Personal Values Priorities and Support for Populism in Europe—An Analysis of Personal Motivations Underpinning Support for Populist Parties in Europe

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Several studies have shown that there are populist attitudes associated with voting for these parties, across left- and right-wing ideologies. As political attitudes and opinions are rooted in people's personal values, this study analyzes the commonalities in the values priorities of populist supporters. The values underlying the vote for populists are reflected in the ideological core of populism, the antagonistic divide between "us"—the people— and "them"—the foreigners and the elite. This article theorizes that voting for populist parties is linked with lower support for self-transcendent values, as they express altruism, tolerance, and pluralism, contradicting the populist claims of exclusionist power of the "people" over "the others." Evidence of this relationship is found using European Social Survey data. The study applies logistic multilevel and multinomial regression models. Findings confirm that voting for populist parties is associated with lower support for self-transcendent values and high support in conservation values, across left and right ideologies.

KEY WORDS: populism, populist values, values, populist vote

The widespread electoral success of populist parties has changed the European political landscape and attracted scholarly interest. Increasing attention has been directed towards understanding why people support populist parties and whether populist supporters share unique attributes that capture the core elements of populism beyond left and right ideologies (Geurkink et al., 2020). This has resulted in a rich corpus of literature on the mass bases of populism. However, within the demand side of the study of populism, focusing on the role of voters' beliefs, attitudes, values, and ideological leanings (e.g., Akkerman et al., 2014; Norris & Inglehart, 2019), less attention has been given to the role of *personal* values, conceived as deep-seated goals, guiding decision-making and political behavior. While Norris and Inglehart (2019) investigated the relationship between macrolevel values and the vote for authoritarian populists, we are left with little knowledge on how microlevel, personal values relate to the vote for populists, beyond left-right ideological associations.

Values represent "cognitive representations of desirable, abstract, trans-situational goals that serve as guiding principles in people's life" and "can be rank-ordered in terms of relative importance" (Schwartz, 1992, p. 4, 1994, p. 21). Personal values have been shown to be relevant in explaining voting behavior, as people use them to organize their beliefs on political issues, to make and to justify political decisions (Caprara et al., 2006; Feldman, 2003; Piurko et al., 2011). Values

constitute the basic principles that give structure to personal attitudes and opinions: They are deep-rooted, enduring guides that are less vulnerable to the impact of events and therefore more stable than attitudes and opinions, and thus they represent the starting point of the causal chain of decision-making (Rokeach, 1973).

This character of values—how they structure attitudes and their connection to voting behavior—makes them particularly suitable for the study of the mass motivations underpinning the vote for populist parties.

Earlier research that has explored the connection between certain attitudes and the vote for populist parties (e.g., Akkerman et al., 2014, 2017; Geurkink et al., 2020; Van Hauwaert & Van Kessel, 2018) shows that there are sets of attitudes significantly linked with the preference for these parties, and the same "populist attitudes" motivate voting for both left- and right-wing populist parties. Populist attitudes are rooted in the key components of populism: people centrism, antielitism, and the antagonistic relationship between the people and the elite, or antipluralism. These findings are relevant as political attitudes and opinion are influenced by people's personal values, leading to the research questions addressed in this article: Are there motivational bases, expressed in terms of basic values priorities, for supporting left-right populist parties? If so, which are the values that predict the support for populist parties, and how do they vary between left-right wing populist parties, if at all?

A recent study (Marcos-Marne, 2021) explored the link between Schwartz personal values and the vote for populist parties in 13 European countries. While highlighting shared predispositions of populist voters, this article focuses on the relationship between single values and the vote for populists. Therefore, it does not take into account how values do not work in isolation but in a system of conflict and compatibility (Feldman, 2003). According to Schwartz et al. (1996), attitudes and behaviors are guided by "trade-offs among competing values that are implicated simultaneously in behavior or attitudes" (Schwartz et al., 1996). The current article diverges from Marcos-Marne (2021) on two main points, namely a different theorization of the relationship between personal values and the vote for populist parties, which also builds on the analysis of the whole system of personal values instead of single values items.

Therefore, this study aims to answer an additional research question: How does the conflict and compatibility system of values relate to the vote for populist parties?

Following the research on populist attitudes, this study benefits from the conceptual clarity provided by the definition of populism by Mudde (2004) and adopts the ideational approach to theorize which values are relevant for populist supporters. Mudde defines populism as a "thin-centred ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, the 'pure and wise people' versus 'the corrupt elite', and which argues that politics should be an expression of the *volonté générale* (general will) of the people" (p. 543). Conceiving populism as an ideology provides a solid framework for analyzing populist movements and parties; beyond its "thinness," the populist ideology is able to incorporate elements from other ideologies while still being identified as "populist," displaying similarities among apparently different parties.

The set of values motivating support for populist parties is expected to be rooted in the ideological core of populism, the main element being the Manichean view of society as ultimately divided in two antagonistic groups. Despite the different meanings of the "good people" and of the "corrupt elite" within the thick ideology in which the party operates, what is constant is the division of society into two opposing groups, an understanding of politics as an expression of the general will of "the people" and the consequent *ideal* replacement of the whole with one of its parts, namely the "good people." These elements are compatible with the class of self-transcendent values and incompatible with conservation values.

Table 1. Description of the 10 Personal Values as in the Schwartz's Literature

Power	Social status and prestige, control or dominance over people and resources
Achievement	Personal success through demonstrating competence according to social standards
Hedonism	Pleasure and sensuous gratification for oneself
Stimulation	Excitement, novelty, and challenge in life
Self-direction	Independent thought and action: choosing, creating, exploring
Universalism	Understanding, appreciation, tolerance, and protection for the welfare of all people and for nature
Benevolence	Preservation and enhancement of the welfare of people with whom one is in frequent personal contact
Tradition	Respect, commitment, and acceptance of the customs and ideas that traditional culture or religion provide the self
Conformity	Restraint of actions, inclinations, and impulses likely to upset or harm others and violate social expectations or norms
Security	Safety, harmony, and stability of society, of relationships, and of self

Theory

The Schwarz Personal Values Theory

Schwartz defines values as "cognitive representations of desirable, abstract, trans-situational goals that serve as guiding principles in people's life" and "can be rank-ordered in terms of relative importance" (Schwartz, 1992, p. 4, 1994, p. 21). The Schwartz Value Theory (1992) identifies 10 personal values, as described in Table 1. On the analytical level, the values have been tested and shown to apply across 67 nations, allowing for cross-national comparability (Schwartz, 1992).

Values are based on universal human and societal needs (Rokeach, 1973) and present dynamic relations of compatibility and opposition among them, which can be represented as a circular motivational continuum, as in Figure 1. Overall, they can be organized along two different bipolar and antagonistic dimensions: self-enhancement and self-transcendent values. Self-enhancement values encourage and legitimize the pursuit of self-interest; they oppose self-transcendence values, which emphasize concern for the welfare of others, intended for people of all nature. Openness values, on the other hand, favor change and encourage the pursuit of new ideas and experiences and oppose conservation values which emphasize maintaining the status quo and avoiding threat (Piurko et al., 2011; Schwartz, 2006).

This conflict-compatibility structure of values allows us to study how whole systems of values, rather than single values, relate to other variables (Schwartz, 2006). Additionally, behaviors or attitudes that are congruent with a single value should be congruent with the adjacent values, but be in conflict with the opposing values (Caprara et al., 2010). As values do not work in isolation but in a system of conflict and compatibility, focusing on a small number of single values could miss the conflict and tensions central to the dynamic of values and behavior (Feldman, 2003). For this reason, this analysis diverges from Marcos-Marne (2021) and explores the link between the high-order values classes and the vote for populist parties.

For theoretical clarity, values must be distinguished from similar constructs such as personality traits. While traits represent the frequency and intensity with which a behavior is executed by someone, values point to the importance that the person gives to a goal as a guide of action. In other words, values represent the *intention* behind an individual's behavior, or "what people consider important," while traits are enduring dispositions, or "what people are like" (Roccas et al., 2002). Another way in which values differ from personality traits is how they are more subject to change; as Inglehart describes it, there is an "interplay between external conditions, values and subjective satisfaction" (Inglehart, 1977, p. 447). Changes within societies lead people to emphasize new goals: This more dynamic nature of values, with respect to the more stable traits, implies that values can be insightful to explain why people change their intentions and decide to vote for or to abandon a populist party.

Figure 1. The motivational continuum among values and the higher-order values classes.

From Values to Voting Behavior

The connection between personal values and political preferences is not straightforward; however, many attribute a central role to values as foundations for political evaluations. Previous research on the association between values, political values, attitudes, and voting behavior shows that there is a value—attitude—behavior hierarchy (Schwartz, 1977). Personal values priorities shape political values and attitudes, and therefore political values and attitudes mediate the relations of values to political behavior. Personal values thus affect political choice through their influence and the shaping of core political values and political attitudes (Schwartz et al., 2010).

Numerous studies have found evidence of the relationship between values and party preferences (e.g., Caprara et al., 2006; Schwartz, 1994). In the Schwartz values tradition, personal values have been able to predict political choice across different cultural contexts and political systems (Barnea, 2003; Caprara et al., 2006). Caprara et al. (2006) found a positive relationship between center-left voters and specific values priorities, as higher support for universalism and benevolence values. Center-right voters gave higher priority to power, achievement, security, and conformity values. Similarly, a study of the 1988 Israeli elections demonstrated that individual's personal values discriminated significantly between voters of the different political parties (Barnea & Schwartz, 1998; Barnea, 2003). There is a substantial amount of evidence that personal values are a source of structure for political attitudes and behavior, and that there should be a set of values associated with support for populist parties that party leaders and members express through political discourses and ideology (Kenny & Bizumic, 2020).

Populist Values Priorities

The chameleonic nature of populism makes theorizing its relationship with personal values complex; nevertheless, the ideological component as defined by Mudde (2004) raises the attention on two core points: the reduction of society to an exclusionary and antagonistic "us" versus "them" and a conception of politics as an expression of general will of the good, homogeneous people. As in the populist-attitudes literature, these are the elements common both to left and

right-wing populism that personal values are expected to tap into when motivating the vote for populist parties.

A first link can be identified between populism and self-transcendent values based on the populist exclusionary and antagonistic conception of society and political power. While liberal democracy is anchored in the belief that a well-organized polity will constrain the people's will and allow for pluralism (Urbinati, 2019), populism wants (symbolically) to replace the whole (the pluralistic society) with one of its parts, that is, the homogeneous and virtuous "people." On one side, pluralism implies that politics reflects the coexistence of many different groups, all of whom interact through compromise (Dahl, 1982; Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013). On the other, the populist ideology holds the idea that "all individuals of a given community are able to unify their wills with the aim of proclaiming popular sovereignty as the only legitimate source of political power" (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013, p. 151). Overall, this implies that populism is at odds with pluralism.

The exclusionary and antagonistic nature of populism is common both to left- and right-wing host ideologies, despite being less straightforward for left-wing populists. As in Sanders et al. (2017) and Reinemann et al. (2017), "the exclusion of out-groups is implicit in any construction and mention of the people"; it helps to "make explicit the standard to which *the people* are contrasted, contributing to strengthening identification with the in-group" (Reinemann et al., 2017, p. 20; Sanders et al., 2017). For right-wing populist parties, the exclusionary dimension focuses on the presence of "others" often represented by immigrants, religious minorities, or left-wing sympathizers. Left-wing populists, on the other hand, usually oppose "the caste," the political and economic establishment, as well as European technocrats and right-wing supporters.

From these standpoints, it can be argued that populism indirectly implies the suspension of the self-transcendent values class, as they express concern for the welfare and interests of others and the understanding and tolerance for all people and nature. Supporting self-transcendent values implies being tolerant and accepting that societies are composed of several different social groups. This is at odds with the exclusionary populists claim of the sole power of the "good people" over the "others," which is supposedly a power that only members of the ruling people possess and are allowed to enjoy (Urbinati, 2019).

It might be argued that left-wing populist parties are more supportive of egalitarianism and inclusivity, and therefore they are closer to self-transcendent values. At the same time, despite being generally more inclusive at the society level, they do not deny the Manichean vision of society. As well as right-wing populists, left-wing populist parties aim at embodying and representing the will of the people, "presenting themselves as the sole true defenders of a sole true people" (Werner & Giebler, 2019, p. 381).

This dualistic and antagonistic dynamic is at the core of the populist ideology, beyond its left or right ideological components. We are thus led to expect a negative relationship between populist support and self-transcendent values due to the contradiction between these values, including concern and tolerance for others' opinions and welfare and the exclusionary and antagonistic populist policy. Based on these arguments, I propose the following hypothesis to be tested empirically:

H1.a: People who give low priority to self-transcendent values are more likely to vote for populist parties.

The motivational continuum of values as in the Schwartz theory holds that people giving low priority to self-transcendence values tend to give high priority to self-enhancement and conservation, and low priority to openness. Thus, the negative relationship with self-transcendent values should imply a positive relationship between self-enhancement and conservation values and populist support.

In particular, the class of conservation values is reflected in the core elements of the populist ideology as the need to protect "the good people" and the "past-oriented" character of populism. Conservation values emphasize the need to avoid or control anxiety and threat and to protect the self and the status quo, ensuring stability and security. The link between populism and conservation values goes beyond the support for traditionalism typical of the populist right. The populist lower propensity to be tolerant toward outgroups is expected to be mirrored by the need to protect the threatened ingroup. These values point to the need of maintaining, restoring, or preserving the interests of the oppressed people against the elite or "the others": The economic losers, the "natives" of a country, the "victims" of cultural change, all express to some extent the need for maintaining or bringing things back to their "normal" order.

As mentioned, conservation values also encompass the idealization of the past typical of populist parties and the skepticism of populism about progress and vanguardism (Canovan, 2004). The populist ideology is anchored in a vision of lost homeland, which expresses nostalgia for an idealized past and in turns provides a sense of security against the perceived loss of identity (Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008; Elçi, 2021). Nostalgia is evoked by both left- and right-wing populist parties as a reaction to economic globalization, less secure forms of employment, the movement of people across borders, and the changes to communities and family (Kenny, 2017). The populist nostalgia conveys a preference for the way things were, evoking images of an economically, politically, and culturally secure past, which also helps with eliciting a sense of change, dysfunction, and decadence of contemporary political systems and societies (Elçi, 2021; Kenny, 2017; Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2018).

These need to protect the interests of the ingroup; the sense of the nation's decline and the perceived loss of control over the everyday environment are expected to be reflected in a positive relationship of the populist vote with conservation values. Following this logic and the compatibility and opposition structure of the higher-order values:

H1.b: People who give more priority to self-enhancement values are more likely to vote for populist parties.

H1.c: People who give more priority to conservation values are more likely to vote for populist parties.

H1.d: People who give less priority to openness values are more likely to vote for populist parties.

This theorization of the values underpinning the support for populist parties diverges and, for some aspects, is in opposition to what is theorized by Marcos-Marne (2021). In his perception, conservation values, while being at the core of the populist ideology, are at odds with populism because they emphasize the status quo that populists want to break with.

In this view, the mean (the mobilizing character of populism) plays a more prominent role than the ideal end/aim of the populist ideology: the return to an idealized golden past.

In the context of this study, however, I argue that considering the deep-rooted nature of human values, the more solid association should be found between populism and conservation, rather than with its ideally transitory reactionary nature. The definition of values (Schwartz, 1992) as goals based on human needs suggests that the desirable end state of populist voters should be to restore the ideal past political community and to protect the "good people." One might theorize a positive link between the mobilizing nature of populism and openness values, even if this implies "breaking" with the motivational continuum of Schwartz values. However, while the mobilizing character of populism represents a prerequisite to get the idealized past back, it is not the end state of the populist ideology, and therefore a connection between this element and deep-rooted values seems less likely to be established.

In addition, the reactionary nature of populism might as well depend on the position that the populist party holds within the political system. As for now, many populist parties have had government experiences, which for most resulted in the challenging task to maintain the critiques of the status quo and the mobilizing character credible and at the same level. On the other hand, the need to protect the "good people" and restoring the "natural order of things" is a constant element in the populist discourses and ideology; it is not affected by the position that the party holds and therefore seems more likely to find correspondence in people's values.

On the differences between left- and right-wing populist parties, the categorization of the populist ideology as "thin-centered" explains populism's malleability and accounts for further ideological associations. Populist parties do not belong to one single party family, but they adhere to other host ideologies like nationalism and social conservatism, as well as liberalism and socialism (Rydgren, 2008).

Right-wing authoritarian populist parties, for example, believe in a strictly ordered society and unquestioning obedience. They are supportive of more law, order, and a return to traditional values (Pauwels, 2012). To this extent, they might be more explicitly associated with conservation values, but also with power and achievement. On the other hand, left-wing populists tend to favor more socially liberal attitudes; they call for more social justice and new forms of political participation (Norris, 2019). Consequently, they might be more closely linked to the class of openness values, enhancing novelty, independent thought, and action. Building on this:

H2.a: Right-wing populist supporters are expected to rank higher in conservation values than left-wing populist supporters.

H2.b: Left-wing populist supporters are expected to rank higher in openness values than right-wing populist supporters.

Method

To test the hypotheses, this study applies the ESS dataset, Round 9 (second release, 2018–2020) and the PopuList dataset, Version 2.0 (Rooduijn et al., 2019).

Dependent Variable

The support for populist parties was measured recoding the variable on the party voted for in the last election held in each country.[1]

The "*PopuList*" dataset has been used to distinguish populist and nonpopulist parties; the list includes parties from 31 countries which have been classified as populist, far right or far left, following Mudde's definition, and has been peer reviewed by more than 80 academics (Rooduijn et al., 2019).[2] From this, the dependent variable *populistvote* was created, including the votes cast for populist parties in each country.[3]

Independent Variables

Section H of the European Social Survey questionnaire is aimed at registering information on human values as in the Schwartz literature and includes portraits of different people, each describing

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[1]For Germany, I included the second votes determining each party's share of the popular vote.

[2]Serbia was not part of the list. Populist parties have been distinguished according to the article *Populism in the Balkans: The Case of Serbia* (Stojarová & Vykoupilová, 2008).

[3]Table A8 in the appendix reports the list of the included populist parties.

a person's goals or traits that point implicitly to the importance of a value on a scale ranging from "very much like me" to "not like me at all." To measure personal values, the PVQ (Portrait Values Questionnaire) was used, which measures each of the 10 values with three to six items. The values items were recoded so that the increasing level of agreement with the sentence is associated with greater scores (1 = *not like me at all* to 6 = *very much like me*).

As explained earlier in this article, this study applies the higher-order values factors (conservation, self-enhancement, self-transcendent, and openness). In addition to the theoretical explanation, the choice is due to the fact that all indicators load very strongly on the higher-order dimensions while they do not as individual values. Also, it has been shown that models where single values are used tend to suffer from multicollinearity (Davidov et al., 2014).[4]

Previous studies (e.g., Davidov et al., 2008; Schwartz & Cieciuch, 2021) assessed the internal reliability, circular structure, and measurement invariance of the four higher-order values across countries as in the PVQ of ESS data. These studies found that the PVQ reproduced the theorized values structure and that metric invariance is supported, allowing comparability of the values classes across different contexts. I therefore use Cronbach's Alpha to report the reliability of the four values classes in each country and for the whole sample.[5] The average Cronbach Alpha reliability coefficients for the whole sample are 0.7060 for conservation, 0.7067 for self enhancement, 0.7541 for self-transcendent, and 0.7681 for openness. The fit of the values classes was also assessed by estimating the standardized factor loadings and the group goodness of fit for each country.[6]

The countries included in the analysis are Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czechia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Serbia, Slovenia, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland. Cyprus, Latvia, Portugal, and Montenegro have been excluded from the dataset; Portugal was excluded for the absence of relevant populist parties while Montenegro for the lack of reliable sources ranking its populist parties. Cyprus and Latvia were underrepresented in comparison with other countries' average observations (CY 781 and LV 918 observation). Estonia and the United Kingdom were excluded for the marginal populist vote share (5%–8%).[7]

Voting for populist parties has previously been linked to sociodemographic variables, therefore age, gender, education, and occupational status were also considered. Occupational status was coded as a dummy variable, with "employed" used as a reference category.

A series of items was combined into the following control variables: political trust, satisfaction with national democracy, political efficacy, and attitudes toward immigration. Previous research has shown that these attitudes play a significant role in determining the conditions for populism to be successful, leading to the choice of including them in the analysis, to control for their effect on values. The items were combined after checking the Cronbach Alpha coefficient[8] and recoded so that higher values are associated with higher level of agreement with the items.[9]

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[4]This is why the results of this article diverges partially from those of Marcos-Marne (2021) on the same topic.

[5]See Table B2 in the online supporting information.

[6]Self-enhancement: RMSEA = 0.025 SRMR = 0.007 CFI = 0.998 RRC = 0.720

Self-transcendent: RMSEA = 0.058 SRMR = 0.022 CFI = 0.983 RRC = 0.739

Conservation: RMSEA = 0.069 SRMR = 0.032 CFI = 0.95 RRC = 0.703

Openness: RMSEA = 0.105 SRMR = 0.046 CFI = 0.922 RRC = 0.766.

[7]This might have been solved with the use of weights; however, I decided to focus on countries that represented more robust cases for this analysis.

[8]Attitudes toward immigration: scale reliability coefficient: 0.7103. Satisfaction with national politics: 0.7041.

Trust in institution: 0.8804. Political efficacy: 0.8347.

[9]Table B1 in the online supporting information reports items and wording of these variables.

A series of logistic regression techniques was then used to conduct the analysis, with the dependent variable being the vote for populist parties and the independent variables being the four high-order values classes (self-enhancement, self-transcendent, openness, and conservation). The models included the following control variables: age, gender, education, main activity, satisfaction with national politics, trust in institutions,[10] attitudes toward immigration, and perceived political efficacy.

To test the specific values of left/right-wing populist parties, two approaches were used. The first included two separate dependent variables and logistic regression models for left- and right-wing populist vote. As the two samples differed largely making comparison of the results difficult, a subsample including countries having both left- and right-wing populist parties was selected.[11] The second approach is thus based on a subsample of countries and on a multinomial logistic regression model, contrasting the values of left-wing populist voters to those of right-wing populist supporters, while nonpopulist voters serve as the reference category. This model also constitutes a way of testing the robustness of the results obtained in the previous models and to control for the initial sample, unbalanced towards a majority of right-wing populist parties.

Results

The analysis is divided into two parts, the first being an exploratory investigation of personal values and vote for populist parties in 21 European countries. The second part is based on a subsample of nine countries and constitutes a robustness assessment of the results, conducted with a multinomial logistic regression.

Table 2 shows the multilevel logistic regression model of personal values and vote for populist parties, reported as odds ratio. The base model indicates the effect of the high-order values classes on the populist vote, while the complete model includes attitudes and control variables. The models indicate a lower probability to vote for populist parties for those supportive of self-transcendent values, together with a positive relationship between conservation values and the vote for populist, as hypothesized. The results show a positive relationship between the class of openness values and the vote for populist parties, and a negative correlation of self-enhancement values and vote for populists. Following the motivational continuum of the personal values theory, we should have expected to find that populist voters give lower priority to openness values and higher priority to self-enhancement. However, the link between self-enhancement and openness values and vote for populist parties goes in the opposite direction as hypothesized. It is possible to deduce that the motivational continuum as theorized by Schwartz does not find complete correspondence in these results.

The results are stable when controlling for sociodemographic variables, left and right ideological positioning, and the set of control variables, supporting at this stage Hypotheses 1a and 1c while Hypotheses 1b and 1d are not confirmed. The control variables on trust, immigration, satisfaction with national politics, and perceived political efficacy display nonsignificant effects. A robustness check was carried out to assess whether the effect of human values derives from ideological preferences, through a model including programmatic preferences on economic redistribution, EU unification process, and same-sex unions.[12] The overall results are stable, while the effect of the programmatic variables is not significant, confirming the role of human values.

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[10]Trust in country's parliament, legal system, police, politicians, political parties, European Parliament, and United Nations.
[11]Countries included France, Germany, Ireland, Netherlands, Serbia, Slovenia, Slovakia, Spain, and Croatia.
[12]Table A5 in the appendix.

Table 2. Multilevel Logistic Regression of Values and Vote for Populist Parties

Variables	Base Model	Control Variables	Complete Model
Self-enhancement	0.920***		0.883***
	(0.0163)		(0.0142)
Self-transcendent	0.726***		0.885**
	(0.0563)		(0.0455)
Openness	1.188***		1.102*
	(0.0652)		(0.0624)
Conservation	1.213		1.112**
	(0.143)		(0.0581)
Religion		0.628***	0.637***
		(0.0849)	(0.0832)
Age		0.983***	0.982***
		(0.00464)	(0.00472)
Women		1.106	1.100*
		(0.0713)	(0.0632)
Education level		0.844***	0.848***
		(0.0259)	(0.0263)
Dummy set of occupation (ref. category: employed)			
Student		0.764*	0.724
		(0.115)	(0.146)
Unemployed		2.016***	1.965***
		(0.197)	(0.172)
Retired		0.998	0.980
		(0.141)	(0.141)
Housework		0.974	0.965
		(0.0487)	(0.0524)
Left-Right		1.249**	1.245**
		(0.119)	(0.118)
Trust institution		1.010	1.014
		(0.0166)	(0.0169)
Political efficacy		1.020	1.025
		(0.0289)	(0.0257)
Satisfaction national politics		0.991	0.982
		(0.0246)	(0.0292)
Immigration		1.004	1.006
		(0.0270)	(0.0292)
Observations	22,219	18,920	18,805
Number of groups	21	21	21

Note. Results reported as odds ratios.
***$p < .01$
**$p < .05$
*$p < .1$.

The relationship between self-transcendent and conservation values is also confirmed by the aggregated individual-level results.[13] The similarity of the results across the models provides a preliminary insight on the relevance of these two classes of values in relation to the vote for populist parties. In the aggregated model, the main difference lies in the coherence of the relationship of all the values classes with what was expected according to the motivational continuum theorized by Schwartz. People who scored high in self-enhancement and conservation values are more likely to vote for populist parties, while people who scored high on self-transcendent and openness values were less likely to vote for populist parties.

[13]Table A2 in the appendix.

These results are also in line with what emerged from a series of exploratory single-country regressions.[14] Here I regressed the personal values classes and the vote for populist parties in each analyzed country to undertake a first look at the relation between values and the vote for populist parties in the sample. Despite the lack of a universal values system associated with the vote for populist parties across countries, the results are coherent with what emerged from the multilevel and individual models. Concerning self-transcendent and conservation values, the hypothesized negative relationship between self-transcendent values and the vote for populist parties is confirmed in 14 of 21 countries, and in 9 of 21 countries for conservation values. The unexpected positive relationship between the class of openness values and the vote for populist parties is confirmed in 12 of 21 countries, while self-enhancement values were not statistically significant. What remains stable across these models is the relationship of conservation and self-transcendent values with the vote for populist parties and rather mixed results for the class of openness and self-enhancement values.

Similar to the findings of Piurko et al. (2011), the majority of Eastern European countries, except Bulgaria, Czech Republic, and Poland, showed no significant relationship between values and the vote for populist parties. The lack of a solid association between values and vote could be due to the fact that these countries are still undergoing a transition period after the experience of communism, as well as to the less ideological character of Eastern European populist parties (Kriesi & Pappas, 2015). More specifically, to influence political behavior, values need to be activated in a specific situation or political context. For values to be activated, parties must clearly express their ideological positions, political programs, and policy stands. This allows voters to (subconsciously) translate what their personal values mean in the political context, to understand which political program or party is in line with their values priorities and motives, and ultimately to rely on them when making their vote choice (Barnea & Schwartz, 1998; Van Deth & Scarbrough, 1995).

Populist parties in Eastern Europe have focused mainly on antiestablishment and corruption discourses and less on the gap between the people and the elite (Kriesi & Pappas, 2015). This might be why they are lacking a solid association between personal values and vote: Voters did not have sufficient information on the parties and their ideological/populist position to choose them based on their values.

This first part of the analysis is based on a sample of 21 countries, biased towards a higher number of right-wing populist parties (41 opposed to 13). Controlling for right- and left-wing ideologies might not be enough to ensure well-adjusted results. Consequently, a subset of countries having both left- and right-wing populist parties was selected at this stage. A multinomial logistic regression model based on the subsample was used to assess the robustness of the previous results and to analyze the results for left- and right-wing populist parties.

The previous models showed that self-transcendent and conservation values seem to predict the vote for populist parties. However, this raises the question of whether this is confirmed for both left- and right-wing populist parties. To answer this question, two approaches were used. The first applied logistic regression models based on two different subsamples, including respectively only right- and left-wing populist parties.[15] These models indicate that right-wing populist supporters give higher priority to self-enhancement and conservation values, while confirming the negative correlation with self-transcendent and openness values. The results for left-wing populist parties indicated, in line with the previous models and with the right-wing results, a negative relationship between the vote for left-wing populist parties and self-transcendent values, together with a positive relationship with conservation values. Self-enhancement and openness values, on the other hand, display nonsignificant effects. The main difference is

[14]Table A1 in the appendix.
[15]Tables A3 and A4 in the appendix.

Table 3. Multinomial Logistic Regression of Values and Vote for Left- and Right-Wing Populist Parties

Variables	Right-Wing Populist Voters	Left-Wing Populist Voters	Right-Wing Populist Voters	Left-Wing Populist Voters
Self-enhancement	1.014	0.960	0.966	0.998
	(0.0428)	(0.0385)	(0.0478)	(0.0474)
Self-transcendent	0.548***	0.817***	0.626***	0.654***
	(0.0359)	(0.0511)	(0.0496)	(0.0474)
Openness	1.276***	1.105**	1.159**	1.038
	(0.0627)	(0.0515)	(0.0686)	(0.0583)
Conservation	1.602***	1.065	1.565***	1.282***
	(0.0862)	(0.0504)	(0.107)	(0.0759)
Religion			0.821**	0.845**
			(0.0750)	(0.0712)
Age			0.985***	0.983***
			(0.00371)	(0.00367)
Women			1.105	0.916
			(0.0953)	(0.0742)
Education Level			0.845***	0.933***
			(0.0221)	(0.0227)
Dummy set of occupation (ref. category: employed)				
Student			0.440***	0.951
			(0.113)	(0.187)
Unemployed			1.200	1.388**
			(0.201)	(0.219)
Retired			0.729**	1.364**
			(0.0994)	(0.177)
Housework			0.725*	1.140
			(0.129)	(0.184)
Left-Right			1.291***	0.707***
			(0.0246)	(0.0133)
Trust institution			0.944**	1.024
			(0.0264)	(0.0270)
Political efficacy			0.889**	0.954
			(0.0458)	(0.0467)
Satisfaction national politics			1.024	1.013
			(0.0269)	(0.0251)
Immigration			0.897***	0.882***
			(0.0322)	(0.0304)
Observations	7,862	7,862	6,465	6,465

Note. Results reported as odds ratio. The reference category is nonpopulist vote.
***$p < .01$
**$p < .05$
*$p < .1$.

represented by the overall impact of values: The effects are lower for left-wing populist parties than for right-wing populist parties.

As specified, the second approach applies a multinomial logistic regression with nonpopulist vote set as the reference category to assess the robustness of the previous results, including the specific left- and right-wing populist values. Table 3 reports the findings. This model confirms the outcomes of the previous models, pointing at a constant tendency across all tables of a negative relationship between self-transcendent values and a positive association between the vote for populists and support for conservation values. Table 3 does not provide sufficient evidence for confirming specific personal values associated with the vote for left- and right-wing populist parties. The model, however, constitutes a robustness test confirming how giving lower priority

to self-transcendent values and higher support for conservation values is associated with voting for populist parties, across left and right-wing ideological positions. This is also confirmed by the logistic regression model calculated on the overall subsample of countries having both left- and right-wing populist parties.[16] The results confirm the negative relationship with self-transcendent values and the positive link with conservation values, both at the individual and at the country level.

The model presented in Table 3 was replicated, with right-wing populist voters as the reference category to further investigate the differences in values across left- and right-populist parties.[17] The results show that the only significant difference in values between left- and right-wing populist parties is a lower support for conservation values of left-wing populist voters, with respect to right-wing populist voters. This is in line with what was theorized in Hypothesis 2a, and it shows how there is not any significant difference between the predictors of votes for left- or right-wing populists; the only difference is between voters of populist parties and voters of non-populist parties.

The results of sociodemographic control variables are for the most part coherent with previous studies. Despite some differences in effects and significance across the models, higher-educated people and students are less likely to vote for populist parties, while unemployed persons were seen to be more likely to vote for populist parties. Age was almost uninfluential across the different models. In this study, being religious resulted in being negatively related with the vote for populist parties. This might appear counterintuitive, as a number of right-wing populist parties are trying to build a more Christian profile. However, research on the effect of Christian values in Western Europe has showed mixed results. In some cases, being religious implied negative attitudes toward religious minorities; in others, it showed higher levels of tolerance towards possible "outgroups" (Molle, 2019).

Discussion

This article analyzes the association between personal values priorities and the vote for populist parties. Rather than focusing on the single values items, I examined how the whole system of high-order values related to support for populism.

Based on the core elements of the populist ideology, I hypothesized that a lower support for self-transcendent values followed by a higher support for conservation values predict the vote for populist parties. As values show compatibility and opposition among them, I hypothesized that in predicting the vote for populist parties, a lower support for self-transcendent values is expected to be associated with a higher support for self-enhancement values and lower support for openness values. Furthermore, I hypothesized that left- and right-wing populist parties should have a specific set of values that points at their host ideology: openness values for the left and a higher support for conservation values for the right.

The results suggest that populist parties' voters are less likely to be supportive of self-transcendent values, while they are more likely to support conservation values across left- and right-wing ideologies. The results give strong support to Hypothesis 1a, holding that people who give low priority to self-transcendent values are more likely to vote for populist parties, and Hypothesis 1c, stating that people who give more priority to conservation values are more likely to vote for populist parties. This constitutes a robust confirmation that the Manichean and exclusionary character of the populist ideology finds correspondence in a specific base of personal values. Populist voters are less likely to give priority to inclusiveness and tolerance and to be

[16]Table A6 in the appendix.
[17]Table A7 in the appendix.

concerned for the welfare and interests of outgroups. On the other hand, they are more likely to give higher priority to the ingroup protection-oriented values that express the need to avoid or control anxiety and threat, to protect the self and stability of society. Personal values are only *indirectly* linked with political preferences; they express people's priorities in everyday life and not in the political domain. The fact that they are consistently linked to the preference for populist parties is a confirmation of the deep roots of populist ideas at the mass level, which strengthens our understanding of the populist phenomenon.

The motivational structure of values priority is partially confirmed as self-enhancement and openness values pointed at mixed results. Openness values resulted significantly in most of the models, but as self-enhancement values, they showed diverse directions of the relationship with the vote for populists, making generalization or inferences not possible at this stage. Hypotheses 1b and 1d, holding respectively that people giving more priority to self-enhancement values and less priority to openness values are expected to be more likely to vote for populist parties, are thus not confirmed. The relevance of these results is addressed below.

The mixed results of the class of openness values might point at the ambivalent connection of populism with change and preservation. These parties advocate an ideal transformation of society and political systems, while they do so calling for the protection, maintenance, or restoration of the status of a group of people. As mentioned earlier in this article, theorizing a positive relationship of openness values with populist vote implies attributing to the reactionary nature of populist parties the character of an end state more than a necessary, but transitory element in the populist narrative. Rather, the lack of coherence of self-enhancement and openness values might relate to the relevance of context in the activation of personal values as mentioned earlier. Populism not only must be combined with other ideologies but must also be understood together with context-dependent elements, such as the political and institutional context in which the party operates (Hawkins et al., 2020). While more research on this is needed, it might be argued that the activation of self-enhancement and openness values depends on nonideational, contextual elements of populism, while the stable and consistent role of conservation and self-transcendent values capture the ideational core of populism.

Overall, the core values associated with the vote for populist parties seem to be resistant to the values associated traditionally with left and right "thick" ideologies. This might constitute an apparent challenge to the concept of populism as a thin ideology. This does not mean rejecting the conception of populism as a thin ideology; however, from a values-based perspective, the populist ideology does not look as thin as it is in terms of programmatic scope, as it seems to be resistant to the values of the host ideologies.

On values and vote for left- or right-wing populist parties, the models did not point at distinct values priorities associated with the two ideologies; the results merely confirmed the tendencies about self-transcendent and conservation values. Based on this, Hypothesis 2b on the expected higher support for openness parties of left-wing populist supporters is not confirmed. However, Hypothesis 2a theorizing a higher support for conservation values by right-wing populist supporters is confirmed. The absence of relevant differences in the values of left- and right-wing populist voters further emphasizes the relevance of the presence of significant values differences between populist and nonpopulist voters.

The main difference between left- and right-wing parties is represented by the more straightforward results for the values of right-wing populist parties: There is a stronger relationship between values and the right-wing populist vote, while the results for left-wing populism are less explicit. It might be argued that right-wing populist parties share more defined and explicit characteristics while left-wing populists are more varied, and their lines of attack more abstract than those of right-wing populism. Right-wing populist parties very often define the "others" and the "ingroups" in personalized terms (e.g., immigrants as opposed to the ethnic homogeneous group),

while left-wing populists tend to use broader terms of socioeconomic structures, attacking a politically constructed "other." The connection between right-wing populism and values might be more straightforward, as the societal divisions and issues they stand for are more personalized and heightened than it appears to be for the left making the connection with people's personal values easier.

On the attitudes toward immigration, the multinomial model shows how positive attitudes towards immigration are negatively correlated and significant both for right- and left-wing populist parties and show immigration attitudes to have a greater impact on left-wing populist supporters. There might be a link between this tendency and the fact that patriotism and the defense of national interests seems to have become popular across left- and right-wing populist parties: These parties generally tend to identify "the good people" within a national context which can be more (i.e., right-wing populism) or less (left-wing populist) defined in ethnic or cultural terms (Ivaldi et al., 2017). Also Fieschi (2019) underlines how left-wing populism, similarly to right-wing populism, relies to some extent on a culturally homogeneous notion of the people, by appealing to "hard-working, ordinary people whose interests are shaped by shared experiences" (p. 32). It seems, however, logical to link this shared negative attitude towards immigration with the overall lower propensity of being supportive of self-transcendent values across the two factions of populist parties.

Limitations

Many aspects related to this study could be addressed by additional research. The personal values approach might be used to analyze different populist-rich contexts such as Latin America or to study in-depth single cases with solid and varied history of populism (e.g., France, Netherlands, Italy). More research is also needed to clarify the role of self-enhancement and openness values when linked to the vote for populist parties.

Concluding Remarks

Within the framework of the demand-side approach to the study of populism, this contribution reflects on and explores the roots of populist ideas at the mass level by analyzing the basic values priorities which serve as a guide in people's decision-making process. Considering how political choice is increasingly volatile, it is of high importance to try to understand which "packages of ideas" (Fieschi, 2019) and motives are driving people's political choices. This is what this article has explored, highlighting how voting for populist parties relates to two classes of values, self-transcendent and conservation, theorized to be relevant in capturing the exclusionary and Manichean vision of society as in the populist ideology. We can think about these values priorities as the motives, the "packages of ideas" or the expression of what is important to people who vote for populist parties.

The results of this study show that for populist voters it is less important to understand, protect, and show concern about other people or possible outgroups, while it is more important to protect and ensure the safety of themselves and of people "like them," the ingroup of virtuous and homogeneous people, whether this symbolizes belonging to a specific country, ethnic group, or socioeconomic conditions.

Tracing these priorities allows us to better understand populism, its evolution over time, and contextual differences, getting beyond vague concepts like *zeitgeist* to understand the deepest roots of the populist appeal.

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Supporting Information

Additional supporting information may be found in the online version of this article at the publisher's web site:

Appendix

Table A1. Logistic Regression Expressed as Odds Ratio of Values Categories and Vote for Populist Parties per Country

Variables	Self-Enhancement	Self-Transcendent	Openness	Conservation	Observations
Austria	0.976	0.472***	1.555***	1.579***	1,701
	(0.0806)	(0.0505)	(0.148)	(0.164)	
Belgium	0.978	0.493**	1.458	0.984	1,108
	(0.245)	(0.176)	(0.460)	(0.275)	
Bulgaria	0.857	1.402**	1.444***	0.640***	775
	(0.0966)	(0.219)	(0.124)	(0.0911)	
Switzerland	0.972	0.370***	1.122	2.471***	634
	(0.120)	(0.0714)	(0.176)	(0.386)	
Czech Republic	0.903	0.721***	1.024	1.493***	1,349
	(0.0647)	(0.0774)	(0.0897)	(0.155)	
Germany	0.906	0.641***	1.369***	1.056	1,567
	(0.0855)	(0.0924)	(0.156)	(0.104)	
Spain	0.966	1.145	1.234**	0.763**	931
	(0.0814)	(0.189)	(0.125)	(0.0864)	
Finland	1.076	0.489***	1.044	1.283**	1,202
	(0.117)	(0.0802)	(0.143)	(0.159)	
France	1.010	0.786*	1.354***	1.017	943
	(0.100)	(0.107)	(0.155)	(0.107)	
Croatia	0.844	0.848	1.198	0.965	991
	(0.0903)	(0.131)	(0.145)	(0.133)	
Hungary	1.131	0.777*	1.003	1.492***	907
	(0.108)	(0.102)	(0.120)	(0.207)	
Ireland	1.163	0.659***	1.344**	0.914	1,397
	(0.127)	(0.0990)	(0.174)	(0.119)	
Italy	0.983	0.523***	1.287***	1.910***	1,275
	(0.0882)	(0.0647)	(0.113)	(0.224)	
Latvia	0.935	0.658**	1.278*	0.937	826
	(0.122)	(0.117)	(0.175)	(0.147)	
Netherlands	0.730***	0.875	1.257*	1.143	1,198
	(0.0767)	(0.148)	(0.165)	(0.128)	
Norway	0.859	0.353***	1.775***	1.747***	1,095
	(0.118)	(0.0660)	(0.270)	(0.273)	
Poland	0.968	0.465***	0.835*	2.293***	803
	(0.0940)	(0.0675)	(0.0882)	(0.312)	
Serbia	0.813*	1.166	1.081	0.918	924
	(0.0927)	(0.216)	(0.121)	(0.155)	
Sweden	0.872	0.321***	1.728***	1.761***	1,285
	(0.103)	(0.0529)	(0.246)	(0.234)	
Slovenia	1.005	0.860	1.005	0.919	626
	(0.123)	(0.162)	(0.123)	(0.126)	
Slovakia	0.850	1.065	0.896	1.244	627
	(0.102)	(0.179)	(0.124)	(0.200)	

***$p < .01$
**$p < .05$
*$p < .1$.

Table A2. Logistic Regression Models of Vote for Populist Parties over Personal Values

Variables	Base Model	Complete Model
Self-enhancement	1.305***	1.239***
	(0.0362)	(0.0390)
Self-transcendent	0.546***	0.685***
	(0.0230)	(0.0325)
Openness	0.905***	0.856***
	(0.0285)	(0.0308)
Conservation	1.508***	1.324***
	(0.0556)	(0.0585)
Religion		0.886**
		(0.0494)
Age		0.979***
		(0.00228)
Women		1.007
		(0.0536)
Education level		0.835***
		(0.0131)
Dummy set of occupation (ref. category: employed)		
Student		0.731**
		(0.106)
Unemployed		1.905***
		(0.209)
Retired		1.035
		(0.0875)
Housework		0.922
		(0.101)
Left-Right		1.214***
		(0.0153)
Trust institution		1.018
		(0.0181)
Political efficacy		0.824***
		(0.0266)
Satisfaction national politics		0.954***
		(0.0161)
Immigration		0.888***
		(0.0197)
Observations	22,219	18,805

Note. Results reported as odds ratio.

***$p < .01$

**$p < .05$

Table A3. Logistic Regression Model of Values and Vote for Right-Wing Populist Parties

Variables	Base Model	Complete Model
Self-enhancement	1.290***	1.218***
	(0.0440)	(0.0508)
Self-transcendent	0.417***	0.603***
	(0.0198)	(0.0358)
Openness	0.886***	0.868***
	(0.0337)	(0.0400)
Conservation	2.018***	1.535***
	(0.0863)	(0.0881)
Religion		1.088
		(0.0795)
Age		0.979***
		(0.00285)
Women		0.981
		(0.0660)
Education level		0.798***
		(0.0162)
Dummy set of occupation (ref. category: employed)		
Student		0.275***
		(0.0535)
Unemployed		1.157
		(0.165)
Retired		1.109
		(0.120)
Housework		0.823
		(0.123)
Left-Right		1.685***
		(0.0279)
Trust institution		0.963*
		(0.0208)
Political efficacy		0.935*
		(0.0372)
Satisfaction national politics		1.022
		(0.0209)
Immigration		0.901***
		(0.0248)
Observations	20,822	17,624

Note. Results reported as odds ratio.

***p < .01

*p < .1.

Table A4. Logistic Regression Model of Values and Vote for Left-Wing Populist Parties

Variables	Base Model	Complete Model
Self-enhancement	0.974	1.019
	(0.0369)	(0.0451)
Self-transcendent	0.829***	0.672***
	(0.0513)	(0.0446)
Openness	1.053	1.054
	(0.0482)	(0.0553)
Conservation	1.090*	1.242***
	(0.0533)	(0.0686)
Religion		0.833**
		(0.0658)
Age		0.984***
		(0.00335)
Women		0.980
		(0.0741)
Education level		0.911***
		(0.0205)
Dummy set of occupation (ref. category: employed)		
Student		0.973
		(0.178)
Unemployed		1.555***
		(0.216)
Retired		1.293**
		(0.155)
Housework		1.178
		(0.170)
Left-Right		0.687***
		(0.0122)
Trust institution		1.033
		(0.0253)
Political efficacy		0.955
		(0.0432)
Satisfaction national politics		1.000
		(0.0231)
Immigration		0.899***
		(0.0288)
Observations	9,259	7,646

Note. Results reported as odds ratio.
***$p < .01$
**$p < .05$
*$p < .1$.

Table A5. Multilevel Logistic Regression of Values and Vote for Populist Parties, Including Programmatic Preferences

Variables	
Self-enhancement	0.883***
	(0.0177)
Self-transcendent	0.852***
	(0.0350)
Openness	1.115*
	(0.0673)
Conservation	1.146***
	(0.0450)
Religion	0.628***
	(0.0784)
Age	0.982***
	(0.00462)
Women	1.095
	(0.0715)
Education level	0.855***
	(0.0286)
Dummy set of occupation (ref. category: employed)	
Student	0.732**
	(0.114)
Unemployed	2.072***
	(0.196)
Retired	0.998
	(0.153)
Housework	0.946
	(0.0461)
Left-Right	1.234**
	(0.118)
Trust institution	1.009
	(0.0166)
Political efficacy	1.009
	(0.0250)
Satisfaction national politics	0.989
	(0.0225)
Immigration	1.020
	(0.0313)
Same-sex union	1.039
	(0.0401)
Income redistribution	1.002
	(0.0261)
EU unification	0.990
	(0.00872)
Observations	17,402
Number of groups	21

Note. Results reported as odds ratio.
***$p < .01$
**$p < .05$
*$p < .1$.

Table A6. Logistic Regression Predicting Populist Vote on the Subsample of Countries Having Left- and Right-Wing Populist Parties

Variables	Individual Level	Multilevel
Self-enhancement	0.907*	0.882***
	(0.0458)	(0.0189)
Self-transcendent	0.769***	0.843*
	(0.0608)	(0.0815)
Openness	1.098	1.103**
	(0.0668)	(0.0473)
Conservation	1.163**	1.087***
	(0.0728)	(0.0297)
Religion	0.631***	0.587***
	(0.0553)	(0.101)
Age	0.979***	0.979**
	(0.00375)	(0.00886)
Women	1.090	1.126
	(0.0939)	(0.103)
Education level	0.862***	0.863***
	(0.0213)	(0.0425)
Dummy set of occupation (ref. category: employed)		
Student	0.651**	0.675
	(0.132)	(0.208)
Unemployed	1.815***	1.836***
	(0.296)	(0.227)
Retired	1.031	0.996
	(0.147)	(0.107)
Housework	0.883	0.935
	(0.155)	(0.0944)
Left-Right	0.982	0.989
	(0.0217)	(0.0382)
Trust institution	1.021	1.020
	(0.0303)	(0.0125)
Political efficacy	0.890**	0.982
	(0.0458)	(0.0358)
Satisfaction national politics	0.923***	0.946
	(0.0257)	(0.0371)
Immigration	0.955	0.992
	(0.0362)	(0.0457)
Observations	6,465	6,465

Note. Results reported as odds ratio.
***$p < .01$
**$p < .05$
*$p < .1$.

Table A7. Multinomial Logistic Regression of Values and Vote for Left- and Right-Wing Populist Parties

Variables	Nonpopulist Voters	Left-Wing Populist Voters	Nonpopulist Voters	Left-Wing Populist Voters
Self-enhancement	0.986	0.947	1.035	1.033
	(0.0416)	(0.0512)	(0.0512)	(0.0672)
Self-transcendent	1.826***	1.493***	1.598***	1.044
	(0.120)	(0.125)	(0.127)	(0.106)
Openness	0.784***	0.866**	0.863**	0.895
	(0.0385)	(0.0545)	(0.0510)	(0.0694)
Conservation	0.624***	0.665***	0.639***	0.819**
	(0.0336)	(0.0445)	(0.0438)	(0.0706)
Religion			1.218**	1.029
			(0.111)	(0.121)
Age			1.015***	0.998
			(0.00382)	(0.00500)
Women			0.905	0.829*
			(0.0781)	(0.0930)
Education level			1.183***	1.104***
			(0.0309)	(0.0375)
Dummy set of occupation (ref. category: employed)				
Student			2.274***	2.163**
			(0.585)	(0.666)
Unemployed			0.833	1.157
			(0.140)	(0.248)
Retired			1.372**	1.872***
			(0.187)	(0.335)
Housework			1.380*	1.574**
			(0.246)	(0.360)
Left-Right			0.774***	0.548***
			(0.0148)	(0.0142)
Trust institution			1.059**	1.084**
			(0.0296)	(0.0395)
Political efficacy			1.125**	1.074
			(0.0579)	(0.0723)
Satisfaction national politics			0.977	0.989
			(0.0257)	(0.0339)
Immigration			1.115***	0.983
			(0.0401)	(0.0464)
Observations			6,465	6,465

Note. Results reported as odds ratio. The reference category is right-wing populist vote.

***p < .01

**p < .05

*p < .1.

Table A8. Populist Parties Included in the Sample

Country	Party Name	Party Family
Austria	FPO	Right
Belgium	Front National	Right
	Lijst Dedecker | Libertair, Direct, Democratisch	Right
	Parti populaire	Right
	Vlaams Blok	Right
Bulgaria	Grazhdani za Evropeysko Razvitie na Balgariya	Right
	Ataka	Right
	Volya	Right
Switzerland	Schweizerische Volkspartei—Union Démocratique du Centre	Right
	Eidgenössisch-Demokratische Union—Union Démocratique Fédérale	Right
	Lega dei Ticinesi	Right
Czech Republic	ANO 2011	No Party Family
	Svoboda a prímá demokracie Tomio Okamura	Right
Finland	Suomen Maaseudun Puolue | Perussuomalaiset	No Party Family
	Sininen tulevaisuus	Right
France	La France Insoumise	Left
	Debout la république | Debout la France	Right
	Front national	Right
Germany	PDS | Die Linke	Left
	Alternative für Deutschland	Right
Hungaria	Fidesz—Magyar Polgári Szövetség	Right
	Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom	Right
	Fidesz—Magyar Polgári Szövetség/Kereszténydemokrata Néppárt	Right
Ireland	Sinn Fein	Left
Italy	Movimento 5 Stelle	No Party Family
	Forza Italia—Il Popolo della Libertà	Right
	Lega (Nord)	Right
	Fratelli d'Italia—Centrodestra Nazionale	Right
Netherlands	Partij voor de Vrijheid	Right
	Socialistiese Partij	Left
	Forum voor Democratie	Right
Norway	Fremskrittspartiet	Right
	Kystpartiet	Right
Poland	Kukiz'15	Right
	Prawo i Sprawiedliwosc	Right
Serbia	Dr Vojislav Šešelj—Srpska radikalna	Right
	Dveri—Demokratska stranka Srbije	Right
	Ivica Dačić—''Socijalistička partija	Left
Slovenia	Levica	Left
	Lista Marjana Šarca	Left
	Slovenska Demokratska Stranka	Right
	Slovenska nacionalna stranka	Right
Lithuania	Lietuvos laisves sajunga	Left
	Tvarka ir teisingumas—Liberalu Demokratu Partija	Right
	Darbo Partija	No Party Family
	Drasos Kelias	No Party Family
Slovakia	Obycajní ludia a nezávislé osobnosti	Right
	Slovenská národná strana	Right
	Smer—sociálna demokracia	Left
	Sme Rodina—Boris Kollár	Right
Spain	Podemos	Left
	Podemos	Left
	En Comú Podem	Left
	VOX	Right
Sweden	Sverigedemokraterna	Right
Croatia	Most nezavisnih lista	Right
	Živi zid	Left
	Hrvatski demokratski savez Slavonije i Baranje	Right