summit of the D-8 organisation took place in January 1997 in Istanbul, where the aims included economic development, promotion of democracy and commercial relations (Akşin, 2007, p. 303-304). Erbakan's reconnection of major Muslim countries is an example of how Neo-Ottomanism dominated Turkey´s foreign policy in the 1990s.

Regarding the Turkish application to join the EU, its status as an accession candidate country was rejected in 1997. However, the Helsinki European Council finally acknowledged it in 1999, resulting in several years of accession negotiations as well as a Turkish aim to fulfil the Copenhagen criteria as well as resolving its human rights issues (Turhan & Reiners, 2021, p. 15: Nas & Özer, 2017, p. 1: Rumford, 2010, p. 97). However, the EU´s strong support for human rights initiatives in Turkey is a contentious

issue. One Turkish argument is that the promotion of human rights is additional support for terrorists and the mobilisation of anti-Turkish groups. The Turkish government have also requested the EU to "not support terrorist groups either directly or indirectly under the pretext of human rights" (Rumford, 2010, p. 98).

Within its borders, major changes were brewing when the Justice and Development Party (AKP) won the election. Recep Tayyip Erdogan was elected to parliament as Turkey´s Prime Minister in March 2003 (Mango, 2005, p. 25). The newly elected government had many pressing foreign policy issues to deal with, however (Mango, 2005, p. 25), especially the EU membership fixation. (Akşin, 2007, p. 318).

With a goal of breaking the old Republican elite´s hold on power, the process for EU membership with its requirements for judicial, economic and democratic reforms was seen as the most efficient way to do so (Haugom, 2019, p. 215). Turkey´s accession was in the works, but it was described by many as a tortuous process. The dream of full membership was motivated by several reasons, including a guarantee for a functional democracy, a solution to its economic issues and a prospect for educational, cultural and social development (Akşin, 2007, p. 318). In order to realise this dream, Erdogan decided quickly after the elections that his top priority was to make sure a date was set for membership negotiations. Therefore, he declared by the end of 2003 that Turkey had met the criteria for EU membership after making many changes to the constitution and other laws (Mango, 2005, p. 25-26). Some examples include removing legal provisions that restricted human rights and that the military was subordinated to civil power (Mango, 2005, p. 26).

Erdogan also realised that he would have to reassess the Turkish policy on Cyprus, knowing that the island would become an EU member state in May 2004 (Mango, 2005, p. 25). Even though the Cyprus problem was not a part of the Copenhagen criteria, the EU stressed that the accession of a divided Cyprus was internationally recognised as an obstacle to Turkey´s own accession process and, therefore, often urged them to help reunite the island (Mango, 2005, p. 26). Erdogan responded by giving his support to a reunification plan, and a referendum was held on both the Turkish and Greek sides of Cyprus. However, even though the Turkish side voted with a two-thirds majority for reunification, the Greek side voted against it with an even larger majority (Mango, 2005, p. 26). Despite the result, Erdogan and Turkey had shown an effort for reunification (Mango, 2005, p. 26). It was a sign that Turkey prioritised peace (Shankaland, 2005, p. 54), and the EU commended their effort (Mango, 2005, p. 26).

Turkey´s transformation and modernisation were evident, and by 2003 they were considered the 20th largest economy in the world when calculating on the basis of purchasing power. In the face of many economic, military and political crises in recent history, both external and civil war has been avoided (Mango, 2005, p. 26). "Turk be self-confident, hard-working and proud" was the words of Turkey´s first president Atatürk (Mango, 2005, p. 27). Erdogan brought his words back, making it clear that if faced with a situation where EU membership was not possible, the alternative would be themselves (Mango, 2005, p. 27). However, the day did eventually come on 17 December 2004, when the EU finally accepted that Turkey had met the membership criteria, and they declared that negotiations would begin on 3 October 2005 (Mango, 2005, p. 28)

Since Erdogan was elected President of Turkey in 2014, the main focus of their foreign policy has been national security (Haugom, 2019, p. 206, 210). This focus is deeply

rooted in the reasoning for three major changes in Turkish action in foreign policy. The first change in action is that Turkey has become more independent and taken on a more controlling role in its Middle Eastern neighbourhood. An example is continually deploying military forces into Syria and Iraq (Haugom, 2019, p. 206). The second change is that Turkey has re-established their relationship with Russia and other Eastern powers due to a marked rapprochement (Haugom, 2019, p. 206). Thirdly, Turkey has moved apart from many of its Western allies. One example is the troublesome accession process with the EU, which also includes a deteriorating relationship with the United States and European nations such as France, Germany and the Netherlands (Haugom, 2019, p. 206). Erdogan has raised Turkey´s global position by changing its foreign policy further away from a Western orientation to a more Southern and Eastern orientation (Müftüler-Baç & Keyman, 2012, p. 90).

Under President Erdogan, the third strategic vision, "Turkish Gaullism", outlined by Taspinar, has become prominent (Haugom, 2019, p. 210). Whereas Kemalism was characterised by preserving national interest, security and economy, and Neo-Ottomanism was characterised by the perception of Turkey as a great power with religious, cultural and historical links to the former Ottoman Empire, Turkish Gaullism combines elements from both (Haugom, 2019, p. 209-210). Meaning, as Lars Haugom describes it:

> "[…] perceptions of Turkey´s greatness and role as regional power are wedded to a strong emphasis on threats to national independence and national interests" (2019, p. 210).

He then goes on to describe Turkish foreign policy with Erdogan as having become more assertive, defiant, independent, and nationalistic (Haugom, 2019, p. 210). Several events help reflect this. Foreign policy refers to both diplomacy and military power, and Turkey has become more assertive in both under Erdogan. The country has assumed a highly assertive attitude regarding diplomatic relations, especially towards NATO and its Western allies. Some would even describe the attitude from Turkey as defiant or even threatening in some cases (Haugom, 2019, p. 210). Concerning assertiveness through military power, Turkey pursues a proactive security policy with the use of preemptive military force outside its borders, even towards its alliance partners. Some examples are the major military operations in Iraq and Syria in 2016, as well as the establishment of military bases in both Somalia and Qatar (Haugom, 2019, p. 211).

Additionally, Turkey seems to have developed a preference for interest-based and transactional relations with other states (Haugom, 2019, p. 21). One example is the 2016 refugee agreement with the EU (Haugom, 2019, p. 21), where the goal was to reduce the smuggling of refugees across the Mediterranean and over the EU´s borders (Keukeleire & Delreux, 2022, p. 68). What made this deal different from the ongoing accession negotiations was that where Turkey had to continually adjust to the membership criteria, both parties aimed to achieve their own separate interests. EU, on the one hand, wished to slow down the flow of people crossing its borders, and Turkey, on the other, wanted benefits such as cash and visa-free travel for its citizens within the Schengen area (Haugom, 2019, p. 211).

The refugee deal was a small signal that the EU might be willing to change its relationship with Turkey to a more transactional basis (Haugom, 2019, p. 211). The EU

project is fading for Turkey, and at home, President Erdogan is increasing his appeal to the nationalist right in politics, focusing more on national security (Haugom, 2019, p. 215). Erdogan´s ideological turn has resulted in a more hard-line nationalist policy. It has most likely affected what has become a more assertive style in foreign policy, where national security and national interests are placed front and centre (Haugom, 2019, p. 215).

Even with the refugee agreement, Turkey and the EU have moved further apart from each other and accession negotiations (Haugom, 2019, p. 206). The Turkish now view the EU as an emerging geopolitical rival that evokes several power struggles in their neighbourhood, especially highlighting Syria and Libya (Turhan & Reiners, 2021, p. 3). The EU themselves view Turkey as unreliable and untrustworthy, and as a result, the relationship between the two actors became more estranged. Negotiations were put on hold following a statement from the Council in June 2018, leading to the actors having to find alternative forms of cooperation (Turhan & Reiners, 2021, p. 3).

4 Analysis

In this chapter, the thesis will examine how the three logics of political action have dominated the EU´s and Turkey´s foreign policy towards each other from the 1950s to the 2010s. To do so, the chapter is two-fold, beginning with an analysis of the EU´s foreign policy towards Turkey, followed by an analysis of Turkey´s foreign policy towards the EU. The analysis will go through the decades and discuss which logic of political action dominated both actors´ motivations in their relationship towards each other. A summary of the categorisation can be seen below in Table 2.

As previously mentioned, one cannot completely exclude one logic in favour of another, as there is a probability of finding evidence of all three logics in one foreign policy action. However, this thesis argues that one or two will prove more dominant, which is what this chapter aims to present.

Table 2: Categorisation of the EU´s and Turkey´s foreign policy towards each other.

Decades	EU	Turkey
1950s	LoC: Strategic interests - Soviet threat buffer.	LoC: Economic interests - Application for association with the EEC. LoA: Achieve "European legitimisation".
1960s	LoC: Strategic and economic interests - Soviet threat buffer, the need for a workforce.	LoC: Economic interests - the need for economic aid.
1970s	LoA: Issues with human rights and non-European values.	LoC: Security interests - control of energy routes.
1980s	LoA: Issues with human rights and democracy.	LoC: Economic interests - Application of full membership in the EEC.
1990s	LoA: Issues with human rights, democracy and non-European values.	LoC: Economic interests EU-Turkey Customs Union of 1996. LoA: Disagreement on human rights issues.
2000s	LoC: Economic interests - trade and investment.	LoC: Economic and social interests EU-membership best option to achieve interests.
2010s	LoC: Political interests – EU-Turkey refugee deal of 2016. LoA: Issues with the EU´s core values.	LoC: Economic interest - transactional interest-based cooperation with other states. LoA: Moving away from the West and towards an Eastern foreign policy orientation

Source: Author´s own compilation

4.1 Theorising EU foreign policy towards Turkey

The events during the 1950s marked the beginning of Europe´s relationship with modern Turkey. Turkey joined NATO and the Council of Europe, and they applied for association with the EEC (Turhan & Reiners, 2021, p. 1: Müftüler-Baç, 1997, p. 3). Some have argued that Europe´s motivation for cooperating with Turkey in this matter was in order to create a buffer towards the Soviet Union and their designs for the East (Müftüler-Baç, 1997, p. 3). This thesis´ argue that this decision is motivated by the LoC, as cooperation was the solution to a specific problem the West had with the Soviet.

Similar interests influenced the EEC in the 1960s. In fact, the implementation of the Ankara Agreement in 1963 was more motivated by political interests than economic interests, seeing that Turkey was not economically eligible. There were two political interests in particular. One was the same as the previous decade, with Turkey serving as a buffer against Soviet expansion. The second was that Europe needed a workforce in its reconstruction of the continent after the wars, and the free movement of workers from Turkey into Europe was therefore included in the Agreement (Müftüler-Baç, 2000, p. 29: Aybey, 2004, p. 22). This focus on achieving these political interests is a clear case of the LoC.

With the 1970s began the first round of a genuinely turbulent time in the EU-Turkey relationship. Domestically, Turkey was facing violent conflicts and growing dissatisfaction with Western and European values and foreign policy (Cerami, 2011, p. 20). These events and Turkey´s issues with protecting human rights made the EU unsure about deepening their cooperation, and this decade did not include any further steps towards integrating Turkey into Europe (Cerami, 2011). The EU´s view on the matter seems a clear sign of being motivated by the LoA, as all interest-based arguments were not considered at the same level.

The turbulent time continued through the 1980s. Despite that, Turkey applied for full membership in 1987 (MacMillan, 2018, p. 5). One highlighted obstacle was the events happening domestically in Turkey, including the military coup of 1980. Events such as that showed a weakness of their democracy. This, in addition to the issues with human rights, were areas that created friction between the two actors. The two values of human rights and democracy are important parts of the EU identity, and in the view of the EU, Turkey did not share the same values (Rumford, 2010, p. 93). This view eventually led to the rejection of the Turkish application for full membership, showing the dominance of the LoA in the EU´s decision.

The LoA also dominated the EU´s foreign policy in general and towards Turkey in the 1990s. The Treaty that established the EU in 1992 states that the union will not exclude anyone from membership as long as they are committed to the EU´s core principles and values, i.e., freedom, democracy, the rule of law and protection of human rights (Dudley, 2020, p. 527). This general foreign policy focus shows a dominance of the LoA, which is also evident in their policy action against Turkey specifically. Some European politicians have spoken against including Turkey in the union, with the reason being how they do not share the same Christian and cultural values (Rumford, 2010, p. 95). Despite eventual economic and political interests that may profit from Turkish accession, a prejudice against Turkey, especially as a Muslim country, has been more than evident from several member states.

The domination of the LoA can also be seen in the decision to allow Cyprus into the EU. As previously stated, the situation on Cyprus has been and still is a very important factor in the EU-Turkey relationship. In 1994 came the decision to include Cyprus in the subsequent enlargement, which was going to "reunite the European family" (Müftüler-Baç & Güney, 2005, p. 286). Turkey was not included in this round of enlargement, despite some deeming the country eligible (Müftüler-Baç & Güney, 2005, p. 288), sending a signal that Turkey was not part of the "European family". The focus on identity and belonging to a specific community (Europe) is an argument that the EU´s foreign policy towards Turkey was influenced by the LoA.

This tendency changed towards the end of the 1990s, however, with the creation of the EU-Turkey Customs Union in 1996 and the confirmation of Turkey´s accession candidacy status in 1999 (Mango, 2005, p. 23: Turhan & Reiners, 2021, p. 15). The EU´s motivation for finally granting this status was both economic and strategic. Turkey´s large market domestically, as well as in relation to Central Asia and the Middle East and its potential as an area for investment were the arguments that supported this decision (Turhan & Reiners, 2021, p. 15: Nas & Özer, 2017, p. 1: Akşin, 2007, p. 318). These motivations are clear examples of acting through the LoC, which was the dominating logic for EU foreign policy around the change of the decade and continuing into the 2000s.

During the 2010s, the EU´s foreign policy in general and in connection to Turkey´s EU bid was motivated by the LoA. As the relationship grew even more estranged, Turkey was increasingly perceived by the EU as gradually moving away from the core values and principles of the EU (Turhan & Reiners, 2021, p. 3).

At the same time, however, came the controversial refugee deal with Turkey in 2016. The background for this deal was a goal to reduce the number of refugees crossing into the EU´s borders, and an agreement with Turkey on the matter served as the solution to this specific problem, showing the influence of the LoC. The deal came despite the EU´s several statements showing hesitance to welcome them into the union due to a clash of values. The thesis, therefore, argues that regarding Turkish EU membership negotiations, foreign policy was dominated by the LoA. In contrast, in separate bilateral agreements, the foreign policy actions were influenced by the LoC.

4.2 Theorising Turkish foreign policy towards the EU

In the 1950s, Turkey´s mission was to move away from the former Ottoman systems and towards the West and Europe. Their foreign policy actions and changes in politics were directly motivated by their wish for the world to accept them as a part of Western alliances, which was confirmed by its NATO membership and application for an association with the EEC (Akşin, 2007, p. 254: Turhan & Reiners, 2021, p. 1). Even though some scholars have pointed out that Turkish application came as a result of economic problems, which would clearly show a dominance of the LoC, the Western orientation and the need to act according to European values would prove that the LoA also influenced Turkish foreign policy in the 1950s.

Turkish foreign policy in the 1960s included several events that show a LoC perspective. Firstly, the country faced difficulties when it became clear that it had a greater need for economic aid than the US and other Western allies were able to provide. The solution to

the problem came with the Ankara Agreement of 1963, providing greater economic involvement with Europe (Mango, 2005, p. 20-21). This, in addition to the continuation of Europe´s influence on the Turkish economy, with economic planning and checks and balances, all show how the LoC influenced Turkey´s foreign policy towards the EU.

In the 1970s, the Cyprus conflict came to a head when Turkey brought their forces to the island to protect the Turkish Cypriots in the middle of a military coup (Ulusoy, 2016, p. 395: Mango, 2005, p. 21). Even though Turkey´s action on the island was not posed directly towards the EU, the Cyprus problem has been and still is a very important factor in the EU-Turkey relationship. Therefore, Turkey´s actions on Cyprus are included in the analysis of its foreign policy in regard to its bid for EU membership. In addition to protecting the Turkish Cypriots, the significance of controlling the island also lies in its location along the energy routes (Ulusoy, 2016, p. 395). With that in mind, Turkey´s security interests could be compromised if they were to lose the island to enemy powers. This focus on security interests shows the dominance of the LoC.

Turkey´s foreign policy in the 1980s was a continuation of the main objectives of the previous decade. The situation in Cyprus stayed more or less the same, with Turkey recognising a declaration of independence of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in 1983 (Turhan & Reiners, 2021, p. 6). Motivations stayed the same, and the argument that the LoC dominated Turkey's foreign policy on the island still remains. In 1987 Turkey applied for full membership in the EEC, which was said to be motivated by economic distress domestically (Mango, 2005, p. 22). Therefore, the EEC application came as an efficient solution to a specific problem, which is one of the main components of the LoC.

Interestingly, the period from 1923 to the end of the Cold War, known as the strategic vision of Kemalism, shows an overall consideration of economic progress and national security interests (Haugom, 2019). These considerations in foreign policy are all main components of the LoC, showing that in this specific time period, Turkey was dominated mainly by the LoC.

At the beginning of the 1990s, Turkey was still considered to be within the period of Kemalism, where economic development continued to be a foreign policy goal. Policymakers still saw EU membership as the best solution to economic crises at home. Through both political and economic reforms, Turkey achieved one of its goals as the EU-Turkey Customs Union of 1996 was implemented (Mango, 2005, p. 23). Marking the end of the Kemalism period, the event in 1996 also marked the end of the LoC´s dominance streak on Turkish foreign policy towards the EU.

The late 1990s saw the beginning of the second strategic vision in Turkish foreign policy, Neo-Ottomanism, with stronger cultural and religious ties to the former Ottoman Empire (Haugom, 2019, p. 209). Turkey still aimed to become an EU member state, and its candidacy was acknowledged in 1999. What followed was negotiations on how Turkey would seek to fulfil the Copenhagen criteria and resolve its human rights issues (Turhan & Reiners, 2021, p. 15: Nas & Özer, 2017, p. 1: Rumford, 2010, p. 97). For Turkey, however, the human rights issue was a contested one, as one argument was that the EU´s idea of supporting human rights in Turkey also supported anti-Turkish groups, according to the country itself (Rumford, 2010, p. 98). Therefore, Turkey was hesitant to comply with the EU´s demands as it stood against what they themselves deemed as appropriate behaviour within the Turkish community. This is where we first see a clear dominance of the LoA in Turkish foreign policy towards the EU.

In the 2000s, when Erdogan was elected Prime Minister, Turkey´s foreign policy seemed to revolt back to being mostly dominated by the LoC. The new government had many aspirations to deal with, including economic, social and democratic development. Viewing their options, the EU membership requirements of economic and democratic reforms were considered the most efficient way to achieve their goals (Haugom, 2019, p. 215). This thought can be argued to be a clear example of LoC dominance.

The 2010s and the election of Erdogan as Turkey´s president marked the beginning of the third strategic vision, Turkish Gaullism. The logics dominating their foreign policy in this decade can be argued to be a combination of the LoC and the LoA. On the one hand, they developed a preference for interest-based transactional relations with other states over belonging to one specific European community (Haugom, 2019, p. 211). This preference can be argued to be motivated by the LoC. On the other hand, Turkey was said to have become more nationalistic, re-establishing its relationship with other Eastern powers. Moving away from its Western allies, Turkey began to make decisions based on appropriate behaviour within an Eastern foreign policy orientation (Haugom, 2019, p. 206: Müftüler-Baç & Keyman, 2012, p. 90). This sudden shift in foreign policy objectives towards the EU can be argued to have happened because of the dominance of the LoA.

Interestingly, as this analysis has shown, the LoMJ have not been dominant in how either the EU or Turkey operationalise their foreign policy towards each other. Even if there were to be slight tendencies of it, which this analysis has not found, it would not be near enough to be considered dominating in comparison to the LoC or the LoA. Arguments as to why the LoMJ have not shown explanatory of the actor´s foreign policy will be presented in the following discussion of the thesis, where the chapter aims to answer the research questions.

5 Discussion

This chapter aims to discuss the findings of chapters 3 and 4 and answer the thesis´ research questions. To do this, the chapter is structured into three sections. First, the thesis will provide answers to the thesis´ main research question and two sub-questions. Secondly, the thesis will investigate whether the results met this author's expectations and how the findings fit into the existing pool of literature on the subject. Lastly, the thesis will present the limitations of this thesis and explore topics for further research.

5.1 Key findings and research questions

The main research question of this thesis is *(1) How can we account for the continually turbulent relationship between the EU and Turkey?* In Chapter 3, the thesis provided a contextual framework to see the evolution of the relationship between the EU and Turkey. The events, conflicts, agreements and statements presented have helped to give a better picture of the development of the relationship and to answer how it has become a complicated one. In order to provide an account for the continually turbulent relationship, the thesis set out to answer two sub-questions.

The first was *(a) Which of the three logics of political action, identified in the international relations literature, have dominated the EU´s and Turkey´s foreign policy towards each other from the 1950s to the 2010s?* Chapter 4 consisted of an analysis of the EU´s and Turkey´s foreign policy towards each other since the beginning of their modern relationship, beginning in the 1950s. This chapter examined how the three logics of political action influence their actions towards each other.

Most decades did show a dominance for one logic. However, it would be incorrect not to include two in some cases. Looking at the EU´s foreign policy first, the analysis showed that both the LoC and the LoA have been equally influential throughout the years. The LoC dominated the union´s foreign policy in the 1950s, 1960s, the 2000s and the 2010s, and the LoA dominated the 1970s, 1980s, 1990s and the 2010s. Meaning that the in the 2010s, strong evidence was found for both logics. In the 1950s and 1960s, the LoC dominated the EU´s foreign policy due to their choice to act according to strategic and economic interests. From the 1970s to the 1990s, the union´s actions were dominated by the LoA in that they highlighted issues with human rights, democracy and other European core values in their actions. Then, in the 2000s, their actions were dominated by the LoC again due to their following economic interests. The 2010s included evidence for both the LoC and the LoA due to economic interests in the EU-Turkey refugee deal and the issues with clashing core values in the Turkish accession process.

For Turkey, the analysis shows that the LoC has been slightly more influential than the LoA, with the LoC being dominant in the 1950s, 1960s, 1970s, 1980s, 1990s the 2000s and the 2010s, and the LoA being dominant in the 1950s, 1990s and the 2010s. Similar to the EU, evidence showed that Turkish foreign policy was also dominated by both the LoC and the LoA in the 2010s, in addition to the 1990s and the 1950s. In the 1950s, Turkey acted in accordance with both economic interests and their goal of becoming a part of the European community, showing evidence that both the LoC and the LoA

influenced their actions in this decade. From the 1960s to the 1990s, this thesis argues that Turkey operationalised their foreign policy towards the EU through the LoC, acting according to mainly economic and security interests. Additionally, in the 1990s, the influence of the LoA can be found in the EU and Turkey´s disagreement on human rights issues. The 2000s was again dominated by the LoC, with Turkey focusing on economic and social interests before the 2010s again being influenced by both the LoC and the LoA in its split focus on both economic interests and a clearer Eastern belonging.

One interesting observation is connected to how the EU-Turkey relationship went through several ups and downs since the beginning of their modern relationship. As the contextual framework and analysis have shown, when the EU and Turkey operationalise their foreign policy through the same logic, their relationship deepened, and cooperation increased. This was the case in the 1950s and 1960s when both actors showed a dominance of the LoC in their foreign policy actions towards each other. In this period, the Ankara Agreement was signed, and Turkey became an associate member of the EEC (Mango, 2005, p. 21). Then, the 1970s and 1980s were a period of turbulence in their relationship, with no significant steps towards further integration due to Turkish domestic politics and human rights issues (Cerami, 2011, p. 20). In these decades, the EU´s foreign policy towards Turkey showed a dominance of the LoA, while Turkey´s foreign policy towards the EU showed a dominance of the LoC.

Moving on to the 1990s, the LoA influenced both actors, and two major steps towards Turkish membership took place. First was the EU-Turkey Customs Union of 1996, followed by the recognition of Turkish candidacy status in 1999 (Mango, 2005, p. 23: Turhan & Reiners, 2021, p. 15). In the 2000s, the dominating logic for both actors switched to the LoC, and even though it was a decade of some turbulence, essential steps towards further integration were taken. Erdogan gave his support for a reunification plan for Cyprus, an effort commended by the EU (Mango, 2005, p. 26), and in 2004 the EU declared that Turkey had met the membership criteria, and negotiations were set to begin in 2005 (Mango, 2005, p. 28). Finally, the 2010s are a bit more complicated, seeing how the actors operationalised both the LoC and the LoA in their foreign policy actions towards each other. Both progress and stagnation took place in the 2010s, with the EU-Tukey refugee deal in 2016 as well as the membership negotiation freeze in 2018 (Haugom, 2019, p. 21: Turhan & Reiners, 2021, p. 3).

The second sub-question aimed to better grasp the relationship's complexity by investigating the most important arguments as to why Turkey has yet to become an EU member state. The question was, therefore, *(b) How can we explain the failure of Turkey to join the EU?* In order to provide an answer to this question, the thesis utilises the contextual framework. The main explanatory factors this thesis has focused on have been issues with human rights and democracy, the situation with Cyprus and cultural clashes.

To begin, the issue surrounding human rights and democracy has been one of the most prominent factors explaining why Turkey has not yet become an EU member state. It has become clear that when the two actors experience regression and turbulence in their relationship, it is often explained by the EU to be based on human rights issues and problems with democracy. This became especially clear in the 1970s and 1980s, with violent religious and political conflicts within Turkey´s border and the military coup in 1980, challenging Turkish democracy (Cerami, 2011, p. 20: Turhan & Reiners, 2021, p. 14: MacMillan, 2018, p. 5). Even in 1999, when Turkey´s candidacy status was

confirmed, the EU said that Turkey suffered from shortcomings in terms of human rights, especially in protecting minorities (Rumford, 2010, p. 96). On the other hand, Turkey found the EU´s support for human rights initiatives in their country problematic because, in their opinion, support for human rights is additional support for terrorists and anti-Turkish groups (Rumford, 2010, p. 98). It is, therefore, safe to say that the issue surrounding human rights and democracy is one of the main factors explaining the complexity of their relationship, especially seeing how they disagree on the circumstances.

The second explanatory factor this thesis highlights is the conflict on Cyprus between Turkey and Greece and, consequently, the EU. The Ottomans conquered the island in 1517, leading to half being Turkish Cypriots even after its independence in 1960. The island's strategic position is also important for Turkey as it is positioned along energy routes. These two reasons helped rationalise their choice in 1974 when they brought forces to the island to protect the Turkish Cypriots during a military coup (Ulusoy, 2016). For the EU, their involvement in the conflict began formally with the Association Agreement with Cyprus in 1973, the year before Turkish forces landed on the island. With Greece´s accession to the union in 1981 and Cyprus´ accession in 2004, the conflict became one of the most critical obstacles to further cooperation.

Finally, cultural clashes, especially highlighting religion, have also been a factor in why Turkey has yet to become an EU member state. This fact goes back to the relationship between European states, which were mainly Christian, and the Ottoman Empire, which was Muslim (Müftüler-Baç, 2000, p. 27). With the decline of the Ottoman Empire, Turkey remained a Muslim country. However, the place of religion as the legitimising factor in running the government was replaced by legitimisation through institutions (Müftüler-Baç, 2000, p. 28). Despite this, religion still had a place in Turkish politics, especially during the period from the end of the Cold War to around 2014, when Neo-Ottomanism was considered the strategic vision of Turkey where a new Turkish identity was established by using cultural and religious ties to the Ottoman Empire (Haugom, 2019, p. 209). This fact became clear with Erbakan´s government in the 1990s and his idea to develop a Muslim alliance (Akşin, 2007, p. 303). During this time came the statement from Luxembourg´s Prime Minister, stating that a country such as Turkey should not sit at the EU table, highlighting how the EU have Christian and cultural values that Turkey does not have (Rumford, 2010, p. 95). All in all, cultural differences have been one factor explaining the failure of the Turkish accession process, as politicians often draw comparisons between Turkey and the Ottoman Empire when arguing against cooperation with the country (Joseph, 2006, p. 11-12).

The abovementioned factors are what this thesis has drawn upon as the most explanatory in answering why Turkey has yet to become an EU member state. However, the thesis acknowledges that there are additional factors that have not been investigated to the same extent. The selection of factors has been this author´s observation of what existing literature has deemed the most important in explaining the lack of results in the Turkish accession process.

5.2 Expectations and contributions

One expectation this author had before beginning with the analysis was that there would not reveal to be a problem assigning one logic to each decade. Even when aware of how

previous research states that one cannot completely exclude one logic in favour of another, deciding which was more dominating was not expected to be a problem. Although expectations were met in most cases, some were not as easily categorised. For the EU, there were conflicting motivations between the LoC and the LoA in the 2010s, and for Turkey, similar conflicts became evident in the 1950s, the 1990s and the 2010s.

Another expectation was that the LoMJ would dominate some political actions, especially in the case of EU foreign policy. As exemplified in the literature review, the LoMJ was relevant in explaining EU foreign policy motivations in its eastern enlargement process. In that process, EU member states gathered together to influence EU foreign policy as they deemed it "the right thing" for all candidates to begin negotiations at the same time, regardless of membership criteria (Piedrafita & Torreblanca, p. 2005, p. 50). However, there was no such tendency in the case of Turkish accession.

Additionally, this thesis argues that the LoMJ is irrelevant when defining the EU-Turkish relationship, considering how the two rarely agree on what is just, moral and the right thing to do. More specifically, the problem might be how different they are. The relationship consists of a democratic institution on one side and a semi-democratic nation on the other, with varying ideals regarding morality and justice. At times this issue goes as far as them completely disagreeing on these ideals, exemplified by how the EU encourages more support to human rights initiatives and Turkey calling out this support as financing terrorism and anti-Turkish groups under false pretences (Rumford, 2010, p. 98). Therefore, the EU's argument that it is not moral to let Turkey in because of their human rights issues is challenged by Turkey´s argument that it is amoral of the EU not to let them in after many decades of forward process and broken promises. With that in mind, no set of principles is mutually recognised between the two, and therefore, the LoMJ does not apply in this specific study.

This thesis contributes two-fold to the existing literature on the EU-Turkey relationship. Firstly, the thesis contributes by investigating the relationship through a new lens by applying the three logics of political action. The three logics have been primarily included in the literature on EU foreign policy and enlargement, but to this author´s knowledge, not to other nations´ motivations. In doing so, the thesis tests the three logics explanatory powers beyond the EU. The second contribution is found in the results of this appliance. While concluding that both the LoC and the LoA can explain how the EU and Turkey operationalise their foreign policy towards each other, it also found that the LoMJ does not apply to this relationship.

5.3 Limitations and recommendations for further research

There are factors which limit this study, also highlighted in the methodology of this thesis. Firstly, the weakness of conducting a qualitative case study is identified in that it comes at the expense of being able to make generalisations. Concluding that both the LoC and the LoA are explanatory to Turkish foreign policy towards the EU sparks an interest to learn whether they, in addition to the LoMJ, might be applicable to other nations as well. With this limitation comes the first recommendation for further research: testing the three logics of political action on other nations´ foreign policy towards the EU.

Another limitation highlighted is in the studied time period of this thesis. Due to this ambitious goal, one limitation has been that the thesis has been unable to research the

relationship at a micro level, i.e., individual member states´ views and motivations. For further research, it would therefore be interesting to look at the views and motivations of individual member states in the EU-Turkey relationship. Two member states in particular that would be interesting are Greece, due to the situation surrounding Cyprus, and also France, considering how they have often found themselves leading Turkey sceptics in Brussels, unilaterally vetoing as many as five chapters during accession negotiations (Bechev, 2013, p. 45).

Also, the chosen time period does not account for the EU-Turkey relationship after accession negotiations stopped in 2018. Interestingly, even though the relationship has become more strained, Turkey still has ambitions to join the EU. Statements from Turkish officials have highlighted that accession continues to be a strategic goal. This became evident in July of 2023 when Turkey´s President Erdogan linked his support for Sweden´s NATO bid with Turkey´s own application to join the EU (Lynch & Barigazzi, 2023, 13. July). The EU has recognised that despite stopping accession negotiations, it is important to continue working with Turkey due to it being a bridge to Russia, Asia and the Middle East (Lynch & Barigazzi, 2023, 13. July). For further research, it would therefore be interesting to investigate the two actors' foreign policy motivations towards each other after negotiations froze in 2018.

6 Conclusion

The findings of this thesis shed light on the complexity of the EU-Turkey relationship. This study has examined the relationship from the 1950s to the 2010s through an extensive contextual framework and analysis of foreign policy motivations.

The main research question asked how to account for the continually turbulent relationship between the two actors, and two sub-questions were asked to clarify better and limit the scope of this study. First, the thesis aimed to discover the motivations behind the EU´s and Turkey´s foreign policy actions towards each other. To answer this, the thesis utilised three logics of political action: the Logic of Consequences (LoC), the Logic of Appropriateness (LoA), and the Logic of Moral Justification (LoMJ). A calculation of consequences drives actions through the LoC, actions through the LoA are driven by appropriate behaviour within a specific community, and actions through the LoMJ are driven by a set of principles that are morally acceptable and mutually recognised. Chapter 4 consisted of an analysis that examined how the three logics can explain the motivations behind the EU´s and Turkey´s foreign policy towards each other.

The thesis has found that both the LoC and the LoA have been dominant for the EU. The LoC influenced the EU´s foreign policy in the 1950s, 1960s and 2000s, while the LoA was dominant in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s. The 2010s showed influence by both the LoC and the LoA, showing how one is never completely influenced by one logic, but in most cases, one can argue that one is most dominant. The same is true for Turkey, as their foreign policy actions were dominated by both the LoC and the LoA in the 1950s, 1990s and 2010s. As for the other decades, the LoC influenced Turkey in the 1960s, 1970s, 1980s and 2000s. This evidence shows that the LoC has been more influential in Turkish foreign policy than the LoA, with the LoA never truly dominating a decade alone. In addition to their motivations, these results show that when the EU and Turkey operationalise their foreign policy through the same logic, like in the 1950s, 1960s, 1990s and 2000s, their relationship deepened, and cooperation increased. In a similar fashion, in periods when their foreign policy was dominated by different logics, like in the 1970s and 1980s, their relationship experienced turbulence and a decrease of cooperation. The 2010s were more complicated, as the actors were influenced by both the LoC and the LoA. There was progress in 2016 with the EU-Turkey refugee deal and stagnation in the negotiations freeze of 2018.

The second sub-questions aimed to better understand the complexity of the EU-Turkey relationship by examining the main explanatory factors as to why Turkey has yet to become an EU member state. By utilising the contextual framework, the thesis argued that the main factors are human rights and democracy, the situation with Cyprus and cultural clashes. While acknowledging that other factors have not been given the same attention as the abovementioned ones, the thesis argued that these three are the most important based on this study and the attention given to them by previous scholars.

Two main features of the thesis serve as the main contributions to the existing literature. Firstly, the thesis tests the explanatory power of the three logics of political action onto other actors than the EU. To this author's knowledge, the three logics have been mainly applied to the EU in the context of enlargement. The second contribution comes with the

argument that the LoMJ has not dominated the EU´s or Turkey´s foreign policy towards each other in the investigated time period. The argument is that this logic is irrelevant when defining the EU-Turkey relationship, as the two actors rarely agree upon what is moral and just.

To conclude, the complexity of the EU-Turkey relationship deserves the reputation it has gained. Their relationship has featured many ups and downs, grounded in whether the same or different motivations for action have influenced the two actors. Moving forward, it will be interesting to see whether the topics of human rights and democracy issues, Cyprus and cultural clashes will continue to be the main arguments standing in the way of Turkish accession. Turkey and Erdogan still have ambitions of joining the EU, and the EU recognises the importance of upholding a working relationship with Turkey. Therefore, this author has no doubts that the dynamics of the EU-Turkey relationship will continue to be highly relevant and an important field of study in the future.

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https://doi.org/10.1080/00263200500035462

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