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The worldviews of populist supporters

A study of citizens' values and attitudes in the context of European populism

Doctoral thesis

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Summary

Over the past decades, political choices have become increasingly volatile across Europe and beyond. In many democracies, intermittent voters have become the majority. Party affiliations have been declining, together with party identifications. Populist parties, on the other hand, have in many instances been on the rise; they have been growing in number and popularity, in terms of both electoral outcomes and institutional power. Populism has proven not to be merely a temporary phenomenon: many populist parties have acquainted themselves with the functioning of democratic politics, passing the "office-experience test".

The fact that populist parties managed, to different extents, to succeed in such a time of volatile and intermittent voting highlights the importance of gaining "a deeper understanding of which 'packages of ideas' move people to action" (Fieschi, 2019 p. 23), and to investigate whether populist supporters share unique attributes that capture the core elements of populism beyond left and right ideologies.

This dissertation attempts to realize this aim by employing the concepts of values and attitudes. More specifically, I investigate (I) the presence of particular personal values connected to the vote for populist parties, the attitudinal consistency across (II) countries, and (III) time, and the affective component of attitudes among populists supporters (IV).

This work's overall findings suggest that there is a core of beliefs that is common to populist supporters. Populist voters share the same personal values across ideologies, and these values impact the probability of voting for a populist party, pointing at the strength of the roots of populist ideas at the mass level.

Moving on to a lower level of abstraction, when it comes to attitudes toward specific objects and their influence on preference for populist parties, supporters of populist parties tend to share similar attitudes. Lack of trust in politics and satisfaction with the functioning of democracy, Euroscepticism, income, and attitudes about immigration are consistently and, to some extent, stable predictors of people's support for populists.

The findings highlight the fact that some clarifications are, however, needed to understand the conditions under which populist supporters have something in common. The overall results

show that context is essential to understand the specific, different 'look' and roots of citizens' demand for populism.

On the emotional components of attitudes, this dissertation shows how the link with affective reactions is not unique to populist supporters. Moreover, in the broader picture of this dissertation, this finding reveals how some almost 'taken for granted' elements (e.g., the role of trust and social conservatism) can play a different role in people's decisions to support populist parties.

This dissertation borrows the terms 'thin' and 'thick', employed to define populist ideology, to describe the composition of populist voters' worldview. Populist supporters are here considered to share a thin line of commonalities across cases, while the remaining thick part is contextual, or chameleonic. However thin, I consider this line of commonalities to be relatively robust, as it cuts across an overwhelmingly diverse class of parties.

Acknowledgments

I always thought that writing the acknowledgments would have been fun and easy. I believed I would have known precisely what to write and even the words I would have used. I also thought it would have taken me 10 minutes to complete. However, it turns out that this document is over a month old and that writing the acknowledgments is a much more difficult task than I thought. And it involves, although happy, crying.

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Elena Baro

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1. Introduction

1.1. Why study populism

Over the past decades, political choices have become increasingly volatile, in different contexts. In many democracies, intermittent voters have become the majority. Party affiliations have been declining, together with party identifications. Overall, citizens' dissatisfaction with their representatives has been steadily increasing. Populists, on the other hand, have, in many instances, been on the rise. Populist parties have been growing in number and in popularity in terms of electoral outcomes and institutional power in almost every party system. Even though they might have emerged as "political challengers" (De Vries & Hobolt, 2020), a considerable number of populist parties acquainted themselves with the functioning of democratic politics (Krauser and Vagner, 2021). While many scholars initially argued that taking part in government coalitions would have been detrimental for populists, many of them have managed to adapt. By keeping "one foot in and one foot out of government" (Albertazzi and McDonnell, 2005), they have been able to criticize the establishment of which they became a part, thus passing the 'office-experience test'. As a consequence, some populist parties have now been around for nearly 50 years (such as the Norwegian Progress Party and the National Rally in France). Their electoral success also has consequences for mainstream parties, as well as for agenda-setting and policy proposals.

The fact that populist parties have managed, to different extents, to succeed in such a time of volatile and intermittent voting means that it is crucial to gain "a deeper understanding of which "packages of ideas" move people to action" (Fieschi, 2019 p. 23). The approach and purpose of this dissertation, rooted in the demand side of the study of populism, are thus aimed at gathering a better understanding of which and how these "packages of ideas" move populist voters to action.

Better understanding these "packages of ideas" not only will shed light on the populist demand per se, but also will deepen our understanding of contemporary European societies, democracies and what people might demand from such democracies. Steady evolution is inherent to human nature, and such evolution clearly does not spare political systems, or citizens' demands within a democratic system. Therefore, getting to know these changing

demands is of high importance to understand the new nature and dynamics of contemporary European politics and societies (Taggart, 2017).

Lastly, moving beyond Europe, we have seen that bringing the Manichaean vision of society to its extreme, has had worrisome consequences around the world, even in consolidated democracies such as the American one, as attested by the storming of Capitol Hill on January 6th, 2021. Populism can thus be seen as a source of both threats and opportunities for democracies; it is therefore vital to gain a better understanding of this phenomenon to minimize the risks, and to maximize the opportunities.

1.2.   So, what is populism?

As this contribution focuses on the worldviews of populist supporters, it is essential to state what the conception of populism is in the framework of this dissertation.

When it comes to a definition of populism, I build on the conceptual clarity provided by Cas Mudde (2004), also known as the ideational approach. According to Mudde (2004), populism can be defined as a "thin ideology", a set of ideas "that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, the pure and wise people versus the corrupt elite, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the *volonté générale* (general will) of the people" (Mudde, 2004). While this is far from being the sole definition of populism in the field, I will delve later to a greater extent into the different conceptions of populism and the reasons why this work is anchored in the ideational approach.

The conceptual framework provided by the above-mentioned definition of populism as in Mudde (2004) made it possible to identify the three core characteristics of populist parties, i.e.:

- Its people-centered nature: a conception of 'common people' as sovereign, as opposed to the 'establishment'.
- The Manichaean character: "there are only friends and foes" (Mudde, 2004 p. 544).
- A conception of politics as the expression of the will of the people: linked to Rousseau's argument: populists argue that politics should follow the general will of the people.

These three main features allow us, among other things, not only to identify the parties that can be defined as "populists", but also to investigate how these components are articulated in citizens' worldviews, partly anticipating one of the reasons why this work builds on this specific definition of populism.

1.3.   The malleable, thin, and chameleonic nature of populism

All the aforementioned core characteristics, as in the definition of populism, are equally worthy of attention. One, however, is particularly important to understand "the tricky nature" of populism and why it is such a challenging and somewhat elusive phenomenon to analyze. That is, populism is *thin* and must therefore be combined with other ideologies, or a "host ideology" to stand, and these may be left- or right- wing leaning ideologies, or even centrist.

Populism alone does not present a coherent set of ideas or a vision of society; populism must borrow such "thick" elements from other ideologies. This "empty heart" (Taggart, 2004) at the very core of populism, has important consequences for our understanding of the phenomenon and how we will approach it. First, the fact that populism is a "thin" ideology means that populism is adaptable, or, as in Taggart's (2004) words, it has a "chameleonic nature". By combining populism with other sets of ideas, populist parties master the ability to unify very different grievances (Spruyt et al., 2016) and to politicize grievances that are relevant in their own context, at specific times. This is why one can observe very different types of populist forces across places and time (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2018). Therefore, populist parties have been more or less equally successful across profoundly different contexts, political cultures, economic situations, electoral systems, etc.

Such diversity and adaptability capture the essence of the difficulty of (entirely) making sense of populism and foretell the recurring complexity of pinpointing what worldviews populist voters might have in common across contexts. Nevertheless, beyond this diversity and adaptability, it must be considered that "the lack of an acknowledged ideology is not the same as the lack of an ideology" (Stanley, 2008 p.100). As Stanley (2008) puts it, the fact that populist parties do not share a common history that led to their emergence, and the fact that they do not share the same political project or program or a clear-cut social base, does not necessarily mean that "there is no coherence to the collection of concepts that comprise populist ideology" (Stanley, 2008 p.100). As a consequence, if there is even a thin line of coherence in

such "collection of concepts" that constitute the populist ideology, there should also be coherence, to some extent, in the worldviews of the people who support such an ideology.

In this sense, populism is located in a grey zone between the coherence and incoherence of its forms and elements. Once again, this highlights the difficulty of finding the right balance between particularisms and general trends when trying to make sense of populism.

1.4. What causes populism? Some overarching theories

Before moving to the possible reasons why people might want to vote for populist parties, it is necessary to mention what, supposedly, triggered the rise/success of populism. Even though, as anticipated, populism is context-dependent and the particular causes of its rise must be researched in the specific context in which it emerged, many scholars have tried to develop overarching theories to explain the emergence of this phenomenon which has universal and, yet, particular features. While there is a multitude of studies supporting and/or disconfirming one or the other explanation, I will at this stage summarize only briefly the main ones, that are more relevant in the context of this dissertation and leave a more comprehensive discussion for the following chapter.

The analysis of what supposedly triggered the rise of populism can of course be approached from many different angles; theoretically, the main approaches, which are not mutually exclusive, can be organized into three categories. To begin with, the demand side investigates the role of voters' attitudes, values, and opinions and the overall voters' demand for populism. At the same time, the supply side is focused on the strategic appeals of parties, their leaders and political parties within the institutional context, the programmatic content that parties offer to their voters, their evolution over time. A final branch is concerned with the role played by institutional rules regulating party competition, such as ballot access laws, effective vote thresholds, types of electoral systems and internal party organizations.

As the demand side is concerned with voters' opinions, motivations, attitudes etc., it is particularly relevant for this dissertation, and represents the theoretical space within which this contribution is positioned.

Going back to the overarching theories that have been developed to explain the rise of populist parties, most of the debate has been organized around the "economic versus cultural" explanations. Both of these theories focus on and see populism as the result of the consequences of long-term, societal changes, one building on a cultural matrix and the other on an economic matrix.

Studies and scholars supporting the economic matrix conceive of populism as the result of economic downturns and societal changes that have followed globalization. Populism, in this view, is understood as the consequence of globalization and the resulting citizens' experience of economic inequality, relative or actual deprivation. These explanations (see Betz, 1994 Kriesi et al., 2006) focus on how globalization, neoliberalism, technological change, and structural changes, which have been transforming post-industrial economies, have generated discontent and divisions among citizens. These changes would have created a new structural conflict between "winners" and losers" of globalization, whereas the latter group would be the one experiencing a more economically insecure life and be thus more receptive to populist appeals, especially from the right. According to Kriesi et al. (2006) populist parties have been the most successful in formulating an "attractive ideological package for the 'losers' of economic transformations" (Kriesi et al., 2006 p. 929).

Moving to the cultural explanation, the rise of populist parties reflects a reaction against a wide range of rapid cultural and value changes which occurred during the late twentieth century. Part of the population believes these societal and values changes erode the values and customs of Western societies. According to the so-called silent revolution hypothesis (Inglehart, 1970), the high levels of existential security experienced by citizens of Western countries during the post-war decades caused significant changes in values among the population. This represented the precondition to a shift toward post-materialist values, such as cosmopolitanism and multiculturalism, support for left-libertarian parties, and other progressive movements focusing on environmental protection, human rights, and gender equality. At the same time, this generated a counterrevolutionary cultural backlash (Norris and Inglehart, 2019) leading some citizens to reject the new progressive values and stick to more traditionalist values. According to the cultural-backlash approach, the shift in values has now reached a 'tipping point' where the supporters of traditional values fear that they are about to become a minority and lose their cultural hegemony (Norris and Inglehart 2019, p. 47). Since, according to the authors, the 'tipping point' has been reached, social conservatives feel under threat and resentful: such

feelings are then translated into votes for *authoritarian populist parties*. Thus, the driving force of the 'cultural backlash' and, more generally, of the cultural explanations is the political mobilization of social-conservative forces in defense of traditional values.

Beyond the cultural and economic explanations, some scholars see populism as the consequence of a struggle between core elements of democracy and representation (Canovan, 1999; Mair, 2009). These explanations are anchored in the supply-side of the study of populism, and thus locate the main cause of populism in changes in democracy itself, such as the growing inability or unwillingness of elites to perform their representative functions and meet citizens' demands (Berman, 2021). According to Mair (2009), populism results from the erosion of parties' representative function. The origins of such erosion can be found in the shift of the balance and attention of West European parties toward their governmental roles to the detriment of their representative role. Similarly, for Canovan (1999) populism results from the unbalanced interactions between "the two faces of democracy" (Canovan, 1999), being the heroic face and the pragmatic one. On one side, the heroic face represents "the promise of a better world through the action of sovereign people". At the same time, the pragmatic one refers to "the business of politics", or all the practices, mechanisms, and ways of dealing with conflicts without having recourse to repression or violence. On this view, populism results from a (perceived) imbalance between these two faces, whereas pragmatism seems to dominate over the heroic face of politics. Seen through this perspective, populism can be read as people's demand for the democratic promise to be respected and honored in a more explicit way, and might serve, as Mudde and Kaltwasser (2018) put it, as a "corrective for democracy".

This brief description of some of the main theories about the possible roots of populist success in the last decades sets the stage for moving the discussion to the voters' perspective and delving more into the next question: who, then, supposedly, votes for populist parties and why?

1.5. The voters' perspective. Who votes for populist parties, and why?

Some of the above-mentioned studies suggested, inspired, and/or to different extents stated who might be voting for populist parties and why. Again, the literature on populism has been extensively developed and it is therefore incumbent upon the writer to limit the focus to the most relevant studies.

The cultural backlash theory, to start with, provides us with a clear description of the prototypical voter of what the authors identify as authoritarian populist parties. The electorate of *authoritarian populist parties* according to the cultural backlash theory is represented by older social conservatives who support traditional values and have authoritarian attitudes. Among traditional values, the authors include people holding negative attitudes toward homosexuals, European integration, and immigration.

In addition, it must be noticed that immigration and attitudes about immigrants are at the core of the theories building on the cultural explanation, especially when explaining the success of the populist-right. The effect of people's negative attitudes toward immigration is confirmed by extensive empirical research (e.g., Ivarsflaten, 2008). The reasoning behind the anxiety concerning immigration is that the increased immigration flows to Europe that took place beginning in the 1980s have triggered perceived or actual competition for resources (such as housing, jobs, and access to welfare benefits…) and have opened the door to cultural conflicts to arise and become politicized. Minority ethnic groups are also used as scapegoats for economic hardship (Golder, 2003).

Moving to the theory of the winners and losers in globalization, the reasoning behind it suggests that people who vote for populist parties can be identified according to specific socioeconomic backgrounds. According to this theory, as globalization transforms societies and particularly labor markets, the "losers of globalization" are those who tend to vote for populist parties, and they can then be identified with those who are unemployed, who have lower-skill jobs, the less educated, and those who receive a low (or lower) income. Overall, the people who vote for populist parties, according to the globalization losers' theory, are therefore linked to the experience of actual or perceived economic vulnerability. Empirical studies, however, provide us with a large body of mixed and contradictory evidence regarding the effect of socioeconomic indicators (e.g., Rooduijn, 2018).

Further, Gidron and Hall (2020) bring focus to peoples' experience of feelings of social integration and social marginalization. As feelings of social marginalization can arise both from the loss of one's economic position and from feelings of cultural marginalization, economic and cultural developments might have the same effect in explaining peoples' support for those that they define as *radical parties*. According to these authors, people who feel socially marginalized by economic and cultural developments are more likely to vote for

radical parties. These feelings are the consequence of economic and cultural developments, leading some people, especially those with low levels of income or skills, to feel like they have been relegated to the side-lines of society (Gidron and Hall, 2020).

Overall, these studies provide a depiction of the prototypical populist voter that accounts for macro and micro level factors, as they tap into the societal changes on the basis of populism and the individuals' responses to them. More recently, studies have been developed that look more into the personal characteristics of individuals who vote for populist parties, therefore focusing exclusively on the micro-level factors. These studies analyze and confirm the presence of specific attitudes among populist voters (e.g., Akkerman et al., 2014, 2017; Geurkink et al., 2020; Van Hauwaert & Van Kessel, 2018), personality traits (Bakker, Rooduijn and Schumacher, 2016), values (Marcos Marne, 2021; Baro, 2022) and emotions (Rico et al., 2017).

Thus, it seems undeniable that increasing attention has been directed toward understanding why people support populist parties and whether populist supporters share unique attributes that capture the core elements of populism beyond left and right ideologies (Geurkink et. al., 2020). Therefore, at first sight, there is a rich body of literature that conveys an impression of who votes for populist parties. However, this same body of literature proves at the same time "everything and nothing"; the literature on populist parties and especially on their voters is extensively developed yet fragmented. While there is a general agreement on some aspects of the populist phenomenon, a quick literature review focusing on the explanatory factors of populism will offer mainly mixed and sometimes even contradictory empirical findings. Peoples' experience of unemployment for instance, has been found to have a positive effect in explaining the vote for populist parties in some studies (e.g., Gidron and Hall, 2020), while in others, it was said to be negatively correlated with support for populism or even having insignificant effects (Rooduijn, 2018; van Elsas, 2017).

While this might be partially due to the chameleonic essence of populism (Taggart, 2004) or to the employment of different approaches to the study of populism, it calls for the need for more refined and systematic studies. Such a need also arises from the following aspects:

Different operationalizations of populism. Different studies tend to use different operationalizations of populism. Some examples have already been provided in the previous

paragraphs: Norris and Inglehart (2019) talk about *authoritarian populists*, Gidron and Hall (2020) refer to populist parties as *radical parties*. Different definitions are then translated in different conceptions of what can be defined as populist or not, and consequently to the use of samples of populist parties, which can differ profoundly. Consequently, this leads to the exclusion and/or inclusion of parties that might be or might not be included in other studies, with significant consequences in terms of results and generalizability of the findings.

Radicalism or populism? Connected to the previous point, some studies, by focusing on *radical* populism, might mistakenly assume that their results are linked to the populist aspect, overlooking the fact that they might be due to the radical character of such parties. The same reasoning can be applied to adjacent concepts such as nativism.

Scope. Due to its chameleonic nature, populism varies, and it is therefore difficult to fully integrate the contributions of the studies on populism that come from very different contexts (Taggart, 2017). As a result, some studies, while very valuable, might have too narrow a scope to be relevant for a general understanding of populism. The fact that populism varies in its content according to the place in which it operates means that the results from a study having too narrow a scope might not tell us much about populism per se but only about populism at that specific time and place. At the same time, however, having too broad a scope might come with the cost or risk of overlooking important differences that must be considered (e.g., as in cultural backlash theory).

Exclusion of the temporal component. I argue that a possible source of such diverse tendencies identified across different countries and studies might be explained by the temporal component. Considering not only local but also time specificities is important when investigating the presence of a common set of motives moving populist supporters. Previous research helped to identify many relevant cross-sectional associations. However, the issue of change over time, and how individual-level outcomes may depend on time-varying social, political, and economic conditions, is left unanswered.

Lack of systematic review on the demand side. Overall, even if it might sound incredible considering the amount of scientific work on populism, the demand side of the study of populism is much more novel and presents a lack of a systemic analysis on the absence or existence of commonalities shared by voters of populist parties (Roodujin, 2018). These

commonalities are expected to reflect the core elements of the populist ideology, as described above, and are expected to be found beyond the differences that characterize these parties when it comes to leadership, ideology, and style (Rooduijn, 2018; Geurking et. al., 2020).

This dissertation builds on and addresses these overarching criticalities. It does so mainly by (I) analyzing the whole spectrum of populist parties and (II) by conducting a systematic review of the demand-side of populism that looks at several elements of the structure of public opinion.

Analyzing the whole spectrum of populist parties: Beyond adhering to the definition of populism as in Mudde's work, thereby selecting cases respecting the same criteria across articles, in this dissertation I consider populist parties from the left- and right-, radical or non-radical, host ideologies to which they adhere. Investigating the presence of common worldviews shared by populist supporters implies that such worldviews should be investigated beyond the differences that characterize these parties when it comes to leadership, ideology, and style (Rooduijn, 2018; Geurking et. al., 2020). As Taggart (2017) suggests: "populism can be fully understood if we consider the whole range of populist forces" (Taggart, 2017 p.250): "we need to understand this diverse group in terms of their populism and in terms of their ideology as a whole" (ibidem, p.248). This is not to downplay the neat distinction between left- and right-wing populist parties; this dissertation also seeks to account for this distinction. It is however important to keep in mind that there is considerable variation within populist parties of the left- and right, in terms of the positions that they take on core issues. Similarly, when it comes to their radicalism, if present, populist parties display patterns of de-radicalization and re-radicalization also during or after experience in government (Akkerman et al., 2016). I consider this variation within different populist parties belonging to the same host-ideology, and the variation in their level of radicalism (when present), to be representative of all the shapes and forms that these parties can take in the light of their adhering to the populist ideology.

A comprehensive analysis of public opinion: employing a broad approach in the study of public opinion allows one, first, to provide a systematic analysis of the worldviews of populist supporters and, second, to fill some of the gaps that exist within the demand side of the study of populism. For instance, while we know that there are specific attitudes connected to the vote for populist parties (see Akkerman et al., 2014, 2017), there is little knowledge about the presence of shared personal values, the role of which is to structure attitudes, among populist

supporters. It is also unclear whether populist supporters' worldviews have been stable or have been susceptible to changes and trends. It is therefore essential to consider that beyond scholarly attention to the populist phenomenon, the demand-side is less developed overall, and many questions remain unanswered. Parallelly, however, the chaotic literature, as pointed out earlier, requires a re-consideration/assessment that builds on what we already know about populism. In order to take that knowledge one step forward, we need to reconsider some existing studies (e.g., does the cultural backlash approach really help to explain authoritarian populism in Europe in its current state?) and build further on what we have (e.g., we know that there is a particular link between populism and emotions, but is it still that peculiar if we also consider mainstream parties and voters?). As it will be explained below, this dissertation contributes to clarifying this issue by responding to these questions and criticalities within the demand side of the study of populism by employing the personal values and attitudes concepts. Specifically, I analyze (I) the presence of particular personal values connected to the vote for populist parties; the attitudinal consistency across (II) countries and (III) time, the affective component of attitudes among populists supporters (IV). Building on personal values and attitudes allows us to improve our understanding of the worldviews of populist supporters, filling some of the gaps identified in the literature and providing a potentially helpful approach for future studies on the demand-side of populism.

1.6. A look into the structure of public opinion: from values to attitudes and behavior

Since the pioneering work of Converse (1964), demonstrating that only a minority of people use ideology to structure their political evaluations, less attention has been paid to ideology alone as explaining political behavior and political reasoning, while more attention has been progressively devoted to other relevant elements, such as values and attitudes. This dissertation will focus specifically on the role of these elements, which are the foundations of public opinion formation, in investigating the worldviews of populist supporters.[1]

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[1] Talking about citizens' worldviews, I do acknowledge the existence of an ongoing and unsolved debate on whether citizens evaluate parties based on their preferences, or if it is parties that influence citizens' preferences (see Goren, et al., 2009; Leeper and Slothuus, 2014). As stated, while acknowledging the existence of this debate, I will not align my dissertation with one or another explanation; rather, I will limit myself to describing the preferences of citizens that support populist parties, recognizing that parties also play a role in shaping such positions.

Returning to public opinion formation, many scholars have considered individual values a central starting point to understand peoples' attitudes and behavior (e.g., Davidov et al., 2008). This is because values, which can be defined as desirable goals that people strive to attain or defend (Schwartz, 2007), constitute the basic principles that give structure to personal attitudes and, thus, opinions: they are deep-rooted, enduring guides that are less vulnerable to the impact of events and therefore represent the starting point of the causal chain of decision-making (Rokeach, 1973). Moreover, as values represent trans-situational goals, people use them to organize their beliefs and attitudes (also) on political issues, to make and to justify political decisions, becoming relevant in explaining voting behavior (Caprara et al., 2006; Feldman, 2003; Piurko et al., 2011).

As stated, values transcend specific actions and situations; they are overarching goals and therefore operate at a high level of abstraction. Attitudes, on the other hand, refer to specific actions, objects, or situations (Schwartz, 2007). Attitudes are made up of a cognitive and an affective element: they involve the (cognitive) construction and (affective) evaluation of an object (Bergman, 1998). Applied to the aim of this study, such an object could be a candidate, a party, a policy issue, and so on. Other than giving structure to attitudes, values also give structure to behavior, which in this context can be considered citizens' choices in a democracy, expressed either as voting or in the form of parties'/candidates' evaluations.

Using Leeper and Slothuus' (2014) words; "understanding public opinion formation requires acknowledging that the choices individuals make as citizens are shaped both by their predispositions and [by] the political context" (Leeper and Slothuus, 2014 p.131). Looking more in-depth at this chain of values, attitudes, and behavior allows us to gain a deeper understanding of how these "predispositions" look, when it comes to populist supporters. In order to carry out the systematic analysis of the worldviews of populist supporters, this dissertation delves into the role of these elements, starting from the higher level of abstraction (e.g., do populist supporters share the same personal values?), the affective and cognitive component of attitudes (e.g., is the affective component stronger for populist supporters than it is for mainstream parties' supporters?), and the different roots of such attitudes. Building on the foregoing, this dissertation raises and answers the following research questions:

- What do supporters of populist parties have in common?

- Which values do populist supporters hold?
- To what extent do populist supporters share the same attitudes, across time and countries? And how do the roots of such attitudes differ across contexts?
- To what extent is the affective component of these attitudes stronger for populist supporters than for mainstream supporters?

1.7. The contribution of the dissertation as a whole

After describing the theoretical framework, the methodological choices, and the general conclusion of the dissertation, I present four independent research articles. The articles deal with different aspects related to the demand side of populism. Broadly speaking, the first article is focused on the presence of shared personal values among populist supporters in the European context. The second article, a comparative study focusing on four countries, builds on the cultural backlash theory as described earlier. It highlights the different roots, across contexts, of some of the most critical attitudes that have been linked to the support for authoritarian populism, and the importance of accounting for contextual differences when studying populism (e.g., some attitudes might be more important in explaining people's support for populist parties in some countries, due, for instance, to historical developments). The third article, focusing on Western Europe, analyzes the coherence of populist supporters' attitudes across time in the light of both possible demand and supply side shocks and variations (e.g., the economic crisis, and cycles of political behavior). Finally, the fourth article investigates the affective component of populism by investigating if the emotions that have been linked to populist supporters are, de facto, exclusively a "populist" feature or if they find their counterparts among mainstream parties' supporters.

The dissertation's four articles together provide an overview of the worldviews of populist supporters. Moreover, this contribution fills in some of the previously identified gaps in the literature on the demand side of populism and overcomes the pinpointed criticalities identified in previous studies. Precisely, it does so in the following ways:

Through the personal values and attitudes approach, the dissertation improves on the *lack of systematic review on the demand side of populism.* It achieves this goal by providing such a systematic review, made up of a mix of 'new' contributions (such as the role of personal values

and time varying conditions) and revised/refined studies (e.g., a re-dimensioned role of the cultural backlash thesis in explaining contemporary populism and of the role of the affective component as a peculiar feature of populist supporters).

Of particular relevance, when it comes to the 'new' contributions, this work fills in the identified gap on the *exclusion of the temporal component* by including time in the demand side of the study of populism. It displays how time-changing conditions (such as a populist party being part of the governing coalition at a specific point in time) can have an impact on people's attitudes and on the relevance of these attitudes in determining how likely they are to support a populist party.

Overall, by being consistently rooted in the ideational approach and in the definition of populism as provided by Mudde (2004), the dissertation and related articles address the issue of the lack of coherence linked to the *different operationalization of populism*. The populist parties that are analyzed in the context of this work are thus those that adhere to the populist ideology as defined by Mudde (2004).

As argued, investigating the presence of common worldviews shared by populist supporters implies that such worldviews should be analyzed beyond the differences that characterize these parties, e.g., leadership, ideology, style (Rooduijn, 2018; Geurking et. al., 2020). The dissertation accomplishes this by looking at the whole spectrum of populist parties, including left-and right-wing host ideologies, radical and non-radical parties. This work offers an overview of the worldviews of populist supporters representing all the shapes and forms that these parties can assume, and is not limited to, for instance, radical populist parties.

When it comes to the issue related to the *scope* of the studies, the dissertation as a whole provides a mix of studies that look at general trends in the European context (see Article 1 and Article 3); a more in-depth focus on four cases studies (see Article 2), and that focus on one country (Norway) selected as a least-likely case (Article 4). This work refrains from having too broad a scope. Instead, it focuses on *one* region (the European one) and by investigating both general trends and specificities within this region, it allows us to some extent to find the balance between having too narrow or too broad a scope.

Overall, as bittersweet as it might sound, I do not think that the dissertation provides a solution to 'the problem' of the demand side of populism. However, it provides some recommendations and tools that can be useful to move the research on the demand-side of populism one step forward.

Specifically, I call for the importance of bringing more awareness to the impact of the contextual elements in determining the specific looks and roots of the demand side of populism. Contextual elements can be related both to the societal level (such as the salience of specific issues, a populist in government or in opposition, the history of a country) and individual factors (such as the experience of economic hardship and feelings of social marginalization). As I demonstrate in the dissertation, these elements contribute largely to the understanding of the specific worldviews of populist supporters. Employing the personal values and attitudes approach further provides a framework and tool for discerning stable (e.g., personal values) and less stable (attitudes) elements of the demand side of populism, as well as general and specific patterns.

I thus believe that this approach and my findings can help future research on populist demand to further disentangle the particular from the general aspects of populism (what is really 'populist' across cases and what is peculiar to a specific case) and to identify the different patterns and paths that lead to support for populism. I do not necessarily believe that investigating more and more of the diverse paths to support for populism might necessarily get us lost in particularism. Instead, as stated in the beginning of this chapter, I think that it might be helpful to get to know people's changing demands and, more generally, contemporary European democracies and societies.

Table 1. Overview of articles, research questions and publication status

Title	Research questions (broad)	Authorship	Publication status
Personal Values Priorities and Support for Populism in Europe - An analysis of personal motivations underpinning support for populist parties in Europe	What do supporters of populist parties have in common? Which values do populist supporters hold?	Elena Baro	Published in *Political Psychology*, March 19th, 2022
The limits of the cultural backlash-theory: A comparative study of authoritarian populism in four European countries	What do supporters of populist parties have in common? To what extent do populist supporters share the same attitudes, across time and countries? And how do the roots of such attitudes differ across contexts?	Elena Baro; Anders Todal Jenssen	Under review in *Political Studies*
Do populist voters have anything in common at all? An analysis of voters' opinions over time	What do supporters of populist parties have in common? To what extent do populist supporters share the same attitudes, across time and countries? And how do the roots of such attitudes differ across contexts?	Elena Baro	Under review in *European Journal of Political Research*
Are populist voters more emotional than other voters? And what about the elitists and the mainstream voters?	To what extent is the affective component of these attitudes stronger for populist supporters than for mainstream supporters?	Elena Baro; Anders Todal Jenssen	Under review in *Political Psychology*

2.   Theoretical framework

As anticipated in the introduction, the literature on populism is vast and steadily growing. It is, therefore, neither possible nor beneficial for the scope of this work, to cover every study that has been conducted on the topic. To guide the reader through my theoretical framework and literature review, I will now introduce the different issues that will be discussed in the following sections, and their relevance for the scope of this work.

After a brief introduction to the key conceptual and party developments of populism, I will start by drawing attention to the different conceptualizations that have been employed in the study of populism. In this section, I keep the focus on the overarching conceptions applied in the context of comparative studies of populism and provide a more detailed explanation as to why this work is rooted in the ideational approach. This is followed by a brief discussion of the core elements of populism in the ideational approach employed herein.

Having stated and explained the adopted definition of populism and thus my theoretical framework from a supply-side perspective, I move on to addressing the leading causes and overarching theories that have been developed on the presumed origins of the populist *demand.* In this section, I will thus present the main theories on what supposedly caused populism, and I will highlight, with some precautions, why this dissertation is theoretically rooted in the work of Kriesi (2014).

Consequently, I will report on the state of the art and ways forward on what voters of populist parties have been found to have in common. Building on what is left unanswered within the demand side of populism, I will then propose my original approach, being an analysis of citizens' values and attitudes in relation to the support for populism. The final sections are thus aimed at delving more into the concepts of attitudes and values, relevant definitions and previous research, and clarifying how they can be useful to deepen our knowledge of populism.

2.1. Populism: Some key developments

Going through some of the key developments in the history of populism, allows me, to begin with, to highlight and introduce some recurring patterns and challenges related to this

phenomenon. More specifically, it allows me to shed light on one of the core elements that are, in my view, essential to an understanding of populism i.e., its past and present *variety*. Two implications follow from this variety: first, the difficulty in defining populism in an uncontested way, and second, as addressed in Article 3, the need to adopt a long-term perspective in the study of populism.

Many academics have focused extensively on populism after the economic and financial crisis, Brexit, or the election of Donald Trump in 2016, conveying the misleading impression that populism and populist ideas came to the surface only in recent years (Hawkins and Kaltwasser, 2017). Nevertheless, it is wrong to assume that populism is a new phenomenon. Populist parties were already established in Europe long before the economic and financial crisis, and the election of Donald Trump in 2016 represented another piece of the already large puzzle of populism rather than one of the first steppingstones of the populist momentum. As I argue in Article 3, it is, therefore, essential to consider populism and populist ideas among the electorate acknowledging this long-term, longitudinal perspective. The risk, as posed by Gidron and Bonikowski (2013) is that "some of the claims about contemporary populism may be prone to a presentist bias" (Gidron and Bonikowski, 2013 p.25).

Looking at party developments, the roots of populist movements may be traced back to the 1890s, when the term "populism" was first used with reference to the US People's Party, an ideologically left-leaning movement that contested "the elites", while these elites were represented by "Washington", bankers, railroad entrepreneurs, et al. (Kaltwasser et al., 2017). Similar populist movements, in the early Cold War period (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2017), were later active with an anti-communist stance. The common, good people were then the patriotic Americans, opposing the evil elites from the coastal areas, sympathizers of more socialist ideas. More recently, movements with populist *features* such as Occupy Wall Street and the Tea Party have been opposing the government bailout of the bank sector, but respectively framing their populist arguments in terms of progressive social justice for the first and more exclusionary support for an implicitly racialized conception of the "good people" for the second (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2017). Adopting a long-term perspective, it can be briefly noted how, while starting as left-leaning, American populism has progressively moved toward the right, culminating in the election of Donald Trump in 2016. Other examples of "early" forms of populism are recognized, for example, in Russia (the Narodnik movement) in the 1860s and in

France (Boulangism) in 1890s, and in Latin America throughout the 20th century (see for instance Peronism in Argentina between the 1940s-50s).

Moving the focus to contemporary European populism, several important developments in the scholarly and electoral success of populism took place between the 1950s and the 1970s. Even though this is not a comprehensive list, it is nevertheless telling how, in just a few decades, populist parties started to emerge in almost every European country. The 1970s saw the rise of the Norwegian Progress Party, the French National Front, and the Danish People's Party, followed in the 1980s by the "populist turn" of the Austrian Freedom Party and in the 1990s by the emergence of the Italian Northern League and Forza Italia. More recent examples include the foundation in the early 2000s of Pim Fortuyn's list in The Netherlands, and of Vlaams Belang in Belgium (2004).

As anticipated, a recurring pattern of variety can be identified both in their developments over the long term and in the content of their populism across cases. On the former, for instance, the French National Front emerged as a far-right populist party, advocating strong nationalistic and anti-immigrant stances. Having then been through a process of "de-demonization" it is nowadays able to attract a far broader electorate than it could earlier, an electorate that is not limited to supporters of its right-wing ideological positions but includes even working-class voters. Similarly, the Northern League originally had strong secessionist, anti-national characteristics as it opposed the national government that "had enslaved the north of the country" (Molle, 2019). The strong narrative of the Northern vs Southern Italy cultural and economic competition was however replaced as the 'new' League managed to establish itself as a national party, attracting an electorate which is not limited to its regional base any longer, criticizing a new 'elite' (secular Europe) and new 'others' (immigrants). Moving the attention to the content of their populism, some of these parties articulated their populism in regionalist terms (Vlaams Belang and Northern League), others used anti-tax arguments (Norwegian and Danish Progress Parties), or anti-immigrant, Euroskeptic, or even socialist arguments (Podemos, Syriza).

As indicated above, the proliferation and success of populist parties, especially (but not only) in the European context, has been going hand in hand with the scholarly development of our knowledge about populism. In terms of scholarship, between the 1950s and 1970s, the first definitions of populism started to be proposed by authors such as Dahl (1956) and Germani

(1978) and, beyond existing differences, they emphasized both popular sovereignty and the struggle with the elite. Later on, scholars such as Canovan (1981), Laclau (2005), Taggart (2000), and Mudde (2004) progressively added fundamental knowledge, also reported in the previous and following sections, that constitute the building blocks of our current knowledge on populism. These authors have provided the first comprehensive overviews that attempt to analyze and identify the common traits of populism, based on all its different manifestations and elusiveness (Canovan, 1981), describing the core elements of populism (Taggart, 2000) and providing what can be defined as the most widely adopted and encompassing definition of populism up to now (Mudde, 2004). While far from being uncontested, Mudde's definition of populism constitutes an arrival point in the scholarly debate on how to define populism, and it is the first definition to capture populism across different contexts.

As anticipated, this (yet not exhaustive) list of examples foretells and identifies what is understood here as a recurring and essential element of populism: the *variety* of past and present populisms. As argued further in Article 2 and 3, in the context of this dissertation populism is thus conceived as a phenomenon the manifestations of which are contextual and dependent on the political, social, and religious culture of the country at hand: the language and content of populism are coherent with the political culture of the society in which the specific instance has arisen (Urbinati, 2019).

Based on all this, it does not come as a surprise that the term "populism" has proven to be extremely hard to define in an uncontested way. In addition, having an understanding of populism that highlights its variety implies the need to adopt a definition that is particularly well-suited for comparative studies. The following section is thus dedicated to the description of the main approaches to the study of populism.

2.2. The different approaches to the study of populism

The extensive academic literature on the populist phenomenon provides us also with a rich production of different conceptualizations on what populism supposedly is and what it is not. Broadly speaking, populism has been conceived as an ideology, a political regime, a representative process, a way of doing politics, a rhetorical style. As the adoption of one or the other understanding is then translated into a specific way of studying populism, I will now analyze the main approaches to the study of populism and elaborate more on why this

dissertation and its articles are anchored in the so-called ideational approach, and why other approaches are unsuited for the scope of this dissertation and, more broadly, for the study of populism. Once again, delving into each different, ad-hoc definition of populism is neither possible nor useful for the scope of this work. Instead, I will limit myself to reporting broader conceptual approaches, each referring to a particular understanding of populism, that can be applied to empirical and comparative work on populism.

Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2018), building on previous work as in the *Oxford Handbook of Populism* (Rovira Kaltwasser, Taggart, Ochoa Espejo, & Ostiguy, 2017), offer three main, overarching approaches, applied in the context of comparative studies of populism: the ideational approach, the political strategic approach, and the sociocultural approach.

2.2.1. The ideational approach

Populism is here conceived as a set of ideas considering society to be divided between "the pure people" versus "the corrupt elite," and that consider politics as an expression of popular will (Mudde, 2004). Despite the common agreement on these minimal boundaries of the phenomenon, scholars adopting this approach tend to disagree on the actual nature of the phenomenon: some refer to populism as a discourse or style (e.g., Moffit, 2016; Jagers and Walgrave, 2007), a "thin-centered ideology" (Mudde, 2004), or a "worldview" (Hawkins, 2010). Nevertheless, the agreement on the core features of populism dominates over minor conceptual differences. Beyond discrepancies, all scholars adopting the ideational approach consider populism to be a set of ideas about "the people" and "the elite" (Mudde, 2017). As Mudde (2017) notes, other ideologies are based on a distinction between the people and the elite, but the primary scope of such distinction is based on concepts of, e.g., class or nation. In the populist ideology, the distinction between the people and the elite is based on a way more abstract *moral evaluation*, where the people are good, pure, and authentic, while the elite has a corrupt nature.

The main advantage of the ideational approach for the focus of this dissertation lies in the fact that conceiving populism as a set of ideas allows us to study both the supply and the demand-side of populism. It enables me to study not only candidates and parties advocating populist ideas, but also how and why the electorate adheres to such populist ideas (Hawkins and Rovira Kaltwasser 2017), thus fitting with the scope of the dissertation. To use Mudde and Rovira

Kaltwasser's words, focusing on the demand-side "invites us to think about the reasons why there is a demand for populism at the mass level, thereby permitting us to undertake survey research to detect the role of populist ideas in electoral behavior (…) instead of assuming that populist ideas are manufactured from above" (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2018 p.1671). Another advantage of the ideational approach which is particularly suitable not only for the purpose of this dissertation, but more broadly, for advancing our knowledge of populism, is that it allows cross-national, cross-regional, cross-temporal employability and comparability. This conception of populism is neither geographically nor temporally specific (Mudde, 2017), allowing cross-sectional and longitudinal comparisons. Lastly, the ideational approach to the study of populism enables me to distinguish what can be defined as populism or populist and what it cannot, therefore allowing me also to distinguish populism from adjacent concepts such as elitism and pluralism.

2.2.2.   The political strategic approach

The main definition of populism according to the political strategic approach sees populism "as a political strategy through which a personalistic leader seeks or exercises government power based on direct, unmediated, uninstitutionalised support from large numbers of mostly unorganized followers" (Weyland, 2001). Such a definition is therefore focused on the strategies that the populist leaders use to gain and maintain power. Scholars who accept this definition see "the people" as too heterogeneous and unable to act on their own; the role of the leader is thus essential in giving direction and in mobilizing the followers to realize what the leader defines as "the will of the people" (Weyland, 2017). On one side, this approach has the merit of highlighting the role of the populist leadership, that undeniably plays an important role for many, but not all, populist parties. On the other side, in fact, charismatic leadership is not a necessary nor sufficient condition for populist movements to be successful (Mudde, 2017). This approach is biased toward a top-down conception of populist politics and does not take into account the essential role of popular support in ensuring the electoral success of a populist party.

While it might be plausible for a movement in its infancy, I struggle to see how deeply diverse and heterogenous people would keep feeling represented, in a long-term perspective, simply based on identification with their leader. There has to be something beyond the personal connection with the leader that brings together people in the same movement/party. This

approach also does not consider the fact that beyond the diversity and malleability of populist parties, there is some coherence in what they stand for: populist parties tend to present, to different extent, clear political programs. To add to this, Schumacher and Rooduijn (2013) provide us with empirical evidence that goes against this definition: they show that party leader evaluations do not distinguish between populist and mainstream parties. This, in line with the main critiques of this approach, supports the argument that while leadership might facilitate the success of a populist party, it is not a defining feature of populism. For mainstream voters, leadership evaluation is equally important as it is for voters for populist parties (Schumacher and Rooduijn, 2013).

2.2.3. The sociocultural approach

This approach conceives of populism as "the antagonistic mobilizational flaunting of the 'low'." By this terminology, Ostiguy (2017, p.78) means both a socio-cultural and politico-cultural low. The socio-cultural low refers to a performative, "soap opera" style, with a leader who is both "like me" (meaning with no cultural achievements) and an ego ideal (Ostiguy, 2017, p.77). The politico-cultural low, on the other hand, refers to a "strong, personalistic, "one-man" leadership" (Ostiguy, 2017, p.88). In this conception, populism opposes the "well brought up, the proper, the accepted truths, and ways associated with diverse world elites" (Ostiguy, p. 84). While this definition might be useful to the analysis of some specific cases, there are exceptions that confute it (e.g., Pim Fortuyn) and make it not sufficiently encompassing. There are two additional aspects that make this definition unfitting to capture *only* populist parties: the socio-cultural low to which Ostiguy (2017) refers is not a prerogative of populist parties. The mediatization and personalization of politics and the soap opera style are found among both populist and mainstream leaders and party members. Secondly, as highlighted in the previous section, personalistic leaderships are not a defining or an essential characteristic for the success of populist parties.

Beyond disagreements and different conceptualizations of populism, many scholars have employed the ideational approach to the study of populism, with important implications (for a complete analysis see Rooduijn, 2019). To begin with, conceiving of populism in such a way, i.e., as a set of ideas, has given scholars the opportunity to measure populism, to establish the degree to which leaders and parties appeal to populist ideas, or to measure populist messages in the media or in party manifestos. More importantly for the focus of this dissertation, adopting

the ideational approach has led many scholars to move beyond the supply side and to focus more on the demand side, lifting important questions about what the populist electorate and its ideas look like.

To conclude, it is also essential to distinguish populism from merely a movement of contestation, as it aims to conquer representative institutions and win a governing majority to model society on the ideology of the people (Urbinati, 2019). A populist government relies on a strongly opinionated audience that clamors for the direct translation of its opinion into decisions. This distinguishes populism from all the protest movements that similarly stressed the dichotomic way of dividing societies between "we, the people" and "you, the establishment" (such as *Occupy Wall Street*, or the Spanish *Indignados*).

2.2.4. The empty signifiers of populism: the people, the elite, the others

As previously highlighted, defining populism has proven to be quite challenging for scholars. Again, the reasons for this are to be found in the elusive nature of populism, also defined as the "empty heart" of populism (Taggart, 2004), and in the use of "empty signifiers" (Laclau, 2005). As to the former, as said, populist ideas cannot stand on their own; instead, they must adhere to other "thick" ideologies. Consequently, movements and parties defined as populist are present on both the left and the right of the ideological spectrum, where some advocate protectionist economic policies, others redistributive policies, and still others forms of welfare chauvinism. On the societal level, some populists support liberalism and progressive stances, while others are more conservative. However, beyond the different, specific definitions, we have seen that, especially within the ideational approach, there is agreement on the core concepts of populism: "the people" and "the elite". What all these diverse parties have in common is that they all claim to speak for and represent "the pure people", against the "corrupt elites"; this lying at the core of the populist ideology, these concepts require a more in-depth analysis of their meanings.

Also known as "empty signifiers" (Laclau, 2005), or "empty vessels" (Mudde, 2004) the "people" and the "elite" lack clear boundaries or definitions. However, while essentially being "empty" concepts and therefore open to interpretation, following again the moral divide on which populist ideology is based, "the people" will always be pure and "on the right side",

while the "elite", whoever they are or whatever they represent, will be bad, corrupt, and plotting against the pure people.

To explain the meaning that these empty concepts can assume, some scholars (e.g., Canovan 2004), stress the fact that populism cannot stand alone. As populism alone exists only at a high level of abstraction, for the people and the elite to gain a more concrete meaning, they need to be put into context, and borrow those thick elements from, for example, the host ideology (people as class or nation) or the context in which it operates (e.g., people as "Europeans" as opposed to Muslims). More broadly, beyond thick ideologies or contextual elements, the definition of "the elite" can also serve specific purposes/needs of the party and/or leader, and therefore journalists, banks, intellectuals, et al. can potentially represent "the corrupt elite".

A further important specification is needed regarding the populist conception of the people. Again, following the moral, Manichaean vision of society as in the populist ideology, there is an inner distinction that needs to be kept in mind, between the "good people" and "the others". Not surprisingly by now, also the use of this further Manichaean distinction between "the good people" and "the others" can be adapted according to the host-ideology of the populist party, or for specific needs: "the others" can thus represent immigrants, refugees, 'the rich', intellectuals, bureaucrats, those who oppose the populist party and its supporters, and so on.

Populism is thus based on an exclusionary and antagonistic conception of society and political power. While liberal democracy is anchored in the belief that a well-organized polity will constrain the people's will and allow for pluralism (Urbinati, 2019), populism seeks (symbolically) to replace the whole (the pluralistic society) with one of its parts, that is, the homogeneous and virtuous "people". The exclusionary and antagonistic nature of populism is common to both left- and right-wing host ideologies, despite being less straightforward for left-wing populists. As in Sanders et al. (2017) and Reinemann et al. (2017), "the exclusion of out-groups is implicit in any construction and mention of the people"; it helps to "make explicit the standard to which the people are contrasted, contributing to strengthening identification with the in-group" (Reinemann et al., 2017, p. 20; Sanders et al., 2017). For right-wing populist parties, the exclusionary dimension focuses on the presence of "others" often represented by immigrants, religious minorities, or left-wing sympathizers. Left-wing populists, on the other hand, usually oppose "the caste", the political and economic establishment, as well as European technocrats and right-wing supporters.

As I point out in Article 1, being at the core of the populist ideology, this exclusionary, Manichaean, antagonistic conception of society is relevant when investigating the personal values priorities of populist voters.

Having outlined the core concepts of the populist ideology, I will now move to the demand-side of the study of populism, providing an overview of the main theories about the roots of populism and of people's positive response to populism.

2.3.   Main theories on the causes of populism

As anticipated in the introductory chapter, the success of populism can be seen as the result of a combination of cultural, economic, and social factors; it can be understood as the consequence of the failure of democracy to deliver its founding promises, of the growth of social and economic inequalities, new structural conflicts, or new cultural codes (Urbinati, 2019).

The following paragraphs provide a more in-depth account of the main conditions that are said to have provoked and/or facilitated the success of populist parties. The relevance of illustrating the diverse theories about the roots of populism for the purpose of this dissertation is linked to (I) the implications that they have for the understanding of the genesis and 'look' of people's positive response to populism and (II) for the recurring role of grievances in the success of populism, which is directly addressed in Article 4.

Having previously described the nature of the populist phenomenon and in line with my understanding of it, I believe that it is highly unlikely that a single theory or process can explain populism across different contexts and periods of time. On this point, I find myself particularly convinced that the multifaceted causes as described by Kriesi (2014) - such as the variability pinpointed by the author between different areas of Europe, the interchange between supply and demand, and the overcoming of the dichotomous debate between cultural and economic drivers - are the forces that best explain the demand and supply of *contemporary European* populism.

Going back to the overarching theories, the main economic explanation, also known as "the losers of globalization" thesis, stems from Betz's (1994) analysis of the effects of the changes in the labor market that followed the globalization process. Betz's (1994) argument holds that those who do not meet the demands of post-industrialism - meaning the unemployed, underemployed, low-skilled and those whose skills are not required anymore due to advancing technology and changing needs of the labor market - are defined as "the losers of globalization". These individuals are more likely to develop resentment toward mainstream parties and "elites" whom they blame for traveling along "the road to globalization", and thus tend to turn to populist right- and left- wing parties (Hawkins et al., 2017). According to the theory, this division between the "winners" and the "losers" of globalization originated a new structural conflict that has now transformed the political space. By contrast, mainstream parties have now to compete to mobilize the demands of the "losers" of globalization with populist parties (Kriesi et al., 2006, 2014). While especially the populist right parties managed to benefit from and to mobilize supporters along the lines of this new conflict (Kriesi, 2014), the societal changes due to globalization have been framed accordingly by both right- and left- wing populist parties.

Moving to the cultural explanations, the main theory within this debate is probably the "cultural backlash" thesis proposed by Norris and Inglehart (2019). These authors hold that the growing support for what they define as *'authoritarian populism'* in the Americas and Europe is the consequence of a 'cultural backlash': a conservative and religious reaction in favor of traditional values, reacting to the spread of progressive values, and an 'authoritarian reflex', triggered by economic insecurity and increasing inequality. The authors hold that there are generational differences explaining the support for traditional or progressive values, and consequently authoritarian populism: older cohorts are more likely to support traditional values, while younger cohorts tend to support more progressive values. The theory builds on Inglehart's early works, in which he argued that the steady and fast economic recovery and peace created a 'cultural shift' from materialist values to post-materialism in Western Europe, as new generations raised under favorable conditions replaced older generations marked by poverty and war (Inglehart, (1971; 1977). According to the cultural-backlash, the values shift has now reached a 'tipping point' where the supporters of traditional values fear that they are about to become a minority and lose their cultural hegemony (Norris and Inglehart 2019, p. 47). Since, according to the authors, the 'tipping point' has been reached, social conservatives feel under threat and resentful: such feelings are then translated into votes for authoritarian

populist parties. Thus, the driving force of the 'cultural backlash' is the political mobilization of social-conservative forces in defense of traditional values.

As theorized in Article 2, in its "pure" state, the cultural backlash thesis is of limited use to the study and understanding of populism outside the United States. Among other criticalities, the cultural shift from social conservative to more progressive values might be at different stages in different countries. While the cultural backlash theory might fit the American case better, the picture in Europe is a lot more complex and diversified. European countries have rather different experiences with authoritarian and democratic rule, nationalism and immigration, economic hardship, religion, and social conservatism. In Europe, countries display a different history of authoritarian and democratic rule, the role of Church and religion in society, their experience of ethnic diversity and migration. They differ in the average standard of living and level of economic inequality, and when it comes to the support for traditional versus secular and survival versus self-expression values (Inglehart 2018). A unique theory or explanation might not be sufficient to capture this diversity; rather, the cultural backlash theory seems adequate to describe the specific forces that led to the electoral victory of Donald Trump in 2016.

Paying attention also to the supply-side, Canovan (1999) sees populism as the result of a (perceived) imbalance between the two faces of democracy, whereas pragmatism ("the business of politics") seems to dominate over the heroic face of politics ("the promise of a better world through the action of sovereign people"). On this view, populism can be read as a people's demand for the democratic promise to be kept and honored in a more explicit way. Similarly, Peter Mair (2009) sees populism as a symptom of the crisis and erosion of parties' representative function. Such erosion can be observed in the slow but steady decline in party membership, declines in voter turnouts, and increased electoral volatility. According to Mair (2009), the origins of such erosion can be found in the shift of the balance and attention of West European parties to their governmental roles, to the detriment of their representative role. While the scope of this theory is restricted to Europe, and particularly to Western Europe, according to Kriesi (2014), this theory could potentially explain the rise of populist parties also in other parts of Europe, such as East Central Europe. It must, however, be noted that, while the outcome might be the same (populists' success accompanying scarce representation of mainstream parties), the roots and motives behind such response are deeply different between Eastern and Western Europe. This theory is less overarching or ambitious in its intent and scope

(as it is limited to Western Europe), and it looks only at the populist phenomenon as the result of parties' strategies and functions. However, it taps into something relevant which is at the core of the populist ideology itself as "the betrayal of the elite" and, according to Kriesi's critique (2014), the different roots from which the populist response might originate.

On this latter point, by linking Mair's theory on the role of the erosion of parties' representative function and the winners and losers of globalization theory, Kriesi (2014) offers probably one of the most encompassing theories on the roots of contemporary European populism. Agreeing with Mair on the overall erosion of parties' representation that opened the door to populist parties, Kriesi argues that the causes might not be what Mair suggested (the shift of balance toward the governmental role at the expense of the representative one). Rather, the roots, which are multiple, might be found in the increased importance of supranational organizations, on the basis of the new multilevel governance structure, and the mediatization of politics (Kriesi, 2014, p.364). His reasoning can be summarized by looking at three core elements that underpin his theory:

- The erosion of parties' representative functions, heightened by the increasing importance of supranational levels of governance.
- The increasing role of the media in national politics.
- The emergence of new structuring conflicts that characterize contemporary European societies.

These points somehow bring together supply- and demand-side elements which have contributed to the emergence and success of populism. The first point, for example, taps into the supposed source of the established, populist dichotomy between citizens and their political representatives or elites, both at the national and at the international level. The second point suggests how the media might play a role in the heightening of such feelings and, more recently, supplying populist actors with special channels to establish a direct relationship with their followers, and to make their messages (even) more vocal. Finally, the third point deals with the emergence of new conflicts and vulnerabilities as a consequence of long-term societal changes. The broader conception implied by "structuring conflicts" as in Kriesi (2014), makes it possible to include vulnerabilities of both cultural and economic matrices, overcoming the cultural versus economic divide, and to include populist responses both from the left- and the

right-wing of the political spectrum. According to Kriesi (2014), populist parties on the right tend to highlight the new cultural and political conflicts of globalization, while populist parties on the left lean towards the socio-economic aspects of globalization. The conception of populism adopted by the author coincides with the ideational approach proposed by Mudde (2004).

2.4. Conditions that favor populist parties

Moving beyond the overarching theories, the literature on the roots of populism offers a large body of studies which are more focused on describing and pinpointing *conditions* that facilitate the emergence or success of populism, rather than all-encompassing theories. Among the main ones, relevant for this dissertation, we find the decline of social democratic parties, political disillusionment with politicians, the impact of (new) media in making the populist message particularly resonant, and possibly the effect of crises.

2.4.1. The decline of social democratic parties

Somehow integrating globalization theory to understand the rise of populist parties (Betz, 1994; Kriesi, 2006;2014), some scholars link the success of populism to the decline of social democratic parties (e.g., Berman and Snegovaya, 2019). Such decline would be the result of factors linked to globalization, among others, the decline of manufactures and the changing face of the labor market during the end of the last century, that weakened the working class and trade unions, eroding the most traditional voting base of the left. In this context, populist radical right parties have been able to gain votes that otherwise would have gone to the center left, such as those coming from blue-collar occupations, the unemployed or those in casual labor (Bale et al., 2010). In addition, the shift toward the center of many social democratic parties on some economic matters would have further contributed to its loss of attraction to its traditional voters. Berman and Snegovaya (2019) argue that also the increased focus on cultural issues, such as multiculturalism, at the expenses of more traditional economic issues might have made these parties no longer attractive to some of their voters (Berman and Snegovaya, 2019). Consequently, after distributive issues had structured the left-right divide for a long time, the new left brought value and (new) identity issues to the political table. Political disputes on the left side of the ideological spectrum are now more often described as cultural and values-based in character (Bornischier, 2010), while the attention to specific identities

moved away from those originally advocated by left-wing parties (e.g., class) to, for example, gender and ethnic identities. The vacuum left by the social democratic parties has thus become an opportunity for the new political challengers, i.e., populist parties, to capitalize on growing discontent.

2.4.2. Political disillusionment with politicians

The mistrust and disappointment with political elites is at the core of the populist arsenal, as previously pointed out. It is therefore easy to understand why many scholars and studies identify a special link between lack of trust and/or satisfaction with elites and the propensity to vote for populist parties. As previously discussed, for some scholars (see Canovan, 1999; Mair, 2009) political disillusionment is the main source of the emergence and success of populist parties. Canovan (1999) sees populism as the result of a (perceived) imbalance between the two faces of democracy, whereas populism is the result of people's demand for the democratic promise to be respected more explicitly. For Mair (2009), the shift of West European parties to their governmental roles, to the detriment of their representative role, reflects the slow but steady decline in their party membership, turnouts, increased electoral volatility and ultimately the appeal of the populist uplift.

On this view, populist supporters seem to be lacking the sense of legitimacy on the basis of which Easton has identified its 'diffuse support' (Easton, 1965 p.272-74). Diffuse support refers to affect for the entire political system, affect which is not influenced by specific rewards or deprivations (Easton, 1965). Citizens develop diffuse support, however, only if they perceive that political institutions, norms, and procedures and the behavior of politicians and officials conform to "moral principles" and "what is right and proper" (Easton, 1965 p.278-79).

On these lines, some link the distrust of political elites with major political scandals that occurred in many Western democracies (e.g., Fieschi and Heywood, 2004). In this regard, the development of a media logic which includes the sensationalizing and soap-operatisation of political events - particularly of political scandals - might have fueled citizens' feelings of disaffection with democratic actors (Fieschi and Heywood, 2004). Taking a broader look, Taggart (2017) believes that the populist conception of corruption goes beyond the strict definition of the use of public office for private gain (Nye, 1967), but it is rather about the "loss of purity" on the part of the elite.

On a different note, Huseby (2000) holds that satisfaction with democracy is quite unstable and distinguishing between the effects of fluctuations caused by scandals and other fluctuations is a rather difficult task (Huseby, 2000). Alternatively, some scholars (e.g., Miller, 1974; Huseby, 2000) see the source of distrust in politics to be rooted in ideological and policy disagreements. As Miller and Listhaug (1990) argue, disagreeing with government policies or even with the policies proposed by one's preferred party can lead to diffuse cynicism not just about the party, but about the whole political system, if one feels like 'there are no alternatives'. As will be further explained in Article 4, this account is particularly relevant when exploring the plausible sources of emotional reactions between populist supporters and their counterparts, the elitists. More specifically, linked to Huseby and Miller's argument, the directional theory of issue voting (Rabinowitz and MacDonald, 1989) holds that voters are attracted to the issue-positions and political actors linked to them: a short distance between the voter and party positions is then translated into positive affect and the absence of negative affect. On the contrary, long distances mean the absence of positive affect and a high level of negative affect. This raises the question, addressed in Article 4, as to whether the emotional arousal among populists can be seen as a consequence of the distance in the positions on issues that populists favor, rather than as the "thin" populist ideology as such.

2.4.3. The impact of (new) media and populist communication

As anticipated briefly in the previous section, the media might have contributed to make populist messages particularly resonant. On this point, Mazzoleni (2008) suggests that there is a "complicitous" relationship between the media and populists. The logic of the media dictates that the focus should be on loud, disruptive, extreme messages which populist parties are happy to provide, leading them to be compared to "drunken dinner guest(s)" (Arditi, 2007). Such a style of populist parties that "emphasises agitation, spectacular acts, exaggeration, calculated provocations, and the intended breech of political and socio-cultural taboos" (Heinisch 2003: 94) therefore largely meets the media's need for sensationalism. As media themselves are sometimes the target of the populist messages, accused of being corrupted and taking the side of the elite, social media come to the rescue, allowing populist actors to bypass the mediation of journalists and mainstream media and to establish a direct link with their audience and supporters.

Overall, the content of populist actors' communication practices tends to mirror the ideological core of populism as defined by Mudde (2004), and thus very often involves the blaming of various "others", or offers a description of society and events through a divisive lens. Further, populist messages tend to be largely affective (see Nai 2021), based on the attribution of blame for the various sources of people's ressentiment both on the elites and/or on an evil "other". This affective focus on blame attribution and discrediting of the elite, combined with the "architecture" of the social media, gives populists ample opportunity to activate anger among people (Jacobs et al. 2020). As argued in Article 4, this largely affective communicative dimension of populism is of relevance, among other elements (see Bonansinga, 2020), when investigating the presence of a distinctive relationship between emotions and populism.

2.4.4. Crisis and populism

A further condition that might (potentially) set the stage for the success of populist parties is a crisis. Several studies highlight the tight, positive relationship between crisis and the emergence or success of populist parties, where crises can be crises of representation, of democracy, or economic or cultural crises. A milestone work in this area is Laclau's (2005) conception of populism as inseparable from crisis. Laclau states that "some degree of crisis in the old structure is a necessary precondition of populism" (Laclau, 2005 p.177), as populism tends to emerge when the institutional system has been disrupted, failing to keep society together. Populism thus can introduce order where there is or has been a disruption of the state of things, of the dominant ideological discourse that is reflected in a "more general social crisis". More recently, Moffitt (2015) expanded the literature on the relationship between populism and crisis by theorizing how populism is not simply the result of a crisis but can also be what *generates* it. Moffitt (2015) proposes a complete and new perspective for the understanding of crisis also as a core, internal element that nurtures and helps populists to be successful. "Generating" a sense of crisis allows populist parties and their leaders to continue to be attractive and to engage by iterating a sense of emergency and urgency, even when the "real" crisis is over and no longer relevant, or even when there is not objectively a crisis at all (Moffitt, 2015). According to this theory, populists do not limit themselves to reacting and "taking advantage" of external shocks, but also actively perform and foster a sense of crisis, that makes it easy for them to propose a dichotomised view of society and gives them the opportunity to present themselves as saviors of the "good people".

Empirical evidence on the role of crises and support for populism is however mixed; Pappas and Kriesi (2015), in their analysis of the relationship between the great recession and European populism, came up with mainly mixed results: while in some contexts the experience of the economic and financial crisis did boost populist support and/or has seen the rise of new populist forces (e.g., Italy, Greece, Hungary), in other cases it did not have any effect (see Norway and Poland). On one side, what Kriesi and Pappas (2015) demonstrated is that, overall, the reasons for populist success are not limited to crises, but rather to contextual specificities, making the crises framework of limited applicability for comparative analyses. At the same time, as argued in Article 3, the crises framework might be a relevant factor to consider when investigating the heightening or shifts in people's attitudes on the basis of populist support, over a long term perspective.

2.4.5. An emotional phenomenon? The affective component of the causes of populism

As partly anticipated and as argued in Article 4, a pattern can be identified when going through all the different theories on the origin of the populist demand. Beyond the diverse foci of those theories, they all tend to highlight how certain long-term, macro-level societal changes (such as globalization, value change, changes in the representative function of political parties) culminated in a series of grievances which aroused strong emotions. For instance, being the left-out losers of globalization (Kriesi et al. 2006), or the "about to be displaced" conservative minority in a new, progressive society (Norris and Inglehart, 2019), or the people "abandoned" by their own representatives, has an affective dimension which cannot be ignored. For example, looking in more detail at the globalization-thesis, shows how globalization created new conflicts that induced some citizens to experience the erosion of their identities, and their economic and status power, or to feel insecure, deprived, or threatened, whether culturally or economically, or both (Gidron & Hall 2017, 2020). The same logic could be easily applied to the cultural backlash thesis or to the crisis of representation arguments. Overall, such structural changes which are supposedly the roots of the populist demand have subjective consequences in terms of people's (more or less) experience of insecurity, shame, deprivation, vulnerabilities, anger and frustration.

The affective component is not limited to the origin of the demand for populism and populist parties. As briefly discussed, successful populists master the ability to channel these *ressentiment* feelings through communication practices which, mirroring the ideological core

of populism as defined by Mudde (2004), very often involve the blaming of various "others". In addition, charismatic leaders and harsh rhetoric make the populist message newsworthy, giving populists access to large audiences through mainstream media (Esser et al. 2017). As already noted, populist messages tend to be largely affective, based on the attribution of blame for the various sources of people's *ressentiment* against the elites and/or against an evil "other".

Overall, the link between affect and populism is supported by a large body of empirical studies (e.g., Nai, 2021; Rico et al., 2017; Jost, 2019). What is, however, left unanswered, is the question as to whether this link with emotional reaction is a prerogative of populist supporters, or if it is found also among mainstream supporters. The literature so far provides us with only one side of the story; this question is thus addressed and further investigated in Article 4 of the dissertation.

2.5. What do supporters of populist parties have in common? State of the art and ways forward

The previous sections on the different theories about the genesis of populism, and the core components of the populist ideology, allowed me to identify several elements that are supposedly common to populist supporters and that are recurrent in many studies of populism. This resulted in a series of theoretical and empirical studies investigating many of the aspects that are supposed to be common among the populist electorate.

The following sections are thus devoted to describing the main determining factors that have been recurrently and significantly associated with people's support for populist parties. The next paragraphs will thus be devoted to depicting the causal mechanisms between hostility towards the elite, Euroscepticism, socioeconomic conditions, immigration, populist attitudes and the propensity to vote for populist parties. I will first describe briefly the causal mechanisms underlying why they might/do explain people's preference for populist parties, and then provide a brief overview of the empirical evidence connected to it.

Overall, this brief review constitutes both an arrival and a starting point in terms of scholarly development on the demand-side of populism. It highlights most aspects that have been uncovered so far on the motives moving populist supporters, and it sets the stage for what is left unanswered, and, more specifically, the gaps that will be addressed as part of the

dissertation and the approach that is used to address them, based on people's personal values and attitudes.

2.5.1. Hostility towards the elite/External efficacy

Hostility toward the elite or external efficacy - understood as the perceived responsiveness of a political regime - lies at the very core of the populist ideology. As said, populist parties from both the left- and the right-wing of the political spectrum oppose the 'good people' to the corrupt elite, whom they criticize (Krause and Wagner, 2021). Beyond ideological-specific arguments, populist parties tend to criticize and target elites for not being responsive to citizens, for not caring about the 'popular will', for being indistinguishable from each other, or for pursuing their own interests (Pauwels, 2014).

It is therefore easy to draw a theoretical line connecting people's disaffection and/or disappointment with their representatives and their propensity to vote for populist parties. Citizens who feel disenchanted with the working of democracy, or who feel like their representatives have become unresponsive and unreliable might not want to vote for a mainstream party, but rather, for someone who is (supposedly) contraposed to mainstream parties and who overtly criticizes their modus operandi.[2] This is of course true only if we assume that these citizens are interested in voting or engaging in politics *at all*: being disenchanted with the work of representative and the overall functioning of democracy is also related to abstentionism. What seems to be distinguishing non-voters from populist voters, when it comes to their reaction to being dissatisfied with politicians, is that non-voters seem to be *too* disconnected from politics and too opposed to political parties to even respond to populist mobilization (Koch at al., 2021).

Going back to dissatisfied yet engaged citizens, populist parties have been successful in capitalizing on citizens' disenchantment with their representatives, and interestingly enough, they have been able to keep their anti-elite arguments alive and kicking, even while holding office positions, or after having been part of the 'establishment' for a while. When populist parties take part in national governments, the elite-criticism can be moved more decisively to

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[2] One might argue that this might not be a sufficient reason to support a populist party. It is important to specify that the proposed policy positions are as relevant as the elite criticism in explaining voting behavior (see van der Brug, 2005).

the outside (the EU, foreign elites...) while, by attacking national institutions, media, etc., populists keep "one foot in and one foot out" of government (Albertazzi and McDonnell, 2005). While the causal order is not clear, by repurposing and perpetuating their harsh rhetoric against the elite, populist parties themselves do their best to fuel voters' feelings of betrayal, disenchantment, and hostility towards the political class.

Many different hypotheses have been developed on the source of these feelings. As previously discussed, it has been argued that the roots of feelings of citizens' disenchantment with their representatives may be traced to the erosion of parties' representative functions, on which populist parties have been able to capitalize (e.g., Kriesi, 2014; Mair, 2009; Canovan, 1999). A different account is the one provided by Miller (1974) and later Huseby (2000), holding that the more general roots of citizens' distrust are to be found in disagreement with governments' policies. Bouckaert et al., (2002) further discuss the possible connections between disagreement and distrust by showing how one can, for instance, develop distrust because one's preferred party is not in government, and finding that one disagrees with the government's policy proposals. Further, if one disagrees with the stances of the government and/or of one's preferred party, the distrust can turn into diffuse cynicism vis-à-vis the whole party-system (Miller and Listhaug, 1990). While these mechanisms are true also for supporters of mainstream parties, considering that mistrust of and disappointment with political elites lie at the core of the populist ideology, the impact is probably much higher when it comes to populism. This is discussed at greater length in Article 4.

Moving to the empirical evidence, disaffection with democratic actors, institutions or the so-called political elite have been found to be an important predictor of the vote for both left- and right-wing populists (e.g., Ivarsflaten, 2008; Van Hauwaert and Van Kessel, 2018). Schumacher and Rooduijn (2013) find that protest attitudes (negativity towards the elite) are those that distinguish the populist electorate from mainstream voters. While policy positions and leadership evaluations are important determinants for decisions to vote for either mainstream or populist parties, what really makes the difference, in their study of the Dutch case, between populist and mainstream voters is protest attitudes. Similarly, Hooge et al. (2011) find that in the Belgian case, lower levels of trust in politics make it more likely for citizens to vote for populist parties. In Rooduijn's (2018) analysis of the commonalities of voters' base of populist parties in Western Europe, political distrust is the variable that displays the most

consistently positive, significant effect across cases. Nevertheless, this study also highlights how low trust in parliaments and politicians does not matter for *all* populist parties to the same extent. Based on this last point, Rooduijn comes to the conclusion that populist voters do not have much in common with each other (Rooduijn, 2018). While partially agreeing with this statement, I argue that, considering the very thin nature of populism, we should not expect *all* populist voters to share *exactly* the same characteristics to the same extent, but rather to share the same attitudes to *some* extent. More recently, Krause and Wagner (2021), focusing on Central, Eastern, and Western European populist parties and voters, have shown how lacking external efficacy has different effects for different populist parties. While it is a significant predictor for some populist parties, it does not have any effect in other cases, while in still other cases, feelings of political responsiveness may even contribute to the success of these parties. They also show that the more established a populist party is, the lower the effect of lacking external efficacy is for the propensity to vote for a populist party. While constituting a valuable and insightful study, the main limitation comes from the fact that it is based on the propensity to vote for a populist party in the context of European (so second order) elections.

2.5.2. Euroscepticism and support for populism

Very similarly to populism, Euroscepticism expresses a critique on an unresponsive elite (the European one, in this case) and/or on the functioning of the European governance and its decision-making procedures. Broadly speaking, "Euroscepticism expresses the idea of contingent or qualified opposition, as well as incorporating outright and unqualified opposition to the process of European integration" (Taggart 1998: 366).[3]

Conceptually, Euroscepticism and populism are distinct phenomena, yet with many commonalities that are worthy of being considered, and that justify the overlap and tight relationship between the two. Beyond commonalities, it is however good to consider the fundamental difference between the two concepts: while populism is abstract and 'merely' based on a moral distinction between the undefined evil 'elite' and the 'good people', Euroscepticism targets a more concrete issue, such as the process of European integration, and/or the functioning of the EU (Rooduijn & van Kessel, 2019). Euroscepticism, differently

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[3] Recently, more refined definitions distinguished for instance hard and soft forms of Euroscepticism (see Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2004) or Eurosceptic and Eurorejects parties' positions (Kopecký and Mudde, 2002).

from populism, constitutes a position on a specific issue. I will now proceed to discuss why Euroscepticism has been a relevant explanatory factor for people's support and vote for populist parties, from both a theoretical and an empirical standpoint.

As previously mentioned, the roots of people's support and vote for populist parties might be found (also) in the increased importance of supranational organizations, on the basis of the new multilevel governance structure (Kriesi, 2014, p.364). On this view, the erosion of parties' representative functions is heightened by the increasing importance of supranational levels of governance such as the European one, explaining the link between Euroscepticism and populism.

Beyond this specific theory, there seems to be a consistent correlation between populism and Euroscepticism (Kneuer, 2019; Rooduijn & van Kessel, 2019): this correlation is at the same time linked to, and independent of, the dominant ideology. Going beyond the ideological association, the link between Euroscepticism and populism is based on broader anti-elite discourses which are at the core of populism, according to which European institutions represent "just another elite", pursuing their own interests at the expense of "ordinary people". Similarly, populists tend to dislike and oppose the complex European decision-making processes, which are seen and framed as an obstacle to the implementation of the popular will (Rooduijn & van Kessel, 2019). At the same time, right-wing populist parties defend the alleged *homogeneity* of the people, going against the main presumption of European integration. Left-wing populists, on the other hand, stand for the "emancipation and independence from great powers which are seen as exploitative of the popular classes" (Halikiopoulou, 2012). This last point highlights a further conceptual affinity between populism and Euroscepticism: they both rely on their 'host ideologies' in developing the content of their claims. Because of all these affinities, populism and Euroscepticism often (but not always) go in tandem: most populist parties are Eurosceptic, and many Eurosceptic parties are populist (Rooduijn & van Kessel, 2019).

Overall, De Vries and Van Kersbergen (2007) argue that the source of Eurosceptic feelings is to be found in interest- and identity-based explanations. On this view, Euroscepticism is rooted in citizens' perceived threat to their economic wellbeing and and/or their national identity.

Empirically, many studies support the link between Euroscepticism and vote for *radical parties* and far-right/left parties (e.g., Werts et al., 2012; Ivarsflaten, 2005; Hooge et al., 2002). Lubbers and Scheepers (2007) find that Eurosceptic attitudes explain voting for both what they define as far left- and far right-wing parties. Similarly, De Vries and Edwards (2009) show that Eurosceptic cues are found on both extremes of the political spectrum, and that parties belonging to different opposites of the political spectrum mobilize anti-EU sentiment for different reasons. While right-wing extremist parties oppose the EU to advocate the defense of national sovereignty and identity, left-wing extremist parties make use of Eurosceptic cues to mobilize perceptions of economic uncertainty and to oppose the neoliberal character of the European project (De Vries and Edwards, 2009).

With a broader scope and a more explicit focus on populism, Kaltwasser et al. (2019) show how people who vote for populist parties tend to have strong Eurosceptic positions (Kaltwasser et al., 2019). Looking at populist attitudes and voting choices in the context of the latest European elections, the authors identify a clear pattern of polarization between the supporters of mainstream parties (Christian democrats, conservatives, social democrats, liberals, and Greens) and the supporters of populist and parties, including radical parties, from both left-wing and right-wing ideologies. The supporters of mainstream parties are overall satisfied with EU democracy and membership, while the supporters of populist and extremist parties are opposed to EU membership, and dissatisfied with EU democracy.

2.5.3. Socioeconomic conditions

Starting once again with the losers of globalization thesis, some scholars have begun to consider populist supporters both from the left and from the right of the ideological spectrum as more likely to be less well off than more moderate voters (Kriesi et. al., 2006; 2014). Being the losers of globalization whose social and economic positions are at risk because of the economic and cultural transformation is theoretically linked with a harsh critique and need to challenge the evil elites (that populist parties are happy to offer) who 'allowed globalization to happen.'

Similarly to Eurosceptic attitudes, there are both (host) ideological and non-ideological reasons to support this link. On the one hand, a lower socioeconomic position can lead people to hold certain attitudes, such as aversion to immigrants for right-wing leaning supporters and support

for welfare redistribution for left-leaning supporters (Rooduijn and Burgoon, 2018). On the other hand, as anticipated, those who are less well-off might be equally motivated to vote for a party that challenges the established elite, to express their discontent. Further, people who are less well-off are also more likely to be distrustful of politics (see Catterberg & Moreno, 2006).

In their analysis of the Belgian case, Spruyt et al. 2016 theorize how, thanks to the use of empty signifiers (Laclau, 2005) and of a dichotomization of society, populist parties are able to unify different grievances. According to the authors, these elements allow populist parties to capitalize on the experience of vulnerabilities: they present an individual's situation as a consequence and/or a part of a bigger opposition between groups, where one group is exploiting the other (Spruyt et al., 2016).

Among other aspects, Spruyt et al. (2016) investigate why education is, according to some studies (e.g., Bornschier, 2010) a predictor of populist support in Europe. They attribute the effect of education to the consequences of its socialization effect, namely how education contributes to "civic knowledge, feelings of political efficacy, or more general cultural capital" (Spruyt et al. 2016). Particularly, the lower educated weakened position in the knowledge society would strengthen their feelings of social, economic and political vulnerability (Spruyt et al. 2016). At the same time, the authors call for further attention to the effects of education on status (Spruyt et al. 2016).

Connected to this last point, Gidron and Hall (2020) argue that the support for radical parties can be seen as a problem of social marginalization: "the sense some people have that they have been pushed to the fringes of their national community and deprived of the roles and respect normally accorded full members of it" (Gidron and Hall, p.1028). Rather than focusing exclusively on objective measures of objective economic and status indicators, the authors lay stress on subjective status feelings about where one stands relative to others in society. Nevertheless, it is the objective conditions that influence people's subjective status feelings.

Despite overall agreement that lower socioeconomic conditions are a significant predictor of voting for populist parties, the empirical evidence is once again mixed and is mainly focused on radical parties (see Rooduijn, 2018; Rooduijn and Burgoon, 2018, Gidron and Hall, 2020). Gidron and Hall show how the feelings of social marginalization that lead people to support radical parties are higher among people with lower levels of income or skills. Rooduijn (2018),

by contrast, analyzing the voter bases of western European populist parties, concludes that populist supporters are not so-called losers of globalization. The author came to that conclusion because not *all* the parties he analyzed display the same results (e.g., income is not significant and negatively correlated in all the cases analyzed). Nevertheless, his results show a tendency especially when it comes to the consistently negative effect of low levels of education in most of the analyzed cases. To add to this variety, Ramiro and Gomez (2016) find that, in the Spanish case, the voter base of the left-wing populist party Podemos is composed of highly skilled, dissatisfied individuals, and not of people with lower socioeconomic status. The literature also reveals mixed results when it comes to the role of education in predicting the vote for radical left populist parties: in some instances, having a higher education level predicts voting for these parties (see *Die Linke* in Rooduin, 2018; Ramiro, 2016).

On these latter aspects, it has been argued that in high-income countries the living standards across the whole educational spectrum, therefore including also highly educated individuals, have been stagnating (Inglehart and Norris, 2017). On this argument, sharing stagnating incomes, rising inequalities and increased living expenses would potentially diminish the gap between the less and highly educated, when it comes to predicting their respective probability to support a populist party.

2.5.4. Immigration and populism

Starting in the 1980s, immigration grew substantially in Western Europe. Among others, the oil crisis, the fall of the Berlin wall, and more recently the Syrian war, induced people to migrate to more attractive European countries. When facing the first migration flows, most European countries were largely unprepared to welcome immigrants, to include them properly in the job market, and to deal with the cultural conflicts that started to emerge. Right-wing populist parties, on the other side, have been ready quickly to take hold of and capitalize on this available issue.

As mentioned, the role of immigrants and, more broadly, immigration play a central role in the so-called cultural explanation of the emergence of populism, specifically of right-wing populist parties. While far from being single-issue parties, right-wing populists have been able to capitalize on and take ownership of the issue of immigration, which has become one of the main issues to which these parties from the right appeal, in harnessing people's grievances over

the topic (Ivarsflaten, 2008; Zaslove, 2004). Specifically, right-wing populist parties combine their populism with nativism, implementing a frame according to which the "pure people" are the natives of the country, while the corrupt elites are supposedly favoring "the evil others", in this case foreigners, over the good people (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2018). Many populist parties from the right have been successfully appealing to people's negative attitudes toward immigrants and immigration by fueling their discontent and framing the topic in terms of ethnic substitution terms, crime, and security issues (especially in correspondence with terroristic attacks), job competitions, welfare expenses, and not less importantly cultural and religious terms.

The debate on the origins of these perceptions among the population is ongoing and without a unique answer (e.g., Allport, 1954; Weber, 2015; Norris and Inglehart, 2019; Evans and Ivaldi, 2020). Keeping the focus on the scope of the dissertation, as argued in Article 2, the source of these attitudes might be diverse across countries. While some countries have experienced and keep experiencing refugees and immigrants' influxes, many other European countries experience emigration rather than immigration. In the countries characterized mainly by emigration and very little or no immigration, the *perceived* threat might be what triggers the aversion, connected to the threat of what immigrants supposedly represent (multiculturalism, increased job competition, increased welfare expense, and so on).

Empirically, when it comes to the effect of anti-immigrant and anti-immigration attitudes on the propensity to vote for or prefer a populist right party, the results are clear. Studies consistently confirm a significant effect of holding negative attitudes about immigrants and/or immigration and on voting for or supporting populist right parties, with the effect of these attitudes having in many cases the strongest effect in explaining the expressed preference for populists (see Van der Brug et al., 2000; Ivarsflaten, 2008; Akkerman et al., 2017; Van Hauwaert & Van Kessel, 2018).

2.5.5. Populist attitudes

A more recent and promising arena for the study of people's motives to vote for populist parties comes from the 'populist attitudes' approach. Many scholars (see for example Hawkins 2012, Akkerman et al., 2014; Van Hauwaert & Van Kessel, 2018) started to argue that it is possible to measure populism at the individual level, building on the ideational approach's idea that

populism consists of a set of ideas concerning the world, democracy, and political representation (Hawkins et al., 2012). According to this approach, "populism is an individual attribute that can be directly measured among individuals and is therefore not only a feature of political parties" (Gerukink et al., 2020 p.248). Populist attitudes are rooted in the key components of populism: people centrism, anti-elitism, and the antagonistic relationship between the people and the elite, or anti-pluralism. These attitudes have been proven to be distinct and independent from similar attitudes such as pluralist and elitist attitudes (Akkerman et. al., 2014), and from political trust and external political efficacy, even if with some partial overlap on a common feature of these attitudes, namely anti-elitism (Geurkink et al., 2020). By contrast with other attitudes such as political trust and political efficacy, populist attitudes have proven to be the only feature that explains the preference for populist parties consistently across a variety of different populist parties.

Empirically, research that has explored the connection between certain attitudes and the vote for populist parties (e.g., Akkerman et al., 2014, 2017; Geurkink et al., 2020; Van Hauwaert & Van Kessel, 2018) shows that there are sets of attitudes significantly linked with the preference for these parties, and that the same "populist attitudes" motivate voting for both left-and right-wing populist parties. Populist attitudes have been found to be linked to a preference for populist parties across European countries (Van Hauwert and & Van Kessel, 2018). While their effect becomes lower when positions on specific issues are taken into account, they seem to be nevertheless relevant in explaining party preferences (Van Hauwert and & Van Kessel, 2018).

As argued in Article 1, the fact that there are certain attitudes that are linked to the preference for populist parties from left- and right-wing ideological association is relevant as attitudes are rooted in people's personal values, raising the question, as stated in the introduction, as to how the whole chain of values and the different attitudinal components (broadly conceived) of populist supporters look.

2.6. What is left unanswered within the demand-side of populism

As highlighted by the previous sections, the knowledge about what voters of populist parties have in common is not scarce, either theoretically or empirically. There are, however, some broader issues and questions that are left unanswered, which are addressed by this dissertation. As mentioned in the introduction, one major issue is the use of different operationalizations of

populism. Among the aforementioned studies, many refer to, for example, radical parties or the radical right, thus providing unclear evidence as to whether their findings are related to the radical character of such parties or to their populism. In some cases, it is also unclear whether 'radical' is used as a different label to identify populist parties (see Gidron and Hall, 2020), or whether it refers to a different conceptual framework. Another consequence, as explained, is the different selection of cases due to the unclear distinction (if any) between populism and radicalism.

This brief review of populist supporters' commonalities further revealed many mixed findings across studies. While not limited to the following explanations, one might argue that the origin of such sometimes contrasting findings might be due to the different scope of these studies or, as argued in Article 3, to the exclusion of the temporal component in the analyses. As to the former, many studies have a single-country focus: the implications of focusing on one country when it comes to populism are not to be underestimated. As previously stated, populism is a context-dependent phenomenon: being 'thin' and chameleonic, it varies in its content according to the place in which it operates. Consequently, the results might be related to the specific context (e.g., specific issues that a country is facing, specific economic conditions of a country…) rather than to populism per se. At the same time, including too many countries in the sample might come with the cost of missing important differences that, as argued in Article 2, should be accounted for. On the latter point, as addressed in Article 3, considering not only contextual but also temporal specificities is important when investigating the presence of a common set of motivations among populist supporters. Previous research helped us to identify many relevant cross-sectional associations, but the issue of change over time, and how individual-level outcomes may depend on time-varying social, political, and economic conditions is left unanswered.

A further shortcoming, as briefly mentioned, concerns the fact that the demand-side of the study of populism is much more novel and presents a lack of a systemic analysis of the absence or existence of commonalities shared by voters of populist parties (Roodujin, 2018). In particular, the knowledge that there are specific attitudes linked to the vote for populist parties that are distinct from adjacent concepts and consistent across contexts sparked my interest to analyze whether such attitudinal coherence among populist voters holds when looking at several, different aspects of people's broader belief systems. Specifically, as addressed in Article 1, knowing that 'populist attitudes' exist has raised the question about the coherence of

what gives structure to attitudes, namely values, or, as in Article 4, on the coherence of the affective component of attitudes among populist supporters.

Consequently, building on some of these shortcomings on the overall demand-side of the study of populism I position my contribution and approach as a systematic analysis and review of the structure of people's worldviews in the context of European populism. More specifically, employing the personal values and attitudes approach, I provide an analysis and a framework that helps to identify and discern the stable (e.g., personal values) and less stable (attitudes) elements of the demand side of populism. Combining such an approach with the thin and chameleonic nature of populism further allows me to disentangle the aspects of populism that are common across cases from what is peculiar to specific cases.

In addition to the employment of the personal values and attitudes approach, the dissertation realizes its aims also by confronting some of the previously identified challenges on the demand side of the study of populism. This work displays conceptual consistency by being consistently rooted in the ideational approach and in the definition of populism as provided by Mudde (2004), therefore selecting cases (i.e., populist parties) accordingly. It further provides an overview of the commonalities in the worldviews of populist supporters that reflect the core elements of the populist ideology, beyond the differences that characterize these parties (such as their host- ideologies, their radical or non-radical character). This latter point will be explained further in the next section. I will then move on to discuss in greater detail the values and attitudes concepts, together with the commonly adopted definitions, and see how they can be helpful in the analysis of the worldviews of populist supporters.

2.6.1. Analyzing the whole spectrum of populist parties

As previously argued, it is important to keep in mind that there is considerable variation within populist parties of the left, right, and center in terms of positions that they take on core issues. Similarly, when it comes to their radicalism, if present, populist parties display also patterns of de-radicalization and re-radicalization across time, for instance during or after experience in government (Akkerman et al., 2016). As a consequence, I have decided to adopt a broad conception of populist parties and to include them in the analysis, basing my choice on their adherence to populist ideology.

The fact that most populist parties in the European context subscribe to a right-wing ideology is also not to be underestimated. Consequently, this issue is addressed and accounted for in the individual articles, particularly when it comes to cross-national analyses as presented in Articles 1 and 3. I nevertheless tend to consider the internal variation common to the family of right-wing populist parties to 'undermine' to some extent the notion that they belong to a right-wing host ideology. In other words, I consider their internal variation to be representative of all the shapes and forms that these parties can take in light of their *populism*, and therefore more relevant to the understanding of populism, than their leaning toward the right side of the ideological spectrum.

2.6.2. A closer look into the demand-side of the study of populism

As anticipated, to address the overarching research questions of the dissertation, I build on the overall lack of systematic studies within the demand side of the study of populism and propose an approach that allows me to take a broader yet comprehensive look at the worldviews of populist supporters. The approach is thus aimed at obtaining a better understanding of which "packages of ideas" (Fieschi, 2019 p.23) move populist voters to action. To do so, I adopt the values and attitudes constructs. As previously stated, I investigate (I) the presence of particular personal values connected to the vote for populist parties; the attitudinal consistency across (II) countries and (III) time, the affective component of attitudes among populists supporters (IV).

In the literature there is no single approach or consensus on the methods to be applied in the study of values- and attitudes-voting relationship. However, more importantly, there is a substantial amount of evidence that values are a major source of structure for political attitudes. The role of values and attitudes in predicting vote choice therefore represents a possible way of exploring a broader and more nuanced political orientation within the electorate, in line with the aim of the dissertation.

In greater detail, Feldman (2003), building on the work of, among others, Kinder (1998) and Converse (1964), sheds light on how "People may not view the world in ideological terms but they do have political attitudes, beliefs, and preferences that need to be explained" (Feldman, 1988 p.416). In particular, he holds that, while ideology has proven not to be an adequate concept to describe and explain how people structure their political attitudes, the values concept might allow one to do so. Beyond the different definitions of values, scholars tend to agree that

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values, broadly understood as "the criteria that people use to select and justify actions and to evaluate people (including the self) and events" (Schwartz, 1992) do structure attitudes and are relevant for the study of political behavior. As attitudes can be defined as evaluations of specific objects, an evaluation of a political object (being a candidate, a party, a policy proposal and so on) would thus represent a political attitude.

Three more elements make the values and attitude concepts a valuable tool to analyze the demand-side of the study of populism. First, attitudinal evaluations have a cognitive and an affective component: this allows one to explore not only what people think about a particular object, but also how they feel about it. Secondly, when/if activated, the values-attitude system motivates behavior, including behavior in the domain of politics (e.g., candidates and parties' evaluations, party choice, vote). Finally, values and attitudes are *acquired* behavioral dispositions. For conceptual clarity, behavioral dispositions can be broadly defined as "tendencies toward particular acts, such as evaluating, or acting toward, a particular object or a particular process" (Bergman, 1998). The fact that they are acquired means that values and attitudes are formed through socialization processes, in specific social contexts: they therefore allow one to investigate the interplay between different social context and the possible influence on citizens' attitudes.

Building on this, I consider the values and attitudes concepts to be particularly valuable in exploring the worldviews of populist supporters. As already mentioned in this dissertation, I focus particularly on the role of personal values in relation to the populist vote, and on the role of attitudes, their cognitive and affective components, and their cross-country and longitudinal consistency and composition.

Why focus on these specific aspects? To begin with, as already mentioned, the importance of analyzing the connection between people's personal values and their probability to vote for a populist party lies in the fact that, while we know that there are 'populist attitudes' motivating the vote for populist parties, the question as to whether also personal values, which give structure to attitudes, play a role is still left unanswered.

Further, the importance of analyzing the cross-national and temporal composition of attitudes in relation to populist support is twofold. First, it is based on one of the core features of the populist ideology, i.e., its thin nature, as previously discussed. Secondly, attitudes are acquired

behavioral dispositions: scholars tend to agree that values and attitudes are formed through socialization processes, in specific social contexts (see Inglehart, 1971; Schwartz, 1992; Rokeach, 1973). Taking context into account is important also when it comes to the *activation* and *formation* of specific attitudes. On the former, where and when a political contest takes place contributes to defining the issues that are salient (Loughran, 2016) and consequently can define which attitudes become relevant (activation) for voters, as argued in Article 3. If a country is facing several political scandals, for instance, the issues of the behavior of politicians and officials might be particularly salient at that time, together with citizens' attitudes about their representatives. On the latter aspect, elements of social context (e.g., the country's economic situation, the state of democracy) can influence attitudes' *formation,* meaning that different contexts might explain how people are more prone to hold certain attitudes. Finally, the fact that attitudes have an affective component, combined with the link that many studies (Rico et al., 2017, Erisen & Vasilopoulou 2021, Schumacher et al., 2022) have identified between support for populism and negative emotions, has opened the opportunity to further analyze the sources of such links and to what extent it is limited to populist supporters.

Before moving to the next sections, a brief clarification is needed on the choice to analyze values and attitudes 'independently'. While some of the elements and arguments reviewed in this analysis might resemble or recall specific models such as the socio-psychological Michigan model of voting (Campbell et al., 1960), I shall not engage with or build on any specific model, but I will rather limit myself to describing some of the so-called behavioral dispositions in relation to people's votes for populist parties. Specifically, as anticipated, I will focus on the concepts of values and attitudes, in the light of their role as guiding behavior, including political choices, in relation to populism. Rooting the dissertation in a specific model would go beyond its scope and would not fit with the overall aim or professed contribution of its independent articles.

In the following sections, I will delve more into the different conceptualizations and approaches to the study of values, and why part of this work (Article 1) benefits from the Schwartz values theory. I will then move to the description of attitudes, the adopted conception, and how they are useful and relevant for deepening our understanding of populism (Article 2, 3 and 4).

2.7. Values and attitudes: definitions and relevance to the study of public opinion and political behavior

2.7.1. Defining 'values'

While there is little consensus on many aspects of the literature on values, there is an overall agreement on their core definition. Beyond the specific conceptualizations, scholars agree on the fact that values represent individuals' guiding principles in life, that transcend specific situations, and structure attitudes about and behavior in regard to what is "preferable" (Schwartz, 1992). This generally accepted conception of values as the "compass" in individuals' decision-making process is what makes them particularly relevant for the social sciences, or as Rokeach (1973) stated in his milestone contribution, "the value concept, more than any other, should occupy a central position across all the social sciences" (Rokeach 1973 p. 3).

For Rokeach (1973), *all* people possess a relatively small number of values, and all people possess the same values, even though they might rank them differently. These values are organized into values systems and find their roots in culture, society and its institutions, and individuals' personalities. More importantly, Rokeach (1973) holds that the consequences of human values will be manifested in virtually all phenomena that social scientists might consider worth understanding.

Rokeach defines a value as "an enduring belief that a specific mode of conduct or end state of existence is personally or socially preferable to an opposite or converse mode of conduct or end-state of existence. A values system is an enduring organization of beliefs concerning preferable modes of conduct or end-states of existence along a continuum of relative importance" (Rokeach, 1973 p.5). In his view, values have, at the same time, a changing and an enduring character; in line with individual and social development they allow both continuity and social development, whereas change can be seen as a reordering of values and priorities. Consequently, differences between cultures, social classes, occupations, and religious or political orientations are all translatable into questions concerning differences in underlying values and value systems.

As part of his contribution on the nature of values, Rokeach introduced a distinction between instrumental and terminal values. Instrumental values are those that people use as a means to guide everyday decisions and actions: they are related to modes of behavior and are generally connected to an immediate social context and conceived as politically neutral constructs. Terminal values, on the other hand, are defined as more abstract conceptions of outcomes representing an individual's goals of desirable end states both for themselves and others. As such, terminal values are not politically neutral or dependent on the immediate behavioral environment: they are contested social and political territory because generally individuals cannot achieve or express these desirable end states through their own actions.

On the conceptualization of values, another widely accepted definition is Schwartz's definition of values as "abstract beliefs about desirable end states or behaviors that transcend specific situations, guide evaluation and behavior and can be rank ordered in terms of relative importance" (Schwartz, 1994). According to Schwartz (1992; 1994) values represent "cognitive representations of desirable, abstract, trans-situational goals that serve as guiding principles in people's life". Likewise, using this terminal definition of values as competing conceptions of the good makes it clear that values have an important role in political life and political analysis.

Furthermore, Converse (1964) defines values as "a sort of glue to bind together many more specific attitudes and beliefs" referring to values as a form of attitude constraint. Converse's theory introduced two sources of constraint on attitudes, i.e., sociological and psychological constraints, which also imply a rough distinction between the role of supply- and demand- sides of politics. For sociological constraint, related to the role of the supply-side, "political attitudes and beliefs are organized into coherent structures by political elites for consumption by the public" (Feldman, 1988 p.416-417). Psychological constraint, on the other hand, is connected to the demand-side, and implies that individual attitudes towards political objects can be grounded in fundamental moral principles of personal identity rather than defined by the framing of political elites.

While this is far from being a comprehensive list of definitions, it nevertheless highlights how there is general agreement concerning the definition of values, and on their relevance to the study of social and political phenomena.

2.7.2. Values, public opinion, and political behavior

As people use values to organize their beliefs (also) on political issues and to make and justify political decisions (Feldman, 2003; Caprara, Schwartz, Vecchione, 2006; Piurko, Schwartz, Davidov, 2011), it does not come as a surprise that values have been shown to be relevant in explaining voting behavior.

The idea of values as structuring political divisions while playing a relevant role in electoral competition has long been central to political research. This link is originally based on the definition of electoral politics as a way of peacefully resolving disputes regarding alternative visions of society (Schattschneider, 1948). These alternative visions of society are both connected to conflicts among different interest groups over the distribution of goods and linked to people's different "competing conceptions of the good" (Tetlock, 1986). These aspects are strictly related to the definition of values as important elements that help in defining the relevance of specific interests or issues, and as guides representing competing conceptions of the good (Converse, 1964; Schwartz, 1992; Rokeach, 1973). In this light, elections play a central role as primary arenas for value conflicts, suggesting that one significant function of voting is representing a form of values expression. So, elections and political parties can be identified, among other things, as a way of aggregating these competing interests, visions, and thus values.

Coherently with the definition of values as guiding principles that give structure to attitudes and beliefs, the values concept has also become relevant to address research questions related to the structure of public opinion. This approach became increasingly successful in political research as more and more evidence confirmed the structure of public opinion as multidimensional, challenging the more general assumption of a single ideological dimension underlying political opinion (Converse, 1964). Feldman (1988), who linked this multidimensionality with political values, recognized hierarchical values constraints as structuring underlying divisions in public opinion, rather than ideology. In the same work, he identifies the role of values as predictors of party preferences and candidate evaluations.

Further numerous research studies have found evidence of the relationship between values and political preferences (Feldman, 2003; Vecchione et al., 2015; Piurko et al., 2011). These studies show that citizens tend to vote for parties whose platforms or images suggest that electing them

will promote the attainment or preservation of their personal values. According to the literature, people show support for ideologies and/or policies which are in line with their values. At the same time, other scholars have assigned a central role to values as organizers of political evaluations: Schwartz (1994), for instance, argues that behind political ideologies and attitudes there are specific sets of personal values underpinning them (see also Vecchione et al., 2015).

These characteristics of values, namely how they structure attitudes, their stability, and their connection to voting behavior, make them a suitable concept for the study of the mass motivations underpinning the vote for populist parties, as addressed in Article 1. Consequently, I will now present the main approaches to the study of values and explain why the dissertation is rooted in Schwartz's theory of values.

2.7.3. Approaches to the study of values in political behavior

As anticipated, while there is overall consensus on how values can be defined, and their role in structuring political behavior and public opinion, there is very little agreement on the measurement and application of values in political research. As a result, it is possible to identify three main, broad approaches that have been used in the study of values and political behavior (Loughran, 2016):

Personal Values approach. This approach focuses on personal values and has the aim of demonstrating the universal cross-cultural consistency of individual human values, as in Schwartz's writings (Schwartz, 1992, 1994). Schwartz's theory of value (1992) identifies ten broad personal values that derive from universal requirements of human existence. These values may encompass the full range of motivationally distinct values recognized across cultures (Schwartz, 2006). They include power (social status and prestige, control or dominance over people and resources), achievement (personal success through demonstrating competence according to social standards), hedonism (pleasure and gratification for oneself), stimulation (excitement, novelty, and challenge in life), self-direction (independent thought and action choosing, creating, exploring), universalism (understanding, appreciation, tolerance, and protection for the welfare of all people and for nature), benevolence (understanding, appreciation, tolerance, and protection for the welfare of all people and for nature), tradition (respect, commitment and acceptance of the customs and ideas that traditional culture or religion provide the self), conformity (restraint of actions, inclinations, and impulses

likely to upset or harm others and violate social expectations or norms) and security (safety and stability of society, of relationships, and of self). According to Schwartz, (1992) there are dynamic relations among the 10 values, which can be represented by a circular motivational continuum reflecting the conflict and compatibility among the values. As Schwartz puts it: "Actions in pursuit of any value have psychological, practical, and social consequences that may conflict or may be congruent with the pursuit of other values. For example, the pursuit of achievement values may conflict with the pursuit of benevolence values - seeking success for self is likely to obstruct actions aimed at enhancing the welfare of others who need one's help" (Schwartz, 2006 p.2). Any behavior or attitude that is congruent with one basic value (e.g., a right orientation vis-à-vis power) should also be congruent with the adjacent values in the circle (security and achievement) but in conflict with the opposing values (universalism, benevolence, and self-direction). Furthermore, the 10 values can be organized along two bipolar dimensions: self-enhancement values that encourage and legitimize the pursuit of self-interest oppose self-transcendence values that emphasize concern for the welfare of others; while openness values that favor change and encourage the pursuit of new ideas and experiences oppose conservation values, that emphasize maintaining the status quo and avoiding threat (Schwartz, 2006; Piurko, Schwartz, Davidov 2011).

In the Schwartz values tradition, personal values have served as predictors of political choice across different cultural contexts and political systems (Barnea, 2003; Caprara et al., 2006). Caprara et al. (2006) found a positive relationship between center-left voters and specific value priorities, such as higher support for universalism and benevolence values. Center-right voters give higher priority to power, achievement, security, and conformity values. Similarly, a study of the 1988 Israeli elections demonstrated that an individual's personal values discriminated significantly between voters of the different political parties (Barnea & Schwartz, 1998; Barnea, 2003). There is thus a substantial amount of evidence that personal values are a source of structure for political attitudes and behavior.

Building on this, Schwartz's theory offers a typology of values that can be applied across time and different countries and that can be thus used in the study of motivations underpinning social and political phenomena across contexts. The operationalization of Schwartz's theory has been realized through the Portrait Values Questionnaire, which includes 40 short verbal portraits of different people, each describing a person's goals, aspirations, or wishes that point implicitly to the importance of a value. The respondents' values are thus inferred from the values of the

portraits they describe as similar to themselves. Through the PVQ, the values were tested and shown to apply across 67 nations and have proved to be a construct able to predict political choices across different cultural contexts and political systems. Among the different approaches to the study of values, Schwartz's values theory and its attendant Portrait Values Questionnaire display a high degree of coherence and reliability. Other theories (see Inglehart, 1977; Rokeach, 1973) claiming to analyze personal values capture political attitudes only through their measurement techniques, or do not provide a scale which is as reliable as the Schwartz PVQ (see Rokeach, 1973). Schwartz's approach thus provides a solid theoretical and methodological framework that has been widely used in the study of political phenomena, and therefore represents a valid construct to theorize what personal values might underpin peoples' vote for populist parties, as in Article 1.

Core political values. Core political values are overarching normative principles and assumptions about government, citizenship, and society (McCann, 1997). They underlie specific attitudes, preferences, and evaluations in the sphere of politics, giving them some degree of coherence and consistency (Feldman, 1988; Hurwitz & Peffley, 1987). Schwartz et al. (2010) suggest that these values express, in the political domain, more basic personal values that guide people in all domains of life. Overall, the political values approach is represented by an extremely wide and diverse spectrum of ways in which these values have been conceptualized and measured. These approaches tend to be based on the idea that political value structures are variable constructs that can be investigated only *within specific contexts* (Marietta and Barker, 2007).

A brief literature review of the studies employing political values shows that there is no clear consensus regarding the number and content of core political values in modern democracies; nor is there a unique theory that helps to identify the universe of political values. To mention some, while Rokeach (1973) identified two political values (freedom and equality), Feldman (1988) identified three core political values (i.e., equality of opportunity, economic individualism, and free enterprise), McCann (1997) specified two (egalitarianism and moral traditionalism), Goren (2005) four (traditional family values, equal opportunity, moral tolerance, and limited government), Schwartz, Vecchione and Caprara (2010) identified six core political values (law and order, traditional morality, equality, free enterprise, civil liberties, and blind patriotism). The fact that political values seem to be context specific, together with the lack of agreement on the content or number of political values, makes them

unfitting for comparative, cross-national studies and therefore unfitting for the purposes of this dissertation.

Values as dimensions of social change. This approach includes research that emphasizes the influence of the values dimension in representing long-term divisions within societies, and their role in driving social and political change, as in Inglehart's *Silent Revolution* (1977). The most influential works in this area include Inglehart's (1971) post-materialism and studies on the authoritarian-libertarian values divide (Inglehart, 1971; Flanagan and Lee, 2003; Kriesi et al., 2008; Norris and Inglehart, 2019). These works place a particular emphasis on the shift from materialist to postmaterialist values that took place between the Sixties and the Seventies, which brought new political issues to the stage and provided much of the impetus for new political movements to emerge. This value shift is part of a broader syndrome of intergenerational cultural change, in which a growing emphasis on the quality of life is accompanied by a declining emphasis on traditional political, religious, and material security, and moral and social norms. The latest developments within this approach are linked to the previously mentioned cultural backlash theory (Norris and Inglehart, 2019). This theory, as previously specified, links changes in values to the rise of authoritarian populism and is addressed in Article 2.

As stated, I rely on Schwartz's theory of values to theorize which personal values might underpin the decision to vote for populist parties. This theorization brings together Schwartz's theory and the core features of populism as described in the previous sections. Thus, building on the relevance of values in guiding and explaining political behavior, I hypothesize a negative link between populism and self-transcendent values based on the populist exclusionary and antagonistic conception of society and political power, common to both left- and right-wing host ideologies. Values such as universalism and benevolence entail concern for other people's opinions and welfare, and people are also considered to be equal, which is far from the populist claims on behalf of the exclusive power of the many over "the others". Consistent with the motivational continuum in Schwartz's theory, I hypothesize a positive link between populism and conservation values, whereas these values are reflected in core elements of the populist ideology: the need to protect "the good people" and the "past-oriented", nostalgic character of populism. Conservation values emphasize the need to avoid or control anxiety and threat and to protect the self and the status quo, ensuring stability and security. These values point to the need to maintain, restore, or preserve the interests of the oppressed people against the elite or

"the others": The economic losers, the "natives" of a country, the "victims" of cultural change, all express to some extent the need to maintain normality or bring things back to their "normal" order.[4]

2.7.4. From values to attitudes and behavior

Moving from values to attitudes, as highlighted in the previous sections, there is overall agreement that values give structure to attitudes. Among others, Schwartz (1994) argues that behind political ideologies and attitudes there are specific sets of personal values underpinning them. For Rokeach (1973), values constitute the basic principles that give structure to personal attitudes. Similarly, Converse (1964) sees values as "a sort of glue to bind together many more specific attitudes and beliefs," with values functioning as a form of attitude constraint.

The main distinction between values and attitudes lies in their different levels of abstraction. While values operate at a high level of abstraction and are trans-situational goals, attitudes represent evaluations of specific objects.

When it comes to the different conceptions of attitudes, the main source of scholarly disagreement concerns the number and type of defining components that attitudes have. Are attitudes merely emotional evaluations of objects, or is a behavioral reaction also a defining characteristic of attitudes? The debate, thus, sees scholars who consider attitudes to have only one defining component (affective component), two (affective and cognitive), or three components (affective, cognitive, and behavioral).

Therefore, for some scholars attitudes are constituted only by their affective component, meaning the emotional evaluation of an object (see Ajzen, 1988; Fazio, 1986). In this tradition, "an opinion is an unemotional statement about an object, while an attitude is an emotional

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[4] For theoretical clarity, values must be distinguished from similar constructs such as personality traits. While traits represent the frequency and intensity with which a behavior is executed by someone, values point to the importance that the person gives to a goal as a guide of action. In other words, values represent the intention behind an individual's behavior, or "what people consider important," while traits are enduring dispositions, or "what people are like" (Roccas et al., 2002). Another way in which values differ from personality traits is how they are more subject to change; as Inglehart describes it, there is an "interplay between external conditions, values and subjective satisfaction" (Inglehart, 1977, p. 447). Changes within societies lead people to emphasize new goals: This more dynamic nature of values, with respect to the more stable traits, implies that values can be insightful to explain why people change their intentions and decide to vote for or to abandon a populist party.

evaluation of an object" (Bergman, 1998 p. 83). However, as Bergman counterargues in his conceptual review, attitudes are evaluations of specific objects: this implies that we always evaluate *something*. As this 'something' is an object of our thought, it is hard to see attitudes as simply being the result of an affective evaluation. Rather, they are more likely the results of affective *and* cognitive evaluations. This latter conception has been widely accepted by scholars of cognitive processes (e.g., Lazarus, 1982). Within this discipline the debate is not focused on the number of defining characteristics that attitudes possess, but rather on whether it is the affective component that precedes the cognitive one, or vice versa. Finally, some scholars hold that attitudes have *three* defining components: affective, cognitive, and behavioral (Kothandapani, 1971; Ostrom, 1969). However, studies have demonstrated that there is not a one-on-one correspondence between attitudes and behavior (e.g., Zanna and Fazio, 1982). The fact that attitudes *can* motivate behavior, but they do not conduce to a behavioral response automatically in all instances, leads me to reject this latter conception.

Overall, in line with Bergman's (1998) review and reflection I consider attitudes as having a cognitive and an affective component. Moreover, by rejecting the distinction between attitudes as simply emotional and opinions as purely cognitive, I consider attitudes and opinions as *synonyms*.

In this light, most of the factors previously discussed, relevant in explaining people's support for populist parties (such as Europe, "the elite", immigration and immigrants and so on), constitute evaluations of specific objects. Consequently, they can and are treated as attitudes in this dissertation. Moreover, while some of the previously mentioned elements (i.e., socioeconomic status) are not strictly attitudinal, they nevertheless tend to shape certain value priorities and attitudes, as previously suggested.

Moving to the relevance of attitudes to the study of political behavior, their importance goes beyond the 'simple' description of people's evaluations of specific political objects. Attitudes, in fact, under specific circumstances can and do motivate behavior. Some elements mediate the link between attitudes and behavior: there are ongoing debates in the fields of psychology and social psychology on the specific mechanism/sequences underlying each of these mediators. I will, however, not discuss such debates here, but rather limit myself to briefly describing the conditions that can facilitate a behavioral response. Beyond the different debates, scholars tend overall to agree that some elements have an impact on constraining or

motivating behavior. There is agreement, among others, on the role of the *importance* or *centrality* of an attitude (i.e., how central or relevant an attitude is to the person) in motivating behavior and in the role of *salience/accessibility* (i.e., how much an attitude is present in an individual's everyday life and interactions).

Broadly speaking, these elements reveal the importance of specific contextual conditions in the activation of not only attitudes, but also behavior. As previously specified, the particular context in which a political contest takes place contributes to defining salient issues (Loughran, 2016) and consequently which attitudes are potentially relevant for voters. As said, context is particularly relevant to understand populism: the specific attitudes that populist supporters might hold must be thus researched in line with this assumption. This latter aspect is addressed in Articles 2 and 3.

In particular, Article 2 highlights how the role of context (e.g., countries' different economic conditions, or the importance of religion in different societies) in attitude formation and activation impact the combination of specific attitudes that are relevant in explaining populist support. Article 3 builds further on the importance of context by analyzing how changing contextual conditions across time (e.g., such as the salience of specific issues, crises, whether a populist party holds an office position) might have an impact on the attitudes that are salient, and particularly attitudes that are salient among populist supporters and that explain their preferences. Looking at the stability or change of attitudes among populist supporters is important not only because of the thin and shifting nature of populism, but also because attitudes are shaped by our context-dependent experience of the given moment.

Moving the focus away from the role of context in potentially influencing attitudes, another relevant aspect for the scope and contribution of this dissertation is the affective component of attitudes. It has been previously highlighted that populism presents a recurring affective component in many of its aspects: all the different theories on its causes focus on people's *grievances*; the communication style of populist actors has been proven to be largely affective. More broadly, the Manichaean division and the moral criterion that guide the populist ideology in defining what or who is 'good' or 'bad' has an inherent affective component that is worthy of attention. Not surprisingly, the support for populist parties started to be associated with appeals to anger and resentment among their supporters (see Rico et al., 2017). As is argued in Article 4, however, affective reactions are common to all voters, not only to populists. As a

consequence, in order to fully understand the affective appeals of populism, we must consider also the affective reactions of other voters, together with the question as to whether it is actually the populist character of these parties that is to blame for the affective arousal among voters.

A clarification is needed when it comes to the affective components of attitudes. As said, attitudes represent evaluations of what we think about a specific object, and how we feel about it. On this latter aspect, it is important to specify how the focus of the dissertation and particularly of Article 4 is directed at emotions that involve conscious awareness, or feelings. This clarification is based on the fact that emotional systems have effects that occur also and mostly outside awareness: we experience the influence of emotions, our feelings, only when they are robust enough to enter awareness and gain our notice (Marcus et al., 2000; Marcus, 2010). Theories of emotions focus on how we label the strong emotional experiences that enter awareness, but the emotional systems operate mostly outside awareness: the emotions that we experience consciously (feelings such as happiness, anger, worry) represent only the tip of the iceberg of the much broader, unconscious activity of our emotional systems (Marcus et al., 2000; Marcus, 2010).

2.8. A clarification on the role of the supply-side

On a final note, a clarification is needed on the role of the supply side in shaping people's attitudes. As specified, this work is anchored in the demand-side of the study of populism and, while acknowledging that supply-side factors do have an impact in shaping values and attitudes, I limit myself, in the course of this dissertation, to describing those elements in relation to the support for populist parties.

I do, however, find it important to highlight that people are likewise affected by the political messages to which they are exposed (Roodujin et. al., 2016). Lasswell (1927) and Lippmann (1922) argued that messages from political elites do have an impact on citizens' attitudes. Citizens might look for information shortcuts, including cues from parties, as most people might not want to look for and assess all the relevant information to form their opinions. Several studies corroborated the existence also of a two-way mechanism on political cues and opinion formation (e.g., Ray, 2003; Steenbergen et al.,2007), where citizens look for cues from parties with which they identify or support, being at the same time affected by the messages advocated by the party and being more likely to be in sync with them or to change their opinion

accordingly. Citizens tend to change their opinions to be more consistent with the ideas of the party for which they vote, and citizens' attitudes are also affected by their voting behavior. Whatever the initial reason to support a populist party, it is expected that supporting that populist party will reinforce and fuel some of the attitudes. Citizens who support a party because they agree with this party's stances on core issues, are more inclined to be in agreement with this party's positions on other issues (Bartels, 2002; Cohen, 2003; Lenz, 2009).

While not being the direct object of this dissertation, it is important to acknowledge also the role of the supply side in influencing/reinforcing citizens attitudes. There is a constant interchange between demand and supply, and people's attitudes should be seen as the result of such interchange, rather than simply being the consequence of one or the other aspect.

3. Philosophy of science and methodology

3.1. A positivist approach

As a paradigm defines a researcher's philosophical orientation, it has significant implications for every decision made in the research process, including the choice of research methods. The term paradigm, within the research context, describes the researcher's "worldview" (Mackenzie & Knipe, 2006). A research paradigm thus constitutes the beliefs and principles that shape how a researcher sees the world, and one interprets and acts within that world.

The current dissertation is rooted in the positivist paradigm. I adhere to the paradigm's stance holding that experimentation, observation, and reason based on experience are the basis for understanding human behavior. Positivists posit that the social world can be studied and explained in a scientific manner, even when considering factors such as beliefs, ideologies, culture, and ideas, as in the purpose of this dissertation. There are some further implications in the embrace the positivist paradigm, such as the consequent adoption of an objective epistemological position, a realist ontology, or deductive and quantitative methodological approaches. The following paragraphs will briefly summarize the meaning of these positions in the context of this work and the related shortcomings, while more attention will be paid to the specific operationalization of the main concepts and methodological choices of this dissertation in the next section.

This work adopts a realist ontology, meaning an understanding that social reality "exists independently of the observer, and that it can be observed, measured and studied objectively through the scientific method without any interference from the researcher or the observer" Hussain et al. (2013). Coherently with the chosen paradigm, throughout all the articles of this dissertation I employ a deductive approach; I thus develop testable hypotheses based on previous research and theory, and I then verify their validity (or lack of) through quantitative research methods that will be described in more detail later in this chapter.

A further implication is the adoption of an objectivist epistemological position: through this lens, human experience of the social world is considered to be objective and to reflect an independent reality, which provides the foundation for human knowledge (Weber, 2004). This implies that, through research, we can gain knowledge which helps us to become more

objective in understanding the world around us. While adhering to this principle, I acknowledge its shortcomings when it comes to the study of the social versus the natural sciences.

On this latter point, the positivist paradigm presents the strengths and advantages of precision, rigor, standardization, and generalizability. However, when it comes to its weaknesses, it fails to differentiate social sciences from the natural sciences, treating human beings as natural objects and denying human uniqueness and individuality (Benton and Craib, 2011). As a consequence, while adhering to the positivist paradigm and its declinations throughout this dissertation, I acknowledge this main weakness when discussing the implications of the individual articles, and the broader meaning of this work.

The complexity of individuals, of the multifaceted societal issues and the wide spectrum of possible human responses to stimuli and challenges cannot be fully equated with the more 'firm' objects of the natural sciences. Therefore, while sticking to objectivity when reporting the results, we must also acknowledge that, when it comes to humans, social phenomena, and how to interpret them, it is important to recognize that we cannot *explain* everything in a purely *objective* way. After having developed hypotheses based on theory, and having tested those hypotheses through statistical models, we report our results. But when it comes to *explaining* the meaning of those results, what we can explain in relation to social phenomena is most likely only part of the picture, or one of the possible explanations. Consequently, given the nature of the objects of study within the social sciences, I consider probabilistic terms to be more appropriate to explain human behavior and social phenomena than determinism.

With this in mind, the picture becomes even more complicated when taking into account the malleable and thin nature of populism as explained in the previous chapter, and the assumption, as in the positivist approach, that objective inferences can be reached as long as the person doing the observation is objective and disregards her or his emotions or personal views. On one side, the striving for objectivity among positivist researchers including in this case social and political scientists is undeniable; on the other, however, the line between objectivity and subjectivity is to some extent blurred when making inferences. I will provide here two brief examples to better explain my concern, one linked to a broader discussion within the literature on populism, and one taken from this dissertation.

The former example refers to the ongoing debate between scholars who consider populism a threat to democracy and those who consider it a potential corrective to democracy. While some (e.g., Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2012; Urbinati 1998) argue that populism undermines liberal democratic institutions, others (e.g., Canovan, 1999; Laclau, 2005) take a more optimistic stance and see populism as having the potential to improve the representative link between citizens and representatives. The debate extends even to some elements of populism: scholars tend to take different stances on, for instance, the exclusionary character of European right-wing populist parties (see Huber and Schimpf, 2016). While some highlight the exclusion of ethnic minorities, others emphasize how populism, despite the exclusionary tones, can be seen rather as a channel of representation and participation for groups of citizens that otherwise would not have been involved in politics (Abts and Rummens, 2007).

The second example, which was also mentioned in the previous chapter of this dissertation, refers to (potentially) different conclusions that may be reached, based on different explanations of the meaning of research data. Specifically, in his study of the commonalities of populist supporters in several European countries, Rooduijn (2018) comes to the conclusion that populist supporters *do not* have anything in common at all, even though some of the variables (e.g., political distrust) display a fairly consistent effect across *most* of the cases. However, the fact that, for example, feelings of lacking trust in parliaments and politicians do not matter for *all* populist parties to the same extent, led Rooduijn to the conclusion that populist voters do not have much in common (Rooduijn, 2018). Coming from the same conceptual approach as the author (i.e., the ideational approach), I am inclined, on the basis of my reading of those results, however, to reach a different conclusion. As previously stated, I would have argued that, considering the very thin nature of populism, we should not expect *all* populist voters to share *exactly* the same characteristics to the same extent, but rather to share the same attitudes to *some* extent. Therefore, I would have come to the conclusion that populist voters *do* have something in common.

To conclude, while adhering strictly to the positivist paradigm, I build on these two examples to highlight also the importance of acknowledging its shortcomings: considering the nature of the objects of the social sciences, as argued, even within positivism a single phenomenon can have multiple interpretations and/or meanings. However, it is important to stress that, while interpretation is somehow necessary within the positivist paradigm, when dealing with the object of study of the social sciences, its use is limited to explaining the broader meaning of

the results. Positivism tries to interpret observations in terms of facts or measurable entities. It does not, however, employ interpretation and relativism in measuring or reporting the results, thus maintaining its distinction from other paradigms, such as the constructivist one.

3.2. Operational definitions and methodological choices

3.2.1. Main concepts: definitions and operationalizations

The role of concepts in research is fundamental: concepts guide us in defining what we are looking for, where to look and helping us to notice and recognize things we are analyzing (Becker, 1998). Further, the process of transforming and reducing these concepts or definitions to measurable variables is often referred to as operationalization. The conceptual framework of this dissertation builds mainly on the concepts of 'populism', 'populist supporters or voters', 'populist parties', 'individuals' 'values' and 'attitudes'. I will now proceed by reporting the adopted definitions and operationalization of the main concepts of this dissertation.

3.2.1.1. *Populism and populist parties*

As has been discussed in the previous chapter, in this dissertation I have adopted the definition of populism provided by Mudde (2004), also known as the ideational approach. According to Mudde (2004), populism can be defined as a "thin ideology", a set of ideas "that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, the pure and wise people versus the corrupt elite, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the *volonté générale* (general will) of the people" (Mudde, 2004). Building on this definition, I consider populist parties as those that adhere to the populist ideology as defined by Mudde (2004).

When it comes to the operationalization of populism, I rely on the PopuList dataset. This dataset employs the definition of populism given in Mudde (2004), being thus in line with this dissertation. The PopuList, a dataset which has been peer-reviewed by more than 80 academics, classifies European parties from 31 countries that can be defined as populist, far right, far left and/or Eurosceptic, and that have either won (1) at least 1 seat or (2) at least 2% of the votes in national parliamentary elections since 1989.

A valid alternative to the PopuList in the operationalization of populism might have been the Populism and Political parties Expert Survey – POPPA (Meijers and Zaslove, 2020). An advantage of employing the POPPA Expert Survey would have been the fact that it allows one to measure *degrees* of populism, rather than the dichotomous 'presence versus absence' of populism, as in the PopuList dataset. The POPPA dataset, however, presents some disadvantages that discouraged me from choosing it for the purpose of this dissertation: first, the latest version is from 2018. As populist parties' degrees of populism change constantly (see Akkerman et al., 2016), using such a database would have required more frequent updates. Secondly, employing this database would have opened up the possibility to develop research questions and hypotheses that consider also the degree of populism. While this is a very interesting frontier for further research, I think that it would have moved the focus away from what is the very aim of this dissertation, namely looking at the worldviews of populist supporters.

A further clarification is needed when it comes to the operationalization of 'authoritarian populist parties' as adopted in Article 2. The operationalization in this case relies on the distinction originally made by Norris and Inglehart (2019). While not necessarily agreeing with the definitions of authoritarian populism adopted by the authors, for the specific purpose of this study We decided to keep their classification. The classification of these parties is, however, in line with their classification as right-wing populist parties in the PopuList.

On a final note, in Article 4 we operationalized populist parties as those that attracted voters with a populist worldview. Such populist worldview is based on and measured through a scale that builds on Mudde's (2004) definition of populism, as will be explained further.

3.2.1.2. *Populist voters and supporters*

The adopted definition of populist voters and supporters refers to citizens who expressed a preference for a populist party either in the form of (I) a vote (*voters*) or (II) by ranking a populist party as their preferred party (*supporters*).

The operationalization of populist voters has been measured by recoding the variable on the party voted for in the last election held in each country (Article 1). As anticipated, the "PopuList" dataset has been used to distinguish between populist and non-populist parties.

When it comes to populist supporters, it is measured by recoding the variable asking the respondents *"Which (political) party appeals to you most?"* (as in Article 2) or *"Which party do you feel closest to?"* (as in Article 3).

I rely on these two different operationalizations for the following reasons: in the European Values Study dataset, employed for the analysis of Article 2, the variable on party voted for was not present in the questionnaire, and I thus relied on the alternative *"Which (political) party appeals to you most?"*. When it comes to Article 3, while the European Social Survey dataset offers the possibility of including the party voted for, I considered the question *"Which party do you feel closest to?"* more suitable for the purpose of this specific contribution. I acknowledge that it would have been better, for instance, to measure the respondents' preferred party. The choice of this specific variable over alternative ones was, however, tied to data availability and consistency throughout waves and countries. Moreover, as this is a longitudinal study covering a period of 16 years, the ESS waves, which are conducted every second year, would have been too close to consider alternative variables such as the party voted for. On the other hand, strategic voting might not reflect actual party preference.

On a final note, the specific operationalization of populist voters as in Article 4 builds on the measurement of a populism-elitism scale among voters. This scale was constructed to reflect the conflict between populism and elitism over the distribution of political power and authority, as in Mudde's (2004) definition. The specific aim of the scale and of this operationalization has been to juxtapose voters with a populist worldview against their counterparts, the elitists, and to further analyze the impact of holding (or not) a populist worldview in determining emotional reactions, under alternative explanations (e.g., political distance).

On this latter case, a dichotomous variable in the form of 'did you vote for/prefer a populist party' over a mainstream one would have not been suitable for the purpose of this specific contribution.

3.2.1.3.   *Values*

The adopted definition of values is the one provided by Schwartz (1992; 1994), understanding values as "abstract beliefs about desirable end states or behaviors that transcend specific situations, guide evaluation and behavior and can be rank ordered in terms of relative

importance" (Schwartz, 1994). Values represent "cognitive representations of desirable, abstract, trans-situational goals that serve as guiding principles in people's life" (Schwartz, 1992; 1994).

When it comes to the operationalization, to measure personal values, the PVQ (Portrait Values Questionnaire) was used, which measures each of the 10 values with three to six items. The Portrait Values Questionnaire (PVQ: Schwartz 2006; Schwartz et al. 2001) includes 40 short verbal portraits of different people, each describing a person's goals, aspirations, or wishes that point implicitly to the importance of a value. Respondents are asked to report how similar they feel to the verbal portrait on a scale going from 1 (not like me at all) to 6 (very much like me). The respondents' values are thus inferred from the values of the portraits they describe as similar to themselves.

The discriminant validity of the PVQ and the overall validity of the items in relation to the whole Schwartz values theory (e.g., conflict and compatibility, four higher value classes, ten personal values) have been extensively tested and confirmed (see Schwartz 2006; Schwartz and Cieciuch, 2022).

Overall, the choice of this specific operationalization relies on the coherence between nominal and operational definition of values, which does not find equivalents among other definitions and operationalizations of values. On this latter point, most alternative definitions and operationalizations of values are either context specific (see Goren 2005), or tend to measure attitudes, rather than overarching individual values (see Inglehart, 1997). An additional alternative operationalization of values is the one developed by Rokeach (1973). The validity of the Rokeach Value Survey (Rokeach 1973;1979), however, has been the object of critiques and reassessment that uncovered several weaknesses and measurement issues (for a full analysis see Braithwaite and Law, 1985). Consequently, the validity of the PVQ, together with the related conflict and compatibility structure, its reliability across countries and cultures and the availability in the ESS dataset seemed thus the more optimal choice.

3.2.1.4. Attitudes

I define attitudes as evaluations of specific objects, which present a cognitive and an affective component. On this understanding, *attitudes* thus may be seen as a synonym for *opinions* (see Bergman, 1998).

When it comes to the operationalization of attitudes, the specific operationalization depends on the object of the attitude. Overall, attitude-variables are obtained through composite measures: due to the complexity of these multidimensional concepts, one item would not be enough to measure the concept with reliability and validity. I thus employ several items, each of which provides some indication of the attitude-variable, to overcome the reliability and validity problems. For instance, (Article 3) when it comes to the measurement of attitudes about immigration, the variable is operationalized through several items asking the respondents whether we should allow many or few immigrants from poorer countries outside Europe, immigrants from different ethnic and racial groups, alongside those from the same ethnic groups. The remaining items ask the respondents whether they think that immigration is good or bad for the economy, if it enriches the country's culture, and if it makes the country a better place to live. Similarly, social conservatism (Article 2) is operationalized by a scale of five items measuring the level of agreement on whether homosexuality, abortion, divorce, having casual sex and artificial/in-vitro fertilization can be always, never, or sometimes justified.

The measurement of authoritarianism in the context of Article 2 has proven to be particularly challenging. On one hand, the European Values Study dataset, employed for the analysis of Article 2, offers the possibility of measuring authoritarianism through Altmeyer's Right-Wing authoritarianism scale (RWA). On the other hand, the RWA scale does not allow one to measure authoritarian predispositions without simultaneously measuring other political attitudes that authoritarianism is theorized to predict (Tillman, 2013), which are also crucial for the purpose of this specific contribution, i.e., social conservatism, leading to the decision of not using the RWA scale. I thus preferred to keep the measurement of these two attitudes separate and to measure citizens' support for authoritarian values with two items asking whether "greater respect for authority is a good or bad change in our way of life that might take place in the near future" and whether "having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections" is a good or bad way of governing the country. This variable comes with limitations; however, while several alternative indices have been tested, none of them was

valid and reliable across countries, including a scale building on items on child-rearing practices, which did not reach discriminant validity across all the analyzed countries.

A final specification is needed on the operational definitions of the emotional aspect of attitudes, as in Article 4. Emotional reactions have been measured by asking the respondents what emotions [name of politician] evokes, and "what he/she stands for." The emotions (hope and enthusiasm, fear, trust, unease, anger and frustration, joy and pride, disgust) were presented one at a time and respondents were asked whether they felt "not at all", "to a small degree", "to some degree", "to a strong degree" or to "a very strong degree" emotionally aroused.

3.2.2. Methodological choices: quantitative data analysis

All the independent articles of this dissertation employ quantitative data analysis techniques. Overall, the statistical method is considered the next best method within the positivistic paradigm, allowing the researcher to infer knowledge about the world by observing it and by allowing one to generalize beyond the specific data (Jakobsen & Mehmetoglu, 2022).

In the articles I adopt different regression techniques that fit with the specific purpose of each contribution, as will be further discussed. Overall, to carry out the quantitative data analyses in this dissertation I have relied on different datasets that will be described in the following sections.

3.2.2.1. *Regression techniques*

In the process of the testing of hypotheses, regression analysis constitutes a valuable tool that allows one to obtain and provide quantitative evidence about the existence (or lack) of a relationship between a set of variables.

As the dependent variable (vote or support for populist parties) has been operationalized in a dichotomous way in 3 out of 4 articles as previously clarified, most of this dissertation's articles rely specifically on *logistical* regressions; the analysis in Article 4 is, however, based on linear regressions. Put simply, logistical regressions allow one to calculate the probability of the dependent variable of having the value 1, given the value of certain explanatory variables. Differently from linear regressions, however, logistical regressions estimate how much the

natural logarithm of the odds of Y=1 changes for each one-unit change in the independent variable. Furthermore, the effect of one independent variable is conditioned by the scores of the other independent variables.

As two of this dissertation's articles focus on several countries, I employed in these cases multilevel logistic regressions, following the calculation of the intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC) or variance partition coefficient. Using a multilevel model allows me to meet both theoretical and statistical requirements due to the hierarchical structure of the data. Theoretically, we must account for the fact that respondents coming from the same country share a similar history, culture, experiences, and so on, being thus more likely to be similar than respondents coming from different countries. Statistically, a shared context means that the observations are not independent from one another (Jakobsen & Mehmetoglu, 2022). Such dependency must be accounted for. Therefore, a multilevel logistic regression model has been used in Article 1 to account for the intra-unit correlations due to the shared context (country) of respondents belonging to the same groups. In Article 3, such a model was employed not only to account for the share context of respondents, but also to model the changing impact of some predictors across context, through multilevel random slope and intercept models.

Some alternative models might have been employed when carrying out the analyses of the articles. I will now briefly discuss such alternatives and explain why I landed on the models described above.

In Article 1, I apply multilevel logistical regression and multinomial logistic regression. As values are latent constructs, one could argue that, alternatively, GSEM could have been used to carry out the analysis. However, as the reliability of the values construct has been tested and confirmed in many instances (e.g., Vecchione et al., 2015; Piurko et al., 2011), following more recent studies that analyzed values in relation to voting behavior (see Marcos-Marne, 2021) I preferred to use the more intuitive regression analysis.

In Article 2 logistical regression models are run for each individual country. A possible alternative to this strategy would have been to carry out a pooled analysis, perhaps including more countries to re-assess the cultural backlash theory. The choice of having only a few countries and running independent models lies in the attempt to gather a more in-depth understanding of those cases, that symbolically represent the complexity of the broader

European context. On one side, including more countries is helpful to identify and investigate general trends. On the other side, however, focusing on a smaller number of countries allows us to gather a better understanding of 'what is behind' those general trends, or the specific, different paths leading to the same outcome. It is important not to focus simply on the general trends but rather to integrate such knowledge with more in-depth case studies.

Moving on to Article 3, one of the aims of this contribution is to investigate the changing composition and effect of populist supporters' worldviews across time and countries, assuming that, among others, contextual changes can influence electoral behavior. One might thus argue that a model including second level variables (such as GDP, unemployment rates and so on) or a difference in differences model would have been more appropriate to fit this purpose. While I consider these interesting and valid alternatives, I preferred to keep the focus on the analysis of the *varying* effects of the predictors across time and countries as stated in the theory, rather than focusing primarily on the effects of contextual elements. Additionally, some practical reasons are behind this choice: the combination of logistic and multilevel modelling result in very complex calculations and in large data requirements. Large datasets and/or a complex model, such as the random slopes and intercepts models employed in Article 3, do not make this task any easier.

3.2.2.2. Datasets

For the empirical work in this dissertation, I use data on both individuals and parties. For individuals, I need cross-nationally and temporally comparable information on respondents' values and attitudes. Two datasets fit this purpose: the European Social Survey (ESS) and the European Values Study (EVS).

The European Social Survey (ESS) is an academically driven cross-national survey that has been conducted across Europe since its establishment in 2001. Every two years, face-to-face interviews are conducted with newly selected, cross-sectional samples. The survey measures the attitudes, beliefs and behavior patterns of diverse populations in more than thirty nations. Specifically, two features of the ESS led me to the choice of this dataset for the empirical analyses of Articles 1 and 3: first, the ESS includes the Schwartz PVQ. Secondly, the regular inclusion of core modules in all rounds of the ESS allowed me to analyze possible changes

across countries and over time in citizens' economic, social, political attitudes and behaviors, fitting with the aim of Article 3.

For the purpose of Article 2, the European Values Study (EVS) constituted a better fit and has been thus chosen for the empirical analysis of this study. The EVS is, similarly to the ESS, a large-scale cross-national survey covering attitudes on, among others, family, religion, politics, and society. Driving the choice of this dataset is the fact that, by contrast with the ESS, the European Values Study offers better items to measure some of the core attitudes part of Article 2, such as authoritarianism, social conservatism, and nationalism, thus constituting a better data source for this specific analysis.

Article 4 employs original survey data collected after the Norwegian 2021 election. The dataset allowed me to measure the emotional reactions of respondents to the leaders of the four main Norwegian parties, the position of the respondents on an elitism-populism scale, the strength of their party identification and the overall political distance.

Moving on to the dataset on parties, as anticipated, I need information on their populist character. As stated, the PopuList fits this purpose, allowing me to track populist parties in European countries, that can be defined as populist, far right, far left, or Eurosceptic, and that have either won (1) at least 1 seat or (2) at least 2% of the votes in national parliamentary elections since 1989.

4. Summary of the articles

In this chapter I present the summary of each independent article of this dissertation, setting the stage for the discussion of the work's broader results and conclusions in the next chapter. While being part of a broader project and responding to interconnected and/or different aspects of the same research questions, the four articles also constitute independent contributions.

4.1. Article 1 - Personal Values Priorities and Support for Populism in Europe—An Analysis of Personal Motivations Underpinning Support for Populist Parties in Europe

As anticipated, the starting point of this dissertation and of its first contribution is the increasing attention that has been devoted to understanding why people support populist parties, and whether populist supporters share unique attributes that capture the core elements of populism beyond left and right ideologies (Geurkink et al., 2020). The first article thus investigates the presence and composition of motivational bases, expressed in terms of basic values priorities, for supporting left-right populist parties and how they vary between left-right wing populist parties.

Within the demand side of the study of populism, less attention has been paid to the role of personal values, conceived as deep-seated goals, guiding people's decision-making and political behavior. People use personal values to organize their beliefs on political issues, to make and to justify political decisions. Further, values give structure to personal attitudes and opinions: they are deep-rooted, enduring guides that are less vulnerable to the impact of events and therefore more stable than attitudes, and they represent the starting point of the causal chain of decision-making.

Building on Schwartz's values theory and on Mudde's (2004) theory of populism, I theorize that the set of values motivating support for populist parties is expected to be rooted in the ideological core of populism, the main element being the Manichaean view of society as ultimately divided into two antagonistic groups. Despite the different meanings of the "good people" and of the "corrupt elite", what remains constant are the division of society into two opposing groups, an understanding of politics as an expression of the general will of "the people", and the consequent ideal replacement of the whole with one of its parts, namely the

"good people." These elements are incompatible with the class of self-transcendent values and compatible with conservation values.

The findings suggest that people who attach less importance to self-transcendent values and more relevance to conservation values are more likely to vote for populist parties, across left- and right-wing ideologies. These results imply that the Manichaean and exclusionary character of the populist ideology finds correspondence in a specific base of personal values. While populist voters are less likely to assign priority to inclusiveness and tolerance and to be concerned for the welfare and interests of outgroups, they are more likely to assign higher priority to the ingroup protection-oriented values that express the need to avoid or control anxiety and threat, to protect the self and stability of society. The results, however, while being common to both left- and right- wing populist voters, display a stronger relationship between values and the right-wing populist vote. The results for left-wing populist voters are less explicit.

4.2.   Article 2 - The limits of the cultural backlash theory: A comparative study of authoritarian populism in four European countries

The second independent contribution of this dissertation, co-authored with Anders Todal Jenssen, investigates the attitudinal constituency of populist supporters across countries. We do so by building on the cultural backlash theory as developed by Norris and Inglehart (2019).

By holding that the support for 'authoritarian populism' in America and Europe is the consequence of a cultural backlash, Norris and Inglehart (2019) indirectly argue that the same structural causes explain authoritarian populism across contexts. We argue, however, that, while such a model may work to explain the social forces that brought Donald Trump to power, it does not explain the rise of 'authoritarian populism' in Europe. We pinpoint how European countries have different experiences with authoritarian and democratic rule, nationalism and immigration, economic hardship, religion, and social conservatism. This diversity is what we argue might make the cultural-backlash theory unfitting to explain authoritarian populism indiscriminately: alternatively, we propose that there is more than one road to success for authoritarian populist parties.

Based on the results and analysis of our four test-cases, we suggest that multicausal explanations are more suitable for the study of populism: each context is unique and the support for authoritarian populism has diverse roots. The countries analyzed, and more generally the European political landscape, present different structural conditions, party backgrounds, and a diversified electorate. The drivers explaining the electorate's motives to support authoritarian parties are diverse and reflect the different combinations of social forces acting in each country.

Simultaneously, this study confirms how the supporters of different authoritarian populist parties have as a common denominator anti-immigrant and authoritarian attitudes and downgrades the role of social conservative values in determining the support for authoritarian populists.

4.3. Article 3 – Analysing opinions over time and across countries: do populist supporters have anything in common at all?

The third Article in this dissertation is focused on the attitudinal consistency of populist supporters across time and countries. The starting point of this article is the agreement over the definition of populism as a time and context related phenomenon, and the lack of empirical studies investigating this aspect from a demand side perspective. As mentioned above, more and more efforts have been devoted to understanding whether populist voters share unique attributes that capture the core elements of populism beyond left and right ideologies. While previous research helped me to identify many relevant cross-sectional associations, the issue of change over time, and how individual-level outcomes may depend on time-varying social, political, and economic conditions is left unanswered. I therefore argue that considering not only contextual but also time specificities is important when investigating the presence of a common set of "populist ideas", or to use other words, of a "populist voter".

When theorizing about the potential importance of time to the understanding of populist appeals, I build on different aspects: some are related to the chameleonic character of these parties as described above, thus related to the supply-side of populism, while others find their roots in general cycles of political behavior, the concern of the demand-side of populism. As people's beliefs can be affected by both agenda-settings events that can have an impact on voting behavior and by changes in the supply-side of parties, it is important to include both the

demand and the supply side when theorizing about the potential relevance of the temporal component.

Including both cross-sectional and longitudinal dimensions, this study tests empirically, and confirms, the assumption that populism is a context- and time-dependent phenomenon, from a demand-side perspective. The results suggest that, overall, there is a core of beliefs that cut across time and context: trust in politics, satisfaction with the functioning of democracy, Euroscepticism, income, and attitudes toward immigration are consistently and to some extent stable predictors of people's support for populists. Nevertheless, the specific combination of attitudes seems to depend on the very moment and place.

4.4.   Article 4 - Are populist voters more emotional than other voters? And what about the elitists?

The final article of this dissertation deals with the affective component of attitudes among populist supporters. This contribution, co-authored with Anders Todal Jenssen, focuses on the Norwegian case, selected as a least-likely case for the analysis of affective reactions. As populist parties and leaders have been showing open hostility and disgust with, among others, immigrants, minorities, and the 'elite', populism has become connected to expressive politics, political preferences and participation driven by affect. Starting with the work of Rico et al. (2017) many have come to see blame attribution and confrontational rhetoric as defining characteristics of populism, appealing to anger and resentment among its supporters.

On this latter point, an important question is left unanswered as to whether the appeal to negative emotions is an exclusive trait of populist supporters, and if the populist character of these parties is the one to blame for the affective arousal among voters. Several theories suggest that *all people*, not only populists, experience emotional arousal in relation to political symbols, actors, and issues. As a consequence, in this contribution we discuss (I) whether affective arousal is ingrained in the populist supporters' worldviews, by confronting the affective arousal of populists with one of populists' adversaries, the elitists, and (II) investigates what populists and their adversaries react against emotionally.

From a theoretical standpoint, this article is inspired by the theory of Affective Intelligence and the Directional theory of issue voting. We carry out the analysis using original survey data

collected during the first week after the Norwegian elections in 2021. Our results suggest that despite resentment being ingrained in populism, populist supporters, when compared with their counterparts, the elitists, are *not* more emotional. Populism is linked to and builds on negative emotions and populist *leaders* make use of more negative emotions than mainstream leaders do (Nai, 2021); but, as our results have shown, the same cannot be said of their *followers*. The fact that distance in political space explains emotionality better than the populism-elitism scale does, means that the link between negative emotions and support for populism is not unique. Rather, it seems like the link between populism and emotion is limited to some issues the leaders exploit (Nai 2021).

4.5. Main contributions

Having briefly described the contribution and findings of each individual article, it is now possible to take a step back and summarize what are the findings in the dissertation's broader picture and aim. To begin with, this work has uncovered and analyzed from different perspectives the commonalities in the worldviews of populist voters belonging to different host-ideologies. All four articles somehow contributed to responding to different aspects of the broader research question asking *what supporters of populist parties have in common*. The answer that I provide to this question, as mentioned in Table 2, identifies a 'thin line of commonalities shared by populist supporters'.

The starting point of the analysis of such commonalities is the highest level of abstraction, represented by the connection between personal values and the vote for populist parties. What Article 1 shows, regarding the personal values of populist voters, is that populist voters do share the same values across ideologies, and that these values have an impact on the probability to vote for a populist party. Responding to the second research question on *which values do populist supporters hold?* Article 1 shows that people who attach less importance to self-transcendent values and more relevance to conservation values are more likely to vote for populist parties, across left-and right-wing ideologies. These results constitute the proof of the strength of the roots of populist ideas at the mass level. Moving on to a lower level of abstraction, when it comes to attitudes about specific objects and their influence on the preference for populist parties, populist supporters do have *something* in common. Articles 2 and 3 show how, beyond differences populist supporters share, respectively, a common denominator exists to support authoritarian populist parties (anti-immigrants attitudes and

authoritarianism, as in Article 2) and a core of attitudes that cuts across time and countries. Article 3 shows how income, Euroscepticism, trust in politics, satisfaction with the political system and attitudes toward immigrations consistently predict people's support for populist parties.

Articles 2 and 3 further reveal variation in populist supporters' attitudes, providing an answer to the question *as to what extent populist supporters share the same attitudes, across time and countries? And how do the roots of such attitudes differ across contexts?* The implication of these articles' findings suggest that some clarifications are, however, needed when it comes to understanding the conditions under which populist supporters have something in common. As anticipated, based on the Articles' findings, I hold that context matters for populism. With this regard, Article 2 unveils the different roots of the commonalities and the different pathways that can lead to the same outcome across diverse contexts. Also, when sharing similar attitudes, we must consider where those attitudes might have arisen in order fully to make sense of them. For instance, in all the analyzed countries of Article 2, respondents holding anti-immigrant attitudes are more likely to support authoritarian populist parties. However, only two of the four countries analyzed have experienced immigration directly (Italy and Norway). In Hungary and Poland, the strength of anti-immigrant attitudes is probably due to the exploitation of the perceived threat of immigration. Further, Article 3 shows how, beyond the existence of a core of shared attitudes that cut across time and context, the specific, final combination of such attitudes and the strength of their impact in determining the preference for populist parties seem to depend on the very moment and place.

A final pattern emerged across the articles, i.e., populist voters are not exactly who we thought they were. As in Article 4, populism is linked to and builds on negative emotions, and populist *leaders* exploit negative emotions more often than mainstream leaders do; however, the link with affective reactions is not unique to populist supporters. Elitists, in fact, display very similar patterns of emotional reactions to their counterparts, responding to the fourth and final research question on *to what extent the affective component of these attitudes is stronger for populist supporters*. Moreover, as Article 2 displays, authoritarian populist supporters are not necessarily holding social conservative attitudes: on the contrary, in some cases, holding social conservative attitudes was negatively correlated with the preference for authoritarian populist parties.

Table 2. Main findings and core contributions

Article	Main findings	Integration of findings
Article 1: Personal Values Priorities and Support for Populism in Europe—An Analysis of Personal Motivations Underpinning Support for Populist Parties in Europe	• Populist voters across ideologies share a core of personal values priorities • The populist ideology finds correspondence in a specific base of personal values • Deep roots of populist ideas at the mass level	Thin line of commonalities among populist supporters
Article 2: The limits of the cultural backlash theory: A comparative study of authoritarian populism in four European countries	• Common denominators: authoritarianism and anti-immigrant attitudes • Different drivers to the support for authoritarian populism in different contexts • De-escalation of the role of social conservatism in determining support for right-wing populists	Context matters
Article 3: Analyzing opinions over time: do populist supporters have anything in common at all?	• Confirmation of populism as a context and time dependent phenomenon • Combination of common denominators and context-specific ones • There is not a single "populist voter", but rather, there are many populist voters	
Article 4: Are populist voters more emotional than other voters? And what about the elitists?	• Populist supporters are not more emotional than their counterparts • Political distance is a better explanation of emotional reactions than populism • Emotions linked to issues that populist propose, not populism per se	Populist voters are not exactly who we thought they were

5. Conclusions

5.1. Implications of the findings

In a broader picture of increased volatility in citizens' political choices and disaffection with democratic actors and institutions, populism has been on the rise, successfully managing to attract votes, and gaining a stable presence in many European democracies. Building on this, the current dissertation takes as its starting point the need for more research on the demand side of the study of populism, meaning voters' attitudes, values, and opinions and voters' overall demand for populism.

I therefore built on the overall lack of systematic studies within the demand side of the study of populism and proposed and employed an approach that allowed me to take a broader yet comprehensive look at the worldviews of populist supporters. As previously stated, by employing the values and attitudes constructed, the dissertation investigated (I) the presence of particular personal values connected to the vote for populist parties; the attitudinal consistency across (II) countries and (III) time, the affective component of attitudes among populists' supporters (IV).

What are, then, the implications of this dissertation's findings?

As anticipated, a first implication is that context matters for populism. Context, intended both as place and time, is essential if we are to better understand the 'look' and roots of citizens' support for populist parties, as Articles 2 and 3 demonstrate. Going back to the main features of populism, as it being a thin ideology with a malleable or chameleonic character, this dissertation has shown how these elements are also reflected in populist voters' worldviews. The results provided by Articles 2 and 3 pointed exactly in this direction: Article 2 demonstrated how looking at the differences in countries' political, economic, and historical background can shed a light on people's different drivers to support, in this instance, authoritarian populist parties in different countries. Context is thus essential in understanding the nature and combination of drivers that constitute the source of people's probability to support populist parties. As displayed by article 2, in Poland the support for right-wing populism is driven by social conservatism and religious attitudes. In Hungary, on the contrary,

the effects of religiosity and social conservatism are insignificant while nationalism is a strong driver to the support for right-wing populists. Thus, while the outcome might be the same across cases (e.g., the vote or the expressed preference for a populist parties) people's motives and/or the road to that outcome differ deeply across contexts. Further, as Article 3 shows, there is a core of common attitudes among populist supporters that cut across time and context (such as income, Euroscepticism, trust in politics, satisfaction with the political system and attitudes toward immigrations). However, the specific, final combination of those attitudes and the strength of their impact in determining the preference for populist parties seem to depend on the very moment and place (for instance, the effects of trust in politics and satisfaction with the political system seem to change if a populist party is part of the government coalition). Context plays a central role in understanding the demand side of populism, and it is probably part of the answer to such a fragmented literature on the motives behind the support for populism.

However, this is not to say that populist worldviews are to be understood exclusively in relation to the context in which they are rooted: Articles 1, 2 and 3 also revealed common patterns across cases that should not be overlooked. On one side, as illustrated, the commonalities among populist supporters are outnumbered by differences; however, as previously argued, it is important to keep in mind the *thin* nature of the populist ideology when making sense of these commonalities. Even though they are fewer in number, if we evaluate these commonalities in the context of the thin, malleable, and chameleonic nature of populism, then populist supporters *do* have something in common across contexts. As previously mentioned, there is a thin line - as thin as the populist ideology - yet thick enough of commonalities among populist voters' worldviews. This, in my understanding, is a valuable second implication of the broader findings of this dissertation.

This latter point also allows me to clarify the boundaries of the chameleonic nature of this class of parties. As stated throughout this dissertation, populist parties do have a chameleonic character: they tend to adapt, mobilize and easily 'take the form' of the grievances which are relevant in the context in which they operate. This dissertation adds to this by displaying that the chameleonic nature of populism tells us only half of the story: beyond their malleability, populist parties share an equally relevant core of commonalities that cut across different contexts.

As a third implication, building on the role of contextual differences and the importance of context in determining the exact shape of the populist demand, I infer that theories claiming to be universally true do not work (too) well with populism. Articles 2 and 3 provide evidence on this latter point, showing how multicausal explanations are more suitable for the study of populism: each context is unique and the support for authoritarian populism has diverse roots. While this might be true for other instances as well, it seems a particularly challenging task to develop a theory on populism that has significant explanatory power yet does not fall into particularisms. This reasoning clearly builds on the intrinsic role of context in determining the different forms that populism takes in different places or at different times. Moreover, the particularly dynamic nature of populist parties seems to clash with the more static nature of theories. As already mentioned and building on the cultural backlash theory, it is not advisable to have too broad a scope with such a highly context-dependent phenomenon. Focusing on specific regions (e.g., Europe or Latin America) or even subregions (e.g., Eastern or Western Europe) might be a more cautious, but not less challenging choice when trying to develop theories on populism. In this sense, the concept of Middle-Range Theories – or MRT – (Merton, 1968) as opposed to General theories might be useful to the study of populism. Rather than trying to explain *all* social behavior with a given set of assumptions operationalized at a high level of abstraction, scholars should develop more specific theories, whose explanation of causal connections is restricted to a subset of phenomena operating within a given domain (Merton 1968).

A further implication that stems from the articles' results is that, as said, populist supporters are not exactly who we thought they were. The most surprising findings are probably those stemming from Article 4, showing how, despite a large body of literature pointing at a particular, existing link between strong negative emotions and populism, populist supporters are *not* more emotional than supporters of other parties. Equally surprising are the results obtained in Article 2, questioning the widely accepted equation between voting for populist right-wing parties and holding socially conservative views. Contrary to what one might have expected, holding socially conservative attitudes is, in some cases, even negatively correlated with the probability to support for right-wing populist parties: right-wing populist supporters are not necessarily socially conservative. This also raises the question as to the origins/genesis of the link between social conservatism and voting for right-wing populist parties in those instances, as in the case of the Italian one in Article 2, where the appeal to socially conservative attitudes represents an important element of the party platform, whereas voters' actual attitudes

seem to point in the opposite direction. Probably less surprising but nevertheless interesting is the fact that populist voters are not always distrustful of political actors and institutions: they tend to display distrust only when mainstream politicians are in charge (see Articles 2 and 3), confirming what has been argued by, among others, Miller (1974) and Huseby (2000) who see in disagreement a main source of political distrust. This 'trust the populists and distrust the mainstream' divide seems to be particularly strong: as shown by the results of Article 3, this relationship holds also when populists from another host ideology are in charge[5]. On a final note, based on the results of Articles 2 and 3, it is possible to infer that populist supporters are not really the so-called 'economic losers' of globalization. This suggests that we might try to look elsewhere for the source of discontent, as in more psychological components (as in Gidron and Hall, 2020) rather than objective socioeconomic measures.

Overall, Articles 2 and 4 further contribute to revealing how many of the features that were thought to be proper to populist supporters are not. Also, building on the findings of Article 3, I therefore infer that it is probably more appropriate to state that there is not a single "populist voter", but rather, there are many populist voters. This latter point also constitutes a key difference between mainstream voters and populist voters.

To conclude, this dissertation has been concerned with the analysis and dissecting of populist supporters' worldviews. Based on the results, I hold that the thinness of the populist ideology is mirrored in the commonalities of its supporters' worldviews. I borrow the terms 'thin' and 'thick', employed to define the populist ideology, to describe the composition of populist voters' worldview. I consider populist supporters to share a thin line of commonalities across cases, while the remaining, thick part, is contextual, or chameleonic. However thin, I consider this line of commonalities to be rather robust, as it cuts across an overwhelmingly diverse class of parties. Such robustness is further corroborated by the deep roots of populism: as argued in Article 1, personal values are only indirectly linked with political preferences: the fact that they are consistently linked to the preference for populist parties is a confirmation of the deep roots of populist ideas at the mass level.

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[5] In the Dutch case, populist from the left displayed a higher level of trust in politicians when populists from the right were holding government positions in 2010-2012

What emerges as a recurrent pattern across the articles is the effective malleability of the populist phenomenon and of its electorate. Hence, because of its thinness and malleability, populism is extremely adaptable; such features are likely to constitute a main strength and recipe for enduring success.

5.2.   Limitations and further research

In addition to the limitations outlined throughout the chapters of this dissertation, I will now consider some shortcomings of this work and then move on to illustrate some potential paths forward for future research.

To begin with, while large-scale, cross-national surveys such as the European Social Survey and the European Values Study come with great benefits such as, among others, highly reliable, extensive, comparable modules across time and countries, employing large scale datasets, however, comes also with a major drawback, i.e., the dataset is clearly not customized to one's research aims. As a consequence, some items or modules that would have been ideally included in the analyses were not available in the master dataset. As already mentioned, it would have been better to have more or different items to measure authoritarianism in the context of Article 2. Similarly, it would have been interesting to include measures of social integration (as in Gidron and Hall, 2020) in Article 3 or to include more countries in the analysis. Along the same lines, in the context of Article 1, it would have been interesting to test empirically the link between the so-called 'populist attitudes' and personal values.

On a somehow minor note, further research should overcome some of the limitations of current work by including and confronting populist voters with mainstream voters or even with abstainers, to fully discern the peculiarities of the populist electorate. As previously noted, some of the aspects addressed by this dissertation should also be investigated by employing a non-dichotomous dependent variable, such as degrees of populism.

Taking a broader look at potential paths for future research that stemmed from this dissertation, one could pinpoint how what has been investigated as part of Article 1 is only one side of the 'personal values' story. There is, in fact, a reciprocal influence between values and background/life circumstances: in this sense, Article 1 is limited to addressing personal values as independent variables, explaining the vote for populist parties. People, however, adapt their

values to life circumstances and background characteristics, such as one's education level, age, or gender (Schwartz, 2006): they can upgrade or downgrade the importance that they attribute to values that are respectively easily attainable or whose pursuit is blocked (Schwartz and Bardi, 1997). For example, people who experience unfavorable economic conditions assign more importance to values such as power and security than people who live in safer conditions (Inglehart, 1997). By bringing together the Schwartz and Inglehart values theories, further research should thus attempt to adopt an integrated perspective that includes and investigates the importance of life circumstances in determining the pursuit of specific values priorities, and in particular of those related to the vote for populist parties.

An additional arena for future research could investigate further the consistent divide between in-groups and out-groups that emerged from the results across the articles. In this sense, 'populist-collectivism' could be seen as a response to anxiety in the face of social change in the realm of politics, raising the question as to whether feelings of 'belonging to a community' are more important to populist voters.

Finally, I believe that more attention should be directed toward better understanding the dynamics at the intersection between contextual factors and the individual responses that lead to the support for populism. This would allow researchers to identify more of the different pathways that can lead to populist votes, from both a supply and a demand perspective.

6. References

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Personal Values Priorities and Support for Populism in Europe— An Analysis of Personal Motivations Underpinning Support for Populist Parties in Europe

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Several studies have shown that there are populist attitudes associated with voting for these parties, across left- and right-wing ideologies. As political attitudes and opinions are rooted in people's personal values, this study analyzes the commonalities in the values priorities of populist supporters. The values underlying the vote for populists are reflected in the ideological core of populism, the antagonistic divide between "us"— the people— and "them"— the foreigners and the elite. This article theorizes that voting for populist parties is linked with lower support for self-transcendent values, as they express altruism, tolerance, and pluralism, contradicting the populist claims of exclusionist power of the "people" over "the others." Evidence of this relationship is found using European Social Survey data. The study applies logistic multilevel and multinomial regression models. Findings confirm that voting for populist parties is associated with lower support for self-transcendent values and high support in conservation values, across left and right ideologies.

KEY WORDS: populism, populist values, values, populist vote

The widespread electoral success of populist parties has changed the European political landscape and attracted scholarly interest. Increasing attention has been directed towards understanding why people support populist parties and whether populist supporters share unique attributes that capture the core elements of populism beyond left and right ideologies (Geurkink et al., 2020). This has resulted in a rich corpus of literature on the mass bases of populism. However, within the demand side of the study of populism, focusing on the role of voters' beliefs, attitudes, values, and ideological leanings (e.g., Akkerman et al., 2014; Norris & Inglehart, 2019), less attention has been given to the role of *personal* values, conceived as deep-seated goals, guiding decision- making and political behavior. While Norris and Inglehart (2019) investigated the relationship between macrolevel values and the vote for authoritarian populists, we are left with little knowledge on how microlevel, personal values relate to the vote for populists, beyond left- right ideological associations.

Values represent "cognitive representations of desirable, abstract, trans- situational goals that serve as guiding principles in people's life" and "can be rank- ordered in terms of relative importance" (Schwartz, 1992, p. 4, 1994, p. 21). Personal values have been shown to be relevant in explaining voting behavior, as people use them to organize their beliefs on political issues, to make and to justify political decisions (Caprara et al., 2006; Feldman, 2003; Piurko et al., 2011). Values constitute the basic principles that give structure to personal attitudes and opinions: They are deep- rooted, enduring guides that are less vulnerable to the impact of events and therefore more stable than attitudes and opinions, and thus they represent the starting point of the causal chain of decision- making (Rokeach, 1973).

This character of values—how they structure attitudes and their connection to voting behavior— makes   them particularly suitable for the study of the mass motivations underpinning the vote for populist parties.

Earlier research that has explored the connection between certain attitudes and the vote for populist parties (e.g., Akkerman et al., 2014, 2017; Geurkink et al., 2020; Van Hauwaert & Van Kessel, 2018) shows that there are sets of attitudes significantly linked with the preference for these parties, and the same "populist attitudes" motivate voting for both left- and right- wing populist parties. Populist attitudes are rooted in the key components of populism: people centrism, antielitism, and the antagonistic relationship between the people and the elite, or

antipluralism. These findings are relevant as political attitudes and opinion are influenced by people's personal values, leading to the research questions addressed in this article: Are there motivational bases, expressed in terms of basic values priorities, for supporting left- right populist parties? If so, which are the values that predict the support for populist parties, and how do they vary between left- right wing populist parties, if at all?

A recent study (Marcos- Marne, 2021) explored the link between Schwartz personal values and the vote for populist parties in 13 European countries. While highlighting shared predispositions of populist voters, this article focuses on the relationship between single values and the vote for populists. Therefore, it does not take into account how values do not work in isolation but in a system of conflict and compatibility (Feldman, 2003). According to Schwartz et al. (1996), attitudes and behaviors are guided by "trade-offs among competing values that are implicated simultaneously in be- havior or attitudes" (Schwartz et al., 1996). The current article diverges from Marcos-Marne (2021) on two main points, namely a different theorization of the relationship between personal values and the vote for populist parties, which also builds on the analysis of the whole system of personal values instead of single values items.

Therefore, this study aims to answer an additional research question: How does the conflict and compatibility system of values relate to the vote for populist parties?

Following the research on populist attitudes, this study benefits from the conceptual clarity provided by the definition of populism by Mudde (2004) and adopts the ideational approach to theorize which values are relevant for populist supporters. Mudde defines populism as a "thin- centred ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, the 'pure and wise people' versus 'the corrupt elite', and which argues that politics should be an expression of the *volonté générale* (general will) of the people" (p. 543). Conceiving populism as an ideology provides a solid framework for analyzing populist movements and parties; beyond its "thinness," the populist ideology is able to incorporate elements from other ideologies while still being identified as "populist," displaying similarities among apparently different parties.

The set of values motivating support for populist parties is expected to be rooted in the ideological core of populism, the main element being the Manichean view of society as ultimately divided in two antagonistic groups. Despite the different meanings of the "good people" and of the "corrupt elite" within the thick ideology in which the party operates, what is constant is the division of society into two opposing groups, an understanding of politics as an expression of the general will of "the people" and the consequent *ideal* replacement of the whole with one of its parts, namely the "good people." These elements are compatible with the class of self-transcendent values and incompatible with conservation values.

Table 1. Description of the 10 Personal Values as in the Schwartz's Literature

Power	Social status and prestige, control or dominance over people and resources
Achievement	Personal success through demonstrating competence according to social standards
Hedonism	Pleasure and sensuous gratification for oneself
Stimulation	Excitement, novelty, and challenge in life
Self- direction	Independent thought and action: choosing, creating, exploring
Universalism	Understanding, appreciation, tolerance, and protection for the welfare of all people and for nature
Benevolence	Preservation and enhancement of the welfare of people with whom one is in frequent personal contact
Tradition	Respect, commitment, and acceptance of the customs and ideas that traditional culture or religion provide the self
Conformity	Restraint of actions, inclinations, and impulses likely to upset or harm others and violate social expectations or norms
Security	Safety, harmony, and stability of society, of relationships, and of self

Theory

The Schwarz Personal Values Theory

Schwartz defines values as "cognitive representations of desirable, abstract, trans-situational goals that serve as guiding principles in people's life" and "can be rank-ordered in terms of relative importance" (Schwartz, 1992, p. 4, 1994, p. 21). The Schwartz Value Theory (1992) identifies 10 personal values, as described in Table 1. On the analytical level, the values have been tested and shown to apply across 67 nations, allowing for cross- national comparability (Schwartz, 1992).

Values are based on universal human and societal needs (Rokeach, 1973) and present dynamic relations of compatibility and opposition among them, which can be represented as a circular motivational continuum, as in Figure 1. Overall, they can be organized along two different bipolar and antagonistic dimensions: self-enhancement and self- transcendent values. Self- enhancement values encourage and legitimize the pursuit of

self- interest; they oppose self- transcendence values, which emphasize concern for the welfare of others, intended for people of all nature. Openness values, on the other hand, favor change and encourage the pursuit of new ideas and experiences and oppose conservation values which emphasize maintaining the status quo and avoiding threat (Piurko et al., 2011; Schwartz, 2006).

This conflict- compatibility structure of values allows us to study how whole systems of values, rather than single values, relate to other variables (Schwartz, 2006). Additionally, behaviors or attitudes that are congruent with a single value should be congruent with the adjacent values, but be in conflict with the opposing values (Caprara et al., 2010). As values do not work in isolation but in a system of conflict and compatibility, focusing on a small number of single values could miss the conflict and tensions central to the dynamic of values and behavior (Feldman, 2003). For this reason, this analysis diverges from Marcos- Marne (2021) and explores the link between the high- order values classes and the vote for populist parties.

For theoretical clarity, values must be distinguished from similar constructs such as personality traits. While traits represent the frequency and intensity with which a behavior is executed by someone, values point to the importance that the person gives to a goal as a guide of action. In other words, values represent the *intention* behind an individual's behavior, or "what people consider important," while traits are enduring dispositions, or "what people are like" (Roccas et al., 2002). Another way in which values differ from personality traits is how they are more subject to change; as Inglehart describes it, there is an "interplay between external conditions, values and subjective satisfaction" (Inglehart, 1977, p. 447). Changes within societies lead people to emphasize new goals: This more dynamic nature of values, with respect to the more stable traits, implies that values can be insightful to explain why people change their intentions and decide to vote for or to abandon a populist party.

Figure 1. The motivational continuum among values and the higher- order values classes.

From Values to Voting Behavior

The connection between personal values and political preferences is not straightforward; however, many attribute a central role to values as foundations for political evaluations. Previous research on the association between values, political values, attitudes, and voting behavior shows that there is a value— attitude— behavior hierarchy (Schwartz, 1977). Personal values priorities shape political values and attitudes, and therefore political values and attitudes mediate the relations of values to political behavior. Personal values thus affect political choice through their influence and the shaping of core political values and political attitudes (Schwartz et al., 2010).

Numerous studies have found evidence of the relationship between values and party preferences (e.g., Caprara et al., 2006; Schwartz, 1994). In the Schwartz values tradition, personal values have been able to predict political choice across different cultural contexts and political systems (Barnea, 2003; Caprara et al., 2006). Caprara et al. (2006) found a positive relationship between center- left voters and specific values priorities, as higher support for universalism and benevolence values. Center-right voters gave higher priority to power, achievement, security, and conformity val- ues. Similarly, a study of the 1988 Israeli elections demonstrated that individual's personal values discriminated significantly between voters of the different political parties (Barnea & Schwartz, 1998; Barnea, 2003). There is a substantial amount of evidence that personal values are a source of structure for

political attitudes and behavior, and that there should be a set of values associated with support for populist parties that party leaders and members express through political discourses and ideology (Kenny & Bizumic, 2020).

Populist Values Priorities

The chameleonic nature of populism makes theorizing its relationship with personal values complex; nevertheless, the ideological component as defined by Mudde (2004) raises the attention on two core points: the reduction of society to an exclusionary and antagonistic "us" versus "them" and a conception of politics as an expression of general will of the good, homogeneous people. As in the populist-attitudes literature, these are the elements common both to left and right- wing populism that personal values are expected to tap into when motivating the vote for populist parties.

A first link can be identified between populism and self- transcendent values based on the populist exclusionary and antagonistic conception of society and political power. While liberal democracy is anchored in the belief that a well- organized polity will constrain the people's will and allow for pluralism (Urbinati, 2019), populism wants (symbolically) to replace the whole (the pluralistic society) with one of its parts, that is, the homogeneous and virtuous "people." On one side, pluralism implies that politics reflects the coexistence of many different groups, all of whom interact through compromise (Dahl, 1982; Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013). On the other, the populist ideology holds the idea that "all individuals of a given community are able to unify their wills with the aim of proclaiming popular sovereignty as the only legitimate source of political power" (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013, p. 151). Overall, this implies that populism is at odds with pluralism.

The exclusionary and antagonistic nature of populism is common both to left- and right- wing host ideologies, despite being less straightforward for left-wing populists. As in Sanders et al. (2017) and Reinemann et al. (2017), "the exclusion of out-groups is implicit in any construction and men- tion of the people"; it helps to "make explicit the standard to which *the people* are contrasted, contributing to strengthening identification with the in- group" (Reinemann et al., 2017, p. 20; Sanders et al., 2017). For right- wing populist parties, the exclusionary dimension focuses on the presence of "others" often represented by immigrants, religious minorities, or left- wing sympathizers. Left- wing populists, on the other hand, usually oppose "the caste," the political and economic establishment, as well as European technocrats and right- wing supporters.

From these standpoints, it can be argued that populism indirectly implies the suspension of the self- transcendent values class, as they express concern for the welfare and interests of others and the understanding and tolerance for all people and nature. Supporting self- transcendent values implies being tolerant and accepting that societies are composed of several different social groups. This is at odds with the exclusionary populists claim of the sole power of the "good people" over the "others," which is supposedly a power that only members of the ruling people possess and are allowed to enjoy (Urbinati, 2019).

It might be argued that left-wing populist parties are more supportive of egalitarianism and in- clusivity, and therefore they are closer to self- transcendent values. At the same time, despite being generally more inclusive at the society level, they do not deny the Manichean vision of society. As well as right-wing populists, left- wing populist parties aim at embodying and representing the will of the people, "presenting themselves as the sole true defenders of a sole true people" (Werner & Giebler, 2019, p. 381).

This dualistic and antagonistic dynamic is at the core of the populist ideology, beyond its left or right ideological components. We are thus led to expect a negative relationship between populist support and self- transcendent values due to the contradiction between these values, including concern and tolerance for others' opinions and welfare and the exclusionary and antagonistic populist policy. Based on these arguments, I propose the following hypothesis to be tested empirically:

H1.a: People who give low priority to self- transcendent values are more likely to vote for populist parties.

The motivational continuum of values as in the Schwartz theory holds that people giving low priority to self-transcendence values tend to give high priority to self- enhancement and conservation, and low priority to openness. Thus, the negative relationship with self-transcendent values should imply a positive relationship between self- enhancement and conservation values and populist support.

In particular, the class of conservation values is reflected in the core elements of the populist ideology as the need to protect "the good people" and the "past-oriented" character of populism. Conservation values emphasize the need to avoid or control anxiety and threat and to protect the self and the status quo, ensuring stability and security. The link between populism and conservation values goes beyond the support for traditionalism typical of the populist right. The populist lower propensity to be tolerant toward outgroups is expected to be mirrored by the need to protect the threatened ingroup. These values point to the need of maintaining, restoring, or preserving the interests of the oppressed people against the elite or "the others": The economic losers, the "natives" of a country,

the "victims" of cultural change, all express to some extent the need for maintaining or bringing things back to their "normal" order.

As mentioned, conservation values also encompass the idealization of the past typical of populist parties and the skepticism of populism about progress and vanguardism (Canovan, 2004). The populist ideology is anchored in a vision of lost homeland, which expresses nostalgia for an idealized past and in turns provides a sense of security against the perceived loss of identity (Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008; Elçi, 2021). Nostalgia is evoked by both left- and right- wing populist parties as a reaction to economic globalization, less secure forms of employment, the movement of people across borders, and the changes to communities and family (Kenny, 2017). The populist nostalgia conveys a preference for the way things were, evoking images of an economically, politically, and culturally secure past, which also helps with eliciting a sense of change, dysfunction, and decadence of contemporary political systems and societies (Elçi, 2021; Kenny, 2017; Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2018).

These need to protect the interests of the ingroup; the sense of the nation's decline and the perceived loss of control over the everyday environment are expected to be reflected in a positive relationship of the populist vote with conservation values. Following this logic and the compatibility and opposition structure of the higher- order values:

H1.b: People who give more priority to self- enhancement values are more likely to vote for populist parties.

H1.c: People who give more priority to conservation values are more likely to vote for populist parties.

H1.d: People who give less priority to openness values are more likely to vote for populist parties.

This theorization of the values underpinning the support for populist parties diverges and, for some aspects, is in opposition to what is theorized by Marcos- Marne (2021). In his perception, conservation values, while being at the core of the populist ideology, are at odds with populism because they emphasize the status quo that populists want to break with.

In this view, the mean (the mobilizing character of populism) plays a more prominent role than the ideal end/aim of the populist ideology: the return to an idealized golden past.

In the context of this study, however, I argue that considering the deep-rooted nature of human values, the more solid association should be found between populism and conservation, rather than with its ideally transitory reactionary nature. The definition of values (Schwartz, 1992) as goals based on human needs suggests that the desirable end state of populist voters should be to restore the ideal past political community and to protect the "good people." One might theorize a positive link between the mobilizing nature of populism and openness values, even if this implies "breaking" with the motivational continuum of Schwartz values. However, while the mobilizing character of populism represents a prerequisite to get the idealized past back, it is not the end state of the populist ideology, and therefore a connection between this element and deep- rooted values seems less likely to be established.

In addition, the reactionary nature of populism might as well depend on the position that the populist party holds within the political system. As for now, many populist parties have had government experiences, which for most resulted in the challenging task to maintain the critiques of the status quo and the mobilizing character credible and at the same level. On the other hand, the need to protect the "good people" and restoring the "natural order of things" is a constant element in the populist discourses and ideology; it is not affected by the position that the party holds and therefore seems more likely to find correspondence in people's values.

On the differences between left- and right- wing populist parties, the categorization of the populist ideology as "thin- centered" explains populism's malleability and accounts for further ideological associations. Populist parties do not belong to one single party family, but they adhere to other host ideologies like nationalism and social conservatism, as well as liberalism and socialism (Rydgren, 2008).

Right- wing authoritarian populist parties, for example, believe in a strictly ordered society and unquestioning obedience. They are supportive of more law, order, and a return to traditional values (Pauwels, 2012). To this extent, they might be more explicitly associated with conservation values, but also with power and achievement. On the other hand, left-wing populists tend to favor more socially liberal attitudes; they call for more social justice and new forms of political participation (Norris, 2019). Consequently, they might be more closely linked to the class of openness values, enhancing novelty, independent thought, and action. Building on this:

H2.a: Right- wing populist supporters are expected to rank higher in conservation values than left- wing populist supporters.

H2.b: Left- wing populist supporters are expected to rank higher in openness values than right- wing populist supporters.

To test the hypotheses, this study applies the ESS dataset, Round 9 (second release, 2018– 2020) and the PopuList dataset, Version 2.0 (Rooduijn et al., 2019).

Dependent Variable

The support for populist parties was measured recoding the variable on the party voted for in the last election held in each country.[1]

The "*PopuList*" dataset has been used to distinguish populist and nonpopulist parties; the list includes parties from 31 countries which have been classified as populist, far right or far left, following Mudde's definition, and has been peer reviewed by more than 80 academics (Rooduijn et al., 2019).[2] From this, the dependent variable *populistvote* was created, including the votes cast for populist parties in each country.[3]

Independent Variables

Section H of the European Social Survey questionnaire is aimed at registering information on human values as in the Schwartz literature and includes portraits of different people, each describing a person's goals or traits that point implicitly to the importance of a value on a scale ranging from "very much like me" to "not like me at all." To measure personal values, the PVQ (Portrait Values Questionnaire) was used, which measures each of the 10 values with three to six items. The values items were recoded so that the increasing level of agreement with the sentence is associated with greater scores (1 = *not like me at all* to 6 = *very much like me*).

As explained earlier in this article, this study applies the higher-order values factors (conserva- tion, self-enhancement, self- transcendent, and openness). In addition to the theoretical explanation, the choice is due to the fact that all indicators load very strongly on the higher- order dimensions while they do not as individual values. Also, it has been shown that models where single values are used tend to suffer from multicollinearity (Davidov et al., 2014).[4]

Previous studies (e.g., Davidov et al., 2008; Schwartz & Cieciuch, 2021) assessed the internal reliability, circular structure, and measurement invariance of the four higher- order values across countries as in the PVQ of ESS data. These studies found that the PVQ reproduced the theorized values structure and that metric invariance is supported, allowing comparability of the values classes across different contexts. I therefore use Cronbach's Alpha to report the reliability of the four values classes in each country and for the whole sample.[5] The average Cronbach Alpha reliability coefficients for the whole sample are 0.7060 for conservation, 0.7067 for self enhancement, 0.7541 for self-transcendent, and 0.7681 for openness. The fit of the values classes was also assessed by estimating the standardized factor loadings and the group goodness of fit for each country.[6]

The countries included in the analysis are Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czechia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Serbia, Slovenia, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland. Cyprus, Latvia, Portugal, and Montenegro have been excluded from the dataset; Portugal was excluded for the absence of relevant populist parties while Montenegro for the lack of reliable sources ranking its populist parties. Cyprus and Latvia were underrepresented in comparison with other countries' average observations (CY 781 and LV 918 observation). Estonia and the United Kingdom were excluded for the marginal populist vote share (5%–8 %).[7]

Voting for populist parties has previously been linked to sociodemographic variables, therefore age, gender, education, and occupational status were also considered. Occupational status was coded as a dummy variable, with "employed" used as a reference category.

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[1] For Germany, I included the second votes determining each party's share of the popular vote.

[2] Serbia was not part of the list. Populist parties have been distinguished according to the article *Populism in the Balkans: The Case of Serbia* (Stojarová & Vykoupilová, 2008).

[3] Table A8 in the appendix reports the list of the included populist parties.

[4] This is why the results of this article diverges partially from those of Marcos- Marne (2021) on the same topic.

[5] See Table B2 in the online supporting information.

[6] Self- enhancement: RMSEA = 0.025 SRMR = 0.007 CFI = 0.998 RRC = 0.720

Self- transcendent: RMSEA = 0.058 SRMR = 0.022 CFI = 0.983 RRC = 0.739 Conservation:

RMSEA = 0.069 SRMR = 0.032 CFI = 0.95 RRC = 0.703 Openness: RMSEA = 0.105 SRMR = 0.046 CFI = 0.922 RRC = 0.766.

[7] This might have been solved with the use of weights; however, I decided to focus on countries that represented more robust cases for this analysis.

A series of items was combined into the following control variables: political trust, satisfaction with national democracy, political efficacy, and attitudes toward immigration. Previous research has shown that these attitudes play a significant role in determining the conditions for populism to be successful, leading to the choice of including them in the analysis, to control for their effect on values. The items were combined after checking the Cronbach Alpha coefficient[8] and recoded so that higher values are associated with higher level of agreement with the items.[9]

A series of logistic regression techniques was then used to conduct the analysis, with the dependent variable being the vote for populist parties and the independent variables being the four high- order values classes (self-enhancement, self- transcendent, openness, and conservation). The models included the following control variables: age, gender, education, main activity, satisfaction with national politics, trust in institutions,[10] attitudes toward immigration, and perceived political efficacy.

To test the specific values of left/right- wing populist parties, two approaches were used. The first included two separate dependent variables and logistic regression models for left- and right- wing populist vote. As the two samples differed largely making comparison of the results difficult, a subsample including countries having both left- and right-wing populist parties was selected. [11] The second approach is thus based on a subsample of countries and on a multinomial logistic regression model, contrasting the values of left-wing populist voters to those of right- wing populist supporters, while nonpopulist voters serve as the reference category. This model also constitutes a way of testing the robustness of the results obtained in the previous models and to control for the initial sample, unbalanced towards a majority of right- wing populist parties.

<div align="center">Results</div>

The analysis is divided into two parts, the first being an exploratory investigation of personal values and vote for populist parties in 21 European countries. The second part is based on a subsample of nine countries and constitutes a robustness assessment of the results, conducted with a multinomial logistic regression.

Table 2 shows the multilevel logistic regression model of personal values and vote for populist parties, reported as odds ratio. The base model indicates the effect of the high- order values classes on the populist vote, while the complete model includes attitudes and control variables. The models indicate a lower probability to vote for populist parties for those supportive of self- transcendent values, together with a positive relationship between conservation values and the vote for populist, as hypothesized. The results show a positive relationship between the class of openness values and the vote for populist parties, and a negative correlation of self-enhancement values and vote for populists. Following the motivational continuum of the personal values theory, we should have expected to find that populist voters give lower priority to openness values and higher priority to self-enhancement. However, the link between self- enhancement and openness values and vote for populist parties goes in the opposite direction as hypothesized. It is possible to deduce that the motivational continuum as theorized by Schwartz does not find complete correspondence in these results.

The results are stable when controlling for sociodemographic variables, left and right ideological positioning, and the set of control variables, supporting at this stage Hypotheses 1a and 1c while Hypotheses 1b and 1d are not confirmed. The control variables on trust, immigration, satisfaction with national politics, and perceived political efficacy display nonsignificant effects. A robustness check was carried out to assess whether the effect of human values derives from ideological preferences, through a model including programmatic preferences on economic redistribution, EU unification process, and same- sex unions.[12] The overall results are stable, while the effect of the programmatic variables is not significant, confirming the role of human values.

Table 2. Multilevel Logistic Regression of Values and Vote for Populist Parties

Variables	Base Model	Control Variables	Complete Model
Self- enhancement	0.920***		0.883***
	(0.0163)		(0.0142)
Self- transcendent	0.726***		0.885**
	(0.0563)		(0.0455)
Openness	1.188***		1.102*

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[8] Attitudes toward immigration: scale reliability coefficient: 0.7103. Satisfaction with national politics: 0.7041. Trust in institution: 0.8804. Political efficacy: 0.8347.

[9] Table B1 in the online supporting information reports items and wording of these variables.

[10] Trust in country's parliament, legal system, police, politicians, political parties, European Parliament, and United Nations.

[11] Countries included France, Germany, Ireland, Netherlands, Serbia, Slovenia, Slovakia, Spain, and Croatia. [12]Table A5 in the appendix.

	(0.0652)		(0.0624)
Conservation	1.213		1.112**
	(0.143)		(0.0581)
Religion		0.628***	0.637***
		(0.0849)	(0.0832)
Age		0.983***	0.982***
		(0.00464)	(0.00472)
Women		1.106	1.100*
		(0.0713)	(0.0632)
Education level		0.844***	0.848***
		(0.0259)	(0.0263)
Dummy set of occupation (ref. category: employed			
Student		0.764*	0.724
		(0.115)	(0.146)
Unemployed		2.016***	1.965***
		(0.197)	(0.172)
Retired		0.998	0.980
		(0.141)	(0.141)
Housework		0.974	0.965
		(0.0487)	(0.0524)
Left- Right		1.249**	1.245**
		(0.119)	(0.118)
Trust institution		1.010	1.014
		(0.0166)	(0.0169)
Political efficacy		1.020	1.025
		(0.0289)	(0.0257)
Satisfaction national politics		0.991	0.982
		(0.0246)	(0.0292)
Immigration		1.004	1.006
		(0.0270)	(0.0292)
Observations	22,219	18,920	18,805
Number of groups	21	21	21

Note. Results reported as odds ratios. ***p < .01 **p < .05 *p < .1.

The relationship between self- transcendent and conservation values is also confirmed by the aggregated individual- level results.[12] The similarity of the results across the models provides a preliminary insight on the relevance of these two classes of values in relation to the vote for populist parties. In the aggregated model, the main difference lies in the coherence of the relationship of all the values classes with what was expected according to the motivational continuum theorized by Schwartz. People who scored high in self- enhancement and conservation values are more likely to vote for populist parties, while people who scored high on self-transcendent and openness values were less likely to vote for populist parties.

These results are also in line with what emerged from a series of exploratory single-country regressions.[13] Here I regressed the personal values classes and the vote for populist parties in each analyzed country to undertake a first look at the relation between values and the vote for populist parties in the sample. Despite the lack of a universal values system associated with the vote for populist parties across countries, the results are coherent with what emerged from the multilevel and individual models. Concerning self-transcendent and conservation values, the hypothesized negative relationship between self-transcendent values and the vote for populist parties is confirmed in 14 of 21 countries, and in 9 of 21 countries for conservation values. The unexpected positive relationship between the class of openness values and the vote for populist parties is confirmed in 12 of 21 countries, while self-enhancement values were not statistically significant. What remains stable across these models is the relationship of conservation and self- transcendent values with the vote for populist parties and rather mixed results for the class of openness and self- enhancement values.

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[12] Table A2 in the appendix.
[13] Table A1 in the appendix.

Similar to the findings of Piurko et al. (2011), the majority of Eastern European countries, except Bulgaria, Czech Republic, and Poland, showed no significant relationship between values and the vote for populist parties. The lack of a solid association between values and vote could be due to the fact that these countries are still undergoing a transition period after the experience of communism, as well as to the less ideological character of Eastern European populist parties (Kriesi & Pappas, 2015). More specifically, to influence political behavior, values need to be activated in a specific situation or political context. For values to be activated, parties must clearly express their ideological positions, political programs, and policy stands. This allows voters to (subconsciously) translate what their personal values mean in the political context, to understand which political program or party is in line with their values priorities and motives, and ultimately to rely on them when making their vote choice (Barnea & Schwartz, 1998; Van Deth & Scarbrough, 1995).

Populist parties in Eastern Europe have focused mainly on antiestablishment and corruption discourses and less on the gap between the people and the elite (Kriesi & Pappas, 2015). This might be why they are lacking a solid association between personal values and vote: Voters did not have sufficient information on the parties and their ideological/populist position to choose them based on their values.

This first part of the analysis is based on a sample of 21 countries, biased towards a higher number of right- wing populist parties (41 opposed to 13). Controlling for right- and left-wing ideologies might not be enough to ensure well- adjusted results. Consequently, a subset of countries having both left- and right- wing populist parties was selected at this stage. A multinomial logistic regression model based on the subsample was used to assess the robustness of the previous results and to analyze the results for left- and right- wing populist parties.

The previous models showed that self- transcendent and conservation values seem to predict the vote for populist parties. However, this raises the question of whether this is confirmed for both left- and right- wing populist parties. To answer this question, two approaches were used. The first applied logistic regression models based on two different subsamples, including respectively only right- and left- wing populist parties.[14] These models indicate that right-wing populist supporters give higher priority to self- enhancement and conservation values, while confirming the negative correlation with self- transcendent and openness values. The results for left- wing populist parties indicated, in line with the previous models and with the right-wing results, a negative relationship between the vote for left- wing populist parties and self- transcendent values, together with a positive relationship with conservation values. Self-enhancement and openness values, on the other hand, display nonsignificant effects. The main difference is

Table 3. Multinomial Logistic Regression of Values and Vote for Left- and Right- Wing Populist Parties

Variables	Right- Wing Populist Voters	Left- Wing Populist Voters	Right- Wing Populist Voters	Left- Wing Populist Voters
Self- enhancement	1.014	0.960	0.966	0.998
	(0.0428)	(0.0385)	(0.0478)	(0.0474)
Self- transcendent	0.548***	0.817***	0.626***	0.654***
	(0.0359)	(0.0511)	(0.0496)	(0.0474)
Openness	1.276***	1.105**	1.159**	1.038
	(0.0627)	(0.0515)	(0.0686)	(0.0583)
Conservation	1.602***	1.065	1.565***	1.282***
	(0.0862)	(0.0504)	(0.107)	(0.0759)
Religion			0.821**	0.845**
			(0.0750)	(0.0712)
Age			0.985***	0.983***
			(0.00371)	(0.00367)
Women			1.105	0.916
			(0.0953)	(0.0742)
Education Level			0.845***	0.933***
			(0.0221)	(0.0227)
Dummy set of occupation (ref. category: employed				
Student			0.440***	0.951
			(0.113)	(0.187)
Unemployed			1.200	1.388**
			(0.201)	(0.219)
Retired			0.729**	1.364**
			(0.0994)	(0.177)
Housework			0.725*	1.140
			(0.129)	(0.184)

[14] Tables A3 and A4 in the appendix.

Left- Right			1.291***	0.707***
			(0.0246)	(0.0133)
Trust institution			0.944**	1.024
			(0.0264)	(0.0270)
Political efficacy			0.889**	0.954
			(0.0458)	(0.0467)
Satisfaction national politics			1.024	1.013
			(0.0269)	(0.0251)
Immigration			0.897***	0.882***
			(0.0322)	(0.0304)
Observations	7,862	7,862	6,465	6,465

Note. Results reported as odds ratio. The reference category is nonpopulist vote. ***$p < .01$ **$p < .05$ *$p < .1$.

represented by the overall impact of values: The effects are lower for left- wing populist parties than for right-wing populist parties.

As specified, the second approach applies a multinomial logistic regression with nonpopulist vote set as the reference category to assess the robustness of the previous results, including the specific left- and right- wing populist values. Table 3 reports the findings. This model confirms the outcomes of the previous models, pointing at a constant tendency across all tables of a negative relationship between self- transcendent values and a positive association between the vote for populists and support for conservation values. Table 3 does not provide sufficient evidence for confirming specific personal values associated with the vote for left- and right- wing populist parties. The model, however, constitutes a robustness test confirming how giving lower priority to self- transcendent values and higher support for conservation values is associated with voting for populist parties, across left and right-wing ideological positions. This is also confirmed by the logistic regression model calculated on the overall subsample of countries having both left- and right- wing populist parties.[15] The results confirm the negative relationship with self-transcendent values and the positive link with conservation values, both at the individual and at the country level.

The model presented in Table 3 was replicated, with right-wing populist voters as the refer- ence category to further investigate the differences in values across left- and right-populist par- ties.[16] The results show that the only significant difference in values between left- and right- wing populist parties is a lower support for conservation values of left-wing populist voters, with re- spect to right-wing populist voters. This is in line with what was theorized in Hypothesis 2a, and it shows how there is not any significant difference between the predictors of votes for left- or right- wing populists; the only difference is between voters of populist parties and voters of nonpopulist parties.

The results of sociodemographic control variables are for the most part coherent with previous studies. Despite some differences in effects and significance across the models, higher-educated people and students are less likely to vote for populist parties, while unemployed persons were seen to be more likely to vote for populist parties. Age was almost uninfluential across the different models. In this study, being religious resulted in being negatively related with the vote for populist parties. This might appear counterintuitive, as a number of right-wing populist parties are trying to build a more Christian profile. However, research on the effect of Christian values in Western Europe has showed mixed results. In some cases, being religious implied negative attitudes toward religious minorities; in others, it showed higher levels of tolerance towards possible "outgroups" (Molle, 2019).

Discussion

This article analyzes the association between personal values priorities and the vote for populist parties. Rather than focusing on the single values items, I examined how the whole system of high- order values related to support for populism.

Based on the core elements of the populist ideology, I hypothesized that a lower support for self- transcendent values followed by a higher support for conservation values predict the vote for populist parties. As values show compatibility and opposition among them, I hypothesized that in predicting the vote for populist parties, a lower support for self-transcendent values is expected to be associated with a higher support for self- enhancement values and lower support for openness values. Furthermore, I hypothesized that left- and right- wing populist

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[15] Table A6 in the appendix.
[16] Table A7 in the appendix.

parties should have a specific set of values that points at their host ideology: openness values for the left and a higher support for conservation values for the right.

The results suggest that populist parties' voters are less likely to be supportive of self- transcendent values, while they are more likely to support conservation values across left- and right- wing ideologies. The results give strong support to Hypothesis 1a, holding that people who give low priority to self-transcendent values are more likely to vote for populist parties, and Hypothesis 1c, stating that people who give more priority to conservation values are more likely to vote for populist parties. This constitutes a robust confirmation that the Manichaean and exclusionary character of the populist ideology finds correspondence in a specific base of personal values. Populist voters are less likely to give priority to inclusiveness and tolerance and to be concerned for the welfare and interests of outgroups. On the other hand, they are more likely to give higher priority to the ingroup protection- oriented values that express the need to avoid or control anxiety and threat, to protect the self and stability of society. Personal values are only *indirectly* linked with political preferences; they express people's priorities in everyday life and not in the political domain. The fact that they are consistently linked to the preference for populist parties is a confirmation of the deep roots of populist ideas at the mass level, which strengthens our understanding of the populist phenomenon.

The motivational structure of values priority is partially confirmed as self- enhancement and openness values pointed at mixed results. Openness values resulted significantly in most of the models, but as self-enhancement values, they showed diverse directions of the relationship with the vote for populists, making generalization or inferences not possible at this stage. Hypotheses 1b and 1d, holding respectively that people giving more priority to self- enhancement values and less priority to openness values are expected to be more likely to vote for populist parties, are thus not confirmed. The relevance of these results is addressed below.

The mixed results of the class of openness values might point at the ambivalent connection of populism with change and preservation. These parties advocate an ideal transformation of society and political systems, while they do so calling for the protection, maintenance, or restoration of the status of a group of people. As mentioned earlier in this article, theorizing a positive relationship of openness values with populist vote implies attributing to the reactionary nature of populist parties the character of an end state more than a necessary, but transitory element in the populist narrative. Rather, the lack of coherence of self- enhancement and openness values might relate to the relevance of context in the activation of personal values as mentioned earlier. Populism not only must be combined with other ideologies but must also be understood together with context- dependent elements, such as the political and institutional context in which the party operates (Hawkins et al., 2020). While more research on this is needed, it might be argued that the activation of self- enhancement and openness values depends on nonideational, contextual elements of populism, while the stable and consistent role of conservation and self-transcendent values capture the ideational core of populism.

Overall, the core values associated with the vote for populist parties seem to be resistant to the values associated traditionally with left and right "thick" ideologies. This might constitute an apparent challenge to the concept of populism as a thin ideology. This does not mean rejecting the conception of populism as a thin ideology; however, from a values- based perspective, the populist ideology does not look as thin as it is in terms of programmatic scope, as it seems to be resistant to the values of the host ideologies.

On values and vote for left- or right- wing populist parties, the models did not point at distinct values priorities associated with the two ideologies; the results merely confirmed the tendencies about self- transcendent and conservation values. Based on this, Hypothesis 2b on the expected higher support for openness parties of left-wing populist supporters is not confirmed. However, Hypothesis 2a theorizing a higher support for conservation values by right- wing populist supporters is confirmed. The absence of relevant differences in the values of left- and right- wing populist voters further emphasizes the relevance of the presence of significant values differences between populist and nonpopulist voters.

The main difference between left- and right- wing parties is represented by the more straightforward results for the values of right-wing populist parties: There is a stronger relationship between values and the right-wing populist vote, while the results for left- wing populism are less explicit. It might be argued that right-wing populist parties share more defined and explicit char- acteristics while left- wing populists are more varied, and their lines of attack more abstract than those of right- wing populism. Right- wing populist parties very often define the "others" and the "ingroups" in personalized terms (e.g., immigrants as opposed to the ethnic homogeneous groupwhile left- wing populists tend to use broader terms of socioeconomic structures, attacking a politically constructed "other." The connection between right- wing populism and values might be more straightforward, as the societal divisions and issues they stand for are more personalized and heightened than it appears to be for the left making the connection with people's personal values easier.

On the attitudes toward immigration, the multinomial model shows how positive attitudes towards immigration are negatively correlated and significant both for right- and left-wing populist parties and show immigration attitudes to have a greater impact on left-wing populist supporters. There might be a link between this tendency

and the fact that patriotism and the defense of national interests seems to have become popular across left- and right- wing populist parties: These parties generally tend to identify "the good people" within a national context which can be more (i.e., right- wing populism) or less (left- wing populist) defined in ethnic or cultural terms (Ivaldi et al., 2017). Also Fieschi (2019) underlines how left- wing populism, similarly to right- wing populism, relies to some extent on a culturally homogeneous notion of the people, by appealing to "hard- working, ordinary people whose interests are shaped by shared experiences" (p. 32). It seems, however, logical to link this shared negative attitude towards immigration with the overall lower propensity of being supportive of self-transcendent values across the two factions of pop- ulist parties.

Limitations

Many aspects related to this study could be addressed by additional research. The personal values approach might be used to analyze different populist-rich contexts such as Latin America or to study in- depth single cases with solid and varied history of populism (e.g., France, Netherlands, Italy). More research is also needed to clarify the role of self- enhancement and openness values when linked to the vote for populist parties.

Concluding Remarks

Within the framework of the demand-side approach to the study of populism, this contribu- tion reflects on and explores the roots of populist ideas at the mass level by analyzing the basic values priorities which serve as a guide in people's decision- making process. Considering how political choice is increasingly volatile, it is of high importance to try to understand which "packages of ideas" (Fieschi, 2019) and motives are driving people's political choices. This is what this article has explored, highlighting how voting for populist parties relates to two classes of values, self- transcendent and conservation, theorized to be relevant in capturing the exclusionary and Manichean vision of society as in the populist ideology. We can think about these values priorities as the motives, the "packages of ideas" or the expression of what is important to people who vote for populist parties.

The results of this study show that for populist voters it is less important to understand, protect, and show concern about other people or possible outgroups, while it is more important to protect and ensure the safety of themselves and of people "like them," the ingroup of virtuous and homogeneous people, whether this symbolizes belonging to a specific country, ethnic group, or socioeconomic conditions.

Tracing these priorities allows us to better understand populism, its evolution over time, and contextual differences, getting beyond vague concepts like *zeitgeist* to understand the deepest roots of the populist appeal.

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Supporting Information
Additional supporting information may be found in the online version of this article at the publisher's web site:

Appendix

Table A1. Logistic Regression Expressed as Odds Ratio of Values Categories and Vote for Populist Parties per Country

Variables	Self-Enhancement	Self-Transcendent	Openness	Conservation	Observations
Austria	0.976	0.472***	1.555***	1.579***	1,701
	(0.0806)	(0.0505)	(0.148)	(0.164)	
Belgium	0.978	0.493**	1.458	0.984	1,108
	(0.245)	(0.176)	(0.460)	(0.275)	
Bulgaria	0.857	1.402**	1.444***	0.640***	775
	(0.0966)	(0.219)	(0.124)	(0.0911)	
Switzerland	0.972	0.370***	1.122	2.471***	634
	(0.120)	(0.0714)	(0.176)	(0.386)	
Czech Republic	0.903	0.721***	1.024	1.493***	1,349
	(0.0647)	(0.0774)	(0.0897)	(0.155)	
Germany	0.906	0.641***	1.369***	1.056	1,567
	(0.0855)	(0.0924)	(0.156)	(0.104)	
Spain	0.966	1.145	1.234**	0.763**	931
	(0.0814)	(0.189)	(0.125)	(0.0864)	
Finland	1.076	0.489***	1.044	1.283**	1,202
	(0.117)	(0.0802)	(0.143)	(0.159)	
France	1.010	0.786*	1.354***	1.017	943
	(0.100)	(0.107)	(0.155)	(0.107)	
Croatia	0.844	0.848	1.198	0.965	991
	(0.0903)	(0.131)	(0.145)	(0.133)	
Hungary	1.131	0.777*	1.003	1.492***	907
	(0.108)	(0.102)	(0.120)	(0.207)	
Ireland	1.163	0.659***	1.344**	0.914	1,397
	(0.127)	(0.0990)	(0.174)	(0.119)	
Italy	0.983	0.523***	1.287***	1.910***	1,275
	(0.0882)	(0.0647)	(0.113)	(0.224)	
Latvia	0.935	0.658**	1.278*	0.937	826
	(0.122)	(0.117)	(0.175)	(0.147)	
Netherlands	0.730***	0.875	1.257*	1.143	1,198
	(0.0767)	(0.148)	(0.165)	(0.128)	
Norway	0.859	0.353***	1.775***	1.747***	1,095
	(0.118)	(0.0660)	(0.270)	(0.273)	
Poland	0.968	0.465***	0.835*	2.293***	803
	(0.0940)	(0.0675)	(0.0882)	(0.312)	
Serbia	0.813*	1.166	1.081	0.918	924
	(0.0927)	(0.216)	(0.121)	(0.155)	
Sweden	0.872	0.321***	1.728***	1.761***	1,285
	(0.103)	(0.0529)	(0.246)	(0.234)	
Slovenia	1.005	0.860	1.005	0.919	626
	(0.123)	(0.162)	(0.123)	(0.126)	
Slovakia	0.850	1.065	0.896	1.244	627
	(0.102)	(0.179)	(0.124)	(0.200)	

***$p < .01$ **$p < .05$ *$p < .1$.

Table A2. Logistic Regression Models of Vote for Populist Parties over Personal Values

Variables	Base Model	Complete Model
Self- enhancement	1.305***	1.239***
	(0.0362)	(0.0390)
Self- transcendent	0.546***	0.685***
	(0.0230)	(0.0325)
Openness	0.905***	0.856***
	(0.0285)	(0.0308)
Conservation	1.508***	1.324***
	(0.0556)	(0.0585)
Religion		0.886**
Age		0.979***
		(0.00228)
Women		1.007
		(0.0536)
Education level		0.835***
		(0.0131)
Dummy set of occupation (ref. category: employed		
Student		0.731**
		(0.106)
Unemployed		1.905***
		(0.209)
Retired		1.035
		(0.0875)
Housework		0.922
		(0.101)
Left- Right		1.214***
		(0.0153)
Trust institution		1.018
		(0.0181)
Political efficacy		0.824***
		(0.0266)
Satisfaction national politics		0.954***
		(0.0161)
Immigration		0.888***
		(0.0197)
Observations	22,219	18,805

Note. Results reported as odds ratio.

***$p < .01$ **$p < .05$ *$p < .1$.

Table A3. Logistic Regression Model of Values and Vote for Right- Wing Populist Parties

Variables	Base Model	Complete Model
Self- enhancement	1.290***	1.218***
	(0.0440)	(0.0508)
Self- transcendent	0.417***	0.603***
	(0.0198)	(0.0358)
Openness	0.886***	0.868***
	(0.0337)	(0.0400)
Conservation	2.018***	1.535***
	(0.0863)	(0.0881)
Religion		1.088
		(0.0795)
Age		0.979***
		(0.00285)
Women		0.981
		(0.0660)
Education level		0.798***
		(0.0162)
Dummy set of occupation (ref. category: employed		
Student		0.275***
		(0.0535)
Unemployed		1.157
		(0.165)
Retired		1.109
		(0.120)
Housework		0.823
		(0.123)
Left- Right		1.685***
		(0.0279)
Trust institution		0.963*
		(0.0208)
Political efficacy		0.935*
		(0.0372)
Satisfaction national politics		1.022
		(0.0209)
Immigration		0.901***
		(0.0248)
Observations	20,822	17,624

Note. Results reported as odds ratio
***p < .01 **p < .05 *p < .1.

Table A4. Logistic Regression Model of Values and Vote for Left- Wing Populist Parties

Variables	Base Model	Complete Model
Self- enhancement	0.974	1.019
	(0.0369)	(0.0451)
Self- transcendent	0.829***	0.672***
	(0.0513)	(0.0446)
Openness	1.053	1.054
	(0.0482)	(0.0553)
Conservation	1.090*	1.242***
	(0.0533)	(0.0686)
Religion		0.833**
		(0.0658)
Age		0.984***
		(0.00335)
Women		0.980
		(0.0741)
Education level		0.911***
		(0.0205)
Dummy set of occupation (ref. category: employed)		
Student		0.973
		(0.178)
Unemployed		1.555***
		(0.216)
Retired		1.293**
		(0.155)
Housework		1.178
		(0.170)
Left- Right		0.687***
		(0.0122)
Trust institution		1.033
		(0.0253)
Political efficacy		0.955
		(0.0432)
Satisfaction national politics		1.000
		(0.0231)
Immigration		0.899***
		(0.0288)
Observations	9,259	7,646

Note. Results reported as odds ratio.
***p < .01 **p < .05 *p < .1.

Table A5. Multilevel Logistic Regression of Values and Vote for Populist Parties, Including Programmatic Preferences

Variables	
Self- enhancement	0.883***
	(0.0177)
Self- transcendent	0.852***
	(0.0350)
Openness	1.115*
	(0.0673)
Conservation	1.146***
	(0.0450)
Religion	0.628***
	(0.0784)
Age	0.982***
	(0.00462)
Women	1.095
	(0.0715)
Education level	0.855***
	(0.0286)
Dummy set of occupation (ref. category: employed)	
Student	0.732**
	(0.114)
Unemployed	2.072***
	(0.196)
Retired	0.998
	(0.153)
Housework	0.946
	(0.0461)
Left- Right	1.234**
	(0.118)
Trust institution	1.009
	(0.0166)
Political efficacy	1.009
	(0.0250)
Satisfaction national politics	0.989
	(0.0225)
Immigration	1.020
	(0.0313)
Same- sex union	1.039
	(0.0401)
Income redistribution	1.002
	(0.0261)
EU unification	0.990
	(0.00872)
Observations	17,402
Number of groups	21

Note. Results reported as odds ratio.
***$p < .01$ **$p < .05$ *$p < .1$.

Table A6. Logistic Regression Predicting Populist Vote on the Subsample of Countries Having Left- and Right- Wing Populist Parties

Variables	Individual Level	Multilevel
Self- enhancement	0.907*	0.882***
	(0.0458)	(0.0189)
Self- transcendent	0.769***	0.843*
	(0.0608)	(0.0815)
Openness	1.098	1.103**
	(0.0668)	(0.0473)
Conservation	1.163**	1.087***
	(0.0728)	(0.0297)
Religion	0.631***	0.587***
	(0.0553)	(0.101)
Age	0.979***	0.979**
	(0.00375)	(0.00886)
Women	1.090	1.126
	(0.0939)	(0.103)
Education level	0.862***	0.863***
	(0.0213)	(0.0425)
Dummy set of occupation (ref. category: employed)		
Student	0.651**	0.675
	(0.132)	(0.208)
Unemployed	1.815***	1.836***
	(0.296)	(0.227)
Retired	1.031	0.996
	(0.147)	(0.107)
Housework	0.883	0.935
	(0.155)	(0.0944)
Left- Right	0.982	0.989
	(0.0217)	(0.0382)
Trust institution	1.021	1.020
	(0.0303)	(0.0125)
Political efficacy	0.890**	0.982
	(0.0458)	(0.0358)
Satisfaction national politics	0.923***	0.946
	(0.0257)	(0.0371)
Immigration	0.955	0.992
	(0.0362)	(0.0457)
Observations	6,465	6,465

Note. Results reported as odds ratio.

***$p < .01$ **$p < .05$ *$p < .1$.

Table A7. Multinomial Logistic Regression of Values and Vote for Left- and Right- Wing Populist Parties

Variables	Nonpopulist Voters	Left- Wing Populist Voters	Nonpopulist Voters	Left- Wing Populist Voters
Self- enhancement	0.986	0.947	1.035	1.033
	(0.0416)	(0.0512)	(0.0512)	(0.0672)
Self- transcendent	1.826***	1.493***	1.598***	1.044
	(0.120)	(0.125)	(0.127)	(0.106)
Openness	0.784***	0.866**	0.863**	0.895
	(0.0385)	(0.0545)	(0.0510)	(0.0694)
Conservation	0.624***	0.665***	0.639***	0.819**
	(0.0336)	(0.0445)	(0.0438)	(0.0706)
Religion			1.218**	1.029
			(0.111)	(0.121)
Age			1.015***	0.998
			(0.00382)	(0.00500)
Women			0.905	0.829*
			(0.0781)	(0.0930)
Education level			1.183***	1.104***
			(0.0309)	(0.0375)
Dummy set of occupation				
(ref. category: employed)				
Student			2.274***	2.163**
			(0.585)	(0.666)
Unemployed			0.833	1.157
			(0.140)	(0.248)
Retired			1.372**	1.872***
			(0.187)	(0.335)
Housework			1.380*	1.574**
			(0.246)	(0.360)
Left- Right			0.774***	0.548***
			(0.0148)	(0.0142)
Trust institution			1.059**	1.084**
			(0.0296)	(0.0395)
Political efficacy			1.125**	1.074
			(0.0579)	(0.0723)
Satisfaction national politics			0.977	0.989
			(0.0257)	(0.0339)
Immigration			1.115***	0.983
			(0.0401)	(0.0464)
Observations			6,465	6,465

Note. Results reported as odds ratio. The reference category is right- wing populist vote.

***$p < .01$ **$p < .05$ *$p < .1$.

Table A8. Populist Parties Included in the Sample

Country	Party Name	Party Family
Austria	FPO	Right
Belgium	Front National	Right
	Lijst Dedecker | Libertair, Direct, Democratisch	Right
	Parti populaire	Right
	Vlaams Blok	Right
Bulgaria	Grazhdani za Evropeysko Razvitie na Balgariya	Right
	Ataka	Right
	Volya	Right
Switzerland	Schweizerische Volkspartei— Union Démocratique du Centre	Right
	Eidgenössisch- Demokratische Union— Union Démocratique Fédérale	Right
	Lega dei Ticinesi	Right
Czech Republic	ANO 2011	No Party Family
	Svoboda a prímá demokracie Tomio Okamura	Right
Finland	Suomen Maaseudun Puolue | Perussuomalaiset	No Party Family
	Sininen tulevaisuus	Right
France	La France Insoumise	Left
	Debout la république | Debout la France	Right
	Front national	Right
Germany	PDS | Die Linke	Left
	Alternative für Deutschland	Right
Hungaria	Fidesz— Magyar Polgári Szövetség	Right
	Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom	Right
	Fidesz— Magyar Polgári Szövetség/Kereszténydemokrata Néppárt	Right
Ireland	Sinn Fein	Left
Italy	Movimento 5 Stelle	No Party Family
	Forza Italia— Il Popolo della Libertà	Right
	Lega (Nord)	Right
	Fratelli d'Italia— Centrodestra Nazionale	Right
Netherlands	Partij voor de Vrijheid	Right
	Socialistiese Partij	Left
	Forum voor Democratie	Right
Norway	Fremskrittspartiet	Right
	Kystpartiet	Right
Poland	Kukiz'15	Right
	Prawo i Sprawiedliwosc	Right
Serbia	Dr Vojislav Šešelj— Srpska radikalna	Right
	Dveri— Demokratska stranka Srbije	Right

	Ivica Dačić— ''Socijalistička partija	Left
Slovenia	Levica	Left
	Lista Marjana Šarca	Left
	Slovenska Demokratska Stranka	Right
	Slovenska nacionalna stranka	Right
Lithuania	Lietuvos laisves sajunga	Left
	Tvarka ir teisingumas— Liberalu Demokratu Partija	Right
	Darbo Partija	No Party Family
	Drasos Kelias	No Party Family
Slovakia	Obycajní ludia a nezávislé osobnosti	Right
	Slovenská národná strana	Right
	Smer— sociálna demokracia	Left
	Sme Rodina— Boris Kollár	Right
Spain	Podemos	Left
	Podemos	Left
	En Comú Podem	Left
	VOX	Right
Sweden	Sverigedemokraterna	Right
Croatia	Most nezavisnih lista	Right
	Živi zid	Left
	Hrvatski demokratski savez Slavonije i Baranje	Right

The limits of the cultural backlash theory: A comparative study of authoritarian populism in four European countries

Abstract

Inglehart and Norris have argued that the "cultural backlash" causes the growing "authoritarian populism" in America and Europe: a conservative and religious mobilization in favor of traditional and Christian values and an "authoritarian reflex" against everything foreign triggered by economic insecurity and inequality. As a description of the social forces that brought Trump to power, the model works well, but in Europe the situation is more complex. This article improves the cultural backlash theory by including contextual variables like strength of the country's democratic political culture, perceived threats to the national identity, and the political role of the Catholic church. Using data from the European Values Study, this article nuances the paradigm of far-right supporters: while confirming how anti-immigrants attitudes and authoritarian sentiments constitute the common denominator for supporting authoritarian populist parties, our study reveals important differences in social forces and underlying dynamics determining the support for authoritarian populists.

Keywords

Cultural backlash; populism; far-right; authoritarian populism;

Analysing opinions over time: do populist supporters have anything in common at all?

Abstract

Despite the scholarly attention to the populist phenomenon, we still know little about the existence (or lack) of common motivations of populist parties' voters across ideologies, or their presence over time. Some scholars theorise that it might be possible to identify "a populist voter". However, when tested empirically, most of the features that were thought to be common to populist supporters across ideologies have demonstrated diverse tendencies across countries (e.g., Rooduijn, 2018). I argue that one possible explanation for the scarcity of cohesive results is the lack of studies that consider both contextual and time differences in their statistical models. From a demand-side perspective, there is consensus over the definition of populism as a context *and* time-dependent phenomenon, but we are lacking studies that investigate the latter aspect. Previous research has identified many relevant cross-sectional explanatory factors. Still, the crucial issue of change over time and how individual-level outcomes may depend on time-varying social, political, and economic conditions are so far left mostly unanswered. Thus, this study investigates the presence, consistency and evolution of the beliefs unifying voters of populist parties from left and right-wing ideologies across time. Accordingly, this study explores the presence of commonalities among the voter base of populist parties across countries and across time by using nine waves of ESS data (2002-2018), in nine countries that have had established and successful populist parties for the whole period. Including both cross-sectional and longitudinal dimensions, I test empirically and confirm the assumption that populism is a context and time dependent phenomenon, from a demand-side perspective.

This paper is awaiting publicaton and is not included in NTNU Open

Are populist voters more emotional than other voters? And what about the elitists?

Introduction

Several observers have taken notice of the affect-laden rhetoric of populist parties and the provocative appearances of many populist leaders. In many countries, right wing-populists have displayed open hostility toward, and disgust with, immigrants, minorities, with the distant elite. Since the attack on the US Capitol in January 2021, populism has also been associated with anti-democratic behavior and political violence. Populism has therefore become connected to expressive politics, political preferences and participation driven by affect, often by a deep resentment against the elite and various groups seen as deviant or undeserving. Starting with the work of Rico et al. (2017) many have come to see blame attribution and confrontational rhetoric as defining characteristics of populism, appealing to anger and resentment among its supporters.

On this latter point, an important question is left unanswered on whether the appeal to negative emotions is an exclusive trait of populist supporters, and if the populist character of these parties is the one to blame for the affective arousal among voters. Therefore, in this contribution, we further discuss whether affective arousal is ingrained in the populist supporters' worldviews, by confronting the affective arousal of populists with the one of populists' adversaries, here referred to as the elitists. Several theories suggest that *all people*, not only populists, experience emotional arousal in relation to political symbols, actors, and issues. Therefore, we add to the literature by investigating the possibility that the elitists' supporters, may also be prone to experience negative emotions directed at the populists: a point that has not drawn much attention, but that is essential to fully make sense of the largely discussed affective component of populism and its supporters.

Emotions used to be seen as ingrained in political attitudes: the positive or negative emotions linked to an attitude object were defined as the "valence" of the attitude. Later, emotional arousal has received attention as a distinct causal mechanism in, among others, *Symbolic politics theory* (Sears er.al. 1980, Sears & Citrin 1982, Sears 2001), *the online model* or "hot cognition hypothesis" (Lodge et.al. 1989; 1995; 2005), *the Affective Intelligence Theory*. According to this last theory, all people react emotionally in certain situations, whether they

recognize it or not. The implications are twofold: on one side, emotions are likely to be experienced not only by populist supporters but also by their counterparts. On the other, populists are characterized by *what* they react emotionally against, not the emotional arousal as such.

On this later point, inspired by the work of Rabinowitz and MacDonald (1989), we see distances in political space as expressions of affective intensity. Voters are attracted to the issue-positions, and the political actors linked to them, arousing the strongest positive emotions and repulsed by the issue-positions and politicians that stir strong negative emotion. Those positions that do not evoke affect are uninteresting. Therefore, the emotional arousal among populists can be seen as a consequence of the extreme positions on issues that populists favor, rather than the "thin" populist ideology as such. It also follows that populists may experience more hostility from supporters of elitist and mainstream parties, than supporters of these parties get from populists. The extreme issue-position of the populists triggers negative affect among others, whereas the populists might see mainstream policy-positions as boring rather than appalling.

We test our arguments by employing survey data collected after the Norwegian 2021 election. The level of party-polarization in Norway is generally low.[1] The 2021 election did not call forth strong emotions. Elections in stable democracies marked by consensus-politics and several cross-cutting cleavages rarely do. Moreover, the outcome of the election was predictable. Months before the election, the opinion polls projected a clear win for the opposition; consequently, the campaign lacked the intensity of a close election. Our survey measures the respondents' emotional reactions to the leaders of the four largest parties, and what they stand for.

We find that populist supporters have stronger negative feelings about the leaders of mainstream parties than do other voters, even when we control for strength of identification with another party and the distance in political space between the voter's preferred party and the party in question. However, also the elitists express negative feelings about the leaders of the two populist parties, the Progress Party and the Centre Party. Negative emotions *are not* a prerogative of populist supporters. To add to this, we find that political distance provides, over populism, the strongest explanation of the negative feelings felt about the Progress Party leader.

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[1] In an unpublished comparison of party-polarization in Western Europe, based on Dalton's polarization index and data from the European Value Survey (2017-8), Norway scores as low as 3.25 and ranks number eleven out of the fourteen countries, far behind its Nordic neighbors.

The party, however, is not punished disproportionally; rather, the hostility increases linearly with political distance. People with a strong party identification tend to carry negative feelings about the leaders of other parties. Populism is the strongest predictor only in the case of the Conservative Party leader, Solberg, who after eight years as prime minister, probably stood out as the very incarnation of "elite".

The paper proceeds as follows: first, we discuss the theoretical and empirical contributions on the distinctive relationship between populism and emotions. Further, we describe and build on the Affective Intelligence Theory to theorize the role that emotions might play also for mainstream supporters. Finally, we build on the Directional theory of issue voting and the role of party identification when arguing what might be the drivers of the affective reactions among populist and non-populist supporters.

Populism and feelings

Populists are frequently described as angry, frustrated, and aggressive (e.g., Erisen & Vasiloppoulou 2021, Marcus et al. 2019, Müller 2016, Rhodes-Purdy et al. 2021, Rudolph 2021, Schumacher et al. 2022, Stapleton & Dawkins 2022, Webster 2018). They suffer from alienation, lack of trust, and low efficacy, which leads to a deeply felt resentment (Cramer 2016, p. 66). While on one side emotionality is ingrained in all types of political engagement, there is a distinctive relationship between emotions and populism (Bonansinga 2020). Following Bonansinga's (2020) categorization, the link between populism and emotions can be analyzed by looking at structural, subjective, and communicative dimensions of populism, and how these are linked to emotions.

The structural dimension deals with different theories on the origin of the populist demand; beyond the diverse focuses of those theories, they all tend to highlight how certain long-term, macro-level societal changes (such as globalization) culminated in a series of grievances which present an affective aspect. Being the left-out losers of economic globalization (Kriesi et al. 2006), or the "about to be displaced" conservative minority in a new, liberal society (Norris and Inglehart, 2019) has an affective dimension which cannot be ignored. Some citizens experience the erosion of their identities and their economic power, and feel insecure, deprived, or threatened, whether culturally and/or economically (Gidron & Hall 2017; 2020).

Moving to the subjective dimension of populism, theories started to be developed on the specific link between emotions and the support for populist ideas and parties. Among others, two generic theories about emotions have been applied to the study of affective and populism,

Affective intelligence theory (Brader & Marcus 2013) and Appraisal theory (Lazarus 1991). Affective intelligence theory claims that emotions are our conscious experience of processes in our brain dedicated to learning and to dealing with danger. Appraisal theory links the emotional reaction to aspects of the concrete situation. The two arguments are theoretically distinct, but the hypotheses derived from the two theories are similar, with some exceptions. In line with Affective Intelligence theory, Vasilopoulous et al. (2019) and Marcus et al. (2019) argue that right-wing populism and authoritarianism is caused by anger, whereas fear leads people to shy away from populism and authoritarianism. Vasilopoulos et al. (2019) found that Front National gained support among those reacting with anger to the Paris terror in 2015, while those reacting with anxiety stayed away from the FN. Rico et al. (2017) on the other hand, claim that the Appraisal theory is sufficient to explain the populists' anger: when a threat is posed by a well-known and inferior "other", disgust and anger are the affective response under the circumstances. Jost (2019), on the other hand, found that both fear and anger are associated with support for right-wing populism, but that anger, being the stronger predictor, suppresses the effect of fear in multivariate models.

Furthermore, Salmela and Scheve (2017) theorized that support for right-wing populism is rooted in two psychological mechanisms in which shame plays a key role. When shame is repressed, feelings of fear and insecurity are transformed into anger, hatred, and resentment. The second mechanism is the shift of social identity away from identities triggering shame, to identities which boost status and respectability.

Likewise, Betz (2018) underlines the aggressive side of populism, by making a distinction between *ressentiment* and resentment in relation to populism. The concept "ressentiment" originates from Nietzsche's discussion of slave morality, the passive-aggressive attitude of the subject-classes, created by the experience of powerlessness, loss of status and insecure identity. Populists, on the contrary, do not feel powerless, they are aggressive, and they resent those they blame for their loss of status and who threaten their identities.

Other argued that some of the populists' negative affect seems to originate from their affect-laden opposition to immigrants and immigration (Rudolph, 2021, Erisen & Vasilopoulou, 2021). Similarly, distrust in the federal government has been identified as one of the main roots of the anger among Trump-supporters in 2016 (Rudolph, 2021), as well as in other elections (Webster, 2018).

On the communicative dimension, populists master the ability of channeling these ressentiment feelings through communication practices which, mirroring the ideological core of populism as defined by Mudde (2004), very often involve the blaming of various "others", or the

description of society and events through a divisive, Manichaean lens. In addition, charismatic leaders and harsh rhetoric make the populist message newsworthy, giving populists access to large audiences through mainstream media (Esser et al. 2017). As noted, populist messages tend to be largely affective (see Nai 2021), based on the attribution of blame for the various sources of people's ressentiment both to the elites and/or to an evil "other". This affective focus on blame attribution and discrediting of the elite, combined with the "architecture" of the social media, give populists ample opportunity to activate anger among people (Jacobs et. al. 2020). Skonieczy (2018) has argued that the rhetoric of both Trump and Sanders was suitable to arise fear, anxiety, anger, and a feeling of powerlessness among the public. Similarly, Widmann (2021) found that populist politicians in Germany, Austria, and Switzerland expressed more negative and fewer positive emotions, compared to mainstream politicians. Stapleton and Dawkins (2022) have argued that feelings like anger, disgust and outrage can be transmitted directly from populist leaders to the rank-and-file by "affective linkage", a partly subconscious process in which individuals sometimes mimic the emotional expressions of others, but also a more conscious process where the communality between sender and receiver is important.

In sum, emotions seem to be linked to populism for several reasons. The structural societal changes at the basis of populism trigger strong negative emotions and these feelings are exploited in the populists' affective communication strategies. Such link is largely documented by, among other, the above-mentioned studies on the subjective link between emotions and populism. Building on this we suggest our first hypothesis:

(H$_1$) *Negative affective arousal is more prominent among people with a populist worldview than among others.*

However, as anticipated, a thorough analysis of the link between emotions and populism cannot exclude the analysis of the emotional reactions of the elitists. Focusing merely on populist supporters will only tell half of the story. While none of the aforementioned studies claim that strong emotions are a uniquely populist attribute, nor that populists are more emotionally aroused than other people, the reader might easily come to that conclusion, since emotions among mainstream voters are rarely discussed. We analyze this latter point by building on two general theories on emotions in political life, the Theory of Affective Intelligence and the Directional theory of issue voting. The former helps with theorizing why we should consider not only the emotions of populist supporters, while the latter helps with understanding what might trigger the emotional responses. We will also discuss briefly how the emotional dimension of party identification may play a significant role.

Affective Intelligence Theory

Feelings are the conscious experience of automated, semi-conscious processes in our brains, and they often precede thinking (Zajonc, 1980). For instance, an immediate emotional response to a political symbol initiates a cognitive process, the search for arguments justifying the initial affective response. A central implication of this argument is that *all citizens*, not only populists, may react emotionally, and in given situations *will* react emotionally. Parts of our brains are devoted to monitoring our surroundings and activating other parts of the brain, such as short-term memory and awareness. We experience this as emotions (LeDoux 1996). Inspired by the works of Gray (1970; 1990) and Tellegen (1985), Marcus (1988, 1991) identified two regulatory mechanisms associated with feelings of enthusiasm and accomplishment, and unease and anxiety, respectively. The "dispositional" or positive system tends to boost existing preferences and patterns of behavior, whereas the "surveillance" or negative system stimulates reasoning, a search for alternative behavioral strategies and new information (Marcus and MacKuen 1993, Marcus et.al. 2000, ch. 4.).

Later, the argument was refined by distinguishing between anxiety and stronger, more aggressive feelings such as anger and aversion, contempt, and hatred (Marcus 2003, Huddy et al. 2007, Brader and Marcus, 2013, Marcus et al. 2019). This distinction is significant, because aversion and aggression trigger (hostile) action but little thinking, whereas anxiety and unease stimulate thinking but inhibit action. The context triggering the two sets of emotions are also described as different. Aggression tends to be triggered by threats from well-known and controllable sources, whereas the sources of anxiety are often diffuse and the context unfamiliar (Lerner and Keltner 2000, MacKuen et.al. 2010). Because these three types of emotional reactions are rooted in different parts of the brain, they can be aroused independently. So, it is possible to experience fear and enthusiasm simultaneously, provoked by the same political symbol or communication. From this argument we derive our second hypothesis:

(H$_2$) *All people, including populists and their adversaries, the elitists, as well as mainstream voters, may experience emotional arousal in relation to political symbols, actors, and issues.*

This proposition highlights the need for a clarification on what supposedly triggers the emotional response in different groups of voters. We expect populists to express negative feelings about the party leaders they regard as elitists, whereas the elitists will react negatively toward the leaders associated with populism. However, all voters, including mainstream voters, will express negative feelings when the distance to the other party in political space is considerable.

Emotional political space

The Directional theory of issue voting was inspired by Symbolic Politics theory (e.g., Sears et al., 1980; Kinder and Sears, 1981; Sears and Citrin, 1985). Within Symbolic Politics theory voters are described as motivated by their emotional responses to significant political symbols (social groups, party names, ideologies etc.) rather than a pursuit of self-interest: *The key tenet of symbolic politics is that for issues to have impact, they must evoke emotions and sentiments rather than simple objective appraisal of information* (Rabinowitz and MacDonald, 1989 p. 94).

Directional theory (Rabinowitz and MacDonald, 1989; MacDonald et al., 1991) introduced two important ideas: first, political space is constituted by emotional intensity. What we experience as short distances between ourselves and a party, is a high level of positive affect and absence of negative affect. Long distances mean absence of positive affect and a high level of negative affect. The positions of parties, politicians and policy-positions in political space are thus defined by the emotions they trigger among voters. Our third hypothesis follows from this argument:

(H$_3$) *The level of negative emotions toward political opponents is a function of the political distance between the voter and the opponent*.

Secondly, Rabinowitz and MacDonald argued that affective political space is not uniform. As a rule, a party generating strong positive emotions will win over voters from parties triggering positive, but less intense, emotions, but only within limits. If a political actor moves outside "the region of acceptability," the actor will lose support. The actor becomes "unreasonable" even in the eye of potential followers and may be stigmatized as "extreme" by rivals. Rabinowitz and MacDonald made an example of the Progress Party in Norway (MacDonald et al. 1991). Even in the consensus-oriented Scandinavian polities, mainstream parties have tried to isolate and stigmatize extremist parties. With the arrival of the right-wing Progress parties in Denmark and Norway in the early 1970's the mainstream parties first tried to isolate the newcomers. But gradually the conservative and center-right parties have broken the *cordon sanitaire.* They have become dependent on the right-wing populist parties in their strive for government-power.

Party identification and emotions

The academic debate over political polarization in the US and elsewhere has resulted in a renewed interest in the emotional aspects of party identification (Iyengar et al., 2012; Miller and Conover, 2015; Abramowitz and Webster, 2016; Lelkes and Westwood, 2017; Bankert 2020). Party identification has been described as loaded with positive emotions linked to the party, its policy and leader (Campbell et al., 1960; Marcus et al., 2000; Green et al., 2002). Recent studies have demonstrated that party identification is also loaded with *negative* feelings about conflicting parties and their leaders. Tajfel's Social Identity theory (Tajfel, 1974; 1981; 1982; Tajfel and Turner, 1979) is often mentioned by scholars who argue that party identification is a crucial component in the social identity of many. Tajfel argued that a person's self-esteem is boosted through the systematic exaggeration of positive aspects of the in-group, and the assignment of negative attributes to out-groups. A strong party identity adds to the emotional intensity by making politics personal. Hence, identification with one party generates negative emotional reactions to rival parties:

(H4) *We expect those with a strong party identification to express more negative feelings about other parties and their leaders, than people without a party identification.*

Kekkonen and Ylä-Anttila (2021) have suggested that party-blocs may be more significant objects of affective identification than parties in multiparty systems. We will consider this argument in our concluding section.

Data and measurement

We test our hypotheses building on the Norwegian case. As anticipated, the polls predicted a clear win for the opposition, therefore the electoral campaign lacked much of the intensity associated with close elections (Campbell 1966). Beyond this specific election, however, the fact that Norway presents overall low levels of party polarization, and a consensus-oriented political culture make Norway a least-likely case for our hypotheses testing. Consequently, if what hypothesized is confirmed, we expect these assumptions to be likely to be valid elsewhere in Europe.

Kantar carried out a web-survey in the first week after the election (N=1551). A probability sample was drawn from the Gallup-panel, a base of more than 50,000 who had agreed to take part in web-surveys. Participation was promoted through a lottery-system. Sampling biases were corrected by weighting the sample according to age, gender, level of education, and place

of residence. A full report on the sampling, weighting-procedure, etc. is available on request (Jortveit, 2021).

We believe that concrete and specific attitudinal objects are more likely to trigger emotional arousal than abstract and vague objects. Party leaders have become embodiments of their parties, the media-celebrities of politics (Mugham 2000) even in Norway (Jenssen & Aalberg 2006); hence, we asked respondents about their feelings about the leaders of the four largest parties. The leaders were presented with full name, party affiliation and a neutral picture. They were: (outgoing) PM and leader of the Conservative Party, *Solberg*; leader of the Labour Party (incoming PM), *Støre*; leader of the Centre Party *Vedum*; and the leader of the Progress Party, *Listhaug*. The order in which they were presented in the survey was rotated. For each politician, the respondents were asked what emotions [name of politician], and "what he/she stands for" evoke in them. The clarification was added to make sure that respondents focused on the political role - not the personal life - of the party leader in question. In addition to party leaders, as a robustness check, we analyze the affective reactions of populist and elitists supports in relation to a series of institutions and movements (e.g., UN climate experts, the social democratic labor unions).

The emotions were presented one at a time and respondents were asked whether they felt "not at all", "to a small degree", "to some degree", "to a strong degree" or to "a very strong degree" emotionally aroused. The seven emotions were: Hope and enthusiasm, fear, trust, unease, anger and frustration, joy and pride, disgust, hope and enthusiasm. Based on the results from previous studies, some associated emotions were combined into single items, such as "joy and pride". Trust was not among the emotions applied in the previous studies of emotional responses to political actors, and some will probably argue that trust is not an emotion at all. Trust can be described as the *absence* of fear and anxiety. At the same time, *trust* is probably the term used most frequently by Norwegians, when they express their views about politicians; it seems to work like a summary of their feelings about a politician.

Four factor-analyzes (Figures A3-6) were conducted to test the dimensionality of the emotional responses to the party leaders. For all party leaders, the results were identical, two strong dimensions, one consisting of the four negative emotions, and a second factor including the three positive emotions. We nevertheless decided to maintain the distinction between milder negative feelings (anxiety and fear) and stronger ones (anger and disgust) in the initial analysis, for the sake of the theoretical argument.

The measurement of populism, elitism, and pluralism among voters has proven difficult; as this article is *not* a contribution in the ongoing exchange, we will discuss our approach briefly.

The operationalization builds on Mudde's (2004) "ideational" definition of populism and elitism as conflictual, "thin" ideologies, that must be combined with full ideologies to function. Populism and elitism share a Manichaean outlook: the conflict between the people and the elite is fundamental in society, but they take different sides in the struggle. Populists tend to see the elite as corrupt, self-serving, and out of touch, whereas elitists regard ordinary people as unsophisticated, irresponsible, and politically incompetent. We therefore base the operationalization of the items (see appendix for details) on the conflict between populism and elitism on the distribution of political power and authority.

The respondents were asked to indicate their positions between two contradictory statements, one expressing a populist position and one an elitist stance on a 11-point scale. As presenting outrageous arguments incline respondents to choose the "neutral" middle-category, we operationalized both the elitist and populist arguments as reasonable:

1. *The impact of the will of the people on policy must become stronger* versus *The most competent and knowledgeable must govern.*

2. *The top-politicians tend to become self-serving and arrogant* versus *The so-called "grass-roots" is ignorant and old-fashioned.*

3. *Common people do not understand what is best for themselves in politics and economics* versus *The elites do not care about the needs and problems of ordinary people.*

4. *Politicians trying to please the public make bad decisions* versus *Right now, politicians must learn to listen to ordinary people and govern accordingly.*

We have not attempted to measure monism versus pluralism, the second dimension in Mudde's definition. To measure support for an abstract idea such as pluralism is difficult without mentioning specific groups, and when groups are mentioned, they inevitably become the main attitude object.

Distance in political space has been operationalized both as party voted for (dummies) and as the difference between the average score of the party for which the respondent voted and the average score of the other party on the left-right scale (Table 2). Although the meaning of "left" and "right" might not be identical for all voters, we believe the distance between parties is a valid and parsimonious indicator for the level of political distance between parties (Cf. appendix for discussion).

Analysis

The first step in the analysis is to describe the level of emotional arousal among the voters. Following the latest version of Affective Intelligence Theory (Marcus & Brader 2013), we have constructed three indexes: Enthusiasm, Anxiety (fear and anxiety) and Anger (anger and frustration, disgust). As argued, given the low intensity of the campaign, the unsurprising election result, and previous findings (Syrstad and Aardal, 2019), we can hardly expect strong emotional responses from the voters.

Figure 1. Level of emotional arousal linked to four party leaders and what they stand for. Average scores on enthusiasm, anxiety and anger (0-1 scales).

The leader of the Conservative Party, Solberg, aroused the strongest positive feelings, closely followed by the leader of the Labour Party, Støre. The Centre Party leader, Vedum, was almost on par. These leaders triggered some negative emotions as well, but, overall, they are well-liked. The same cannot be said about the leader of the Progress Party, Listhaug. Her score on the enthusiasm-index was only a fraction of the scores of the others, and she triggered both anxiety and anger in many voters. However, the average voters' scores on the anxiety and anger indexes did not reach 0.5; so, the scores are well below the maximum intensity of 1.0.

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Figure 2 shows the respondents' score on the elitism-populism scale, sorted by the party for which they voted. It is important to bear in mind that the minimum value in the elitism-populism scale is 0 and the maximum 1. Most voters, irrespective of the party for which they voted, are positioned close to the population average (the "mainstream voters"), slightly on the populist side of the center.


Figure 2. Populism-elitism by party voted for 2021. Deviations from the population's mean score (0.59) on a 0-1 scale. Eta 0.39 p<0.001

Three parties, with very different ideological roots, attracted voters with a populist worldview: the right-wing Progress Party, the center-left Centre Party and a small left-wing party, Red. Elitists were drawn to the Liberal Party and the Conservative Party above all. The average Labour Party-supporter scored much closer to the population's average on the elitism-populism scale. If populists dislike elitists and vice-versa, this leads us to expect that among the four party leaders we discuss here, Solberg (Conservative Party) will trigger the strongest negative emotions among populists. Vedum (Centre Party) and Listhaug (Progress Party), on the other hand, will generate negative emotions among elitists. Støre (Labour Party) may arouse negative feelings among populists, but not to the same degree as Solberg.

To test this, we ran a series of regression analyzes of the feelings of anxiety and anger related to party leaders and what they stand for. Table 1 displays the results. Model 1 includes only the effect of elitism versus populism on negative affect vis-à-vis party leaders, while Model 2

adds the party voted for (political distance), and the level of identification with a competing party.

Table 1. Feelings of anxiety and anger (0-1 scales) in relation to four party leaders and what they stand for as a result elitism-populism (0-1 scale), party voted for, and level of party identification. Unstandardized coefficients from OLS-regressions and standard errors in brackets.

	Jonas Gahr Støre – Labour Party		Trygve Slagsvold Vedum - Centre Party		Erna Solberg – Conservative Party		Sylvi Listhaug – Progress Party	
Model 1	Anxiety	Anger	Anxiety	Anger	Anxiety	Anger	Anxiety	Anger
Elitism-populism	.15***	.16***	-.22***	-.19***	.38***	42***	-.09	-.10
	(.04)	(.04)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.05)
Model 2:								
Elitism-populism	.19***	.20***	-.15***	-.14***	.32***	.33***	-.11**	-.14**
	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.03)	(.03)	(.04)	(.05)	(.04)
Voted for:								
Red	-.08***	-.10***	.00	.02	.10***	.08***	.41***	.40***
	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.03)	(.03)
Socialist Left	-.11***	-.11***	.03	.03	.02	.01	.39***	.36***
	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.03)	(.03)
Green	-.02	-.05	.09**	.10***	.09**	.06*	.33***	.34***
	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.04)	(.04)
Labour	Ref. cat.	Ref.cat.	-.01	-.01	.03*	.04*	.29***	.28***
			(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)
Center Party	-.02	-.05*	Ref. cat.	Ref.cat.	.07***	.04*	.16***	.09**
	(.02)	(.02)			(.02)	(.02)	(.03)	(.03)
Christian Democrats	.05	.04	.06	.04	-.06	-.06	.22***	.12*
	(.03)	(.03)	(.04)	(.03)	(.03)	(.04)	(.05)	(.05)
Liberal	.03	.01	.14***	.11***	.03	.01	.24***	.18***
	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.04)	(.04)
Conservative	.10***	.07***	.08***	.05**	Ref. cat.	Ref.cat.	.04	-.03
	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)			(.03)	(.03)
Progress Party	.14***	.13***	.05*	.03	-.03	-.04	Ref.cat.	Ref. cat.
	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)		
Abstainers	.01	.02	.05	.06*	.04	.08**	.24***	.18***
	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.04)	(.04)
Strong ID other party[a]	.13***	.11***	.08***	.07***	.11***	.12***	.14***	.17***
	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)
Moderate ID other party[a]	.05***	.06***	.03*	.03*	.06***	.07***	.05**	.07***
	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.02)	(.02)
Adjusted R^2	.010/ .145	.012/ .130	.025/ .074	.021/ .055	.079/ .141	.091/ .153	.001/ .250	.001/ .252

[a]Identification with the leader of the party leader in question is coded as no party identification (0).
The model improvements were statistically significant (p< .001) in all cases.
***p < .001, ** p < .01 *p < .05.
Constants were omitted from the table.

The effect of elitism versus populism on negative affect vis-à-vis party leaders stands up well when controlled for the party voted for; in the case of Støre and Listhaug the effect increases a bit. Solberg – and what she stands for – trigger feelings of anxiety and anger among populists (confirming H_1 in this case), even when we take the party voted for and level of party identification into account.

The party leaders with the strongest appeal to populist voters, Listhaug (Progress Party) and Vedum (Centre Party), aroused neither anxiety nor anger among populists; on the contrary, it is the *elitists* who experienced anxiety and anger in relation to these two leaders (H_2). The leader of the Progress Party, Listhaug, triggers the strongest negative emotions among the four. The level of anxiety and anger is firmly linked to distance in political space, with the strongest emotional arousal among those voting for parties on the left. However, the Progress Party leader also unleashes anxiety and anger among those voting for the Centre Party, the Liberal Party, and the Christian Democrats. Elitists are considerably more likely than other voters to express negative emotions about Listhaug.

As expected (H_4), those with a strong identification with another party hold stronger negative feelings about the party leaders in all instances, and this effect overcomes the effects of the party voted for and elitism-populism.

The overall results suggest that the distinction between anxiety and anger is of less consequence than the Affective Intelligence Theory suggests. Those feeling anger in relation to a party leader also feel anxiety and vise-versa (Table A1). In the case of Progress Party leader Listhaug, the correlation is .83 (r_{xy}).

Introducing statistical controls for education, income, age, and gender (Table A3) does not alter the results reported above. The model's overall explanatory power is enhanced, but the effects of the key explanatory variables are barely affected. Adding an interaction term between party voted for and elitism-populism in cases where parties are considered close in political space, but one party attracts populist voters or other elitists, does not improve the models.

The order in which the parties (voted for) were listed in table 1 mirrors the left-right self-placement of their respective voters. Eyeballing tells us that, in most cases, the level of emotional arousal follows a left/right-pattern; voters on the left-wing react most negatively to the party leader on the far right, and vice-versa. Although the ideological space in Norway has been described as multi-dimensional in several studies (Aardal 2015, Aardal et.al. 2019) the pattern in table 1 hints that the distance between the respondent and the party and party leader in question on the left/right scale may serve as a proxy for both the emotional and political distance between them. In table 2, we have therefore substituted the party voted for dummies with distance on the left/right-scale between the party for which the respondent voted and the party of the party leader in question (C.f. appendix for details).

The results of table 1 displayed very similar results for anxiety and anger. This comes as no surprise, given the strong covariance between the two indices (see Table A1). Consequently, in the analyzes reported in table 2, they were collapsed into one index, tagged "Negative

feelings". This both condenses the presentation and improves the statistical quality of the dependent variable (more variance, less skewedness). We have also included Distrust in parties and politicians among the independent variables. The literature describes political distrust as a significant aspect of populism, but distrust may also add explanatory power, as distrust in parties and politicians is more widespread than populism. Finally, we have added squared distance on the left/right scale in model 3, to test whether distances in political space is non-linear, as suggested in Directional theory of issue voting.

Table 2. Negative feelings about party leaders and what they stand for (0-1 scale) by level of elitism-populism (0-1 scale), political distance (0-1 scale), strength of identification with another party and distrust in politicians and parties (0-1 scale). Unstandardized coefficients (B) with standard errors from OLS-regressions.

	Støre Labour Party		Vedum Centre Party		Solberg Conservative Party		Listhaug Progress Party	
Model 1:	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE
Elitism-Populism scale	.16***	.03	-.20***	.03	.40***	.03	-.10*	.05
Model 2:								
Elitism-Populism scale	.08*	.03	-.21***	.03	.25***	.03	-.17***	.04
Political distance	.33***	.04	.20***	.05	.22***	.03	.74***	.04
Strong PID other party	.11***	.02	.08**	.02	.12***	.02	.15***	.02
Moderate PID other party	.03**	.01	.03**	.01	.06***	.01	.07***	.02
Distrust in political actors	.28***	.02	.10***	.02	.21***	.02	-.10**	.03
Model 3:								
Elitism-Populism scale	.08***	.03	-.19***	.03	.25***	.03	-.17***	.04
Political distance	-.09	.14	1.73***	.30	.37***	.08	.72***	.11
Political distance squared	.95**	.31	-5.03***	.98	-.30***	.14	.04	.20
Strong PID other party	.12***	.02	.07***	.02	.12***	.02	.15***	.02
Moderate PID other party	.04***	.02	.02*	.01	.06***	.01	.07***	.02
Distrust in politicians, parties	.28***	.01	.10***	.02	.20***	.02	-.10**	.03
R^2 (M1/M2/M3)	.01/ .20 / .20		.03/ .07/ .08		.10/ .21/ .22		.00/ .28/ .28	
*** p<.001 ** p<.01 *<.05 Constants omitted.								

Political distance is more important than elitism-populism in explaining negative emotions linked to Støre and Listhaug, confirming H_3 (Figures 3b and 3d). Again, populists express significantly more negative feelings about the leaders of the Labour Party, and especially the Conservatives (Figure 3a) than other respondents. Elitists report more negative feelings about the leaders of the Centre Party (Figure 3c). For Solberg, the effect of populism is stronger than

the effect of political distance. Voters identifying strongly with another party express stronger negative emotions, as expected (H_4).

Distrust in parties and politicians adds to the negative feelings towards Støre, Solberg and Vedum, but for the leader of the Progress Party, the effect is reversed. General distrust in politicians and parties *decreases* negative feelings towards Listhaug.

To test whether the negative feelings associated with the Progress Party leader are stronger than the linear political distance predicts, a non-linear term for political distance was added (Model 3). The level of animosity linked to Listhaug and what she stands for proved to be a linear function of political distance only. The effect of the squared distance was statistically insignificant. However, the addition of the non-linear term also revealed that the negative emotions aroused by Solberg (Conservatives) rise sharply with distance when we move from center-right to center-left parties, but then levels off (hence the negative sign). There is a corresponding, effect for Vedum (Centre Party), suggesting that the divide between the center-left and center-right blocs has a significant effect. Støre (Labour) on the other hand triggers negative emotions on the right, especially the extreme right (Cf. Table 1). In both instances the model improvements were significant, but tiny (Table A2).

Adding education, age, income, and gender contributes to the overall explanatory power of the model but causes only tiny changes in the effects of the key variables (see appendix table A4). The effects of the demographic variables reflect the support for the various parties in the respective demographic subgroups.

Figure 3a. Negative feelings towards Solberg (Cons.) by net effects of elitism *vs.* populism and political distance (L-R).


Elitism-Populism
Distance L-R

0,8

0,6

0,4

0,2

0

0   0,1 0,2 0,3 0,4 0,5 0,6 0,7 0,8 0,9 1

Figure 3b. Negative feelings towards Støre (Lab.) by net effects of elitism *vs.* populism and political distance (L-R).

Elitism-Populism
Distance L-R

0,8

0,6

0,4

0,2

0

0   0,1 0,2 0,3 0,4 0,5 0,6 0,7 0,8 0,9 1

Figure 3c. Negative feelings towards Vedum (Cent.) by net effects of elitism *vs.* populism and political distance (L-R).

Elitism-Populism
Distance L-R

0,8

0,6

0,4

0,2

0

0   0,1 0,2 0,3 0,4 0,5 0,6 0,7 0,8 0,9 1

Figure 3d. Negative feelings towards Listhaug (Prog.) by net effects of elitism *vs.* populism and political distance (L-R).

Elitism-Populism
Distance L-R

1

0,8

0,6

0,4

0,2

0

0   0,1 0,2 0,3 0,4 0,5 0,6 0,7 0,8 0,9 1

The political distance was fixed to 0.5 for the estimation of effect of elitism-populism. Likewise, elitism-populism was fixed to 0.5 for the estimation of the effect of political distance. The other variables are set to the following values : No party identification, 1-3 years of university or college education, 30-44 years of age, low to medium income, female.

Discussion

This article is inspired by the theory of Affective Intelligence and the Directional theory of issue voting, holding (1) that all humans react emotionally in some situations and (2) that what we think of distances in political space are reflections of the direction (positive or negative) and affective intensity. We apply these theories in the context of emotional reactions of populist supporters and their counterpart, the elitist supporters. We also argue that people with strong party identifications tend to develop negative feelings about other parties. We find support for the argument that resentment against an elite is ingrained in the populist worldview, but we also find that the populists' adversaries, the elitists, express negative emotions, typically about the party leaders populists find attractive.

Overall, our results confirm how the link between emotionality and populism is not a one-way street: negative emotions are intrinsic to populism, but populist politicians are also targets for hostility from others, both elitists and mainstream voters. While populists express stronger negative feelings about the leaders of the two mainstream parties than others, the elitists also report more anxiety and anger in connection with the populist leaders Vedum and Listhaug. There are, however, exceptions to the *populists and elitists despise each other* pattern. The leader of the Progress Party, Listhaug, incites strong negative emotions among many, but not among (elitist) supporters of the Conservative Party. The (populist) supporters of the Centre Party, in turn, express both anxiety and anger about Listhaug.

From this, it seems that emotionality is ingrained in both populism and elitism, even when controlled for the party voted for. Table 2 displays a more complicated yet refined picture. Negative feelings are closely linked to distance in political space: political distance is a more powerful predictor than the elitism-populism scale in explaining negative emotions linked to Støre (Labour) and Listhaug (Progress Party). Voters identifying strongly with other parties express more negative emotions, as expected.

This has some important consequences for our understanding of populism, its supporters and leaders. Our results demonstrate how, despite resentment being ingrained in populism, populist supporters, when compared with their counterparts, the elitists, are *not* more emotional. Populism is linked to and builds on negative emotions and populist *leaders* make use of more negative emotions than mainstream leaders do (Nai, 2021); but as our results have shown, the same cannot be said of their *followers*. The fact that distance in political space explains emotionality better than the populism-elitism scale does, means that the link between negative

emotions and support for populism is not unique. Rather, it seems like the link between populism and emotion is limited to some issues the leaders exploit (Nai 2021).

In the case of Solberg, the effect of populism was stronger than the effect of political distance. After eight years as prime minister, Solberg probably stood out as the very incarnation of "elite", the establishment, the political class, everything populists dislike. The fact that Solberg was generally well liked also contributed to this result.

Some of the political parties in Norway do not define their policy-position in terms of left and right. Researchers have typically needed 5-6 attitude-dimensions to describe the political space (e.g., Aardal 2015; Aardal et al. 2019). Almost all Norwegian voters are, nevertheless, perfectly able to position themselves on the left/right-scale. How do voters translate their complex issue-positions into one dimension? The answer to this enigma, *may* come from the theories focusing on voters' feelings. The results presented in this article are compatible with the idea that political space is constituted by feelings. People vote for the party evoking the strongest positive feelings in them and rate the other parties by the level of negative feelings they have about them. People are nevertheless able to give reasons for their choice of party and their issue-positions. Affective Intelligence Theory argues that people feel *and* think, not that they feel rather than think.

Furthermore, the affective reactions of populists and elitists are not limited to political parties and their leaders. Populists harbor negative emotions toward for instance, UN climate experts, the health authorities, and the environmental movement, whereas elitists tend to dislike the social democratic labor unions and the farmers' organization, even when controlled for party voted for (Table A5).

On a final note, the 2021 election may have had some unique characteristics that yet do not impact the validity of the results beyond this specific case. In the years leading up to the 2021 election, the periphery, in Rokkan's understanding of the term, was mobilized against the policy of the government. The Centre Party spearheaded the protest and was rewarded by the voters. A significant number of voters, especially in the rural areas, abandoned the Progress Party and the Conservative Party in favor of the Centre Party.[32] As a result of the 2021 election, the Centre Party is now in government and the Progress Party in opposition. By 2025, the

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[32] According to the Norwegian National Election Survey 2021 presented by Våge (Statistics Norway) at a media briefing, 10 % of those voting for the Centre Party in 2021 had voted for the Progress party in 2017. Another 10% had voted for the Conservatives in 2017.

Progress Party will probably have reclaimed many populist voters from the Centre Party. Likewise, Støre will probably replace Solberg as *the* incarnation of "the elite". This implies that the distribution presented in figure 2 is about to change, but the main findings of this study will stand because the underlying mechanisms are unchanged. When it comes to the generalizability of the results beyond the Norwegian case, as discussed, considering the relatively low levels of party polarization, which find also correspondence in overall low levels of emotional reactions as in Figure 1, one might argue that if these results are found in Norway, they are likely to be confirmed also in other contexts.

Conclusions

Our first hypothesis (H_1) was not generally confirmed. The affective arousal among populists was not stronger than among others *in all instances*. Populists harbored stronger negative feelings than other voters about mainstream politicians, especially PM Solberg, also when controlled for party voted for and strength of party identification, but in the cases of Vedum, the leader of the Centre Party, and the Progress Party leader Listhaug, it was the *elitists* who reported the highest levels of anger and anxiety. The strongest negative feelings overall, were directed at the leader of the leader of populist Progress Party, Listhaug.

We have demonstrated that both populists and elitists are emotionally aroused when faced with political opponents. Moreover, we have shown that distance in political space is linked to emotional arousal. This suggests that most *voters* may experience emotional arousal in relation to politics, but we cannot claim that *all people* always react emotionally to political symbols, actors, and issues (H_2).

The level of negative emotions about political opponents rises as a function of the distance between the voter and the opponent (confirming H_3), and in the cases of Listhaug and Støre, political distance is by far the strongest predictor. The rise is not linear in all cases, the negative emotions linked to Solberg (Conservative) and Vedum (Centre Party) first rise sharply, then level off as we move from right to left over the political spectrum. This pattern is consistent with the argument presented by Kekkonen and Ylä-Anttila (2021); party-blocs may be more salient and hence significant political entities than single parties, at least for some voters. Støre (Labour) is disproportionally disliked by right-wing voters.

Political distance explains more of the negative feelings towards the Progress Party leader than any other variable, but the party and its leader were not stigmatized. While MacDonald et al. (1991) found that the Progress Party was punished for being outside the region of acceptability in the 1981-election, the results in tables 1 and 2 suggest that this is no longer true; the Progress Party have become salonfähig, at least among supporters of the Conservative Party.

People identifying with a party are generally more likely to report negative emotions about the leaders of other parties, and the stronger the identification, the stronger the negative the reaction (H_4). This holds, even when controlled for distance in political space. When politics becomes personal, it adds to the emotional arousal caused by the political symbols, issues, and actors, probably because self-esteem and personal virtues come into play. The effect of strong party identification is consistent across all models, but the effect is modest. Distrust in parties and politicians is linked to populism ($r_{xy} = .27$), and pass on some, but far from all the populists' anger and resentment.

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Are populist voters more emotional than other voters? And what about the elitists? - Online Appendix

Variables and index construction.

Seven questions on emotional arousal were presented for each of the four party leaders. The emotions were hope and enthusiasm, fear, trust, anxiety, anger and frustration, joy and pride, and disgust. Respondents described their level of emotional arousal by selecting either: "not at all", "to a small degree", "to some degree", "to a strong degree", or "to a very strong degree".

Three indices named - enthusiasm, anxiety, and anger -- were constructed by summing the scores on the level of emotional arousal-variables (1-5). In table 2, the two indices covering negative affect were collapsed into one. A series of factor-analyzes – one for every party leader (Not reported here) – suggests that the seven indicators can be reduced to two underlying factors, one including the positive emotions and one containing the negative emotions. All scales were recoded, with a minimum value of zero, and the maximum of one.

Several attempts have been made to measure populism and its antithesis, elitism with mixed results. Without diving into this ongoing debate, we will briefly mention two of our considerations: (1) Respondents needed help to understand what we were asking about. Presenting them with the choice between a populist and elitist argument, helped; and (2) the use of the Likert-format questions can lead to skewed distributions of replies and inflated correlations due to yes-saying. The respondents were asked to indicate their positions between two contradictory statements, one expressing a populist position and one stating an elitist stance on a 11-point scale. In all, four choices were presented, one at a time.

5. *The impact of the will of the people on policy must become stronger* versus *The most competent and knowledgeable must govern.*
6. *The top-politicians tend to become self-serving and arrogant* versus *The so-called "grass-roots" is ignorant and old-fashioned.*
7. *Common people do not understand what is best for themselves in politics and economics* versus *The elites do not care about the needs and problems of ordinary people.*
8. *Politicians trying to please the public make bad decisions* versus *Right now, politicians must learn to listen to ordinary people and govern accordingly.*

Most respondents position themselves close to the mid-point on all four scales, with the sample mean slightly on the populist side. There were few extreme populists and even fewer extreme elitists. The distributions are very similar to those in a previous face-to-face survey applying similar interview questions and identical question format, suggesting that both extreme populism and elitism are rare in Norway.

The limited variance in the variables affects the intercorrelations between the four items. They vary from .25 to .40. Cronbach's alpha for the elitism-populism index is .67.

We believe the most parsimonious way of operationalizing distance in political space is the distance between the average score of the party voted for and the average score of the other party in question on the left-right scale. The estimated distances were obtained from the Norwegian election survey from 2021. Can distance between two political positions, be reduced to one single number? Although the left/right scale was originally linked to economic issues, it has more recently been seen as a more abstract ideological dimension with shifting content, helping voters to navigate between political leaders and parties, a "decision making

tool" (Mair 2007). A variety of themes and issues seem to be absorbed into the left-right "super issue" (Knutsen 1995). "Left" and "right" are abstract but resilient concepts because people need them when thinking about and discussing politics (Fuchs and Klingemann 1990). The issue-positions associated with "left" and "right" may differ over time and between countries, but the *conflict* between left and right, is always present. A long distance on the left-right scale signifies a deep political divide.

This solution is not perfect. Self-positioning on the left-right scale is, according to the Norwegian Election Study, still strongly correlated with the traditional economic left right issues (r_{xy} = .59), but also correlated with attitudes toward immigrants and immigration (r_{xy} = .44) and environmental issues (r_{xy} = .42), but less associated with religious issues (r_{xy} = .15) and the center-periphery-issues (r_{xy} = .06).

Table A1. Elitism versus populism (0-1 scale, populism = high) with emotions linked to the four party leaders and what they stand for. Pearson correlations

	Joy, enthusiasm	Anxiety, unease	Anger, disgust
Solberg, Conservative Party	-.34***	.28***	.30***
Støre, Labour Party	-.06*	.10***	.11***
Vedum, Centre Party	.23***	-.16***	-.15***
Listhaug, Progress Party	.09***	-.05	-.05
N > 1527. * p < .05 ** p < .01, *** p < .001			

Table A2. Model improvements (Referring to table 2)

	Støre Labour Party	Vedum Centre Party	Solberg Conserve Party	Listhaug Progress Party
Base model R^2	.17	.08	.18	.31
Adding interaction Elitism-Populism X Political distance (R^2 change)	.01	.00	.00	.00
Sig. Model improvement	p<.01	p=.31	p=.90	p=.50
Adding squared Political Distance to the base model (R^2 change)	.01	.01	.01	.00
Sig. Model improvement	p<.001	p<.001	p<.01	p=.18

Table A3 and A4 are extended versions of tables 1 and 2 in the text, including demographic controls.

Table A3. Feelings of anxiety and anger (0-1 scales) in relation to four party leaders and what they stand for as a result elitism-populism (0-1 scale), party voted for, and level of party identification and demographic controls. Unstandardized coefficients from OLS-regressions and standard errors.

	Jonas Gahr Støre – Labour Party		Trygve Slagsvold Vedum - Centre Party		Erna Solberg – Conservative Party		Sylvi Listhaug – Progress Party	
Elitism-populism	.17***	.19***	-.14**	-.15***	.31***	.35***	-.08	-.11*
	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.03)	(.03)	(.04)	(.05)	(.05)
Voted for:								
Red	-.08***	-.11***	.-01	.01	.09***	.07**	.39***	.37***
	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.03)	(.03)
Socialist Left	-.10***	-.11***	.02	.01	.02	.00	.38***	.33***
	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.03)	(.03)
Green	-.05	-.09**	.09**	.06*	.06*	.06*	.31***	.29***
	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.04)	(.04)
Labour	Ref. cat.	Ref.cat.	-.01	-.01	.03*	.04*	.29***	.27***
			(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)
Centre Party	-.03	-.05**	Ref. cat.	Ref.cat.	.06**	.04*	.16***	.08**
	(.02)	(.02)			(.02)	(.02)	(.03)	(.03)
Christian Democrats	.06	.04	.05	.03	-.06	-.06	.22***	.11*
	(.03)	(.03)	(.04)	(.03)	(.03)	(.04)	(.05)	(.05)
Liberal	.02	-.02	.12***	.09**	.02	.01	.23***	.14***
	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.04)	(.04)
Conservative	.10***	.08***	.09***	.06***	Ref. cat.	Ref.cat.	.03	-.03
	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)			(.03)	(.03)
Progress Party	.14***	.13***	.06**	.03	-.03	-.04	Ref.cat.	Ref. cat.
	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)		
Abstainers	-.01	-.01	.03	.03	.02	.05	.18***	.13***
	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.04)	(.04)
Strong ID other party[a]	.13***	.10***	.08***	.08***	.10***	.12***	.14***	.17***
	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)
Moderate ID other party[a]	.04**	.05***	.03*	.03**	.06***	.07***	.05**	.07***
	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.02)	(.02)
College 1-4	.01	.01	.02	.04*	.00	.02	.05*	.04
	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)
University 5+	-.02	-.01	.02	.03	-.01	.01	.05*	.06*
	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.03)
Vocational	.03*	.03	.00	.02	-.01	.02	.01	.00
	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.02)	(.01)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)
Age 30-44	.01	-.03	-.02	-.04*	-.01	-.02	-.02	-.05*
	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)
Age 45-59	-.02	-.08***	-.04	-.09***	-.04*	-.08***	-.07**	-.12***
	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.03)
Age 60+	-.05**	-.10***	-.03	-.08***	-.06***	-.08***	-.06**	-.10***
	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)
Low-mid income.	-.06***	-.03	-.05**	-.05**	.01	-.02	.03	.01
Mid-high income	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)
High income	-.06***	-.04*	-.04*	-.05*	-.02	-.03	.03	.01
	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.03)
Unreported income	-.06**	-.04	-.04	-.07***	-.05*	-.07***	.04	.02
	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.03)	(.03)
	-.02	.01	-.04	.00	-.01	.02	-.06**	.04
	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.03)	(.03)
Female	-.05***	-.05***	-.03**	-.02*	-.04**	-.06**	.03*	.03*
	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.02)	(.02)
Constant	.14***	.12***	.31***	.29***	.03	.01	.24***	.32***
	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.04)	(.04)
Adjusted R^2	.010/ .179	012/ .179	.025/ .085	.021/ .095	.079/ .156	091/ .196	.001/ .262	.001/ .270

Table A4 Negative feelings about party leaders and what they stand for (0-1 scale) by level of elitism-populism (0-1 scale) and political distance (0-1 scale), and distrust (0-1 scale) controlled for education, age, income, and gender. Unstandardized coefficients (B) with standard errors from OLS-regressions.

	Gahr Støre Labour Party		Vedum Centre Party		Solberg Conservative Party		Listhaug Progress Party	
	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE
Elitism-Populism scale	.07*	.03	-.20***	.03	.25***	.03	-.14**	.04
Political distance	.34***	.04	.23***	.05	.19***	.03	.70***	.04
Strong PID other party	.10***	.02	.08***	.02	.12***	.02	.15***	.02
Moderate PID other p.	.03**	.01	.03**	.01	.05***	.01	.07***	.02
Distrust in politicians and parties	.26***	.02	.10***	.02	.20***	.02	-.08*	.03
1-3 years Uni/Colᵃ	.01	.02	.04*	.02	.01	.02	.05*	.02
4+ years Universityᵃ	-.02	.02	.04*	.02	.01	.02	.06**	.02
Vocational educationᵃ	.03*	.01	.01	.01	.00	.01	.01	.02
Age 30-44ᵇ	-.02	.02	-.04*	.02	-.03*	.02	-.05*	.02
Age 45-59ᵇ	-.05**	.02	-.08***	.02	-.07***	.02	-.10***	.02
Age 60+ᵇ	-.07***	.02	-.07***	.02	-.08***	.02	-.09***	.02
Low-mid incomeᶜ	-.04*	.02	-.05**	.02	.01	.02	.01	.02
Mid-high incomeᶜ	-.04**	.02	-.05**	.02	-.02	.02	.01	.02
High incomeᶜ	-.03	.02	-.06**	.02	-.04*	.02	.03	.03
Income unreportedᶜ	-.01	.02	-.03	.02	.00	.02	.03	.03
Female	-.04***	.01	-.02*	.01	-.04***	.01	.03*	.01
Constant	-.02	.03	.30***	.03	-.05*	.02	.33***	.04
R²	.24		.11		.22		.25	

ᵃThe reference category is compulsory education
ᵇThe reference category is 18 to 29 years of age
ᶜLow income (< 300.000 NOK) is the reference category.
*** p<.001 ** p<.01 *<.05

Table A5. Feelings towards significant social actors (like-dislike, 11-point scale) by elitism/populism (high) -score (model 1) and party voted for (model 2). Coefficients from OLS-regression. Data from web survey, September 2021.

	Trade Union C. (LO)	Environ-mental org.	Farmers' org.	Muslim council	Employers org. (NHO)	Women's move-ment	UN climate-experts	Norwegian Church	Health authorities
Model 1									
Populism-elitism	2.03*** (.38)	-3.37*** (.43)	2.50*** (.36)	-2.28*** (.41)	-2.26*** (.31)	-.99** (.38)	-4.51*** (.41)	-0.34 (.39)	-2.78*** (.28)
r_{xy}	.14	-.20	.19	-.16	-.19	-.07	-.28	-.02	-.25
Model 2									
Populism-elitism	1.04** (.37)	3.24*** (.39)	1.80*** (.37)	-1.95*** (.40)	-1.42*** (.32)	-1.30** (.37)	-4.00*** (.38)	-.03 (.40)	-2.52*** (.29)
Voted:[a]									
Red	1.06*** (.24)	1.95*** (.25)	.29 (.25)	1.50*** (.28)	-.94*** (.21)	1.56*** (.24)	1.50*** (.24)	-1.24*** (.26)	.16 (.19)
Socialist. Left Party	.59** (.22)	2.13*** (.23)	.14 (.22)	1.10*** (.26)	-.47** (.19)	1.81*** (.22)	2.11*** (.23)	-.80*** (.24)	.67*** (.17)
Center Party	-.27 (.20)	-1.03*** (.21)	1.60*** (.19)	-.31 (.23)	-.23 (.17)	-.17 (.20)	-.90*** (.21)	.57** (.21)	-.16 (.16)
Christian Democratic	-1.64*** (.37)	-.01 (.38)	.46 (.34)	.41 (.42)	.49 (.31)	-1.02** (.37)	-.28 (.37)	2.17*** (.38)	.26 (.28)
Liberal Party	-1.17*** (.29)	.91** (31)	-.20 (.28)	.49 (.33)	.68** (.25)	.02 (.29)	1.04*** (.30)	-.06 (.31)	.23 (.23)
Conserva-tive	-2.14*** (.17)	-1.33*** (.18)	-.43* (.17)	-.56** (.19)	.95*** (.15)	-.79*** (.17)	-.50** (.18)	.35 (.18)	.26 (.14)
Progress Party	-2.25*** (.20)	-2.42*** (.22)	-.65** (.20)	-1.79*** (.23)	.42* (.18)	-1.57*** (.21)	-2.22*** (.22)	.07 (.22)	-.18 (.17)
Green Party	.13 (.32)	3.19*** (.32)	-.41 (.32)	1.31*** (.37)	-.08 (.27)	1.19*** (.32)	2.54*** (.31)	-.45 (.33)	.26 (.24)
Did not vote[b]	-.84* (.32)	.42 (.36)	-.36 (.33)	.50 (.39)	-.23 (.29)	.35 (.32)	.60 (.34)	-.37 (.36)	.25 (.26)
Adj R2	.02/.22	.04/.32	.04/.12	.03/.15	.04/.10	.01/.16	.08/.30	.00/.06	.06/.07

[a] The reference category is Voted for the Labour party.
[b] Those voting for minor parties are included in this category.
* p < .05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 N > 1141.

Figure A1. Negative emotions (0-1 scale) towards Støre (Lab.) and Listhaug (Prog.) by strength of identification with th e Labour Party and the Progress Party.

Figure A2. Negative emotions (0-1 scale) towards Solberg (Cons.) and Listhaug (Prog.) by strength of identification with the Conservative Party and the Progress Party.

Figure A3. Emotional reactions to Party leader Vedum (Centre party) and "what he stands for".
Factor loadings, Varimax-rotation

Figure A4. Emotional reactions to Party leader Gahr Støre (Labour Party) and "what he stands for". Factor loadings, Varimax-rotation

Figure A5. Emotional reactions to Party leader Listhaug (Progress Party) and "what she stands for". Factor loadings, Varimax-rotation

Figure A6. Emotional reactions to Party leader Solberg (Conservative Party) and "what she stands for". Factor loadings, Varimax-rotation

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