

Isolde Edvardsen

"Back to basics"

Norwegian Security Decisions, strengthening the balance in the High North.

Master's thesis in European Studies
Supervisor: Dr. Viktoriya Fedorchak
May 2022

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Abstract

Power rivalry has led to increased instability and unpredictability. International norms, rules and institutions are severely strangled and the foundation of constructive unity and cooperation within Europe and throughout the Euro-Atlantic area are under pressure. Modern societies and economies have become far more vulnerable to various threats, and the ability to understand the surroundings and to identify threats across society are more important than ever.

Not since the end of the Cold War have Norway and its allies faced such a scale of simultaneous security challenges - against the state, society and the individual. In the next few years, Norway must maneuver in a security policy landscape characterized by more direct competition and rivalry that can quickly develop into confrontation. The aim of this study is to address what Norwegian defense areas are Norway prioritizing and why they are important, as well as what challenges the Norwegian defense strategy is facing. As the Norwegian values are closely linked to the Armed Forces it was also interesting to analyze Norwegians' opinions on several aspects of security and defense policy. I explore all these issues using mixed research methods. The mixed research method consists of a case study of Norway, as well as document analysis and a questionnaire. The research methods presented are a means of triangulation, which is a combination of methodologies that allowed me to conduct an analysis which provides a stronger understanding of the issues presented using both qualitative and quantitative approaches.

This study concludes that a continued strengthening of their Alliance in NATO, the High North, and a strengthening of the territorial defense are the main priorities. The challenges are many, the Norwegian defense policy drastically changed from territorial defense to a collective defense in the early 2000's, and there is a great need to build up the Norwegian defense, aligned with the strategies of NATO but priority should also be given to safeguarding Norwegian values and strengthening of the "Total Defense". This can be done through a closer cooperation with the Nordic Countries, a potential membership will prove helpful to Norway in reaching its main priority in Norwegian defense, to secure the High North and become more robust and expand its territorial and total defense – going back to its roots from post-cold war.

Sammendrag

Maktrivalisering har ført til økt ustabilitet og uforutsigbarhet. Internasjonale normer, regler og institusjoner er alvorlig kvalt og grunnlaget for konstruktiv enhet og samarbeid i Europa og i hele det euro-atlantiske området er under press. Moderne samfunn og økonomier har blitt langt mer sårbare for ulike trusler, og evnen til å forstå omgivelsene og identifisere trusler på tvers av samfunnet er viktigere enn noen gang.

Ikke siden slutten av den kalde krigen har Norge og dets allierte stått overfor et slikt omfang av sikkerhetsutfordringer – mot staten, samfunnet og individet. Norge må de neste årene manøvrere i et sikkerhetspolitisk landskap preget av mer direkte konkurranse og rivalisering som raskt kan utvikle seg til konfrontasjon. Målet med denne studien er å ta for seg hvilke norske forsvarsområder Norge prioriterer og hvorfor de er viktige, samt hvilke utfordringer den norske forsvarsstrategien står overfor. Siden de norske verdiene er nært knyttet til Forsvaret, var det også interessant å analysere nordmenns meninger om flere sider ved sikkerhets- og forsvarspolitikken. Jeg utforsker alle disse problemstillingene ved å bruke blandede forskningsmetoder. Den blandede forskningsmetoden består av en casestudie av Norge, samt dokumentanalyse og et spørreskjema. Forskningsmetodene som presenteres i denne studien er et middel for triangulering, det er en kombinasjon av metodikk gjør at jeg kan gjennomføre en analyse som gir en sterkere forståelse av problemstillingene som presenteres ved bruk av både kvalitative og kvantitative tilnærminger.

Denne studien konkluderer med at en fortsatt styrking av Norges allianse i NATO, nordområdene, og en styrking av det territorielle forsvaret er hovedprioriteringene til det norske forsvaret. Utfordringene er mange, norsk forsvarspolitikken endret seg drastisk fra territorielt forsvar til et kollektivt forsvar tidlig på 2000-tallet, og det er et stort behov for å bygge opp det norske forsvaret i tråd med NATOs strategier, men det bør også prioriteres å ivareta Norske verdier og styrking av Totalforsvaret. Norge må sikre nordområdene og bli mer robust, samtidig som de må utvide sitt territorielle forsvar og Totalforsvaret. Dette kan gjøres gjennom et tettere samarbeid med de nordiske landene, et potensielt Finsk og Svensk medlemskap, kan vise seg å være løsningen.

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When I started on this thesis in May of 2021, the world looked a little different. I, as everyone else, had no idea that in under a year the liberal order of Europe would be challenged to this extent. “Never again”, we said and yet we are facing challenges we thought was left behind after the Cold War. My last three years as a student have also been challenging, COVID-19 has characterized my time at NTNU with mostly online learning and virtual coffee dates. However, I want to give a thanks to my fellow students who have still managed to get me and themselves through this period of time with laughter, discussions and positive attitudes. I would also like to thank my colleague, Lene Lad Johansen for being so supportive, flexible and patient in allowing me to manage my time on this thesis next to my work at SINTEF.

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I also want to mention the incredible and overwhelming resistance of the Ukrainian people. I am not writing this thesis light-heartedly; you are fighting for your democracy and the liberal order, and it saddens me that it had to come to this in order for the world to open its eyes and realize that the threats we have seen coming for several years have become a reality. Slava Ukraini! You will fight through.

Isolde Edvardsen, Trondheim, May 2022

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Abbreviations

ECSDP	European Common Security and Defense Policy
EU	European Union
US	The United States
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
MOD	Ministry of Defense
NAF	Norwegian Armed Forces
EEA	The European Economic Area
EDF	European Defense Fund
NUPI	The Norwegian Institute of International Affairs
ENISA	European Union Agency for Cybersecurity
PESCO	Permanent Structured Cooperation
FFI	Norwegian Defense Research Establishment

Introduction

Albert Einstein once said, «as long as there are sovereign nations possessing great power, war is inevitable». In order to keep the peace in Europe after the Cold War, smaller states balanced one another and helped diminish great power tension in the region through alliance-building or declaring neutrality. With the drastic change in the geopolitical security environment which has emerged in these past months, the liberal world order is again being challenged.

In a matter of weeks, the EU has rallied together to agree upon economic sanctions, legislative changes, humanitarian aid and care-packages worth millions of euros. Member states and countries in alliances are questioning and challenging their position in this new geopolitical landscape, finding solutions to how they can strengthen their military defenses and security in line with each other – Norway included. As the European Union is more united than ever, showing not only their economic strength but also their military capabilities, what strategic choices are to be made for Norwegian security and defense, both in terms of international collaboration with their long-standing Alliance in NATO but also for a possible strengthening of Nordic collaboration, to safeguard the High North.

Since the Second World War, the Armed Forces of Norway, and the strategic ambitions of Norwegian security and defense policy, have been based on the realization that the security challenges against Norway cannot be faced alone. The comprehensive safeguarding of Norwegian security must, now as before, rest on both good utilization of society's overall ability to support the defense capability and on collective and bilateral support and guarantee within the framework of NATO (Prop. 14 S (2020-2021)). Power rivalry has led to increased instability and unpredictability. International norms, rules and institutions are severely strangled and the foundation of constructive unity and cooperation within Europe and throughout the Euro-Atlantic area are under pressure. Modern societies and economies have become far more vulnerable to various threats, and the ability to understand the surroundings and to identify threats across society are more important than ever.

Not since the end of the Cold War have Norway and its allies faced such a scale of simultaneous security challenges - against the state, society and the individual. In the next few years, Norway must maneuver in a security policy landscape characterized by more direct competition and rivalry that can quickly develop into confrontation. The aim of this dissertation is to analyze the long-term plans for Norwegian defense and security, strengthening of collaboration, and how the power of balance is being challenged. The Norwegian Armed Forces, and Norwegian defense policy, weigh heavily on national identity and societal norms and therefore it is relevant to explore the attitudes of the Norwegian public perception on security and defense, and to analyze to which extent the strategic choices by the Government are in line with the general public opinion. The situation in Ukraine has shown that Russia wants to challenge the security policy system that was developed in Europe in the years after the end of the Cold War. This makes an analysis of the basis of the NATO alliance highly relevant in order to clarify the relationship between the various types of tasks that NATO and the Norwegian Armed Forces will undertake in the future.

This dissertation seeks to answer the following research question: **What Norwegian defense areas are Norway prioritizing and why are they important? And what challenges is the Norwegian defense strategy facing?** In order to do this, I have used historical sources, official military documents, government propositions, expert opinions and news articles. I have also conducted an online survey to map Norwegian personal? opinions on Norwegian Foreign Policy; as Norwegian Defense Policy is closely linked to the Norwegian values of the people, it is relevant to see if these opinions correlate with the Government's strategic plans for Norwegian security and defense in the new geopolitical landscape.

Structure of dissertation

The first part of this dissertation explores current and previous literature on the matter; themes on security and defense are always a difficult subject to study as it is a continuously changing environment, affected by the fluidity of modern security due to multiple factors and events. This dissertation is divided thematically into three parts: Norwegian security as the general theme with sub-categories discussing Norway's relation to international alliances, such as its membership in NATO, its close ties to the EU, and Nordic collaboration. Norwegian defense policy research is often based on the geopolitical position of Norway, their strategies after the Cold War, and the Collective Defense in NATO. Most of the literature on Norway and the EU

is based on the EEA agreement and the economic perspective, with very few scholars asking the question on how Norwegian security will balance along the three defense lines, territorial security, NATO and EU. My contribution to this research area is to look at what strategic choices are best for Norwegian Defense, how they balance its security policy and face these challenges so that it is in line with its internal defense structure, NATO, the ambitions of the EU as a security and defense actor, and Nordic collaboration. I explore all these issues using mixed research methods. The mixed research method consists of a case study of Norway, as well as document analysis and a questionnaire. The research methods presented are a means of triangulation, which is a combination of methodologies that allowed me to conduct an analysis which provides a stronger understanding of the issues presented using both qualitative and quantitative approaches. Chapter 4 presents the theoretical framework. In order to discuss the strategies and prioritized areas of Norwegian defense and security policy, understanding the balance of power is essential. The balance of power and Norway's alliance with NATO have shaped the Nordic security landscape and created the political and military concepts such as deterrence and "Total Defense" which have been important in relation to Russia and the Norwegian security and defense policy. Following this chapter, the findings from the survey are presented, which gives an overall view on Norwegians' opinions on security and defense, in relation to Norway.

Part II presents the contextual chapters and the analysis of the Norwegian armed forces and the Government's long-term defense plans. First, the overall perception of international collaboration from the questionnaire is presented. Furthermore, the contextual chapters that follows are divided into four main themes: Norwegian security and defense, Norway and NATO, Nordic security, and European Security and Defense. Lastly, the main analysis is presented in the discussion chapter – summarizing and analyzing the quantitative data from the questionnaire, as well as the qualitative data from the documents used.

1 Review of existing literature

Themes on security and defense policy are one of the most complex areas to discuss and have been extensively studied for decades with a very large body of literature. Kenneth Waltz argued that to understand international politics, we must understand the nature of the international system -- the political environment in which states interact. Many scholars look to structural realism and neorealism to explain why states act the way they do, and how the nature of the international structure is defined by its ordering principle, anarchy and by the distribution of capabilities which is measured by the number of great powers within the international system (Lobell 2010). A contradictory theory is constructivism, which is based on the idea that people actively construct or make their own knowledge. It is an approach to social analysis that deals with the role of human consciousness in social life. It asserts that human interaction is shaped primarily by ideational factors which are historically and socially constructed. It focuses on “Social facts” according to Searle (1995) – money, sovereignty, and rights, have no material reality but exist only because people collectively believe they exist and act accordingly (Lobell 2010).

Neorealism is one of the major theoretical paradigms in International Relations: states are the main actors and are essentially concerned with their security and survival. Structural realism or neorealism was introduced by Kenneth Waltz in his book *Theory of International Politics*, in 1979 and has since been applied to political frameworks for decades. Waltz argued that structural realism was based on the anarchic system and the distribution of capabilities are powerful constraints and inducements which produce “sameness” in the behavior of states (Collard-Wexler 2006, p. 423). It holds that the nature of the international structure. This approach has been met by a lot of criticism in regard to the European Union and European security in general, including Norway. Neorealists such as Mearsheimer predicted that once the Cold War was over and the American security umbrella removed, European states would come to view each other with fear and suspicion. Relative gains would once again become an acute concern for states. If and when economic growth slows down, the prediction continues, states will break ranks with the stability and growth pact and other commitments and revert to protectionist and mercantilist policies. After Russia’s attack on Ukraine in February 2022, the hope from the Russian side was that the attack would split Europe and the western Countries

but instead it has become a more united Europe and the neorealist theory is to some extent lacking in explaining the EU in this context (Collard-Wexler 2006, p. 423).

2.1 Norwegian defense and NATO

National identity weighs heavily and has had a preservative effect on the Armed Forces' structure and tasks for some time, which according to some scholars, makes it difficult to adapt the Norwegian Armed Forces to a new era (Friis, 2021, p. 220). On the other hand, if we look at Norwegian Defense in relation to NATO and the EU, the policies intertwine. Many scholars look at Norwegian Defense as part of a NATO defense, in theory this is not wrong because a strong national defense is a strengthening of NATO overall and is enshrined in Art 3 of the Washington Treaty. The long-term plan for the Armed Forces state that:

“The defense of Norway, and the structure of Norwegian security and defense policy, has since World War II been based on the recognition that the security challenges against Norway exceed what Norway will be able to muster of capacity alone. The comprehensive safeguarding of Norwegian security must, now as before, be based on both good utilization of society's overall ability to support the defense capability and on collective and bilateral support and guarantee within the framework of NATO” (Meld, St. 35 (2020-2021), pg. 7).

Showing that the Norwegian Defense basis, relies on collaboration and allies. For Norwegian defense strategy and theory, scholars have long emphasized the natural connection between the state, the nation, and the Norwegian territory (Friis, 2021, p. 220). The Norwegian defense was largely developed during the Cold War, in line with the Alliance's Defense and NATO's doctrines and policies and much of the research on Norwegian Defense relies on this (Græger, 2019, p. 85). It has since then been based on research from post-cold war until the 2000's, when the Armed Forces took a drastic turn in their defense strategies towards collective defense. A recurring challenge has been how Norway should balance the alliance obligations against other important foreign policy and domestic policy considerations. During the Cold War, this was particularly evident in the view of NATO's nuclear policy and Norway's base declaration from 1949 (and clarifications in this from 1952). The declaration set limits on allied activities on Norwegian territory in peacetime through self-imposed restrictions - primarily nuclear and the base policy (no storage of nuclear weapons on Norwegian soil, the arrival of vessels with nuclear weapons on board or the landing of Allied aircraft that can deliver nuclear weapons in

Norway in peacetime), but also in relation to Allied intelligence and liaison installations in Norway. This policy was based on considerations of reassurance towards the Soviet Union and low tensions in Norway's neighboring areas and the Nordic countries, and initially received full support from NATO (NOU, 1978: 72). However, different interpretations of the policy from the 1970s onwards created pressure on the Norwegian government both from the USA and in Norway, and which led to certain concessions (Børresen, Gjeseth & Tamnes, 2004, chap. 8).

Some scholars suggest that Norway moved to a lesser extent away from the traditional Nordic view of military power that had been dominant during the Cold War. Neither military nor political leaders wanted any comprehensive changes (Græger & Leira, 2005, p. 54). In Somalia and the Balkans, Norway deliberately chose to only provide support units where fighting took place. Transport, logistics and sanitation departments were the typical Norwegian contribution. It was not until 1997 that this pattern changed, when a mechanized battalion was sent to Bosnia (Børresen, Gjeseth & Tamnes, 2004, pg.196–236). Norwegian politicians did not want to be associated too closely with military affairs, but at the same time they wanted to contribute to operations where Norway's allies were involved. The solution was to emphasize the humanitarian and «non-military» aspects of Norway's military involvement (Haaland, 2008, pg. 83–85). A humanitarian emphasis on the military missions abroad was undertaken, safer and less controversial (Friis, 2006, p. 112). This observation fits well with what Halvard Leira has called the Norwegian "peace discourse" (Leira 2005). Lange, Pharo and Østerud, as well as Skånland, also point to what they call the idea of a Norwegian peace tradition, which stood strong after the Cold War (Lange et al, 2009, pg. 12–26)

Norway's geopolitical position have also to a large extent shaped the defense policy before and after the Cold War. Geopolitical representations are often based on the fact that power decreases with distance, and that states are "locked in" in their geographical location. The main question thus becomes how the distance between states, and especially the strongest of them, affects their behavior and the relations between them (Mouritzen et al, 2009, pg. 168–169). Although it is important to emphasize that geographical location in itself does not determine the actions of states, foreign and security policy analyzes rooted in geopolitical representations have a strong position in academia, among foreign policy practitioners and in the public debate on international issues (Tuathail, 2006). Several scholars point to the fact that smaller states such as Norway, act as "neutralizer" when it comes to Great Powers, although the geopolitical

location in itself does not determine the actions of states, Norwegian Defense policy largely relies on this when assessing threats and challenges.

2.2 Norway-EU relations, integration vs autonomy

When it comes to Norway and EU relations on security and defense it becomes a question of integration vs autonomy. Norwegians often think of Norway's relationship with the EU as the EEA-agreement, but the EU has become much more than just a common market focusing on economic policies. The Union is an international player in the areas of security and defense. Norway and the EU have been cooperating in these areas for decades. As a result, Norway-EU interactions in this area have taken a variety of expressions, from formal agreements to ad hoc and non-legal setups. Unlike the other established EU-Norway frameworks of cooperation, cooperation in the field of the ECSDP does not rely on a single comprehensive system involving elaborate institutional arrangements and dynamic obligations. Rather, Norway has joined forces with the Union in an ad hoc fashion, and often on the basis of specific, economic and flexible arrangements; they agreed to sanctions together with the other European countries in 2014 after the annexation of Crimea and again in 2022 after Russia further attacked Ukraine (Hillion, 2019, p. 5). While this approach has in principle preserved Norway's formal national sovereignty in foreign, security and defense policy, it has also entailed that the country has few formal channels at its disposal for exerting influence on EU CFSP decisions to which it subsequently subscribes. This partly explains Norway's interest in putting its CFSP cooperation with the EU on a more institutionalized basis, where they can participate more actively in the shaping of CFSP decisions. Christensen et al uses this theory in order to explain how these instruments influence the actor's behavior and how Norway positions itself on this matter (Hillion, 2019, p. 6). The Norwegian Institute of International Affairs has several research projects that are ongoing, one of these is EUFLEX – which aims at understanding the drivers of mechanisms of the EU's foreign, security and defense policy. EUFLEX studies both how the EU, agreements and associated states, such as Norway, balance between the consideration of safeguarding national self-determination (autonomy) on the one hand, and loyalty to the EU project itself in the form of integration and closer cooperation on the other. This is an ongoing project (Rieker, 2021). As the EU is moving towards becoming more active in security and defense and introducing new initiatives in the area of CFSP, Norway has to find a way other than its economic interest to position itself. Hillion offers four solutions to how Norway can actively participate which relies heavily on

the existing EEA agreement and economic interests; he does, however, point out that a possible solution could be to set up a distinct EU-Norway CFSP agreement. Since Brexit, there have been ongoing discussions on a UK-EU security partnership covering foreign policy, security and defense – this could be a steppingstone in terms of exploring a possible enhanced CFSP cooperation between the EU and Norway (Hillion, 2019, p. 26).

When looking at Norwegian military capabilities and security and defense policies in relation to NATO and the EU, the literature and perspectives shared intertwine as well as differ from each other in many ways. The changing geopolitical situation and the strengthening of the EU's common security and defense policy has created tensions in Norway's security policy over the years (Græger, 2019, p. 85). Research on this area is lacking on what position Norway should take: on the one hand, Norway is an actively participating member of NATO and an important ally of the Treaty, and on the other hand, Norway has joined forces with the EU based on specific, economic and flexible arrangements (Hillion, 2019, p. 5). The discussion on how Norway should balance this is not quite clear, but the defense of Norway takes place along three main lines, according to the long-term defense plans.

1. National defense capability
2. Collective defense in NATO
3. Bilateral support and reinforcement from close allies (Prop. 14 S (2020-2021), p. 11).

Investment in defense capability must therefore support security and defense policy goals by producing results along the three main lines in parallel. The three main lines must be supported by a modern and prepared total defense that strengthens the nation's resilience and endurance, as well as reduces vulnerability to complex threats or other security-threatening activities. This holistic approach to the defense of Norway constitutes the core of the defense concept (Prop. 14 S (2020-2021), p.11).

2.3 Moving forward

The establishment of the European Common Security and Defense Policy in 2009 marked the beginning of an era for the EU as a global actor (Larivé, 2014, p. 20) and most of the research on this matter is based after the Treaty of Lisbon. The war in Ukraine is a turning point for Europe now, and this area of research is uncharted theory – making it difficult to assess where ECSDP is heading. Scholarly and historical literature on the Norwegian Defense strategy is mainly based on Norwegian territorial security, with focus on northern Norway, and as Norwegian defense relies heavily on NATO, significant literature on this matter is connected

to Norway's position in NATO. Most of the literature on Norway and the EU are based on the EEA agreement and the economic perspective, with very few scholars asking the question of how Norwegian security will balance along the three defense lines that were stated in the long-term defense plan. My contribution to this research area is to look at what the main areas of priority are, and what challenges the Norwegian Defense are facing, and how it can balance its security policy so that it is in line with its internal defense structure, NATO and the ambitions of the EU as a security and defense actor. I explore all these issues in a more recent time frame using mixed research methods.

2 Methodology

This chapter presents the methodology I am using. I have chosen to use a combination of both qualitative and quantitative methods. Also known as the Mixed-method approach. I am using a qualitative approach to analyze official documents such as long-term defense plans, official reports and expert opinions and I look at the historical background of Norwegian security and defense, which provides the reader with an understanding in this area. However, in order to analyze the issues in implementing change and innovation in the Norwegian society, I am using a questionnaire to map Norwegian opinions on foreign security and defense policy as this is closely linked to the “Total Defense” and Norway’s prioritized areas in security and defense.

The respondents are structured numerically in excel and used as a statistical analysis in order to visualize my findings in graphs. Nation-wide questionnaires are quite common in Norway and Norwegian opinions are easily accessible to the public, however, due to the changing geopolitical situation there are no recent surveys conducted, and I, therefore, took it upon myself to create one based on a survey done by the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) before COVID-19. In my analysis, I use both of these surveys to show how opinions have changed as a direct result of Russia’s war on Ukraine and I found it best to use a mixed-method research approach, as it provides me with a set of data that provides a stronger understanding of these issues using both qualitative and quantitative approaches.

2.1 Mixed method approach

A mixed method approach can enhance the reliability and validity of the research, and by using multiple methods to study the same problem, one can detect recurrent patterns or consistent relationships among variables (Abowitz & Toole, 2010, p. 108). By examining information collected through different methods, I can corroborate my findings across data sets and thus reduce the impact of potential biases that can exist in a single study. According to Patton (1990), triangulation can help guard against the accusation that a study’s findings are simply an artifact of a single method, a single source, or a single investigator’s bias (Bowen, 2009, p. 28). Mixed-method research emerged in the early 20th century; however, it was not until 1959 that Campbell and Fiske advanced the multi-trait, multimethod approach (Creswell, 1999, p. 458). Two trends are noteworthy at present. First, authors linked methods to the process of research. Brewer and

Hunter discussed the multimethod research of surveys, experiments, fieldwork and nonreactive measurement, and establishing causal explanations of social phenomena. A second trend was to draw visual models of mixed-method designs. For example, three visual models capture the procedures of conducting mixed-method studies. These models are represented in visual images, consisting of a two-phase model, in which the qualitative part follows the quantitative part (Creswell, 1999, p. 459).

In social sciences, mixed method research is called the “third paradigm” in evaluation research and it is relatively new in the social and human sciences as a distinct research approach (Creswell, 1999, p. 456). The language and rhetoric of mixed-method research have provided a set of terms; scholars have referred to it as multimethodological, integrating and combining. It provides researchers with a method where one can use at least one quantitative method and one qualitative method to collect, analyze, and report findings in a single case study (Creswell, 1999, p. 457). The quantitative research involves gathering numeric information through instruments; in this dissertation, this is done through the questionnaire. The qualitative research involves collecting texts from current or historical policy documents, interviews, news articles and military documents that are open to the public, as well as notes taken through seminars I have attended in regards to the European Defense Fund (EDF). Combining these two approaches in a case-study allows me to conduct an analysis that is explanatory, in the sense that quantitative data collection was conducted before the qualitative and it opens the possibility to study a larger subject pool. It also allows me to fill in and reflect on the quantitative data with existing literature focusing on Norway as a case study (Creswell, 1999, p. 460).

2.2 Case study

In order to describe and explain a certain social phenomenon that relates to people, groups, organizations, communities or countries, one can use a diversity of approaches or strategies. As this study concerns Norwegian security and defense policy and Norwegian opinions, it draws upon the approach of a case study. Case studies are difficult to define as a research strategy, because the typologies of research strategies are based on different sources of data. A case study, however, is compatible with many data sources, and therefore also hard to posit in a system of strategies. Generally, case studies are divided into two general types, extensive approaches and intensive approaches. In an *extensive approach*, researchers use a large set of events, people, organizations or nation-states to ground the conclusion about a phenomenon; an

intensive approach is focused on only one specific instance of a phenomenon (Swanborn, 2010, pg. 2).

A singular case study approach is based on in-depth investigation of a single country. The aim is to provide a detailed description of institutional settings with which individuals or groups' action take place in order to improve our understanding of the context. This approach does not provide explicit comparisons between countries, but under certain circumstances it is possible to draw implicit conclusions regarding the way institutions and cultural characteristics affect individual's behavior (ESS, 2022). The main advantage of this research method is that it provides in-depth examination of national context; in this way, it is thus possible to gain detailed information about the country in question and provides a careful analysis of institutional arrangements and their historical development. Despite the potential for providing a comprehensive description of the national context, this approach suffers from several drawbacks and limitations. Firstly, the strategy does not permit a direct examination of structural effects on individual behavior. Secondly, because the analysis is carried out in one country it may not be helpful to explain the ways social institutions and specific policies affect individual consequences and it proves difficult to generalize and compare the outcomes since it is based on one country (ESS, 2022).

As the aim of this study is to analyze the prioritized areas of Norwegian Defense and the Armed Forces in the context of NATO and the EU, it will prove helpful to look at Norway as a case-study because it is both a member of NATO and an active participant of the European, regional security in the High North, bordering to Russia which makes Norway important in the geopolitical perspective.

The High North is in this study described in the context of the Norwegian Government's High North Strategy. "the High North" and "the Arctic" may to some extent overlap, but whereas the latter is a distinct geographical concept which can be defined in precise geographical terms. "the High North", in this context is developed and understood specifically to serve the purpose of the High North Strategy (Skagestad, 2010, p.6). The Norwegian government presented the High North Strategy in Tromsø 1 December 2006, they define "the High North" as:

The High North is a broad concept both geographically and politically. In geographical terms, it covers the sea and land, including islands and archipelagos, stretching northwards from the southern boundary of Nordland county in Norway and eastwards from the Greenland Sea to the Barents Sea and the Pechora Sea. In political terms, it includes the administrative entities in Norway, Sweden, Finland and Russia that are part of the Barents Cooperation. Furthermore, Norway's High North policy overlaps with the Nordic cooperation, our relations with the US and Canada through the Arctic Council, and our relations with the EU through the Northern Dimension (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2006, p.13).

This definition is the basis for my analysis when I look at the High North in security and defense policy.

2.3 The questionnaire

Since the 1970's, sample surveys have developed considerably and have become a major source for the vast majority of empirical data (Gad, 2006, p. 2). The growing widespread access to the internet and social media allowed me to conduct an online questionnaire or survey, that had or has interactive capabilities and gives the respondents the opportunity to share the survey so that the outreach is much larger, and it hits the intended target groups. The selection for this questionnaire was based on my own interest in Norwegian Defense and policy, as well as questions similar to the questionnaire conducted by NUPI, in order to compare the two. My family background and interests are closely linked to NATO and the Norwegian Armed Forces as several people in my family have worked for NATO and in the Armed Forces. This both strengthens and weakens the study. It strengthens the study due to my understanding of Norwegian representation and the importance of NATO in Norway but is also raises the question of personal bias. To mediate this bias, this study is not conducted on personal questions and the answers are analyzed quantitatively and not as separate responses. The aim of this study is to look at patterns and trends at the macro level to give a more generalized conclusion. The questionnaire was composed of various types of questions but consisted mostly of closed questions. The aim of the questionnaire was to generate numbers in order to analyze the data quantitatively. It was necessary to develop closed questions that required 'yes/no' answers, multiple choice, or answers reflected through scales (Andres, 2012, p. 35)

The questionnaire is structured into four parts, the three first parts are thematically based on:

1. (a) *Norwegian foreign policy*, (b) *NATO and Norway*, (c) *Norway and the EU*. The fourth and last part is to analyze perception of threats and security and how the respondents perceive the security situation and threats in and against Norway.

It is based on nine threats, which were presented as ranking scales from least to greatest (1-10).

2. *(1) General perception of the level of security threats against Norway, (2) Cyber-attacks from other countries, (3) Global climate change, (4) Refugees and migrants, (5) Nationalism and populism in Europe and the United States, (6) Tensions in relation to Russia, (7) China's increasing power, (8) Terrorist organizations (ISIS), and (9) Nuclear threats.*

The ranking scales questions can be difficult to complete, as the respondent is forced to distinguish between least to greatest. In relation to (a) Norwegian foreign policy, the respondents were given two options when answering, this was based on where Norwegian foreign policy should expand further or if it should continue with today's alliances. Further questions in the two last parts ((b) NATO and Norway, and (c) Norway and the EU) allowed the respondent to agree or disagree with a statement from strongly agree, agree, neutral, disagree or strongly disagree. For some questions it included yes/no answers, and also the option to answer don't know/impossible to answer. This was done to include those with less knowledge of the matter. Furthermore, even though the questions were created to be simplified as much as possible for those who may not know much about the subject, I have taken into consideration that some of the questions might be misunderstood and that the answer they provide is lacking in context.

One of the major advantages of doing an online survey is the format, both when it comes to visualization and accessibility. Each section contextualizes the four themes in order to guide the respondent; I wanted to make the survey user-friendly for all, taking into account the older age group for accessibility and the younger for visualization and format. Due to the circumstances, the major point was to reach as many respondents as possible, in sharing the survey with friends and using social media it was easily accessible to all and a low threshold to answer the questions and share the survey on several digital platforms. However, while the internet is used as a unique mode of collection, it is important to take into account that there may be significant differences in the way the target population is denned, with implications of under-coverage (Gad, 2006, p. 4). In some cases, the survey can relate to a well-defined population, such as members of organizations, students of an educational establishment – as it is shared with my personal network the outreach might get biased opinions based on my own network which consist of students studying international relations and military personnel. However, when analyzing the outreach, I found the questionnaire was shared not only through

friends-of-friends but also openly from people I did not know. It reached close to 400 respondents, ranging in age from 18 to 70+. The gender equality was also 50/50 which provided me with interesting findings that I find representative.

2.4 Document analysis

Organizational and institutional documents have been a staple in qualitative research for many years and are pivotal in this study. In recent years, there has been an increase in the number of research reports and journal articles that mention document analysis as part of the methodology, however there is often a lack of sufficient detail in most reports found in the reviewed literature, regarding the procedure followed and the outcomes of the analysis of the document. Document analysis is defined as a systematic procedure for reviewing or evaluating documents. Like other analytical methods in qualitative research, it requires that data be examined and interpreted in order to elicit meaning and gain understanding to develop empirical knowledge (Bowen 2009, p. 27). The documents used for this systematic evaluation take a variety of forms. They include manuals, minutes of meeting, advertisements, even programs, books, background chapters and many more. In this study, the documents used are historical documents; official military records; debates; speeches; news articles; organizational, meeting, and institutional reports; and survey data. The documents used in this paper provide background information on the historical insight of Norwegian Defense traditions, as well as the relationship with NATO and the EU. It is also beneficial to use document analysis in order to track change and development when I analyze the long-term defense plan set out by the Norwegian government. These documents provide context for the research question and further future discussion on the topic; when various drafts are accessible it allows me to compare and identify changes from the post-Cold War strategy to today's policy and defense strategy (Bowen, 2009, p. 30).

The advantages are that document analysis is less time-consuming and more efficient than other research methods, analysis requires data *selection* instead of data *collection*. It is also cost-effective as data have already been gathered and many documents are also publicly available, making it an attractive option for qualitative research. Another advantage of document analysis is that it provides a broad coverage, it covers a long span of time and many events (Bowen, 2009, p. 31). This method also has its limitations. It can include insufficient detail because some documents are produced for some purpose other than research; the most prominent drawback is biased selectivity-- some of the documents may be aligned with corporate policies and

procedures and with the agenda of the organization's principals, such as government documents based on party-politics (Bowen, 2009, p. 31).

In order to analyze what defense areas the Norwegian Armed Forces prioritize and why they are important, as well as the challenges it is facing. Both qualitative and quantitative research is needed. The research methods presented in this section is a means of triangulation -- a combination of methodologies in the study of the same phenomenon (Bowen, 2009, g. 28).

3 Theoretical framework and concepts

In this section, the theoretical framework and commonly used concepts are presented. The Balance of Power is used as a theoretical framework to analyze smaller-states powers between two Great Powers. For Norway, its geopolitical position has to a large extent shaped the defense policy before and after the Cold War, making it interesting to use this theoretical framework for further discussions on Norway as a case-study. The concepts presented is used in further discussion throughout this study.

3.1 Balance of power as a theoretical framework

The balance of power is one of the oldest and most fundamental concepts in the study of international relations. Although there are many variations of balance of power theory and interpretations of the concept, all versions of this theory begin with the hard-core assumption of realist theory: the system is anarchic, the key actors are territorial states, their goals are to maximize their power and security, and they act rationally to promote their goal (Levy, 2014, p. 31). While some theorists use this concept to describe the actual distribution of power in the international system, others use it to refer to an ideal distribution of power or a particular kind of system, and still, some see balance of power as a state strategy rather than as an international outcome (Levy, 2014, p. 29). The Great Powers Theory uses several mechanisms to restore the balance, this includes internal military buildup – where economic wealth is converted into military power, the formation of counterbalancing alliances, and settlements to mention a few (Lobell, 2014). In contrast to this, many scholars find that secondary states are more likely to join with more powerful states or in coalitions of states rather than balance against it, this is based on structural realism as Kenneth Waltz introduces it. The anarchic system and shifts in the relative distribution of capabilities mean that balances of power form in the international system, and how states balance this will depend on the distribution of capabilities among the greater powers (Ripsman, 2011, p. 2 & Lobell 2014). According to Waltz, in bipolar distribution of power (two great powers), states will balance through internal military buildup. In multipolar distribution of power (three or more states), states will balance through the formation of counterbalancing alliances. Finally, according to John Mearsheimer, in balancing multipolar distribution of power (three or more equally powerful states), great powers are likely to play the “blame game” in the responsibility of balancing (Lobell, 2014).

In the Nordic perspective, the balance of power was introduced in the early years of the Cold War by Arne Olav Brundtland's work (1966). Brundtland established a theoretical model according to which the balance or the reciprocity of the security policies of the Nordic states and their relationship with the Great Power blocs has largely prevented Great Powers from military and political engagement in Scandinavia (Noreen, 1983, p. 44). He argued that the alliance choice of the Nordic States balanced one another and helped diminish great power tensions in the region. With Sweden declaring neutrality, and Finland's Friendship Pact and Cooperation and Assistance Treaty with the Soviet Union, and Norwegian and Danish NATO membership, each served to situate each Nordic state in an institutional setting that balanced between competing concerns. However, the parameters for this internal Nordic balance changed with the end of the Cold War (Haugevik & Sending, 2020, p. 443), and more recently with the discussion of applying for a NATO membership in Sweden and Finland.

Small powers, such as the Nordic countries, desire to adapt a policy of neutrality between the Great Powers and to act as bridgebuilders between them (Can, 2021, p.190). In an environment characterized by low tension between the Great Powers, the small powers will seek to screen themselves from the great power and adapt reassurance policies towards the threatening power (Can, 2021, p.190). It is therefore natural that Sweden and Finland chose to be non-aligned with NATO and reassure Russia that they wanted to remain "neutral" after the Cold War. However, the political security environment has changed, and the balance of power is being challenged. Therefore, in this study I will focus on how small powers adapt their security and defense policies, based on the environmental security changes and how smaller states are forced to prioritize their immediate security concerns and that neutrality is no longer a viable option (Can 2021, p. 190).

3.2 Concepts

4.2.1 Total Defense

In Norway, "Total Defense" is the common term for the sum of military defense and civilian preparedness. The concept was developed by the Norwegian government during World War II. The Defense Commission of 1946 stated that in order to secure the country, all resources must be available to use in times of crisis and war, which means that the Norwegian Armed Forces are dependent on civilian resources and civilian logistics to be able to carry out its

mission (Folk og Forsvar, date, page?). During the Cold War, the “Total Defense” concept was the core of the Norwegian mobilization defense. A comprehensive system was developed, based on mobilization and requisition, to ensure that the Armed Forces had access to the personnel and materials it needed in the event of war. The mobilization defense was based on conscription. However, when the Cold War was over, the systems and planning were not maintained, and in practice the total defense was shut down (Saxi, 2022, p. 57).

It was not until 2016 that it was decided to modernize the Total Defense concept, and in 2017 Norway re-aligned their Total Defense to fit with the challenges it had faced, especially after the terrorist attacks in Norway on July 22, 2011, and a changed security policy climate. The terrorist attacks had shown major weaknesses in Norwegian emergency preparedness, and the new instructions simplified and streamlined cooperation between the civilian emergency preparedness and the Armed Forces (Norheim-Martinsen, 2019).

4.2.2 Non-Offensive Defense

Møller introduces non-offensive defense (NOD) as an approach to common security, which is consistent with both “realists” and “neorealism” approaches to the study of international relations. The concept of NOD is linked to common security and is part of the quest for a more appropriate concept of “security” that has characterized international relations theory and strategic thinking for several years (Moller, 1996, p.48). Granted, his study and this approach is older and not as widely used, but I found it fitting to show a contrasting theoretical framework when discussing security and defense for this dissertation. There are three different modes of expansions: **procedural expansion**, which does not affect what security is about, but points to other paths leading in the same direction. It implies an expanded scope of security for the dyads of states, regional systems, or international systems as a whole. **Focal expansion**, which implies taking into consideration the security of other entities than states, for instance nations and other societal groupings, and **sectoral expansion**, which implies including other types of threats besides the military ones, for example economic or environmental dimensions of threats (Møller, 1996, p. 48).

4.2.3 Deterrence

Deterrence is not a new concept; it was earlier defined as a coercive strategy where the aim was to persuade an adversary and that actors must not act for fear of the consequences. Most of the foundational works on conventional and nuclear deterrence were written during the Cold War. It was a major component of the containment strategy pursued by the US and its allies during

the Cold War, especially in the nuclear area, because deterrence had to be bulletproof because even a single instance of failure of deterrence could produce catastrophic results (Rostoks, 2019 p. 14). After the end of the Cold War, with a stable Europe and a Russia that was not interested in threatening its Western neighbors or was too weak to do so – deterrence fell out of fashion and was seemingly less relevant. Deterrence only becomes relevant when someone has to be deterred from carrying out hostile activities, but at that time there was no one to be deterred in Europe (Rostoks, 2019, p.15). Russia was, for some time, regarded not only as a partner but also a potential member of the EU and NATO – although this was always treated as a very distant perspective (ibid). Since 2014, deterrence has again become an integral part of the security debate in Europe. Although Russia's policies towards Ukraine have been a concern for most of the countries neighboring Russia, these concerns have been further strengthened by Russia's assertive foreign policy and its demonstrations of military capabilities across Europe and Syria. Russia needed to be deterred again because of its aggressive policies and because of the domestic weakness of its neighbors. To deter Russia, its neighbors had to develop credible military capabilities and for the past few years, the primary focus of the countries that are close neighbors of Russia has been on increasing defense expenditures, reconfiguring their defense strategies and improving NATO deterrence (ibid).

4.2.4 Collective Defense

The principle of collective defense is at the very heart of NATO's founding treaty. During the opening of the Foreign Ministers' meeting on 7 April 2022, Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg emphasized that Russia's action seeks to replace a European security system based on international law with a system based on the use of military force (Stoltenberg 2022). This has included the incorporation of the Crimean Peninsula into Russia in violation of key principles of the UN Charter, but also in violation of the principles of the Helsinki Final Act in 1975. On the basis of these incidents, there is now agreement among the 28 members that NATO must strengthen its profile as a collective defense alliance. At the NATO Summit in Wales in September 2014, a "Readiness Action Plan" was adopted (NATO, 2014). The plan shall ensure that the alliance is able to react effectively and quickly if a situation arises that could trigger the alliance's collective defense obligations. Although the plan formally means that NATO will be able to respond to threats from the east and south, including threats within the cyber domain and the proliferation of missiles, there are many indications that the plan's overall purpose is to stem the military threats from Russia (NATO, 2014). In this way, the alliance will deter Russia

and reassure eastern NATO members such as Poland and the Baltic countries. On transatlantic relations, which were also adopted in Wales, it is emphasized that NATO's collective defense obligations are the basis of the transatlantic security community (NATO 2014). Thus, NATO again appears as an alliance that has collective defense as its primary task after having actually had international stabilization operations outside its own area as its main task since the end of the Cold War (NATO, 2014).

Part II – Analysis

4. Norwegians' attitudes to Foreign and Security Policy

The findings from the survey


The study will now move on to present the responses received through the questionnaire. Norwegian defense policy is to a large extent shaped by Norwegian identity and Norwegian values. A state's defense policy has never been merely about physical defense of the state's borders, it is also often an important participant and contributor in the shaping of national values and an important marker of identity within the society. In Norway, this applies because the Armed Forces are an institution and have carried on a set of values that have influenced the society and norms. The values of the Armed Forces rest on a set of basic Norwegian, national values. The Norwegian Armed Forces are therefore a social institution that influences and is influenced by society in general (Friis, 2021, p. 219). One of the major reasons for this is the conscription in the Armed Forces. The conscription system continues to be the foundation for the Norwegian defense structure, and it is an important link between the Armed Forces and the people. The will to defend a nation is closely linked to how the Armed Forces and Security and Defense policy are perceived by the general public and it needs to be perceived as relevant and credible and this support can only be maintained by ensuring a strong anchoring of the Armed Forces in the population – as an integral part of society (Prop. 48 (2007-2008)).

This chapter explores Norwegian attitudes and opinions on a set of statements related to international collaboration, foreign policy and the overall threat perceptions. The first section presents the overall socio-economic background of the respondents, which can give an indication of the general results presented. In the second part, it presents the attitudes toward Norway's foreign policy from a global perspective with alliances and the relationship with Russia. The attitude towards Russia is especially interesting as this shows a great difference from the survey that was done by NUPI in 2020 on the same question. Lastly, I will set the agenda for the discussion chapter which analyses how the threat perception from the Norwegian public may affect what areas Norway are prioritizing in Security and Defense. Furthermore, the contextual chapters, presents the findings from the thematic sections of the survey and compares them with the existing literature.

4.1 Today's alliances in the global perspective


The core principles of the rules-based liberal international order we know are being challenged, not only by Russia but also by the growing power of China. The negative effects of international competition exacerbated by the Trump administration and the exit of the United Kingdom from the EU have also proved to be challenging and have raised some concerns regarding global stability. After President Biden was elected, he assured the United States' allies that "America is back," but he has not succeeded in removing the uncertainty his predecessor created. Biden has also emphasized that his priorities are the three C's – China, Climate and Covid (Hagan, 2021). In all these areas, he has emphasized that the United States does not necessarily agree with the EU or emphasize European views. The long-term prioritization of the US is mainly focused on Asia. The agreement with Australia on the acquisition of US nuclear-powered submarines, entails a comprehensive US escalation of military cooperation with allies in the Pacific region. This has created a fear that the US can no longer, to the same extent, be seen as Europe's sole ally, and that the ambitions of the EU to become autonomous are more important than ever (Skjelland et al, 2022, p. 15).

The rapid change in international politics brings a range of dilemmas and priorities that all states must deal with, including Norway. Graphs 1 and 2 may indicate that stability is important for the Norwegian people and that the collaborations they have today are the ones they want to continue to stay in. Norway is strongly embedded in the liberal international order and has been committed to its principles since after World War II (Svendsen & Weltzien, 2020, p. 17). Therefore, it is not surprising that 95% of the respondents answered that Norway should continue to pursue its foreign policy in existing alliances, and that only 5%, which accounts for 18 people, thinks that Norway should seek new alliance partners. This can indicate that as of now, it is hard to tell what new alliances might look like but that the assumed decline of US power may show a trend that new alliance partners should be considered. In graph 2, the majority of the respondents think that Norway should continue to support the UN to promote common rules in international politics, indicating that stability is important for Norway.




Graph 2: Overview of alliances

Source: author's own compilation based on the questionnaire's response.



Graph 3: Overview of organizational collaboration

Source: author's own compilation based on the questionnaire's response.



Graph 4: Threat perception, least to most likely

Source: author’s own compilation based on the questionnaire’s response.

Graph 4, shows the threat perception from least to most likely. This study is mainly focused on crucial, national security threats such as direct acts of war or aggression. Therefore, I will not address these threats further. However, the threats presented all compromise the nation’s welfare and are equally important to address when it comes to global security, which involves coalitions of nations working together, such as the United Nations. It is noteworthy to see that “Global Climate change” is perceived as an equally important threat as “Tensions in relation to Russia”, both at 14% (meaning second place in threat perception). Cyber-attacks from other countries are at the top of the threat perception of 15%, although this study does not address cyber-attacks from other countries as the main challenge and threat for the Norwegian Armed Forces, it is an important area to look at when it comes to Research Developments in the European Defense Fund. It has also been stated as an area of concern in the long-term defense plan of the Norwegian Armed Forces and the development (Prop 14S (2020-2021), p. 28).

5. Norwegian security and defense

Norwegian defense policy is to a large extent shaped by Norwegian identity and Norwegian values, and territorial defense has always remained a key priority. Even though Norwegian security has been rooted in NATO and cooperation with the United States, the primary objective of Norwegian security policy is to safeguard Norway's sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political freedom of action (Friis, 2021, p. 218). The Norwegian Armed Forces legitimacy is argued to rest on a set of unspoken and established values that were central to the post-war accounts of World War II. These stories were important for the building of the modern defense in Norway during the Cold War, and they continued to influence Norwegian defense policy even after the 1990s and still do to this day. For Norwegian defense strategy and theory, scholars have long emphasized the natural connection between the state, the nation, and the Norwegian territory. In the standard works from World War II, the battles in Norway in 1940 and the "Hjemmefrontens" activities throughout the war are given great weight, while regular Norwegian forces' participation in Allied operations is to some extent pushed into the background. These representations emphasize the collective will of the Norwegian people and downplay the efforts and importance of military leaders, individuals, and military "elite departments" (Friis, 2021, p. 220).

Ulriksen emphasizes that the Norwegian "defense tradition" is the connection between the state, the people's will to defend and the nation's territory. Given this way of thinking, it is not surprising that a defense model was based on the state's mobilization of large parts of the population to directly defend Norwegian mainland territory and that this had a broad political and popular appeal. The concept of "invasjonsforsvar" (**invasion defense**) fits hand-in-glove with traditional Norwegian security thinking. The way the invasion defense concept was developed was also based on the idea that there was a natural connection between the Norwegian people and the demanding Norwegian nature. The defense concept drew on "De norske friskusverdier" (**The Norwegian Friskus values**). Nature and culture functioned in this image almost as an organic whole and Norwegian nature and Norwegian culture were two sides of the same coin. Given that the task was to be able to operate in the wild to defend the territory during World War II, it was natural that the Army remained the largest, most important, and dominant branch of the Norwegian Defense (Friis, 2021, p. 220). For the last decade, priority has been given to maritime and air defense in Norway, in this next part I will give a

historical background to the shaping of the Norwegian Armed Forces and the change in Norwegian Defense and Security policy which took a drastic turn in the early 2000s.

5.1 The shaping of the Norwegian Armed Forces and Norwegian Security Policy

Tradition and strategy from the WWII to the Cold War.

As mentioned in the literature review, Norwegian Defense was, during the Second World War, largely connected to the Norwegian nature and in the post-war era, all recruits – from the Army to the Marines had to learn basic army routines and the ability to cope in nature in general. Emphasis was put on skiing, putting up a tent camp, movement in the terrain and having tactical exercises at night. The idea was to learn how to fight and survive in nature, rather than in the cities as Norwegian territorial security was mainly to defend the borders and the demography in Norway is largely based on nature and woods, it was also in the out-skirts of towns that the Norwegian culture lived (Eriksen, 1995). Furthermore, the Norwegian Defense has had a strong focus on the tactical level, planned and practiced maneuvering at the lowest level that is the “direct confrontation.” While Defense Policy, Norwegian identity, and a more long-term strategic framework were not given the same weight, the strategy was simple: defend the Lyngen line in Troms in addition to ensuring the longest possible “holding time” (resist the invaders until Allied aid came). This focus on tactical power shows the importance of Norway’s emphasis on the egalitarian principles, where the conscripts formed the main pillar of Norwegian defense during the Second? World War (Friis, 2021, p. 221).

Given that all Norwegians were assumed to possess the necessary and crucial outdoor skills to be able to operate in the Norwegian nature, it was not necessary to have too much additional military training in the decades after World War II. Norwegian defense built on the characteristics and qualities that existed in the Norwegian population. The Norwegian conscription and mobilization model could therefore be based on the “every man’s rifle principle” which means that defense thinking was quantity over quality in its logistics. The model focused on getting as many men as possible under arms, as many departments as possible during mobilization, not to specially train them or utilize their individual qualities but rather to generate a physical presence of as many bodies as possible with weapons in hand (Friis, 2021, p. 222).

These values were also reflected in the idea of the Norwegian “Total Defense”, which remains important in Norwegian security and defense plans to this day. At the height of the Cold War, the Total Defense plan called for the mobilization of around 400,000 military personnel in wartime – one tenth of the country’s population. An equal number of people were assigned civil wartime roles within the civil administration, the police, the health services, civil defense and in economic preparedness. Their role was to support the wartime armed forces and provide for civil defense and the functioning of society during wartime. In total, 20-30 percent of the population had a role in the prepared total defense plans, where the aim was to mobilize the country’s resources fully to survive against a Soviet attack (Saxi, 2022, p. 56-57). Norwegian defense was, in other words, not based on hierarchy and elites’ traditions; emphasis was put on that people not only had a duty of defense, but also a right to defend. This was most clearly expressed through the conscription system. Here, people from different social classes and background met on an equal footing. Despite differences under all sorts of classes and cultural differences, there was a basic core in all parts that freedom emanated from the people themselves, and they had to fight for it and preserve it. The conscription system was integrative and contributed to nation-building according to Johan Sverdrup, and it was important to ensure that the Armed Forces did not become a “state within the state”, but it had to ensure that people realized and perceived the need for the Armed Forces (Friis, 2021, p. 221). After the Cold War, the strategy was no longer based on volume and the Norwegian Defense strategy leaned more towards alliances and cutting-edge technology, which have now set the agenda for today’s security and defense strategy. However, the Norwegian conscription system and the civilians in the Norwegian Armed Forces remain pivotal in the Norwegian security structure.

A shift from the “old” to the “new”

The aftermath of the Cold War gradually challenged the cornerstones of Norwegian defense policy. In the 1990s, the Norwegian defense concept was based on four basic principles:

Table 1: Norwegian defense principles in the 1990s (Prop. 8 (1997-98), pg. 52-58).

<ol style="list-style-type: none">1. A nationally balanced defense2. Conscription3. Total defense4. Alliance affiliation

The most important defense tasks were to constitute an invasion-defense that could meet a major military attack in northern Norway and to constitute a nationwide territorial defense (Prop. 8 (1997-1998), pg. 52-58). As these tasks seemed less and less important in terms of security policy power, the first three principles on which the old defense concept was built on were increasingly challenged in the early 2000s (Friis, 2021, p. 223). The transition was marked by an intense discussion over what the Armed Forces' 'natural' and 'real' tasks were and should be. A new representation emerged that challenged the established notion of how the Armed Forces should be organized and used. Arguments were made that the Armed Forces needed to be more actively used in international operations, for example in the Balkans or in Africa and the officers wanted to use the Armed Forces to meet the new security policy challenges that had risen after the Cold War, such as intra-state conflicts. This new push came mostly from younger officers who had taken part in international operations. Norwegian defense traditionally had relied heavily on the national defense and their long history of securing the Norwegian mainland since the World War so when this new idea was introduced, it was met with strong opposition from the "older generation." The reason why the reorganization was so difficult was that the Armed Forces after WWII indirectly protected the social institutions and did not only exist to protect Norwegian territory. The Norwegian Armed Forces represented the same "Norwegian values", they were not only a physical defender of the material institutions, but also a representative of national values. It represented the link between the Norwegian people and Norwegian nature, and it was based on key Norwegian values such as equality, freedom and sobriety (Friis, 2021, p. 224).

The slow and painful shift from the 2000s

The early 2000s constituted a paradigm shift in Norwegian defense policy, questions in how to meet the new international situation and Norway's position in the international arena collided with the previous framework conditions for the Armed Forces. Under the Bondevik government in 2001, Norway's conservatism from the 1990s both in NATO and at home, was replaced by an active participation in the Alliance's transformation work and set the agenda towards the Norwegian Defense policy we know today. Nevertheless, the degree of change in Norway at the beginning of 2000 was not as abrupt as many sought it out to be. Compared to Denmark, the change in Norwegian Defense policy thinking and the application of the Armed Forces in Norway was cautious and gradual. It took, for example, ten years longer to introduce an ordering of obligation for international operations in Norway than in Denmark – which resulted in these changes coming to Norway much later (Saxi, 2011, pg. 43-50). One reason for this was

that there was resistance from both traditionalists inside the military and the political class to organizational and doctrinal change. Even though the Norwegian defense policy was open to international operations, the developments in NATO placed new demands on Norway, including to contribute to the Alliance's work for stable development in the Euro-Atlantic area. There was also an issue of the uncertainty in which direction and what consequences the development of the cooperation on security and defense policy in the EU would have, also for Norway and NATO as a whole (Prop. 45 (200- 2001), p. 13). The main challenge was that the government and parliament repeatedly passed decisions regarding the structure and size of the military but failed to follow suit with sufficient funding to implement these decisions – something that has been a challenge to this day. In the long-term plan from 2002-2005, the recommendation from the Armed Forces was that after World War II, Norway had not paid for the entirety of the Norwegian defense they had at their disposal. Material and infrastructure was mainly financed through US arms aid in the first decade after the war, and through NATO infrastructure programs throughout the post-war period and large parts of the infrastructure of the Armed Forces represented this (Prop. 45 (200- 2001), p. 6). Nevertheless, Norway still managed to contribute a significant number of troops in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, and later in Afghanistan. They also participated in a number of smaller missions with NATO, the European Union and the United Nations. The Norwegian Armed Forces gradually became more focused on international operations, while according less priority to territorial defense. Engagement rather than deterrence was considered the best security policy towards Russia (Friis, 2018, p. 160).

5.2 The long-term plan for the Norwegian Armed Forces.

The primary objective of Norwegian security policy is to safeguard Norway's sovereignty, territorial integrity and political freedom of action. The defense of Norway, and the structure of Norwegian security and defense policy, has since World War II been based on the recognition that the security challenges against Norway exceed what Norway will be able to muster of its capacity alone. The comprehensive safeguarding of Norwegian security must, now as before, be based on both good utilization of society's overall ability to support the defense capability and on collective and bilateral support and guarantee within the framework of NATO (Prop. 14S (2020-2021), p. 7). Overall, the main tasks of the Armed Forces are:

1. Deter an enemy from attacking
2. Endure an attack for several weeks until Allied forces can assist
3. Protect allies who come to Norway

4. Contribute soldier to NATO – or other allied missions abroad. (Bentzrød, 2022).

In the fall of 2020, the Norwegian Government laid out its long-term defense plan and by early December 2020, Prop. 14S (2020-2021) was approved by the Storting. It includes expert opinions on what the strategic objectives of the Norwegian Armed Forces should be in the years to come, and a recommendation on what the budget should be. It sets out the ambitions for the Norwegian Armed Forces and areas that provide a much-needed financial investment in Norwegian defense capabilities and entails a significant financial boost for the defense sector. In the recommendation from the committee, 24 proposals for resolutions from six different majority constellations were presented. The Storting decided among other things on the Armed Forces' future force structure, and that Norway will participate in the European Defense Fund (Prop. 14S (2020-2021)).

The Defense Analysis 2022

As a response to this, the Norwegian Defense Research Establishment (FFI,) on behalf of the Ministry of Defense, produced an annual analysis where the main task was to give the defense leadership a better grip on the Armed Forces' strategic development. "The Defense Analysis 2022" is the first edition. The analysis assesses the development of framework factors and assumptions, provides an updated picture of the current direction of development for the Armed Forces, and assesses how the development plans can be improved and renewed. The report is based on analysis done in December 22, 2021, which means that the consequences of Russia's attack on Ukraine have not been analyzed (Skjelland et al, 2021, p. 3).

Prop. 14S – Ability to defend, and the willingness to prepare

The defense of Norway is safeguarded through national efforts abroad and at home, and arrangements for allied efforts in Norway and in their neighboring areas. The proposition states that the Government needs to facilitate a continued strengthening and modernization of the Armed Forces, which builds on the priorities and initiatives in the previous long-term plan for the defense sector. Norwegian security and defense policy must be based on the values and interests we want to secure. These values mean that Norway and our democracy can be developed in a framework of necessary freedom and independence, to ensure law and order, human rights and security. Society must be able to protect itself from serious threats to these values. Credible defense is the state's most basic tool for ensuring peace and stability (Prop 14S

(2020-2021), p. 8). The global outbreak of Covid-19 seems to have also reinforced some of the negative developments in international security. In addition to the pandemic's serious consequences for life and health, it has also challenged the security situation of many countries in a broader perspective. Among other things, we have seen several restrictions on cross-border cooperation and increased protectionism (Prop 14S (2020-2021), p. 8).

The negative security policy development the government pointed out in the previous long-term plan has increasingly become a reality for Norway. A strong national defense is needed to meet the challenges with NATO and our allies. The Norwegian Government has taken important steps since the last defense plan and the Armed Forces is operating at a higher level of activity than in many years. The initiatives that the government recommended and that the Storting agreed to in the previous plan are now being realized. At the same time, in this new long-term plan, the Storting also lay the foundation for a further and step-by-step strengthening of the defense capability through new and important initiatives over time. This includes an increase in budget, and the Norwegian Government has assumed that it will spend NOK 16.5 billion more on defense in 2028 than today (Prop 14S (2020-2021), p. 9). The new long-term plan will increase the Armed Forces' preparedness, responsiveness and endurance. The plan includes strengthening in all four areas of the Armed Forces, including new tanks to the army to increase firepower and operational capacity. The government is also acquiring four new submarines, establishing a new task squadron in the Marine Hunter Command, and for the Air Force, the introduction of the new F-35 combat aircraft and P-8 maritime patrol aircraft will have the main priority until 2025. The new F-35 combat aircraft will be used to deter, while a strengthening of an Army in Finnmark will strengthen combat defense on the ground. (Prop 14S (2020-2021), p. 8). Another priority is the pace of technological developments. This area is moving fast, and long-range precision weapons and new weapon systems are being developed that have revealed new types of vulnerabilities for Norway. In order for Norway to defend itself against these challenges, the Armed Forces must modernize its capabilities and increase its operational capability in order to be relevant in a new security policy situation with the emergence of advanced technology. The high rate of technological change and proliferation provide new opportunities, but at the same time it challenges the current structure of development, procurement and the management of systems (Prop 14S (2020-2021), p. 8).

The most central input to the new long-term plan is the Chief of Defense's Professional Military Council (FMR). The Chief of Defense recommended a comprehensive strengthening of the

Armed Forces, with an increase in volume, meaning that the Armed Forces need to expand to a wider variety of tasks. There also needs to be an improvement in resilience and in the ability to react to threats. The Chief of Defense also pointed to a significant need to reduce vulnerabilities in critical structural elements, such as buildings and airports and to be able to contribute to NATO's collective defense and in international efforts. The new plan set out nine tasks for the Armed Forces:

Table 2: The tasks of the Armed Forces (Prop 14S (2020-2021), p. 8).

1. Ensure credible deterrence based on NATO's collective defense
2. Defend Norway and allies against serious threats within the framework of NATO'S collective defense
3. Prevent and deal with episodes and security policy crises with national resources, including facilitating allied engagement.
4. Ensure a national decision basis through monitoring and intelligence
5. Claim Norwegian sovereignty and sovereign rights
6. Ensure the exercise of authority in limited areas
7. Participate in multinational crisis management, including peace operations
8. Contribute to international cooperation in the area of security and defense policy
9. Contribute to safeguarding social security and other key societal tasks

Even though Norwegian defense policy is to a large extent shaped by Norwegian identity and Norwegian values, and territorial defense. Norwegian security has been rooted in NATO and contributes actively to the collective defense strategy of NATO. Norway's geopolitical position is also important in how NATO perceived and uses Norway, small powers adapt their security and defense policies, based on the environmental security changes and smaller states are forced to prioritize their immediate security concerns, and the same can be said for Norway (Can 2021, p. 190).

6. Norway, NATO in the North?

Norway is mainly considered NATO in the North due to the geographically important placement of the country in the Scandinavian peninsula. Scandinavia is a geopolitically stable area and can strategically be considered an island. The only threat by land is from Russia, therefore Norway can only be saved from those states that have the strongest naval powers in the North Atlantic. In reality, only the US has a maritime projection capability that can strengthen the Scandinavian countries in a conflict with Russia and Norway is a key player to safeguard this territory (Skjelland et al, 2022, p. 17).

Some scholars see NATO as an institution that helps bind the United States to European security policy and thus contributes to the United States also being a European power. Several European members have developed a strong trans-Atlantic security identity, and this has helped strengthen NATO's traditional position as the cornerstone of European security (Græger & Haugevik, 2011). Norwegian security has been rooted in NATO since Norway joined the Atlantic Pact in 1949, and Norwegian deterrence cannot really be separated from NATO, since allied reinforcements are at the very cornerstone of the Norwegian defense. At the beginning of the Second World War, Norway declared neutrality but following the Nazi invasion in 1940 and the five-year occupation, the public perception changed. Norway became a signatory partner to the Washington Treaty, which established NATO in 1949. Before joining NATO, Norway announced that there should be no permanent allied bases in Norway in peacetime – this was their so-called base policy. By doing this, Norway demonstrated a certain understanding of the Soviet concern about Western militarization of the northern flank and kept some national political maneuvering space between the United States and Russia, essentially making their impact on NATO and acting as a reassuring and deterrent actor in the US-Russia relations (Friis, 2018, p. 159). The term “deterrence” began to be emphasized in official Norwegian defense vocabulary in 2016 when the new long-term plan for armed forces was launched, the phrase has previously been used to define the main purpose of the armed forces as “war-preventing threshold” (Friis, 2018, p. 164). Since Russian aggression against Ukraine in 2014 and the further attack in 2022 -- the Norwegian defense discourse has changed. In 2005,

the Norwegian government designated the High North ¹as a strategic focus area although not primarily in defense policy significance. But external factors such as Putin's provocative speech at the Munich Security Conference in 2007, the resumption of strategic flights from Kola, and Russia's invasion of Georgia contributed to Norway turning its back on the traditional threat picture: Russian military activity in our immediate area. In 2007–2008, Norway took an informal initiative in NATO where the desire was for a more balanced focus (i.e. not just international operations). A "non-paper" called the Neighborhoods Initiative was presented in 2008, just after Russia's invasion of Georgia, which called for the Alliance to focus more on its own territory and periphery. The initiative had several concrete proposals, such as regional responsibilities in NATO's command structure. The proposal received both support and opposition, with the latter emphasizing that the initiative was reactionary at a time when resources had to be used "outside," showing that Norway remained focused on collective defense and regional security (Friis, 2021, p. 225). Norway has since been one of the driving forces behind the revitalization of NATO's collective defense and a new command structure based on the idea from 2009 which is better adapted to the defense of Europe. Nationally, the debate has expressed skepticism about too close ties to the United States and some want less aggression towards Russia. This general opinion was quite clear and had a broad consensus before Russia again attacked Ukraine in 2022.

Representation of Russia after Crimea's annexation

Since Russia attacked Ukraine and annexed Crimea in 2014, NATO's strategic focus has shifted, revitalizing its collective defense plans. Norway's attitude towards Russia has always been to reassure and show restraint; the new geopolitical situation is making a huge impact on this rhetoric. In 2015, the Norwegian Defense Minister, Ine Eriksen Søreide, stated on CNN:

“We are faced with a different Russia. I want to warn against the fact that some people see this as something that is going to pass. The situation has changed”. “There is no going back to some sort of normality or some sort of back to normal business, because that normality does not exist” (CNN 2015).

This tougher stance towards Russia was met with some resistance in the Norwegian public debate. Some found the defense minister's words to be too harsh and confrontational at the time even though the political, economic, cultural and personal investments Norway and Russia had made were at an all-time low. Many also worried that such language, and that the Norwegian

armament and deterrence efforts, would have escalatory effect (Friis, 2016, p. 160). The Ministry of Defense described in their long-term military plan in 2016 a resurgent Russia, aiming to regain major power status and willing and able to use force to maintain political dominance and influence (Prop. 151S (2015-2016), pg. 28–29). However, until 2022 the government had also been arguing in favor of a combined deterrence and dialogue approach, both bilaterally and in NATO. Norway joined the EU sanctions regime and suspended all bilateral military cooperation with Russia after the annexation of Crimea, but bilateral cooperation on fishery management, search and rescue and incidents at sea continued. Even though the Norwegian Government took a tougher stance on Russia, Norway repeatedly stated that they did not consider Russia a military threat to Norway and emphasized the importance of keeping an open dialogue with Russia to reduce the chances of misunderstandings and escalation (Friis, 2016, p. 160).

6.1 Northern Norway – NATO's maritime flank

Norway is NATO's eyes and ears in the north, the question of the strategic ambitions of northern Norway in NATO have been discussed for several years. The closure of several airbases to build one main base have been criticized. The defense budget for air defense has also created heated debates, but Russia's attack on Ukraine in February 2022 has pushed the Norwegian government to revise its military strategy and long-term defense plan, as well as the defense budget. In order to understand the strategic importance of northern Norway in security and defense policy for Norway and NATO, I will present some background information on the conflicts that have been active since mid-2000s, especially the critique the Norwegian government got after promising rearmament to the capability developments in the North and how little was actually done in practice. Some would say that the ambitions and goals set out were not in line with the security situation, especially after Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014. Norway had, up until 2014, radically reorganized and downsized their armed forces and focused on international operations – the question remained if Norway was able to provide credible deterrence against a rapidly modernizing Russian military. Since 2007, Russian military activity in the High North has increased steadily. This included deployment of new submarines, construction of new bases, deployment of new mobile precision-guided missiles, increased training and exercises, and generally increased activity at sea and in the air (Friis, 2016, p. 166).

When the Cold War came to an end, Norway had a strong air defense, the Norwegian Air Force was leading in NATO when it came to integrating the various weapons systems, which was and is absolutely central to establishing effective air defense. However, the Norwegian air defense reached its lowest point when the air defense battalion in Bodø was closed down in 2015, and personnel and equipment were transferred to Ørland. This resulted in a significant loss of personnel and not least a significant loss of competence. The status was that the Air Force eventually had only one operational Norwegian Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System (NASAMS) battery and the air defense organization, which in total consisted of less than 70 people (Bentzrød, 2019). At the same time, it was decided in 2016 that the airport at Andøya, which had been a strategically important base for Norway and NATO when it came to surveillance aircraft patrolling sea areas west and north of Norway, should be closed down and moved to Evenes. The reason was because the Norwegian Government set out to establish a single base for combat aircraft and maritime surveillance aircraft protected by long-range air defense and the airport at Andøya would be used for civilian industry and for military exercises (Bentzrød, 2019). This was met with considerable opposition, both from the public and from employees in the Armed Forces. Major General Tonje Skinnarland, then head of the Air Force, stated in the Oslo Military Society in September 2020,

“The Air Force's greatest limitation and vulnerability is their base dependence. Without operational combat bases that are well supported and protected, the Air Force cannot solve its missions. Our bases are attractive and obvious goals for an opponent. This is amplified by the formidable combat power the F-35 exerts in the air. For an enemy, it will be much easier to put the planes out of action when they are on the ground. Today, the protection of our bases is not satisfactory. " (Major General Tonje Skinnarland, Oslo Military Society, September 2020).


In the Long-Term Plan for the Defense Sector Prop. 151 S (2015–2016) for the period 2017–2020, the government wanted to “... strengthen the protection of the Air Force's bases, reception areas for allied support and other important infrastructure” (Prop. 151 S (2015-2016), p. 19). And "It is absolutely crucial for the utilization of the F-35 and other aircraft systems that the bases from which the aircraft operate are protected." (Prop. 151 S (2015-2016), p. 63). This entails a need for both active and passive defense in the form of air defense, base defense, fortification and the ability to quickly repair runways, as well as the possibility of being able to operate for shorter or longer periods of time from dispersal bases. Unfortunately, the Storting does, to some extent, not follow up on its intentions. In the latest long-term plan (2021–2024), Prop. 14 S (2020–2021), the ambition is abandoned, and the acquisition of a long-range air

defense system is postponed until after 2028. The government will, however, strengthen the operations of the new combat aircrafts, new maritime patrol aircraft and the maritime helicopters by 235 million NOK and finance the phasing in of the new combat aircraft with a base solution of more than 7 billion NOK (Arstad, 2021). Russia's attack on Ukraine and the tense situation in Europe have made many questions if the best strategy for Norway is to put all their eggs in one basket, both combat aircrafts and maritime surveillance will be concentrated in one place in the north – experts agree that this should be spread out. Jacob Børresen, a former flag general and the military secretary to the Minister of Defense stated:

“It is a great weakness that we have concentrated our resources. There is a great danger that these important capabilities may be knocked out at the outset of an armed conflict or surprise attack” (NRK 2022).

He also reflects over what Norway has spent on the Armed Forces. Last year (2021) Norway spent 1.85 per cent of its gross national product on the Armed Forces, thus not reaching NATO's 2% target. Børresen states that there is little political will to spend more money on the Armed Forces and points out that during the Cold War, Norway spent 3 percent of GDP and thinks that Norway's ambition should be to reach this level, especially given Norway's geography and that they are in the middle of tension between the United States and Russia (Budalen, Lysvold and Forland, 2022).


When the respondents of the survey were asked on how they perceive Norway's relationship with NATO, 87% look at NATO positively, this reflects the long-standing tradition of how the Norwegian Defense Policy is largely based and aligned with NATO's ambition and also in this case, that it reflects positively to the Norwegian people.



Graph 5: Viewpoint on NATO

The findings from the survey comes as no surprise, however, when it comes to territorial defense; the survey shows that over 170 are dissatisfied with the territorial security and think that Norway is not supported enough through NATO when it comes to our borders. The strengthening of air bases and new combat aircrafts, as well as a strategic focus on northern Norway – show that the long-term defense plans for the next ten years are aligned with the opinions of the Norwegian people.

Source: author’s own compilation based on the questionnaire’s response.



Graph 6: Territorial security

Source: author’s own compilation based on the questionnaire’s response.

NATO has been important in shaping and setting the agenda for Norwegian Security and Defense Policy for several years, however it has also allowed for a furthering of the already well-established collaboration in Nordic Security, especially between the non-aligned

countries Finland and Sweden. The debate around the possibilities of Nordic collaboration has again been raised as a direct effect of Russia's invasion of Ukraine this year and that the common old enemy has awakened.

7. Nordic security

Nordic cooperation consists of Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Iceland and Finland. Nordic cooperation has always been a success but had, up until the end of the Cold War, mainly consisted of an intensive cooperation in the societal field and was not based on defense. After the Cold War, the countries chose their own, individual security path and situated themselves into those alignments they deemed necessary. However, there was still a question if the Nordic area could come to represent an alternative organization to the European community, or that the Nordic states in the future would form a functional subgroup within the EU institutions and structures (Haugevik & Sending, 2019, p. 443).

Since 2009, however, big leaps have been taken in the development of a better-equipped joint Nordic security and defense toolbox. Nordic defense cooperation was intensified in 2009 against the backdrop of the financial crisis by the formation of a new institutional structure, “NORDEFCO” (Saxi, 2019, p. 660). In 2008, the Commanders in Chief of Norway, Sweden and Finland identified areas of cooperation and launched a series of new programs. (Forsberg, 2013, p. 1161). One of the major pillars in the cooperation area was the Stoltenberg Report of 2009, where the Nordic foreign ministers prepared 13 proposals for enhancing Nordic security policy, two of the proposals were a declaration of solidarity and a joint Nordic operation for air surveillance of Icelandic airspace. Another vision of Nordic defense was a report produced by Gunnar Wetterberg in 2010. He prepared a report for the Nordic Council in which the Nordic Council of Ministers proposed a Nordic Union with joint foreign and security policy. Johan Strang added to this and envisioned a more flexible “Nordic Communities” that would play a bigger role in a more pragmatic way. The underlying argument in favor of Nordic cooperation is that while Nordic countries are relatively small, by pooling their resources and acting jointly they could constitute a middle-sized European power, with a combined GDP almost at the level of Russia, India or Canada, and a combined defense budget bigger than Turkey or Spain (Forsberg, 2013, p. 1162). Because large-scale Nordic defense cooperation has failed in the past, there has been a lot of skepticism around if this trend of cooperation will last. Experts seem to be cautiously optimistic, but a common conclusion is that Nordic countries are not prepared to assume full collective responsibility for Nordic security but that the Nordic framework provides an attractive avenue for technical military cooperation (Forsberg, 2013, p.

1162). The debate around the possibilities of Nordic collaboration has again been raised as a direct effect of Russia's invasion of Ukraine this year and that the common old enemy has awakened.

7.1 A short background or context

The alliance choices of the Nordic States after the war and their history need to be shortly introduced in order to understand the context of the obstacles we see in today's difficulties with collaboration. Here I will focus on Finland and Sweden as they are not members of NATO, and Norwegian and Danish security and defense collaboration in NATO have been more prominent than Iceland. Finland's Friendship Pact with Russia and their joint Cooperation and Assistance Treaty came after several conflicts between the two nations. The dramatic outcome of the Winter and Continuation War in 1939 and 1941 left Finland with a strangled relationship to Russia. In 1939, Finland suffered great territorial losses and endured the displacement of nearly half a million Karelians from the ceded territory in the east. This created a will to fight against Russia when the time came (Medvedev, 1999, p. 99). When Hitler started the invasion of Russia during World War II, Finland became allied with Nazi Germany and claimed back their territorial losses to some extent. When Germany lost, Finland capitulated, and Russia regained the territory they ceded during the Winter and Continuation War (Medvedev, 1999, p. 101). Since then, Finland has become more independent from Russia in terms of defense policy, but the presence of Russia remains strong and the Finnish military are more concerned about possible infringement on Russia's interest than the general public. This creates the backbone of the challenges from the Finnish side in Nordic security collaboration (ibid). From the Swedish perspective, they have usually maintained a position of "neutrality" making the Swedish defense and policy to some extent ambivalent to future cooperation.

7.2 Obstacles for collaboration

The first obstacle in the Nordic collaboration has been the regional focus. The most important for each nation is that national interests always come first, and one will prioritize one's own defense capability above all else. When comparing Danish, Finnish, Norwegian and Swedish discourses on security and defense one can find striking similarities in their assessments of the contemporary international security environment. Norway, Sweden and Finland have had a common threat perception of their neighboring country Russia and they have had strong incentives to cooperate in this area for decades. It is only recently, after the annexation of

Crimea in 2014 and the upsurge of cyber threats, that Denmark saw Russia as a major security challenge, mainly due to a concern that misinterpretation and errors in a tense situation could spiral out of control and trigger a military conflict in the Nordic neighborhood (Haugevik et al, 2022, p. 7). However, there is variation to what degree each nation highlights the importance of certain geographical areas. For example, in the Nordic neighborhood, all four states highlighted the Arctic and the Baltic Sea as geographical areas of importance but there was some variation in the weighing of these two, Norway wants to focus more on the Arctic, and Finland more on the Baltic sea while Sweden prioritizes the Gulf of Bothnia (Haugevik et al, 2022, p. 7). Another challenge is the political will to make unpopular decisions, such as reducing or increasing the number of military bases or the size of the national defense industry in order to realize the potential gains for Nordic cooperation. There is also a question of how hard the countries would bargain when the distribution of gains takes place, and how party politics cooperate with each other in the sharing of burdens (Saxi, 2011, p. 61).

The second obstacle is institutional affiliations, as the countries merge themselves into different security alliances their priorities and defense policy depend on the ambitions of the alliances. All four states put a high premium on their relationship with the United States, but Norway and Denmark remain the most committed to Trans-atlanticists, pinpointing NATO as the cornerstone of their security and defense policies. Meanwhile, Finland depicted the United States as their most important and closest partner, but NATO is also described as important in regard to the European regional security and the Baltic Sea. However, Finland's ties to Russia have to some extent pushed them away from a NATO membership until recently (Haugevik et al, 2022, p.14). In Sweden, the United States and the UK are acknowledged as important partners, a NATO membership has also been discussed in Sweden. However, in December 2020, the defense and foreign ministers said that that uncertain times must not lead to sudden shifts and it was argued that security policy required stability, long-term strategic thinking and predictability and that joining NATO would create even more tensions towards Russia. However, as the case is for both Finland and Sweden – a NATO membership has become even more relevant, and it is not met with reluctance any longer (Haugevik et al, 2022, p. 18).

The third obstacle is the obvious national reflexes, which prohibit proactive pooling and sharing in military matters, especially in sharing defense materiel with industry and operational plans (Bengtsson, 2020, p. 107). Different regulations and routines in the Nordic states prove to be a challenge to strengthened cooperation. Any nation with independent security authority, will for

natural reasons want to limit the possibility for other nations to gain access to planning, strategies and critical technology programs through foreign nationals (Ali & Willassen, 2010, p. 18). National operational plans were to a large extent developed and shared during the Cold War between the Nordic Countries, but as the countries entered into different alliances, this co-operation and sharing of defense plans were no longer possible (Saxi, 2022, p. 58). The great differences in the Nordic countries' histories, cultures and approaches to international co-operation have also led to a material heritage that is very different, partly because it has been acquired from different nations. The materiel heritage in Finland largely consists of Russian and Swedish materiel, while Norway has mainly had a lot of American equipment due to the Marshall Plan, and Sweden has developed much of the materiel themselves. There is also a varying degree of co-operation between the authorities and industry in the Nordic region. Sweden has a significant defense industry, where large international defense companies have entered the ownership side in recent times, creating challenges associated with the industrial aspects of an enhanced Nordic cooperation (Ali & Willassen, 2010, p. 17). The major Nordic weapons manufacturers in 2008 were the Swedish companies Saab (\$3 billion in arms sales) and BAE Systems Hägglunds (\$670 million), the Finnish Patria (\$670 million), and the Norwegian Kongsberg Gruppen (\$540 million). Together these companies employed more than 22,000 people across the Nordic countries and abroad, about half of them Saab employees (Saxi, 2011, p.66). With the exception of Kongsberg Gruppen, which derived only 40 per cent of its sales from weapons, these companies derived more than 80 per cent or more of their income from the sale of armaments (Saxi, 2011, p.66). Armaments manufactures differ from a normal business because it is considered as a vital part of the security of any country and it is also very competitive, as of now there is not really an intra-Nordic market, and there is little cooperation in the defense industry. Outside suppliers provide about 70-80 percent of the weapons imported into the Nordic states, therefore Nordic armament partnership is not the most important source of trade for any of the countries involved (Hagelin, 2006, pg. 167–178). However, the trade between Norway and Sweden is the most beneficial one where each takes 20-25 percent of the other's export (Hurt, 2021).

7.3 Recent developments in collaboration

Although Nordic defense cooperation has had its challenges, the Nordic states have sought to advance their defense cooperation “beyond peacetime” since 2014, and many of the obstacles raised previously have been addressed. A pivotal moment to further collaboration was in September 2020, when the ministers of defense from Norway, Sweden and Finland met at


Porsangmoen Norway to sign a document on enhanced trilateral military cooperation. The document was titled “Statement of Intent on Enhanced Operational Cooperation” (Saxi 2022, p. 54). Even though it only included a letter of intent, it had the potential to advance Norway’s operational defense cooperation with Sweden and Finland. The document instructed the countries’ ministries of defense and armed forces to begin discussing their respective national operational plans in the areas of common concern, it also highlighted the possibility of developing a common operational plan in certain areas (Ministry of Defense of Finland, Sweden and Norway, *Statement of Intent*, p. 2). In September 2021, almost a year after the Porsangmoen meeting, the ministers of defense from Norway, Sweden and Denmark signed an almost identical document, where the common operational planning was extended to the southern shores of Scandinavia including Skagerrak, Kattegat, the Baltic Sea, the North Sea, the Danish straits and other surrounding areas as required (Saxi, 2022, p. 54). This also allowed for surveillance over the Icelandic airspace, which had been a question in both Sweden and Finland since 2012 (Bengtsson, 2020, p. 104). Both countries agreed to be part of the arrangement after Iceland asked Finland and Sweden to help the alliance monitor its airspace because they do not have their own air force. This was met with a lot of opposition, especially in Finland where a survey showed that only 22 percent supported this decision (Kinnunen, 2012). However, on behalf of NATO, Norwegian F-35s have, since 2020, guarded Icelandic airspace for the second time in one year as of March 2021. The project is called Iceland Air Policing (IAP) and goes rotates between the alliance's member countries. In March 2021, several Norwegian combat aircrafts were stationed in Iceland. There they would move out if unknown aircraft came close to Icelandic airspace. The contingency is called QRA (quick reaction alert) and corresponds to the Norwegian F-16 solver from Bodø every day (Norwegian Armed Forces, 2021).

Another area of cooperation has been the education of officers and military training exercises. Since Norway, Sweden and Finland have a common security concern in relation to Russia they have cooperated in major national military exercises and conducted joint training and education on a unit-to-unit level, enabling the training of small and specialized capabilities. The Norwegian army in northern Norway and their Swedish counterparts in northern Sweden also cooperate closely on training for specialized personnel, such as divers (Saxi, 2011, p. 42) The Nordic countries also have the opportunity to land with armed aircraft at each other's airports and an agreement is being worked on to exchange radar data. Major military exercises continue to be an important and priority area in Nordic defense collaboration. For example, in 2017 and 2018, Sweden and Norway hosted the Aurora 17 and Trident Juncture exercises,

respectively, the former was a national defense exercise involving about 20,000 troops, the latter a NATO high-visibility exercise involving about 50,000 troops. Both involved troops from Nordic and NATO countries practicing the defense of the Nordic region. The Nordic ministers of defense described it as an exercise aimed at defending the Nordic neighborhood. Finland planned a similar national defense exercise to Aurora 17 in 2021, but it was called off due to the coronavirus pandemic (Saxi, 2022, p. 62). In regards to industrial military collaboration, improved technology and reduced unit cost are other benefits that would accrue from increased Nordic defense industry cooperation. The European Defense Fund will provide this through a closer and more binding cooperation between defense and industry. Furthermore, the increased de-politicization of cooperation with the United States and NATO in Sweden and Finland over the past years has created an area where cooperation is easier, and the common threat of Russia has made Nordic cooperation even more relevant (Haugevik et al, 2022, p.33). As for collaboration in the industry, there will probably not be any intra-Nordic- industry market. The Nordic states will ultimately be better served by developing their industry as part of a wider European defense industry market but using the Nordic framework as a supplement. It can thus help Sweden remain one of the top five or six arms manufacturers in Europe, giving Norway and Finland a medium-sized partner, and gaining some protection from the asymmetrical relationship with the much larger continental European and US firms (Saxi, 2011, p. 67).

Lastly, the debate about possible NATO membership, which has been going on for a decade in Sweden and Finland, is finally becoming a reality, which will create even further possibilities for Nordic security cooperation and the previously mentioned bleak prospect of Nordic cooperation may no longer be the common agreement in scholarly literature.

Q7: Norway should collaborate closer with....



Graph 7: Further collaboration

Source: author's own compilation on the questionnaire's response.

The trends we see in future collaboration with Nordic countries is also shown in the survey, where 35% responded that Norway should collaborate closer with Scandinavian countries, while collaboration with NATO is still proving to be in the top, with 36.6%, while future collaboration with the EU falls to 27.7%. As all the Nordic countries are intertwined in trans-Atlantic alliances and closely connected in all political aspects, it is not surprising that there are no great gaps when the respondents can choose where Norway should collaborate further. These findings also support the ambitions of the Norwegian long-term defense plans which states that:

“The defense of Norway, and the structure of Norwegian security and defense policy, has since World War II been based on the recognition that the security challenges against Norway exceed what *Norway will be able to muster of capacity alone*. The comprehensive safeguarding of Norwegian security must, now as before, *be based on both good utilization of society's overall ability to support the defense capability and on collective and bilateral support* and guarantee within the framework of NATO” (Meld. St. 35 200-2021), p. 7).

Collective and bilateral support are key words in Norwegian defense policy, therefore collaboration with three of Norway's closest allies is not only important on the economic level but also when it comes to security and defense.

8. European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP)

The idea of increased cooperation across Europe in security and defense capabilities dates back to 1945 in the aftermath of World War II. The signing of the Treaty of Brussels included a mutual defense clause, laying down the foundations for the creation of the Western European Union (WEU). Since then, European cooperation and security have been strengthened through several treaties. The Treaty of Amsterdam codified a new structure and tasks for the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy and defined a range of military tasks which the EU could undertake, it also indicated the possibility of developing a future common defense policy for the Union. The Maastricht Treaty identified ambitious objectives in the area of external security and defense, but it was not until the late 1990s that concrete provisions were introduced to tackle the growing threat and concern in the European Union after the wars of secession in the Balkans (Rehrl and Weisserth, 2010, p. 12).

The 1990s were a turning point for the European integration project as the world witnessed the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States becoming the sole superpower, and the wars in the Balkans. The military dimension in the EU, the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) was first introduced in 1998. France and the United Kingdom met in Saint Malo, France to lay the foundation for a new chapter of European integration in the realm of defense and security (Larivé, 2014, p. 1). Following the St. Malo Declaration, numerous European Council summit meetings defined the military and civilian capabilities needed to fulfil the "Petersburg Tasks," which then included: *Humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping tasks, and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making* (Keukeleire and Delreux, 2014, p. 174). The most important European Council summit was the meeting in 1999 in Cologne, Germany. At this meeting, the EU heads of state and/or government agreed that 'the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and readiness to do so, in order to respond to the international crisis without prejudice to actions by NATO' (Rehrl and Weisserth, 2010, p. 12). In 2009, the Lisbon Treaty served as a cornerstone for the development and strengthening of ESDP, now called 'The Common Security and Defense Policy' (CSDP). The treaty included both a mutual

assistance clause, which follows the EU principle of solidarity and guarantees EU member states aid and assistance from all other partners in the event of armed aggression on the territory of a Member State (European External Action Service, 2016). The Treaty of Lisbon further expanded on the Petersburg tasks to include joint disarmament operations, military advice and assistance tasks, and post-conflict stabilization tasks. The Treaty allowed for the creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS) where a permanent body was established. This consists of representatives at ambassador level with political/military expertise, allowing for the expansion of the post the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs & Security Policy to include the President for Foreign Affairs Council and the vice-president of the Commission (Rehrl and Weisserth, 2010, p. 12).

As the EU is moving towards strengthening itself as a security and defense policy actor, there is a great need for tools that respond to the growing challenges when it comes to security and defense. A common, resilient, and effective common defense has never been more important than now. The ongoing war in Ukraine has shown us the importance and need, but also the difficulties, in mobilizing and maintaining security in Europe. One of the many issues for the European Union has been how it responds to crises, threatening not only European integration but also collaboration with member states and alliances. Since its inception, the EU integration project has been characterized by a mix of incremental change and integration spurts that usually followed major crises (Riddervold et al, 2021, p. 4). Since 2016, the EU has launched several measures to strengthen itself as a security policy actor. The measures constitute the EU's defense package and will contribute to joint European capability development to strengthen the EU's operational capability. The goal is to achieve “strategic autonomy»,” which means that the EU will be able to act, preferably together with partners such as NATO and the USA, but, if necessary, also alone in military operations (Howorth, 2017). However, although the Treaty of Lisbon strengthened and reformed the EU's foreign security and defense policy, there was little consideration given for fixed arrangements for political dialogue on security and defense policy issues with third countries (Græger, 2019, p. 89).

8.1 Norwegian contribution in EU security and defense policy

Norway's relations with the EU date back to the late 1950s when Norway became a member of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). The end of the Cold War led to a number of European organizations being considered as relevant security policy instruments, and as I have discussed previously, countries placed themselves into those security alliances which they

deemed necessary. There were discussions in Norway about joining the EU, one in 1972 and another in 1994 – both were voted down. Norway has nevertheless developed a close relationship with the EU through the EEA agreement and the Schengen Agreement. In the area of security policy they have also developed close ties through agreements such as the exchange of classified information, the framework of agreement on participation in EU civilian and military management operations, and the European Defense Agency (EDA) Agreement. (Græger, 2019, p. 89).

Although several Norwegian governments throughout the years have pursued an active European policy, Norway's relationship with the ECSDP has nevertheless been marked by more setbacks than by results. Influence in the decision-making process was rejected early by the EU, which instead established various formats for political dialogue with non-members. Norway's contribution to the EU's crisis management operations has also had little impact on the EU's security and defense policy. Norway offered to provide up to 3,500 soldiers, in addition to air and maritime contributions, to the EU Task Force as early as 1999, and has participated in EU force generation conferences and civilian and military operations. Nor in the contributor committee, where countries that contribute to EU-led operations are invited, have the force contributions been translated into any form of co-determination or status, unlike in NATO operations (Græger, 2015).

Therefore, the recent developments in EDA through the European Defense Fund (EDF), may be where Norwegian and European collaboration can succeed on security and defense policy. Stated in the Norwegian long-term defense plan, it is important for the Norwegian government to have good access to up-to-date research bases and knowledge and insight within the full range of defense and security policy issues. Research and development (R&D) in the defense sector will complement civilian research and development activities. The defense sector in Norway will to a greater extent utilize the national knowledge base and make use of research bases and advice. Norway also has an ambition to be among the leading countries in Europe in innovation, in doing so the defense sector have an ambition to facilitate research and development to a greater extent than today, one of the ways they will do this is through the EDA, EDF and the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) (Prop. 14 S (2020-2021), p. 12).

8.2 European Defense Agency and Norwegian participation

The European Defense Agency (EDA) was established by the EU Council of Ministers in July 2004. Its tasks consisted of supporting the Member States and the Council of Ministers in their efforts to improve defense capabilities within crisis management and support the ECSDP. It currently has 26 members, including all EU countries except Denmark. Norway is the only non-EU member and joined in 2006 through a co-operation agreement that allows for participation in the activities of EDA, including observer status at meetings, but they have no formal access to the decision-making processes (Ali & Willassen, 2010, p.19). The main tasks of EDA are to support the development of defense capabilities and military cooperation among the EU member states, stimulate defense R&D and strengthen the European defense industry, while at the same time acting as a military interface to EU policies (Ali & Willassen, 2010, p. 19).

The strategies developed by EDA will contribute to better international cooperation in the defense market and between nations. One of the ways they have enhanced this ambition is through the EDF. The objective of EDF is to “foster the competitiveness, efficiency and innovation of the European defense industry and thereby contribute to the strategic autonomy of the Union. EDA is involved in two levels, *the research dimension* and the *capability dimension*. EDA is managing and implementing the European Commissions’ Preparatory Action on Defense Research (PADR) which was the first EU-funded defense research activity, completed in 2019. For the capability dimension, the Agency contributed to the European Defense Industrial Development Program (EDIDP) work program and supported member states in preparing the projects they would later propose for EU financial support (EDA, date N/A).

Norwegian participation in EDF


Norway participates as an “associated country”. For a long time, there were discussions on to what extent Norway could participate and if the government was willing to put more into the defense budget. For the last couple of months, this has become an active discussion in the political environment, where Norwegian government officials have expressed and implied that Norway would like to actively participate. A turning point was the 10th of March, when the Ministry of Defense, Innovation Norway and the Defense and Security Industry Association? signed an agreement that forms the framework for a newly created position as Defense Industry Council at Norway’s delegation to the EU. This collaboration will strengthen Norwegian and European defense capabilities and combat power by securing Norway’s and Europe’s industrial

defense and technological base in both a short-term and long-term perspective (FSi 2022). Norway will actively participate, and this will strengthen Norwegian weapons exports, while also securing its position on the EDA board, giving Norway some sense of responsibility.

According to St. meld. No. 35 (2020-2021), "Export of defense materiel from Norway in 2020, export control and international non-proliferation cooperation," the Norwegian defense industry has positioned itself actively in the United States, and almost 80% of all export of class A materiel has been to NATO countries. Class A materiel is defined as a weapon and ammunition of all kinds that could significantly affect the military balance of power beyond the immediate area, including equipment for maritime surveillance and electronic measures against satellite-borne systems (Meld. St. 35 (2020-2021), p. 38). Two of the ambitions and strategic areas of importance in Norwegian security and defense policy have been the industrial market and weapon exports and for Norway to become an active participant and provider in the European Market. By creating stable frameworks, it will bring the industry closer to the end-users, and this will also strengthen Nordic collaboration (Svensgård, 2022, personal communication).

Even though the CSDP has to some extent not been successful for Norway in certain areas, my survey shows that Norwegians are positive to furthering this collaboration, as seen in graph 10, 33% of respondents completely agree that Norway should cooperate closer with the EU on CSDP and 46% partly agree, leaving the majority of 79% positive to cooperation. Even though there is will, there also needs to be power – therefore I will explore and analyze in the next chapter in what direction this type of cooperation is moving from the Norwegian security and defense policy viewpoint. Furthermore, as the EU moves towards strengthening its defense and security policy and pushing for an autonomous Europe with France in the forefront and Germany gradually ending their era of pacifism, especially these last couple of months-- I found it interesting to reflect on if the Norwegian people think this ambition is realistic. The responses were surprising, as I thought there would be greater differences, but graph 11 shows that 30% agreed that the EU will become the new global actor in security and defense, while 32% disagreed, leaving 38% of the respondents saying that it is impossible to answer.

Q8: Norway should cooperate closer with the EU on security and defense policy




Graph 8: Cooperation in security and defense policy

Source: author's own compilation based on the questionnaire's response.

Q9: The EU will become the new global actor in security and defense.

The EU will be the new global actor in security and Defense



Graph 9: The EU as a security and defense actor?

Source: author's own compilation based on the questionnaire's response.

9. Discussion - Back to basics

Politics change much faster than the military armament processes, and security and defense remain as one of the world's most competitive industries, I assume that the system of IR is to a large extent anarchic – the goal of all states is to maximize their power and security and in doing this there needs to be ideal distribution of power. Great powers use several mechanisms to restore this balance, but they can at the same time invest heavily and to a greater extent shape the development, smaller countries like Norway are dependent on their alliances and cannot do this to the same extent (Levy 2014, p. 29). Therefore, analyzing the Norwegian Armed Forces' strategic development and their priorities is demanding because of the highly uncertain and changing geopolitical situation and less leeway in the international context.

9.1.1 The prioritized areas – an evaluation

The weakness in the strategic development of the Armed Forces is about the ability to choose what is of strategic importance. In February 2019, FFI presented an analysis on behalf of the Ministry of Defense as part of the preparations for the work of the professional military council and the new long-term plan. They suggested three areas where the use of an increased defense budget should and could be applied:

- | |
|--|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none">(a) Between allied cooperation and national defense capability,(b) between the ability to handle crisis and war(c) between the levels of ambition in war |
|--|

Table 3: Suggestion of areas to increase in defense budget (Skjelland et al, 2022, p. 10).

However, long-term plans provide an opportunity for comprehensive planning and political anchoring. These plans are the most important tool in the development of the Armed Forces, but the long-term plans take place over a timespan of four years and with the rapid changes in security and defense, these plans may not remain relevant during this period. The recommendations given from FFI were that the Armed Forces should pay more attention to the challenges in the lower parts of the conflict spectrum so that this does not become a “blind spot” in the ability to take care of Norwegian security (Skjelland et al, 2022, p. 4). They also need to strengthen the exploration of new concepts, and to distinctly clarify those who will secure the

best possible operational capability today, and in the future. FFI's scenario-based gap analysis shows that the Armed Forces has vulnerabilities in surveillance, communication, air defense, preparedness and endurance. They have also identified challenges with increasing personnel shortages and in civilian logistics chain (Skjelland et al, 2022, p. 4). Furthermore, in their defense analysis for 2022, FFI highlighted two overall goals of the Armed Forces that can be formulated along two axes:

1. The Armed Forces needs to be a relevant instrument for the state in both peace and wartime.
2. It needs to be able to deal with the challenges to Norwegian security in the short and long term. (Skjelland et al, 2022, p.4).

In the fall of 2019, the then Chief of Defense, Haakon Bruun-Hanssen presented what he thought the future defense would need, he stated that in a conflict, Norway risked ending up behind Russia's line of defense if they did not act now (Bengtzerød, 2022). When assessing what the Armed forces need and want, and what can be obtained in short notice -- the information on this is classified and therefore difficult to assess. The Armed Forces do not want to pursue politics but will answer to the government if asked. However, given the long-term plans and suggestions from experts, the Armed Forces wants predictability. Today's Chief of Defense, Eirik Kristoffersen, wants to:

- Increase the military staff
- Make conscription more flexible, where, among other things, soldiers who are trained in advanced weapons can stay in the Armed Forces for at least 18 months.
- Train people who have completed military service in recent years, to have so-called "reservists"
- Prioritize strengthening air defense earlier than 2025
- Place ground-based, long-range precision weapons in the north
- Strengthen the Navy (Bengtzerød 2022).

9.1.1 The High North as a priority

The Russian attack on Ukraine and a new war in Europe have dramatically intensified the negative developments in relations between Russia and the West. However, the High North still appears to be a relatively stable area with low political and military tension. Therefore, in response to the developments in Ukraine, NATO has chosen to strengthen its military presence in Poland and the Baltic countries, as well as in the Black Sea region, where there are four new battlegroups in Slovakia, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria (Skjelland et al, 2022, p.4). Even though the High North appears to be stable, Russia's assertive political and military line is nevertheless noticeable in this area, with a build-up of military forces, infrastructure and generally increased activity. This might be one of the reasons why in the Norwegian long-term defense plan, air surveillance and maritime security have been categorized as a priority area. With an unstable situation in Central Europe, Norwegian forces cannot to the same extent expect a large mobilization from allied NATO member states and therefore the Norwegian Armed Forces have chosen to improve this area and again establish a strong air-force and maritime defense (Prop 14 S (2020-2021), p. 94).

The huge areas of international sea and airspace also provide the High North with great opportunities for marking the Norwegian interests and signaling their ambitions through military exercises and training with their allies. An increase and prioritization in maritime and air military activities in the Norwegian Sea and the Barents Sea is also a result of a coordinated NATO strategy, and the US, the UK and other northern European countries have increased their air and maritime activities as well (Hurt, 2021). The Norwegian capacity to continue a leading role in the Allied operations in its immediate environments will both strengthen the Norwegian deterrence and defense capabilities. NATO and close allies are increasing the volume, responsiveness and mobility of their forces. This is reflected through an updated plan and a custom command structure. This development creates increased expectations for Norway's reception capacity. The short warning time makes northern Norway particularly important. It is here that increased allied presence, as well as the ability to receive, support and cooperate with allies, is most crucial (Prop. 14 S (2020-2021), p. 95).

9.1.2 Increase in defense budget

Since 2014, there has been an overarching goal to increase defense spending and strengthen the overall budget. Defense spending has increased by approximately 30 percent. In the same

period, the growth in the Norwegian economy has been ten percent. This means that the budget growth represents a real prioritization of defense and that the defense budget has been strengthened by approximately two percent annually (Skjelland et al, 2022, p. 18). One reason for the increase in defense spending can be linked to Russia's annexation of Crimea but another important factor was President Trump's great pressure on the European allies to meet NATO's two percent target. The planning framework for the current long-term plan indicates that the Armed Forces will continue to be prioritized at the expense of other parts of the public sector. In the period 2021–2024, there is a real growth in defense budgets of 11 percent, while GDP is expected to grow by about eight percent (Meld. St 14 (2020-2021)). In the period 2025–2028, the long-term plan provides for defense budgets to grow three percent annually, while expectations to GDP growth indicates an annual growth of 1.3 percent in the long term. In that case, this will mean an increase of the defense budget's share of GDP beyond the two per cent target (SSB, 2022).

However, there are several factors that make this development uncertain. The state's revenues from oil and gas were already initially expected to fall in the years ahead. Such a fall may accelerate as a result of increased awareness of climate change. At the same time, freedom of action in the state budget is reduced as the pressure on public budgets increases as a result of both the green shift and fewer and fewer people working for each recipient of a pension or other financial benefits (Skjelland et al, 2022, p. 19). Should the escalation of military activity in the High North and the relation to Russia become more strained, the close to two percent of GDP target might not be enough. With Russia's unprovoked attack on a neighboring country, the Norwegian Government have in the last couple of weeks questioned how to best organize the Norwegian defense in the short and long term. It becomes clear that the Norwegian Armed Forces are not where they should be, new equipment is arriving later than planned, construction projects are becoming more expensive and recruiting and retaining the right expertise is a challenge. One of the ways to address these issues are to increase the purchase of combat aircrafts. The new F-35s have proven to give better combat power than when the Norwegian government entered the contract to purchase them, and they are now looking at manning the aircraft again. The Government are also looking at how to protect these aircrafts, and one of the solutions is to open more airbases, like the decision to keep the airbase at Andøya. As an immediate measure to these issues, the government has proposed strengthening the Armed Forces by an additional 3 billion NOK (Gram, 2022).

In his speech to the nation, the Minister of Defense, Bjørn Arild Gram stated that:

“It is especially important to strengthen our defense capability in the north” (Gram, 2022).

In order to do this, the government will increase activity in the Army and the Home Guard, and the Navy will sail more. Furthermore, the government will replenish contingency stocks, personal equipment, spare parts and ammunition, as well as fuel stocks. The importance of strengthening the ability to receive allies in the North was also put forward on the agenda, the government agrees that the national capacity for Allied reception is not good enough, and Norway needs more reception capacity and personnel to support their allies when they practice and train in Norway. The government has also promised that they will continue to strengthen future defense budgets and they are adjusting the plans for the current and next year, in order to make sure that the financial means are effectively used, they have appointed a defense commission and a total defense commission together with a professional military council (Gram, 2022).

The leader of the Norwegian Officers Association, Torbjørn Bongo have four suggestions that would give immediate effect:

- Filling up stocks on both military equipment and fuel has an immediate effect
- Which in turn will increase the sums for training and exercises
- An indisputable effect is to cut the Armed Forces reaction time, there is a need to make the Armed Forces ready for battle at a short notice
- Increasing the budget for operations, will ensure that the Armed Forces can follow through on their tasks (Bengtørød 2022).

9.1.3 Strengthening of Norwegian Defense Industry and European collaboration

As the EU is strengthening itself in several areas as mentioned through EDA, PESCO, and EDF, the Norwegian government states in their long-term defense plan that they will continue to strengthen security and defense policy cooperation with the EU (Prop. 14 S (2020-2021), p. 92). This means further developing the security policy dialogue and coordination with the EU through joint annual seminars and consultations, and through dialogue about the opportunity to participate in new and existing defense initiatives. From a Norwegian perspective, it is important that defense and security policy developments in the EU complement NATO and contribute to strengthening transatlantic cooperation and the bilateral defense and security


policy cooperation with the United States (Prop. 14 S (2020-2021), p. 98). The EU's defense initiatives must therefore be developed in an open and inclusive manner *vis-a-vis* NATO and allied countries that are not members of the EU. As mentioned, the EU is an important export market for the Norwegian defense industry and by strengthening collaboration and participating in EDF and other initiatives, Norwegian expertise can be utilized. The Norwegian defense research environment is small, and involvement in these initiatives can help expand the Norwegian research environment and strengthen Norway's ambition to become a leader in technology and innovation.

In European collaboration, dialogue with Germany, France, the Netherlands, Denmark, Finland and Sweden have been given priority. The UK's future participation in the EU's foreign and security policy cooperation is also an area of interest for Norway, as the UK's central role in Europe and in trans-Atlantic security is considered one of the most important European partners for Norway. Norwegian participation in the EU system for civil preparedness and crisis management will also be important, and the participation in the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA) – will be an area of priority in light of the growing concern for cyber-attacks on individual countries and across national borders (Prop 14 S (2020-2021), p. 98).

9.1.2 Will the Balance of Power become unbalanced?


The balance of power is one of the oldest and most fundamental concepts in the study of international relations, it has been an especially important framework in order to keep the stability in Europe since the Cold War. The alliance choice of the Nordic States balanced one another and helped diminish Great Power tensions in the region. Although these countries desired to remain neutral and act as a bridge builder between the Great Powers, their ability to do so was constrained by the level of tension between the Powers (Can, 2021, p. 187). Sweden declared neutrality, while Finland entered a Friendship Pact and created a Cooperation and Assistance Treaty with the Soviet Union, while Norway and Denmark joined NATO (Haugevik & Sending, 2020, p. 443). This balance of power has remained for decades, however, in recent times this stability has been challenged – which in turn has made NATO membership more desirable and it has also pushed the ambitions of the EU to act and pursue greater autonomy in security policy. This leads to a discussion on what consequences does this have for Norway and the geopolitical West we have known since the Cold War?

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has created a radically different security situation in Europe, and we are witnessing a reemergence of Great Power competition which affects how small powers situate themselves between these Great Powers and how they adapt to this new strategic environment (Can, 2021, p.190). This has also been shown in the responses to my survey. When asked how Norwegians would consider their relationship with Russia, 31% percent responded that it was important for Norway to have good economic relations with Russia, while 69% responded that Norway needed to have a tough attitude towards Russia. This is a stark contrast from when the same question was asked in 2020, where NUPI's graph showed that the majority of 58.2% responded that Norway need to have a good economic relation to Russia.



Graph 10: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, relation to Russia

Source: A Sentio Research Group representative inhabitants survey in Norway commissioned by the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (Svendsen & Weltzien, 2020, p. 5).



Graph 11: Relationship to Russia

Source: author’s own compilation based on the questionnaire’s response.

The discussion on a NATO membership is currently a reaction to the instability in the international order right now, but a Swedish and Finnish membership would be a significant change in security policy. One can question if a Swedish and Finnish NATO membership will destabilize the international order but deterring and reassuring will still be important, albeit in a different fashion. It will, however, affect the relationship with Russia and how Russia views the West. For the Nordic Balance, these developments may lead to a solution to the significant weakness we have seen in Nordic defense cooperation, it will create security guarantees and closer collaboration in the High North. The close collaboration between the Nordic countries is already in place, and a potential membership will prove helpful to Norway in reaching its main priority in Norwegian defense, to secure the High North and become more robust and expand its territorial and total defense – going back to its roots from post-cold war. Sweden and Finland are already active partners of NATO as Enhanced Opportunity Partners and they have collaborated closely on NATO matters for several years. As stated by a previous deputy National Military Representative (NMR) at one of the NATO bases, SHAPE:

“Finland and Sweden have had a special position since they came to SHAPE, they have had officers who have worked on NATO issues, and they were included in monthly meetings with the Nordic NMR offices where we discussed developments in Nordic cooperation and how it

could be combined with the priorities and strategies of NATO”. (A. Edvardsen, *personal communication*, 28. April 2022).

One of the reasons why the reorganization of the Norwegian defense and security policy was so difficult after the Cold War was that the Armed Forces indirectly protected the social institutions and did not exist only to protect Norwegian territory but also the Norwegian values (Friis, 2021, p. 222). Even though Norwegian defense took a drastic turn in the 2000s, towards alliance building and NATO, which at the time was important, the concerns have always been that Norway is relying too much on its allies in NATO, and that there is a need to prioritize security in the High North and to strengthen the “Total Defense.” These concerns were also highlighted in FFI’s “Defense Report”, where the analysis showed that the Armed Forces had vulnerabilities in surveillance, communication, air defense, preparedness and endurance (Skjelland et al, 2022, p. 4). With Finnish and Swedish NATO membership, these areas can be strengthened, even though NATO will always give the main guarantee for security – Nordic collaboration will prove beneficial not only for NATO but also for Norway’s prioritized areas. It will be easier for the Nordic countries to strategically plan and pool their resources in order to stabilize and strengthen their territorial borders.

An interesting observation is that the areas of prioritization we see in the long-term defense plans and the recommendation from the Defense Report conducted by FFI, is quite similar to the defense strategy Norway had during and right after the Cold War, except military equipment and technology have become far more advanced and current.

1. Air defenses are again in the forefront.
2. Increase in the defense budget.
3. Strengthening territorial borders and military capacity in the High North.
4. Increase military personnel and in civilian logistics chain.

These developments were all important in the initial “Total Defense” concept, although this was revised in 2016, after the 2011 terror attack, it is again becoming an important concept and how to best organize the Norwegian Defense in the short and long term is therefore a highly relevant issue. The concept of “Total Defense” is that the defense of Norway is a matter that concerns the whole society. If a crisis occurs, the whole society will be affected. It is therefore crucial that we have both the ability to defend and the will to defend.

As the Minister of Defense, Bjørn Arild Gram stated in his speech:

“In Ukraine, we see the whole society mobilize to resist the invading forces. Precisely for this reason, the debate on how to defend the country is far too important to be left to a few. Our safety concerns us all. I would therefore encourage everyone to get involved in the debate on how the defense of Norway should be strengthened and contribute so that we get the best defense we can get.” Source: Gram, B.,A. (2022) *Forsvaret av Norge skal styrkes*.

The liberal order is being challenged and it becomes clear that Norway must maneuver in a security policy landscape characterized by more direct competition and rivalry that can quickly develop into confrontation. The geopolitical landscape is forever changed, which have caused Norway to revise and strengthen their security and defense policy by prioritizing several areas in the Armed Forces. Even though Norwegian defense will always be closely linked to NATO's collective defense, the Armed Forces are again focusing on the defense of Norway and this study show that there is a growing trend of reinforcing some of the main strategies Norway focused on during the Cold War, such as prioritizing the High North, strengthening the air force and increasing the defense budget. This may indicate that the old structures were there all along and that identity, culture and basic Norwegian values are not so easily shaken, when faced with challenges -- they are to the best of their ability confronted.

10. Conclusion

Security and defense are one of the world's most competitive industries, there are formidable investments and resources to gain benefits and advantage. Larger countries such as the United States, China and Russia can invest heavily and to a certain extent shape the development in ECSDP. This is not a luxury Norway has. As a smaller "power" state, Norway has acted as a reassuring state in balancing the power between the US and Russia. Throughout this analysis, it has become evident that the stable and "balanced" Europe we have known since the Cold War is going through drastic changes, and we are facing a new security geopolitical landscape. Deterrence and reassurance towards Russia is no longer the only strategy and a strengthened Norwegian Defense is becoming a priority.

The aim of this study was to address what Norwegian defense areas are Norway prioritizing and why they are important, as well as what challenges the Norwegian defense strategy is facing. As the Norwegian values are closely linked to the Armed Forces it was also interesting to analyze Norwegians' opinions on several aspects of security and defense policy. This study concludes that a continued strengthening of their Alliance in NATO, the High North, and a strengthening of the territorial defense are the main priorities. The challenges are many, the Norwegian defense policy drastically changed from territorial defense to a collective defense in the early 2000's, and there is a great need to build up the Norwegian defense, aligned with the strategies of NATO but priority should also be given to safeguarding Norwegian values and strengthening of the "Total Defense". In order to face these challenges, the Norwegian government have increased the defense budget, and have promised a gradual increase in the years to come in order for the Armed Forces to upgrade infrastructure, purchasing of weapons, and mobilize to a larger extent the military personnel, as well as the civilian structure. As the values of the Armed Forces are closely linked to the Norwegian society and norms, it is important for the Armed Forces to gain trust in the public, which again might increase a will for the people to further their education in the military or continue to work, even after their conscription-period (Friis, 2021, p. 219).

Even though several European political leaders continue to point out the need for greater European autonomy in security policy, there is considerable doubt about whether this is

possible, regardless of the strong European will for the countries to act together in connection to the war in Ukraine. The uncertainty is related to how lasting this effect will be, and how willing European countries will be to coordinate the use of increased defense budgets to compensate for a weakened US commitment in the long run. The European security policy perspectives and priorities are very different from region to region, which makes it difficult for the EU to act as a global actor in security and defense. The EU will, however, prove to be important in the industrial market – creating a market where associated countries such as Norway also can participate, and facilitate an arena where Nordic industrial collaboration is possible.

When it comes to future collaboration with the Nordic countries, the softening of Swedish and Finnish opposition to join NATO reduces the previously sharp divide between Norway and the other Scandinavian countries. With partner status in NATO, membership in the regional grouping “The Northern Group,” participation in the British-led Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF), and separate trilateral defense agreement with the United States, it will be interesting to see how the NATO membership debates in Sweden and Finland play out. This development confirms that the natural geopolitical community that follows from the countries’ location and their shared threat perception and safeguarding of the north can be the start of a long-awaited Nordic defense. These developments should be further addressed by researchers as the ECSDP is forever changed, and Norwegian security and defense will continue to face threats and challenges in the years to come.

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