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## When Women Rally

A quantitative study of the association between women's participation in nonviolent civil resistance and democratization

Master's thesis in Statsvitenskap  
Supervisor: Professor Charles Butcher  
June 2022



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Norwegian University of Science and Technology  
Faculty of Social and Educational Sciences  
Department of Sociology and Political Science



## ABSTRACT

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Why does some countries transition to democracy, while others do not? The agency approach focuses on *who* the actors involved in pro-democratic movements are, and *how* the actors involved influence the outcome. This premise, that actors in civil resistance play an important role in the transition to democracy, is this thesis theoretical framework. In line with this, the previous key question could be converted to; What explains why some civil resistance movements leads to democracy, while others do not? Scholars have long believed that democratic transitions are more likely to be successful when the opposition against the regime is led by certain social groups. However, most literature on civil resistance does not account for women as social actors. Consequently, the effect of women's participation in civil resistance have been largely overlooked in the academic literature. To expand the knowledge about women's contribution, this thesis will do a cross sectional study when trying to answer the research question: *how does women's participation in nonviolent resistance campaigns influence the prospects of democratization?* This study suggests that different types of women's participation influences the prospect of democratization through different conditions. The participation of women's organizations is the most outstanding finding, showing a significant and positive association with democratization in almost every model. Based on this, the thesis argues that the association between women's participation and democratization is strongest if the participation takes place through formal women's organizations.

## ABSTRAKT

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Hvorfor lykkes noen land i å demokratiseres seg, mens andre ikke gjør det? «Aktør-tilnærmingen» setter søkelys på hvem aktørene i prodemokratiske motstandsbevegelser er, og hvordan de involverte aktørene påvirker utfallet. Dette premisset, at aktører i motstandsbevegelser spiller en viktig rolle i overgangen til demokrati, er denne oppgavens teoretiske rammeverk. I tråd med dette kan forrige nøkkelspørsmål konverteres til; Hva forklarer hvorfor noen sivile motstandsbevegelser fører til demokrati, mens andre ikke gjør det? Forskere har lenge ment at demokratiske overganger er mer sannsynlige å lykkes når motstandsbevegelsen mot et regime ledes av visse sosiale grupper. Det meste av denne litteraturen tar imidlertid ikke hensyn til kvinner som sosiale aktører i sivil motstand. Følgelig har effekten av kvinners deltakelse i sivil motstand i stor grad blitt oversett i den akademiske litteraturen. For å utvide kunnskapen om kvinners bidrag, utfører denne masteroppgaven en tverrsnitt studie i et forsøk på å besvare forskningsspørsmålet: *hvordan påvirker kvinners deltakelse i ikke-voldelige motstandskampanjer demokratisering?* Studien antyder at ulike typer av kvinners deltakelse påvirker demokratisering ulikt. Videre er deltakelsen av formelle kvinneorganisasjoner det mest interessante funnet, og viser en betydelig og positiv sammenheng med demokratisering i nesten alle modeller. Basert på dette argumenterer oppgaven for at sammenhengen mellom kvinners deltakelse og demokratisering er sterkest dersom deltakelsen skjer gjennom formelle kanaler som kvinneorganisasjoner.

## PREFACE

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# CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

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The first known female resistance campaign was in North America in the sixteenth century. Women from the Iroquois tribe gathered to end unregulated warfare within the Iroquois nation. Men controlled the declaration of war and all other political powers, and the different tribes were often at war with each other. In an attempt to stop the constant struggle between the tribes, the Iroquois women coordinated a sex and childbearing strike. In addition, they refused to harvest, prepare crops, and produce moccasins, which are all necessary elements in warfare. In the end, the women won power to veto war declarations (Chenoweth, 2021, p. 7). Later, in the 1880s, The Ladies Land League in Ireland created noncooperative tactics to secure ownership of the soil from the occupiers. Irish women were often responsible for paying rent to landowners and cultivating crops, and by the 1880s they launched a campaign in which they refused to pay rent and help with the harvest. A year later, a land reform bill in the British Parliament conceded to their demands (Chenoweth, 2021, p. 98-99). In 2019, during the `Sudanese revolution`, a female student named Alaa Salah lead the protests that eventually resulted in a breakdown of the old autocratic regime. Best known for the photo on top of a car, wearing a white hijab, speaking to thousands of Sudanese demonstrators in the capitol Khartoum in April 2019, Salah is described as the “22-year-old female student who took down the 77-year-old dictator” (Andreasen, 2019). Salah was the symbol for all women, from different classes, generations, religions, educational levels, and ethnicities that mobilized and continued protesting. She gave rise to the female participation in a country that is known for its female oppression. Consequently, the young women were at the forefront forming the majority of the protestors and leading the protests throughout 2019 and 2020, making the women’s participation an “exceptional” one in the history of the region (Tønnessen, 2020; Handique, 2020).

These examples illustrate that woman, throughout time and region, *do* participate in resistance to change the status quo. Moreover, they illustrate that women are willing to challenge autocratic regimes, arguably, with the goal of establishing more democratic societies. Empirics do confirm this claim. Women are disproportionately the victims of

underdevelopment, poverty, diseases, and violence throughout the world, and especially in non-democratic societies (Hornset & de Soysa, 2021, p. 2). Moreover, female empowerment and civil liberties are more restricted in autocracies where women often are collectively oppressed and excluded from power (Baldez, 2002, p. 11; Balianmoune-Lutz, 2013; Boldt & White, 2011, pp. 29-30; Momsen, 2008). Therefore, women have a particular interest in achieving democracy (Boldt & White, 2011; Mohanty, 1997).<sup>1</sup> This sentiment can also be traced in the answer from Tawakkol Karman, the Nobel peace prize winner of 2011 and the “mother of revolution” in Yemen, when she was asked why so many women participated in the demonstrations during the Arab Spring. Her answer was that

*“Perhaps because they, like the youth of these countries, were the biggest victims of those corrupt regimes that had failed to respect human dignity and provide them with liberty, essential freedoms and equal rights. They were thus the main beneficiaries of change, and they made sure that change continued everyday”* (Karman, 2017, p. 2).

Overall, it is established that women *do* participate in civil resistance.<sup>2</sup> However, *the effect* of women’s participation in civil resistance have been largely overlooked in the academic literature. Studies in the 1970’s and 1990’s did debate women’s and political, economic, and social participation (Brinton, 1993; Conover & Sapiro, 1993; Flammang, 1997; Gilligan, 1977; Oakley & Cracknell, 1981; Rosen, 1995), but few looked specifically at the effect of women’s mobilization in pro-democratic movements on the prospects of democratization. Waylen (1993) tried to examine the relationship between women’s movements and democratic *consolidation* in Latin America, but later identified that researchers had a poor understanding of the interplay between gender relations and democratization. She did nevertheless conclude that “any analysis of democratization that fails to incorporate a gendered perspective will be flawed” (Waylen, 1994, pp. 327-328).

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<sup>1</sup> Even though not all women share a common interest in mobilizing, those who mobilize often choose to mobilize based on their shared identity and common struggle (Boldt & White, 2011, p. 30).

<sup>2</sup> Civil resistance campaign is a form of collective action used by civil groups that seeks to affect the political, social, and/or economic status quo without the use, or threat, of violence against the opposite side (Chenoweth, 2021, p. 1). I will define this term more explicitly in chapter 3.

Recent studies have argued that the participation of women in popular-movements and democratic transitions are critical for understanding the complexity of democratization (Boldt & White, 2011; Tamaru et al., 2018; Teele, 2018; Young, 2020). Nevertheless, women's contribution in the democratization process continues to be an underexplored topic (Teel, 2018, p. 15). One answer as to why this is might be because quantitative data on the roles women play in civil resistance and the prospect of democratization have been unavailable (Principe, 2017 p. 1). However, in 2019, The Women in Resistance (WiRe) data set was published (Chenoweth, 2019a). WiRe catalogues women's participation in 338 maximalist (violent and nonviolent) resistance campaigns (i.e., those campaigns that call for the toppling of an oppressive government or territorial self-determination) in every country in the world from 1945-2014. As the first, this data set makes it possible to statistically test women's contribution in civil resistance. From this, the report "*Women's participation and the fate of nonviolent campaigns*", was published (Chenoweth, 2019b). In it, Chenoweth concludes, in line with Waylen (1994), that "excluding a discussion of women's power regarding the outcomes of mass movement is likely incomplete" (Chenoweth, 2019, p. 6-7). I wish to contribute to filling parts of this gap by exploring the association between women's participation and democratization.

This thesis asks the following research question: *how does women's participation in nonviolent civil resistance campaigns influence the prospects of democratization?*

To answer this question, this thesis will apply an agency approach as its theoretical foundation. The agency approach focuses on *who* the actors involved in pro-democratic civil resistance are, and how the actors involved influence the probability of democratization (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2006; Chenoweth, 2021; Dahlum et al., 2019; Olson, 1993; Wood, 2001). Traditionally, scholars have disagreed on which social groups are key actors in pro-democratic movements but do agree that *who* revolts matters for democratization (Dahlum, et al., 2019, p. 1494). However, most literature on civil resistance does not account for women as social actors in (Teel, 2018, p. 15).

Therefore, this thesis will conduct a cross-sectional study to explore the association between women's participation and democratization by combining two available data sets, one that captures the degree of women's participation in different civil resistance campaigns from 1945-2014, the WiRe data set (Chenoweth, 2019a), and one that captures the level of

democracy, the Varieties of Democracy Data set (Coppedge et al., 2021). I further conceptualize women's participation through three participatory roles. These roles are I) women's frontline participation. This describes women observed in terms of numerical participation in a campaign. II) Women's participation in campaign leadership which describes women as part of the formal campaign- decision- making structure, and III) the participation of formal women's organizations. To test how women's participation is associated with democratization, I create lead- variables measuring the level of democracy five and ten years after a civil resistance campaign that featured women's participation.

From this, 36 bivariate, multivariate and interaction models (OLS) were used to uncover the association. The study finds that all three of the participatory roles might influence the prospect of democratization through different conditions. The participation of women's organizations is the most outstanding finding, showing a significant and positive association with democratization in almost every model. Furthermore, the participation of women's organizations in nonviolent civil resistance seems to matter almost as much as campaign success for longer-term democratization. Based on this, the thesis suggests that the association between women's participation and democratization is strongest if the participation takes place through formal women's organizations.

### 1.1. WHY STUDY THIS?

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Understanding and identifying why democracies emerge and endure might be one of the most important aspects for promoting global human welfare. Democratic countries generate faster economic growth compared to autocracies on average, they have lower levels of corruption, build better public health institutions and have higher levels of education for all genders, lower levels of domestic human rights abuse, longer life expectancy, lower likelihood for violent internal violent conflict and close to zero percent chance of going to war with other democracies (Davenport & Armstrong, 2004; De Mesquita et al., 2005; Doucouliagos & Ulubaşoğlu, 2008; Hegre, 2001; Russett, 1994; Treisman, 2020). Authoritarian countries, on the other hand, exclude and monopolize political power for a person, group, or party and are more repressive with little or no respect for human rights and democratic principles and practices (Luhmann, 2019, s. 1110).

Today, liberal democracy as the dominant governing system is under threat. The level of democracy enjoyed by the average global citizen in 2021 was down to levels last seen in 1989 (Alizada et al., 2022, p. 6). After peaking in 2012 with 42 countries defined as liberal democracies, there are now only 34 democratic countries left, housing only 13% of the world population. Compared, closed autocracies<sup>3</sup> have increased and are now the home of 26% of the world population. Electoral autocracies<sup>4</sup> remain the most common regime type and harbor 44% of the world's population, which is 3.4 billion people (Alizada et al., 2022, p. 6). As of February 2022, these levels might increase even further after Russia's war on Ukraine.

Therefore, it is highly relevant and important for democratic survival that we identify important components and mechanisms that have a positive and strengthening effect in stabilizing democracies and promoting successful democratization. I believe that women's participation in pro-democratic resistance campaigns might be one of these important components, one that has been largely overlooked thus far.

## 1.2. STRUCTURE

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This thesis begins with an overview of previous research on the topic of democratization, civil resistance, and women's participation. Chapter two starts by outlining three theoretical approaches commonly used to explain how democratization occurs, and democracies endure. One of these is the agency approach, which is the theoretical foundation of this thesis. Based on the assumption that mass-civil resistance drives democratization, the thesis moves on to describe past research on the connection between *nonviolent* resistance and democratization, and why nonviolent resistance is the preferred method of resistance when movements desire democratization. After that, I present an overview of the role of women. This section is divided into two sections. The first section briefly covers the historically (lack of) literature on women's contribution in conflict and civil resistance. The second section presents the recent literature on the role of women in different aspects of war, peace, and resistance. At the end of

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<sup>3</sup> An individual or group of people exercise power largely unconstrained by the people. Alizada, N., Boese, V. A., Lundstedt, M., Morrison, K., Natsika, N., Sato, Y., Tai, H., & Lindberg, S. I. (2022). *Autocratization Changing Nature? V-Dem Working Paper Forthcoming*.

<sup>4</sup> Institutions emulating democracy but falling substantially below the threshold for democracy in terms of authenticity or quality (ibid).

chapter 2, I outline this thesis's contribution to the field of study. In chapter three I define the thesis's core concepts, nonviolent maximalist campaigns, democracy, democratization, and successful campaigns. I also conceptualize women's participation in three participatory roles at the end of chapter three. In chapter four I present the theoretical framework. I begin the chapter by presenting theory on democratization in the context of nonviolent civil resistance. Then I present theory and three hypotheses about democratization in the context of women's participation in nonviolent civil resistance. In chapter five, my data and methods are described more before I present the results in chapter six. Chapter six is divided into three sections, one for each participatory role. At the end of chapter six, I also present the results of a model diagnostic. In chapter seven I discuss my findings in relations to the three hypotheses. I also discuss the limitations of this thesis before I suggest what future research on this topic should focus on. In chapter eight I conclude based on the thesis results.

# CHAPTER 2: PREVIOUS RESEARCH

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## 2.1. HOW TO TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY

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*“The limits of tyrants are prescribed by the endurance of those whom they oppress”*

*(Frederick Douglass, 1857)*

*What explains why some countries transition to democracy, while others do not?* The field of thinkers that is mostly connected to the study of transition between regime types are labeled “transitologists”. This was a highly relevant and popular field of study during the 1980’s and 1990’s when many countries went through some form of transition to democracy (Carothers, 2002, p. 6). Because of these waves of democratization, the democratic debate came to be dominated by the “transition paradigm” (Grugel & Bishop, 2013, pp. 30-31). This paradigm signaled a shift in the academic focus within democratic theory, from what constitutes a democracy, towards (I) identifying factors that made democratization possible, and (II) what makes new democracies consolidate and endure (Grugel & Bishop, 2013, p. 74)<sup>5</sup>. The shift in focus towards these two factors will constitute the following section. There are three main theoretical approaches that have dominated the literature on how democracies are established and consolidated (Grugel & Bishop, 2013, p. 74). One way to divide these dominant theories is between (I) Structural approaches, (II) Elite approach and (III) Agency approach.

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### I) STRUCTURAL APPROACH

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Within structural approaches the focus is from a macro-level view and emphasizes different structural, social, and economic factors as underlying structural requisites for successful democratization and democracy.

Oil wealth (Ross, 2001), religion (Fish, 2002), and culture (Donno & Russett, 2004, p. 582) are all structural factors which might be associated with a country's precondition for

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<sup>5</sup> Later a third focus area, the (III) quality of democracy, also became an increasingly important theme too. See Grugel, J., & Bishop, M. L. (2013). *Democratization: a critical introduction*. Macmillan International Higher Education.



democracy. For example, several scholars have argued for a negative connection between oil occurrence and democracy, also described as the resource curse. This is an alternative explanation for why many African and middle east countries struggle to establish and consolidate democracy (Moses & Letnes, 2017; Randen, 2014; Ross, 2008; Ross, 2001, 2015). Several have also looked at the connection between inequality and the lack of democracy (Boix & Stokes, 2003; Haggard & Kaufman, 2012; Houle, 2009), and, key elements within the structural factor is the economy, income level and education (Lipset, 1959; Vanhanen, 1990, Celestino & Gleditsch, 2013).

Within this realm of research, the modernization theory is most dominant. This theory focuses on economic development as an important factor that both produces democratization but also helps to sustain newly established democracies. More specifically, transition to and consolidation of democracy is more likely in (economically) developed countries (Geddes, 1999, p. 117). However, Przeworski & Limonigi's (1997) findings have been characterized as a challenge to modernization theory and the strongest empirical confirmation (Geddes, 1999, p. 117). Building on Lipset's (1959) observation that democracy is somehow related to economic development, they arrived at the conclusion that economic development does not cause *democratization*, but that economic development was a key determinant for the *consolidation* of the democracy after the transition (Przeworski & Limongi, 1997, p. 159). From this they arrive at the conclusion that democracies survives if there is a certain level – a threshold<sup>6</sup>- of economic development, and countries below that threshold will have a higher probability for reversion to authoritarianism (pp. 162 & 181). A recent contribution to this field shows that there is a strong and consistent link between higher income and democratization and democratic survival in the medium term (10-20 years), but not necessary in shorter term aspects (Treisman, 2020).

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## II) ELITE APPROACH

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Second, the literature on how elites influence democratization concentrates more on the nature of pacts and coalitions that need to be formed between elite groups and the regime or military in order to facilitate a successful democratization (Waylen, 1994, p. 331). Where the early structural explanations tended to focus on transition from a top-down perspective, the elite literature sees the role of specific agencies in facilitating democratization. Drawing on

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<sup>6</sup> When countries reach a per capita income of 4,115\$ over a period of time (see p. 164 for more detailed information)

experiences from Latin America, research suspected that democracy emerges from “elite pacts” and emphasized the elite’s willingness and acceptance for regime change as crucial for successful democratization (O’Donnell et al., 1986; Przeworski, 1991, pp. 77-78). The logic behind this is based on the notion that no system is monolithic (Chenoweth, 2021, p. 30). Every oppressive regime depends on the cooperation of different elites, also referred to as “pillars of support”. These are security forces such as military branches, police forces and intelligence services (Chenoweth, 2021, pp. 31-32)<sup>7</sup>. Therefore, and to a significant degree, the people that the autocratic regime rely upon to carry out their wishes have a lot of power in deciding how long the regime can maintain the status quo (Chenoweth, 2021, p. 32).

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### III) AGENCY APPROACH – POPULAR MOBILIZATION

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The third approach challenges the elite-driven approach where non-elite actors are viewed as passive bystanders. The transition- from -below- perspective highlights the prominent role of individuals and actors, such as labor unions and non-governmental organizations, in facilitating transitions to democracy through popular collective action (Collier & Mahoney, 1999; Dahlum et al., 2019). The main argument is that democratic transitions often emerge after organized popular movements force authoritarian regimes from power (Dahlum et al., 2019, p. 1494). This actor- perspective therefore recognizes how popular collective action undermines authoritarian regimes and consequently causes democratization (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2006; Olson, 1993; Przeworski, 1988; Wood, 2001). Furthermore, the agency approach focuses on *who* the actors involved in pro-democratic civil resistance are, and how the actors involved influence the outcome (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2006; Chenoweth, 2021; Dahlum et al., 2019; Olson, 1993; Wood, 2001). As mentioned, there has been a debate about which social groups matter more for democratization. Earlier, some argued that the peasants, under certain conditions, are key figures in a democratic movement (Stephens, 1989). Later, the disagreement was between which urban groups were more effective in promoting democracy. Some argued that revolutions for democracy can only succeed if the bourgeoisie are involved (Moore, 1966), others hold that industrial workers and labor movements, because of their high organizational capacity, are the key agents in democratization (Butcher et al.,

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<sup>7</sup> Pillars of support can also be the national guard, economic elites like bankers, wealthy business owners, trade associations, lobbyists and companies and bureaucrats that oversee that government’s function and policy runs (ibid).

2018; Collier & Mahoney, 1999). Moreover, urban middle classes are thought to be key actors in other works (Ansell & Samuels, 2014), and the poor as the “biggest threat to autocracies (Boix, 2003). Recent findings show how civil resistance movements that are dominated by industrial workers or the urban middle classes have a higher success rate in democratization (Dahlum et al., 2019, p. 1494). Overall, the premise that social groups in popular movements play an important role in the transition to democracy, is this thesis theoretical foundation. Specifically, it asks what effect women, as a previous underexplored group, might have on the prospect of democratization.

There are further three core assumptions that motivate this approach. The first assumption holds that power is based on legitimacy rather than coercion and assume that political power comes from the ability to get people to voluntarily cooperate and obey authority. This, however, depends on whether the people consider obedience to be in their own self-interest and when whomever or whatever is wielding that power is considered legitimate. If the people have reason to believe that the government does not deserve power, and a large amount of people stop voluntarily complying, power is difficult to restore (Chenoweth, 2021, p. 31).

Second, and as mentioned, power is never to be taken for granted, and regimes rely upon the “pillars of support”, or elites, to stay in power. However, mass mobilization can pull the pillars of support away from the power holders, causing the government to collapse. For instance, in apartheid South Africa, rich, white business owners experienced economic challenges under the pressure of colored South-African-led boycotts and international sanctions. Few white business owners converted to the ANC's vision of abolishing Apartheid, but they knew that their businesses would not prosper unless they pressured the government to acquiesce to the claim for racial equality of colored South Africans. Consequently, many joined the movement in support of their claims (Chenoweth, 2021, p. 43).

Third, and consequently, power is never permanent (Chenoweth, 2021, p. 30). Power holders must constantly renew their power, either by fulfilling an implicit or explicit social contract, through good performance or through moral righteousness.<sup>8</sup> They must keep demonstrating their legitimacy to their pillars of support and to the population. If civil

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<sup>8</sup> The legitimacy approach does not assume that the opponent must possess some level of morality. The lack of morality or empathy does not matter as much as the organized resistance movement's ability to use broad range of coordinated methods to overthrow the regime (p. 34-35).

resistance campaigns occur, it reveals that this legitimacy is in crisis (Chenoweth, 2021, p. 34).

In sum, there are several important theories that have been developed in an attempt to explain why some countries transition to democracy, while other do not. Even though they are all important in answering the question, this thesis will focus on how actors involved in (nonviolent) civil resistance facilitates democratization. There are further two methods of resistance a civil resistance movement can choose when mobilizing, violent or nonviolent. The next section gives a brief overview over what defines each method, and which method is the preferred one when the resistance movements aspire democratization.

## 2.2 METHOD OF RESISTANCE- NONVIOLENT VS. VIOLENT

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Nonviolent civil resistance is a “civilian-based method used to wage conflict through social, psychological, economic and political means without the threat or use of violence” (Chenoweth, 2021, pp. 37-38; Sharp, 1973; Stephan & Chenoweth, 2008, p. 9). Violent methods use coercion, threats, or physical violence against the opponent (Stephan & Chenoweth, 2008, p. 10). Violent strategies in a campaign have been justified through what Chenoweth (2021) describes as “the control approach” (p. 29). The control approach is a theory of change that accepts militarism and violence as necessary evil in defending or transforming an unjust society (Chenoweth, 2021, p. 29). Examples of this justification are found throughout history, for instance, during de-colonization in Algeria from 1954-1962 where opposition groups argued that violence is the only way people could be free, or in Mao Zedong’s rhetoric when he argued that “power flows from the barrel of a gun”. Early Studies assumed that the most effective means of waging political struggle involved violence (Byman & Waxman, 2000; Horowitz & Reiter, 2001; Pape, 1997, 2008). For instance, some scholars have argued that terrorism is an effective strategy to succeed in political change (Pape, 2008, pp. 66-73)<sup>9</sup>. However, Abrahms (2006) showed that terrorism has an extremely low success rate, accomplishing policy objectives only 7% of the time (Abrahms, 2006, p. 44). Instead, studies show how *nonviolent* methods are the most effective means of resistance (Ackerman & DuVall, 2000; Chenoweth, 2021; Chenoweth et al., 2011; Hadiz, 2006; Karatnycky &

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<sup>9</sup> Mainly focuses on suicide terrorism.

Ackerman, 2004; Sharp, 1973), and are nearly twice as successful as violent (Principe, 2017 p. 1; Stephan & Chenoweth, 2008, p. 8). The highly influential study of Stephan & Chenoweth (2008), who observed samples of violent and nonviolent movements from 1900-2006, showed how nonviolent resistance movements were more likely to succeed and result in stable, peaceful democracies compared to violent ones (Stephan & Chenoweth, 2008, p. 8). Recent studies also confirm this. From 1945 to 2011, 80% of regime transitions initiated by nonviolent resistance ended with at least a minimal level of democracy. Compared, fewer than 30% of transitions initiated by violent means ended with the same minimal level of democracy (Pinckney, 2020, p. 6). Even countries that experienced failed nonviolent campaigns were still about four times more likely to transition to democracy within five years of the conflict's end, compared to campaigns that used violent methods (Chenoweth, 2021, p. 241)<sup>10</sup>. Studies therefore argue that democratization in the wake of successful nonviolent resistance campaigns create more durable and internally peaceful democracies than transitions after a violent campaign (Chenoweth, 2021; Chenoweth et al., 2011; Pinckney, 2020).

Based on the literature describing the association between nonviolent civil resistance and democratization, this thesis will also focus on *nonviolent* civil resistance campaigns and the role women might play in the outcome of such resistance.

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### 2.3. THE ROLE OF WOMEN

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#### HISTORICALLY

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Traditionally, the public sphere and the governing of society has been reserved exclusively for men. The private sphere, that revolved around the functioning of everyday life, has been the role assigned to women (Boldt & White, 2011, p. 30). These assumptions have for the most part also been evident in times of conflict. Men were assumed to be the natural leaders and participants in war, conflict and resistance, and women were the head of the domestic family

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<sup>10</sup> The specific mechanisms that link nonviolent resistance to increased probability of democratization, will be elaborated more in chapter 4 (theory).

affairs and natural care givers (Elshtain, 1995, p. 5). However, women have also been important actors in times of conflict (Heyzer, 2005, p. 56), and have always played a part in organizing resistance (Chenoweth, 2019b, p. 1). Women have organized resistance to change women's legal status, to demand women's suffrage, to challenge the maldistribution of wealth; they have taken part in miners strikes and peasant movements and been involved in land invasions and in neighborhood organizations to protect their homes and gain water and electricity; they have organized with other women to protest consumer price increases, create health care, day care and schools, and women have joined political parties even before they had the right to vote (Jaquette, 2018, p. 2). Overall, women have a long history of forming groups and participating in resistance (Heyzer, 2005, p. 56). However, women's contributions have often been underestimated or forgotten in the historical narrative (Arenfeldt & Golley, 2012, p. 17; Eglitis & Zelče, 2013; Jaquette, 2018, pp. 2-3). Women who do not play their social roles according to the normative script are often left out of the history narratives. For instance, over 800 000 women served in the Soviet Red Army during World War II. Many served in "traditionally female positions" like nurses, doctors, medics, cooks, and laundresses, but many were also snipers, machine gunners, combat engineers and radio operators (Eglitis & Zelče, 2013, p. 988). Nevertheless, dominant historical accounts of World War II from both Soviet and other countries, shed little light on the experiences and contribution of these women, in part, some argue, because the narrative of them as active combatants in war challenged the normative social roles ascribed to women (Eglitis & Zelče, 2013, pp. 987-988). The same lack of historical confirmation is also evident during the many liberations struggles in Africa. Women's participation and contribution were key elements in many countries and can be traces in every part of Africa (Krishna & Mulenga, 2004, p. 8). Yet, their contribution is less acknowledged.

*"Women, after all are the unsung heroines of many a liberation struggle that rid Africa of the galling yoke of colonialism and white oppression. (...) unfortunately, many of their exploit's accomplishment and sacrifices have gone unrecognized. Yet, without such women, victory would have been impossible" (Krishna & Mulenga, 2004, p. 8)*

Overall, it seems like underestimating women's participation and contribution in many resistances during the twentieth century has been the norm. However, the attention given to women's participation in different aspect of resistance has increased.

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## RECENTLY

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Women's status and political influence has been improved substantially over the past decades, both in relative and absolute terms (Bakken & Buhaug, 2021, p. 983). The focus on women's role in times of conflict and peace has consequently increased dramatically the last 20 years and especially after the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1325 in 2000<sup>11</sup> (Chenoweth, 2019b, p. 3).

For starters, there is a large body of research on the effect of female combatants and war. Many have looked at non-armed- and armed groups, both cross-nationally and within specific cases (Alison, 2009; Braithwaite & Ruiz, 2018; Klouzal, 2008; Loken, 2018; Mason, 1992; Penn, 2005; Wood, 2019). Loken (2018) demonstrates how women's military presence can have ideologically and politically legitimizing effect among civilians (Loken, 2018, p. 1). Additionally, studies suggest that war and conflict might enhance the prospect of female empowerment. Evidence from post conflict African countries show higher rates of female legislative representation and a faster trajectory of adopting women's rights reforms because women's groups seized the opportunity for political reform during conflict, compared to non-post conflict countries (Tripp, 2015, pp. 33-35). This is in line with the findings of Webster et.al (2019) who show how warfare, at least in short or medium term, can disrupt social institutions and lead to an increase in women's empowerment via mechanisms related to role shifts across society and political shifts catalyzed by war (Webster et al., 2019, p. 255).

Regarding post-conflict peace agreements, several studies have found a robust correlation between women's participation in peace negotiations and the durability of peace (Caprioli et al., 2010; Gizelis, 2009; Krause et al., 2018; Principe, 2017 ). When women and women's groups strongly influence a negotiation process, the chances of a final agreement being reached are much higher than when women's influence is moderate, weak, or absent (Principe, 2017, p. 10). Gizelis (2009) found that the prospects for successful peacebuilding operations increase when women participate because women can express a voice in the peacemaking process that includes more diversity and a broader domestic participation

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<sup>11</sup> This resolution called for the "strengthening of women's and girls' protection from conflict-related sexual violence and women's equal participation in all stages of the prevention and resolution of conflict and women's participation in peace negotiations" SC, U. (2000). Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security.

(Gizelis, 2009, pp. 505-506). For instance, collaboration with diverse women's groups- especially between those in representative positions and civil society groups- during the peace process is said to increase the quality of a peace agreement (Krause et al., 2018, pp. 985-988). Peace agreements with women signatories have a higher quality, in terms of sociopolitical changes, and higher implementation rates than those with few or no women signatories (Krause et al., 2018, pp. 985-988). On the other hand, gender inequality is a strong predictor for civil war onset (Caprioli, 2005; Melander, 2005). There is also evidence suggesting that women as UN peacekeepers reduce various forms of violence in conflicts and war (Karim & Beardsley, 2017; Simić, 2018). The latest contribution to this field of study has established the female political empowerment-conflict and peace -link by drawing on global data over a 200-year period (1817-2017) and found a strong and positive association between female political empowerment and civil peace (Dahlum & Wig, 2020, p. 879).

Compared to women's role in war and peace agreements, the effect of women's participation in nonviolent movements and democratization have been less explored. Waylen (1993) argued that women's organizations played a major role in many regime- breakdowns in Latin-America. Another study showed how countries with an advance in women's political empowerment and rights prior to the Arab Spring were the ones most likely to transition successfully to democracy, and that women's growing empowerment and political leadership in Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria after the Arab Spring is said to have strengthened the quality of democracy (Moghadam, 2014, p. 35). Furthermore, higher levels of gender equality, regardless of democracy level, seem to result in a higher likelihood of nonviolent campaign *onset* (Schaftenaar, 2017, p. 762). Scholars claim that women have been central in the downfall of several oppressive regimes, for instance in several countries in Latin-America, and in Egypt, Sudan, and Algeria (Chenoweth, 2019b, p. 3). However, researchers have been unable to explore *how* women's participation in civil resistance campaigns might affect the nature and outcome of the campaign, partly because of a lack of (quantitative) data (Principe, 2017). Recently the *Women in Resistance* (WiRe) data set was published (Chenoweth, 2019a). After using this data, Chenoweth (2019) presents five main findings. First, ninety-nine percent of nonviolent campaigns featured frontline women's participation compared with seventy-six percent of violent campaigns. Second, the greater role of women in campaigns (in terms of observable numerical participation), the larger the correlation with nonviolent methods, even in highly repressive contexts. Movements with both women's frontline



participation and the more formal involvement of women's organizations are more likely to maintain nonviolent discipline. Third, frontline women's participation is highly correlated with successful resistance campaigns. This is also true after controlling for other factors such as campaign size. Fourth, women's participation is associated with gender equality after a nonviolent campaign has succeeded. This effect is not the same for violent campaigns. Fifth, the descriptive findings in the report show that excluding a discussion of women's power regarding the outcomes of mass movement is likely incomplete (Chenoweth, 2019, p. 6-7).

Overall, the report establishes two basic assumptions. First, women *do* participate in violent and nonviolent civil resistance. Two, women's participation clearly influences campaign's nonviolent discipline and probability of campaign success (Chenoweth, 2019b).

Building further on the report, Marks & Chenoweth (2020) find strong evidence of a substantial increase in egalitarian democracy in countries where women have participated in resistance movements against the regime (Marks & Chenoweth, 2020, p. 5). Extensive women's frontline participation (observed numerical participation) nearly doubles the predicted score of egalitarian democracy five years after the movements ends compared to movements with no women participants. However, this only applies when campaigns succeed. Higher rates of women observed in campaigns led to a greater risk of backlash and repression if the campaign failed (Marks & Chenoweth, 2020, p. 5). The same is true for democracy levels. In failed-nonviolent campaigns with large numbers of women's participation, the egalitarian democracy level drops five years after the uprising, which may indicate revenge from authoritarian actors against women who have challenged the male-dominated system through mass participation (p. 5). The report of Marks & Chenoweth (2020)<sup>12</sup> is the closest to what this thesis wishes to explore.

## 2.4. IDENTIFYING THE RESEARCH GAP AND THE THESIS CONTRIBUTION TO THE FIELD OF STUDY

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<sup>12</sup> There is currently and ongoing research, expanding on this study, about the impact of women's participation on revolutionary outcomes, but this work is yet to be published. I e-mailed Professor Chenoweth in January 2022 who said the book was still in draft form. For more information; <https://www.radcliffe.harvard.edu/event/2022-erica-chenoweth-fellow-presentation-virtual>

Marks & Chenoweth (2020) do offer important insights. However, I wish to make three new contributions to this.

First, the research thus far has focused on the correlation between women's frontline participation and campaign success, and less on the causal story behind this. I wish to elaborate and provide mechanisms about *how* women's participation is associated with democratization. I also expand the current quantitative research, which has for now only looked at women's *frontline* participation, by including two additional conceptualizations of women's participation (women's participation in campaign leadership and the participation of women's organization) and present theory – and test- how each of them affects democratization differently.

Second, Marks & Chenoweth (2020) find a positive association between women's frontline participation on *egalitarian* democracy. However, my thesis also includes the polyarchy democracy score, making it possible to look at how women's participation effects a broader set of democracy indicators.

Third, the positive association between women's participation and future egalitarian score is argued to be conditioned on whether the campaign itself *succeeds* (Marks & Chenoweth, 2020, p. 5). This indicates that the association between women's participation and democratization might be conditional on campaign success. This link has only been drawn based on women's frontline participation and has not yet been explored on other participatory roles. Therefore, I wish to explore this connection by adding an interaction term between “success” on each of the roles previously mentioned. With this, I wish to see if the association between women participation and democratization depends on success, or if women's participation is independently associated with democratization.

In sum, this thesis will explore the association between women's participation in nonviolent civil resistance and democratization, by dis-aggregate women's participation and build a new theory of how each of them might affect democratization differently.

# CHAPTER 3: DEFINING THE CONCEPTS

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## 3.1. NONVIOLENT MAXIMALIST RESISTANCE CAMPAIGNS

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Civil resistance campaigns are a form of collective action used by civil groups that seek to affect the political, social, and/or economic status quo without the use, or threat, of violence against the opposite side. In short, “civil resistance campaigns are organized, public and explicitly nonviolent in its means and ends” (Chenoweth, 2021, p. 1). There are several terms related to civil resistance (Chenoweth, 2021, p. 28).<sup>13</sup> This thesis focuses on a subset of civil resistance campaigns with “maximalist” goals, also referred to as *maximalist resistance campaigns*<sup>14</sup>. A maximalist resistance campaign is a campaign with a broader objective, often the toppling of an oppressive government, to replace the political leadership, create territorial self-determination or expel a foreign military occupation or colonial power (Chenoweth, 2019b, p. 1; 2020, p. 71). Butcher et al., (2021) define maximalist demands as calls for change in the political structure that significantly alter the executive’s access to state power<sup>15</sup>. Examples of these maximalist demands includes demands for democratization in autocratic settings (Butcher et al., 2021, p. 2). Accordingly, this thesis defines maximalist resistance campaigns as civil resistance with the objective of overthrowing an autocratic government for the purpose of democratization (Butcher et al., 2021; Chenoweth, 2021, p. 13). Based on this, I choose to only include nonviolent maximalist campaigns that has had the objective of

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<sup>13</sup> These include, Satyagraha, positive action, nonviolent civil resistance movements, mass-nonviolent antigovernment movements, civil resistance, people power, unarmed struggle, and nonviolent action (Chenoweth, 2020, p. 70; 2021, p. 6; De Waal & Ibreck, 2013, p. 307). Methods such as strikes, protests, sit-ins, boycotts, stay-away demonstrations, noncooperation, and several others

<sup>14</sup> This is partly because these are a more limited subset of civil resistance for which figures are widely available Chenoweth, E. (2020). The future of nonviolent resistance. *Journal of democracy*, 31(3), 69-84. . But also because this term-maximalist resistance campaigns- are explicitly used in the report this thesis is based on and are the only campaigns included in the WiRE data set Chenoweth, E. (2019a). Women in Resistance Dataset, version 1. *Harvard Dataverse*, 3.

<sup>15</sup> Maximalist demands are also changes in the rules in which executives are selected, or the policy or geographic areas for which the executive has the right to make laws.

regime change. I therefore assert that campaigns with the objective of regime change are mostly pro-democracy movements, at least during the period of resistance<sup>16</sup>.

I use the terms civil resistance, maximalist civil resistance campaign and nonviolent civil resistance campaign interchangeably.

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## 3.2. DEMOCRACY AND DEMOCRATIZATION

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### 3.2.1 POLYARCHY AND EGALITARIAN DEMOCRACY

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This thesis's understanding of democracy can be summarized within two dimensions. First, the narrow institutional one - *polyarchy democracy*. Within this traditional understanding, three prerequisites must be in place. First, democracy exists when leaders achieve power through free and fair elections (Schumpeter, 1976). Two, when all relevant political forces agree to submit their interest and values to the uncertain interplay of the institutions and continue the "peaceful play" (Lipset, 1959; Przeworski, 1991, p. 26). Third, democracy exists where there is near-universal suffrage and basic freedoms like freedom to organize, freedom of speech, and freedom to stand for election (Dahl, 1973, p. 2), in addition to the liberal components (Luhmann, 2019). The second dimension is a more broad-based, social equality approach. Here, (egalitarian) democracy exist when, *in addition* to the institutional prerequisites, the protection of rights, freedom for all individuals and access to power is equal across all social groups (Coppedge et al., 2021, p. 41).

The first concept of democracy relates to Dahl's (1956) "polyarchy democracy" term. Much of the contemporary understanding of democracy was produced during the Cold War (Grugel & Bishop, 2013, p. 26; Sigman & Lindberg, 2019, p. 595) and polyarchy was, according to Dahl, the most sufficient way to define democracy since there were many conditions of democracy that (western) democracies did not meet (Grugel & Bishop, 2013, p. 29).

Polyarchy democracy exists when there is near-universal suffrage and basic freedoms like freedom to organize, freedom of speech, and freedom to stand for election (Dahl, 1973, p. 2).

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<sup>16</sup> Even though it could be argued that democracy is not the only aim some campaign, they could also include social, economic, and racial justice, democracy and democratic institutions are often a prerequisite for realizing these broader goals (Chenoweth, 2021, p. 241).

Polyarchy is neither a democracy in its full normative sense, or a dictatorship, but is the closest to the democratic ideal any country can come (Dahl, 1956, p. 59). Building further on Dahl's indicators, democracy-scholars added two prerequisites that needs to be secured to be labeled a (polyarchy) democracy. First, democracy exists when leaders achieve power through free and fair elections (Schumpeter, 1976). Two, when all relevant political forces agree to submit their interest and values to the uncertain interplay of the institutions and continue the "peaceful play". More specifically, when the losing side tries again within the same institutions under which they have lost (Lipset, 1959b; Przeworski, 1991, p. 26).

The concept of polyarchy became the basis for describing the characteristics of liberal democracy from the 1970s (Grugel & Bishop, 2013, p. 29). In addition to these basic components, liberal democracies must involve rule of law, ensure respect for civil rights and balance power between the executive and legislature branch (Luhmann, 2019, p. 897).

Nevertheless, even though these definitions have a long intellectual history, this is a narrow and restricted institutional definition of democracy (Bråten, 2018, p. 238; Waylen, 1994, p. 331). Liberal democracy does emphasize "respect for civil rights", however, there is no mention of which conditions must exist for all citizens to properly engage in the democracy (Sigman & Lindberg, 2019, p. 598). A truly democratic approach does not only pay attention to the procedures – the how- of democratic decision making- but must also include the *who* of decision- making (Bråten, 2018, p. 239). In the context of this thesis, the *who* are the women.

Given the theoretical connection between democracy and equality, where inequality among different social groups is a democratic obstacle because it inhibits the full exercise of people's formal democratic rights and political participation, it may seem that democracy and gender equality should go hand in hand (Houle, 2009; Sigman & Lindberg, 2019, p. 598).<sup>17</sup> Yet, historically, democratic theory has excluded women (Beer, 2009; Bråten, 2018; Sigman & Lindberg, 2019, p. 596). Many democracy -scholars find no contradiction in categorizing political systems as "democratic" even when women are not allowed to vote (Beer, 2009). A wider definition of democracy, that also includes a gendered perspective, has consequently

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<sup>17</sup> For instance, Boix (2003), Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) and Ansell and Samuels (2014) provides evidence that high levels of inequality threaten both the survival and quality of democracy

been debated (Held, 1987; Landman, 2018; Pateman, 1989; Razavi, 2001; Waylen, 1994). For instance, and as previously mentioned, Waylen (1994) attempted to develop a framework for analyzing the interplay between gender and democratization. However, she argues that, to analyze the outcome, one must begin by determining what is meant by democracy.

Traditionally this has been in lines of Dahl's polyarchy term, but this excludes possible analysis of the outcomes of democratization in any terms other than the narrow institutional approach. Consequently, democracy at the institutional level does not entail a more even distribution of power in society, particularly regarding gender (Waylen, 1994, p. 333).

Accordingly, scholars today are increasingly attentive to the connection between democratic procedures, rights and freedoms, and the extent to which they apply equally across citizens (Sigman & Lindberg, 2019, p. 595). In this sense, *egalitarian democracy* can provide a broader understanding of democracy, partly because it views equality as a prerequisite for democratic participation. For a country to be labeled as an egalitarian democracy, three preconditions must be accomplished. First, the protection of rights and freedoms of individuals must be equal across all social groups; second, resources must be distributed equally across all social groups; and third, groups and individuals must enjoy equal access to power (Coppedge et al., 2021, p. 41).

However, one might argue that to establish an egalitarian democracy, the institutional prerequisites must be in place. Hence, egalitarian democracy might not be able to exist without the institutional components which facilitate democratic principles and practices. Only when they are in place, the egalitarian principles can follow. Based on this, the thesis will explore the association between women's participation and democratization on both democracy indicators.

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### 3.2.2. DEMOCRATIZATION

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*Democratization* is as a process towards the ideal goals of (polyarchy and egalitarian) democracy, and *autocratization* as a process away from them (Grugel & Bishop, 2013, p. 30; Pinckney et al., 2022, p. 2).

There is further an assumption that democratization tends to unfold in a set of sequence of stages (Carothers, 2002, p. 7). First, there is the *opening*. This is a period of democratic

ferment and political liberalization that shows cracks and weakness in the ruling regime (Carothers, 2002, p. 7). After that there is the *breakthrough*, also labeled *transition*. *Transition* refers to the period between the breakdown of one political regime and the establishment of another (Pinckney, 2020, p. 45) and the emergence of a democratic system with a new government through national elections and often with a new constitution (Carothers, 2002, p. 7). After the transition comes *consolidation*. This is often a slow process in “which democratic forms are transformed into democratic substance” through the strengthening of democratic institutions and regularization of elections. Overall, this is where the “democratic rules of the game” are established (Carothers, 2002, p. 7).

This thesis will therefore understand democratization as a process consisting of these three stages, with an especially focus on the short- term effect (the opening) and medium/longer-term effects (transition phase) and how female participation in nonviolent resistance associates with the outcome of these two stages.

### 3.3. SUCCESSFUL CAMPAIGNS AND DEMOCRATIZATION

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A campaign is defined as *successful* if the campaign achieves their stated goal(s) within a year of the campaign’s peak/campaigns end, and that the success was a direct result of campaign activities (Chenoweth & Shay, 2019, p. 9). In the context of this paper, that only looks at campaigns with the objective of regime change, successful campaigns mean campaigns that has succeeded in bringing down an autocratic regime, for the purpose of establishing democracy. Accordingly, since democratization unfolds in stages, *successful campaigns*, in this context, translates to the beginning of the democratization process because the campaigns have succeeding in phase one, the opening. Success in the transition phase, on the other hand, mean institutional changes, i.e., democratization in the medium/longer term aspect.

### 3.4. CONCEPTUALIZATION OF WOMEN’S PARTICIPATION IN NONVIOLENT MAXIMALIST RESISTANCE CAMPAIGN

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As the section about the role of women indicates, women’s participation in resistance campaigns is not homogenous, but rather complex and sometimes overlapping. This is because “(...) *women play a multiplicity of roles, as peace activists, as domestic or economy-saving labor, as logistical and health care supporters, and/or as active participants in*

*agitating for regime change*” (Sjoberg & Whooley, 2015, p. 264). Hence, women can participate in resistance campaigns in different ways and through different roles.

There are further several ways to conceptualize these roles. Chenoweth (2019b) presents different categories that identify the roles women can take on during a maximalist civil resistance campaign (pp. 28- 33). Three are especially relevant for this thesis because they are some of the roles that present the strongest link to increased probability of democratization. These three are frontline participation, women in formal campaign leadership and participation of formal women’s organization. One way to divide these roles is between informal and formal participation. Resistance campaigns are often made up of coalitions of informal participants and groups, and formal organizations (Pinckney et al., 2022, p. 2). By following this divide, I will be better able to evaluate if there is a difference in association between grass-root dissident and formal participation in the campaign on democratization.

The informal dimension covers frontline participation because it focuses more on the individual/numeric observation of women participation. The formal dimension conceptualizes women in formal campaign leadership or through the participation of formal women’s organizations, constituting the more “hands- on”, active and organized association of women participation.

I will now present the conceptualization of these three roles as described by Chenoweth (2019b). I will elaborate them further in chapter 4.

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## I) FRONTLINE ROLES

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Women in frontline roles describes women observed in terms of observed numerical participation in a campaign (Chenoweth, 2019b, p. 1). This means that when women are observed as *campaign -participants* they are hence participating in frontline roles (Chenoweth, 2019b, p. 7). For instance, there was an unprecedented high level of female participation in several of the civil resistance campaign in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen during the Arab Spring (Tnani, 2020, p. 1). During the protests in Egypt in 2011, some estimate that 50 percent of the campaign participants where women (Sjoberg & Whooley,



2015, p. 267)<sup>18</sup>. This is not a new phenomenon. Ninety nine percent of nonviolent campaigns from 1945-2014 have had frontline women's participation to some extent (Chenoweth, 2019b, pp. 3 & 14).

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## II) FORMAL LEADERSHIP ROLES

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Leadership in civil resistance campaigns is critical and can be defined as formal and “strategic decision-makers who inspire and organize others to participate in social movements” (Morris & Staggenborg, 2004, p. 171). Historically, leadership roles in civil resistance have been occupied by men (Morris & Staggenborg, 2004, p. 177). However, since WWII, women in leadership positions in civil resistance campaigns have increased (Chenoweth, 2019b, p. 8). For instance, a woman named Julia Mulenga was an important leader figure during the Zambian liberation struggle. Popularly known as “Mama Chikamoneka”, she recruited women participants by teaching them about the discrimination and ill treatment by Europeans towards Zambians while running a food-shop. She organized large numbers of people and lead several protests in support of the freedom fighters. She mobilized nearly three quarters of the women in Zambia to take part in different protests movements, while also preparing meals for male freedom fighters to enable them to continue. At night, she would rattle tin with stones in order to call women for politically oriented meetings (Krishna & Mulenga, 2004, p. 11). More recently, during the Sudanese revolution 2018-2019, the women were visible leaders, and the leadership of the student Alaa Salah eventually resulted in a breakdown of the old regime in Sudan in 2019 (Tønnessen, 2020; Handique, 2020).

Conceptualizing women in leadership roles in a civil resistance campaign can, however, be tricky because of the complexity of different leadership roles in a campaign. Women are often excluded from the top formal leadership positions in favor of other secondary leadership roles (Morris & Staggenborg, 2004, p. 177). Robnett (1997) argues that women in civil resistance function as a “bridge leader”, which is defined as intermediate layer of leadership, whose task includes bridging participants, potential constituents, and formal leaders to the movement” (p.19). This might indicate that women have been excluded from the analytic meaning of the concept of leadership because their “type of leadership” might not fit into the common understanding of campaign leadership (Morris & Staggenborg, 2004, p. 177). This distinction

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<sup>18</sup> Others estimates the crowd to be 20 percent female (ibid).

might also be the reason why “quantifiable data on how female leadership influence a movement’s ability to achieve its goals is lacking” (Principe, 2017, p. 9-10). However, the WiRe data set conceptualizes women’s campaign leadership as either *among* formal leadership or *primary* leaders of a campaign (Chenoweth, 2019b, p. 30), making it possible to take the distinction in to account. Consequently, I also conceptualize leadership in a broader way that includes women in leadership even if they are not the “top” leader.

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### III) FORMAL WOMEN’S ORGANIZATION

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Formal organizations are a type of group that is deliberately constructed and whose members are organized to achieve specific goal(s) (Miller & Brown, 2013). Formal women’s organizations mean women’s organizations with formal titles (Chenoweth, 2019a, p. 32).

Formal organizations are central in every phase of a democratization process, from mobilizing people, sustaining, and coordinating acts of resistance to forming fronts and cooperation between different groups and negotiating with regimes (Butcher et al., 2018; McAdam, 1999; Tarrow, 2011). The probability of democratization increases when strong and durable organizations mobilize against an autocratic regime (Della Porta & Diani, 2020, p. 136; Pinckney et al., 2022, p. 3). Historically, women’s organizations have been categorized as important actors for democratization and have played a major role in several maximalist campaigns (Jaquette, 2001, p. 112; Murdie & Peksen, 2015, p. 183). For instance, the Tunisian women’s organization *Association Tunisienne des Femmes Democratés*, (ATFD), played an instrumental role in the democratization in Tunisia, especially in the transition after the overthrow of President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali’s regime (Deane, 2013, p. 13; Labidi, 2014, p. 1; Refle, 2016, p. 5).

I believe that women’s participation in these three roles should influence democratization. I will further elaborate their specific mechanisms in section 4.2. Later, I will test whether there is an association between the participation of women in these roles and future levels of democracy, both polyarchy and egalitarian.

# CHAPTER 4: THEORY

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*What explains why some nonviolent maximalist civil resistance campaigns lead to democracy, while others do not?* This section will first address democratization in the context of nonviolent campaigns and why nonviolent campaigns are the method of conflict most associated with democratization. Then I will present specific mechanisms that are argued to increase the probability of democratization for each stage, separately.

## 4.1. DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE CONTEXT OF NONVIOLENT MAXIMALIST CIVIL RESISTANCE CAMPAIGNS

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Despite literature claiming that nonviolent campaigns are nearly twice as successful as violent (Principe, 2017 p. 1; Stephan & Chenoweth, 2008, p. 8), the presence of nonviolent civil resistance campaigns does not necessary mean that democratization will happen. In fact, half of all pro-democratic movements fail, and more than half are not democracies five years after (Chenoweth et al., 2011, p. 215). There are huge variations within nonviolent resistance campaigns that affect the probability of a campaign to lead to democratization. In this section I will elaborate on some mechanisms nonviolent campaigns should possess to increase the probability of democratization.

As mentioned, this thesis will understand democratization as a process consisting of different stages. The main focus in this context are the opening and transition phases. I will therefore address each stage, and present specific mechanisms that are argued to increase the probability of democratization for each stage, separately.

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### 4.1.1. THE OPENING: MASS MOBILIZATION

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As mentioned, there are three core assumption that motivates the agency approach (Chenoweth, 2021, pp. 31-34) and if civil resistance campaigns occur, it reveals that this legitimacy is in crisis and the *opening*, which shows cracks and weakness in the ruling regime, has begun.

Kurt Shock (2005) introduced two key concepts that civil resistance campaigns should possess to increase the probability of (short term) success. These are resilience and leverage. Resilience refers to “the capacity of contentious actors to continue to mobilize collective action despite the actions of the opponents aimed at constraining or inhibiting their activities”. Leverage is described as “the ability of contentious actors to mobilize the withdrawal of support from opponents or invoke pressure against them through the networks upon which opponents depend for their power” i.e., the pillars of support. (Shock, 2005, pp. 142-143). There are especially three resilience and leverage mechanisms that are often cited as key to campaign success. I) Big, unified and diversified campaigns, II) Diverse Use of Nonviolent Methods and III) Maintaining a nonviolent discipline.

#### I) BIG, UNIFIED AND DIVERSE CAMPAIGNS

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Numbers matter, and mass-participation disrupts the status quo and makes continued repression from the regime impossible to sustain (Chenoweth, 2021, p. 83). In addition, it often prompts defections from its opponents’ pillars of support and the state security forces (Chenoweth, 2021, p. 83; Schock, 2005, pp. 143-145). Pillars of support and state security forces are of critical value for illiberal regimes because they are instruments of coercion and oppression, and police and military institutions have the potential to sanction or stop potential challengers of the regime (Binnendijk & Marovic, 2006, p. 411). A nonviolent campaign is 46 times more likely to succeed if a regime’s security force defect, voice support for- or join- the campaign (Chenoweth et al., 2011). Therefore, one core objective for a nonviolent campaign should be to undermine the loyalty and obedience of a regime’s security forces, such as the police and military. This is more likely to happen if campaigns are big, making it possible to convince individuals in the security forces of the legitimacy of their cause, or raising the political, economic and/or moral costs of suppression and violence against the participants (Binnendijk & Marovic, 2006, p. 412; Sharp, 1973). This objective was achieved in the Serbian Otpor movements in 2000 and in the Ukrainian Orange movements in 2004. Both movements used a combination of persuasive and deterrent techniques to develop explicit strategies to increase the costs of repression and undermine the willingness of state security forces to engage in violence and repressive acts against them. Both movements gathered a huge amount of people and ensured that the movements held a nonviolent discipline within

the ranks, which would “significantly raise the costs of repression for the regime in power” (Binnendijk & Marovic, 2006, pp. 414-415).

Numbers matter, but the ability to unify large number of people is also important. The foremost aspect of doing so is to develop a shared and inclusive vision for the civil resistance movement. Movements that are able to interweave its aspirations and goals into an inclusive unifying vision, are more likely to achieve mass participation and to undermine the loyalties of the regime’s supporters (Stephan, 2009, p. 26). In addition, unifying the campaign under one specific goal, will also increases the participation from diverse social groups (Ackerman & Merriman, 2014, p. 6), which is also an important feature.

The more diverse a campaign’s base of participants is, the more likely it is to succeed (Chenoweth, 2021, p. 83). A diverse representation in gender, age, religion, ethnicity, socioeconomic status, and ideology, will increase the campaigns legitimacy and make it challenging for the regime to isolate certain groups for repression. This will increase the likelihood of adopting indiscriminate tactics by the regime that will garner backlash from security forces and pillars of support (Chenoweth et al., 2011; Principe, 2017 p. 3; Schock, 2005). The same is claimed to be important within the formal campaign structure. A campaign is more likely to succeed if it attracts campaign leaders with diverse backgrounds, skills, and viewpoints (Morris & Staggenborg, 2004, p. 188). In addition, diversity gives the campaign more access to new knowledge and resources, which contributes to development of new tactics while building resilience (Principe, 2017 ; Schock, 2005). When a campaign manages to draw mass participation between different people, groups and organizations that are willing to cooperate for a united agenda, the probability of success increases, partly because it enhances a campaign’s ability to continue confronting the regime, even if they are repressed (Shock, 2005, pp. 143-145). Consequently, this will increase the probability for “pillars of support” to withdraw their support for the regime (Shock, 2005, pp. 143-145).

For instance, the 1963 March on Washington in the United States, the protests in 2000 that eventually lead to the overthrow of Slobodan Milosevic in Serbia, the 2011 campaign in Tunisia and the Sudanese revolution in 2018-2019 all involved big and diverse campaigns where citizens of all ages, genders and professions engaged for the unified goal of political change (Chenoweth, 2021, p. 83; Principe, 2017 p. 3).

## II) DIVERSE USE OF NONVIOLENT METHODS AND TACTICAL INNOVATION

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If the resistance campaign uses a diverse set of nonviolent methods and tactical innovation this will increase both the leverage and resilience of a nonviolent campaign (Shock, 2005, pp. 143-145). There are various tactics one can choose when participating in civil resistance, and an effective campaign is one that involves many different methods (Chenoweth, 2021, p. 37-38). Examples of these tactics includes, civil disobedience, demonstrations, marches, hunger strikes, boycotts, creating human shields as defense or physically occupy public space (Dann, 2014). The latter tactic did serve as a powerful tool in Egypt when ten thousands of people gathered at Cairo`s Tahrir Square, marking the beginning of Egypt`s Arab spring (Acemoglu et al., 2018). Another example of diverse tactical strategies is the effort of Norwegian teachers during the second world war. In February 1942 the Norwegian Nazi government led by Vidkun Quisling attempted to change the curriculum in Norwegian schools to reflect Nazi ideology and propaganda. The government ordered Norwegian school teachers to join a Nazi teacher association, but over 83% of the Norway`s teachers refused, went on strike, or continued teaching underground. Thousands were jailed by the Gestapo, but the teachers did not capitulate. Instead, the community members gathered to resist and raised funds to support families of the strikers and incarcerated. In April 1942, nearly five hundred teachers were sent to concentration camp in Northern Norway<sup>19</sup>. The Norwegians, however, gathered along the trains tracks to sing and hand out food to the prisoners on the train. The remaining teachers outside the prison and concentration camps continued to fight against the Nazification of the Norwegian school system. In November 1942, Quisling concluded that he could escalate his brutality, but that he could not do so and maintain legitimacy among the Norwegian population. He therefore abandoned his attempts to Nazify the Norwegian curriculum (Chenoweth, 2021, p. 87-88). This is an example of several innovative nonviolent tactics which ultimately lead to (short term) success.

Overall, when nonviolent campaigns use their vast human capital to create new and unexpected tactics are more likely to succeed than movements that only rely on a single method. This is because they are often better at maintaining momentum compared to

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<sup>19</sup> Among them was my great- grandfather, Knut Dukane.

movements that are predictable and tactically stagnant, and because it makes it more difficult for the regime to predict and adjust its counter-methods (Chenoweth, 2021, p. 87). In addition, a diverse use of methods attracts more diverse participants which increases mobilization capacity (Shock, 2005, pp. 143-145).

### III) MAINTAINING A NONVIOLENT DISCIPLINE

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
Maintaining nonviolent discipline throughout the civil resistance campaign is important for several reasons (Ackerman & Merriman, 2014; Chenoweth, 2021; Chenoweth et al., 2011; Schock, 2005; Sharp, 1973). First, when campaigns can keep nonviolent discipline, movements will maximize civilian participation by decreasing participation barriers. Higher numbers of participants and involvement builds legitimacy and enhances a movement's leverage (Schock, 2005, p. 144). In addition, nonviolent movements increase the probability of capturing global attention, which is an important component that increases campaigns' probability of success (Principe, 2017, p.) Second, maintaining nonviolent discipline, even if the regime responds violently, increases the probability of success. From 1900-2019, nonviolent campaigns that faced violent repression from the regime, but upheld their nonviolent strategy, succeeded 45% of the time, compared to violent ones who only succeeded 22% of the time (Chenoweth, 2021, p. 89). Third, security forces are rarely comfortable with being ordered to use violence against nonviolent people. If a regime still orders the use of violence against a nonviolent campaign, this will in turn increase the likelihood of defection from key pillars of support and security forces (Ackerman & Merriman, 2014, p. 8; Principe, 2017 p. 3; Schock, 2005, pp. 143-145). Additionally, if security forces do respond violently at a nonviolent campaign, the probability that this repression will backfire increases. For instance, through increasing external and internal support which could affect the regimes willingness to concede to the campaign demands. These are key elements that contribute to differential in success rates between violent and nonviolent civil resistance campaigns (Chenoweth et al., 2011, p. 30).

When these three mechanisms are present, high numbers, unity, diversity, tactical innovation, and nonviolent discipline, three critical trends are more likely to emerge. One, increasing civilian participation, two, diminishing impact of repression and three, increased backfire and defections from the movement's opponent (Ackerman & Merriman, 2014, p. 5). The

combination of these trends is all a part of sustaining the movement and increasing the probability of regime breakdown, and hence short-term success (Ackerman & Merriman, 2014; Chenoweth, 2021; Chenoweth et al., 2011; Principe, 2017 p. 3).

Figure 1 illustrates these three points in the context of democratization.

FIGURE 1: DEMOCRATIZATION – THE OPENING PHASE




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4.1.2. THE TRANSITION PHASE (IN THE CONTEXT OF CIVIL RESISTANCE)

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*“Nothing as much as revolution simultaneously demands hope, inspires hope and betrays hope” (Bayat, 2017, p. 219)*

The previous section tries to establish a plausible link between nonviolent campaigns and the probability of short-term democratic openings, especially if the campaign possesses certain resilience and leverage mechanisms. However, even if the protest movement achieves the initial opening, they will face a second challenge of maintaining high levels of civic mobilization also through the transition period where the goal is to establish democratic, political institutions (Pinckney et al.,2020, p. 5).



There are especially three paths' countries may follow in the wake of a maximalist resistance campaigns that succeeds in the opening phase. One, the government are replaced by even more repressive leaders, two, democratization and consolidation happens, and three, the new leaders do not institutionalize democratic principles and armed revolutions happens, often leading to civil war (Chenoweth, 2021, p. 240). Transition to democracy after a civil resistance campaign is more likely to happen if activists can keep their social bases mobilized for positive political change while directing that mobilization toward building new political institutions (Pinckney, 2018). Furthermore, the continued involvement of civil society<sup>20</sup> during transition to democracy has been a necessary condition for the establishment of representative forms of government, such as democracy (Bernhard, 1993, p. 307). Based on this, democratic transition should be categorized by high levels of mobilization capacity and two, inclusive negotiations that foster inclusive institutions.

#### I) HIGH LEVELS OF TRANSITIONAL MOBILIZATION

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A nonviolent campaign gives people experience with using nonviolent methods to demand and create government accountability (Chenoweth, 2021, p. 241; Pinckney, 2020, p. 30). The norms of peaceful dispute resolution should be maintained through the transition period as well. High levels of mobilization based on nonviolent resistance must continue through the transition. This is also called *transitional mobilization* (Pinckney, 2020, p. 11 & 30). *Transitional mobilization* means that the movement must “maintain a level of civic engagement, public pressure and protest during the transition that is like the level of engagement during the period of struggle against the old regime” (Pinckney, 2020, p. 30). Campaigns that have succeeded in the preliminary opening have a unique opportunity in holding the new powers accountable, create greater civic engagement and push the regime toward deeper democracy by continue demanding their wishes to be heard (Pinckney, 2020, p. 22). Several studies argue that the degree of engagement and influence that civil society has over the transition process, and the strength and cohesiveness of the nonviolent movement also in the transition phase, are important factors in ensuring democratization (Marchant & Puddington, 2008; Pinckney, 2018; Pinckney, 2020). For instance, during the Polish transition

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<sup>20</sup> A community of groups of citizens that are separated from the state and linked by common interests and collective activity. It refers to a wide array of organizations, community groups, non-governmental organizations, labor unions, indigenous groups etc (Bernhard, 1993, p. 309).

to democracy civil society kept protesting to make their demands heard and ensure that the democratic “rules of the game” was established and fulfilled. This became an effective check on potential abuses of government authority. Similar, in Portugal, hundreds of thousands of Portuguese citizens protested to support a pro-democratic faction of the military. When the pro-democratic revolution succeeded, people kept spreading the norms of public engagement and mobilization, creating local institutions that continued to advocate for democratic change during the transition (Pinckney, 2018, p. 18). For instance, trade unions and organized labor are argued to create democratic institutions during the post conflict period partly because of their continued mobilization capacity during the transition (Butcher et al., 2018).

Continued mobilization in the transition period can therefore push the country’s democratic transition forward (Pinckney, 2020, p. 7). For instance, new leaders, and especially leader figures from the campaigns, are more likely to be placed in positions of influence when the power holders fear the consequences if they ignore the popular demands (Pinckney, 2020, p. 30). Consequently, high levels of mobilization capacity could increase the participation of civil society and external actors in the transition negotiations. The participation of civil society and external actors is vital for democratic development (Krause et al., 2018, p. 989). When external actors are involved in negotiations during the transition, they encourage and incentivize states to introduce affirmative action mechanisms that might strengthen democratic institutions and transparency (Shair-Rosenfield & Wood, 2017, p. 997). By doing this, the elites will be held accountable and ensure that the masses maintain the temporary power advantage of a nonviolent revolution until new institutions are in place (Pinckney, 2020, p. 11).

This was the case in Tunis after the Arab Spring in 2011 where the initial transitional government was dominated by figures from the old Ben Ali regime. Consequently, Tunisia’s civil society demanded the transition to be led by external actors outside the Ben Ali regime. This demand successfully led to the creation of a body of representatives from civil society and opposition parties that was involved in the mobilization against the regime in the opening, and who played a key role in the transition phase as well (Pinckney, 2020, p. 30).


## II) INCLUSIVITY IN THE TRANSITIONAL NEGOTIATIONS

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The second element that civil resistance movements should do after their initial success, is to shift their political and social mobilization away from revolutionary goals and tactics and into new institutionalized political channels that is characterized by inclusive political negotiations, and implementation of policies that reflects socially broad political agenda, rather than narrow partisan goals (Pinckney, 2020, p. 30-32). The transition phase should hence reflect inclusivity and the implementation of policies that aspires to substantiates new democratic institutional avenues for political engagement (Pinckney, 2020, p. 32). Therefore, the negotiations during transition are important for future democratic development because they often lead to the development and implementation of new governance structures and laws which influences the populations' ability to participate in policy making and politics (Hartzell & Hoddie, 2003; Shair-Rosenfield & Wood, 2017, p. 997). The visions and institutions that are shaped during the transition should therefore be focusing on the needs and desires of the people and foster an inclusiveness of politics that ensures trust in the new democracy (Pinckney, 2018, p. 55). Overall, the transition negotiations and implementations should hence strive to include an inclusive and diverse coalitions with public interest (Pinckney, 2018, p. 59). It is important that the institutions implemented promotes good governance that increases the civic trust and prioritize social welfare expenditures, which is argued to be key to promote stability and increase the populations trust in the new government and hence reduce the risk of renewed conflict (Hartzell et al., 2001; Hartzell & Hoddie, 2015; Pinckney, 2018, p. 59; Shair-Rosenfield & Wood, 2017, p. 999).

Figure 2 tries to illustrate the main points about increased probability of democratization in the wake of nonviolent civil resistance during phase two.

FIGURE 2: DEMOCRATIZATION- THE TRANSITION PHASE



In sum, nonviolent maximalist campaigns are more likely to lead to democratization with the presence of seven mechanisms. When phase one, the breakthrough phase, is characterized by a mass-broad based participation from diverse swathes of society that is unified in its objective, tactical in its opposition, and disciplined in its nonviolent strategy. Second, when the transition phase is characterized by high degrees of mobilization capacity and inclusivity in the transitional negotiations throughout the transition.

As of now I have presented two causal models of democratization in the context of nonviolent civil resistance campaigns. Below I argue that women participation in these campaigns could increase the likelihood of these mechanisms to be present.

## 4.2. DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE CONTEXT OF WOMEN'S PARTICIPATION IN NONVIOLENT MAXIMALIST RESISTANCE CAMPAIGNS

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Women's participation in nonviolent civil resistance can shape immediate and longer-term outcomes (Marks & Chenoweth, 2020, p. 1). This is evident through recent events. Political and cultural elites in addition to intelligence services did not anticipate that women would rise and take part in the popular uprisings during the Arab Spring. Their participation confounded dictatorships and their contributions have been credited for the quick downfall of several oppressive regimes (Chenoweth, 2019b; Johansson-Nogués, 2013; Karman, 2017; Khalil, 2016; Moghadam, 2014; Olimat, 2013). Consistent with this, Chenoweth (2019b) reveals that women *do* participate in nonviolent civil resistance. However, there is a need for more knowledge about how their participation is associated with democratization.

The previous key question, *what explains why some civil resistance campaigns create democracy, while others do not? Will now be elaborated to; and how does women's participation affect these outcomes?* Below I will present arguments on how each of the previously presented roles influence each stage of democratization. At the end of each section, I present my hypotheses.

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### I) WOMEN'S FRONTLINE PARTICIPATION

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#### THE OPENING

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As mentioned, women can be observed in the frontline roles, meaning women are reported as participants in the front lines of a nonviolent campaigns (Chenoweth, 2019b, p. 28). Ninety nine percent of the nonviolent campaigns from 1945-2014 in the WiRe data set had frontline women's participation to some extent, and higher levels of frontline participation is highly correlated with campaign success (Chenoweth, 2019b, pp. 3 & 14). I argue that women observed in frontline roles are important for phase one, the opening phase, for three reasons.

First, numbers matter and women have the potential to increase campaign size by 50% (Marks & Chenoweth, 2020, p. 2). By not including women, the campaign is more likely to suffer low numbers and, hence reducing their disruptive potential (Marks & Chenoweth, 2020, p. 3). For

instance, the unprecedented high number of female participants in Tunisia during the Arab Spring is said to have started a domino effect, increasing women's participation in Egypt, Libya, and Yemen (Tnani, 2020, p. 1). Accordingly, during the protests in Egypt in 2011, some estimated that the crowd was 50 percent female (Sjoberg & Whooley, 2015, p. 267). Women's ability to increase numbers is important for several reasons. First, increasing campaign size, because of women's participation, can also increase the perceived legitimacy and catalyze mobilization across broader swathes of society, hence making the campaign more diverse (Marks & Chenoweth, 2020, p. 4). Accordingly, the presence of women can encourage greater and more diverse participation (Principe, 2017, p. 6). As mentioned in the previous section, diversity in the campaign is important for several reasons, among others because it increases the campaigns' access to knowledge and resources which in turn increases mobilization capacity and the development of new tactics.

Improving tactical innovation is important because this will increase both the leverage and resilience of a nonviolent campaign, and women's frontline participation in campaigns can increase movements capacity for tactical innovation (Marks & Chenoweth, 2020, p. 4). Women have innovated different nonviolent defensive tactics when the movements are confronted by security forces. Women have relied on the prevailing ideas of them as "victims" to pose a moral dilemma to security forces when faced with the option of using violence toward female opponents (Chenoweth, 2021, p. 98-99). In addition, women have also used their own bodies, and the idealization surrounding the use of it, as a tool for dissidence (Principe, 2017, p. 4-5). Examples of these defense tactics include creating human shields to protect participants or stripping naked to embarrass observers. For instance, in Kenya, in 1992, during the environmentalist and feminist Green Belt Movement, the security forces began to beat protesters. Women on the frontlines undressed to publicly shame and repel the police and de-escalated the situation (Chenoweth, 2021, p. 99). In Zambia, during the struggle for independence, women blocked roads and disrupted public meetings by demonstrating half naked before the colonial authorities to embarrass them (Krishna & Mulenga, 2004, p. 9). During a civil resistance campaign in Sierra Leone in 2000, the protestors were violently confronted by the Sierra Leone's military. An older female protester lifted her skirt to embarrass the soldiers. This action invoked local superstitions saying that other women in the family have the responsibility to follow the elder's example in support of their action. The mobilization of different local communities in support for the older women

led to one of the biggest demonstrations during the civil war (Gizelis, 2009, p. 512). More recently, during the many Black Lives Matters protests in the US, white women gathered, creating a shield around Afro-American protestors in solidarity and for protection against police brutality (Duncan, 2020). These are all innovative tactics which provide protection without the need for violence or escalation.

Third, and consequently, when nonviolent campaigns feature female participants, the campaign is more likely to maintain nonviolent discipline (Chenoweth, 2019, p. 2). Maintaining nonviolent discipline is one of the key elements for success. In addition to the implications of maximizing civilian participation and diversity, keeping a nonviolent discipline increases the probability of internal and external support. Increasing external and internal support could in turn increase the likelihood of defection from key pillars of support, especially if the regime uses violence against the campaign. Security forces tend to be less willing to open fire on women (Principe, 2017, p. 6). Therefore, higher levels of frontline women's participation is associated with higher chances of elicit loyalty shifts within the opponent security force (Chenoweth, 2019b, p. 13; Principe, 2017 p. 6). Hence, the presence of women can both increase the likelihood to maintain a nonviolent discipline and temper a violent response.

## THE TRANSITION

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All the presented mechanisms are important for increasing the probability of democratization by increasing the likelihood of success in phase one, the opening. However, as the conceptualization of frontline participation suggests, they do not have a formal role in the campaign but act as informal (but important) participants. Therefore, it is less obvious how they might influence the transition phase.

However, even though many post-Arab Spring countries have punished women for their role in the uprisings, it is the women who have remained steady in their demands for a democratic future (Karman, 2017). For instance, in the capital of Yemen, which for a long time was controlled by the Houthi militia after the Arab Spring, women kept mobilizing for change and was the only ones participating in sit-ins. In Syria and Egypt, women have been at the forefront of the continued criticism of the military rule and the lack of fundamental rights and freedoms (Karman, 2017, p. 2). This suggests high levels of transitional mobilization. Therefore, I expect to see a positive effect of women's participation on democratization, and

the thesis first hypothesis is

*H1: Women's frontline participation in nonviolent maximalist resistance campaigns increase the probability of democratization*

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## II) WOMEN'S PARTICIPATION IN FORMAL CAMPAIGN LEADERSHIP

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### THE OPENING

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Campaign leaders make a difference in converting potential conditions for mobilization into actual civil resistance (Morris & Staggenborg, 2004, p. 178). Historically, campaign leaders have disproportionately been of male sex (Morris & Staggenborg, 2004, p. 174; Snow et al., 2008, p. 180). However, since WWII, women's leadership in campaigns has increased dramatically (Chenoweth, 2019, p. 8). In fact, of the total sixteen female winners of the Nobel Peace Prize, eleven were awarded the price for leading movements against an authoritarian regime (Principe, 2017, p. 11). This was also evident during the Arab Spring. For instance, Tawakkol Karman, known as "The Mother of Revolution" in Yemen, was at the forefront and a leader in the resistance movement. She demanded human rights for all citizens and organized several nonviolent protests that increased enormously in size and became one of the most important movements in the Arab spring (UN, 2012).

Women have also been important leadership figures during the many liberation struggles in Africa. In addition to the already mentioned Julia Mulenga in Zambia, another example is Dr. Abigail Olufunmilayo Ransome- Kuti who was a political activist in Nigeria in the 1940's. For many, she was known as the "Mother of Africa" or "Lioness of Lisabi" for the movements she successfully led against the local government which eventually led to the abdication of Egba Gigh King Oba Ademola II in 1949 (Aka, 2012, pp. 27- 28). Furthermore, in Asia in the 1980's and 1990's, several women led successful resistance campaigns against dictatorships. Corazon C. Aquino in the Philippines (1986), Benazir Bhutto in Pakistan (1988), Khaleda Zia and Sheikh Hasina Wajed in Bangladesh (1990) and Megawati Sukarnoputri in Indonesia (1998) all organized and led mass -protests against the countries non-democratic regimes (Thompson, 2002, p. 535).



However, and despite the examples presented above, the Wire data set do reveal that there are more observations of women *among* formal leadership (55%) than *primary* leadership (5%), confirming the traditional idea of women as secondary/ bridge leaders. Nevertheless, most movements require the effort of “bridge leaders” to be able to succeed (Robnett, 1997a, p. 1700). They operate as organizers and leaders that mediate between top leadership and the followers, turning “dreams and grand plans into on-the-ground realities” (Robnett, 1997b, p. 21). Bridge leaders affect the probability of success through their work within the movements, mobilizing the necessary support to carry out collective action tactics, which might result in concrete gains for the campaign (Morris & Staggenborg, 2004, p. 188). For instance, Septima Clark was a bridge leader during the civil rights movements in the US. She took it upon herself to travel to rural communities making sure that also African Americans in the rural areas understood the message of the movement and their rights as citizens. This is said to have increased participation in the movement (Robnett, 1997, p. 22). In fact, many women served as “bridge-leaders” during the civil rights movements and have been credited as key actors in the mobilization of diverse participants to the movements (Morris & Staggenborg, 2004, p. 180).

In addition, many women bridge-leaders also tend to be routinely engaged in top- leadership activities, meaning that women can obtain crossed leadership-positions (Morris & Staggenborg, 2004, p. 188; Robnett, 1997b, p. 21). Whenever women access leadership positions, either top or secondary positions, they tend to attract more diversified participants to the campaign (Snow et al., 2008, p. 180). Further, when women are involved in campaigns formal leadership structure, they diversify the leadership background, skills and viewpoints, which is important for campaign success (Snow et al., 2008, p. 180).

Overall, women have often prioritized nonviolent strategies and tactics in their political mobilization (Marks & Chenoweth, 2020, p. 3). This might be why campaigns where women are involved in leadership roles, are more likely to maintain a nonviolent discipline and increasing the probability of security defection (Chenoweth, 2019b, p. 29), which is argued to be key mechanisms that increase the likelihood of short-term success

## THE TRANSITION

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There are findings suggesting that women who participate in successful campaigns, become more effective public actors and active participants in newly established democracies (Boldt & White, 2011, p. 27). Therefore, there are reasons to believe that when women are part of campaign leadership, they would also engage in the transition. For instance, the already mentioned Dr. Abigail Olufunmilayo Ransome- Kuti who led many anti-colonial movements in Nigeria in the 1940's, was also a key figure in the transition to independence. In the 1950s she founded the Commoners Peoples Party to challenge the ruling party and won. She was one of the members of the delegation that successfully negotiated the independence of Nigeria with the British Colonialist (Aka, 2012, p. 28). Similar, the young, female student Alaa Salah, that lead the Sudanese people through many protests during the Sudanese revolution in 2018-2019, was also a part of the transitional negotiations (True, 2020, p. 89; Young, 2020, p. 28). Additionally, in the aftermath of the Arab Spring, Tunisian women, and women's groups that was key in mobilizing against the regime, were also key actors in the transitional period. Consequently, women made up 31% of the seats in the country's constitution-making body (Tamaru et al., 2018, p. 1). Within the constituent assembly, women played a major role in building consensus between the opposite camps after the revolution by focusing on finding common ground and working across partisan lines to advance shared interest (Tamura et al., 2018, p. 1). With decades of experiences under former autocratic presidents, the Tunisian female officials understood that "without specific, constitutionalized guarantees of their fundamental freedoms and participation, their voices would not be heard in future debates" (Tamaru, et al., 2018, p. 22). Once in power, the women especially prioritized human rights, transparency, freedom of conscience and transitional justice. Consequently, women's officials managed to get gender equality before the law and equal political participation as part of the new Tunisian constitution (Tamaru, et al., 2018, p. 22).<sup>21</sup>

In general, when women gain access to political leadership, they pursue different policies than male legislators. For instance, states with larger proportions of female legislators tend to produce policies that address development, social welfare, and social justice, such as

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<sup>21</sup> They strategically postponed more divisive, hard-to-win battles, such as the right to equal inheritance (Tamaru, N., Holt-Ivry, O., & O'Reilly, M. (2018). *Beyond Revolution: How Women Influenced Constitution Making in Tunisia*. *Institute for Inclusive Security*. <https://www.inclusivesecurity.org/publication/beyond-revolution-women-influenced-constitution-making-tunisia>.

improving living standards, enhancing social stability and reducing incentives for violent mobilization against the state (Shair-Rosenfield & Wood, 2017, p. 999). Legislative bodies with greater numbers of women tend to increase their social welfare expenditures, improving key indicators of social welfare and reducing the risk of civil conflict (Shair-Rosenfield & Wood, 2017, p. 999). Women in political leadership do tend to gain more credibility and inter-elite trust. In addition, women leaders tend to promote good governance and are generally perceived as less corrupt than men, more dedicated to earnest and honest governance and more committed to compromise (Shair-Rosenfield & Wood, 2017, p. 1000). Furthermore, when women access leadership positions in peacebuilding and conflict resolutions, they frequently bring important issues to the agenda that male elites tend to overlook, such as the inclusive and accessibility of processes and institutions and the plurality of citizens' voices (Castillejo, 2016, p. 1). Women's leadership positions in post-conflict peacebuilding also positively impact gender equality and women's rights, which are both important elements in themselves, but also critical for democratic development (Castillejo, 2016, p. 2; Wyndow et al., 2013, p. 34).

However, even though transition after a resistance campaign is difficult, it seems to be more difficult if they are led by women (Thompson, 2002, p. 549). The female-led resistances in the Asian countries mentioned above illustrates this point. In all cases, the women who led the campaign moved on to official offices, trying to guide the transition into a democracy, but all struggled with the consolidation process after the initial breakthrough (Thompson, 2002, p. 535).<sup>22</sup> One factor that is argued to hinder this transition is the traditional status of women in these countries. Despite being praised for their role and contribution in the resistance, once in power they were called to restrict themselves back to the traditional roles and leave the political business to men (Thompson, 2002, p. 550). This seems to be the case also in more recent times. For instance, even though Alaa Salah, the young student who became the symbol of the Sudanese revolution in 2018-2019, succeeded in mobilizing and leading the Sudanese people through many protests, she, and other women activists, were sidelined

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<sup>22</sup> Aquino was the Philippines' first president after the Marcos dictatorship. Bhutto served twice as prime minister in the post-Zia era in Pakistan. Khaleda Zia and Sheikh Hasina have alternated as prime minister since the end of military rule in Bangladesh. Megawati, who was initially elected vice president, succeeded to the Indonesian presidency. Thompson, M. R. (2002). Female leadership of democratic transitions in Asia. *Pacific Affairs*, 75(4), 535-555.

during the political transition to a new regime, and excluded from critical meetings by male officials (True, 2020, p. 89; Young, 2020, p. 28).

In sum, the association between women's leadership participation in nonviolent campaigns - and the following leadership participation during the transition, might be challenged by the lack of access. However, when women *do* gain access to campaign leadership and leadership positions during the transition, they tend to bring with them several mechanisms important for democratization. Based on this, the second hypothesis is

*H2: Women's participation in campaign leadership in nonviolent maximalist resistance campaigns increase the probability of democratization*

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### III) PARTICIPATION OF FORMAL WOMEN'S ORGANIZATION

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#### THE OPENING

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People do mobilize in periods of resistance, but their demands are often instantiated by formal organizations (Pinckney et al., 2022, p. 3). The potential for people to exert power and fight for change often increases significantly if they are organized into formal organizations (Stephen, 2009, p. 26). Formal organizations play multiple crucial roles in civil resistance campaigns. They enable people to participate in campaigns in a coordinated way by providing them with incentives and motivations to act and continue to act. This is because organizations have the resources to keep action going even when individual citizens' commitment to the cause might be fading (Della Porta & Diani, 2020, p. 136). In addition, organizations often provide strategic and tactical leadership, which is "a focal point for the interaction of activists (...) and a source for recruiting new members and identifying future leaders" (Tarrow, 2011, p. 123).

Women's organizations have been involved in about 67% of the nonviolent maximalist campaigns from 1945-2014 (Chenoweth, 2019b, p. 16), and has a long history of political activism and development of organizational alliances when pursuing the goal of democratic development (Hassim, 2006; Jaquette, 2001, p. 112; Murdie & Peksen, 2015, p. 183). Overall, scholars argue that the collective action of historical women's organizations has been key in

the fight for political rights in South- Africa, Argentina, Ghana, Brazil, East Germany, Poland, and El Salvador (Baldez, 2003; Viterna & Fallon, 2008; Waylen, 1993).<sup>23</sup>

Women's organizations are often old, and in the Middle East women's organizations were established simultaneously as the independence movements in each country (Arenfeldt & Golley, 2012, pp. 12-20). Overall, it's argued that it was the emergence of women's formal organizations that drew women in large scales into activism and politics (Hassim, 2006, p. 47). In line with this, there are also findings suggesting that the presence of women's organizations in countries increases the likelihood of women to participating in protest (Murdie & Peksen, 2015, p. 180). For instance, in Chile in 1913, working-class women organized to address the exploitation of women workers. This gave rise to a variety of women's political organizations devoted to expanding women's political and economic rights in the 1920s (Jaquette, 2018, p. 66). In addition, during the 1970s, the women's organization "Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo", a group of women living under the right-wing dictator Pinochet, have been credited for their longstanding fight against the regime. The Pinochet regime kidnapped and tortured approximately thirty thousand dissidents, between the ages of sixteen and thirty during the time they ruled. The women, often mothers of the kidnapped, gathered every Thursday in the main parliamentary square and silently dance La Cueca, Chile's national dance, while holding photographs of their missing children (Waylen, 1994, p. 336). The women's collective that formed during this time created a powerful backbone for the pro-democracy movement that emerged in the mid 1980's and 1990's that eventually led to the end of the military rule in Chile<sup>24</sup> (Chenoweth, 2021, p. 98; Principe, 2017 pp. 3-4). During the anti-apartheid struggle in South-Africa, Women's National Coalition (WNC), had a vision of developing a "grassroot power (...) among ordinary people to promote mass-based transformation from below" (Hassim, 2006, p. 48). Consequently, WNC have been credited for their role in mobilizing South-Africans from diverse swaths of society (Dobrowolsky &

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<sup>23</sup> For example, Palestinian Women's Union in 1919 and Women's Awakening Club in Iraq in 1923. Several other groups formed after the second world war, like the Women's Adeni Women's Club in Aden in 1940s, Women's Associations in Yemen in 1950s and 1960s, Jordanian Women's Movements in 1960s and Nadi-Al Fatat (Girls Club) in Kuwait in 1970s Arenfeldt, P., & Golley, N. A.-H. (2012). *Mapping Arab women's movements: A century of transformations from within*. Oxford University Press. .

<sup>24</sup> In addition, the La Cueca caught the attention of the international community, inspiring Sting's 1987 protest song "They Dance Alone" Chenoweth, E. (2021). *Civil Resistance: What Everyone Needs to Know*®. Oxford University Press. , Principe, M. (2017). Women in Nonviolent Movements *United States Institute of Peace Special Report 399*.

Hart, 2003, p. 1; Waylen, 2007, p. 522). In Israel, a women's organization called "Four Mothers" have been credited for their organizational skill and persistence in several huge anti-war protests, which ultimately influenced the Israeli government to withdraw from Southern Lebanon in 2000 (Murdie & Peksen, 2015, p. 183). In Togo in 2012, the "women's wing" of the "Let's Save Togo Organization" organized several anti-government protests in the capital (Murdie & Peksen, 2015, p. 183). In Sierra Leone, women's organizations took the initiative to plan mass demonstrations encouraging a large portion of the population to participate (Gizelis, 2009, p. 512). Furthermore, women's organization tend to draw diverse participants (Jaquette, 2001, pp. 113 & 116). One explanation for this is found in the organizational structure of women's organizations. Women's organizations are rarely homogeneous, particularly in terms of class compositions and many women's organizations are formed on a coalition between different class, race and partisan lines which makes them important actors in gathering participants across traditional conflict lines (Baldez, 2003; Waylen, 1993). For instance, in Uganda, several women's organizations and movements used their autonomy and ability to organize participants across religious division and social status to enhance the democratization mobilization (Jaquette, 2001, p. 116).

In addition to their domestic contributions, formal women's organizations have been credited for their international cooperation with other women's groups and their support for each other's stated goals (Arenfeldt & Golley, 2012, p. 270). For instance, in the 1980's, several women's organizations in Arab countries created a transnational network in support for each other's common struggles, called "Women Living Under Islamic Law" (WLUIL) (Sinha, 2012, p. 149). In the 1990's several of the same women's organizations, established another coalition and formed a vibrant transnational network called *Collectif 95 Maghreb-Egalité*. The *Collectif* worked together to enhance women's rights agenda and supported a number of other transnational women's rights groups to further advance women's social, legal and political rights. Additionally, they regularly met in each other's countries and cooperated on seminars, books and media activities (Moghadam, 2018, p. 669). In more recent times, The Tunisian Association of Democratic Women (*Association Tunisienne des Femmes Démocrates, ATFD (ATFD)*), continued this type of cooperation by forming a coalition of 16 like-minded organizations from Syria, Libya and Yemen during the Arab spring. Their objective was to mobilize women in protests and create a strong support base for women's democratic claims during the transition (Tamaru et al., 2018, p. 8). Therefore, there it

plausible to believe that the presence of women's organizations might foster bigger and more diverse campaigns. Additionally, the presence of formal women's organizations in nonviolent civil resistance are associated with the maintenance of nonviolent discipline and the increased likelihood of the withdrawal of support from security forces (Chenoweth, 2019b, p. 16 & 21).

## THE TRANSITION

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Formal organizations are often involved in the transition period and tend to be a part of the negotiations of new political institutions and thus also when deciding whether to accept government concessions or to remobilize (Pinckney et al., 2022, p. 3). Democratization is argued to be more likely when the organizations participating have high levels of mobilization capacities and strong and stable preferences for democracy (Pinckney et al., 2022, p. 3; Pinckney, 2020). There are reasons to believe that women's organizations might access these mechanisms.

Women's organizations tend to have democratic principles as their core goal and are important actors in the constant advocacy for a more democratic practice and holding the elites accountable (Arenfeldt & Golley, 2012, pp. 65-66). For instance, the prospect of successful peacebuilding increases when women's organizations participate because women's group can, and often do, fight for democratic practices that includes a broader domestic participation (Gizelis, 2009, pp. 505-506 & 512). In line with this, women's organizations are argued to play a key role in holding governments accountable for the full implementation of and compliance with international norms and standards on gender equality and women's empowerment (Puri, 2016). This is, as mentioned, important elements for democratic development (Castillejo, 2016, p. 2; Wyndow et al., 2013, p. 34). A recent example of this mechanisms at play is the case of the already mentioned ATFD in Tunisia.

Tunisia is regarded as the country with the most successful and peaceful democratic transition after the Arab Spring (Deane, 2013; Refle, 2016; Tamaru et al., 2018). ATFD was one of the first politically independent organization in Tunisia and also played an instrumental role in the democratization in Tunisia, especially in the transition after the overthrow of President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali's regime (Deane, 2013, p. 13; Labidi, 2014, p. 1; Refle, 2016, p. 5). They were key figures in raising awareness and rights ahead of the constituent assembly. They ensured that women were represented in protest and negotiations during the transition by

trying to “show the link between the private and the political and the importance of participation in the democratic process” (Tamaru et al., 2018, pp. 8-9). They were key figures in raising awareness and rights ahead of the constituent assembly. Their main objective was to encourage women to take part in the elections, either by running for official seats or through voting, and voice their demands and interest in the constitutional process (Tamaru et al., 2018, pp. 8-9). As a result, and as previously mentioned, Tunisian women secured 31% of seats in the country’s constitution-making body (Tamaru et al., 2018, p. 1). In addition to the women’s outstanding contribution to securing women’s right in the constitution, the elected female officials kept close cooperation with the ATFD outside the assembly, creating dialogues between the assembly members and civil society representatives making the ATFD a “(...) bridge between civil society and the assembly” (Tamaru et al., 2018, p. 18). Consequently, ATFD, and other organizations, were at the forefront during the transition, keeping the process accountable to the people through continued demonstrations as well as demanding increased transparency in the assembly for citizens (Tamaru et al., 2018, p. 1).

In sum, there is reason to believe that the presence of women’s organizations in a nonviolent maximalist resistance campaign increases probability democratization by being key actors in phase one and phase two. Therefore, the thesis third hypothesis is

*H3: The participation of women’s organizations in nonviolent maximalist resistance campaigns increase the probability of democratization*



# CHAPTER 5: DATA AND METHOD

## 5.1.DATA AND DESIGN

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To test the presented hypothesis, two main data sets are used, the WiRe dataset and V-dem dataset (Chenoweth, 2019a; Coppedge et al., 2021). The WiRe data set expands upon the Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes (NAVCO 1.2) that includes 389 maximalist campaigns for the years 1945-2014 (Chenoweth & Shay, 2019). Maximalist campaigns are identified when at least 1000 people were observed mobilizing (Chenoweth, 2019, p. 27). The WiRe data set expands upon this by adding additional variables that identify the scope, type, and degree of women's participation in 338<sup>25</sup> maximalist campaigns throughout the world from 1945-2014 (Chenoweth, 2019, p. 4). Only the nonviolent campaigns with the objective of regime change are included and constitutes the thesis unit of analysis.<sup>26</sup> There are 169 nonviolent campaigns in the data set, where 153 had the objective of regime change. The observation year is the “end year” or the year at which the campaign reaches its peak, i.e., the most members or biggest events. If data is unavailable for members or events, the peak is the year in which the campaign ended (i.e., if the regime changed). For instance, if the campaign successfully led to a regime change in 2009, the end year is 2009. I will use “campaign end” when I describe the findings.<sup>27</sup>

There are several quantitative research designs one can use to investigate the association between female participation in nonviolent resistance campaigns and democratization. One is through a cross sectional study, which is the approach this thesis will adopt. Cross sectional studies (CSS), also known as transverse studies or prevalence studies, are an observational study that examines a cross-section of social reality, focusing on variation between units and explaining the variation in the dependent variable (Kellstedt & Whitten, 2018, p. 95). In this case I examine the variation across nonviolent maximalist campaigns, with varying levels of women's participation, and future democracy scores.

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<sup>25</sup> There is a discrepancy in the number of campaigns between NAVCO 1.2 and the WiRe data set. It is unclear as to why this is.

<sup>26</sup> An overview of the name, location, beginning year and end-year can be found in the appendix.

<sup>27</sup> Meaning I will explain democratic levels five/ten years after campaign end.

This is, however, not without its challenges. As with any methodological approach, outside variables and outcomes might be simultaneous, meaning that high or low levels of democracy co-occurring with high or low levels of female participation can be a result of other, omitted, variables and conditions. Therefore, controlling for confounding variables will always be a challenge (Kellstedt & Whitten, 2018, p. 60).<sup>28</sup>

### 5.1.1. THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE – POLYARCHY AND EGALITARIAN DEMOCRACY

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The dependent variable is the continuous variable “democracy”, measured through egalitarian and polyarchy democracy.

Democratization is a process that can take many years to complete (Pinckney et al., 2022, p. 2), and it will take some time for the effect of a women’s participation to be visible on future democracy score. Therefore, I construct two new lead- variables (t+5 and t+10 years) for each democracy index to try and capture short-term and long-term democratization.

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#### EGALITARIAN DEMOCRACY INDEX

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The first dependent variable is the Egalitarian Democracy Index, *v2x\_egalDEM*, from the V-dem project (Coppedge et al., 202, p. 45). The index is based on the question; *To what extent is the ideal of egalitarian democracy achieved?* It is an interval variable ranging from low to high (0-1), where the value 0 represents full autocracy and 1 represents the ideal of egalitarian democracy. As mentioned, egalitarian democracy is founded on the principle that inequalities inhibit the full exercise of one’s formal rights and liberties and limit the political participation of citizens of varied social groups. To measure egalitarian democracy, the index also takes the level of electoral (polyarchy) democracy into account (Coppedge et al., 2021, p 45).<sup>29</sup>


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<sup>29</sup> The implication of this will be discussed in chapter 7

I construct two lead variables that measure the egalitarian democracy score five (t+5) and ten (t+10) years after the observation year (campaign end). This means that they capture the democracy score in the years after the resistance campaign.

Figure 3 shows two histograms of the (first) dependent variable – egalitarian democracy.

FIGURE 3: HISTOGRAM: EGALITARIAN DEMOCRACY INDEX (T+5) AND (T+10)



The histograms show the distribution of egalitarian democracy across the campaigns in the data sets and illustrates that there were higher levels of autocracy five years after campaign end than ten years after campaign end.

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
### POLYARCHY DEMOCRACY INDEX

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The second dependent variable is the V-Dem Electoral Democracy Index, *v2x\_polyarchy*. The index is also an interval from low to high, where the value 0 represents full autocracy and 1 represent the ideal of the electoral democracy. The variable consists of five sub-components, each being built from a number of indicators that together capture Dahl’s seven prerequisites for the polyarchy ideal; freedom of association, suffrage, clean elections, elected executive, and freedom of expression and alternative sources of information (Coppedge et al., 2021, p. 43). In the V-Dem conceptual scheme, electoral democracy is understood as an essential element of any other conception of representative democracy (p. 44). As with the Egalitarian index, I construct two new variables from the polyarchy democracy index at (t+5)

and (t+10). These lead variables capture the democracy score 5 and 10 years after the campaign ends.

FIGURE 4: HISTOGRAM: POLYARCHY DEMOCRACY INDEX (T+5) AND (T+10)



The histograms for polyarchy democracy score are more evenly distributed across campaigns than egalitarian democracy, but there is still a predominance of autocratic conditions.

The following is a description of the dependent variable(s).

TABLE 1: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE(S)

Variables	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	p1	p99	Skew.	Kurt.
Egalitarian democracy <sub>(t+5)</sub>	159	.319	.185	.029	.814	.034	.802	.758	2.814
Egalitarian democracy <sub>(t+10)</sub>	130	.343	.199	.034	.798	.047	.772	.664	2.42
Polyarchy democracy <sub>(t+5)</sub>	159	.445	.231	.069	.896	.074	.889	.161	1.939
Polyarchy democracy <sub>(t+10)</sub>	130	.471	.246	.071	.881	.074	.875	.075	1.778

### 5.1.2. INDEPENDENT VARIABLE - WOMEN'S PARTICIPATION

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To test if women's participation in a nonviolent resistance campaign is associated with democratization, I will test the association of each role presented in the theory chapter on the democracy score five and ten years after campaign end. As mentioned, I will test three participatory roles women can take on during a nonviolent resistance campaign: frontline roles, leadership roles and through formal women's organizations. The variables that measure the observation of the roles are dichotomous and are taken from the WiRe data set (Chenoweth, 2019a).

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#### FRONTLINE PARTICIPATION

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
To explore the association between women's frontline participation and democratization, I will use the variable called "*extent of frontline participation*". It has four categories ranging from 0-3<sup>30</sup>: (0) indicates no women observed in frontline roles, (1) indicates that less than 25% of observed frontlines are women (limited participation), (2) means that women are clearly and routinely involved in frontline roles of the campaign, and that between 25% and 50% frontline participants are women (moderate participation), and (3) means that women comprise the majority of the frontline participation, i.e., at least 50% of the observed participants are women (extensive participation). Since there are very few observations of extensive participation (only 3%), estimating the effects of this category would be difficult. Therefore, I choose to dichotomize this variable into category 0 (none/limited observation) and category 1 (moderate/extensive participation).

Figure 5 illustrates the percentage of observations of women's frontline participation in a nonviolent maximalist resistance campaign with the objective of regime change from the data set.

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<sup>30</sup> Ambiguous (-99) indicates that after extensive searching, the extent of women participation is ambiguous or difficult to find (Chenoweth, 2019, p. 28). -99 values were treated as missing and are dropped from the analysis

FIGURE 5: WOMEN'S FRONTLINE PARTICIPATION



The figure shows that 36% of the nonviolent maximalist resistance campaigns with the objective of regime change have featured moderate/extensive women's frontline participation.

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### PARTICIPATION IN CAMPAIGN LEADERSHIP


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To measure the effect of women in formal leadership roles, I will use the variable “*Extent of women in campaign leadership*”. It has three categories: 0 indicates no observed women in the campaign's upper echelons, (1) indicates that one or more women are among the campaign's leaders, but not the primary leader or figurehead (Women among formal leadership), and (2) indicates that the primary campaign leader includes one or more women (Women as primary campaign leader) (Chenoweth, 2019b, p. 30).<sup>31</sup> However, there are few observations of women in category 2, (only 3%). Therefore, I choose to also dichotomize this variable because this gives me more variation among fewer categories. The new variables consist of two categories. Value 0 indicates “no observation of women in leadership”. Value 1 indicates “women in leadership” and contains both observations of women *among* formal leadership and observations of women in *primary* campaign leadership.

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<sup>31</sup> If this is ambiguous or unknown after extensive searching, the variable is coded -99 (Chenoweth, 2019b, p. 30).

FIGURE 6: WOMEN'S PARTICIPATION IN CAMPAIGN LEADERSHIP



A large proportion, 61%, of the campaigns have had women in campaign leadership.

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
### PARTICIPATION OF WOMEN'S ORGANIZATIONS

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To explore the association between the participation of formal women's organizations and democratization, I will use the variable "*formalinvolve*". This measures if formal women's organizations are observed in the campaign or not. Observations coded 1 indicate that formal women's organizations participated, and observations coded 0 mean no participation of formal women's organizations.

Figure 7 illustrates that 67% of the nonviolent resistance campaigns from different parts of the world between 1945-2014 have featured women's organizations.

FIGURE 7: PARTICIPATION OF WOMEN'S ORGANIZATIONS



Figures 5, 6 and 7 shows that women have participated in some form, and to a varying degree, in nonviolent resistance campaigns from different parts of the world between 1945-2014.

The following table illustrates the descriptive statistics of the thesis independent variable.

TABLE 2: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLE(S)

Variables	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	p1	p99	Skew.	Kurt.
Women's frontline participation	149	.362	.482	0	1	0	1	.572	1.328
Women's participation in campaign leadership	148	.608	.49	0	1	0	1	-.443	1.196
Participation of formal women's organizations	149	.664	.474	0	1	0	1	-.696	1.485

### 5.1.3 CONTROL VARIABLES

#### DEMOCRACY<sub>(T-1)</sub>

It is common to add a lagged variable that measures the value of the dependent variable one year prior to the observation year if you expect that the current value of the dependent variable is heavily influenced by the value a year before (Mehmetoglu & Jakobsen, 2016, p. 254)<sup>32</sup>. Consequently, I create a lagged democracy variable, that measures the democracy score one (t-1) year prior to the observation year (campaign end), for both egalitarian democracy and polyarchy democracy. In this case I control for whether the democracy score was high prior to the end of a campaign, which might indicate an already beginning democratization process and a more democratic society. If the democracy score was high prior to campaign end, this could also explain women's participation in campaigns, because

<sup>32</sup> However, this is not a perfect solution to the problem of controlling for unobserved variables. See Mehmetoglu, M., & Jakobsen, T. G. (2016). *Applied statistics using Stata: a guide for the social sciences*. Sage.



democratic societies tend to facilitate more gender-equality, increasing probability for women's participation.

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### FEMALE EMPOWERMENT<sub>(T-1)</sub>

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In addition to lagged democracy score, the level of female empowerment is especially important in this context. The general presumption has often been that democracy leads to improvement of female empowerment. However, studies have found that there is a reversed causal relationship showing that improved female empowerment is strongly associated with democratic development (Jaquette, 2001, p. 11; Wyndow et al., 2013, p. 34), peace and stability (O'Reilly, 2016). If the female empowerment score was high prior to campaigns end, it could both explain an increase in democracy score five and ten years after, because of the association between female empowerment and democratic development, and also female participation in campaigns, because high levels of female empowerment would increase participation opportunities. An already strong female empowerment could therefore heavily influence the dependent and independent variable. This will be controlled for by using a 1-year lag of the V-dem variable *v2x\_gender* (Women political empowerment index (D)). Women's political empowerment is defined as a

*“...process of increasing capacity for women, leading to greater choice, agency, and participation in societal decision-making. It is understood to incorporate three equally-weighted dimensions: fundamental civil liberties, women's open discussion of political issues and participation in civil society organizations, and the descriptive representation of women in formal political positions»* (Coppedge et al., 2021, p. 298)

The variable is based on the question; *how politically empowered are women?* and measured on a scale with intervals from low to high (0-1).

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### GDP PER CAPITA<sub>(T-1)</sub>

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Based on the claim that democratization is more likely in countries with high economic performance (Celestino & Gleditsch, 2013; Geddes, 1999; Lipset, 1959; Przeworski &

Limongi, 1997; Treisman, 2020), I will also control for GDP per capita levels<sup>33</sup>. GDP per capita measures the economic output of a nation per person. It seeks to determine the prosperity of a nation by economic growth (Dynan & Sheiner, 2018, p. 3), which could influence the dependent and independent variable. GDP might be associated with women's potential participation in campaigns through female empowerment (Krause et al., 2018; Stockemer, 2009). Increases in GDP per capita often lead to a weakening of traditional values, decreased fertility rates, greater educational and labor force participation for women and an attitude change in the perception of traditional women's roles. Hence, higher GDP per capita levels indicates developed nations that are more likely to embrace liberal and egalitarian cultures for women compared to less developed nations (Stockemer, 2009, p. 436). This would increase the probability of higher democracy score and women's participation in campaigns.

To measure the levels of GDP per capita, I use the variable *GDP per capita, logged, base 10 (E)* (*e\_migdppc1n*) from the Maddison project (Coppedge et al., 2021; Maddison, 2018). By using a variable that is already log-transformed the distribution of GDP is more symmetrical because the outliers are pulled in (Mehmetoglu & Jakobsen, 2016, p. 172). Like the other control variables, I also create a lagged variable of GDP per capita, meaning that the variable will control for GDP per capita levels one year prior to campaign end.

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### REGION-FIXED EFFECTS

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Finally, in this context, it is also important to control for unobserved regional factors that could explain the variation in the dependent and independent variable. Regional, historical, and institutional variations among regions is important to account for when one considers the emergence of democracies (Jaquette, 2001, p. 112). For instance, it has been argued that Arab countries are less likely to democratize (Khondker, 2019, p. 1). Many Arabic countries are governed by authoritarian regimes, and women's rights are significantly worse in these countries than in others (Donno & Russett, 2004, p. 582). The lack of gender equality and the general treatment of women and girls is argued to be one of the explanation for the lack of

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<sup>33</sup> There is a debate in the research field whether GDP, as currently defined, is a good measurement for a country's economic performance (Dynan & Sheiner, 2018, p. 2). Nevertheless, findings do show that GDP per capita does a "reasonable job in capturing changes in economic well-being in countries" (Dynan & Sheiner, 2018, p. 2). In accordance with this, and to be consistent with past research, I choose to use GDP per capita as a measure of economic performance.

democracies in the Muslim world (Fish, 2002). Consequently, since women's empowerment is associated with democratic development (Wyndow et al., 2013, p. 34), religion and cultures in different regions might both explain the lack of democracy and female participation in campaigns. Accordingly, I include the nominal variable *e\_regionpol\_6C* (politico-geographic 6-category) which I call "Region". The regions are described as politico geographic, meaning that "they are based on geographical proximity as well as characteristic that contribute to regional understanding as identified by scholars in studies of democratization" (Coppedge et al., 2021, p. 357). The variable has six categories<sup>34</sup> and is based on the question: *In which politico-geographic region is this country located?* Category 1, East- Europe and Central Asia is the reference category.

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### INTERACTION: SUCCESS

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Success is a dichotomized variable from the NAVCO project, with values 0 (no success) and 1 (success) taken from the NAVCO data set (Chenoweth & Shay, 2019, p. 9). A campaign is labeled 1 (successful) if the campaign achieved its stated goals within a year of the peak of activities. In most cases, campaign outcomes was achieved within a year of the campaign's peak. However, there are also cases where success was achieved several years after the campaign peaked, but the success was a direct result of campaign activities. When such a direct link can be demonstrated, these campaigns are also coded as successful (Chenoweth & Shay, 2019, p. 9).

I only use the variables "success" as an interaction term combined with the variables of each role. Overall, I present 12 interaction models.

An interaction model is a product- term approach where a new variable ( $X_3$ ) is created by multiplying two variables ( $X_1$  and  $X_2$ ) that is assumed to have a greater overall effect on the dependent variable (Mehmetoglu & Jakobsen, 2016, p. 112). Based on previous research, women's participation is positively associated with future egalitarian democracy score (Marks & Chenoweth, 2020, p. 2). However, this is argued to be conditioned on whether the

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<sup>34</sup> 1. East- Europe and Central- Asia.  
2. Latin- America and the Caribbean.  
3. MENA (MENA, an acronym referring to a grouping of countries situated in and around the Middle East and N. Africa.  
4. Sub-Saharan Africa,  
5. West Europe and North America and  
6. Asia and the pacific.

campaign itself succeeds (Marks & Chenoweth, 2020, p. 5). Additionally, the link between success and women's participation only been drawn based on women's frontline participation. Therefore, I wish to explore this connection by adding an interaction term with a dummy predictor (female participation) and dummy moderators (success) for each role in each section. By doing this, I wish to see if the effect of different types of women's participation depends on success, as suggested by Marks and Chenoweth (2020).

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## 5.2 METHOD

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### ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES (OLS)

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I estimate 12 tables and 36 OLS models when testing the association between female participation in a nonviolent campaign and democracy. All models are estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS). OLS is a type of linear regression analysis where one uses the least squares method for estimating the unknown parameters in a linear regression model (Mehmetoglu & Jakobsen, 2016, pp. 50-52). There are especially two reasons for choosing OLS in this case. First, since my dependent variables are continuous, an OLS is appropriate (Skog, 2017, p. 215). Second, OLS is characterized as the best estimator of all the linear regression methods estimators because it exhibits two important functions. First, the regression coefficients obtained through OLS are known to be the best linear unbiased estimates of the population regression parameter. Unbiasedness means that the mean of the sampling distribution of OLS estimates will approximate the true population parameter value (Mehmetoglu & Jakobsen, 2016, p. 52), making it the method that provides the least statistical uncertainty (Skog, 2017, p. 223). However, even though the OLS is known to have the best linear unbiased estimates, this only applies if specific assumptions are met (Mehmetoglu & Jakobsen, 2016, p. 52). These regression assumptions can be divided in to two parts: one deals with the specification of the least-squares model and the other with assumption about the residuals (Mehmetoglu & Jakobsen, 2016, p. 135). These assumptions will be tested and discussed in section 6.4 "diagnostics".

# CHAPTER 6: RESULTS

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I will now present the three participatory roles in separate sections and test each role, and the mentioned control variables, on democracy scores five and ten years after a campaign end. Each section consists of four tables. The first two tables show the mean of egalitarian and polyarchy democracy scores one year prior to campaign end and five and ten years after campaign end across each level of women's participation. This makes it possible to explore if campaigns occurred in autocratic settings or not. The third table in each section consists of eight models. Models 1-4 show bivariate models with only the dependent (democracy) and independent variable (women's participation). Models 1-2 show the egalitarian democracy score 5 and 10 years after campaign ends, while models 3 and 4 show the polyarchy democracy score 5 and 10 years after campaigns ends. Models 5-8 show the output of multivariate regression models that measure the association between women's participation and the other control variables on the democracy score five and ten years after campaign end. Models 5 and 6 estimate the egalitarian democracy score 5 and 10 years after campaign ends, while models 7 and 8 estimate the polyarchy democracy score 5 and 10 years after campaigns ends.

At the end of each section, I present a fourth table with four interaction models between the variable "success" combined with the variables of each role. I also present some of the findings from the OLS and interaction models graphically by using *marginsplot*.

I begin with the informal dimension, women's frontline participation. Then I move on to the formal dimension with women's participation in campaign leadership and the participation of women's organization.

## 6.1. FRONTLINE PARTICIPATION

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Table 3 shows women observed in frontline roles and the mean of egalitarian democracy score one year prior to campaign end, and five and ten years after campaign end.

TABLE 3: WOMEN'S FRONTLINE PARTICIPATION AND THE MEAN OF EGALITARIAN DEMOCRACY (T-1), (T+5) AND (T+10).

<i>Frontline participation</i>	<i>Observations in campaign</i>	Democracy <sub>t-1</sub>	Democracy <sub>t+5</sub>	Democracy <sub>t+10</sub>
(0)	None/limited	.21	.32	.33
(1)	Moderate/extensive	.20	.37	.39

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Table 4 shows women observed in frontline roles and the mean of polyarchy democracy score one year prior to campaign end and five and ten years after campaign end.

TABLE 4: WOMEN'S FRONTLINE PARTICIPATION AND THE MEAN OF POLYARCHY DEMOCRACY (T-1), (T+5) AND (T+10)

<i>Frontline participation</i>	<i>Observations in campaign</i>	Democracy <sub>t-1</sub>	Democracy <sub>t+5</sub>	Democracy <sub>t+10</sub>
(0)	None/limited	.30	.47	.46
(1)	Moderate/extensive	.28	.50	.53

---

Table 3 and 4 indicate that countries in the data set had low democracy scores and autocratic situations prior to campaign end. The average polyarchy democracy score is higher than the average egalitarian democracy score one year prior to campaign end, but still relatively low. Both tables suggest that women participate in less democratic contexts. In addition, moderate/extensive female frontline participation in a campaign is associated with a higher democracy score five and ten years after campaign ends compared to none/limited participation.

The following table is the output of eight OLS- regression models. Models 1-4 are bivariate models. Models 5-8 are multivariate models. Eastern- Europe and Central Asia is the reference category for the region- variable.

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**OLS REGRESSION- WOMEN IN FRONTLINE ROLES AND DEMOCRACY SCORE**

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TABLE 5: OLS REGRESSION- WOMEN'S FRONTLINE PARTICIPATION

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Egalitarian democracy	Egalitarian democracy	Polyarchy democracy	Polyarchy democracy	Egalitarian democracy	Egalitarian democracy	Polyarchy democracy	Polyarchy democracy
	t+5	t+10	t+5	t+10	t+5	t+10	t+5	t+10
<b>Women's frontline participation</b>	-0.00137 (0.967)	0.0593 (0.152)	-0.0114 (0.775)	0.0829 (0.095)	-0.00210 (0.942)	0.0331 (0.362)	-0.00729 (0.854)	0.0452 (0.364)
Egalitarian democracy <sub>t-1</sub>					0.718*** (0.000)	0.753*** (0.000)		
Female political empowerment <sub>t-1</sub>					-0.164 (0.209)	-0.373* (0.016)	0.189 (0.274)	-0.209 (0.321)
GDP per capita <sub>t-1</sub>					0.0517* (0.013)	0.0944*** (0.000)	0.0495 (0.080)	0.0929** (0.007)
Latin- A, and the Caribbean					-0.00793 (0.868)	-0.0573 (0.278)	0.144 (0.052)	0.0556 (0.515)
MENA					-0.208*** (0.000)	-0.321** (0.002)	-0.191* (0.016)	-0.341* (0.022)
Sub-Saharan Africa					-0.0434 (0.379)	-0.0120 (0.840)	0.0165 (0.814)	0.0172 (0.840)
W. Europe and N. America					0.0570 (0.502)	0.00407 (0.965)	0.112 (0.335)	0.0231 (0.857)
Asia and pacific					-0.0831* (0.050)	-0.0894 (0.060)	-0.0455 (0.446)	-0.0753 (0.273)

Polyarchy democracy <sub>t-1</sub>							0.241 (0.113)	0.348 (0.061)
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R-Squared	0.0000	0.0093	0.0006	0.0240	0.4266	0.4381	0.3039	0.2685
_cons	0.322*** (0.000)	0.329*** (0.000)	0.457*** (0.000)	0.457*** (0.000)	-0.125 (0.496)	-0.350 (0.112)	-0.143 (0.566)	-0.269 (0.363)
N	144	117	144	117	129	105	129	105

---

*p*-values in parentheses

\* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001

None of the models find a significant association between female frontline participation in campaigns and future democracy scores.

The control variables in models 5-8 are for the most part statistically significant. The lagged egalitarian democracy score is positive and significant. This indicates that the egalitarian democracy score that existed prior to the campaign end is positively associated with the egalitarian democracy score five and ten years after the campaign. This was expected as it is plausible to assume that the democracy level before a campaign affects the democracy level after a campaign. Surprisingly, the lagged polyarchy democracy score has no significant values, meaning that there is no significant association between polyarchy score one year prior to a campaign and the polyarchy score five and ten years after the campaign ends. However, the coefficient is big, and the score is close to significant (0.06). GDP per capita is positive and significant in all models, except from model 7. A one unit increase in GDP per capita levels (t-1) increases egalitarian democracy (t+5) by 0.0517 and democracy (t+10) by .0944 units. This indicates, as expected, that GDP per capita one year prior to a campaign is positively associated with democracy scores five and ten after a campaign, with the strongest association in Model 6, egalitarian democracy (t+10). However, the association between GDP and the polyarchy democracy score ten years after a campaign is somewhat weaker compared to the association between egalitarian democracy scores ten years after, but still significant. There is a weak, negative, and significant association between female political empowerment one year prior to a campaign and the egalitarian democracy score ten years after campaign end, indicating that one unit increase in female political empowerment (t-1) negatively




correlates with the egalitarian democracy score (t+10). This is, however, only occurs in model 6. Of the regions, MENA and Asia and the Pacific are the only ones significantly different from Eastern-Europe and Central Asia. In model 5-8, the MENA region is negatively associated with the democracy scores five and ten years after campaign end, suggesting that democracy is more difficult to establish and obtain in and around the Middle East and North Africa. Asia and Pacific have a significant negative association with the egalitarian democracy score five years after campaign end, but not in the other models.

**PREDICTED MEAN- MARGINS PLOT**

Below is the output of two margins- figures showing the predicted mean of the democracy score (t+10) when there is none/limited and moderate/extensive frontline participation of women. The egalitarian democracy score is to the left, while the polyarchy democracy score is to the right.

FIGURE 8: PREDICTED MEAN OF DEMOCRACY (T+10)- WOMEN’S FRONTLINE PARTICIPATION



Both figures indicate a slight increase in the predicted democracy score when there is moderate/extensive participation of women. However, this is not significant.

**INTERACTION MODEL - WOMEN IN FRONTLINE ROLES, CAMPAIGN SUCCESS  
AND DEMOCRACY SCORE**

Table 6 shows four interaction models between a dummy predictor and a dummy moderator and illustrate an interaction between women participating in frontline roles in a campaign and campaign success on the egalitarian and polyarchy democracy score five (t+5) and ten (t+10) years after campaign end. This is included to see if the effect of women's participation is conditioned by success, as suggested by Marks and Chenoweth (2020). Models 1-2 show the egalitarian democracy score five and ten years after a campaign. Models 3-4 show the polyarchy democracy score five and ten years after a campaign. Success is a dichotomized variable, with values 0 (no success) and 1 (success).

TABLE 6: INTERACTION MODEL- WOMEN'S FRONTLINE PARTICIPATION

	(1) Egalitarian democracy $t+5$	(2) Egalitarian democracy $t+10$	(3) Polyarchy Democracy $t+5$	(4) Polyarchy democracy $t+10$
Frontline participation	-0.0285 (0.488)	-0.0118 (0.833)	-0.0186 (0.737)	-0.00263 (0.972)
Campaign success	0.107** (0.002)	0.0908* (0.022)	0.181*** (0.000)	0.148** (0.006)
Frontline participation* campaign success	0.0470 (0.393)	0.0743 (0.310)	0.0228 (0.758)	0.0793 (0.426)
Egalitarian democracy $_{t-1}$	0.645*** (0.000)	0.719*** (0.000)		
Female political empowerment $_{t-1}$	-0.186 (0.121)	-0.399** (0.006)	0.174 (0.267)	-0.239 (0.230)
GDP per capita $_{t-1}$	0.0592** (0.002)	0.0909*** (0.000)	0.0607* (0.018)	0.0880** (0.006)
Latin- America and the Caribbean	-0.0114 (0.797)	-0.0583 (0.258)	0.145* (0.030)	0.0550 (0.494)
MENA	-0.202*** (0.000)	-0.336*** (0.001)	-0.176* (0.013)	-0.361** (0.009)
Sub-Saharan Africa	-0.0423	-0.0357	0.0186	-0.0193

	(0.359)	(0.534)	(0.772)	(0.811)
W. Europe and N. America	0.0105 (0.894)	-0.0341 (0.703)	0.0338 (0.747)	-0.0395 (0.744)
Asia and pacific	-0.0826* (0.036)	-0.0898 (0.052)	-0.0424 (0.433)	-0.0762 (0.241)
Polyarchy democracy <sub>t-1</sub>			0.155 (0.260)	0.311 (0.073)
_cons	-0.225 (0.193)	-0.351 (0.098)	-0.314 (0.170)	-0.285 (0.311)
N	129	105	129	105

p-values in parentheses


\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

The interaction models indicate that the effect of success on future democracy score is *independent* of women's frontline participation. In campaigns with no/limited observations of female participation in frontline roles and campaign success, there is a positive and statistically significant effect on the democracy score in all models.

### PREDICTED MEAN- MARGINS PLOT: INTERACTION

Below is the output of two margins- figures showing the predicted mean of democracy score (t+10) with the interaction between success and women's frontline participation.

FIGURE 9: PREDICTED MEAN OF DEMOCRACY (T+10)- WOMEN'S FRONTLINE PARTICIPATION AND SUCCESS



The margins plot does indicate that successful campaigns democratize independently from women's frontline participation. However, although not statistically significant, the plots also suggest that when women participate, successful campaigns are more likely to democratize, which is less certain compared to successful campaigns that did not feature women's frontline participation. It looks like this is more applicable to the predicted egalitarian democracy score, indicating that successful campaigns without women's participation are less likely to lead to increasing egalitarian democracy scores. Overall, the plots indicate that the association between women's frontline participation and democratization might be conditioned by successful campaigns.

This finding is in line with Marks & Chenoweth (2020) who also show that success boost the effect of women's participation. However, expanding on Marks & Chenoweth (2020) results that suggested a decrease in egalitarian democracy five years after unsuccessful campaigns that featured women's frontline participation, there is little to no indication of a decrease in egalitarian democracy *ten* years after an unsuccessful campaign that featured women's frontline participation. The predicted democracy score after unsuccessful campaigns remains unchanged.

## 6.2. PARTICIPATION IN FORMAL CAMPAIGN LEADERSHIP

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Table 7 shows women observed in formal leadership roles in a campaign and the mean of the egalitarian democracy score one year prior to campaign end and five and ten years after campaign end.

TABLE 7: WOMEN'S PARTICIPATION IN CAMPAIGN LEADERSHIP AND THE MEAN OF EGALITARIAN DEMOCRACY (T-1), (T+5) AND (T+10)

<i>Leadership roles</i>	<i>Observations in campaign</i>	Democracy <sub>t-1</sub>	Democracy <sub>t+5</sub>	Democracy <sub>t+10</sub>
(0)	No women in campaign leadership	.23	.32	.32
(1)	Women in campaign leadership	.21	.35	.37

Table 8 shows women observed in formal leadership roles in a campaign and the mean of the polyarchy democracy score one year prior to campaign end and five and ten years after campaign end.

TABLE 8: WOMEN'S PARTICIPATION IN CAMPAIGNS LEADERSHIP AND THE MEAN OF POLYARCHY DEMOCRACY (T-1), (T+5) AND (T+10)

<i>Leadership roles</i>	<i>Observations in campaign</i>	Democracy <sub>t-1</sub>	Democracy <sub>t+5</sub>	Democracy <sub>t+10</sub>
(0)	No women in campaign leadership	.31	.45	.43
(1)	Women in campaign leadership	.28	.50	.52

Table 7 and 8 show low levels of democracy one year prior to the campaign, indicating again that campaigns occur in autocratic settings. When women are among formal leadership and primary campaign leaders the average egalitarian and polyarchy democracy score increases more compared to campaigns without women in campaign leadership.

The following table shows OLS- regression models with bivariate and multivariate models that estimates the effect of women's participation in campaign leadership and the other control variables on the democracy score five and ten years after campaign end.

### OLS REGRESSION- WOMEN IN FORMAL LEADERSHIP ROLES AND DEMOCRACY SCORE

TABLE 9: OLS REGRESSION- WOMEN'S PARTICIPATION IN CAMPAIGN LEADERSHIP

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Egalitarian democracy	Egalitarian democracy	Polyarchy democracy	Polyarchy democracy	Egalitarian democracy	Egalitarian democracy	Polyarchy democracy	Polyarchy democracy
	t+5	t+10	t+5	t+10	t+5	t+10	t+5	t+10
Women in campaign leadership	0.0220 (0.500)	0.0502 (0.188)	0.0331 (0.404)	0.0870 (0.057)	0.0329 (0.228)	0.0526 (0.099)	0.0468 (0.210)	0.0790 (0.071)
Egalitarian democracy <sub>t-1</sub>					0.736*** (0.000)	0.767*** (0.000)		
Female political empowerment <sub>t-1</sub>					-0.171 (0.190)	-0.376* (0.014)	0.185 (0.285)	-0.217 (0.296)
GDP per capita <sub>t-1</sub>					0.0527* (0.011)	0.0992*** (0.000)	0.0509 (0.069)	0.100** (0.003)
Latin-A. and the Caribbean					-0.00618 (0.896)	-0.0503 (0.334)	0.145* (0.050)	0.0622 (0.459)
MENA					-0.211*** (0.000)	-0.280** (0.006)	-0.194* (0.014)	-0.285* (0.046)
Sub-Saharan Africa					-0.0367 (0.459)	-0.00158 (0.979)	0.0251 (0.722)	0.0318 (0.709)

W. Europe and N. America					0.0616 (0.467)	0.00771 (0.933)	0.120 (0.298)	0.0281 (0.825)
Asia and pacific					-0.0768 (0.071)	-0.0809 (0.088)	-0.0379 (0.527)	-0.0645 (0.343)
Polyarchy <sub>t-1</sub>							0.255 (0.096)	0.366* (0.046)
R-squared	0.0032	0.0150	0.0049	0.0310	0.4333	0.4492	0.3109	0.2871
_cons	0.308*** (0.000)	0.317*** (0.000)	0.434*** (0.000)	0.430*** (0.000)	-0.158 (0.393)	-0.421 (0.059)	-0.192 (0.444)	-0.374 (0.208)
N	143	117	143	117	128	105	128	105

*p*-values in parentheses

\* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001

None of the models finds a significant association between women in campaign leadership and future democracy score. However, Models 4, 6 and 8 show results that are very close to significant.

The control variables in models 5-8 indicate, as in the previous section, that egalitarian democracy scores one year prior to campaign ends are positively and significantly associated with the egalitarian democracy score five and ten years after. However, there is still no significant association between the polyarchy democracy score one year prior to the campaign end on the polyarchy score five and ten years after campaign end. Female political empowerment one year prior to campaign is still only statistically significant in model 6, egalitarian democracy (t+10). As in the previous section (frontline roles), the level of female political empowerment one year prior to a campaign is negatively and significantly associated with the egalitarian score ten years after campaign end. GDP per capita is positive and significantly associated with egalitarian democracy scores five and ten years after campaign end, but only positive and significantly associated with the polyarchy democracy score ten years after campaign end. Of the regions, Sub-Saharan Africa is negatively and significantly associated with lower democracy scores, the MENA and Asia and the Pacific regions are no longer statistically significant, as it was in the previous section (frontline roles).

## PREDICTED MEAN- MARGINS PLOT

Below is the output of two margins- figures showing the predicted mean of democracy score (t+10) in campaigns with and without women in leadership. The egalitarian democracy score is to the left, while the polyarchy democracy score is to the right.

FIGURE 10: PREDICTED MEAN OF DEMOCRACY (T+10)- WOMEN'S PARTICIPATION IN CAMPAIGN LEADERSHIP




Figure 10 indicate that the predicted democracy score ten years after a campaign increases more when women are part of campaign leadership, compared to when women are not part of campaign leadership. The plots show a higher predicted increase in the polyarchy democracy score, which is borderline significant. These are not statistically significant results, but do suggests, in line with the literature, that women who take part in campaign leadership might also be active participants during the transitional phase, which may be more likely to significantly influence the establishment of institutional democracy.

## INTERACTION MODEL: WOMEN IN LEADERSHIP, CAMPAIGN SUCCESS AND DEMOCRACY SCORE

Table 10 consists of four interaction models. These models estimate an interaction between women in formal leadership roles in a campaign and campaign success on the egalitarian and polyarchy democracy score five (t+5) and ten (t+10) years after campaign end. This is included to see if the effect of women's participation is conditioned by success. Models 1-2



show the egalitarian democracy score five and ten years after a campaign. Models 3-4 shows the polyarchy democracy score five and ten years after a campaign.

TABLE 10: INTERACTION MODEL: WOMEN'S PARTICIPATION IN CAMPAIGN LEADERSHIP

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Egalitarian democracy <sub>t+5</sub>	Egalitarian democracy <sub>t+10</sub>	Polyarchy democracy <sub>t+5</sub>	Polyarchy democracy <sub>t+10</sub>
Women in campaign leadership	-0.00869 (0.829)	0.00886 (0.999)	0.0164 (0.764)	0.0186 (0.789)
Campaign success	0.0838* (0.047)	0.0684 (0.172)	0.158** (0.006)	0.122 (0.076)
Women in campaign leadership * campaign success	0.0683 (0.188)	0.0719 (0.267)	0.0508 (0.470)	0.0787 (0.371)
Egalitarian democracy <sub>t-1</sub>	0.679*** (0.000)	0.756*** (0.000)		
Female political empowerment <sub>t-1</sub>	-0.202 (0.090)	-0.402** (0.006)	0.152 (0.331)	-0.241 (0.218)
GDP per capita <sub>t-1</sub>	0.0593** (0.002)	0.0919*** (0.000)	0.0614* (0.015)	0.0916** (0.005)
Latin- America and the Caribbean	-0.0237 (0.583)	-0.0698 (0.159)	0.134* (0.044)	0.0407 (0.606)
MENA	-0.214*** (0.000)	-0.307** (0.001)	-0.190** (0.007)	-0.320* (0.017)
Sub-Saharan Africa	-0.0446 (0.321)	-0.0416 (0.464)	0.0205 (0.744)	-0.0233 (0.772)
W. Europe and N. America	0.00800 (0.918)	-0.0382 (0.663)	0.0373 (0.718)	-0.0412 (0.729)
Asia and pacific	-0.0806 (0.037)	-0.0919* (0.040)	-0.0381 (0.474)	-0.0783 (0.217)
Polyarchy democracy <sub>t-1</sub>			0.186 (0.180)	0.338 (0.052)
_cons	-0.228 (0.193)	-0.366 (0.103)	-0.333 (0.155)	-0.329 (0.268)
N	128	105	128	105

*p*-values in parentheses

\* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001


The interaction models indicates that the effect of success on future democracy score is *independent* of women's participation in campaign leadership, but only in the short term

(t+5). This suggests that successful campaigns without women’s participation in campaign leadership, might lead to short-term (t+5) democratization, but not necessary longer- term democratization.

PREDICTED MEAN- MARGINS PLOT

The figures below show the output of two margins- figures showing the predicted mean of democracy score (t+10) based on the interaction between success and women’s participation in campaign leadership.

FIGURE 11: PREDICTED MEAN OF DEMOCRACY (T+10)- WOMEN’S PARTICIPATION IN CAMPAIGN LEADERSHIP AND SUCCESS



As with frontline participation, these margins plots are not statistically significant, but they are suggestive. Like frontline participation, they indicate that when women participate in campaign leadership in successful campaigns, the probability of democratization increases. Therefore, it looks like the association between women’s participation in campaign leadership on democratization is, in this context, conditional. Furthermore, the plot also suggests that successful campaigns *without* women’s participation do not necessarily increase future egalitarian democracy scores. This might indicate that even if campaigns succeed, egalitarian democracy is less likely to be established if women are not part of campaign leadership.

### 6.3. PARTICIPATION OF FORMAL WOMEN'S ORGANIZATIONS

Table 11 shows observations of formal women's organization in a campaign and the mean of the egalitarian democracy score one year prior to campaign end and five and ten years after campaign end.

TABLE 11: PARTICIPATION OF WOMEN'S ORGANIZATIONS AND THE MEAN OF EGALITARIAN DEMOCRACY (T-1), (T+5) AND (T+10).

<i>Formal women's organization</i>	<i>Observation in campaign</i>	Democracy <sub>t-1</sub>	Democracy <sub>t+5</sub>	Democracy <sub>t+10</sub>
(0)	Not observed	.24	.31	.30
(1)	Observed	.20	.35	.38

Table 12 shows observations of formal women's organization in a campaign and the mean of the polyarchy democracy score one year prior to campaign end and five and ten years after campaign end.

TABLE 12: PARTICIPATION OF WOMEN'S ORGANIZATIONS AND THE MEAN OF POLYARCHY DEMOCRACY (T-1), (T+5) AND (T+10).

<i>Formal women's organization</i>	<i>Observation in campaign</i>	Democracy <sub>t-1</sub>	Democracy <sub>t+5</sub>	Democracy <sub>t+10</sub>
(0)	Not observed	.30	.41	.38
(1)	Observed	.29	.52	.54

Table 11 and 12 indicate that most countries were autocratic prior to a campaign, and that formal women's organizations participate in campaigns for regime change in autocratic settings. The egalitarian and polyarchy democracy scores increase five years after a campaign end when there is no observation of the participation of formal women's organization. However, the average democracy score increases more when formal women's organizations

are observed in a campaign. The increase in the polyarchy democracy score is higher than in the egalitarian democracy score.

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### OLS REGRESSION- FORMAL WOMEN'S ORGANIZATION AND DEMOCRACY SCORE

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Table 13 shows 8 OLS- regression models measuring the association between the participation of women's organization and future democracy score.

TABLE 13: OLS REGRESSION- FORMAL WOMEN'S ORGANIZATION

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Egalitarian democracy t+5	Egalitarian democracy t+10	Polyarchy democracy t+5	Polyarchy democracy t+10	Egalitarian democracy t+5	Egalitarian democracy t+10	Polyarchy democracy t+5	Polyarchy democracy t+10
Participation of formal women's organization	0.0299 (0.368)	0.0800* (0.040)	0.0708 (0.080)	0.162*** (0.000)	0.0600* (0.037)	0.0917** (0.005)	0.102** (0.009)	0.149*** (0.001)
Egalitarian democracy <sub>t-1</sub>					0.724*** (0.000)	0.740*** (0.000)		
Female political empowerment <sub>t-1</sub>					-0.149 (0.246)	-0.339* (0.022)	0.232 (0.169)	-0.129 (0.519)
GDP per capita <sub>t-1</sub>					0.0502* (0.014)	0.0955*** (0.000)	0.0467 (0.087)	0.0936** (0.004)
Latin- America and the Caribbean					-0.0176 (0.706)	-0.0704 (0.168)	0.131 (0.069)	0.0436 (0.589)
MENA					-0.225*** (0.000)	-0.301** (0.002)	-0.219** (0.004)	-0.306* (0.025)
Sub-Saharan Africa					-0.0496 (0.307)	-0.0281 (0.621)	0.00809 (0.906)	-0.00156 (0.985)
W. Europe and N. America					0.0657 (0.431)	0.0120 (0.893)	0.131 (0.244)	0.0441 (0.717)
Asia and pacific					-0.0785 (0.059)	-0.0872 (0.057)	-0.0365 (0.530)	-0.0663 (0.308)

Polyarchy democracy <sub>t-1</sub>							0.228 (0.123)	0.306 (0.080)
R-Squared	0.0057	0.0362	0.0214	0.1019	0.4473	0.4793	0.3424	0.3458
_cons	0.301*** (0.000)	0.295*** (0.000)	0.406*** (0.000)	0.378*** (0.000)	-0.161 (0.375)	-0.420* (0.050)	-0.207 (0.393)	-0.387 (0.169)
N	144	117	144	117	129	105	129	105

*p*-values in parentheses


\* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001

In the bivariate models 2 and 4, the participation of formal women's organizations in campaigns are positive and significant associated with an increase in future democracy score. The increase is larger for polyarchy democracy than egalitarian democracy. The association between women's organizations in campaigns and future democracy scores does for the most part become stronger in the multivariate models. Models 5-8 show that the participation of formal women's organizations is positively and significantly associated with increased egalitarian and polyarchy democracy score. The strongest association is on the polyarchy democracy score (t+10). Model 8 indicates that when formal women's organizations participate in a campaign, the future polyarchy democracy score increases by near 0.15 units. Comparing, the egalitarian democracy score (t+10) increases by 0.0917 units. These findings suggest that the participation of women's organization in campaigns matters for democratization, even after controlling for other confounding variables.

#### PREDICTED MEAN- MARGINS PLOT

Below is the output of two margins- figures showing the predicted mean of democracy score (t+10) in campaigns with and without participation of women's organization. The egalitarian democracy score is to the left, while the polyarchy democracy score is to the right.

FIGURE 12: PREDICTED MEAN OF DEMOCRACY (T+10)- WOMEN'S ORGANIZATION



Both figures show that the predicted democracy score increases when formal women's organization participates in nonviolent maximalist resistance campaigns. This association is stronger for the predicted polyarchy democracy score than the egalitarian democracy score.

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**INTERACTION MODEL- FORMAL WOMEN'S ORGANIZATIONS, CAMPAIGN SUCCESS AND DEMOCRACY SCORE**

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The following is a table consisting of four interaction models. These models illustrate the association between the participation of formal women's organization in a campaign and campaign success on the egalitarian and polyarchy democracy score five (t+5) and ten (t+10) years after campaign end. In line with Marks and Chenoweth (2020) I explore whether the effect of women's participation on future democracy score is conditioned by success. Models 1-2 shows the egalitarian democracy score five and ten years after a campaign. Models 3-4 shows the polyarchy democracy score five and ten years after a campaign.

TABLE 14: INTERACTION MODEL- WOMEN'S ORGANIZATION

	(1) Egalitarian democracy t+5	(2) Egalitarian democracy t+10	(3) Polyarchy democracy t+5	(4) Polyarchy democracy t+10
Participation of women's organization	0.0452 (0.278)	0.113* (0.027)	0.105 (0.059)	0.192** (0.005)
Campaign success	0.111* (0.013)	0.137** (0.008)	0.193** (0.001)	0.218** (0.001)
Participation of women's organizations* campaign success	0.0219 (0.672)	-0.0409 (0.517)	-0.00488 (0.943)	-0.0768 (0.357)
Egalitarian democracy <sub>t-1</sub>	0.652*** (0.000)	0.692*** (0.000)		
Female political empowerment <sub>t-1</sub>	-0.1620 (0.168)	-0.341* (0.016)	0.227 (0.130)	-0.113 (0.543)
GDP per capita <sub>t-1</sub>	0.0588** (0.002)	0.0982*** (0.000)	0.0589* (0.016)	0.0968** (0.002)
Latin- America and the Caribbean	-0.0281 (0.511)	-0.0848 (0.080)	0.129* (0.043)	0.0346 (0.642)
MENA	-0.223*** (0.000)	-0.315*** (0.001)	-0.205** (0.002)	-0.311* (0.015)
Sub-Saharan Africa	-0.0567 (0.200)	-0.0580 (0.289)	0.00653 (0.914)	-0.0385 (0.609)
W. Europe and N. America	0.0115 (0.881)	-0.0424 (0.620)	0.0490 (0.626)	-0.0346 (0.760)
Asia and pacific	-0.0847* (0.026)	-0.0976* (0.025)	-0.0360 (0.484)	-0.0735 (0.222)
Polyarchy democracy <sub>t-1</sub>			0.136 (0.304)	0.237 (0.144)
_cons	-0.270 (0.113)	-0.502* (0.019)	-0.396 (0.076)	-0.524 (0.056)
<i>N</i>	129	105	129	105

*p*-values in parentheses


The models suggest, firstly, that the association between formal women's organizations and democratization is *independent of* success. The models show that the presence of women's organizations in a civil resistance campaign increases the probability of democratization *even if the campaign fails*. In unsuccessful campaigns where women's organizations have participated, the egalitarian and polyarchy democracy (t+10) score still increases by 0.11 and

0.19 units ten years after campaign ends. Successful campaigns without women’s participation also seem to increase future democracy scores in all models. However, when comparing Models 2 and 4 between the models showing success *without* women’s organizations and women’s organizations without success, the difference is small. This indicates that successful campaigns without women’s organizations do not necessary increase the probability of democratization more than unsuccessful campaigns *with* the participation of women’s organizations. I.e., the participation of women’s organizations in civil resistance seems to matter almost as much as campaign success for longer-term democratization.

PREDICTED MEAN- MARGINS PLOT

The figures below show the output of two margins- figures showing the predicted mean of democracy score (t+10) based on the interaction between success and the participation of women’s organization in campaigns.

FIGURE 13: PREDICTED MEAN OF DEMOCRACY (T+10)- WOMEN’S ORGANIZATION AND SUCCESS



The figures show that the participation of formal women’s organizations increase the predicted egalitarian and polyarchy democracy score ten years after campaign end. Moreover, it shows how in cases where the campaigns have failed, future egalitarian and polyarchy democracy score still increases when women’s organizations have participated. Interestingly, the participation of women’s organizations seem to matter *more* for future polyarchy



democracy when campaigns fail. Overall, the participation of women's organizations positively influence the prospects of democratization.

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## 6.4. MODEL DIAGNOSTICS

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In this section I will run some model- diagnostics to explore whether the estimates of the models are correct. The regression assumptions for OLS can be divided in to two parts: one deals with the specification of the least-squares model and the other with assumption about the residuals (Mehmetoglu & Jakobsen, 2016, p. 135).

I will address each part separately and only run diagnostic for model 8 (polyarchy t+10) in section 6.3, formal women's organizations. There are especially two reasons for why I choose to only run diagnostics on this model. First, it is the model with the most robust findings when it comes to the association between women's participation in nonviolent maximalist resistance campaign and future democracy score. Model 8 does suggest that when formal women's organizations participate in a campaign, the future polyarchy democracy score increases by almost 0.15 units. In addition, this finding is significant almost at the 1% level. It is therefore interesting to see if this model meets the assumptions. If it does not, it might raise concerns over the estimates.

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### 6.4.1. MODEL SPECIFICATION

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Model specifications can be divided in to two assumptions. First, the question whether all X-variables included in the model are relevant. Two, the absence of multicollinearity (Mehmetoglu & Jakobsen, 2016, pp. 135-146).

#### I) ALL RELEVANT X- VARIABLES ARE INCLUDED

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The first assumption is first and foremost a theoretical question. Ideally, all variables that should be expected to influence the dependent variable should be included in the model. However, data limitations often make this assumption difficult to meet (Mehmetoglu & Jakobsen, 2016, p. 135).

To test whether there are omitted variables, we can use *ovtest*. *Ovtest* carries out two versions of Ramsey (1969) regression specification error test for omitted variables (Mehmetoglu &

Jakobsen, 2016, p. 136). A non-significant test means that we keep our null hypotheses that states that there is no omitted variable. I run the test and get a  $P >$  of 0.203, which means that, according to this test, Model 8 does not suffer from omitted variables. However, it is important to note that passing this test does not mean that I have specified the best possible model, either statistically or substantively. Only that it has passed some minimal statistical threshold of data fitting.

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## II) ABSENCE OF MULTICOLLINEARITY

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This assumption implies that two X- variables in the same model cannot be perfectly correlated. In addition, one X-variable cannot be perfectly explained by a linear combination of other X-variables in the model. If multicollinearity occurs, variables will steal explanatory power from each other, making it difficult to assess their relative importance, resulting in standard errors that are too low (Mehmetoglu & Jakobsen, 2016, p. 146). To test if this assumption is met in model 8 in section 6.3, I run the *vif* (variance inflation factor) test. I have no values over 5 which indicates an unproblematic multicollinearity in Model 8 (Mehmetoglu & Jakobsen, 2016, p. 147).

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### 6.4.2. ASSUMPTION ABOUT THE RESIDUALS

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A breach in the assumption about the residuals could be problematic because it indicates that the OLS would no longer be the best estimator, and our parameters would not be representative of the population parameter. The breach happens if X-variables are not strictly exogenous. This can, however, be discovered when testing for homoscedasticity (Mehmetoglu & Jakobsen, 2016, p. 148).

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#### I) HOMOSCEDASTICITY

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Homoscedasticity is the assumption that the error term has constant variance, meaning that the residuals must be the same for units regardless of their predicted values. This is important to produce statistical generalization about the result from the sample. If this assumption is *not* met, we have a heteroscedasticity problem (Mehmetoglu & Jakobsen, 2016, p.149). However, most models will suffer from some heteroscedasticity, but we must evaluate whether the degree of it is problematic. To measure the degree of heteroscedasticity we can run the Breusch and Pagan (1979) test. The test estimates the variance of Y from the average of squared values of the residuals (Mehmetoglu & Jakobsen, 2016, p.149). If the P-value is less

than 0.005, we have a heteroscedasticity problem. However, the P-value for Model 8 when running the test is 0.992, meaning that the assumption of homoscedasticity is met.

To summarize the diagnostics table 5 shows the results from the tests I have run on Model 8 in section 6.3, plus some additional robust test I have chosen not to elaborate.

TABLE 15: MODEL DIAGNOSTIC

1) no heterokedasticity problem	<b>Breusch-Pagan hettest</b> Chi2(1): 0.000 p-value: 0.992	> 0.05
2) no multicollinearity problem	<b>Variance inflation factor</b> formalgrouprole : 1.06 poldemocracy_lag1 : 2.58 polempower_lag1 : 2.97 ln_GDP_lag1 : 2.01 2.region : 2.65 3.region : 1.29 4.region : 2.93 5.region : 1.38 6.region : 2.27	< 5.00
3) residuals are normally distributed	<b>Shapiro-Wilk W normality test</b> z: 1.882 p-value: 0.030	> 0.01
4) no specification problem	<b>Linktest</b> t: 0.517 p-value: 0.606	> 0.05
5) appropriate functional form	<b>Test for appropriate functional form</b> F(3,92):1.564 p-value: 0.203	> 0.05
6) no influential observations	<b>Cook's distance</b> no distance is above the cutoff	< 1.00

## CHAPTER 7: DISCUSSION

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Why do some countries transition to democracy, while others do not? The question is as important as it is complex, and several theories are pivot in the pursuit for the answer. To make this question more manageable, I asked “*What explains why some nonviolent maximalist civil resistance campaigns leads to democracy, while others do not?*” The purpose of this thesis has been to explore whether women's participation in nonviolent civil resistance campaigns are one explanatory factor in the variation of outcomes, one that has been largely overlooked in the academic literature thus far. I asked the following research question; *how does female participation in nonviolent resistance campaigns influence the prospects of democratization?* and in this section, I will discuss my findings against the relation to the research question. After that, I will also address some limitations with this study before I discuss the papers validity. I make some suggestions for future research throughout the text. However, more suggestions will be presented in the following chapter 8 (conclusion).

### MAIN RESULTS

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Previously, I presented a chapter on important mechanisms that were argued to increase a nonviolent civil resistance campaigns probability of democratization. These were further divided in to two phases, the opening, and the transition phase. The literature on women’s contribution in several civil resistance campaigns does suggest that women’s participation can be associated with the presence of these mechanisms and positively contribute to democratization in these two phases. From this, the study arrived at three hypotheses.

- *H1: Women’s frontline participation in nonviolent maximalist resistance campaigns increases the probability of democratization*
- *H2: Women’s participation in campaign leadership increases the probability of democratization*
- *H3: The participation of women’s organization in the campaign increases probability of democratization*

I will now discuss the main findings in connection to these hypotheses. I discuss the findings for frontline participation and campaign leadership in one section, while the association between women's organizations and democratization are placed in a separate section.

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### WOMEN'S FRONTLINE PARTICIPATION AND WOMEN IN CAMPAIGN LEADERSHIP

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None of the OLS regression models finds a statistically significant association between women's frontline participation and democratization. Consequently, I find no statistical support for H1 and H2. However, the results from the margins plots based on the interaction models are somewhat ambiguous and could suggest two noteworthy points.

First, the association between women's frontline participation, women's participation in campaign leadership and democratization seems to only matter in the context of campaign success. I.e., the impact of women's participation in these two roles might matter if the campaigns succeed. Overall, and in line with Marks & Chenoweth (2020), this suggests that women's frontline participation is conditioned by success but has now expanded this to also account for women's participation in campaign leadership. Moreover, the findings also suggest that women's participation in these two roles might boost the effect of success.

Second, it looks like future polyarchy democracy increases more than future egalitarian democracy after successful campaigns *without* women's participation in these two roles. This suggests that successful campaigns without women's participation does not necessary translate into egalitarian democracy, indicating that women's participation at the frontlines or in campaign leadership is important for the establishment of egalitarian democracy., i.e., the social, and political rights across social groups. However, this does not necessarily mean that the association between women's participation and polyarchy democracy is unimportant. Even though future polyarchy democracy seems to increase without women's participation in figure 9 and 11<sup>35</sup>, the predicted score increases more when women participate. Additionally, models 4 and 8 in Table 9 do indicate a positive association between women's participation in campaign leadership and future polyarchy democracy score that is close to significant. While the *absence* of women seems to make the establishment of egalitarian democracy less likely,

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<sup>35</sup> Marginsplot figures of the interaction models for frontline participation and women's participation in campaign leadership

the *presence* of women, and especially women in campaign leadership, seems to be able to have a positively impact the future polyarchy democracy score as well.

Overall, it seems that if there is an association between women's frontline participation and participation in campaign leadership and democratization, this association is conditional on whether the campaign succeeds. Moreover, successful campaigns without women's frontline – or campaign leadership- participation might lead to democratization, but it looks like the we can be more certain that the probability of democratization increases when they participate.

Furthermore, and unlike the findings for frontline participation, longer-term democratization seems to be less likely after successful campaigns with no participation of women in campaign leadership. This could suggest that success without women's participation in campaign leadership might only matter for short-term democratization (t+5), but not for long-term democratization (t+10).

The difference in effect between frontline participation and (longer- term) democratization coincides with the absence of mechanisms linking women's frontline participation to the probability of democratization during phase two, the transition. Even though women have shown high mobilization capacity by mobilizing at the frontline for the continued fight for democracy in Yemen, Syria, and Egypt, after the Arab Spring, this does not indicate that women through frontline participation affect democratic *transitions*. Compared, the literature does provide examples which substantiate the claim that women's leadership participation matters also in the transition phase. The examples of Dr. Abigail Olufunmilayo Ransome-Kuti who led many anti-colonial movements in Nigeria in the 1940's and acted as a key figure in the transition to independence, or the Tunisian women's rise to power in the aftermath of The Arab Spring, or the (attempted) participation in the transitional negotiations of student Alaa Salah, does suggest that women who participate in phase one, also want to be active actors in phase two. This coincides with the findings of Boldt & White (2011, p. 27) who show that women who participate in successful campaigns become more effective public actors and active participants in newly established democracies. Nevertheless, this has been and continues to be challenged by traditional social roles and the expectations of a women's place in politics. It seems to be an old- standing sexist barrier preventing women from obtaining leadership positions and participating in transitional negotiations.

However, what does seem to be a trend, is that *when* women gain access to political leadership, they tend to pursue policies that address development, social welfare, social justice, gender equality and women's rights. These are all important elements in themselves, but also critical for democratic development (Wyndow et al., 2013, p. 34), and arguably more important in the development of egalitarian democracy, than polyarchy democracy. The pursuit of the implementation of these politics might enhance the probability of equal protection, rights, and freedom across social groups, which is the core of egalitarian democracy. This coincides with my findings suggesting that *absence* of women's participation in leadership after successful campaigns, makes the establishment egalitarian democracy less certain compared to polyarchy democracy. Overall, it looks like democratic institutions are established in the wake of successful campaigns *regardless* of women's participation. The same does not seem to be true for egalitarian democracy

In sum, the literature on women in leadership and the examples brought forth does suggest that women can increase the probability of democratization, and especially in terms of egalitarian democratic establishment, in phase two as well. However, this is not a mechanism that has been tested explicitly in this thesis. I will come back to this point later.

Overall, and even though I find no statistically significant results between women's frontline participation and participation in campaign leadership and democratization, the interaction models indicate that if they matter, it is in the context of success. This means that the association between of women's frontline participation and participation in campaign leadership and democratization might be conditional on campaign success.

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## WOMEN'S FORMAL ORGANIZATIONS

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The association between the participation of women's organizations and democratization is the most outstanding finding from this study. The findings show how the association between the participation of women's organizations and democratization is *independent of success*, meaning that the participation of women's organizations independently influences the prospects of democratization. Consequently, I argue that I find support for H3: *The participation of women's organization in the campaign increases probability of democratization.*

The literature does confirm that women's organizations have participated in several resistance campaign across the world and throughout time. Consistent with the literature examining the role of women's organizations, I find that their participation is positively associated with future democracy score in almost every OLS model. Additionally, the interaction models do suggest an important distinction from the other participatory roles. The presence of women's organizations in nonviolent maximalist resistance campaigns indicates that democratization is possible, even if campaigns are *unsuccessful*. Therefore, and unlike women's frontline participation and women's participation in campaign leadership, the association between the participation of women's organizations and democratization operate positively and independently from campaign success. Moreover, the participation of women's organizations in civil resistance seems to matter almost as much as campaign success for longer-term democratization. Based on this, I argue that the study finds support for H3 (*The observation of women's organization in the campaign increases the probability of democratization*).

These findings indicates that women's organizations provide important mechanisms that increase the probability of democratization. Previous statistical findings suggest that the presence of formal women's organizations are associated with the maintenance of nonviolent discipline and the increased likelihood of the withdrawal of support from security forces (Chenoweth, 2019b, p. 16 & 21). These are key mechanisms that increase the probability of successful campaigns and short-term democratization. However, based on the literature presented in this thesis, it is possible to argue that women's organizations might increase the likelihood of other key mechanisms to be present as well. Even though I have no statistical



basis of saying which specific mechanisms is at play, I will emphasize three arguments in support of this claim.

First, I argue that women's organizations have high levels of mobilizational capacity, both in phase one and in phase two. In phase one, women's organizations can be pivot in increasing campaign size by "simply" adding participants. These additional participants are most likely women. After all, Hassim (2006) does argue that, historically, it was the emergence of women's formal organizations that drew women in large scales into activism and politics (p. 47), and Murdie & Peksen's (2015) finds that the presence of women's organizations increases the probability of women becoming involved in domestic protests. However, and as an important point, I do not argue that women's organizations effort in *mobilizing women* is sufficient for democratization, but may be sufficient in creating a necessary point of departure in times of resistance. The contribution of the organization "Mother of the Plaza de Mayo" illustrates this point. Even though their contribution was not the sole reason for the collapse of the Pinochet regime, the women's collective that formed during this time did create a powerful backbone for the pro-democracy movement that emerged in the mid 1980's and 1990's that eventually led to the end of the military rule. Therefore, women's organizations might serve as one important tool in getting women involved in resistance, consequently increasing the probability of mass-broad participation. Additionally, several other mechanisms follow the participation of women's organizations. For starters, Waylen (1993) shows how women's organizations are rarely homogeneous, particularly in terms of class composition, making women's organizations a powerful tool in mobilizing people across social status, traditional conflict lines and unite them for a common goal. This have been argued to be the case in Uganda and several Latin – America countries- where women's organizations gathered participants of both genders across traditional conflict lines to enhance the democratization mobilization (Jaquette, 2001, p 116; Waylen 1993). Consequently, women's organizations might have a unique ability mobilize and diversify the participants.

Secondly, their mobilizational capacity seems to persist in phase two as well. As the literature suggests, women's organizations are often old, and many have had democratic principles as their objective for a long time. In this there is an element of durability in the fight for democracy, and a strong desire to ensure democratic transition. In line with Tarrow (2011) who argues that organizations are a "source for recruiting new members and identifying future

leaders” (p. 123), it does look like women’s organizations are an important force in getting women in positions of power during the transition and keeping mobilization capacity high. A good example of this mechanism at play is the effort of ATFD in Tunisia. In addition to getting women into the constitutional negotiation process and their continued mobilization in holding the new regime accountable in securing democratic principles and transparent in their political accomplishment, they also played a key role in keeping women in the transitional loop and acting as a bridge between civil society and the new assembly. Once in power, the literature suggest that women follow policies that are important for women’s rights and democratic development (Castillejo, 2016; Shair-Rosenfield & Wood, 2017). Based on this, there is reason to believe that women’s organizations also have an interest in – and a capacity to redirect the revolutionary goals into new institutionalized democratic political channels and ensure sufficient, democratic transitions after the initial opening phase, possibly driven by the knowledge that women bear the burdens when a society does not follow democratic principles.

Thirdly, expanding on Murdie & Peksen’s (2015) argument that the presence of women’s organizations *within* a state matter for women’s participation in *domestic* protests (p. 183), I argue that the *transnational* cooperation between women’s organization might be especially important in the context of democratization. In addition to their mobilization capacity during domestic affairs, like WNC in South-Africa, The Four Mothers in Israel, or the *Madres* in Chile, it looks like women’s organizations are also highly capable of forming coalitions across state borders. The *Collectif 95 Maghreb-Egalité* in the 1990’s and the coalition of 16 like-minded organizations from Syria, Libya, and Yemen during the Arab spring, both indicate that women’s organizations support each other’s aspirations for empowerment and democratic development. This further suggest that women’s organizations can mobilize diverse swathes of women also across state borders, creating a sort of domino effect of “opportunity structure” for female activism and participation. This opportunity structure and transnational cooperation can make women's organizations central in creating movement support across state borders and further strengthen each other’s mobilization capacity. Both in phase one, by mobilizing participants, but also in phase two by supporting each other's efforts in holding new governments accountable for the full implementation of democratic principles. Therefore, it is plausible that this transnational corporation explains the unprecedented high number of women’s participation that shocked several dictatorships and contributed to the

quick downfall of several regimes during the Arab Spring. Consequently, there is reason to believe that women's organizations will continue to be important actors in future democratizations across regions.

Interestingly, the margins plot also points out that democratization still happens after *unsuccessful* campaigns if women's organizations participate. Although speculative, this could suggest that women's organizations can sustain an important degree of lobbying activities and continuing resistance. Because women's organizations are old, their long battle for gender equality and a more just society have had to force women's organizations to re-adjust and find alternative routes for creating change several times. Consequently, women's organizations might have long experience of adopting new approaches for continued mobilization and networking which ultimately could lead to democratization even if the campaign is unsuccessful.

In sum, and in lines with both Hassim (2006) and Murdie & Peksen (2015) who argue that the establishment and presence of women's organizations are key in getting women involved in politics and protests, I also argue that the women's organizations are important in facilitating democratization by being central in both phases of the democratization process. First, by mobilizing and diversify the people and sustaining the resistance, then by having a strong interest in re-directing revolutionary goals into implementation of policies that aspires to substantives new democratic institutions, and the capacity to hold the new regimes accountable during the transition.

The challenge going forward is to evaluate if the association between women's organizations and democratization are "just" another confirmation that organizations are important actors for democratization, as argued by many scholars (Celestino & Gleditsch, 2013; Chenoweth et al., 2011; Pinckney et al., 2022; Sutton et al., 2014), or whether women's organizations possess something unique that makes the presence of specific mechanisms linked to a higher probability of democratization more likely to occur. To explore this, one could compare the association between women's organizations and democratization with other organizational types that are linked to democratization, for instance trade unions and religious organizations.

## LIMITATIONS

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There are several limitations to this study, and some are linked to the main data set I have used. Chenoweth (2019) do identify several challenges to the WiRe data set. I choose to emphasize four of them.

First, the data only identify the presence or absence of women, and do not account for important overlapping identities, such as class, age, ethnicity, race, and sexuality. For instance, the WiRe data set does focus on a dichotomous treatment of gender, meaning that the WiRe data identifies the presence of people that are ascribed female or femme identities. Consequently, the presence of nonconforming or queer identities are not yet identified as part of women's participation. These elements may be crucial for understanding structural differences in the risks, costs, and effects of participation among women with different social status and sexual orientation (Chenoweth, 2019b, p. 11).

The second limitation with the data set is the aggregated unit of analysis. Because the focus is on peak participation (campaign end) it is difficult to explore whether women's participation occurred differently throughout the lifespan of the campaign. Therefore, it is not possible to evaluate potential ebb, flows or geographical variation in women's participation within the different campaigns.<sup>36</sup>

The third limitation with the data set is the possibility of underreporting and loss of information. Because the WiRe data set rely on historical cases when identifying women's participation, there are reason to believe that many different features of women's participation, such as total participation, techniques of resistance and the diversity of women, in campaigns have been underreported.

Moreover, this thesis's conceptualization of women's participation have excluded several other participatory roles women can take on during civil resistance. Exploring the association between women's participation in supportive roles i.e., supporting participants at the frontlines, or in symbolic roles i.e., women advocating for the campaign in social media, or

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<sup>36</sup> Chenoweth does argue that it is possible to disaggregate the data into longitudinal form, but by doing this missingness becomes very problematic (p. 11).

as figureheads i.e., women as movements icons, and the prospect of democratization could give additional insight on the dynamics of their contributions.

Fourth, and as an important point, the WiRe data “only” covers the post war era, meaning that important cases of women’s participation and mobilization that occurred prior to this, are not accounted for (Chenoweth, 2019b, p. 11). In addition to the already mentioned women of the Iroquois tribe in the sixteen-century and The Ladies Land League in Ireland in 1880s, there is also research identifying women’s participation and contribution in many anti- colonial uprisings, such as India’s Independence movements (Krishna & Mulenga, 2004), the Chinese Revolution (Gilmartin, 1995), The Arab Revolt, and many anti-Nazi resistance groups during WWII (Sheramy, 2001). However, the contribution of the women in these movements are left underexplored in the WiRe data set and consequently in this study.

This time- restriction also brings an additional component of endogeneity to the discussion. Since the WiRe data is limited to the postwar international context, the global trend towards growing women’s empowerment might be an important alternative explanation. As mentioned, increased women’s empowerment could both explain women’s participation within resistance campaigns and democratization. Even though this thesis does control for the level of female *political* empowerment one year prior to campaign end and finds few statistically significant associations with future democracy scores, this endogenous variable should still be treated as an alternative hypothesis. However, and as mentioned, the literature on women’s participation does suggest that women’s mobilization in civil resistance is not a phenomenon unique for the postwar era and that women have mobilized in less empowered settings. Still, the important possibility that female empowerment affects both variables cannot be ruled out.

Nevertheless, I also argue that there might be a reverse causality with this claim. Women’s participation in nonviolent civil resistance can lead to an increase in women’s empowerment in the longer term (Chenoweth, 2019b, p. 13). As previously mentioned, women have, and continue to, participate in civil resistance despite low levels of women’s empowerment and societal structures that should have prevented them from participating in the first place. Meaning that women participate, not necessarily *because* of high levels of female empowerment, but despite of it. Furthermore, participating in less empowered settings, might

be the exact reason for choosing to participate, because they have much to gain by challenging the status quo. For instance, as the literature indicates, women who participate in a successful campaign, become more effective public actors and active participants in newly established democracies (Boldt & White, 2011, p. 27). When they gain access to power, they do tend to focus on social policies and increased gender equality (Castillejo, 2016, p. 2; Wyndow et al., 2013, p. 34). This link is best illustrated through the example of the Tunisian women's effort in getting gender equality before the law and equal political participation as part of the new Tunisian constitution, understanding that "without specific, constitutionalized guarantees of their fundamental freedoms and participation, their voices would not be heard in future debates" (Tamaru, et al., 2018, p. 22). Thus, there may be reason to believe that women's participation in civil resistance may be one contributing element for the rising female empowerment in the post-war era.

Another alternative explanation that is important in this context is the question of whether the nature of nonviolent civil resistance affects both the dependent and independent variables. Nonviolent civil resistance is a more "inclusive strategy" that arguable boost higher levels of women's participation.<sup>37</sup> Additionally, and as mentioned, nonviolent civil resistance does correlate with democratization (Celestino & Gleditsch, 2013; Chenoweth et al., 2011; Pinckney, 2020). I.e., the nature and strategy of nonviolent civil resistance could explain women's participation and democratization. This argument, on the other hand, brings back the discussion of female empowerment. It is plausible to assume that, in principle, it must be *possible* for women to participate in nonviolent resistance. This could be explained by increased female empowerment, making it possible for women to participate in the first place. Furthermore, based on literature and Chenoweth (2019) findings, it looks like women's participating in nonviolent resistance increases the probability of maintaining a nonviolent discipline, making women's participation a central element in nonviolent civil resistance's inclusive strategy.

Even though growing female empowerment and the nature of nonviolent civil resistance is important and possible confounding variables, these will be treated as a possible alternative hypothesis, and not a rejection of the statical associations discovered in this study. Overall,

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<sup>37</sup> This argument is also emphasized in Marks and Chenoweth (2020, p. 2 & 6).

when women participate, and especially as part of formal organizations, they influence the prospect of democratization.

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## VALIDITY

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It is important to discuss whether I have fulfilled the purpose of this study, which has been to explore the association between women's participation in nonviolent maximalist civil resistance campaigns and democratization. There are especially three things I will address regarding the paper's validity.

First, in this study I have tried to capture the complexity of democratization. Democratization is difficult to define, partly because there is no consensus on how to mark the beginning and end of democratization. Consistent with some previous research I understood democratization as consisting of several stages. *The opening*, which shows cracks and weaknesses in the ruling regime, and the *transition*, which marks the period between the breakdown of the old regime and the establishment of the new regime, is what has been focused on when describing the democratization process. Consequently, I made five- and ten- year lead variables to see the short- term and long-term effect of women's participation on democratization. Others might define this process differently and highlight more structural features within the process, such as the period between the transition and the first (free) election. In line with this, a three- year lead could have been a better measure of short-term democratization.

The challenge with any approach trying to measure democratization, is that there is difficulty to assess when the democratization process stops. In line with Dahl (1956) concept of polyarchy, democracy is an ideal and all countries can be viewed as continually being in a democratization process. Additionally, I have not given much attention to the consolidation aspect of the democratization process. Even though it might look like women's participation matters (differently) for transitional democratization, transition does not always lead to a consolidated democracy. Consequently, I have not been able to assert whether women's participation affect democratic consolidation.

Secondly, and as an important point, in the theory chapter, I present several mechanisms that are argued to increase the probability of democratization in the context of nonviolent civil resistance. However, I only test the observable aspects of the theory, i.e., if women participate

in nonviolent civil resistance or not. This thesis has no statistical basis to claim that the mechanisms highlighted by the theory are at work, such as increased campaign size, diverse participation, nonviolent discipline, and tactical innovation, is more or less likely to happen when women participate in civil resistance. Moreover, I have no data showing the participation of women in the *transition phase*. Hence, I do not statistically test the association between women's participation in the second phase of democratization, on future democracy score.<sup>38</sup> In sum, the evidence is consistent with the theory, and I provide examples of the mechanisms, but future work should explore these more explicitly.

Additionally, there will always be a question of omitted variables and this study have not controlled for all relevant variables. In hindsight I do see that there are several other confounding variables that could have been included, such as the degree of violence from the opponent, the regime's access to natural resources income, and campaign size. However, I would argue that this is to an extent controlled for by adding the interaction term "success" since success should entail a large, nonviolent campaign.

Finally, I mentioned, in a footnote (p. 48), that V-Dem's measure of egalitarian democracy also takes the level of electoral democracy (polyarchy democracy) into account. This means that in the measurement of the level of egalitarian democracy, institutional democracy is also being accounted for. This might raise the question as to whether the thesis has explored the association of women's participation on a *broader set* of democracy indicators, as previously argued as one contribution. However, below I argue that it does.

In V-Dem's conceptualization scheme, electoral democracy (polyarchy) is considered when creating the egalitarian democracy index. This means that egalitarian democracy measures the level of institutional democracy *in addition to* the prerequisites of egalitarian democracy, as equal access to political and civil rights across social groups. However, the same is not the case for the polyarchy democracy index. Polyarchy democracy, as conceptualized by V-dem, mostly measures the institutional aspects of democracy, as previously discussed, and not the level of other democratic indicators, as egalitarian indicators. This means that the association between women's participation on future polyarchy democracy scores "only" accounts for

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<sup>38</sup> However, to the best of my knowledge, there is no data on this.



democracy on the institutional level, and not the other indicators for egalitarian democracy, such as equal rights across social groups. Interestingly, my findings show a variation across the democracy indicators. I will address two of these variations. First, every model does suggest an overall stronger increase on the polyarchy democracy score, while egalitarian democracy score increases less. This does support two claims. One, that institutional democracy might be more prioritized than egalitarian democracy and/or it might take longer time to establish an egalitarian democratic society after civil resistance. Two, and consequently, the establishment of polyarchy democracy is a prerequisite for egalitarian democratic development.

Secondly, based on the interaction models for women's frontline participation and women's participation in campaign leadership, the predicted egalitarian democracy score seems to increase less after successful campaigns *without* women's participation, compared to the predicted polyarchy democracy score. Since an increase in polyarchy democracy score "only" indicates institutional democratization, the lack of increase on the egalitarian index must then be explained by something *unique* for the egalitarian democracy index. I.e., equal access to political and civil rights across social groups. However, the participation of women's formal organizations seem to matter for the increase in both indicators.

In sum, every model in this study shows a variation across the two democracy indicators. The polyarchy democracy index seems to have an overall stronger increase than egalitarian democracy. Furthermore, the establishment of egalitarian democracy seems to be less likely when women don't participate in successful campaigns. As previously mentioned, it looks like democratic institutions are established in the wake of successful campaigns *regardless* of women's participation. The same does not seem to be true for egalitarian democracy, i.e., social rights across social groups. Therefore, I do measure the association between women's participation and democratization across broader sets of democracy indicators.

## CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION

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In this paper, I have examined the association between women's participation and democratization. I began by outlining how women across time and region have been active participants in civil resistance, but that their contribution has for a long time been overlooked in the academic literature. Moreover, I gave a short overview of "the state of the world" where liberal democracy as the dominant governing system is under threat, where 70% of the world's population lives under some form of autocratic regime, and where the European peace faces its greatest threat since 1945. I argued that it is pivot for democratic survival that we continue identifying important components and mechanisms that have a positive and strengthening effect in stabilizing democracies and promoting successful democratization. I further believed that women's participation in pro-democratic resistance campaigns could be one of these important components, one that has been largely overlooked thus far. Based on the agency approach, which argue that *who* revolts matters for democratization, I asked the following question; *how does women's participation in nonviolent resistance campaigns influence the prospects of democratization?* In this section I conclude based on my findings.

This study finds no statistically significant associations between women's frontline participation and women's participation in campaign leadership and democratization. However, the margins plots suggest that women's frontline participation and participation in campaign leadership can impact democratization, but only in the context of success. However, the lack of statistically significant findings should not disapprove their contribution. The literature on women's participation in these two roles does indicate that women's participation in nonviolent civil resistance can impact the dynamic of the movement by creating special opportunities for participation, diversification, and tactical innovations. Even though this study fails to detect a significant association, the examples brought forward about women's contribution as frontline participants and as part of campaign leadership should merit some value and increase curiosity about the topic in further research. For instance, future research could explore if there are certain characteristics with the women at the frontlines compared to women in other participatory roles, such as supportive roles, to evaluate if there are some characteristics that are more prone to participate in frontline roles. Additionally, further research should explore why women tends to be excluded from top-leadership positions in campaigns, and if there are different leadership styles between men and women within a

campaign. Furthermore, research should explore why women leaders seem to be sidelined during negotiation and how to prevent this from happening. The exploration of this might call for greater knowledge-sharing between disciplines, such as psychology and sociology.

Furthermore, this study finds that the participation of women's organizations is unconditional from success, meaning that the participation of women's organizations independently and positively influences the prospects of democratization. Therefore, based on this study findings, I argue that I find support for H3- *the participation of women's organizations in nonviolent maximalist resistance campaigns increase the probability of democratization*. This statement, however, should not be construed as a generalizing statement. In this study I have only identified that women's participation matters in *nonviolent maximalist* campaigns with over *1000 participants* that has the objective of *regime change*. I.e., I cannot claim that women's participation in other types of protests with other objectives, for instance environmental protest, have more, less or the same impact. However, the contribution of women's organization in other types of protests should be further evaluated. Moreover, the correlation between women's organizations and future democracy score uncovered in this study, does suggest an association that should merit further research. There is a need for a more thorough evaluation of how and why women's organizations seem to have the ability to increase the prospect of democratization. This study has tried to uncover some of these mechanisms, but future research could explore more specifically if women's organizations have a special organizational structure or capacity that makes them more resilient actors in holding new elites accountable for democratic principles, such as the case with ATFD in Tunisia. Moreover, the contribution of women's organizations should be compared to other types of organizations in order to evaluate if women's organizations inhibit something unique, besides facilitating and coordinating acts of resistance. Additionally, researchers should also expand the knowledge about how women's transnational cooperation might influence each step of the democratization process. Furthermore, the margins plot also indicates that women's organizations matters *especially* if the campaign fails, which is very interesting. This should raise some questions and merit further research regarding women's organizations capability of maintaining high levels of mobilization capacity and adopting new approaches for continued mobilization even if the campaign is unsuccessful.

In sum, women's contribution in the democratization process have been an underexplored topic. However, the WiRe data set offers a new and important opportunity to shine a light on women's participation in civil resistance, which could further make us capable of evaluating what role women might play in the complexity of democratization. There is no longer a lack of quantitative data on the topic, however, there is a need for more research putting the data in context. Going forward future research should, to a greater extent, focus on exploring the specific mechanisms that are argued to follow women's participation. For instance, future research could apply a mediation design to statically test if the proposed mechanisms, such as diversity and security defection, occurs when women participate. Furthermore, questions such as how do women obtain a nonviolent strategy and are movements featuring women's participation more likely to uphold nonviolent discipline even in the face of repression? should be given more space in the literature on civil resistance.

Overall, the findings of this study suggest that when women participate in nonviolent civil resistance campaigns, they can influence the prospect of democratization. Moreover, the study finds that when women *rally together*, through organized channels, they increase the probability of democratization. Therefore, the contribution of women's organizations, and the mechanisms that makes them important actors in democratization, should be given increased attention.

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## APPENDIX

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This is an overview of the campaigns included in the data set. These are nonviolent campaigns that has had the objective of regime change. *B-year* means the year the campaign begun. *E-year* mean the year in which the campaign ended.

CAMPAIGN	LOCATION	B-YEAR	E-YEAR
Public Against Violence	Slovakia	1989	1992
Defiance Campaign	South Africa	1952	1961
Active Voices	Madagascar	1991	1993
Albanian anti-communist	Albania	1990	1991
anti-Arap Moi	Kenya	1990	1991
anti-Banda campaign	Malawi	1992	1994
anti-Burnham/Hoyte campaign	Guyana	1990	1992
anti-Calderon campaign	Mexico	2006	2006
anti-Chiluba campaign	Zambia	2001	2001
anti-Diouf campaign	Senegal	2000	2000
anti-Duvalier campaign	Haiti	1985	1986
anti-Fujimori campaign	Peru	2000	2000
Anti-Gayoom Campaign	Maldives	2003	2008
anti-Jaafar campaign	Sudan	1985	1985
anti-Jimenez campaign	Venezuela	1958	1958
anti-Karamanlis campaign	Greece	1963	1963
anti-Khan campaign	Pakistan	1968	1969
anti-Milosevic	Serbia	1996	2000
anti-Noriega campaign	Panama	1987	1989
anti-PRI campaign	Mexico	1987	2000
anti-Pinochet campaign	Chile	1983	1989
anti-Suharto campaign	Indonesia	1997	1998
anti-Thaksin campaign	Thailand	2005	2006
Argentina anti-coup	Argentina	1987	1987
pro-democracy movement	Argentina	1977	1983
anti-Ershad campaign	Bangladesh	1987	1990
Belarus anti-communist	Belarus	1988	1991
Denim revolution	Belarus	2006	2006
Benin anti-communist	Benin	1989	1990
Bolivian anti-juntas	Bolivia	1977	1982
Bulgarian anti-communist	Bulgaria	1989	1990
pro-dem movement	Burma	1988	1990
Carnation Revolution	Portugal	1973	1974
Cedar Revolution	Lebanon	2005	2005
Convention People's Party movement	Ghana	1949	1957
Croatian nationalists	Yugoslavia	1970	1971
Czech uprising	Czechoslovakia	1968	1968
Democracy Movement	China	1976	1979
diretas ja	Brazil	1984	1985
Druze resistance	Israel	1981	1982
East German uprising	East Germany	1953	1953
pro-dem movement	East Germany	1989	1989
Greek anti-military	Greece	1973	1974
Hundred Flowers Movement	China	1956	1957

Hungarian uprising	Hungary	1956	1956
pro-dem movement	Hungary	1989	1989
Iranian Revolution	Iran	1977	1979
Kefaya	Egypt	2000	2005
Kosovo Albanian nationalist movement	Yugoslavia	1981	1981
Kyrgyzstan Democratic Movement	Kyrgyzstan	1990	1991
pro-dem movement	Latvia	1989	1991
pro-democracy movement	Madagascar	2002	2002
Mali anti-military	Mali	1990	1991
Mongolian anti-communist	Mongolia	1989	1990
Nepalese anti-government	Nepal	2002	2006
Niger anti-military	Niger	1990	1992
Nigeria anti-military	Nigeria	1993	1999
Independence Movement	Nigeria	1945	1950
Nyasaland African Congress	Malawi	1958	1959
Ogoni movement	Nigeria	1990	1995
Orange Revolution	Ukraine	2000	2004
pro-dem movement	Pakistan	1983	1983
First Intifada	Palestine	1987	1990
People Power	Philippines	1983	1986
Poland Anti-Communist I	Poland	1968	1968
Poland Anti-Communist II	Poland	1970	1970
Warsaw Worker's Uprising	Poland	1976	1976
Poznan protests	Poland	1956	1956
Rose Revolution	Georgia	2003	2003
pro-dem movement	Russia	1990	1991
pro-democracy movement/Sajudis	Lithuania	1988	1991
Second People Power Movement	Philippines	2001	2001
Singing Revolution	Estonia	1987	1991
Slovenia anti-communist	Slovenia	1989	1990
Slovenian independence	Slovenia	1990	1991
Solidarity	Poland	1980	1989
South African Second Defiance Campaign	South Africa	1984	1994
South Korean anti-junta	South Korea	1979	1980
South Korean anti-military	South Korea	1986	1987
Student Revolution	South Korea	1960	1960
Taiwan pro-democracy	Taiwan	1979	1985
pro-democracy movement	Tanzania	1992	1995
pro-dem movement	Thailand	1992	1992
student protests	Thailand	1973	1973
The Stir	Nepal	1990	1990
Tiananmen Square	China	1989	1989
Timorese resistance	East Timor	1989	1999
Tulip Revolution	Kyrgyzstan	2005	2005
Uruguay anti-military campaign	Uruguay	1984	1985
Velvet Revolution	Czechoslovakia	1989	1989
Western Sahara Independence Movement	Morocco	1999	2005
student protests	Yugoslavia	1968	1968
Zambia anti-single party rule	Zambia	1990	1991
Zambian independence movement	Zambia	1961	1963
anti-Ceausescu movement	Romania	1987	1989
Pro-Independence Campaign	Aruba	1977	1977

Anti-King Hamad Campaign	Bahrain	2011	2014
Anti-Sanchez de Lozada Campaign	Bolivia	2003	2003
NCCOP pro-democracy movement	Cameroon	1991	1991
Djibouti Arab Spring	Djibouti	2011	2011
Rebellion of the Forajidos	Ecuador	2005	2005
Anti-Morsi Protests	Egypt	2013	2013
Indo-Fijian Anti-Coup Campaign	Fiji	1987	1987
Anti-Chaudhry Campaign	Fiji	2000	2000
Frente Nacionalæde Resistencia Popular (FNRP)	Honduras	2009	2009
Student Protests (Anti-Habibie)	Indonesia	1999	1999
Second Revolution	Kyrgyzstan	2010	2010
Anti-Tsiranana	Madagascar	1972	1972
anti-Ravalomanana movement	Madagascar	2009	2009
Maoist Anti-Govt Protests	Nepal	2010	2010
Anti-Somoza Strike	Nicaragua	1978	1978
Anti-Bhutto	Pakistan	1977	1977
Anti-Zia al-Haq	Pakistan	1986	1986
People Power III	Philippines	2001	2001
Anti-Military Govt	South Vietnam	1966	1966
anti-monarchy protests	Swaziland	2011	2011
Anti-Military Government Campaign	Thailand	2007	2007
People's Alliance for Democracy Campaign	Thailand	2008	2008
Anti-Eyadema	Togo	1991	1991
Togo anti-Gnassingbe/Coup Crisis	Togo	2005	2005
students union protests	Ukraine	1990	1990
Awami League Protests	Bangladesh	2006	2007
Anti-Siles Zuazo	Bolivia	1985	1985
Dance with me Campaign	Bulgaria	2013	2014
Ivorian pro-democracy movement	Ivory Coast	1989	1990
pro-Ouattara campaign	Ivory Coast	2010	2011
Pro-Morsi Protests	Egypt	2013	2014
Anti-National Governing Council (CNG)	Haiti	1987	1987
Anti-Aristide Campaign 2004	Haiti	2003	2004
Cutlery Revolution	Iceland	2008	2009
Anti-Mutharika	Malawi	2011	2012
Nasheed Supporters	Maldives	2012	2013
Anti-Musharraf Campaign (Lawyer's Movement)	Pakistan	2007	2008
MFDC secessionist campaign (Casamance)	Senegal	1982	1983
Anti-Bouterse	Suriname	1983	1984
Civil Movement for Democracy	Thailand	2013	2014
Let's Save Togo (Anti-Gnassingbe)	Togo	2012	2013
Pro-Democracy Protests	Tonga	2005	2006
Anti-Ben Ali Campaign (Jasmin Revolution)	Tunisia	2010	2011
Anti-Islamist Government Protests	Tunisia	2013	2014
anti-Erdogan	Turkey	2013	2014
Euromaidan	Ukraine	2013	2014
Anti Ali Adduallah Saleh Campaign	Yemen	2011	2012
Anti-Abdelaziz Bouteflika Campaign	Algeria	2011	2011
Armenian Opposition Protest / March 1st Movement	Armenia	2007	2009
Protest for Constitutional Reform	Jordan	2011	2013
Lebanon Political Crisis	Lebanon	2006	2008
Anti-al-Bashar Government	Sudan	2011	2013

Red Shirt Campaign	Thailand	2008	2010
CCCN and union pro-democracy movement	CAR	1990	1993
pro-democracy movement	Guinea	2007	2010
Anti-Mubarak movement	Egypt	2007	2011
Anti-Saakashvilli campaign	Georgia	2007	2013
Green Revolution and Day of Rage	Iran	2009	2013
Snow Revolution	Russia	2010	2014
Anti-Roh Tae Woo	South Korea	1988	1992
Pro-Aristide Campaign	Haiti	2005	2010
Anti-Aziz Protests	Mauritania	2011	2014
Oust The Government Campaign	Bangladesh	2004	2004
Croatian pro-democracy	Croatia	1999	2000
El Salvador anti-junta	El Salvador	1977	1980
anti-Rawlings campaign	Ghana	2000	2000
Anti-Indira Campaign (Phase 3)	India	1977	1977
Saffron Revolution	Myanmar	2007	2007
Anti-Huong	South Vietnam	1964	1965
Syrian Uprising	Syria	2011	2011
Tibetan independence movement	Tibet	1987	1989
West Papua self-determination struggle	West Papua	1979	2014
Renewed Western Sahara Independence Protests	Western Sahara	2010	2014





