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Evaluative adjectives in Norwegian compared to English

Master's thesis in Language Studies with Teacher Education

Supervisor: Christopher Wilder

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Abstract

This thesis explores the topic of evaluative adjectives (EAs) in Norwegian compared to English. The English behaviour is explained by the findings of the literature concerning the structural patterns of EAs and argument alternations. The control clause in the agent-action structure and the distinction between stage level and individual level predicates. In Norwegian, the som-clause is uncovered as a distinct difference from English EA structures, which is always presupposed.

Sammendrag

Denne masteroppgaven tas for seg evaluerende adjektiv, og deres oppførsel på engelsk sammenlignet med norsk. Flere aspekter vedrørende disse adjektivene har blitt utforsket. Funnet i denne masteroppgaven er at en av de norske EA strukturene er strukturelt og semantisk ulik fra den korresponderende engelske EA strukturen.

Preface

The completion of this thesis is not only thanks to me. I would like to thank my supervisor Christopher Wilder, for all of the work he has put into the entire process. The topic of the thesis was a suggestion from him. It is one I have come to find very interesting, but I would not have been able to write this thesis without the help of him throughout the process.

My husband, my family and my friends have been very supportive. Thank you all so much for the help, for listening, for encouraging, and always loving me. I could not have done this without all of you!

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1. Introduction

The aim of this thesis is to explore the properties of evaluative adjectives (EAs) in Norwegian compared to English. English EAs and their argument alternations have been discussed by several researchers, among others (Fàbregas et al., 2019; Karttunen et al., 2014; Kertz, 2006; Landau, 2009; Maezawa, 2009; Stowell, 1991). To my knowledge, the topic of Norwegian EAs has not been explored in previous works, which makes the topic of this thesis interesting in itself. Additionally, there are differences between the Norwegian and English EAs that makes the topic interesting for the field of studying EAs. Heinat (2012) has studied EAs in Swedish. Since Norwegian and Swedish are closely related, Heinat (2012) will be used when examining Norwegian EAs in this thesis.

The class of evaluative adjectives are comprised of many adjectives, a list of examples is seen in (1), it is not an exhaustive list. EAs are used to convey the speaker's impression of the person, based on behaviour or attitude (Landau, 2009, p.317).

- (1) clever, smart, intelligent, cunning, careful, stupid, crazy, mad, idiotic, foolish, clumsy, polite, noble, modest, rude, impolite, gross, kind, nice, generous, considerate, brave, courageous, mean, cruel, selfish.

(Landau, 2009, p.317)

Evaluative adjectives behave in a different way from other adjectives, in that they can be used in several structural patterns, particularly with an argument alternation seen in (2) below. Argument alternations have been well studied for verbs (Levin, 1993), but has not been seen with other adjective types than EAs. The topic of argument alternations will be further explained below in section 2.1.1.

- (2) a. Tom was mean to steal the car.
 b. To steal the car was mean of Tom.

Norwegian EAs are also found in several structural patterns, which correspond to the ones found with English EAs, making Norwegian EAs a relevant field of study. There is a difference between Norwegian and English EA structures involved in the argument alternation. For English EA structures like (2), the alternation involves a non-finite clause in different positions. However, the corresponding Norwegian EA structures in (3) alternate the positions of a finite clause in (3a) and a non-finite clause in (3b).

- (3) a. Tom var slem som stjal bilen.
 Tom was mean who stole the car.
 Tom was mean to steal the car.
 b. Å stjele bilen var slem av Tom.
 To steal the car was mean of Tom.

With a finite clause involved in the argument alternation for Norwegian EAs, the Norwegian EA structure is significantly different from the structural pattern of English EAs. The

structural difference further supports the relevance of studying Norwegian EAs. The finite clause in (3a) is similar in structure to a Norwegian relative clause with the relative pronoun *som* ‘who’¹, and will be referred to as a som-clause throughout this thesis. In section 3.3, the som-clause will be compared to relative clauses, with a basis in the discussion in Heinat (2012).

The structural difference between the non-finite clause in English and the finite clause in Norwegian correlates to a semantic difference. The finite som-clause can be used, not only in EA structures, but also with the adjective *heldig* ‘lucky,’ like in (4). Unlike Norwegian EAs, *heldig* ‘lucky’ can also be used with a non-finite clause, like in (5).

- (4) Han var heldig som vant i lotto.
He was lucky who won the lottery.
- (5) Han var heldig å vinne i lotto.
He was lucky to win the lottery.

The semantic difference between the non-finite clause and the finite clause in Norwegian is connected to presupposition. Presupposition will be further explained and discussed concerning EAs in section 4 of this thesis. Simply put, when something is presupposed, it is assumed to be true and known to the listener. Semantically, presupposition holds over negation, meaning that the presupposed matter is seen as true also if the sentence is negated. For the finite and non-finite clauses above, (4) and (5) respectively, the first is presupposed, while the second is not presupposed, which can be observed for the negated sentences in (6) and (7).

- (6) Han var ikke heldig som vant i lotto.
He wasn’t lucky who won the lottery.
- (7) Han var ikke heldig å vinne i lotto.
He wasn’t lucky to win the lottery.

In other words, by using the finite clause in the negated sentence in (6), the person *won the lottery*, but *wasn’t lucky* for doing so. On the other hand, by using the non-finite clause in the negated sentence in (7), the person did not *win the lottery*, and not doing so *wasn’t lucky*. The semantic difference between the finite and non-finite clause is notable since the main difference between Norwegian and English EA structures is the use of these clauses.

The Norwegian EA structures have a finite embedded clause, which is presupposed. In English, the EA structures have a non-finite embedded clause, where there have been discussions about the semantic interpretations and presupposition (Karttunen et al., 2014). According to Karttunen et al. (2014), some native speakers interpret the non-finite clause as always being presupposed, where the context does not change the interpretation. Other native English speakers interpret the embedded clause as either presupposed or not, based on the

¹ The relative pronoun in Norwegian, *som*, can be translated into any of the English relative pronouns ‘that’, ‘which’ and ‘who’.

context and general impression of the action in the clause. This will be further explained and discussed in section 4.2 of this thesis.

The structural and semantic difference between Norwegian and English EAs described above is the main finding of this thesis. English EA structures use a non-finite embedded clause which is being interpreted as either presupposed or not. Norwegian EA structures use a finite embedded clause, which is interpreted as presupposed. However, the assumption that the finite clause is presupposed has not been tested and calls for further research on the topic.

In section 2, the topic of evaluative adjectives in English will be explored. In section 3, the Norwegian EAs will be examined. In section 4, the semantic relationship of presupposition is explored for Norwegian and English EAs. Finally, some concluding remarks in section 5.

The theta grid contains the number of arguments required by the verb represented by the theta roles of the arguments, such as AGENT, THEME, and LOCATION in the theta grid of *put* in (11) above. A theta role is a label for the semantic role of an argument in relation to the verb (Saeed, 2016, p.455).

For argument alternations, there is one verb occurring in more than one structures, each with their own set of arguments. This results in different theta grids for each alternation, which are stored in the lexicon as separate entries. One such alternation is illustrated in (12) below, with specific examples in (a) and the theta grids of each alternation in (b) (Saeed, 2016, p.163). The theta grids in (b) include the syntactic information below each argument. There are several examples of argument alternations involving verb phrases (VPs) in Levin (1993, p.67) where the alternation in (12) is identified, and the theta grids are found in Saeed (2016, p.163).

- (12) a. She tapped the can against the window.
 She tapped the window with the can.
 b. V: <AGENT, INSTRUMENT & THEME, LOCATION>
 NP NP PP
 V: <AGENT, LOCATION, INSTRUMENT & THEME>
 NP NP PP (Saeed, 2016, p.163)

Importantly, there are only arguments in the theta grids, never adjuncts (Carnie, 2013, p.234). There are no restrictions on the number of adjuncts in a structure, but there can only be as many arguments in the structure as there are theta roles in the theta grid (Carnie, 2013, p.234). This constriction is known as the theta criterion, where the number of arguments and number of theta roles must be the same (Carnie, 2013, p.234).

2.1.2 Behaviour of English EAs

Evaluative adjectives (EAs) behave in a specific way, where the EAs and their constituents appear in several syntactic structures (13)-(16), a distribution which is unique for this type of adjectives (Kertz, 2006; Landau, 2009; Maezawa, 2009; Stowell, 1991). These structures can be interpreted as argument alternations for the EA, with four separate entries of theta grids for the EAs in the lexicon.

- (13) Tom is mean.
 (14) Tom was mean to scare the children.
 (15) To scare the children was mean (of Tom).
 (16) Tom was mean to Harry.

These EA structures (13)-(16) have the following patterns. In structure (13), the subject *Tom* is assigned the quality of the EA *mean*. In structure (14), the subject *Tom* is assigned the quality of the EA *mean* for performing the action *to scare the children*. While in structure

(15), the subject *to scare the children* is described to have the quality of the EA *mean*. In addition, the optional PP *of Tom* has the quality of the EA *mean*, for performing the action. In structure (16), the subject *Tom* is assigned the quality of the EA for some implicit behaviour towards the sentient constituent *Harry*. Common for all EA structures (13)-(16) is that there is a sentient (human) constituent *Tom* who the EA is ascribed to (Landau, 2009, p.317).

The literature has been interested in differences between the EA structures, particularly the argument alternation for the structures (14)-(15), which has not been found with other types of adjectives. The alternation between (14)-(15) is similar to a diathesis alternation, since the constituents change places (Levin, 1993). Additionally, the alternation between (13) and (14) is similar to a transitivity alternation (Levin, 1993). However, there are debates about the argument status of the embedded clause in the EA structure in (14) (Stowell, 1991), which will be elaborated upon below in section 2.1.3. Consequently, the statuses of the observed argument alternations are also in question, whether they actually are argument alternations, or only appear to be so.

The structural patterns of (13)-(16) are explored concerning the specific syntactic elements required and the semantic roles of the constituents in each EA structure, in (17)-(20) below respectively. Each structural frame below is given a name at the left which will be used throughout the thesis when referring to the specific EA structures. On the right, the syntactic elements required in each structure are presented on the first line, optional elements are in parentheses. On the second line, the constituents are given semantic labels similar to theta roles. Since the argument status of the constituents are unclear, the labels are not to be interpreted as formal theta roles in a theta grid.

(17)	‘Possessor-subject’	DP POSSESSOR	+ be + ADJ
(18)	‘Agent-action’	DP AGENT	+ be + ADJ + INF-clause ACTION
(19)	‘Action-subject’	INF-clause ACTION	+ be + ADJ + (of-PP) AGENT
(20)	‘Agent-goal’	DP AGENT	+ be + ADJ + to-PP GOAL

The terminology used in this thesis is presented in the examples (17)-(20). The semantic labels POSSESSOR, AGENT, ACTION, and GOAL will be used throughout the thesis when referring to the specific constituents of the EA structures. The names for each of the EA structures are ‘possessor-subject’ (17), ‘agent-action’ (18), ‘action-subject’ (19), and ‘agent-goal’ (20). The structures have been named from the semantic arguments and partly their syntactic function, attempting to capture the unique elements that distinguish the structures from each other. Below, the reasoning behind names and semantic labels are discussed for each of the four structures.

First, the ‘possessor-subject’ structure (17) is named after the semantic role of the subject, POSSESSOR, see example of the structure in (13) above. The subject in (17) holds the property of the EA, there are no indications of any implicit action in the structure, which is why the subject receives the passive semantic label of POSSESSOR. Structure (17) is the only one where the sentient constituent is given this semantic label.

Second, the ‘agent-action’ structure (18) is named after the semantic labels of the constituents in the structure, AGENT and ACTION, and the order in which they are presented, see example of the structure in (14) above. The subject AGENT in (18) is given the property of the EA, similar to the subject in (17), however, the subject is given the property based on the behaviour described in the embedded, infinitival clause ACTION. Since the subject has a degree of control, or agency, over the behaviour and consequently the acquiring of the property of the EA, the subject is given the semantic label of AGENT rather than POSSESSOR as in (17). The embedded clause depicts an event or action performed by the AGENT, where there is agency, giving it the semantic label ACTION. The structure name ‘agent-action’ reflects the unique composition of having both AGENT and ACTION in that specific order and cannot be confused with any of the other EA structures.

Third, the ‘action-subject’ structure (19) is named after the semantic label of the subject, since the structure is different from the other EA structures, by having the ACTION as the subject, see example of the structure in (15) above. The action-subject structure has the same semantic arguments as the agent-action structure, in alternated positions and different syntactic roles. The ACTION is the subject, and the AGENT is realised as an optional prepositional phrase, an *of*-PP. Although the *of*-PP is unique among the EA structures and could have been the basis for naming the EA structure, it is an optional constituent, which would complicate the interpretation of which structure the name applied to. It could have been interpreted as if the name only applied to the EA structure where the AGENT was explicit. Because of this, the syntactic role of ACTION as subject is an even more integral part of the structure.

Fourth, the ‘agent-goal’ structure (20) is named after the semantic arguments, AGENT and GOAL, and their order in the structure, see example of the structure in (16) above. The AGENT is the subject of the structure, and the GOAL is realised as a PP. The prepositional phrase *to*-PP has the preposition *to* with a sentient argument which is the recipient of the implicit behaviour of the AGENT. The AGENT is given the property of the EA for some implicit behaviour towards the other sentient argument, giving the semantic label GOAL. The AGENT is interpreted as having agency in the implicit behaviour, distinguishing the subject AGENT from the POSSESSOR in the possessor-subject structure (17).

The terminology for EAs, the EA structures and the constituents involved have not been consistent in the literature, which is why the terminology for this thesis has been so thoroughly introduced. The adjectives themselves have been known as mental property adjectives (Stowell, 1991), class W adjectives (Maezawa, 2009), but more commonly evaluative adjectives (Fàbregas et al., 2019; Karttunen et al., 2014; Kertz, 2006; Landau, 2009), which seems to be the accepted term of the field at this point.

For the EA structures, the literature has been divided, some have not given specific names to the structures (Karttunen et al., 2014; Kertz, 2006; Stowell, 1991), while others have given specific names as follows. Landau (2009) distinguishes between two structures, the *basic variant* (BasA) in (17) and the *derived variant* (DerA) in (19). The structure in (18) is claimed to be the BasA structure modified by an adjunct clause (Landau, 2009, p.324). Maezawa (2009) distinguishes the three EA structures (17)-(19) by names based on semantic roles as follows, *possessor subject* in (17), *possessor subject-with-cause* in (18), and *cause subject* in (19).

The method of naming the structures in this thesis is different from Landau (2009), since those names indicate a derivational process for the EA structures, which has not been explored in this thesis. Rather, the naming has been similar to that of Maezawa (2009), although, the specific names differ. The difference in names in this thesis compared to Maezawa (2009) is based on different semantic labels for the constituents in the EA structures, which will be further explored below.

The specific constituents in the EA structures have received other names in the literature than in this thesis. AGENT has been named *the human/sentient argument* (Landau, 2009; Stowell, 1991) and *possessors* (Maezawa, 2009), ACTION has been named *the action-denoting argument* (Landau, 2009; Stowell, 1991) and *cause* (Maezawa, 2009), GOAL has been named *goal argument* (Landau, 2009; Stowell, 1991, Maezawa, 2009). Generally, the use of *argument* in names for constituents has been avoided in this thesis, since the status as syntactic argument change for the constituents depending on the specific EA structure, such as for AGENT in (18) and (19).

Unlike Maezawa (2009), this thesis distinguishes between POSSESSOR and AGENT, as explained above. Furthermore, the embedded clause has been named ACTION in this thesis, more similar to the names in Landau (2009) and Stowell (1991), while Maezawa (2009) uses the name *cause*. Using *cause* emphasises the relationship between the AGENT and the EA, but it holds a more passive connotation to me than ACTION, especially when it is combined with *possessor* rather than AGENT. The disadvantage of ACTION is that it does not convey the connection it has to the allocation of the property of the EA, which is something *cause* does.

There are examples that do not fit into the EA structures above, like (21) and (22)². In the examples above, there was a clear distinction between the passive POSSESSOR in (17) and the active AGENT in (18)-(20). However, there are examples such as (21) and (22), that contain only one argument, but it is not the POSSESSOR subject found in (17). The examples in (21) and (22) contain only the AGENT subject alone, without ACTION or GOAL found in (18) and (20).

- (21) John is being kind.
- (22) John was kind yesterday.

² I would like to thank my supervisor Christopher Wilder for pointing out these types of examples and his suggestions for possible explanations.

The progressive aspect in (21), and the tense and temporal adverbial in (22) create a separation from the generality of (17), into a temporary interpretation like in (18)-(20). Without the ACTION and GOAL, these structures are difficult to categorise since they do not fit the syntactic frames above. To resolve this problem of categorisation, it is possible to suggest the existence of implicit, optional arguments, either in the form of ACTION, GOAL, or both. Alternatively, there could be a separate structure where there is only an AGENT. This structure would be similar to the possessor-subject structure, but with AGENT instead of POSSESSOR. Deciding which solution best categorise these and similar examples is not in the scope of this thesis.

An action-subject structure (19), such as (15), can be extraposed (23), which is a property of any sentence with a subject clause (Carnie, 2013, p.431). It can be useful to realise that it is possible to extrapose the action-subject structure, and that they are “two variants of the same construction” (Maezawa, 2009, p.118). There are many examples of the extraposed variant of the EA structure being mentioned in the literature (Kertz, 2006; Landau, 2009; Stowell, 1991), which warrants the brief clarification in this thesis, that it is not considered to be a distinct EA structure.

(23) It was mean (of Tom) to scare the children.

The EAs are considered to be a coherent semantic class of adjectives (Kertz, 2006), however, Wilder (2020) divide them into three separate categories based on their meanings. These categories are determined by which type of evaluation they make of the AGENT, specifically the AGENT’s ‘intellectual capacity’ (24), ‘adherence to social norms’ (25), and ‘moral quality’ (26).

(24) ‘Intellectual capacity’
clever, smart, intelligent, cunning, ...
stupid, silly, crazy, mad, idiotic, ... (Wilder, 2020)

(25) ‘Adherence to social norms’
polite, courteous, decent, noble, modest, ...
rude, impolite, crude, indecent, pretentious, ... (Wilder, 2020)

(26) ‘Moral quality’
kind, nice, generous, considerate, ...
nasty, mean, cruel, naughty, selfish, ... (Wilder, 2020)

In addition to the difference in meaning, the types of EAs classified above behave differently. The EAs denoting intellectual capacity (24) cannot be combined with the GOAL, as seen in (28), unlike the other two types of EAs, as seen in (27) (Wilder, 2020). The division of EAs into separate groups could be an interesting topic to explore, however, that is not in the scope of this thesis.

(27) Tom was kind/mean/polite/rude to Harry.

(28) *Tom was clever/stupid/smart/silly to Harry.

that the ACTION in the agent-action structure is an adjunct, specifically a control adjunct. Although Kertz (2006) considers the clause to be an adjunct, it is considered to be a semantic argument in the structure. Stowell (1991, p.123), on the other hand, claims that the infinitival clause is an argument of the EA, but not as a complement (internal argument), but as an external argument. However, Stowell (1991) does not make a distinction between the EA structures but attempts to explain all EA structures as derived from the same D-structure. Meaning that both the agent-action structure and the action-subject structure are claimed by Stowell (1991) to have the same syntactic framework, and that movement within the structure can explain the different realisations. For the purposes of this thesis, the explanations given in Stowell (1991) will not be explored further, but rather that the EA structures are similar to argument alternations with separate entries in the lexicon.

Landau (2009) claims that the ACTION in the agent-action structure is an adjunct. To support the claim, Landau (2009, p.324) observes an asymmetry in the acceptability of *that* substitution for the action-subject (37) and agent-action structure (38). Additionally, Landau (2009, p.324) compares the ability to substitute the embedded clause for two other adjectives *eager* in (39) and *proud* in (40). Only the agent-action structure is unable to replace the embedded clause with *that*, Landau (2009) argues that the asymmetry follows from the infinitival clause in the agent-action structure not being an argument of the EA predicate.

- (37) Leaving town/That was stupid of John.
- (38) John was stupid to leave town./*John was stupid of that.
- (39) John was eager to leave town./John was eager for that.
- (40) John was proud to leave town./John was proud of that.

(Landau, 2009, p.324, 25a-d)

Kertz (2006) and Stowell (1991) explore whether extraction from the infinitival clause in the agent-action structure is acceptable, or whether there are island effects. Stowell (1991, p.123) note that extraction from complements is usually acceptable, while extraction from adjuncts and non-complements is excluded by island effects. Stowell (1991) observes that extraction from the infinitival clause of the agent-action structure is acceptable in (41), but not in (42). Since there are some island effects, Stowell (1991) concludes that the infinitival clause is external to AP, not a complement.

- (41) Who_i was John stupid [to talk to t_i]? (Stowell, 1991, p.123, 34b,d)
- (42) *To whom_i was John stupid [to talk t_i]? (Stowell, 1991, p.123, 34b,d)

Kertz (2006) also compare the acceptability of extracting a question element from the infinitival clause in three different types of structures. The adverbial *favourably* can be extracted from a raising (43) and control complement (44), but it is ungrammatical to extract it from the EA structure (45) (Kertz, 2006, p.232).

- (43) How is John likely to respond? Favourably (Kertz, 2006, p.232, 32)
- (44) How is John eager to respond? Favourably (Kertz, 2006, p.232, 33)
- (45) *How is John smart to respond? Favourably (Kertz, 2006, p.232, 34)

Kertz (2006) concludes that the infinitival clause in (45) is a control adjunct, from comparing it to the complements in (43)-(44). The matter of raising and control will be further explained and discussed for EAs in section 2.2.

Through wh-movement, Kertz (2006) compares the acceptability of pied-piping for the EA in (46)-(47) and the adjective *eager* in (48)-(49). The adjective *eager* allows the infinitival clause to be pie-piped in (49). For the EA *stupid*, the infinitival clause is unable to be pie-piped with the AP in (47), it must remain in situ like in (46). while Kertz (2006) concludes that it is an adjunct.

- | | | |
|------|---------------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| (46) | How stupid was Bill _ to leave town? | (Stowell, 1991, p.126, 46b) |
| (47) | *How stupid to leave town was Bill _? | (Stowell, 1991, p.125, 45a) |
| (48) | How eager was John _ to leave town? | (Kertz, 2006, p.232, 30) |
| (49) | How eager to leave town was John _? | (Kertz, 2006, p.232, 31) |

Based on the discussion above, the infinitival clause in the agent-action structure is assumed to be a structural adjunct, in this thesis. However, the clause seems to have a role as a semantic argument in the structure. The argument alternations mentioned above are assumed to be relevant for further exploration, despite the adjunct status. All the EA structures, possessor-subject, agent-action, action-subject, and agent-goal structures are considered to have separate entries in the lexicon, for the purposes for this thesis.

2.2 ACTION as a control clause

The infinitival clause of the EA structures agent-action and action-subject is assessed to be a control clause in the agent-action structure. To argue for this claim, first, in section 2.2.1, theory on raising and control is presented. Second, in section 2.2.2, the status of the infinitival clause for EAs is discussed.

2.2.1 Raising versus control clauses

Some sentences appear very similar in form, but when explored further, it becomes clear that they are structurally different (Carnie, 2013). The structures in (50) and (51) are examples of this, where the predicates *likely* and *reluctant* appear to be in the same structures, but from (52)-(53) we can see that they are not. The predicate *likely* can be used with an expletive subject, but *reluctant* cannot. This is because the embedded clause in (50) is a raising clause, while the embedded clause in (51) is a control clause.

- | | |
|------|-----------------------------------|
| (50) | She is likely to sell the car. |
| (51) | She is reluctant to sell the car. |
| (52) | It is likely to snow. |
| (53) | *It is reluctant to snow. |

Looking at the structures, their differences can be explained by (50) having subject-to-subject raising, but (51) has subject control. With raising clauses, the main clause does not take a

subject, which is why expletive subjects are allowed, like in (52) (Carnie, 2013). Conversely, the main clause of a control clause needs to take a subject, therefore it cannot take an expletive subject, like in (53) (Carnie, 2013).

Subject raising gives a structural analysis like in (36'), where the subject *she* moves from the subject position of the embedded clause with the trace t_i , to the subject position of the main clause she_i (Carnie, 2013). On the other hand, subject control does not involve movement, seen in (37'), it involves a null-subject PRO in the subject position of the embedded clause that is controlled by the subject of the main clause (Carnie, 2013). The control-relationship is marked by the coefficient i on the parts involved (37').

- | | | |
|-------|---|----------------|
| (36') | She _{<i>i</i>} is likely [t_i to sell the car]. | <i>Raising</i> |
| (37') | She _{<i>i</i>} is reluctant [PRO _{<i>i</i>} to sell the car]. | <i>Control</i> |

The difference between the structures (50)-(51) are due to the different predicates in the main clauses, *likely* and *reluctant* (Carnie, 2013). The two predicates have different theta-grids, which accounts for the difference in subject-structures (Carnie, 2013). The theta grid of *likely* only allows for one argument, it only takes an internal argument, the object. In other words, something (object) is likely. This can be seen in (54) and (55), where the only argument to *likely* is 'that she will sell the car'. As a result, the subject in (50) moves from inside the argument, to the subject position of the main clause (Carnie, 2013). There is no other argument to hold the subject position of the main clause, leaving room for subject-to-subject movement (50), a clausal subject (54), or an expletive subject (52) and (55).

- | | |
|------|--|
| (54) | That she will sell the car is likely. |
| (55) | It is likely that she will sell the car. |

The theta grid of *reluctant* contains two arguments, an internal (object) and an external (subject) argument. In other words, someone (subject) is reluctant of something (object). For the embedded clause, the subject position is filled by a null-subject PRO, which is controlled by the subject of the main clause (Carnie, 2013).

Additionally, there are examples of object-control (56), where the object controls the null-subject in the embedded clause (Carnie, 2013). The theta grid of *persuade* contains three arguments, two internal arguments (indirect and direct object) and one external argument (subject). In other words, someone (subject) persuades someone else (indirect object) of something (direct object).

- | | |
|------|---|
| (56) | Lisa persuaded Tom _{<i>i</i>} [PRO _{<i>i</i>} to sell the car]. |
|------|---|

Predicates about the weather do not take any arguments and can only have the expletive subject *it*. In (52), the expletive subject can fill the subject position of the main clause since there is no subject in the main clause, and the embedded clause fulfils the role of internal argument for *likely*. However, the predicate *reluctant* takes two arguments, which cannot be filled by an expletive subject, since it is not an argument. Additionally, the predicate *to snow* can only have an expletive subject, forcing the interpretation of (53) to be ungrammatical.

2.2.2 Raising or control for EAs

The EA agent-action structure in (57) appears similar to the two structures (50)-(51), that appear similar to each other but have different underlying structures. Using the embedded clause *to snow* with an EA predicate is ungrammatical (58). This argues against the EA structure having a raising clause, and in favour of the EA structure having a control clause, with the underlying structure in (59). The null-subject PRO_i of the embedded clause in (59) is controlled by the subject of the main clause *she_i*.

- (57) She was clever to sell the car.
(58) *It was clever to snow.
(59) She_i was clever [PRO_i to sell the car].

From this it seems that the theta grid of the agent-action structure for EAs has two arguments, external (subject) argument and an internal (object), not a raising structure without the external argument. In other words, someone (subject) is clever for something (object). From the discussion above in section 2.1.3, the embedded clause is assumed to be an adjunct, not an internal argument. Altogether, the embedded clause of the agent-action structure is a control adjunct.

2.3 The stage level/individual level predicate distinction

The topic of stage level predicates (SLPs) and individual level predicates (ILPs) is interesting to the field of EAs. Stowell (1991) observes that there is a difference in the classification of EAs depending on their structure. EAs in the possessor-subject structure like (60) have an ILP interpretation, while EAs in the agent-action structure like (61) have an SLP interpretation (Stowell, 1991).

- (60) Robert is smart.
(61) Robert was smart to buy the house.

The claim by Stowell (1991) has been influential in the exploration of EAs, although some argue against the claim (Kertz, 2006). To understand the topic the theory is presented first in section 2.3.1, then revisited for EAs in section 2.3.2.

2.3.1 Stage level predicates and individual level predicates

Predicates can be categorised as stage level predicates (SLPs) and individual level predicates (ILPs), as well as kind level predicates (KLPs) although they are not relevant to this thesis (Fernald, 2000). Roughly the ILPs can be described as properties that are somewhat permanent to an individual (62), while SLPs are conditions that the individual temporarily fulfil (63). Another distinction between the two are that ILPs can be temporary, but for it to

end it requires some change in the individual (Fernald, 2000). For SLPs to stop applying to an individual, there is no need for the individual to change, only the situation changes. For the example of an ILP in (62), the property *blond* is generally permanent, but dying your hair, or going grey are very much options that would change the property, but as mentioned it would require some change in the individual.

(62) Mark is blond.

(63) Mark is hungry.

Predicates can be categorised as stative or non-stative, a distinction that follows closely to the ILP/SLP distinction (Fernald, 2000). “All ILPs are stative, and all non-statives are SLPs” (Fernald, 2000, p.7), but there are some stative SLPs. The diagnostics for ILP/SLP distinction and stative/non-stative distinction are also overlapping, which complicates the process of determining which category a predicate belongs to. Stativity refers to how the predicates describe a situation, stative predicates describe them as static, and non-static predicates describe them as dynamic (Wilder, 2018).

A grammatical difference between stative and non-stative predicates are that stative predicates use the simple present tense, while non-stative predicates use the present progressive tense and aspect to describe a situation that is happening right now (Wilder, 2018). The predicates in example (64) and (65) are stative and non-stative respectively. The matter of *knowing* is static, while *building* is dynamic, it has a manifestation in time and space as a process.

(64) Mark knows how to build a birdhouse.

(65) Mark is building a birdhouse.

(66) Mark builds a birdhouse (every spring/*right now).

Stative verbs use the simple present for what is happening now (Wilder, 2018). Non-stative verbs used in the simple present describe habitual situations, like in (66) (Wilder, 2018). In (66) the adverbial *every spring* can be used, but it would not be grammatical to use the adverbial *right now*, indicating that *build* is a non-stative predicate.

SLP/ILP diagnostics

There are several possible ways to diagnose a predicate as either stage-level or individual-level. I will mention only those used for this thesis to diagnose the EAs as either ILPs or SLPs. As a non-native English speaker there are some of these diagnostics that are difficult to use since they rely on intuitions about the structures. The diagnostics below will be used to diagnose both English and Norwegian EAs.

First, a diagnostic with bare plurals and indefinites. In sentences with ILPs and SLPs there are differences in how they are interpreted if the subjects are bare plural or indefinites. Bare plural or indefinite subjects used with ILPs are interpreted as generic or generalised

statements (Fernald, 2000). SLPs can be interpreted as existential, when used with a bare plural or indefinite subject (Fernald, 2000). Using a bare plural subject in (67) results in a generic interpretation, usually, firemen are tall. However, in (68) the interpretation is existential, at the time of the statement, there are some firemen dancing, not a general statement or trait for firemen that they dance.

- | | | | |
|------|----------------------|--------------------|-----|
| (67) | Firemen are tall. | <i>Generic</i> | ILP |
| (68) | Firemen are dancing. | <i>Existential</i> | SLP |

Second, a diagnostic with modification for time and space. A difference between ILPs and SLPs are their ability to be modified for time and space, with SLPs being able and ILPs not able to be modified for time and space (Fernald, 2000). The interpretations of sentences with ILPs modified in time and space can be strange, such as (70) and (72) (Fernald, 2000, p.23, 45b, 46b). Sentences with SLPs are fully acceptable, like (69) and (71) (Fernald, 2000, p.23, 45a, 46a).

- | | | |
|------|------------------------------------|----------------------------|
| (69) | Robert is dancing on the lawn. | (Fernald, 2000, p.23, 45a) |
| (70) | ?Robert is a dancer on the lawn. | (Fernald, 2000, p.23, 45b) |
| (71) | Robert is dancing this morning. | (Fernald, 2000, p.23, 46a) |
| (72) | ?Robert was a dancer this morning. | (Fernald, 2000, p.23, 46b) |

The temporal modifications that separate SLPs and ILPs are short term, since longer durations can modify ILPs as well as SLPs (Fernald, 2000). The diagnostic needs to be used critically.

- | | | |
|------|-------------------------|----------------------------|
| (73) | I was a dancer in 1978. | (Fernald, 2000, p.23, 47a) |
|------|-------------------------|----------------------------|

In some cases, clear ILPs can be interpreted with temporal modifiers of short duration, this might be a case for coercion, where ILPs are being used as SLPs (Fernald, 2000).

- | | | |
|------|--|----------------------------|
| (74) | John is a goalie this morning (although he usually plays forward). | (Fernald, 2000, p.23, 47c) |
|------|--|----------------------------|

2.3.2 SLP/ILP distinction for EAs

For EAs there have been discussions of whether the possessor-subject structure (75) and the agent-action structure (76) are classified in the same group when looking at the ILP-SLP distinction (Kertz, 2006; Stowell, 1991). The possessor-subject structure is claimed by Stowell (1991) to be used as an ILP, while the agent-action structure is an SLP. Stowell (1991) claims that the EAs can be used as either ILPs or SLPs, depending on the structure.

- | | |
|------|-------------------------------|
| (75) | John is kind. |
| (76) | John was kind to pet the dog. |

nor SLPs. According to Kertz (2006), accepting temporal and locative modifiers is not conclusive for any interpretation.

- (85) Today, Thomas is kind.
- (86) ?In the garden, Thomas is kind.
- (87) Yesterday, Thomas was kind to pet the dog.
- (88) In the garden, Thomas was kind to pet the dog.

In section 2.1.2, there were examples of structures that did not fit the pattern of the EA structures, since the subject seemed to be an AGENT, not a POSSESSOR. Examples like (85), seem to be of this type, which might be why the temporal modifier is acceptable, but any conclusions on this are not within the scope of this thesis.

Further diagnostics to distinguish between ILPs and SLPs are found in Kertz (2006) and Fábregas et al. (2019). Kertz (2006) observe that further diagnostics on the possessor-subject and agent-action structures of EAs follow the patterns of ILPs. There is an inability to combine with an existential *there* subject and a weak subject (Kertz, 2009, p.230). In addition, the agent-action structure is unable to be embedded under perception verbs like *see* (Kertz, 2006, p.231).

Fábregas et al. (2019) do not examine the agent-action structure, only EA structures with a human subject argument. As mentioned, many modifications to the possessor-subject structure result in an intuition that the subject is no longer a possessor, but rather an agent, separating those examples from the original structure. Fábregas et al. (2019, p.239) observe that the possessor-subject structure accepts embedding under the perception verb *see*, unlike the agent-action structure (Kertz, 2006). Furthermore, Fábregas et al. (2019, p.239) claims that the possessor-subject structure behaves like SLPs by allowing a temporal modifier like *sometimes* and allowing *when*-clauses. For the purposes of this thesis, it is sufficient to observe that there are discussions on the topic of SLP/ILP distinction for EAs, and some of the findings from the literature. Finally, it seems from Fábregas et al. (2019) that the original hypothesis of Stowell (1991) is incorrect, but that there are aspects of EAs that separate them from other adjectives concerning the topic of SLP/ILP.

3. Evaluative Adjectives in Norwegian

In this chapter, the behaviour of Norwegian EAs will be discussed and compared to English EAs. The work of Heinat (2012) will be used extensively, although the topic there is Swedish EAs, since there have not been any works concerned with Norwegian EAs, to my knowledge. Scandinavian languages are quite similar, and from my findings, this applies to the behaviour of EAs as well.

3.1 Properties of Norwegian EAs

Examples of English EAs are listed in (1) above, which can be translated nearly word-for-word into Norwegian EAs in (89) below. In other words, the EAs in Norwegian and English have similar meanings.

- (89) Frekk ‘rude’, slem ‘mean’, lur ‘clever’, smart ‘smart’, hyggelig ‘nice’, snill ‘kind’, tullete ‘silly’, ubetenksom ‘imprudent’, uhøflig ‘impolite’, sjenerøs ‘generous’, høflig ‘courteous’, grusom ‘cruel’.

In addition to the similarity in meaning, Norwegian EAs are found in several structural frames, see (90)-(93) below, parallel to the frames of English EAs, see examples (13)-(16) in section 2.1.2 above.

- (90) John er slem.
John is mean.
- (91) John var slem som sparket hunden.
John was mean who kicked the dog
John was mean to kick the dog.
- (92) Å sparke hunden var slemt (av John).
To kick the dog was mean (of John).
- (93) John var slem mot Lisa.
John was mean to Lisa.

In each EA structure, the property of the EA is assigned, but the basis for assigning the property is not the same in all structures. There are also different constituents in the EA structures. First, in (90), the property of the EA is assigned on a general basis to the subject *John*. Second, in (91), the property of the EA is assigned to the subject *John* based on performing the action in the embedded clause *som sparket hunden* ‘that kicked the dog’. Third, in (92), the property of the EA is assigned to the action, *å sparke hunden* ‘to kick the dog’, realised as an infinitival clause. The property of the EA is also assigned to the person *John*, realised as an optional PP *av John* ‘of John’, for performing the action. Finally, in (93), the subject is assigned the property of the EA based on some implicit behaviour towards another person *Lisa* realised in a PP *mot Lisa* ‘to Lisa’.

The structural alternation found with English EAs (13)-(16) is paralleled in Norwegian with the structures (90)-(93). The Norwegian EA structures will be named as their English parallels: the possessor-subject structure (13) and (90), the agent-action structure (14) and (91), the action-subject structure (15) and (92), and the agent-goal structure (16) and (93).

The structures for EAs in Norwegian are similar to those in English. In each of the structures, the semantic arguments are the same for both languages. Compare the examples (94)-(97) for the Norwegian structures with the English examples (17)-(20) in section 2.1.2. The possessor-subject structure in (94), the agent-action structure in (95), the action-subject structure in (96), and the agent-goal structure in (97). However, the syntactic components in the agent-action structure are different for Norwegian from English. Semantically, the same elements are involved, AGENT and ACTION.

(94)	‘Possessor-subject’	DP POSSESSOR	+ <i>være</i> ‘be’ + ADJ
(95)	‘Agent-action’	DP AGENT	+ <i>være</i> ‘be’ + ADJ + <i>som</i> -clause (FINITE) ACTION
(96)	‘Action-subject’	INF-clause ACTION	+ <i>være</i> ‘be’ + ADJ + (<i>av</i> -PP) AGENT
(97)	‘Agent-goal’	DP AGENT	+ <i>være</i> ‘be’ + ADJ + <i>mot</i> -PP GOAL

Despite the similarities, there is a significant difference between the agent-action structure in Norwegian (95) and in English (18), repeated below for convenience.

(18)	‘Agent-action’ (English)	DP AGENT	+ be + ADJ + INF-clause ACTION
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In English, the agent-action structure (18) consists of an AGENT, the predicate EA, and an embedded infinitival clause. For the Norwegian agent-action structure (95), there is an AGENT and an EA predicate, but the embedded clause is not infinitival, it is a finite clause. The finite clause is similar to the infinitival clause in meaning, since it depicts the ACTION that is the cause to why the EA is ascribed to the AGENT. Structurally, there is a significant difference between the two clauses, both in finiteness, but also since the finite clause in (95) begins with a complementiser, the Norwegian relative pronoun *som* ‘who’. This clause will therefore be referred to as the *som*-clause in this thesis.

In section 2.1.2, two examples that do not fit the EA structures are presented, (21) and (22). For Norwegian, there is no progressive aspect to form a corresponding example to (21). However, the Norwegian sentence in (98) is a corresponding example to the English example

in (22). The temporal adverbial *i går* ‘yesterday’ changes the passivity from the possessor-subject structure in (94), to an agentive structure with an AGENT subject.

- (98) John var snill i går.
John was kind yesterday

In the same way as in English, it is possible to extrapose any structures that have a clause as a subject in Norwegian (Åfarli & Sakshaug, 2006). The extraposed structures are (23) in English and (99) in Norwegian.

- (99) Det var slemt av John å sparke hunden.
It was mean of John to kick the dog.

The English EAs are divided into three types of EAs in section 2.1.2, based on their semantic interpretation (Wilder, 2020). Based on the examples from Wilder (2020), the same types of EAs can be identified in Norwegian below ‘intellectual capacity’ in (100), ‘adherence to social norms’ in (101), and ‘moral quality’ in (102).

- (100) Intellectual capacity:
lur, smart, intelligent, ...
dum, teit, gal, ...
- (101) Adherence to social norms:
høflig, redelig, beskjeden, ...
frekk, uhøflig, pretensjøs, ...
- (102) Moral quality:
snill, hyggelig, sjenerøs, omtenksom, ...
uhyggelig, slem, egoistisk, ...

In section 2.1.2, the separate types of EAs in English behaved differently concerning the agent-goal structure. Not all types of EAs take a GOAL, in English the asymmetry is seen in examples (27) and (28). In Norwegian, the same pattern is observed in the examples below, in (104) the EAs of ‘moral quality’ do not take a GOAL, while in (103) the other two can take a GOAL.

- (103) Tom var snill/slem/høflig/frekk mot Lisa.
Tom was kind/mean/polite/rude to Lisa.
- (104) *Tom var smart/gal mot Lisa.
Tom was smart/crazy to Lisa.

English EAs are compared to other English adjectives in section 2.1.2, where it is emphasised that both EAs (31) and other adjectives (32)-(33) can ascribe properties to people. The same applies to corresponding Norwegian adjectives, like in (105)-(106). Similar to English (35), some Norwegian adjectives can take ACTION, but not simultaneously AGENT (107). As stated for English adjectives, something can be important without the person being important for doing it.

- (105) Tom er berømt/viktig.
Tom is famous/important.
- (106) Dave er høy/blond.
Dave is tall/blonde.
- (107) Å vinne valget var viktig (*av Tom).
To win the election was important (of Tom).

For examples like (108), adjectives like *tall* (no: *høy*) cannot take an ACTION as a fronted infinitival clause. However, when the structure is similar to the agent-action structure for EAs, it is possible in Norwegian to have both an AGENT and ACTION as a som-clause (109)-(110). This could possibly indicate that there is a difference between the infinitival clause and the som-clause for English and Norwegian.

- (108) *Å nå opp i taket var høyt (av Dave).
*To reach the ceiling was tall (of Dave).
- (109) Sofie var liten som fikk plass under bordet.
Sofie was small to fit under the table.
- (110) Tom var høy som nådde opp til taket.
Tom was tall to reach the ceiling.

Although adjectives like *høy* ‘tall’ can take both AGENT and ACTION in Norwegian (109)-(110), according to Heinat (2012), the corresponding structure is ungrammatical in Swedish, see (111) below. In the Swedish structure there is a similar som-clause as in Norwegian for the ACTION. This indicates that there are subtle differences that influence the acceptability of (109)-(111), not merely the presence of the som-clause.

- (111) *Lisa är lång som når upp till taket. (Heinat, 2012, p.42.)
‘Lisa is tall to reach the ceiling.’
- (112) *Tom var viktig som vant valget.
Tom was important to win the election.

Additionally, using a som-clause with the adjective *viktig* ‘important’ is ungrammatical in Norwegian (112), strengthening the assumption that the properties of the som-clause are not sufficient for making such a structure grammatical for any adjective.

3.2 Argument structure for Norwegian EAs

In section 2.1.3, the argument structure of English EAs is explored for the agent-action structure, since there have been debates on whether the ACTION is a complement or an adjunct. The ACTION is considered to be a structural adjunct, but a semantic argument. Because of the discussion on English EAs, the topic is explored for the *som*-clause of the Norwegian agent-action structure below.

Norwegian EA structures have two very different types of embedded clauses. The embedded clause for the agent-action structure is a finite clause resembling a relative clause (113), but for the action-subject structure it is a non-finite clause (114). The infinitival clause in the action-subject structure is in the subject position, clearly a syntactic argument of the EA. The finite clause in the agent-action structure, the *som*-clause, is in a position where it could be a complement or an adjunct.

- (113) Han var snill som hentet posten.
 He was kind who fetched the post
 He was kind to fetch the post.
- (114) Å hente posten var snilt av han.
 To fetch the post was kind of him.

There are constituency tests that can be used to test whether a constituent is a complement or an adjunct, such as substitution, fronting, wh-movement, and forming exclamations. Substitution in coordinated sentences show that substituting the EA and *som*-clause together is acceptable (115), but only substituting the EA is unacceptable (116). This is an indication that the *som*-clause is a complement of the EA in the agent-action structure.

- (115) Lisa var slem som sparket hunden og det var Tom også.
 Lisa was mean who kicked the dog and that was Tom also.
 Lisa was mean to kick the dog and so was Tom.
- (116) *Lisa var slem som sparket hunden og det var Tom også som sparket katten.
 Lisa was mean who kicked the dog and that was Tom also who kicked the cat.

The *som*-clause cannot be fronted alone (117), but it is possible to front it together with the EA, both facts indicate that the clause is a complement in the agent-action structure (Heinat, 2012, p.59).

- (117) *Som hentet posten, var han snill.
 Who fetched the mail, was he kind.
 To fetch the mail, he was kind.
- (118) Snill som hentet posten, var han.
 Kind to fetch the mail, he was.

Fronting the EA alone is also possible (119), Heinat (2012, p.60) refers to it as predicate fronting. However, the interpretation of (119) is ambiguous, the *som*-clause can be interpreted as modifying the fronted EA, English translation (i) or it can be interpreted as a restrictive relative clause modifying the AGENT NP, English translation (ii).

- (119) Snill var han som hentet posten.
 (i) Kind he was to fetch the post.
 (ii) Kind, he who fetched the post was.

Forming wh-questions can be done to test constituents, by seeing how much of the structure would be pie-piped in the wh-movement. Wh-movement of the EA and *som*-clause is not

acceptable (121) and (123), while only moving the EA is more acceptable (122) and (124). This indicates that the som-clause might be an adjunct, but some constituents are unable to be pie-piped (Wilder, 2014, p.16). Heinat (2012, p.60) got the same results by using wh-movement on the EA structure in Swedish.

- (120) John var veldig slem som sparket hunden.
 (121) *Hvor slem som sparket hunden var John _?
 (122) ?Hvor slem var John _ som sparket hunden?
 (123) *Hvor slem som sparket hunden var John?
 how mean who kicked the dog was John
 How mean to kick the dog var John?
 (124) ?Hvor slem var John som sparket hunden?
 how mean was John who kicked the dog

Another instance where it is unacceptable to move the som-clause along with the EA is in forming exclamations out of the EA structure (125). Exclamations where only the EA has moved are fully acceptable (126). These findings do not support the som-clause being a complement of the EA, but the pattern of unacceptability could be caused by end-weight (Heinat, 2012, p.61).

- (125) ?Så snill som hentet posten han var!
 How kind who got the mail he was
 (126) Så snill han var som hentet posten!
 How kind he was who got the mail
 How kind he was to get the mail!

From these results, it seems that the som-clause is a complement in the agent-action structure for EAs. However, these results are not unequivocal, and it is possible that the som-clause is an adjunct, such as the infinitival clause, ACTION, for English EAs in agent-action structures, see section 2.1.3.

3.3 The ACTION, som-clause - control or relative clause

English EA structures do not have any finite embedded clauses, like Norwegian. The comparison to English is therefore lacking. Heinat (2012) compares the Swedish som-clause to control clauses and relative clauses, and since Swedish and Norwegian EAs seem to have corresponding syntactical patterns, the same comparisons are done in this section 3.3.

3.3.1 Comparison to control clauses

One of the reasons to compare the som-clause to control clauses is that the control clause in the action-subject structure (128) (underlined) can be called a paraphrase of the som-clause in the agent-action structure (127) (Heinat, 2012, p.44). Second, the translation of the som-

clause into English is a control clause (129), see discussion in section 2.2. These reasons are indirect, nonetheless they make it useful to explore possible similarities.

- (127) Han var snill som hentet posten.
 He was kind who fetched the mail
 He was kind to fetch the mail.
- (128) Å hente posten var snilt av han.
 To fetch the mail was kind of him.
- (129) He was kind to fetch the mail.

Both control clauses and som-clauses only allow for a subject gap (Heinat, 2012). The subject of control clauses is PRO (Åfarli & Eide, 2003), which fills the subject gap like in (130) and (131). PRO is controlled by the subject of the main clause in (130) and the object in (131), indicated by the index.

- (130) Maria_i ønsket å PRO_i treffe John.
 Maria_i wanted to PRO_i meet John.
- (131) Maria overtalte John_i til å PRO_i treffe Lisa.
 Maria persuaded John_i to PRO_i meet Lisa.

Testing the possible gaps in the som-clause in EA structures, in (132)-(135), shows that only the subject gap (132) is acceptable. For the ungrammatical structures, there is an object gap (133), an indirect object gap (134), and a gap in the object of the preposition (135).

- (132) Studenten var snill som _ hjalp Lars. SUBJECT
 The student was kind who _ helped Lars
 The student was kind to help Lars.
- (133) *Studenten var snill som Lars hjalp _. OBJECT
 The student was kind who Lars helped.
 The student was kind to be helped by Lars.
- (134) *Studenten var snill som Lars ga _ boken. INDIRECT OBJ.
 The student was kind who Lars gave the book.
 The student was kind to be given the book by Lars.
- (135) *Studenten var snill som Lars snakket med _. OBJECT OF PREP.
 The student was kind who Lars talked to.
 The student was kind to be talked to by Lars.

Another factor that is special for the subject gap of the som-clause in the EA structure is the semantic restriction. The semantic restriction is that the subject gap, semantically referencing the subject of the main clause, needs to have an active AGENT role with some form of control/influence over the ACTION in the som-clause (Heinat, 2012, p.46). The example in Heinat (2012, p.46) has a passive where the subject of the som-clause is not agentive (136). The restriction also applies to paraphrases where the EA is used with a different clause from

the som-clause, a clause with the subjunction *ettersom* ‘since’ (137). This indicates that it is the EA that puts the semantic restriction on the subject gap in the embedded clause, not the som-clause itself. There is no semantic restriction on the subject gap of control clauses (Heinat, 2012, p.45).

- (136) *Tyven er dum som arresteres.
The thief is stupid that is arrested.
- (137) *Tyven er dum ettersom han arresteres.
The thief is stupid since he is arrested.

However, the sentence is acceptable if the subject is given control by rephrasing the sentence using the passive with *bli* ‘become’ (138), the verb *la* ‘let’ (139), and a combination of the two (140). Additionally, sentences where the subject causes the ACTION (141), or is the experiencer of an event (142), are also acceptable.

- (138) Tyven var dum som ble arrestert.
The thief was stupid that became arrested
The thief was stupid to get arrested.
- (139) Tyven var dum som lot seg arresteres.
The thief was stupid that let himself be arrested.
The thief was stupid to let himself be arrested.
- (140) Tyven var dum som lot seg bli arrestert.
The thief was stupid that let himself become arrested.
The thief was stupid to let himself get arrested.
- (141) Tyven var dum som fikk kompisen arrestert.
The thief was stupid that got his friend arrested.
The thief was stupid to get his friend arrested.
- (142) Gutten var gal som var forelsket i henne.
The boy was crazy that was in love with her.
The boy was crazy to be in love with her.

One major difference between the som-clauses and control clauses is the tense, som-clauses are finite and control clauses are non-finite. Common for the tense of the two clause types is that they are somehow dependent on the tense of the main clause, control clauses depend on the main clause for their interpretation, while som-clauses are restricted by the tense of the main clause (Heinat, 2012). Interpreting the control clauses below shows that having the main clause in past tense or future aspect, both lead to interpreting the events in the control clauses as occurring after the event in the main clause.

- (143) Jeg overtalte Lisa til å ta oppvasken.
I persuaded Lisa to do the dishes.
- (144) Jeg skal overtale Lisa til å ta oppvasken.
I will persuade Lisa to do the dishes.

The tense dependency of som-clauses can be seen by testing different tense combinations for the main clause and the som-clause. Som-clauses with the same tense as the main clause are acceptable, see present in (145) and past in (146). There is some acceptability with main clause in present tense and som-clause in past tense (147), but only when the event is very recent (Heinat, 2012, p.48). However, there is no acceptability with main clause in past tense and som-clause in present tense (148). Heinat (2012, p.48-49) explains that it is unacceptable for the state described by the EA to have ended when the ACTION in the som-clause takes place.

- (145) Tom er snill som henter posten.
Tom is kind who fetches the mail.
Tom is kind to fetch the mail.
- (146) Tom var snill som hentet posten.
Tom was kind who fetched the mail.
Tom was kind to fetch the mail.
- (147) ?Tom er snill som hentet posten.
Tom is kind who fetched the mail.
Tom is kind to fetch the mail.
- (148) *Tom var snill som henter posten.
Tom was kind who fetches the mail.
Tom was kind to fetch the mail.

Heinat (2012) tests whether the som-clause has independent tense or so called ‘parasitic’ tense, where the tense of the embedded clause is perfunctory. Control clauses lack independent tense, and if the som-clause has parasitic tense it would make them similar in that aspect (Heinat, 2012, p.49). However, from observing that the tense in som-clauses need to be finite, and cannot interchange with an infinitive, Heinat (2012) concludes that the tense is independent.

Another difference between control clauses and som-clauses is the ability to be fronted. As discussed above with (117), som-clauses are unable to be fronted. It is possible to front control clauses like in (149).

- (149) Å ta oppvasken, overtalte jeg Lisa til.
To take the dishes, persuaded I Lisa to.
To do the dishes, I persuaded Lisa to do.

Finally, control clauses and som-clauses cannot be interchanged, they are in complementary distribution, where som-clauses only follow evaluative predicates and control clauses never follow them (150) (Heinat, 2012, p.52). All of these differences indicate that som-clauses are not a type of control clauses.

- (150) *Tom er snill å hente posten.
Tom is kind to fetch the mail.

3.3.2 Comparison to relative clauses

The som-clause in the agent-action structure of EAs is similar in structure to a relative clause. Heinat (2012) argues for the clause to be a type of relative clause which he calls predicate modifying relative clause (PRMC), since it modifies predicates, such as EAs, not nominal phrases, which is the norm for relative clauses. However, although relative clauses normally modify nominal phrases, it is not an absolute rule in Norwegian (Åfarli & Eide, 2003, p.271; Åfarli & Sakshaug, 2006, p.165).

The acceptability pattern for gaps in som-clauses contrasts relative clauses, which allow for any type of gap. Since these structures are more similar in structure than the som-clause and control clauses, it is natural to assume that they would behave similarly. However, in Norwegian, the relative clause allows for all the gap types tested on som-clauses above; a subject gap (151), an object gap (152), an indirect object gap (153), and a gap in the object of the preposition (154).

- | | | |
|-------|---|-----------------|
| (151) | Vi kjenner studenten som _ hjalp Lars.
We know the student that _ helped Lars. | SUBJECT |
| (152) | Vi kjenner studenten som Lars hjalp _.
We know the student that Lars helped _. | OBJECT |
| (153) | Vi kjenner studenten som Lars ga _ boken.
We know the student that Lars gave _ the book. | INDIRECT OBJ. |
| (154) | Vi kjenner studenten som Lars snakket med _.
We know the student that Lars talked to. | OBJECT OF PREP. |

Another difference between the som-clauses and the relative clauses concerning gaps are the semantic restrictions on the subject gap in som-clauses. There are no semantic restrictions on the gaps of RCs (Heinat, 2012).

The structure of som-clauses and RCs are similar, both beginning with the relative pronoun 'som' (that), and they are both finite. There is a tense dependency for som-clauses, as discussed above, RCs, on the other hand, do not have any tense dependency to the main clause. This difference might be connected to the difference in function and which elements they modify. The som-clause modifies the EA and is semantically connected to the event in the main clause.

- | | |
|-------|---|
| (155) | Den mannen er smart som husker hele periodetabellen.
That man is smart to remember the entire periodic table. |
| (156) | Her bodde mannen som husker hele periodetabellen.
Here lived the man that remembers the entire periodic table. |

In (155), the event of *remembering the entire periodic table* is connected to the event of *that man being smart*. The RC modifies the NP in the main clause but is not connected to the event described in the main clause. In (156), the event of *remembering the entire periodic table* is not connected to the event of *the man living there*. Therefore, there is no need for tense dependency between the events in the RC and the main clause. This is probably also the reason for the difference in semantic restrictions on the gaps of the two clause types, which was mentioned above.

In addition to both som-clauses and RCs being finite and beginning with *som*, neither structure can be fronted. The RC in (151) is fronted in (157), showing that it is unacceptable to front RCs.

(157) *Som hjalp Lars, kjenner vi studenten.
 That helped Lars, we know the student.

According to Heinat (2012) the main difference between RCs and som-clauses are the requirements for a subject gap with semantic restrictions. As well as the unusual modification of EAs, not NPs.

3.4 The SLP/ILP distinction for Norwegian EAs

There are several tests to distinguish ILPs and SLPs, several are mentioned in section 2.3. Fàbregas et al. (2019) performed these on English EAs. Their findings suggest that the EAs behave as neither ILPs nor SLPs (Fàbregas et al., 2019). The behaviour of EAs corresponded to ILPs in several tests and SLPs in other tests. These findings will now be explored for Norwegian below.

3.4.1 EAs as ILPs

For English there is a test using so called *there*-insertion, which only SLPs allow. In Norwegian, there is no distinction between *there* and *it*, making the test less predictable. However, the translation using *det* in the insertion seems to yield the same results as in English for the traditional SLP and ILP structures, as well as the agent-action structure for EAs. Below the examples from Fàbregas et al. (2019, p.238) are repeated with my Norwegian translations.

The SLP structure (158) allow for *det* ‘there’ insertion in (159), while the ILP structure (160) does not allow for *det* ‘there’ insertion in (161). The agent-action structure for (162) behaves like an ILP and does not allow for *det* ‘there’ insertion (163).

(158) Flere politimenn var tilgjengelige.
 Several policemen were available.

(159) Det var flere politimenn tilgjengelig.
 There were several policemen available.

- (160) Flere politimenn var spanske.
Several policemen were Spanish.
- (161) *Det var flere politimenn spanske.
There were several policemen Spanish. (Fàbregas et al.,2019, p.238)
- (162) Flere politimenn var modige.
Several policemen were brave.
- (163) *Det var flere politimenn modige.
There were several policemen brave. (Fàbregas et al.,2019, p.238)

A second test where EA structures behave like ILPs is one where the subjects are bare plurals or indefinites. The examples below are translated from Fàbregas et al. (2019, p.238). For these, SLPs allow for an existential interpretation, but the ILPs only allow for a generic interpretation.

- (164) Leger er tilgjengelige. E&G
Doctors are available.
- (165) En lege er tilgjengelig. E&G
A doctor is available.
- (166) Leger er beleste. G
Doctors are well-read.
- (167) En lege er belest. G
A doctor is well-read.
- (168) Leger er tålmodige. G
Doctors are patient.
- (169) En lege er tålmodig. G
A doctor is patient. (Fàbregas et al.,2019, p.238)

For SLPs like *tilgjengelig* ‘available’ using both bare plurals (164) and indefinites (165) allow for both existential (E) and generic (G) interpretations. For ILPs like *belest* ‘well-read’, using bare plurals (166) and indefinites (167) only allow for a generic interpretation. For EAs like *tålmodig* ‘patient’, using bare plurals (168) and indefinites (169) only allow for a generic interpretation. These results correspond to the English results for SLPs, ILPs, and EAs (Fàbregas et al.,2019, p.238).

Thirdly, there is a test where SLPs behave as depictives (Fàbregas et al.,2019, p.239), while using ILPs or EAs is unacceptable in English. The structure in English uses the verb *arrived* translated here to *ankom* in Norwegian. Corresponding to the English results, Norwegian SLPs are acceptable (170), ILPs (171) and EAs (172) are unacceptable.

- (170) Peter ankom {sint/full/syk}
Peter arrived {angry/drunken/sick}
- (171) *Martha ankom {fransk/gammel/høy}
Martha arrived {French/old/tall}
- (172) *John ankom {modig/slem/beskjeden}
John arrived {brave/cruel/modest} (Fàbregas et al.,2019, p.239)

3.4.2 EAs as SLPs

There are some diagnostic tests distinguishing ILPs and SLPs where English EAs behave like SLPs according to Fàbregas et al. (2019). The first test uses what is called episodic adverbs, such as *sometimes/always/often*, where English SLPs and EAs allow them, but ILPs do not. Using the translated examples from Fàbregas et al. (2019, p.239), the Norwegian SLPs (173), and EAs (175) allow the adverb modifications, but the ILPs (174) do not.

- (173) John er {av og til/alltid/ofte} {sint/full/syk}.
John is {sometimes/always/often} {angry/drunk/sick}.
- (174) *John er {av og til/alltid/ofte} {Fransk/gammel/høy}.
John is {sometimes/always/often} {French/old/tall}.
- (175) John er {av og til/alltid/ofte} {modig/slem/snill}.
John is {sometimes/always/often} {brave/cruel/nice}. (Fàbregas et al., 2019, p.239)

Secondly, Fàbregas et al. (2019) show that using so-called *when*-clauses give the same results as the adverbs in the previous test. Translating the English example into Norwegian show that SLPs (176) and EAs (178) can be placed in *when* (*når*)-clauses, but ILPs (177) cannot.

- (176) Når John er full, er han skikkelig full.
When John is drunk, he is really drunk.
- (177) *Når John er høy/lang, er han skikkelig høy/lang.
When John is tall, he is really tall.
- (178) Når John er slem, er han skikkelig slem.
When John is cruel, he is really cruel. (Fàbregas et al., 2019, p.239)

For the tests shown in these two sections, EAs behave similar to both ILPs and SLPs, complicating the assessment. For the purposes of this thesis, it is sufficient to observe that Norwegian EAs have a complex pattern concerning ILP/SLP distinction, that matches that of English EAs, as far as this section has observed.

4. Presupposition

4.1 Semantic relationships

4.1.1 Presupposition

In conversations and in writing, there are some aspects that are taken for granted, assumed to be true and known by both parties of the interaction. These matters can be presented in a sentence as a presupposition (Saeed, 2016). It is not something that is presented as a statement of a fact, that could be true or false, simply a presupposed matter. The special qualities of presuppositions are that they semantically remain presupposed whether the sentence is negated or not (Saeed, 2016). If the presupposed matter is false, it makes the sentence, not false, but paradoxical, it simply fails (Saeed, 2016). This is the challenge to truth-based theories of semantics, there is a truth-value gap for sentences where the presupposed matter is false, because the sentence then becomes neither true nor false (Saeed, 2016).

In example (179) the statement is that a specific person (Tom's daughter) lives in Paris, this statement presupposes that this person is real, that (180) is true. If the statement in (179) is negated like in (181), the presupposition (180) still holds, Tom still has a daughter.

- (179) Tom's daughter lives in Paris.
(180) Tom has a daughter.
(181) Tom's daughter doesn't live in Paris.

Presuppositions are not easy to refute, something that can be seen in police-interviews on TV. The question in (182) presupposes (183), answering 'no' only negates the reason for killing him (184). Similarly, answering 'yes' would only apply to the reason, always presupposing that (183) was true. To deny a presupposition, the presupposition needs to be specifically denied (188).

- (182) Did you kill Paul because you hated him?

The presupposition in (182) is:

- (183) You killed Paul.

Possible answers and their meaning underlined:

- (184) No, it was not because I hated Paul that I killed him.
(185) No, I didn't hate Paul.
(186) Yes, it was because I hated Paul that I killed him.

(187) Yes, I hated Paul.

These answers do not refute the presupposition (183). The answer that denies the presupposition needs to negate the premise for the question, leading to a response like in (188).

(188) Hey, wait a minute, I didn't kill the man!

4.1.2 Factive and implicative predicates

In addition to presupposition, there are semantic relationships where a predicate can be factive or implicative. A factive predicate has a presupposed complement clause, an example is the verb *regret* (Saeed, 2016). The truth of a factive predicate is independent of the negation of the main clause. In both (189) and (190), the embedded clause is presupposed, even though the main clause is negated in (190).

(189) Maria regretted walking home.

(190) Maria didn't regret walking home.

Implicative predicates are more complex and can be explained through examples (191) and (192). With the affirmative sentence in (191), the embedded clause is true, but with the negated sentence in (192), the embedded sentence is negated.

(191) Paul managed to escape. → Paul escaped.

(192) Paul didn't manage to escape. → Paul didn't escape.

4.2 Presupposition for English EAs

Evaluative adjectives taking an ACTION like in (193), where the infinitival clause 'to kick the dog' is the ACTION. The common view is that this ACTION is presupposed (Karttunen et al., 2014), meaning that it is assumed to be true/a fact (194). If the statement is negated (195), the presupposition holds for the negated sentence (194). In the example (193), the presupposed statement is (194), but this still holds for the negated statement (195). When the statement is negated (195), the negation applies to the evaluative adjective 'cruel', meaning that 'John was not cruel' for performing the action described in the presupposition (194).

(193) John was cruel to kick the dog.

(194) John kicked the dog.

(195) John was not cruel to kick the dog.

The example above applies to the agent-action structure of EAs, but the same can be seen for the action-subject structure (196) and the extraposed (197) version as well, where they have

the presupposition (194). Further, the presupposition (194) also holds for the negated statements in (198)-(199).

- (196) To kick the dog was cruel of John.
- (197) It was cruel of John to kick the dog.
- (198) To kick the dog was not cruel of John.
- (199) It was not cruel of John to kick the dog.

For Evaluative adjectives, there have been a consensus among linguists that the ACTION in structures like (193) and (195) are presupposed (Karttunen et al., 2014). Presupposing the ACTION gives what is called a factive interpretation of the sentence. Alternatively, an implicative interpretation of the sentence is one where the ACTION in (195) is not presupposed. Despite the common view that EAs are factive, Karttunen et al. (2014) found uses of structures such as (200) being used implicatively. For (200) the implicative interpretation would be that to *yell at the children* (VP) would be *stupid* (Adj), and therefore *Tim* (NP) did not do that. Giving the implicative interpretation in (201).

- (200) Tim was not stupid to yell at the children.
- (201) NP not VPing was not Adj.

Karttunen et al. (2014) summarised the factive and implicative interpretation patterns in Table 1 and 2 respectively. The sentences in table 1 can be exemplified by (193) and (195), while table 2 can be represented by example (200) when negated or not.

Table 1		Table 2	
SENTENCE	FACTIVE	SENTENCE	IMPLICATIVE
NP was Adj to VP	NP VPed NP VPing was Adj	NP was Adj to VP	NP VPed NP VPing was Adj
NP wasn't Adj to VP	NP VPed NP VPing wasn't Adj	NP wasn't Adj to VP	NP didn't VP NP not VPing wasn't Adj

Karttunen et al. (2014) have discovered that there are conditions that, for some speakers, impact the interpretation of the sentences as factive or implicative. Such conditions are called CONSONANT when there is a tendency to believe that “for someone to do the action is described by the adjective” (for NP to VP is Adj), leading to an implicative interpretation. The conditions are called DISSONANT then there is a tendency to believe that for someone to do the action is not described by the adjective (for NP to VP is not Adj), leading to a factive interpretation.

For instance, (202) exemplify a CONSONANT situation, where it is generally believed that *to choose the best price is clever*, leading to an implicative interpretation of (202). Further, (203) exemplify a DISSONANT situation, where it is generally believed that *to choose the worst price is not clever*, leading to a factive interpretation of (203).

(202)	Robin was not clever to choose the best piece.	(CONSONANT) (I)
(203)	Robin was not clever to choose the worst piece.	(DISSONANT) (F)
(204)	Kim was not stupid to save money.	(DISSONANT) (F)
(205)	Kim was not stupid to waste money.	(CONSONANT) (I)

The findings by Karttunen et al. (2014) are based on data from web-searches, and although there are some speakers that interpret the EA structures as being able to either have a factive or an implicative interpretation, there are some native speakers that do not accept any other interpretations than the factive one.

4.3 Presupposition for Norwegian EAs

There are examples of sentences with the EA agent-action structure in English, where the ACTION in the embedded clause can be considered not presupposed. These are sentences where it is generally considered more likely that the evaluation of the EA to apply if the ACTION did not happen. For instance:

(206) Kate wasn't stupid to waste money.

In Norwegian, the translated sentence is seen differently. The ACTION of the som-clause is presupposed, despite common sense indicating the opposite. This could indicate a difference in the English and Norwegian structures.

(207) Katrine var ikke dum som kastet bort penger.
 Katrine was not stupid who wasted money
 Katrine wasn't stupid to waste money.

The action-subject structure in Norwegian has a control clause as an embedded clause, similar to English. Karttunen et al. (2014) only looked at the agent-action structure, when exploring presupposition, but from my intuition it seems like even the examples where it is contrary to common sense, the ACTION is presupposed (208). This applies to Norwegian as well (209).

(208) To waste money wasn't stupid of Kate.
 (209) Å kaste bort penger var ikke dumt av Katrine.
 To waste money was not stupid of Katrine.

The reason why the control clauses of the action-subject structures are presupposed can be structural. There are structures, such as cleft-constructions, which trigger presupposition

(Saeed, 2016, p.101). Similarly, there could be a structural reason for the control clauses in action-subject EA structures to be presupposed. Finally, there appears to be a semantic difference between the English infinitival clause in agent-action structures and the Norwegian som-clause, in that the English clause have the possibility of an implicative interpretation, while the Norwegian clause does not. The Norwegian som-clause is therefore different in both structure and semantics.

4.4 The 'heldig' situation

Karttunen (2013) writes about the adjective 'lucky' as related to EAs, although it is in this thesis being considered different from EAs. The adjective 'lucky' does not appear in the different EA structures, only the agent-action structure is possible for 'lucky'. In Norwegian, the translated *heldig* is also different from EAs, but share the ability to be modified by a som-clause. Heinat (2012) claims that the som-clause is only found with the EA structures, this is not the case for the Norwegian som-clause. In addition to the adjective *heldig* 'lucky', it has been mentioned in section 3.1, examples (109) and (110). However, unlike EAs, *heldig* 'lucky' is also able to be modified by a control clause.

- (210) Tom var heldig som vant i lotto.
Tom was lucky who won the lottery.
- (211) Tom var heldig å vinne i lotto.
Tom was lucky to win the lottery.

Comparing the two structures, where *heldig* takes a som-clause or a control clause, it seems on the surface like they are simply paraphrases of each other. However, when testing for presupposition, something interesting is revealed. In the heldig-structure with a som-clause, the ACTION is presupposed, so the negated example only negates the premise that the ACTION was heldig. In the heldig-structure with the control clause, the ACTION is not presupposed, and the negated example negates the ACTION having happened.

- (212) Tom var ikke heldig som vant i lotto.
- (213) Tom var ikke heldig å vinne i lotto.

EA structures cannot use som-clauses and control clauses interchangeably, and it is therefore not possible to test the effect of using control clauses with EAs. However, it is very interesting to see the difference between the two clauses used with *heldig*. The effect that is seen with the heldig-constructions can be compared to the difference between English and Norwegian EA structures. In English, the control clause is used, and Karttunen et al. (2014) claims that these clauses can be interpreted as implicative. In Norwegian, the som-clause is used, and it seems like they are factive. The difference in presupposition for EAs in the two languages can therefore be attributed to the difference in type of embedded clause used with the EAs.

5. Conclusion

The thesis has compared evaluative adjectives in Norwegian to those in English and discussed the patterns of behaviour against the theoretical background established in section 2. The pattern of behaviour for English EAs has been examined concerning argument structure, raising and control, and stage level and individual level predicates. For Norwegian EAs the same topics have been explored, in addition to a comparison of the *som*-clause to relative clauses. The semantic relationships concerning presupposition has been explored for English and Norwegian EAs, as well as the adjective *heldig* 'lucky'.

The findings of this thesis are first that the EAs behave similarly in most respects for Norwegian and English. Second, there is a syntactic difference between the languages, concerning the embedded clause in the agent-action structure of EAs. The difference is between finite and infinitive in Norwegian and English respectively. In addition, the types of clauses are different, with a control clause in English and a relative clause-like clause in Norwegian. Third and finally, the semantic difference is prevalent between the two clauses. The infinitival clause can be interpreted as implicative by some English speakers, while the *som*-clause is always interpreted as factive. The field of evaluative adjectives has not been fully explored, and there are several topics mentioned in this thesis that are possible topics for further research.

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
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Relevance for the profession

This master's thesis is a work that has challenged me, as well as given me an insight into how works of this type and length can be written. As a future lector, it will be relevant to work with young adults that face great challenges in their schoolwork, and this is a struggle that I feel like I have a deeper understanding of, after working on this thesis. As an adult, many of the tasks young adults are faced with seem simple. However, the same tasks may be great challenges to these young adults, both do to skills and to emotional toil. Working with an academically challenging task like a master's thesis gave me insight into working on a project that has seemed daunting.

After working with this thesis, it I have gotten further insights into how to face challenges where I have to overcome negative thoughts and the high bar of expectations that I put on myself in the process. In addition, having to overcome the expectations I perceive that others have to me. Young adults do not have the experience of succeeding on tasks that they have not attempted yet, and that in itself can be a challenge to attempting the work. As adults and teachers, we need to help young adults when they face challenges, and not dismiss their experiences based on how we have faced greater challenges. The challenges they face may be just as great when we consider their knowledge and experience.

On an academic basis, the master's thesis has given me the opportunity to immerse myself into a field of linguistics. The experience of researching the literature and exploring within the field has given me a professional growth. The knowledge I am left with will help me in my future work as a lector, since a fundamental understanding of the English language and the relationship it has to Norwegian is useful when teaching English as a second language. When learning a second language, it is easy to look for corresponding words and phrases in the two languages. However, there are many times the languages are without direct translations, but languages are made for communication, and all languages have their own ways of conveying anything we need. My insights into linguistics can help me as a lector, to find other connections between English and Norwegian than only the direct translations new learners often look for.



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