

Nikolai André Rødal

The Policy of the Ostrich

A comparative analysis of Western reactions to embargo on Rhodesian chrome, ca.1965-1980

Masteroppgave i Historie
Veileder: Hans Otto Frøland
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Norges teknisk-naturvitenskapelige universitet
Det humanistiske fakultet
Institutt for moderne samfunnshistorie



Kunnskap for en bedre verden

Sammendrag

I denne oppgaven diskuterer jeg hvilken innvirkning FNs sanksjoner mot Rhodesia hadde på vestlige lands strategier, med tanke på deres avhengighet av krom. Europeisk importavhengighet for krom ligger på rundt 90-100% på 1970-tallet, og denne importavhengigheten legger grunnlaget for deres strategi innen kromhandel. Fokuset for analysen sammenligner strategiene til USA og det Europeiske Fellesskap (EF), på grunn av deres ledende rolle i ferrokromproduksjon på begynnelsen av oppgavens tidsramme, rundt 1965. Ferrokromindustrien i Europa og USA svekkes i forhold til det sørlige Afrika, som drar nytte av teknologiske framskritt for å raskt bygge opp egen ferrokromindustri, som svekker vestlige smelteverk, samtidig som avhengigheten av det sørlige Afrika blir større og større.

Oppgaven skaper et bilde av en industri som er i stor endring – hvor endringer i produksjonsmønster av ferrokrom fører til at flere land bryter med sanksjoner, mens USA er de eneste som gjør det åpenlyst i form av Byrd Amendment. Oppgaven viser at amerikansk utenrikspolitikk var drevet av ideologiske likheter og frykt for å bli avhengig av sovjetisk krom. Samtidig førte EF en strategi som holdt kromhandel, og handel for øvrig under jorden, noe som gjør det vanskelig å bevise graden av sanksjonsbryting som ble gjennomført av EF. Både USA og EF var sannsynligvis involvert i kromhandel under sanksjonene, men EFs politikk var i større grad under jorden, mens USAs handel med Rhodesia var gjort i åpenhet.

Abstract

In this paper, I will be discussing the impact that the UN sanctions against Rhodesia had on Western countries' strategies, considering their dependence on Rhodesian chrome. European import dependency for chromium is around 90-100% in the 1970s, and this import dependency forms the basis of their chromium trade strategy. The focus of this analysis is to compare the strategies of the United States and the European Community (EC), due to their large ferrochrome industries around the year 1965. The ferrochrome industry in Europe and the US was becoming weaker in relation to Southern Africa, which was taking advantage of technological advances to rapidly build up its own ferrochrome production capacity, weakening Western industries, who were becoming increasingly dependent on Southern Africa for ores.

The paper creates a picture of an industry that was undergoing major change - where changes in ferrochrome production patterns led several countries to violate sanctions, while the US was the only one to do so openly in the form of the Byrd Amendment. The paper shows that American foreign policy was driven by ideological similarities and fear of becoming dependent on Soviet chromium. At the same time, the EC pursued a strategy that kept the chromium trade, and trade in general, underground, which makes it difficult to prove the degree of sanctions busting carried out by the EC. Both the US and the EC were likely to have been involved in chrome trade during the sanctions, but the EC's policy remained covert, while the US trade with Rhodesia was done openly.

Forord/Foreword

Det har vært svært krevende å skrive denne masteroppgaven, og det føles nesten surrealistisk å sitte og skrive de siste ordene på oppgaven nå. Arbeidet med oppgaven over de siste 2 årene har vært fylt med stress, men de har også vært svært spennende, og er en opplevelse jeg ikke ville vært foruten. Jeg kunne ikke ha skrevet denne oppgaven selv, så det er bare å sette i gang med takkerunden. Jeg vil først takke min veileder, Hans Otto Frøland, for å ha geleidet meg inn på temaet om europeisk krom-industri, dyttet meg i riktig retning (Brussel) og for å ha pushet meg mot slutten av arbeidet når tempoet måtte opp. Jeg har alltid vært inspirert etter veiledningsmøtene.

Ellers er det nesten umulig å takke alle jeg skulle ha takket, men jeg gir det et forsøk. Jeg vil gjerne takke samtlige av de fra lesesalen 6393, som har bidratt til å gjøre dagene på Dragvoll en glede. En spesiell takk går til Magnus for våre lange kvelder med både forferdelig (bra) forsøk på humor, men også dype samtaler om livet og kjærligheten og alt imellom. Jeg vil sende en takk til Halvdan også, som har vært så snill å la meg bo hos han i innspurten, og som har vært med å kjempe natt og dag den siste uken. Jeg ønsker også å takke kollektivet mitt i Nedre Møllenberg gate 79, hvor det alltid har vært god stemning når jeg har kommet sent hjem fra lesesal, og hvor praten om alt og ingenting kunne gå i timevis.

Og så til de viktigste av alle, familien min. Jeg ønsker å takke familien min for å alltid ha vært støttende, og for å ha fulgt med meg hele veien. Mamma og pappa, dere har vært positive når jeg har vært negativ, og dere har alltid hatt plass til meg hjemme når jeg har trengt en tur hjem. Denne sommeren har vært tøff for oss alle, men dere har likevel vært så beroligende og gode som dere alltid er når jeg trenger det. Og takk til Synnøve, lillesøsteren min, som jeg har kunnet ventilere all min frustrasjon til, og som har hørt på med åpne ører

Ne croyez pas que je vous ai oubliée. Un grand merci à Louise, qui m'a donné de la joie et de la motivation après de longues journées, et qui m'a fait avancer lorsque nous étions ensemble. Il ne reste plus beaucoup de temps avant Bruxelles.

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1. Introduction

1.1 Theme

On November 11th, 1965, Rhodesia issued a Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) from the British Commonwealth. This was met with sweeping sanctions from the United Kingdom (UK), and followed up by United Nations (UN) encouragement to issue embargo to its Member states through Resolution 216 of the of 12th November 1965. The enactment of mandatory embargo for UN member states was introduced by the UN Security Council through Resolution 232 of 16th December 1966. These sanctions were wide, and mainly targeted Rhodesian exports of consumer goods such as tobacco and meats, as well as the import of petroleum products and weapons. Comprehensive mandatory embargo was enforced through Resolution 253 on the 28th of May, 1968, comprising all Rhodesian trade and diplomatic relations. The sanctions were made to cripple the Rhodesian economy, and by those means force the apartheid government of Ian Smith to give in to majority rule lest the country collapse. Still, Rhodesia managed to survive, even thrive according to some accounts.¹ The Rhodesian production of minerals remained stable, even increasing in value throughout the sanctions, despite the initial lack of manufacturing capabilities in the country.² This was due to severe and widespread sanction-breaking from every facet of the world economy. The United States (US), France, Japan and many other countries were part of this, sometimes as shameless as the enactment of the Byrd Amendment, a US Amendment, effective from 17th November 1971. This amendment came about as a result of the US fear of becoming reliant on the Soviet Union, and allowed US companies to trade freely with Rhodesia.³ For several countries, sanctions could be described as a play for the gallery, to show their stance against apartheid that was not backed by decisive action.

Chrome ore was an important mineral export of Rhodesia, along with other minerals like nickel and asbestos, however chrome ore differs in the area of availability. Indeed, Rhodesia was the largest exporter of chrome to the western world in 1965. This was due to the superior chemical composition of Rhodesian chrome allowing for higher-quality ferrochrome than that of South Africa, as well as the West's fear of becoming dependent on trade with the Soviet Union.⁴ As

¹ Doxey, p.78

² Gibson, p.78

³ Congressional Hearings and Mission Reports: U.S. Relations with Southern Africa, 9.6.1973, p.4

⁴ Slatter, The Chromium Resource of Zimbabwe, p.4

such, chrome was a crucial contributing factor for the extensive sanctions-breaking that took place throughout Rhodesia's lifespan; from 1965 to 1979, despite chrome being a minor export of Rhodesia when compared to gold, copper and nickel, which could also be found elsewhere.

Due to its importance to the thesis and its wide scope, the term "sanctions" should be defined for this thesis. Indeed, sanctions can be applied to anything from sporting sanctions, trade embargo, diplomatic sanctions, it can really come forward in several ways. According to Johan Galtung, the Rhodesian sanctions can certainly be considered negative sanctions that were aimed at the collective Rhodesia (even though the goal is to achieve majority rule, the sanctions were collective in its effect). Furthermore, the sanctions on Rhodesia were due to the internal situation of Rhodesia, with the country's independence and refusal to allow majority rule the key component for the degree of sanctions initiated. For the purpose of this thesis, when sanctions are discussed it is related to economic sanctions, and mainly those imposed through Resolution 253.⁵

This thesis contains research about the execution of the United Nations (UN) embargo on Rhodesia by Western States, namely the United States (US) and the European Communities (EC). These were chosen because of their prominent position in the discussions and execution of the UN mandatory embargo on Rhodesia of 1966, as the US and United Kingdom (UK) were both criticized for their handling of the embargo, but they were also both important in the resolution of it. The UK joined the EC in 1976, but will be discussed as its own entity throughout the thesis. Both the US, UK and other EC countries were reliant on Rhodesia to an extent for their chrome ores, and this reliance will be the subject of the thesis.

The thesis will have two main research questions:

To what extent did the Western response to the Rhodesian UDI revolve around chromite- and ferrochrome-trade?

And how did the EC and US responses to changing trade patterns compare to each other?

⁵ *On the Effects of International Economic Sanctions: With Examples from the Case of Rhodesia*, J. Galtung, 1967, p.379

This thesis will focus on a combination of the US and EC response to Rhodesia's UDI, in order to give a comparative view of the US and EC strategies.. The US response has already been covered extensively by research, but the EC has not been discussed as an entity to the same degree, although there exists some literature about individual countries. The thesis will focus on the effects of the situation on trade and production of ferrochrome, but will also cover some cultural and ideological issues as well, as to give a broader context to the subject. There is an apparent lack of literature on the exact strategies of the EC ferrochrome industry as a whole, particularly in the late 1970s, which is why this will be the main aim of the thesis. The thesis will focus more on the EC, as they were very reliant on chrome ore from Rhodesia and South Africa both before and after UDI, while changing tides of the ferrochrome industry and relaxed enforcement of sanctions brought problems for both US and EC industries.

1.2 Structure

Chapter 2 of this thesis discusses the background for the thesis. This chapter contains information about the physical qualities of chromite, its uses, limitations and its distribution. The chapter gives an overview of the different players of the chrome trade, and shows the developments prior to the UDI of Rhodesia, with explanations for the initiation of sanctions, and the role of the UN.

In chapter 3, the Rhodesian relations with the important EC ferrochrome producers is discussed, along with the US and UK. This chapter shows the state of some of the individual countries' chrome industries, discussing factors which could have impacted relations with Rhodesia. The chapter also mentions the role of covert operations, both from the view of private business and the role of some state organisations, such as the French Service de Documentation Exteriure et de Contre-Espionage (SDECE).⁶

Chapter 4 will seek to discuss the extent of governments' knowledge of sanctions breaches, by considering discussions in the UN Security Council and examining UN reports on the pursuance of Resolution 253. The chapter also discusses the statistical data presented in the UN Security Council reports, which is used as evidence to show that breaches of sanction were happening on a large scale, without being reported.

⁶ Flower, p.121

In chapter 5, the US foreign policy changes in the late 1970s is explained, and there is a deeper dive into their relations with the EC in regards to the enforcement on chrome sanctions. The chapter shows the difficulties facing both US and EC ferrochrome industries, and the effect of shifting ferrochrome production centres from Western importers to producing nations.

Finally, chapter 6 will be the conclusion, which will seek to answer the research question by giving an account of the discussion established throughout the other chapters. Chapter 6 will discuss how the covert nature of sanctions makes it difficult to conclude precisely how influential Rhodesian chrome was on the strategies of the EC ferrochrome production, and that US openness in the end of the 1970s stood in stark contrast to the EC reluctance to tighten sanctions.

1.3 Previous literature

Johan Galtung's "*On the Effects of International Economic Sanctions: With Examples from the Case of Rhodesia*" (1967), describes both how the Rhodesians initially saw the sanctions as an opportunity for thrill-seeking. The book also gives one view of the effect and intention of international sanctions, attempting to answer why the Rhodesian embargo was put in force. The book attempts to give a framework for the functioning of sanctions, and as it was written quite early in the period of sanctions on Rhodesia, its view is based on theory rather than hindsight when discussing how sanctions would unfold.⁷

Hans. W. Maull's "*Raw Materials, Energy & Western Security*" (1984) discusses the situation in the chrome market, and how the West was dependent on Southern Africa for chrome ores. This book uses the market trends of the 1960s and 70s to declare chromium a critical resource. Maull also discusses EC strategy, mentioning the anti-dumping agreements passed in the European Commission between steelmakers and the ferrochrome producers of the Community. Maull provides insight into the industry, while providing discussion on how Community and US producers would need to adapt to the changing markets. The book is angled more towards a contemporary view of the mineral markets, using historical data to discuss the overall import reliability of Western nations.⁸

⁷ Galtung 1967, "*On the Effects of International Economic Sanctions: With Examples from the Case of Rhodesia*"

⁸ Maull 1984, "*Raw Materials, Energy & Western Security*"

Margaret P. Doxey's "*Economic Sanctions and International Enforcement*" (1980) discusses all facets of sanctions, including the problems and effects of attempting to implement sanctions. The book uses different sanctions to create a picture of how sanctions are enforced on an international level. In the case of Rhodesia, she writes that Rhodesian solidarity and efforts to switch to subsistence farming, keeping up exports and maintaining diverse imports were reasons for their persistent circumvention of sanctions.⁹ Doxey writes about how covert trade with Rhodesia was keeping them afloat, and how the sanctions were only viewed as an inconvenience for much of the time it was implemented. She also discusses how the Rhodesian optimism following the Byrd Amendment dwindled towards the end, as it became clearer that the regime would be unable to maintain its position.¹⁰ Doxey focuses more on the effects on Rhodesia, and direct US and UK involvement.

Otherwise, the literature mainly revolves around the UN embargo or the strategies of countries involved, such as Andrew DeRoche's "*Black, White & Chrome*" (2001), which details the evolution of American policy on Rhodesia, as well as covering the Bush War and the Smith regime's actions. The book goes in great detail about the events that unfolded all the way from the 1950s until 1994, and gives a great overview of the American initiatives and the thought process behind them, such as regards repealing the Byrd Amendment. The book gives an account of the different presidents' policies, and discusses the US view of how the Rhodesian problem should be handled. DeRoche also discusses the Carter administration in great detail, and the seemingly genuine interest in helping to create a free Zimbabwe.¹¹

Another central US-centric work would be the article "*This outcome gives me no pleasure. It is extremely painful for me to be the instrument of their fate (1965–1979)*" (2019), by Eddie Michel. Michel discusses the shifting roles of the US in relation to Rhodesia, and how the US foreign policy changed throughout the different presidential periods. Michel seeks to discuss the pragmatic side of US influence in Rhodesia, attempting to keep Cold War politics and racial lenses out of his analysis, focusing strictly on the actions of the Oval Office. He describes the reigns of the different presidents by giving accounts of what they did with Rhodesia. This led him to conclude that Nixon was friendly with Rhodesia, emphasising their interest in the intense

⁹ Doxey 1980, "*Economic Sanctions and International Enforcement*" p.77

¹⁰ Doxey 1980, p.78

¹¹ DeRoche 2001, "*Black, White & Chrome*"

Rhodesian anti-communism and their pro-western stances. Nixon was, according to Michel, devoted to Realpolitik, acting in the US' strategic interest completely unfazed by, for example UN sanctions. Carter was, on the other hand, the only president he viewed as feeling morally obligated to solving the Rhodesian problem.¹²

Elizabeth Schmidt & William Minter's "*When Sanctions Worked: The Case of Rhodesia Reexamined*" (1988), describes sanctions as a successful enterprise, in opposition to much of the previous writing. Indeed, they argue that sanctions were the cause of the various troubles, such as the massive debt and the crippling civil war, which eventually led to the end of Rhodesia. They argue that sanctions were a contributing force to the end of the Smith regime, but maintains that the question around the success of sanctions should rather have been, according to Minter and Schmidt: "*What would have happened had sanctions not been adopted, being replaced by inaction or some other policy alternative?*"¹³ The aim of this book seems to have been to give an opposite view to that of the contemporary one for the duration of the sanctions regime, namely that they were a failure. Indeed, while much was already written about the sanctions not being able to stop the Smith regime, this book describes sanctions as a major contributing force, which was certainly decisive, even if it was not the only contribution.

Alois Mlambo's "*Honoured more in the Breach than its observance*" (2019) is a piece of literature which argues that the UN sanctions were largely useless, and that the end of the Smith regime came about as a result of the Bush War. Indeed, Mlambo's view is critical in its nature and, as indicated in the title, provides an opposite view of the one described by William Minter & Elizabeth Schmidt. This book give one view of the Rhodesian embargo, strongly criticising the international response. While it is focused on general trade, both import and exports, during the embargo, it discusses a wide variety of examples of sanctions being breached one way or another, often involving government intervention. Thus, the article shows that there were several problems with the way sanctions were enforced, or not enforced, which led to the inaction of several governments.¹⁴

¹² Michel 2019, "*This outcome gives me no pleasure. It is extremely painful for me to be the instrument of their fate (1965–1979)*" p. 464

¹³ Minter & Schmidt 1988, "*When Sanctions Worked: The Case of Rhodesia Reexamined*", p.210

¹⁴ Mlambo 2019, "*Honoured more in the Breach than its observance*"

Niels Boender's *"From Federation to 'White Redoubt'"* discusses the ties between Europe and Rhodesia, arguing that the global perspective of Rhodesia was integral to the situation in the region, and that the Rhodesian propaganda propagating themselves as a bulwark against the communist threat in Southern Africa was what allowed white Rhodesia to gain friends in the West. He also writes that a "settler decolonisation" was viewed as an acceptable alternative to decolonisation among Africans, and that the anti-communism of Rhodesia was what gained them ideological allies in places like the US and Europe following UDI. Boender points out that Western sympathies to Rhodesia were not only rooted in economics, and that sanctions breaching was just as much rooted in far-right and anti-communist influences on both US and European policy.¹⁵

The reports of the UN have been previously studied, and several cases of sanctions breaking have been covered by previous literature on the topic, such as Mlambo. Previous literature on the subject has extensively discussed the regular sanctions breaking on a world stage, and a lot has been written about US policy towards Rhodesia and the Byrd Amendment, which is obviously an interesting topic as it was such a completely blatant violation of UN sanctions. However, the research into the role of the EC has not been as evident, particularly in the trade of chrome and ferrochrome. While research into the topic is becoming more popular recently, with works such as Warson's *"Entangled Ends of Empire: The role of France and Francophone Africa in the decolonization of Rhodesia."* Warson, along with Mlambo, have recently had a more critical view of the European role in Rhodesia. Warson has taken a deep dive into the French efforts to breach sanctions, putting forward evidence of breaches through motor vehicles, setting up networks of shell companies through francophone Africa, continuing airline operations into Rhodesia and maintaining a Rhodesian information office in Paris.¹⁶

1.4 Sources

The research of this thesis is based on qualitative source material, stemming from the European Commission Archives, the UN Digital Library and historical sources from the US Congress. These sources have been chosen in order to shine a light on the attitudes that were behind the stances taken by the European Commission as a whole. The source material gathered from the EC is crucial in the insight it gives to the attitudes of the EC delegation to the US, providing

¹⁵ Boender 2023, *"From Federation to 'White Redoubt'"*

¹⁶ Warson 2015, *"Entangled Ends of Empire: The role of France and Francophone Africa in the decolonization of Rhodesia."*

insight into their negative reactions to extended measures, while also providing some of the statistics which the EC based their decisions on.

The online archives of the Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), has been used to some degree in this thesis, to give insights into US attitudes to the Rhodesian issue, and some of the thoughts behind their actions. However, much literature has also been written about this topic, so much of the US policy has also been discussed through previous literature, such as DeRoche. A Congress hearing discussing the repealing of the Byrd Amendment from 1973 has also been used as a source, as it provides information about the disagreements within the US structure, discussing the reasons for sanctions and showing the influence of the Union Carbide lobby.¹⁷

The UN reports contain much information which has been useful for the thesis, including information on individual cases which show the sometimes lacklustre adherence to the sanctions by some companies and individuals. The reports also help by providing statistics on the situation in Rhodesia which is seemingly not available anywhere else, such as advanced statistical measurements on the output of the Rhodesian neighbour-states, estimated Rhodesian trade statistics and the discrepancies of trade that was revealed between Southern African countries and their trade partners.

The thesis has also applied a report by Executive Director of Rio Tinto Ltd. Of Rhodesia, Craig Gibson, which discusses the upswing of the economy in the years leading up to 1973. This report grants a view from the inside of Rhodesia, and shows how Rhodesia's projections showed a strong growth in their economy due to sanctions breaches.

1.5 Method

The thesis will apply a comparative analysis of the US and EC strategic decisions to the ferrochrome industry, and how they both handled sanctions. Considering that the thesis mainly revolves around the archival material showing discussions by national or international state organs such as the EC or the UN, there is a large variety in the subject matter. What I mean by that is that there are both letter exchanges supporting the opinions of the EC members,

¹⁷ Congressional Hearings and Mission Reports: U.S. Relations with Southern Africa, 9.6.1973

discussions on policy by the European delegations, minutes from UN meetings and detailed reports of the UN Security Council. The thesis will thus use a combination of qualitative and quantitative analysis, as the issues of trade and production of chrome and ferrochrome is better explained using figures on trade volume, value of trade and other statistics which has been gathered both from the source material and select literature. The quantitative sources are still analysed in comparison to the qualitative sources, in an attempt to create a clear picture of why and how decisions have been made, and the facts on which the decisions were taken. Literature will also be used to accompany these sources, giving different points of view, and attempting to add new insight.

2 Rhodesia, chrome and UN embargo

Chromite is a mineral compound made up of chromium, iron and oxygen. It has a chemical code of FeCr_2O_4 , and is generally a dark grey-black colour, although earlier finds of chromite ore along other metals describes it as different colours.¹⁸ Most of the world's chromium supply is located in the Bushveld complex in South Africa or the Great Dyke in Zimbabwe, with smaller supplies located in various places across the globe such as Finland, Russia, India and Kazakhstan.¹⁹ Chromium mining and working with chromium alloys such as stainless steel can be hazardous in poor working conditions, potentially leading to health issues such as lung cancer.²⁰

Chromium's main usage is in the production of alloys; the most important being the ferro-alloy known as ferrochrome, which can be used to create stainless steel. Ferrochrome is created by combining iron and chromite in an industrial furnace, and can then be used in higher industry to create stainless steel, which was its main usage for the Western powers. However, it is also used for the production of nichrome for usage as insulation in heating units or for superalloys which can endure the extreme heats of jet engines. It is also used as a pigment in some paints, such as "chrome yellow" and in chrome plating in cars or appliances, giving it a shiny look.²¹ On a strategic level, most imports of chrome are directed towards manufacturing stainless steel, which is an important metal in both civil and military use.

South Africa was the main supplier of chromite ore on the global market, and had been so since expansion of chromite mining in the 1930s.²² Chromium has been extracted since it was discovered in the Ural mountains in the late 1700s, and was originally used as a pigment. Chromite can be found in varying amounts and forms, with the first find being red-lead chromite. Chromite has since been found in deposits of various sizes everywhere from the USA to South Africa and Albania. In regards to production, the world production of chromite dramatically increased from 1936 onwards. This is because of the increased use of chromite in heavy industry, like the production of ferro-alloys usable in the creation of stainless steel.²³

¹⁸ <https://geology.com/minerals/chromite.shtml>

¹⁹ Ibid

²⁰ *NGU-rapport Nr. 88.056*: Flaten, Trond P. p. 1

²¹ <https://geology.com/minerals/chromite.shtml>

²² Howatt, D.D p.1

²³ Howatt, p.37

Chromite ore has since 1936 mostly been extracted from the former USSR and the countries of South Africa and Zimbabwe, with smaller operations in countries such as Albania and Turkey. In fact, in 1980, South Africa and the USSR were responsible for 35.3 and 25.3 percent of the world production respectively.²⁴ Overall though, the deposits of chromite ore are mainly located in the South of Africa, with around 68% being found in South Africa, and 30% being located in Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe/Rhodesia used to be the main exporter of chromite ore to the Western world due to the high quality of the ore, which had been mostly depleted by the year 1986.²⁵

Chromite ore is used for three main industries; metallurgical production, refractories and chemical industries. The main production is for metallurgical ferrochrome alloys, which are useful for the production of stainless steel and the hardening of other metals.²⁶ The production of ferrochrome was usually performed by countries which imported metals to areas with good access to hydropower or which possessed good metallurgical production capabilities, such as Norway, Sweden and Japan.²⁷ However, there were also large producers in the EC countries of Italy, France and West Germany, as well as the US, as will be shown in chapter 3.

Leading up to the 1970s, Western countries mainly imported their chromite ore from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) or Zimbabwe(Rhodesia at the time), due to the high iron contents making it more suitable for use in ferrochrome alloys than that of South Africa, which was seen as suitable for chemical industry due to its low iron contents and high carbon percentage.²⁸

Why was chrome ore of such great importance for the Western powers, including the US and the EC? Chrome ore was mostly restricted to Southern Africa, with Southern Rhodesia and South Africa as the main suppliers of chrome on the global market(excluding the Communist states).²⁹ While chromite was by no means a rare metal, with enough chromite in the Great Dyke alone to sustain the worlds usage for hundreds of years, the fact that its extraction was

²⁴ Howatt, p.37

²⁵ Howatt, p.38

²⁶ Howatt, p.42

²⁷ Howatt, p.40

²⁸ Howatt 1986, p.41

²⁹ Howatt 1986. p.37

mainly limited to the South of Africa made it more important to secure a stable relation with these countries.³⁰

In fact, at the beginning of the declaration of sanctions on Rhodesia by the UN in 1966, Rhodesian chrome was seen as the most valuable version of chromite, due to its naturally higher percentage of pure chromium making it easier to use in industry. This would not change until the discovery of “charge chrome”, which made it possible to utilize South African high-carbon ferrochrome to a much larger extent, making it similar in quality and cheaper than regular ferrochrome.³¹

The Rhodesian economy saw a massive increase in its industrial capacity and the value of its mining industry from the early settlements of the late 1800s until the declaration of independence in 1965. Rhodesia was originally known for its gold production, with early settlers ensuring a rapid expansion of the gold production of the country. Between the years 1910 and 1915 the value of gold produced had risen from 300 000 £ to 4 000 000 £, leading Rhodesia into a role as an important gold producer worldwide. Rhodesian mining was, however, not only based on gold. There were 4 main ores extracted from the country, with chrome, coal and copper being mined alongside gold in the early 1900s.³² Expansion of the mining industry meant the discovery of more and more rare minerals, with for example asbestos becoming a major export following the Second World War.³³

The large growth of Rhodesian industry following the Second World War led Rhodesia to become a major exporter within several fields, and it was especially crucial in the field of chrome. While Rhodesian production was greatly diversified, with its large production of several minerals, its largest market share appears to be in the field of chrome. The production of the ore had grown rapidly in the years prior to UDI, as the enormous reserves of chrome were exploited to a higher degree than earlier.³⁴ Rhodesia was home to the largest single high-quality chrome deposit known, the Great Dyke.³⁵ According to Craig A. Gibson, Executive Director of Rio Tinto Rhodesia Ltd.:

³⁰ Dixon, C.J. (1979). *Atlas of Economic Mineral Deposits*. Springer, Dordrecht. P.6

³¹ BDT/260/94, p.3

³² Gibson, 1972, p.72

³³ Gibson 1972, p.73

³⁴ Gibson 1972, p.78

³⁵ Gibson 1972, p.75

“As regards chrome, we have in the Great Dyke the largest reserves in the world of high quality chrome ore. This ore is particularly suited to the manufacture of high carbon ferro-chrome and the current trend in the stainless steel industry, particularly in view of the increasing use of AOD furnaces, is for an increasing demand for high carbon ferro-chrome. In the face of this demand, and in view of the limited availability of such high grade ore elsewhere in the non-Communist world, it seems inevitable that there should be an increasing demand for Great Dyke ore so that this, too, in future, should add still more to the export revenue of the mining industry.”³⁶

This quote underlines the belief in Rhodesia’s exports several years into the embargo, and underlines the believed situation of the chrome and ferro-chrome industry at the time. It is interesting to note that the situation of Rhodesia in comparison to South African producers would decline throughout the 1970s due to the developments in the production of charge-chrome, allowing South African ferro-chrome production to become more efficient than Rhodesian production.³⁷ Nevertheless, the outlook of the Rhodesian export industry in the early stages of sanctions was one of optimism.³⁸

On the 11th of November 1965 the self-governing colony of Southern Rhodesia of the British Empire, declare itself a sovereign state through a unilateral declaration of independence(UDI). This declaration was issued by President Ian Douglas Smith of the Rhodesian Front government.³⁹ The government was formed of the white minority ruling class, and was in any sense an apartheid government, similar to the one in South Africa. The UDI was met with outrage in the international community, and within the British Commonwealth. The British Government immediately issued an embargo for all Commonwealth countries, which included tobacco, denied arms sales, expelled Rhodesia from preferential trade agreements such as the Sterling Area and denied Rhodesian passports entry into Great Britain.⁴⁰ The British Prime Minister believed that the Rhodesian regime would crumble “in a matter of weeks, and not

³⁶ Gibson 1972, p.75

³⁷ Howatt 1986, p.41

³⁸ Gibson 1972, p.78

³⁹ Mlambo 2019, p.371

⁴⁰ Mlambo 2019 p.371

months”⁴¹. The sanctions from the British Commonwealth were only the beginning though, as a more complete global denunciation of Rhodesia was about to be enforced.

On the 12th of November, one day after the UDI and the British sanctions, the UN Security Council encouraged states to neither recognise nor provide aid for Rhodesia through Resolution 216.⁴² This was expanded upon in Resolution 217⁴³ eight days later, in which the UN encouraged all nations to cut diplomatic ties to Rhodesia, and encouraging the UK to “enforce with vigour” its embargo on the colony-gone-rogue.⁴⁴ This was followed by the declaration of a UN-sanctioned mandatory embargo on Rhodesian goods in December 1966 through Resolution 232. The resolution deemed the Rhodesian regime as a “threat to international peace and security”, allowing a mandatory embargo through the UN Charter’s chapter 7.⁴⁵

The British embargo encompassed gradually moved from a selective to a complete import ban from December 1965 through February 1965, encompassing imports of Rhodesian metals and ores along with consumer goods like maize and beef. The embargo also imposed a ban in exporting petroleum and petroleum products into Rhodesia.⁴⁶ One of the key commodities included in the British imports embargo was chrome ore, which was a key export in Rhodesia, and a key import for most Western industrial nations. Chrome ore was, as mentioned, only mined on a great scale in the South of Africa and in the Soviet Bloc, which limited options for the embargo actors. With the establishment of the mandatory embargo, the Security Council encouraged countries to:

*“prevent the import into their territories of Rhodesian asbestos, iron ore, chrome, pig-iron, sugar, tobacco, copper, and meat and meat products; the transfer of funds to Rhodesia; any trade in arms, ammunition of all types, military aircraft, military vehicles and equipment and materials for the manufacture and maintenance of arms and ammunition in Southern Rhodesia; the supply of motor vehicles or equipment for the manufacture of motor vehicles and aircraft to the country; or the supply of oil and oil products to the Southern Rhodesia.”*⁴⁷

⁴¹ Mlambo 2019, p.372

⁴² S/RES/216, 12th of November

⁴³ S/RES/217, 20th of November

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ W. Minter & E. Schmidt 1988, p.212

⁴⁶ Minter & Schmidt 1988, p.211

⁴⁷ Resolution 232 (1966), S/RES/232

The UN embargo placed on Rhodesia was meant to force the Smith government to crumble. However, through the ingrained strength of the Rhodesian doctrine, the craftiness of its population and the willingness to adapt its industries, allowed Rhodesia to continue for 15 years without direct access to much of the global market.⁴⁸

The introduction of embargo on Rhodesia seemed to have promised change, however its execution seemed lacking, due to the blatant breaches made by several of the member countries. The Rhodesian economy would likely have buckled if the embargo had been properly executed, however the regime was able to keep hold of power through twisting trade deals with several states.

The initial UN embargo of 1966, Resolution 232, was not a success in regards to immediate change, as most of the embargoing countries would either ignore the embargo completely or go around it in some capacity in order to obtain goods from Rhodesia.⁴⁹ While the embargo involved essentially all UN member nations excluding Portugal and South Africa, it can be argued that the embargo was a show of support for the international scene, and not grounds for any real action.⁵⁰ For example, France continued to trade with Rhodesia continuously after the initiation of the sanctions, with imports in the first three months of 1967 even increasing to 200% of the level it had been pre-UDI.⁵¹ This trade continued for the duration of the embargoes, with evidence of French exports of civilian vehicles to the country as well:

“Kits for Renault and Alfa Romeo cars have arrived in Rhodesia at a time when stocks of certain other models previously assembled were believed to be running low. This latest coup by the government will bring sighs of relief from harassed potential car buyers [...] The news is generally hailed as yet another victory against sanctions [...] since the end of 1968, French, German and Japanese cars have at all times been assembled in Rhodesia from kits.”⁵²

This quote also reveals the German and Japanese involvement in Rhodesia, suggesting that these countries were not very strict in their enforcement of the embargo. While it is true that

⁴⁸ Mlambo 2019, p.373

⁴⁹ Mlambo 2019, p.372

⁵⁰ Mlambo 2019, p.378

⁵¹ Mlambo 2019, p.378

⁵² As written in the *Rhodesian Commentary*, October 5, 1970, as mentioned in: *UN Security Council, 'Fourth Report of the Committee Established in Pursuance of Security Council Resolution 253 (1968) Special Supplement No. 2, 1971, S/9844/Add.2, Annex VII, p. 125.*

these breaches of the embargo were ultimately committed by companies unrelated to the state, it does reflect the governments inclination to downplay state involvement in embargo enforcement. In fact, the French supplied arms to Rhodesia such as Alouette helicopters, which were produced by a state-owned company called Sud-Aviation (SNIAS), which were crucial in the Bush War against the Zimbabwean African People's Party (ZAPU) and Zimbabwean African National Union (ZANU) liberation movements.⁵³

The Bush War gradually grew forward in the mid-1960s, as the liberation forces grew in numbers and turned towards military means, especially following UDI.⁵⁴ The parties of the war were the ZAPU and ZANU organisations, led by Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe respectively. While they were both receiving aid from communist countries, they were, according to DeRoche: "*primarily nationalists, not communists influenced by Moscow*"⁵⁵. This tells us that they were pragmatic in their beliefs, as they would cater to communist countries due to their aid in anti-colonialism.

The Soviet investment in Southern African liberation struggles, such as the Angolan conflict and their involvement with ZAPU, saw the involvement of Rhodesia, along with the US, in a struggle which was filled with mistrust and ideological connotations. This can be seen in the US aid to Rhodesia in the form of the Byrd Amendment, and the Rhodesian view of the black Africans as being controlled by a communist conspiracy.⁵⁶ The nationalists, on the other hand, seemingly started leaning more towards communism, possibly due to this propaganda painting communism as opposition to the Rhodesian state. In any case, the ZAPU did receive aid from the Soviet Union, and the ZANU from China.⁵⁷ The two groups formed a loose cooperation known as the Patriotic Front(PF) in 1976.⁵⁸

The Rhodesian situation can be seen through both the North-South and East-West perspectives, being an example of the surge of decolonisation and African nationalism, but also as one of many playing fields in the Cold War. In any case, Rhodesia shared both cultural and economic ties with several Western countries before UDI, some of which continued through the 1970s.

⁵³ Mlambo 2019, p.378

⁵⁴ Flower 1987, p.102

⁵⁵ DeRoche 2001, p.4

⁵⁶ Lowry 2007, p.183

⁵⁷ Visser 2008, p.138

⁵⁸ DeRoche 2001, p.226

3 Western relations with Rhodesia

“I have to admit, life had a tendency to be somewhat boring. And then these blessed sanctions came into our existence and we had to get out of our smug practices and use all our talents again <...> You have to figure out how products can be brought in by middlemen, how you can threaten that firms we used to import from will lose their markets here forever if they do not help us”⁵⁹

The embargo of Rhodesia seemed to be a serious blow to several of its trading partners, as they would face condemnation from the international community for continuing trade with the nation. However, the Rhodesian market was an important one for several important goods, such as chrome, asbestos and gold. The Rhodesian economy was heavily reliant on imports from Europe before the implementation of sanctions, which was the reason why sanctions were implemented in the first place, as it was believed this reliance would break the Rhodesian economy.⁶⁰ However, the Rhodesian economy thrived, and much of this can be attributed to the mutual reliance between Rhodesia and the Europeans.

Despite the declaration of UDI and the following mandatory sanctions, most Western powers retained some level of contact, both officially and unofficially, with Rhodesia. The US flat-out opposed sanctions following the Byrd Amendment due to fears of overreliance on the USSR, as well as some sympathetic views towards Rhodesia and their perceived struggle.⁶¹ The French were unofficially helping the Rhodesians connect with Europe, and had long viewed Rhodesia as a strategic piece of their African ambition; a piece they would not give up due to sanctions.⁶² British attempts to enforce sanctions were undermined by their government’s lack of decisiveness and will to enforce sanctions properly.⁶³ West Germany was likely connected to Rhodesia through their steel and ferrochrome industry, which were both reliant on imports.⁶⁴

German steelworks were also involved in the RISCO-case, the biggest organized case of sanctions busting throughout the sanctions regime. Mostly, the reasons for keeping up contacts

⁵⁹ Excerpt from an interview with a Rhodesian businessman, Galtung 1967, p. 397

⁶⁰ Mlambo 2019, p.371-372

⁶¹ DeRoche 2001, p.145, 172

⁶² Warson 2015

⁶³ Flower 1987, p.67

⁶⁴ BDT 260/94

in Rhodesia was due to a general lack of interest in sanctions, and the economic benefits of trading with them, due to lowered prices when compared to for example chrome from the USSR.⁶⁵ Examples of sanction busting will be discussed in the next chapter.

This chapter will discuss relations between the EC countries and Rhodesia through analyses of previous literature and source materials. The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview over some of the most important chrome importers of the Western world, and to show why they might have been reliant on Rhodesian chrome. The chapter will discuss how the relations between Rhodesia and the different Western powers were based on cultural factors and economic factors alike. The relations between the US and Rhodesia in the 1960s-70s will be discussed in this chapter. From the EC, Rhodesian relations with Great Britain (who joined the Community in 1973)⁶⁶, France, West Germany and Italy will be discussed, as these were the major trade partners of Rhodesia, with Italy, West Germany and France also being the three ferrochrome producers of the EC. The chapter also attempts to show the sanctions from a Rhodesian point of view through Ken Flower's contributions to the literature.⁶⁷ What were the reasons for Western powers to retain relations with Rhodesia? And how were these nations' relationship towards Rhodesia impacted by sanctions?

Diplomatically, most countries were openly denouncing Rhodesia from the start of UDI, and especially with the onset of mandatory sanctions in May, 1968.⁶⁸ This means that on the surface there was a united front against the Rhodesian regime. The EC was, however, not united in its stance, with different levels of reliance on and contact with Rhodesian firms. The heaviest investment in Rhodesia had of course come from its previous overlord, the British. According to a report from the Commission regarding the ascension of Zimbabwe to the Lomé System, Rhodesian exports were divided to the following countries: Britain (22%), Zambia (25%), South Africa (9%), Germany (5%), Malawi (5%), Japan (5%), and all other countries less than 5%. Rhodesian imports on the other hand, by country of origin were: Britain (30%), South Africa (25%), USA (7%), Japan (6%), and all other countries less than 5%.⁶⁹ This tells us that

⁶⁵ US congress discussions 1973, p.66

⁶⁶ <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/216/the-united-kingdom>

⁶⁷ Ken Flower's "*Serving Secretly: An Intelligence Chief on Record, Rhodesia into Zimbabwe 1964-1981*". (1987) provides a personal account of the Rhodesian embargo from the perspective of an officer within the Rhodesian Secret Intelligence. Due to the source's nature as a first-hand source written years and decades after the events it describe, to should be taken with a grain of salt, but in general it describes the thought process of the Rhodesian regime, while also revealing some of the secret connections held by Rhodesia.

⁶⁸ UN Resolution 253

⁶⁹ P.23 INV 1/2018, European Commission Archives

the main trading partners of Rhodesia were former members of the British Commonwealth of Nations, Zambia and South Africa, and most importantly Britain itself. Considering the exports of Rhodesia mainly consisted of meats, tobacco and gold, the percentage of chrome in this trade was likely small.

However, it is known that chrome production was an important part of the mining sector, which as a whole had seen large investments from foreign companies. An American company, Union Carbide, was one of the companies involved in investments into chrome mines during the embargo years.⁷⁰ This was revealed in an article from *Africa Today* in 1970, and covers mostly South African, but also Rhodesian investments.⁷¹ In an article comparing the different investments of US companies, Union Carbide is specifically mentioned as one that continues investments in the Rhodesian chrome market, with support from the US Iron and Steel Institute. This reflects the fact that the US had considerable interest in the expansion of its chrome industry into Rhodesia. Also, as the Byrd Amendment was not officially enacted until 1971, this example of state-backed investments shows that the US already had interests in Rhodesia before 1971, which might have been a part of the plan to progress away from reliance on the Soviet Union for imports.

3.1 International connections and the role of private enterprise

Private enterprise served a major role in building relations with Rhodesia and breaking sanctions. As mentioned in the Congress hearing regarding the Byrd Amendment, the Rhodesian state-managed company Univex⁷² was the driving force behind the Rhodesian ferrochrome exports, and cooperated with US companies like Union Carbide. This was also likely many other countries which have remained secret. Indeed, Ken Flower reveals that he had several connections all over the world, whom he had picked carefully based on their perceived reliability. He also describes how Rhodesia was heavily involved in efforts to keep these dealings secret, and to counteract the British and UN attempts to expose their business.⁷³ There is little concrete proof of European business' ties Rhodesia, however there is one example from the UN Security Council's investigations in 1974 which stands out. It appears that there was a larger "conspiracy" between firms from several Western countries, including the likes of

⁷⁰ Jackson 1970, p.22

⁷¹ Jackson 1970, p.22

⁷² Congress discussions 1973, p.67

⁷³ Flower 1987, p.73

Switzerland, Germany, Austria, to set up a scheme to import steel from Rhodesia to Germany. This case was to be known as the RISCO case, and investigation into it started in April 1974.⁷⁴ The plans, which were drawn up in 1972, regarded the expansion of production of RISCO's (Rhodesian Iron and Steel Company) facilities. The plans were to expand production from ca. 400 000 tons of steel to 1 million annually, and was estimated to be worth 63.5 million R\$, which in 1972 would equal 93 662 500 US\$.⁷⁵ This case involved setting up a shell corporation in Switzerland to take up loans with a South African bank which was acting on behalf of RISCO. The operation was well underway at the time of its discovery, and was described by the Security Council as "the most serious case to come before it of violation of the sanctions established by the Security Council against the illegal regime of Southern Rhodesia in terms of both the money and the number and importance of the financial institutions and industrial corporations involved."⁷⁶

This is a result of the underground network built by the Rhodesian regime. The fact that it was possible to organize such a large movement of metals and money in countries that were part of the sanctions against Rhodesia means that the Rhodesian strategy of close cooperation between industry and finance, paired with clever covert politics, was successful. It also affirms the idea that Rhodesian connections established through Univex were found all over Europe, with Handford describing it as "a network centred on obscure offices in back streets of cities in Europe — as fast as one London press-man uncovered a hide-out, another would be set up."⁷⁷ It is thereby likely that many smaller operations were never leaked, especially considering how long it took for the RISCO case to be discovered.

Exactly how much different countries' authorities have aided in these activities is hard to know. We know that some European governments, through French and Italian intelligence offices, had relations with Rhodesia.⁷⁸ On a common European level, however, there seems to be the fact that the archival material does not show a concrete discussion among the European representatives in the Commission, might be a reflection of the rather covert situation of relations with Rhodesia. Also, as discussed previously, the EC were attempting to establish themselves as a cohesive force in the world markets, however they had also led significantly

⁷⁴ UN Special report on RISCO, p.1

⁷⁵ Ibid, p.2

⁷⁶ Ibid., p.7

⁷⁷ Handford 1976, p.6,7

⁷⁸ Flower 1987, p.67

different policies in regards to mineral imports and their relations with Rhodesia. The covert operations of businesses based in EC countries were likely on a national level, which naturally made it into a non-issue for the Commission. Especially when considering the fact that some nations' authorities were allegedly involved in the business of smuggling with Rhodesia.⁷⁹

However, the interests of private enterprise did not completely control the discourse in Rhodesia. Even though sanctions busting through shell corporations was aiding the Rhodesian economy, the outlook for Rhodesia was not great. Stephenson describes Rhodesia's problems during the sanctions regime as "increasingly political rather than economic" and that "the sanction policy has not reduced the value of exports."⁸⁰

"The economic growth rate in real terms was 8.4 percent in 1972 and 6.5 percent in 1973. Clearly, the sanction policy of the United Nations has not proved effective because Rhodesia, though landlocked, has been able to use its neighbour's ports. But if South Africa, for political or strategic reasons, wishes to force Rhodesia into some type of settlement, it has the capacity to exert considerable power against the white-dominated government there."⁸¹

This quote shows that the economy of Rhodesia was growing despite sanctions, which is likely due to sanctions busting and a concerted effort by the white minority regime to create a self-sufficient economy. The quote also mentions political problems as the main hinderance to Rhodesia, as its dependence on Mozambique and South Africa to continue trade proved to be an issue in the longer term, with Mozambique's independence and South Africa growing increasingly distanced over time.⁸²

3.2 Stockpiles & Overreliance

While importing chrome was strategically important, many countries had realized the security threat overreliance on Southern Africa posed, and opted to establish stocks. As of 1973, the US for example possessed a stock consisting of around 5.3 million tons of metallurgical grade chrome, which would equal around 4 years of wartime needs.⁸³ West Germany and France were not keeping strategical stockpiles of many important metals before late in the 1970s. For example, as Van Rensburg put it:

⁷⁹ Flower 1987, p.73 and Warson 2015

⁸⁰ Stephenson 1975, p.387

⁸¹ Stephenson 1975, p.387

⁸² Stephenson 1975, p.387

⁸³ Congressional hearings, p.4

*“In mid- 1979 the government announced plans for building a stockpile limited to five minerals - cobalt, chrome, manganese, vanadium, and blue asbestos - all produced in Southern Africa. All are to be stockpiled in their most useful form, for instance ferrochrome instead of chrome ore.”*⁸⁴

This quote describes the German strategy as more focused on free trade than stockpiling critical resources, putting more trust into its companies to gather materials for the country’s ferrochrome industry. This point will be further discussed later in the chapter, as German companies and ships are mentioned in relations to several examples of sanctions busting.

The UK and Japan had also kept stockpiles according to Maull, as visualized in the table below:

	France	West Germany	UK	Japan	US
Chromium dependence	Medium	365/500*	Great	No information	Great
Stockpiles	Suspected	No	Yes	Yes	Yes

Table 3.1: The table shows the grade of strategic risk associated with chromium dependence by each of the largest producers, along with whether or not there were known strategic stockpiles of chrome in each country.⁸⁵

*West German strategic risk evaluated with numbers, based on 500 as a theoretical maximum⁸⁶

This table shows the political risk assessment of several industrialized nations, and whether they have a confirmed stockpile of certain metals. This risk assessment also sets chromium as a critical mineral for most industrialized nations, with Germany even ranking it as the #1 critical metal in 1982, at which point chromite had also been a part of the Lomé II negotiations.⁸⁷ While the contents of France’s strategic stockpile had been kept secret, they were suspected to contain chrome, at the very least since 1975 according to van Rensburg.⁸⁸

There is little to directly support the covert operations of French authorities in the material gathered from the European Commission Archives. This might be because I was not looking in the right archival fonds, or I might have missed some key communications due to language barrier, however I believe this sort of information is more likely to be found within French archives if anything. However, the archives have contained statistical data which shows the

⁸⁴ Van Rensburg 1981, p. 10

⁸⁵ Hans Maull 1984, p.23

⁸⁶ Hans Maull 1984, p.23

⁸⁷ Source materials, Zimbabwe

⁸⁸ Van Rensburg 1981, p.10

reliance on chrome trade, which can be paired with the knowledge gathered from previous literature to conclude that several countries in the EC, and particularly France and West Germany, maintained good relations with Rhodesia, as is reflected in their trade patterns. An excerpt from a West German newspaper, the Frankfurter Rundschau was a part of the archival material I found in Brussels. It was published the 21.January, the year is not included, but it was likely 1979 considering other documents from the same collection. It was included in a file on the negotiations of Lomé II, and comments on the resource dependence of the EC. Considering it is added in the Commission's own archives one can assume it is accurate, or at least it was useful in some way. I found the most interesting quote from the article to be (translated from German):

*“For six minerals, the EC is completely dependent on imports: these are: Manganese (which occurs 45 percent in South Africa and 38 percent in the Soviet Union), **Chromium (95 percent in South Africa and Rhodesia)**, Cobalt (38 percent in Zaire and Zambia, 22 percent in the USSR), Platinum (81 percent in South Africa, 16 percent in the USSR), Vanadium (75 percent USSR, 19 percent South Africa).”*⁸⁹

This quote tells us a couple of things about the EC relation to Rhodesia. Since it refers to Rhodesia and South Africa together, it shows that trade with Rhodesia was likely known by the public to some degree. At the same time, the newspaper does not critique trading with Rhodesia, rather focusing on the strategic aspects of trade. It is also interesting to note that the article refers to the countries of South Africa and Rhodesia together, referencing the fact that that Rhodesian metals & ores had gone through South Africa. Of course, this could still only be a practical grouping due to the two countries' proximity. The article uses the facts above to discuss the need for an updated system similar to Lomé, and how the trend of European foreign dependence is leading it to increase investments in African countries.⁹⁰

UN documents regarding the Security Council's work in sanctions-busting reveals that there were many recorded cases of chrome shipments from South Africa which were suspected to contain Rhodesian chrome instead.⁹¹ William J.S. van Rensburg describes an effort by the French to build stockpiles from 1975 onwards, which were assumed to contain chrome.⁹² By

⁸⁹ BDT 077/93

⁹⁰ BDT 077/93

⁹¹ UN reports

⁹² Van Rensburg 1985, p.9

1979, Italy had also played around with the idea to build their own stockpiles which, again, would likely contain chrome in order to satisfy their own industrial needs.⁹³ Indeed, van Rensburg perpetuates the idea that the EC was 100% reliant on chrome ore from abroad. France adding chrome to their stockpile program would only make sense, seeing as how stockpiles are only really necessary when you have a heavy reliance on imports of minerals. This is the case with chrome, as the only available large-scale sources throughout the 1970s would have been Rhodesia, South Africa and the Soviet Union, of which Rhodesian chrome had historically been viewed as the superior metallurgical grade ore.⁹⁴

Attempts at creating stockpiles could indicate which countries were the most dependent on Southern Africa. In general, if a country has a great stockpile of chrome, they would theoretically be more poised to efficiently enforce embargo, as they would be able to withstand a few years' drought of imports. However, the one country which we know to have had large stockpiles of chrome prior to UDI, the US, would be the one to openly break sanctions in order to gain Rhodesian chrome. This shows that the notion of larger stocks being the deciding factor is not necessarily true for the situation in the chrome market, which in the earlier periods of UDI was on the surface severely dependent on Southern Africa and the USSR. Still, many EC countries would later start building stocks when worldwide ferrochrome production was high, likely in an attempt to prepare for potential instability in South Africa.⁹⁵

3.3 United States

The US were the only country to have joined the UN embargo from 1968, only to overwrite its stance and reopen trade with Rhodesia. Indeed, the US had been a major trade partner of Rhodesia before UDI, which is why it would opt to break out of the sanctions regime. The US was, along with the EC countries and many other ferrochrome producers, completely reliant on imports for ore to keep production going. The US trade was distributed as shown in the following graph, gathered from a US congress meeting:

⁹³ Van Rensburg 1985, p.9-10

⁹⁴ De Roche 2001, p.144

⁹⁵ BDT/051/91 and Maull, p.211




Figure 3.1: This figure shows the percentage of trade from each of the US' main chrome sources. The table shows that, despite the Byrd Amendment being repealed in 1971, the USSR remained the main trade partner of the US, as it had been in all but one year leading up to UN mandatory sanctions.⁹⁶

When discussing matters of chrome imports from Rhodesia, it is necessary to mention the American role. Not only were two of the largest companies in Rhodesian mineral trade American (Union Carbide and Anglo-American), but the US also was heavily involved in sanctions-breaking with Rhodesia following and even predating the Byrd Amendment.⁹⁷ In fact, it can be argued that this amendment was detrimental to the success of sanctions, and might have been the key reason as to why Rhodesian majority rule would take until the late 1970s to be put in effect.

However, the open rejection of sanctions was not a continual and deliberate strategy of the US. In fact, the US had maintained very strong adherence to the sanctions regime, and even went further than many nations in their condemnation of the Rhodesian government during the reign of President Lyndon B. Johnson. When compared to several other Western countries, the US made more efforts to uphold sanctions than others. As George Shepherd puts it:

“in addition to South Africa and Portugal, who had an ideological stake in violating the UN request, France, Iran, Japan, and West Germany all increased their trade in 1967

⁹⁶ Congressional discussion 1973, p.49

⁹⁷ Minter & Schmidt 1988, p. 213

with Rhodesia. Few followed the example of the United States Government which evoked its United Nations Participation Act and announced that any nationals violating the Act would be prosecuted with fine and imprisonment”⁹⁸

It was only after President Johnson, during President Nixon’s reign, that the US withdrew from the sanctions regime. This decision followed a lengthy debate in Congress, in which senator Robert Byrd took on a key role in lobbying activities to reopen trade with Rhodesia.⁹⁹ This amendment completely undermined the UN declaration. While other countries had many cases of covert sanctions breaking themselves, particularly in Europe and Japan, the US defying UN sanctions as an official policy created an issue. Ignoring UN decisions was simply too easy, and the US did not receive more than a slap on the wrist in form of a denouncement from the UN.¹⁰⁰ The introduction of the Byrd Amendment was openly discussed and passed through Congress, which sets American sanctions breaking apart from that of most other nations. The US approach was opposite of for example the French approach, in which companies were forced to hide their dealings with Rhodesia through covert operations.¹⁰¹ I have extracted a discussion from several Congress meetings about repealing the Byrd Amendment, which show the two sides of the matter, and their views on US relations with Rhodesia. Following the introduction of the Byrd Amendment, discussions on whether to repeal the Byrd Amendment swiftly took place, as it was viewed by many as unnecessary and counterproductive.¹⁰² John J. Sheehan, Vice President of the United Steel Workers’ of America spoke in Congress on May 30th, 1973, where he said that:

“The origination and continuation of the Rhodesian embargo is an issue of international social justice, the consideration of which belongs in the United Nations. As a major participant in the UN, it is important that we uphold its decision to impose sanctions as long as that policy is in effect. We hope that you will join as a cosponsor of this important legislation.”¹⁰³

The argument was essentially based on the morality of sanctions, and, as Sheehan pointed out, the economic benefits of maintaining the Byrd amendment were likely minimal. Therefore, it

⁹⁸ Shepherd 1968, p. 8

⁹⁹ DeRoche 2001, p.144

¹⁰⁰ Mlambo 2019, p.385

¹⁰¹ Warson 2015

¹⁰² Congress discussions 1973, p. 53

¹⁰³ Ibid., p.54

was argued that the US should rejoin the UN embargo, while enforcing sanctions more strictly than what had been done before.¹⁰⁴

On the flipside was the stance taken by Union Carbide, along with their supporters in Congress. The Vice President of Union Carbide, Fred O'Mara, was called up to explain Union Carbide's business in Rhodesia, and defend his and his supporters' stance on the Byrd Amendment. O'Mara's main arguments regard the reliance on the USSR as an important point, and maintains that the US needs several sources of chromite in order for the US ferrochrome industry to stay afloat. He also nods to a US legislation S.773, which lowered the size of the US ferrochrome stockpiles to less than sufficient needs, meaning they would be reliant on imports if a war would break out and cut off trade with their eastern partners.¹⁰⁵ The US policy had thus been shifted from reliance on their own stockpiles, to reliance on trade even in an emergency event. In his speech on the 27th of September, 1972, O'Mara is quoted as saying:

*"Since the imposition of sanctions, control over the marketing of Rhodesian chrome has been taken over by a Rodesian state trading company, Univex. Under Government mandate, Rodesian chrome operations produce ore and alloys as directed by Univex to meet its marketing requirements. Univex has successfully sold in world markets all of the chrome produced in Rodesia. It has significantly increased the output of chrome ore, and it has vastly increased the production of ferrochrome in Rodesia."*¹⁰⁶

He thus makes the claim that Univex, a state-controlled company in Rhodesia, had taken control of the Rhodesian ferrochrome industry, and was successfully creating demand in overseas markets. In O'Mara's opinion, the US need to allow companies to purchase ore and alloys through Univex to secure high-demand ore for cheaper prices, which would be sold anyways.¹⁰⁷

These two stances show that there was a considerable dispute in Congress. There is a clear discourse between the workers and the owners on the reasons to keep breaking sanctions. It also reflects the view that the Byrd Amendment was passed due to heavy lobbying from the businesses that owned property and had established themselves in Rhodesia. Union Carbide for

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., p. 61

¹⁰⁵ Ibid, p.65

¹⁰⁶ Ibid, p.69

¹⁰⁷ Ibid, p.70

example, had been “unwilling to relinquish its high stakes in Rhodesian chrome and used its “heavy influence” over the White House and the State Department to maintain its position in the region.”¹⁰⁸

It would also seem that Rhodesia enjoyed much support in the US due to the Civil Rights’ issue, especially in the Southern States. This is reflected in Ken Flower’s memoirs, in which he mentions a meeting with American Senator Jim Eastland, who apparently exclaimed that Rhodesia should be helped to “put the niggers right back where they belong.”¹⁰⁹ This view of race relations, and the recent discourse in the US following the Civil Rights Act, might explain why many US politicians viewed Rhodesia as an ally. Robert Byrd himself was a major opponent to the Civil Rights Act, filibustering the Act for 14 hours straight. He also previously had ties to the Ku Klux Klan, although he had efficiently distanced himself from the organization.¹¹⁰ Similar ideological views based on race relations was likely a contributing factor for many US politicians supporting Rhodesia, and by extension supporting Byrd Amendment in 1971. What is interesting to note here, is that US assumptions of the USSR importing chrome from Rhodesia to then export to the US actually turned out to be true, according to J. Jolly.¹¹¹

3.4 European Communities

French and West German trade with Rhodesia increased significantly directly following UDI, with West German exports increasing by 62% and French exports increasing by 22% in 1967 when compared to 1966. Swiss imports of Rhodesian goods even increased as much as 107%, which again reflects their neutral stance towards Rhodesia.¹¹² These numbers tell us that, despite being diplomatically separated from the UN countries, Rhodesia managed to retain ties with several countries. In the case of West Germany, this makes sense, as they were not members of the UN when the first mandatory sanctions were enacted under Resolution 232. This also explains why the West German trade increased so dramatically (along with Japan who also experienced a 62% increase in Rhodesian exports). France, however, who abstained to partake in the first round of embargo, experienced an increase in trade despite being in the UN.

¹⁰⁸ Warson 2015

¹⁰⁹ Flower 1987, p.73

¹¹⁰ The Washington Post, 17th Oct. 2007

¹¹¹ Jolly 1978, p.786

¹¹² Mlabmo 2019, p.377

Consumption of ferrochrome in the EC was on the rise, as illustrated in Table 3.1. The table shows that the EC consumption rose by around 194 000 metric tons from 1974 to the 1980 estimate. This growth was even interrupted by the economic crisis of the mid 1970s, which saw a dip in consumption in the middle years. Still, the EC ferrochrome needs were increasing significantly over the century.

Consumption of ferrochrome in the Community (Metric tons)			
	Low Carbon (LC)	High Carbon (HC)	Total
1974			477 000
1977			459 950
1978	96 720	462 925	559 645
1979	97 724	523 500	621 224
1980(estimate)	102 000	569 000	671 000

Table 3.1: Official numbers of the EC on the amount of ferrochrome consumed in the Community.¹¹³

While the EC consumption of ferrochrome was growing, its imports of ferrochrome rose significantly, showing that the EC was increasingly reliant on foreign industry to satisfy its demand for ferrochrome, which would be in line with the general development of the world markets.

Imports of ferrochrome to the Community (Metric tons)			
	LC	HC	Total
1974	189 450	77 000	266 450
1977	296 850	158 850	455 700
1978	327 718	148 549	476 267
1979	379 547	202 976	582 523

Table 3.2: EC numbers on the imports of ferrochrome, showing a high import dependency which was still growing.¹¹⁴

In the early days of UN sanctions, the EC did not have a coherent, unified trade policy, as it would be in the face of the later stages, exemplified by their response to investigations into sanctions breaches under the common banner of the EC in 1979, as written down in the 12th

¹¹³ BDT 051/91

¹¹⁴ BDT 051/91

UN report on the situation in Rhodesia.¹¹⁵ This led to the different responses from the EC countries, who seemingly did not discuss Rhodesian relations in great detail during their meetings. However, there was seemingly much sympathy for Rhodesia, with Rhodesian products finding their way to European markets and vice versa.¹¹⁶ Indeed, Rhodesian society as a whole had made a concerted effort to resist sanctions, and this included smuggling, which happened under the noses of European authorities. In this regard, the degree of knowledge from authorities differed as well. For example, French authorities were directly involved in the effort to avoid sanctions, as described by Ken Flower. He describes the head of the French Secret intelligence, the SDECE as “always anxious to help”, due to his affection for the country, which he might have gathered from his time living in Rhodesia.¹¹⁷

These examples show the connections between the Rhodesian secret service and their counterparts in Europe, and paints a picture of a connected network of Intelligence Services connecting to hatch out plans to avoid sanctions.

3.4.1 Great Britain

The British were not a major ferrochrome producer like France, West Germany and Italy, and were therefore not reliant on Rhodesian chrome in its raw form. However, the ferrochrome needs of the EC for its steel industries was still a problem which had to be taken care of. According to Crowson, the UK were 72% reliant on South Africa for its chromite needs, and 43% reliant on them for their ferrochrome needs in the year 1979/80.¹¹⁸ While there were measures enacted to stop trade with Rhodesia, it would be a possibility that some of the imports were originally Rhodesian, although as we have established this would be difficult to prove. There is not much trade data on UK imports of chrome in the 1970s, as many authors group them in together with the EC, or leave them out of discussions due to their small ferrochrome industry.

Great Britain was perhaps the country which most strongly opposed Rhodesia following UDI, simply due to the fact that they were seen as a rogue colony in their eyes. This is reflected in the swift implementation of sanctions by Great Britain, as well as the severing of diplomatic

¹¹⁵ S/13750, p.

¹¹⁶ Flower, p.72

¹¹⁷ Flower, p.74

¹¹⁸ Crowson 1978, p.51

relations with Rhodesia. However, Britain opposed the attempts of several African countries to impose mandatory sanctions in May 1966. While imposition of mandatory sanctions would be enforced through Resolution 253 the following year, it did afford Rhodesia time to prepare for sanctions. George Shepherd writes that “the argument of the U.K. at this point was that Rhodesia was neither a self-governing territory nor an independent state but had a special status and relationship to the U.K., which the U.K. alone could settle. Her position was indirectly supported by eight abstentions (Argentina, China, France, Japan, the Netherlands, U.K., U.S. and Uruguay).¹¹⁹” Nevertheless, Britain did impose sanctions of their own, and would later comply with UN mandatory sanctions.

As their largest trading partner, British sanctions should have taken a heavy toll on the Rhodesian economy. While sanctions did cause problems, the Rhodesian economy still managed fine, which can possibly be attributed to the lax implementation of sanctions from Great Britain. Ken Flower, the former Intelligence Chief of the Rhodesian Secret Service, describes the efforts of Britain to enforce trade sanctions as lacking any real threat. Indeed, Flower writes that the UK falsified reports that they were monitoring the sea routes outside of Mozambique in order to stop Rhodesian oil shipments, possibly in an attempt to appear more heavy-handed than they in reality were.¹²⁰ The British authorities also publicly threatened military intervention in Rhodesia, but the Rhodesian government never believed those threats to be realistic, and simply ignored it. These examples reflect a general unwillingness for the British government to take enforcement of sanctions incredibly seriously. Indeed, according to Flower “Only Britain and some Scandinavian countries appeared to be trying to enforce sanctions,, but even Britain did not always seem to take sanctions seriously”¹²¹.

This reflects a generally nonchalant world view in regards to sanctions enforcement, in which a Britain which seemingly did not care is regarded as one of the more strict countries in regards to sanctions enforcement. Flower also maintained that British authorities, along with the American ones prior to the enactment of the Byrd Amendment, had masses of evidence of sanctions evasion, “but they used it either defensively or not at all”.¹²² While most of what is written in the book is based on Flower’s memories, it is still valuable to investigate this due to

¹¹⁹ Shepherd 1968,p.10

¹²⁰ Flower 1987, p.67

¹²¹ Flower 1987, p.69

¹²² Flower 1987, p.69

the position Flower had in the Smith regime. There is also some supporting evidence for this in the source materials, in regards to the UN reports on breaches of sanctions.

Virtually all notes regarding sanctions breaking have been submitted by the United Kingdom, even when the companies mentioned are not British nor dealing with British companies.¹²³ This shows that the UK had knowledge regarding shipping to and from Rhodesia. This would also imply that UK authorities had knowledge of British firms that were engaging in sanctions violations, but it does not confirm Flower's accusations on the UK ignoring sanctions breaking.

Despite the official government stance of the UK, which was strongly against the Smith regime, some popular support was definitely enjoyed. Flower writes that during his visits to Britain he encountered a great deal of unexpected sympathy, with British businessmen seemingly lining up to create relations with Rhodesia, despite the consequences implicit in breaking sanctions.¹²⁴ This popular sympathy might have played a role in the general unwillingness of the government to heavily enforce sanctions. If it was indeed an unpopular policy, it would make sense for the government to only superficially enforce sanctions, as to keep up appearances for the global community. Still, British trade with Rhodesia did significantly decline during the UDI years, and was in many cases replaced by the French and De Gaulle who, in Flower's words, were only too ready to snub their noses at the British and ignore the United Nations.¹²⁵

The economic aspects of sanctions breaking thus seem to be less impactful in regards to the British regime, and this would support the argument that cultural ties were the more important reason for the lax British enforcement of sanctions. One could argue that the British were forced to act with sanctions on the UDI, but that they would not act as harshly as they could due to the sympathetic view towards Rhodesia enjoyed by many Brits. Also, the Rhodesian government must have seemed like the safer option, while some of the Patriotic Front was perceived to be in cahoots with communist countries in their liberation struggle.¹²⁶

3.4.2 France

¹²³ UN, FOURTH REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ESTABLISHED IN PURSUANCE OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 253 (1968), p.73

¹²⁴ Flower 1987, p.90

¹²⁵ Flower 1987, p.74

¹²⁶ Lowry 2007, pp.182-185

France was one of the three major ferrochrome producers of the EC, and thus one of the largest Western producers. While the French were mainly relying on foreign chrome to feed their ferrochrome industry initially, they became more reliant on ferrochrome imports towards the latter half of the sanctions period. Indeed, the French were 55.2% reliant on ferrochrome imports by 1980, with their own production levels dropping from 115 000 tons in 1974 to 81 900 in 1980.¹²⁷ The French capacity for ferrochrome production had thus dropped significantly in the late 1970s.

French relations with Rhodesia, while not necessarily friendly, were more cordial than other nations. French interactions with Rhodesia can be considered pragmatic, as they were originally unwilling to join the UN resolution to initiate an embargo on Rhodesia, although with the enactment of mandatory sanctions in 1968 they were forced to follow suit – at least on the surface. Indeed, French sanctions breaking has been documented in multiple cases, and shows that the French were either careless or unbothered by the direct links between the Rhodesian government and France. Examples of sanctions breaking is the sudden emergence of French (and also German) automobiles in Rhodesia and the use of French weapons and military vehicles in the Bush War.¹²⁸ This indicates that there was still some level of trade between the countries, despite the fact that sanctions would theoretically prevent this. One possible reason for French sanctions breaking could be that they were trying to fill the void in the Rhodesian market following the wholesale British withdrawal from Rhodesian markets in the beginning of the sanctions period. This would make sense in the case of chromite, as other alternatives were either not of the correct quality, too expensive or originated from the Communist Bloc. Also, since both Portuguese Mozambique and South Africa, as ideological supporters of Rhodesia, were part of upholding trade connections, it was near-impossible to prove which ores originated from where. Other than guesswork, the only viable option would be to test the chemical composition of the ores, which would not be common practice until the introduction of special certificates regarding the import of chromite ore, which would not be conducted until 1977.¹²⁹ While breaking with UN law, it was an opportunity that could be exploited, and the French seemingly did so.

¹²⁷ BDT 051/91

¹²⁸ Mlambo, p. 378

¹²⁹ BDT 076-94, European Commission Archives

According to Mlambo, French authorities kept good relations with Rhodesia for the entirety of the sanctions regime. In terms of exports and imports, as well as tourism and foreign aid, French companies were incredibly interested in Rhodesia as an investment opportunity, and in some cases were aided indirectly by the authorities. An example of this is the company Aluminium FraGais, which kept production in Bulawayo and Salisbury, two of Rhodesia's largest cities and industrial centres.¹³⁰ I would like to put forward an example on French foreign policy regarding tobacco trade, which was one of the commodities which France had actively enacted an embargo upon alongside chrome, put forward by Dr. Joanna Warson based on archival materials from the Rhodesian principal foreign representative, van der Byl:

“According to P.K. van der Byl (...) in the immediate aftermath of UDI, the president-director of a powerful French financial group, the Compagnie Française de Transactions Internationales (TRANSACO), approached representatives of Smith’s government and indicated the company’s interest in importing large quantities of Rhodesian tobacco via South Africa and Portugal and then re-exporting their produce to France. TRANSACO claimed that they had received from the French authorities “a clear confidential undertaking that they could do as much trade as they liked with Rhodesia.”¹³¹

This example, although not directly related to the chromium trade, reflects the French government's position on matters of trade regarding Rhodesia. Both tobacco and chromite was banned for trade, however if this statement is true, then it is reasonable to assume that both of these commodities were still being traded. On a strategic level, it would even make more sense for the French authorities to interfere in the chromite trade due to the lack of viable options in the global market. Even then, Rhodesia's markets were likely ripe for the taking following the heavy reduction in trade with British companies, although the already present American company Union Carbide would still control and extract a large percentage of the chromite industry.¹³² In this situation, although it is obvious that there have been some dubious dealings in the chrome-trade, it is nigh-impossible to determine the exact measures taken by the French authorities to secure their supplies, due to the secrecy of the operation. Nevertheless, this excerpt proves that there were good relations between French businesses and the Rhodesian foreign office, while alluding to the French government's role in maintaining good relations with Rhodesia – despite officially signing onto the sanctions regime.

¹³⁰ Mlambo 2019, p.378

¹³¹ Warson 2015

¹³² Maull 1984, p.210 & J. Warson 2015

This involvement of the French authorities is reflected in Flower's notes, with regards to the ties between French and Rhodesian intelligence. Flower wrote that;

“France provided the entree into much of Europe, the Middle East and Africa. De Gaulle and Pompidou were only too ready to snub their noses at the British and ignore the United Nations, and thus I found that my opposite number in Paris, the head of SDECE (Service de Documentation Exteriure et de Contre-Espionage) was always anxious to help; the fact that he had once worked on a Rhodesian farm and had thus developed a warm affection for the country may have had a little to do with it. His influence led us into Belgium, Italy, Greece and several countries in North and West Africa.”¹³³

This solidifies Warson's argument that French authorities were heavily involved in dealings with Rhodesia. It also tells us that there were important figures in key positions who were able to be exploited by Rhodesia to reach out to the world, who for whatever the reason were fond of or sympathetic of Rhodesia. Indeed, Flower writes that Rhodesia were able to keep diplomatic ties with sympathetic countries intact during UDI, through underground channels such as through the SDECE.¹³⁴

According to Warson, the French had been on a longer mission to gain closer ties to Rhodesia since the end of the Second World War, which might have contributed to their reluctance to joining in on sanctions.¹³⁵ The French policy directors in the Francophone West and Equatorial Africa were even the same as the ones employed to deal with French policy in Rhodesia, further reinforcing the idea of a French-Rhodesian project. Indeed, these plans for Rhodesia to be a part of the French African interests meant that Rhodesia and France maintained good relations throughout much of the sanction-period. French companies involved in Rhodesia were often to some degree state-sanctioned, which makes sense when you consider the strategic importance of Rhodesia to French interests. One example of this is the French aeroplane-company Union des Transports Aériens (UTA). This was a French company with heavy ties to the Presidential palace, which was part of an organized strategy of relations-building between the two countries.

¹³³ Flower 2019, p.74

¹³⁴ Flower 1987, p.73

¹³⁵ Warson 2015

UTA arranged tours for Rhodesian students to travel to France, and also advertised for travels to Rhodesia in France, as well as maintaining information offices in Rhodesia.¹³⁶

As mentioned by both Mlambo and Doxey, the French helped in the establishment and maintenance of a “sanctions-busting” trade network through Gabon and the Ivory Coast, which was intended to help maintain the trade of Rhodesian goods through these two countries and into other African and European countries.¹³⁷ This shows that the French government were willing to ignore, even oversee, the breaching of the embargo for the benefit of its own economy, as was the case for many other European nations.

3.4.3 Italy

Italy were the third largest producer of ferrochrome in the EC, after West Germany and France, and was equally as dependent on ferrochrome imports as the others. The Italian capacity for ferrochrome production was relatively stagnant during the 1970s, staying at 55 000 tons of ferrochrome from 1974 to 1980, most of which was high carbon.¹³⁸ In the period 1977-80, the Italian import dependency changed from 74.8% to 65%.¹³⁹ In my research I was not able to find any numbers detailing this statistic previous to 1977, nor did I find any numbers on specifically Italian consumption, as they were generally grouped with the EC countries in the source material.

When it comes to the relations with Rhodesian authorities, Flower described Italy as friendly;

*“The Italians were as uninhibited by the United Nations sanctions as Mussolini had been when faced with similar League of Nations action over Abyssinia in 1935. Amongst our most valuable connections in Italy were those in the Holy See itself. And in the Italian Intelligence we found a firm friend in the Head of the organization, General Michelli.”*¹⁴⁰

¹³⁶ Warson 2015

¹³⁷ Mlambo 2019, p.379 and Doxey 1980, p.77

¹³⁸ BDT/051/91

¹³⁹ Ibid.

¹⁴⁰ Flower 1987, p.74

According to Flower, Italian Intelligence were enthusiastic allies of Rhodesia. Considering that the Italians were one of the 3 ferrochrome producing countries in the EC, they could very well have used these connections to arrange for imports of chrome ore from Rhodesia to Italy while Michelli was the leader of the organisation, although he was arrested in 1974 for his involvement in a political conspiracy to overthrow the Italian government.¹⁴¹

The Italian situation provides fuel for the argument that Rhodesia was kept alive through the help of ideological sympathisers, similar to the French and the British. Indeed, if we are to believe in what Flower writes, then the power of private contacts within different governments proved to efficiently connect Rhodesian and European markets together, and the trade on the world seas was sufficiently large that smuggling goods was seemingly a breeze.

3.4.4 West Germany

West Germany were the last of the three big producers in the EC, with a production of around 160 000 tons of ferrochrome in 1980, with the peak being in 1977 with 200 000 tons. The German ferrochrome industry, like the others, relied exclusively on imports of chromite ore to create ferrochrome, with consumption rates going from 59.3% in 1977 to 116.5% in 1980.¹⁴²

West Germany had also been investigating opportunities to invest in its overseas exploration for strategic metals since 1971. This was done through subsidies, which in 1973 was expanded for domestic exploration. In 1979, West German plans to invest in stockpiles was announced, with chrome, vanadium, cobalt, manganese and blue asbestos being among the important metals.¹⁴³ This building of stockpiles is reflected in their import dependence of 1980, as stated in a Community letter on the situation of the ferrochrome industry. The West German import dependence was noted as 116.5% of production, which proves that they were indeed building stockpiles.¹⁴⁴ This appears to be a part of the West German policy to build security in case of trouble, which likely came around as a reaction to the restricted sources of chrome that were available when Rhodesia was sanctioned.

This shows a concerted effort to increase its supply of, among others, chromite. West Germany were likely partaking in sanctions-breaching to some extent along with countries like Great Britain, the US and France, however this would be hard to prove, especially as a deliberate

¹⁴¹ Flower 1987, p.75

¹⁴² BDT 051/91

¹⁴³ van Rensburg 1981, p. 10

¹⁴⁴ BDT 051/91

policy. The West German economy was reliant on chrome imports for its ferrochrome industry to fuel the stainless steel plants of West Germany. In fact the West German economy was so reliant on chrome imports that the GDP of West Germany would drop by 20% and leave 2 million people without work if there was to be a sanction on South Africa in 1984, according to a study done by the West German government.¹⁴⁵ Although this source studies the relationship between South Africa and Germany and occurs later than the embargo of Rhodesia, it shows that the West Germany were reliant on its ferrochrome and stainless steel industries. German steel industry had been heavily reliant on Southern African ores before the apartheid state in Rhodesia was toppled, and would likely have been dependent on Rhodesian imports before the growth of South African chrome exports in the 1970s.

In fact, when taking a deeper look at the statistics of ferrochrome production in the EC, it is clear that West Germany produced a disproportionate amount of low-carbon ferrochrome when compared to other European countries. Considering the fact that Rhodesia was regarded as the main producer of low-carbon ferrochrome, it would indicate that West Germany were at least somewhat reliant on chrome ore originating from Rhodesia.¹⁴⁶ It must be noted that the production of low-carbon ferrochrome can merely be considered an indication rather than an indictment, as both the USSR and South Africa were producing it in smaller quantities than what Rhodesia did.

As had been seen many times before, interruptions in the supply chain from Southern Africa would lead to price jumps and scarcity. This had happened multiple times already, with large price jumps following the implementation of sanctions as world markets scramble to find new sources, as well as in 1972 when unrest in the port of Lourenco Marques had led to breaks in supply from both South Africa and Rhodesia.¹⁴⁷

Companies were able to bypass the sanctions through the use of middle men. This process of course happened by shipping goods from the ports of Rhodesia's ideological allies and neighbour states, South Africa and Portugal, and especially the port of Lourenco Marques.¹⁴⁸ Many of the companies involved in this scheme were allowed to operate as usual in Switzerland,

¹⁴⁵ Gustafsson, Odén, Tegen 1990, p.13

¹⁴⁶ BDT 260/94

¹⁴⁷ Maull 1984, p.211

¹⁴⁸ Flower 1987, p.67

which deemed that its principle of neutrality made it impossible to enforce the UN embargo on Rhodesia. While this did align with their ideological stance of complete neutrality, it was also undeniably good for business. Companies interested in breaking sanctions were thus able to create headquarters in Switzerland, from which they were legally able to purchase Rhodesian goods.¹⁴⁹

3.5 Discussion

Western relations with Rhodesia had been longstanding, with investment from all of the US, France and Great Britain, with West Germany also very interested in trade with Rhodesia for their ferrochrome industry. While these countries were more openly interested in Rhodesia, there were still covert ties to Italy, and West Germany had been importing large amounts of chromite prior to sanctions, and were infamously connected to the RISCO case. What this chapter has shown is that the EC had no distinguishable common policy towards Rhodesia. The UK of course were in a special position, and the US were breaching sanctions with no hesitation. The French had multiple shady connections with Rhodesia, established well before sanctions were initiated, which could have been used in order to access the market without being detected, which they did in many cases. The Italians were also connected to Rhodesia, but as far as established only directly through General Michelli, and a large low carbon ferrochrome production. While this is not enough to conclude that Italy was acquiring illegal chrome, it would certainly indicate so. The West German government had no direct ties to Rhodesia, but there are several cases of sanctions being breached, particularly the RISCO-case. They were also not strict in their enforcement, and their large low carbon ferrochrome production might also hint towards imports of Rhodesian ores, although this is still not entirely clear.

¹⁴⁹ Mlambo 2019, p.376

4 Breaching sanctions & UN denouncement

Throughout the course of UN discussions on the situation of Southern Rhodesia, there were concerns on the upholding of sanctions. Indeed, historians are split on the success of the sanctions, with some believing sanctions to be a success due to the eventual collapse of the Smith regime, emphasising the role sanctions played on the diplomatic isolation of Rhodesia following the collapse of Portuguese colonies along with South Africa distancing themselves in the latter half of the 1970s.¹⁵⁰ Other historians, such as Mlambo, describe the sanctions as useless, arguing that the lack of will described throughout the UN reports lead to a much slower and bloodier independence movement, which would ultimately prove successful due to military victory rather than economic troubles.¹⁵¹

The discussions within the UN Security Council and the reports of the Committee shows that, while sanctions-breaking was fairly common, the only instance of a state openly and wilfully avoiding sanctions was in the chromite market.¹⁵² The report shows that the chromite market was a fairly important topic of discussion since, as shown in the 4th report, there were many reported cases of illegal exports of chrome and ferrochrome. What becomes clear when reading the material contained in the discussions of the Security Council is that the US has a consistent stance that they are merely formalizing what is already common among other member states. The US stance aligned with the UK in the sense that they were both against expansion of sanctions, rather opting for a more rigid approach with stricter cooperation by Member States. The fact that the UK and the US were aligned in their policies can be observed in the fact that they voted similarly in many of the votes in the Security Council, namely Resolutions 314 & 333, as well as their cooperation in the discussions leading to the fall of the Smith regime through the Lancaster House Agreement on the 21st December 1979.¹⁵³

This chapter will attempt to show the situations in the UN Security Council discussions on the situation in Rhodesia. There were many meetings around the subject, but for the subject of this thesis we will focus on two; the meeting directly following Resolution 253 and the meetings around the Draft Resolutions for Resolution 333, calling for stronger measures in the enforcement of Res. 253. These meetings were chosen due to their content, which shows the

¹⁵⁰ Minter and Schimdt 1988, p.208

¹⁵¹ Mlambo 2019, p.376

¹⁵² UN Security Council 1645th meeting, S/PV.1645, p.3

¹⁵³ DeRoche 2001, p.285

deteriorating trust by many African and Socialist countries towards the UK and the US, as it becomes increasingly clear that they were not interested in strictly enforcing sanctions. The draft resolution includes measures to prevent Rhodesian goods escaping the country, such as extending the Beira patrol into the ports of Lourenço Marques & Durban and also denying landing rights for carriers of nations known to operate air services in Rhodesia.¹⁵⁴

The discussions provide a qualitative addition to the statistics contained in the reports, and show that the UK was heavily criticised by member states such as the USSR, Yugoslavia and Kenya for their handling of the Rhodesian situation in 1974, following a much more friendly meeting in 1968.

It will also discuss the extent to which sanctions busting took place in the West, and will take a particular look into the UN Security Council's reports on the breach of sanctions from the 1st report in 1968 to the 12th report in 1980. There were twelve reports in total, with two additional special reports. The reports serve as the foundations on which discussions in the Security Council itself would take place, as they show the UN investigations and the actions of governments and firms which attempted to break sanctions. Some problems with the reports are that, while most governments seemed cooperative, the information flow went extremely slow, leading to most cases never being solved, or simply dragging on too long for evidence to be valid. Also, there hardly exists explicit evidence as to the origin of exported ores, which proved to be a major issue for the Security Council. This was due to the lax rules for registering the ores which were sent from South Africa, and would prove to be a problem for the entirety of the sanctions regime, despite efforts to tighten security and increase requirements. How did the initiatives of the UN Security Council affect the adherence of Western countries to Resolution 253?

4.1 Discussions in the UN Security Council regarding Sanctions on Rhodesia

The issue of Southern Rhodesia was addressed multiple times in the UN Security Council, in which draft resolutions were discussed & altered by the member states' representatives. In the meeting discussing the implementation of Resolution 253, it becomes clear that several states were opposed to the UK's handling of the situation, while retaining the belief that the UK would

¹⁵⁴ S/PV 10928

be responsible for an eventual solution to the problem. Indeed, many of the representatives were in favour of military intervention, as noted by the Soviet representative in the meeting of 29th of May, 1968.¹⁵⁵ The criticism of the UK mainly revolved around its insistence on a peaceful resolution, despite the view that Rhodesia was a rebel state of the UK. The Soviet representative also pointed to the fact that the sanctions were proven to be inefficient. He pointed to the examples of tobacco & minerals, stating that “the annual Southern Rhodesian tobacco sales have once again opened in Salisbury this year as if nothing had happened”¹⁵⁶, also noting that the mineral trade was following the same trend.¹⁵⁷ As is noted in the reports of the UN Security Council on Resolution 253, there were still many cases of shipments being allowed to go through the other ports, arriving to their destination, and then being resold without any action being taken until it was too late.¹⁵⁸ This further spurred on the criticism towards the UK. Since the UK were viewed as the offended party in the UDI, they were also the main country responsible for reaching a conclusion on the subject. However, their seemingly unwillingness to act made it seem like they were, at the least sympathetic towards the Smith-regime, which might have been true based on the popular support received by the regime, as mentioned in subchapter 3.4.1.

The criticism of the UK was only getting more and more intense as the inefficiency of sanctions grew. The UK had been adamant in continuing their approach of dialogue over military intervention, despite the fact that many UN countries were in favour of deposing the Smith regime by force.¹⁵⁹ They were also getting criticism for their seeming reluctance to criticize the US following their open sanctions breaking.¹⁶⁰ The sanctions were effective to a degree still, as Rhodesian trade had to manoeuvre its way around trade barriers and diplomatic breaks in order to keep its country going.

This discussion shows the criticism towards the UK, and while the discussions seem to point to other countries being implicit in sanctions breaking, the UK has been singled out as the responsible party for the adherence to sanctions. While it would be considered legitimate to point out that the UK were not doing its part, the lack of focus on other countries’ role in the

¹⁵⁵ UN Security Council 1428th meeting, S/PV.1428, p.6

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid*, p.2

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid*, p.2

¹⁵⁸ Several UN reports

¹⁵⁹ S/PV.1645, p.6

¹⁶⁰ S/PV.1645, p.5

sanctions is interesting. US and UK reluctance to expand sanctions was likely the reason for their singling out, as there was not any other country to point fingers at, only suspicions.

4.1.1 Mentions of chrome

The situation of chrome exports from Rhodesia was first specifically mentioned in a UN Resolution in Resolution 314, which was issued the 28th of February, 1972.¹⁶¹ In this Resolution, the Security Council calls upon Member States to “refrain from taking any measures that would in any way permit or facilitate the importation from Southern Rhodesia of commodities falling within the scope of the obligations imposed by Resolution 253 (1968), including chrome ore”.¹⁶² While this statement did not mention the US specifically, their policy of continuing chrome imports from Rhodesia makes it fairly obvious that the US were the main target of the line. The discussions behind the Resolution show this clearly, as the US seizes the moment to attempt to defend its policy of allowing chrome imports.

The US delegate remained steadfast in the view that the US needed to allow imports from Rhodesia due to the already widespread sanctions-breaking, claiming that the US was the only country to openly admit to it.¹⁶³ The US used an example from the 4th report of the Security Council Committee, issued in 1971, to explain that “Rhodesian indirect exports to world markets through third countries rose from \$8 million in 1966 to \$215 million in 1970. It is common knowledge that in the last few years Rhodesia has been able to export the bulk of its mineral output. These exports must go somewhere-and they have not gone to the United States.”¹⁶⁴ The US remained steadfast that the Byrd Amendment was “only a very small part of the problem” due to its small scope, only focusing on chrome imports.¹⁶⁵ The US recommended chemical testing of suspected cargo, along with a detailed list of the sources of strategic metals being submitted by each Member State to the UN.

The USSR delegate commented on the US justification of the Byrd Amendment, and denounced the open flouting of UN sanctions. They explained to the meeting how the US had blamed inflated prices on Soviet chrome on the passing of the Byrd Amendment, however the Soviets claim to be selling chrome to the US at the level of international prices. Indeed, the Soviet

¹⁶¹ S/RES/314

¹⁶² S/RES/314

¹⁶³ S/PV.1645, p.4

¹⁶⁴ S/PV.1645, p.4

¹⁶⁵ S/PV 1645, p.4

Union claims that the US is using chrome as a justification to help the Smith regime. The Soviet Union pointed to the giant US stockpiles of chrome & the fact that the US already were importing 50% of its chrome from other sources than the USSR to say that the US did not need to break UN sanctions to reach their needs of chrome.¹⁶⁶ While this would be true, the US chrome stockpiles were only expected to last around 2 years, with much of it consisting of poor quality chrome, according to discussions in the US Congress.¹⁶⁷

Nevertheless, the US were heavily criticized for their focus on chrome imports over the implementation of UN policy as required by membership of the UN. The vote taken in Resolution 314 also sees both the US & UK abstain from voting, with the UK explaining that they “do not believe that resolutions on any aspect of the Rhodesian question are necessary at this time.”¹⁶⁸

However, Rhodesian trade was still effective enough, and this was because they could keep up relations with their neighbours, and use their ports. The UK received plenty of criticism from the international community, mainly from the Socialist Bloc (USSR, Yugoslavia) and the African countries (Kenya, Sudan).¹⁶⁹ One of these criticisms was the lacking enforcement of the Beira Patrol. The Beira Patrol was initiated by the British in 1966 as a means to stop Rhodesian wares to travel through Mozambique into the world oceans, and was meant to be a swift and efficient manoeuvre. However, Rhodesian wares only found new ways to enter the world markets, with smaller cargos being carried by plane and larger cargos being shipped to different ports; namely Lourenço Marques in Mozambique and Durban in South Africa.¹⁷⁰

The situation had not changed when the UN Security Council again met a year later, at the 1716th meeting, calling for an intensified application of the Beira patrol again, stating that other ports had also expanded in order to keep up with the interest in Rhodesian goods. Indeed, as mentioned by the representative of the Sudan at the 1716th meeting in 1973:

¹⁶⁶ S/PV 1645, p.6

¹⁶⁷ Congressional Hearings 1973, p.99

¹⁶⁸ S/PV 1645, p.9

¹⁶⁹ S/PV 1716, pp2-10

¹⁷⁰ SPV1716, p. 2

“It [the Committee] should have been aware of the fact that the British naval patrol, at Beira Port, has not only been relaxed but that Lourenço Marques and Durban Ports have extended their port facilities in the service of contraband trade from and to Southern Rhodesia.”¹⁷¹

This excerpt shows that the problems of efficiently maintaining the blockade at Beira still was not working, and tells us that it was commonly known, at least among the UN that the Mozambiquan and South African ports were used for the purpose of contraband trade. It is a point which highlights the inaction of the UK, however the discussion also fails to properly address the widespread sanctions breaching of other countries, which remained unnamed, as it was impossible to address more than mere suspicions towards other governments. Indeed, the UK seems to have been made into a scapegoat in this manner, as their responsibility for the situation was obvious to the other member states.

During the same meeting, there was a vote on the draft resolution S/10928, in which the UK and US were the only countries voting against the implementation of stronger sanctions. France and Austria abstained from voting, with the following countries voting in favour of the resolution; Australia, China, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Panama, Peru, Sudan, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics & Yugoslavia.¹⁷² The draft resolution was discussed in the context of further strengthening sanctions in the face of the blunt sanctions busting of Portugal & South Africa, and was demanding the open denouncement of these two countries along with more comprehensive measures being implemented on them. The resolution, among others points, states that the Security Council “Decides that all States should limit, with immediate effect, any purchase of chromium ores, asbestos, tobacco, pig iron, copper, sugar, maize and any products from South Africa, Mozambique and Angola to the quantitative levels prevailing in 1965”.¹⁷³ This point, while accepted for a majority of countries, would be an obvious problem for the UK & the US, as they had considerable trade interests in these countries, particularly South Africa. This scenario would surely call for a response by the governments of South Africa & Portugal, and would lead to further political instability in the South of Africa, which would not be ideal for the West, who were reliant on these countries for their chrome needs.

On face value, however, the proposition seems to be relatively mild, as it did not call for sanctions on South Africa & Portugal as a whole, but only of their goods which would be

¹⁷¹ S/PV 1716, p.2

¹⁷² S/PV 1716

¹⁷³ Ibid

suspected of being shipped from Rhodesia. Other measures to prevent Rhodesian goods escaping the country would be extending the Beira patrol into the ports of Lourenço Marques & Durban and denying landing rights for carriers of nations known to operate air services in Rhodesia.¹⁷⁴ These measures would require the UK to jeopardize their relationship with Portugal and South Africa, as they would be effectively blocking out their largest alternatives to Rhodesia, which would not have been possible for an extended amount of time.

4.1.2 Stricter or wider sanctions?

The failure of the draft resolution to pass allowed for much criticism of the vetoing powers. The Chinese representative, Chuang Yen, called out the UK & US following the votes, stating that; “Regrettably, however, the second draft resolution has been vetoed by two permanent members, the United Kingdom and the United States. This cannot but offer food for deep thought.”¹⁷⁵ The sentiment is shared with both India & Yugoslavia in the following discussions, both of whom pointed to the UKs insistence on continuing sanctions while being unwilling to commit to full-scale sanctions.¹⁷⁶ The UK response is focused on the view that they have been keeping to the recommendations given in the reports on the situation of Resolution 253, which do not cover the expansion of sanctions, unlike what has been proposed with the draft resolutions.¹⁷⁷ Indeed, the UK showed support for continuing with sanctions without expansion in the meeting preceding the presentation of draft resolutions S/PV 10927 & 10928. In the 1715th meeting of the Security Council, the UK had argued that the current sanctions regime was not efficiently executed, and wanted to lay the emphasis on encouraging nations to review their import statistics for discrepancies of trade & evaluate their routines for checking imports.¹⁷⁸ Also, the UK insists on the fact that international trade was taking place on such a technical level that simply expanding embargo would not be enough. They argued that both legal and illegal trade was taking place with so many intermediaries that blocking trade with Southern Africa, as proposed to a degree in the draft resolutions, would not prove effective. They argued that wares would make its way to international trade no matter what the situation with Southern Africa, and thus widening the Beira blockade would not produce any major results.¹⁷⁹

¹⁷⁴ S/PV 10928

¹⁷⁵ S/PV 1716, p.6

¹⁷⁶ Ibid

¹⁷⁷ Ibid, p.8

¹⁷⁸ S/PV 1715, p.3-4

¹⁷⁹ Ibid

Most other states were still in favour of enacting the draft resolutions calling for the furthering of sanctions to involve South Africa & Portugal.¹⁸⁰ The Senegalese delegation calls out the strategy of some states which practice a “two-faced policy” as “the policy of the ostrich”, stating that the countries which speak about solidarity with Rhodesia must also cease to work against the strengthening of sanctions.¹⁸¹ The Senegalese delegation exclaimed that: “Among those States one cannot gloss over the attitude of the Government of the United States of America which, by resuming the import of chrome and other strategic minerals, opens the way for other States to practise, with the racists of Southern Rhodesia, a trade disapproved of by the international community.”¹⁸² The criticism towards the US was that they had openly flouted sanctions, and undermined the sanctions system, allowing for the Rhodesian economy to amass a record-high export earnings of £138 million.¹⁸³ The UK is also once again criticized for their lack of military intervention, as the Senegalese delegation believes that “Great Britain has been able, in other places, to resort to repression. If has the responsibility of using that same force in its colony of Southern Rhodesia and to restore, through universal suffrage, the rule of the African majority.”¹⁸⁴ This reflects the view that Rhodesia was treated differently due to their settler history, leaning into the idea that settler decolonisation was accepted by the West.

However, it is also important to note the differences in the draft resolutions discussed & the final state of Resolution 333. The Resolution which was actually enacted was essentially the same as the first draft resolution of May 18th 1973, which was very different from the draft resolution discussed above. The first draft resolution called for limited measures, such as asking governments to declare their sources of common Rhodesian exports such as chrome, asbestos & maize, with a denouncement against South Africa & Portugal.¹⁸⁵ The second draft proposal contained much stronger action, such as the expansion of the Beira blockade & the reduction of trade with Portugal & South Africa to levels of 1965.¹⁸⁶ This could explain the unwillingness of the UK and the US, as a previous draft resolution had seemingly been proposed, one which did not drastically enlarge the scope of sanctions. One could argue that this draft resolution was

¹⁸⁰ S/PV1715, p.7

¹⁸¹ S/PV, 1715,p.5

¹⁸² *Ibid*, p.5

¹⁸³ *Ibid*,p.5

¹⁸⁴ *Ibid*,p.5

¹⁸⁵ S/PV 10927

¹⁸⁶ S/PV 10928

added with the expectation that it would be vetoed, in order to create a discussion at the Security Council regarding the topic and expose the perceived inefficiency of the UK in its leading role.

The discussions in the UN Security Council can be described as heated, with the UK and US specifically receiving major criticism for their lacking decisiveness & open violation of sanctions respectively. The main point of these discussions was the addition of additional measures towards Portugal & South Africa, who were both known to be on the side of Rhodesia, and who both were known to aid in the violation of sanctions by allowing illegal wares to come through their territories. In the wake of a record year of Rhodesian export earnings, it would seem that an end of the Smith regime was far away. The discussions were based on the reports of the UN Security Council's Committee on Resolution 253 which, in addition to the reporting of specific cases of sanctions breaking, also provided invaluable statistics on the trade volumes & values around Rhodesia & Southern Africa, providing a basis for the scope of sanctions violations.¹⁸⁷

Looking at the discussions leading up to Resolution(s) 314 & 333 shows that, following the Byrd Amendment, there was appearing a divide between the US/UK and the rest of the members of the Security Council.

4.2 Economic development in sanctioned Rhodesia

The 1st report of the Security Council Committee, issued at the end of 1968, describes the trade statistics of Rhodesia, and how there were large discrepancies in the reported trade of Rhodesia compared to the reported trade of its trade partners. Indeed, the reported Rhodesian exports amount to around \$262 million in 1967, of which only \$107 million is reported by the importing countries, with an estimated \$80 million going to South Africa.¹⁸⁸ This would mean that around \$95 million was unaccounted for in the trade statistics of some countries, although around \$19 million of this may be accounted for by gold exports, which is not accounted for in merchandise trade statistics.¹⁸⁹ One of the problems associated with the discrepancy in trade is that some countries were not mentioning Rhodesia as an entity for exports/imports, leading to difficulties in tracking down the direction of goods. Portugal & South Africa are mentioned as examples

¹⁸⁷ Various UN reports

¹⁸⁸ 1st report S/8594 1968, p.9

¹⁸⁹ Ibid, p.9

of this, already showing their intentions of aiding Rhodesia. Other countries had not noted Rhodesia as its own destination due to the sanctions, and rather added it to an “others” or indistinguishable” category, and would be asked to provide statistics on the topic for the Committee.¹⁹⁰ These numbers are from 1967, meaning that there were large discrepancies in trade even before the initiation of comprehensive mandatory sanctions introduced through Resolution 253.

Seeing as Resolution 232, the reigning resolution at the time, only called for the mandatory sanctions of certain goods, namely tobacco, asbestos, copper and chrome, it is natural that the trade statistics of these goods are mentioned. The report describes tobacco as the main export of Rhodesia at the time, also stating that the nature of the tobacco trade could be an explanation of the missing \$80-85 million which were unaccounted for in the trade numbers of 1967. Indeed, the report suggests that tobacco stocks lying in bond could be a viable answer to the question of the discrepancies in exports. This due to the fact that tobacco stocks would not be reported as income until the stocks are removed from bond, meaning that trade could have taken place without it showing on the trade statistics.¹⁹¹ The global trade numbers of tobacco did still show a significant decline in Rhodesian wares, as producers such as the US, China, South Korea & Thailand reportedly overtook the gap. Rhodesian tobacco exports, which would have normally been around 245 000 tons in 1966 & 1967, were in reality around 45 000 tons, showing a large decline in exports of the commodity.¹⁹²

Asbestos exports in 1965 was around \$30 million, while amounting to around \$1.7 million worth of asbestos in the first half of 1968, of which \$1.2 million went to West Germany & \$0.5 million went to the USA.¹⁹³ The US explained its trade as shipments happening before 16th December 1966, the date Resolution 232 was implemented. The export of asbestos from Rhodesia to South Africa was not available, while the level of trade in South Africa had increased from \$35-39 million in 1960-1965 to \$59 million in 1967 & \$28 million in the first half of 1968.¹⁹⁴

¹⁹⁰ Ibid, p.7

¹⁹¹Ibid., p.11

¹⁹² Ibid, p.11

¹⁹³ Ibid, p.12

¹⁹⁴ Ibid, p.13

Copper exports from Rhodesia, amounting to \$18.6 million in 1965, appeared to have completely ceased following Resolution 232, as there was no reported trade in 1967 & the first half of 1968. However, the report states that there was a chance of West Germany importing \$7 million worth of copper in 1968, as West German trade numbers showed imports over \$7 million from “undisclosed countries”.¹⁹⁵ Along with the fact that West Germany was the chief importer of Rhodesian copper in 1965 leads the Committee to believe that “ There is reason to believe that these imports originated in S, Rhodesia.”¹⁹⁶

The report states that chromite was chiefly imported by the US pre-UDI, who imported \$5 million out of a reported \$10.7 million worth of chromite in 1965. The report states that the US were importing \$3.7 million in 1967, arguing again that the shipments were made prior to Resolution 232, and that in the first half of 1968 no more shipments had been made.¹⁹⁷ The report acknowledges that \$3.7 million had been imported by South Africa in 1965, and that later trade statistics between the countries was not available.¹⁹⁸ It is interesting to note that in the import statistics added in the annex of the report shows that all reporting countries reported lessening imports from Rhodesia, with the exception of Mozambique & Angola, the colonies of Portugal.¹⁹⁹ Why the, at the time, colonies of Portugal were reporting trade with Rhodesia, but not Portugal itself is unclear.

The chrome imports/exports of several nations declined dramatically in the period of 1965-1968 following the declaration of UDI. The annex contains import numbers for all reporting governments, as reported by the governments themselves, which shows that countries such as the UK, US, West Germany & France all show a strong decline in their imports of chromite from Southern Rhodesia & South Africa alike. While ceasing trade with Rhodesia following Resolution 232, except for the US, which continued in 1967 due to delayed payments, it is interesting that also trade with South Africa plummeted in the short term.²⁰⁰ While this could be explained by short-term trade fluctuations, it could also be caused by mistrust & an awareness that South Africa would be helping the Smith regime.

¹⁹⁵ Ibid, p.13

¹⁹⁶ Ibid, p.13

¹⁹⁷ Ibid, p.13

¹⁹⁸ Ibid, p.13

¹⁹⁹ Ibid, p.15

²⁰⁰ Ibid, p.56

The 1st report states that Rhodesian exports had “officially” fallen to 60% of the 1965-levels, showing that sanctions were somewhat effective. Still, the report states that the Rhodesian economy had recovered relatively well following the initial hit it received in the immediate aftermath of sanctions, when trade was dramatically lowered and the economy needed to be shifted. As of 1968, the sanctions would seemingly not have been effective in crippling the Rhodesian economy, as the report states there had been a seemingly budding shift from cash crops to less profitable crops due to circumstance.²⁰¹ The report also notes import substitution, continued high mining outputs, agricultural diversification and the exceptional harvest in Rhodesia in 1966-67 as a reason for their economic position being stronger than anticipated. The report concludes that the UN member-states would need to improve their adherence to the sanctions regime, as to close the gap between official numbers of Rhodesian exports & reported imports. The report suggests that the Rhodesian economy would struggle in the face of another bad harvest following one in 1968, while the output of mining would seemingly remain stable. It also states that Rhodesia’s survival would depend on efficiently expanding its secondary industry to cover for the lack of imports, although there would be some reliance on imports in any case, leaving the secondary sector reliant on sanctions breaking being effective.

As we have seen earlier in the text, sanctions were not more efficiently implemented as the report would have hoped for, and the Rhodesian economy was thus able to flourish. Indeed, the Rhodesian economy reached record export income in 1973.²⁰² Although the report seemed optimistic in its chances of terminating the Smith regime, it would not be an easy task, as it would take more than ten years from this report to the end of the regime.

The tenth report, issued in 1978, focused on the statistical situation of Southern Rhodesian exports in 1976. The report mentioned that Rhodesian trade had grown from the previous year by \$103 million, from \$654m to \$748m.²⁰³ The report tells us that Rhodesia stopped issuing trade numbers completely in 1974, stating that “the United Nations intensification of hostility towards Rhodesia” was a factor in their decision to stop informing the worldwide community of their trade statistics.²⁰⁴ The tenth report shows that the countries surrounding Rhodesia had been consistently reporting lower exports than the imports reported by their trade partners. For

²⁰¹ *Ibid*, p.100

²⁰² *Ibid*, p.101

²⁰³ Tenth report S/12529 1978, p.1

²⁰⁴ *Ibid*, p.1

example, South African exports in 1975 was around \$159m lower than reported by the importing countries, which is evidence of the well-known fact that South Africa was aiding Rhodesia in avoiding sanctions, and also shows that countries were still keen to trade with South Africa.²⁰⁵ This is shown in Table 1 below, and is measured in comparison to 23 countries, consisting of several Western European nations, Canada, New Zealand, Japan & Australia.²⁰⁶

4.3 How Rhodesia avoided sanctions through neighbouring countries

Mozambique also shows signs of having consistently aided the Smith regime in breaking sanctions, having a consistent and significant difference excess of imports over exports.²⁰⁷ Comparisons of the 23 countries' excess of reported imports over the exports of the four neighbouring countries mentioned in Table 1 below and the indirect exports of Rhodesia, shows that around \$327m excess imports were reported in 1976, compared to around \$325m that was estimated to have left Rhodesia and entered the international market.²⁰⁸ This is shown in Table 3 below.

Export trade of South African Customs Union with 23 countries (Million \$USD)						
S. African Customs Union						
S.A exports	1008	1127	1310	3472	3752	3651
23 imports	1060	1210	1401	3630	3911	4046
Excess (imports over exports)	52	83	91	158	159	395
Mozambique						
Mozambique's exports	60	62	69	176	122	127
23 imports	81	81	120	364	284	201
Excess	21	19	51	188	162	74

²⁰⁵ Ibid, p.3

²⁰⁶ Ibid, p.2

²⁰⁷ Ibid, p.3

²⁰⁸ Ibid, p.4

Zambia						
Zambian exports	457	622	544	1031	736	762
23 imports	410	518	510	1020	672	637
Excess	-47	-104	-34	-11	-64	-125
Malawi						
Malawian exports	26	33	40	63	87	109
23 imports	24	32	34	61	91	92
Excess	-2	-1	-6	-2	4	-17
Total						
Exporting countries' figures	1551	1844	1963	4742	4697	4649
23 imports	1575	1841	2065	5075	4958	4976
Excess	24	-3	102	333	261	327

Table 4.1: The table shows the discrepancies in export numbers between the neighbors of Rhodesia and the imports of 23 reporting countries. The 23 countries were not named in the report, but are based on developed market economies.²⁰⁹

Indirect exports of Southern Rhodesia (Million \$USD)			
	Excess of reported imports of 23 countries over exports of 4 neighbors of Rhodesia (A)	Indirect exports of Southern Rhodesia, including re-exports (B)	Differences (A)-(B)
1965	24	43	-19
1966	-3	21	-24
1967	102	79	23
1974	333	302	31
1975	261	254	7

²⁰⁹ S/12529 1978, p.3

1976	327	325	2
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Table 4.2: This table shows the indirect exports of Southern Rhodesia, calculated by comparing the excess of reported income provided by official trade numbers for Rhodesia (1965-1967) and estimated trade numbers for the years where official numbers were not provided (1974-).²¹⁰

The table below shows that the Rhodesian exports of chrome through the South African Customs Union were likely to have grown during the sanctions regime. Table 7 shows that the amount of chromite estimated to have been exported through the South African Customs Union and Mozambique respectively had grown substantially following 1965, with an apparent peak in 1974. The trade from Rhodesia itself was quite low over the same period, which is to be expected given the situation.²¹¹ This table again underlines that there is a discrepancy between the reported numbers & the actual numbers which have been given by the importing countries, thus justifying that the Committee's investigations into suspicious activity by different countries' companies were justified.

Chrome ore situation in Southern Rhodesia(SR) in thousand metric tons								
Imports of reporting countries	1964	1965	1966	1967	1974	1975	1976	
Directly from SR	406	397	179	136	57	59	16	
Via SACR	-	-	181	166	319*	183*	209*	
Recorded imports of SACR believed to be of SR origin	49	84	98	75	76	80	120	
Imports of reporting	16	20	52	30	52	101	66	

²¹⁰ Ibid. p.4

²¹¹ Ibid, p.10

countries from Mozambique							
Total exports of SR	471	501	510	407	504*	423*	411*

*Estimated

Table 4.3: The table shows the export of chrome ore from Rhodesia in the period 1964-1967, and the estimated amount of chrome ore shipped in 1974-1976 (due to lack of trade numbers from Rhodesia).²¹²

The table below shows the Western importers' statistics regarding their situation of chromite imports with the South African Customs Union, showing the levels of trade in chrome ore in 1965, and how it had changed until the years 1974, 1975, and 1976. This table shows us that some countries, like Japan, West Germany and the UK saw a steady rise in their imports of South African chrome since 1965, while the US had severely dropped their chrome imports. With the trend of Rhodesian firms exporting through South Africa, it is uncertain the amount of ores that would have originated from Rhodesia, but with the amount of discussions regarding smuggling, it is safe to assume that some of these imports were of Rhodesian origin.

External trade of S. Africa Customs Union, chrome ore (in '000 metric tons)				
	1965	1974	1975	1976
France	4	61.9	54.9	68.9
West Germany	117.6	175.6	136.9	177.9
Italy	3.2	24.8	25.0	34.4
United Kingdom	68.8	45.2	80.8	102.9
United States	436.2	257.5	108.2	156.3
Japan	52.2	423.7	342.8	415.6

Table 4.4: The external trade of the South African Customs Union in selected years following UDI. The table shows that the export of chrome was at its peak around the end of the commodity boom, and was affected by the financial crisis of 1975.²¹³

²¹² S/12529, p.10

²¹³ S/12519, p.11

The table shows that the South African trade of chrome ores had increased drastically from the start of sanctions until the mid-1970s. This was, as we have noted due to the investments into beneficiation processes to create charge chrome, thereby utilising the potential available in the country. This allowed for countries to trade much more chrome with South Africa, but along with it would come more room to expand trade with Southern Rhodesia. While not many cases have been verified, there have been many allegations, and one such is the case of Japan. On 5 April 1974, the New York Times reported that:

*“in the last two years, Japan’s official figures of the imports of chrome from South Africa were considerably larger than South Africa’s statistics for chrome exports to Japan. For instance, in 1972 Japan imported 445 000 metric tons from South Africa, while South African export figures showed only 253 000 tons were exported.”*²¹⁴

According to the newspaper, diplomatic sources were charging that Japanese concerns had been using false South African certificates of origin and shipping the chrome through either South Africa or Mozambique. In addition, in violation of Resolution 253, Japan’s External Trade Organisation was maintaining a representative in Salisbury.²¹⁵ While these numbers do not 100% confirm that Japan were trading with Rhodesia, it certainly does point to that, as such a large discrepancy of trade would be near impossible to achieve otherwise. In any case, the External Trade Organisation of Japan being present in Salisbury would indicate that they were present, and that a government organ of Japan was unabashedly violating sanctions.

4.4 Imported chrome: Where did it originate?

The import of chrome ores into Europe and the US was dependent on Rhodesia before UDI, so even if most countries did not declare it, they were likely still dependent in the following years as well. Rhodesia was the biggest exporter of chrome before the UDI, and it would thus be unlikely that the chrome market would be sustainable without them. There is also evidence of higher exports of high-quality chrome from South Africa than what it would have been able to produce in the early stages of the embargo. It is known that Rhodesia and South Africa maintained diplomatic ties throughout the first half of sanctions at least, and Rhodesia likely exported its chrome through South African shell corporations, as evidenced by the RISCO case. We also know that more direct trade has happened, either through direct or covert action, such

²¹⁴ New York Times, 5. April 1974, gathered from BDT 076/94

²¹⁵ Mlambo 2019, p.390

as the implementation of the Byrd Amendment, and French military equipment and vehicles being used by the Rhodesian military in the Bush War.²¹⁶

However, due to the nature of the situation it is not clear where the chrome used in European industry originated from, as there would have been interest from all sides to maintain trade. There is evidence that Rhodesia had trade relations, and that there were established shell corporations, and also that high-quality ore was still being produced in Rhodesia. Sanctions-breaking on a wide scale was common, with the economic benefits of keeping up trade with Rhodesia in many cases trumping the moral grounds on which the sanctions were based.

Metallurgical grade Rhodesian chrome ore had long been exported to more developed industries in order to be processed into ferrochrome, which would then be usable in the stainless steel industry. This relationship changed over the course of the sanctions regime, as the Rhodesian economy grew to be more self-sufficient, leading to an increased production of ferrochrome within Rhodesia itself.²¹⁷ It is difficult to tell exactly how much the production of chrome and ferrochrome ores within Rhodesia changed from 1965 to 1979 due to the covert nature of exports making the Rhodesian economy rather isolated. However, some of the literature discussed in the thesis hint to an expansion of the manufacturing capabilities of Rhodesia during the sanctions regime. Indeed, the Congress hearing of 1973 discusses the import of ferrochrome to the US, in which Mr. J. Sheehan describes the then current state of trade with Rhodesia. Mr. Sheehan exclaimed that:

“The fact is that the bulk of the Rhodesian material did not come to us as chrome ore, which would have benefited the ferrochrome domestic ferroalloy industry and provided the jobs that we heard so much about; the fact that it did not come in but, rather, came in as processed ferrochrome, negates any benefit which may be theorized from this shift in the prime source of our total chrome ore, the shift from Russian to non-Russian sources.”²¹⁸

The quote tells us that the US imports consisted mostly of ferrochrome in 1973, meaning that the industry had advanced since the declaration of UDI in 1965. This is a testament to the work done by Rhodesian authorities to diversify its economy, and to find a use for the excess chrome ore which would have been produced following UDI. Indeed, the Rhodesia authorities had taken over the production of mines that belonged to foreign companies, as expressed by the

²¹⁶ Warson 2015

²¹⁷ Howat 1984, p.41

²¹⁸ Congressional hearing, 1973 p.43

Union Carbide president O'Hara in Congress.²¹⁹ O'Hara described the efforts of Univex, a Rhodesian company ran by the state, to keep up and expand the mining sector, and to export ferrochrome in its processed form. This would mean that in times of lower chromite exports, Rhodesia was able to keep up mining activity, as the ferrochrome industry would need fuelling. Another point which further solidifies the idea that Rhodesian industry had developed to include ferrochrome production was the rapid expansion of the South African production described in some sources. Due to sanctions, the Rhodesian economy was often included in South African export numbers, meaning that distinguishing the exports of the two countries was difficult. However, when describing EC dependence on chromite and ferrochrome, Hans Maull writes that: *“European Community dependence on chromium ore supplies from South Africa grew from about 24 per cent in 1963 to 48 per cent in 1979/80; dependence on ferro-chrome from 14 per cent in 1966 to 50 per cent in 1979-80.”*²²⁰

This describes the EC as heavily reliant on South Africa for their chrome and ferrochrome needs, with a particular rise in the reliance of ferrochrome. While these numbers are the official numbers, there is almost certainly a part of the ferrochrome production which belongs to Rhodesian firms shipping through South Africa.

According to Maull, Rhodesian ferrochrome exports to the EC had increased from 1.400 to 54.200 tons from 1966 to 1979/80.²²¹ This shows that the increase in finished ferrochrome which entered the European market had drastically increased from 1966 to 1979. At the same time, the South African exports of ferrochrome had shot up from 11 600 tons, to 246.5 thousand, with chrome imports going from 131 700 to 472 300 in the same timeframe. The EC imports might indicate investments into a greater amount of production of ferrochrome within Rhodesia itself. The Rhodesian expansion of the ferrochrome industry was necessary in order to compete with South Africa, as Rhodesia needed to follow market trends of increasing home production of finished materials. This investment has certainly come partially from Rhodesia itself, as their policy of investment into the mineral industry, sponsored by the government through Univex, had an aim to create a strong manufacturing industry in Rhodesia.²²² This aim was deliberately adopted to make themselves attractive to the market, and even attracted foreign investors as

²¹⁹ Congressional hearing 1973, p. 69

²²⁰ Maull 1984, p.206

²²¹ Maull 1984, p.208

²²² Gibson 1973, p. 76

evidenced by the RISCO case. This shows that, while Rhodesia were forced to nationalise their economy, they were still not against investments from foreign business.

4.5 Industrialised countries' covert trade with Rhodesia

The UN reports on the applications of sanctions following Resolution 253 will be used to support the claim that many industrialized countries intentionally & willingly aided in trade with Southern Rhodesia. This chapter discusses the cases & decisions mentioned in several different UN reports on the pursuance of sanctions; the 3rd report (1970), the 7th report(1974), the 8th report(1975), and the 2nd Special report(1972) and the Special report on EC members' involvement with RISCO(1975). These specific reports have been chosen due to the addition of several examples of chrome shipments being suspected of trading with Southern Rhodesia, and because they contain the responses of governments along with the decisions of the Special Committee on the response to sanctions breaking.

The UN reports on the pursuance of states on Resolution 253 were established as part of the Resolution with its signing in 1968. The reports were established in order to determine the extent of sanctions breaking in the international markets, and to provide a forum for states to report suspicious activity by companies or persons in regards to following sanctions. The reports would list cases of suspected breaches of sanctions, while also containing reports on the statistical discrepancies. There were a number of cases investigated by the Committee, of which many were either never solved or they were abandoned due to a lack of evidence. This can be seen in the long list of open cases enclosed in every report, with the last report, the 12th report(1980), there were still 232 open cases of suspected breaches of sanctions by participating states, of which 40 were regarding the exports of various forms of chrome or ferrochrome.²²³ In addition to this, there were around 46 separate cases of ships registered in reporting countries shipping Rhodesian chrome, nickel or other materials to the US, which were reported and investigated by the Committee.²²⁴

One of the major issues facing the Committee in its investigations into the pursuance of Resolution 253 was the difficulty of acquiring proper proof of origin. Indeed, in several of the reports issued by the Security Council, it is noted that the investigated party were unaware of

²²³ S/13750 1980, PP.3-5, 19-21

²²⁴ Ibid, p.23

any connection to Rhodesia, due to the lack of strict demands for documentation for wares shipped through the port. While many of the cases do maintain that there was some documentation proving that ores were from a certain area, it was impossible to know where it originally came from, considering the heavy cooperations between Rhodesia and its neighbours. Indeed, Doxey writes that the UN was unable to pursue the alleged sanctions breaches from European governments due to the reluctance of many member states to cooperate in cases.²²⁵ The UN Security Council would in some cases demand further documentation, which will be discussed in examples below.²²⁶ The Committee was also often ignored or dismissed by the investigated nations, which further hindered their attempts to gain documentation, as the companies involved would then argue that nothing could be done due to the time which passed.²²⁷

4.5.1 Case nr. 100: Cuxhaven

This case concerns the shipments of chrome & several other ores from Lourenco Marques, which was first mentioned in the 4th report of the Committee, dated 1971. The case refers to a note sent by the United Kingdom, concerning the shipment of goods on the vessel “Cuxhaven”. The UK note states that the information was received from “commercial sources”, and that it was regarding “further shipments of minerals suspected to be of Rhodesian origin which they consider to be sufficiently reliable to warrant further investigation.”²²⁸ The source in question alleges that “some 5,000 tons of mineral, half of which was chrome, one-third ferrochrome and the rest made up of about 1,000 tons of ferrosilicon chrome and some 50 tons of other minerals packed in drums all believed to be of Rhodesian origin, were recently loaded at Lourenco Marques aboard the m.v. 'Cuxhaven'”²²⁹ The vessel was owned by the West German firm “Bugsier, Reederei und Bergungs A.G.”, and was travelling to the port of Rotterdam in the Netherlands where the contents were further transported into Europe. The Security Council sent messages to the governments of the Netherlands, Germany & Belgium, while noting the involvement of a Swiss-based company; Handelsgesellschaft Zurich A.G.

In the 7th report, dated 1975, the government of the Netherlands, following a period of investigation, sent a message to the Security Council with the following message: "In view of

²²⁵ Doxey 1980, pp.69-75

²²⁶ Various UN reports

²²⁷ Various UN reports

²²⁸ S/10229, P.103

²²⁹ Ibid

the considerable time which has elapsed since the shipment of chrome ore:, silicon chrome ore, ferro-chrome and nickel cathodes aboard the German MY Cuxhaven took place, information further to that already forwarded to the Secretary-General is not expected.”²³⁰ This explains how the Netherlands believed that they were unable to further add to the investigations, in view of the age of the case and the likelihood of the ores having been further processed and untraceable. This illustrated one of the problems of the UN sanctions regime, as ores being smelted and turned into ferrochrome would make it harder to follow up investigations, providing less opportunity for the Security Council to demand investigation. In addition, Spain is pointed out as not responding, and thus being placed on the list of non-responding countries which was posted by the UN on a quarterly basis.²³¹ Spain were added to this list on several occasions, and seemingly did not respond to the UN requests until the case would have been dismissed.

4.5.2 Case Nr. USI-7

This case was a part of the 7th report, in which there was a focus on documenting US shipments to and from Rhodesia, which had been conducted in cooperation with other countries. While it was technically legal for the US to trade with Rhodesia, it was heavily denounced upon by the UN, and the reports on US trade was made in response. In this case, two Italian ships were documented to have aided in the shipment of various metals, but mainly containing ferrochrome. The Alfredo Primo was the prime suspect, which was then investigated by the UN to contain Rhodesian chrome. This led to further discrepancies, as the documentation of the ship alleged that the wares had been loaded in Durban, and not Lourenço Marques, while also alleging that the metals were not of Southern Rhodesian origin.²³²

Meanwhile, the US company which had ordered the shipment were of the belief that the wares were Rhodesian, and that the wares had been loaded in Lourenço Marques. The captain of the ship had agreed to this, adding that the loading port had been “erroneously indicated as Durban” in the note sent by the Italian authorities to the UN Security Council.²³³

This case appeared in the 6th and 7th reports, and the case was seemingly closed after the 7th report, after the US delegation to the UN believed the captain of the ship to be acting in good

²³⁰ S/11594, p.11

²³¹ S/11594, p.11

²³² *Ibid.*, p.14

²³³ *Ibid.*, p.14

faith, seeing as he believed the documentation received was valid. However, the US government “continued to believe the cargo was Southern Rhodesian in origin.”²³⁴ This case which could be seen as a cause for concern for in regards to the sanctions regime would be the seemingly intentional use of falsified documents. It is more likely that the goods were indeed from Rhodesia, since the documentation received by the captain of the ship stated that the goods were not of Southern Rhodesian origin, while the contrary was maintained by the US company that had ordered the shipment. As noted in the report;

*"Mr. Katzen (US representative to the UN) could not understand why a United States company importing minerals from South Africa would testify to the 'United States Government and to the United Nations Sanctions Committee that the cargo, in fact, was from Southern Rhodesia.'"*²³⁵

Indeed, due to the Byrd Amendment, the US was not in a position where lying about the origins of a shipment would be necessary. In this case, one of two realistic outcomes has occurred. There might have been a misunderstanding somewhere along the line, meaning that either the US customer had believed the origin to be Rhodesia, when it in fact was somewhere else, or the documentation had accidentally been misleading. The other option, which I believe to be the most likely, is that someone had deliberately falsified documents in order to pick up the wares with an Italian ship. Indeed, according to Resolution 253, as long as the home country of a vessel is part of the sanctions regime, it was deemed illegal by the UN to aid in the shipments of commodities from Rhodesia, even if both importing & exporting countries were breaking sanctions.²³⁶ This reflects the situation portrayed in the UN Security Council discussions, where it becomes clear that other countries' ships were complicit in breaking sanctions, despite the official stance of the EC countries being in compliance with UN guidelines.

4.6 Discussion

This chapter has discussed the reasons for breaching sanctions, and attempted to give insights into how companies were able to circumvent sanctions through intermediaries in South Africa, as well as showing the attitudes of the industrial nations. The chapter has discussed the US and EC policy in view of the criticism received by the UK and US in the UN Security Council, particularly the US decision to completely breach chrome sanctions. The US stance was unflinching in its view that there was no point in maintaining sanctions when so many countries

²³⁴ S/11594 1975, p.15

²³⁵ S/11594 1975, p.15

²³⁶ S/RES/253

were breaching them, a problem which had been made clear through the UN reports. I would argue that the US stance in the UN was quite valid, considering that there were many other sanctions breaching nations which were not willing to be transparent enough with their trade statistics, and who remained silent. Or in the case of the USSR, even heaped the criticism onto the US, potentially in a bid to deflect the attentions from themselves. The UN Security Council resolutions did not seem to change the decisions made by reporting nations, while the US remained completely unpunished for their straight reluctance to adherence, while other EC countries were not discussed in the same vein. Nevertheless, sanctions breaches were common, and most countries in the UN maintained a relaxed position on sanctions.

5 Policy change on Southern Africa from 1977

The Anglo-American peace talks were not a success, but they did lay a foundation for the eventual understanding which produced the Lancaster House Agreement in 1979/80. The US policy switch gave the EC little choice but to abide, and join in the discussions for a certificate program, which likely did help with the eventual fall of the Smith regime. It can be argued that the fact that the US were re-entering the sanctions regime and backing the UK in negotiations would be enough to signal that the end of the Smith regime would be close, as they no longer had any support on the global stage following their loss of South Africa and Portugal as close allies.

However, was this driven by a moral obligation or by the developments of the markets? One could argue that the developments in mineral markets, and especially the decline in the stainless steel consumption in the US and EC offered a chance to take a step in the “right direction”, when a Rhodesia weakened by war and economic hardship was presented with even greater obstacles when their exports would decline in value as well. Not to mention the fact that South African ferrochrome became increasingly effective as their production method and market trends tilted the market in favour of local production of ferrochrome, with charge chrome being more and more accepted in the stainless steel industry. And with South African ores having similarly low prices to that of Rhodesia.²³⁷

The EC local ferrochrome industry took a strong hit following the implementation of certificates, and especially following the independence of Zimbabwe. Indeed, following the certificate program and chemical testing which was implemented in late 1977, the EC producers needed to plea to the Commission for help in the form of anti-dumping measures against South African and Swedish or Zimbabwean producers twice, once in 1978 and once in 1981. While it could be because of general market terms, which in the source material was described as an oversaturated market, it could also be a result of the balance shifting. For example, EC ferrochrome producers who had previously relied on cheaper Rhodesian chrome ore would find it even harder to compete with foreign ferrochrome producers following the implementation of the certificates and the near collapse of the EC ferrochrome industry in 1977.²³⁸ Still it becomes

²³⁷ New York Times, May 6th, 1976

²³⁸ BDT 110/086/C196, 24.10.1980

clear from the source material that the EC ferrochrome industry was doomed to fail, simply due to their lack of raw material and the reliance on Southern Africa for their materials.

This chapter will discuss the renewed interest in finding a solution to the Rhodesian question in the time period from ca. 1976-1979. The chapter will seek to lay out the situation of Rhodesian chrome in the world markets along with shifting ties with their neighbours, leading to the gradual weakening of the Rhodesian economy. The chapter will draw source materials of the European Commission to shed light on the renewed interest in strengthening sanctions efforts that was initiated in 1977, and how the effects of these efforts were felt by the EC ferrochrome industry in the time both before and directly following the independence of Zimbabwe. These discussions revolved around exact measures to be implemented towards Rhodesia, with communications between several members of the European Commission and the delegate of the European Economic Community Executive Commission to the United States, Fernand Spaak.²³⁹ These discussions show the stance of several EC member states, which were notably hesitant to implement stricter regulations on the imports of ferrochrome of Rhodesian origin for practical and economic reasons.

How did the EC-US negotiations impact the effects of sanctions? And how did a new entity on the ferrochrome market in the form of Zimbabwe impact the EC ferrochrome industry, which was struggling in the face of dumping from foreign producers?

5.1 Ferrochrome in the EC: Recession and overproduction

The ferrochrome production of European countries, namely West Germany, France and Italy, were heavily struck following the economic crisis of 1975, with rising prices of both chrome and ferrochrome, but also lower demands for steel.²⁴⁰ Indeed, the prices of both ferrochrome and chrome ore rose sharply on the world markets in the 1970s, which led to EC industries falling behind due to their comparative disadvantage to countries like Turkey, the USSR and South Africa on the world market.²⁴¹ This meant that the costs of production for the import-reliant EC producers would fall relative to other producers. According to Maull, the EC would need to introduce political aid to the ferrochrome industry in order for it to survive, as the EC

²³⁹ BDT-076-94

²⁴⁰ Jolly 1979, p.785

²⁴¹ Maull 1984, p.211

indeed did in 1978.²⁴² The introduction of anti-dumping measures against Sweden and South Africa was discussed by the European Commission in a series of notes dated 26th of June, 1978.²⁴³ The notes, while not directly related to the Rhodesian embargo, shows that there were problems with the European ferrochrome industry the year following the implementation of the new certificate system. Indeed, one note describes anti-dumping measures to be implemented to these two countries, due to their significantly lower costs compared to EC producers.²⁴⁴ One note contains a table noting the situation of ferrochrome imports to the EC from those countries, as well as the EC's self-sufficiency. Note that this is regarding ferrochrome, and not raw chrome ore.

Situation of European producers		1974	1977
Imports(tons):	South Africa	77 000	159 000
	Sweden	17 000	46 000
EEC Production		276 000	230 000
EEC Consumption		478 000	460 000
Market share:	South Africa	16%	35%
	Sweden	3%	10%
	EEC Producers	59%	35%

Table 5.1: The table was mentioned in discussions about introducing anti-dumping measures to protect EC producers, as South African and Swedish producers were applying dumping practices in the ferrochrome market.²⁴⁵ The table above shows that the EC producers had lost 46 000 tons of domestic production over the three years from 1974 to 1977, while their consumption had dropped by only 18 000. The problem for the European industry would be that the use of domestic chrome ore was not possible in the same way as in South Africa or Rhodesia, while Sweden, Rhodesia and South Africa all also had access to great amounts of cheap energy such as hydropower. Thus, the EC producers were falling behind due to their inability to adjust to the world market.

The following graph shows the worldwide production capacity of ferrochrome worldwide by country in 1980 (measured in tons):

²⁴² Ibid, p.212

²⁴³ SEC(78)2772 1978,p.2

²⁴⁴ Ibid.

²⁴⁵ SEC(78)2272

Ferrochrome production capacity	Low Carbon	High Carbon	Total
France	40 000	120 000	160 000
West Germany	65 000	80 000	145 000
Italy	15 000	40 000	55 000
EC total:	120 000	240 000	360 000
Norway	10 000	25 000	35 000
Finland	-	50 000	50 000
Sweden	45 000	175 000	220 000
Spain	10 000	20 000	30 000
Yugoslavia	22 000	30 000	52 000
Turkey	14 000	35 000	49 000
Europe total (excl. EC):	101 000	335 000	436 000
USA	98 000	245 000	343 000
Canada	5 000	3 000	8 000
Brasil	6 000	60 000	66 000
Mexico	-	5 500	5 500
Americas total:	109 000	313 500	422 500
South Africa	50 000	750 000	800 000
Zimbabwe	40 000	212 000	252 000
African total:	90 000	962 000	1 052 000
Japan	100 000	550 000	650 000
India	15 000	5 000	20 000
Asian total:	115 000	555 000	670 000
Worldwide total:	535 000	2 405 500	2 940 500

Table 5.2: Figures from the EC archives, regarding ferrochrome production capacity. The table excludes the Socialist Bloc, likely due to lacking production numbers.²⁴⁶

The table shows that the majority of ferrochrome was produced in South Africa by 1980, and that the EC ferrochrome production was far from the greatest in the world by that time. While this does not reflect the actual production numbers, it does show the size of the industry, highlighting the emergence of competitors such as Sweden and Brazil, with the EC and US falling behind their classic competitors in Japan and South Africa.

²⁴⁶ BDT 260/94,

Movement from importer-based ferrochrome to local ferrochrome industries was a large part of the late 1970s ferrochrome industry. Rhodesia invested in local industries due to the sanctions through both private investment and state participation, an example of which is RISCO, which was owned 49.7% by the Rhodesian government.²⁴⁷ South Africa decided to do so in the mid-1970s, which is represented in the drastic rise of market share in the 3 years found in Table 3.1 above. While the cheap manpower, electricity and ores available in Southern Africa along with the newer production techniques were what drove forward the South African explosion in production.²⁴⁸ This was detrimental to the EC and US ferrochrome industries, who were struggling to compete with the prices of South African ferrochrome.²⁴⁹

The shifting market in the mid-1970s was marked by the switch from ore export towards manufacturing based economy for both Rhodesia and South Africa. The falling market share of the EC ferrochrome producers was due to their lack of competitive edge, and the higher price put on EC ferrochrome would have naturally made the steel industry more interested in investing in foreign ferrochrome, especially following the financial crisis. Indeed, one could argue that the increasing South African market share could have been more likely to induce sanctions breaking with Rhodesia, with regards to both chrome ore and processed ferrochrome. It would be natural for a struggling industry like the EC industry, which was losing its market shares rapidly while also underutilising its capacity, to attempt whichever measures it could in order to stay afloat. Including breaching sanctions to gain cheaper ores from a Rhodesia which was in need of markets to fuel its fight against the Patriotic Front (PF). Indeed, we know that there was attempts to import chrome even after the Certificate programme was introduced, as evidenced by a chrome shipment worth \$23.4 million headed for Austria which was seized by Dutch authorities.²⁵⁰

5.2 Repealing the Byrd Amendment: US policy change under Carter

Jimmy Carter's inauguration as US president in 1976 saw a significant shift in US foreign policy in Africa. Carter's priorities in Rhodesia was to have a good relationship with the

²⁴⁷ Jolly 1978, p.789

²⁴⁸ Howat 1986, p. 41

²⁴⁹ Howat 1986 p.42

²⁵⁰ Jolly, p.786, Although Austria were not a member state of the EC at this time, the shipment was sent through the Rhine, and was hence stopped when going through Dutch customs.

Africans, which led his administration to work against the Byrd Amendment. Indeed, the Foreign Relations of the US (FRUS) archives contain discussions on the position the US should take in the Rhodesian question, as their role was rather unclear until their repealing of the Byrd Amendment. Indeed, the US were taking on more responsibility for Rhodesia, and were determined to include one of the Patriotic Front presidents at the negotiation table. This was done in order to legitimise the government in the eyes of the resistance as well, and the US were aware of the need to include all sides to the conflict in order to successfully barter a peaceful solution, according a memorandum from US Secretary of State Vance to the president.²⁵¹ The memorandum also explicitly mentions the need to cancel the Byrd Amendment in order justify US involvement in the peace settlements.²⁵² Still, the US were afraid of taking the peace discussions to the UN due to possible influence of the Soviet Union, as noted in conversations between the US and UK Foreign Secretaries.²⁵³ They discussed how a British-led effort would be more beneficial to both the US and the UK, as they were reliant on all sides of the Rhodesian conflict to find their desired solution.²⁵⁴ One could assume that their willingness to negotiate outside of the UN, and without the Soviets, was mostly grounded in the backdrop of the Cold War, especially considering that both the US and USSR had been involved in Southern African affairs on more than one occasion, such as in Angola and Rhodesia.²⁵⁵

After prolonged discussions in Congress, many of the proponents of the Byrd Amendment had changed their mind, persuaded by the argument that high-grade chromite from Rhodesia was not necessary anymore due to technological advances and the opening up of several smaller markets.²⁵⁶

At the same time, the steel markets of the world had been shifting for some time, with a notable shift following its peak in 1973. Indeed, the US producers of industrial metals went from their peak production of 146 Mt in 1973, to 80 Mt in 1982.²⁵⁷ While this would include more metals than ferrochrome by itself, it is an indication of the trajectory of the US industry. When Carter's

²⁵¹ FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1977–1980, VOLUME XVI, SOUTHERN AFRICA, "139. Memorandum from Secretary of State Vance to President Carter", Washington, 10th February 1977

²⁵² Ibid.

²⁵³ FRUS, 1977–1980, VOLUME XVI, SOUTHERN AFRICA, "145. Memorandum of conversation" London, April 1st 1977

²⁵⁴ Ibid.

²⁵⁵ Lowry 2007, p.186 and Visser 2009, pp.137-138

²⁵⁶ DeRoche 2001, p.244

²⁵⁷ Smil 2006, p.89

administration took office, global trends had been leading to higher production of metals in the developing world, with Western market economies generally following the US course according to Vaclav Smil, who also states that the EC and Japan were following this trend.²⁵⁸ This might not be the case for ferrochrome though, as pointed out by Crowson. In his “*Mineral Handbook of 1982/83*”, he describes the EC growth of chrome consumption at 6.5% (compared to the US 0.5% and Japan at 4.1%) annually for the 1970s, which is the highest out of the major ferrochrome producing countries (US, EC, Japan).²⁵⁹ He also points out that the EC had the highest share of the world market, at 18%, compared to US and Japan with 12% each. This example shows that the US had a declining domestic ferrochrome consumption when compared to Japan and Europe. However, the production of the US was still higher than Europe in 1979/80, at 242 000 tonnes compared to EC’s 159 000 tonnes of ferrochrome, with Japan towering above at 419 000 tonnes.²⁶⁰

As stainless steel was the number one product of ferrochrome, this could indicate a trend of the US requiring less steel, or that the US were focusing more on importing steel from abroad, however I have not found any definitive data for this in my research. What the numbers also tell us, is that the US were not as reliant on imports as the EC, as they produced roughly half of all ferrochrome consumed themselves in the years 1979-80 on average. In addition, the country had many investments both in South Africa and Rhodesia through Union Carbide. Also, the US had massive stockpiles, as mentioned in Chapter 3, which would make them much less dependent on a domestic ferrochrome industry, and especially when prices of chromite were as high as they were following the financial crisis. One could argue that the influence of Union Carbide in Southern Africa, together with the US declining stainless steel industry together with their large strategic stocks of ferrochrome, were factors which could have aided in the turn away from the Byrd Amendment for the US.

5.3 Rhodesian economy in the late 1970s: Mounting war costs & diplomatic isolation

The trend following the oil-crisis was a general decline in world trade, and particularly in expansion of industries like the steel industries.²⁶¹ How impactful this was in the ferrochrome

²⁵⁸ Smil 2006, p.90

²⁵⁹ Crowson 1978, p.52

²⁶⁰ Crowson 1978, p.51

²⁶¹ Smil 2006, p.89

trade is debatable, as much literature points to the ferrochrome trade as rather valuable, with rising prices until 1979.²⁶² Jolly, contrary to Maull, describes Rhodesian chrome as “remaining low” in 1978, which would indicate that there were fluctuating prices for Rhodesian chrome. Whether this would mean only Rhodesian chrome, or Rhodesian chrome and ferrochrome is unclear.²⁶³ However, it could be describing a situation in which the average price of chrome worldwide was rising, which we know to be the case with Soviet and Turkish chrome for example, leaving Rhodesia behind. Indeed, one could imagine that the Rhodesian chrome prices would need to be lower than that of the other chrome producers, as any importer would take on the risk of being discovered, and would need to go through significant hurdles in order to trade with Rhodesia. The Rhodesian industry was also technologically backwards compared to other producers, relying mostly on older equipment from before UDI and whatever they were able to create domestically.²⁶⁴ From this we can gather that the Rhodesian chrome industry was falling behind in profitability, leaving it more vulnerable to the tightening of sanctions which occurred in 1977.

This is reflected in the 10th UN report, issued in 1978, tells us that Rhodesian chrome exports were likely on a downwards trend, with total estimated value of exported Rhodesian chrome going from \$504m in 1974 to \$411m in 1976 as stated in the 10th report.²⁶⁵ While these numbers at the time could have shown the beginning of a decline after 1975, it was more likely a direct response to the financial crisis, at least in the chrome market.

Still, the Rhodesian economy was constantly growing according to Jolly, but the increasing intensity of the Rhodesian Bush War and the increasing reluctance of south Africa to aid in the fight against sanctions made the costs greater every year, and eventually too much to bear.²⁶⁶ It is clear that the fight against the Patriotic Front was a money drain for Rhodesia, but it was not stopping their determination to continue avoiding sanctions until the beginning of serious peace talks between the US, UK and nationalist leaders around 1977.²⁶⁷ Indeed, according to Jolly, the Bush War was costing the regime around 40% of its national budget in 1978-79, and the economy in general was declining at 5% per year over the last 4 years, opposite to the 8% yearly growth of the 10 years prior.²⁶⁸

²⁶² Maull 1984, p.211

²⁶³ Jolly 1978, p.787

²⁶⁴ Jolly 1978,p.785

²⁶⁵S/12529, 1978, p.10

²⁶⁶ Jolly 1974, pp.785-787

²⁶⁷ DeRoche 2001, p.252 and Jolly 1978, p.286

²⁶⁸ Jolly 1978, p.287

It could be argued that the large Rhodesian costs was a direct reason why the US had rejoined sanctions and why the peace talks were taking place, as the Rhodesian situation appeared increasingly hopeless after 1975. Still, while peace talks were going on, the Rhodesians continued to fight, and thus a critical part of the strengthening of sanctions would be the increased fervour of the Smith regime, who continuously escalated the Bush War through their investment in modern military equipment and the intensified advances into rebel-controlled areas both within Rhodesia and across the borders of their neighbours in Zambia and Mozambique.²⁶⁹ While Rhodesia was being pressed by independence movements, the Rhodesian friendship with South Africa seemed to buckle as well. The South Africans had allegedly started asking for a surcharge for taking on Rhodesian goods through the country, of around \$20 million USD in 1977, according to an article in the New York Times of Jan. 15th 1978.²⁷⁰

Starting around April, 1977, the UK & US were discussing the idea of creating a solution to the Rhodesian problem, commonly referred to as the Anglo-American Initiative.²⁷¹ The negotiations with all parties started in August 1977. The Anglo-American attempts to create a lasting peace in Rhodesia included the adoption of universal suffrage, investments into a Zimbabwe Development Fund by the US & UK and, decisively, the idea to base the army on the liberation forces alongside the existing military.²⁷² The terms of this settlement were discussed, but the issue of law & order, especially the use of liberation forces as military in the new state, saw the Smith regime withdraw from the Anglo-American negotiations.²⁷³ This happened in December, 1977 and saw the initial roots of an internal settlement absent of foreign involvement between the Smith regime, Muzorewa and Sithole.²⁷⁴ Muzorewa and Sithole were both Zimbabwean nationalists who had previously studied in the USA, and who took a more diplomatic approach than the Patriotic Front, believing that a compromise with the Rhodesian government could be made. Muzorewa was a pastor who had dabbled into politics and taken a leading role in the nationalist cause, and Sithole had been related to the ZANU, but was more moderate than Mugabe, and therefore open to negotiations.²⁷⁵

²⁶⁹ DeRoche 2001,p.206 and S/13759 1980

²⁷⁰ New York Times, 15th Jan. 1978

²⁷¹ DeRoche 2001, p.255 and Windrich 1979, p.295

²⁷² DeRoche 2001, p.253

²⁷³ Ibid, p.255

²⁷⁴ Ibid., p.260

²⁷⁵ Ibid., pp.30, 80

While the discussion of an internal settlement continued between Smith, Muzorewa & Sithole, the situation with the Bush War was worsening. Indeed, recent attacks by the regime against the Patriotic Front had intensified the determination of Mugabe's men to reach independence through guerilla warfare. This was due to the brutal attacks on PF-controlled areas in Mozambique, which killed over 1000 people, including hundreds of women and children.²⁷⁶ While an internal agreement which would theoretically allow for a gradual power change which towards the black majority was struck between the parties mentioned above, it was not accepted by the other African leaders, Mugabe and Nkomo, who did not believe in a settlement where the Smith regime would remain in government.²⁷⁷ Even after an internal settlement was agreed between Muzorewa and Smith, it was rejected by the Patriotic Front and the international community, which did not believe an internal settlement would stop the war.²⁷⁸

5.4 EC reaction to intensified embargo

The US policy change under Carter led to a U-turn on their Rhodesian policy, setting in motion the intensification of chromite sanctions, an initiative which was followed up by the EC. This initiative of intensified chromite sanctions saw lengthy negotiations on the shape and technicalities of such an undertaking, and was discussed internally in the European Commission from spring to autumn 1977. The source material is mainly based on correspondence between the EC delegate to the US, Ferdinand Spaak, and various members of the European Commission. Some of these include European Commissioner of the Internal Market, the Customs Union & Foreign Affairs, Etienne Davignon along with Vice President and Commissioner of the Economic & Financial Affairs, Wilhelm Haferkamp.²⁷⁹ The subchapter will discuss the contents of these negotiations, and seek to investigate the extent of cooperation between the US & the EC in terms of the chromite embargo.

The US plan to introduce blanket certifications was initiated the 18th of March, 1977, while the negotiations with the EC were only started the 1st of May. The US plan allowed a grace period of 90 days, as mentioned in the discussions of 4.5.77, and would seemingly be enforced with or without the EC.²⁸⁰ The initiative would mainly involve any country doing business with the

²⁷⁶Ibid., p.265

²⁷⁷ Ibid., pp. 263-265

²⁷⁸ Ibid, p.263

²⁷⁹ BDT-076-94

²⁸⁰ BDT/076/94

US directly, but adding more countries to the blanket certification system would seemingly require these countries to commit to strict controls similar to the US.

According to the discussions in the Commission, some EC countries, such as West Germany and Italy, were major producers of stainless steel at the time and they were heavily reliant on exporting to the US, and thus applying blanket certifications.²⁸¹ It would seem that there were problems about whether it would be a Community policy, or whether countries would need to join the system on an individual basis. The EC were interested in maintaining a common trade policy, but considering the low need for chrome ores and ferrochrome for those EC member states which were neither large steel or ferrochrome producers. It would not have been in the interests of all nations, and the representative of Ireland pointed out that Ireland already had a national policy of embargo on Rhodesia enacted, seemingly confused about why there was need to put into force more measures.²⁸²

The main points of the discussions are contained within a telex dated 04.05.77 from Spaak to Haferkamp, Davignon & delegations I and III, the delegation of foreign relations and the delegation of Industrial & Technological affairs respectively.²⁸³ In the telex is enclosed the points of discussion, which Spaak describes as the “most difficult problems”, indicating that they would be problematic for the Commission to accept.

A problem would be blanket certification, which seemingly “implies community embargo for ferro chrome and specialty steel from “non-certifying countries”.”²⁸⁴ This would theoretically cause issues with any free trade agreements the Community had with any countries which was shipping ferrochrome or chrome products, such as Sweden, Norway or Algeria, which would be a “flagrant infringement of community obligations”²⁸⁵ However, the US were convinced that these countries would accept certifications.

Chemical testing of all shipments of ferrochrome and chrome from South Africa was also pointed out as a problem. The EC were seemingly more in favour of random sampling, which might be due to the costs associated with chemical testing. This also shows the reduced

²⁸¹ BDT/076/94

²⁸² BDT/076/94, letter from Robert Doyle to Brix Knudsen, 25th May 1977,

²⁸³ BDT-076-94, telex dated 04.05.77

²⁸⁴ BDT-076-94 telex 04.05.77, p.2

²⁸⁵ Ibid, p.2

willingness of EC embargo efforts when compared to the US. The EC also indicated that different laboratory testing methods could be a problem, however the US indicated that similar methods would be accepted.²⁸⁶

The EC also expressed concern with the large amounts of Rhodesian chromite in US stocks, which would give an unfair advantage to US firms, while Community producers would need to certify all exports to the US.²⁸⁷ Scrap imports from the US was considered another problem, due to contents of Rhodesian chrome. US were in favour of an undertaking to allow free imports of scrap metal regardless of origin. This seems to build on the idea that all Rhodesian chrome would be problematic, even when it was known to have been imported prior to the new measures. This can be viewed as an attempt by EC delegates to use whichever objection was available to them in order to stop the changes taking form, as they were seemingly pointing out every possible flaw that was proposed by the US. However, this could of course be due to the EC wanting to extensively analyse any agreement made, in order to rule out any loopholes which might be incorporated in the deal.

EC found the requirement for direct shipments to be problematic, as shipments to the Community would often be smaller, and headed for multiple destinations. This problem could be solved by allowing “breaking of journey, unloading, storage and loading under customs supervision and transit and processing via certifying countries.”²⁸⁸ This was a fair point, as one of the characteristics of chrome shipments is that they often go through multiple ports on their way to a final destination. Especially when shipping from Southern Africa to the EC, it would be more practical to allow for a single ship to dock multiple times, and Germany would be reliant on ships through the Netherlands. Additionally, it would provide another cost issues for the importers, as stricter customs supervision would likely add to costs, in addition to the need for updated certificates and laboratory equipment for testing procedures.

The EC attitudes were seemingly not enthusiastic towards the US proposals. The EC were pushing back on all points that the US proposed in the discussions, which makes it seem like they were not cooperating to their full extent. Considering that several cases of sanctions breaking had been recorded and suspected in Europe, the EC could have been pushing back as

²⁸⁶ *Ibid*, p.2

²⁸⁷ *Ibid*, p.2

²⁸⁸ *Ibid*, p.2

they were aware that stricter sanctions would hurt their ability to import from Rhodesia.²⁸⁹ While the evidence is not enough to conclude with this, it remains a possibility, especially considering the covert ties between the Rhodesian governments and other European governments which were revealed by Flower.²⁹⁰ Many of the problems, such as the import of US scrap metals into the EC and their reluctance to standardized testing methods, seem to be rather insignificant problems which have been used as arguments against the implementation of these measures. While later negotiations would allow for compromise on the situation, the EC seemed to be generally unenthusiastic about a wholesale policy of stricter sanctions.

The document also states that commercial counsellors of interested member states had been informed, and that only one of them, “g.gb.” reacted negatively, questioning the necessity of a common solution and believing individually issued certifications would be sufficient.²⁹¹ The source does not disclose who “g.gb” refers to, but nevertheless it does show that the community were not entirely in unison in their decision to continue entertaining the US initiative. This shows that, in a commercial sense, many of the Community member states were positive to the idea of a certificate program. However, other considerations were also important, and several countries’ representatives made clear their doubts over the issue. Their issues were mostly regarding the availability of massive stocks of Rhodesian chrome for the US to use freely, but also their view of the US as casting suspicion on the EC by asking for stricter measures. This seems rather confrontational when considering the discussions, as the measures indicated, at least on surface level, do not seem entirely unreasonable.

The examination of the proposals by Spaak is interesting, as they show how the member states were seemingly opposed to the increased efforts, seeing the already established sanction measures as satisfactory. Indeed, in a letter dated 3. May 1977, sent to several delegations and the cabinets of Haferkamp & Davignon, he seemingly assesses the US initiative as an affront to the EC’s implementation of the existing UN embargo.²⁹² After outlining the initial proposals of the US to the EC, Spaak writes the following:

“after examination of new proposal, we expressed serious doubts to reach an agreement on this basis, stated that community has long and positive experience in applying embargo.”

²⁸⁹ Jolly 1978, p.387

²⁹⁰ Flower 1987, p.79

²⁹¹ Ibid, p.3

²⁹² BDT-076-94

Governments should find unsubstantiated US suspicions of non-application of embargo by this administration impalatable and would consider US procedures as barrier to trade. [...]the existing US machinery and especially sanctions committee that could deal with any aspects of non-respect of embargo. competition arising from possibility of US firms to be free to use existing stocks without formality whereas importers would have to certify absence of Rhodesian chrome.”²⁹³

This quote seems to be an assessment of the EC delegation to the US, as the letter was sent to the divisions in Brussels led by Haferkamp and Davignon. The letter shows that the EC were clearly unhappy with the way discussions with the US had taken place. The argument of barriers of trade is an argument which could be discussed further, which it did in the end as we will see. However, in these early discussions it seems like this was taken as an affront to the EC for their handling of the sanctions so far, even though they themselves believed they did a good job. This seems like an unnecessary reaction to an arrogant belief that sanctions were working, even when there were several examples of them not, as noted in previous chapters. In my view, these “unsubstantiated” claims were not meant to be an attack on the EC handling of sanctions, but rather an acknowledgement that more needed to be done, which is in line with the US foreign policy under Carter, who sought to end the Smith regime and efficiently return to UN sanctions.²⁹⁴

One could argue that the EC were focusing too much on the past, both in how they themselves had handled sanctions and how they focused on the US benefit of large stockpiles. They were too busy focusing on the US’ perceived insult to their handling of the situation, ignoring the actual objective of tightening sanctions to end the Rhodesian regime.

5.4.1 Ferrochrome production in South Africa: Why blanket certifications would work

The difference between South African ferrochrome and Rhodesian ferrochrome was the chromium content, with Rhodesian chrome ore naturally containing more chromium than the South African. This was the basis of the chemical testing proposed by the US in discussions with the EC, as the level of chromite would automatically determine its origin. A letter from Spaak to the relevant delegates as of 2.6.77 showed that ferrochrome containing more than 60%

²⁹³ BDT-076-94

²⁹⁴ DeRoche 2001, pp. 1-2, pp.246-255

chrome would be subject to an investigation, which could theoretically grant an exception.²⁹⁵ This agreement would create a stronger cooperation between the US and the EC, and the document also states that the two entities agreed on a “*procedure of administrative cooperation*” in order to “*ensure the effective implementation of the embargo*”²⁹⁶. Nevertheless the renewed embargo was not implemented until a further 4 months following this telex, due to objections on the grace period by numerous EC countries, which will be discussed later in the text.

South African ferrochrome producers were almost exclusively producing low-carbon ferrochrome at the time of the discussions above. This is backed up by a report of the EC Ministry of Mines dated 9.6.77.²⁹⁷ The report states that one of the companies investigated, Palmiet, had adopted a Swedish style of production which made it possible for them to produce high-carbon ferrochrome with the lower grade South African ores (charge chrome).²⁹⁸ This technique had been in use for the period 1966-71, while the US were still actively applying sanctions, but were abandoned in favour of cost following the Byrd Amendment. Thus, there were no large-scale producer of high-carbon ferrochrome in South Africa, with the exception of the Grassvally Mine in the north of South Africa, which had a trade agreement with Japan until 1980 according to the report.²⁹⁹

A note dated 4.7.1977 from Mr. Pingel, who was director of the Administration of the Customs Union, to Viscount Davignon tells us the general EC stance on the testing procedures that were set to be implemented.³⁰⁰ The note discusses the agreement reached, in which it is mentioned that there were some problems with the system. The 113 Committee, a committee which was tasked with deciding on whether or not new legislation would break with the common trade policy of the EC, had several legal and administrative problems, according to Pingel. Some member states, Italy, Ireland and the Benelux, had “doubts if existing embargo legislation on Rhodesian goods covered ferrochrome manufactured from Rhodesian chrome ore.”³⁰¹ Several

²⁹⁵BDT/076/94, 2.6.77

²⁹⁶ Ibid.

²⁹⁷ BDT/076/94 9.6.77

²⁹⁸ Ibid.

²⁹⁹ Ibid.

³⁰⁰ BDT 076/94, 4.7.1977

³⁰¹ Ibid

Community members also alleged that they would not be able to accommodate a certification system “within the existing systems in all Member States.”³⁰²

5.4.2 Postponements of certification efforts

The implementation of the certificate program saw multiple postponements, seeing the transitional time of the programme moved from March 18th to October 18th. The initial postponements came during the negotiations of the treaty, which would make sense. The start of negotiations contained in the folder only starts at the beginning of May 1977, while the US proposal included a start date much before that. However, several EC countries pushed for later dates. There were two main reasons for this according to the source material; namely difficulties in the physical implementation of a testing system, but also the regard to third countries. Many member states were concerned that the implementation of a certificate system would cause barriers of trade between the EC and third countries, due to the need for increased documentation and effort to clear a shipment of ferrochrome. Indeed, the definitive date of entry for the certification efforts would be the 28th of July, according to a telex dated 29.6.77 from Brix Knudsen* to the Washington Delegation.³⁰³ Still, the EC were insisting on a transitional period until 18th of September, and even then required that there “must be no discrimination between member states”, and that “the new procedures will come into force gradually in member states, but we can give no specific dates”.³⁰⁴

This makes it seem like the EC were demanding a large amount of flexibility on a subject that should be relatively straight forward. This shows that the different EC countries had different priorities, as the countries which were not major importers of chrome products would not have any particular incentive to be involved in the negotiations. On the other hand, the largest chrome importers; Italy, West Germany and France, could have seen the transitional period as an opportunity to import chrome without the extra measures required by the agreement. However, the source material scarcely separates between the different member states’ opinions, so this can only be regarded as speculation.

³⁰² Ibid

³⁰³ BDT 076/94, 29.6.1977 and The European Union Encyclopedia and Directory 1999, Europa Publications

*What the role of Brix Knudsen is, is hard to tell, as I was not able to find any information about his work in the 1970s. However, Per Brix Knudsen was mentioned as an EU director responsible for the co-ordination and fraud prevention in 1999. From the letter in question, it would seem that Brix Knudsen was the Danish representative to the EC.

³⁰⁴ Ibid.

The EC ferrochrome industry was at a “very critical point” in 1977, according to the appendix to a telex dated 24th October, 1980 on the overreliance on ferrochrome imports, sent from F. Braun, who I have been unable to identify, but was seemingly involved in EC industrial strategy, to Davignon.³⁰⁵ The appendix also discusses the measures taken by the EC industry to combat the poor performance of the industries. The EC had stopped producing charge chrome, lowered their industrial capacity from 300 000 tons to 120 000, initiated anti-dumping measures towards South Africa and Sweden, and convinced the steel industries to import a percentage of EC ferrochrome at higher than market prices. While these measures worked initially, the ferrochrome market would struggle again in 1980, following Zimbabwean addition to zero-duty quotas and a lowered US steel consumption.³⁰⁶

This shows that the EC had moved away from producing charge chrome following the implementation stricter sanctions measures. This would indicate that the EC producers would need higher quality chrome, as charge chrome was based on high-carbon ores which were found in South Africa. The ores in Rhodesia would be suitable in this case, as well as those ores found in the Soviet Union, which were both considered to be high quality. What this means is that they would need to be more reliant on one of these countries for their needs of chrome ores, and even if they would trade with South Africa it would be even more likely that Rhodesian ores were shipped. Together with the critical situation of the industry, this could provide an incentive to slow down discussions, especially if they were aware that their firms relied on potentially Rhodesian goods from South Africa.

Another issue is the cost of production, which seemed to be a problem for the EC countries. Indeed, as mentioned earlier in the chapter, the general trends of the ferrochrome industry was moving towards localized production, making use of comparative advantages to create cheaper, high quality ferrochrome products in developing countries. This led to the costs of production for the EC producers to be too high in comparison to the competition, which is made clear in a complaint from the EC ferrochrome producers regarding anti-dumping measures against Sweden and South Africa, dated 26th of June, 1978.³⁰⁷ While it is not mentioned if this is an organisation or a group of some kind, it is implied that the letter represents the combined

³⁰⁵ BDT 110/086/C196, 24.10.80

³⁰⁶ BDT 110/086/C196

³⁰⁷ SEC(78)2772, 26/7/78

interests of the EC ferrochrome producers.³⁰⁸ The note shows that the production costs of the EC industries, contained in West Germany, Italy and France, was too high to compete. The sales prices had also dropped by around 30% from 1975 to 1978 in the EC markets, the results of which were that the EC ferrochrome industry was generally selling at 20-30% less than their operation cost. This tells us that the EC producers were in a period of economic hardship while they were discussing certification efforts with the US. This could support an argument of cost issues. Indeed, there are 3 theoretical issues with the cost that could come forward following the special certificate program:

1. There would likely be higher transportation costs, as the certificate would need to contain more accurate information than before and there would need to be supervision of port security at all times when loading. This would require more labour, and thus higher costs. Also, the certificate program would restrict vessels from loading at multiple ports, and trading with third countries who were not part of the certificate program would be a problem in this regard, incurring more testing procedures and having higher documentation needs.³⁰⁹
2. The actual cost of testing chrome shipments would also be an additional cost. The cost of this would be 60\$ per shipment, as mentioned in a letter from Spaak regarding the negotiations on certification.³¹⁰ While the cost of this would thus be relatively low when compared to the cost of an entire shipment, which would usually be several thousand tons, it is nevertheless an additional expense, which could create additional barriers to trade and affect a struggling EC industry.
3. The last point would be the potential loss of cheap imports. While we know that the EC countries were all a part of the UN sanctions against Rhodesia, we also know that many cases of sanctions breaking were related to industries in Europe.³¹¹ Indeed, there is a high chance that at least some of the ferrochrome plants in France, Italy and West Germany were to some capacity knowingly smuggling chrome ore from Rhodesia. While this is only speculation, it would explain the lack of interest of some countries in the discussions on certificate programs, and the pushback of several EC countries to US proposals.

³⁰⁸ Ibid.

³⁰⁹ BDT/051/90

³¹⁰ BDT/076/94

³¹¹ S/11597 1975, p.2

Considering the downturn in the ferrochrome industry of the EC, it is thus likely that the industry and its representatives would be against the imposition of stricter measures on the import of chrome ore, as it would lead to additional hardships for an already struggling industry. With that said, the economic downturn would lead to losses regardless, as the EC production of ferrochrome had been completely dependent on chromite imports for a long time, and would thus be at a disadvantage no matter. With the development of the worldwide trade, it would seem that the industry would eventually need state intervention like the anti-dumping measures of 1978 regardless of the implementation of certificates.

5.5 Certificates in action: Effects in the UN Security Council Reports

The certificate program and its clauses were efficiently implemented by 1978, at which point the European Communities were involved in a case involving a suspected sanctions breaking by the Netherlands and Germany. This case was discussed in the 12th report of the Committee on UN Resolution 253, where it was suspected that a shipment of ferrochrome had made it through the new system in order to arrive in Germany. After all documentation had been sent by the Commission of the European Communities Delegation to the United Nations, it became clear that the shipment was not likely of Rhodesian origin. This was namely due to the fact that chemical analysis had been conducted on the shipment, proving that it was likely of South African origin due to the composition of the metal.³¹²

This case shows how the chemical testing of the ferrochrome in question allowed the Committee to efficiently analyse the situation and come to a conclusion. It also shows that the European Communities were seemingly taking the certification efforts more seriously. Other than this example, no European country was named in the reports, implying that the tightening of the embargo protocols by the US and EC was successful at deterring attempts to import from Rhodesian sources. At the same time, the case could be that the system was still poorly functioning, with the negotiations and systems being put in place being merely surface level, with illicit trade still being conducted under the table, although this would be unlikely given the US dedication to have an agreement in place.

³¹² S/13750, 1980, p. 38

5.6 Community ferrochrome industry under threat: Anti-dumping protocols following Zimbabwe's independence

The Smith regime officially fell following the elections of January 1980, after a deal was reached at the Lancaster House on December 21st 1979 between the British, the Smith regime and Mugabe's Patriotic Front.³¹³ This deal would lead to the end of sanctions, but this would not be the end of problems in chrome industries. Indeed, over the period of UN sanctions following UDI, the Rhodesians had developed a strong ferrochrome industry, which was to be taken into use by the new Zimbabwe. After having been serving secretly for almost 15 years, the industry would finally be able to be traded legally, which would lead to a strong export economy, such as with its ferrochrome industry. What effect did the Zimbabwean independence have on EC foreign reliance?

Following the independence of Zimbabwe, as part of the negotiations for independence, the UK had promised to invest into the country. And due to their mineral wealth they were also invited to join the Lomé-system, and the newly established SYSMIN. This system was established as a way for the EC to ensure their supply of minerals by aiding in the development of mining infrastructure in African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries. SYSMIN was introduced in the negotiations for Lomé II, and the newly formed independent Zimbabwe was allowed to the negotiating table. The demands from Zimbabwe was the addition of chrome to the list of critical minerals, which made its way into the final version of the first SYSMIN agreement.³¹⁴ While SYSMIN was designed to aid the developing nations within the ACP to create stability for their exports, it was also designed to allow EC countries a stable supply of strategic minerals to fuel their industries. However, this came at a cost for the EC ferrochrome industry, which was now competing with Zimbabwean producers of ferrochrome, who were willing to ship their ferrochrome for cheap, pricing out the Europeans.³¹⁵

The addition of chrome into the SYSMIN agreement did, however, expose the overreliance of the EC on sources of ferrochrome outside of its own industry. An example of this would be the EC correspondence regarding the implementation of new anti-dumping procedures, similar to those introduced in 1978.³¹⁶ The source is a description of the situation of European ferrochrome producers, and in particular how they were being priced out of the market by

³¹³ DeRoche 2001, p.285

³¹⁴ BDT 260/94, Draft ACP Proposal, 21st May 1979

³¹⁵ BDT 110/086/C196, 24.10.1980

³¹⁶ *Ibid.*

ferrochrome producers of Southern Africa. The note, dated 24th of October 1980, makes it clear that there is a belief that the EC ferrochrome industry “is practically condemned to die”³¹⁷ The document describes that the anti-dumping measures of 1978 had given the Community producers a relatively stable market, but states that newer, more aggressive approaches by particularly the Southern African zone had created more problems for the EC industries.³¹⁸ The main culprit was described as Zimbabwe, a country which had recently gained independence and had started “launching increased quantities (of ferrochrome) on the European markets at excessively low prices”³¹⁹

The report states that the EC ferrochrome producers were struggling to keep up with foreign prices, putting forward Zimbabwe as the main culprit. The lifting of the embargo against Rhodesia and the treatment of Zimbabwe as a developing country with lower customs duties left Zimbabwe in a position to exploit the European market, as they had a very large production capacity following independence, at more than the size of France and West Germany combined.³²⁰ It is also noted that the Zimbabwean policy following their independence revolved around exploiting their large production capacity and cheap production costs to flood the market with cheap chrome ore and drowning out the competition.³²¹

The report discussed the different methods that could be useful in order to combat the problem of Zimbabwean dumping in the EC. The four methods would include anti-dumping measures that would intrinsically cause problems between the ferrochrome and steel producers, as the EC steel producers might react negatively to having to pay a higher price for their chrome imports. Another solution would have been to find an agreement between the EC producers and the ones in Zimbabwe and South Africa. This solution would also be problematic, as the document speculates that it could lead to a cartel situation, while it would also lead to a negative reaction from EC steel producers. The last option was seen as the most favourable one, and the one which would be initiated. This option would call for EC steel producers to acquire 20% of their ferrochrome ores from other EC sources, with 80% being allowed to be imported from outside

³¹⁷ *Ibid*,

³¹⁸ *Ibid*.

³¹⁹ *Ibid*.

³²⁰ *Ibid*.

³²¹ *Ibid*. p.2

of the Community. This would still lead to closure of some EC facilities, but would safeguard the ferrochrome industry as a whole, while satisfying the needs of the steel industry.³²²

Why were the EC so enthusiastic to get Zimbabwe into SYSMIN? When considering the mineral wealth of Zimbabwe, it is not hard to imagine. Indeed, the country was producing so much raw ore that was necessary for heavy industries, and especially in regards to chrome, the EC were expanding, as mentioned in Chapter 5.1. Zimbabwe on its side would benefit from greater investment opportunities, and would be protected from market swings through subsidies by the EC. As it turns out, the amount of ferrochrome produced by Zimbabwe would be problematic for the EC producers, however the steel industry would be very happy with this, as they would gain access to cheap raw materials within the zero-duty quota. This sees a divide between the EC involvement in ACP ferrochrome trade and EC ferrochrome industry, as the EC anti-dumping laws were essentially keeping their ferrochrome industry artificially alive by introducing anti-dumping measures, which would become increasingly difficult as the growing trend of vertical integration among chrome-exporting nations would continue.

5.7 Discussion

The change in policy towards Rhodesia from 1977 onwards was a step in the right direction for the end of the regime, but a destructive chapter for both EC and US ferrochrome producers. While the new-found interest of the US to reinstate chrome and ferrochrome imports showed that the US were prepared to turn the tide in Southern Africa, the EC reluctantly accepted stricter sanctions enforcement. Perhaps this reluctance was a desperate attempt to keep their ferrochrome industries going, perhaps for feelings that the US were judging them for inefficiently applied sanctions. We know that discussions on stricter sanctions coincided with the dwindling of EC ferrochrome industry, and one can imagine that the state of the industry would have a bearing on their decision to postpone the measures, perhaps only to secure other channels of imports before entering an agreement stopping Rhodesian ores. Nevertheless, the EC ferrochrome industry was on the decline, with anti-dumping measures following both in 1978 and 1980, and the trend of outsourcing ferrochrome production seemed to be inevitable for the European Community industry.

³²² BDT 110/086, p.3-4

6 Conclusion

The thesis has attempted to give discussion on the Western response to the difficulties of the ferrochrome trade following the UN declaration of mandatory sanctions against Rhodesia in 1968. The thesis has looked deeper into the nature of the ferrochrome trade between the West and Rhodesia, and has attempted to answer the following questions:

To what extent did the Western response to the UN sanctions revolve around chromite- and ferrochrome-trade? And what impact did the UN sanctions have on Rhodesia's production patterns and export of ferrochrome?

The US response was directly related to chrome imports, although the response of their industry suggested that this was counterintuitive. The Byrd Amendment staying in force for as long as it did, despite its apparent harm to the economy, indicates that the Amendment was more of a political tool to keep Rhodesia going than for their own gain until the U-turn of Carter.

The European response was, at least officially, to conform to sanctions, although the breaches of the sanctions system has been regarded as an openly kept secret by previous research. In Chapter 5, the sources tell us that the EC made it hard for the certificate deal with the US be implemented swiftly, believing the US were insinuating that the EC were purposefully not following sanctions, leading to prolonged discussions. This shows what could be interpreted as unwillingness from the EC to commit to swift negotiations about stepping up the sanctions efforts, and considering the deep roots of Rhodesian connections as discussed previously, this could be caused by Rhodesian ferrochrome imports into Europe. It would be hard to prove that this be the case with the facts we have available for this thesis, but the discussions do in any way reinforce the general feeling that the Commission of the EC were not particularly bothered with the Rhodesian problem as a whole. Still, it is certain that the EC were not strictly enforcing sanctions as shown by the many cases of breaches involving EC businesses, and the conspiracy-like dealing of RISCO with EC producers, despite their official adherence to the UN Resolutions.

While their exact motivations for the lax enforcement remain unclear, we do know that EC domestic production of ferrochrome was declining throughout the late 1970s, together with the US. The importance of domestic productions of ferrochrome were presumably affected by the global recessions, as the general steel consumption of the West fell in accordance with the

economic crisis of the mid-1970s. The EC consumption of steel, was, however, increasing in the years before 1980, and together with a declining domestic production of ferrochrome, the EC resorted to imports for the most part of their needs.

What is especially interesting to note here is the EC's own ambitions in commodity markets, as they had outlined a Community strategy of diversification of resources.³²³ And still, their chrome resources were almost entirely generated through South Africa, as explained in Chapter 3. This would mean that the EC were either straying from the general aims they had set for themselves in 1975 for their future mineral procurement strategy, or the governments were, knowingly or unknowingly, importing chrome and ferrochrome ores from Rhodesia through South Africa. This is evidenced by the many different reports of minerals being shipped to EC ports, as well as the large amount of imports from South Africa experienced by the EC.

The examples from the UN reports in Chapter 4 shows the ease at which countries could circumvent sanctions, as few cases were definitely closed, with most of the cases being dismissed as "mistakes" or the provision of documents were delayed long enough that it was impossible to act upon the information that the Committee had gathered. It is not hard to imagine that the responding EC governments used this uncertainty to covertly access Rhodesian markets, or feigned ignorance when trading with South Africa.

Throughout this thesis, the sympathies from some EC states, namely Italy, France and the UK as well as the US, has become quite clear, which is supported by Mlambo's claim that sympathies towards Rhodesia was a part of why sanctions in general were applied, and DeRoche's descriptions of US sympathies for Rhodesia.³²⁴ Warson also mentions this in the case of France, as they had long been building relations with Rhodesia to gain influence in an increasingly decolonised Africa, focusing on a more ideological connection with Rhodesia from the EC, which is not discussed in Commission discussions, but nevertheless suggests that Rhodesian propaganda and ideological allies in the West helped undermine sanctions.³²⁵

Dependence on Rhodesia was not a problem on a global scale, as seen with the trade numbers of other countries, such as US-USSR trade and the position of competitors like Turkey, Albania.

³²³ COM(75) 50, p.7

³²⁴ Mlambo 2019, p.374 and DeRoche 2001, p.145

³²⁵ Warson 2015

The rising amount of ferrochrome production would lead to making Rhodesian trade in the late 70s less relevant regardless, and with their diplomatic isolation, there only reasons to trade with Rhodesia would have been due to costs, which were still similar to South African prices, or to support the regime. Trading with South Africa was also risky, as Rhodesian ores were hard to identify, particularly before blanket certifications were introduced. The continued trade with South Africa even when there was relatively large chance that the metals they would gain were of Rhodesian origin, shows that the EC were either not bothered by the chance to import Rhodesian chrome, or were intentionally doing it. While the argument can be had that there were no other realistic options on the world market, there was the possibility of opening up to trade with the Soviet Union or smaller suppliers. The UK not vetoing the suggestion to threaten sanctions in South Africa when the UN discussions in 1972, and the French abstention as the notable EC abstention, shows that the Rhodesian question was not taken seriously, perhaps due to the knowledge of Western countries of the possible consequences of an embargo on 99% of the world's reserves of chromite.³²⁶ Thus, even if the EC countries were not intently breaching sanctions, they were certainly not afraid of trading with South Africa, who was knowingly the “partner in crime” of Rhodesia.

The Byrd Amendment was not as influential as what has been previously believed. The Byrd Amendment would not change a lot about the Rhodesian situation, as the US were acting in the interests of Union Carbide, and did not expand trade with Rhodesia. The Rhodesian regime had been eagerly rounding sanctions since long before the Byrd Amendment was in force, with a constantly growing economy according to UN sources.³²⁷

It can be argued that the end of the Smith regime came about partly due to the renewed US initiatives as a mediator of peace in the wake of revoking the Byrd Amendment. The US were able to withdraw the Byrd Amendment after discussions in the US Senate had swayed most supporters of the amendment, after presenting the facts about the US economic relation with Rhodesia which had been apparent since 1972: The US were not as reliant on Rhodesia as it had been argued by the Union Carbide lobby in Congress.³²⁸ This became particularly apparent in the overproducing ferrochrome markets in the late 1970s, which made the Byrd Amendment

³²⁶ Crowson 1978, p.47

³²⁷ Up until 1974, no major jumps were recorded following the Byrd Amendment, and in 1974 all Rhodesian trade statistics seized to be shared with the global community.

³²⁸ Congress meetings 1973. and DeRoche 2001, p.162

entirely obsolete. The Amendment was revoked in 1977, at which point the US reinstated sanctions and urged other countries, including the EC, as discussed in chapter 5, to tighten security measures.

The turnaround of US foreign policy on Rhodesia during Nixon's reign was heavily influenced by the chromite lobby. I would argue that the US reinvolved and their major role in the last couple of years before Zimbabwe became independent came about directly (but not exclusively) due to the lower need for chrome ore in the global markets following the trends of producer-exporters of ferrochrome. The EC were also affected by this, however the EC growth rates were much higher than that of the US, and this could indicate that the EC were still reliant on Rhodesia, despite pursuing more diversified imports.

The EC were likely to be importing a lot of chrome from Rhodesia as well, as they had done in other markets. France had continued supplying the Rhodesians with weapons and vehicles up until at least 1974.³²⁹ The difference being that the blatant sanctions breaking of the US was out in the open, and therefore more interesting to the global community, than the covert operations of other countries. The RISCO case was also a strong and severe example of EC conspiracy, with contacts within large business in both Germany, France and Austrian Steel industries. The fact that this case had been brewing for as long as it did before being exposed, proves that it would be possible for there to have been other cases which were never exposed, which could have taken advantage of the frankly lazy enforcement of embargo by most governments and the stringent Beira patrol, in order to gain cheap materials for their industry.

The research for this thesis has certainly revealed that breaches of the Rhodesian sanctions, while being majorly influenced by chrome production and export trends, were not exclusively controlled by these trends. While there was a large probability that there was a lot of illegal trade between Rhodesia and the EC, there exists little definitive proof of this, due to the lack of transparency in the chrome trade. The sanctions were also majorly affected by Western stances on Rhodesia in the Cold War, and the fear of political instability and the cutting of supply chains would be a reasonable fear for the West to have, considering the war and the perceived Soviet influence. The Byrd Amendment of course had a large influence on the US foreign policy in Southern Africa, but its effectiveness was limited, and it only discredited the UN further in its

³²⁹ Mlambo, p. 379

efforts to bind Rhodesia. The EC ferrochrome industry was also certainly affected by the sanctions, and I would say that there is a likelihood that Rhodesian trade had been going unnoticed for much of the sanctions regime, however diversified EC trading partners and the declining Rhodesian economy and market share in the face of a growing South African ferrochrome industry saw any sanctions busting attempts fail in the late 1970s.

What is different in my research? The Byrd Amendment and US policy has been extensively researched already, but the EC stance on the special certificates has been a new addition here. The focus on EC strategy shows that the EC did not treat Rhodesia as a serious problem, but were not following the US example of straight defying sanctions. On a whole, they seemed to be perfectly content with sitting still, and ignoring the breaches taking place within the Community. This is reflected in slow and unhelpful EC responses to UN investigations, their silence in UN Security Council meetings, and their negative reactions to US discussions on stricter sanctions. The EC and US reactions to sanctions seem to be opposites until the late 1970s, at which point the US insistence on stricter sanctions caused a common policy, which would allow for the eventual end of sanctions.

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8 th report	1976	S/11927
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10 th report	1978	S/12529
12 th report	1980	S/13750
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Sammendrag

I denne oppgaven diskuterer jeg hvilken innvirkning FNs sanksjoner mot Rhodesia hadde på vestlige lands strategier, med tanke på deres avhengighet av krom. Europeisk importavhengighet for krom ligger på rundt 90-100% på 1970-tallet, og denne importavhengigheten legger grunnlaget for deres strategi innen kromhandel. Fokuset for analysen sammenligner strategiene til USA og det Europeiske Fellesskap (EF), på grunn av deres ledende rolle i ferrokromproduksjon på begynnelsen av oppgavens tidsramme, rundt 1965. Ferrokromindustrien i Europa og USA svekkes i forhold til det sørlige Afrika, som drar nytte av teknologiske fremskritt for å raskt bygge opp egen ferrokromindustri, som svekker vestlige smelteverk, samtidig som avhengigheten av det sørlige Afrika blir større og større.

Oppgaven skaper et bilde av en industri som er i stor endring – hvor endringer i produksjonsmønster av ferrokrom fører til at flere land bryter med sanksjoner, mens USA er de eneste som gjør det åpenlyst i form av Byrd Amendment. Oppgaven viser at amerikansk utenrikspolitikk var drevet av ideologiske likheter og frykt for å bli avhengig av sovjetisk krom. Samtidig førte EF en strategi som holdt kromhandel, og handel for øvrig under jorden, noe som gjør det vanskelig å bevise graden av sanksjonsbryting som ble gjennomført av EF. Både USA og EF var sannsynligvis involvert i kromhandel under sanksjonene, men EFs politikk var i større grad under jorden, mens USAs handel med Rhodesia var gjort i åpenhet.

Abstract

In this paper, I will be discussing the impact that the UN sanctions against Rhodesia had on Western countries' strategies, considering their dependence on Rhodesian chrome. European import dependency for chromium is around 90-100% in the 1970s, and this import dependency forms the basis of their chromium trade strategy. The focus of this analysis is to compare the strategies of the United States and the European Community (EC), due to their large ferrochrome industries around the year 1965. The ferrochrome industry in Europe and the US was becoming weaker in relation to Southern Africa, which was taking advantage of technological advances to rapidly build up its own ferrochrome production capacity, weakening Western industries, who were becoming increasingly dependent on Southern Africa for ores.

The paper creates a picture of an industry that was undergoing major change - where changes in ferrochrome production patterns led several countries to violate sanctions, while the US was the only one to do so openly in the form of the Byrd Amendment. The paper shows that American foreign policy was driven by ideological similarities and fear of becoming dependent on Soviet chromium. At the same time, the EC pursued a strategy that kept the chromium trade, and trade in general, underground, which makes it difficult to prove the degree of sanctions busting carried out by the EC. Both the US and the EC were likely to have been involved in chrome trade during the sanctions, but the EC's policy remained covert, while the US trade with Rhodesia was done openly.

Forord/Foreword

Det har vært svært krevende å skrive denne masteroppgaven, og det føles nesten surrealistisk å sitte og skrive de siste ordene på oppgaven nå. Arbeidet med oppgaven over de siste 2 årene har vært fylt med stress, men de har også vært svært spennende, og er en opplevelse jeg ikke ville vært foruten. Jeg kunne ikke ha skrevet denne oppgaven selv, så det er bare å sette i gang med takkerunden. Jeg vil først takke min veileder, Hans Otto Frøland, for å ha geleidet meg inn på temaet om europeisk krom-industri, dyttet meg i riktig retning (Brussel) og for å ha pushet meg mot slutten av arbeidet når tempoet måtte opp. Jeg har alltid vært inspirert etter veiledningsmøtene.

Ellers er det nesten umulig å takke alle jeg skulle ha takket, men jeg gir det et forsøk. Jeg vil gjerne takke samtlige av de fra lesesalen 6393, som har bidratt til å gjøre dagene på Dragvoll en glede. En spesiell takk går til Magnus for våre lange kvelder med både forferdelig (bra) forsøk på humor, men også dype samtaler om livet og kjærligheten og alt imellom. Jeg vil sende en takk til Halvdan også, som har vært så snill å la meg bo hos han i innspurten, og som har vært med å kjempe natt og dag den siste uken. Jeg ønsker også å takke kollektivet mitt i Nedre Møllenberg gate 79, hvor det alltid har vært god stemning når jeg har kommet sent hjem fra lesesal, og hvor praten om alt og ingenting kunne gå i timevis.

Og så til de viktigste av alle, familien min. Jeg ønsker å takke familien min for å alltid ha vært støttende, og for å ha fulgt med meg hele veien. Mamma og pappa, dere har vært positive når jeg har vært negativ, og dere har alltid hatt plass til meg hjemme når jeg har trengt en tur hjem. Denne sommeren har vært tøff for oss alle, men dere har likevel vært så beroligende og gode som dere alltid er når jeg trenger det. Og takk til Synnøve, lillesøsteren min, som jeg har kunnet ventilere all min frustrasjon til, og som har hørt på med åpne ører

Ne croyez pas que je vous ai oubliée. Un grand merci à Louise, qui m'a donné de la joie et de la motivation après de longues journées, et qui m'a fait avancer lorsque nous étions ensemble. Il ne reste plus beaucoup de temps avant Bruxelles.

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1. Introduction

1.1 Theme

On November 11th, 1965, Rhodesia issued a Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) from the British Commonwealth. This was met with sweeping sanctions from the United Kingdom (UK), and followed up by United Nations (UN) encouragement to issue embargo to its Member states through Resolution 216 of the of 12th November 1965. The enactment of mandatory embargo for UN member states was introduced by the UN Security Council through Resolution 232 of 16th December 1966. These sanctions were wide, and mainly targeted Rhodesian exports of consumer goods such as tobacco and meats, as well as the import of petroleum products and weapons. Comprehensive mandatory embargo was enforced through Resolution 253 on the 28th of May, 1968, comprising all Rhodesian trade and diplomatic relations. The sanctions were made to cripple the Rhodesian economy, and by those means force the apartheid government of Ian Smith to give in to majority rule lest the country collapse. Still, Rhodesia managed to survive, even thrive according to some accounts.¹ The Rhodesian production of minerals remained stable, even increasing in value throughout the sanctions, despite the initial lack of manufacturing capabilities in the country.² This was due to severe and widespread sanction-breaking from every facet of the world economy. The United States (US), France, Japan and many other countries were part of this, sometimes as shameless as the enactment of the Byrd Amendment, a US Amendment, effective from 17th November 1971. This amendment came about as a result of the US fear of becoming reliant on the Soviet Union, and allowed US companies to trade freely with Rhodesia.³ For several countries, sanctions could be described as a play for the gallery, to show their stance against apartheid that was not backed by decisive action.

Chrome ore was an important mineral export of Rhodesia, along with other minerals like nickel and asbestos, however chrome ore differs in the area of availability. Indeed, Rhodesia was the largest exporter of chrome to the western world in 1965. This was due to the superior chemical composition of Rhodesian chrome allowing for higher-quality ferrochrome than that of South Africa, as well as the West's fear of becoming dependent on trade with the Soviet Union.⁴ As

¹ Doxey, p.78

² Gibson, p.78

³ Congressional Hearings and Mission Reports: U.S. Relations with Southern Africa, 9.6.1973, p.4

⁴ Slatter, The Chromium Resource of Zimbabwe, p.4

such, chrome was a crucial contributing factor for the extensive sanctions-breaking that took place throughout Rhodesia's lifespan; from 1965 to 1979, despite chrome being a minor export of Rhodesia when compared to gold, copper and nickel, which could also be found elsewhere.

Due to its importance to the thesis and its wide scope, the term "sanctions" should be defined for this thesis. Indeed, sanctions can be applied to anything from sporting sanctions, trade embargo, diplomatic sanctions, it can really come forward in several ways. According to Johan Galtung, the Rhodesian sanctions can certainly be considered negative sanctions that were aimed at the collective Rhodesia (even though the goal is to achieve majority rule, the sanctions were collective in its effect). Furthermore, the sanctions on Rhodesia were due to the internal situation of Rhodesia, with the country's independence and refusal to allow majority rule the key component for the degree of sanctions initiated. For the purpose of this thesis, when sanctions are discussed it is related to economic sanctions, and mainly those imposed through Resolution 253.⁵

This thesis contains research about the execution of the United Nations (UN) embargo on Rhodesia by Western States, namely the United States (US) and the European Communities (EC). These were chosen because of their prominent position in the discussions and execution of the UN mandatory embargo on Rhodesia of 1966, as the US and United Kingdom (UK) were both criticized for their handling of the embargo, but they were also both important in the resolution of it. The UK joined the EC in 1976, but will be discussed as its own entity throughout the thesis. Both the US, UK and other EC countries were reliant on Rhodesia to an extent for their chrome ores, and this reliance will be the subject of the thesis.

The thesis will have two main research questions:

To what extent did the Western response to the Rhodesian UDI revolve around chromite- and ferrochrome-trade?

And how did the EC and US responses to changing trade patterns compare to each other?

⁵ *On the Effects of International Economic Sanctions: With Examples from the Case of Rhodesia*, J. Galtung, 1967, p.379

This thesis will focus on a combination of the US and EC response to Rhodesia's UDI, in order to give a comparative view of the US and EC strategies.. The US response has already been covered extensively by research, but the EC has not been discussed as an entity to the same degree, although there exists some literature about individual countries. The thesis will focus on the effects of the situation on trade and production of ferrochrome, but will also cover some cultural and ideological issues as well, as to give a broader context to the subject. There is an apparent lack of literature on the exact strategies of the EC ferrochrome industry as a whole, particularly in the late 1970s, which is why this will be the main aim of the thesis. The thesis will focus more on the EC, as they were very reliant on chrome ore from Rhodesia and South Africa both before and after UDI, while changing tides of the ferrochrome industry and relaxed enforcement of sanctions brought problems for both US and EC industries.

1.2 Structure

Chapter 2 of this thesis discusses the background for the thesis. This chapter contains information about the physical qualities of chromite, its uses, limitations and its distribution. The chapter gives an overview of the different players of the chrome trade, and shows the developments prior to the UDI of Rhodesia, with explanations for the initiation of sanctions, and the role of the UN.

In chapter 3, the Rhodesian relations with the important EC ferrochrome producers is discussed, along with the US and UK. This chapter shows the state of some of the individual countries' chrome industries, discussing factors which could have impacted relations with Rhodesia. The chapter also mentions the role of covert operations, both from the view of private business and the role of some state organisations, such as the French Service de Documentation Exteriure et de Contre-Espionage (SDECE).⁶

Chapter 4 will seek to discuss the extent of governments' knowledge of sanctions breaches, by considering discussions in the UN Security Council and examining UN reports on the pursuance of Resolution 253. The chapter also discusses the statistical data presented in the UN Security Council reports, which is used as evidence to show that breaches of sanction were happening on a large scale, without being reported.

⁶ Flower, p.121

In chapter 5, the US foreign policy changes in the late 1970s is explained, and there is a deeper dive into their relations with the EC in regards to the enforcement on chrome sanctions. The chapter shows the difficulties facing both US and EC ferrochrome industries, and the effect of shifting ferrochrome production centres from Western importers to producing nations.

Finally, chapter 6 will be the conclusion, which will seek to answer the research question by giving an account of the discussion established throughout the other chapters. Chapter 6 will discuss how the covert nature of sanctions makes it difficult to conclude precisely how influential Rhodesian chrome was on the strategies of the EC ferrochrome production, and that US openness in the end of the 1970s stood in stark contrast to the EC reluctance to tighten sanctions.

1.3 Previous literature

Johan Galtung's "*On the Effects of International Economic Sanctions: With Examples from the Case of Rhodesia*" (1967), describes both how the Rhodesians initially saw the sanctions as an opportunity for thrill-seeking. The book also gives one view of the effect and intention of international sanctions, attempting to answer why the Rhodesian embargo was put in force. The book attempts to give a framework for the functioning of sanctions, and as it was written quite early in the period of sanctions on Rhodesia, its view is based on theory rather than hindsight when discussing how sanctions would unfold.⁷

Hans. W. Maull's "*Raw Materials, Energy & Western Security*" (1984) discusses the situation in the chrome market, and how the West was dependent on Southern Africa for chrome ores. This book uses the market trends of the 1960s and 70s to declare chromium a critical resource. Maull also discusses EC strategy, mentioning the anti-dumping agreements passed in the European Commission between steelmakers and the ferrochrome producers of the Community. Maull provides insight into the industry, while providing discussion on how Community and US producers would need to adapt to the changing markets. The book is angled more towards a contemporary view of the mineral markets, using historical data to discuss the overall import reliability of Western nations.⁸

⁷ Galtung 1967, "*On the Effects of International Economic Sanctions: With Examples from the Case of Rhodesia*"

⁸ Maull 1984, "*Raw Materials, Energy & Western Security*"

Margaret P. Doxey's "*Economic Sanctions and International Enforcement*" (1980) discusses all facets of sanctions, including the problems and effects of attempting to implement sanctions. The book uses different sanctions to create a picture of how sanctions are enforced on an international level. In the case of Rhodesia, she writes that Rhodesian solidarity and efforts to switch to subsistence farming, keeping up exports and maintaining diverse imports were reasons for their persistent circumvention of sanctions.⁹ Doxey writes about how covert trade with Rhodesia was keeping them afloat, and how the sanctions were only viewed as an inconvenience for much of the time it was implemented. She also discusses how the Rhodesian optimism following the Byrd Amendment dwindled towards the end, as it became clearer that the regime would be unable to maintain its position.¹⁰ Doxey focuses more on the effects on Rhodesia, and direct US and UK involvement.

Otherwise, the literature mainly revolves around the UN embargo or the strategies of countries involved, such as Andrew DeRoche's "*Black, White & Chrome*" (2001), which details the evolution of American policy on Rhodesia, as well as covering the Bush War and the Smith regime's actions. The book goes in great detail about the events that unfolded all the way from the 1950s until 1994, and gives a great overview of the American initiatives and the thought process behind them, such as regards repealing the Byrd Amendment. The book gives an account of the different presidents' policies, and discusses the US view of how the Rhodesian problem should be handled. DeRoche also discusses the Carter administration in great detail, and the seemingly genuine interest in helping to create a free Zimbabwe.¹¹

Another central US-centric work would be the article "*This outcome gives me no pleasure. It is extremely painful for me to be the instrument of their fate (1965–1979)*" (2019), by Eddie Michel. Michel discusses the shifting roles of the US in relation to Rhodesia, and how the US foreign policy changed throughout the different presidential periods. Michel seeks to discuss the pragmatic side of US influence in Rhodesia, attempting to keep Cold War politics and racial lenses out of his analysis, focusing strictly on the actions of the Oval Office. He describes the reigns of the different presidents by giving accounts of what they did with Rhodesia. This led him to conclude that Nixon was friendly with Rhodesia, emphasising their interest in the intense

⁹ Doxey 1980, "*Economic Sanctions and International Enforcement*" p.77

¹⁰ Doxey 1980, p.78

¹¹ DeRoche 2001, "*Black, White & Chrome*"

Rhodesian anti-communism and their pro-western stances. Nixon was, according to Michel, devoted to Realpolitik, acting in the US' strategic interest completely unfazed by, for example UN sanctions. Carter was, on the other hand, the only president he viewed as feeling morally obligated to solving the Rhodesian problem.¹²

Elizabeth Schmidt & William Minter's "*When Sanctions Worked: The Case of Rhodesia Reexamined*" (1988), describes sanctions as a successful enterprise, in opposition to much of the previous writing. Indeed, they argue that sanctions were the cause of the various troubles, such as the massive debt and the crippling civil war, which eventually led to the end of Rhodesia. They argue that sanctions were a contributing force to the end of the Smith regime, but maintains that the question around the success of sanctions should rather have been, according to Minter and Schmidt: "*What would have happened had sanctions not been adopted, being replaced by inaction or some other policy alternative?*"¹³ The aim of this book seems to have been to give an opposite view to that of the contemporary one for the duration of the sanctions regime, namely that they were a failure. Indeed, while much was already written about the sanctions not being able to stop the Smith regime, this book describes sanctions as a major contributing force, which was certainly decisive, even if it was not the only contribution.

Alois Mlambo's "*Honoured more in the Breach than its observance*" (2019) is a piece of literature which argues that the UN sanctions were largely useless, and that the end of the Smith regime came about as a result of the Bush War. Indeed, Mlambo's view is critical in its nature and, as indicated in the title, provides an opposite view of the one described by William Minter & Elizabeth Schmidt. This book give one view of the Rhodesian embargo, strongly criticising the international response. While it is focused on general trade, both import and exports, during the embargo, it discusses a wide variety of examples of sanctions being breached one way or another, often involving government intervention. Thus, the article shows that there were several problems with the way sanctions were enforced, or not enforced, which led to the inaction of several governments.¹⁴

¹² Michel 2019, "*This outcome gives me no pleasure. It is extremely painful for me to be the instrument of their fate (1965–1979)*" p. 464

¹³ Minter & Schmidt 1988, "*When Sanctions Worked: The Case of Rhodesia Reexamined*", p.210

¹⁴ Mlambo 2019, "*Honoured more in the Breach than its observance*"

Niels Boender's *"From Federation to 'White Redoubt'"* discusses the ties between Europe and Rhodesia, arguing that the global perspective of Rhodesia was integral to the situation in the region, and that the Rhodesian propaganda propagating themselves as a bulwark against the communist threat in Southern Africa was what allowed white Rhodesia to gain friends in the West. He also writes that a "settler decolonisation" was viewed as an acceptable alternative to decolonisation among Africans, and that the anti-communism of Rhodesia was what gained them ideological allies in places like the US and Europe following UDI. Boender points out that Western sympathies to Rhodesia were not only rooted in economics, and that sanctions breaching was just as much rooted in far-right and anti-communist influences on both US and European policy.¹⁵

The reports of the UN have been previously studied, and several cases of sanctions breaking have been covered by previous literature on the topic, such as Mlambo. Previous literature on the subject has extensively discussed the regular sanctions breaking on a world stage, and a lot has been written about US policy towards Rhodesia and the Byrd Amendment, which is obviously an interesting topic as it was such a completely blatant violation of UN sanctions. However, the research into the role of the EC has not been as evident, particularly in the trade of chrome and ferrochrome. While research into the topic is becoming more popular recently, with works such as Warson's *"Entangled Ends of Empire: The role of France and Francophone Africa in the decolonization of Rhodesia."* Warson, along with Mlambo, have recently had a more critical view of the European role in Rhodesia. Warson has taken a deep dive into the French efforts to breach sanctions, putting forward evidence of breaches through motor vehicles, setting up networks of shell companies through francophone Africa, continuing airline operations into Rhodesia and maintaining a Rhodesian information office in Paris.¹⁶

1.4 Sources

The research of this thesis is based on qualitative source material, stemming from the European Commission Archives, the UN Digital Library and historical sources from the US Congress. These sources have been chosen in order to shine a light on the attitudes that were behind the stances taken by the European Commission as a whole. The source material gathered from the EC is crucial in the insight it gives to the attitudes of the EC delegation to the US, providing

¹⁵ Boender 2023, *"From Federation to 'White Redoubt'"*

¹⁶ Warson 2015, *"Entangled Ends of Empire: The role of France and Francophone Africa in the decolonization of Rhodesia."*

insight into their negative reactions to extended measures, while also providing some of the statistics which the EC based their decisions on.

The online archives of the Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), has been used to some degree in this thesis, to give insights into US attitudes to the Rhodesian issue, and some of the thoughts behind their actions. However, much literature has also been written about this topic, so much of the US policy has also been discussed through previous literature, such as DeRoche. A Congress hearing discussing the repealing of the Byrd Amendment from 1973 has also been used as a source, as it provides information about the disagreements within the US structure, discussing the reasons for sanctions and showing the influence of the Union Carbide lobby.¹⁷

The UN reports contain much information which has been useful for the thesis, including information on individual cases which show the sometimes lacklustre adherence to the sanctions by some companies and individuals. The reports also help by providing statistics on the situation in Rhodesia which is seemingly not available anywhere else, such as advanced statistical measurements on the output of the Rhodesian neighbour-states, estimated Rhodesian trade statistics and the discrepancies of trade that was revealed between Southern African countries and their trade partners.

The thesis has also applied a report by Executive Director of Rio Tinto Ltd. Of Rhodesia, Craig Gibson, which discusses the upswing of the economy in the years leading up to 1973. This report grants a view from the inside of Rhodesia, and shows how Rhodesia's projections showed a strong growth in their economy due to sanctions breaches.

1.5 Method

The thesis will apply a comparative analysis of the US and EC strategic decisions to the ferrochrome industry, and how they both handled sanctions. Considering that the thesis mainly revolves around the archival material showing discussions by national or international state organs such as the EC or the UN, there is a large variety in the subject matter. What I mean by that is that there are both letter exchanges supporting the opinions of the EC members,

¹⁷ Congressional Hearings and Mission Reports: U.S. Relations with Southern Africa, 9.6.1973

discussions on policy by the European delegations, minutes from UN meetings and detailed reports of the UN Security Council. The thesis will thus use a combination of qualitative and quantitative analysis, as the issues of trade and production of chrome and ferrochrome is better explained using figures on trade volume, value of trade and other statistics which has been gathered both from the source material and select literature. The quantitative sources are still analysed in comparison to the qualitative sources, in an attempt to create a clear picture of why and how decisions have been made, and the facts on which the decisions were taken. Literature will also be used to accompany these sources, giving different points of view, and attempting to add new insight.

2 Rhodesia, chrome and UN embargo

Chromite is a mineral compound made up of chromium, iron and oxygen. It has a chemical code of FeCr_2O_4 , and is generally a dark grey-black colour, although earlier finds of chromite ore along other metals describes it as different colours.¹⁸ Most of the world's chromium supply is located in the Bushveld complex in South Africa or the Great Dyke in Zimbabwe, with smaller supplies located in various places across the globe such as Finland, Russia, India and Kazakhstan.¹⁹ Chromium mining and working with chromium alloys such as stainless steel can be hazardous in poor working conditions, potentially leading to health issues such as lung cancer.²⁰

Chromium's main usage is in the production of alloys; the most important being the ferro-alloy known as ferrochrome, which can be used to create stainless steel. Ferrochrome is created by combining iron and chromite in an industrial furnace, and can then be used in higher industry to create stainless steel, which was its main usage for the Western powers. However, it is also used for the production of nichrome for usage as insulation in heating units or for superalloys which can endure the extreme heats of jet engines. It is also used as a pigment in some paints, such as "chrome yellow" and in chrome plating in cars or appliances, giving it a shiny look.²¹ On a strategic level, most imports of chrome are directed towards manufacturing stainless steel, which is an important metal in both civil and military use.

South Africa was the main supplier of chromite ore on the global market, and had been so since expansion of chromite mining in the 1930s.²² Chromium has been extracted since it was discovered in the Ural mountains in the late 1700s, and was originally used as a pigment. Chromite can be found in varying amounts and forms, with the first find being red-lead chromite. Chromite has since been found in deposits of various sizes everywhere from the USA to South Africa and Albania. In regards to production, the world production of chromite dramatically increased from 1936 onwards. This is because of the increased use of chromite in heavy industry, like the production of ferro-alloys usable in the creation of stainless steel.²³

¹⁸ <https://geology.com/minerals/chromite.shtml>

¹⁹ Ibid

²⁰ *NGU-rapport Nr. 88.056*: Flaten, Trond P. p. 1

²¹ <https://geology.com/minerals/chromite.shtml>

²² Howatt, D.D p.1

²³ Howatt, p.37

Chromite ore has since 1936 mostly been extracted from the former USSR and the countries of South Africa and Zimbabwe, with smaller operations in countries such as Albania and Turkey. In fact, in 1980, South Africa and the USSR were responsible for 35.3 and 25.3 percent of the world production respectively.²⁴ Overall though, the deposits of chromite ore are mainly located in the South of Africa, with around 68% being found in South Africa, and 30% being located in Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe/Rhodesia used to be the main exporter of chromite ore to the Western world due to the high quality of the ore, which had been mostly depleted by the year 1986.²⁵

Chromite ore is used for three main industries; metallurgical production, refractories and chemical industries. The main production is for metallurgical ferrochrome alloys, which are useful for the production of stainless steel and the hardening of other metals.²⁶ The production of ferrochrome was usually performed by countries which imported metals to areas with good access to hydropower or which possessed good metallurgical production capabilities, such as Norway, Sweden and Japan.²⁷ However, there were also large producers in the EC countries of Italy, France and West Germany, as well as the US, as will be shown in chapter 3.

Leading up to the 1970s, Western countries mainly imported their chromite ore from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) or Zimbabwe(Rhodesia at the time), due to the high iron contents making it more suitable for use in ferrochrome alloys than that of South Africa, which was seen as suitable for chemical industry due to its low iron contents and high carbon percentage.²⁸

Why was chrome ore of such great importance for the Western powers, including the US and the EC? Chrome ore was mostly restricted to Southern Africa, with Southern Rhodesia and South Africa as the main suppliers of chrome on the global market(excluding the Communist states).²⁹ While chromite was by no means a rare metal, with enough chromite in the Great Dyke alone to sustain the worlds usage for hundreds of years, the fact that its extraction was

²⁴ Howatt, p.37

²⁵ Howatt, p.38

²⁶ Howatt, p.42

²⁷ Howatt, p.40

²⁸ Howatt 1986, p.41

²⁹ Howatt 1986. p.37

mainly limited to the South of Africa made it more important to secure a stable relation with these countries.³⁰

In fact, at the beginning of the declaration of sanctions on Rhodesia by the UN in 1966, Rhodesian chrome was seen as the most valuable version of chromite, due to its naturally higher percentage of pure chromium making it easier to use in industry. This would not change until the discovery of “charge chrome”, which made it possible to utilize South African high-carbon ferrochrome to a much larger extent, making it similar in quality and cheaper than regular ferrochrome.³¹

The Rhodesian economy saw a massive increase in its industrial capacity and the value of its mining industry from the early settlements of the late 1800s until the declaration of independence in 1965. Rhodesia was originally known for its gold production, with early settlers ensuring a rapid expansion of the gold production of the country. Between the years 1910 and 1915 the value of gold produced had risen from 300 000 £ to 4 000 000 £, leading Rhodesia into a role as an important gold producer worldwide. Rhodesian mining was, however, not only based on gold. There were 4 main ores extracted from the country, with chrome, coal and copper being mined alongside gold in the early 1900s.³² Expansion of the mining industry meant the discovery of more and more rare minerals, with for example asbestos becoming a major export following the Second World War.³³

The large growth of Rhodesian industry following the Second World War led Rhodesia to become a major exporter within several fields, and it was especially crucial in the field of chrome. While Rhodesian production was greatly diversified, with its large production of several minerals, its largest market share appears to be in the field of chrome. The production of the ore had grown rapidly in the years prior to UDI, as the enormous reserves of chrome were exploited to a higher degree than earlier.³⁴ Rhodesia was home to the largest single high-quality chrome deposit known, the Great Dyke.³⁵ According to Craig A. Gibson, Executive Director of Rio Tinto Rhodesia Ltd.:

³⁰ Dixon, C.J. (1979). *Atlas of Economic Mineral Deposits*. Springer, Dordrecht. P.6

³¹ BDT/260/94, p.3

³² Gibson, 1972, p.72

³³ Gibson 1972, p.73

³⁴ Gibson 1972, p.78

³⁵ Gibson 1972, p.75

*“As regards chrome, we have in the Great Dyke the largest reserves in the world of high quality chrome ore. This ore is particularly suited to the manufacture of high carbon ferro-chrome and the current trend in the stainless steel industry, particularly in view of the increasing use of AOD furnaces, is for an increasing demand for high carbon ferro-chrome. In the face of this demand, and in view of the limited availability of such high grade ore elsewhere in the non-Communist world, it seems inevitable that there should be an increasing demand for Great Dyke ore so that this, too, in future, should add still more to the export revenue of the mining industry.”*³⁶

This quote underlines the belief in Rhodesia’s exports several years into the embargo, and underlines the believed situation of the chrome and ferro-chrome industry at the time. It is interesting to note that the situation of Rhodesia in comparison to South African producers would decline throughout the 1970s due to the developments in the production of charge-chrome, allowing South African ferro-chrome production to become more efficient than Rhodesian production.³⁷ Nevertheless, the outlook of the Rhodesian export industry in the early stages of sanctions was one of optimism.³⁸

On the 11th of November 1965 the self-governing colony of Southern Rhodesia of the British Empire, declare itself a sovereign state through a unilateral declaration of independence(UDI). This declaration was issued by President Ian Douglas Smith of the Rhodesian Front government.³⁹ The government was formed of the white minority ruling class, and was in any sense an apartheid government, similar to the one in South Africa. The UDI was met with outrage in the international community, and within the British Commonwealth. The British Government immediately issued an embargo for all Commonwealth countries, which included tobacco, denied arms sales, expelled Rhodesia from preferential trade agreements such as the Sterling Area and denied Rhodesian passports entry into Great Britain.⁴⁰ The British Prime Minister believed that the Rhodesian regime would crumble “in a matter of weeks, and not

³⁶ Gibson 1972, p.75

³⁷ Howatt 1986, p.41

³⁸ Gibson 1972, p.78

³⁹ Mlambo 2019, p.371

⁴⁰ Mlambo 2019 p.371

months”⁴¹. The sanctions from the British Commonwealth were only the beginning though, as a more complete global denunciation of Rhodesia was about to be enforced.

On the 12th of November, one day after the UDI and the British sanctions, the UN Security Council encouraged states to neither recognise nor provide aid for Rhodesia through Resolution 216.⁴² This was expanded upon in Resolution 217⁴³ eight days later, in which the UN encouraged all nations to cut diplomatic ties to Rhodesia, and encouraging the UK to “enforce with vigour” its embargo on the colony-gone-rogue.⁴⁴ This was followed by the declaration of a UN-sanctioned mandatory embargo on Rhodesian goods in December 1966 through Resolution 232. The resolution deemed the Rhodesian regime as a “threat to international peace and security”, allowing a mandatory embargo through the UN Charter’s chapter 7.⁴⁵

The British embargo encompassed gradually moved from a selective to a complete import ban from December 1965 through February 1965, encompassing imports of Rhodesian metals and ores along with consumer goods like maize and beef. The embargo also imposed a ban in exporting petroleum and petroleum products into Rhodesia.⁴⁶ One of the key commodities included in the British imports embargo was chrome ore, which was a key export in Rhodesia, and a key import for most Western industrial nations. Chrome ore was, as mentioned, only mined on a great scale in the South of Africa and in the Soviet Bloc, which limited options for the embargo actors. With the establishment of the mandatory embargo, the Security Council encouraged countries to:

*“prevent the import into their territories of Rhodesian asbestos, iron ore, chrome, pig-iron, sugar, tobacco, copper, and meat and meat products; the transfer of funds to Rhodesia; any trade in arms, ammunition of all types, military aircraft, military vehicles and equipment and materials for the manufacture and maintenance of arms and ammunition in Southern Rhodesia; the supply of motor vehicles or equipment for the manufacture of motor vehicles and aircraft to the country; or the supply of oil and oil products to the Southern Rhodesia.”*⁴⁷

⁴¹ Mlambo 2019, p.372

⁴² S/RES/216, 12th of November

⁴³ S/RES/217, 20th of November

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ W. Minter & E. Schmidt 1988, p.212

⁴⁶ Minter & Schmidt 1988, p.211

⁴⁷ Resolution 232 (1966), S/RES/232

The UN embargo placed on Rhodesia was meant to force the Smith government to crumble. However, through the ingrained strength of the Rhodesian doctrine, the craftiness of its population and the willingness to adapt its industries, allowed Rhodesia to continue for 15 years without direct access to much of the global market.⁴⁸

The introduction of embargo on Rhodesia seemed to have promised change, however its execution seemed lacking, due to the blatant breaches made by several of the member countries. The Rhodesian economy would likely have buckled if the embargo had been properly executed, however the regime was able to keep hold of power through twisting trade deals with several states.

The initial UN embargo of 1966, Resolution 232, was not a success in regards to immediate change, as most of the embargoing countries would either ignore the embargo completely or go around it in some capacity in order to obtain goods from Rhodesia.⁴⁹ While the embargo involved essentially all UN member nations excluding Portugal and South Africa, it can be argued that the embargo was a show of support for the international scene, and not grounds for any real action.⁵⁰ For example, France continued to trade with Rhodesia continuously after the initiation of the sanctions, with imports in the first three months of 1967 even increasing to 200% of the level it had been pre-UDI.⁵¹ This trade continued for the duration of the embargoes, with evidence of French exports of civilian vehicles to the country as well:

“Kits for Renault and Alfa Romeo cars have arrived in Rhodesia at a time when stocks of certain other models previously assembled were believed to be running low. This latest coup by the government will bring sighs of relief from harassed potential car buyers [...] The news is generally hailed as yet another victory against sanctions [...] since the end of 1968, French, German and Japanese cars have at all times been assembled in Rhodesia from kits.”⁵²

This quote also reveals the German and Japanese involvement in Rhodesia, suggesting that these countries were not very strict in their enforcement of the embargo. While it is true that

⁴⁸ Mlambo 2019, p.373

⁴⁹ Mlambo 2019, p.372

⁵⁰ Mlambo 2019, p.378

⁵¹ Mlambo 2019, p.378

⁵² As written in the *Rhodesian Commentary*, October 5, 1970, as mentioned in: *UN Security Council, 'Fourth Report of the Committee Established in Pursuance of Security Council Resolution 253 (1968) Special Supplement No. 2, 1971, S/9844/Add.2, Annex VII, p. 125.*

these breaches of the embargo were ultimately committed by companies unrelated to the state, it does reflect the governments inclination to downplay state involvement in embargo enforcement. In fact, the French supplied arms to Rhodesia such as Alouette helicopters, which were produced by a state-owned company called Sud-Aviation (SNIAS), which were crucial in the Bush War against the Zimbabwean African People's Party (ZAPU) and Zimbabwean African National Union (ZANU) liberation movements.⁵³

The Bush War gradually grew forward in the mid-1960s, as the liberation forces grew in numbers and turned towards military means, especially following UDI.⁵⁴ The parties of the war were the ZAPU and ZANU organisations, led by Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe respectively. While they were both receiving aid from communist countries, they were, according to DeRoche: "*primarily nationalists, not communists influenced by Moscow*"⁵⁵. This tells us that they were pragmatic in their beliefs, as they would cater to communist countries due to their aid in anti-colonialism.

The Soviet investment in Southern African liberation struggles, such as the Angolan conflict and their involvement with ZAPU, saw the involvement of Rhodesia, along with the US, in a struggle which was filled with mistrust and ideological connotations. This can be seen in the US aid to Rhodesia in the form of the Byrd Amendment, and the Rhodesian view of the black Africans as being controlled by a communist conspiracy.⁵⁶ The nationalists, on the other hand, seemingly started leaning more towards communism, possibly due to this propaganda painting communism as opposition to the Rhodesian state. In any case, the ZAPU did receive aid from the Soviet Union, and the ZANU from China.⁵⁷ The two groups formed a loose cooperation known as the Patriotic Front(PF) in 1976.⁵⁸

The Rhodesian situation can be seen through both the North-South and East-West perspectives, being an example of the surge of decolonisation and African nationalism, but also as one of many playing fields in the Cold War. In any case, Rhodesia shared both cultural and economic ties with several Western countries before UDI, some of which continued through the 1970s.

⁵³ Mlambo 2019, p.378

⁵⁴ Flower 1987, p.102

⁵⁵ DeRoche 2001, p.4

⁵⁶ Lowry 2007, p.183

⁵⁷ Visser 2008, p.138

⁵⁸ DeRoche 2001, p.226

3 Western relations with Rhodesia

“I have to admit, life had a tendency to be somewhat boring. And then these blessed sanctions came into our existence and we had to get out of our smug practices and use all our talents again <...> You have to figure out how products can be brought in by middlemen, how you can threaten that firms we used to import from will lose their markets here forever if they do not help us”⁵⁹

The embargo of Rhodesia seemed to be a serious blow to several of its trading partners, as they would face condemnation from the international community for continuing trade with the nation. However, the Rhodesian market was an important one for several important goods, such as chrome, asbestos and gold. The Rhodesian economy was heavily reliant on imports from Europe before the implementation of sanctions, which was the reason why sanctions were implemented in the first place, as it was believed this reliance would break the Rhodesian economy.⁶⁰ However, the Rhodesian economy thrived, and much of this can be attributed to the mutual reliance between Rhodesia and the Europeans.

Despite the declaration of UDI and the following mandatory sanctions, most Western powers retained some level of contact, both officially and unofficially, with Rhodesia. The US flat-out opposed sanctions following the Byrd Amendment due to fears of overreliance on the USSR, as well as some sympathetic views towards Rhodesia and their perceived struggle.⁶¹ The French were unofficially helping the Rhodesians connect with Europe, and had long viewed Rhodesia as a strategic piece of their African ambition; a piece they would not give up due to sanctions.⁶² British attempts to enforce sanctions were undermined by their government’s lack of decisiveness and will to enforce sanctions properly.⁶³ West Germany was likely connected to Rhodesia through their steel and ferrochrome industry, which were both reliant on imports.⁶⁴

German steelworks were also involved in the RISCO-case, the biggest organized case of sanctions busting throughout the sanctions regime. Mostly, the reasons for keeping up contacts

⁵⁹ Excerpt from an interview with a Rhodesian businessman, Galtung 1967, p. 397

⁶⁰ Mlambo 2019, p.371-372

⁶¹ DeRoche 2001, p.145, 172

⁶² Warson 2015

⁶³ Flower 1987, p.67

⁶⁴ BDT 260/94

in Rhodesia was due to a general lack of interest in sanctions, and the economic benefits of trading with them, due to lowered prices when compared to for example chrome from the USSR.⁶⁵ Examples of sanction busting will be discussed in the next chapter.

This chapter will discuss relations between the EC countries and Rhodesia through analyses of previous literature and source materials. The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview over some of the most important chrome importers of the Western world, and to show why they might have been reliant on Rhodesian chrome. The chapter will discuss how the relations between Rhodesia and the different Western powers were based on cultural factors and economic factors alike. The relations between the US and Rhodesia in the 1960s-70s will be discussed in this chapter. From the EC, Rhodesian relations with Great Britain (who joined the Community in 1973)⁶⁶, France, West Germany and Italy will be discussed, as these were the major trade partners of Rhodesia, with Italy, West Germany and France also being the three ferrochrome producers of the EC. The chapter also attempts to show the sanctions from a Rhodesian point of view through Ken Flower's contributions to the literature.⁶⁷ What were the reasons for Western powers to retain relations with Rhodesia? And how were these nations' relationship towards Rhodesia impacted by sanctions?

Diplomatically, most countries were openly denouncing Rhodesia from the start of UDI, and especially with the onset of mandatory sanctions in May, 1968.⁶⁸ This means that on the surface there was a united front against the Rhodesian regime. The EC was, however, not united in its stance, with different levels of reliance on and contact with Rhodesian firms. The heaviest investment in Rhodesia had of course come from its previous overlord, the British. According to a report from the Commission regarding the ascension of Zimbabwe to the Lomé System, Rhodesian exports were divided to the following countries: Britain (22%), Zambia (25%), South Africa (9%), Germany (5%), Malawi (5%), Japan (5%), and all other countries less than 5%. Rhodesian imports on the other hand, by country of origin were: Britain (30%), South Africa (25%), USA (7%), Japan (6%), and all other countries less than 5%.⁶⁹ This tells us that

⁶⁵ US congress discussions 1973, p.66

⁶⁶ <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/216/the-united-kingdom>

⁶⁷ Ken Flower's "*Serving Secretly: An Intelligence Chief on Record, Rhodesia into Zimbabwe 1964-1981*". (1987) provides a personal account of the Rhodesian embargo from the perspective of an officer within the Rhodesian Secret Intelligence. Due to the source's nature as a first-hand source written years and decades after the events it describe, to should be taken with a grain of salt, but in general it describes the thought process of the Rhodesian regime, while also revealing some of the secret connections held by Rhodesia.

⁶⁸ UN Resolution 253

⁶⁹ P.23 INV 1/2018, European Commission Archives

the main trading partners of Rhodesia were former members of the British Commonwealth of Nations, Zambia and South Africa, and most importantly Britain itself. Considering the exports of Rhodesia mainly consisted of meats, tobacco and gold, the percentage of chrome in this trade was likely small.

However, it is known that chrome production was an important part of the mining sector, which as a whole had seen large investments from foreign companies. An American company, Union Carbide, was one of the companies involved in investments into chrome mines during the embargo years.⁷⁰ This was revealed in an article from *Africa Today* in 1970, and covers mostly South African, but also Rhodesian investments.⁷¹ In an article comparing the different investments of US companies, Union Carbide is specifically mentioned as one that continues investments in the Rhodesian chrome market, with support from the US Iron and Steel Institute. This reflects the fact that the US had considerable interest in the expansion of its chrome industry into Rhodesia. Also, as the Byrd Amendment was not officially enacted until 1971, this example of state-backed investments shows that the US already had interests in Rhodesia before 1971, which might have been a part of the plan to progress away from reliance on the Soviet Union for imports.

3.1 International connections and the role of private enterprise

Private enterprise served a major role in building relations with Rhodesia and breaking sanctions. As mentioned in the Congress hearing regarding the Byrd Amendment, the Rhodesian state-managed company Univex⁷² was the driving force behind the Rhodesian ferrochrome exports, and cooperated with US companies like Union Carbide. This was also likely many other countries which have remained secret. Indeed, Ken Flower reveals that he had several connections all over the world, whom he had picked carefully based on their perceived reliability. He also describes how Rhodesia was heavily involved in efforts to keep these dealings secret, and to counteract the British and UN attempts to expose their business.⁷³ There is little concrete proof of European business' ties Rhodesia, however there is one example from the UN Security Council's investigations in 1974 which stands out. It appears that there was a larger "conspiracy" between firms from several Western countries, including the likes of

⁷⁰ Jackson 1970, p.22

⁷¹ Jackson 1970, p.22

⁷² Congress discussions 1973, p.67

⁷³ Flower 1987, p.73

Switzerland, Germany, Austria, to set up a scheme to import steel from Rhodesia to Germany. This case was to be known as the RISCO case, and investigation into it started in April 1974.⁷⁴ The plans, which were drawn up in 1972, regarded the expansion of production of RISCO's (Rhodesian Iron and Steel Company) facilities. The plans were to expand production from ca. 400 000 tons of steel to 1 million annually, and was estimated to be worth 63.5 million R\$, which in 1972 would equal 93 662 500 US\$.⁷⁵ This case involved setting up a shell corporation in Switzerland to take up loans with a South African bank which was acting on behalf of RISCO. The operation was well underway at the time of its discovery, and was described by the Security Council as "the most serious case to come before it of violation of the sanctions established by the Security Council against the illegal regime of Southern Rhodesia in terms of both the money and the number and importance of the financial institutions and industrial corporations involved."⁷⁶

This is a result of the underground network built by the Rhodesian regime. The fact that it was possible to organize such a large movement of metals and money in countries that were part of the sanctions against Rhodesia means that the Rhodesian strategy of close cooperation between industry and finance, paired with clever covert politics, was successful. It also affirms the idea that Rhodesian connections established through Univex were found all over Europe, with Handford describing it as "a network centred on obscure offices in back streets of cities in Europe — as fast as one London press-man uncovered a hide-out, another would be set up."⁷⁷ It is thereby likely that many smaller operations were never leaked, especially considering how long it took for the RISCO case to be discovered.

Exactly how much different countries' authorities have aided in these activities is hard to know. We know that some European governments, through French and Italian intelligence offices, had relations with Rhodesia.⁷⁸ On a common European level, however, there seems to be the fact that the archival material does not show a concrete discussion among the European representatives in the Commission, might be a reflection of the rather covert situation of relations with Rhodesia. Also, as discussed previously, the EC were attempting to establish themselves as a cohesive force in the world markets, however they had also led significantly

⁷⁴ UN Special report on RISCO, p.1

⁷⁵ Ibid, p.2

⁷⁶ Ibid., p.7

⁷⁷ Handford 1976, p.6,7

⁷⁸ Flower 1987, p.67

different policies in regards to mineral imports and their relations with Rhodesia. The covert operations of businesses based in EC countries were likely on a national level, which naturally made it into a non-issue for the Commission. Especially when considering the fact that some nations' authorities were allegedly involved in the business of smuggling with Rhodesia.⁷⁹

However, the interests of private enterprise did not completely control the discourse in Rhodesia. Even though sanctions busting through shell corporations was aiding the Rhodesian economy, the outlook for Rhodesia was not great. Stephenson describes Rhodesia's problems during the sanctions regime as "increasingly political rather than economic" and that "the sanction policy has not reduced the value of exports."⁸⁰

"The economic growth rate in real terms was 8.4 percent in 1972 and 6.5 percent in 1973. Clearly, the sanction policy of the United Nations has not proved effective because Rhodesia, though landlocked, has been able to use its neighbour's ports. But if South Africa, for political or strategic reasons, wishes to force Rhodesia into some type of settlement, it has the capacity to exert considerable power against the white-dominated government there."⁸¹

This quote shows that the economy of Rhodesia was growing despite sanctions, which is likely due to sanctions busting and a concerted effort by the white minority regime to create a self-sufficient economy. The quote also mentions political problems as the main hinderance to Rhodesia, as its dependence on Mozambique and South Africa to continue trade proved to be an issue in the longer term, with Mozambique's independence and South Africa growing increasingly distanced over time.⁸²

3.2 Stockpiles & Overreliance

While importing chrome was strategically important, many countries had realized the security threat overreliance on Southern Africa posed, and opted to establish stocks. As of 1973, the US for example possessed a stock consisting of around 5.3 million tons of metallurgical grade chrome, which would equal around 4 years of wartime needs.⁸³ West Germany and France were not keeping strategical stockpiles of many important metals before late in the 1970s. For example, as Van Rensburg put it:

⁷⁹ Flower 1987, p.73 and Warson 2015

⁸⁰ Stephenson 1975, p.387

⁸¹ Stephenson 1975, p.387

⁸² Stephenson 1975, p.387

⁸³ Congressional hearings, p.4

*“In mid- 1979 the government announced plans for building a stockpile limited to five minerals - cobalt, chrome, manganese, vanadium, and blue asbestos - all produced in Southern Africa. All are to be stockpiled in their most useful form, for instance ferrochrome instead of chrome ore.”*⁸⁴

This quote describes the German strategy as more focused on free trade than stockpiling critical resources, putting more trust into its companies to gather materials for the country’s ferrochrome industry. This point will be further discussed later in the chapter, as German companies and ships are mentioned in relations to several examples of sanctions busting.

The UK and Japan had also kept stockpiles according to Maull, as visualized in the table below:

	France	West Germany	UK	Japan	US
Chromium dependence	Medium	365/500*	Great	No information	Great
Stockpiles	Suspected	No	Yes	Yes	Yes

Table 3.1: The table shows the grade of strategic risk associated with chromium dependence by each of the largest producers, along with whether or not there were known strategic stockpiles of chrome in each country.⁸⁵

*West German strategic risk evaluated with numbers, based on 500 as a theoretical maximum⁸⁶

This table shows the political risk assessment of several industrialized nations, and whether they have a confirmed stockpile of certain metals. This risk assessment also sets chromium as a critical mineral for most industrialized nations, with Germany even ranking it as the #1 critical metal in 1982, at which point chromite had also been a part of the Lomé II negotiations.⁸⁷ While the contents of France’s strategic stockpile had been kept secret, they were suspected to contain chrome, at the very least since 1975 according to van Rensburg.⁸⁸

There is little to directly support the covert operations of French authorities in the material gathered from the European Commission Archives. This might be because I was not looking in the right archival fonds, or I might have missed some key communications due to language barrier, however I believe this sort of information is more likely to be found within French archives if anything. However, the archives have contained statistical data which shows the

⁸⁴ Van Rensburg 1981, p. 10

⁸⁵ Hans Maull 1984, p.23

⁸⁶ Hans Maull 1984, p.23

⁸⁷ Source materials, Zimbabwe

⁸⁸ Van Rensburg 1981, p.10

reliance on chrome trade, which can be paired with the knowledge gathered from previous literature to conclude that several countries in the EC, and particularly France and West Germany, maintained good relations with Rhodesia, as is reflected in their trade patterns. An excerpt from a West German newspaper, the Frankfurter Rundschau was a part of the archival material I found in Brussels. It was published the 21.January, the year is not included, but it was likely 1979 considering other documents from the same collection. It was included in a file on the negotiations of Lomé II, and comments on the resource dependence of the EC. Considering it is added in the Commission's own archives one can assume it is accurate, or at least it was useful in some way. I found the most interesting quote from the article to be (translated from German):

*“For six minerals, the EC is completely dependent on imports: these are: Manganese (which occurs 45 percent in South Africa and 38 percent in the Soviet Union), **Chromium (95 percent in South Africa and Rhodesia)**, Cobalt (38 percent in Zaire and Zambia, 22 percent in the USSR), Platinum (81 percent in South Africa, 16 percent in the USSR), Vanadium (75 percent USSR, 19 percent South Africa).”*⁸⁹

This quote tells us a couple of things about the EC relation to Rhodesia. Since it refers to Rhodesia and South Africa together, it shows that trade with Rhodesia was likely known by the public to some degree. At the same time, the newspaper does not critique trading with Rhodesia, rather focusing on the strategic aspects of trade. It is also interesting to note that the article refers to the countries of South Africa and Rhodesia together, referencing the fact that that Rhodesian metals & ores had gone through South Africa. Of course, this could still only be a practical grouping due to the two countries' proximity. The article uses the facts above to discuss the need for an updated system similar to Lomé, and how the trend of European foreign dependence is leading it to increase investments in African countries.⁹⁰

UN documents regarding the Security Council's work in sanctions-busting reveals that there were many recorded cases of chrome shipments from South Africa which were suspected to contain Rhodesian chrome instead.⁹¹ William J.S. van Rensburg describes an effort by the French to build stockpiles from 1975 onwards, which were assumed to contain chrome.⁹² By

⁸⁹ BDT 077/93

⁹⁰ BDT 077/93

⁹¹ UN reports

⁹² Van Rensburg 1985, p.9

1979, Italy had also played around with the idea to build their own stockpiles which, again, would likely contain chrome in order to satisfy their own industrial needs.⁹³ Indeed, van Rensburg perpetuates the idea that the EC was 100% reliant on chrome ore from abroad. France adding chrome to their stockpile program would only make sense, seeing as how stockpiles are only really necessary when you have a heavy reliance on imports of minerals. This is the case with chrome, as the only available large-scale sources throughout the 1970s would have been Rhodesia, South Africa and the Soviet Union, of which Rhodesian chrome had historically been viewed as the superior metallurgical grade ore.⁹⁴

Attempts at creating stockpiles could indicate which countries were the most dependent on Southern Africa. In general, if a country has a great stockpile of chrome, they would theoretically be more poised to efficiently enforce embargo, as they would be able to withstand a few years' drought of imports. However, the one country which we know to have had large stockpiles of chrome prior to UDI, the US, would be the one to openly break sanctions in order to gain Rhodesian chrome. This shows that the notion of larger stocks being the deciding factor is not necessarily true for the situation in the chrome market, which in the earlier periods of UDI was on the surface severely dependent on Southern Africa and the USSR. Still, many EC countries would later start building stocks when worldwide ferrochrome production was high, likely in an attempt to prepare for potential instability in South Africa.⁹⁵

3.3 United States

The US were the only country to have joined the UN embargo from 1968, only to overwrite its stance and reopen trade with Rhodesia. Indeed, the US had been a major trade partner of Rhodesia before UDI, which is why it would opt to break out of the sanctions regime. The US was, along with the EC countries and many other ferrochrome producers, completely reliant on imports for ore to keep production going. The US trade was distributed as shown in the following graph, gathered from a US congress meeting:

⁹³ Van Rensburg 1985, p.9-10

⁹⁴ De Roche 2001, p.144

⁹⁵ BDT/051/91 and Maull, p.211




Figure 3.1: This figure shows the percentage of trade from each of the US' main chrome sources. The table shows that, despite the Byrd Amendment being repealed in 1971, the USSR remained the main trade partner of the US, as it had been in all but one year leading up to UN mandatory sanctions.⁹⁶

When discussing matters of chrome imports from Rhodesia, it is necessary to mention the American role. Not only were two of the largest companies in Rhodesian mineral trade American (Union Carbide and Anglo-American), but the US also was heavily involved in sanctions-breaking with Rhodesia following and even predating the Byrd Amendment.⁹⁷ In fact, it can be argued that this amendment was detrimental to the success of sanctions, and might have been the key reason as to why Rhodesian majority rule would take until the late 1970s to be put in effect.

However, the open rejection of sanctions was not a continual and deliberate strategy of the US. In fact, the US had maintained very strong adherence to the sanctions regime, and even went further than many nations in their condemnation of the Rhodesian government during the reign of President Lyndon B. Johnson. When compared to several other Western countries, the US made more efforts to uphold sanctions than others. As George Shepherd puts it:

“in addition to South Africa and Portugal, who had an ideological stake in violating the UN request, France, Iran, Japan, and West Germany all increased their trade in 1967

⁹⁶ Congressional discussion 1973, p.49

⁹⁷ Minter & Schmidt 1988, p. 213

with Rhodesia. Few followed the example of the United States Government which evoked its United Nations Participation Act and announced that any nationals violating the Act would be prosecuted with fine and imprisonment”⁹⁸

It was only after President Johnson, during President Nixon’s reign, that the US withdrew from the sanctions regime. This decision followed a lengthy debate in Congress, in which senator Robert Byrd took on a key role in lobbying activities to reopen trade with Rhodesia.⁹⁹ This amendment completely undermined the UN declaration. While other countries had many cases of covert sanctions breaking themselves, particularly in Europe and Japan, the US defying UN sanctions as an official policy created an issue. Ignoring UN decisions was simply too easy, and the US did not receive more than a slap on the wrist in form of a denouncement from the UN.¹⁰⁰ The introduction of the Byrd Amendment was openly discussed and passed through Congress, which sets American sanctions breaking apart from that of most other nations. The US approach was opposite of for example the French approach, in which companies were forced to hide their dealings with Rhodesia through covert operations.¹⁰¹ I have extracted a discussion from several Congress meetings about repealing the Byrd Amendment, which show the two sides of the matter, and their views on US relations with Rhodesia. Following the introduction of the Byrd Amendment, discussions on whether to repeal the Byrd Amendment swiftly took place, as it was viewed by many as unnecessary and counterproductive.¹⁰² John J. Sheehan, Vice President of the United Steel Workers’ of America spoke in Congress on May 30th, 1973, where he said that:

“The origination and continuation of the Rhodesian embargo is an issue of international social justice, the consideration of which belongs in the United Nations. As a major participant in the UN, it is important that we uphold its decision to impose sanctions as long as that policy is in effect. We hope that you will join as a cosponsor of this important legislation.”¹⁰³

The argument was essentially based on the morality of sanctions, and, as Sheehan pointed out, the economic benefits of maintaining the Byrd amendment were likely minimal. Therefore, it

⁹⁸ Shepherd 1968, p. 8

⁹⁹ DeRoche 2001, p.144

¹⁰⁰ Mlambo 2019, p.385

¹⁰¹ Warson 2015

¹⁰² Congress discussions 1973, p. 53

¹⁰³ Ibid., p.54

was argued that the US should rejoin the UN embargo, while enforcing sanctions more strictly than what had been done before.¹⁰⁴

On the flipside was the stance taken by Union Carbide, along with their supporters in Congress. The Vice President of Union Carbide, Fred O'Mara, was called up to explain Union Carbide's business in Rhodesia, and defend his and his supporters' stance on the Byrd Amendment. O'Mara's main arguments regard the reliance on the USSR as an important point, and maintains that the US needs several sources of chromite in order for the US ferrochrome industry to stay afloat. He also nods to a US legislation S.773, which lowered the size of the US ferrochrome stockpiles to less than sufficient needs, meaning they would be reliant on imports if a war would break out and cut off trade with their eastern partners.¹⁰⁵ The US policy had thus been shifted from reliance on their own stockpiles, to reliance on trade even in an emergency event. In his speech on the 27th of September, 1972, O'Mara is quoted as saying:

*"Since the imposition of sanctions, control over the marketing of Rhodesian chrome has been taken over by a Rodesian state trading company, Univex. Under Government mandate, Rodesian chrome operations produce ore and alloys as directed by Univex to meet its marketing requirements. Univex has successfully sold in world markets all of the chrome produced in Rodesia. It has significantly increased the output of chrome ore, and it has vastly increased the production of ferrochrome in Rodesia."*¹⁰⁶

He thus makes the claim that Univex, a state-controlled company in Rhodesia, had taken control of the Rhodesian ferrochrome industry, and was successfully creating demand in overseas markets. In O'Mara's opinion, the US need to allow companies to purchase ore and alloys through Univex to secure high-demand ore for cheaper prices, which would be sold anyways.¹⁰⁷

These two stances show that there was a considerable dispute in Congress. There is a clear discourse between the workers and the owners on the reasons to keep breaking sanctions. It also reflects the view that the Byrd Amendment was passed due to heavy lobbying from the businesses that owned property and had established themselves in Rhodesia. Union Carbide for

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., p. 61

¹⁰⁵ Ibid, p.65

¹⁰⁶ Ibid, p.69

¹⁰⁷ Ibid, p.70

example, had been “unwilling to relinquish its high stakes in Rhodesian chrome and used its “heavy influence” over the White House and the State Department to maintain its position in the region.”¹⁰⁸

It would also seem that Rhodesia enjoyed much support in the US due to the Civil Rights’ issue, especially in the Southern States. This is reflected in Ken Flower’s memoirs, in which he mentions a meeting with American Senator Jim Eastland, who apparently exclaimed that Rhodesia should be helped to “put the niggers right back where they belong.”¹⁰⁹ This view of race relations, and the recent discourse in the US following the Civil Rights Act, might explain why many US politicians viewed Rhodesia as an ally. Robert Byrd himself was a major opponent to the Civil Rights Act, filibustering the Act for 14 hours straight. He also previously had ties to the Ku Klux Klan, although he had efficiently distanced himself from the organization.¹¹⁰ Similar ideological views based on race relations was likely a contributing factor for many US politicians supporting Rhodesia, and by extension supporting Byrd Amendment in 1971. What is interesting to note here, is that US assumptions of the USSR importing chrome from Rhodesia to then export to the US actually turned out to be true, according to J. Jolly.¹¹¹

3.4 European Communities

French and West German trade with Rhodesia increased significantly directly following UDI, with West German exports increasing by 62% and French exports increasing by 22% in 1967 when compared to 1966. Swiss imports of Rhodesian goods even increased as much as 107%, which again reflects their neutral stance towards Rhodesia.¹¹² These numbers tell us that, despite being diplomatically separated from the UN countries, Rhodesia managed to retain ties with several countries. In the case of West Germany, this makes sense, as they were not members of the UN when the first mandatory sanctions were enacted under Resolution 232. This also explains why the West German trade increased so dramatically (along with Japan who also experienced a 62% increase in Rhodesian exports). France, however, who abstained to partake in the first round of embargo, experienced an increase in trade despite being in the UN.

¹⁰⁸ Warson 2015

¹⁰⁹ Flower 1987, p.73

¹¹⁰ The Washington Post, 17th Oct. 2007

¹¹¹ Jolly 1978, p.786

¹¹² Mlabmo 2019, p.377

Consumption of ferrochrome in the EC was on the rise, as illustrated in Table 3.1. The table shows that the EC consumption rose by around 194 000 metric tons from 1974 to the 1980 estimate. This growth was even interrupted by the economic crisis of the mid 1970s, which saw a dip in consumption in the middle years. Still, the EC ferrochrome needs were increasing significantly over the century.

Consumption of ferrochrome in the Community (Metric tons)			
	Low Carbon (LC)	High Carbon (HC)	Total
1974			477 000
1977			459 950
1978	96 720	462 925	559 645
1979	97 724	523 500	621 224
1980(estimate)	102 000	569 000	671 000

Table 3.1: Official numbers of the EC on the amount of ferrochrome consumed in the Community.¹¹³

While the EC consumption of ferrochrome was growing, its imports of ferrochrome rose significantly, showing that the EC was increasingly reliant on foreign industry to satisfy its demand for ferrochrome, which would be in line with the general development of the world markets.

Imports of ferrochrome to the Community (Metric tons)			
	LC	HC	Total
1974	189 450	77 000	266 450
1977	296 850	158 850	455 700
1978	327 718	148 549	476 267
1979	379 547	202 976	582 523

Table 3.2: EC numbers on the imports of ferrochrome, showing a high import dependency which was still growing.¹¹⁴

In the early days of UN sanctions, the EC did not have a coherent, unified trade policy, as it would be in the face of the later stages, exemplified by their response to investigations into sanctions breaches under the common banner of the EC in 1979, as written down in the 12th

¹¹³ BDT 051/91

¹¹⁴ BDT 051/91

UN report on the situation in Rhodesia.¹¹⁵ This led to the different responses from the EC countries, who seemingly did not discuss Rhodesian relations in great detail during their meetings. However, there was seemingly much sympathy for Rhodesia, with Rhodesian products finding their way to European markets and vice versa.¹¹⁶ Indeed, Rhodesian society as a whole had made a concerted effort to resist sanctions, and this included smuggling, which happened under the noses of European authorities. In this regard, the degree of knowledge from authorities differed as well. For example, French authorities were directly involved in the effort to avoid sanctions, as described by Ken Flower. He describes the head of the French Secret intelligence, the SDECE as “always anxious to help”, due to his affection for the country, which he might have gathered from his time living in Rhodesia.¹¹⁷

These examples show the connections between the Rhodesian secret service and their counterparts in Europe, and paints a picture of a connected network of Intelligence Services connecting to hatch out plans to avoid sanctions.

3.4.1 Great Britain

The British were not a major ferrochrome producer like France, West Germany and Italy, and were therefore not reliant on Rhodesian chrome in its raw form. However, the ferrochrome needs of the EC for its steel industries was still a problem which had to be taken care of. According to Crowson, the UK were 72% reliant on South Africa for its chromite needs, and 43% reliant on them for their ferrochrome needs in the year 1979/80.¹¹⁸ While there were measures enacted to stop trade with Rhodesia, it would be a possibility that some of the imports were originally Rhodesian, although as we have established this would be difficult to prove. There is not much trade data on UK imports of chrome in the 1970s, as many authors group them in together with the EC, or leave them out of discussions due to their small ferrochrome industry.

Great Britain was perhaps the country which most strongly opposed Rhodesia following UDI, simply due to the fact that they were seen as a rogue colony in their eyes. This is reflected in the swift implementation of sanctions by Great Britain, as well as the severing of diplomatic

¹¹⁵ S/13750, p.

¹¹⁶ Flower, p.72

¹¹⁷ Flower, p.74

¹¹⁸ Crowson 1978, p.51

relations with Rhodesia. However, Britain opposed the attempts of several African countries to impose mandatory sanctions in May 1966. While imposition of mandatory sanctions would be enforced through Resolution 253 the following year, it did afford Rhodesia time to prepare for sanctions. George Shepherd writes that “the argument of the U.K. at this point was that Rhodesia was neither a self-governing territory nor an independent state but had a special status and relationship to the U.K., which the U.K. alone could settle. Her position was indirectly supported by eight abstentions (Argentina, China, France, Japan, the Netherlands, U.K., U.S. and Uruguay).¹¹⁹” Nevertheless, Britain did impose sanctions of their own, and would later comply with UN mandatory sanctions.

As their largest trading partner, British sanctions should have taken a heavy toll on the Rhodesian economy. While sanctions did cause problems, the Rhodesian economy still managed fine, which can possibly be attributed to the lax implementation of sanctions from Great Britain. Ken Flower, the former Intelligence Chief of the Rhodesian Secret Service, describes the efforts of Britain to enforce trade sanctions as lacking any real threat. Indeed, Flower writes that the UK falsified reports that they were monitoring the sea routes outside of Mozambique in order to stop Rhodesian oil shipments, possibly in an attempt to appear more heavy-handed than they in reality were.¹²⁰ The British authorities also publicly threatened military intervention in Rhodesia, but the Rhodesian government never believed those threats to be realistic, and simply ignored it. These examples reflect a general unwillingness for the British government to take enforcement of sanctions incredibly seriously. Indeed, according to Flower “Only Britain and some Scandinavian countries appeared to be trying to enforce sanctions,, but even Britain did not always seem to take sanctions seriously”¹²¹.

This reflects a generally nonchalant world view in regards to sanctions enforcement, in which a Britain which seemingly did not care is regarded as one of the more strict countries in regards to sanctions enforcement. Flower also maintained that British authorities, along with the American ones prior to the enactment of the Byrd Amendment, had masses of evidence of sanctions evasion, “but they used it either defensively or not at all”.¹²² While most of what is written in the book is based on Flower’s memories, it is still valuable to investigate this due to

¹¹⁹ Shepherd 1968, p.10

¹²⁰ Flower 1987, p.67

¹²¹ Flower 1987, p.69

¹²² Flower 1987, p.69

the position Flower had in the Smith regime. There is also some supporting evidence for this in the source materials, in regards to the UN reports on breaches of sanctions.

Virtually all notes regarding sanctions breaking have been submitted by the United Kingdom, even when the companies mentioned are not British nor dealing with British companies.¹²³ This shows that the UK had knowledge regarding shipping to and from Rhodesia. This would also imply that UK authorities had knowledge of British firms that were engaging in sanctions violations, but it does not confirm Flower's accusations on the UK ignoring sanctions breaking.

Despite the official government stance of the UK, which was strongly against the Smith regime, some popular support was definitely enjoyed. Flower writes that during his visits to Britain he encountered a great deal of unexpected sympathy, with British businessmen seemingly lining up to create relations with Rhodesia, despite the consequences implicit in breaking sanctions.¹²⁴ This popular sympathy might have played a role in the general unwillingness of the government to heavily enforce sanctions. If it was indeed an unpopular policy, it would make sense for the government to only superficially enforce sanctions, as to keep up appearances for the global community. Still, British trade with Rhodesia did significantly decline during the UDI years, and was in many cases replaced by the French and De Gaulle who, in Flower's words, were only too ready to snub their noses at the British and ignore the United Nations.¹²⁵

The economic aspects of sanctions breaking thus seem to be less impactful in regards to the British regime, and this would support the argument that cultural ties were the more important reason for the lax British enforcement of sanctions. One could argue that the British were forced to act with sanctions on the UDI, but that they would not act as harshly as they could due to the sympathetic view towards Rhodesia enjoyed by many Brits. Also, the Rhodesian government must have seemed like the safer option, while some of the Patriotic Front was perceived to be in cahoots with communist countries in their liberation struggle.¹²⁶

3.4.2 France

¹²³ UN, FOURTH REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ESTABLISHED IN PURSUANCE OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 253 (1968), p.73

¹²⁴ Flower 1987, p.90

¹²⁵ Flower 1987, p.74

¹²⁶ Lowry 2007, pp.182-185

France was one of the three major ferrochrome producers of the EC, and thus one of the largest Western producers. While the French were mainly relying on foreign chrome to feed their ferrochrome industry initially, they became more reliant on ferrochrome imports towards the latter half of the sanctions period. Indeed, the French were 55.2% reliant on ferrochrome imports by 1980, with their own production levels dropping from 115 000 tons in 1974 to 81 900 in 1980.¹²⁷ The French capacity for ferrochrome production had thus dropped significantly in the late 1970s.

French relations with Rhodesia, while not necessarily friendly, were more cordial than other nations. French interactions with Rhodesia can be considered pragmatic, as they were originally unwilling to join the UN resolution to initiate an embargo on Rhodesia, although with the enactment of mandatory sanctions in 1968 they were forced to follow suit – at least on the surface. Indeed, French sanctions breaking has been documented in multiple cases, and shows that the French were either careless or unbothered by the direct links between the Rhodesian government and France. Examples of sanctions breaking is the sudden emergence of French (and also German) automobiles in Rhodesia and the use of French weapons and military vehicles in the Bush War.¹²⁸ This indicates that there was still some level of trade between the countries, despite the fact that sanctions would theoretically prevent this. One possible reason for French sanctions breaking could be that they were trying to fill the void in the Rhodesian market following the wholesale British withdrawal from Rhodesian markets in the beginning of the sanctions period. This would make sense in the case of chromite, as other alternatives were either not of the correct quality, too expensive or originated from the Communist Bloc. Also, since both Portuguese Mozambique and South Africa, as ideological supporters of Rhodesia, were part of upholding trade connections, it was near-impossible to prove which ores originated from where. Other than guesswork, the only viable option would be to test the chemical composition of the ores, which would not be common practice until the introduction of special certificates regarding the import of chromite ore, which would not be conducted until 1977.¹²⁹ While breaking with UN law, it was an opportunity that could be exploited, and the French seemingly did so.

¹²⁷ BDT 051/91

¹²⁸ Mlambo, p. 378

¹²⁹ BDT 076-94, European Commission Archives

According to Mlambo, French authorities kept good relations with Rhodesia for the entirety of the sanctions regime. In terms of exports and imports, as well as tourism and foreign aid, French companies were incredibly interested in Rhodesia as an investment opportunity, and in some cases were aided indirectly by the authorities. An example of this is the company Aluminium FraGais, which kept production in Bulawayo and Salisbury, two of Rhodesia's largest cities and industrial centres.¹³⁰ I would like to put forward an example on French foreign policy regarding tobacco trade, which was one of the commodities which France had actively enacted an embargo upon alongside chrome, put forward by Dr. Joanna Warson based on archival materials from the Rhodesian principal foreign representative, van der Byl:

“According to P.K. van der Byl (...) in the immediate aftermath of UDI, the president-director of a powerful French financial group, the Compagnie Française de Transactions Internationales (TRANSACO), approached representatives of Smith’s government and indicated the company’s interest in importing large quantities of Rhodesian tobacco via South Africa and Portugal and then re-exporting their produce to France. TRANSACO claimed that they had received from the French authorities “a clear confidential undertaking that they could do as much trade as they liked with Rhodesia.”¹³¹

This example, although not directly related to the chromium trade, reflects the French government's position on matters of trade regarding Rhodesia. Both tobacco and chromite was banned for trade, however if this statement is true, then it is reasonable to assume that both of these commodities were still being traded. On a strategic level, it would even make more sense for the French authorities to interfere in the chromite trade due to the lack of viable options in the global market. Even then, Rhodesia's markets were likely ripe for the taking following the heavy reduction in trade with British companies, although the already present American company Union Carbide would still control and extract a large percentage of the chromite industry.¹³² In this situation, although it is obvious that there have been some dubious dealings in the chrome-trade, it is nigh-impossible to determine the exact measures taken by the French authorities to secure their supplies, due to the secrecy of the operation. Nevertheless, this excerpt proves that there were good relations between French businesses and the Rhodesian foreign office, while alluding to the French government's role in maintaining good relations with Rhodesia – despite officially signing onto the sanctions regime.

¹³⁰ Mlambo 2019, p.378

¹³¹ Warson 2015

¹³² Maull 1984, p.210 & J. Warson 2015

This involvement of the French authorities is reflected in Flower's notes, with regards to the ties between French and Rhodesian intelligence. Flower wrote that;

“France provided the entree into much of Europe, the Middle East and Africa. De Gaulle and Pompidou were only too ready to snub their noses at the British and ignore the United Nations, and thus I found that my opposite number in Paris, the head of SDECE (Service de Documentation Exteriure et de Contre-Espionage) was always anxious to help; the fact that he had once worked on a Rhodesian farm and had thus developed a warm affection for the country may have had a little to do with it. His influence led us into Belgium, Italy, Greece and several countries in North and West Africa.”¹³³

This solidifies Warson's argument that French authorities were heavily involved in dealings with Rhodesia. It also tells us that there were important figures in key positions who were able to be exploited by Rhodesia to reach out to the world, who for whatever the reason were fond of or sympathetic of Rhodesia. Indeed, Flower writes that Rhodesia were able to keep diplomatic ties with sympathetic countries intact during UDI, through underground channels such as through the SDECE.¹³⁴

According to Warson, the French had been on a longer mission to gain closer ties to Rhodesia since the end of the Second World War, which might have contributed to their reluctance to joining in on sanctions.¹³⁵ The French policy directors in the Francophone West and Equatorial Africa were even the same as the ones employed to deal with French policy in Rhodesia, further reinforcing the idea of a French-Rhodesian project. Indeed, these plans for Rhodesia to be a part of the French African interests meant that Rhodesia and France maintained good relations throughout much of the sanction-period. French companies involved in Rhodesia were often to some degree state-sanctioned, which makes sense when you consider the strategic importance of Rhodesia to French interests. One example of this is the French aeroplane-company Union des Transports Aériens (UTA). This was a French company with heavy ties to the Presidential palace, which was part of an organized strategy of relations-building between the two countries.

¹³³ Flower 2019, p.74

¹³⁴ Flower 1987, p.73

¹³⁵ Warson 2015

UTA arranged tours for Rhodesian students to travel to France, and also advertised for travels to Rhodesia in France, as well as maintaining information offices in Rhodesia.¹³⁶

As mentioned by both Mlambo and Doxey, the French helped in the establishment and maintenance of a “sanctions-busting” trade network through Gabon and the Ivory Coast, which was intended to help maintain the trade of Rhodesian goods through these two countries and into other African and European countries.¹³⁷ This shows that the French government were willing to ignore, even oversee, the breaching of the embargo for the benefit of its own economy, as was the case for many other European nations.

3.4.3 Italy

Italy were the third largest producer of ferrochrome in the EC, after West Germany and France, and was equally as dependent on ferrochrome imports as the others. The Italian capacity for ferrochrome production was relatively stagnant during the 1970s, staying at 55 000 tons of ferrochrome from 1974 to 1980, most of which was high carbon.¹³⁸ In the period 1977-80, the Italian import dependency changed from 74.8% to 65%.¹³⁹ In my research I was not able to find any numbers detailing this statistic previous to 1977, nor did I find any numbers on specifically Italian consumption, as they were generally grouped with the EC countries in the source material.

When it comes to the relations with Rhodesian authorities, Flower described Italy as friendly;

*“The Italians were as uninhibited by the United Nations sanctions as Mussolini had been when faced with similar League of Nations action over Abyssinia in 1935. Amongst our most valuable connections in Italy were those in the Holy See itself. And in the Italian Intelligence we found a firm friend in the Head of the organization, General Michelli.”*¹⁴⁰

¹³⁶ Warson 2015

¹³⁷ Mlambo 2019, p.379 and Doxey 1980, p.77

¹³⁸ BDT/051/91

¹³⁹ Ibid.

¹⁴⁰ Flower 1987, p.74

According to Flower, Italian Intelligence were enthusiastic allies of Rhodesia. Considering that the Italians were one of the 3 ferrochrome producing countries in the EC, they could very well have used these connections to arrange for imports of chrome ore from Rhodesia to Italy while Michelli was the leader of the organisation, although he was arrested in 1974 for his involvement in a political conspiracy to overthrow the Italian government.¹⁴¹

The Italian situation provides fuel for the argument that Rhodesia was kept alive through the help of ideological sympathisers, similar to the French and the British. Indeed, if we are to believe in what Flower writes, then the power of private contacts within different governments proved to efficiently connect Rhodesian and European markets together, and the trade on the world seas was sufficiently large that smuggling goods was seemingly a breeze.

3.4.4 West Germany

West Germany were the last of the three big producers in the EC, with a production of around 160 000 tons of ferrochrome in 1980, with the peak being in 1977 with 200 000 tons. The German ferrochrome industry, like the others, relied exclusively on imports of chromite ore to create ferrochrome, with consumption rates going from 59.3% in 1977 to 116.5% in 1980.¹⁴²

West Germany had also been investigating opportunities to invest in its overseas exploration for strategic metals since 1971. This was done through subsidies, which in 1973 was expanded for domestic exploration. In 1979, West German plans to invest in stockpiles was announced, with chrome, vanadium, cobalt, manganese and blue asbestos being among the important metals.¹⁴³ This building of stockpiles is reflected in their import dependence of 1980, as stated in a Community letter on the situation of the ferrochrome industry. The West German import dependence was noted as 116.5% of production, which proves that they were indeed building stockpiles.¹⁴⁴ This appears to be a part of the West German policy to build security in case of trouble, which likely came around as a reaction to the restricted sources of chrome that were available when Rhodesia was sanctioned.

This shows a concerted effort to increase its supply of, among others, chromite. West Germany were likely partaking in sanctions-breaching to some extent along with countries like Great Britain, the US and France, however this would be hard to prove, especially as a deliberate

¹⁴¹ Flower 1987, p.75

¹⁴² BDT 051/91

¹⁴³ van Rensburg 1981, p. 10

¹⁴⁴ BDT 051/91

policy. The West German economy was reliant on chrome imports for its ferrochrome industry to fuel the stainless steel plants of West Germany. In fact the West German economy was so reliant on chrome imports that the GDP of West Germany would drop by 20% and leave 2 million people without work if there was to be a sanction on South Africa in 1984, according to a study done by the West German government.¹⁴⁵ Although this source studies the relationship between South Africa and Germany and occurs later than the embargo of Rhodesia, it shows that the West Germany were reliant on its ferrochrome and stainless steel industries. German steel industry had been heavily reliant on Southern African ores before the apartheid state in Rhodesia was toppled, and would likely have been dependent on Rhodesian imports before the growth of South African chrome exports in the 1970s.

In fact, when taking a deeper look at the statistics of ferrochrome production in the EC, it is clear that West Germany produced a disproportionate amount of low-carbon ferrochrome when compared to other European countries. Considering the fact that Rhodesia was regarded as the main producer of low-carbon ferrochrome, it would indicate that West Germany were at least somewhat reliant on chrome ore originating from Rhodesia.¹⁴⁶ It must be noted that the production of low-carbon ferrochrome can merely be considered an indication rather than an indictment, as both the USSR and South Africa were producing it in smaller quantities than what Rhodesia did.

As had been seen many times before, interruptions in the supply chain from Southern Africa would lead to price jumps and scarcity. This had happened multiple times already, with large price jumps following the implementation of sanctions as world markets scramble to find new sources, as well as in 1972 when unrest in the port of Lourenco Marques had led to breaks in supply from both South Africa and Rhodesia.¹⁴⁷

Companies were able to bypass the sanctions through the use of middle men. This process of course happened by shipping goods from the ports of Rhodesia's ideological allies and neighbour states, South Africa and Portugal, and especially the port of Lourenco Marques.¹⁴⁸ Many of the companies involved in this scheme were allowed to operate as usual in Switzerland,

¹⁴⁵ Gustafsson, Odén, Tegen 1990, p.13

¹⁴⁶ BDT 260/94

¹⁴⁷ Maull 1984, p.211

¹⁴⁸ Flower 1987, p.67

which deemed that its principle of neutrality made it impossible to enforce the UN embargo on Rhodesia. While this did align with their ideological stance of complete neutrality, it was also undeniably good for business. Companies interested in breaking sanctions were thus able to create headquarters in Switzerland, from which they were legally able to purchase Rhodesian goods.¹⁴⁹

3.5 Discussion

Western relations with Rhodesia had been longstanding, with investment from all of the US, France and Great Britain, with West Germany also very interested in trade with Rhodesia for their ferrochrome industry. While these countries were more openly interested in Rhodesia, there were still covert ties to Italy, and West Germany had been importing large amounts of chromite prior to sanctions, and were infamously connected to the RISCO case. What this chapter has shown is that the EC had no distinguishable common policy towards Rhodesia. The UK of course were in a special position, and the US were breaching sanctions with no hesitation. The French had multiple shady connections with Rhodesia, established well before sanctions were initiated, which could have been used in order to access the market without being detected, which they did in many cases. The Italians were also connected to Rhodesia, but as far as established only directly through General Michelli, and a large low carbon ferrochrome production. While this is not enough to conclude that Italy was acquiring illegal chrome, it would certainly indicate so. The West German government had no direct ties to Rhodesia, but there are several cases of sanctions being breached, particularly the RISCO-case. They were also not strict in their enforcement, and their large low carbon ferrochrome production might also hint towards imports of Rhodesian ores, although this is still not entirely clear.

¹⁴⁹ Mlambo 2019, p.376

4 Breaching sanctions & UN denouncement

Throughout the course of UN discussions on the situation of Southern Rhodesia, there were concerns on the upholding of sanctions. Indeed, historians are split on the success of the sanctions, with some believing sanctions to be a success due to the eventual collapse of the Smith regime, emphasising the role sanctions played on the diplomatic isolation of Rhodesia following the collapse of Portuguese colonies along with South Africa distancing themselves in the latter half of the 1970s.¹⁵⁰ Other historians, such as Mlambo, describe the sanctions as useless, arguing that the lack of will described throughout the UN reports lead to a much slower and bloodier independence movement, which would ultimately prove successful due to military victory rather than economic troubles.¹⁵¹

The discussions within the UN Security Council and the reports of the Committee shows that, while sanctions-breaking was fairly common, the only instance of a state openly and wilfully avoiding sanctions was in the chromite market.¹⁵² The report shows that the chromite market was a fairly important topic of discussion since, as shown in the 4th report, there were many reported cases of illegal exports of chrome and ferrochrome. What becomes clear when reading the material contained in the discussions of the Security Council is that the US has a consistent stance that they are merely formalizing what is already common among other member states. The US stance aligned with the UK in the sense that they were both against expansion of sanctions, rather opting for a more rigid approach with stricter cooperation by Member States. The fact that the UK and the US were aligned in their policies can be observed in the fact that they voted similarly in many of the votes in the Security Council, namely Resolutions 314 & 333, as well as their cooperation in the discussions leading to the fall of the Smith regime through the Lancaster House Agreement on the 21st December 1979.¹⁵³

This chapter will attempt to show the situations in the UN Security Council discussions on the situation in Rhodesia. There were many meetings around the subject, but for the subject of this thesis we will focus on two; the meeting directly following Resolution 253 and the meetings around the Draft Resolutions for Resolution 333, calling for stronger measures in the enforcement of Res. 253. These meetings were chosen due to their content, which shows the

¹⁵⁰ Minter and Schimdt 1988, p.208

¹⁵¹ Mlambo 2019, p.376

¹⁵² UN Security Council 1645th meeting, S/PV.1645, p.3

¹⁵³ DeRoche 2001, p.285

deteriorating trust by many African and Socialist countries towards the UK and the US, as it becomes increasingly clear that they were not interested in strictly enforcing sanctions. The draft resolution includes measures to prevent Rhodesian goods escaping the country, such as extending the Beira patrol into the ports of Lourenço Marques & Durban and also denying landing rights for carriers of nations known to operate air services in Rhodesia.¹⁵⁴

The discussions provide a qualitative addition to the statistics contained in the reports, and show that the UK was heavily criticised by member states such as the USSR, Yugoslavia and Kenya for their handling of the Rhodesian situation in 1974, following a much more friendly meeting in 1968.

It will also discuss the extent to which sanctions busting took place in the West, and will take a particular look into the UN Security Council's reports on the breach of sanctions from the 1st report in 1968 to the 12th report in 1980. There were twelve reports in total, with two additional special reports. The reports serve as the foundations on which discussions in the Security Council itself would take place, as they show the UN investigations and the actions of governments and firms which attempted to break sanctions. Some problems with the reports are that, while most governments seemed cooperative, the information flow went extremely slow, leading to most cases never being solved, or simply dragging on too long for evidence to be valid. Also, there hardly exists explicit evidence as to the origin of exported ores, which proved to be a major issue for the Security Council. This was due to the lax rules for registering the ores which were sent from South Africa, and would prove to be a problem for the entirety of the sanctions regime, despite efforts to tighten security and increase requirements. How did the initiatives of the UN Security Council affect the adherence of Western countries to Resolution 253?

4.1 Discussions in the UN Security Council regarding Sanctions on Rhodesia

The issue of Southern Rhodesia was addressed multiple times in the UN Security Council, in which draft resolutions were discussed & altered by the member states' representatives. In the meeting discussing the implementation of Resolution 253, it becomes clear that several states were opposed to the UK's handling of the situation, while retaining the belief that the UK would

¹⁵⁴ S/PV 10928

be responsible for an eventual solution to the problem. Indeed, many of the representatives were in favour of military intervention, as noted by the Soviet representative in the meeting of 29th of May, 1968.¹⁵⁵ The criticism of the UK mainly revolved around its insistence on a peaceful resolution, despite the view that Rhodesia was a rebel state of the UK. The Soviet representative also pointed to the fact that the sanctions were proven to be inefficient. He pointed to the examples of tobacco & minerals, stating that “the annual Southern Rhodesian tobacco sales have once again opened in Salisbury this year as if nothing had happened”¹⁵⁶, also noting that the mineral trade was following the same trend.¹⁵⁷ As is noted in the reports of the UN Security Council on Resolution 253, there were still many cases of shipments being allowed to go through the other ports, arriving to their destination, and then being resold without any action being taken until it was too late.¹⁵⁸ This further spurred on the criticism towards the UK. Since the UK were viewed as the offended party in the UDI, they were also the main country responsible for reaching a conclusion on the subject. However, their seemingly unwillingness to act made it seem like they were, at the least sympathetic towards the Smith-regime, which might have been true based on the popular support received by the regime, as mentioned in subchapter 3.4.1.

The criticism of the UK was only getting more and more intense as the inefficiency of sanctions grew. The UK had been adamant in continuing their approach of dialogue over military intervention, despite the fact that many UN countries were in favour of deposing the Smith regime by force.¹⁵⁹ They were also getting criticism for their seeming reluctance to criticize the US following their open sanctions breaking.¹⁶⁰ The sanctions were effective to a degree still, as Rhodesian trade had to manoeuvre its way around trade barriers and diplomatic breaks in order to keep its country going.

This discussion shows the criticism towards the UK, and while the discussions seem to point to other countries being implicit in sanctions breaking, the UK has been singled out as the responsible party for the adherence to sanctions. While it would be considered legitimate to point out that the UK were not doing its part, the lack of focus on other countries’ role in the

¹⁵⁵ UN Security Council 1428th meeting, S/PV.1428, p.6

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid*, p.2

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid*, p.2

¹⁵⁸ Several UN reports

¹⁵⁹ S/PV.1645, p.6

¹⁶⁰ S/PV.1645, p.5

sanctions is interesting. US and UK reluctance to expand sanctions was likely the reason for their singling out, as there was not any other country to point fingers at, only suspicions.

4.1.1 Mentions of chrome

The situation of chrome exports from Rhodesia was first specifically mentioned in a UN Resolution in Resolution 314, which was issued the 28th of February, 1972.¹⁶¹ In this Resolution, the Security Council calls upon Member States to “refrain from taking any measures that would in any way permit or facilitate the importation from Southern Rhodesia of commodities falling within the scope of the obligations imposed by Resolution 253 (1968), including chrome ore”.¹⁶² While this statement did not mention the US specifically, their policy of continuing chrome imports from Rhodesia makes it fairly obvious that the US were the main target of the line. The discussions behind the Resolution show this clearly, as the US seizes the moment to attempt to defend its policy of allowing chrome imports.

The US delegate remained steadfast in the view that the US needed to allow imports from Rhodesia due to the already widespread sanctions-breaking, claiming that the US was the only country to openly admit to it.¹⁶³ The US used an example from the 4th report of the Security Council Committee, issued in 1971, to explain that “Rhodesian indirect exports to world markets through third countries rose from \$8 million in 1966 to \$215 million in 1970. It is common knowledge that in the last few years Rhodesia has been able to export the bulk of its mineral output. These exports must go somewhere-and they have not gone to the United States.”¹⁶⁴ The US remained steadfast that the Byrd Amendment was “only a very small part of the problem” due to its small scope, only focusing on chrome imports.¹⁶⁵ The US recommended chemical testing of suspected cargo, along with a detailed list of the sources of strategic metals being submitted by each Member State to the UN.

The USSR delegate commented on the US justification of the Byrd Amendment, and denounced the open flouting of UN sanctions. They explained to the meeting how the US had blamed inflated prices on Soviet chrome on the passing of the Byrd Amendment, however the Soviets claim to be selling chrome to the US at the level of international prices. Indeed, the Soviet

¹⁶¹ S/RES/314

¹⁶² S/RES/314

¹⁶³ S/PV.1645, p.4

¹⁶⁴ S/PV.1645, p.4

¹⁶⁵ S/PV 1645, p.4

Union claims that the US is using chrome as a justification to help the Smith regime. The Soviet Union pointed to the giant US stockpiles of chrome & the fact that the US already were importing 50% of its chrome from other sources than the USSR to say that the US did not need to break UN sanctions to reach their needs of chrome.¹⁶⁶ While this would be true, the US chrome stockpiles were only expected to last around 2 years, with much of it consisting of poor quality chrome, according to discussions in the US Congress.¹⁶⁷

Nevertheless, the US were heavily criticized for their focus on chrome imports over the implementation of UN policy as required by membership of the UN. The vote taken in Resolution 314 also sees both the US & UK abstain from voting, with the UK explaining that they “do not believe that resolutions on any aspect of the Rhodesian question are necessary at this time.”¹⁶⁸

However, Rhodesian trade was still effective enough, and this was because they could keep up relations with their neighbours, and use their ports. The UK received plenty of criticism from the international community, mainly from the Socialist Bloc (USSR, Yugoslavia) and the African countries (Kenya, Sudan).¹⁶⁹ One of these criticisms was the lacking enforcement of the Beira Patrol. The Beira Patrol was initiated by the British in 1966 as a means to stop Rhodesian wares to travel through Mozambique into the world oceans, and was meant to be a swift and efficient manoeuvre. However, Rhodesian wares only found new ways to enter the world markets, with smaller cargos being carried by plane and larger cargos being shipped to different ports; namely Lourenço Marques in Mozambique and Durban in South Africa.¹⁷⁰

The situation had not changed when the UN Security Council again met a year later, at the 1716th meeting, calling for an intensified application of the Beira patrol again, stating that other ports had also expanded in order to keep up with the interest in Rhodesian goods. Indeed, as mentioned by the representative of the Sudan at the 1716th meeting in 1973:

¹⁶⁶ S/PV 1645, p.6

¹⁶⁷ Congressional Hearings 1973, p.99

¹⁶⁸ S/PV 1645, p.9

¹⁶⁹ S/PV 1716, pp2-10

¹⁷⁰ SPV1716, p. 2

“It [the Committee] should have been aware of the fact that the British naval patrol, at Beira Port, has not only been relaxed but that Lourenço Marques and Durban Ports have extended their port facilities in the service of contraband trade from and to Southern Rhodesia.”¹⁷¹

This excerpt shows that the problems of efficiently maintaining the blockade at Beira still was not working, and tells us that it was commonly known, at least among the UN that the Mozambiquan and South African ports were used for the purpose of contraband trade. It is a point which highlights the inaction of the UK, however the discussion also fails to properly address the widespread sanctions breaching of other countries, which remained unnamed, as it was impossible to address more than mere suspicions towards other governments. Indeed, the UK seems to have been made into a scapegoat in this manner, as their responsibility for the situation was obvious to the other member states.

During the same meeting, there was a vote on the draft resolution S/10928, in which the UK and US were the only countries voting against the implementation of stronger sanctions. France and Austria abstained from voting, with the following countries voting in favour of the resolution; Australia, China, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Panama, Peru, Sudan, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics & Yugoslavia.¹⁷² The draft resolution was discussed in the context of further strengthening sanctions in the face of the blunt sanctions busting of Portugal & South Africa, and was demanding the open denouncement of these two countries along with more comprehensive measures being implemented on them. The resolution, among others points, states that the Security Council “Decides that all States should limit, with immediate effect, any purchase of chromium ores, asbestos, tobacco, pig iron, copper, sugar, maize and any products from South Africa, Mozambique and Angola to the quantitative levels prevailing in 1965”.¹⁷³ This point, while accepted for a majority of countries, would be an obvious problem for the UK & the US, as they had considerable trade interests in these countries, particularly South Africa. This scenario would surely call for a response by the governments of South Africa & Portugal, and would lead to further political instability in the South of Africa, which would not be ideal for the West, who were reliant on these countries for their chrome needs.

On face value, however, the proposition seems to be relatively mild, as it did not call for sanctions on South Africa & Portugal as a whole, but only of their goods which would be

¹⁷¹ S/PV 1716, p.2

¹⁷² S/PV 1716

¹⁷³ Ibid

suspected of being shipped from Rhodesia. Other measures to prevent Rhodesian goods escaping the country would be extending the Beira patrol into the ports of Lourenço Marques & Durban and denying landing rights for carriers of nations known to operate air services in Rhodesia.¹⁷⁴ These measures would require the UK to jeopardize their relationship with Portugal and South Africa, as they would be effectively blocking out their largest alternatives to Rhodesia, which would not have been possible for an extended amount of time.

4.1.2 Stricter or wider sanctions?

The failure of the draft resolution to pass allowed for much criticism of the vetoing powers. The Chinese representative, Chuang Yen, called out the UK & US following the votes, stating that; “Regrettably, however, the second draft resolution has been vetoed by two permanent members, the United Kingdom and the United States. This cannot but offer food for deep thought.”¹⁷⁵ The sentiment is shared with both India & Yugoslavia in the following discussions, both of whom pointed to the UKs insistence on continuing sanctions while being unwilling to commit to full-scale sanctions.¹⁷⁶ The UK response is focused on the view that they have been keeping to the recommendations given in the reports on the situation of Resolution 253, which do not cover the expansion of sanctions, unlike what has been proposed with the draft resolutions.¹⁷⁷ Indeed, the UK showed support for continuing with sanctions without expansion in the meeting preceding the presentation of draft resolutions S/PV 10927 & 10928. In the 1715th meeting of the Security Council, the UK had argued that the current sanctions regime was not efficiently executed, and wanted to lay the emphasis on encouraging nations to review their import statistics for discrepancies of trade & evaluate their routines for checking imports.¹⁷⁸ Also, the UK insists on the fact that international trade was taking place on such a technical level that simply expanding embargo would not be enough. They argued that both legal and illegal trade was taking place with so many intermediaries that blocking trade with Southern Africa, as proposed to a degree in the draft resolutions, would not prove effective. They argued that wares would make its way to international trade no matter what the situation with Southern Africa, and thus widening the Beira blockade would not produce any major results.¹⁷⁹

¹⁷⁴ S/PV 10928

¹⁷⁵ S/PV 1716, p.6

¹⁷⁶ Ibid

¹⁷⁷ Ibid, p.8

¹⁷⁸ S/PV 1715, p.3-4

¹⁷⁹ Ibid

Most other states were still in favour of enacting the draft resolutions calling for the furthering of sanctions to involve South Africa & Portugal.¹⁸⁰ The Senegalese delegation calls out the strategy of some states which practice a “two-faced policy” as “the policy of the ostrich”, stating that the countries which speak about solidarity with Rhodesia must also cease to work against the strengthening of sanctions.¹⁸¹ The Senegalese delegation exclaimed that: “Among those States one cannot gloss over the attitude of the Government of the United States of America which, by resuming the import of chrome and other strategic minerals, opens the way for other States to practise, with the racists of Southern Rhodesia, a trade disapproved of by the international community.”¹⁸² The criticism towards the US was that they had openly flouted sanctions, and undermined the sanctions system, allowing for the Rhodesian economy to amass a record-high export earnings of £138 million.¹⁸³ The UK is also once again criticized for their lack of military intervention, as the Senegalese delegation believes that “Great Britain has been able, in other places, to resort to repression. If has the responsibility of using that same force in its colony of Southern Rhodesia and to restore, through universal suffrage, the rule of the African majority.”¹⁸⁴ This reflects the view that Rhodesia was treated differently due to their settler history, leaning into the idea that settler decolonisation was accepted by the West.

However, it is also important to note the differences in the draft resolutions discussed & the final state of Resolution 333. The Resolution which was actually enacted was essentially the same as the first draft resolution of May 18th 1973, which was very different from the draft resolution discussed above. The first draft resolution called for limited measures, such as asking governments to declare their sources of common Rhodesian exports such as chrome, asbestos & maize, with a denouncement against South Africa & Portugal.¹⁸⁵ The second draft proposal contained much stronger action, such as the expansion of the Beira blockade & the reduction of trade with Portugal & South Africa to levels of 1965.¹⁸⁶ This could explain the unwillingness of the UK and the US, as a previous draft resolution had seemingly been proposed, one which did not drastically enlarge the scope of sanctions. One could argue that this draft resolution was

¹⁸⁰ S/PV1715, p.7

¹⁸¹ S/PV, 1715,p.5

¹⁸² *Ibid*, p.5

¹⁸³ *Ibid*,p.5

¹⁸⁴ *Ibid*,p.5

¹⁸⁵ S/PV 10927

¹⁸⁶ S/PV 10928

added with the expectation that it would be vetoed, in order to create a discussion at the Security Council regarding the topic and expose the perceived inefficiency of the UK in its leading role.

The discussions in the UN Security Council can be described as heated, with the UK and US specifically receiving major criticism for their lacking decisiveness & open violation of sanctions respectively. The main point of these discussions was the addition of additional measures towards Portugal & South Africa, who were both known to be on the side of Rhodesia, and who both were known to aid in the violation of sanctions by allowing illegal wares to come through their territories. In the wake of a record year of Rhodesian export earnings, it would seem that an end of the Smith regime was far away. The discussions were based on the reports of the UN Security Council's Committee on Resolution 253 which, in addition to the reporting of specific cases of sanctions breaking, also provided invaluable statistics on the trade volumes & values around Rhodesia & Southern Africa, providing a basis for the scope of sanctions violations.¹⁸⁷

Looking at the discussions leading up to Resolution(s) 314 & 333 shows that, following the Byrd Amendment, there was appearing a divide between the US/UK and the rest of the members of the Security Council.

4.2 Economic development in sanctioned Rhodesia

The 1st report of the Security Council Committee, issued at the end of 1968, describes the trade statistics of Rhodesia, and how there were large discrepancies in the reported trade of Rhodesia compared to the reported trade of its trade partners. Indeed, the reported Rhodesian exports amount to around \$262 million in 1967, of which only \$107 million is reported by the importing countries, with an estimated \$80 million going to South Africa.¹⁸⁸ This would mean that around \$95 million was unaccounted for in the trade statistics of some countries, although around \$19 million of this may be accounted for by gold exports, which is not accounted for in merchandise trade statistics.¹⁸⁹ One of the problems associated with the discrepancy in trade is that some countries were not mentioning Rhodesia as an entity for exports/imports, leading to difficulties in tracking down the direction of goods. Portugal & South Africa are mentioned as examples

¹⁸⁷ Various UN reports

¹⁸⁸ 1st report S/8594 1968, p.9

¹⁸⁹ Ibid, p.9

of this, already showing their intentions of aiding Rhodesia. Other countries had not noted Rhodesia as its own destination due to the sanctions, and rather added it to an “others” or indistinguishable” category, and would be asked to provide statistics on the topic for the Committee.¹⁹⁰ These numbers are from 1967, meaning that there were large discrepancies in trade even before the initiation of comprehensive mandatory sanctions introduced through Resolution 253.

Seeing as Resolution 232, the reigning resolution at the time, only called for the mandatory sanctions of certain goods, namely tobacco, asbestos, copper and chrome, it is natural that the trade statistics of these goods are mentioned. The report describes tobacco as the main export of Rhodesia at the time, also stating that the nature of the tobacco trade could be an explanation of the missing \$80-85 million which were unaccounted for in the trade numbers of 1967. Indeed, the report suggests that tobacco stocks lying in bond could be a viable answer to the question of the discrepancies in exports. This due to the fact that tobacco stocks would not be reported as income until the stocks are removed from bond, meaning that trade could have taken place without it showing on the trade statistics.¹⁹¹ The global trade numbers of tobacco did still show a significant decline in Rhodesian wares, as producers such as the US, China, South Korea & Thailand reportedly overtook the gap. Rhodesian tobacco exports, which would have normally been around 245 000 tons in 1966 & 1967, were in reality around 45 000 tons, showing a large decline in exports of the commodity.¹⁹²

Asbestos exports in 1965 was around \$30 million, while amounting to around \$1.7 million worth of asbestos in the first half of 1968, of which \$1.2 million went to West Germany & \$0.5 million went to the USA.¹⁹³ The US explained its trade as shipments happening before 16th December 1966, the date Resolution 232 was implemented. The export of asbestos from Rhodesia to South Africa was not available, while the level of trade in South Africa had increased from \$35-39 million in 1960-1965 to \$59 million in 1967 & \$28 million in the first half of 1968.¹⁹⁴

¹⁹⁰ Ibid, p.7

¹⁹¹Ibid., p.11

¹⁹² Ibid, p.11

¹⁹³ Ibid, p.12

¹⁹⁴ Ibid, p.13

Copper exports from Rhodesia, amounting to \$18.6 million in 1965, appeared to have completely ceased following Resolution 232, as there was no reported trade in 1967 & the first half of 1968. However, the report states that there was a chance of West Germany importing \$7 million worth of copper in 1968, as West German trade numbers showed imports over \$7 million from “undisclosed countries”.¹⁹⁵ Along with the fact that West Germany was the chief importer of Rhodesian copper in 1965 leads the Committee to believe that “ There is reason to believe that these imports originated in S, Rhodesia.”¹⁹⁶

The report states that chromite was chiefly imported by the US pre-UDI, who imported \$5 million out of a reported \$10.7 million worth of chromite in 1965. The report states that the US were importing \$3.7 million in 1967, arguing again that the shipments were made prior to Resolution 232, and that in the first half of 1968 no more shipments had been made.¹⁹⁷ The report acknowledges that \$3.7 million had been imported by South Africa in 1965, and that later trade statistics between the countries was not available.¹⁹⁸ It is interesting to note that in the import statistics added in the annex of the report shows that all reporting countries reported lessening imports from Rhodesia, with the exception of Mozambique & Angola, the colonies of Portugal.¹⁹⁹ Why the, at the time, colonies of Portugal were reporting trade with Rhodesia, but not Portugal itself is unclear.

The chrome imports/exports of several nations declined dramatically in the period of 1965-1968 following the declaration of UDI. The annex contains import numbers for all reporting governments, as reported by the governments themselves, which shows that countries such as the UK, US, West Germany & France all show a strong decline in their imports of chromite from Southern Rhodesia & South Africa alike. While ceasing trade with Rhodesia following Resolution 232, except for the US, which continued in 1967 due to delayed payments, it is interesting that also trade with South Africa plummeted in the short term.²⁰⁰ While this could be explained by short-term trade fluctuations, it could also be caused by mistrust & an awareness that South Africa would be helping the Smith regime.

¹⁹⁵ Ibid, p.13

¹⁹⁶ Ibid, p.13

¹⁹⁷ Ibid, p.13

¹⁹⁸ Ibid, p.13

¹⁹⁹ Ibid, p.15

²⁰⁰ Ibid, p.56

The 1st report states that Rhodesian exports had “officially” fallen to 60% of the 1965-levels, showing that sanctions were somewhat effective. Still, the report states that the Rhodesian economy had recovered relatively well following the initial hit it received in the immediate aftermath of sanctions, when trade was dramatically lowered and the economy needed to be shifted. As of 1968, the sanctions would seemingly not have been effective in crippling the Rhodesian economy, as the report states there had been a seemingly budding shift from cash crops to less profitable crops due to circumstance.²⁰¹ The report also notes import substitution, continued high mining outputs, agricultural diversification and the exceptional harvest in Rhodesia in 1966-67 as a reason for their economic position being stronger than anticipated. The report concludes that the UN member-states would need to improve their adherence to the sanctions regime, as to close the gap between official numbers of Rhodesian exports & reported imports. The report suggests that the Rhodesian economy would struggle in the face of another bad harvest following one in 1968, while the output of mining would seemingly remain stable. It also states that Rhodesia’s survival would depend on efficiently expanding its secondary industry to cover for the lack of imports, although there would be some reliance on imports in any case, leaving the secondary sector reliant on sanctions breaking being effective.

As we have seen earlier in the text, sanctions were not more efficiently implemented as the report would have hoped for, and the Rhodesian economy was thus able to flourish. Indeed, the Rhodesian economy reached record export income in 1973.²⁰² Although the report seemed optimistic in its chances of terminating the Smith regime, it would not be an easy task, as it would take more than ten years from this report to the end of the regime.

The tenth report, issued in 1978, focused on the statistical situation of Southern Rhodesian exports in 1976. The report mentioned that Rhodesian trade had grown from the previous year by \$103 million, from \$654m to \$748m.²⁰³ The report tells us that Rhodesia stopped issuing trade numbers completely in 1974, stating that “the United Nations intensification of hostility towards Rhodesia” was a factor in their decision to stop informing the worldwide community of their trade statistics.²⁰⁴ The tenth report shows that the countries surrounding Rhodesia had been consistently reporting lower exports than the imports reported by their trade partners. For

²⁰¹ *Ibid*, p.100

²⁰² *Ibid*, p.101

²⁰³ Tenth report S/12529 1978, p.1

²⁰⁴ *Ibid*, p.1

example, South African exports in 1975 was around \$159m lower than reported by the importing countries, which is evidence of the well-known fact that South Africa was aiding Rhodesia in avoiding sanctions, and also shows that countries were still keen to trade with South Africa.²⁰⁵ This is shown in Table 1 below, and is measured in comparison to 23 countries, consisting of several Western European nations, Canada, New Zealand, Japan & Australia.²⁰⁶

4.3 How Rhodesia avoided sanctions through neighbouring countries

Mozambique also shows signs of having consistently aided the Smith regime in breaking sanctions, having a consistent and significant difference excess of imports over exports.²⁰⁷ Comparisons of the 23 countries' excess of reported imports over the exports of the four neighbouring countries mentioned in Table 1 below and the indirect exports of Rhodesia, shows that around \$327m excess imports were reported in 1976, compared to around \$325m that was estimated to have left Rhodesia and entered the international market.²⁰⁸ This is shown in Table 3 below.

Export trade of South African Customs Union with 23 countries (Million \$USD)						
S. African Customs Union						
S.A exports	1008	1127	1310	3472	3752	3651
23 imports	1060	1210	1401	3630	3911	4046
Excess (imports over exports)	52	83	91	158	159	395
Mozambique						
Mozambique's exports	60	62	69	176	122	127
23 imports	81	81	120	364	284	201
Excess	21	19	51	188	162	74

²⁰⁵ Ibid, p.3

²⁰⁶ Ibid, p.2

²⁰⁷ Ibid, p.3

²⁰⁸ Ibid, p.4

Zambia						
Zambian exports	457	622	544	1031	736	762
23 imports	410	518	510	1020	672	637
Excess	-47	-104	-34	-11	-64	-125
Malawi						
Malawian exports	26	33	40	63	87	109
23 imports	24	32	34	61	91	92
Excess	-2	-1	-6	-2	4	-17
Total						
Exporting countries' figures	1551	1844	1963	4742	4697	4649
23 imports	1575	1841	2065	5075	4958	4976
Excess	24	-3	102	333	261	327

Table 4.1: The table shows the discrepancies in export numbers between the neighbors of Rhodesia and the imports of 23 reporting countries. The 23 countries were not named in the report, but are based on developed market economies.²⁰⁹

Indirect exports of Southern Rhodesia (Million \$USD)			
	Excess of reported imports of 23 countries over exports of 4 neighbors of Rhodesia (A)	Indirect exports of Southern Rhodesia, including re-exports (B)	Differences (A)-(B)
1965	24	43	-19
1966	-3	21	-24
1967	102	79	23
1974	333	302	31
1975	261	254	7

²⁰⁹ S/12529 1978, p.3

1976	327	325	2
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Table 4.2: This table shows the indirect exports of Southern Rhodesia, calculated by comparing the excess of reported income provided by official trade numbers for Rhodesia (1965-1967) and estimated trade numbers for the years where official numbers were not provided (1974-).²¹⁰

The table below shows that the Rhodesian exports of chrome through the South African Customs Union were likely to have grown during the sanctions regime. Table 7 shows that the amount of chromite estimated to have been exported through the South African Customs Union and Mozambique respectively had grown substantially following 1965, with an apparent peak in 1974. The trade from Rhodesia itself was quite low over the same period, which is to be expected given the situation.²¹¹ This table again underlines that there is a discrepancy between the reported numbers & the actual numbers which have been given by the importing countries, thus justifying that the Committee's investigations into suspicious activity by different countries' companies were justified.

Chrome ore situation in Southern Rhodesia(SR) in thousand metric tons								
Imports of reporting countries	1964	1965	1966	1967	1974	1975	1976	
Directly from SR	406	397	179	136	57	59	16	
Via SACR	-	-	181	166	319*	183*	209*	
Recorded imports of SACR believed to be of SR origin	49	84	98	75	76	80	120	
Imports of reporting	16	20	52	30	52	101	66	

²¹⁰ Ibid. p.4

²¹¹ Ibid, p.10

countries from Mozambique							
Total exports of SR	471	501	510	407	504*	423*	411*

*Estimated

Table 4.3: The table shows the export of chrome ore from Rhodesia in the period 1964-1967, and the estimated amount of chrome ore shipped in 1974-1976 (due to lack of trade numbers from Rhodesia).²¹²

The table below shows the Western importers' statistics regarding their situation of chromite imports with the South African Customs Union, showing the levels of trade in chrome ore in 1965, and how it had changed until the years 1974, 1975, and 1976. This table shows us that some countries, like Japan, West Germany and the UK saw a steady rise in their imports of South African chrome since 1965, while the US had severely dropped their chrome imports. With the trend of Rhodesian firms exporting through South Africa, it is uncertain the amount of ores that would have originated from Rhodesia, but with the amount of discussions regarding smuggling, it is safe to assume that some of these imports were of Rhodesian origin.

External trade of S. Africa Customs Union, chrome ore (in '000 metric tons)				
	1965	1974	1975	1976
France	4	61.9	54.9	68.9
West Germany	117.6	175.6	136.9	177.9
Italy	3.2	24.8	25.0	34.4
United Kingdom	68.8	45.2	80.8	102.9
United States	436.2	257.5	108.2	156.3
Japan	52.2	423.7	342.8	415.6

Table 4.4: The external trade of the South African Customs Union in selected years following UDI. The table shows that the export of chrome was at its peak around the end of the commodity boom, and was affected by the financial crisis of 1975.²¹³

²¹² S/12529, p.10

²¹³ S/12519, p.11

The table shows that the South African trade of chrome ores had increased drastically from the start of sanctions until the mid-1970s. This was, as we have noted due to the investments into beneficiation processes to create charge chrome, thereby utilising the potential available in the country. This allowed for countries to trade much more chrome with South Africa, but along with it would come more room to expand trade with Southern Rhodesia. While not many cases have been verified, there have been many allegations, and one such is the case of Japan. On 5 April 1974, the New York Times reported that:

*“in the last two years, Japan’s official figures of the imports of chrome from South Africa were considerably larger than South Africa’s statistics for chrome exports to Japan. For instance, in 1972 Japan imported 445 000 metric tons from South Africa, while South African export figures showed only 253 000 tons were exported.”*²¹⁴

According to the newspaper, diplomatic sources were charging that Japanese concerns had been using false South African certificates of origin and shipping the chrome through either South Africa or Mozambique. In addition, in violation of Resolution 253, Japan’s External Trade Organisation was maintaining a representative in Salisbury.²¹⁵ While these numbers do not 100% confirm that Japan were trading with Rhodesia, it certainly does point to that, as such a large discrepancy of trade would be near impossible to achieve otherwise. In any case, the External Trade Organisation of Japan being present in Salisbury would indicate that they were present, and that a government organ of Japan was unabashedly violating sanctions.

4.4 Imported chrome: Where did it originate?

The import of chrome ores into Europe and the US was dependent on Rhodesia before UDI, so even if most countries did not declare it, they were likely still dependent in the following years as well. Rhodesia was the biggest exporter of chrome before the UDI, and it would thus be unlikely that the chrome market would be sustainable without them. There is also evidence of higher exports of high-quality chrome from South Africa than what it would have been able to produce in the early stages of the embargo. It is known that Rhodesia and South Africa maintained diplomatic ties throughout the first half of sanctions at least, and Rhodesia likely exported its chrome through South African shell corporations, as evidenced by the RISCO case. We also know that more direct trade has happened, either through direct or covert action, such

²¹⁴ New York Times, 5. April 1974, gathered from BDT 076/94

²¹⁵ Mlambo 2019, p.390

as the implementation of the Byrd Amendment, and French military equipment and vehicles being used by the Rhodesian military in the Bush War.²¹⁶

However, due to the nature of the situation it is not clear where the chrome used in European industry originated from, as there would have been interest from all sides to maintain trade. There is evidence that Rhodesia had trade relations, and that there were established shell corporations, and also that high-quality ore was still being produced in Rhodesia. Sanctions-breaking on a wide scale was common, with the economic benefits of keeping up trade with Rhodesia in many cases trumping the moral grounds on which the sanctions were based.

Metallurgical grade Rhodesian chrome ore had long been exported to more developed industries in order to be processed into ferrochrome, which would then be usable in the stainless steel industry. This relationship changed over the course of the sanctions regime, as the Rhodesian economy grew to be more self-sufficient, leading to an increased production of ferrochrome within Rhodesia itself.²¹⁷ It is difficult to tell exactly how much the production of chrome and ferrochrome ores within Rhodesia changed from 1965 to 1979 due to the covert nature of exports making the Rhodesian economy rather isolated. However, some of the literature discussed in the thesis hint to an expansion of the manufacturing capabilities of Rhodesia during the sanctions regime. Indeed, the Congress hearing of 1973 discusses the import of ferrochrome to the US, in which Mr. J. Sheehan describes the then current state of trade with Rhodesia. Mr. Sheehan exclaimed that:

“The fact is that the bulk of the Rhodesian material did not come to us as chrome ore, which would have benefited the ferrochrome domestic ferroalloy industry and provided the jobs that we heard so much about; the fact that it did not come in but, rather, came in as processed ferrochrome, negates any benefit which may be theorized from this shift in the prime source of our total chrome ore, the shift from Russian to non-Russian sources.”²¹⁸

The quote tells us that the US imports consisted mostly of ferrochrome in 1973, meaning that the industry had advanced since the declaration of UDI in 1965. This is a testament to the work done by Rhodesian authorities to diversify its economy, and to find a use for the excess chrome ore which would have been produced following UDI. Indeed, the Rhodesia authorities had taken over the production of mines that belonged to foreign companies, as expressed by the

²¹⁶ Warson 2015

²¹⁷ Howat 1984, p.41

²¹⁸ Congressional hearing, 1973 p.43

Union Carbide president O'Hara in Congress.²¹⁹ O'Hara described the efforts of Univex, a Rhodesian company ran by the state, to keep up and expand the mining sector, and to export ferrochrome in its processed form. This would mean that in times of lower chromite exports, Rhodesia was able to keep up mining activity, as the ferrochrome industry would need fuelling. Another point which further solidifies the idea that Rhodesian industry had developed to include ferrochrome production was the rapid expansion of the South African production described in some sources. Due to sanctions, the Rhodesian economy was often included in South African export numbers, meaning that distinguishing the exports of the two countries was difficult. However, when describing EC dependence on chromite and ferrochrome, Hans Maull writes that: *“European Community dependence on chromium ore supplies from South Africa grew from about 24 per cent in 1963 to 48 per cent in 1979/80; dependence on ferro-chrome from 14 per cent in 1966 to 50 per cent in 1979-80.”*²²⁰

This describes the EC as heavily reliant on South Africa for their chrome and ferrochrome needs, with a particular rise in the reliance of ferrochrome. While these numbers are the official numbers, there is almost certainly a part of the ferrochrome production which belongs to Rhodesian firms shipping through South Africa.

According to Maull, Rhodesian ferrochrome exports to the EC had increased from 1.400 to 54.200 tons from 1966 to 1979/80.²²¹ This shows that the increase in finished ferrochrome which entered the European market had drastically increased from 1966 to 1979. At the same time, the South African exports of ferrochrome had shot up from 11 600 tons, to 246.5 thousand, with chrome imports going from 131 700 to 472 300 in the same timeframe. The EC imports might indicate investments into a greater amount of production of ferrochrome within Rhodesia itself. The Rhodesian expansion of the ferrochrome industry was necessary in order to compete with South Africa, as Rhodesia needed to follow market trends of increasing home production of finished materials. This investment has certainly come partially from Rhodesia itself, as their policy of investment into the mineral industry, sponsored by the government through Univex, had an aim to create a strong manufacturing industry in Rhodesia.²²² This aim was deliberately adopted to make themselves attractive to the market, and even attracted foreign investors as

²¹⁹ Congressional hearing 1973, p. 69

²²⁰ Maull 1984, p.206

²²¹ Maull 1984, p.208

²²² Gibson 1973, p. 76

evidenced by the RISCO case. This shows that, while Rhodesia were forced to nationalise their economy, they were still not against investments from foreign business.

4.5 Industrialised countries' covert trade with Rhodesia

The UN reports on the applications of sanctions following Resolution 253 will be used to support the claim that many industrialized countries intentionally & willingly aided in trade with Southern Rhodesia. This chapter discusses the cases & decisions mentioned in several different UN reports on the pursuance of sanctions; the 3rd report (1970), the 7th report(1974), the 8th report(1975), and the 2nd Special report(1972) and the Special report on EC members' involvement with RISCO(1975). These specific reports have been chosen due to the addition of several examples of chrome shipments being suspected of trading with Southern Rhodesia, and because they contain the responses of governments along with the decisions of the Special Committee on the response to sanctions breaking.

The UN reports on the pursuance of states on Resolution 253 were established as part of the Resolution with its signing in 1968. The reports were established in order to determine the extent of sanctions breaking in the international markets, and to provide a forum for states to report suspicious activity by companies or persons in regards to following sanctions. The reports would list cases of suspected breaches of sanctions, while also containing reports on the statistical discrepancies. There were a number of cases investigated by the Committee, of which many were either never solved or they were abandoned due to a lack of evidence. This can be seen in the long list of open cases enclosed in every report, with the last report, the 12th report(1980), there were still 232 open cases of suspected breaches of sanctions by participating states, of which 40 were regarding the exports of various forms of chrome or ferrochrome.²²³ In addition to this, there were around 46 separate cases of ships registered in reporting countries shipping Rhodesian chrome, nickel or other materials to the US, which were reported and investigated by the Committee.²²⁴

One of the major issues facing the Committee in its investigations into the pursuance of Resolution 253 was the difficulty of acquiring proper proof of origin. Indeed, in several of the reports issued by the Security Council, it is noted that the investigated party were unaware of

²²³ S/13750 1980, PP.3-5, 19-21

²²⁴ Ibid, p.23

any connection to Rhodesia, due to the lack of strict demands for documentation for wares shipped through the port. While many of the cases do maintain that there was some documentation proving that ores were from a certain area, it was impossible to know where it originally came from, considering the heavy cooperations between Rhodesia and its neighbours. Indeed, Doxey writes that the UN was unable to pursue the alleged sanctions breaches from European governments due to the reluctance of many member states to cooperate in cases.²²⁵ The UN Security Council would in some cases demand further documentation, which will be discussed in examples below.²²⁶ The Committee was also often ignored or dismissed by the investigated nations, which further hindered their attempts to gain documentation, as the companies involved would then argue that nothing could be done due to the time which passed.²²⁷

4.5.1 Case nr. 100: Cuxhaven

This case concerns the shipments of chrome & several other ores from Lourenco Marques, which was first mentioned in the 4th report of the Committee, dated 1971. The case refers to a note sent by the United Kingdom, concerning the shipment of goods on the vessel “Cuxhaven”. The UK note states that the information was received from “commercial sources”, and that it was regarding “further shipments of minerals suspected to be of Rhodesian origin which they consider to be sufficiently reliable to warrant further investigation.”²²⁸ The source in question alleges that “some 5,000 tons of mineral, half of which was chrome, one-third ferrochrome and the rest made up of about 1,000 tons of ferrosilicon chrome and some 50 tons of other minerals packed in drums all believed to be of Rhodesian origin, were recently loaded at Lourenco Marques aboard the m.v. 'Cuxhaven'”²²⁹ The vessel was owned by the West German firm “Bugsier, Reederei und Bergungs A.G.”, and was travelling to the port of Rotterdam in the Netherlands where the contents were further transported into Europe. The Security Council sent messages to the governments of the Netherlands, Germany & Belgium, while noting the involvement of a Swiss-based company; Handelsgesellschaft Zurich A.G.

In the 7th report, dated 1975, the government of the Netherlands, following a period of investigation, sent a message to the Security Council with the following message: "In view of

²²⁵ Doxey 1980, pp.69-75

²²⁶ Various UN reports

²²⁷ Various UN reports

²²⁸ S/10229, P.103

²²⁹ Ibid

the considerable time which has elapsed since the shipment of chrome ore:, silicon chrome ore, ferro-chrome and nickel cathodes aboard the German MY Cuxhaven took place, information further to that already forwarded to the Secretary-General is not expected.”²³⁰ This explains how the Netherlands believed that they were unable to further add to the investigations, in view of the age of the case and the likelihood of the ores having been further processed and untraceable. This illustrated one of the problems of the UN sanctions regime, as ores being smelted and turned into ferrochrome would make it harder to follow up investigations, providing less opportunity for the Security Council to demand investigation. In addition, Spain is pointed out as not responding, and thus being placed on the list of non-responding countries which was posted by the UN on a quarterly basis.²³¹ Spain were added to this list on several occasions, and seemingly did not respond to the UN requests until the case would have been dismissed.

4.5.2 Case Nr. USI-7

This case was a part of the 7th report, in which there was a focus on documenting US shipments to and from Rhodesia, which had been conducted in cooperation with other countries. While it was technically legal for the US to trade with Rhodesia, it was heavily denounced upon by the UN, and the reports on US trade was made in response. In this case, two Italian ships were documented to have aided in the shipment of various metals, but mainly containing ferrochrome. The Alfredo Primo was the prime suspect, which was then investigated by the UN to contain Rhodesian chrome. This led to further discrepancies, as the documentation of the ship alleged that the wares had been loaded in Durban, and not Lourenço Marques, while also alleging that the metals were not of Southern Rhodesian origin.²³²

Meanwhile, the US company which had ordered the shipment were of the belief that the wares were Rhodesian, and that the wares had been loaded in Lourenço Marques. The captain of the ship had agreed to this, adding that the loading port had been “erroneously indicated as Durban” in the note sent by the Italian authorities to the UN Security Council.²³³

This case appeared in the 6th and 7th reports, and the case was seemingly closed after the 7th report, after the US delegation to the UN believed the captain of the ship to be acting in good

²³⁰ S/11594, p.11

²³¹ S/11594, p.11

²³² *Ibid.*, p.14

²³³ *Ibid.*, p.14

faith, seeing as he believed the documentation received was valid. However, the US government “continued to believe the cargo was Southern Rhodesian in origin.”²³⁴ This case which could be seen as a cause for concern for in regards to the sanctions regime would be the seemingly intentional use of falsified documents. It is more likely that the goods were indeed from Rhodesia, since the documentation received by the captain of the ship stated that the goods were not of Southern Rhodesian origin, while the contrary was maintained by the US company that had ordered the shipment. As noted in the report;

*"Mr. Katzen (US representative to the UN) could not understand why a United States company importing minerals from South Africa would testify to the 'United States Government and to the United Nations Sanctions Committee that the cargo, in fact, was from Southern Rhodesia.'"*²³⁵

Indeed, due to the Byrd Amendment, the US was not in a position where lying about the origins of a shipment would be necessary. In this case, one of two realistic outcomes has occurred. There might have been a misunderstanding somewhere along the line, meaning that either the US customer had believed the origin to be Rhodesia, when it in fact was somewhere else, or the documentation had accidentally been misleading. The other option, which I believe to be the most likely, is that someone had deliberately falsified documents in order to pick up the wares with an Italian ship. Indeed, according to Resolution 253, as long as the home country of a vessel is part of the sanctions regime, it was deemed illegal by the UN to aid in the shipments of commodities from Rhodesia, even if both importing & exporting countries were breaking sanctions.²³⁶ This reflects the situation portrayed in the UN Security Council discussions, where it becomes clear that other countries' ships were complicit in breaking sanctions, despite the official stance of the EC countries being in compliance with UN guidelines.

4.6 Discussion

This chapter has discussed the reasons for breaching sanctions, and attempted to give insights into how companies were able to circumvent sanctions through intermediaries in South Africa, as well as showing the attitudes of the industrial nations. The chapter has discussed the US and EC policy in view of the criticism received by the UK and US in the UN Security Council, particularly the US decision to completely breach chrome sanctions. The US stance was unflinching in its view that there was no point in maintaining sanctions when so many countries

²³⁴ S/11594 1975, p.15

²³⁵ S/11594 1975, p.15

²³⁶ S/RES/253

were breaching them, a problem which had been made clear through the UN reports. I would argue that the US stance in the UN was quite valid, considering that there were many other sanctions breaching nations which were not willing to be transparent enough with their trade statistics, and who remained silent. Or in the case of the USSR, even heaped the criticism onto the US, potentially in a bid to deflect the attentions from themselves. The UN Security Council resolutions did not seem to change the decisions made by reporting nations, while the US remained completely unpunished for their straight reluctance to adherence, while other EC countries were not discussed in the same vein. Nevertheless, sanctions breaches were common, and most countries in the UN maintained a relaxed position on sanctions.

5 Policy change on Southern Africa from 1977

The Anglo-American peace talks were not a success, but they did lay a foundation for the eventual understanding which produced the Lancaster House Agreement in 1979/80. The US policy switch gave the EC little choice but to abide, and join in the discussions for a certificate program, which likely did help with the eventual fall of the Smith regime. It can be argued that the fact that the US were re-entering the sanctions regime and backing the UK in negotiations would be enough to signal that the end of the Smith regime would be close, as they no longer had any support on the global stage following their loss of South Africa and Portugal as close allies.

However, was this driven by a moral obligation or by the developments of the markets? One could argue that the developments in mineral markets, and especially the decline in the stainless steel consumption in the US and EC offered a chance to take a step in the “right direction”, when a Rhodesia weakened by war and economic hardship was presented with even greater obstacles when their exports would decline in value as well. Not to mention the fact that South African ferrochrome became increasingly effective as their production method and market trends tilted the market in favour of local production of ferrochrome, with charge chrome being more and more accepted in the stainless steel industry. And with South African ores having similarly low prices to that of Rhodesia.²³⁷

The EC local ferrochrome industry took a strong hit following the implementation of certificates, and especially following the independence of Zimbabwe. Indeed, following the certificate program and chemical testing which was implemented in late 1977, the EC producers needed to plea to the Commission for help in the form of anti-dumping measures against South African and Swedish or Zimbabwean producers twice, once in 1978 and once in 1981. While it could be because of general market terms, which in the source material was described as an oversaturated market, it could also be a result of the balance shifting. For example, EC ferrochrome producers who had previously relied on cheaper Rhodesian chrome ore would find it even harder to compete with foreign ferrochrome producers following the implementation of the certificates and the near collapse of the EC ferrochrome industry in 1977.²³⁸ Still it becomes

²³⁷ New York Times, May 6th, 1976

²³⁸ BDT 110/086/C196, 24.10.1980

clear from the source material that the EC ferrochrome industry was doomed to fail, simply due to their lack of raw material and the reliance on Southern Africa for their materials.

This chapter will discuss the renewed interest in finding a solution to the Rhodesian question in the time period from ca. 1976-1979. The chapter will seek to lay out the situation of Rhodesian chrome in the world markets along with shifting ties with their neighbours, leading to the gradual weakening of the Rhodesian economy. The chapter will draw source materials of the European Commission to shed light on the renewed interest in strengthening sanctions efforts that was initiated in 1977, and how the effects of these efforts were felt by the EC ferrochrome industry in the time both before and directly following the independence of Zimbabwe. These discussions revolved around exact measures to be implemented towards Rhodesia, with communications between several members of the European Commission and the delegate of the European Economic Community Executive Commission to the United States, Fernand Spaak.²³⁹ These discussions show the stance of several EC member states, which were notably hesitant to implement stricter regulations on the imports of ferrochrome of Rhodesian origin for practical and economic reasons.

How did the EC-US negotiations impact the effects of sanctions? And how did a new entity on the ferrochrome market in the form of Zimbabwe impact the EC ferrochrome industry, which was struggling in the face of dumping from foreign producers?

5.1 Ferrochrome in the EC: Recession and overproduction

The ferrochrome production of European countries, namely West Germany, France and Italy, were heavily struck following the economic crisis of 1975, with rising prices of both chrome and ferrochrome, but also lower demands for steel.²⁴⁰ Indeed, the prices of both ferrochrome and chrome ore rose sharply on the world markets in the 1970s, which led to EC industries falling behind due to their comparative disadvantage to countries like Turkey, the USSR and South Africa on the world market.²⁴¹ This meant that the costs of production for the import-reliant EC producers would fall relative to other producers. According to Maull, the EC would need to introduce political aid to the ferrochrome industry in order for it to survive, as the EC

²³⁹ BDT-076-94

²⁴⁰ Jolly 1979, p.785

²⁴¹ Maull 1984, p.211

indeed did in 1978.²⁴² The introduction of anti-dumping measures against Sweden and South Africa was discussed by the European Commission in a series of notes dated 26th of June, 1978.²⁴³ The notes, while not directly related to the Rhodesian embargo, shows that there were problems with the European ferrochrome industry the year following the implementation of the new certificate system. Indeed, one note describes anti-dumping measures to be implemented to these two countries, due to their significantly lower costs compared to EC producers.²⁴⁴ One note contains a table noting the situation of ferrochrome imports to the EC from those countries, as well as the EC's self-sufficiency. Note that this is regarding ferrochrome, and not raw chrome ore.

Situation of European producers		1974	1977
Imports(tons):	South Africa	77 000	159 000
	Sweden	17 000	46 000
EEC Production		276 000	230 000
EEC Consumption		478 000	460 000
Market share:	South Africa	16%	35%
	Sweden	3%	10%
	EEC Producers	59%	35%

Table 5.1: The table was mentioned in discussions about introducing anti-dumping measures to protect EC producers, as South African and Swedish producers were applying dumping practices in the ferrochrome market.²⁴⁵ The table above shows that the EC producers had lost 46 000 tons of domestic production over the three years from 1974 to 1977, while their consumption had dropped by only 18 000. The problem for the European industry would be that the use of domestic chrome ore was not possible in the same way as in South Africa or Rhodesia, while Sweden, Rhodesia and South Africa all also had access to great amounts of cheap energy such as hydropower. Thus, the EC producers were falling behind due to their inability to adjust to the world market.

The following graph shows the worldwide production capacity of ferrochrome worldwide by country in 1980 (measured in tons):

²⁴² Ibid, p.212

²⁴³ SEC(78)2772 1978,p.2

²⁴⁴ Ibid.

²⁴⁵ SEC(78)2272

Ferrochrome production capacity	Low Carbon	High Carbon	Total
France	40 000	120 000	160 000
West Germany	65 000	80 000	145 000
Italy	15 000	40 000	55 000
EC total:	120 000	240 000	360 000
Norway	10 000	25 000	35 000
Finland	-	50 000	50 000
Sweden	45 000	175 000	220 000
Spain	10 000	20 000	30 000
Yugoslavia	22 000	30 000	52 000
Turkey	14 000	35 000	49 000
Europe total (excl. EC):	101 000	335 000	436 000
USA	98 000	245 000	343 000
Canada	5 000	3 000	8 000
Brasil	6 000	60 000	66 000
Mexico	-	5 500	5 500
Americas total:	109 000	313 500	422 500
South Africa	50 000	750 000	800 000
Zimbabwe	40 000	212 000	252 000
African total:	90 000	962 000	1 052 000
Japan	100 000	550 000	650 000
India	15 000	5 000	20 000
Asian total:	115 000	555 000	670 000
Worldwide total:	535 000	2 405 500	2 940 500

Table 5.2: Figures from the EC archives, regarding ferrochrome production capacity. The table excludes the Socialist Bloc, likely due to lacking production numbers.²⁴⁶

The table shows that the majority of ferrochrome was produced in South Africa by 1980, and that the EC ferrochrome production was far from the greatest in the world by that time. While this does not reflect the actual production numbers, it does show the size of the industry, highlighting the emergence of competitors such as Sweden and Brazil, with the EC and US falling behind their classic competitors in Japan and South Africa.

²⁴⁶ BDT 260/94,

Movement from importer-based ferrochrome to local ferrochrome industries was a large part of the late 1970s ferrochrome industry. Rhodesia invested in local industries due to the sanctions through both private investment and state participation, an example of which is RISCO, which was owned 49.7% by the Rhodesian government.²⁴⁷ South Africa decided to do so in the mid-1970s, which is represented in the drastic rise of market share in the 3 years found in Table 3.1 above. While the cheap manpower, electricity and ores available in Southern Africa along with the newer production techniques were what drove forward the South African explosion in production.²⁴⁸ This was detrimental to the EC and US ferrochrome industries, who were struggling to compete with the prices of South African ferrochrome.²⁴⁹

The shifting market in the mid-1970s was marked by the switch from ore export towards manufacturing based economy for both Rhodesia and South Africa. The falling market share of the EC ferrochrome producers was due to their lack of competitive edge, and the higher price put on EC ferrochrome would have naturally made the steel industry more interested in investing in foreign ferrochrome, especially following the financial crisis. Indeed, one could argue that the increasing South African market share could have been more likely to induce sanctions breaking with Rhodesia, with regards to both chrome ore and processed ferrochrome. It would be natural for a struggling industry like the EC industry, which was losing its market shares rapidly while also underutilising its capacity, to attempt whichever measures it could in order to stay afloat. Including breaching sanctions to gain cheaper ores from a Rhodesia which was in need of markets to fuel its fight against the Patriotic Front (PF). Indeed, we know that there was attempts to import chrome even after the Certificate programme was introduced, as evidenced by a chrome shipment worth \$23.4 million headed for Austria which was seized by Dutch authorities.²⁵⁰

5.2 Repealing the Byrd Amendment: US policy change under Carter

Jimmy Carter's inauguration as US president in 1976 saw a significant shift in US foreign policy in Africa. Carter's priorities in Rhodesia was to have a good relationship with the

²⁴⁷ Jolly 1978, p.789

²⁴⁸ Howat 1986, p. 41

²⁴⁹ Howat 1986 p.42

²⁵⁰ Jolly, p.786, Although Austria were not a member state of the EC at this time, the shipment was sent through the Rhine, and was hence stopped when going through Dutch customs.

Africans, which led his administration to work against the Byrd Amendment. Indeed, the Foreign Relations of the US (FRUS) archives contain discussions on the position the US should take in the Rhodesian question, as their role was rather unclear until their repealing of the Byrd Amendment. Indeed, the US were taking on more responsibility for Rhodesia, and were determined to include one of the Patriotic Front presidents at the negotiation table. This was done in order to legitimise the government in the eyes of the resistance as well, and the US were aware of the need to include all sides to the conflict in order to successfully barter a peaceful solution, according a memorandum from US Secretary of State Vance to the president.²⁵¹ The memorandum also explicitly mentions the need to cancel the Byrd Amendment in order justify US involvement in the peace settlements.²⁵² Still, the US were afraid of taking the peace discussions to the UN due to possible influence of the Soviet Union, as noted in conversations between the US and UK Foreign Secretaries.²⁵³ They discussed how a British-led effort would be more beneficial to both the US and the UK, as they were reliant on all sides of the Rhodesian conflict to find their desired solution.²⁵⁴ One could assume that their willingness to negotiate outside of the UN, and without the Soviets, was mostly grounded in the backdrop of the Cold War, especially considering that both the US and USSR had been involved in Southern African affairs on more than one occasion, such as in Angola and Rhodesia.²⁵⁵

After prolonged discussions in Congress, many of the proponents of the Byrd Amendment had changed their mind, persuaded by the argument that high-grade chromite from Rhodesia was not necessary anymore due to technological advances and the opening up of several smaller markets.²⁵⁶

At the same time, the steel markets of the world had been shifting for some time, with a notable shift following its peak in 1973. Indeed, the US producers of industrial metals went from their peak production of 146 Mt in 1973, to 80 Mt in 1982.²⁵⁷ While this would include more metals than ferrochrome by itself, it is an indication of the trajectory of the US industry. When Carter's

²⁵¹ FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1977–1980, VOLUME XVI, SOUTHERN AFRICA, “139. Memorandum from Secretary of State Vance to President Carter”, Washington, 10th February 1977

²⁵² Ibid.

²⁵³ FRUS, 1977–1980, VOLUME XVI, SOUTHERN AFRICA, “145. Memorandum of conversation” London, April 1st 1977

²⁵⁴ Ibid.

²⁵⁵ Lowry 2007, p.186 and Visser 2009, pp.137-138

²⁵⁶ DeRoche 2001, p.244

²⁵⁷ Smil 2006, p.89

administration took office, global trends had been leading to higher production of metals in the developing world, with Western market economies generally following the US course according to Vaclav Smil, who also states that the EC and Japan were following this trend.²⁵⁸ This might not be the case for ferrochrome though, as pointed out by Crowson. In his “*Mineral Handbook of 1982/83*”, he describes the EC growth of chrome consumption at 6.5% (compared to the US 0.5% and Japan at 4.1%) annually for the 1970s, which is the highest out of the major ferrochrome producing countries (US, EC, Japan).²⁵⁹ He also points out that the EC had the highest share of the world market, at 18%, compared to US and Japan with 12% each. This example shows that the US had a declining domestic ferrochrome consumption when compared to Japan and Europe. However, the production of the US was still higher than Europe in 1979/80, at 242 000 tonnes compared to EC’s 159 000 tonnes of ferrochrome, with Japan towering above at 419 000 tonnes.²⁶⁰

As stainless steel was the number one product of ferrochrome, this could indicate a trend of the US requiring less steel, or that the US were focusing more on importing steel from abroad, however I have not found any definitive data for this in my research. What the numbers also tell us, is that the US were not as reliant on imports as the EC, as they produced roughly half of all ferrochrome consumed themselves in the years 1979-80 on average. In addition, the country had many investments both in South Africa and Rhodesia through Union Carbide. Also, the US had massive stockpiles, as mentioned in Chapter 3, which would make them much less dependent on a domestic ferrochrome industry, and especially when prices of chromite were as high as they were following the financial crisis. One could argue that the influence of Union Carbide in Southern Africa, together with the US declining stainless steel industry together with their large strategic stocks of ferrochrome, were factors which could have aided in the turn away from the Byrd Amendment for the US.

5.3 Rhodesian economy in the late 1970s: Mounting war costs & diplomatic isolation

The trend following the oil-crisis was a general decline in world trade, and particularly in expansion of industries like the steel industries.²⁶¹ How impactful this was in the ferrochrome

²⁵⁸ Smil 2006, p.90

²⁵⁹ Crowson 1978, p.52

²⁶⁰ Crowson 1978, p.51

²⁶¹ Smil 2006, p.89

trade is debatable, as much literature points to the ferrochrome trade as rather valuable, with rising prices until 1979.²⁶² Jolly, contrary to Maull, describes Rhodesian chrome as “remaining low” in 1978, which would indicate that there were fluctuating prices for Rhodesian chrome. Whether this would mean only Rhodesian chrome, or Rhodesian chrome and ferrochrome is unclear.²⁶³ However, it could be describing a situation in which the average price of chrome worldwide was rising, which we know to be the case with Soviet and Turkish chrome for example, leaving Rhodesia behind. Indeed, one could imagine that the Rhodesian chrome prices would need to be lower than that of the other chrome producers, as any importer would take on the risk of being discovered, and would need to go through significant hurdles in order to trade with Rhodesia. The Rhodesian industry was also technologically backwards compared to other producers, relying mostly on older equipment from before UDI and whatever they were able to create domestically.²⁶⁴ From this we can gather that the Rhodesian chrome industry was falling behind in profitability, leaving it more vulnerable to the tightening of sanctions which occurred in 1977.

This is reflected in the 10th UN report, issued in 1978, tells us that Rhodesian chrome exports were likely on a downwards trend, with total estimated value of exported Rhodesian chrome going from \$504m in 1974 to \$411m in 1976 as stated in the 10th report.²⁶⁵ While these numbers at the time could have shown the beginning of a decline after 1975, it was more likely a direct response to the financial crisis, at least in the chrome market.

Still, the Rhodesian economy was constantly growing according to Jolly, but the increasing intensity of the Rhodesian Bush War and the increasing reluctance of south Africa to aid in the fight against sanctions made the costs greater every year, and eventually too much to bear.²⁶⁶ It is clear that the fight against the Patriotic Front was a money drain for Rhodesia, but it was not stopping their determination to continue avoiding sanctions until the beginning of serious peace talks between the US, UK and nationalist leaders around 1977.²⁶⁷ Indeed, according to Jolly, the Bush War was costing the regime around 40% of its national budget in 1978-79, and the economy in general was declining at 5% per year over the last 4 years, opposite to the 8% yearly growth of the 10 years prior.²⁶⁸

²⁶² Maull 1984, p.211

²⁶³ Jolly 1978, p.787

²⁶⁴ Jolly 1978, p.785

²⁶⁵ S/12529, 1978, p.10

²⁶⁶ Jolly 1974, pp.785-787

²⁶⁷ DeRoche 2001, p.252 and Jolly 1978, p.286

²⁶⁸ Jolly 1978, p.287

It could be argued that the large Rhodesian costs was a direct reason why the US had rejoined sanctions and why the peace talks were taking place, as the Rhodesian situation appeared increasingly hopeless after 1975. Still, while peace talks were going on, the Rhodesians continued to fight, and thus a critical part of the strengthening of sanctions would be the increased fervour of the Smith regime, who continuously escalated the Bush War through their investment in modern military equipment and the intensified advances into rebel-controlled areas both within Rhodesia and across the borders of their neighbours in Zambia and Mozambique.²⁶⁹ While Rhodesia was being pressed by independence movements, the Rhodesian friendship with South Africa seemed to buckle as well. The South Africans had allegedly started asking for a surcharge for taking on Rhodesian goods through the country, of around \$20 million USD in 1977, according to an article in the New York Times of Jan. 15th 1978.²⁷⁰

Starting around April, 1977, the UK & US were discussing the idea of creating a solution to the Rhodesian problem, commonly referred to as the Anglo-American Initiative.²⁷¹ The negotiations with all parties started in August 1977. The Anglo-American attempts to create a lasting peace in Rhodesia included the adoption of universal suffrage, investments into a Zimbabwe Development Fund by the US & UK and, decisively, the idea to base the army on the liberation forces alongside the existing military.²⁷² The terms of this settlement were discussed, but the issue of law & order, especially the use of liberation forces as military in the new state, saw the Smith regime withdraw from the Anglo-American negotiations.²⁷³ This happened in December, 1977 and saw the initial roots of an internal settlement absent of foreign involvement between the Smith regime, Muzorewa and Sithole.²⁷⁴ Muzorewa and Sithole were both Zimbabwean nationalists who had previously studied in the USA, and who took a more diplomatic approach than the Patriotic Front, believing that a compromise with the Rhodesian government could be made. Muzorewa was a pastor who had dabbled into politics and taken a leading role in the nationalist cause, and Sithole had been related to the ZANU, but was more moderate than Mugabe, and therefore open to negotiations.²⁷⁵

²⁶⁹ DeRoche 2001,p.206 and S/13759 1980

²⁷⁰ New York Times, 15th Jan. 1978

²⁷¹ DeRoche 2001, p.255 and Windrich 1979, p.295

²⁷² DeRoche 2001, p.253

²⁷³ Ibid, p.255

²⁷⁴ Ibid., p.260

²⁷⁵ Ibid., pp.30, 80

While the discussion of an internal settlement continued between Smith, Muzorewa & Sithole, the situation with the Bush War was worsening. Indeed, recent attacks by the regime against the Patriotic Front had intensified the determination of Mugabe's men to reach independence through guerilla warfare. This was due to the brutal attacks on PF-controlled areas in Mozambique, which killed over 1000 people, including hundreds of women and children.²⁷⁶ While an internal agreement which would theoretically allow for a gradual power change which towards the black majority was struck between the parties mentioned above, it was not accepted by the other African leaders, Mugabe and Nkomo, who did not believe in a settlement where the Smith regime would remain in government.²⁷⁷ Even after an internal settlement was agreed between Muzorewa and Smith, it was rejected by the Patriotic Front and the international community, which did not believe an internal settlement would stop the war.²⁷⁸

5.4 EC reaction to intensified embargo

The US policy change under Carter led to a U-turn on their Rhodesian policy, setting in motion the intensification of chromite sanctions, an initiative which was followed up by the EC. This initiative of intensified chromite sanctions saw lengthy negotiations on the shape and technicalities of such an undertaking, and was discussed internally in the European Commission from spring to autumn 1977. The source material is mainly based on correspondence between the EC delegate to the US, Ferdinand Spaak, and various members of the European Commission. Some of these include European Commissioner of the Internal Market, the Customs Union & Foreign Affairs, Etienne Davignon along with Vice President and Commissioner of the Economic & Financial Affairs, Wilhelm Haferkamp.²⁷⁹ The subchapter will discuss the contents of these negotiations, and seek to investigate the extent of cooperation between the US & the EC in terms of the chromite embargo.

The US plan to introduce blanket certifications was initiated the 18th of March, 1977, while the negotiations with the EC were only started the 1st of May. The US plan allowed a grace period of 90 days, as mentioned in the discussions of 4.5.77, and would seemingly be enforced with or without the EC.²⁸⁰ The initiative would mainly involve any country doing business with the

²⁷⁶Ibid., p.265

²⁷⁷ Ibid., pp. 263-265

²⁷⁸ Ibid, p.263

²⁷⁹ BDT-076-94

²⁸⁰ BDT/076/94

US directly, but adding more countries to the blanket certification system would seemingly require these countries to commit to strict controls similar to the US.

According to the discussions in the Commission, some EC countries, such as West Germany and Italy, were major producers of stainless steel at the time and they were heavily reliant on exporting to the US, and thus applying blanket certifications.²⁸¹ It would seem that there were problems about whether it would be a Community policy, or whether countries would need to join the system on an individual basis. The EC were interested in maintaining a common trade policy, but considering the low need for chrome ores and ferrochrome for those EC member states which were neither large steel or ferrochrome producers. It would not have been in the interests of all nations, and the representative of Ireland pointed out that Ireland already had a national policy of embargo on Rhodesia enacted, seemingly confused about why there was need to put into force more measures.²⁸²

The main points of the discussions are contained within a telex dated 04.05.77 from Spaak to Haferkamp, Davignon & delegations I and III, the delegation of foreign relations and the delegation of Industrial & Technological affairs respectively.²⁸³ In the telex is enclosed the points of discussion, which Spaak describes as the “most difficult problems”, indicating that they would be problematic for the Commission to accept.

A problem would be blanket certification, which seemingly “implies community embargo for ferro chrome and specialty steel from “non-certifying countries”.”²⁸⁴ This would theoretically cause issues with any free trade agreements the Community had with any countries which was shipping ferrochrome or chrome products, such as Sweden, Norway or Algeria, which would be a “flagrant infringement of community obligations”²⁸⁵ However, the US were convinced that these countries would accept certifications.

Chemical testing of all shipments of ferrochrome and chrome from South Africa was also pointed out as a problem. The EC were seemingly more in favour of random sampling, which might be due to the costs associated with chemical testing. This also shows the reduced

²⁸¹ BDT/076/94

²⁸² BDT/076/94, letter from Robert Doyle to Brix Knudsen, 25th May 1977,

²⁸³ BDT-076-94, telex dated 04.05.77

²⁸⁴ BDT-076-94 telex 04.05.77, p.2

²⁸⁵ Ibid, p.2

willingness of EC embargo efforts when compared to the US. The EC also indicated that different laboratory testing methods could be a problem, however the US indicated that similar methods would be accepted.²⁸⁶

The EC also expressed concern with the large amounts of Rhodesian chromite in US stocks, which would give an unfair advantage to US firms, while Community producers would need to certify all exports to the US.²⁸⁷ Scrap imports from the US was considered another problem, due to contents of Rhodesian chrome. US were in favour of an undertaking to allow free imports of scrap metal regardless of origin. This seems to build on the idea that all Rhodesian chrome would be problematic, even when it was known to have been imported prior to the new measures. This can be viewed as an attempt by EC delegates to use whichever objection was available to them in order to stop the changes taking form, as they were seemingly pointing out every possible flaw that was proposed by the US. However, this could of course be due to the EC wanting to extensively analyse any agreement made, in order to rule out any loopholes which might be incorporated in the deal.

EC found the requirement for direct shipments to be problematic, as shipments to the Community would often be smaller, and headed for multiple destinations. This problem could be solved by allowing “breaking of journey, unloading, storage and loading under customs supervision and transit and processing via certifying countries.”²⁸⁸ This was a fair point, as one of the characteristics of chrome shipments is that they often go through multiple ports on their way to a final destination. Especially when shipping from Southern Africa to the EC, it would be more practical to allow for a single ship to dock multiple times, and Germany would be reliant on ships through the Netherlands. Additionally, it would provide another cost issues for the importers, as stricter customs supervision would likely add to costs, in addition to the need for updated certificates and laboratory equipment for testing procedures.

The EC attitudes were seemingly not enthusiastic towards the US proposals. The EC were pushing back on all points that the US proposed in the discussions, which makes it seem like they were not cooperating to their full extent. Considering that several cases of sanctions breaking had been recorded and suspected in Europe, the EC could have been pushing back as

²⁸⁶ *Ibid*, p.2

²⁸⁷ *Ibid*, p.2

²⁸⁸ *Ibid*, p.2

they were aware that stricter sanctions would hurt their ability to import from Rhodesia.²⁸⁹ While the evidence is not enough to conclude with this, it remains a possibility, especially considering the covert ties between the Rhodesian governments and other European governments which were revealed by Flower.²⁹⁰ Many of the problems, such as the import of US scrap metals into the EC and their reluctance to standardized testing methods, seem to be rather insignificant problems which have been used as arguments against the implementation of these measures. While later negotiations would allow for compromise on the situation, the EC seemed to be generally unenthusiastic about a wholesale policy of stricter sanctions.

The document also states that commercial counsellors of interested member states had been informed, and that only one of them, “g.gb.” reacted negatively, questioning the necessity of a common solution and believing individually issued certifications would be sufficient.²⁹¹ The source does not disclose who “g.gb” refers to, but nevertheless it does show that the community were not entirely in unison in their decision to continue entertaining the US initiative. This shows that, in a commercial sense, many of the Community member states were positive to the idea of a certificate program. However, other considerations were also important, and several countries’ representatives made clear their doubts over the issue. Their issues were mostly regarding the availability of massive stocks of Rhodesian chrome for the US to use freely, but also their view of the US as casting suspicion on the EC by asking for stricter measures. This seems rather confrontational when considering the discussions, as the measures indicated, at least on surface level, do not seem entirely unreasonable.

The examination of the proposals by Spaak is interesting, as they show how the member states were seemingly opposed to the increased efforts, seeing the already established sanction measures as satisfactory. Indeed, in a letter dated 3. May 1977, sent to several delegations and the cabinets of Haferkamp & Davignon, he seemingly assesses the US initiative as an affront to the EC’s implementation of the existing UN embargo.²⁹² After outlining the initial proposals of the US to the EC, Spaak writes the following:

“after examination of new proposal, we expressed serious doubts to reach an agreement on this basis, stated that community has long and positive experience in applying embargo.”

²⁸⁹ Jolly 1978, p.387

²⁹⁰ Flower 1987, p.79

²⁹¹ Ibid, p.3

²⁹² BDT-076-94

Governments should find unsubstantiated US suspicions of non-application of embargo by this administration impalatable and would consider US procedures as barrier to trade. [...]the existing US machinery and especially sanctions committee that could deal with any aspects of non-respect of embargo. competition arising from possibility of US firms to be free to use existing stocks without formality whereas importers would have to certify absence of Rhodesian chrome.”²⁹³

This quote seems to be an assessment of the EC delegation to the US, as the letter was sent to the divisions in Brussels led by Haferkamp and Davignon. The letter shows that the EC were clearly unhappy with the way discussions with the US had taken place. The argument of barriers of trade is an argument which could be discussed further, which it did in the end as we will see. However, in these early discussions it seems like this was taken as an affront to the EC for their handling of the sanctions so far, even though they themselves believed they did a good job. This seems like an unnecessary reaction to an arrogant belief that sanctions were working, even when there were several examples of them not, as noted in previous chapters. In my view, these “unsubstantiated” claims were not meant to be an attack on the EC handling of sanctions, but rather an acknowledgement that more needed to be done, which is in line with the US foreign policy under Carter, who sought to end the Smith regime and efficiently return to UN sanctions.²⁹⁴

One could argue that the EC were focusing too much on the past, both in how they themselves had handled sanctions and how they focused on the US benefit of large stockpiles. They were too busy focusing on the US’ perceived insult to their handling of the situation, ignoring the actual objective of tightening sanctions to end the Rhodesian regime.

5.4.1 Ferrochrome production in South Africa: Why blanket certifications would work

The difference between South African ferrochrome and Rhodesian ferrochrome was the chromium content, with Rhodesian chrome ore naturally containing more chromium than the South African. This was the basis of the chemical testing proposed by the US in discussions with the EC, as the level of chromite would automatically determine its origin. A letter from Spaak to the relevant delegates as of 2.6.77 showed that ferrochrome containing more than 60%

²⁹³ BDT-076-94

²⁹⁴ DeRoche 2001, pp. 1-2, pp.246-255

chrome would be subject to an investigation, which could theoretically grant an exception.²⁹⁵ This agreement would create a stronger cooperation between the US and the EC, and the document also states that the two entities agreed on a “*procedure of administrative cooperation*” in order to “*ensure the effective implementation of the embargo*”²⁹⁶. Nevertheless the renewed embargo was not implemented until a further 4 months following this telex, due to objections on the grace period by numerous EC countries, which will be discussed later in the text.

South African ferrochrome producers were almost exclusively producing low-carbon ferrochrome at the time of the discussions above. This is backed up by a report of the EC Ministry of Mines dated 9.6.77.²⁹⁷ The report states that one of the companies investigated, Palmiet, had adopted a Swedish style of production which made it possible for them to produce high-carbon ferrochrome with the lower grade South African ores (charge chrome).²⁹⁸ This technique had been in use for the period 1966-71, while the US were still actively applying sanctions, but were abandoned in favour of cost following the Byrd Amendment. Thus, there were no large-scale producer of high-carbon ferrochrome in South Africa, with the exception of the Grassvally Mine in the north of South Africa, which had a trade agreement with Japan until 1980 according to the report.²⁹⁹

A note dated 4.7.1977 from Mr. Pingel, who was director of the Administration of the Customs Union, to Viscount Davignon tells us the general EC stance on the testing procedures that were set to be implemented.³⁰⁰ The note discusses the agreement reached, in which it is mentioned that there were some problems with the system. The 113 Committee, a committee which was tasked with deciding on whether or not new legislation would break with the common trade policy of the EC, had several legal and administrative problems, according to Pingel. Some member states, Italy, Ireland and the Benelux, had “doubts if existing embargo legislation on Rhodesian goods covered ferrochrome manufactured from Rhodesian chrome ore.”³⁰¹ Several

²⁹⁵BDT/076/94, 2.6.77

²⁹⁶ Ibid.

²⁹⁷ BDT/076/94 9.6.77

²⁹⁸ Ibid.

²⁹⁹ Ibid.

³⁰⁰ BDT 076/94, 4.7.1977

³⁰¹ Ibid

Community members also alleged that they would not be able to accommodate a certification system “within the existing systems in all Member States.”³⁰²

5.4.2 Postponements of certification efforts

The implementation of the certificate program saw multiple postponements, seeing the transitional time of the programme moved from March 18th to October 18th. The initial postponements came during the negotiations of the treaty, which would make sense. The start of negotiations contained in the folder only starts at the beginning of May 1977, while the US proposal included a start date much before that. However, several EC countries pushed for later dates. There were two main reasons for this according to the source material; namely difficulties in the physical implementation of a testing system, but also the regard to third countries. Many member states were concerned that the implementation of a certificate system would cause barriers of trade between the EC and third countries, due to the need for increased documentation and effort to clear a shipment of ferrochrome. Indeed, the definitive date of entry for the certification efforts would be the 28th of July, according to a telex dated 29.6.77 from Brix Knudsen* to the Washington Delegation.³⁰³ Still, the EC were insisting on a transitional period until 18th of September, and even then required that there “must be no discrimination between member states”, and that “the new procedures will come into force gradually in member states, but we can give no specific dates”.³⁰⁴

This makes it seem like the EC were demanding a large amount of flexibility on a subject that should be relatively straight forward. This shows that the different EC countries had different priorities, as the countries which were not major importers of chrome products would not have any particular incentive to be involved in the negotiations. On the other hand, the largest chrome importers; Italy, West Germany and France, could have seen the transitional period as an opportunity to import chrome without the extra measures required by the agreement. However, the source material scarcely separates between the different member states’ opinions, so this can only be regarded as speculation.

³⁰² Ibid

³⁰³ BDT 076/94, 29.6.1977 and The European Union Encyclopedia and Directory 1999, Europa Publications

*What the role of Brix Knudsen is, is hard to tell, as I was not able to find any information about his work in the 1970s. However, Per Brix Knudsen was mentioned as an EU director responsible for the co-ordination and fraud prevention in 1999. From the letter in question, it would seem that Brix Knudsen was the Danish representative to the EC.

³⁰⁴ Ibid.

The EC ferrochrome industry was at a “very critical point” in 1977, according to the appendix to a telex dated 24th October, 1980 on the overreliance on ferrochrome imports, sent from F. Braun, who I have been unable to identify, but was seemingly involved in EC industrial strategy, to Davignon.³⁰⁵ The appendix also discusses the measures taken by the EC industry to combat the poor performance of the industries. The EC had stopped producing charge chrome, lowered their industrial capacity from 300 000 tons to 120 000, initiated anti-dumping measures towards South Africa and Sweden, and convinced the steel industries to import a percentage of EC ferrochrome at higher than market prices. While these measures worked initially, the ferrochrome market would struggle again in 1980, following Zimbabwean addition to zero-duty quotas and a lowered US steel consumption.³⁰⁶

This shows that the EC had moved away from producing charge chrome following the implementation stricter sanctions measures. This would indicate that the EC producers would need higher quality chrome, as charge chrome was based on high-carbon ores which were found in South Africa. The ores in Rhodesia would be suitable in this case, as well as those ores found in the Soviet Union, which were both considered to be high quality. What this means is that they would need to be more reliant on one of these countries for their needs of chrome ores, and even if they would trade with South Africa it would be even more likely that Rhodesian ores were shipped. Together with the critical situation of the industry, this could provide an incentive to slow down discussions, especially if they were aware that their firms relied on potentially Rhodesian goods from South Africa.

Another issue is the cost of production, which seemed to be a problem for the EC countries. Indeed, as mentioned earlier in the chapter, the general trends of the ferrochrome industry was moving towards localized production, making use of comparative advantages to create cheaper, high quality ferrochrome products in developing countries. This led to the costs of production for the EC producers to be too high in comparison to the competition, which is made clear in a complaint from the EC ferrochrome producers regarding anti-dumping measures against Sweden and South Africa, dated 26th of June, 1978.³⁰⁷ While it is not mentioned if this is an organisation or a group of some kind, it is implied that the letter represents the combined

³⁰⁵ BDT 110/086/C196, 24.10.80

³⁰⁶ BDT 110/086/C196

³⁰⁷ SEC(78)2772, 26/7/78

interests of the EC ferrochrome producers.³⁰⁸ The note shows that the production costs of the EC industries, contained in West Germany, Italy and France, was too high to compete. The sales prices had also dropped by around 30% from 1975 to 1978 in the EC markets, the results of which were that the EC ferrochrome industry was generally selling at 20-30% less than their operation cost. This tells us that the EC producers were in a period of economic hardship while they were discussing certification efforts with the US. This could support an argument of cost issues. Indeed, there are 3 theoretical issues with the cost that could come forward following the special certificate program:

1. There would likely be higher transportation costs, as the certificate would need to contain more accurate information than before and there would need to be supervision of port security at all times when loading. This would require more labour, and thus higher costs. Also, the certificate program would restrict vessels from loading at multiple ports, and trading with third countries who were not part of the certificate program would be a problem in this regard, incurring more testing procedures and having higher documentation needs.³⁰⁹
2. The actual cost of testing chrome shipments would also be an additional cost. The cost of this would be 60\$ per shipment, as mentioned in a letter from Spaak regarding the negotiations on certification.³¹⁰ While the cost of this would thus be relatively low when compared to the cost of an entire shipment, which would usually be several thousand tons, it is nevertheless an additional expense, which could create additional barriers to trade and affect a struggling EC industry.
3. The last point would be the potential loss of cheap imports. While we know that the EC countries were all a part of the UN sanctions against Rhodesia, we also know that many cases of sanctions breaking were related to industries in Europe.³¹¹ Indeed, there is a high chance that at least some of the ferrochrome plants in France, Italy and West Germany were to some capacity knowingly smuggling chrome ore from Rhodesia. While this is only speculation, it would explain the lack of interest of some countries in the discussions on certificate programs, and the pushback of several EC countries to US proposals.

³⁰⁸ Ibid.

³⁰⁹ BDT/051/90

³¹⁰ BDT/076/94

³¹¹ S/11597 1975, p.2

Considering the downturn in the ferrochrome industry of the EC, it is thus likely that the industry and its representatives would be against the imposition of stricter measures on the import of chrome ore, as it would lead to additional hardships for an already struggling industry. With that said, the economic downturn would lead to losses regardless, as the EC production of ferrochrome had been completely dependent on chromite imports for a long time, and would thus be at a disadvantage no matter. With the development of the worldwide trade, it would seem that the industry would eventually need state intervention like the anti-dumping measures of 1978 regardless of the implementation of certificates.

5.5 Certificates in action: Effects in the UN Security Council Reports

The certificate program and its clauses were efficiently implemented by 1978, at which point the European Communities were involved in a case involving a suspected sanctions breaking by the Netherlands and Germany. This case was discussed in the 12th report of the Committee on UN Resolution 253, where it was suspected that a shipment of ferrochrome had made it through the new system in order to arrive in Germany. After all documentation had been sent by the Commission of the European Communities Delegation to the United Nations, it became clear that the shipment was not likely of Rhodesian origin. This was namely due to the fact that chemical analysis had been conducted on the shipment, proving that it was likely of South African origin due to the composition of the metal.³¹²

This case shows how the chemical testing of the ferrochrome in question allowed the Committee to efficiently analyse the situation and come to a conclusion. It also shows that the European Communities were seemingly taking the certification efforts more seriously. Other than this example, no European country was named in the reports, implying that the tightening of the embargo protocols by the US and EC was successful at deterring attempts to import from Rhodesian sources. At the same time, the case could be that the system was still poorly functioning, with the negotiations and systems being put in place being merely surface level, with illicit trade still being conducted under the table, although this would be unlikely given the US dedication to have an agreement in place.

³¹² S/13750, 1980, p. 38

5.6 Community ferrochrome industry under threat: Anti-dumping protocols following Zimbabwe's independence

The Smith regime officially fell following the elections of January 1980, after a deal was reached at the Lancaster House on December 21st 1979 between the British, the Smith regime and Mugabe's Patriotic Front.³¹³ This deal would lead to the end of sanctions, but this would not be the end of problems in chrome industries. Indeed, over the period of UN sanctions following UDI, the Rhodesians had developed a strong ferrochrome industry, which was to be taken into use by the new Zimbabwe. After having been serving secretly for almost 15 years, the industry would finally be able to be traded legally, which would lead to a strong export economy, such as with its ferrochrome industry. What effect did the Zimbabwean independence have on EC foreign reliance?

Following the independence of Zimbabwe, as part of the negotiations for independence, the UK had promised to invest into the country. And due to their mineral wealth they were also invited to join the Lomé-system, and the newly established SYSMIN. This system was established as a way for the EC to ensure their supply of minerals by aiding in the development of mining infrastructure in African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries. SYSMIN was introduced in the negotiations for Lomé II, and the newly formed independent Zimbabwe was allowed to the negotiating table. The demands from Zimbabwe was the addition of chrome to the list of critical minerals, which made its way into the final version of the first SYSMIN agreement.³¹⁴ While SYSMIN was designed to aid the developing nations within the ACP to create stability for their exports, it was also designed to allow EC countries a stable supply of strategic minerals to fuel their industries. However, this came at a cost for the EC ferrochrome industry, which was now competing with Zimbabwean producers of ferrochrome, who were willing to ship their ferrochrome for cheap, pricing out the Europeans.³¹⁵

The addition of chrome into the SYSMIN agreement did, however, expose the overreliance of the EC on sources of ferrochrome outside of its own industry. An example of this would be the EC correspondence regarding the implementation of new anti-dumping procedures, similar to those introduced in 1978.³¹⁶ The source is a description of the situation of European ferrochrome producers, and in particular how they were being priced out of the market by

³¹³ DeRoche 2001, p.285

³¹⁴ BDT 260/94, Draft ACP Proposal, 21st May 1979

³¹⁵ BDT 110/086/C196, 24.10.1980

³¹⁶ *Ibid.*

ferrochrome producers of Southern Africa. The note, dated 24th of October 1980, makes it clear that there is a belief that the EC ferrochrome industry “is practically condemned to die”³¹⁷ The document describes that the anti-dumping measures of 1978 had given the Community producers a relatively stable market, but states that newer, more aggressive approaches by particularly the Southern African zone had created more problems for the EC industries.³¹⁸ The main culprit was described as Zimbabwe, a country which had recently gained independence and had started “launching increased quantities (of ferrochrome) on the European markets at excessively low prices”³¹⁹

The report states that the EC ferrochrome producers were struggling to keep up with foreign prices, putting forward Zimbabwe as the main culprit. The lifting of the embargo against Rhodesia and the treatment of Zimbabwe as a developing country with lower customs duties left Zimbabwe in a position to exploit the European market, as they had a very large production capacity following independence, at more than the size of France and West Germany combined.³²⁰ It is also noted that the Zimbabwean policy following their independence revolved around exploiting their large production capacity and cheap production costs to flood the market with cheap chrome ore and drowning out the competition.³²¹

The report discussed the different methods that could be useful in order to combat the problem of Zimbabwean dumping in the EC. The four methods would include anti-dumping measures that would intrinsically cause problems between the ferrochrome and steel producers, as the EC steel producers might react negatively to having to pay a higher price for their chrome imports. Another solution would have been to find an agreement between the EC producers and the ones in Zimbabwe and South Africa. This solution would also be problematic, as the document speculates that it could lead to a cartel situation, while it would also lead to a negative reaction from EC steel producers. The last option was seen as the most favourable one, and the one which would be initiated. This option would call for EC steel producers to acquire 20% of their ferrochrome ores from other EC sources, with 80% being allowed to be imported from outside

³¹⁷ *Ibid*,

³¹⁸ *Ibid*.

³¹⁹ *Ibid*.

³²⁰ *Ibid*.

³²¹ *Ibid*. p.2

of the Community. This would still lead to closure of some EC facilities, but would safeguard the ferrochrome industry as a whole, while satisfying the needs of the steel industry.³²²

Why were the EC so enthusiastic to get Zimbabwe into SYSMIN? When considering the mineral wealth of Zimbabwe, it is not hard to imagine. Indeed, the country was producing so much raw ore that was necessary for heavy industries, and especially in regards to chrome, the EC were expanding, as mentioned in Chapter 5.1. Zimbabwe on its side would benefit from greater investment opportunities, and would be protected from market swings through subsidies by the EC. As it turns out, the amount of ferrochrome produced by Zimbabwe would be problematic for the EC producers, however the steel industry would be very happy with this, as they would gain access to cheap raw materials within the zero-duty quota. This sees a divide between the EC involvement in ACP ferrochrome trade and EC ferrochrome industry, as the EC anti-dumping laws were essentially keeping their ferrochrome industry artificially alive by introducing anti-dumping measures, which would become increasingly difficult as the growing trend of vertical integration among chrome-exporting nations would continue.

5.7 Discussion

The change in policy towards Rhodesia from 1977 onwards was a step in the right direction for the end of the regime, but a destructive chapter for both EC and US ferrochrome producers. While the new-found interest of the US to reinstate chrome and ferrochrome imports showed that the US were prepared to turn the tide in Southern Africa, the EC reluctantly accepted stricter sanctions enforcement. Perhaps this reluctance was a desperate attempt to keep their ferrochrome industries going, perhaps for feelings that the US were judging them for inefficiently applied sanctions. We know that discussions on stricter sanctions coincided with the dwindling of EC ferrochrome industry, and one can imagine that the state of the industry would have a bearing on their decision to postpone the measures, perhaps only to secure other channels of imports before entering an agreement stopping Rhodesian ores. Nevertheless, the EC ferrochrome industry was on the decline, with anti-dumping measures following both in 1978 and 1980, and the trend of outsourcing ferrochrome production seemed to be inevitable for the European Community industry.

³²² BDT 110/086, p.3-4

6 Conclusion

The thesis has attempted to give discussion on the Western response to the difficulties of the ferrochrome trade following the UN declaration of mandatory sanctions against Rhodesia in 1968. The thesis has looked deeper into the nature of the ferrochrome trade between the West and Rhodesia, and has attempted to answer the following questions:

To what extent did the Western response to the UN sanctions revolve around chromite- and ferrochrome-trade? And what impact did the UN sanctions have on Rhodesia's production patterns and export of ferrochrome?

The US response was directly related to chrome imports, although the response of their industry suggested that this was counterintuitive. The Byrd Amendment staying in force for as long as it did, despite its apparent harm to the economy, indicates that the Amendment was more of a political tool to keep Rhodesia going than for their own gain until the U-turn of Carter.

The European response was, at least officially, to conform to sanctions, although the breaches of the sanctions system has been regarded as an openly kept secret by previous research. In Chapter 5, the sources tell us that the EC made it hard for the certificate deal with the US be implemented swiftly, believing the US were insinuating that the EC were purposefully not following sanctions, leading to prolonged discussions. This shows what could be interpreted as unwillingness from the EC to commit to swift negotiations about stepping up the sanctions efforts, and considering the deep roots of Rhodesian connections as discussed previously, this could be caused by Rhodesian ferrochrome imports into Europe. It would be hard to prove that this be the case with the facts we have available for this thesis, but the discussions do in any way reinforce the general feeling that the Commission of the EC were not particularly bothered with the Rhodesian problem as a whole. Still, it is certain that the EC were not strictly enforcing sanctions as shown by the many cases of breaches involving EC businesses, and the conspiracy-like dealing of RISCO with EC producers, despite their official adherence to the UN Resolutions.

While their exact motivations for the lax enforcement remain unclear, we do know that EC domestic production of ferrochrome was declining throughout the late 1970s, together with the US. The importance of domestic productions of ferrochrome were presumably affected by the global recessions, as the general steel consumption of the West fell in accordance with the

economic crisis of the mid-1970s. The EC consumption of steel, was, however, increasing in the years before 1980, and together with a declining domestic production of ferrochrome, the EC resorted to imports for the most part of their needs.

What is especially interesting to note here is the EC's own ambitions in commodity markets, as they had outlined a Community strategy of diversification of resources.³²³ And still, their chrome resources were almost entirely generated through South Africa, as explained in Chapter 3. This would mean that the EC were either straying from the general aims they had set for themselves in 1975 for their future mineral procurement strategy, or the governments were, knowingly or unknowingly, importing chrome and ferrochrome ores from Rhodesia through South Africa. This is evidenced by the many different reports of minerals being shipped to EC ports, as well as the large amount of imports from South Africa experienced by the EC.

The examples from the UN reports in Chapter 4 shows the ease at which countries could circumvent sanctions, as few cases were definitely closed, with most of the cases being dismissed as "mistakes" or the provision of documents were delayed long enough that it was impossible to act upon the information that the Committee had gathered. It is not hard to imagine that the responding EC governments used this uncertainty to covertly access Rhodesian markets, or feigned ignorance when trading with South Africa.

Throughout this thesis, the sympathies from some EC states, namely Italy, France and the UK as well as the US, has become quite clear, which is supported by Mlambo's claim that sympathies towards Rhodesia was a part of why sanctions in general were applied, and DeRoche's descriptions of US sympathies for Rhodesia.³²⁴ Warson also mentions this in the case of France, as they had long been building relations with Rhodesia to gain influence in an increasingly decolonised Africa, focusing on a more ideological connection with Rhodesia from the EC, which is not discussed in Commission discussions, but nevertheless suggests that Rhodesian propaganda and ideological allies in the West helped undermine sanctions.³²⁵

Dependence on Rhodesia was not a problem on a global scale, as seen with the trade numbers of other countries, such as US-USSR trade and the position of competitors like Turkey, Albania.

³²³ COM(75) 50, p.7

³²⁴ Mlambo 2019, p.374 and DeRoche 2001, p.145

³²⁵ Warson 2015

The rising amount of ferrochrome production would lead to making Rhodesian trade in the late 70s less relevant regardless, and with their diplomatic isolation, there only reasons to trade with Rhodesia would have been due to costs, which were still similar to South African prices, or to support the regime. Trading with South Africa was also risky, as Rhodesian ores were hard to identify, particularly before blanket certifications were introduced. The continued trade with South Africa even when there was relatively large chance that the metals they would gain were of Rhodesian origin, shows that the EC were either not bothered by the chance to import Rhodesian chrome, or were intentionally doing it. While the argument can be had that there were no other realistic options on the world market, there was the possibility of opening up to trade with the Soviet Union or smaller suppliers. The UK not vetoing the suggestion to threaten sanctions in South Africa when the UN discussions in 1972, and the French abstention as the notable EC abstention, shows that the Rhodesian question was not taken seriously, perhaps due to the knowledge of Western countries of the possible consequences of an embargo on 99% of the world's reserves of chromite.³²⁶ Thus, even if the EC countries were not intently breaching sanctions, they were certainly not afraid of trading with South Africa, who was knowingly the “partner in crime” of Rhodesia.

The Byrd Amendment was not as influential as what has been previously believed. The Byrd Amendment would not change a lot about the Rhodesian situation, as the US were acting in the interests of Union Carbide, and did not expand trade with Rhodesia. The Rhodesian regime had been eagerly rounding sanctions since long before the Byrd Amendment was in force, with a constantly growing economy according to UN sources.³²⁷

It can be argued that the end of the Smith regime came about partly due to the renewed US initiatives as a mediator of peace in the wake of revoking the Byrd Amendment. The US were able to withdraw the Byrd Amendment after discussions in the US Senate had swayed most supporters of the amendment, after presenting the facts about the US economic relation with Rhodesia which had been apparent since 1972: The US were not as reliant on Rhodesia as it had been argued by the Union Carbide lobby in Congress.³²⁸ This became particularly apparent in the overproducing ferrochrome markets in the late 1970s, which made the Byrd Amendment

³²⁶ Crowson 1978, p.47

³²⁷ Up until 1974, no major jumps were recorded following the Byrd Amendment, and in 1974 all Rhodesian trade statistics seized to be shared with the global community.

³²⁸ Congress meetings 1973. and DeRoche 2001, p.162

entirely obsolete. The Amendment was revoked in 1977, at which point the US reinstated sanctions and urged other countries, including the EC, as discussed in chapter 5, to tighten security measures.

The turnaround of US foreign policy on Rhodesia during Nixon's reign was heavily influenced by the chromite lobby. I would argue that the US reinvolved and their major role in the last couple of years before Zimbabwe became independent came about directly (but not exclusively) due to the lower need for chrome ore in the global markets following the trends of producer-exporters of ferrochrome. The EC were also affected by this, however the EC growth rates were much higher than that of the US, and this could indicate that the EC were still reliant on Rhodesia, despite pursuing more diversified imports.

The EC were likely to be importing a lot of chrome from Rhodesia as well, as they had done in other markets. France had continued supplying the Rhodesians with weapons and vehicles up until at least 1974.³²⁹ The difference being that the blatant sanctions breaking of the US was out in the open, and therefore more interesting to the global community, than the covert operations of other countries. The RISCO case was also a strong and severe example of EC conspiracy, with contacts within large business in both Germany, France and Austrian Steel industries. The fact that this case had been brewing for as long as it did before being exposed, proves that it would be possible for there to have been other cases which were never exposed, which could have taken advantage of the frankly lazy enforcement of embargo by most governments and the stringent Beira patrol, in order to gain cheap materials for their industry.

The research for this thesis has certainly revealed that breaches of the Rhodesian sanctions, while being majorly influenced by chrome production and export trends, were not exclusively controlled by these trends. While there was a large probability that there was a lot of illegal trade between Rhodesia and the EC, there exists little definitive proof of this, due to the lack of transparency in the chrome trade. The sanctions were also majorly affected by Western stances on Rhodesia in the Cold War, and the fear of political instability and the cutting of supply chains would be a reasonable fear for the West to have, considering the war and the perceived Soviet influence. The Byrd Amendment of course had a large influence on the US foreign policy in Southern Africa, but its effectiveness was limited, and it only discredited the UN further in its

³²⁹ Mlambo, p. 379

efforts to bind Rhodesia. The EC ferrochrome industry was also certainly affected by the sanctions, and I would say that there is a likelihood that Rhodesian trade had been going unnoticed for much of the sanctions regime, however diversified EC trading partners and the declining Rhodesian economy and market share in the face of a growing South African ferrochrome industry saw any sanctions busting attempts fail in the late 1970s.

What is different in my research? The Byrd Amendment and US policy has been extensively researched already, but the EC stance on the special certificates has been a new addition here. The focus on EC strategy shows that the EC did not treat Rhodesia as a serious problem, but were not following the US example of straight defying sanctions. On a whole, they seemed to be perfectly content with sitting still, and ignoring the breaches taking place within the Community. This is reflected in slow and unhelpful EC responses to UN investigations, their silence in UN Security Council meetings, and their negative reactions to US discussions on stricter sanctions. The EC and US reactions to sanctions seem to be opposites until the late 1970s, at which point the US insistence on stricter sanctions caused a common policy, which would allow for the eventual end of sanctions.

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8 th report	1976	S/11927
9 th report	1977	S/12265
10 th report	1978	S/12529
12 th report	1980	S/13750
Special Report on RISCO	15 th January, 1975	S/11597
Special report nr.2	15 th April, 1973	S/10920

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