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Euroscepticism in the political culture of Norway and Switzerland

A Comparative Case-study Analysis.

Bachelor's thesis in European Studies

Supervisor: Carine Germond

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ABSTRACT

This bachelor thesis is a qualitative, comparative paper on Euroscepticism in the political culture of Norway and Switzerland. The questions I seek to answer are *What kind of Euroscepticism exists in Norway and Switzerland? To what extent is Euroscepticism prevalent in the political culture of these two countries?* And if it is prevalent, why is that? I analyse this using multiple comparative case study analysis and motivational typologies of Euroscepticism. The motivational typologies I focus on are political- and cultural Euroscepticism. Based on the results from the European Values Study 2017, I find that both types can be found in both cases based on political systems, political history, and national identity. My discussion leads me to conclude that Euroscepticism is prevalent in both Norway and Switzerland, although they differ in reasons.

SAMMENDRAG

Denne bacheloroppgaven er en kvalitativ, komparativ artikkel om euroskeptisisme i den politiske kulturen i Norge og Sveits. Spørsmålet jeg ønsker svar på er *hvilken type euroskeptisisme finnes i Norge og Sveits? I hvilken grad er euroskeptisisme til stede i den politiske kulturen i disse landene? Og hvis det er til stede, hvorfor?* Jeg analyserer dette gjennom å bruke en komparative fler-case-studie, og motivasjonstypologier av euroskeptisisme. Motivasjonstypologiene jeg setter søkelys på er politisk- og kulturell euroskeptisisme. Utifra resultatene fra European Values Study 2017, finner jeg at både politisk- og kulturell euroskeptisisme baseres på politisk system, politisk historie og nasjonal identitet. Min diskusjon leder meg til å konkludere med at euroskeptisisme er til stede i både Norge og Sveits, men den baseres på ulike ting.

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List of abbreviations

BA – Bilateral Agreement

CFSP – Common Foreign- and Security Policy

EC – European Community

ECSC – European Coal and Steel Community

EEA – European Economic Agreement

EFTA – European Free Trade Association

ESA – EFTA Surveillance Authority

EU – European Union

EVS – European Values Study

FTA – Free Trade Agreement

FRP – Fremskrittspartiet

MDSD – Most Dissimilar System Design

MSSD – Most Similar System Design

RQ – Research Question

SPP – Swiss Peoples Party (SVP in German)

UKIP – United Kingdom Independence Party

VCR – Values, political Cultural and Rural society

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1. Introduction

Norway and Switzerland are two rich, small countries closely related to - and geographically close to- the European Union (EU), still refraining from being a full member. Norway is located at the northern periphery of Europe as a continent, while Switzerland is located at the heart of the continent. In relation to the EU, Norway is a very close associate, while Switzerland is only an economic partner to the union. This, bachelor thesis is a comparative multiple case study analysis of Norway and Switzerland and aims at establishing whether there exists political- and/ or cultural Euroscepticism in their respective political cultures. By *political culture*, I mean “[t]he sum of individual values and norms regarding politics and the political system, or the culture of a group which gives shared meaning to political action” (Hague, et al., 2019, p.200).

Thus, my research questions are: *What kind/s of Euroscepticism exist/s in Norway and Switzerland? To what extent is Euroscepticism prevalent in the political culture of these two countries? And if it is prevalent, why is that?* By using a theoretical framework of motivational typologies of Euroscepticism - presented by Leconte (2010), Skinner (2012) and Sørensen (2008), mainly political and cultural Euroscepticism, I seek to find meaningful answers to these questions. Based on arguments presented by Eriksen and Fossum (2015), one could claim that political Euroscepticism can be found in the democratic implications and issues of sovereignty in the relationship with the EU (Eriksen & Fossum, 2015). Culturally, Euroscepticism in both cases can be traced to a historically founded anti-Europeanism in Norway (Neumann, 2001; Neumann, 2009; Archer, 2000) and in Switzerland (Church, 2004). Additionally, in Norway and Switzerland cultural Euroscepticism can be based on a fear of a diminished national identity. In the former the focus is on linguistic concerns (Neumann 2001), while in the latter, the focus is on the three core ideas of Swiss national identity – federalism, direct democracy and neutrality - , together with religious and ethnocentric regards (Theiler, 2004; Christin & Trechsel, 2002; Church, 2004). Though, as will be shown throughout this thesis, these two types of Euroscepticism can be hard to distinguish, especially when talking about national identity.

Initially, there is no literature specifically relating to motivational typologies of Euroscepticism in the political culture with Norway and Switzerland compared at once (to my knowledge). Though there is in fact a variety of literature that compare the two countries on matters concerning the EU and European affairs (Eriksen & Fossum, 2015; Skinner, 2013). Moreover, there is also some literature about party-based Euroscepticism in Norway (Archer, 2000; Leruth, 2018; Fossum, 2021), and in Switzerland (Schimmelfennig, 2021; Sarrasin, et al., 2018). Party-based Euroscepticism is scepticism found in the political parties of a country, for example United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) in Great Britain.

After searching on Euroscepticism in relation to Norway as a case, there seems to be a consensus of Norway as a hard Eurosceptic state, though there is a lack of explaining why that is. The literature is often based on the result of the two referendums (Archer, 2000; Nielsen, 2018; Raunio, 2007; Holst, 1975; Neumann, 2001). In addition, Norway is seldom researched in a single-case study when it comes to Euroscepticism. Rather there are various multiple-case study articles focusing on Scandinavia (Nielsen, 2018) or the Nordic countries (Raunio, 2007; Leruth, 2018). There is only a very little amount directly linked to Euroscepticism in the public opinion and political culture in Norway (Skinner, 2012; Skinner, 2013; Raunio, 2007). Marianne Skinner writes explicitly about Norwegian Euroscepticism, with an emphasis on the VCR-model – “Values, political Culture and Rural society”, using discourse analysis (Skinner, 2012, p.422).

When it comes to Switzerland there are some linguistic limitations, in that much of the literature is in German or French, though of what is written in English there are some articles focusing explicitly on Euroscepticism in Switzerland (Church, 2004; Cristin & Trechsel, 2002; Theiler, 2004). In all these articles the political culture and national identity in Switzerland is said to contain three core elements: *federalism*, *direct democracy*, and *neutrality*. These values are also referred to as “*Sonderfall Schweiz*” (Church, 2004, p.277). Clive Church has written a huge number of literatures on Switzerland, ranging from a purely historical aspect (Church & Head, 2013) to a more specific Eurosceptic Switzerland (Church, 2004). Though he somewhat refrains from the use of the term *Euroscepticism* widely in relation to Switzerland because instead he finds a general scepticism towards all international organizations and associational relations (Church, 2004). He claims that “the EU is seen as problematic not just in itself, but as part of a wider threat posed by interdependence to Swiss life and to the country’s traditional world role” (ibid., p.276). In this manner, Church accounts for an anti-European approach to Euroscepticism, while Tobias Theiler, on the other hand, focuses on the origins of Euroscepticism in Switzerland (Theiler, 2004). Last, Cristin & Trechsel attempt to explain the public opinion in Switzerland, demonstrating both Euroenthusiasts and Eurosceptics through four main concepts; (1) national identity embedded in neutrality, federalism and direct democracy, (2) constitutional patriotism due to a lack of common culture, (3) ethnocentrism viewed through the image of neighbouring countries, and (4) threat to national interests (in many ways an utilitarian approach) (Cristin & Trechsel, 2002, pp.417-420).

Thus, I find a lack of focus in the relevant literature, on *why* there exists Euroscepticism in Norway and Switzerland, and especially if the reason behind it, inter alia, can be traced to fear of democratic implications, a history of renunciation of sovereignty for both Norway and Switzerland, and a fear of losing national identity based on general anti-Europeanism. In the literature of my knowledge, if conceptualized in a Norwegian or Swiss context the

focus is either on whether there exists Euroscepticism or not in general, and if so, only on party-based Euroscepticism. This thesis seeks to answer *why* there is Euroscepticism in the political culture, and what type/s of Euroscepticism that is most prominent, and thus contribute to the research of Norwegian and Swiss Euroscepticism in the political culture.

First, I provide a conceptual framework for Euroscepticism, in which I define the term and explain the typologies I will use. Second, the method I use is comparative multiple case study analysis, with Norway and Switzerland as my cases. Third, my primary sources presented in the methods and data section are statistics from the European Values Study (EVS) of 2017, of which I have chosen a handful questions asked in the survey. In the main body of the thesis, I start by presenting these data. In the last section, I analyse the results in relation to political- and cultural Euroscepticism in order to answer my RQs. Finally, I conclude that both types of motivational Euroscepticism exist in Norway and Switzerland, though on a somewhat different ground.

2. Conceptual framework

2.1 Defining Euroscepticism

First, there is no established definition of Euroscepticism across all fields of scholarship, though many have tried to come up with satisfying and sufficient definitions. Although not expressed explicitly as Euroscepticism, in the early days of European integration there existed "opposition to the setting up of a supranational institutional system" (Leconte, 2012, p.43). Though Euroscepticism, as a term, was first introduced in the 1985 in relation to Members of Parliament (MPs) in the British Parliament that was opposed to or had reservations about the then European Community (EC) and European integration (Leruth, et al., 2018, p.4). The first attempt to define Euroscepticism was provided by Paul Taggart, in this British context, who defined it as "the idea of contingent or qualified opposition, as well as incorporating outright and unqualified opposition to the process of European Integration" (Taggart, 1998, p.336). Half a decade later Taggart, with his companion Szczerbiak added a differentiation between hard and soft Euroscepticism, which did not sufficiently satisfy other scholars, because of a perceived lack of "specific criteria of categorization", and the fact that all opposition to the EU or European integration could fall into this soft Euroscepticism (Vasilopoulou, 2018, p.23). Other attempts to solve this problem has been issued by Kopecky and Mudde (2002), who established a categorization as follows: "Euroenthusiasts, Europragmatists, Eurosceptic and Eurorejects", though this is only reserved to party-based Euroscepticism (ibid.).

Theiler (2004) claims that the already "established" explanations of Euroscepticism - economic, elite-centered and ideologically based Euroscepticism - are flawed (Theiler,

2004, p.638). Instead he proposes an alternative explanation of the predictability of Euroscepticism: (1) geographic location and cultural background – northern (anti) vs southern (pro) and Anglo-Saxon/ Germanic (more anti-EU) vs Latin (more pro-EU); (2) political history – “pride and confidence in one’s political system is a strong reason for wanting to leave it untouched”; (3) ethnically, culturally or linguistically plural states where the majority is anti and the minority is pro (Theiler, 2004, pp.639-640).

Furthermore, there are mainly two different kinds of Euroscepticism that have been applied to the literature, and that is party-based Euroscepticism and Euroscepticism in public opinion. Vasilopoulou explains the complexity of Euroscepticism and how the term can be applied in a number of different ways, and with a number of different goals.

“It may be defined in terms of modes of opposition (diffuse, specific), targets of opposition (authorities, regime, community), intensity of opposition (hard, soft), indicators of opposition (principle, practice, future of integration) and type of opposition (utilitarian, sovereignty-based, democratic, social)” (Vasilopoulou, 2018, p.26).

2.2 Typologies of Euroscepticism

For this thesis, I found it interesting and useful to investigate Euroscepticism in the public opinion, using motivational typologies and types of opposition. Here is an overview of the motivational typologies (Skinner, 2013, p.128).

Table 2.1 Motivational typologies.

	<i>Economic</i>	<i>Political</i>	<i>Left-wing values</i>	<i>Cultural</i>	<i>Right-wing values</i>	<i>Rural values</i>
Sørensen (2008)	Utilitarian	Sovereignty-based Democratic	Social			
Leconte (2010)	Utilitarian	Political		Cultural	Value-based	
Skinner (2012)	Utilitarian	Political culture	Postmaterialist values	National identity		Rural society

Source: From Skinner (2013). Different varieties of Euroscepticism? Conceptualizing and Explaining Euroscepticism in Western European Non-Member States.

Sørensen (2008) first introduced a possible way of explaining Euroscepticism in public opinion through the following motivational typology, which included the ideal-types: “utilitarian, sovereignty-based, democratic and social Euroscepticism types” (Skinner, 2013, p.127). As is shown in Table 2.1. Leconte (2010) agreed on utilitarian, but called sovereignty-based and democratic-based, political Euroscepticism (ibid.). In addition, she changed the social variant to cultural and value-based (ibid.). In her book she explains utilitarian Euroscepticism as scepticism towards “the gains derived from EU membership

at individual or country level" (Leconte, 2010, p.43). Moreover, for her, political Euroscepticism referred to "concerns over the impact of European integration on national sovereignty and identity" (ibid.). Furthermore, Leconte explained political Euroscepticism more in depth as "principled opposition or defiance towards the setting up of a supranational institutional system, the delegation of powers to supranational institutions beyond a limited core of policies ... and to the principle of the pooling of sovereignties" (ibid., p.50). In Leconte's classification value-based Euroscepticism referred to scepticism "which denounces EU-'interference' with normative issues"; and last, cultural anti-Europeanism "rooted in a broader hostility towards Europe as a continent" (Leconte, 2010, p.43). Skinner, on her part, classified Euroscepticism in a five-fold categorization, based on; utilitarian, political culture, post-materialist values, national identity and rural society (Skinner, 2013, p.128).

In this thesis, I use parts of Sørensen (2008); democracy-based and sovereignty-based, part of Skinner (2012); national identity and part of Leconte's cultural Euroscepticism; anti-Europeanism. Due to a lack of time and space in this thesis, I will simplify this, by calling the first two political Euroscepticism, and the last two cultural Euroscepticism. As will be evident, political- and cultural Euroscepticism can be hard to distinguish, in this fashion there might be a need to establish a more concrete typology than that proposed by these three authors.

3. Method and Data

3.1 Method

For this thesis, I use qualitative, comparative multiple case study analysis to examine why and to what extent there exists political- and cultural Euroscepticism in the following two cases: Norway and Switzerland. Multiple case study analysis is a method used by a variety of scholars. According to Baxter and Jack, a qualitative case study is used when the researcher wants to explore "a phenomenon within its context using a variety of data sources" (Baxter and Jack, 2008, p.544). In this thesis, this phenomenon is Euroscepticism. Moreover, there are different reasons as to why to choose case study as a method. Among these you can choose it if your research questions contain a "how" or "why" component, or if "you want to cover contextual conditions because you believe they are relevant to the phenomenon under study" (ibid.). According to van Evera, case-studies serves five main purposes: "testing theories, creating theories, identifying antecedent conditions, testing the importance of these antecedent conditions, and explain cases of intrinsic importance" (Van Evera, 1997, p.55). The purpose here is to identify antecedent factors behind the Euroscepticism in Norway and Switzerland. Additionally, in a comparative multiple case study one can either have most similar system design (MSSD),

or most dissimilar system design (MDS) (Møller, 2015, p.101). This kind of method is developed out of John Stuart Mill's "method of difference" and "method of agreement" (Van Evera, 1997, p.57). In this thesis, I will use most dissimilar system design, as I expect there to be both political and cultural Euroscepticism in the political culture of both cases, even though they differ on type of political system, type of government and type of association with the EU.

I chose Norway because of its exceptionally close relationship with the EU despite refraining from membership two times. Similarly, I chose Switzerland as a comparative case, due to its exceptional, isolated character in international relations and the bilateral agreements with the EU. Switzerland is isolated politically in that it is neither a member of the EU nor the European Economic Area (EEA), nor any other international organizations such as NATO, which demonstrates its core idea of neutrality (Blatter, 2015, p.53). Furthermore, there is no integration between Switzerland and the EU, rather a purely economic relation through separate bilateral agreements (BAs) for each policy, a system that is called sectorial bilateralism (ibid., p.55). By 2015, there were 16 bilateral agreements (Lavenex & Schwok, 2015, p.38).

On the one hand, Norway and Switzerland do share a variety of similarities, for example their size and richness, as well as a quite close relationship to the EU, without being a member, although the two cases differ in what kind of relationship they have with the EU. Both of my cases are members of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) which was established in 1960 by the Stockholm Convention as a counterpart to the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) born two years in advance (Schwok, 2009, p.24). The additional, original countries of EFTA were Denmark, the United Kingdom, Austria, Sweden and Portugal (ibid.). Today, Norway, Switzerland, Lichtenstein and Iceland are the only remaining EFTA countries. On the other hand, the two cases are different on three core points; (1) the two countries have different forms of government. Norway is a constitutional monarchy, while Switzerland is a federal state; (2) both countries are in fact democracies, though they differ in democracy-type. Norway is a representative democracy, while Switzerland is a direct democracy; (3) Norway is part of the European Economic Area (EEA), while Switzerland voted no.

3.2 Data

My primary source for this thesis is the European Values Study (EVS), which "is a large-scale, cross-national and longitudinal survey research program on how Europeans think about family, work, religion, politics, and society" (EVS, 2022a). I chose this data for my thesis because it is one of the only large public opinion surveys on EU-related topics that includes data from both Norway and Switzerland alongside the EU member states. Among the relevant areas covered are national identity and politics and society. The first EVS was

performed in 1981, and every nine years since that, a new survey has been conducted by GESIS Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences in Cologne, which is a research organization aimed at providing relevant statistics in the research for scholars in social sciences (ibid.). I chose the EVS 2017 because it is the latest and most updated of these five surveys. Moreover, there were in total 37 participating countries (ibid.). For each participating country, there were separate questionnaires conducted in the relevant national language. For this thesis the relevant questionnaires were in Norwegian for Norway and German and French for Switzerland. Though I will refer to the master questionnaire in English when presenting my data. In the EVS 2017 the number of respondents were 35 489, whereas 1123 answered in Norway and 3660 in Switzerland (ibid.).

Furthermore, the respondents in both surveys were asked about 250 questions each (ibid.) Among these I chose seven questions, shown in five tables, with results relating to this thesis and RQs. I chose the first set of questions because the results would tell us something about a probable political Euroscepticism, while the second set of questions concerns national identity, and thus a possible cultural Euroscepticism. As for the first set, I expect there to be low confidence in the EU because both Norway and Switzerland have opposed EU membership. Consequently, I also expect there to be high levels of both confidence in the government, democratic system and political system in each case. In relation to national identity, I expect that cultural aspects are most important and embedded in Norway, as Switzerland is less coherent culturally.


4. Results

In this section I will concisely present the results from the EVS 2017. First, I present results relating to political Euroscepticism. Second, I present results relating to cultural Euroscepticism and national identity. All questions that I use was based on a scale of 1-4, with 4 being highest level, and 1 being lowest level. Accordingly, the higher the number, the higher the level of confidence/ attachment/ pride/ importance. For the results presented in Table 4.2, the scale was from 1-10, one being total unhappiness and 10 being great happiness. It is to be noted that even though these data might tell us something about the levels of confidence /attachment/ pride/ importance of something, they still do not give us insight into the reasons behind this. As a result, there are some limitations to this data. With that in mind, the data still tell us something about the public opinion on matters relating to political- and cultural Euroscepticism.

The first set of questions are political in nature. Table 4.1 demonstrates political trust (confidence) in the EU and political trust in the governments of the respective countries. Political trust is an important part of the political culture. By *political trust* is meant "[t]he belief that rulers are generally well-intended and effective in serving the interests of the

governed” (Hague, et al. 2019, p.207). Furthermore, “[p]olitical trust in society is an indicator of how well the process of representation works” (Listhaug, 2005, p.836). In the results from the EVS 2017, there is a gap between the Swiss and the Norwegian confidence in the EU. Interestingly, Norwegian confidence in the EU is even higher than the EU average in 2017. The mean score of Norwegian confidence in the EU is 2,4, while in Switzerland it is 2,13. In addition to confidence in the EU, Table 4.1 also shows the levels of confidence in the respective governments of Norway and Switzerland. As is revealed, both Norway and Switzerland scores relatively high on happiness with their government (Norway 2,63; Switzerland 2,74). In this case, Switzerland scores highest with a mean score of 2,74, while Norway has a mean score of 2,63. Anyhow, both sets of results for both countries tell us that the political trust in general is on the plus side.

Table 4.1: Confidence in the EU vs own government



Source: The EVS 2017: Q38 “How much confidence do you have in [the EU] / government in [COUNTRY]?”¹.


Though, the second question that is relevant to this thesis, is concerned with satisfaction with how the democratically each country is governed, as well as satisfaction with the political system. It seems that there is a high amount of happiness in how democratically both Norway and Switzerland are being governed, though the levels of happiness about the political system in each, are surprisingly very low (see Table 4.2). One interesting observation is that both representative democracy in Norway and direct democracy in Switzerland appear to be equally well working. Though the gap percentage between

¹ See list of relevant questions from the questionnaire in annexes. Received from EVS B (2022).

happiness with democracy, and how well the political system is functioning in both countries are almost identically wide, while in the EU average satisfaction with both democracy and the political system are centred in the middle. This means that both Norway and Switzerland fail to accommodate their people’s happiness in their political system.

Theiler claims that political Euroscepticism can be based on the fact that “pride and confidence in one’s political system is a strong reason for wanting to leave it untouched” (Theiler, 2004, pp.639-640). This claim is quite contrary to what the results are telling us because Norway and Switzerland have refrained from being part of the EU, even though the majority of the respondents said that they were closer to unhappy than happy with their own political system. Of course, one needs to think about what the respondents lay in the term political system, as levels of democratic governance and confidence in their governments seems to be distinguished from the term political system. Hence, this question seems to be lacking some clarification. Are they unhappy about the policies of their government? Are they unhappy about the politicians? Are they unhappy about the electoral systems? Therefore, it is a bit confusing to interpret the results of this question. Nevertheless, there seems to be a need for some research in how to improve the happiness with the political system in both cases.

Table 4.2: Happiness with democracy and political system




Source: EVS 2017: Q41 “How democratically is this country being governed today? and Q42 How satisfied are you with how the political system is functioning in your country these days?”.

The following questions chosen are cultural in character and linked to feelings of national identity. Table 4.3 demonstrates percentages of identity feelings surrounding territorial

attachment from the EVS 2017. In Norway the attachment-feelings range highest in all the five territories, while Switzerland had a generally lower attachment on all five variables. Both countries hold strongest attachment to their own country; a mean score of 3,81 attachment to Norway as a country and 3,52 for Switzerland. The attachment to *Europe* is low in both countries. What these numbers show us is that both Norway and Switzerland somehow feel distanced from Europe identity wise, which might support the claim of anti-Europeanism in both countries. Moreover, it seems to be a slight difference in the second choice. The Swiss respondents are more attached to their region than their locality, while the Norwegian respondents are more attached to their locality than their region. This reflects the federal structure of Switzerland.

Table 4.3: Attachment to territory




Source: The EVS 2017: Q45 "How close do you feel to [TERRITORY]?".

The fourth relevant question regarded pride in being a citizen in the given country. The results reveal that Norwegians clearly share both a higher attachment to their country (Table 4.3), as well as a very high level of pride in being Norwegian (Table 4.4.). The same can be said for Switzerland, except to a somewhat lesser degree. In a cross-national study of national pride, performed by Tom Smith and Lars Jarkko in 1998, the respondents were given different factors that can amount in national pride, for example democracy, sports, military and so forth (Smith & Jarkko, 1998). In this study the Norwegian respondents scored generally very high on all factors. The results were presented in percentages of the answers *proud* and *very proud*. The results on the relevant factors for this thesis were 76,3 percent on *democracy*, 72,1 percent on *politics*, 72,2 percent on *history*, and 65,2 percent

on average pride (ibid., p.35). Unfortunately, Switzerland was not included in Smith and Jarkko’s study, so I do not have statistics to show for there. Even so, my point is that pride in having a specific nationality can signify different things, based on each factor presented. Thus, there are some shortcomings in this question as well.


Table 4.4: Pride in being a citizen in [COUNTRY].



Source: The EVS 2017: Q47 “How proud are you to be a [COUNTRY] citizen?”.

Last, the fifth area of interest in the survey, regards determinators of identity with their respective nationalities. There were five different factors or determinators that the respondents could choose from as to explain what is most important for them to determine if a person can count as their fellow countryman or not. Both ancestry and birthplace seem to matter less to determine nationality in both Norway and Switzerland. On the contrary, respect for political institutions and laws in each country, as well as the ability to speak the national tongue, combined with the importance of sharing national culture, are the most prominent nationality determinators (Table 4.5). Hence, one might be inclined to draw the conclusion that in relation to anti-immigration, it is not a racial, ethnical or national issue, but rather a more cultural issue concerned with “lack” of similar religious, linguistical and political culture.

Table 4.5. Determinators of nationality



Source: The EVS 2017: Q53 "How important are the following to determine whether a person is truly [NATIONALITY]?".

In general the Norwegians and the Swisshes score high on political trust in their own governments, and satisfaction with democracy. They share close attachments to their respective countries, which is reflected in a high mean score on national pride. On the contrary, the people are dissatisfied with the function of the political system of their country, although there seems to be an issue with how to define political system. Moreover, the Norwegian and Swiss respondents neither share close ties with Europe as a continent, nor do they have faith in the EU. Thus, based on these results both countries are Eurosceptic, or at least to an extent anti-European. Still, it is left to be seen what the reasons behind this scepticism are. It also remains to be seen whether the political cultures of these countries are politically and/or culturally Eurosceptic.

5. Discussion: political vs cultural Euroscepticism in the Norwegian and Swiss political culture

In the discussion, I will use the results from the EVS 2017, to establish whether there exist political- and/ or cultural Euroscepticism in Norway and Switzerland. The political culture of Switzerland can in short be summed up by these three ideas: neutrality, direct democracy, and federalism. Arguably, all these are political and state-related ideas/ values, thus pertaining to political Euroscepticism, whereas the Norwegian political culture is based on the fight for independence through the othering of Europe and European values. The last is directly linked to cultural Euroscepticism. The results revealed that political trust in the EU is low in both Norway and Switzerland, which might be the foremost indicator of general Euroscepticism in both cases. As will be evident, political- and cultural Euroscepticism can be hard to distinguish, hence I have not structured the discussion around these two parts specifically, rather this section is structured on scepticism towards; (1) democracy and the political system, (2) sovereignty and national pride, and (3) national identity and anti-Europeanness. Arguably, all these contain both political- and cultural Euroscepticism.

5.1 Democracy and the political system

Political Euroscepticism can be reflected in democratic concerns or institutional problems. In this first type of scepticism, regarding democracy and political system, the cases are somewhat similar. Table 4.5 showed that respect for the political system, laws and rules in the respective country is the strongest denominator of nationality. This correlates with what was demonstrated in the Table 4.2, where both Norwegians and Swissses are quite happy with how their countries are being governed democratically, and at the same time they score low on satisfaction with the political system. According to Heywood (2015) a political system "extends far beyond the institutions of government themselves and encompasses all those processes, relationships and institutions through which government is linked to the governed" (Heywood, 2015, p.66). One could define *democracy* as "[a] political system in which government is based on a fair and open mandate from all qualified citizens of a state" (Hague, et al., 2019, p.71). In this manner, there might be a need to differentiate democracy specifically on the one hand; representative vs direct democracy, and the political system in general on the other hand; federalism vs constitutional monarchy. Nevertheless, the results tell us that people are satisfied with the democratic jig saw pieces but displeased with the whole picture of the political system.

In this first instance, both Norway and Switzerland are content with how democratically their countries are being governed (see Table 2.), which is quite striking as Norway and Switzerland differ on type of democracy, in which the Norwegian representative democracy

is most like that of the EU. Representative democracy means that “[g]overnment is left in the hands of professional politicians who are invested with the responsibility for making decisions on behalf of people” (Heywood, 2015, p.146). “Representation in modern democracies can be modelled as a chain of delegation from voters to representatives, from representative to the cabinet, and from the cabinet to ministries and the civil service” (Listhaug, 2005, p.836). Since the Norwegian representative democracy is similar to the EU democratic structure, it is easier for the Norwegian government to implement and integrate into the European system, than for the Swiss government that must hold referendums on every single policy and agreement change.

Therefore, Norway is both politically- and economically integrated with the EU furthestmost through the EEA – as opposed to Switzerland, which is merely economic. In 1994, the dynamic, multilateral EEA came into force, which Switzerland in a referendum refused to join by a marginal majority (Schwok, 2009, p.29). Though for Norway there are some democratic implications with the EEA. Among others, the fact that the Norwegian government decided not to hold a referendum on the EEA, since it was esteemed to concern primarily economic issues, and supposedly not sovereignty, self-determination, or democracy (Fossum, 2019, p.17). In the constitution there are two different clauses; one regarding constitutional cession of sovereignty §26 that demand a 2/3 majority in the Norwegian parliament, that was used in the referendums of 1972 and 1994, and another §93 concerned with less invasive international issues that demand a ¾ majority, that was used in relation to the EEA (Holmøyvik, 2015, p.53)². This reflects a gap between the rulers and the ruled in Norway, which mirrors political Euroscepticism based on a fear of a bigger gap, which reflects the low level of happiness with the political system shown in Table 4.2.

Moreover, Theiler claims that Switzerland is a state without a culture due to its multicultural character, therefore, the institutions and the political structure is what binds the Swiss people together (Theiler, 2004, p.641). This clearly corresponds with Table 4.5, in which respect for the political institutions, rules and laws is the strongest denominator of nationality for both countries. In 1848, Switzerland was “born” with the first constitution which established the political institutions (Church & Head, 2013, p.7). Embedded in the constitution one could find both the construction of direct democracy as the political system, as well as features of federalism as form of government, which has not changed till this day (ibid., p.8). A direct democracy or participatory democracy means that “the citizens themselves [are] able to rule directly, obliterating the distinction between government and the governed and between the state and civil society” (Heywood, 2015, p.146). The most prominent feature of a direct democracy are *referendums*, which can be

² §93 has been changed to §115 in the newest version of the Norwegian constitution. See Lovdata for more information: <https://lovdata.no/dokument/NL/lov/1814-05-17?q=%C2%A7115>

described as “a popular vote on a specific issue which enables electors to make decisions directly, instead of selecting politicians to do so on their behalf” (ibid.). Until this day, the Swiss people remains opposed “to exchange direct-democratic veto rights with rights to be represented in rule-shaping and -making in Brussels, because that would represent a paradigmatic shift from republicanism to liberalism” (Blatter, 2015, p.52). Thus, the political Euroscepticism in Switzerland is based on a fundamental issue, in which the country would have to completely change the democratic structure.

In addition to different forms of democracy, the two cases are also dissimilar when it comes to political structure, which is mirrored in the second choices of territorial attachments in Table 4.3. Switzerland is a federal state consisting of 26 cantons (regions) and 2,500 municipalities (localities) governed by direct democracy (Blatter, 2015, pp.53-54). Switzerland is in fact “the country with the strongest institutionalization” (ibid., p.53). It is decentralized in the sense that all municipalities and cantons have their own competences and resources to govern, and they are also able to hold referendums within their own region (ibid., p.54). “The high degree of decentralization of Swiss government contributes to the scepticism towards European integration” (Pettersen, et al., p.267).

In Norway, the municipalities, and cantons have some autonomy, but most of the important decisions are made in the Norwegian Parliament or the Norwegian Government centred in the capital Oslo. In contrast, Norway is a constitutional monarchy. The Norwegian constitution was written on 17th of May 1814 and counts as the first Norwegian independence (Holmøyvik, 2014, p.43). Though, in many ways, Norway as a nation was not born until 1905, with the first referendum uniting the Norwegians against a union, a greater power and all that had in fact made them less Norwegian, as well as which political structure to count for as the preferred Norwegian alternative to this union (Holst, 1975, p.114). The referendum resulted in a solid majority preferring constitutional monarchy. The constitution established that Norwegian Parliament function as legislative power, the King (in practice his government) to be the executive and the judicial power lay with the High Court (Holmøyvik, 2014, p.43). Hence, in practice Norway is also more similar to the EU based on centralization. Though it is to be noted that Norwegian voters are dissatisfied with this centralization (Pettersen, et al., 1996, p.259).

5.2 National pride, sovereignty, and independence

While democracy and the political structure is the body of the state, national identity and pride, sovereignty and independence is the soul. In Table 4.4 Norwegian national pride scores very high. This might be a result of the Norwegian political history, which is shaped by a variety of different unions, as well as nation building and referendums. The Norwegian political history can be traced to "Norgesveldet" in the mid-1200s, following the common kingship with Sweden from 1319 which culminated in the Calmar Union with Denmark and Sweden from 1387 (Fermann, 2019, p.32). Thenceforth, Norway was forced into a continued union with Denmark from 1380-1814, in a personal union with Sweden from 1814-1905, and occupied by Nazi-Germany from 1940-1945 (ibid., p.33). In fact, for the past 704 years, Norway has only been completely independent for 113 years. I argue that it is important to look at the history, to demonstrate the fact that the word *union* is heavily loaded in a Norwegian context, as signifying being the underdog in a forced relationship with a more powerful part.

"In the fight for the majority of the Norwegian people's votes, the game was actually up when the EC changed its name to the EU. That opened things up for the final brainwash, with the concept of the union as the detergent. For conspicuous historical reasons, it is easier in Norwegian than in any other language to use the word union in order to preclude any pretence to thinking, or remove any trace thereof" (Neumann, 2001, p.123).

Neumann argues that Norway as a nation was built on ideals that originated from Europe, though when Norway left the union with Sweden in 1905, she was built on the pillars of "othering" Europe. One tried to establish a nation contrary to Europe, built on sovereignty, the people and self-governing (Neumann, 2009, p.414). This is further elaborated by Skinner (2012):

"[The] psychological heritage of 500 years of governance of foreign powers [has made] the victories over those hegemony [...] important elements in Norwegian nation-building. They make it rather unattractive to the Norwegians to restrict their hard-won sovereignty by joining a supranational union" (Skinner, 2012, p.427).

Yet, there is a difference in type of union (personal union vs supranational union), which might have been a completely different experience for the Norwegians (Neumann, 2009, p.416). Nevertheless, a high score of Norwegian national pride based on the political history of independence and sovereignty mirrors Euroscepticism and anti-Europeanism, where Europe and the EU are viewed as those to blame for Norwegian, historical subordination. When it comes to sovereignty and self-rule, the cases are less similar. Sovereignty could be defined as "the ultimate source of legitimate authority over the state"

(Knutsen, 2016, p.5). One could argue that both Norway and Switzerland are sovereign states in that they rule with unconditional power within their own territory. What is problematic with both cases, are the costs of sovereignty and independence in relation with the EU. Eriksen and Fossum refer to the relationship as based on voluntarily hegemony/ or voluntarily domination (Eriksen & Fossum, 2015, p.242). As opposed to the Norwegian political history, “[i]t does not involve direct intervention and autocratic submission; it is an arrangement that accidentally inhibits and intimidates the parties” (Eriksen & Fossum, 2015, p.242). This “form of dominance that the associated non-members experience is ... both structural and voluntary” (ibid.). Furthermore, both countries have “willingly marginalised [themselves] as ... passive executor[s]” of EU law (Lavenez & Schwok, 2015, p.36). In addition, Norway especially must follow a great amount of EU laws and rules (130), in which she did not take part in the decision-making process (Fossum, 2019, p.13). These rules and laws are under the supervision of the EFTA Surveillance Authority (ESA), which leaves a great amount of power in the hands of EFTA. Here it is evident that the Norwegian political culture does have political Euroscepticism when it comes to questions of sovereignty and independence.

As for Switzerland, the country does not share the same history of being occupied or ruled by another state, yet the result of Swiss pride also scores high in national pride in Table 4.4. Before reaching the point of the first constitution, Switzerland found herself battling four civil wars between 1444 and 1715, based on religious-, linguistical-, political-, and cultural matters (Church & Head, 2013, p.2). With the constitution, the Swiss people were for the first time bound together as a coherent people, based on the political and governmental structure; federalism and direct democracy. Thus, one might argue that as a country Switzerland is more of a state, while Norway is more of a nation. Moreover, the Swiss proudly proclaim themselves to be a special case, based among other things on the famous Swiss neutrality. This is the case because all the five other states that have proclaimed themselves neutral (Sweden, Finland, Malta, Austria and Ireland), have since joined the EU and the Common Foreign – and Security Policy (CFSP), therefore they cannot be said to be completely neutral, which leaves Switzerland as the only neutral European state. (Morris & White, 2011, p.104). Understandably, there is a fear of having to refrain from this exceptional neutrality (Christin & Trechsel, 2002, p.416). “[N]eutrality has moved from being a tool of policy to a defining and untouchable virtue linked, through the militia army, to national cohesion as well as to independence” (Church, 2004, p.278). Thus, the Norwegian and Swiss political histories demonstrate a difference between the notions of independence, whereas Norwegian independence is based on self-rule and the fight for freedom, and thus scepticism towards a greater power, while Swiss independence is based on neutrality, in which Euroscepticism is embedded.

5.3 National identity and cultural anti-Europeanism

Initially, cultural Euroscepticism can be founded on extreme right- and left-wing values, religious aspects, linguistical aspects and lastly cultural traditions in general. Culturally, nations can be defined by objective characteristics like “common language, religion, traditions [and] historical consciousness” (Heywood, 2015, p.90). National identity on the other hand is made up of subjective characteristics “by a people’s awareness of its nationality or what may be called their national consciousness... [which] encompasses a sense of belonging or loyalty to a particular community” (ibid.). Since cultural Euroscepticism is based on many different values, as well as social- and cultural features, I chose to encompass national identity in this category, together with cultural anti-Europeanism, although some scholars categorize national identity as a separate motivational typology of Euroscepticism (Skinner, 2012), and others put national identity in the category of political Euroscepticism (Leconte, 2010). In Table 4.3 it was evident that territorial attachment to the respective countries were strong, which correlates with high levels of national pride found in Table 4.4. “Those who identify more strongly with the in-group show stronger bias and hostility toward the outgroup” (Taydas & Kentmen-Cin, 2017, p.607). Fears of losing national identity or changing it can be said to be found in both countries, though on a somewhat different ground.

Table 4.5 reveals that the strongest denominators of nationality – besides respect for political institutions and laws – is to speak the language of the country, as well as to share a common culture, while birthplace and ancestry are less important (see Table 4.5). Culture can be defined as “the set of distinctive spiritual, material, intellectual and emotional features of society group ... [encompassing], in addition to art and literature, lifestyles, ways of living together, value systems, traditions and beliefs” (Hague, et al., 2019, p.200). For Norway the national identity rests on a strong culture, national symbols and national pride. “[I]nterest in folkways – in the collection of national costumes [bunad], old songs, old myths ... [and] an interest in the old Norse language” (Neumann, 2001, p.95). From a linguistical aspect, the two countries somewhat different. In Norway, the language debate between the variants *bokmål* and *nynorsk* has been a very important part of nation building and national identity (ibid.). Since the 19th century, there has been a need for *one*, common, own language, to distance oneself to the occupational powers of the time. In the EU debate, there were arguments against membership based on fears of losing identity through a demise of the Norwegian language (ibid.).

Switzerland, on the contrary, is less affiliated to a common language since it is a multilingual state: there are German-, French-, Italian-, and Romani native speakers, but no “Swiss-speakers” (Sarrasin, et.al., 2018, p.203). What is striking is that three of the official languages of Switzerland are languages of EU members, which logically could

indicate that Switzerland would share closer ties with the EU on linguistic matters, yet the Swiss people refuse to join the EU (ibid.). However, the results of Table 4.5 tell us that this is not the case, because both Norwegians AND Swissses claims national language as an important part of their national identities.

For Switzerland, this corresponds with the results in Table 4.3 where she scores low on attachment to Europe. One could speculate that there exists a fear of joining the EU based on immigration as a threat to all the four official languages. This is the case, from a religious perspective, in which both Norway and Switzerland are for the most part protestant countries. "Shared religious identity creates in-group awareness and favoritism, which are positively related to out-group hostility" (Taydas & Kentmen-Cin, 2017, p.607). Norway is built on "the egalitarian welfare state model" and "[a] protestant political culture ... [in which] concepts such as nation-state and national sovereignty have ... traditionally occupied a more central place" (Raunio, 2007, p.191). In this respect, religious or otherwise conservative views oftentimes mirror anti-European integration towards "muslim countries" in Switzerland, for example in relation to the Turkish accession talks (Leconte, 2010, p.182). In Switzerland, right-wing values are more established than in Norway, and the scepticism found is often said to be of the right-wing kind, led by the Swiss People's Party (SPP) (*Schweizerische Volkspartei – SVP*) (Sarrasin, et al., 2018, p.206). On the contrary, Norwegian Euroscepticism is mostly found on the left-wing side (post-materialist values, quality of life and environment), or in general among the smaller parties, for example the Norwegian right-wing party *Fremskrittspartiet* (Frp) Skinner, 2013, p.129).

Moreover, the Swiss confidence in the EU, as demonstrated in Table 4.1 was at an average of 2,13 out of 4. This might be an indicator of what Bauer et al. calls the "immigration-related political culture" in Switzerland, of which he holds to mean "integration policies and shared conservative values" (Bauer, et al., 2016, p.1748). One can speculate that this has something to do with the impact of the Eastern European Enlargement after the Lisbon Treaty, and the Migration Crisis in 2015. According to Europeelects there has in fact been three referendums in Switzerland relating to migration and the EU freedom of movement since 1992, where the last two of them resulted in a solid majority of no - respondents (Gagnebin, 2022). "[H]ostility towards immigration can easily lead to hostility towards European integration, as the latter is associated with increased immigration" (Leconte, 2010, p.183).

Last, based on geographic location, Norway with its peripheral location at the "end of Europe" in the North, while Switzerland finds herself at the heart of Europe. Following this, it is arguably easier for the Norwegian people to establish this European other that is the EU. Neumann writes about a rhetoric used by the no-side in the EU debate in Norway: "Europe is hierarchical. Norway is egalitarian. Europe is centralised, Norway is dispersed.

Europe cares about the strong, Norway cares about the weak" (Neumann, 2001, p.112). Yet, "by voting against the opportunity of decision-making as a member of the EU, the Norwegian citizens have robbed themselves of the opportunity to decide the extent and speed of the Europeanization process" (Eriksen & Fossum, 2014, p.221 [authors translation]). Leconte describes a cultural anti-Europeanism as scepticism "rooted in a broader hostility towards Europe as a continent" (Leconte, 2010, p.43). This is the case for both Norway and Switzerland, based on low confidence in the EU (see Table 4.1); low territorial attachment to Europe and high territorial attachment to their own countries (see Table 4.3); and high levels of national pride (see Table 4.4).

6. Conclusion

This thesis has accounted for political- and cultural Euroscepticism in the political cultures of Norway and Switzerland. My RQs are: *what kind/s of Euroscepticism exist/s in Norway and Switzerland? To what extent is Euroscepticism prevalent in the political culture of these two countries? And if it is prevalent, why is that?* In the results from the EVS 2017, the key findings were a general distancing from Europe and the EU demonstrated through low attachment and confidence (see Table 4.3 and Table 4.1), while there is a great amount of political trust, happiness with democracy and pride in the respective countries themselves. Furthermore, in each case nationality seems to be determined by respect for political institutions, rules and laws, common language, and common culture (see Table 4.5).

Thus, at the end of the day, there is in fact political Euroscepticism in both Norway and Switzerland. The political culture of the former contains political Euroscepticism based on democratic implications with the EEA, and a history of hard-won sovereignty and independence. The political culture of the latter contains political Euroscepticism towards the democratic foundations of the EU and a fear of giving up neutrality, as neutrality in a Swiss context has been equalled with independence. When it comes to cultural Euroscepticism, both share a general hostility towards Europe, hence feelings of anti-Europeanism. Moreover, Swiss political culture mirrors conservative feelings and values against immigration both based on linguistic and religious views, while Norwegian political culture is based on linguistic issues, a special othering of Europe, and national symbols.

As for the third research question "why is it prevalent", I realize that the chosen data and results are limited in that they do not sufficiently explain the why component of my research questions. For example, in Table 4.1 the results tell us that confidence in the EU is low, though we do not know which factors contribute to this. Nevertheless, this thesis has demonstrated that there exists political- and cultural Euroscepticism in both Norway and Switzerland, though based on a somewhat different ground. In addition, there is a limitation in the research of this thesis, as all the sources on Norway, Norwegian

Euroscepticism and Norwegian political culture, have been fully accessible and in the languages I speak fluently (Norwegian, English and other Nordic languages); while the literature on Switzerland, Swiss Euroscepticism and Swiss political culture, were limited as they were in German, French and Italian. Moreover, as a Norwegian citizen I might be biased, although I have tried to read and write as objectively as possible.

In future research I would recommend that all motivational typologies of Euroscepticism – presented in Table 2.1 – be investigated all together, as to give a broader picture of the reasons behind Euroscepticism. Also, as it is hard to distinguish between political and cultural Euroscepticism – especially in relation to national identity – there is a need for some further specification of the typologies of Euroscepticism. Finally, this thesis might have been improved if also qualitative primary sources (in dept interviews) had been conducted, as to specifically ask the question *why* the respondents answered what they did. If this kind of data were collected, all my RQs would be answered in a satisfactory manner.

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8. Appendices

Questions from the EVS2017

Q38. How much confidence do you have in ...? (Scale from 1-4) (1 no confidence at all, 4 very much confidence).

v.124 The European Union

v.131 Government

Q41. How democratically is this country being governed today? (Scale 1-10: 1 not at all, 10 completely democratic) (v.143)

Q42. How satisfied are you with how the political system is functioning in your country these days? (Scale 1-10: 1 not at all satisfied, 10 completely satisfies) (v.144)

Q45. How close do you feel to [territory]? (Scale from 1-4) (1 not close at all, 4 very close).

v.164 your town or city

v.165 your region

v.166 your country

v.167 Europe

v.168 the world

Q47. How proud are you to be a [country] citizen? (Scale from 1-4) (1 not proud at all, 4 very proud). (v.170)

Q53. Which factors are important in determining if you are truly [NATIONALITY]? (Scale from 1-4) (1 not important at all, 4 very important).


v.189 to have been born in [COUNTRY]

v.190 to respect [COUNTRY]'s political institutions and laws

v.191 to have [COUNTRY]'s ancestry

v.192 to be able to speak [THE NATIONAL LANGUAGE]

v.193 to share [NATIONAL] culture



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